# document

id: b2d6d48dbb365c2fdd892b376311faae
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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"Human behaviour is affected by the social environment, and in \r\nparticular by what people commonly do or what other people \r\nthink and expect (Cialdini 2006), even though people often do not \r\nacknowledge this (Nolan et  al. 2008; Noppers et  al. 2014); social \r\ninfluence seems more influential in some countries than others \r\n(Pettifor et al. 2017). Specifically, injunctive norms reflect perceptions \r\nof which behaviour is commonly approved or disapproved, and guide \r\nbehaviour, as people are motivated to gain social approval and avoid \r\nsocial disapproval. Injunctive norms are related to a wide range of \r\nmitigation behaviours, including limited meat consumption, limited \r\ncar use, the use of energy-saving light bulbs (Harland et al. 1999), \r\nenergy use (Farrow et al. 2017) and recycling (Geiger et al. 2019), \r\nalthough the effects are not always strong (Gardner and Abraham \r\n2008; Farrow et al. 2017)."


id: 768475fd63b56193a79128a23de073cf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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"Being part of a group or organisation that values the environment and \r\nadvocates mitigation actions promotes mitigation actions (Ruepert \r\net al. 2017; Sloot et al. 2018), particularly when individuals strongly \r\nidentify with the peer group (Biddau et al. 2016; Fielding and Hornsey \r\n2016; Jans et al. 2018) or have strong ties with this group (Weenig \r\nand Midden 1991). When people feel strongly connected to a group, "


id: 8444f279be1b1af3ed1ac1c6c321c0dd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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"Descriptive norms refer to behaviour commonly shown by others, \r\nand affect behaviour because it provides information about which \r\nbehaviour is most sensible in a given situation. Descriptive norms (or \r\npeer effects) are related to different mitigation behaviours, including "


id: 59b18f258e7981842e08494e70f5e81
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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"they may come to adopt the goals of the group as their own goals \r\n(Jans et al. 2018). Similarly, block leader approaches in which change \r\nis initiated from the bottom-up are effective in promoting mitigation \r\nbehaviours (Abrahamse and Steg 2013); local ambassadors are more \r\nsuccessful at convincing others when they have already adopted the \r\npromoted behaviour or programmes themselves as this increases \r\ntheir credibility (Kraft-Todd et al. 2018)."


id: eb71872ab2640948f4afedaa9f426f62
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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"Moving beyond adoption, sociologists of innovation have shown \r\nthat new technologies need to be embedded in multiple contexts \r\n(O Tuama 2015; Kanger et al. 2019; Mylan et al. 2019), which involve \r\nnot just user environments but also: (i) business environments, \r\nincluding the development of business models, supply chains, \r\nrepair facilities and infrastructures (Markard 2011; van Waes et al. \r\n2018), (ii) civil society, including discourses, narratives, and public \r\ndebates that shape cultural legitimacy and societal acceptance of \r\nnew technologies (Geels and Verhees 2011; Rosenbloom et al. 2016), \r\nand (iii) institutional environments, including safety regulations, \r\nreliability standards and performance requirements (Reddy et  al. \r\n1991; Andrews-Speed 2016; Bohnsack et al. 2016)."


id: 510bacc28ce50846790c8fe07278cd0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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"surfing) or business-to-consumer (B2C) or business-to-business (B2B) \r\nplatforms, and allowing rentals in more flexible, social interactive \r\nterms (e.g., Zipcar, WeWork) (Botsman and Rogers 2011; Belk 2014a; \r\nSchor 2014; Mohlmann 2015; Frenken and Schor 2017; Parente et al. \r\n2018). However, there are criticisms regarding business relationships \r\nmasquerading as communal sharing, so-called pseudo-sharing, \r\nbecause these practices may not be beneficial to all parties as well as \r\nfriendly to the environment and to reducing inequalities in access to \r\nproducts and services (Belk 2014b)."


id: f7dedd5d7a5dbe7dd2484933d3e35ffc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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"particular political priorities and values, and within a wider socio\u0002economic context (Eyre and Killip 2019). Government policy \r\ncontributes to shaping demand for energy services, travel and \r\nmobility, and given range of energy-using activities, the policy \r\nagenda involves reaching out to a wide range of actors that includes \r\npractitioners and the general public. Doing this effectively will require \r\na systematic deployment of effective regulatory and enforcement \r\nframework, consisting of regulations, market-based instruments, and \r\ninformation-based instruments to voluntary agreements at various \r\ngovernance levels to address a wide range of stakeholders and their \r\nconcerns (Park 2015; Mundaca and Markandya 2016)."


id: 8fbeed8ae1276e2ba5650f293765e74f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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"In some countries, establishing carbon reduction as a policy priority \r\nis shared across the political spectrum (UK, Germany, India, South \r\nAfrica), but even then much of the consensus has remained in single \r\nissue areas of intervention, such as expansion of renewable energy, \r\nand rarely around structural change in areas such as sustainable \r\nprosperity in a circular economy (Jackson 2017) or sufficiency (Darby \r\nand Fawcett 2018; Thomas et  al. 2019). These are both politically \r\ncontentious and suffer from institutional inertia where the tendency \r\nis that institutions move slowly and resist change in challenges that \r\ncall for structural and system-wide change (Munck af Rosenschold \r\net al. 2014)."


id: 6b961cabdb06acedbc55568750fe1ae1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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"The literature offers several theoretical approaches that attempt to \r\nexplain how transitions take place: social practices, energy cultures, \r\nand socio-technical transitions. Social practice theory emphasises \r\ninteractions between artefacts, competences, and cultural meanings \r\n(Ropke 2009; Shove and Walker 2014). The energy cultures framework \r\nhighlights feedbacks between materials, norms, and behavioural \r\npractices (Stephenson et  al. 2015; Jurisoo et  al. 2019). And socio\u0002technical transitions theory, which spans both provisioning systems \r\nand use contexts, addresses interactions between technologies, user \r\npractices, cultural meanings, business, infrastructures, and public \r\npolicies (McMeekin and Southerton 2012; Geels et al. 2017)."


id: fe51bd5b871d10d57a1b8fa6675f9f77
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"The term sharing economy is used interchangeably with shareconomy, \r\ncollaborative consumption, collaborative economy, the gig economy, \r\nand the mesh (Botsman and Rogers 2011; Martin 2016). The sharing \r\neconomy has grown in a variety of sectors and platforms over the \r\npast years (Belk 2014a; Bocker and Meelen 2017). It defines a system \r\nthat connects users/renters and owner/providers through consumer\u0002to-consumer (C2C)/peer-to-peer (P2P) (e.g., Uber, Airbnb, couch "


id: 986d7c55b225728504e9fe97cafafc2e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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"Cultural meanings and discourses shape the beliefs, preferences \r\nand motivations of various actors and what they consider to be \r\ndesirable, legitimate or acceptable (Stryker 1994; Phillips et al. 2004). \r\nStructural elements such as regulations, institutions, technologies \r\nand infrastructures provide the more tangible contexts within \r\nwhich actors act (Currie and Spyridonidis 2016; Soler et  al. 2020). \r\nActors like households, firms, civil society organisations, and \r\npolicymakers reproduce or transform cultural and structural contexts \r\nthrough storytelling, political lobbying, innovation activities and \r\ninfrastructure building (Lounsbury and Glynn 2001; Battilana et al. \r\n2009; Dolata 2009)."


id: fa0e7a990718adc5b299bbaf154b5ab1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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"The energy cultures framework and socio-technical transitions theory \r\nboth understand demand-side transitions as involving interactions \r\nbetween: (i) radical social or technical innovations, which deviate in one \r\nor more dimensions from dominant configurations, (ii) relatively stable \r\ndominant energy cultures or socio-technical systems, (iii)  external \r\ninfluences such as shocks or gradually increasing pressures."


id: e85bd444a3ad89b4cfd8a4142a28262c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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"Radical demand-side innovations like new technologies, new business \r\nmodels or alternative behavioural practices initially emerge in small, \r\nperipheral niches (Kemp et al. 1998; Schot and Geels 2008). These \r\nprojects and initiatives offer protection from mainstream selection \r\npressures and nurture the development of radical innovations (Smith \r\nand Raven 2012). Dominant energy cultures, social practices or socio\u0002technical systems resist radical change, because they are stabilised \r\nby multiple lock-in mechanisms (Klitkou et al. 2015; Seto et al. 2016; \r\nClausen et al. 2017; Ivanova et al. 2018)."


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"Existing meanings may also lock in existing systems and practices. \r\nDiscourse and cultural studies literature have found that established \r\nmeanings, values and discourses help legitimise and normalise the \r\nstatus quo (Bosman et  al. 2014; Buschmann and Oels 2019). For \r\nexample, discourses that frame cars as status symbols that embody \r\nsuccess, power, freedom, and autonomy help entrench auto-mobility \r\nand hinder shifts to public transport (Stephenson et  al. 2015). \r\nDiscourses that portray dairy milk as healthy and natural stabilise \r\nparticular diets and hinder transitions to plant-based milk (Mylan \r\net al. 2019). Most people and communities hold a plurality of cultural \r\nvalues; environmental protection and climate mitigation is only one \r\nvalue cluster amongst others such as efficiency, security and stability, \r\nsocial justice and fairness, autonomy and freedom, and improved \r\nquality of life (Demski et al. 2015; Plumecocq et al. 2018)."


id: 57d1fb36cdec376118deca897358eec1
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"Structural elements of existing systems and practices are also \r\nstabilised by lock-in mechanisms as sociological, political science \r\nand innovation literature have demonstrated. Institutional lock\u0002in mechanisms can stabilise existing policies that support existing \r\ntechnologies and demand patterns: (i) policy networks facilitate \r\ninteractions between policymakers, specialists, and established \r\nbusiness interests and tend to shape policymaking towards status "


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created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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"Diffusion rates are determined by two broad categories of variables, \r\nthose intrinsic to the technology, product or practice under \r\nconsideration (typically performance, costs, benefits), and those \r\nintrinsic to the adoption environment (e.g., socio-economic and \r\nmarket characteristics)."


id: 4333a60cf2096840251aa6d0356437a7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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"which involve deep changes in lifestyles and social practices, face \r\nlarge feasibility barriers in behavioural routines, institutions and \r\ncultural meanings, small to medium technical barriers and variable \r\neconomic barriers."


id: 95487a375a7401c2b6ca44bb652448f7
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"There is variability within this high-level assessment of feasibility \r\nand speed of transition. Some improve options may diffuse rapidly \r\n(e.g., LED lightbulbs), but other improve options, such as improved \r\ncooking stoves remain at low levels due to a mismatch with cultural \r\npractices or cost barriers. Avoid and shift options often require longer \r\ntime scales, especially if new infrastructures, such as tram lines or \r\nbuilding retrofits, are involved. Sometimes they unfold rapidly, \r\nhowever. For example, digital service provision models ranging from \r\ncommunication to entertainment, retail, or banking via integrated \r\ndigital platforms (typically via smartphone apps) diffused quickly, \r\nreplacing conventional analogue and/or physical service provisioning \r\nsystems (home entertainment systems, bank offices, or shops \r\n(TWI2050 2019)."


id: 98618ac56b2f58aa136a906a4048f779
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"Demand-side transitions thus face the dilemma that improve options \r\nare in some cases more feasible, but only exploit part of the solution \r\nspace, because they are less deep. Shift and avoid options have \r\nhigher mitigation potential, but face larger feasibility barriers, for \r\ninstance living car-free and restricting long-haul flights (Dubois et al. \r\n2019). While the diffusion of most demand-side options is likely to be \r\nslow without stronger policies, this dilemma means that the diffusion \r\nof shift and avoid options would particularly benefit from stronger \r\npolicy support that also address social norms. Importantly, feasibility \r\nbarriers are not fixed or static, but malleable and evolving over time. \r\nObstacles and feasibility barriers are high in early transition phases. \r\nBut over time, the various barriers decrease as a result of technical \r\nand social learning processes, network building, scale economies, \r\ncultural debates and institutional adjustments."


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created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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"The micro-level literature on technology- (or product-) specific rates \r\nof adoption is vast (Tornatzky and Klein 1982; Grubler et al. 1999; \r\nRogers 2003; Peres et al. 2010) and has identified three clusters of \r\nvariables: (i) relative advantage; (ii) adoption effort required and \r\ncomplexity; and (iii) compatibility, observability, and trialability. \r\nAll variables, except adoption effort, are positively correlated with \r\n(rapid) rates of change."


id: 6c6692ad03d27bdd6c930c4785c89235
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"The acceleration of transitions is a complex issue, because of the \r\nmultitude and combination of both macro- (societal, economic, \r\nmarkets) and micro- (e.g., firm or consumer) level determinants. \r\nA recent debate, Sovacool (2016) vs Grubler et  al. (2016) led to \r\na special journal issue on the duration and acceleration of energy \r\ntransitions from a variety of (opposing) perspectives, which ranged \r\nfrom political urgency and malleability (Bromley 2016) to inertia in \r\nlarge-techno-economic systems (Smil 2016); for a summary of the \r\ndebate see Sovacool and Geels (2016)."


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"While demand-side solutions have very high mitigation potential, the \r\nwidespread diffusion and transitioning of many options is challenging. \r\nTable 5.SM.1 provides a high-level assessment of feasibility barriers \r\nfor 'avoid', 'shift' and 'improve' options on behavioural, technological, \r\nbusiness, institutional and socio-cultural dimensions. This assessment \r\nshows that improve options, which are mostly about technical \r\ncomponent substitutions that do not require wider changes, face low \r\nto medium feasibility barriers related to higher costs (especially if \r\nnew technologies also require new infrastructures), limited consumer \r\ninterest, and some industry reluctance. Shift options, which involve \r\ndifferent ways of fulfilling desired services, face medium to large \r\nfeasibility barriers, due to substantial required changes in behavioural \r\nroutines, technologies, institutions, and investments. Avoid options, "


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"Table 5.SM.1 | Assessment of feasibility/barriers for the diffusion of demand-side mitigation options."


id: c8f4d322836ac7fb4d1ef13d48d79327
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"Watanabe 2009). Nearly every scale in between has been applied to \r\nprovide needed services - often serving not a policy-driven market \r\nbut one arising from idiosyncratic consumer needs, for which PV \r\nwas well suited. In the 1950s, the US Navy bought cells for early \r\nsatellites from an electronics entrepreneur who had been selling \r\nsolar-powered radios (NRC 1972; Perlin 1999). In India in early days \r\nactivist entrepreneurs marketed solar-powered lanterns in rural areas \r\nwith unreliable electricity (Roy 1997; Roy and Jana 1998). Off-grid \r\nhousing, water pumps in Mali, and electronics provided important \r\nconsumer niche markets (Perlin 2013). It has played a substantial role \r\nin reducing poverty in China (Zhang et al. 2020)."


id: ccd5c67e79ffd09744ef2807092e5836
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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"Although solar PV has attained massive scale as an energy supply \r\ntechnology, its success in becoming a low-cost mitigation option is \r\nattributable in large part to the collective agency of energy consumers \r\nwho embraced the unique services that PV's modularity provides. \r\nThese bottom-up socio-cultural forces catalysed a supportive policy \r\nenvironment, which enabled improvements in the technology by \r\ninnovative firms. PV's technological evolution can be summarised \r\nas the result of distinct contributions by the USA, Japan, Germany, \r\nAustralia, and China - in that sequence - over seven decades (Nemet \r\n2019) (Figure 5.SM.4)."


id: 4c36c6c3e4f5e331633eef4d2090dbc7
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"Institutionally, the most important policy for the improvements \r\nobserved in PV was Germany's Erneuerbare-Energie Gesetz (EEG) \r\npassed in 2000, guaranteeing prices paid to prosumers (i.e., citizens \r\nacting as both producers and consumers) of renewable electricity for \r\n20 years (RESA 2001). The EEG quadrupled the size of the German \r\nsolar market in one year and stimulated corporate actors to invest \r\nin designing PV-specific production equipment that was crucial for \r\nsubsequent improvements and cost reductions accomplished by \r\nChinese producers (Palz 2010). In India in 1982 the Department of \r\nNon-conventional Energy Sources was set up which eventually got "


id: eed9102b236d0f3f74337f5fc492bfa1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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"Since its first commercial application in 1958, PV has provided \r\ndistinct energy services to a sequence of increasingly large consumer \r\nniche markets with high but decreasing willingness to pay (Dracker \r\nand De Laquil III 1996; Jacobsson and Lauber 2006). Modularity is \r\namong PV's most consequential attributes; the smallest electronics \r\napplication to utility scale spans nine orders of magnitude (Shum and "


id: a5a62a2a927e88e0a73d2fe2855371e8
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"performance improvement, and cost reductions that set the stage for \r\nbroader systemic change (Lauber and Jacobsson 2016)."


id: 2beb992d7ae0dbdadd95fa1884f1c861
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"transformed into the Ministry of Non-conventional Energy Sources \r\n(MNES) in 1992 and the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy \r\n(MNRE) in 2006. The Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency \r\n(IREDA) was established in 1987 to finance renewable energy \r\nprojects (Bhattacharya and Jana 2009)."


id: 762278309ffd7804363bceb93815eab
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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"Today's massive utility-scale PV projects are now a factor of 10,000 \r\ncheaper than the first PV cells in satellites. They are also inextricably \r\nlinked to a seven-decade evolution in which the agency of consumers \r\nhas consistently played a key role in multiple countries, such that \r\nderiving half of global electricity supply from solar is now a realistic \r\npossibility (Creutzig et al. 2017)."


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"The majority of households in developing countries use traditional \r\nsolid biomass fuel through inefficient and incomplete combustion for \r\ncooking and heating (Bhattacharya and Cropper 2010; Nepal et al. \r\n2010; Bonjour et al. 2013; IEA 2017; Wester et al. 2019; Jeuland et al. \r\n2021). This has been a major concern for deforestation (Kissinger \r\net al. 2012) and for health, gender relations, and economic livelihoods \r\n(Batchelor et al. 2019). For example, about 85% of the fine particulate \r\nmatter (PM2.5) emissions in Africa in 2018 came from the burning of \r\nbiomass indoors (IEA 2019)."


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created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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"The EEG only became politically feasible in Germany because of an \r\nenvironmental activist social movement, originating in the 1968 \r\nstudent protests, advocating a shift to consumer-led green energy \r\nproduction (Morris and Jungjohann 2016). PV had the potential to \r\navoid: environmental damage, oil dependence, hegemony of electric \r\nutilities, nuclear power, and later climate change. PV thus attained \r\nmeaning beyond its technical elegance; its main advocate in the \r\nGerman Parliament, Hermann Scheer, emphasised the importance \r\nofits 'emancipatory motivation' (Palz 2010). In 1998, when \r\na  policy window opened, broad social acceptability existed, cities \r\nhad de-risked the technology, and policy implementation details had \r\nbeen worked out, leading to a cascade of technology adoption, "


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"Cleaner and safer cooking solutions in South Asia and Africa can \r\nobtain a range of benefits: reduce firewood collection from the forest \r\n(Pattanayak et al. 2004; Sharma et al. 2020); reduce the burden on \r\nwomen (Hazra et al. 2014); deliver better health (Pant 2008; Thakuri \r\n2009); higher labour productivity (Kalyanaratne 2014) for the users \r\nand reduce emissions of greenhouse gases (Zhang et  al. 2013; \r\nSomanathan and Bluffstone 2015; Lafave et al. 2019; Bluffstone et al. \r\n2021). Studies have shown that net reduction in emissions from the \r\nswitch from biomass as a cooking fuel to LPG has clear climate and \r\nnon-climate benefits (Anenberg et al. 2017; Singh et al. 2017; Ghilardi "


id: fb9c73def8d0f656ce3e01ac8af7f4a1
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"et al. 2018; Goldemberg et al. 2018). In India between 2001 and 2011 \r\nan increase in LPG use led to a net emissions (Kyoto and non-Kyoto \r\ngases) reduction of 6.73 MtCO2-eq (0.94 MtCO2-eq in rural areas and \r\n5.79 MtCO2-eq in urban areas) with 7.2 million tonnes of fuel wood \r\ndisplaced (0.99 million tons in rural areas and 6.19 million tons in \r\nurban areas) (Singh et al. 2017)."


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vector_id: 39665
content:
"To improve the affordability of the cleaner fuel and cookstove \r\nchoice, actors at the households level need motivation through \r\npricing policies like subsidies and installation cost waivers (Troncoso \r\nand Soares da Silva 2017; Dickinson et  al. 2018; Sankhyayan and \r\nDasgupta 2019). Well intended subsidy programmes often do not \r\nhelp world's poorest to adopt cleaner fuel, suggesting a need for \r\ntargeted programmes (Bhattarai et al. 2018). The decision towards \r\nactual transition to a cleaner cooking fuel and technology is often \r\ngoverned by other demand-side drivers and barriers like lifestyle and \r\nsocio-cultural norms and practices."


id: f548031dc026920fa9b4a8b204cd7bdf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40520
content:
"The useful energy demand for cooking is a crucial component of \r\nthe choice between various cooking technology options and has \r\nbeen the subject of numerous studies (Balmer 2007; Nerini et  al. \r\n2016; Van de Ven et al. 2019; Forouli et al. 2020; Silaen et al. 2020; \r\nTaylor et  al. 2020). Daioglo et  al. (2012) conclude that a mean of \r\n3 MJ cap-1 day-1 (range 0.77 to 7.22) of useful energy is required \r\nfor cooking (equivalent to 125 kWh month-1 for a household of five. \r\nAccommodating cooking energy services in off-grid electrification \r\ntechnologies, Zubi et al. (2017) estimate that a three-litre multi-cooker \r\nneeds just 0.6 kWh day-1\r\n to cook lunch and dinner for a household \r\nof six, which is equivalent to 0.36 MJ cap-1 day-1. Similarly, according \r\nto Batchelor et al. (2018) 0.2 kWh could be enough to cook rice for \r\na household of four in a rice cooker."


id: 89ff6a28581fdb24efc2bc56304c5e54
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21447
content:
"Universal access to clean and modern cooking energy could cut \r\npremature deaths from household air pollution by two-thirds \r\nrelative to baseline in 2030, while reducing forest degradation and \r\ndeforestation and contributing to the reduction of up to 50% of CO2\r\nemissions from cooking relative to baseline by 2030 (IEA 2017; Hof \r\net al. 2019). However, in the absence of policy reform and substantial \r\nenergy investments, 2.3 billion people will have no access to clean \r\ncooking fuels such as biogas, LPG, natural gas or electricity in \r\n2030 (IEA 2017). The increasing efficiency improvements in electric \r\ncooking technologies, together with the ongoing decrease in prices \r\nof renewable energy technologies, could enable households to shift \r\nto electric cooking at mass scale (Figure 5.SM.5a)."


id: b78649e6f7272df0bd0090af04a5d3a6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29495
content:
"Shifts towards electric and LPG stoves in Bhutan (Dendup and \r\nArimura 2019), India (Pattanayak et al. 2019), Ecuador (Martinez et al. \r\n2017; Gould et al. 2018) and Ethiopia (Tesfamichael et al. 2021); are \r\ntaking over now compared to past trends towards improved biomass \r\nstoves in China (Smith et al. 1993). Significant subsidy (Litzow et al. \r\n2019), information (Dendup and Arimura 2019), social marketing \r\nand availability of technology in the local markets are some of \r\nthe key instruments to increase adoption of improved cookstoves \r\n(Pattanayak et al. 2019); through supply chain creation availability \r\nwas scaled up enormously in India (Sankhyayan and Dasgupta 2019). \r\nShift in use of energy-efficient cooking appliances like pressure \r\ncookers and rice cookers is now almost universal in South Asia and \r\nbeginning to penetrate the African market as consumer attitudes are \r\nchanging towards household cooking appliances with higher energy \r\nefficiencies (Batchelor et al. 2019)."


id: 414c364df1ae104e44e99d25299641f0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8672
content:
"In densely populated cities in India, mobility is still predominantly \r\ndependent on public transport, walking and cycling (Tiwari et  al. \r\n2016). There is an increasing shift of narratives towards comfortable, \r\naffordable public transport systems in public policy, which is \r\ntranslated into infrastructure investments, procurement of equipment, \r\nroad safety legislation, and even public consultations on mobility in \r\nsmart cities (Roy et al. 2018b; Ghosh and Arora 2019). This transition \r\nin mobility systems in historically public transport dominated cities \r\nlike Kolkata and Mumbai is happening through 'fit and conform' \r\nstrategies, but also by 'stretch and transform' strategies in new cities \r\nlike Ahmedabad, Bangalore, and Pune (Ghosh et al. 2018; Roy et al. \r\n2018b; Ghosh and Schot 2019)."


id: f690daeaf76225752765049471c1a92a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40751
content:
"There is substantial evidence that more awareness programmes \r\nare needed to break the behavioural barriers towards usage of \r\nmodern cooking fuel (Giri and Aadil 2018). While designing improved \r\ncookstoves, along with technical aspects like energy efficiency, \r\nemission mitigation, and improving health outcomes, researchers \r\nalso need to factor in functionality, aesthetics and consumers' need \r\nand preference. A tailoring in the technology is also needed based \r\non the region, climate and culture (Bielecki and Wingenbach 2014). \r\nMany of the families who are first time users of LPG often find safety "


id: 8468cb496eb2ab07892de81570942ddc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20442
content:
"In the megacity Kolkata, as many as twelve different public \r\ntransportation 'regimes' - each with its own system, structure, \r\nnetwork of actors and meanings - co-exist and offer means of \r\nmobility to its 14 million citizens. Most public transport modes are \r\nshared mobility options, ranging from sharing between two people \r\nin a rickshaw or a few hundred in metro or suburban trains. Sharing \r\nalso happens as daily commuters avail shared taxis organised by \r\norganically formed local taxi associations and neighbours borrow "


id: f1e32c6c4a53d77c8f5827ebb8ca54b7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39943
content:
"to cater to people's preferences for safety, reliability and comfort. \r\nA way to incentivise the middle class, urban population of Kolkata to \r\nkeep using public buses was through transforming the socio-cultural \r\nmeaning of the public bus regime by rebranding and advancing a new \r\nimage of the bus as a comfortable and efficient mode of transport."


id: f8f4527a30cd581e3e8258eb37ec6ebd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41162
content:
"Public buses attracting the middle class: Supported by the \r\nNational Urban Renewal Mission in 2010, the West Bengal \r\ngovernment rolled out 1200 new fuel-efficient, low-floor buses with \r\nan aim to provide a 'modern and efficient bus service to the urban \r\nmiddle-class citizens of Kolkata, who will be willing to pay a premium \r\nfare for a comfortable and reliable bus service' (Ghosh and Schot \r\n2019). Several changes in the state bus regime followed this effort \r\nto improve public bus infrastructure to match the demands for a new \r\nurban lifestyle. There were efforts to improve efficiency in managing \r\nfleets and service provision through smart, real time and integrated \r\ndisplay and fare collection systems, and so on. A crucial driver of this \r\npolicy has been to discourage users to shift their demand from public \r\nto private mobility. The primary focus of these strategies has been "


id: 1bbb88f43ce6ad65260969f7d0c03f80
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2063
content:
"Cycling ban policy: While the effects on social justice, equity and \r\ninclusion are clear in the cases of the bus, auto-rickshaw or app-cabs, \r\nsome recent policy actions in Kolkata are directly related to socio\u0002economic exclusion. Since 2014, Kolkata police have banned cycling \r\non many major arterial roads as a traffic management strategy \r\nunder the pressure of congestion and to avoid road accidents in \r\novercrowded narrow streets. Civil society activists and NGOs have \r\nprotested against the ban on grounds of environmental impacts and \r\ninjustice against the poor. The ban was partially retracted in 2016 \r\n(Ghosh 2019). Scholars have argued that such policy measures \r\nexacerbate inequalities by disadvantaging the urban poor, and hence \r\nare undesirable, even though it might seem to be a congestion "


id: 7c8d7f6ab08f60f551677e3c37ea516e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19110
content:
"mitigation strategy in the short term (Raven et al. 2017; Sur 2017). \r\nThe agency of political actors in implementing regulatory policies in \r\nindividual bus, auto or taxi regimes is important, but not enough to \r\nmaintain the existing sustainable practices of shared mobility. The \r\ntransformation processes in state bus and auto-rickshaw regimes \r\nhighlight that policies need to align with specific user demands (for \r\nsafety, reliability, comfort) and focus on changing deeper beliefs and \r\npractices across multiple mobility regimes in the city. The emergence \r\nof the app-cab service suggests the role of digitalisation beyond \r\npolicies and markets to renew the taxi regime, following the existing \r\nride-sharing culture that already exists in Kolkata. The cycling ban "


id: bb6538853ac4f8dbc4898aba75afd54e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30187
content:
"case highlights the exclusionary effects of policy, which the agency \r\nof civil society actors in social movements can hold to account in \r\na democratic context."


id: 6d8e4d3efc250b5937ff3fa50d217c15
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16537
content:
"To conclude, more thoughtful action at a policy level is required \r\nto sustain and coordinate the diversity of public transport modes \r\nthrough infrastructure design and reflecting on the overall direction \r\nof change (Roy et al. 2018b; Schot and Steinmueller 2018). The case \r\nof urban mobility transitions in Kolkata shows interconnected policy, \r\ninstitutional, socio-cultural and behavioural drivers for socio-technical \r\nchange. Change has unfolded in complex interactions between "


id: 337d920fdc5a0391fd9ddbfdfdcdb191
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6308
content:
"A substantial body of literature indicates that self-reported consumer \r\nmotivations for shifting away from meat are primarily linked to \r\nconcerns for personal health. Food safety, cost, and animal welfare, \r\nare also important, with concerns about climate change less so \r\n(Latvala et al. 2012; Dibb and Fitzpatrick 2014; Hartmann and Siegrist \r\n2017; Graca et  al. 2019). However, there is little evidence to link \r\nthese motivations to actual behaviour change (Bianchi et al. 2018; \r\nGraca et al. 2019). This can be attributed to lock-in mechanisms, such \r\nas established habits of food provision; skills deficits in preparing \r\nnon-meat meals (Pohjolainen et  al. 2015); positive socio-cultural \r\nmeanings attached to meat eating, including vitality and sociality \r\n(Mylan 2018) and limitations in the availability of non-meat options \r\nwhen eating out of the home (Graca et al. 2019)."


id: 8f688a64c13e237277380de88d423a3b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22444
content:
"NGO campaigns that aim to change public discourses and attitudes \r\ntoward meat production and consumption (Laestadius et al. 2016), \r\nhave gained prominence in the UK over the past decade, drawing \r\nattention to issues including health, climate change and animal \r\nwelfare. There has also been a proliferation of behaviour change \r\ninitiatives led by social movements including 'meat-free-Mondays' \r\nand 'Veganuary' which, in addition to information provision, aim to \r\nencourage behaviour change by providing practical guidance and \r\ncreating normative pressures (Morris et al. 2014). The effectiveness of \r\nthese civic-led interventions, and accompanying attempts to 'nudge' \r\nconsumers toward meat reduction by altering the visual appeal, \r\nposition, or size of meat offerings at the point of purchase, is being \r\ndebated in the literature (Garnett et al. 2015; Godfray et al. 2018; \r\nTaufik et al. 2019; Harguess et al. 2020; Sahakian et al. 2020)."


id: fd1750f89b3c51160d32c7f43090691a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41881
content:
"UK per capita meat consumption increased from 69.2 kg yr-1 in 1961 \r\nto 85.7 kg yr-1 in 2006, and then declined to 78.6 kg yr-1 in 2015 \r\n(= 8.3%), followed by a small increase in 2016 and decline in 2017 \r\n(Figure  5.SM.6). Despite ups and downs, the trend since 2006 is \r\ndownward. Another long-term trend is a relative shift from carbon\u0002intensive red meat towards poultry. Research indicates that this \r\nshift away from meat consumption is likely to have resulted from \r\ninteractions between several actors and multiple dimensions (Vinnari \r\nand Vinnari 2014)."


id: 25a1c97d96a742132e5405b674da040d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3805
content:
"Companies have started to respond to the growing demand for \r\n'meat free' products, with 16% of new UK food products launched \r\nin 2018 presenting 'non animal' claims - a doubling since 2015 \r\n(MINTEL 2019). These 'meat alternatives' vary in material form, "


id: 502842b7410e577b7a232ab8e84b3a42
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11388
content:
"with more 'radical' products such as cultured meat, or algae\u0002and insect-based proteins, facing substantial structural barriers \r\n(technological, organisational, institutional), which presently hinder \r\ntheir widespread diffusion (van der Weele et al. 2019). Nevertheless, \r\nit is clear that both corporate food actors and new entrants offering \r\nmore innovative 'meat alternatives' view consumer preferences as \r\nan economic opportunity, and are responding by increasing the \r\navailability of meat replacement products. Farmers and meat industry \r\nactors have opposed these developments through political lobbying, \r\nwhich in 2019 led the European Parliament's agriculture committee \r\nto prohibit these new companies from using the terms 'burger' or \r\n'sausage' to describe products that do not contain meat."


id: 17fa8774826b5163bcd5b63a431eb882
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1418
content:
"Policy support for meat alternatives or behavioural change has \r\nremained limited in the UK, where reduced meat consumption is low \r\non the political agenda (Wellesley and Froggatt 2015). The extent to \r\nwhich policymakers are willing to actively stimulate reduced meat \r\nconsumption thus remains an open question (Godfray et al. 2018). \r\nAgricultural policies in the UK serve to support meat production with \r\nlarge subsidies that lower production cost and effectively increase \r\nthe meat intensity of diets at a population level (Simon 2003; Godfray \r\net al. 2018). Deeper, population-wide reductions in meat consumption \r\nare hampered by these lock-in mechanisms which continue to \r\nstabilise the existing meat production-consumption system."


id: 39a60feef81bb1a3eda5e2c86c2b57e6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7354
content:
"To conclude, analysis of the dynamics across the UK food provisioning \r\nsystem which have accompanied the observed decline in UK meat \r\nconsumption, indicates that this has resulted from interaction \r\nbetween multiple behavioural, socio-cultural, and corporate drivers \r\n(Figure 5.SM.5c)."


id: f770f9c0bb3eb3a97f248d71ec1eda9d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40908
content:
"Wynes, S. and K.A. Nicholas, 2017: The climate mitigation gap: Education and \r\ngovernment recommendations miss the most effective individual actions. \r\nEnviron. Res. Lett., 12(7), doi:10.1088/1748-9326/aa7541."


id: 79bab1bafe9b7db7a40fd0b4a7e0eb28
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18622
content:
"Angel De La Vega Navarro (Mexico), Amit Garg (India), Andrea N. Hahmann (Chile/Denmark), \r\nSmail Khennas (Algeria), Ines Margarida Lima de Azevedo (the United States of America/\r\nPortugal), Andreas Loschel (Germany), Ajay Kumar Singh (India), Linda Steg (the Netherlands), \r\nGoran Strbac (Serbia/United Kingdom), Kenichi Wada (Japan)"


id: 128c11473901b2724d6e972503f34906
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 465
content:
"Clarke, L., Y.-M. Wei, A. De La Vega Navarro, A. Garg, A.N. Hahmann, S. Khennas, I.M.L. Azevedo, A. Loschel, A.K. Singh, L. Steg, \r\nG. Strbac, K. Wada, 2022: Energy Systems. In IPCC, 2022: Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution \r\nof Working Group III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [P.R. Shukla, \r\nJ. Skea, R. Slade, A. Al Khourdajie, R. van Diemen, D. McCollum, M. Pathak, S. Some, P. Vyas, R. Fradera, M. Belkacemi, \r\nA. Hasija, G. Lisboa, S. Luz, J. Malley, (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA. \r\ndoi: 10.1017/9781009157926.008."


