# document

id: a94e3ab17c18a9be22f9e86b88397617
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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"[...] result in a 10% reduction in power consumption per day (Takahashi \r et al. 2017). Finally, systems in which capacitors are mounted on an \r electric bus for charging at a stop have been put into practical use, \r for example by a trackless tram (Newman et al. 2019). At the bus \r stop, the capacitor is charged at 600 kW for 10 about 40 seconds, \r which provides enough power for about 5 to 10 km (Newman et al. \r 2019). In addition, more durable capacitors can achieve a longer life \r than LIB systems (ADB 2018)."


id: 8ad2a77fe5fdec4bd843c561d8480cce
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
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"The technological readiness of batteries is a crucial parameter in the \r advancement of EVs (Manzetti and Mariasiu 2015). Energy density, \r power density, cycle life, calendar life, and the cost per kWh are the \r pertinent parameters for comparing the technological readiness of \r various battery technologies (Manzetti and Mariasiu 2015; Andwari \r et al. 2017; Lajunen et al. 2018). Table 6.5 provides a summary of \r the values of these parameters for alternative battery technologies. \r LIBs comprehensively dominate the other battery types and are \r at a readiness level where they can be applied for land transport \r applications (cars, scooters, electrically-assisted cycles) and at \r battery pack costs below USD150 per  kWh, making EVs cost\u0002competitive with conventional vehicles (Nykvist et al. 2019). In 2020 \r the stock of battery electric LDVs had crossed the 10 million mark \r (IEA 2021a). Schmidt et al. (2017) project that the cost of a battery \r [...]"


id: c5db14097ff24ce3a4d906e8aa734073
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
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"[...] pack for LIBs will reach USD100 per kWh by 2030, but more recent \r trends show this could happen much earlier. For example, according \r to IEA, battery pack costs could be as low as USD80 per kWh by \r 2030 (IEA 2019a). In addition, there are clear trends that now \r vehicle manufacturers are offering vehicles with bigger batteries, \r greater driving ranges, higher top speeds, faster acceleration, and \r all size categories (Nykvist et  al. 2019). In 2020 there were over \r 600,000 battery electric buses and over 31,000 battery electric \r trucks operating globally (IEA 2021a)."


id: 581adb322cabc277a6f1086dcfc5d047
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
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"LIBs are not currently envisaged to be suitable for long-haul transport. \r However, several battery technologies are under development \r (Table 6.5), which could further enhance the competitiveness of EVs \r and expand their applicability to very short-haul aviation and ships, \r especially smaller vehicles. Li-S, Li-air, and Zn-air hold the highest \r potential for these segments (Cano et al. 2018). All three of these \r technologies rely on making use of relatively inexpensive elements, \r which can help bring down battery costs (Cano et  al. 2018). The \r main challenge these technologies face is in terms of the cycle \r life. Out of the three, Li-S has already been used for applications in \r unmanned aerial vehicles (Fotouhi et al., 2017) due to relatively high \r specific energy (almost double the state of the art LIBs). However, \r even with low cycle life, Li-air and Zn-air hold good prospects for \r commercialisation as range extender batteries for long-range road \r [...]"


id: cf3d8152bb054c5496f82cb476bf427c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
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vector_id: 33811
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"During the last decade, hydrogen fuel cell vehicles (HFCVs) have \r attracted growing attention, with fuel cell technology improving \r through research and development. Fuel cell systems cost 80% \r to 95% less than they did in the early 2000s, at approximately \r USD50 per kW for light-duty (80 kW) and $100 per kW for medium\u0002heavy-duty (160 kW). These costs are approaching the US Department \r of Energy's (US DOE) goal of USD40 per kW in 2025 at a production \r target of 500,000 systems per year (IEA 2019c). In addition to cost \r reductions, the power density of fuel cell stacks has now reached \r around 3.0 kilowatt per  litre (kW/l) and average durability has \r improved to approximately 2000 to 3000 hours (Jouin et al. 2016; \r Kurtz et al. 2019). Despite these improvements, fuel cell systems are \r not yet mature for many commercial applications. For example, the \r US DOE has outlined that for hydrogen fuel cell articulated trucks \r [...]"