id: b130a9146cdade18a6c60b0a462332fc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28405
content:
"Prices have dropped rapidly over the last five years for \r\nseveral key energy system mitigation options, notably solar \r\nphotovoltaics (PV), wind power, and batteries. From 2015 to \r\n2020, the prices of electricity from PV and wind dropped 56% and \r\n45%, respectively, and battery prices dropped by 64%. Electricity \r\nfrom PV and wind is now cheaper than electricity from fossil sources \r\nin many regions, electric vehicles are increasingly competitive with \r\ninternal combustion engines, and large-scale battery storage on \r\nelectricity grids is increasingly viable. (high confidence) {6.3, 6.4}"


id: c082b7731696a1c737fe1089d3396
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31165
content:
"Warming cannot be limited to well below 2degC without rapid \r\nand deep reductions in energy system carbon dioxide (CO2) \r\nand greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. In scenarios limiting \r\nwarming to 1.5degC (>50%) with no or limited overshoot (2degC (>67%) \r\nwith action starting in 2020), net energy system CO2 emissions \r\n(interquartile range) fall by 87-97% (60-79%) in 2050. In 2030, \r\nin scenarios limiting warming to 1.5degC (>50%) with no or limited \r\novershoot, net CO2 and GHG emissions fall by 35-51% and 38-52% \r\nrespectively. In scenarios limiting warming to 1.5degC (>50%) with \r\nno or limited overshoot (2degC (>67%)), net electricity sector CO2\r\nemissions reach zero globally between 2045 and 2055 (2050 and \r\n2080). (high confidence) {6.7}"


id: c35ef01b495529bfc549c007443805b3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31643
content:
"Global wind and solar PV capacity and generation have \r\nincreased rapidly. Solar PV grew by 170% (to 680 TWh); wind \r\ngrew by 70% (to 1420 TWh) from 2015 to 2019. Policy, societal \r\npressure to limit fossil generation, low interest rates, and cost \r\nreductions have all driven wind and solar PV deployment. Solar PV \r\nand wind together accounted for 21% of total low-carbon electricity \r\ngeneration and 8% of total electricity generation in 2019. Nuclear \r\ngeneration grew 9% between 2015 and 2019 and accounted \r\nfor 10% of total generation in 2019 (2790 TWh); hydroelectric \r\npower grew by 10% and accounted for 16% (4290 TWh) of total \r\ngeneration. In total, low- and zero-carbon electricity generation \r\ntechnologies produced 37% of global electricity in 2019. (high \r\nconfidence) {6.3, 6.4}"


id: 22629bfd3a722ee66b181e749f8b893
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3270
content:
"Limiting warming to well below 2degC will require substantial \r\nenergy system changes over the next 30 years. This includes \r\nreduced fossil fuel consumption, increased production from \r\nlow- and zero-carbon energy sources, and increased use of \r\nelectricity and alternative energy carriers. Coal consumption \r\nwithout carbon capture and storage (CCS) falls by 67-82% \r\n(interquartile range) in 2030 in scenarios limiting warming to 1.5degC \r\n(>50%) with no or limited overshoot. Oil and gas consumption \r\nfall more slowly. Low-carbon sources produce 93-97% of global \r\nelectricity by 2050 in scenarios that limit warming to 2degC (>67%) \r\nwith action starting in 2020. In scenarios limiting warming to 1.5degC \r\n(>50%) with no or limited overshoot (2degC (>67%) with action \r\nstarting in 2020), electricity supplies 48-58% (36-47%) of final \r\nenergy in 2050, up from 20% in 2019. (high confidence) {6.7}"


id: 679f9216f92d01b73595fb9ccfb22808
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15496
content:
"If investments in coal and other fossil infrastructure continue, \r\nenergy systems will be locked in to higher emissions, making \r\nit harder to limit warming to well below 2degC. Many aspects of \r\nthe energy system  - physical infrastructure; institutions, laws, and \r\nregulations; and behaviour - are resistant to change or take many \r\nyears to change. New investments in coal-fired electricity without \r\nCCS are inconsistent with limiting warming to well below 2degC. (high \r\nconfidence) {6.3, 6.7}"


id: 7aa177f2b249354034b8cd6ebb59545b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18770
content:
"Net-zero energy systems will share common characteristics, \r\nbut the approach in every country will depend on national \r\ncircumstances. Common characteristics of net-zero energy systems \r\nwill include: (i) electricity systems that produce no net CO2 or remove \r\nCO2 from the atmosphere; (ii) widespread electrification of end \r\nuses, including light-duty transport, space heating, and cooking; \r\n(iii)  substantially lower use of fossil fuels than today; (iv)  use of \r\nalternative energy carriers such as hydrogen, bioenergy, and ammonia \r\nto substitute for fossil fuels in sectors less amenable to electrification; \r\n(v) more efficient use of energy than today; (vi) greater energy system \r\nintegration across regions and across components of the energy \r\nsystem; and (vii) use of CO2 removal (e.g., direct air carbon capture \r\nand storage (DACCS) and bioenergy with carbon capture and storage \r\n(DACCS, BECCS)) to offset any residual emissions. (high confidence) {6.6}"


id: 8dd637c022339ccc9e93bdfe2adf8725
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22144
content:
"Limiting warming to well below 2degC will strand fossil-related \r\nassets, including fossil infrastructure and unburned fossil fuel \r\nresources. The economic impact of stranded assets could amount to \r\ntrillions of dollars. Coal assets are most vulnerable over the coming \r\ndecade; oil and gas assets are more vulnerable toward mid-century. \r\nCCS can allow fossil fuels to be used longer, reducing potential \r\nstranded assets. (high confidence) {6.7}"


id: 1c9e493e1c5767e342d57a335770c105
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2213
content:
"A low-carbon energy transition will shift investment patterns \r\nand create new economic opportunities. Total energy investment \r\nneeds will rise, relative to today, over the next decades, if warming \r\nis limited to 2degC (>67%) or lower. These increases will be far less \r\npronounced, however, than the reallocations of investment flows \r\nthat are likely to be seen across sub-sectors, namely from fossil fuels \r\n(extraction, conversion, and electricity generation) without CCS \r\nand toward renewables, nuclear power, CCS, electricity networks \r\nand  storage, and end-use energy efficiency. A significant and \r\ngrowing share of investments between now and 2050 will be made \r\nin emerging economies, particularly in Asia. (high confidence) {6.7}"


id: 86bc25f98af43491f526c067bc95438a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20868
content:
"Energy demands and energy sector emissions have continued \r\nto rise. From 2015 to 2019, global final energy consumption grew \r\nby 6.6%, CO2 emissions from the global energy system grew by \r\n4.6%, and total GHG emissions from energy supply rose by 2.7%. \r\nMethane emissions, mainly fugitive emissions from oil, gas, and \r\ncoal, accounted for 18% of GHG emissions in 2019. Coal electricity \r\ncapacity grew by 7.6% between 2015 and 2019, as new builds in \r\nsome countries offset declines in others. Total consumption of oil and \r\noil products increased by 5%, and natural gas consumption grew \r\nby 15%. Declining energy intensity in almost all regions has been \r\nbalanced by increased energy consumption. (high confidence) {6.3}"


id: d2a668d12c5883096a72f4fa45b101a5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34408
content:
"The viable speed and scope of a  low-carbon energy system \r\ntransition will depend on how well it can support sustainable \r\ndevelopment goals (SDGs) and other societal objectives.\r\nEnergy systems are linked to a range of societal objectives, including \r\nenergy access, air and water pollution, health, energy security, \r\nwater security, food security, economic prosperity, international \r\ncompetitiveness, employment. These linkages and their importance \r\nvary among regions. Energy sector mitigation and efforts to achieve \r\nSDGs generally support one another, though there are important \r\nregion-specific exceptions. (high confidence) {6.1, 6.7}"


id: 90b4e893023a1cf625dd767f058f89e2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22662
content:
"Climate change will affect many future local and national low\u0002carbon energy systems. The impacts, however, are uncertain, \r\nparticularly at the regional scale. Climate change will alter \r\nhydropower production, bioenergy and agricultural yields, thermal \r\npower plant efficiencies, and demands for heating and cooling, and \r\nit will directly impact power system infrastructure. Climate change \r\nwill not affect wind and solar resources to the extent that it would \r\ncompromise their ability to reduce emissions. (high confidence) {6.5}"


id: c9c5210b78d23892f951d560a9cb2cde
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32830
content:
"Electricity systems powered predominantly by renewables will \r\nbe increasingly viable over the coming decades, but it will be \r\nchallenging to supply the entire energy system with renewable \r\nenergy. Large shares of variable solar PV and wind power can \r\nbe incorporated in electricity grids through batteries, hydrogen, \r\nand other forms of storage; transmission; flexible non-renewable \r\ngeneration; advanced controls; and greater demand-side responses. \r\nBecause some applications (e.g.,  air travel) are not currently \r\namenable to electrification, 100% renewable energy systems would \r\nlikely need to include alternative fuels such as hydrogen or biofuels. \r\nEconomic, regulatory, social, and operational challenges increase \r\nwith higher shares of renewable electricity and energy. The ability to \r\novercome these challenges in practice is not fully understood. (high \r\nconfidence) {6.6}"


id: 134fccb86311cb51ce7b939f2c0ceb37
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 610
content:
"The economic outcomes of low-carbon transitions in some \r\nsectors and regions may be on a  par with, or superior to \r\nthose of an emissions-intensive future. Cost reductions in key \r\ntechnologies, particularly in electricity and light-duty transport, have \r\nincreased the economic attractiveness of near-term low-carbon \r\ntransitions. Long-term mitigation costs are not well understood and \r\ndepend on policy design and implementation, and the future costs \r\nand availability of technologies. Advances in low-carbon energy \r\nresources and carriers such as next-generation biofuels, hydrogen \r\nproduced from electrolysis, synthetic fuels, and carbon-neutral \r\nammonia would substantially improve the economics of net-zero \r\nenergy systems. (medium confidence) {6.4, 6.7}"


id: a77e91a2895de712619212cbf673de6a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26680
content:
"Multiple energy supply options are available to reduce \r\nemissions over the next decade. Nuclear power and hydropower \r\nare already established technologies. Solar PV and wind are now \r\ncheaper than fossil-generated electricity in many locations. Bioenergy \r\naccounts for about a tenth of global primary energy. Carbon capture \r\nis widely used in the oil and gas industry, with early applications in \r\nelectricity production and biofuels. It will not be possible to widely \r\ndeploy all of these and other options without efforts to address the \r\ngeophysical, environmental-ecological, economic, technological, \r\nsocio-cultural, and institutional factors that can facilitate or hinder \r\ntheir implementation. (high confidence) {6.4}"


id: 1c079d841713ecedb9f5ceb3566af540
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2116
content:
"Some mitigation options can provide more immediate and cost\u0002effective emissions reductions than others, but a comprehensive \r\napproach will be required over the next 10  years to limit \r\nwarming to well below 2degC. There are substantial, cost-effective \r\nopportunities to reduce emissions rapidly in several sectors, including \r\nelectricity generation and light-duty transportation. But near-term \r\nreductions in these sectors will not be sufficient to limit warming to \r\nwell below 2degC. A broad-based approach across the energy sector will \r\nbe necessary to reduce emissions over the next 10 years and to set \r\nthe stage for still deeper reductions beyond 2030. (high confidence) \r\n{6.4, 6.6, 6.7}"


id: c2031b8d831e5e5b42b63c5c42aa4401
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31432
content:
"Enhanced integration across energy system sectors and across \r\nscales will lower costs and facilitate low-carbon energy \r\nsystem transitions. Greater integration between the electricity \r\nsector and end use sectors can facilitate integration of variable \r\nrenewable energy (VRE) options. Energy systems can be integrated \r\nacross district, regional, national, and international scales. (high \r\nconfidence) {6.4, 6.6}"


id: eaa156cdad4b5f4fe834393193abdeb1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38642
content:
"different from those of today if the world successfully limits warming \r\nto well below 2degC. Energy will be provided, converted, and used in \r\ndifferent ways than it is today (Figure 6.1). Achieving and responding \r\nto these changes presents an impressive range of challenges \r\nand opportunities."


id: 5996ca753f4406e639c701fb1a6f856a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12999
content:
"The global energy system is the largest source of CO2 emissions \r\n(Chapter 2). Reducing energy sector emissions is therefore essential \r\nto limit warming. The energy systems of the future will be very "


id: 6e682c40526834b47288c8f5ea4f91
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16688
content:
"Across all of these sections, the chapter aims to explore the ways \r\nthat energy sector mitigation options and strategies interact with \r\nSustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and other societal and \r\nenvironmental goals."


id: d762cbe0bb147c391ce69d2faae68df7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35194
content:
"Within this context, this chapter addresses six topics, each of which \r\nis addressed in a separate section. First, Section 6.2 defines the scope \r\nof the energy system. Section 6.3 then discusses the recent trends \r\nin energy systems that might exert the most significant influence \r\non energy system evolution and options for reducing emissions. \r\nSection  6.4 assesses the status and potential of individual energy \r\nsupply, transformation, storage, transportation and transmission, \r\nand integration mitigation options in the energy sector. Section 6.5 \r\nexplores how climate change might affect energy systems and \r\nalter potential energy system mitigation options and strategies. \r\nSection  6.6 identifies key characteristics of net-zero energy \r\nsystems - those that emit very little or no CO2. Section 6.7 explores \r\ntransition pathways toward and through net-zero energy systems. "


id: 4d141f772274134ab999d4b6056cb39d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10830
content:
"in the literature. For the purposes of this chapter, 'energy supply' \r\nencompasses all primary energy, conversion, and transmission \r\nprocesses with the exception of those that use final energy to \r\nprovide energy services in the end-use sectors (transport, buildings, \r\nindustry and agriculture). The 'energy system' includes energy end \r\nuses sectors along with energy supply. 'Low-emissions' is used for \r\nenergy technologies that produce little CO2 or no CO2 or that remove \r\nCO2 from the atmosphere. Similarly, 'low-carbon' transitions is used \r\nto describe transitions that limit likely to 2degC (>67%) or below. \r\n'Net-zero' energy systems refer to those that produce very little or no \r\nCO2 or may even sequester CO2 from the atmosphere."


id: 7bc25ce1de1ab5652fc2de2c330b8500
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18982
content:
"actual institutions that reside within businesses and governments \r\nat all levels. This includes, for example, rules for trading emissions \r\npermits, deciding when particular electricity generation technologies \r\nmight come online, water management and related environmental \r\nrules that define the availability of hydropower or influence water \r\navailability for cooling power plants, regulations for injecting CO2\r\ninto underground reservoirs or disposing of nuclear waste, and even \r\ncompany policies regarding work hours or teleworking, which can \r\nhave important implications for energy demand profiles. Many people \r\nare employed in the energy sector, and energy system mitigation will \r\neliminate some jobs while creating others."


id: 3a8be201880a52a1366567b15f6b64e8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7505
content:
"This broader view of energy systems is essential for understanding \r\nenergy system mitigation, as these broader societal and institutional \r\nfactors can have an important influence on energy system \r\ntransformations and the potential to rapidly reduce energy CO2\r\nemissions. Energy system mitigation is as much about the challenges \r\nof societal change as it is about the challenges of changes in \r\nphysical infrastructure, technologies, and operations. While this \r\nchapter does not attempt to draw a specific boundary around all the \r\ndifferent systems that interact with the energy system, it frequently \r\nexplores these broader system interactions when assessing different \r\nmitigation options and strategies."


id: 9555cf9273737292a9655a26a338e351
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23476
content:
"Current energy sector emissions trends, if continued, will not limit \r\nglobal temperature change to well below 2degC (high confidence). \r\nGlobal energy system fossil fuel CO2 emissions grew by 4.6% between \r\n2015 and 2019 (1.1% yr-1), reaching 38 GtCO2 yr-1 and accounting \r\nfor approximately two-thirds of annual global anthropogenic GHG \r\nemissions. In 2020, with the worldwide COVID-19 pandemic, energy \r\nsector CO2 emissions dropped by roughly 2 GtCO2 yr-1 (Figure 6.2). \r\nHowever global energy-related CO2 emissions are projected to rebound \r\nby nearly 5% in 2021, approaching the 2018-19 peak (IEA 2021d)."


id: 7c701a35e9d9089a5c2b1fa4425b9976
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19094
content:
"There is no single spatial scale at which energy systems might be \r\ndefined and assessed. They can be assessed at the scales of homes, \r\ncities, states or provinces, countries, regions, or the entire world. \r\nThese different scales are frequently both distinct with their own \r\ninternal dynamics yet  al.o connected to one another. This chapter \r\nmost frequently assesses energy systems from the country and \r\nglobal perspective."


id: c5764fea798675a2c4c0931cf8bac09a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32050
content:
"Coal was the single largest contributor to energy sector CO2 emissions \r\nbetween 2015 and 2019, accounting for about 44% of energy sector \r\nCO2 emissions in 2019. Oil accounted for about 34% and natural gas \r\naccounted for about 22% of energy sector CO2 emissions. Coal, oil \r\nand natural gas CO2 emissions grew respectively by 1.2%, 2% and "


id: a270fb5d2ded91f05526da111716496
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25801
content:
"12.7% (annual rates of 0.31%, 0.5% and 3%) (Figure  6.3). The \r\nelectricity sector remains the single largest source of energy sector \r\nCO2 emissions, accounting for about 36% in 2019, followed by \r\nindustry at 22% and transport (excluding international shipping and \r\naviation transport) at about 18% (Figure 6.3). Shipping and aviation \r\naccounted for a  little over 3%. These proportions have remained \r\nrelatively unchanged over the last decade. Recent trends reinforce \r\nthe near-term challenges facing energy sector mitigation - electricity \r\nsector emissions continue to rise despite rapid deployment of wind \r\nand solar power (see below); transportation emissions continue to \r\nrise, and petroleum remains the dominant fuel, despite advances in \r\nbatteries and electric cars (see below). Some specific sectors, such as \r\nshipping and aviation, may present longer-term challenges."


id: c20142180e3e18c5d84a34670a007ce1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31431
content:
"of energy supply emissions were non-CO2 emissions. Electricity and \r\nheat contributed approximately 69% of total energy supply GHG \r\nemissions in 2019 (Figure 6.3). This growth has occurred despite the \r\nhigh penetration of solar PV and wind power, particularly in Asia and \r\ndeveloped countries."


id: 5a47c05fb8c6f73bb2bc096116d347ce
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13130
content:
"Fugitive emissions from fossil fuel production, primarily methane, \r\naccounted for about 18% of sector supply emissions in 2019, \r\nwith 2.6  Gt CO2-eq yr-1 linked to oil and gas production and \r\n1.3 GtCO2-eq yr -1 to coal mining (Crippa et al. 2021). Oil and gas \r\noperations produced 2.9 GtCO2-eq yr-1 in 2019 (82 Mt yr-1 as \r\nmethane), split roughly equally between the two (IEA 2020a). There \r\nremains a high degree of uncertainty in methane emissions estimates \r\nfrom oil and gas operations despite the emergence of new data from \r\nsatellites and other measurement campaigns. According to a recent \r\nstudy (Hmiel et al. 2020), methane emissions are underestimated by \r\nabout 25 to 40%."


id: 99522728154f7ed1e312f58aa56dcc3f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24194
content:
"Energy supply GHG emissions, including CO2 and non-CO2\r\ngreenhouse gases, reached 20 GtCO2-eq yr -1 in 2019, rising by \r\n2.7% between 2015 and 2019 (0.66% yr -1). Approximately 18% "


id: 8a8a7292bd8675b29fbb1a66f9967f46
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21548
content:
"Figure 6.3 | Global energy sector CO2 emissions and global energy supply GHG emission. Source: Panel (a): data from IEA (2020a); other panels: data from Crippa \r\net al. (2021)."


id: f1141d95ac721ee4bd35d476a6310bea
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39793
content:
"Increasing global energy sector GHG emissions have been driven by \r\nrising emissions in some large developing and emerging countries; \r\nhowever, per  capita emissions in these countries remain well below \r\nthose in developed countries (Yu et al. 2019). From 2015 to 2019, Eastern \r\nAsia, Southern Asia, and South-East Asia energy sector CO2 emissions \r\ngrew by 2.4% yr-1, 2.6% yr-1, and 5.1% yr-1, respectively. The relative \r\nand absolute shares of Europe and North America have continued to \r\ndecline, partly due to the growth in other countries (Figure 6.3)."


id: 21f160ad049739e1367ed35f82b62a08
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3200
content:
"there has been a significant increase in the total primary energy supply \r\n(TPES) and major changes in energy sources. From 2015 to 2019, TPES \r\ngrew by 6.6% (1.6% yr-1) from 569 EJ yr-1 to 606 EJ yr-1. Natural gas \r\nconsumption grew most quickly during this period, at 3.5% yr-1. Coal, \r\noil and oil products grew at annual rates of 0.23% yr-1 and 0.83% yr-1, \r\nrespectively. In 2019, the shares of coal, oil, and natural gas in global \r\nTPES were 27%, 31% and 23%, representing only a  modest shift \r\nfrom 2015, when the shares were 28%, 32% and 22%, respectively. \r\nRenewables, excluding hydropower, grew at an annual rate of 12% yr-1\r\nduring this period; however, their share remains marginal in 2019, \r\nwith just 2.2% of the TPES compared to 1.5% in 2015 (Figure 6.5). \r\nBioenergy (including traditional bioenergy) accounted for 9.4% of the \r\nTPES, a similar share compared with 2015."


id: 6c3a22c2188c0233184a8adb7d1d1aa9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16336
content:
"There are important differences in fuel use across countries. While \r\ndeveloped countries almost exclusively use modern fuels, many \r\ncountries still obtain a  significant fraction of their energy from \r\ntraditional bioenergy (fuelwood and charcoal). Traditional bioenergy "


id: ffb330788c0c3a2be3a818b83b161c2c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42380
content:
"Recent changes in the energy system can be viewed within the context \r\nof longer-term trends in energy supply and use. Over the last decade, "


id: 38e33492f035bf1d3e591e33cbe445e0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7209
content:
"Figure 6.5 | World total primary energy supply (TPES) (EJ) and total final energy consumption (TFC) 2000-2019. Primary energy in this figure is based on IEA \r\naccounting methods and not direct equivalents for several energy sources. Final energy does not include industry own use and losses. Source: adapted from IEA world energy \r\nbalances, Minx et al. (2021b) database for IPCC."


id: 6db631bb046ea711edca6ffe8a16007c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16561
content:
"Energy security. The ability of countries to maintain access to \r\nreliable and affordable energy resources continues to shape energy \r\npolicy. Energy security is perceived as a national security issue and \r\noften prioritised over climate concerns (Nyman 2018). The linkage \r\nbetween climate and energy security is now widely recognised \r\n(Blarke and Lund 2007; Toke and Vezirgiannidou 2013; La Vina et al. \r\n2018; World Energy Council 2020; Fu et  al. 2021; United Nations \r\n2021). Approaches to energy security are frequently driven by the \r\nscope of domestic energy resources. For example, energy security \r\nconcerns have led to continued reliance on domestic coal production \r\nand consumption (Jakob et  al. 2020) and increased investment in \r\ndomestic renewable generation (Konstantinos and Ioannidis 2017). \r\nLiquefied natural gas (LNG) Importers have diversified their sources \r\nas reliance on LNG has increased (Vivoda 2019)."


id: 3fd64e4c68691bf724143b0c084889b4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8423
content:
"(fuelwood and charcoal) is particularly important in sub-Saharan \r\ncountries and some Asian countries such as India, particularly in the \r\nresidential sector for cooking. Africa is still characterised by a high share \r\nof traditional bioenergy in TPES and TFC. In 2019, biomass and waste \r\nin Africa accounted for 44% of the TPES. The global average was 9.4%."


id: da128cab80e5944c667f2339b812119f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35667
content:
"Asia has been particularly important in TFC growth since 2015. \r\nIn 2019, Eastern Asia accounted for more 24% of TFC (1.52% annual \r\ngrowth from 2015). In contrast, TFC has increased by only 0.58% in \r\nEurope and 1.24% in North America. Despite an increase of 2.05% \r\nover the same period, Africa's TFC remains relatively low (6.1% of \r\nglobal TFC), particularly in sub-Saharan countries. Approximately \r\n860  million people, mostly in sub-Saharan Africa and some Asian \r\ncountries, lacked access to electricity and about 2.65 billion to clean\u0002cooking facilities in 2018 (IEA 2019a). Achieving universal energy \r\naccess (SDG 7) will require energy transitions in the domestic sector, \r\nincluding new developments in off-grid energy technologies, emphasis \r\non rationalising energy subsidies, and increasing efforts to address \r\nhealth concerns related to the use of traditional fuels (Box 6.1)."


id: 96e0d56febe0e1b34806eb52efc5eed2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23740
content:
"Air pollution. The energy system is an important source of air \r\npollution, including both indoor and outdoor air pollution. Efforts \r\nto address air pollution in several countries and regions (the USA, \r\nMexico, China, India, European Union, Africa, Southeast Asia, among \r\nothers) have had an importance influence on energy system changes \r\n(Bollen and Brink 2014; Fang et al. 2019). Policies aimed at controlling \r\nnitrogen oxides (NOx) and sulphur dioxide (SO2) emissions have \r\ndriven emissions abatement efforts and coal fleet retirements (Singh \r\nand Rao 2015; Drake and York, 2021). In some places, the prospect \r\nof reducing local air pollution remains more salient to policymakers \r\nand the public than climate mitigation when deciding to tighten \r\nregulations on coal use (Brauers and Oei 2020)."


id: 960263d128be2b24ea7b6ff11fae42c7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23588
content:
"While energy system changes are vital to climate mitigation, recent energy \r\nsystem changes have arisen in response to a much broader set of factors. \r\nImportant factors include economic growth, energy access, energy justice, \r\nenergy security, air pollution, technological progress in low-emissions \r\ntechnologies, local job creation. Several of these are discussed here."


id: d2ba100d015cc8e5e4cc7d4cc1aa1da9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34422
content:
"Energy access. Between 2000 and 2019, the proportion of the \r\npopulation with access to electricity increased from 73% to 90% (IEA \r\n2020c). Although most of those people gaining access to energy have \r\ngained access to fossil fuel-based electricity, an increasing number \r\nare gaining access to electricity from renewable sources. Low\u0002emissions, decentralised systems are proving a cost-effective way to \r\nprovide electricity in rural areas (Scott et al. 2016; Muchunku et al. \r\n2018; IEA 2019b), although the use of diesel generators continues \r\nin some remote areas. Between 2000 and 2019 the proportion of \r\nthe population with access to clean cooking (modern fuels and/or \r\nimproved biomass cookstoves) rose from 52% to 66%."


id: 6257eab823da392d72546371d07c3069
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14579
content:
"Technology and costs. Costs for renewable technologies have fallen \r\nsignificantly in recent years, driving significant changes in electricity \r\nproduction and transportation (see below). These advances are not \r\ndivorced from climate and other environmental concerns (Kuik, \r\nBranger and Quirion 2019; Timilsina and Shah 2020). Recent advances \r\nin PV cells, for example, can be traced in part to aggressive deployment \r\npolicies spurred by energy security, climate, and other environmental \r\nconcerns (Kreuz and Musgens 2017) (Sections 6.3.5 and 6.4.2). \r\nThe falling costs of batteries, manly Li-ion batteries, has boosted the \r\ncompetitiveness of electric vehicles (Nykvist et al. 2015) (Section 6.3.7)."


id: 9a165b06c80debd80d367fd0973c1a87
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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content:
"Successful mitigation must work in tandem with fundamental development goals such as access to modern forms of energy. In many \r\ndeveloping countries, access to electricity, clean cooking fuels, and modern and efficient energy remain an essential societal priority. \r\nThis is particularly true in sub-Saharan Africa and several Asian countries. SDG 7 on universal access to modern energy includes targets \r\non modern energy services, renewable energy, and energy efficiency, which implies a profound transformation of the current energy \r\nsystems. Although there are different definitions of energy access, the ultimate goal is universal access to clean and modern fuels."


id: 1e4d767269a66903d6163483992cd026
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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content:
"Despite progress in some countries such as India, Bangladesh and Kenya, 860 million people were without access to electricity in 2018, \r\ncompared with 1.2 billion in 2010. About 2.65 billion households were cooking with solid fuels, distributed across Asia and Africa \r\n(IEA et al. 2020). Around 850 million people in sub-Saharan Africa relied on traditional biomass (firewood and charcoal) for cooking, \r\nand 60 million relied on kerosene and coal to meet their energy needs (IEA 2018a). Air pollution was likely responsible for 1.1 million \r\ndeaths across Africa in 2019 (Fisher et al. 2021). It has been estimated that 2.2 billion people will still be dependent on inefficient \r\nand polluting energy sources for cooking by 2030, mainly in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, and 650 million people are likely to remain \r\nwithout access to electricity in 2030, 90% of whom will reside in Sub-Saharan Africa (IEA et al. 2020)."


id: 5dbb36a9ac9c715fa53a8cf40adacf4b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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content:
"Research indicates that decentralised and on-grid renewables are likely the least cost options to provide universal access to electricity \r\nby 2030 (Section 6.4.2). Natural gas, LPG, and improved biomass cookstoves are the most important options for cooking. Universal \r\naccess to electricity and clean cooking requires a rapid shift from traditional biomass to cleaner fuels and/or clean cooking technologies \r\n(IEA et  al. 2020). It has been estimated that the provision of electricity and clean cooking for all would require USD786 billion \r\nin cumulative investment to 2030, equal to 3.4% of total energy sector investment over the period (IEA 2017)."


id: ac4463d92cb38476bf6dc22f2686bf99
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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content:
"Even without universal access to modern energy, increased access will substantially affect energy systems, particularly electricity \r\nsystems through the deployment of renewable energy, LPG, and biomass supply chains. Universal access for households, however, \r\nwill have a minimal impact on global energy demand; it has been estimated that universal access for household will increase energy \r\ndemand by 0.2% in 2030 (37 Mtoe yr-1) relative to a future without any change in access to modern energy (IEA 2017)."


id: 933f7bdbf12b07560ea2a13e4af3f372
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"projects for reasons such as overcapacity, environmental constraints, \r\nand the development of renewables (Box 6.2)."


id: 5780f8f1b616734d55eb6876c2c50239
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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content:
"Different regions have replaced retired coal with different energy \r\nsources. Old coal fleets have been replaced approximately half by \r\ngas and half by renewables in the USA, mainly by renewables in the \r\nEU, and by advanced coal plants and renewables in Asia (EMBER \r\n2020). Replacing old coal with new coal facilities is inconsistent with \r\nlimiting warming to 2degC or below (high confidence) (Pfeiffer et al. \r\n2016, 2018; Smith et al. 2019; Tong et al. 2019) (Section 6.7.4)."


id: f6c37518437a336b2d832b466b3a0e9b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Global coal consumption has been declining, with small fluctuations, \r\nsince it peaked in 2013 (IEA 2020d). Coal is faring differently across \r\nregions. Coal use has been decreasing in the OECD regions, particularly \r\nin the USA and the European Union (EU), while remaining mostly flat \r\nin China after a period of growth, and it is continuing to increase \r\nin other major developing Asian economies (IEA 2020d). Trends in \r\nthe electricity sector, where most coal is being consumed, are similar. \r\nGrowth in coal-fired electricity generation capacity in the Asia Pacific \r\nregion has offset retirements in North America and Europe (Jakob \r\net al. 2020; Global Energy Monitor et al., 2021)."


id: ee7acfac7acb8627c056b78824fae773
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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content:
"Major coal-consuming countries with abundant coal reserves remain \r\nfar from phasing out coal (Edenhofer et al. 2018; Spencer et al. 2018). \r\nIn most developing countries with large coal reserves, coal use has \r\nbeen increasing to support energy security and because it is perceived \r\nto have lower costs than alternatives (Steckel et  al. 2015; Kalkuhl \r\net al.2019). However, coal faces increasing business risks from the \r\ndecreasing costs of alternative, low-emissions energy sources and \r\nincreasing focus on air pollution and other environmental impacts \r\nfrom coal mining and use (Garg et al. 2017; Sovacool et al. 2021). \r\nContinued coal builds, mostly in developing countries, will increase \r\nthe risks of stranded assets (Farfan Orozco 2017; Cui et  al. 2019; \r\nSaygin et al. 2019) (Box 6.13)."


id: 24f4ce516c4fe95e05a20d7a5e2842bb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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"Reductions in coal consumption have been driven in large part by \r\nnon-climate factors, most notably environmental regulations to \r\naddress air pollution, rapidly declining costs of renewables, and lower \r\nnatural gas prices, especially inexpensive unconventional gas in the \r\nUSA. (Culver and Hong 2016; Diluiso et al.2021; Vinichenko et al. 2021). \r\nOlder coal-fired power plants that cannot meet new environmental \r\nregulations, or have become unprofitable or uncompetitive, have \r\nbeen closed in many regions. Moreover, coal power expansion has \r\nslowed down in Asia, as countries have suspended and cancelled new "


id: 68ae93cbb9b30e3fb93df3be9927699e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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content:
"outside of coal regions and require different skill sets from the coal \r\nindustry (Spencer et al. 2018). In a broader sense, achieving a 'just \r\ntransition' also requires managing the impacts on regional economic \r\ndevelopment for coal-dependent communities and the effects of \r\nhigher energy prices for consumers and energy-intensive industries \r\nthrough a comprehensive policy package (Green and Gambhir 2020; \r\nJakob et al. 2020) (Box 6.2)."


id: fcfbc1bb1c4fb597a7216fdd4822eb6a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Economic, social, and employment impacts of accelerated coal \r\nphase-outs tend to be significant in coal-dependent regions. \r\nTailored reemployment has been used to support coal transitions in \r\nsome regions. Although some estimates show higher employment \r\nopportunities from low-carbon energy (Garrett-Peltier 2017), \r\nresults vary across regions. Moreover, even with a  net increase in \r\ntotal employment, in the long run, renewable jobs are often located "


id: caeedf7bd35b89d9d92ab25941ad58b6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33041
content:
"Africa. New coal power projects in Africa have been declining since 2016, with only South Africa and Zimbabwe currently building \r\nnew coal plants and several others with planned projects (Littlecott et al. 2021). However, these projects also largely depend on \r\ninternational financing and are thus less likely to be implemented (see above). In South Africa, employment in the coal mining \r\nsector has dropped by almost half since the 1980s and has been estimated to fall from 77,000 today to 22,000 to 42,000 by 2050 \r\n(Cock 2019; Strambo et al. 2019). Policy and financial support are essential to ensure a sustainable transition for these workers \r\n(Swilling et al. 2016)."


id: ae0acec9dac52aa3fcf524f137b68c5e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27862
content:
"Although the shares of wind and solar remain low in the global total \r\nelectricity generation, recent growth rates signal the potential for \r\nthese technologies to support substantial mitigation. The prospects \r\nfor a continuation of recent growth rates will depend on meeting key \r\nchallenges such as rapidly integrating wind and solar into electricity \r\ngrids (Section 6.6.2, Box 6.8) and retiring fossil power plants (see above)."


id: da7d2f9f5f7ec432f2b4de56ff5ad95a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35743
content:
"Recent years have seen a  rapid decline in the cost of energy \r\nstorage, particularly batteries (Section 6.4.4). The price of lithium\u0002ion batteries (LIBs) has declined by 97% in the past three decades, \r\nand by 90% in the past decade alone (IEA 2021a; Ziegler and \r\nTrancik 2021). These declines have important implications for the \r\nenergy systems, most notably in supporting increased deployment \r\nof variable renewable energy (VRE) generation and electrification \r\nof the vehicle fleet."


id: 1635d1db235537f6e28a0117191f0903
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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vector_id: 1117
content:
"Figure  6.6 | Global solar and wind electricity installed capacities (GW) from 2015-2019 and their combined share in total electricity generation.\r\nSource: data from IEA (2021a) and IRENA (2021)."


id: 9bae32a99c059eb25109911e8a00fd91
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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vector_id: 24645
content:
"On the other hand, market-based instruments like emissions rading \r\nschemes (ETS) and auctions coupled with a  regulatory framework \r\nhave been a favourable strategy for more mature technologies (Polzin \r\net al. 2015; Kitzing et al. 2018). FIT, tax incentives, and renewable \r\nportfolio standards - despite potentially substantial programme costs \r\n(Andor and Voss 2016; Abrell et al. 2019) - have played a significant \r\nrole in attracting foreign direct investments in the renewable \r\nsector (Wall et  al. 2019). Subsidies and carbon pricing have also \r\nplayed an important role in mainstreaming these renewable energy \r\nsources (Best and Burke 2018). Recently, subsidy-free investments \r\nin renewables, such as wind offshore (Jansen et  al. 2020), backed \r\nby power purchase agreements, have gained momentum (Frankfurt \r\nSchool-UNEP Centre and BNEF 2020). Similar considerations apply \r\nfor policy mixes targeted to other sectors - for example, transport \r\nand buildings."


id: b9375b244d54063c5697a707e5f507c6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29792
content:
"Battery electricity storage has emerged as important for supporting \r\nthe flexibility of electricity systems as they accommodate rising shares \r\nof VRE. Although pumped-storage hydropower systems accounted \r\nfor 160 GW, or over 90%, of total energy storage capacity in 2019 \r\n(IEA 2020c), battery energy storage systems, led by LIB technology, \r\nhave accounted for over 90% of new capacity addition since 2015 \r\n(IRENA 2019a). In 2019, 10 GW of batteries were connected at the \r\ngrid and consumer level, rising from 0.6 GW in 2015 (IEA WEO 2019; \r\nIEA 2020c)."


id: f90064e2239105d28bd0cb68ed015e0c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41171
content:
"In California in the USA, legislation was passed to procure around \r\n1.3 GW energy storage (excluding pumped storage) by 2020. One of \r\nthe largest utility-scale battery storage facilities (300 MW) recently \r\nwent online in California (Vistra Corp. 2021). Other major projects \r\nare in Florida in the USA (409 MW), London in the UK (320 MW), \r\nLithuania (200 MW), Australia (150 MW), Chile (112 MW) and \r\nGermany (90 MW), (IRENA 2019a; ARENA 2020; Katz 2020)."


id: 591887737d88486fc904d2fe3b1bcdc7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12916
content:
"The drop in battery prices has also had important implications in the \r\ntransportation sector. Automotive LIB production rose from around \r\n40 GWh in 2015 to 160 GWh in 2020 (32%). The stock of battery \r\nelectric vehicles (BEVs) grew from around 0.7 million in 2015 to \r\n4.8 million in 2019 (IEA 2020d). The number of publicly accessible \r\nvehicle chargers reached 1.3 million in 2020, 30% of which were fast \r\nchargers. The average battery size of BEVs reached 67 kWh in 2019 \r\ndue to consumer preferences and government incentives for long\u0002range vehicles (Agency 2020; IEA 2021b)."


id: a53a8d53e30ecbe8eae718c261099a46
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26297
content:
"The current energy sector policy landscape consists of policy mixes \r\nor policy packages, including regulatory, market-based and other \r\napproaches. These mixes have evolved over time and include many \r\nsectoral but also some economy-wide policy instruments, such as \r\ncarbon pricing subsidies."


id: f52052ff29574a64a96368e33ff493ef
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40490
content:
"and economic effectiveness. Recent examples include interactions of \r\nETS with renewable support policies (e.g. Boehringer and Behrens \r\n2015; Del Rio 2017), energy efficiency policies (e.g. Wiese et al. 2018) \r\nor electricity market reform (e.g. Teng et al. 2017), respectively."


id: 72d0ed6da9d5741ffbc5dd920f44d57a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17445
content:
"subsidies (Box  6.3) and regulatory instruments, are used by many \r\ncountries as part of their climate policies. In addition, public provision \r\nand procurement of low-carbon infrastructure and technologies \r\nsuch as energy-efficient devices, renewable energy, and upgrades \r\nin electricity grids through state-sponsored institutions and public\u0002private partnerships have played an important role in low-carbon \r\ndevelopment (e.g., Baron 2016)."


id: a02fa91f2f0d80c54d218bac5a4def15
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25396
content:
"Energy subsidies continue to be widely applied. Global fossil fuel subsidies represent more than half of total energy subsidies with \r\npredominantly adverse environmental, economic, and social effects (high confidence)."


id: 7d70ee66e12aec225d4e5bc759f0eb68
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19236
content:
"India started a large LPG programme in 2015 that provided a capital cost subsidy to poor households (e.g., Gould 2018; Jose et al. \r\n2018; Kar et al. 2019). While the programme has increased adoption of LPG in India (e.g., Sharma et al. 2019), it has not yet achieved \r\na sustained use of LPG and replacement of solid fuels for cooking, amplifying the need for complementary policy measures (Gould \r\n2018; Kar et al. 2019; Mani et al. 2020). The climate impacts of switching from biomass to LPG depend on the degree of biomass \r\ncombustion in stoves and the extent to which biomass originates from non-renewable sources (Singh and Rao 2015; Jose et al. 2018). \r\nBarriers to increasing LPG use for cooking further included abundance of solid fuels at zero (monetary) costs (Mani et al. 2020) as well \r\nas benefits of solid fuels, such as maintaining the traditional taste of food and space heating in colder seasons (Gould 2018; Sharma \r\net al. 2020)."


id: a8253af3f3738b00a927a20782f0daa8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26800
content:
"We touch on a broad range of factors that may enable and inhibit the \r\nimplementation of mitigation options by considering six dimensions \r\nthat affect their feasibility (Table 6.1 and Annex II.11). The assessment \r\naims to identify which mitigation options can be readily implemented \r\nand which face barriers that would need to be overcome before they \r\ncan be deployed at scale."


id: b898e9330d7015617deb4b6d3845b096
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29684
content:
"Table 6.1 | Dimensions and indicators to assess the barriers and enablers of implementing mitigation options in low-carbon energy systems."


id: 61aee6736666568cd42ce46b1c1e2c6d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14472
content:
"Solar photovoltaic (PV) is increasingly competitive with other forms of \r\nelectricity generation, and is the low-cost option in many applications \r\n(high confidence). Costs have declined by 62% since 2015 (high \r\nconfidence) and are anticipated to decline by an additional 16% by \r\n2030 if current trends continue (low confidence, medium evidence). \r\nKey areas for continued improvement are grid integration and non\u0002module costs for rooftop systems (high confidence). Most deployment \r\nis now utility-scale (high confidence). Global future potential is not \r\nlimited by solar irradiation, but by grid integration needed to address \r\nits variability, as well as access to finance, particularly in developing \r\ncountries (high confidence)."


id: 1871355b2da320447c748f5b60aa1349
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1511
content:
"PV costs (Figure 6.8) have fallen for various reasons: lower silicon \r\ncosts, automation, lower margins, automation, higher efficiency, \r\nand a  variety of incremental improvements (Fu et  al. 2018; Green \r\n2019) (Chapter  16). Increasingly, the costs of PV electricity are \r\nconcentrated in the installation and related 'soft costs' (marketing, \r\npermitting) associated with the technology rather than in the \r\nmodules themselves, which now account for only 30% of installed \r\ncosts of rooftop systems (O'Shaughnessy et al. 2019; IRENA 2021b). \r\nFinancing costs are a  significant barrier in developing countries \r\n(Ondraczek et al. 2015) and growth there depends on access to low\u0002cost finance (Creutzig et al. 2017)."


id: ce230b61e8512fc77ccb421b21b168bc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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"CSP costs have also fallen, albeit at about half the rate of PV: -9% yr-1\r\nsince AR5. The lowest prices for CSP are now competitive with more \r\nexpensive fossil fuels, although the average CSP cost is above the \r\nrange for fossil-based power generation. Other data sources put \r\nrecent CSP costs at USD120 MWh-1, in the middle of the fossil range \r\n(Lilliestam et al. 2020). Continuing the pace of change since AR5 will \r\nmake CSP competitive with fossil fuels in sunny locations, although "


id: db3562b3a518bcce0902f348f76e622a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35842
content:
"Figure 6.8 | Levelised costs of electricity (LCOE) of solar energy technologies 2000-2020. Range of fossil fuel LCOE indicated as dashed lines USD50-177 MWh-1. \r\nLinear fit lines were applied to data for AR4-AR5 and post-AR5 (2012). Yellow dots are capacity-weighted global averages for utility-scale installations. The blue area shows \r\nthe range between the 5th and 95th percentile in each year. Data: IRENA (2021b)."


id: d6162968680dcd41e806f9f3ac34d08e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34984
content:
"it will be difficult for CSP to compete with PV and even hybrid \r\nPV-battery systems. CSP electricity can be more valuable, however, \r\nbecause CSP systems can store heat longer than PV battery systems."


id: e127cbb37800a015d04b0ead6d9e7f1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36880
content:
"(Louwen et al. 2016). These recent values are an order of magnitude \r\nlower than coal, and natural gas and further decarbonisation of the \r\nenergy system will make them lower still. Thin films and organics \r\nproduce half the lifecycle emissions of silicon wafer PV, mainly \r\nbecause they use less material (Lizin et al. 2013; Hou et al. 2016). Novel \r\nmaterials promise even lower environmental impacts, especially with \r\nimprovements to their performance ratios and reliability (Gong et al. \r\n2015; Muteri et al. 2020). Higher efficiencies, longer lifetimes, sunny \r\nlocations, less carbon-intensive manufacturing inputs, and shifting to \r\nthin films could reduce future lifecycle impacts."