id: 7acb3d4ecf09cea559219d2e4722c48e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
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"[...] (semi-trailers) to compete with diesel vehicles, fuel cell durability \r will need to reach 30,000 hours (US DOE 2019). While some fuel cell \r buses have demonstrated durability close to these targets (Eudy and \r Post 2018a), another review of light fuel cell vehicles found maximum \r durability of 4000 hours (Kurtz et al. 2019). As more fuel cell vehicles \r are trialled, it is expected that further real-world data will become \r available to track ongoing fuel cell durability improvements."


id: 844ddadbe09edcc1ea55e72365b04d02
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
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"The transport sector relies on liquid gasoline, and diesel for land\u0002based transport, jet fuel for aviation, and heavy fuel oil for shipping. \r Extensive infrastructure for refuelling liquid fossil fuels already \r exists. Ammonia, synthetic fuels, and biofuels have emerged as \r alternative fuels for powering combustion engines and turbines \r used in land, shipping, and aviation (Figure  10.2). Synthetic fuels \r such as e-methanol and Fischer-Tropsch liquids have similar physical \r properties and could be used with existing fossil fuel infrastructure \r (Yugo and Soler, 2019). Similarly, biofuels have been used in several \r countries together with fossil fuels (Panoutsou et al. 2021). Ammonia \r is a  liquid, but only under pressure, and therefore will not be \r compatible with liquid fossil fuel refuelling infrastructure. Ammonia \r is, however, widely used as a fertiliser and chemical raw material and \r 10% of annual ammonia production is transported via sea (Gallucci \r [...]"


id: 6bfcb6b86f7e6ec375c903e1e79e2772
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
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"[...] 2021). As such, a number of port facilities include ammonia storage \r and transport infrastructure and the shipping industry has experience \r in handling ammonia (Gallucci 2021). This infrastructure would likely \r need to be extended in order to support the use of ammonia as a fuel \r for shipping and therefore ports are likely to be the primary sites for \r these new refuelling facilities."


id: 83170b34cb4498eb6b0f6def1d5bafe2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
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"Several FCV-related technologies are fully ready for demonstration \r and early market deployment, however, further research and \r development will be required to achieve full-scale commercialisation, \r likely from 2030 onwards (Staffell et  al. 2019; Energy Transitions \r Commission 2020; IEA 2021b). Some reports argue that it may be \r possible to achieve serial production of fuel cell heavy-duty trucks \r in the late 2020s, with comparable costs to diesel vehicles achieved \r after 2030 (Jordbakker et  al. 2018). Over the next decade or so, \r hydrogen FCVs could become cost-competitive for various transport \r applications, potentially including long-haul trucks, marine ships, \r and aviation (Hydrogen Council 2017; FCHEA 2019; FCHJU 2019; \r BloombergNEF 2020; Hydrogen Council 2020). The speed of fuel \r cell system cost reduction is a key factor for achieving widespread \r uptake. Yet, experts disagree on the relationship between the scale of \r [...]"


id: d9e3af55be9ec5a719db15c75bad10cd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
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"[...] fuel cell demand, cost, and performance improvements (Cano et al. \r 2018). Costs of light-, medium-, and heavy-duty fuel cell powertrains \r have decreased by orders of magnitude with further reductions of \r a  factor of two expected with continued technological progress \r (Whiston et al. 2019). For example, the costs of platinum for fuel cell \r stacks have decreased by an order of magnitude (Staffell et al. 2019); \r current generation FCVs use approximately 0.25 g/kW platinum and \r a further reduction of 50-80% is expected by 2030 (Hao et al. 2019)."