id: 1cfec00ae5b860d2096bc329b6dded92
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2285
content:
"Since solar PV panels have very low operating costs, they can, at \r\nhigh penetrations and in the absence of adequate incentives to shift \r\ndemand, depress prices in wholesale electricity markets, making it \r\ndifficult to recoup investment, and potentially reducing incentives \r\nfor new installations (Hirth 2013; Millstein et al. 2021). Continued \r\ncost reductions help address this issue of value deflation, but only \r\npartially. Comprehensive solutions depend on adding transmission \r\nand storage (Das et al. 2020) and, more fundamentally, adjustments \r\nto electricity market design (Roques and Finon 2017; Bistline and \r\nYoung 2019)."


id: ab885ee2b55d1ab37a7f8f720fa4551e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27411
content:
"Material demand for PV will likely increase substantially to limit \r\nwarming to well below 2degC, but PV materials are widely available, \r\nhave possible substitutes, and can be recycled (medium confidence) \r\n(Box  6.4). The primary materials for PV are silicon, copper, glass, \r\naluminium, and silver - the costliest being silicon, and glass being \r\nthe most essential by mass, at 70%. None of these materials is \r\nconsidered to be either critical or potentially scarce (IEA 2020e). Thin\u0002film cells, such as amorphous silicon, cadmium telluride and copper \r\nindium gallium diselenide (CIGS), use far less material (though they \r\nuse more glass), but account for less than 10% of the global solar \r\nmarket. Other thin-films, such as those based on perovskites, organic \r\nsolar cells, or earth-abundant, non-toxic materials such as kesterites, \r\neither on their own, or layered on silicon, could further reduce \r\nmaterial use per energy produced (Box 6.4)."


id: 3c7f961a983bd451b9a46fb61a152505
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7834
content:
"After a typical lifetime of 30 years of use, PV modules can be recycled to \r\nprevent environmental contamination from the toxic materials within \r\nthem, reusing valuable materials and avoiding waste accumulation. \r\nRecycling allows the reuse of nearly all - 83% in one study - of the \r\ncomponents of PV modules, other than plastics (Ardente et al. 2019) "


id: df52eaa8eec8e237c98ebd4c20789939
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36536
content:
"silicon offer realistic potential for lower costs, reduced material use, \r\nand higher efficiencies in future years (Victoria et al. 2021)."


id: f89960a82b192dab86ba9fb4f8e95572
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41100
content:
"and would add less than 1% to lifecycle GHG emissions (Latunussa \r\net al. 2016). Glass accounts for 70% of the mass of a solar cell and is \r\nrelatively easy to recycle. Recycling technology is advancing, but the \r\nscale and share of recycling is still small (Li et al. 2020d). By 2050, \r\nhowever, end-of-life PV could total 80 MT and comprise 10% of \r\nglobal electronic waste (Stolz and Frischknecht 2017), although most \r\nof it is glass. IEA runs a programme to enable PV recycling by sharing \r\nbest practices to minimise recycling lifecycle impacts. Ensuring \r\nthat a substantial amount of panels are recycled at end of life will \r\nlikely require policy incentives, as the market value of the recovered \r\nmaterials, aside from aluminium and copper, is likely to be too low \r\nto justify recycling on its own (Deng et al. 2019). A near-term priority \r\nis maximising the recovery of silver, silicon, and aluminium, the most \r\nvaluable PV material components (Heath et al. 2020)."


id: c727f0b627b106b4527f721577b6733b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32359
content:
"Solar energy elicits favourable public responses in most countries \r\n(high confidence) (Mcgowan and Sauter 2005; Ma et  al. 2015; \r\nHanger et  al. 2016; Bessette and Arvai 2018; Jobin and Siegrist \r\n2018; Roddis et al. 2019; Hazboun and Boudet 2020). Solar energy is \r\nperceived as clean and environmentally friendly with few downsides \r\n(Faiers and Neame 2006; Whitmarsh et al. 2011b). Key motivations \r\nfor homeowners to adopt PV systems are expected financial gains, \r\nenvironmental benefits, the desire to become more self-sufficient, \r\nand peer expectations (Korcaj et al. 2015; Vasseur and Kemp 2015; \r\nPalm 2017). Hence, the observability of PV systems can facilitate \r\nadoption (Boudet 2019). The main barriers to the adoption of solar PV \r\nby households are its high upfront costs, aesthetics, landlord-tenant \r\nincentives, and concerns about performance and reliability (Faiers \r\nand Neame 2006; Whitmarsh et al. 2011b; Vasseur and Kemp 2015)."


id: 6b286a44a482cb55d65489000a565771
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16148
content:
"Energy from wind is abundant, and the estimated technical potentials \r\nsurpass the total amount of energy needed to limit warming \r\nto well below 2degC (high confidence). Recent global estimates \r\nof potentially exploitable wind energy resource are in the range of \r\n557-717 PWh  yr-1 (2005-2580 EJ yr-1) (Eurek et  al. 2017; Bosch \r\net al. 2017, 2018; McKenna et al. 2022), or 20-30 times the 2017 \r\nglobal electricity demand. Studies have suggested that 'bottom\u0002up' approaches may overestimate technical potentials (Miller et al. \r\n2015; Kleidon and Miller 2020). But even in the most conservative \r\n'top-down' approaches, the technical wind potential surpasses the \r\namount needed to limit warming to well below 2degC (Bosch et al. 2017; \r\nEurek et al. 2017; Volker et al. 2017). The projected climate change "


id: 72e4ce95c54f71f246abdd93a5d223b6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17461
content:
"Wind power is increasingly competitive with other forms of electricity \r\ngeneration and is the low-cost option in many applications (high \r\nconfidence). Costs have declined by 18% and 40% on land and \r\noffshore since 2015 (high confidence), and further reductions can be \r\nexpected by 2030 (medium confidence). Critical areas for continued \r\nimprovement are technology advancements and economies of scale \r\n(high confidence). Global future potential is primarily limited by \r\nonshore land availability in wind power-rich areas, lack of supporting \r\ninfrastructure, grid integration, and access to finance (especially in \r\ndeveloping countries) (high confidence)."


id: 2c8566e49e681044cf001995d3af4695
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5099
content:
"Wind capacity factors have increased over the last decade (Figure 6.11). \r\nThe capacity factor for onshore wind farms increased from 27% in 2010 \r\nto 36% in 2020 (IRENA 2021a). The global average offshore capacity \r\nfactor has decreased from a peak of 45% in 2017. This has been driven \r\nby the increased share of offshore development in China, where projects \r\nare often near-shore and use smaller wind turbines than in Europe "


id: 501f634bcbe97c375f5ca877a279ff01
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11382
content:
"Wind power cost reductions (Figure 6.11) are driven mainly by larger \r\ncapacity turbines, larger rotor diameters and taller hub heights  - \r\nlarger swept areas increase the energy captured and the capacity \r\nfactors for a given wind speed; taller towers provide access to higher \r\nwind speeds (Beiter et  al. 2021). All major onshore wind markets \r\nhave experienced rapid growth in both rotor diameter (from 81.2 m "


id: 680b713c724829fea0fa20ed6b8c46b8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15574
content:
"other aspects besides increases in capacity factors influence the cost \r\n(Junginger et al. 2020b)."


id: 81ad4947f922ba2c205e53eb6bfebeba
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19942
content:
"(IRENA 2021b). Improvements in capacity factors also come from \r\nincreased functionality of wind turbines and wind farms. Manufactures \r\ncan adapt the wind turbine generator to the wind conditions. Turbines \r\nfor windy sites have smaller generators and smaller specific capacity \r\nper rotor area, and therefore operate more efficiently and reach full \r\ncapacity for a longer time period (Rohrig et al. 2019)."


id: 662fff4af0d8917b93bad09707189ca4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15242
content:
"The cost of the turbine (including the towers) makes up the largest \r\ncomponent of wind LCOE. Total installed costs for both onshore \r\nand offshore wind farms have decreased since 2015 (Figure 6.11), \r\nbut the total installed costs for onshore wind projects are very \r\nsite- and market-specific, as reflected in the range of LCOEs. China, \r\nIndia, and  the USA have experienced the largest declines in total \r\ninstalled costs. In 2020, typical country-average total installed \r\ncosts were around USD1150 kW-1 in China and India, and between \r\nUSD1403-2472 kW-1 elsewhere (IRENA 2021b). Total installed costs \r\nof offshore wind farms declined by 12% between 2010 and 2020. \r\nBut, because some of the new offshore wind projects have moved \r\nto deeper waters and further offshore, there are considerable year\u0002to-year variations in their price (IRENA 2021b). Projects outside \r\nChina in recent years have typically been built in deeper waters "


id: 9dffbe544c2c3bb992e6cb441003324d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25033
content:
"Electricity from onshore wind is less expensive than electricity \r\ngenerated from fossil fuels in a  growing number of markets (high \r\nconfidence). The global average LCOE onshore declined by 38% from \r\n2010 to 2020 (Figure 6.11), reaching USD0.039 kWh-1. However, the \r\ndecrease in cost varies substantially by region. Since 2014, wind costs \r\nhave declined more rapidly than the majority of experts predicted \r\n(Wiser et al. 2021). New modelling projects onshore wind LCOE of \r\nUSD.037 kWh-1 by 2030 (Junginger et  al. 2020a), and additional \r\nreductions of 37-39% have been predicted by 2050 (Wiser et  al. \r\n2021). The future cost of offshore wind is more uncertain because "


id: a1dc18cd3dc173fb3051fc1363eb1c31
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25699
content:
"prior to project development, and, in some regions, shutdowns are \r\nrequired during active bird migration (de Lucas et al. 2012). Offshore \r\nwind farms can also impact migratory birds and other sea species \r\n(Hooper et al. 2017). Floating foundations pose lower environmental \r\nimpacts at build stage (IRENA 2019c), but their cumulative long-term \r\nimpacts are unclear (Goodale and Milman 2016). Recent studies find \r\nweak associations between wind farm noise and measures of long\u0002term human health (Poulsen et al. 2018a, b, 2019a, b)."


id: b99c524f0aca061c86b2bfa2437890df
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29863
content:
"(10-55 m) and up to 120 km offshore, compared to around 10 m in \r\n2001-2006, when distances rarely exceeded 20 km. With the shift to \r\ndeeper waters and sites further from ports, the total installed costs of \r\noffshore wind farms rose, from an average of around USD2500 kW-1\r\nin 2000 to around USD5127 kW-1 by 2011-2014, before falling \r\nto around USD3185 kW-1 in 2020 (IRENA 2020a). The full cost of \r\nwind power includes the transmission and system integration costs \r\n(Sections 6.4.3 and 6.4.6). A new technology in development is \r\nthe co-location of wind and solar PV power farms, also known as \r\nhybrid power plants. Co-locating wind, solar PV, and batteries can \r\nlead to synergies in electricity generation, infrastructure, and land \r\nusage, which may lower the overall plant cost compared to single \r\ntechnology systems (Lindberg et al. 2021)."


id: ee6f2f1b8b89073b505366854fb12f03
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39323
content:
"Wind power plants pose relatively low environmental impact, but \r\nsometimes locally significant ecological effects (high confidence). The \r\nenvironmental impact of wind technologies, including CO2 emissions, \r\nis concentrated in the manufacturing, transport, and building stage \r\nand in disposal as the end-of-life of wind turbines is reached (Liu and \r\nBarlow 2017; Mishnaevsky 2021). The operation of wind turbines \r\nproduces no waste or pollutants. The LCA for wind turbines is strongly \r\ninfluenced by the operating lifetime, quality of wind resources, \r\nconversion efficiency, and size of the wind turbines (Kaldellis and \r\nApostolou 2017; Laurent et  al. 2018). All wind power technologies \r\nrepay their carbon footprint in less than a year (Bonou et al. 2016)."


id: c461dce0f33758eac464912ba3d5ec21
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31848
content:
"Wind farms can cause local ecological impacts, including on animal \r\nhabitat and movements, biological concerns, bird and bat fatalities \r\nfrom collisions with rotating blades, and health concerns (Morrison \r\nand Sinclair 2004). The impacts on animal habitats and collisions can \r\nbe resolved or reduced by selectively stopping some wind turbines \r\nin high-risk locations, often without affecting the productivity of \r\nthe wind farm (de Lucas et al. 2012). Many countries now require \r\nenvironmental studies of impacts of wind turbines on wildlife "


id: 8f53ce4bf84f4d6081b4b768d332cc97
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22428
content:
"Common economic barriers to wind development are high initial \r\ncost of capital, long payback periods, and inadequate access to \r\ncapital. Optimal wind energy expansion is most likely to occur in \r\nthe presence of a political commitment to establish, maintain, and \r\nimprove financial support instruments, technological efforts to \r\nsupport a  local supply chains, and grid investments integrate VRE \r\nelectricity (Diogenes et al. 2020)."


id: d90b3637cf709b67fedb7c88610f25ac
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35485
content:
"The secure supply of many metals and minerals (e.g., cobalt, copper, lithium, and rare earth elements (REEs)) is critical to supporting \r\na low-emissions energy system transition (Sovacool et al. 2020). A low-carbon energy system transition will increase the demand for \r\nthese minerals to be used in technologies like wind turbines, PV cells, and batteries (World Bank 2020). Reliance on these minerals has \r\nraised questions about possible constraints to a low-carbon energy system transition, including supply chain disruptions (Chapter 10.6). \r\nConcerns have also been raised about mining for these materials, which frequently results in severe environmental impacts (Sonter \r\net al. 2020), and metal production itself is energy-intensive and difficult to decarbonise (Sovacool et al. 2020)."


id: 1e32b23376d6e523c9a4eda3fc2ce99a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2510
content:
"Wind energy depends on two critical REEs - neodymium and dysprosium - used in magnets in high-performance generators (Pavel \r\net al. 2017; Li et al. 2020b). Silicon-wafer-based solar PV, which accounted for 95% of PV production in 2020, does not use REEs \r\nbut utilises aluminium, copper, and silver (IEA 2021a). Lithium, nickel, cobalt, and phosphorous are used in batteries. Many critical \r\nminerals are used in EVs, including aluminium and copper in manufacturing the necessary EV charging infrastructure, and neodymium \r\nin permanent magnet motors."


id: 1f6675fc23f048dd010dd5f0cd22ae84
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2727
content:
"These strategic minerals are found in a limited number of countries, and concerns have been raised that geopolitical factors could \r\ndisrupt the supply chain necessary for a low-carbon energy system transition. However, excluding cobalt and lithium, no single country \r\nholds more than a third of the world reserves. The known supply of some strategic minerals is still close to 600 years at current levels \r\nof demand (BP 2020), but increased demand would cut more quickly into supplies."


id: 965195ad427ae20878ec310f78644e2e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23641
content:
"There are alternatives to the strategic minerals currently used to support a low-carbon transition. Wind turbines can be manufactured \r\nwithout permanent magnets to reduce the need for strategic minerals, but the production costs are higher, and their efficiency is \r\nreduced (Manberger and Stenqvist 2018). Alternatives to silicon, such as thin films, could be used to produce PVs. Thin-films use much \r\nless material than silicon-based PV, but they contain other potentially critical metals like tellurium, cadmium, and gallium. Alternatives \r\nto lithium-ion batteries, such as sodium-ion batteries, are becoming more practical and feasible (Sovacool et al. 2020)."


id: cb02c77ffaa0d5429af3c27825e95142
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33058
content:
"IEA 2021d). This potential is distributed over 11.8 million locations \r\n(Figure  6.12), but many of the locations cannot be developed for \r\n(current) technical, economic, or political reasons. The estimated \r\ntechnical potential of hydropower is 8-30 PWh yr-1 (29-108 EJ yr-1), \r\nand its estimated economic potential is 8-15 PWh yr-1 (29-54 EJ yr-1) \r\n(Zhou et  al. 2015; van Vliet et  al. 2016c). Actual hydropower \r\ngeneration in 2019 was 4.2 PWh (15.3 EJ), providing about 16% of \r\nglobal electricity and 43% of global electricity from renewables (BP \r\n2020; IEA 2020f; Killingtveit 2020). Asia holds the largest hydropower \r\npotential (48%), followed by South America (19%) (Hoes et al. 2017)."


id: 72fafedf3f40d567c1d8350cdd62d1b9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17478
content:
"Hydropower is technically mature, proved worldwide as a  primary \r\nsource of renewable electricity, and may be used to balance \r\nelectricity supply by providing flexibility and storage. The LCOE of \r\nhydropower is lower than the cheapest new fossil fuel-fired option. \r\nHowever, the future mitigation potential of hydropower depends on \r\nminimising environmental and social impacts during the planning \r\nstages, reducing the risks of dam failures, and modernising the ageing \r\nhydropower fleet to increase generation capacity and flexibility \r\n(high confidence)."


id: a2bd63d9e0c9b612211061ad4ac5e8b5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25848
content:
"Hydropower is a mature technology with locally adapted solutions \r\n(high confidence) (Zhou et  al. 2015; Killingtveit 2020). The peak \r\nefficiency of hydroelectric plants is greater than 85%. Hydropower \r\nplants without storage or with small storage typically produce "


id: b2b617cd5b917d53b10c03407729170
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28682
content:
"Estimates of global gross theoretical available hydropower potential \r\nvaries from 31-128 PWh yr-1 (112-460 EJ yr-1), exceeding total \r\nelectricity production in 2018 (Banerjee et  al.  2017; BP 2020; "


id: b4ce8e87657b0399dd8dcaafe467ca72
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29061
content:
"a few kWs to 10 MWs (examples of plants producing higher amounts \r\ndo exist), and are useful for providing electricity at a  scale from \r\nhouseholds to small communities (El Bassam et  al. 2013; Towler \r\n2014). However, hydropower plants without or with small storage \r\nmay be susceptible to climate variability, especially droughts, when \r\nthe amount of water may not be sufficient to generate electricity \r\n(Premalatha et al. 2014) (Section 6.5)."


id: 48a424ec77d1fb412939d8999c9812ac
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9998
content:
"Hydropower plants with storage may produce 10 GW, reaching over \r\n100 TWh yr-1 (0.36 EJ yr-1), but generally require large areas. Pumped \r\nstorage hydropower stores energy by pumping water to higher \r\nreservoirs during low-demand periods (Killingtveit 2020). The storage \r\nin hydropower systems provides flexibility to compensate for rapid \r\nvariations in electricity loads and supplies. The regulating characteristics \r\nof the storage play an important role in assuring continuity of energy \r\nsupply from renewable sources (Yang et al. 2018b)."


id: 4fcb2b17b90ee3f56346cd34f8b8b0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11332
content:
"Hydropower is one of the lowest-cost electricity technologies \r\n(Mukheibir 2013; IRENA 2021b). Its operation and maintenance \r\ncosts are typically 2-2.5% of the investment costs per kW yr-1 for \r\na lifetime of 40-80 years (Killingtveit 2020). Construction costs are \r\nsite-specific. The total cost for an installed large hydropower project \r\nvaries from USD10,600-804,500 kW-1 if the site is located far \r\naway from transmission lines, roads, and infrastructure. Investment \r\ncosts increase for small hydropower plants and may be as high as \r\nUSD100,000 kW-1or more for the installation of plants of less than \r\n1 MW - 20% to 80% more than for large hydropower plants (IRENA \r\n2015). During the past 100 years, total installed costs and LCOE have \r\nrisen by a few percent, but the LCOE of hydropower remains lower \r\nthan the cheapest new fossil fuel-fired option (IRENA 2019b, 2021)."


id: d2fc13dace549e92aec7fe6cdcfbdb71
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34464
content:
"Nuclear power can deliver low-carbon energy at scale (high \r\nconfidence). Doing so will require improvements in managing \r\nconstruction of reactor designs that hold the promise of lower costs \r\nand broader use (medium confidence). At the same time, nuclear \r\npower continues to be affected by cost overruns, high upfront \r\ninvestment needs, challenges with final disposal of radioactive \r\nwaste, and varying public acceptance and political support levels \r\n(high confidence)."


id: 65b466dffb9dd6b547b90d7074e2c31c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15158
content:
"There are sufficient resources for substantially increasing nuclear \r\ndeployment (medium confidence). Estimates for identified uranium \r\nresources have been increasing steadily over the years. Conventional \r\nuranium resources have been estimated to be sufficient for over \r\n130 years of supply at current levels of use; 100 years were estimated \r\nin 2009 (Hahn 1983; NEA/IAEA 2021). In the case of future uranium \r\nresource scarcity, thorium or recycling of spent fuel might be used \r\nas alternatives. Interest in these alternatives has waned with better "


id: c2e17453cf6ed1dc4d1352057a51ef34
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31563
content:
"Public support for hydroelectric energy is generally high (Steg \r\n2018), and higher than support for coal, gas, and nuclear. Yet, public "


id: 998acaad85d01862833c42e3a9f7e56a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24241
content:
"understanding of uranium deposits, their availability, and low prices \r\n(IAEA 2005; OECD NEA 2015)."


id: 59e0978ec0aa899b58d297f0947cab17
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13053
content:
"Lifetime extensions are significantly cheaper than new builds and cost \r\ncompetitive with other low-carbon technologies. The overnight cost of \r\nlifetime extensions is estimated in the range of USD390-630 kWe-1\r\nfor Europe and North America, and the LCOE in the range of \r\nUSD30-36 MWh-1 for extensions of 10-20 years (IEA 2020j)."


id: 27c75c895643c35532f94cac21946acc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4188
content:
"There are several possible nuclear technology options for the period \r\nfrom 2030 to 2050 (medium confidence). In addition to electricity, \r\nnuclear can also be used to produce low-carbon hydrogen and \r\nfreshwater (Kavvadias and Khamis 2014; Kayfeci et al. 2019)."


id: 4aabaac26454bde0f8a68a2952618c57
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10378
content:
"Cost-cutting opportunities, such as design standardisation and \r\ninnovations in construction approaches, are expected to make SMRs \r\ncompetitive against large reactors by 2040 (Rubio and Tricot 2016) \r\n(medium confidence). As SMRs are under development, there is \r\nsubstantial uncertainty regarding the construction costs. Vendors \r\nhave estimated first-of-a-kind LCOEs at USD131-190 MWh-1. Effects \r\nof learning for nth-of-a-kind SMR are anticipated to reduce the first\u0002of-a-kind LCOE by 19-32%."


id: 560c00a6c5f427c33160ab359934fb9e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12409
content:
"Despite low probabilities, the potential for major nuclear accidents \r\nexists, and the radiation exposure impacts could be large and long\u0002lasting (Steinhauser et  al. 2014). However, new reactor designs \r\nwith passive and enhanced safety systems reduce the risk of such \r\naccidents significantly (high confidence). The (normal) activity of \r\na nuclear reactor results in low volumes of radioactive waste, which \r\nrequires strictly controlled and regulated disposal. On a global scale, \r\nroughly 421 kt of spent nuclear fuel have been produced since \r\n1971 (IEA 2014). Out of this volume, 2-3% is high-level radioactive \r\nwaste, which presents challenges in terms of radiotoxicity and decay \r\nlongevity, and ultimately entails permanent disposal."


id: 74769ff8e822d5da0cda18db3f6c778f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17724
content:
"Nuclear power continues to suffer from limited public and political \r\nsupport in some countries (high confidence). Public support for \r\nnuclear energy is consistently lower than for renewable energy and \r\nnatural gas, and in many countries as low as support for energy from \r\ncoal and oil (Corner et al. 2011; Pampel 2011; Hobman and Ashworth \r\n2013). The major nuclear accidents (i.e., Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, \r\nand Fukushima) decreased public support (Poortinga et  al. 2013; \r\nBird et al. 2014). The public remains concerned about the safety risks \r\nof nuclear power plants and radioactive materials (Pampel 2011; \r\nBird  et  al. 2014; Tsujikawa et  al. 2016). At the same time, some \r\ngroups see nuclear energy as a reliable energy source, beneficial for \r\nthe economy and helpful in climate change mitigation. Public support "


id: 22fb35ff358813b4d7167e5b9b0cdcfd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"for nuclear energy is higher when people are concerned about energy \r\nsecurity, including concerns about the availability of energy and high \r\nenergy prices (Groot et  al. 2013; Gupta et  al. 2019b), and when \r\nthey expect local benefit (Wang et  al. 2020c). Public support also \r\nincreases when trust in managing bodies is higher (de Groot and \r\nSteg 2011). Similarly, transparent and participative decision-making \r\nprocesses enhance perceived procedural fairness and public support \r\n(Sjoberg 2004)."


id: 8d461ad96ae6219e2c303d521a46542d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22039
content:
"Since AR5, there have been increased efforts to develop novel \r\nplatforms that reduce the energy penalty associated with CO2 capture, \r\ndevelop CO2 utilisation pathways as a substitute to geologic storage, \r\nand establish global policies to support CCS (high confidence). CCS \r\ncan be used within electricity and other sectors. While it increases the \r\ncost of electricity, CCS has the potential to contribute significantly to \r\nlow-carbon energy system transitions (IPCC 2018)."


id: 17e2ccabaaaa08df7bc2a5de19986913
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Because of the sheer scale of the investment required (individual \r\nprojects can exceed USD10 billion in value), nearly 90% of nuclear \r\npower plants under construction are run by state-owned or controlled \r\ncompanies, with governments assuming significant part of the risks \r\nand costs. For countries that choose nuclear power in their energy \r\nportfolio, stable political conditions and support, clear regulatory \r\nregimes, and adequate financial framework are crucial for successful \r\nand efficient implementation."


id: 3d3d4b974176f15eb6599e39013685f6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7951
content:
"Many countries have adopted technology-specific policies for \r\nlow-carbon energy courses, and these policies influence the \r\ncompetitiveness of nuclear power. For example, feed-in-tariffs and \r\nfeed-in premiums for renewables widely applied in the EU (Kitzing \r\net al. 2012) or renewable portfolio standards in the USA (Barbose \r\net al. 2016) impact wholesale electricity price (leading occasionally to \r\nlow or even negative prices), which affects the revenues of existing \r\nnuclear and other plants (Bruninx et al. 2013; Newbery et al. 2018; \r\nLesser 2019)."


id: e1a0f73b7d586d7eef3d3dace5637327
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"CO2 utilisation (CCU) - instead of geologic storage - could present \r\nan alternative method of decarbonisation (high confidence). The \r\nglobal CO2 utilisation potential, however, is currently limited to \r\n1-2 GtCO2 yr-1 for use of CO2 as a feedstock (Hepburn et al. 2019; "


id: e015b247a8af9b7aabd37c9f18c68ef0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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vector_id: 36670
content:
"CSA: Central and South America, EEU: Eastern Europe, FSU: Former Soviet Union, MEA: Middle East, ODA: Other Asia (except China and India), WEU: Western Europe."


id: 2c0e6b43b96222d7fb3219d6aa781cbf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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vector_id: 5011
content:
"Katelhon et  al. 2019) but could increase to 20 GtCO2 by the mid\u0002century (medium confidence). CCU involves using CO2 as a feedstock \r\nto synthesise products of economic value and as substitute to fossil \r\nfeedstock. However, several CO2 utilisation avenues might be limited \r\nby energy availability. Depending on the utilisation pathway, the \r\nCO2 may be considered sequestered for centuries (e.g.,  cement \r\ncuring, aggregates), decades (plastics), or only a  few days or \r\nmonths (e.g., fuels) (Hepburn et al. 2019). Moreover, when carbon\u0002rich fuel end-products are combusted, CO2 is emitted back into the \r\natmosphere. Because of the presence of several industrial clusters \r\n(regions with high density of industrial infrastructure) globally, \r\na  number of regions demonstrate locations where CO2 utilisation \r\npotential could be matched with large point sources of CO2 (Wei \r\net al. 2020)."


id: 997dc16486c83c230d40519b1c799e52
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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content:
"and operates based on oxy-combustion capture. Applications using \r\nthe Allam Cycle can deliver net energy efficiency greater than 50% \r\nand nearly 100% CO2 capture, but they are quite sensitive to oxygen \r\nand CO2 purity needs (Scaccabarozzi et al. 2016; Ferrari et al. 2017)."


id: 9899a2571de5bc0a8718163b517474c4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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content:
"CO2 capture costs present a  key challenge, remaining higher than \r\nUSD50 tCO2\r\n-1 for most technologies and regions; novel technologies \r\ncould help reduce some costs (high confidence). The capital cost of \r\na coal or gas electricity generation facility with CCS is almost double \r\nthat of one without CCS (Rubin et al. 2015; Zhai and Rubin 2016; \r\nBui et al. 2018). Additionally, the energy penalty increases the fuel \r\nrequirement for electricity generation by 13-44%, leading to further \r\ncost increases (Table 6.3)."


id: 280455e54baf5d947a477a71ae79e26f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4238
content:
"The technological development for several CO2 utilisation pathways \r\nis still in the laboratory, prototype, and pilot phases, while others have \r\nbeen fully commercialised (such as urea manufacturing). Technology \r\ndevelopment in some end uses is limited by purity requirements \r\nfor CO2 as a feedstock. The efficacy of CCU processes depends on \r\nadditional technological constraints such as CO2 purity and pressure \r\nrequirements. For instance, urea production requires CO2 pressurised \r\nto 122 bar and purified to 99.9%. While most utilisation pathways \r\nrequire purity levels of 95-99%, algae production may be carried out \r\nwith atmospheric CO2 (Voldsund et al. 2016; Ho et al. 2019)."


id: 2fa67b08724cc60fd52d81b51f4f0fdc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5645
content:
"The public is largely unfamiliar with carbon capture, use and storage \r\ntechnologies (L'Orange Seigo et al. 2014; Tcvetkov et al. 2019) (high \r\nconfidence), and many people may not have formed stable attitudes \r\nand risk perceptions regarding these technologies (Daamen et  al. \r\n2006; Jones et al. 2015; Van Heek et al. 2017) (medium confidence). \r\nIn general, low support has been reported for CCS technologies (Allen \r\nand Chatterton 2013; Demski et  al. 2017). When presented with \r\nneutral information on CCS, people favour other mitigation options \r\nsuch as renewable energy and energy efficiency (de Best-Waldhober \r\net al. 2009; Scheer et al. 2013; Karlstrom and Ryghaug 2014). Although \r\nfew totally reject CCS, specific CCS projects have faced strong local "


id: c4b493c719acbc0504b86095107e57d6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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content:
"CO2 capture projects above USD35-50 tCO2\r\n-1 which offset CO2\r\ncapture costs at some efficient plants (Esposito et al. 2019). Similarly, \r\nCalifornia's low-carbon fuel standard offers benefits for CO2 capture \r\nat some industrial facilities such as biorefineries and refineries (Von \r\nWald et al. 2020)."


id: 4cfb50c6ee5773408346e0a9aec0e673
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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content:
"resistance, which has contributed to the cancellation of CCS projects \r\n(Terwel et al. 2012; L'Orange Seigo et al. 2014). Communities may \r\nalso consider CCU to be lower-risk and view it more favourably than \r\nCCS (Arning et al. 2019)."


id: d2644b98a92ccc2e5518e7be45ebe06b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34369
content:
"CCS requires considerable increases in some resources and chemicals, \r\nmost notably water. Power plants with CCS could shut down \r\nperiodically due to water scarcity. In several cases, water withdrawals \r\nfor CCS are 25-200% higher than plants without CCS (Rosa et al. \r\n2020b; Yang et al. 2020) due to energy penalty and cooling duty. The \r\nincrease is slightly lower for non-absorption technologies. In regions \r\nprone to water scarcity such as the Southwestern USA or Southeast \r\nAsia, this may limit deployment and result in power plant shutdowns \r\nduring the summer months (Liu et al. 2019b; Wang et al. 2019c). The \r\nwater use could be managed by changing heat integration strategies \r\nand implementing reuse of wastewater (Magneschi et  al. 2017; \r\nGiannaris et al. 2020b)."


id: 67463eee9185ba61ef6cee7f314615d1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15442
content:
"Bioenergy has the potential to be a  high-value and large-scale \r\nmitigation option to support many different parts of the energy \r\nsystem. Bioenergy could be particularly valuable for sectors with \r\nlimited alternatives to fossil fuels (e.g.,  aviation, heavy industry), \r\nproduction of chemicals and products, and, potentially, in carbon \r\ndioxide removal (CDR) via BECCS or biochar. While traditional \r\nbiomass and first-generation biofuels are widely used today, the \r\ntechnology for large-scale production from advanced processes is not \r\ncompetitive, and growing dedicated bioenergy crops raises a broad \r\nset of sustainability concerns. Its long-term role in low-carbon \r\nenergy systems is therefore uncertain (high confidence). (Note that \r\nthis section focuses on the key technological developments for \r\ndeployment of commercial bioenergy.)"


id: 7b46a2a47c9d0896e3b24f7b1b7aa2e6
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content:
"Because CCS always adds cost, policy instruments are required for it \r\nto be widely deployed (high confidence). Relevant policy instruments \r\ninclude financial instruments such as emission certification and \r\ntrading, legally enforced emission restraints, and carbon pricing \r\n(Haszeldine 2016; Kang et al. 2020). There are some recent examples \r\nof policy instruments specifically focused on promoting CCS. The \r\nrecent 45Q tax credits in the USA offer nationwide tax credits for "


id: bd87e1ae1a5c1210cb3b7a19f30f9662
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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content:
"will require substantial breakthroughs or market changes to become \r\ncompetitive. Moreover, fuels produced from these processes require \r\nupgrading to reach 'drop-in' conditions - that is, conditions in which \r\nthey may be used directly consistent with current standards in \r\nexisting technologies (van Dyk et al. 2019). Additional opportunities \r\nexist to co-optimise second-generation biofuels and engines (Ostadi \r\net  al. 2019; Salman et  al. 2020). In addition, gaseous wastes, or \r\nhigh-moisture biomass, such as dairy manure, wastewater sludge \r\nand organic municipal solid waste (MSW) could be utilised to \r\nproduce renewable natural gas. Technologies for producing biogas \r\n(e.g.,  digestion) tend to be less efficient than thermochemical \r\napproaches and often produce large amounts of CO2, requiring the \r\nproduced fuels to undergo significant upgrading (Melara et al. 2020)."


id: da51935656d0009a159eede484775c03
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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vector_id: 35708
content:
"(high confidence). Different chemical and biological conversion \r\npathways exist to convert diverse biomass feedstocks into multiple \r\nfinal energy carriers (Figure 6.14). Currently, biomass is mostly used \r\nto produce heat, or for cooking purposes (traditional biomass), \r\nelectricity, or first-generation sugar-based biofuels (e.g.,  ethanol \r\nproduced via fermentation), as well as biodiesel produced from \r\nvegetable oils and animal fats. Electricity generated from biomass \r\ncontributes about 3% of global generation. Tens of billions of gallons \r\nof first-generation biofuels are produced per  year. The processing \r\nrequirements (drying, dewatering, pelletising) of different feedstocks \r\nfor producing electricity from biomass are energy-intensive, and when \r\nutilising current power plants, the efficiency is around 22%, with an \r\nincrease up to 28% with advanced technologies (Zhang et al. 2020)."


id: c9eac9c840e222632f31ca9833d81472
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32850
content:
"Scaling up bioenergy use will require advanced technologies such \r\nas gasification, Fischer-Tropsch processing, hydrothermal liquefaction \r\n(HTL), and pyrolysis. These pathways could deliver several final \r\nenergy carriers starting from multiple feedstocks, including forest \r\nbiomass, dedicated cellulosic feedstocks, crop residues, and wastes \r\n(Figure  6.14). While potentially cost-competitive in the future, \r\npyrolysis, Fischer-Tropsch, and HTL are not currently cost-competitive \r\n(IEA 2018c; Molino et al. 2018; Prussi et al. 2019), and scaling-up \r\nthese processes will require robust business strategies and optimised \r\nuse of co-products (Lee and Lavoie 2013). Advanced biofuels \r\nproduction processes are at the pilot or demonstration stage and "


id: 9b9a26d1a949c98b622ed31715f069d6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24631
content:
"A major scale-up of bioenergy production will require dedicated \r\nproduction of advanced biofuels. First-generation biofuels produced \r\ndirectly from food crops or animal fats have limited potential \r\nand lower yield per  land area than advanced biofuels. Wastes \r\nand  residues (e.g.,  from agricultural, forestry, animal manure \r\nprocessing) or biomass grown on degraded, surplus, and marginal \r\nland can provide opportunities for cost-effective and sustainable \r\nbioenergy at significant but limited scale (Morris et al. 2013; Saha \r\nand Eckelman 2018; Fajardy and Mac Dowell 2020; Spagnolo et al. \r\n2020). Assessing the potential for a major scale-up of purpose-grown \r\nbioenergy is challenging due to its far-reaching linkages to issues "


id: 59b80c004a2c8431ba972daa2a0116bd
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content:
"Figure 6.14 | Range of advanced bioenergy conversion pathways (excluding traditional biomass, direct heat generation, first-generation biofuels, and \r\nnon-energy products) based on feedstock, targeted end product, and compatibility with carbon dioxide removal (CDR) via carbon capture and storage \r\n(CCS) and soil carbon sequestration. Source: modified with permission from Baker et al. (2020)."


id: 86e37bbfc08ba11472e6aa00044c8637
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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vector_id: 20897
content:
"beyond the energy sector, including competition with land for food \r\nproduction and forestry, water use, impacts on ecosystems, and land\u0002use change (IPCC 2020; Roe et al. 2021) (Chapter 12). These factors, \r\nrather than geophysical characteristics, largely define the potential \r\nfor bioenergy and explain the difference in estimates of potential in \r\nthe literature. Biomass resources are not always in close proximity \r\nto energy demand, necessitating additional infrastructure or means \r\nto  transport biomass or final bioenergy over larger distances and \r\nincur additional energy use (Baik et al. 2018; Singh et al. 2021)."


id: cb84057d8bb2d8bee37f24c8c955097e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33135
content:
"Large-scale bioenergy production will require more than wastes/\r\nresidues and cultivation on marginal lands, which may raise conflicts \r\nwith SDGs relevant to environmental and societal priorities (Heck et al. \r\n2018; Gerten et al. 2020) (Chapter 12). These include competition with \r\nfood crops, implications for biodiversity, potential deforestation to \r\nsupport bioenergy crop production, energy security implications from \r\nbioenergy trade, point-of-use emissions and associated effects on \r\nair quality, and water use and fertiliser use (Fajardy and Mac Dowell \r\n2018; Fuss et  al. 2018; Tanzer and Ramirez 2019; Brack and King \r\n2020). Overall, the environmental impact of bioenergy production at \r\nscale remains uncertain and varies by region and application."


id: 69b4da76f4a33b07700e48f820338d0d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Alleviating these issues would require some combination of increasing \r\ncrop yields, improving conversion efficiencies, and developing \r\nadvanced biotechnologies for increasing the fuel yield per tonne of \r\nfeedstock (Henry et al. 2018). Policy structures would be necessary to "


id: 9900ac74192b8e2a859c97228b183afe
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content:
"Table 6.4 | The costs of electricity generation, hydrogen production, and second-generation liquid fuels production from biomass in 2020. These costs are \r\nadapted from Bhave et al. (2017), Daioglou et al. (2020), NREL (2020a, 2020b), Witcover and Williams (2020), and Lepage et al. (2021)."


id: 9a411ec73d1750a9f78da1a94e3ea344
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content:
"scale (Zanchi et al. 2012; Wiloso et al. 2016; Booth 2018; Fan et al. \r\n2021). Similarly, the lifecycle emissions of BECCS remain uncertain and \r\nwill depend on how effectively bioenergy conversion processes are \r\noptimised (Fajardy and Mac Dowell 2017; Tanzer and Ramirez 2019)."


id: 407efa84822468a51e4ca26f16736d8f
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8535
content:
"retain biodiversity, manage water use, limit deforestation and land\u0002use change emissions, and ultimately optimally integrate bioenergy \r\nwith transforming ecosystems. Large-scale international trade of \r\nbiomass might be required to support a global bioeconomy, raising \r\nquestions about infrastructure, logistics, financing options, and global \r\nstandards for bioenergy production and trade (Box 6.10). Additional \r\ninstitutional and economic barriers are associated with accounting of \r\ncarbon dioxide removal, including BECCS (Fuss et al. 2014; Muratori \r\net al. 2016; Fridahl and Lehtveer 2018)."