id: bff3eea6cf491c3fca5d301440b4b0bf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
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"'range anxiety' (She et al. 2017). Range anxiety is where consumers \r do not have confidence that an EV will meet their driving range \r requirements. For LDVs, the majority of charging (75-90%) has been \r reported to take place at or near homes (Figenbaum 2017; Webb \r et al. 2019; Wenig et al. 2019). Charging at home is a particularly \r significant factor in the adoption of EVs as consumers are less willing \r to purchase an EV without home charging (Berkeley et al. 2017; Funke \r and Plotz 2017; Nicholas et al. 2017). However, home charging may \r not be an option for all consumers. For example, apartment dwellers \r may face specific challenges in installing charging infrastructure \r (Hall and Lutsey 2020). Thus, the provision of public charging \r infrastructure is another avenue for alleviating range anxiety, \r facilitating longer distance travel in EVs, and in turn, encouraging \r adoption (Hall and Lutsey 2017; Melliger et al. 2018; Narassimhan \r [...]"


id: 81947e192841c2b250c91c5a1cd72fc1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
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"[...] and Johnson 2018; Melton et al. 2020). Currently, approximately 10% \r of charging occurs at public locations, roughly split equally between \r alternating current (AC) (slower) and direct current (DC) (fast) \r charging (Figenbaum 2017; Webb et  al. 2019; Wenig et  al. 2019). \r Deploying charging infrastructure at workplaces and commuter car \r parks is also important, particularly as vehicles are parked at these \r locations for many hours. Indeed, around 15-30% of EV charging \r currently occurs at these locations (Figenbaum 2017; Webb et  al. \r 2019; Wenig et al. 2019). It has been suggested that automakers and \r utilities could provide support for the installation of home charging \r infrastructure (Hardman et al. 2018), while policymakers can provide \r support for public charging. Such support could come via supportive \r planning policy, building regulations, and financial support. Policy \r support could also incentivise the deployment of charging stations \r [...]"


id: 1604840bc4bad3d82e87344cf798e3e9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
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"[...] at workplaces and commuter car parks. Charging at these locations \r would have the added benefit of using excess solar energy generated \r during the day (Hardman et al. 2018; Webb et al. 2019)."


id: 34c7765b91d572fbe829eb0ac3c8dfd6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
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"While charging infrastructure is of high importance for the \r electrification of light-duty vehicles, arguably it is even more \r important for heavy-duty vehicles, given the costs of high-power \r charging infrastructure. It is estimated that the installed cost of fast\u0002charging hardware can vary between approximately USD45,000 \r to USD200,000 per  charger, depending on the charging rate, the \r number of chargers per  site, and other site conditions (Hall and \r Lutsey 2019; Nelder and Rogers 2019; Nicholas 2019). Deployment \r of shared charging infrastructure at key transport hubs, such as bus \r and truck depots, freight distribution centres, marine shipping ports \r and airports, can encourage a transition to electric vehicles across \r the heavy transport segments. Furthermore, if charging infrastructure \r sites are designed to cater for both light- and heavy-duty vehicles, \r infrastructure costs could decrease by increasing utilisation across \r [...]"


id: b6d84f2d6b22e08405420b96ee22affd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
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"Smart charging: electric vehicle-grid integration strategies.\r EVs provide several opportunities for supporting electricity grids \r if appropriately integrated. Conversely, a  lack of integration could \r negatively affect the grid, particularly if several vehicles are charged \r in parallel at higher charging rates during peak demand periods \r (Webb et  al. 2019; Jochem et  al. 2021). There are three primary \r approaches to EV charging. In unmanaged charging, EVs are charged \r ad hoc, whenever connected, regardless of conditions on the broader \r electricity grid (Webb et  al. 2019; Jochem et  al. 2021). Second, in\r managed charging, EVs are charged during periods beneficial to \r the grid, e.g., at periods of high renewable generation and/or low \r demand. Managed charging also allows utilities to regulate the rate \r of charge and can thus provide frequency and regulation services to \r [...]"