id: a937a2cf5feedafa3b35acfee61f2dc5
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26993
content:
"Lifecycle emissions impacts from bioenergy are subject to large \r\nuncertainties and could be incompatible with net-zero emissions \r\nin some contexts. Due to the potentially large energy conversion \r\nrequirements and associated GHG emissions (Chapters 7 and 12), \r\nbioenergy systems may fail to deliver near-zero emissions depending \r\non operating conditions and regional contexts (Elshout et  al. 2015; \r\nDaioglou et al. 2017; Staples et al. 2017; Hanssen et al. 2020; Lade et al. \r\n2020). As a result, bioenergy carbon neutrality is debated and depends \r\non factors such as the source of biomass, conversion pathways and \r\nenergy used for production and transport of biomass, and land-use \r\nchanges, as well as assumed analysis boundary and considered time "


id: fe86ccde7a921bb7a1d0da81f7d0f1d6
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42151
content:
"with fossil fuels, this section aims to elucidate the feasibility criteria \r\naround these fuels itself."


id: 31833a68261c632e358ce71ea592c745
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5956
content:
"Fossil fuels could play a role in climate change mitigation if strategically \r\ndeployed with CCS (high confidence). On the one hand, the primary \r\nmechanism for reducing emissions is to eliminate the unabated \r\nfossil fuel use. On the other hand, fossil energy combined with CCS \r\nprovides a means of producing low-carbon energy while still utilising \r\nthe available base of fossil energy worldwide and limiting stranded \r\nassets. While Section 6.4.2.5 discusses the important aspects of CCS "


id: b93f88d7b9514d27f3094f67bfa1acc3
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29796
content:
"Fossil fuel reserves have continued to rise because of advanced \r\nexploration and utilisation techniques (high confidence). A fraction of \r\nthese available reserves can be used consistent with mitigation goals \r\nwhen paired with CCS opportunities in close geographical proximity \r\n(high confidence). Based on continued exploration, the fossil fuel \r\nresource base has increased significantly; for example, a 9% increase "


id: 39c5f3dce302dc2b91628e93d9bf1e02
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7378
content:
"Coal mine methane and ventilation air methane recovery can reduce \r\nthe fugitive methane emissions by 50-75% (Zhou et al. 2016; Singh \r\nand Sahu 2018)."


id: f35db7d44e212483a1fa698b700ea840
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40192
content:
"in gas reserves and 12% in oil reserves was observed in the USA \r\nbetween 2017 and 2018. This increase is a  result of advanced \r\nexploration techniques, which are often subsidised (Lazarus and van \r\nAsselt 2018; MA et al. 2018). Fossil reserves are distributed unevenly \r\nthroughout the globe. Coal represents the largest remaining resource \r\n(close to 500 ZJ). Conventional oil and gas resources are an order \r\nof magnitude smaller (15-20 ZJ each). Technological advances have \r\nincreased the reserves of unconventional fossil in the last decade. \r\nDiscovered ultimate recoverable resources of unconventional oil and \r\ngas are comparable to conventional oil and gas (Fizaine et al. 2017)."


id: f030bdc849d0496f5d65cc7642aeb9b2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39646
content:
"The cost of producing electricity from fossil sources has remained \r\nroughly the same with some regional exceptions while the costs \r\nof producing transport fuels has gone down significantly (high \r\nconfidence). The cost of producing electricity from fossil fuels has \r\nremained largely static, with the exception of some regional changes, \r\nfor example, a 40% cost reduction in the USA for natural gas (Rai et al. \r\n2019), where the gas wellhead price has declined by almost two-thirds \r\ndue to large reserves. Similarly, the global price of crude oil has declined \r\nfrom almost USD100 bbl-1 to USD55 bbl-1 in the last five years."


id: e2184bbc66cdf4b611422eb973a70c1d
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vector_id: 37058
content:
"It is unlikely that resource constraints will lead to a  phase-out of \r\nfossil fuels, and instead, such a phase-out would require policy action. \r\nAround 80% of coal, 50% of gas, and 20% of oil reserves are likely to \r\nremain unextractable under 2degC constraints (McGlade and Ekins 2015; \r\nPellegrini et al. 2020). Reserves are more likely to be utilised in a low\u0002carbon transition if they can be paired with CCS. Availability of CCS \r\ntechnology not only allows continued use of fossil fuels as a capital \r\nresource for countries but also paves the way for CDR through BECCS \r\n(Haszeldine 2016; Pye et al. 2020). While the theoretical geologic CO2\r\nsequestration potential is vast, there are limits on how much resource \r\nbase could be utilised based on geologic, engineering, and source-sink \r\nmapping criteria (Budinis et al. 2017)."


id: 6e9d7ed03d9a9db15ed39b2215b98e3a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16729
content:
"The energy return of investment (EROI) is a useful indicator of full \r\nfossil lifecycle costs. Fossil fuels create significantly more energy \r\nper unit energy invested - or in other words have much larger EROI - \r\nthan most cleaner fuels such as biomass or electrolysis-derived \r\nhydrogen, where intensive processing reduces EROI (Hall et  al. \r\n2014). That said, recent years have seen a decrease in fossil EROI, \r\nespecially as underground coal mining still represents a substantial \r\nportion of global production. Exploitation of unconventional gas \r\nreservoirs is also energy intensive and has led to a reduction in EROI. \r\nThe primary energy EROI of fossil fuels has converged at about 30, \r\nwhich represents a 20-point decrease from the 1995 value for coal \r\n(Brockway et  al. 2019). When processing and refining stages are \r\nconsidered, these EROI values further decrease."


id: a6a6d128d2cd7bc19cb810d6573dd180
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26535
content:
"Several countries have large reserves of fossil fuels. Owing to climate \r\nconstraints, these may become stranded, causing considerable \r\neconomic impacts (high confidence) (Sections 6.7.3 and 6.7.4, and \r\nBox  6.13). While global fossil energy resources are greater than \r\n600 ZJ, more than half of these resources would likely be unburnable, \r\neven in the presence of CCS (McGlade and Ekins 2015; Pye et  al. \r\n2020). This would entail a significant capital loss for the countries \r\nwith large reserves. The total amount of stranded assets in such \r\na case would amount to USD1-4 trillion at present value (Box 6.13)."


id: 38ff8017eaab3fd4e4f8cb2c655b01de
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7233
content:
"Apart from CO2 emissions and air pollutants from fossil fuel \r\ncombustion, other environmental impacts include fugitive methane \r\nleakages and implications to water systems. While the rate of \r\nmethane leakage from unconventional gas systems is uncertain, their \r\noverall GHG impact is less than coal (Tanaka et al. 2019; Deetjen and \r\nAzevedo 2020). The stated rate of leakage in such systems ranges from \r\n1-8%, and reconciling different estimates requires a  combination \r\nof top-down and bottom-up approaches (Zavala-Araiza et  al. \r\n2015; Grubert and Brandt 2019). Similarly, for coal mining, fugitive \r\nmethane emissions have grown, despite some regulations on the \r\ndegree to which emission controls must be deployed. Recent IPCC \r\ninventory guidance also notes considerable CO2 emissions resulting \r\nfrom spontaneous combustion of the coal surface, and accounting for \r\nthese emissions will likely increase the overall lifecycle emissions by \r\n1-5% (IPCC 2019; Singh 2019; Fiehn et al. 2020)."


id: efe362cdb84912160aada33c56830824
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39589
content:
"Significant potential exists for gasifying deep-seated coal deposits \r\nin situ to produce hydrogen. Doing so reduces fugitive methane \r\nemissions from underground coal mining. The integration costs \r\nof this process with CCS are less than with natural gas reforming. \r\nThe extent to which coal gasification could be compatible with \r\nlow-carbon energy would depend on the rate of CO2 capture and \r\nthe ultimate use of the gas (Verma and Kumar 2015). Similarly, for \r\nongoing underground mining projects, coal mine methane recovery \r\ncan be economic for major coal producers such as China and India. "


id: 6fb6d46429a294d55f22f72753aee426
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16909
content:
"Another key issue consistently noted with unconventional wells (both \r\noil and gas, and coalbed methane) is the large water requirements \r\n(Qin et  al. 2018). The overall water footprint of unconventional "


id: 788aba8df460fae30ef7080a90629b00
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18407
content:
"enhanced investments in social welfare - through sanitation, water, \r\nclean energy - with differentiating impacts (Edenhofer 2015)."


id: a78f834299d6aa5c5eba012f0af11e7e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26692
content:
"reservoirs is higher than conventional reservoirs because of higher \r\nlateral length and fracturing requirements (Scanlon et  al. 2017; \r\nKondash et al. 2018). Moreover, produced water from such formations \r\nis moderately to highly brackish, and treating such waters has large \r\nenergy consumption (Bartholomew and Mauter 2016; Singh and \r\nColosi 2019)."


id: 8d6c3f994dca8b37432e4f5f89a9ba8e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22064
content:
"Geothermal energy is heat stored in the Earth's subsurface and \r\nis a  renewable resource that can be sustainably exploited. The \r\ngeophysical potential of geothermal resources is 1.3 to 13 times \r\nthe  global electricity demand in 2019 (medium confidence). \r\nGeothermal energy can be used directly for various thermal \r\napplications, including space heating and industrial heat input, \r\nor converted to electricity depending on the source temperature \r\n(Limberger et al. 2018; Moya et al. 2018; REN21 2019)."


id: af5390ea247495072166c848a217d3ed
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28080
content:
"Fossil fuel subsidies have been valued in the order of USD0.5-5 trillion \r\nannually by various estimates which have the tendency to introduce \r\neconomic inefficiency within systems (Jakob et al. 2015; Merrill et al. \r\n2015) (high confidence). Subsequent reforms have been suggested \r\nby different researchers who have estimated reductions in CO2\r\nemissions may take place if these subsidies are removed (Mundaca \r\n2017). Such reforms could create the necessary framework for "


id: 19f7b9b20e7478d137e3e70a368ed858
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1769
content:
"However, with the implementation of modern technologies, geothermal \r\npresents fewer adverse environmental impacts. At the same time, \r\npeople perceive geothermal energy as relatively environmentally \r\nfriendly (Tampakis et al. 2013)."


id: 5a58bc5df1d5faa233ec2558d2da4f65
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13149
content:
"geothermal energy. In Kenya, as of July 2019, geothermal accounted \r\nfor 734 MW effective capacity spread over 10 power plants and \r\napproximately one third of the total installed capacity (Kahlen 2019)."


id: 8eb19a752b966dd801a67b0148166444
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22294
content:
"There are two main types of geothermal resources: convective \r\nhydrothermal resources, in which the Earth's heat is carried by \r\nnatural hot water or steam to the surface; and hot, dry rock \r\nresources, in which heat cannot be extracted using water or steam, \r\nand other methods must be developed. There are three basic types \r\nof geothermal power plants: (i) dry steam plants use steam directly \r\nfrom a  geothermal reservoir to turn generator turbines; (ii) flash \r\nsteam plants take high-pressure hot water from deep inside the Earth \r\nand convert it to steam to drive generator turbines; and (iii) binary \r\ncycle power plants transfer the heat from geothermal hot water to \r\nanother liquid. Many of the power plants in operation today are dry \r\nsteam plants or flash plants (single, double and triple) harnessing \r\ntemperatures of more than 180degC."


id: b9428b2c219403edccb2c9db774970d5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29800
content:
"However, medium temperature fields are increasingly used for \r\nelectricity generation or combined heat and power. The use of medium \r\ntemperature fields has been enabled through the development of \r\nbinary cycle technology, in which a geothermal fluid is used via heat \r\nexchangers. Increasing binary generation technologies are now being \r\nutilised instead of flash steam power plants. This will result in almost \r\n100% injection and essentially zero GHG emissions, although GHG \r\nemissions from geothermal power production are generally small \r\ncompared to traditional baseload thermal energy power generation \r\nfacilities (Fridriksson et al. 2016)."


id: b64e0c93487e54df61f5b80de36ef22e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29290
content:
"Additionally, new technologies are being developed like Enhanced \r\nGeothermal Systems (EGS), which is in the demonstration stage \r\n(IRENA 2018), deep geothermal technology, which may increase the \r\nprospects for harnessing the geothermal potential in a large number \r\nof countries, or shallow-geothermal energy, which represents \r\na promising supply source for heating and cooling buildings (Narsilio \r\nand Aye 2018). Successful large-scale deployment of shallow \r\ngeothermal energy will depend not only on site-specific economic \r\nperformance but also on developing suitable governance frameworks \r\n(Bloemendal et al. 2018; Garcia-Gil et al. 2020). Technologies for direct \r\nuses like district heating, geothermal heat pumps, greenhouses, and \r\nother applications, are widely used and considered mature. Given \r\nthe limited number of plants commissioned, economic indicators \r\n(Figure 6.15) vary considerably depending on site characteristics."


id: 4862600ca153afe6ef4e589b1bad30e7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9949
content:
"Waste-to-energy (WTE) is a strategy to recover energy from waste \r\nin a form of consumable heat, electricity, or fuel (Zhao et al. 2016). \r\nThermal (incineration, gasification, and pyrolysis) and biological \r\n(anaerobic digestion and landfill gas to energy) technologies are \r\ncommonly used (Ahmad et  al. 2020). When WTE technologies \r\nare equipped with proper air pollution reduction facilities they can \r\ncontribute to clean electricity production and reduction of GHG \r\nemissions. However, if not properly operated, they can exacerbate \r\nair quality issues."


id: 1cc55bf6b2e1d0f7e9654e30223a5907
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2245
content:
"Public awareness and knowledge of geothermal energy is relatively low\r\n(high confidence). Geothermal energy is evaluated as less acceptable \r\nthan other renewable energy sources such as solar and wind, but is \r\npreferred over fossil and nuclear energy, and in some studies, over \r\nhydroelectric energy (high confidence) (Pellizzone et  al. 2015; Steel \r\net al. 2015; Karytsas et al. 2019; Hazboun and Boudet 2020). Some \r\npeople are concerned about the installation of geothermal facilities \r\nclose to their homes, similar to solar and wind projects (Pellizzone \r\net al. 2015). The main concerns about geothermal energy, particularly \r\nfor large-scale, high-temperature geothermal power generation plants, \r\ninvolve water usage, water scarcity, and seismic risks of drilling (Dowd \r\net  al. 2011). Moreover, noise, smell and damages to the landscape \r\nhave been reasons for protests against specific projects (Walker 1995). "


id: 93fbfc90f10fe17f93e9b84f2763957a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23237
content:
"In 2019, there were more than 1,200 WTE incineration facilities \r\nworldwide, with estimated capacity of 310 million tonnes per  year \r\n(UNECE 2020). It is estimated that treatment of a  minimum of \r\n261  million tonnes/year of waste could produce 283 TWh (1 EJ) \r\nof power and heat by 2022 (Awasthi et al. 2019). Incineration plants "


id: 4b1f8b5bfa19a2243b25d285c3681e27
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10463
content:
"involving advanced information and communication technologies. \r\nReal-time maintenance of supply-demand balance and sufficient \r\nflexibility technologies such as electricity storage, flexible demand, \r\nand grid forming converters (Strbac et  al. 2015a; Lopez Prol and \r\nSchill 2021) would be increasingly valuable for incorporating larger \r\namounts of VRE generation. This flexibility will be particularly \r\nimportant to deal with sudden losses of supply, for example, due to \r\na failure of a large generator or interconnector or a rapid increase \r\nin demand (Teng et al. 2017; Chamorro et al. 2020)."


id: 4d1dd0327253ba2421297990b537a726
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10841
content:
"The transition to a  digitalised-based electricity system control \r\nparadigm would facilitate radical changes in the security of supply, \r\nmoving from the traditional approach of redundancy in assets to \r\na  smart control paradigm. Advanced control and communication \r\nsystems can significantly reduce the electricity system investment \r\nand operation costs (Harper et al. 2018; Munster et al. 2020)."


id: 6774998892a640890526581a36805272
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15467
content:
"Depending on the origin of the waste used, the integration of WTE \r\nand carbon capture and storage (CCS) could enable waste to be a net\u0002zero or even net negative emissions energy source (Kearns 2019; \r\nWienchol et al. 2020). For example, in Europe only, the integration \r\nof CCS with WTE facilities has the potential to capture about 60 to \r\n70 million tonnes of carbon dioxide annually (Tota et al. 2021)."


id: ca19c157c80b79e2408ed4d49dea5654
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32891
content:
"Integrated whole-system approaches can reduce the costs of \r\nlow-carbon energy system transitions (high confidence). A lack \r\nof flexibility in the electricity system may limit the cost-effective \r\nintegration of technologies as part of broader net-zero energy \r\nsystems. At the same time, the enormous latent flexibility hidden \r\nin heating and cooling, hydrogen, transport, gas systems, and other \r\nenergy systems provides opportunities to take advantage of synergies \r\nand to coordinate operations across systems (Martin et  al. 2017; \r\nZhang et al. 2018; Martinez Cesena and Mancarella 2019; Pavicevic \r\net al. 2020; Bogdanov et al. 2021) (Figure 6.16)."


id: 6316b04346e087df0535a5765917fd32
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14725
content:
"Waste-to-energy is an expensive process compared to other energy \r\nsources such as fossil fuels and natural gas (Mohammadi and \r\nHarjunkoski 2020). However, the environmental and economic \r\nbenefits make its high financial costs justifiable. In 2019, the global \r\nWTE market size was valued at USD31 billion, and it is predicted to \r\nexperience 7.4% annual growth until 2027 (UNECE 2020)."


id: 5f98e953fcb1dbc4f25f69aa3c6c91e3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14129
content:
"Sector coupling can significantly increase system flexibility, driven \r\nby the application of advanced technologies (Clegg and Mancarella \r\n2016; Heinen et al. 2016; Bogdanov et al. 2019; Solomon et al. 2019; \r\nZhang et al. 2019b; Zhang and Fujimori 2020; Zhao et al. 2021). For \r\nexample, district heating infrastructure can generate both heat and \r\npower. Cooling systems and electrified heating systems in buildings \r\ncan provide flexibility through preheating and precooling via thermal \r\nenergy storage (Z. Li et al. 2016; G. Li et al. 2017). System balancing \r\nservices can be provided by electric vehicles (EVs) based on vehicle\u0002to-grid concepts and deferred charging through smart control of \r\nEV batteries without compromising customers' requirements for \r\ntransport (Aunedi and Strbac 2020)."


id: c5b8a3dca71aad8e04b8d46f08856444
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32094
content:
"Greenhouse gases are emitted across all economic activities. \r\nTherefore, cost-effective decarbonisation requires a  'system of \r\nsystems' approach that considers the interaction between different \r\nenergy sectors and systems. Flexibility technologies and advanced \r\ncontrol of integrated energy systems (e.g., considering the interaction \r\nbetween electricity, heating/cooling, gas/hydrogen, transport sectors) \r\ncould reduce energy infrastructure investments substantially in future \r\nlow-carbon energy systems (Strbac et al. 2015b; Jacobson et al. 2019)."


id: c52729cc13f489664997bc6309c651a1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31995
content:
"The electricity grid will serve as a  backbone of future low-carbon \r\nenergy systems. Integration of large amounts of VRE generation \r\n(Hansen et al. 2019), particularly wind and solar generation (Bistline \r\nand Young 2019; Perez et al. 2019), presents economic and technical \r\nchallenges to electricity system management across different time \r\nscales from sub-seconds, hours, days, seasons, to multiple years. \r\nFurthermore, electrification of segments of the transport and heat \r\nsectors could disproportionately increase peak demand relative to \r\nsupply (Bistline et al. 2021). Increases in peak demand may require \r\nreinforcing network infrastructures and generation in the historical \r\npassive system operation paradigm (Strbac et al. 2020)."


id: c89437f616dd26b950e6b7749ec7fc86
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32603
content:
"Hydrogen production processes (power-to-gas and vice versa) \r\nand hydrogen storage can support short-term and long-term \r\nbalancing in the energy systems and enhance resilience (Stephen \r\nand Pierluigi 2016; Strbac et  al. 2020). However, the economic \r\nbenefits of flexible power-to-gas plants, energy storage, and other \r\nflexibility technological and options will depend on the locations of \r\nVRE sources, storage sites, gas, hydrogen, and electricity networks \r\n(Jentsch et al. 2014; Heymann and Bessa 2015; Ameli et al. 2020). \r\nCoordinated operation of gas and electricity systems can bring \r\nsignificant benefits in supplying heat demands. For example, \r\nhybrid heating can eliminate investment in electricity infrastructure \r\nreinforcement by switching to heat pumps in off-peak hours and \r\ngas boilers in peak hours (Fischer et al. 2017; Dengiz et al. 2019; "


id: bf7b4b7bbf458de0f8d1151aee26daf8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30951
content:
"Bistline et al. 2021). The heat required by direct air carbon capture \r\nand storage (DACCS) could be effectively supplied by inherent \r\nheat energy in nuclear plants, enhancing overall system efficiency \r\n(Realmonte et al. 2019)."


id: 1370d4e7f653d13c5acb66caef230435
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 628
content:
"been implemented, but they can be enhanced and deployed more \r\nwidely. Due to their interdependencies and similarities, there can \r\nbe both synergies and conflicts for utilising these flexibility options \r\n(Bistline et al. 2021). It will therefore be important to coordinate the \r\ndeployment of the potential flexibility technologies and smart control \r\nstrategies. Important electricity system flexibility options include \r\nthe following:"


id: b11c751e3b319d574c7d7bed50181a89
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28387
content:
"Flexibility technologies  - including energy storage, demand-side \r\nresponse, flexible/dispatchable generation, grid-forming converters, \r\nand transmission interconnection  - as well as advanced control \r\nsystems - can facilitate cost-effective and secure low-carbon energy \r\nsystems (high confidence). Flexibility technologies have already "


id: 193fda011363c6a15bfb9a736453f5ad
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1657
content:
"drive system operation and future design, increasing overall system \r\nefficiency and security of supply while reducing emissions without \r\nsacrificing users' privacy (Andoni et al. 2019; Ahl et al. 2020). When \r\ndeployed with smart contracts, this concept will be suitable for \r\nenergy systems involving many participants, where a prerequisite is \r\ndigitalisation (e.g., smart meters, end-use demand control systems) \r\n(Juhar and Khaled 2018; Teufel et al. 2019)."


id: f067219010b6afbf92a4cdac3db61ed4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39676
content:
"New sources of flexibility and advanced control systems provide \r\na significant opportunity to reduce low-carbon energy system costs \r\nby enhancing operating efficiency and reducing energy infrastructure \r\nand low-carbon generation investments, while continuing to meet \r\nsecurity requirements (high confidence). In the USA, for example, one \r\nstudy found that flexibility in buildings alone could reduce US CO2\r\nemissions by 80 Mt yr-1 and save USD18 billion yr-1 in electricity \r\nsystem costs by 2030 (Satchwell et al. 2021). Key means for creating \r\nsavings are associated with the following:"


id: b68474080c8af4a3b0d637636819acea
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29320
content:
"The transition to advanced data-driven control of energy system \r\noperations (Cremer et  al. 2019; Sun et  al. 2019a) will require \r\nadvanced information and communication technologies and \r\ninfrastructure, including the internet, wireless networks, computers, \r\nsoftware, middleware, smart sensors, internet of things components, \r\nand dedicated technological developments (Hossein Motlagh et al. \r\n2020). The transition will raise standardisation and cyber-security \r\nissues, given that digitalisation can become a single point of failure \r\nfor the complete system (Ustun and Hussain 2019; Unsal et al. 2021). \r\nImplementing peer-to-peer energy trading based on blockchain is \r\nexpected to be one of the key elements of next-generation electricity \r\nsystems (Qiu et  al. 2021). This trading will enable consumers to "


id: a2ba58de26dc06b1ee4040182bbd3302
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25845
content:
"Table 6.5 | Suitability of low-carbon energy storage technologies, in terms of the grid services they can provide, and overall features such as technology \r\nmaturity: where Low represents an emerging technology; Med represents a maturing technology; and High a fully mature technology. The opportunity for \r\nthe cost of a technology to reduce over the next decade is represented by Low, Med and High and the lifetime of installations by: Long, for projects lasting more than 25 years; \r\nMed for those lasting 15-25 years; Short, for those lasting less than 15 years. "


id: 38aac1251629a827c1c49e720b7a24ee
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7174
content:
"Note: PHS - Pumped Hydroelectric Storage; CAES - Compressed Air Energy Storage; LAES - Liquid Air Energy Storage; TES - Thermal Energy Storage; FES - Flywheel Energy \r\nStorage; LIB - Li-ion Batteries; Scap - Supercapacitors; RFB - Redox Flow Batteries; RHFC - Reversible Hydrogen Fuel Cells; PtX - Power to fuels. Source: PHS - Barbour et al. \r\n2016, Yang 2016, IRENA 2017b; CAES - Luo et al. 2014, Brandon et al. 2015, IRENA 2017b; LAES - Luo et al. 2014, Highview 2019; TES - Brandon et al. 2015, Gallo et al. \r\n2016, Smallbone et al. 2017; FES - IRENA 2017b, Yulong et al. 2017; LIB - IRENA 2015b, Hammond and Hazeldine 2015, Nykvist and Nilsson 2015, Staffell, I. and Rustomji, \r\nM. et al. 2016, IRENA 2017b, Schmidt et al. 2017c, May et al. 2018; Scap - Brandon et al. 2015, Gur 2018; RFB - IRENA 2017b; RHFC - IEA 2015, Gur 2018."


id: ba058d4c007b60a4a076b1ba7b32921c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29950
content:
"upgrades can thus be reduced (upgrade deferral), meaning that \r\nless low-carbon generation will need to be built while still reducing \r\nemissions. In the event of an outage, energy storage reserves can keep \r\ncritical services running (islanding) and restart the grid (black start). \r\nThe ability to store and release energy as required provides a range \r\nof market opportunities for buying and selling of energy (arbitrage)."


id: 4ee497410abc1025c57271055cced66f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11160
content:
"reducing investment costs in backup generation, interconnection, \r\ntransmission, and distribution network upgrades (high confidence). \r\nEnergy system decarbonisation relies on increased electrification \r\n(Section  6.6.2.3). Meeting increasing demands with variable \r\nrenewable sources presents challenges and could lead to costly \r\ninfrastructure reinforcements. Energy storage enables electricity from \r\nvariable renewables to be matched against evolving demands across \r\nboth time and space, using short-, medium- and long-term storage of \r\nexcess energy for delivery later or at a different location. In 2017, an \r\nestimated 4.67 TWh (0.017 EJ) of electricity storage was in operation \r\nglobally (IRENA 2017b). If the integration of renewables is doubled \r\nfrom 2014 levels by 2030, the total capacity of global electricity \r\nstorage could triple, reaching 11.89-15.27 TWh (0.043-0.055 EJ) \r\n(IRENA 2017b)."


id: 539837d587ad0bbd8a6ad7d157e5b3e7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11980
content:
"No single, sufficiently mature energy storage technology can \r\nprovide all the required grid services - a portfolio of complementary \r\ntechnologies working together can provide the optimum solution \r\n(high confidence). Different energy storage technologies can \r\nprovide these services and support cost-effective energy system \r\ndecarbonisation (Carbon Trust 2016). To achieve very low-carbon \r\nsystems, significant volumes of storage will be required (Strbac \r\net  al. 2015a; Section  6.4.3.2). There are few mature global supply \r\nchains for many of the less-developed energy storage technologies. \r\nThis means that, although costs today may be relatively high, \r\nthere are significant opportunities for future cost reductions, both \r\nthrough technology innovation and through manufacturing scale. \r\nAdding significant amounts of storage will reduce the price variation \r\nand, therefore, the profitability of additional and existing storage, \r\nincreasing investment risk."


id: ce5ff0662356105e965256ba7f470fd9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33649
content:
"Energy storage technologies can provide a  range of different grid \r\nservices (Table 6.5). Energy storage enhances security of supply by \r\nproviding real-time system regulation services (voltage support, \r\nfrequency regulation, fast reserve, and short-term reserve). A greater \r\nproportion of variable renewable sources reduces system inertia, \r\nrequiring more urgent responses to changes in system frequency, \r\nwhich rapid response storage technologies can provide (stability \r\nrequires responses within sub-second time scale for provision \r\nof frequency and voltage control services). Energy storage also \r\nprovides intermittent renewable sources with flexibility, allowing \r\nthem to contribute a  greater proportion of electrical energy and \r\navoiding curtailment (capacity firming). Investment costs in backup \r\ngeneration, interconnection, transmission, and distribution network "


id: 13485c20697a20abc7f9b28f7b39732
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 604
content:
"Energy storage extends beyond electricity storage and includes \r\ntechnologies that can store energy as heat, cold, and both liquid and \r\ngaseous fuels. Energy storage is a conversion technology, enabling \r\nenergy to be converted from one form to another. This diversification \r\nimproves the overall resilience of energy systems, with each system "


id: b465636cce13ec871dd7d79719138ebc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28974
content:
"through turbines to recharge it (Kougias et al. 2019). Using a similar \r\nconcept, underground siting in abandoned mines and caverns could \r\nbe developed reasonably quickly (IEA 2020h). Storage of energy as \r\ngravitational potential can also be implemented using materials \r\nother than water, such as rocks and sand. Pumped technology is \r\na mature technology (Rehman et al. 2015; Barbour et al. 2016) and \r\ncan be important in supporting the transition to future low-carbon \r\nelectricity grids (IHA 2021)."


id: 68fc91ce04dec367712327c589e393bd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15742
content:
"being able to cover supply shortfalls in the others. For example, \r\nstorage can support the electrification of heating or cooling, as well \r\nas transport through electric vehicles, powered by batteries or by fuel \r\ncells. Storage significantly reduces the need for costly reinforcement \r\nof local distribution networks through smart charging schemes and \r\nthe ability to flow electricity back to the grid (e.g., through vehicle\u0002to-grid). By capturing otherwise wasted energy streams, such as heat \r\nor cold, energy storage improves the efficiency of many systems, such \r\nas buildings, data centres and industrial processes."


id: 72b34f83a56a1cb987953ef33942a3c4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17422
content:
"Pumped hydroelectric storage (PHS). PHS makes use of \r\ngravitational potential energy, using water as the medium. Water \r\nis pumped into an elevated reservoir using off-peak electricity and \r\nstored for later release when electricity is needed. These closed-loop \r\nhydropower plants have been in use for decades and account for 97% \r\nof worldwide electricity storage capacity (IRENA 2017b; IEA 2018b).\r\nPHS is best suited to balancing daily energy needs at a large scale, \r\nand advances in the technology now allow rapid response and power \r\nregulation in both generating and pumping mode (Valavi and Nysveen \r\n2018; Dong et al. 2019; Kougias et al. 2019). The construction itself \r\ncan cause disruption to the local community and environment (Hayes \r\net al. 2019), the initial investment is costly, and extended construction \r\nperiods delay return on investment (Section  6.4.2.3). In addition, \r\nlocations for large-scale PHS plants are limited."


id: 401ac4337ea69284c08c834462337ee1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8465
content:
"Drawbacks of batteries include relatively short lifespans and the \r\nuse of hazardous or costly materials in some variants. While LIB \r\ncosts are decreasing (Schmidt et  al. 2017; Vartiainen et  al. 2020), \r\nthe risk of thermal runaway, which could ignite a fire (Gur 2018; \r\nWang et al. 2019a), concerns about long-term resource availability \r\n(Olivetti et  al. 2017; Sun et  al. 2017), and concerns about global \r\ncradle-to-grave impacts (Peters et al. 2017; Kallitsis et al. 2020) need \r\nto be addressed."


id: f81aae96bb2048b0d9162f97d1c3b9ee
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41024
content:
"Advanced pump-turbines are being developed, allowing both \r\nreversible and variable-speed operation, supporting frequency control \r\nand grid stability with improved round-trip efficiencies (Ardizzon \r\net al. 2014). New possibilities are being explored for small-scale PHS \r\ninstallations and expanding the potential for siting (Kougias et  al. \r\n2019). For example, in underwater PHS, the upper reservoir is the \r\nsea, and the lower is a hollow deposit at the seabed. Seawater is \r\npumped out of the deposit to store off-peak energy and re-enters "


id: 28ab1c21a7ad7132c0b390dfe18f8b17
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4367
content:
"Table 6.6 | Technical characteristics of a selected range of battery chemistries, categorised as those which precede LIBs (white background), LIBs (yellow \r\nbackground) and post LIBs (blue background)."


id: 30f07875f83a7db776b37d5199fde761
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5864
content:
"Note: With the exception of the All-solid-state batteries, all use liquid electrolytes. Source: a Mahmoudzadeh et al. 2017; b Manzetti and Mariasiu 2015; c Placke et al. 2017; d\r\n Nykvist and Nilsson 2015; e Cano et al. 2018; f Bloomberg Energy Finance, 2019; g You and Manthiram 2017; h Fotouhi et al. 2017; i IRENA 2017b; j Yang et al. 2020."


id: 9d65d32f9dbaabe5edb0297ce4917412
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24926
content:
"LAES provides bulk daily storage of electricity, with the additional \r\nadvantage of being able to capture waste heat from industrial \r\nprocesses. This technology is in the early commercial stage (Brandon \r\net al. 2015; Regen 2017). Advances in whole systems integration can be \r\ndeveloped to integrate LAES with industrial processes, making use of \r\ntheir waste heat streams. LAES uniquely removes contaminants in the \r\nair and could potentially incorporate CO2 capture (Taylor et al. 2012)."


id: 72c6239d7a8724395cde3580faf2817f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17436
content:
"Compressed air energy storage (CAES). With CAES, off-peak \r\nelectricity is used to compress air in a  reservoir  - either in salt \r\ncaverns for large-scale or in high-pressure tanks for smaller-scale \r\ninstallations. The air is later released to generate electricity. While \r\nconventional CAES has used natural gas to power compression, \r\nnew low-carbon CAES technologies, such as isothermal or adiabatic \r\nCAES, control thermal losses during compression and expansion \r\n(Wang et  al. 2017c). Fast responses and higher efficiencies occur \r\nin small-scale CAES installations, scalable to suit the application \r\nas a  distributed energy store, offering a  flexible, low-maintenance \r\nalternative (Luo et al. 2014; Venkataramani et al. 2016)."


id: 9e8b9e2c331c14c2b6782deeddd1ff86
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25120
content:
"TES can be much cheaper than batteries and has the unique ability to \r\ncapture and reuse waste heat and cold, enabling the efficiency of many \r\nindustrial, buildings, and domestic processes to be greatly improved \r\n(high confidence). Integration of TES into energy systems is particularly \r\nimportant, as the global demand for cooling is expected to grow (Elzinga \r\net al. 2014; Peters and Sievert 2016). Sensible TES is well developed \r\nand widely used; latent TES is less developed with few applications. \r\nThermochemical TES is the least developed, with no application yet \r\n(Prieto et al. 2016; Clark et al. 2020). The potential for high-density \r\nstorage of industrial heat for long periods in thermochemical TES \r\n(Brandon et  al. 2015) is high, with energy densities comparable to \r\nthat of batteries (Taylor et al. 2012), but material costs are currently \r\nprohibitive, ranging from hundreds to thousands of dollars per tonne."


id: 3a0ec368eab732dee83936a5396ffe67
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7427
content:
"CAES is a mature technology in use since the 1970s. Although CAES \r\ntechnologies have been developed, there are not many installations at \r\npresent (Wang et al. 2017b; Blanc et al. 2020). While the opportunities \r\nfor CAES are significant, with a global geological storage potential of \r\nabout 6.5 PW (Aghahosseini and Breyer 2018), a significant amount \r\nof initial investment is required. Higher efficiencies and energy \r\ndensities can be achieved by exploiting the hydrostatic pressure of \r\ndeep water to compress air within submersible reservoirs (Pimm \r\net al. 2014). CAES is best suited to bulk diurnal electricity storage for \r\nbuffering VRE sources and services, which do not need a very rapid \r\nresponse. In contrast to PHS, CAES has far more siting options and \r\nposes few environmental impacts."


id: 2909581ed0fbaded3a8368c38304c345
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4429
content:
"Flywheel energy storage (FES). Flywheels are charged by \r\naccelerating a rotor/flywheel. Energy is stored in the spinning rotor's \r\ninertia which is only decelerated by friction (minimised by magnetic \r\nbearings in a vacuum), or by contact with a mechanical, electric motor. \r\nThey can reach full charge very rapidly, their state of charge can be \r\neasily determined (Amiryar and Pullen 2017), and they operate over \r\na  wide range of temperatures. While they are more expensive to \r\ninstall than batteries and supercapacitors, they last a long time and \r\nare best suited to stationary grid storage, providing high power for \r\nshort periods (minutes). Flywheels can be used in vehicles, but not as \r\nthe primary energy source."


id: 5079ea94dbb1784503f7e37537b45eb8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11434
content:
"Liquid air energy storage (LAES). LAES uses electricity to \r\nliquefy air by cooling it to -196degC and storing it in this condensed \r\nform (largely liquid nitrogen) in large, insulated tanks. To release \r\nelectricity, the 'liquid air' is evaporated through heating, expanding \r\nto drive gas turbines. Low-grade waste heat can be utilised, providing \r\nopportunities for integrating with industrial processes to increase \r\nsystem efficiency. There are clear, exploitable synergies with the \r\nexisting liquid gas infrastructure (Peters and Sievert 2016)."


id: 4a558a6befa47f89212aa25cddd84d53
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10318
content:
"Flywheels are a relatively mature storage technology but not widely \r\nused, despite their many advantages over electrochemical storage \r\n(Dragoni 2017). Conventional flywheels require costly, high tensile \r\nstrength materials, but high-energy flywheels, using lightweight \r\nrotor materials, are being developed (Hedlund et al. 2015; Amiryar \r\nand Pullen 2017)."


id: d590e93f5a679f6e4d9728a999ac1bde
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34885
content:
"storage to produce electricity again (Bogdanov et al. 2019) due to \r\nthe low roundtrip efficiency of converting electricity to fuel and \r\nback again. However, portable fuels (hydrogen, methane, ammonia, \r\nsynthetic hydrocarbons) are useful in certain applications, for \r\nexample, in energy systems lacking the potential for renewables. \r\nThe high energy density of chemical storage is essential for more \r\ndemanding applications, such as transporting heavy goods and \r\nheating or cooling buildings (IEA 2020h). Research is needed into \r\nmore efficient and flexible electrolysers which last longer and cost \r\nless (Brandon et al. 2015)."


id: 77f21ec2bf6313f1cc05c0d1a7d6abb7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18305
content:
"Supercapacitors  - also known as ultracapacitors or double \r\nlayer capacitors (Scap). Supercapacitors consist of a  porous \r\nseparator sandwiched between two electrodes, immersed in \r\na  liquid electrolyte (Gur 2018). When a  voltage is applied across \r\nthe electrodes, ions in the electrolyte form electric double layers at \r\nthe  electrode surfaces, held by electrostatic forces. This structure \r\nforms a capacitor, storing electrical charge (Brandon et al. 2015; Lin \r\net al. 2017) and can operate from -40degC to 65degC."


id: 7be35680b1a5378a9b1c56a37e5f8cb9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19006
content:
"Supercapacitors can supply high peaks of power very rapidly for \r\nshort periods (seconds up to minutes) and are able to fulfil the \r\ngrid requirements for frequency regulation, but they would need \r\nto be hybridised with batteries for automotive applications. Their \r\ncommercial status is limited by costly materials and additional \r\npower electronics required to stabilise their output (Brandon et al. \r\n2015). Progress in this area includes the development of high-energy \r\nsupercapacitors, LIB-supercapacitor devices (Gonzalez et  al. 2016), \r\nand cheaper materials (Wang et al. 2017a), all providing the potential \r\nto improve the economic case for supercapacitors, either by reducing \r\nmanufacturing costs or extending their service portfolio."


id: c715e4a2405cece38b26b70d5707273e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32346
content:
"Redox flow batteries (RFB). Redox flow batteries use two separate \r\nelectrolyte solutions, usually liquids, but solid or gaseous forms may \r\nalso be involved, stored in separate tanks, and pumped over or through \r\nelectrode stacks during charge and discharge, with an ion-conducting \r\nmembrane separating the liquids. The larger the tank, the greater the \r\nenergy storage capacity, whereas more and larger cells in the stack \r\nincrease the power of the flow battery. This decoupling of energy from \r\npower enables RFB installations to be uniquely tailored to suit the \r\nrequirements of any given application. There are two commercially \r\navailable types today: vanadium and zinc bromide, and both operate \r\nat near ambient temperatures, incurring minimal operational costs."


id: 4699da16ff5282024b618f1cf677d7e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9625
content:
"Hydrogen can play an important role in reducing emissions and has \r\nbeen shown to be the most cost-effective option in some cases, as it \r\nbuilds on existing systems (Staffell et al. 2018). Fuel cell costs need to \r\nbe reduced and the harmonies between hydrogen and complementary \r\ntechnologies, such as batteries, for specific applications need to be \r\nexplored further. Hydrogen can provide long-duration storage to \r\ndeal with prolonged extreme events, such as very low output of \r\nwind generation, to support resilience of future low-carbon energy \r\nsystems. Research in this technology focuses on improving roundtrip \r\nefficiencies, which can be as high as 80% with recycled waste heat \r\nand in high-pressure electrolysers, incorporating more efficient \r\ncompression (Matos et al. 2019). Photo-electrolysis uses solar energy \r\nto directly generate hydrogen from water (Amirante et al. 2017)."