id: 912c1a412f2951e8db93c5cb460b5ae2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
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"[...] the grid (Weis et al. 2014). Finally, in bidirectional charging or vehicle\u0002to-grid (V2G), EVs are generally subject to managed charging, but an \r extension provides the ability to export electricity from the vehicle's \r battery back to the building and/or wider electricity grid (Ercan \r et al. 2016; Noel et al. 2019; Jochem et al. 2021). The term 'smart \r charging' has become an umbrella term to encompass both managed \r charging  (often referred to as V1G) and V2G. For electric utilities, \r smart charging strategies can provide back-up power, support load \r balancing, reduce peak loads (Zhuk et  al. 2016; Noel  et  al. 2019; "


id: f29dd6c53b2323edbf0ab1485862e3ac
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
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"If hydrogen is produced off site in a large centralised plant, it must \r be stored and delivered to refuelling stations. The cost of hydrogen \r delivery depends on the amount of hydrogen delivered, the delivery \r distance, the storage method (compressed gas or cryogenic \r liquid), and the delivery mode (truck or pipeline). Table  10.6 \r describes the three primary options for hydrogen delivery. Most \r hydrogen refuelling stations today are supplied by trucks and, very \r occasionally, hydrogen pipelines. Gaseous tube trailers could also be \r used to deliver hydrogen in the near term, or over shorter distances, \r due to the low fixed cost (although the variable cost is high). Both \r liquefied truck trailers and pipelines are recognised as options in \r the medium to long term as they have higher capacities and lower \r costs over longer distances (FCHJU 2019; Li et al. 2020; EU 2021). \r Alternatively, hydrogen can be produced on site using a small-scale \r [...]"


id: 5efae5596b468aaf2e8972d2ac01c541
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
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"[...] on-site electrolyser or steam methane reforming unit combined with \r CCS. Hydrogen is generally dispensed to vehicles as a compressed \r gas at pressures 350 or 700 bar, or as liquified hydrogen at -253degC \r (Hydrogen Council 2020)."


id: 8ef0d36f3ae6f1495829a7328ecd1a32
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
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"Projections of energy storage suggest smart charging strategies will \r come to play a significant role in future energy systems. Assessment \r of different energy storage technologies for Europe showed that V2G \r offered the most storage potential compared to other options and could \r account for 200 GW of installed capacity by 2060, whereas utility-scale \r batteries and pumped hydro storage could provide 160 GW of storage \r capacity (Despres et  al. 2017). Another study found that EVs with \r controlled charging could provide similar services to stationary storage \r but at a far lower cost (Coignard et al. 2018). While most deployments \r of smart charging strategies are still at the pilot stage, the number \r of projects continues to expand, with the V2G Hub documenting at \r least 90 V2G projects across 22 countries in 2021 (Vehicle to Grid \r 2021). Policymakers have an important role in facilitating collaboration \r between vehicle manufacturers, electricity utilities, infrastructure \r [...]"


id: a3541385640a3a58b3a235ea776cb8ce
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
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vector_id: 25943
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"[...] providers, and consumers to enable smart charging strategies and \r ensure EVs can support grid stability and the uptake of renewable \r energy. This is a critical part of decarbonising transport."


id: fd9d5f25501686b4fd551cb96c297260
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
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"The costs for hydrogen refuelling stations vary widely and remain \r uncertain for the future (IEA 2019c). The IEA reports that the \r investment cost for one hydrogen refuelling station ranges between \r USD0.6 million and USD2 million for hydrogen at a  pressure of \r 700 bar and a delivery capacity of 1300 kg per day. The investment \r cost of hydrogen refuelling stations with lower refuelling capacities \r (~50  kg  H2 per  day) delivered at lower pressure (350 bar) range \r between USD0.15-1.6  million. A  separate estimate by the \r International Council for Clean Transport suggests that at a capacity \r of 600 kg of hydrogen per day, the capital cost of a single refuelling \r station would be approximately USD1.8 million (ICCT 2017). Given \r the high investment costs for hydrogen refuelling stations, low \r utilisation can translate into a high price for delivered hydrogen. In \r Europe, most pumps operate at less than 10% capacity. For small \r [...]"


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created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
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"[...] refuelling stations with a capacity of 50 kg H2 per day, this utilisation \r rate translates to a high price of around USD15-25 per kg H2 - in \r line with current retail prices (IEA 2019c). The dispensed cost of \r hydrogen is also highly correlated with the cost of electricity, when \r H2 is produced using electrolysis, which is required to produce low\u0002carbon hydrogen."


id: aa3ebdf3aa8b163bc1884aefd22e43f1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27183
content:
"HEVs and plug-in HEVs (PHEVs) vary in terms of degree of powertrain \r electrification. HEVs mainly rely on regenerative braking for charging \r the battery. PHEVs combine regenerative braking with external \r power sources for charging the battery. Operating emissions intensity \r is highly dependent on the degree to which electrified driving is \r performed, which in turn is user- and route-dependent. For PHEVs, \r emissions intensity is also dependent on the source of the electricity \r for charging. HEV and PHEV production impacts are comparable \r to the emissions generated for producing ICEVs as the batteries \r are generally small compared to those of BEVs. Current HEVs may \r reduce emissions compared to ICEVs by up to 30%, depending \r on the fuel, yielding median lifecycle intensities varying between \r 60 gCO2-eq pkm-1 (biofuels, EMF33) and 165-170 gCO2-eq pkm-1\r (biofuels, partial models NRG). Within this wide range, all the \r [...]"


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created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
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"[...] combinations of electric and fossil-fuelled driving can be found, \r as well as the lifecycle intensity for driving 100% on fossil fuel. \r Because HEVs rely on combustion as the main energy conversion \r process, they offer limited mitigation opportunities. However, \r HEVs represent a suitable temporary solution, yielding a moderate \r mitigation potential, in areas where the electricity mix is currently so \r carbon intensive that the use of PHEVs and BEVs is not an effective \r mitigation solution (Wolfram and Wiedmann 2017; Wu et al. 2019)."


id: a9e3cc96da8a15dfa5956f59bb6794ab
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
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"Figure 10.4 presents the cumulative lifecycle emissions for selected \r powertrain technologies and fuel chain combinations for compact \r and mid-sized LDVs. This figure summarises the harmonised findings \r from the academic literature reviewed and the data submitted \r through an IPCC data collection effort, as described in Appendix 10.1 \r (Hawkins et al. 2013; Messagie et al. 2014; Bauer et al. 2015; Tong \r et al. 2015b; Ellingsen et al. 2016; Gao et al. 2016; Kim and Wallington \r 2016; Cai et al. 2017; Evangelisti et al. 2017; Ke et al. 2017; Lombardi \r et al. 2017; Miotti et al. 2017; Valente et al. 2017; Cox et al. 2018; \r de Souza et al. 2018; Elgowainy et al. 2018; Luk et al. 2018; Bekel \r and Pauliuk 2019; Cusenza et al. 2019; Hoque et al. 2019; IEA 2019a; \r Rosenfeld et al. 2019; Shen et al. 2019; Wang et al. 2019; Wu et al. \r 2019; Ambrose et  al. 2020; Benajes et  al. 2020; Hill et  al. 2020; \r Knobloch et al. 2020; Prussi et al. 2020; Qiao et al. 2020; Wolfram \r [...]"


id: 2088722424e3bb795e9f0970c3a72836
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2945
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"[...] et al. 2020; Zheng et al. 2020; Sacchi 2021; Valente et al. 2021). The \r values in the figure (and the remaining figures in this section) depend \r on the 100-year global warming potential (GWP) used in each study, \r which may differ from the recent GWP updates from WGI. However, \r it is unlikely that the qualitative insights gained from the figures in \r this section would change using the update 100-year GWP values."