id: e16502025eb17466a3d30a8148f49021
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36919
content:
"RFBs respond rapidly and can perform all the same services as LIBs, \r\nexcept for onboard electricity for EVs. Lower cost chemistries are \r\nemerging, to enable cost-effective bulk energy storage (Brandon \r\net al. 2015). A new membrane-free design eliminates the need for \r\na separator and also halves the system requirements, as the chemical \r\nreactions can coexist in a single electrolyte solution (Navalpotro et al. \r\n2017; Arenas et al. 2018)."


id: b53703845b2850e89eb0dc1617d2184d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29121
content:
"Power to fuels (PtX) (see also Section 6.4.3.1). The process of using \r\nelectricity to generate a gaseous fuel, such as hydrogen or ammonia, \r\nis termed power-to-gas (PtG/P2G) (IEA 2020h). When injected into \r\nthe existing gas infrastructure (Section 6.4.5), it has the added benefit \r\nof decarbonising gas (Brandon et al. 2015). Electricity can be used \r\nto generate hydrogen, which is then converted back into electricity \r\nusing combined-cycle gas turbines that have been converted to run \r\non hydrogen. For greater compatibility with existing gas systems \r\nand appliances, the hydrogen can be combined with captured \r\ncarbon dioxide to form methane and other synthetic fuels (Thema \r\net al. 2019), however, methane has high global warming potential \r\nand its supply chain emissions have been found to be significant \r\n(Balcombe et al. 2013)."


id: 4868e5f92d3e86bc276c094128a6253d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9952
content:
"Public awareness and knowledge about electricity storage \r\ntechnologies, their current state, and their potential role in future \r\nenergy systems is limited (Jones et  al. 2018). For instance, people \r\ndo not perceive energy system flexibility and storage as a significant \r\nissue, or assume storage is already taking place. Public perceptions \r\ndiffer across storage technologies. Hydrogen is considered a modern \r\nand clean technology, but people also have safety concerns. \r\nMoreover, the public is uncertain about hydrogen storage size and \r\nthe possibility of storing hydrogen in or near residential areas (Eitan \r\nand Fischhendler 2021). Battery storage both on the household and \r\ncommunity level was perceived as slightly positive in one study in the \r\nUK (Ambrosio-Albala et al. 2020). However, financial costs are seen "


id: 6a76e1e614d19cb0f8347c658b4217e3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16009
content:
"PtX can provide all required grid services, depending on how it is \r\nintegrated. However, a  significant amount of PtX is required for "


id: c9e34b3619c0f2057d4de003ea704df6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32846
content:
"as a main barrier. The potential of EV batteries to function as flexible \r\nstorage is limited by the current numbers of EV owners and concerns \r\nthat one's car battery might not be fully loaded when needed."


id: c18b1757ca462474a17f115d5cf14f48
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31355
content:
"Low- or zero-carbon produced hydrogen is not currently competitive \r\nfor large-scale applications, but it is likely to have a significant role \r\nin future energy systems, due to its wide-range of applications \r\n(high confidence). Key challenges for hydrogen are: (i) cost-effective \r\nlow/zero carbon production; (ii) delivery infrastructure cost; \r\n(iii)  land area (i.e., 'footprint') requirements of hydrogen pipelines, \r\ncompressor stations, and other infrastructure; (iv) challenges in using \r\nexisting pipeline infrastructure; (v) maintaining hydrogen purity; \r\n(vi) minimising hydrogen leakage; and (vii) the cost and performance \r\nof end uses. Furthermore, it is necessary to consider the public \r\nperception and social acceptance of hydrogen technologies and their \r\nrelated infrastructure requirements (Iribarren et al. 2016; Scott and \r\nPowells 2020)."


id: 53bcb403f6118da9bb28e8b995cd6b97
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12001
content:
"The linkage between energy supply and distribution, on the one hand, \r\nand energy use on the other is facilitated by various mechanisms \r\nfor transporting energy. As the energy system evolves, the way that \r\nenergy is transported will also evolve."


id: fb67f6df16fc9dc2c249cddfbc19cd20
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41604
content:
"Table 6.7 | Key performance and cost characteristics of different non-electric hydrogen production technologies, including carbon capture and storage (CCS)."


id: 455b2f7a2cb8089646ff34e193289987
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9423
content:
"Source: a CSIRO 2021; b IEA 2020; c IRENA 2019; d Hydrogen Council 2020; e CCC 2018; f BEIS 2021; g Ishaq et al. 2021; h Al-Mahtani et al. 2021; i IEA 2019.\r\n* USD per GBP exchange rate: 0.72 (August 2021); LHV: Lower Heating Values; Long-term refers to 2040 and 2050 according to different references."


id: 442d8e979536644565ac7fed6d487955
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9231
content:
"Table 6.8 | Efficiency and cost characteristics of electrolysis technologies for hydrogen production."


id: c02c0262a18a95776d37d58d98d020b4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31106
content:
"Source: a CSIRO 2021; b IEA 2020; c IRENA 2019; d Hydrogen Council 2020; e CCC 2018; f BEIS 2021; g IEA 2019; h Christensen 2020.\r\n* USD per GBP exchange rate: 0.72 (August 2021); +\r\n The cost of hydrogen production from electrolysers is highly dependent on the technology, source of electricity, and \r\noperating hours, and some values provided are based on the assumptions made in the references."


id: fc1344fc868cbc981c594dc5a7f2296
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41710
content:
"technologies (Afif et  al. 2016) could play a  major role in forming \r\na hydrogen and/or ammonia economy to support decarbonisation. \r\nHowever, there are serious concerns regarding the ability to safely \r\nuse ammonia for all these purposes, given its toxicity  - whereas \r\nhydrogen is not considered toxic."


id: 4e96225c57fe3e832cec2fcefdd67771
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11097
content:
"Hydrogen can even be produced by pyrolysis of methane (Sanchez\u0002Bastardo et al. 2020) - sometimes called 'turquoise' hydrogen, solar \r\nthermochemical water splitting, biological hydrogen production \r\n(cyanobacteria) (Velazquez Abad and Dodds 2017) - and microbes \r\nthat use light to make hydrogen (under research) (EIA 2020)."


id: ccb0d738e3d98e2658a42da8903f2db5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33337
content:
"Long-distance hydrogen transport. Hydrogen can allow regional \r\nintegration and better utilisation of low- or zero-carbon energy \r\nsources (Boxes 6.9 and 6.10). Hydrogen produced from renewables \r\nor other low-carbon sources in one location could be transported for \r\nuse elsewhere (Philibert 2017; Ameli et al. 2020). Depending on the \r\ndistance to the user and specific energy carrier utilised (e.g., gaseous \r\nhydrogen or LOHC), various hydrogen transport infrastructures, \r\ndistribution systems, and storage facilities would be required (Hansen \r\n2020; Schonauer and Glanz 2021) (Figure 6.17)."


id: fd7575aa4257328a0be6f9422c22943a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41947
content:
"Figure 6.17 | Hydrogen value chain. Hydrogen can be produced by various means and input and fuel sources. These processes have different emissions \r\nimplications. Hydrogen can be transported by various means and in various forms, and it can be stored in bulk for longer-term use. It also has multiple potential end uses. \r\nCHP: Combined heat and power."


id: 145fe64cc5239a4e0c9fa40019c539a8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 804
content:
"low-pressure gas distribution pipes are being converted from iron to \r\nplastic (Committee on Climate Change 2018). In the Netherlands, an \r\nexisting low-pressure 12 km natural gas pipeline has been used for \r\ntransporting hydrogen (Dohi et al. 2016)."


id: a9b48f79ad7d7215f4c6ed4f744cf02c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27078
content:
"Intra-regional hydrogen transportation. Within a country or region, \r\nhydrogen would likely be pressurised and delivered as compressed \r\ngas. About three times as much compressed hydrogen by volume is \r\nrequired to supply the same amount of energy as natural gas. Security \r\nof supply is therefore more challenging in hydrogen networks than \r\nin natural gas networks. Storing hydrogen in pipelines (linepack) \r\nwould be important to maintaining security of supply (Ameli et  al. \r\n2017, 2019). Due to the physics of hydrogen, in most cases exiting \r\ngas infrastructure would need to be upgraded to transport hydrogen. \r\nTransporting hydrogen in medium- or high-pressure networks most \r\noften would require reinforcements in compressor stations and \r\npipeline construction routes (Dohi et al. 2016). There are several recent \r\nexamples of efforts to transport hydrogen by pipeline. For example, \r\nin the Iron Mains Replacement Programme in the UK, the existing "


id: 51a08ecdccb53e4f4b40fabe121709d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11639
content:
"To bypass gas infrastructure in transporting hydrogen, methane can \r\nbe transported using the existing gas infrastructure, while hydrogen \r\ncan be produced close to the demand centres. This approach will only \r\nmake sense if the methane is produced in a manner that captures \r\ncarbon from the atmosphere and/or if CCS is used when the methane \r\nis used to produce hydrogen."


id: d4e839551436fe45880706ff99d8fc8b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34774
content:
"Bulk hydrogen storage. Currently, hydrogen is stored in bulk in \r\nchemical processes such as metal and chemical hydrides as well as "


id: 94b107c4d4f1a610e309f47368bedd99
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23364
content:
"2021 that would connect 10 GW of PVs in the north of Australia \r\nvia a 4500 km 3 GW HVDC cable to Singapore, suggesting that this \r\nwould be cost effective (Sun Cable 2021). In September 2019, the \r\nChangji-Guquan +-1,100 kV UHVDC transmission project built by \r\nState Grid Corporation of China was officially completed and put \r\ninto operation. The transmission line is able to transmit up to 12 GW \r\nover 3341 km (Pei et al. 2020). This is the UHVDC transmission project \r\nwith the highest voltage level, the largest transmission capacity, and \r\nthe longest transmission distance in the world (Liu 2015)."


id: 20c89ff95a01b3bca1908df87321b51d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2987
content:
"in geologic caverns (Andersson and Gronkvist 2019; Caglayan et al. \r\n2019) (e.g.,  salt caverns operate in Sweden) (Elberry et  al. 2021). \r\nThere are still many challenges, however, due to salt or hard rock \r\ngeologies, large size, and minimum pressure requirements of the sites \r\n(IEA 2019c). Consequently, alternative carbon-free energy carriers, \r\nwhich store hydrogen, may become more attractive (Lan et al. 2012; \r\nKobayashi et al. 2019)."


id: 941ce145ba658096f118c1cf0e519d28
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23263
content:
"Other technologies that could expand the size of transmission \r\ncorridors and/or improve the operational characteristics include low\u0002frequency AC transmission (LFAC) (Y. Tang et al. 2021; Xiang et al. \r\n2021) and half-wave AC transmission (HWACT) (Song et  al. 2018; \r\nXu et al. 2019). LFAC is technically feasible, but the circumstances \r\nin which it is the best economic choice compared to HVDC or \r\nHVAC still needs to be established (Xiang et  al. 2016). HWACT is \r\nrestricted to very long distances, and it has not been demonstrated \r\nin practice, so its feasibility is unproven. There are still a number of \r\ntechnological challenges for long-distance transmission networks \r\nsuch as protection systems for DC or hybrid AC-DC networks (Chaffey \r\n2016; Franck C. et al. 2017), improvement in cabling technology, and \r\nincluding the use of superconductors and nanocomposites (Ballarino \r\net al. 2016; Doukas 2019), which require advanced solutions."


id: aa7e4e44a74debc07e8dbfced7a3f86e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27218
content:
"Challenges, barriers, and recommendations. The main challenge \r\nto inter-regional transmission is the absence of appropriate market \r\ndesigns and regulatory and policy frameworks. In addition, there \r\nare commercial barriers for further enhancement of cross-border \r\ntransmission. The differing impacts of cross-border interconnections \r\non costs and revenues for generation companies in different regions \r\ncould delay the development of these interconnectors. It is not \r\nyet clear how the investment cost of interconnections should be \r\nallocated and recovered, although there is growing support for \r\nallocating costs in accordance with the benefits delivered to the \r\nmarket participants. Increased cross-border interconnection may \r\nalso require new business models which provide incentives for \r\ninvestment and efficient operation, manage risks and uncertainties, \r\nand facilitate coordinated planning and governance (Poudineh and \r\nRubino 2017)."


id: 9365ca03582884eaa72a1aff49e5e8ba
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23138
content:
"A number of studies have demonstrated the cost benefits of \r\ninterconnected grids in a range of geographical settings, including \r\nacross the USA (Bloom et  al. 2020), Europe (Newbery et  al. 2013; \r\nCluet et al. 2020), between Australia and parts of Asia (Halawa et al. \r\n2018), and broader global regions, for example between the Middle \r\nEast and Europe or North Africa and Europe (Tsoutsos et al. 2015). \r\nWhile there is growing interest in interconnection among different \r\nregions or continents, a broad range of geopolitical and socio-techno\u0002economic challenges would need to be overcome to support this \r\nlevel of international cooperation and large-scale network expansion \r\n(Bertsch et al. 2017; Palle 2021)."


id: d5dbec4de6fd7e30bda08cca868f690a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34939
content:
"Optimising the design and operation of the interconnected \r\ntransmission system, both onshore and offshore grids, also requires \r\nmore integrated economic and reliability approaches (Moreno et al. \r\n2012) to ensure the optimal balance between the economics and the \r\nprovision of system security while maximising the benefits of smart \r\nnetwork technologies."


id: 2c3e51332912636e494eb872920357b5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5049
content:
"A wide range of factors, including generation profiles, demand \r\nprofiles circuit losses, reliability characteristics, and maintenance, as \r\nwell as the uncertainties around them will need to be considered in \r\ndesigning and operating long-distance transmission systems if they \r\nare to be widely deployed (Djapic et al. 2008; Du 2009; De Sa and Al \r\nZubaidy 2011; E3G 2021). Public support for extending transmission \r\nsystems will also be crucial, and studies indicate that such support is \r\nfrequently low (Vince 2010; Perlaviciute et al. 2018)."


id: aaafd52cf757ecd2c747609ce2b189c5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27252
content:
"Status of electricity transmission technology. Long-distance \r\nelectricity transmission technologies are already available. High \r\nvoltage alternating current (HVAC), high-voltage direct current \r\n(HVDC), and ultra HVDC (UHVDC) technologies are well-established \r\nand widely used for bulk electricity transmission (Alassi et al. 2019). \r\nHVDC is used with underground cables or long-distance overhead \r\nlines (typically voltages between 100-800 kV) (Alassi et  al. 2019) \r\nwhere HVAC is infeasible or not economic. A project development \r\nagreement, worth approximately USD17 billion, was signed in January "


id: e39169b6b1f498d67cddab31d7e97f94
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37331
content:
"options that enable or inhibit their adoption (high confidence). \r\nGeographic location and climate factors may make some technologies, \r\nsuch as solar PV or solar water heaters, impractical (Chang et al. 2009). \r\nCulture can inhibit efficient use of home heating or PV (Sovacool and \r\nGriffiths 2020), low-carbon diets (Dubois et al. 2019), and advanced \r\nfuel choices (Van Der Kroon et  al. 2013). Also, favourable financial \r\nconditions promote the uptake of PV (Wolske and Stern 2018), good \r\nfacilities increase recycling (Geiger et al. 2019), and vegetarian meal \r\nsales increase when more vegetarian options are offered."


id: 8545f80201646c3316075a884257dea9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20587
content:
"Demand-side measures are fundamental to an integrated approach \r\nto low-carbon energy systems (high confidence). Mitigation options, \r\nsuch as wind parks, CCS, and nuclear power plants, may not be \r\nimplemented when actors oppose these options. Further, end \r\nusers, including consumers, governments, businesses and industry, \r\nwould need to adopt the relevant options, and then use these as \r\nintended; user adoption can be a key driver to scale up markets for \r\nlow-carbon technologies. This section discusses which factors shape \r\nthe likelihood that end users engage in relevant mitigation actions, \r\nfocusing on consumers; strategies to promote mitigation actions are \r\ndiscussed in Section 6.7.6.1."


id: 4212d1eef817ce64206b2588d170ea2a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8821
content:
"Mitigation actions are more likely when individuals feel capable to \r\nadopt them (Pisano and Lubell 2017; Geiger et al. 2019), which may \r\ndepend on income and knowledge. Low-income groups may lack \r\nresources to invest in refurbishments and energy-efficient technology \r\nwith high upfront costs (Chang et al. 2009; Andrews-Speed and Ma \r\n2016; Wolske and Stern 2018). Yet, higher-income groups can afford \r\nmore carbon-intensive lifestyles (Golley and Meng 2012; Frederiks \r\net al. 2015; Wiedenhofer et al. 2017; Namazkhan et al. 2019; Santillan \r\nVera and de la Vega Navarro 2019; Mi et al. 2020). Knowledge of the \r\ncauses and consequences of climate change and of ways to reduce \r\nGHG emissions is not always accurate, but lack of knowledge is not \r\na main barrier to mitigation actions (Boudet 2019)."


id: fab91786dad59f6e15ae521c4825a765
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41488
content:
"A wide range of actions of end users would reduce carbon emissions \r\nin energy systems (Abrahamse et  al. 2007; Dietz 2013; Hackmann \r\net al. 2014; Creutzig et al. 2018; Grubler et al. 2018), including:"


id: 758567fb8154b415834ec0373e532e8d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17904
content:
"Motivation to engage in mitigation action, reflecting individuals' \r\nreasons for actions, depends on general goals that people strive for \r\nin their life (i.e., values). People who strongly value protecting the \r\nenvironment and other people are more likely to consider climate \r\nimpacts and to engage in a wide range of mitigation actions than \r\nthose who strongly value individual consequences of actions, such \r\nas pleasure and money (Taylor et al. 2014; Steg 2016). Values affect \r\nwhich types of costs and benefits people consider and prioritise \r\nwhen making choices, including individual, affective, social, and \r\nenvironmental costs and benefits (Gowdy 2008; Steg 2016)."


id: 9c1504bffbb0714124c3959dc96fc17c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24714
content:
"First, people are more likely to engage in mitigation behaviour \r\n(i.e., energy savings, energy efficiency, resource efficiency in buildings, \r\nlow-carbon energy generation) when they believe such behaviour has \r\nmore individual benefits than costs (Harland et al. 1999; Steg and Vlek \r\n2009; Kastner and Stern 2015; Korcaj et al. 2015; Kardooni et al. 2016; \r\nKastner and Matthies 2016; Wolske et al. 2017), including financial \r\nbenefits, convenience, comfort, autonomy, and independence in \r\nenergy supply (Wolske and Stern 2018). Yet, financial consequences \r\nseem less important for decisions to invest in energy-efficiency and \r\nrenewable energy production than people indicate (Zhao et al. 2012)."


id: c1605af6a5132157fe3f597e1915f0ff
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31325
content:
"Second, people are less likely to engage in mitigation behaviours that \r\nare unpleasurable or inconvenient (Steg 2016), and more likely to do \r\nso when they expect to derive positive feelings from such actions \r\n(Smith et al. 1994; Pelletier et al. 1998; Steg 2005; Carrus et al. 2008; \r\nBrosch et al. 2014; Taufik et al. 2016). Positive feelings may be elicited \r\nwhen behaviour is pleasurable, but also when it is perceived as \r\nmeaningful (Bolderdijk et al. 2013; Taufik et al. 2015)."


id: 84ef9df854bc838ca83782b509dd183c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20527
content:
"Various factors shape whether such mitigation actions are \r\nfeasible and considered by end users, including contextual factors, \r\nindividual abilities, and motivational factors. Mitigation actions can \r\nbe facilitated and encouraged by targeting relevant barriers and \r\nenablers (Section 6.7.6.1)."


id: 8ac155b184fd9330bb52f86685256b60
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21584
content:
"Third, social costs and benefits can affect climate action (Farrow et al. \r\n2017), although people do not always recognise this (Nolan et al. 2008; \r\nNoppers et al. 2014). People engage more in mitigation actions when \r\nthey think others expect them to do so and when others act as well "


id: cc793d9877f9b02ad44198a12e2d2b92
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33292
content:
"their moral norms to act accordingly, and promotes mitigation \r\nactions (Steg and de Groot 2010; Jakovcevic and Steg 2013; Chen \r\n2015; Wolske et al. 2017)."


id: 234ce9a5cb99751d893a47f0f6685977
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3414
content:
"(Harland et al. 1999; Nolan et al. 2008; Rai et al. 2016). Being part of \r\na group that advocates mitigation encourages such actions (Biddau \r\net al. 2016; Fielding and Hornsey 2016; Jans et al. 2018). Talking with \r\npeers can reduce uncertainties and confirm benefits about adoption \r\nof renewable energy technology (Palm 2017), and peers can provide \r\nsocial support (Wolske et al. 2017). People may engage in mitigation \r\nactions when they think this would signal something positive about \r\nthem (Milinski et  al. 2006; Griskevicius et  al. 2010; Noppers et  al. \r\n2014; Kastner and Stern 2015). Social influence can also originate \r\nfrom political and business leaders (Bouman and Steg 2019); GHG \r\nemissions are lower when legislators have strong environmental \r\nrecords (Jensen and Spoon 2011; Dietz et al. 2015)."


id: df71796676cac8c0b95f855c0a7bf48e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36558
content:
"Initial mitigation actions can encourage engagement in other \r\nmitigation actions when people experience that such actions are \r\neasy and effective (Lauren et al. 2016), and when initial actions make \r\nthem realise they are a pro-environmental person, motivating them \r\nto engage in more mitigation actions so as to be consistent (van der \r\nWerff et al. 2014; Lacasse 2015, 2016; Peters et al. 2018). This implies \r\nit would be important to create conditions that make it likely that \r\ninitial mitigation actions motivate further actions."


id: 69d47712bbe6e6af4ed6048bd1f65673
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15889
content:
"Fourth, mitigation actions, including saving energy and hot water, \r\nlimiting meat consumption, and investing in energy efficiency, \r\nresource efficiency in buildings, and renewable energy generation \r\nare more likely when people care more strongly about others and the \r\nenvironment (Steg et al. 2015; Van Der Werff and Steg 2015; Wolske \r\net  al. 2017). People across the world generally strongly value the \r\nenvironment (Steg 2016; Bouman and Steg 2019), suggesting that \r\nthey are motivated to mitigate climate change. The more individuals \r\nare aware of the climate impact of their behaviour, the more they \r\nthink their actions can help reduce such impacts, which strengthens "


id: 4c0fa7bae35546dcc7ab48cd9e919755
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10643
content:
"Designing feasible, desirable, and cost-effective energy sector \r\nmitigation strategies requires comparison between the different \r\nmitigation options. One such metric is the cost of delivering one unit \r\nof energy, for example, the levelised cost, or USD MWh-1, of electricity \r\nproduced from different sources. Levelised costs of electricity (LCOE) \r\nare useful because they normalise the costs per  unit of service \r\nprovided. While useful in characterising options in broad strokes, "


id: b15e7671f48640db18c841500bbbdaec
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28432
content:
"Table 6.9 | Examples of cost of mitigation for selected electricity options. Results represent variations in mitigation options and displaced fossil generation. LCOEs \r\nare illustrative, but consistent with recent estimates. Negative values mean that the mitigation option is cheaper than the displaced option, irrespective of emissions benefits. \r\nNGCC: natural gas combined cycle."


id: 5c34bb774ee0d63cabb3bc73bf44ac42
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13476
content:
"it is important to acknowledge and understand several caveats \r\nassociated with these metrics, particularly when applied globally. \r\nThey may be constructed with different discount rates; they require \r\ninformation on energy input costs for options that require energy \r\ninputs (e.g.,  fossil electricity generation, biofuels); they depend on \r\nlocal resource availability, for example, solar insolation for solar \r\npower, wind classes for wind power, and rainfall and streamflow for \r\nhydropower; and actual implementation costs may include additional \r\nelements, for example, the costs of managing electricity grids heavily \r\ndependent on VRE electricity sources. These complicating factors vary \r\nacross regions, some depend strongly on the policy environment in \r\nwhich mitigation options are deployed, and some depend on how \r\ntechnologies are constructed and operated."


id: abc3d30f5ae7f2fac2f798b00958f00f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27461
content:
"The feasibility and desirability of mitigation options extends well \r\nbeyond the market economic costs of installation and operation \r\n(Section  6.4.1). Figure  6.19 summarises the barriers and enablers \r\nfor implementing different mitigation options in energy systems. The \r\nfeasibility of different options can be enhanced by removing barriers \r\nand/or strengthening enablers of the implementation of the options. \r\nThe feasibility of options may differ across context (e.g., region), time \r\n(e.g., 2030 versus 2050), scale (e.g., small versus large) and the long\u0002term warming goal (e.g., 1.5degC versus 2degC)."


id: 8907265d25a61cf5dc1cf55909cea1de
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21271
content:
"Many components of the energy system are affected by individual \r\nweather events and climate conditions (Table  6.10). In addition, \r\na range of compounding effects can be anticipated, as the complex, \r\ninterconnected climate and energy systems are influenced by multiple \r\nweather and climate conditions. This raises the question of whether \r\nthe energy system transformation needed to limit warming will be \r\nimpacted by climate change."


id: 9be7389a67b4b1e231569d78b31a3c36
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24679
content:
"The impacts of climate change on the energy system can be divided \r\ninto three areas: impacts on the energy supply; impacts on energy \r\nconsumption; and impacts on energy infrastructure. The rest of this \r\nsection focuses on how the future changes in climate drivers might \r\naffect the ability of the energy system transformation needed to \r\nmitigate climate change. The discussion of energy infrastructure in \r\nthis section is limited to electricity system vulnerability."


id: d12d549c274a011569864d9d46307b75
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34149
content:
"A more direct metric of mitigation options is the cost to reduce \r\none tonne of CO2 or equivalent GHGs, or USD tCO2-eq-1 avoided. \r\nIn  addition to the comparison challenges noted above, this metric \r\nmust account for the costs and emissions of the emitting options that \r\nare being displaced by the low-carbon option. Assumptions about the \r\ndisplaced option can lead to very different mitigation cost estimates \r\n(Table  6.9). Despite these challenges, these metrics are useful for \r\nidentifying broad trends and making broad comparisons, even from \r\nthe global perspective in this assessment. But local information will \r\nalways be critical to determine which options are most cost-effective \r\nin any specific applications."


id: 4d041b9f89646f2dea38ebdcf937c637
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10820
content:
"The increased weather dependency of future low-carbon electricity \r\nsystems amplifies the possible impacts of climate change (Staffell \r\nand Pfenninger 2018). However, globally climate change impacts \r\non electricity generation  - including hydro, wind and solar power \r\npotentials  - should not compromise climate mitigation strategies \r\n(high confidence). Many of the changes in the climate system will \r\nbe geographically complex at the regional and local levels. Thus, \r\nregionally climate change impacts on electricity generation could \r\nbe significant. Climate change impacts on bioenergy potentials \r\nare more uncertain because of uncertainties associated with the \r\ncrop response to climate change, future water availability and crop \r\ndeployment. Climate change can reduce the efficiency of thermal \r\npower generation and increase the risk of power plant shutdowns \r\nduring droughts. The potential additional cooling water needs of CCS \r\ncan increase these risks."


id: 2d0a71dff56d89a719d6f46f267f9ebc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5198
content:
"The impacts of climate change on hydropower will vary by region. \r\nHigh latitudes in the northern hemisphere are anticipated to \r\nexperience increased runoff and hydropower potential. For other \r\nregions, studies find both increasing and decreasing runoff and \r\nhydropower potential. Areas with decreased runoff are anticipated \r\nto experience reduced hydropower production and increased water \r\nconflict among different economic activities (high confidence)."


id: ace3bda6395b63b7ad5432424d5eb1c5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27657
content:
"The conclusions regarding climate change impacts on hydropower \r\nvary due to differences in modelling assumptions and methodology, \r\nsuch as choice of the climate and hydrological models, choice of \r\nmetrics (e.g.,  projected production vs hydropower potential), level \r\nof  modelling details between local and global studies, reservoir \r\noperation assumptions. Also important is how hydropower production \r\nmatches up with other reservoir purposes, accounting for other water \r\nand energy users, and how the competing uses are impacted by \r\nclimate change (van Vliet et al. 2016b; Turner et al. 2017). Nonetheless, "


id: 95719cde12e54599d8908290c691bbb5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23498
content:
"Hydropower production is directly related to the availability of water. \r\nChanges in runoff and its seasonality and changes in temperature \r\nand precipitation intensity will influence hydroelectricity production "


id: 9a106151fbd869f7c604b5bfc613a92a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24342
content:
"Figure 6.20 | Global spatial patterns of changes in gross hydropower potential based on climate forcing from five climate models. Changes are shown for \r\nthe 2050s (upper) and the 2080s (lower) for the low-emission scenario (RCP2.6; left) and highest emission scenario (RCP8.5; right) scenarios relative to the control period \r\n(1971-2000). Source: data from van Vliet et al. (2016b)."


id: a884d663c4f8cb154ac528aa08d1620f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26857
content:
"Ferreira et al. 2017; de Jong et al. 2019). No robust future changes \r\nin wind resources have been identified in China (Xiong et al. 2019). \r\nHowever, none of the global or regional studies of the effects of climate \r\nchange on wind resources considers the fine-scale dependence of \r\nwind resources on the topography and wind direction (Sanz Rodrigo \r\net al. 2016; Dorenkamper et al. 2020) or the effect of expanding wind \r\nenergy exploitation (Volker et al. 2017; Lundquist et al. 2019). There \r\nis limited evidence that extreme wind speeds, which can damage \r\nwind turbines, will increase due to climate change (Pes et al. 2017; \r\nPryor et  al. 2020). Nevertheless, projected changes in Europe and \r\nNorth America - regions where the most extensive analysis has been \r\nundertaken - are expected to be within the estimates embedded in \r\nthe design standards of wind turbines (Pryor and Barthelmie 2013)."


id: 2cb7e3a33bf606f6e943067e26d8eb04
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5129
content:
"analyses consistently demonstrate that the global impact of climate \r\nchange on hydropower will be small, but the regional impacts will be \r\nlarger, and will be both positive and negative (Figure 6.20). Gross global \r\nhydropower potential in the 2050s has been estimated to slightly \r\ndecrease (Hamududu and Killingtveit 2012) between 0.4% (for the \r\nlow-emission scenario) and 6.1% (for the highest-emission scenario) \r\nfor the 2080s compared to 1971-2000 (van Vliet et al. 2016a)."


id: c18b7c94e3f455dcf22cee24d98dc9cd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31356
content:
"Climate change will not substantially impact future wind resources \r\nand will not compromise the ability of wind energy to support low\u0002carbon transitions (high confidence). Changing wind variability may \r\nhave a small-to-modest impact on backup energy and storage needs \r\n(low confidence); however, current evidence is largely from studies \r\nfocused on Europe."


id: b222ad1d6e948b1485ab781909373ad4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28568
content:
"Long-term global wind energy resources are not expected to \r\nsubstantially change in future climate scenarios (Karnauskas \r\net  al. 2018; Pryor et  al. 2020; Yalew et  al. 2020). However, recent \r\nresearch has indicated consistent shifts in the geographic position of \r\natmospheric jets in the high-emission scenarios (Harvey et al. 2014), \r\nwhich would decrease wind power potentials across the Northern \r\nHemisphere mid-latitudes and increase wind potentials across \r\nthe tropics and the Southern Hemisphere. However, the climate \r\nmodels used to make these assessments differ in how well they can \r\nreproduce the historical wind resources and wind extremes, which \r\nraises questions about the robustness of their predictions of future \r\nwind resources (Pryor et al. 2020)."


id: ecf15a8e2cd802dfb702a8281423cf09
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39055
content:
"Climate change is not expected to substantially impact global solar \r\ninsolation and will not compromise the ability of solar energy to \r\nsupport low-carbon transitions (high confidence). Models show \r\ndimming and brightening in certain regions, driven by cloud, \r\naerosol and water vapour trends (Chapter 12 of IPCC AR6 WGI). The \r\nincrease in surface temperature, which affects all regions, decreases \r\nsolar power output by reducing the PV panel efficiency. In  some \r\nmodels and climate scenarios, the increases in solar insolation \r\nare counterbalanced by reducing efficiency due to rising surface \r\nair temperatures, which increase significantly in all models and \r\nscenarios (Jerez et al. 2015; Bartok et al. 2017; Emodi et al. 2019). \r\nIncreases in aerosols would reduce the solar resource available and \r\nadd to maintenance costs (Chapter 12 of IPCC AR6 WGI)."


id: 6657ffd3d42cdad21ee191a9d1821909
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15268
content:
"There are many regional studies on changes in wind resources from \r\nclimate change. For Europe, there is medium evidence and moderate \r\nagreement that wind resources are already increasing and will \r\ncontinue to increase in Northern Europe and decrease in Southern \r\nEurope (Carvalho et al. 2017; Devis et al. 2018; Moemken et al. 2018). \r\nFor North America, the various studies have low agreement for the \r\nchanges in future wind resources in part because the year-to-year \r\nvariations in wind resources are often larger than the future change \r\ndue to climate change (Johnson and Erhardt 2016; Chen 2020; \r\nCostoya et al. 2020; Wang et al. 2020b). Studies show increases in \r\nfuture wind resources in windy areas in South America (Ruffato\u0002"


id: 816f8a78ce5b6925e01fd2e7b1ce66c3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19900
content:
"climate change will reduce global bioenergy potential by about 16%; \r\nwith CO2 fertilisation, however, climate change increases this potential \r\nby 45% (Haberl et al. 2011). However, newer studies in the USA find \r\nlittle effect of CO2 fertilisation on switchgrass yield (Dolan et al. 2020). \r\nThere is also a considerable uncertainty across climate and crop models \r\nin estimating bioenergy potential (Hager et al. 2014)."


id: a4b344f196bca9fc897e4f6b07e7a6e9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26193
content:
"Climate change can affect biomass resource potential directly, via \r\nchanges in the suitable range (i.e., the area where bioenergy crops \r\ncan grow) and/or changes in yield, and indirectly, through changes \r\nin land availability. Increases in CO2 concentration increase biomass \r\nyield; climate changes (e.g., temperature, precipitation, and so on) \r\ncan either increase or decrease the yield and suitable range."


id: 5ea4a7546fe8e140377031ca455a23ee
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13940
content:
"Climate change will shift the suitable range for bioenergy towards \r\nhigher latitudes, but the net change in the total suitable area is \r\nuncertain (high confidence). Several studies show northward shifts \r\nin the suitable range for bioenergy in the northern hemisphere (Tuck \r\net al. 2006; Barney and DiTomaso 2010; Bellarby et al. 2010; Hager \r\net al. 2014; Wang et al. 2014a; Preston et al. 2016; Conant et al. 2018; \r\nCronin et  al. 2018), but the net effect of climate change on total \r\nsuitable area varies by region, species, and climate model (Barney \r\nand DiTomaso 2010; Hager et al. 2014; Wang et al. 2014a)."


id: 76d1d983418e846e01d0799636869d00
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18118
content:
"Carbon capture may increase cooling water usage significantly, \r\nespecially in retrofits, with up to 50% increase in water usage for coal\u0002fired power plants globally, depending on the CCS technology (Rosa \r\net al. 2020) (Section 6.4). In Asia, planned coal capacity is expected to \r\nbe vulnerable to droughts, sea level rise, and rising air temperatures, \r\nand this may be exacerbated by incorporating carbon capture (Wang \r\net al. 2019c). Recently, however, studies have proposed designs of \r\nCCS with a minimal increase in water requirements (Magneschi et al. \r\n2017; Mikunda et al. 2021)."


id: 91bf7e46198c2b6de9392ac47e8c34e2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22865
content:
"The effect of climate change on bioenergy crop yields will vary across \r\nregion and feedstock (high confidence); however, in general, yields \r\nwill decline in low latitudes (medium confidence) and increase in \r\nhigh latitudes (low confidence) (Haberl et al. 2010; Cosentino et al. \r\n2012; Preston et  al. 2016; Cronin et  al. 2018; Mbow et  al. 2019). \r\nHowever, the average change in yield varies significantly across \r\nstudies, depending on the feedstock, region, and other factors \r\n(Beringer et al. 2011; Kyle et al. 2014; Mbow et al. 2019; Dolan et al. \r\n2020). Only a few studies extend the modelling of climate change \r\nimpacts on bioenergy to quantify the effect on bioenergy deployment \r\nor its implications on the energy system (Calvin et al. 2013, 2019; \r\nKyle et al. 2014; Thornton et al. 2017). These studies find that changes \r\nin deployment are of the same sign as changes in yield; that is, if \r\nyields increase, then deployment increases."


id: 5c1f3c342d732b3d858f6f99954998dc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13462
content:
"Some of the uncertainty in the sign and magnitude of the impacts \r\nof climate change on bioenergy potential is due to uncertainties \r\nin CO2 fertilisation (the increase in photosynthesis due to increases in \r\natmospheric CO2 concentration) (Haberl et al. 2011; Bonjean Stanton \r\net al. 2016; Cronin et al. 2018; Solaun and Cerda 2019; Yalew et al. \r\n2020). For example, earlier studies found that, without CO2 fertilisation, "


id: 1db91a8f9bfa5469169e2214eec79f5f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2414
content:
"Heating demand will decrease, and cooling demand will increase \r\nin response to climate change. Peak load may increase more than \r\nenergy consumption, and the changing spatial and temporal load \r\npatterns can impact transmission and needs for storage, demands\u0002side management, and peak-generating capacity (high confidence)."


id: f2fc973b37dc0d5c692d6c39e638121c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40141
content:
"Climate change will decrease heating demands, especially in cold \r\nregions, and it will increase cooling demands, especially in warm \r\nregions (Yalew et  al. 2020). Recent studies report significant net \r\nimpacts, with the commercial and industrial sectors and substantial \r\nair condition penetration driving an increase in energy demand \r\n(Davis and Gertler 2015; Levesque et  al. 2018; De Cian and Sue \r\nWing 2019; van Ruijven et al. 2019; Yalew et al. 2020). For example, \r\nglobally, De Cian and Sue Wing (2019) found a 7-17% increase in \r\nenergy consumption due to climate change in 2050, with the range \r\ndepending on the climate change scenario. The overall effects of \r\nclimate change on building energy consumption are regionally \r\ndependent. For example, Zhang et  al. (2019) find that reduced \r\nheating will outweigh increased cooling in the residential buildings \r\nin Europe, but the reverse will be true in China."


id: fcc824117530274b1e02b827ae21d7d5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41838
content:
"In February 2021, the state of Texas was hit by three major storms and suffered significant scale power outages. More than 4.5 million \r\nhomes and businesses on the Texas electric grid were left without electricity for days, limiting the ability to heat homes during \r\ndangerously low temperatures and leading to food and clean water shortages (Busby et al. 2021). The Texas and other events - for \r\nexample, Typhoon Haiyan in Southeast Asia in 2013; the Australian bush fires in 2019-2020; forest fires in 2018 in California; water \r\nshortages in Cape Town, South Africa in 2018 and the western USA during 2021 - raise the question of whether future low-carbon \r\nenergy systems will be more or less resilient than those of today."


id: 695081c0716289b81cca8bca697f751
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15796
content:
"Some characteristics of low-carbon energy systems will make them less resilient. Droughts reduce hydroelectric electricity generation \r\n(Gleick 2016; van Vliet et al. 2016c); wind farms do not produce electricity in calm conditions or shut down in very strong winds \r\n(Petersen and Troen 2012); solar PV generation is reduced by clouds and is less efficient under extreme heat, dust storms, and wildfires \r\n(Perry and Troccoli 2015; Jackson and Gunda 2021). In addition, the electrification of heating will increase the weather dependence \r\nof electricity consumption (Staffell and Pfenninger 2018; Gea-Bermudez et al. 2021). Non-renewable generation, for example, from \r\nnuclear and fossil power plants, are also vulnerable to high temperatures and droughts as they depend on water for cooling (Cronin \r\net al. 2018; Ahmad 2021)."


id: 2160315ea9c2d50b467107bcbd09fb61
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3082
content:
"Lightning can cause wildfires or common-mode faults on electricity \r\nsystems associated with vegetation falling on power substations or \r\noverhead lines but is more generally associated with flashovers and \r\noverloads (Balijepalli et al. 2005). Climate change may change the \r\nprobability of lightning-related events (Romps et al. 2014)."


id: 6408994269e9f42f4c39f58a8e669ba7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14885
content:
"While long-term trends are important for electricity system planning, \r\nshort-term effects associated with loss of power can be disruptive and \r\nlead to significant economic losses along with cascading impacts on \r\nhealth and safety. Extreme weather and storms threaten the electricity \r\nsystem in different ways, affecting system resilience, reliability, and \r\nadequacy (Moreno-Mateos et al. 2020). The implications of climate \r\nchange for electricity system vulnerability will depend on the degree \r\nto which climate change alters the frequency and intensity of extreme \r\nweather events. The complex compounding effects of simultaneous \r\nevents (e.g., high winds and lightning occurring at the same time) are \r\nnot well understood."


id: e65423a92c261748a5738cd022c2912a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37827
content:
"Snow and icing can impact overhead power lines by weighing \r\nthem down beyond their mechanical limits, leading to collapse and \r\ncascading outages (Feng et al. 2015). Snow can also lead to flashovers \r\non lines due to wet snow accumulation on insulators (Yaji et al. 2014; \r\nCroce et al. 2018) and snow and ice can impact wind turbines (Davis \r\net  al. 2016). Climate change will lower the risk of snow and ice \r\nconditions (McColl et al. 2012), but there is still an underlying risk \r\nof sporadic acute cold conditions such as those associated with the \r\nwinter storms in Texas in 2021 (Box 6.6)."


id: 1c3c594318cd4292128891a41582a43a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2160
content:
"High wind speeds can shear lines through mechanical failure \r\nor cause lines to collide, causing transient events (Panteli and \r\nMancarella 2015; Yalew et  al. 2020). Hurricane conditions can \r\ndamage electricity system infrastructures, including utility-scale \r\nwind and solar PV plants. Electricity systems may experience high \r\ndemand when lines are particularly at risk from mechanical failure \r\nfrom wind and storm-related effects. However, except for medium \r\nevidence of increases in heavy precipitation associated with tropical \r\ncyclones, there is limited evidence that extreme wind events will \r\nincrease in frequency or intensity in the future (Kumar et al. 2015; \r\nPryor et al. 2020)."


id: 7569e31059006641837584e06bcda552
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17889
content:
"Flooding poses a threat to the transmission and distribution systems \r\nby inundating low-lying substations and underground cables. Coastal \r\nflooding also poses a threat to electricity system infrastructure. Rising \r\nsea levels from climate change and associated storm surge may also \r\npose a  significant risk for coastal electricity systems (Entriken and \r\nLordan 2012)."


id: 689f908d61e0f12cb329205134a6fe1d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15674
content:
"Temperature increases influence electricity load profiles and \r\nelectricity generation, as well as potentially impact supporting \r\ninformation and communication infrastructure. Heat can pose direct \r\nimpacts to electricity system equipment such as transformers. Referred \r\nto as 'solar heat faults', they occur under high temperatures and low \r\nwind speeds and can be exacerbated by the urban heat island effect \r\n(McColl et al. 2012). Increasing temperatures affect system adequacy \r\nby reducing electric transmission capacity, simultaneously increasing \r\npeak load due to increased air conditioning needs (Bartos et al. 2016)."


id: 65580ed3d99ed10bf543d0924145e854
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15103
content:
"Wildfires pose a  significant threat to electricity systems in dry \r\nconditions and arid regions (Dian et al. 2019). With climate change, \r\nwildfires will probably become more frequent (Flannigan et al. 2013) \r\nand more difficult to address, given that they frequently coincide with \r\ndry air and can be exacerbated by high winds (Mitchell 2013)."


id: c2539d7f9bc4bec9ff33de36c38a2e86
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31472
content:
"While climate change will affect energy systems (Section 6.5), the reverse is potentially also true: increasing the use of renewable energy \r\nsources could affect local climate. Large solar PV arrays and hydroelectric dams darken the land surface, and wind turbines extract the wind's \r\nkinetic energy near the Earth's surface. Their environmental impacts of renewable energy production are mostly confined to areas close \r\nto the production sources and have been shown to be trivial compared to the mitigation benefits of renewable energy (high confidence)."


id: e3a4d5afaecae3ef65620985ce987745
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37341
content:
"Wind energy. Surface temperature changes in the vicinity of wind farms have been detected (Smith et al. 2013; Lee and Lundquist \r\n2017; Takle et al. 2019; Xia et al. 2019) in the form of night-time warming. Data from field campaigns suggest that a 'suppression \r\nof cooling' can explain the observed warming (Takle et  al. 2019). Regional and climate models have been used to describe the \r\ninteractions between turbines and the atmosphere and find minor impacts (Vautard et al. 2014). More sophisticated models confirm \r\nthe local warming effect of wind farms but report that the impact on the regional area is slight and occasional (Wang et al. 2019d). \r\nWind turbines alter the transport and dissipation of momentum near the surface but do not directly impact the Earth's energy balance"


id: e8f5ec793cb1765252368405e95aed10
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38336
content:
"(Fischereit et al. 2021). However, the secondary modifications to the energy and water exchanges have added implications for the \r\nclimate system (Jacobson and Archer 2012)."


id: 29c05edd31f058b4314fc64633b02820
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4570
content:
"Hydropower. The potential climate impacts of hydropower concentrate on the GHG emissions from organic matter decomposition \r\nwhen the carbon cycle is altered by the flooding of the hydroelectric power plant reservoir (Ocko and Hamburg 2019), but emissions \r\nfrom organic matter decomposition decrease over time. The darker surface of the reservoir, compared to the lighter surrounding land \r\nmay counterbalance part of the reduced GHG emissions by hydropower production (Wohlfahrt et al. 2021). However, these impacts \r\nvary significantly among facilities due to the surrounding land properties and the area inundated by the reservoir."


id: 1d0e369f988b5c956f6608647dc32a99
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2293
content:
"This section synthesises current understanding of net-zero energy \r\nsystems. Discussions surrounding efforts to limit warming are \r\nfrequently communicated in terms of the point in time at which net \r\nanthropogenic CO2 emissions reach zero, accompanied by substantial \r\nreductions in non-CO2 emissions (IPCC 2018, Chapter 3). Net-zero GHG \r\ngoals are also common, and they require net-negative CO2 emissions \r\nto compensate for residual non-CO2 emissions. Economy-wide CO2 and \r\nGHG goals appear in many government and corporate decarbonisation \r\nstrategies, and they are used in a variety of ways. Most existing carbon\u0002neutrality commitments from countries and sub-national jurisdictions \r\naim for economies with very low emissions rather than zero emissions. \r\nOffsets, carbon dioxide removal (CDR) methods, and/or land sink \r\nassumptions are used to achieve net-zero goals (Kelly Levin et al. 2020)."


id: dacb18371ca1fd4a5b250677c978c981
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35785
content:
"Limiting warming to well below 2degC requires that CO2 emissions \r\nfrom the energy sector be reduced to near zero or even below \r\nzero (Section  6.7; Chapter  3). Policies, technologies, behaviours, \r\ninvestments, and other factors will determine the speed at which \r\ncountries transition to net-zero energy systems - those that emit very \r\nlittle or no emissions. An understanding of these future energy systems \r\ncan help to chart a course toward them over the coming decades."


id: 587e934622e34092cec129b7aa2cb469
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12812
content:
"Figure 6.21 | Residual emissions and carbon dioxide removal (CDR) when global energy and industrial CO2 emissions reach net-zero. Residual emissions and \r\nCDR in net-zero scenarios from the AR6 Scenarios Database show global differences across warming levels (light blue = scenarios that limit warming to 1.5degC (>50%) with no \r\nor limited overshoot and scenarios that return warming to 1.5degC (>50%) after a high overshoot; yellow = scenarios that limit warming to 2degC (>67%) and scenarios that limit \r\nwarming to 2degC (>50%); dark blue = scenarios that limit warming to 2.5degC (>50%), scenarios that limit warming to 3degC (>50%), scenarios that limit warming to 4degC (>50%), \r\nand scenarios that exceed warming of 4degC (>=50%)). In each case, the boxes show the 25th to 75th percentile ranges, and whiskers show the 5th and 95th percentiles. Lines \r\nand circles within the boxes denote the median and mean values, respectively."


id: 9bff31db0df30a5603af090110efb539
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24697
content:
"pathways for different sectors, enumerating opportunities and barriers \r\nfor each, their costs, highlighting robust insights, and characterising key \r\nuncertainties (Davis et al. 2018; Hepburn et al. 2019)."


id: 73f97f7074367a911b9a65ec267f20af
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17648
content:
"This section focuses on energy systems that produce very little or no \r\nCO2 emissions, referred to in this chapter as 'net-zero energy systems'. \r\nWhile energy systems may not reach net zero concurrently with \r\neconomy-wide CO2 or GHG emissions, they are a useful benchmark \r\nfor planning a path to net zero. Note that the focus here is on energy \r\nsystems with net-zero CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion \r\nand industrial processes, but the lessons will be broadly applicable \r\nto net-zero GHG energy systems as well. Net-zero GHG energy \r\nsystems would incorporate the major efforts made to reduce non-CO2\r\nemissions (e.g., CH4 from oil, gas and coal as discussed in Section 6.4) \r\nand would also need to incorporate more CDR to compensate for \r\nremaining non-CO2 GHG emissions. Energy sector emissions in many \r\ncountries may not reach net zero at the same time as global energy \r\nsystem emissions (Figure 6.25 and Cross-Chapter Box 3 in Chapter 3)."


id: 129824351ce490d391a5705a014918bb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 473
content:
"Configurations of net-zero energy systems will vary by region but \r\nare likely to share several common characteristics (high confidence) \r\n(Figure 6.22). We focus on seven of those common characteristics in \r\nthe remainder of this subsection."


id: dd966ceceeeba39c1213db37a5727518
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36251
content:
"Net-zero energy systems entail trade-offs across economic, \r\nenvironmental, and social dimensions (Davis et  al. 2018). Many \r\nsocio-economic, policy, and market uncertainties will also influence \r\nthe configuration of net-zero energy systems (Smith et  al. 2015; \r\nvan Vuuren et  al. 2018; Bistline et  al. 2019; Krey et  al. 2019; \r\nAzevedo et al. 2021, Pye et al. 2021). There are reasons that countries \r\nmight focus on one system configuration versus another, including \r\ncost, resource endowments, related industrial bases, existing \r\ninfrastructure, geography, governance, public acceptance, and other \r\npolicy priorities (Section 6.6.4 and Chapter 18 of WGII)."


id: 8752d612ace3d16ec89a1eed046383bc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20969
content:
"Explorations of net-zero energy systems have been emerging in the \r\ndetailed systems modelling literature (Azevedo et  al. 2021; Bistline \r\n2021b). Reports associated with net-zero economy-wide targets for \r\ncountries and sub-national entities typically do not provide detailed \r\nroadmaps or modelling but discuss high-level guiding principles, though \r\nmore detailed studies are emerging at national levels (Capros et al. 2019; \r\nWei et al. 2020; Duan et al. 2021; Williams et al. 2021a). Most analysis \r\nhas focused on identifying potential decarbonisation technologies and "


id: 558ec862df4fa249f4c5339941038229
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12322
content:
"There is considerable flexibility regarding the overall quantity of \r\nliquid and gaseous fuels that will be required in net-zero energy \r\nsystems (high confidence) (Figure 6.22 and Section 6.7.4). This will be \r\ndetermined by the relative value of such fuels as compared to systems \r\nwhich rely more or less heavily on zero-emissions electricity. In turn, \r\nthe share of any fuels that are fossil or fossil-derived is uncertain \r\nand will depend on the feasibility of CCS and CDR technologies and "


id: 2e6dd1259165a4409bc76d20f1370788
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5444
content:
"long-term sequestration as compared to alternative, carbon-neutral \r\nfuels. Moreover, to the extent that physical, biological, and/or socio\u0002political factors limit the availability of CDR (Smith et al. 2015; Field \r\nand Mach 2017), carbon management efforts may prioritise residual \r\nemissions related to land use and other non-energy sources."


id: a579e9b6db3b9fe1ddf0a529ad5d0a83
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26343
content:
"other balancing resources discussed in Box 6.8) will be needed to \r\nensure reliability and resource adequacy with high percentages of \r\nwind and solar (Jenkins et al. 2018b; Dowling et al. 2020; Denholm \r\net  al. 2021) though each option involves uncertainty about costs, \r\ntiming, and public acceptance (Albertus et al. 2020)."


id: 9b08cf885e6e8d0daf482c217b7cd878
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24527
content:
"Electricity systems require a range of different functional roles - for \r\nexample, providing energy, capacity, or ancillary services. As a result, \r\na  range of different types of generation, energy storage, and \r\ntransmission resources may be deployed in these systems (Baik et al. \r\n2021). There are many options for each of these roles, each with their \r\nstrengths and weaknesses (Sections 6.4.3 and 6.4.4), and deployment \r\nof these options will be influenced by the evolution of technological \r\ncosts, system benefits, and local resources (Fell and Linn 2013; Hirth \r\n2015; Bistline et al. 2018; Mai et al. 2018; Veers et al. 2019)."


id: e0d8afc92f4d821720de5c4dce146df9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36823
content:
"Net-zero energy systems will rely on decarbonised or net-negative \r\nCO2 emissions electricity systems, due to the many lower-cost options \r\nfor producing zero-carbon electricity and the important role of end\u0002use electrification in decarbonising other sectors (high confidence)."


id: d1e6e959dcb73d6b0f35fa75f195e8cf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34277
content:
"System management is critical for zero- or negative-emissions electricity \r\nsystems. Maintaining reliability will increasingly entail system planning \r\nand operations that account for characteristics of supply- and demand\u0002side resources (Hu et al. 2018). Coordinated planning and operations will \r\nlikely become more prevalent across portions of the electricity system \r\n(e.g., integrated generation, transmission, and distribution planning), \r\nacross sectors, and across geographies (EPRI 2017; Konstantelos et al. \r\n2017; Chan et al. 2018; Bistline and Young 2019) (Section 6.4.3)."


id: 31f580453becf73aa0ffae4c735949e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6043
content:
"The approach to other sectors could impact on electricity sector planning, \r\nand the role of some technologies (e.g.,  hydrogen, batteries, CCS) \r\ncould depend on deployment in other sectors. CCS offers opportunities \r\nfor CO2 removal when fuelled with syngas or biomass containing \r\ncarbon captured from the atmosphere (Hepburn et al. 2019); however, "


id: 7e46778721a66595f51739df68ea569
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19382
content:
"power to fuels (PtX) electricity conversion to create low-emissions \r\nsynthetic fuels (Sections 6.6.2.6, 6.4.4, and 6.4.5), which could impact \r\non electricity system planning and operations. Additionally, if DAC \r\ntechnologies are used, electricity and heat requirements to operate \r\nDAC could impact electricity  system investments and operations \r\n(Realmonte et al. 2019; Bistline and Blanford 2021a)."


id: b6e1bafdd9a6ddf71277da849c6deb30
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29375
content:
"concerns about lifecycle environmental impacts, uncertain costs, and \r\npublic acceptance are potential barriers to widespread deployment \r\n(Section 6.4.2). It is unclear whether CDR options like BECCS will be \r\nincluded in the electricity mix to offset continued emissions in other \r\nparts of the energy system or beyond (MacDowell et al. 2017; Bauer \r\net al. 2018a; Luderer et al. 2018). Some applications may also rely on "


id: adbcf786789f902ebd35394037e8dc81
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27809
content:
"The decreasing cost and increasing performance of renewable energy has generated interest in the feasibility of providing nearly all energy \r\nservices with renewables. Renewable energy includes wind power, solar power, hydroelectric power, bioenergy, geothermal energy, tidal \r\npower, and ocean power. There are two primary frames around which 100% renewable energy systems are discussed: 100% renewable \r\nelectricity systems and 100% renewable energy systems, considering not only electricity but all aspects of the energy system."


id: 62ae2bcbb9e0b60335cb1f60f9c4af38
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14650
content:
"There are many balancing options in systems with very high renewables (Milligan et al. 2015; Jenkins et al. 2018b; Mai et al. 2018; \r\nBistline 2021a; Denholm et al. 2021)."


id: 585e7a8c125e37cd48c4fa2ee70e426d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:14
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12800
content:
"Deployment of integration options depends on their relative costs and value, regulations, and electricity market design. There is \r\nconsiderable uncertainty about future technology costs, performance, availability, scalability, and public acceptance (Kondziella and \r\nBruckner 2016; Bistline et al. 2019). Deploying balanced resources likely requires operational, market design, and other institutional \r\nchanges, as well as technological changes in some cases (Denholm et al. 2021; Cochran et al. 2014). Mixes will differ based on \r\nresources, system size, flexibility, and whether grids are isolated or interconnected."


id: 6e2bd43d836078c81e91b55a1ae20c82
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16646
content:
"Although there are no technical upper bounds on renewable electricity penetration, the economic value of additional wind and \r\nsolar capacity typically decreases as their penetration rises, creating economic challenges at higher deployment levels (Hirth 2013; \r\nGowrisankaran et al. 2016; Cole et al. 2021; Denholm et al. 2021; Millstein et al. 2021). The integration options above, as well as changes \r\nto market design, can mitigate these challenges but likely will not solve them, especially since these options can exhibit declining value \r\nthemselves (De Sisternes et al. 2016; Bistline 2017; Denholm and Mai 2019) and may be complements or substitutes to each other."


id: a61b54c60f5c8e041531e6ee2896319b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26443
content:
"(Section  6.5.4.4), especially relative to biofuels and hydrogen ('low\u0002carbon fuels') (McCollum et al. 2014; Sachs et al. 2016; Rockstrom et al. \r\n2017), the prospects for which are still quite uncertain (Section 6.4). \r\nThe emergence of CDR technologies and the extent to which they \r\nallow for residual emissions as an alternative to electrification will also \r\naffect the overall share of energy served by electricity (Section 6.6.2.7)."


id: ad8baf9c4f640da9572f4559e5e9bd3f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27774
content:
"Regions endowed with cheap and plentiful low-carbon electricity \r\nresources (wind, solar, hydropower) are likely to emphasise \r\nelectrification, while those with substantial bioenergy resources \r\nor availability of other liquid fuels might put less emphasis on \r\nelectrification, particularly in hard-to-electrify end uses (medium \r\nconfidence). For example, among a group of Latin American countries, \r\nrelative assumptions about liquid fuels and electricity result in an \r\nelectrification range of 28-82% for achieving a  net-zero energy \r\nsystem (Bataille et  al. 2020). Similarly, the level of penetration of \r\nbiofuels that can substitute for electrification will depend on regional \r\ncircumstances such as land-use constraints, competition with food, \r\nand sustainability of biomass production (Section 6.6.2.4)."


id: 3cc479710068908c858f2906e1c629e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7877
content:
"Several end uses, such as passenger transportation (light-duty electric \r\nvehicles, two and three wheelers, buses, rail) as well as building \r\nenergy uses (lighting, cooling) are likely to be electrified in net\u0002zero energy  systems (high confidence). Variations in projections of \r\nelectrification largely result from differences in expectations about \r\nthe ability and cost-competitiveness of electricity to serve other end \r\nuses such as non-rail freight transport, aviation, and heavy industry \r\n(McCollum et al. 2014; Bataille et al. 2016; EPRI 2018; Breyer et al. 2019) "


id: 7b3c63905e6f3a301f4720b00e1397ab
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18881
content:
"Electrification of most buildings services, with the possible exception \r\nof space heating in extreme climates, is expected in net-zero energy \r\nsystems (high confidence) (Chapter 9). Space cooling and water heating \r\nare expected to be largely electrified. Building electrification is expected \r\nto rely substantially on heat pumps, which will help lower emissions \r\nboth through reduced thermal requirements and higher efficiencies "


id: 1a606f87fd3fae7ccbe495e574417d0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1840
content:
"(Mathiesen et al. 2015; Sven et al. 2018; Rissman et al. 2020). The level of \r\nelectrification for heating will depend on the trade-offs between building \r\nor household level heat pumps versus more centralised district heating \r\nnetwork options (Mathiesen et al. 2015; Brown et al. 2018), as well as \r\nthe cost and performance of heat pumps in more extreme climates and \r\nregional grid infrastructure (EPRI 2018; Waite and Modi 2020)."


id: c6d71dca166532b9ea1406bc253af6fc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32295
content:
"Useful carbon-based fuels (e.g.,  methane, petroleum, methanol), \r\nhydrogen, ammonia, or alcohols can be produced with net-zero CO2\r\nemissions and without fossil fuel inputs (Sections 6.4.4 and 6.4.5). For \r\nexample, liquid hydrocarbons can be synthesised via hydrogenation \r\nof non-fossil carbon by processes such as Fischer-Tropsch (MacDowell \r\net  al. 2017) or by conversion of biomass (Tilman et  al. 2009). The \r\nresulting energy-dense fuels can serve applications that are difficult to \r\nelectrify, but it is not clear if and when the combined costs of obtaining \r\nnecessary feedstocks and producing these fuels without fossil inputs \r\nwill be less than continuing to use fossil fuels and managing the \r\nrelated carbon through, for example, CCS or CDR (Ueckerdt et al. 2021)."


id: f4f1eaaea9baf43c3ad66681a2f6a6e3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40457
content:
"Costs are the main barrier to synthesis of net-zero emissions fuels \r\n(high confidence), particularly costs of hydrogen (a constituent of \r\nhydrocarbons, ammonia, and alcohols) (Section 6.4.5). Today, most \r\nhydrogen is supplied by steam reformation of fossil methane (CH4\r\ninto CO2 and H2) at a cost of 1.30- USD1.50 kg-1 (Sherwin 2021). \r\nNon-fossil hydrogen can be obtained by electrolysis of water, at \r\ncurrent costs of USD5-7 kgH2\r\n-1 (assuming relatively low electricity \r\ncosts and high utilisation rates) (Graves et  al. 2011; DOE 2020a; \r\nNewborough and Cooley 2020; Peterson et al. 2020). At these costs \r\nfor electrolytic hydrogen, synthesised net-zero emissions fuels would \r\ncost at least USD1.6 per litre of diesel equivalent (or USD6 gallon-1\r\nand USD46  GJ-1, assuming non-fossil carbon feedstock costs "


id: 2437221327645acc48cf09f0caf3f648
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3561
content:
"Net-zero energy systems will need to rely on alternative fuels - notably \r\nhydrogen or biofuels  - in several sectors that are not amenable to \r\nelectricity and otherwise hard to decarbonise (medium confidence)."


id: 43e9fdca63c4f918d131968b551dff85
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9182
content:
"an early stage (Nielander et al. 2015; DOE 2020a). High hydrogen \r\nproduction efficiencies have been demonstrated, but costs, capacity \r\nfactors, and lifetimes need to be improved in order to make such \r\ntechnologies feasible for net-zero emissions fuel production at scale \r\n(McKone et al. 2014; DOE 2020a; Newborough and Cooley 2020)."


id: ef8d3197742e6c3e460b18936dba122f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39524
content:
"of USD100 per  tonne of CO2 and low process costs of USD0.05 \r\nlitre-1 or USD1.5 GJ-1). Similar calculations suggest that synthetic \r\nhydrocarbon fuels could currently avoid CO2 emissions at a cost of \r\nUSD936-1404 tonne-1 (Ueckerdt et al. 2021). However, economies \r\nof scale are expected to bring these costs down substantially in the \r\nfuture (IRENA 2020c; Ueckerdt et  al. 2021), and R&D efforts are \r\ntargeting 60-80% reductions in costs (to less than USD2 kg-1 (H2)\r\n-1) \r\npossibly by use of less mature but promising technologies such as \r\nhigh-temperature electrolysis and thermochemical water splitting \r\n(Kuckshinrichs et al. 2017; Pes et al. 2017; Schmidt et al. 2017; Saba \r\net al. 2018; DOE, 2018, 2020b). Technologies capable of producing \r\nhydrogen directly from water and sunlight (photoelectrochemical \r\ncells or photocatalysts) are also under development, but are at "


id: 37f952ed87ff08339333f354e08ef636
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7054
content:
"The carbon contained in net-zero emissions hydrocarbons must have \r\nbeen removed from the atmosphere either through DAC, or, in the case \r\nof biofuels, by photosynthesis (which could include CO2 captured from \r\nthe exhaust of biomass or biogas combustion) (Zeman and Keith 2008; \r\nGraves et al. 2011). A number of different groups are now developing \r\nDAC technologies, targeting costs of USD100 per tonne of CO2 or less \r\n(Darton and Yang 2018; Keith et al. 2018; Fasihi et al. 2019)."


id: e0f531cf03676b7f7f3f093da1d46352
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36842
content:
"Hydrogen production costs have historically been prohibitive, but recent technological developments are bringing costs down. These \r\ndevelopments include improvements in hydrogen production technologies in terms of efficiency and capital costs (e.g., steam methane \r\nreforming) (Alrashed and Zahid 2021; Boretti and Banik 2021) and the emergence of alternative production technologies such as \r\nelectrolysers (Dawood et al. 2020). These technological changes, along with decreasing costs of renewable power, are increasing \r\nthe viability of hydrogen. Other improvements in hydrogen-based technologies are also emerging quickly. Gas turbines now run on \r\nblended fuels containing 5-95% hydrogen by volume (GE 2020) and could operate entirely on hydrogen by 2030 (Pflug et al. 2019). \r\nFuel cell costs have decreased by 80-95% since the early 2000s, while power density and durability have improved (Jouin et al. 2016; \r\nIEA 2019e; Kurtz et al. 2019)."


id: 709c41137ac871f3bac6091163998937
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17070
content:
"For hydrogen to support decarbonisation, it will need to be produced from zero-carbon or extremely low-carbon energy sources. \r\nOne such production category is 'green hydrogen'. While there is no unified definition for green hydrogen, it can be produced by \r\nthe electrolysis of water using electricity generated without carbon emissions (such as renewables). Hydrogen can also be produced \r\nthrough biomass gasification with carbon capture and storage (BECCS), leading to negative carbon emissions (Arnaiz del Pozo et al. \r\n2021). Additionally, 'blue hydrogen' can be produced from natural gas through the process of auto-thermal reforming (ATR) or steam \r\nmethane reforming, combined with CCS technology that would absorb most of the resulting CO2 (80-90%)."


id: c71f46f6b4c6c2f3d801e9b482479922
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32353
content:
"and cost-effective, with the potential for large-scale deployment \r\n(Chapters 5, 9, 10, and 11). For this reason, existing studies find that \r\nenergy efficiency and demand reduction strategies will be important \r\ncontributors to net-zero energy systems (Creutzig et al. 2018; Davis \r\net al. 2018; DeAngelo et al. 2021). Lower demand reduces the need \r\nfor low-carbon energy or alternative fuel sources."


id: fa15fe148b36f4f66b871c8ce81e2054
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Demand-side or demand reduction strategies include technology \r\nefficiency improvements, strategies that reduce energy consumption \r\nor demand for energy services (such as reducing the use of personal \r\ntransportation, often called 'conservation') (Creutzig et al. 2018), and \r\nstrategies such as load curtailment."


id: f5000b6dfb22d8c5eaccf489ecc5faab
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40469
content:
"Characterising efficiency of net-zero energy systems is problematic \r\ndue to measurement challenges (high confidence). Efficiency itself \r\nis difficult to define and measure across full economies (Saunders \r\net al. 2021). There is no single definition of energy efficiency and the "


id: bd6e40c67b5d94630bef60b6a6bcdbff
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30585
content:
"Net-zero energy systems will use energy more efficiently than \r\nthose of today (high confidence). Energy efficiency and energy \r\nuse reduction strategies are generally identified as being flexible "


id: ce97227aa56c869285d8c28f2e76f1d7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33685
content:
"dwellings, early retirement of inefficient buildings, smaller floor areas, \r\nand smart controls to optimise energy use in the building, namely for \r\nheating, cooling, LED lighting, and water heating (Chapter 9). End \r\nuses would utilise electricity, or potentially hydrogen, produced from \r\nzero-carbon sources. The use of electricity for heating and cooking \r\nmay often be a less efficient process at converting primary energy to \r\nenergy services than using natural gas, but using natural gas would \r\nrequire CDR in order to be considered net-zero emissions. Changes in \r\nbehaviour may modestly lower demand. Most economies would have \r\nbuildings with more efficient technologies powered by zero-carbon \r\nelectricity, and developing economics would shift from biomass \r\nto electricity, raising their energy consumption as population and \r\nwealth increase under net-zero energy systems."


id: c35ab5ed8513cef6496c5a8ddb6d8af
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31642
content:
"definition understandably depends on the context used (Patterson \r\n1996), which ranges from device-level efficiency all the way to the \r\nefficient use of energy throughout an economy. Broadly, energy\u0002efficient strategies allow for the same level of services or output \r\nwhile using less energy. At the level of the entire economy, measures \r\nsuch as primary or final energy per capita or per GDP are often used \r\nas a  proxy for energy efficiency; these measures reflect not only \r\nefficiency, but also many other factors such as industrial structure, \r\nendowed natural resources, consumer preferences, policies, and \r\nregulations. Energy efficiency and other demand-side strategies \r\nrepresent such a large set of technologies, strategies, policies, market \r\nand consumers' responses and policies that aggregate measures can \r\nbe difficult to define (Saunders et al. 2021)."


id: 1baa167ec6507727c8ddf07e450b14ee
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2052
content:
"Industry has seen major efficiency improvements in the past, but \r\nmany processes are now close to their thermodynamic limits. \r\nElectrification and breakthrough processes (such as producing steel \r\nwith electricity and hydrogen), using recycled materials, using heat \r\nmore efficiently by improving thermal insulation, and using waste \r\nheat for heat pumps, as well using advanced sensors, monitoring, \r\nand visualisation and communication technologies may provide \r\nfurther efficiency improvements (Chapter 11)."


id: 682d75e0a951fe5a8042148f5d97a84
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15596
content:
"Measurement issues notwithstanding, virtually all studies that \r\naddress net-zero energy systems assume improved energy intensity \r\nin the future (high confidence). The overall efficiency outcomes and \r\nthe access to such improvements across different nations, however, \r\nare not clear. Energy consumption will increase over time - despite \r\nenergy efficiency improvements  - due to population growth and \r\ndevelopment (DeAngelo et al. 2021)."


id: 5a68ce4666ea6d480f99ac8546ec94e1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13163
content:
"Carbon-neutral energy systems are likely to be more interconnected \r\nthan those of today (high confidence). The many possible feedstocks, \r\nenergy carriers, and interconversion processes imply a greater need \r\nfor the integration of production, transport, storage, and consumption \r\nof different fuels (Davis et al. 2018). For instance, electrification is \r\nexpected to play an important role in decarbonising light-duty \r\nvehicles (Chapter 10, Section 6.4.3), yet the electricity and transport \r\nsectors have few direct interactions today. Systems integration and "


id: 7ebcf9c6f0a61e82047b6237e77c8b72
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
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content:
"is not intended as a replacement for emissions reduction, but rather as \r\na complementary effort to offset residual emissions from sectors that \r\nare not decarbonised and from other low-carbon technologies such as \r\nfossil CCS (McLaren et al. 2019; Gaffney et al. 2020; Iyer et al. 2021)."


id: ad6c25db3c5235df916ed3d5305d980a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27750
content:
"DACCS offers a modular approach to CDR (Creutzig et al. 2019), but \r\nit could be a significant consumer of energy. DAC could also interact \r\nwith other elements of the energy systems as the captured CO2\r\ncould be reused to produce low-carbon methanol and other fuels \r\n(Hoppe et al. 2018; Realmonte et al. 2019; Zhang and Fujimori 2020). \r\nDACCS might also offer an alternative for use of excess electricity \r\nproduced by variable renewables (Wohland et  al. 2018), though \r\nthere are uncertainties about the economic performance of this \r\nintegrated approach."


id: 1657e2e718d3a4c8883528456709fdc3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1149
content:
"Challenges associated with integrating net-zero energy systems \r\ninclude rapid technological change, the importance of behavioural \r\ndimensions in domains with limited experience and data, policy \r\nchanges and interactions, and path dependence. Technological cost \r\nand public acceptance will influence the degree of integration. Sectoral \r\npathways will likely be adaptive and adjust based on the resolution of \r\nuncertainties over time, and the relative competitiveness will evolve \r\nas the technological frontier evolves, which is a  complex and path\u0002dependent function of deployment, R&D, and inter-industry spillovers. \r\nSupply-side options interact with demand-side measures in increasingly \r\nintegrated energy systems (Sorrell 2015; van Vuuren et al. 2018)."


id: 1fade26773637cce690973040cc1ce17
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2783
content:
"The transition to net-zero energy systems is not just technological; \r\nit requires shifts in institutions, organisations, and society more \r\ngenerally. As such, it involves institutional changes alongside \r\nchanges in supply, technology, or markets (Andrews-Speed 2016, \r\nPai et al. 2021). Institutional relationships between governments and \r\nenergy sector actors (e.g.,  consumers, electricity companies) affect \r\nthe nature of net-zero systems, as these entities may collaborate \r\non or dispute net-zero goals and measures to achieve them. For \r\nexample, following the Fukushima disaster, Japan placed emphasis \r\non government-utility-public cooperation on use of nuclear power as \r\na means of reducing carbon emissions (Sklarew 2018). Institutions \r\nare instrumental in shaping net-zero energy systems in multiple ways, \r\ncomplemented by and interacting with the behaviours of actors and \r\npolicy regimes in these systems (Figure 6.24)."


id: 41de46495915fbf5cf56d5cde07d2940
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
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content:
"While CDR is likely necessary for net-zero energy systems, the scale \r\nand mix of strategies is unclear -nonetheless some combination of \r\nBECCS and DACCS are likely to be part of net-zero energy systems \r\n(high confidence). Studies indicate that energy-sector CDR may \r\npotentially remove 5-12 GtCO2 annually globally in net-zero energy \r\nsystems (Fuss et al. 2018) (Figure 6.22; Section 6.7; Chapter 12). CDR "


id: 6399fa188628139e8ee584d3f52efd97
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"One level of institutional interactions reflects embedded institutions, \r\nnorms, beliefs, and ideas that would need to change to support net-zero \r\nenergy systems. This applies, for example, to the objectives of modern \r\neconomies and the potentially contradictory dynamics embedded in "


id: 43c8bdca56511cadb31844604e2c127a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:15
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9152
content:
"(Stern et al. 2016b). Internationally and across different parts of the \r\nenergy system, institutional challenges such as these could become \r\neven more stark and complex (Van de Graaf 2013)."


id: cce2d15b91f0e4df89d3a9eebde5f86e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:16
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:16
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33383
content:
"the concept of 'green growth' (Stegemann and Ossewaarde 2018; \r\nStoknes and Rockstrom 2018). The institutional environment  - the \r\npolitical and legal systems that govern exchanges and protect property \r\nrights - would also need to be different in net-zero energy systems. \r\nIn this setting, changing regulations or subsidies that continue to \r\nfavour carbon-intensive systems over the technologies of a net-zero \r\nenergy system might prove difficult (Sovacool 2017). More generally, \r\nnet-zero energy systems will need new regulatory frameworks to \r\nundertake new challenges, from managing a  more interconnected \r\ngrid to adequately governing underground storage of CO2. Institutions \r\nmay also govern specific transactions, such as firms or networks that \r\nsupply energy fuels or services. Current actors are typically resistant \r\nto disruptions, even if such disruptions may broadly benefit society \r\n(Kungl 2015; Schmid et al. 2017; Mori 2018)."


id: 92116b922bf1d26293de2f2d6a54354e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:16
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:16
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Countries have flexibility to pursue options that make the most sense \r\nfor their national circumstances (Figure 6.25). They may emphasise \r\nsupply transformation over demand reduction; deploy different \r\nresources; engage at different levels in international energy trade; \r\nsupport different energy industries; focus on different energy carriers \r\n(e.g., electricity, hydrogen); or focus more on distributed or integrated \r\nsystems, among others. Many factors may influence the long-term \r\nnet-zero energy systems that are appropriate for any country's \r\nnational circumstances, including the following."


id: 8d0aca8a05350ac5f334088628f11cfb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:16
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:16
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22004
content:
"Future technology. Technological transitions have often been driven \r\nby the relative merits of different technology options. Recent trends in \r\nthe use of PV cells, wind power, and in batteries, for example, have been \r\nspurred by their increasing economic competitiveness (Section 6.3). \r\nYet future technology cannot be fully predicted, so it provides only \r\na partial guide today for charting a path toward future systems."


id: df85080df928579465c28c6794500276
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:16
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:16
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36570
content:
"Indigenous energy resources. Countries may emphasise \r\napproaches that take advantage of indigenous energy resources \r\nsuch as solar power, wind, hydroelectric resources, land for bioenergy \r\ncrops, CO2 storage capability, or fossil resources to be used with CCS. \r\nCountries with less abundant resources may put greater emphasis \r\non demand reductions and regional integration. Countries with \r\nresource bases that are easily tradeable, like low-carbon electricity or \r\nbioenergy, may choose to trade those resources rather than use them \r\ndomestically (Box 6.10, Section 6.4.3, 6.4.5)."


id: fcb92af7a474ec45b8e3c9e265232dfe
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:16
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:16
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41826
content:
"Current energy system configuration. Future sectoral energy \r\ndemands and the potential for demand-side transformation are \r\npartially determined by existing infrastructure (e.g., building stocks, \r\ntransport infrastructure). Countries with less developed or growing \r\nenergy systems will have more flexibility to create the systems that \r\nbest match their long-term goals, but there may be substantial \r\nchallenges in transitioning directly to the most advanced low-carbon \r\ntechnology options, and countries may have different capacities to \r\nabsorb technology from other countries."


id: 493c3b36bafab5fa05a8b2ec63c8a873
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:16
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:16
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10102
content:
"Regional climate. Climate influences heating and cooling demand, \r\nboth of which influence countries' energy demands and energy \r\ninfrastructure to meet those demands (Section 6.5). In addition to \r\ndaily demand profiles, heating and cooling are seasonal, influencing \r\nwhich energy sources may serve these loads and the seasonal \r\nstorage they require. Cooling is almost entirely served by electricity \r\ntoday, and heating has commonly been served by non-electric fuels. \r\nIn low-carbon energy systems, heating may be increasingly served \r\nby electricity (Section 6.6.4), meaning that the influence of regional \r\nclimate may be strongest on countries' electricity systems."


id: 7de0985614722de1eac6e5556d724e26
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:16
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:16
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19324
content:
"Technological leadership, economic opportunities, and growth. \r\nCountries may emphasise technologies in which they intend to have \r\ntechnological leadership and a competitive advantage. These could \r\nemerge over time or be based on current areas of opportunity or \r\nleadership. Industrial policy will influence future energy system as \r\ntechnological choices can benefit or hamper incumbents or new \r\nmarket actors."


id: 7599e96755a0c821d7f7b1c351c28daa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:16
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:16
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17922
content:
"Regional integration. Regional integration will allow countries \r\nto bridge energy gaps using external linkages, including regional \r\nelectricity integration and trade in hydrogen, biomass, and other fuels. \r\nCountries with greater integration can rely more heavily on imports \r\nand may therefore rely less on indigenous resources (Box 6.10)."


id: aa44f8b45ab9a48dfeb929a229399c2f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:16
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:16
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27187
content:
"Energy security. Countries emphasising import security will tend \r\nto rely more heavily on indigenous resources (Section  6.3). Some \r\nindigenous resources may raise security of supply issues that will \r\ninfluence energy system configurations. Bioenergy and hydropower, \r\nfor example, can be subject to import climate risks (Section 6.5), and \r\nsignificant integration of VRE technologies will influence electricity \r\nsystem infrastructure and management (Section 6.6.2, Box 6.8)."


id: a1cebe68aa6402a5114d3fc1f2dfc53b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:16
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:16
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25687
content:
"Other factors. Countries will consider a  wide range of other \r\nfactors in building toward low-carbon energy systems. Population \r\ndensity, for example, will influence building and transportation \r\nenergy demands;  economic transitions will influence industrial \r\nenergy  demands. Societal priorities beyond climate, notably SDGs \r\nmay influence technology choices and types of energy systems \r\n(Sections 6.3 and 6.7.7)."


id: 9789e5bb0c82810f98fe27086efbe148
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:16
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:16
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23876
content:
"Energy systems are linked across countries in many ways: countries transport crude oil across the ocean in supertankers, pipelines \r\ncarry oil and natural gas across country boundaries, electric power lines cross country boundaries, and countries trade industrial \r\ncommodities that carry embodied energy or that are essential inputs to mitigation technologies. Future systems will generate electricity \r\nusing different mixes of technologies, produce and transport different carriers (e.g., hydrogen or biofuels), and use far less fossil fuel, \r\namong other major changes. Important examples include electricity, hydrogen, and biomass."