id: 6c95b56a2e46539db876d553063e3602
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
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"In contrast to HEVs, PHEVs may provide greater opportunities for \r use-phase emissions reductions for LDVs. These increased potential \r benefits are due to the ability to charge the battery with low-carbon \r electricity and the longer full-electric range in comparison to HEVs \r (Laberteaux et  al. 2019). Consumer behaviour (e.g.,  utility factor \r (UF) and charging patterns), manufacturer settings, and access \r to renewable electricity for charging strongly influence the total \r operational impacts (Wu et al. 2019). The UF is a weighting of the \r percentage of distance covered using the electric charge (charge \r depleting (CD) stage) versus the distance covered using the internal \r combustion engine (charge sustaining (CS) stage) (Paffumi et  al. \r 2018). When the PHEV operates in CS mode, the internal combustion \r engine is used for propulsion and to maintain the state of charge \r of the battery within a  certain range, together with regenerative \r [...]"


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created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
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"[...] braking (Plotz et  al. 2018; Raghavan and Tal 2020). When running \r in CS mode, PHEVs have a  reduced mitigation potential and have \r impacts comparable to those of HEVs. On the other hand, when the \r PHEV operates in CD mode, the battery alone provides the required "


id: 9ff0c2e5d40999317102058017f626c7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
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"Figure 10.4 | Life cycle greenhouse gas emissions intensities for mid-sized light-duty vehicle and fuel technologies from the literature. The primary x-axis \r reports units in gCO2-eq vkm-1, assuming a vehicle life of 180,000 km. The secondary x-axis uses units of gCO2-eq pkm-1, assuming a 1.5 occupancy rate. The values in the \r figure rely on the 100-year GWP value embedded in the source data, which may differ slightly from the updated 100-year GWP values from WGI. The shaded area represents \r the interquartile range for combined vehicle manufacturing and end-of-life phases. The length of the box and whiskers represent the interquartile range of the operation phase \r for different fuel chains, while their placement on the x-axis represents the absolute lifecycle climate intensity, that is, includes manufacturing and end-of-life phases. Each \r [...]"


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created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
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"[...] individual marker indicates a data point. 'Advanced biofuels' refers to the use of second-generation biofuels and their respective conversion and cultivation emission factors. \r 'IAM EMF33' refers to emissions factors for advanced biofuels derived from simulation results from the integrated assessment models EMF33 scenarios. 'PM' refers to partial \r models, where 'CLC' is with constant land cover and 'NRG' is with natural regrowth. 'Hydrogen, low-carbon electricity' is produced via electrolysis using low-carbon electricity. \r 'Hydrogen, natural gas SMR' refers to fuels produced via steam methane reforming of natural gas."


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"propulsion energy (Plotz et al. 2018; Raghavan and Tal 2020). Thus, in \r CD mode, PHEVs hold potential for higher mitigation potential, due \r to the possibility of charging the battery with low-carbon electricity \r sources. Consequently, the UF greatly influences the lifecycle emissions \r of PHEVs. The current peer-reviewed literature presents a wide range \r of UFs mainly due to varying testing protocols applied for estimating \r the fuel efficiency and user behaviour (Pavlovic et al. 2017; Paffumi \r et  al. 2018; Plotz et  al. 2018; Plotz et  al. 2020; Raghavan and Tal \r 2020; Hao et al. 2021). These factors make it difficult to harmonise \r and compare impacts across PHEV studies. Due to the low number \r of appropriate PHEV studies relative to the other LDV technologies \r and the complications in harmonising available PHEV results, this \r technology is omitted from Figure  10.4. However, due to the dual \r operating nature of PHEV vehicles, one can expect that the lifecycle \r [...]"


id: 3fba1632048bb1a965f11625ab7ae1d7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8404
content:
"[...] GHG emissions intensities for these vehicles will lie between those \r of their ICEV and BEV counterparts of similar size and performance."