id: f52e54c23471dac12122131b3fbc8352
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:16
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:16
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40500
content:
"Electricity system integration. Net-zero energy systems will rely more heavily on electricity generated from low-emissions \r\ntechnologies. Given the significant variations in the location of low-carbon electricity resources and the temporal variability of some \r\nrenewable electricity sources, notably solar and wind power, regional electricity grids could reduce overall costs of net-zero energy \r\nsystems (Section 6.4.5). Furthermore, electricity transmission interconnections could significantly reduce local energy balancing costs \r\nand investment in peaking plants needed to meet security of supply requirements, and it could increase system resilience, especially in \r\nthe case of extreme events such as heat waves or cold spells (Fasihi and Bogdanov 2016). Important challenges to regional electricity \r\nintegration include geopolitical concerns from cross-border trade and societal and technological challenges associated with building \r\nnew transmission lines."


id: 9ff0763ce23e674491a6dbcda6041eaa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:16
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:16
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25350
content:
"Hydrogen trade. Hydrogen may play an important role in future net-zero energy systems, particularly in applications where electricity \r\nis not economically advantageous (Box 6.9). Hydrogen can be used to decarbonise regions in which it is produced, and it can also be \r\ntransported long distances to facilitate decarbonisation of sectors distant from sources of low-cost supply. Methods of long-distance, \r\nhigh-volume hydrogen transport could include liquid storage, chemical carriers, and gaseous delivery via pipelines (Section 6.4.5). \r\nIn net-zero systems with substantial wind and solar power generation, hydrogen can be generated through electrolysis and then \r\nshipped to other locations. Important challenges to hydrogen trade include cost-effective low-carbon production, cost of delivery \r\ninfrastructure, storage, and end-use technology costs and safety."


id: 8c3a7ffb74f3d80ebf8cf3aac2d103e5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:16
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:16
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21844
content:
"Trade in biomass. Biomass may also play an important role in net-zero energy systems (Section 6.6.4, Chapter 3). Large-scale bioenergy \r\nproduction and consumption is likely to trigger global biomass trade. Global bioenergy trade volumes presently exceed 1 EJ yr-1, \r\nof which 60% is directly traded for energy purposes (Proskurina et al. 2019a). Established trade mechanisms include wood pellet \r\ntransport, ethanol, and biodiesel (Proskurina et al. 2019b). In a net-zero global energy system, bioenergy trade could be greater than \r\ncurrent trade of coal or natural gas, but less than that of petroleum (Sharmina et al. 2017; Mandley et al. 2020). Some studies indicate "


id: 93d4a9853d556a2d75fd7b9251bfed5b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:16
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:16
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23218
content:
"that Latin America and Africa could become key exporting regions, with the EU, the USA, and East Asia emerging as key importers \r\n(Alsaleh and Abdul-Rahim 2018; Rentizelas et al. 2019). Studies have found that net bioenergy exports could be as high as 10% of \r\nGDP for some Latin American countries, while other regions like the EU may be faced with burgeoning import reliance (Daioglou et al. \r\n2020b; Mahlknecht et al. 2020). In addition to challenges associated with bioenergy production (Section 6.4 and Chapter 7), important \r\nchallenges to biomass trade include differences in sustainability criteria and land/biomass definitions in different jurisdictions, and \r\ndifficulties in establishing consistent monitoring and auditing systems (Lamers et al. 2016)."


id: 1a0733eb389fd861c6e6e14d69d02330
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:16
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:16
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1779
content:
"nonetheless support the conclusion that the energy sector will not \r\nbe decarbonised without explicit policy actions to reduce emissions."


id: 1aa1971e8f0a23b0b65546d875d877f6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:16
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:16
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1884
content:
"Figure 6.26 | Projected energy sector GHG emissions for the 1.5degC scenarios (without and with overshoot), and likely below 2degC scenarios (without \r\nand with delayed policy action) during 2020-2050 (Source: AR6 Scenarios Database). Boxes indicate 25th and 75th percentiles, while whiskers indicate 5th and 95th \r\npercentiles. GHG emissions are inclusive of energy sector CO2, CH4, N2O emissions and 80% of global HFC emissions. Number of model-scenario combinations in AR6 Scenarios \r\nDatabase: limit warming to 1.5degC (>50%) with no or limited overshoot: 77; return warming to 1.5degC (>50%) after a high overshoot: 110; limit warming to 2(C (>67%) with \r\naction starting in 2020: 164; limit warming to 2degC (>67%) with NDCs until 2030: 97."


id: b55c5275716f969cc490d3f4e869f0b1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29140
content:
"Figure 6.27 | Net regional (R6) CO2 emissions from energy across scenarios that limit/return warming to 1.5degC (>50%) with no or limited/after a high \r\novershoot, and scenarios that limit warming to 2degC (>67%) with action starting in 2020 or with NDCs until 2030, during 2020-2050 (Source: AR6 Scenarios \r\nDatabase). Boxes indicate 25th and 75th percentiles, while whiskers indicate 5th and 95th percentiles. Most mitigation scenarios are based on a cost-minimising framework \r\nthat does not consider historical responsibility or other equity approaches."


id: 8ee6d4f099831b451275e01c4259e1e6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22329
content:
"Figure 6.28 | The timing of net-zero emissions for full economy greenhouse gases (GHGs), energy sector CO2, and electricity sector CO2. Boxes indicate \r\n25th and 75th percentiles, centre black line is the median, while whiskers indicate 1.5x the inter-quartile range. The vertical dashed lines represent the median point at which \r\nemissions in the scenarios have dropped by 95% (pink) and 97.5% (purple), respectively. Dots represent individual scenarios. The fraction indicates the number of scenarios \r\nreaching net-zero by 2100 out of the total sample. Source: AR6 Scenario Database."


id: f213e393c8f511f9212d5f9de485d49f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39979
content:
"to reduce emissions - if reductions are delayed - a more rapid energy \r\ntransition will subsequently be required to limit warming to 2degC or \r\nlower (Rogelj et al. 2015a, 2018a; IPCC 2018)."


id: b2327f3894270172f32ae76e8720caed
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28583
content:
"(interquartile range) reach zero globally between 2044 and 2055 \r\n(2052 and 2078) (Figure 6.28). It is likely to be less costly to reduce \r\nnet CO2 emissions close to or below zero in the electricity sector than \r\nin other sectors, because there are relatively more low-emissions \r\noptions in electricity. Sectors such as long-distance transport, air \r\ntransport, and process heat are anticipated to face greater challenges \r\nto decarbonisation than the electricity sector (Clark and Herzog 2014; \r\nRogelj et al. 2015b, 2018b; IPCC 2018; Luderer et al. 2018)."


id: c7db9da3ab3de4572def54045aa8f9e4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32469
content:
"The timing of net-zero energy system emissions varies substantially \r\nacross scenarios. In scenarios limiting warming to 1.5degC (>50%) with \r\nno or limited overshoot (2degC (>67%)), the energy system reaches \r\nnet-zero CO2 emissions (interquartile range) from 2060 onwards \r\n(2080-). (Figure 6.28). However, net emissions reach near-zero more \r\nquickly. For example, in scenarios limiting warming to 1.5degC (>50%) \r\nwith no or limited overshoot (2degC (>67%)) net energy system CO2\r\nemissions drop by 95% between 2056 and 2075 (2073 and 2093). \r\nNet full economy GHG emissions reach zero more slowly than net \r\nCO2 emissions. In some scenarios, net energy system CO2 and total \r\nGHG emissions do not reach zero this century, offset by CDR in \r\nother sectors."


id: 32f84007b69531293c9ecb89450d186c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6231
content:
"In addition, there are potential options to remove CO2 from the \r\natmosphere in the electricity sector, notably BECCS, which would \r\nallow electricity sector emissions to drop below zero. Without CDR \r\noptions, electricity sector emissions may not fall all the way to zero. \r\nIf CDR is accomplished in other sectors and not in electricity, some \r\nfossil fuel plants may still lead to positive net electricity sector CO2\r\nemissions, even in net-zero economies (Bistline and Blanford 2021b; \r\nWilliams et al. 2021a)."


id: 2a7ff6955f893378996dd34768c42d7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4706
content:
"The timing of emissions reductions will vary across the different \r\nparts of the energy sector (Figure 6.28). To decarbonise most cost\u0002effectively, global net CO2 emissions from electricity generation \r\nwill likely reach zero before the rest of the energy sector (medium \r\nconfidence). In scenarios limiting warming to 1.5degC (>50%) with no or \r\nlimited overshoot (2degC (>67%)), net electricity sector CO2 emissions "


id: 9d06d9393b5b5549924aa9443a25e287
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24868
content:
"We lack sufficient understanding to pin down precise dates at which \r\nenergy system CO2 emissions in individual countries, regions, or \r\nsectors will reach net zero. Net-zero timing is based on many factors \r\nthat are not known today or are bound up in development of key \r\ntechnologies, such as energy storage, bioenergy, or hydrogen. Some "


id: b1765c5e3737cabff52089a846e8c616
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28445
content:
"countries have low-carbon resource bases that could support deep \r\nemissions reductions, while others do not. Timing is also affected \r\nby the availability of CDR options, whether these options are in the \r\nenergy sector or elsewhere, and the discount rate used to assess \r\nstrategies (Bednar et  al. 2019; Emmerling et  al. 2019). Moreover, \r\nwhile many scenarios are designed to minimise global mitigation \r\ncosts, many other frameworks exist for allocating mitigation effort \r\nacross countries (van den Berg et al. 2019) (Chapter 4)."


id: 4045bf7afd13e45cbce2801115471c69
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8497
content:
"confidence). Low- and zero-carbon technologies produce 74-82% \r\n(interquartile range) of primary energy in 2050 in scenarios limiting \r\nwarming to 1.5degC (>50%) with no or limited overshoot and 55-68% \r\nin scenarios limiting warming to 2degC (>67%) (Figure 6.29). The share \r\nof low-carbon technologies in global primary energy supply today is \r\nbelow 20% (Chapter 3, Section 6.3, and Figure 6.29). The percentage \r\nof low- and zero-carbon energy will depend in part on the evolution of \r\nenergy demand - the more that energy demand grows, the more energy \r\nfrom low- and zero-carbon sources will be needed, and the higher the \r\npercentage of total primary energy these sources will represent."


id: 94583419c1176b4f5ed269476e41af7a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23307
content:
"Low- and zero-carbon sources produce 97-99% of global electricity \r\nin 2050 in scenarios limiting warming to 1.5degC (>50%) with no or \r\nlimited overshoot and 93-97% in scenarios limiting warming to 2degC \r\n(>67%) (Figure 6.29) (medium confidence). Decarbonising electricity \r\ngeneration, in tandem with increasing use of electricity (see below), \r\nis an essential near-term strategy for limiting warming. The increase \r\nin low- and zero-carbon electricity will occur while electricity demand \r\ngrows substantially. Studies have projected that global electricity \r\ndemand will roughly double by 2050 and quadruple to quintuple by \r\n2100 irrespective of efforts to reduce emissions (Bauer et al. 2017; \r\nLuderer et al. 2017; IEA 2019a)."


id: a194a7c5a4d6391bb7217b422efce302
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25643
content:
"There are multiple technological routes to reduce energy system \r\nemissions (Section 6.6). Here we discuss three of these: (i) decarbonising \r\nprimary energy and electricity generation; (ii) switching to electricity, \r\nbioenergy, hydrogen, and other fuels produced from low-carbon \r\nsources; and (iii) limiting energy use through improvement of \r\nefficiency and conservation. CDR is discussed in Section 6.7.1.3 Fossil \r\nfuel transitions are discussed in Section 6.7.4."


id: a96d217794db33ef8665897f003ab969
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27032
content:
"Decarbonising primary energy and electricity generation. \r\nLimiting warming to well below 2degC requires a  rapid and dramatic \r\nincrease in energy produced from low- or zero-carbon sources (high "


id: 4a7167cae3dadd8ca73f43aa92ba379d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10336
content:
"Figure 6.30 | Shares of low-carbon energy (all sources except unabated fossil fuels) and bioenergy (including both traditional and commercial biomass) \r\nin total primary energy, and solar+wind, CCS and nuclear in electricity for scenarios that limit/return warming to 1.5degC (>50%) with no or limited/after \r\na high, overshoot, and scenarios that limit warming to 2degC (>67%), with action starting in 2020 or NDCs until 2030, during 2030-2050 (Source: AR6 \r\nScenarios Database). Boxes indicate 25th and 75th percentiles while whiskers indicate 5th and 95th percentiles."


id: 46f9b66aa6688c7e19e4eab754e7140a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9690
content:
"Nonetheless, it is likely that wind and solar will dominate low-carbon \r\ngeneration and capacity growth over the next couple of decades due \r\nto supporting policies in many countries, and due to their significant \r\nroles in early electric sector decarbonisation, alongside reductions in \r\ncoal generation (Bistline and Blanford 2021b; Pan et al. 2021). Clean \r\nfirm technologies play important roles in providing flexibility and on\u0002demand generation for longer durations, though deployment of these \r\ntechnologies is typically associated with deeper decarbonisation levels \r\n(e.g., beyond 70-80% reductions), which are likely to be more important \r\nafter 2030 in many regions, and with more limited CDR deployment \r\n(Baik et al. 2021; Bistline and Blanford 2021a; Williams et al. 2021a)."


id: c5f32d5a4453a019ae6129cba2768836
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32133
content:
"Renewable energy, especially generation from solar and wind, is \r\nlikely to have an important role in many low-carbon electricity \r\nsystems. The contributions of wind and solar electricity will depend \r\non their levelised costs relative to other options, integration costs, \r\nsystem value, and the ability to integrate variable resources into the \r\ngrid (Section 6.6). Electric sector technology mixes will vary by region \r\nbut will typically include additional resources such as hydropower, \r\nnuclear power, fossil generation with CCS, energy storage resources, \r\nand geothermal energy, among others. Contributions of different \r\noptions vary widely across scenarios based on different assumptions \r\nabout these factors (Figure 6.30)."


id: d4c39b16e3591a2053056469252bbaae
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34750
content:
"Box 6.11, Figure 2 | Illustrative Mitigation Pathway 1.5-Renewables: Africa (AF) in a scenario that limts warming to 1.5degC (>50%) (AF net-zero \r\neconomy, 2055-2060, AF net-zero energy system 2055-2060). Rapid expansion of non-biomass renewables, high electrification, and a fossil fuel phase-out."


id: a2c09c061dc9e01450224059c9de0899
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25851
content:
"Box 6.11, Figure 3 | Illustrative Mitigation Pathway 1.5-Low Demand: Developed Countries (DEV) in a scenario that limits warming to 1.5degC \r\n(>50%) (DEV net-zero economy, 2055-2060, net-zero energy system 2075-2080). Major reduction of energy demand, high electrification, and gradual \r\nfossil fuel phase-out."


id: 93ff233cc12c40ebe7662e0acbd8a389
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23242
content:
"Box 6.11, Figure 4 | Illustrative Mitigation Pathway 1.5-Shifting Pathways: Asia and Pacific (APC) in a scenario that limits warming to 1.5degC \r\n(>50%) (APC net-zero economy, 2075-2080, net-zero energy system 2090-2095). Renewables, high electrification, fossil fuel phase-out and low \r\nagriculture, forestry and other land-use (AFOLU) emissions. Reaches net-zero CO2 relatively late."


id: a73df08eaa8fae496c8cc47544a70ee4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26638
content:
"Box 6.11, Table 1 | Summary of selected Illustrative Mitigation Pathways energy system characteristics in 2050 for the chosen regions."


id: 8a73bb634abfad81be4155078d244065
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21527
content:
"Switching to low-carbon energy carriers. Switching to energy \r\ncarriers produced from low-carbon sources will be an important \r\nstrategy for energy sector decarbonisation. Accelerated electrification \r\nof end uses such as light duty transport, space heating, and cooking \r\nis a critical near-term mitigation strategy (Sugiyama 2012; Zou et al. \r\n2015; Rockstrom et al. 2017; IEA 2019f; Waisman et al. 2019; B. Tang \r\net al. 2021). Electricity supplies 48-58% (interquartile range) of the \r\nglobal final energy demand by 2050 in scenarios limiting warming to \r\n1.5degC (>50%) with no or limited overshoot and 36-47% in scenarios \r\nlimiting warming to 2degC (>67%) (Figure 6.29). Globally, the current \r\nlevel of electrification is about 20%."


id: b717642235ce1f803bf617eb01e198c9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29422
content:
"Indirect electrification encompasses the use of electricity to \r\nproduce hydrogen and synthetic fuels (efuels or power fuels). The \r\nextent of indirect electrification of final energy will depend on \r\nresource endowments and other regionally specific circumstances. \r\nAlthough indirect electrification is less efficient compared to direct \r\nelectrification, it allows low-carbon fuels to be imported from regions \r\nwith abundant low-carbon electricity generation resources (Fasihi \r\nand Bogdanov 2016; Lehtveer et al. 2019; Fasihi and Breyer 2020) \r\n(Box 6.10 on regional integration)."


id: 4f8e6de1d8a61a1654b301bfe1867501
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11282
content:
"across buildings, transport, and industry than most other pathways in \r\nthe literature. In some cases, energy demand levels are lower in 2050 \r\n(and later) than in 2019. These lower demands result in less reliance \r\non bioenergy and a more limited role for CDR (Figure 3.18)."


id: f2d332b3616ae2ba686c7123330c07de
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40117
content:
"While electrifying end uses is a  key decarbonisation strategy, \r\nsome end uses such as long-distance transport (freight, aviation, \r\nand shipping) and energy-intensive industries will be harder to \r\nelectrify. For these sectors, alternative fuels or energy carriers such \r\nas biofuels, hydrogen, ammonia or synthetic methane, may be \r\nneeded (Section 6.6 and Box 6.9). Most scenarios find that hydrogen \r\nconsumption will grow gradually, becoming more valuable when the \r\nenergy system has become predominantly low-carbon (Figure 6.31)."


id: 9bb12e997fea4fd6b6c2a441d455dbdb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24648
content:
"Reducing energy demand. Energy service demand is expected \r\nto continue to increase with growth of the economy, but there is \r\ngreat uncertainty about how much it will increase (Bauer et al. 2017; \r\nRiahi et al. 2017; Yu et al. 2018). Given the need to produce low\u0002carbon energy, the scale of energy demand is a critical determinant \r\nof the mitigation challenge (Riahi et al. 2012). Higher energy demand \r\ncalls for more low-carbon energy and increases the challenge; \r\nlower energy demand reduces the need for low-carbon sources \r\nand therefore can ease a  low-carbon transition. Recent studies \r\nhave shown that tempering the growth of energy demand, while \r\nensuring services and needs are still satisfied, can materially affect \r\nthe need for technological CDR (Section 6.7.1.3) (Grubler et al. 2018; \r\nvan Vuuren et al. 2018). Two of the Illustrative Mitigation Pathways \r\n(IMP-SP, IMP-LD) feature substantially lower final energy demand "


id: bbd3387d3539f79be4a1b28aa9c861e2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30278
content:
"warming to 1.5degC (>50%) with no or limited overshoot and 2-11% \r\nin scenarios that limit warming to 2degC (>67%) with action starting in \r\n2020. Large-scale deployment of CDR allows flexibility in timing of \r\nemissions reduction in hard-to-decarbonise sectors."


id: 2fe79e359718862ca5d6baded9f22edb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5681
content:
"CDR will influence the potential fossil-related stranded assets \r\n(Box 6.13). Availability of low-cost CDR can help reduce premature \r\nretirement for some fossil fuel infrastructure. CDR can allow countries \r\nto reach net-zero emissions without phasing out all fossil fuels. \r\nSpecific infrastructure could also be extended if it is used to burn \r\nbiomass or other non-emitting sources. For example, existing coal\u0002fired power plants, particularly those with CCS, could be co-fired with \r\nbiomass (Woolf et al. 2016; Lu et al. 2019; Pradhan et al. 2021). In \r\nmany scenarios, energy sector CDR is deployed to such an extent that \r\nenergy sector CO2 emissions become negative in the second half of \r\nthe century (Chapter 3)."


id: abe8562e319525e0eac7dab97097041
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27484
content:
"The Global Stocktake is a regularly occurring process under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in which \r\nefforts will be made to understand progress on, among other things, global mitigation. Collective progress of countries towards the \r\nParis Agreement goal will be assessed and its outcome will inform Parties in updating and enhancing their Nationally Determined \r\nContributions (NDCs). This box explores potential indicators to understand energy system mitigation progress."


id: 6ad28e1f5260116daeb2159ae3d07916
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16075
content:
"Beyond these aggregate indicators, a second order assessment would capture more details, such as the electrification rate, share of \r\nrenewables, nuclear, CCS or other low-carbon technologies in electricity generation, land area used for energy production, and the \r\nnumber of EVs or PHEVs. Consumption of coal, oil and gas captures the underlying factors of CO2 emissions. The emphasis of these \r\nindicators could differ across countries in the context of national specific circumstances. Technology- or project-based statistics are \r\nalso useful to check the progress of the low-carbon transition, for example, the number of CCS facilities."


id: 9cb67d8117e286f2ebeacaa38afe9d31
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24807
content:
"A critical challenge in the assessment of energy sector progress is how to measure societal, institutional, and political progress. These \r\nfactors are difficult to quantify, yet they are fundamental determinants of the ability to reduce emissions. Public opinion, special \r\ninterest politics, implications of mitigation for employment, energy subsidies, and energy policies are all critical indicators of progress. \r\nIn addition, while much of the literature focuses on national-level action, mitigation is increasingly being led by cities, states, provinces, \r\nbusinesses, and other sub-national or non-national actors. Understanding the progress of these actors will be critical to assess energy \r\nsystem mitigation progress. New research is needed to better assess these 'societal' indicators and the role of non-national actors."


id: e1f3e19bb67841c8b794c2f9f4c34cc0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37038
content:
"oil, gas, and coal extraction and fossil electricity generation \r\n(USD990 billion  yr -1); renewable electricity, primarily solar and \r\nwind (USD340 billion yr -1); nuclear energy (USD40 billion yr -1); \r\nelectricity networks (USD270 billion yr -1); and end-use energy \r\nefficiency (USD270 billion yr -1)."


id: 43f62ee9b2049fd2e47a4add8a5ae7f3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9189
content:
"Total global energy investment was roughly USD1940 billion yr -1\r\nin 2019 (IEA 2021f). This total can be broken down into the \r\nfollowing main categories: fossil-related energy supply, including "


id: 83643f0897623627a12d309cfeb0eb92
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20248
content:
"Figure  6.32 | Global average annual investments from 2023 to 2052 (undiscounted, in USD billion yr -1) for electricity supply sub-sectors and for \r\nextraction of fossil fuels in scenarios that limit warming to 2degC (>67%) or lower (C1-C3) (Source: AR6 Scenarios Database and Chapter 3). Historical \r\ninvestments are also shown for comparison (Source: IEA 2021; approximations are made for hydro and geothermal based on available data; solar and wind values are for 2020). \r\nT&D: transmission and distribution of electricity. Bars show median values across models-scenarios, and whiskers the interquartile ranges. See Chapters 3 and 15 for additional \r\ninformation on investments and finance."


id: 185fcf3b53df6880c9727f4d87bd92a6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1499
content:
"over the 2023-2052 timeframe: USD1670 to 3070 billion yr -1 (C1), \r\nUSD1600 to 2780 billion yr-1 (C2), and USD1330 to 2680 billion yr-1\r\n(C3) (see also Section 3.6.1.3)."


id: eb8ef4a1058e916306f4c1504378ed25
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38811
content:
"Energy investment needs are projected to rise, according to \r\ninvestment-focused scenario studies found in the literature (McCollum \r\net  al. 2018a; Zhou et  al. 2019; Bertram et  al. 2021). While these \r\nincreases are projected to occur in emissions-intensive pathways as \r\nwell as low-carbon pathways, they are projected to be largest in low\u0002carbon pathways. Average annual global energy investments over \r\nthe 2016-2050 period range (across six models) from USD2100 to \r\n4100 billion yr-1 in pathways limiting warming to 2degC (>67%) and \r\nfrom USD2400 to 4700 billion yr-1 in pathways limiting warming to \r\n1.5degC (>50%) with no or limited overshoot (McCollum et al. 2018). \r\nWhatever the scenario, a significant and growing share of investments \r\nbetween now and 2050 will be channelled toward infrastructure build\u0002out in emerging economies, particularly in Asia (Zhou et al. 2019)."


id: 3e324320d924dee58156af87f2ea2698
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8120
content:
"Beyond these sector-wide numbers, a  key feature of stringent \r\nmitigation pathways is a  pronounced reallocation of investment \r\nflows across sub-sectors, namely from unabated fossil fuels \r\n(extraction, conversion, and electricity generation) and toward \r\nrenewables, nuclear power, CCS, electricity networks and storage, \r\nand end-use energy efficiency (McCollum et  al. 2018a; Bertram \r\net al. 2021; IEA 2021f) (Figure 6.32). Investments in solar, wind, and \r\nelectricity transmission, distribution, and storage increase the most \r\nin mitigation scenarios. Up to 2050, the bulk of these investments \r\nare made in OECD and Asian countries (Figure  6.33). While fossil \r\nfuel extraction investments exhibit a marked downscaling across all \r\nregions, compared to reference scenarios, the declines are especially \r\nstrong in the Middle East, Reforming Economies of Eastern Europe \r\nand the Former Soviet Union (REF), and OECD."


id: d3f13bc19c267637e340d9a622536ce3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34621
content:
"More widespread electrification of buildings, transport, and industry \r\nmeans particularly substantial investment in the electricity system. \r\nAccording to C1-C3 pathways in the IPCC's Sixth Assessment \r\nReport (AR6 Scenarios Database), such investments could be at the \r\nfollowing average annual levels (inter-quartile range, USD2015) "


id: e96b100a526790c518aee19e5384a8ae
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38423
content:
"Figure 6.33 | Regional average annual investments from 2023 to 2052 (undiscounted, in USD billion yr -1) for four of the largest sub-sectors of the energy \r\nsystem in scenarios that limit warming to 2degC (>67%) or lower (C1-C3) (Source: AR6 Scenarios Database and Chapter 3). Historical investments are also \r\nshown for comparison (Source: IEA, 2016). T&D: transmission and distribution of electricity. Extr.: extraction of fossil fuels. Bars show median values across models-scenarios, \r\nand whiskers the inter-quartile ranges. See Chapters 3 and 15 for additional information on investments and finance."


id: 4247dfa162fb2aab6582aec935364b42
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8859
content:
"Investments into end-use energy efficiency are projected to also \r\nbe substantial in mitigation pathways, potentially upwards of \r\nseveral hundred USD billion yr-1 on average to 2050, compared to \r\nUSD270  billion yr-1 in 2019 (McCollum et  al. 2018a; IEA 2021f). \r\nHowever, the literature is inconsistent in how demand-side \r\ninvestments are calculated, as boundary conditions are less clear \r\nthan for energy supply investments. Taking a broader definition can \r\nresult in estimates that are an order-of-magnitude higher, meaning \r\nas large or larger than supply-side investments (Grubler et al. 2012; \r\nIEA 2021f)."


id: b468757ee7c7f4c68b9c178dffffe079
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28977
content:
"Future investment patterns will vary by region, as they do now, due to \r\ndifferences in risk profiles, resource endowments and economic and \r\ngovernance structures (Fizaine et al. 2016; Zhou et al. 2019; Ameli, N. \r\net  al. 2021). In rapidly growing countries, investments to support \r\na low-carbon energy system transition will be integrated with those \r\nneeded to meet rapidly increasing energy demands, irrespective of \r\nwhether efforts are made to reduce emissions. In less rapidly growing \r\ncountries (Sun et al. 2019), investments will focus on transitioning \r\ncurrent energy systems to low-carbon configurations. Most current \r\nenergy investments are concentrated in high- and upper-middle\u0002income countries (IEA 2021f), but this will change as investment \r\nneeds continue to grow in today's lower-middle- and low-income \r\ncountries (McCollum et al. 2018a; Zhou et al. 2019; Bertram et al. \r\n2021; IEA 2021f)."


id: 1cfe06a5763b7a5aeddc42daf93a6219
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2284
content:
"Increasing low-carbon investment primarily requires shifting existing \r\ncapital investment through regulation and incentives as well as \r\nremoving existing investment barriers (McCollum et al. 2018; Hafner \r\net al. 2020; Ameli, N. et al. 2021). While there is a considerable amount \r\nof capital in the world, it is not always available to those wishing \r\nto invest in certain projects. Total annual global investment in fixed "


id: 9fe47f13cb30e640a606d8cbb619afc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25340
content:
"mitigation will require a major course change from recent history, \r\nlock-in is an important issue for emission reductions in the energy \r\nsector. While lock-in is typically expressed in terms of physical \r\ninfrastructure that would need to be retired early to reach mitigation \r\ngoals, it involves a much broader set of issues that go beyond physical \r\nsystems and into societal and institutional systems (Table 6.11)."


id: f47ad99723609b3569fa67b88b17f930
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40387
content:
"Path dependence refers to resistance to change due to favourable \r\nsocio-economic conditions with existing systems; decisions made in \r\nthe past unduly shape future trajectories. Carbon lock-in is a specific \r\ntype of path dependence (Seto et al. 2016). Given that energy system "


id: 9816814df5e1e9ada4af3a42fa43d0b9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23970
content:
"Table 6.11 | Lock-in types and typical mechanisms. Source: Kotilainen et al. 2020), Reproduced under Creative Commons 4.0 International Licence."


id: 9283a3d390efe3049939a98138a4c651
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22997
content:
"innovations among policymakers and the wider public. Managing \r\nlow-carbon transitions is therefore not only a  techno-managerial \r\nchallenge (based on targets, policies, and expert knowledge), but \r\nalso a broader political project that involves the building of support \r\ncoalitions that include businesses and civil society (moderate \r\nevidence, high agreement)."


id: fdc175caef550be51c1584628b19b54b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42005
content:
"A combination of factors - user, business, cultural, regulatory, and \r\ntransnational  - will hinder low-carbon energy transitions. Strong \r\npath dependencies, even in early formative stages, can have lasting \r\nimpacts on energy systems, producing inertia that cuts across \r\ntechnological, economic, institutional and political dimensions (high \r\nconfidence) (Rickards et al. 2014; Vaden et al. 2019) (Chapter 5)."


id: 70e65a53dbd2915e55ca18ffd3637545
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17127
content:
"Low-carbon transitions involve cultural changes extending beyond \r\npurely technical developments to include changes in consumer \r\npractices, business models, and organisational arrangements. The \r\ndevelopment and adoption of low-carbon innovations will therefore \r\nrequire sustained and effective policies to create appropriate \r\nincentives and support. The implementation of such policies entails \r\npolitical struggles because actors have different understandings and \r\ninterests, giving rise to disagreements and conflicts."


id: 317dd4a0ed30c991418601cfdc2f9673
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5949
content:
"Energy systems exemplify the ways in which massive volumes of \r\nlabour, capital, and effort become sunk into particular institutional \r\nconfigurations (Bridge et al. 2013, 2018). Several embedded factors \r\naffect large-scale transformation of these systems and make \r\ntechnological diffusion a complex process:"


id: a32fa31351f5315d673272b815eea722
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25922
content:
"While low-carbon innovation involves systemic change (Geels \r\net  al. 2018), these are typically less popular than energy supply "


id: fa2e49bda16d8853710046060aae75b7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41384
content:
"future (Tong et al. 2019). Coal-fired power plants currently planned or \r\nunder construction are associated with 150-300 GtCO2, of which about \r\n75% and about 10% are located in Asia and the OECD respectively \r\n(Edenhofer et al. 2018; Pfeiffer et al. 2018). If implemented, these new \r\nfleets will further shorten all coal plants' lifetimes by another 10 years \r\nfor meeting climate goals (Cui et al. 2019)."


id: f6ffd3db54f73d605e5b62b3feeab69a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40826
content:
"Current investments in fossil infrastructure have committed \r\n500-700  GtCO2 of emissions, creating significant risks for limiting \r\nwarming to 1.5degC (Callaghan 2020) (high confidence). These \r\ncurrent investments combined with emissions from proposed fossil \r\ninfrastructure exceed the emissions required to limit warming to \r\n1.5degC (medium confidence). Existing coal- and gas-fired electricity \r\ngeneration accounts for 200-300 GtCO2 of committed emissions. \r\nEmissions from coal generation are larger than for gas plants(Smith \r\net al. 2019; Tong et al. 2019). The lifetime of coal-fired power plants \r\nis 25-50 years, creating long-lasting risks to climate goals (Erickson \r\nand Tempest 2015). Gas-fired power plants are younger on average \r\nthan coal-fired power plants. Industry sector lock-in amounts for \r\nmore than 100 GtCO2, while buildings and transport sector together \r\ncontribute another 50-100 GtCO2 (Erickson and Tempest 2015)."


id: d5b1537b5af8cca8f8877401cd36c257
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34909
content:
"Despite the imperative to reduce use of fossil fuels and the multiple \r\nhealth and other benefits from closing coal-based infrastructure \r\n(Portugal-Pereira et al. 2018; Liu et al. 2019a; Karlsson et al. 2020; \r\nRauner et al. 2020; Cui et al. 2021), coal power plants have continued \r\nto be commissioned globally (Jewell et al. 2019; Jakob et al. 2020), \r\nmost notably in Asian countries. Gas power plants also continue to \r\nbe built. In many regions, new fossil electricity generation exceeds \r\nneeded capacity (Shearer et al. 2017)."


id: 40ca0313be27660c4b861c035d8b0037
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8587
content:
"Existing policies and the NDCs are insufficient to prevent an \r\nincrease in fossil infrastructure and associated carbon lock-in (high \r\nconfidence) (Bertram et  al. 2015; Johnson et  al. 2015). Current \r\ninvestment decisions are critical because there is limited room \r\nwithin the carbon budget required to limit warming to well below \r\n2degC (Kalkuhl et al. 2019; Rosenbloom 2019). Delays in mitigation \r\nwill increase carbon lock-in and could result in large-scale stranded \r\nassets if stringency is subsequently increased to limit warming \r\n(Box 6.11). Near-term implementation of stringent GHG mitigation \r\npolicies are likely to be most effective in reducing carbon lock-in \r\n(Haelg et al. 2018). Near-term mitigation policies will also need to \r\nconsider different energy transition strategies as a result of different \r\nresources and carbon budgets between countries (Lucas 2016; Bos \r\nand Gupta 2018)."


id: 1136deb4fe516d16ef9c9ba6e03206f5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 223
content:
"Lock-in is also relevant to fossil resources. Both coal and gas \r\nexploration continue, and new permits are being issued, which may \r\ncause economic (Erickson et al. 2018) as well as non-economic issues \r\n(Boettcher et al. 2019)."


id: 4831ba6e067cefd5530414563424abd0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9914
content:
"The nature of lock-in varies across the energy system. For example, lock\u0002in in urban and transport sectors is different from the electricity sector. \r\nBroadly, urban environments involve infrastructural, institutional, and \r\nbehavioural lock-in (Urge-Vorsatz et al. 2018). Addressing lock-in in \r\nthese sectors requires action by multiple stakeholders and is unlikely \r\nwith just technological evolution (Table 6.11)."


id: b0758476a09c5e5216a96a4940eb5ffb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28280
content:
"Committed carbon emissions are unevenly distributed. The \r\ndisproportionate high share of committed emissions in emerging \r\neconomies is the result of rapid growth in recent years, which has led \r\nto a comparably young fossil infrastructure with substantial remaining \r\nlife (Shearer et al. 2017). Mature industrialised countries tend to have \r\nolder infrastructures, part of which will be up for retirement in the near "


id: 53362cb1d739f0a156386ffeb8d52f44
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11908
content:
"Past and present energy sector investments have created \r\ntechnological, institutional, and behavioural path dependencies \r\naligned towards coal, oil, and natural gas (high confidence). In \r\nseveral emerging economies, large projects are planned that address \r\npoverty reduction and economic development. Coal infrastructure \r\nmay be the default choice for these investments without policies to \r\ninvest in low-carbon infrastructure instead (Joshua and Alola 2020; \r\nSteckel et al. 2020). Path dependencies frequently have sustainability \r\nimplications beyond carbon emissions. (Box 6.2 and Section 6.7.7). "


id: 303fb583f7092e73d904a6154ddaa44f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5744
content:
"There are several SDG co-benefits associated with decarbonisation of \r\nenergy systems (Section 6.7.7) (Sorgel et al. 2021). For example, coal "


id: f2f76c3c040761e2be253261294aca3a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40136
content:
"mining communities frequently experience significant health and \r\neconomic burdens from resource extraction."


id: e1c5074779f495b6b51afb5f33ab0eea
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36998
content:
"Limiting warming to 2degC (>67%) or lower will result in stranded assets (high confidence). Stranded assets can be broadly defined as assets \r\nthat 'suffer from unanticipated or premature write-offs, downward revaluations or [conversion] to liabilities'. Stranded assets may create \r\nrisks for financial market stability and macro-economic stability (Battiston et al. 2017; Mercure et al. 2018; Sen and von Schickfus 2020), \r\nand they will result in a rapid loss of wealth for the owners of affected assets (Vogt-Schilb and Hallegatte 2017; Ploeg and Rezai 2020)."


id: 252d281cfb31e28a31aca2192cc03328
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3733
content:
"There are two types of stranded assets: fossil-fuel resources that cannot be burned; and premature retirement of fossil infrastructure \r\n(e.g., power plants). About 30% of oil, 50% of gas, and 80% of coal reserves will remain unburnable if warming is limited to 2degC \r\n(Meinshausen et al. 2009; Leaton 2011; Leaton Ranger 2013; McGlade and Ekins 2015; Bauer et al. 2016; IRENA 2017b; Pye et al. \r\n2020) (high confidence). Significantly more reserves are expected to remain unburned if warming is limited to 1.5degC. Countries with \r\nlarge oil, gas, and coal reserves are most at risk (Caldecott et al. 2017; Ansari and Holz 2020)."


id: 83c7099290a7cc63ed8a623f6766ad6c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20331
content:
"About 200 GW of fossil fuel electricity generation per year will likely need to be retired prematurely after 2030 to limit warming to 2degC, \r\neven if countries achieve their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) (medium confidence) (Iyer et al. 2015; Johnson et al. 2015; \r\nFofrich et al. 2020). Limiting warming to 1.5degC will require significantly more rapid premature retirement of electricity generation \r\ncapacity (Binsted et al. 2020). Coal- and gas-fired power plants will likely need to retire about 25 years earlier than in the past to limit \r\nwarming to 2degC, and 30 years earlier to limit warming to 1.5degC (Cui et al. 2019; Fofrich et al. 2020). Coal-fired power plants are at \r\nsignificantly greater risk of stranding compared with gas-fired and oil-fired plants (Iyer et al. 2015; Johnson et al. 2015; Fofrich et al. \r\n2020). The risks of stranded power plants are greatest in countries with newer fossil infrastructure."


id: 6e496286bc509068389e85a5f9f7b3ce
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16672
content:
"If warming is limited to 2degC, the discounted economic impacts of stranded assets, including unburned fossil reserves, could be as high \r\nas USD1-4 trillion from 2015 through 2050 (USD10-20 trillion in undiscounted terms) (medium confidence) (IRENA, 2017c; Mercure \r\net al. 2018). About 40% of these impacts correspond to unburned fossil reserves (IRENA 2017b). If warming is limited to 1.5degC, the \r\neconomic impacts of stranded assets are expected to be significantly higher (Binsted et al. 2020)."


id: 2a756b977e4ab581715aa420bcb8c51a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4697
content:
"limited or no overshoot, fossil energy provides 59-69% (interquartile \r\nrange) of primary energy in 2030 and 25-40% primary energy in \r\n2050 (AR6 Scenarios Database). In scenarios limiting warming to 2degC \r\n(>67%) with action starting in 2020, fossil energy provides 71-75% \r\n(interquartile range) primary energy in 2030 and 41-57% primary \r\nenergy in 2050 (AR6 Scenarios Database). The timeline for reducing \r\nproduction and usage varies across coal, oil, and gas due to their \r\ndiffering carbon intensities and uses."


id: 89cf2e1ee15cd167d0a544054fa280d1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21413
content:
"Global fossil fuel use will need to decline substantially by 2050 to \r\nlimit warming to 2degC (>67%), and it must decline substantially by \r\n2030 to limit warming to 1.5degC (>50%) with no or limited overshoot \r\n(high confidence). Failing to reduce global fossil fuel use below \r\ntoday's levels by 2030 will make it more challenging to limit warming \r\nto below 2degC (>67%). (high confidence). Fossil fuel use declines by \r\n260-330 EJ (52-73% from 2020 levels, interquartile range) through \r\n2050 in scenarios that limit warming to 1.5degC (>50%) with no or \r\nlimited overshoot, and 124-231 EJ (24-51% reduction compared \r\nto 2020 levels) in scenarios that limit warming to 2degC (>67%) with \r\naction starting in 2020. This will require a significant reduction in coal, \r\noil and gas investments. Fossil fuels account for about 80% of primary \r\nenergy today. In scenarios limiting warming to 1.5degC (>50%) with "


id: 71b2a277037e6c1752a1414d7ad71b5d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17249
content:
"Global coal consumption without CCS needs to be largely eliminated \r\nby 2040-2050 to limit warming to 1.5degC (>50%), and 2050-2060 \r\nto limit warming to 2degC (>67%) (high confidence). New investments \r\nin coal-fired electricity without CCS are inconsistent with limiting \r\nwarming to 2degC (>67%) or lower (high confidence) (Edenhofer et al. \r\n2018; Pfeiffer et al. 2018; Spencer et al. 2018; Cui et al. 2019). Coal "


id: 9174ac42da0a2de422ae168f1982db27
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22801
content:
"earlier retirements of plants based on technical (efficiency), economic \r\n(profitability, local employment) and environmental considerations \r\n(e.g., water scarcity for cooling)."


id: b2e70051c26d38d9279e14dba38ebd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28711
content:
"Figure  6.35 | Global fossil fuel pathways for scenarios that limit/return warming to 1.5degC (>50%) with no or limited/after a  high, overshoot, and \r\nscenarios that limit warming to 2degC (>67%), with action starting in 2020 or NDCs until 2030, during 2030-2050. Boxes indicate 25th and 75th percentiles \r\nwhile whiskers indicate 5th and 95th percentiles. Results for total consumption are expressed as a percentage relative to 2020 consumption. Results for fossil energy with CCS \r\nare expressed in total energy consumption. Oil use with CCS is not shown here as it remains below 5% of total use. Source: AR6 Scenarios Database."


id: dc0ba3a0a1161b75ecac50935fe82d47
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35992
content:
"policies, particularly within the UK's Climate Change Act 2008 (Grubb \r\nand Newbery 2018). More generally, the implementation of the NDCs \r\nunder the Paris Agreement are all characterised by diverse climate \r\npolicy mixes."


id: d10d2af4709a3447606dd2266778b4d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34133
content:
"There is a  lack of consensus about how CCS might alter fossil \r\nfuel transitions for limiting warming to 2degC (>67%) or lower. CCS \r\ndeployment will increase the shares of fossil fuels associated with \r\nlimiting warming, and it can ease the economic transition to a low\u0002carbon energy system (Muratori et al. 2016; Marcucci et al. 2019). While \r\nsome studies find a significant role for fossil fuels with CCS by 2050 \r\n(Koelbl et al. 2014; Eom et al. 2015; Vishwanathan and Garg 2020), \r\nothers find that retirement of unabated coal far outpaces the \r\ndeployment of coal with CCS (Budinis et al. 2018; Xie et al. 2020; \r\nMcJeon et  al. 2021) Moreover, several studies also project that, \r\nwith availability of CO2 capture technology, BECCS might become \r\nsignificantly more appealing than fossil CCS, even before 2050 \r\n(Muratori et al. 2017; Luderer et al. 2018b)."


id: 8f82b5889d166749f57c706134d0e2ff
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22460
content:
"Policy and governance frameworks are essential for shaping near\u0002and medium-term low-emissions energy system transitions (high \r\nconfidence). While policy interventions are necessary to achieve \r\nlow-carbon energy system transitions, appropriate governance \r\nframeworks are crucial to ensure policy implementation (high \r\nconfidence). The policy environment in energy transition pathways \r\nrelate to climate policy goals, the characteristics of the policy regimes \r\nand measures to reach the policy goals including implementation \r\nlimits and obstacles, and the timing of the climate instrument \r\n(Kriegler et al. 2014b)."


id: 2f913774196ce4987c2be994e862d725
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5632
content:
"The literature discusses a broad set of policy approaches. Environmental \r\neconomics focuses mainly on market-based approaches as the least\u0002cost policy to achieve emission reductions (Kube et al. 2018). Many \r\ncountries, however, have implemented policy mixes with a diverse \r\nset of complementary policies to achieve energy and climate policy \r\ntargets. One example is the German Energiewende, which includes \r\nsubstantial support for renewables, an action plan for energy \r\nefficiency, and phase-out processes for nuclear- and coal-based \r\npower generation next to carbon pricing (Loschel et al. 2019). The \r\nhalving of CO2 emissions in UK power generation reflects multiple "


id: 71ba0c4305624315fe174ee5506514c4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17253
content:
"still based on cost-optimal evaluation frameworks and include only \r\nlimited analysis of interactions between policy measures. Hence they \r\nare often not describing real-world energy transitions properly, but \r\nrather differences in implied carbon prices, constraints in technology \r\ndeployment, and timing of policies (Trutnevyte 2016)."


id: 2c71accb5f2ad1f3e71df9d29abf2076
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5083
content:
"potential issues of (industrial) competitiveness (Martin et al. 2014; \r\nRosendahl et al. 2017). Energy leakage may become more important \r\nduring low-carbon energy systems. Numerous studies have identified \r\npathways for carbon leakage in electricity markets with incomplete \r\nemission markets (Caron et  al. 2015; Murray and Maniloff 2015; \r\nThurber et al. 2015; Duan et al. 2017; Fell and Maniloff 2017; Qian \r\net al. 2018). Well-designed policy mixes will need to target the whole \r\nlifecycle or value chains, for example, through policies on limiting \r\nfossil fuel extraction (Asheim et al. 2019), or they will need to include \r\nmeasures to limit carbon leakage (e.g. Cosbey et al. 2019)."


id: b952c793d68c2ff879652244187a3c47
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29816
content:
"Members of societies, including individuals, civil society, and \r\nbusinesses, will all need to engage with, and be affected by, low\u0002carbon energy system transitions (high confidence). This raises \r\nquestions about the extent to which different strategies and policy \r\nwould effectively promote mitigation behaviours and the factors that \r\nincrease the social acceptability of mitigation options, policies, and \r\nsystem changes."


id: 1cd8c095b7875657425ed989d01c46a9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2257
content:
"Interactions between policy measures including their scope, \r\nstringency, and timing, influence the costs of reducing emissions \r\n(Corradini et  al. 2018). In particular, some policy instruments may \r\nlead to lock-in effects (Section 6.7.3), compete with other regulations \r\n(Graaf and Sovacool 2020), or trigger negative policy interactions \r\n(Perino 2015; Jarke-Neuert and Perino 2020). Existing policy mixes \r\noften reflect different political economy constraints, and sometimes \r\nnot well coordinated goals. The resulting policy mixes are often \r\neconomically inefficient. However, comprehensive evaluation of \r\npolicy mixes requires a broader set of criteria that reflect different \r\nconsiderations, such as broader goals (e.g., SDGs) and the feasibility \r\nof policies (high confidence)."


id: 80b14d815d6bf6c176d8beed5e3caa93
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19773
content:
"Climate policy will be particularly effective if it targets key factors \r\ninhibiting, enabling, and motivating mitigation behaviours. As \r\nbarriers differ across mitigation options, regions, and groups, tailored \r\napproaches are more effective (Grubb et al. 2017). When people face \r\nimportant barriers to change (e.g., high costs, legal barriers), policy \r\nwould be needed make low-carbon actions more attractive, or to \r\nmake high-carbon actions less attractive. As people generally face \r\nmultiple barriers for change, combinations of policies would be more \r\neffective (Rosenow et al. 2017)."


id: 9b8b7bef6679438ff75d358a33367ba3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24618
content:
"Policy mixes might rather emerge piece-by-piece over time out of \r\nindividual policy interventions rather than be designed as a whole from \r\nthe outset (Howlett 2014; Rogge 2017) and may reflect differences \r\nacross jurisdictions and sectors (Howlett 2014). For example, taking \r\ninto account country-specific objectives, failures, and limitations, \r\ncarbon prices may be only one part of a  broader policy mix, and \r\nthereby may not be uniform across countries (Bataille 2020). This lack \r\nof consistency makes it more difficult to assess economic outcomes \r\nsince costs of complementary policies are often less visible and are \r\noften targeted at high-cost mitigation options (Borenstein et al. 2019)."


id: 5d4db91ade25313090dd5a49f528dee1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13694
content:
"Communicating financial consequences of behaviour seems less \r\neffective than emphasising social rewards (Handgraaf et al. 2013) or \r\nbenefits of actions for people (e.g., public health, comfort) and the \r\nenvironment (Bolderdijk et al. 2013; Asensio and Delmas 2015, 2016; \r\nSchwartz et al. 2015; Ossokina 2020). Financial appeals may have \r\nlimited effects because they reduce people's focus on environmental \r\nconsequences, weaken intrinsic motivation to engage in mitigation \r\nactions, provide a licence to pollute (Agrawal et al. 2015; Bolderdijk \r\nand Steg 2015; Schwartz et al. 2015), and because pursuing small "


id: 37a24548e8d5a673b5c9a751d9df444f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6997
content:
"Potential future policies are difficult to evaluate due to methodological \r\nchallenges (high confidence). Recent model-based analyses of future \r\npolicy mixes based on 'current policy scenarios' try to implement \r\nexisting policies besides explicit or implicit carbon prices (den Elzen \r\net al. 2016; Rogelj et al. 2016; van Soest et al. 2017; Roelfsema et al. \r\n2020). Many assessments of future low-carbon energy transitions are "


id: fdccb04f5d284600aba335007acd7c92
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42011
content:
"financial gains is perceived not worth the effort (Bolderdijk et  al. \r\n2013; Dogan et al. 2014)."


id: 6c736731a66b803be2b073003884f4c8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16374
content:
"Bottom-up approaches can promote mitigation action (Abrahamse \r\nand Steg 2013). Indeed, community energy initiatives can encourage \r\nmembers' low-carbon behaviour (Middlemiss 2011; Seyfang and \r\nHaxeltine 2012; Abrahamse and Steg 2013; Sloot et  al. 2018). \r\nOrganisations can promote mitigation behaviour among their employees \r\nand customers by communicating their mission and strategies to \r\nmitigate climate change (Ruepert et al. 2017; van der Werff et al. 2021)."


id: f55301e090d670ab24733f0f52429280
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40531
content:
"Default options, where a preset choice is implemented if users do not \r\nselect another option, can promote mitigation actions such as energy \r\nsavings, green electricity uptake, and meat-free options (Pichert and \r\nKatsikopoulos 2008; Bessette et al. 2014; Campbell-Arvai et al. 2014; \r\nKunreuther and Weber 2014; Olander and Thogersen 2014; Ebeling \r\nand Lotz 2015; Liebe et al. 2018; Liebe et al. 2021)."


id: d1b46677a1995cf86f11b013f0d0aff1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34245
content:
"Next, climate policy and low-carbon options are evaluated as more \r\nfair and acceptable when costs and benefits are distributed equally, \r\nand when nature, the environment and future generations are \r\nprotected (Schuitema et al. 2011; Drews and Van den Bergh 2016). \r\nCompensating affected groups for losses due to policy or systems \r\nchanges enhanced public acceptability in some cases (Perlaviciute and \r\nSteg 2014), but people may disagree on which compensation would \r\nbe worthwhile (Aitken 2010b; Cass et al. 2010), on the distribution \r\nof compensation (Devine-Wright and Sherry-Brennan 2019; Leer \r\nJorgensen et al. 2020), or feel they are being bribed (Cass et al. 2010; \r\nPerlaviciute and Steg 2014). Pricing policies are more acceptable \r\nwhen revenues are earmarked for environmental purposes (Steg \r\net  al. 2006; Saelen and Kallbekken 2011) or redistributed towards \r\nthose affected (Schuitema and Steg 2008)."


id: 437cd4227bb9dbb6e53977d675b08ef8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9098
content:
"Social influence approaches that communicate what other people \r\ndo or think can encourage mitigation actions (Clayton et al. 2015), \r\nas can social models of desired actions (Osbaldiston and Schott \r\n2012; Abrahamse and Steg 2013; Sussman and Gifford 2013; Wolske \r\net al. 2020). Feedback on one's own energy use relative to others \r\ncan be effective (Nolan et al. 2008; Allcott 2011; Schultz et al. 2015), \r\nalthough not always, and effect sizes are small (Abrahamse and Steg \r\n2013) compared to other types of feedback (Karlin et al. 2015)."


id: 95fba2939d3efac86bea5c2efeee292
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23580
content:
"Interventions that capitalise on people's motivation to be consistent \r\ncan promote mitigation actions (Steg 2016). Examples are commitment \r\nstrategies where people pledge to act (Abrahamse and Steg 2013; \r\nLokhorst et al. 2013), implementation intentions where they additionally \r\nexplicate how and when they will perform the relevant action and how \r\nthey would cope with possible barriers (Bamberg 2000, 2002; Rees \r\net al. 2018), and hypocrisy-related strategies that make people aware "


id: 3a6b07eb4d35ca005d6d6a70957ca2a7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7479
content:
"Climate policy and mitigation options, such as renewable energy \r\nprojects, are also perceived as more fair and acceptable when the \r\npublic (Dietz 2013; Bidwell 2014; Bernauer et  al. 2016b) or public \r\nsociety organisations (Terwel et al. 2010; Bernauer et al. 2016b) could \r\nparticipate in the decision-making (Arvai 2003; Devine-Wright 2005; "


id: f83e5a6659b66d1473cc2e57c0ac1887
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41047
content:
"transitions may still be economically favourable when accounting \r\nfor health impacts and other co-benefits (Gielen et  al. 2019). Past \r\nassessments have quantified the aggregate economic costs for \r\nclimate change mitigation using different metrics, for example, \r\ncarbon prices, GDP losses, investments in energy infrastructure, and \r\nenergy system costs. Assessments of mitigation costs from integrated \r\nassessment and energy system models vary widely. For example, \r\nscenarios include carbon prices in 2030 of less than USD20 tCO2\r\n-1, \r\nbut also more than USD400 tCO2\r\n-1 depending on the region, sector \r\nboundary, and methodology (e.g., Bauer et al. 2016; Brouwer et al. \r\n2016; Oshiro et al. 2017; Vaillancourt et al. 2017; Chen et al. 2019). \r\nThose arise both from different methodologies (Guivarch and Rogelj \r\n2017) and assumptions about uncertainties in key factors that drive \r\ncosts (Meyer et al. 2021)."


id: 8bcb1e57ff05d08c62e9028127ce4a71
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21766
content:
"Terwel et al. 2012; Walker and Baxter 2017; Perlaviciute and Squintani \r\n2020). People are more motivated to participate in decision-making \r\non local projects than on national or general policy goals (Perlaviciute \r\nand Squintani 2020). Public acceptability is also higher when people \r\ncan influence major rather than only minor decisions, particularly \r\nwhen trust in responsible parties is low (Liu et  al. 2019a). Public \r\nparticipation can enhance the quality and legitimacy of decisions by \r\nincluding local knowledge and views that may otherwise be missed \r\n(Dietz 2013; Bidwell 2016)."


id: 530d35a2e698c5c93c3af99ca041dddf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11876
content:
"Public support is higher when people trust responsible parties \r\n(Perlaviciute and Steg 2014; Drews and Van den Bergh 2016; Michaels \r\nand Parag 2016; Jiang et al. 2018; Liu et al. 2019a). Public support \r\nfor unilateral climate policy is rather strong and robust (Bernauer \r\net al. 2016a), even in the absence of reciprocal commitments by other \r\nstates (Bernauer and Gampfer 2015)."


id: ff6d6c6367781f2979c4c9d6c4ab1774
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42342
content:
"Recent developments, however, raise the prospect that economic \r\noutcomes could be substantially superior to prior estimates, \r\nparticularly if key technologies continue to improve rapidly. In some \r\nregions and circumstances, particularly in the electricity sector, near\u0002term mitigation may lead to superior economic outcomes than \r\ncontinuing to invest in and utilise emissions-intensive infrastructure \r\n(e.g. Brown et  al. 2017; Kumar et  al. 2020). Given the importance \r\nof electricity decarbonisation in near-term mitigation strategies \r\n(Section  6.7.1), decreasing costs of solar PV, wind power, and \r\nbatteries to support their integration, have an outsized influence on \r\nnear-term economic outcomes from mitigation. At the same time, \r\neconomic outcomes may vary across regions depending, among \r\nother things, on the characteristics of the current energy systems, \r\nenergy resources, and needs for integrating VRE technologies."


id: 62de0ab01985423238390a02b33fef7f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14693
content:
"The attractiveness of energy sector mitigation ultimately depends \r\non the way that it provides benefits and reduces the costs for the \r\nmany different priorities that societies value (Yang et al. 2018a; Wei \r\net al. 2018, 2020). While costs and benefits of climate mitigation are \r\noften considered in the context of pure economic outcomes  - for \r\nexample, GDP effects or changes in value of consumption  - costs \r\nand benefits should be viewed with a  broader lens that accounts \r\nfor the many ways that the energy system interacts with societal \r\npriorities (Karlsson et al. 2020). Climate mitigation is not separate \r\nfrom countries' broader growth and development strategies, but \r\nrather as a key element of those strategies."


id: c37910c1f5e4bb604367603a321a739
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31670
content:
"Cost reductions in key technologies, particularly in electricity and \r\nlight-duty transport, have increased the economic attractiveness of \r\nnear-term low-carbon energy system transitions (high confidence). \r\nThe near-term, economic outcomes of low-carbon energy system \r\ntransitions in some sectors and regions may be on par with or superior \r\nto those of an emissions-intensive future (high confidence). Even in \r\ncases when system costs are higher for low-carbon transitions, these "


id: 1e1707156fe187582c8f77e16adad981
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2489
content:
"Estimates of long-run mitigation costs are highly uncertain and \r\ndepend on various factors. Both faster technological developments \r\nand international cooperation are consistently found to improve \r\neconomic outcomes (Paroussos et al. 2019). Long-term mitigation is \r\nlikely to be more challenging than near-term mitigation because low-"


id: d006c1785d8756ce7f902869ebfa0542
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33953
content:
"cost opportunities get utilised first and later efforts would require \r\nmitigation in more challenging sectors (Section  6.6). Advances in \r\nlow-carbon energy resources and carriers such as next-generation \r\nbiofuels, hydrogen produced from electrolysis, synthetic fuels, and \r\ncarbon-neutral ammonia would substantially improve the economics \r\nof net-zero energy systems (high confidence). Current estimates of \r\ncumulative mitigation costs are comparably high for developing \r\ncountries, amounting to up to 2-3% of GDP, indicating difficulties \r\nfor mitigation without adequate support from developed countries \r\n(Dorband et  al. 2019; Fujimori et  al. 2020). In scenarios involving \r\nlarge amounts of stranded assets, the overall costs of low-carbon \r\ntransitions also include the additional costs of early retirements \r\n(Box 6.11)."


id: b96166be3d92dabb576bfedbfdb9737e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29827
content:
"transmission losses has been estimated to mitigate 500  MtCO2\r\nper  year globally (Surana and Jordaan 2019). For several other \r\noptions, such as methane mitigation from the natural gas sector, the \r\ncosts of infrastructure refurbishing could be offset with the value of \r\nthe recovered natural gas (Kang et al. 2019)."


id: a788e77cd9136ab3efc25ec6eab87b16
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26688
content:
"Figure 6.36 | The relationship between total per capita energy use, rate of electrification and human development index (HDI). Improved efficiency has \r\nlowered the energy demand required for meeting a threshold HDI during 2012-2017."


id: b71342fe324f4df008030c5a4030eae4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29420
content:
"the added advantage of promoting SDG 6 on clean water (Rathore \r\net al. 2018; Elkadeem et al. 2019)."


id: 86669eabc15c53f52db00ab005c54c3a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20809
content:
"Past trends have also indicated that, in some Asian countries, \r\nelectrification has been obtained at lower income levels as compared \r\nto developed countries (Rao and Pachauri 2017), with corresponding \r\nimpacts for development goals. For example, a human development \r\nindex (HDI) greater than 0.7 (Figure  6.36) which signifies high \r\ndevelopment is now possible at close to 30 GJ yr-1 per  person. \r\nThis was attainable only at the energy consumption of 50 GJ yr-1 \r\nper person in preceding decades."


id: 87b9b8dc86c39ede6417d234538caf63
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21038
content:
"CDR and CCS can create significant land and water trade-offs (high \r\nconfidence). For large-scale CDR and CCS deployment to not conflict \r\nwith development goals requires efforts to reduce implications on \r\nwater and food systems. The water impacts of carbon capture are \r\nlarge, but these impacts can be strategically managed (Magneschi \r\net al. 2017; Liu et al. 2019a; Realmonte et al. 2019; Giannaris et al. \r\n2020c). In addition, high-salinity brines are produced from geologic \r\ncarbon storage, which may be a synergy or trade-off depending on "


id: 9ac3fd56a750c656cbe8c6069acc9bf0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24471
content:
"Electrification also improves energy efficiency, with corresponding \r\nimplications for development goals. For example, the availability of \r\nelectric cooking may reduce the cooking primary energy requirement \r\nconsiderably compared to traditional stoves (Yang and Yang 2018; \r\nBatchelor et al. 2019; Khan and Alam 2020) while also promoting \r\nimproved indoor air quality (SDG 3). Similarly, PV-powered irrigation \r\nand water pumping reduces pumping energy demands, which has "


id: d5cde47aad9d800b9180fb21cfa3f35b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34925
content:
"Overall, the scope for positive interactions between low-carbon \r\nenergy systems and SDGs is considerably larger than the trade-offs \r\n(Figure 6.37) (McCollum et al. 2018b). Some critical trade-offs include \r\nimpact to biodiversity due to large-scale mineral mining needed for \r\nrenewable infrastructure (Sonter et al. 2020)."


id: 71efe8a84d3ae28ee663b90692a6dd8e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17295
content:
"Clarke, L., Y.-M. Wei, A. De La Vega Navarro, A. Garg, A.N. Hahmann, S. Khennas, I.M.L. Azevedo, A. Loschel, A.K. Singh, \r\nL.  Steg, G. Strbac, K. Wada, 2022: Energy Systems Supplementary Material. In IPCC, 2022: Climate Change 2022: \r\nMitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental \r\nPanel on Climate Change [P.R. Shukla, J. Skea, R. Slade, A. Al Khourdajie, R. van Diemen, D. McCollum, M. Pathak, \r\nS. Some, P. Vyas, R. Fradera, M. Belkacemi, A. Hasija, G. Lisboa, S. Luz, J. Malley, (eds.)]. Available from https://www.ipcc.\r\nch/report/ar6/wg3/."


id: 1afb2987d231a0ba0b8a2bc6165015ac
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1944
content:
"Overview of the factors affecting the feasibility of mitigation options in energy systems and how they differ across context (e.g., region), time (e.g., 2030 \r\nversus 2050), and scale (e.g., small versus large), and the line of sight on which the feasibility assessment shown in Figure 6.9 is based. The feasibility \r\nassessment method is explained in Annex II.11 and Box TS.7."


id: b89bb5a8b4fb13c816451207c26bd010
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29689
content:
"Yalew, S.G. et al., 2020: Impacts of \r\nclimate change on energy systems in \r\nglobal and regional scenarios. Nat. \r\nEnergy, 5(10), 794-802, doi:10.1038/\r\ns41560-020-0664-z."


id: 18038f5f8cf8dee97217b705544d8b02
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1428
content:
"Dowd, A.M., N. Boughen, P. Ashworth, and S. Carr-Cornish, 2011: Geothermal technology in Australia: Investigating social acceptance. Energy Policy, 39, \r\n6301-6307, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2011.07.029."


id: b7d3ba7d62710473b422dcc188017465
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29561
content:
"Hunt, T.M., 2001: Five Lectures on Environmental Effects of Geothermal Utilization. United Nations University, Geothermal Training Programme, Reykjavik, \r\nIceland, 109 pp. https://orkustofnun.is/gogn/unu-gtp-report/UNU-GTP-2000-01.pdf."


id: 96fd72595210b2186bc221df18afeffe
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23755
content:
"IPCC, 2018: Global Warming \r\nof 1.5degC. An IPCC Special Report \r\non the impacts of global warming \r\nof 1.5degC above pre-industrial levels \r\nand related global greenhouse \r\ngas emission pathways, in the \r\ncontext of strengthening the global \r\nresponse to the threat of climate \r\nchange, sustainable development, \r\nand efforts to eradicate poverty\r\n[Masson-Delmotte, V., P. Zhai, \r\nH.-O. Portner, D. Roberts, J. Skea, \r\nP.R. Shukla, A. Pirani, W. Moufouma\u0002Okia, C. Pean, R. Pidcock, S. Connors, \r\nJ.B.R. Matthews, Y. Chen, X. Zhou, \r\nM.I. Gomis, E. Lonnoy, T. Maycock, \r\nM. Tignor, and T. Waterfield (eds.)]. \r\nCambridge University Press, \r\nCambridge, UK and New York, NY, \r\nUSA, 616 pp."


id: faee8f1e2982f2df6d319c3ec285b1bb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41531
content:
"IAEA, 2016: Nuclear power and sustainable \r\ndevelopment, International Atomic Energy \r\nAgency (IAEA),Vienna, Austria, 130 pp."


id: 83682faf9aa5a8f2192c7f4ea0b57a5b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20253
content:
"Assem Abu Hatab (Egypt/Sweden), Mercedes Bustamante (Brazil), Harry Clark (New Zealand), \r\nPetr Havlik (the Czech Republic), Joanna I. House (United Kingdom), Cheikh Mbow (Senegal), \r\nKarachepone N.  Ninan (India), Alexander Popp (Germany), Stephanie Roe (the Philippines/\r\nthe United States of America), Brent Sohngen (the United States of America), Sirintornthep \r\nTowprayoon (Thailand)"


id: 3e7888c487368ee74ed5b52c4aa404ce
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8173
content:
"Lillian Aoki (the United States of America), Goran Berndes (Sweden), Katherine Calvin (the \r\nUnited States of America), Annette Cowie (Australia), Vassilis Daioglou (Greece), Andre \r\nDeppermann (Germany), Jeremy P.  Emmet-Booth (Ireland/New Zealand), Shinichiro Fujimori \r\n(Japan), Giacomo  Grassi (Italy/European Union), Viola Heinrich (United Kingdom/Germany), \r\nFlorian Humpenoder (Germany), J.  Boone Kauffman (the United States of America), William \r\nF. Lamb (Germany/United Kingdom), William Laurance (Australia), Sinead Leahy (New Zealand), \r\nSebastiaan Luyssaert (Belgium), Deissy Martinez-Baron (Colombia), Suvadip Neogi (India), \r\nMichael O'Sullivan (United Kingdom), Joeri Rogelj (Belgium/United Kingdom), Todd Rosenstock \r\n(the United States of America), Pete Smith (United Kingdom), Jonas Steinfeld (Germany/Brazil), \r\nFrancesco N. Tubiello (Italy), Pieter Johannes Verkerk (the Netherlands)"


id: 1c1f86e021008cd3eeda149f2393b1cd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2129
content:
"Nabuurs, G-J., R. Mrabet, A. Abu Hatab, M. Bustamante, H. Clark, P. Havlik, J. House, C. Mbow, K.N. Ninan, A. Popp, \r\nS. Roe, B. Sohngen, S. Towprayoon, 2022: Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Uses (AFOLU). In IPCC, 2022: Climate \r\nChange 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the \r\nIntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [P.R. Shukla, J. Skea, R. Slade, A. Al Khourdajie, R. van Diemen, D. McCollum, \r\nM. Pathak, S. Some, P. Vyas, R. Fradera, M. Belkacemi, A. Hasija, G. Lisboa, S. Luz, J. Malley, (eds.)]. Cambridge University \r\nPress, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA. doi: 10.1017/9781009157926.009"


id: 2036c9d584f7bdb1bbb5eea7acd5d435
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2881
content:
"boreal regions. Agricultural methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O) \r\nemissions are estimated to average 157 +- 47.1 MtCH4 yr-1 and \r\n6.6  +- 4.0 MtN2O yr-1 or 4.2 +- 1.3 and 1.8 +- 1.1 GtCO2-eq yr-1\r\n(using IPCC AR6 GWP100 values for CH4 and N2O) respectively \r\nbetween 2010 and 2019. AFOLU CH4 emissions continue to increase \r\n(high confidence), the main source of which is enteric fermentation \r\nfrom ruminant animals (high confidence). Similarly, AFOLU N2O \r\nemissions are increasing, dominated by agriculture, notably from \r\nmanure application, nitrogen deposition, and nitrogen fertiliser use \r\n(high confidence). In addition to being a source and sink for GHG \r\nemissions, land plays an important role in climate through albedo \r\neffects, evapotranspiration and volatile organic compounds (VOCs) \r\nand their mix, although the combined role in total climate forcing is \r\nunclear and varies strongly with bioclimatic region and management \r\ntype. {2.4.2.5, 7.2, 7.2.1, 7.2.3, 7.3}"


id: bd1e642f130659e41c22769e81e40811
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30524
content:
"AFOLU CO2 emissions fluxes are mainly driven by land use \r\nchange (CO2 LULUCF), and account for about half of total \r\nnet AFOLU emissions. The rate of deforestation has generally \r\ndeclined, while global tree cover and global forest growing \r\nstock levels are likely increasing (medium confidence).\r\nThere are substantial regional differences, with losses of carbon \r\ngenerally observed in tropical regions and gains in temperate and "


id: 8165b712b307e8a1b9bf1b66ed42c5d2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19893
content:
"Most mitigation options are available and ready to deploy. Emissions \r\nreductions can be unlocked relatively quickly, whereas CDR needs \r\nupfront investment. Sustainable intensification in agriculture, shifting \r\ndiets, and reducing food waste could enhance efficiencies and reduce \r\nagricultural land needs, and are therefore critical for enabling \r\nsupply-side measures such as reforestation, restoration, as well as \r\ndecreasing CH4 and N2O emissions from agricultural production. In \r\naddition, emerging technologies (e.g.,  vaccines or inhibitors) have \r\nthe potential to substantially increase CH4 mitigation potential \r\nbeyond current estimates. AFOLU mitigation is not only relevant in \r\ncountries with large land areas. Many smaller countries and regions, \r\nparticularly with wetlands, have disproportionately high levels of \r\nAFOLU mitigation potential density. {7.4, 7.5}"


id: 72d16aea7996ad95106b0e052227199e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17447
content:
"urgently needed to accelerate the deployment of AFOLU mitigation \r\noptions. These interventions are effective when they include funding \r\nschemes and long-term consistent support for implementation with \r\ngovernments taking the initiative together with private funders and \r\nnon-state actors. {7.6}"


id: 25e5802e63f75f7905938e9bb50e44d4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3846
content:
"AFOLU measures that enable mitigation while also contributing \r\nto biodiversity conservation, ecosystem functioning, livelihoods \r\nfor millions of farmers and foresters, and many other Sustainable \r\nDevelopment Goals (SDGs) (high confidence). {7.7}"


id: b4233d18b911f45bc37b13a97cd5702d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28930
content:
"Addressing the many knowledge gaps in the development \r\nand testing of AFOLU mitigation options can rapidly advance \r\nthe likelihood of achieving sustained mitigation (high\r\nconfidence). Research priorities include improved quantification \r\nof anthropogenic and natural GHG fluxes and emissions modelling, \r\nbetter understanding of the impacts of climate change on the \r\nmitigation potential, permanence and additionality of estimated \r\nmitigation actions, and improved (real time and cheap) measurement, \r\nreporting and verification. There is a need to include a greater suite of \r\nmitigation measures in IAMs, informed by more realistic assessments \r\nthat take into account local circumstances and socio-economic \r\nfactors and cross-sector synergies and trade-offs. Finally, there is \r\na  critical need for more targeted research to develop appropriate \r\ncountry-level, locally specific, policy and land management response \r\noptions. These options could support more specific NDCs with "


id: 5d5211efca52819c5f12e5bcafea78a8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13702
content:
"rate of biodiversity loss, and wider environmental degradation (IPBES \r\n2019b; IPCC 2019). Urgent action to reverse this trend was deemed \r\ncrucial in helping to accommodate the increasing demands on land \r\nand enhance climate change adaptation capacity. There was high \r\nconfidence that global warming was already causing an increase in \r\nthe frequency and intensity of extreme weather and climate events, \r\nimpacting ecosystems, food security, disturbances and production \r\nprocesses, with existing (and new) carbon stocks in soils and biomass \r\nat serious risk. The impact of land cover on regional climate (through \r\nbiophysical effects) was also highlighted, although there was no \r\nconfidence regarding impacts on global climate."


id: 97c0639cce50ead8a424204e4b421209
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23913
content:
"Since the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (AR5), the share of AFOLU \r\nto anthropogenic GHG emissions had remained largely unchanged \r\nat 13-21% of total GHG emissions (medium confidence), though \r\nuncertainty in estimates of both sources and sinks of CO2, \r\nexacerbated by difficulties in separating natural and anthropogenic \r\nfluxes, was emphasised. Models indicated land (including the natural \r\nsink) to have very likely provided a net removal of CO2 between 2007 \r\nand 2016. As in AR5, land cover change, notably deforestation, was \r\nidentified as a  major driver of anthropogenic CO2 emissions while \r\nagriculture was a major driver of the increasing anthropogenic CH4\r\nand N2O emissions."


id: db40505edd5044ff4e8f2e7d8c939e77
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35846
content:
"None the less, the importance of mitigation within AFOLU was \r\nhighlighted in all IPCC reports, with modelled scenarios demonstrating \r\nthe considerable potential role and land-based mitigation forming an \r\nimportant component of pledged mitigation in Nationally Determined \r\nContributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement. The sector was \r\nidentified as the only one in which large-scale carbon dioxide removal \r\n(CDR) may currently and at short term be possible (e.g.,  through \r\nafforestation/reforestation or soil organic carbon management). This \r\nCDR component was deemed crucial to limit climate change and its \r\nimpacts, which would otherwise lead to enhanced release of carbon \r\nfrom land. However, the SRCCL emphasised that mitigation cannot \r\nbe pursued in isolation. The need for integrated response options, \r\nthat mitigate and adapt to climate change, but also deal with land \r\ndegradation and desertification, while enhancing food and fibre "


id: e166e0568dce8537be8393b7a34e673b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36923
content:
"Land can only be part of the solution alongside rapid emission \r\nreduction in other sectors (IPCC 2019). It was recognised that land \r\nsupports many ecosystem services on which human existence, well\u0002being and livelihoods ultimately depend. Yet over-exploitation of land \r\nresources was reported as driving considerable and unprecedented "


id: dfc80001c35e1d8c48f8d4c95704831d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36615
content:
"security, biodiversity and contributing to other SDGs has been made \r\nclear (IPCC 2019; IPBES 2019a; IPBES-IPCC 2021)."


id: 41973e7aec154907ab5d90b199cba1e4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8730
content:
"sectors may in part, be dependent on contributions from land and \r\nthe AFOLU sector, with interactions between all sectors discussed \r\nin Chapter 12. This chapter also has important links with IPCC AR6 \r\nWGII regarding climate change impacts and adaptation. Linkages \r\nare illustrated in Figure 7.1."


id: 21aa0e9515f46d4ca61dadfba6dc6100
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3132
content:
"As highlighted in both AR5 and the SRCCL, there is a  complex \r\ninterplay between land management and GHG fluxes as illustrated in \r\nFigure 7.2, with considerable variation in management regionally, as \r\na result of geophysical, climatic, ecological, economic, technological, \r\ninstitutional and socio-cultural diversity. The capacity for land\u0002based mitigation varies accordingly. The principal focus of this \r\nchapter is therefore, on evaluating regional land-based mitigation \r\npotential, identifying applicable AFOLU mitigation measures, \r\nestimating associated costs and exploring policy options that could \r\nenable implementation."


id: bbf10d891671f4731693100e1689849d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30299
content:
"This chapter assesses GHG fluxes between land and the atmosphere \r\ndue to AFOLU, the associated drivers behind these fluxes, \r\nmitigation response options and related policy, at time scales of \r\n2030 and 2050. Land and its management has important links \r\nwith other sectors and therefore associated chapters within this \r\nreport, notably concerning the provision of food, feed, fuel or fibre \r\nfor human consumption and societal well-being (Chapter  5), for \r\nbioenergy (Chapter 6), the built environment (Chapter 9), transport \r\n(Chapter  10) and industry (Chapter  11). Mitigation within these "


id: 1f8e0fe192ae319b9700f35f411e4a22
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2762
content:
"Figure 7.1 | Linkage between Chapter 7 and other chapters within this report, as well as to IPCC AR6 WGII. Mitigation potential estimates in this chapter consider \r\npotential emission reductions and removals only within the AFOLU sector itself, and not the substitution effects from biomass and bio-based products in sectors such as Energy, \r\nTransport, Industry, Buildings, nor biophysical effects of, for example, cooling of cities. These are covered in their respective chapters."


id: 352521afae3cc64b85e4d21f0ec040ac
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6590
content:
"This chapter first outlines the latest trends in AFOLU fluxes and \r\nthe methodology supporting their estimation (Section  7.2). Direct \r\nand indirect drivers behind emission trends are discussed in \r\nSection 7.3. Mitigation measures, their costs, co-benefits, trade-offs, \r\nestimated regional potential and contribution within integrated \r\nglobal mitigation scenarios, is presented in Sections  7.4 and 7.5 \r\nrespectively. Assessment of associated policy responses and links \r\nwith SDGs are explored in Section 7.6. The chapter concludes with \r\ngaps in knowledge (Section 7.7) and frequently asked questions."


id: 6538bda2cb1ec04279aad023e7675831
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15081
content:
"The biosphere on land and in wetlands is a source and sink of CO2\r\nand CH4, and a source of N2O due to both natural and anthropogenic \r\nprocesses that happen simultaneously and are therefore difficult \r\nto disentangle (IPCC 2010; Angelo and Du Plesis 2017; IPCC 2019). \r\nAFOLU is the only GHG sector to currently include anthropogenic sinks. \r\nA range of methodological approaches and data have been applied to \r\nestimating AFOLU emissions and removals, each developed for their \r\nown purposes, with estimates varying accordingly. Since the SRCCL (Jia \r\net al. 2019), emissions estimates have been updated (Sections 7.2.2 and \r\n7.2.3), while the assessment of biophysical processes and short-lived "


id: 416ef01e2fa3f0a7fca5ad876c051112
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8701
content:
"climate forcers (Section 7.2.4) is largely unchanged. Further progress \r\nhas been made on the implications of differences in AFOLU emissions \r\nestimates for assessing collective climate progress (Section 7.2.2.2 and \r\nCross-Chapter Box 6 in this chapter)."


id: 31d05b54a09469c73cd4c30f0d180639
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6014
content:
"separate by gas and implicitly include CO2 emissions that stem from \r\nthe agriculture part of AFOLU, though these account for a relatively \r\nsmall portion."


id: 6dccdd28c677aeceffe9806fa9964cb2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16576
content:
"Total global net anthropogenic GHG emissions from AFOLU were \r\n11.9 +- 4.4 GtCO2-eq yr-1 on average over the period 2010-2019, \r\naround 21% of total global net anthropogenic GHG emissions \r\n(Table 7.1 and Figure 7.3, using the sum of bookkeeping models for \r\nthe CO2 component). When using FAOSTAT/NGHGIs CO2 flux data, \r\nthen the contribution of AFOLU to total emissions amounts to 13% of \r\nglobal emissions."


id: 21b8774b811908805395c8cc20f7c253
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3146
content:
"National greenhouse gas inventory (NGHGI) reporting following the \r\nIPCC 1996 guidelines (IPCC 1996), separates the total anthropogenic \r\nAFOLU flux into: (i) net anthropogenic flux from Land Use, Land\u0002Use Change, and Forestry (LULUCF) due to both change in land \r\ncover and land management; and (ii) the net flux from Agriculture. \r\nWhile fluxes of CO2 (Section 7.2.2) are predominantly from LULUCF \r\nand fluxes of CH4 and N2O (Section 7.2.3) are predominantly from \r\nagriculture, fluxes of all three gases are associated with both sub\u0002sectors. However, not all methods separate them consistently \r\naccording to these sub-sectors, thus here we use the term AFOLU, "