id: adbc026ddabb16170929da80991aea6e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27808
content:
"As with BEVs, current HFCVs have higher production emissions than \r similarly-sized ICEVs and BEVs, generating on average approximately \r 15 tCO2-eq per vehicle. As with BEVs, the lifecycle impacts of FCVs \r are highly dependent on the fuel chain. To date, the most common \r method of hydrogen production is steam methane reforming of \r natural gas (Khojasteh Salkuyeh et  al. 2017), which is relatively \r carbon intensive, resulting in lifecycle emissions of approximately \r 88 gCO2-eq pkm-1. Current literature covering lifecycle impacts \r of FCVs shows that vehicles fuelled with hydrogen produced from \r steam methane reforming of natural gas offer little or no mitigation \r potential over ICEVs. Other available hydrogen fuel chains vary widely \r in carbon intensity, depending on the synthesis method and the \r energy source used (electrolysis or steam methane reforming; fossil \r fuels or renewables). The least carbon-intensive hydrogen pathways \r [...]"


id: c352bb05912bd239a0b1d90cfebdaa7c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31636
content:
"[...] rely on electrolysis powered by low-carbon electricity. Compared to \r ICEVs and BEVs, FCVs for LDVs are at a lower technology readiness \r level, as discussed in section 10.3."


id: 59ff686c59d99fbc2eea8caf84c13589
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13079
content:
"Currently, BEVs have higher manufacturing emissions than \r equivalently-sized ICEVs, with median emissions of 14 tCO2-eq \r per  vehicle against approximately 10 tCO2-eq per  vehicle of their \r mid-sized fossil-fuelled counterparts. These higher production \r emissions of BEVs are largely attributed to the battery pack \r manufacturing and to the additional power electronics required. \r As manufacturing technology and capacity utilisation improve and \r globalise to regions with low-carbon electricity, battery manufacturing \r emissions will likely decrease. Due to the higher energy efficiency \r of the electric powertrain, BEVs may compensate for these higher \r production emissions in the driving phase. However, the mitigation \r ability of this technology relative to ICEVs is highly dependent on \r the electricity mix used to charge the vehicle. As a consequence of \r the  variety of energy sources available today, current BEVs have \r [...]"


id: 83b25609970c1736e62fdea87e2dbd94
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20311
content:
"Vehicle size trends. On a global scale, SUV sales have been constantly growing in the last decade, with 39% of the vehicles sold in \r 2018 being SUVs (IEA 2019d). If the trend towards increasing vehicle size and engine power continues, it may result in higher overall \r emissions from the LDV fleet (relative to smaller vehicles with the same powertrain technology). The magnitude of the influence \r vehicle mass has on fuel efficiency varies with the powertrain, which have different efficiencies. Box 10.3 Figure 1 highlights this \r relationship using data from the same literature used to create Figure 10.4. Higher powertrain efficiency results in lower energy losses \r in operation, and thus requires less energy input to move a given mass than a powertrain of lower efficiency. This pattern is illustrated \r by the more gradual slope of BEVs in Box 10.3 Figure 1. The trend towards bigger and heavier vehicles, with consequently higher use \r [...]"


id: 6ed2ef63de75c995fa313ce90159a405
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16769
content:
"[...] phase emissions, can be somewhat offset by improvements in powertrain design, fuel efficiency, lightweighting, and aerodynamics \r (Gargoloff et  al. 2018; Wolfram et  al. 2020). The potential improvements provided by these strategies are case specific and not \r thoroughly evaluated in the literature, either individually or as a combination of multiple strategies."


id: e09456bb2b2645c70264fd9caaae7e1a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36765
content:
"Lightweighting. There is an increasing use of advanced materials such as high-strength steel, aluminium, carbon fibre, and polymer \r composites for vehicle lightweighting (Hottle et al. 2017). These materials reduce the mass of the vehicle and thereby also reduce \r the fuel or energy required to drive. Lightweighted components often have higher production emissions than the components they \r replace due to the advanced materials used (Kim and Wallington 2016). Despite these higher production emissions, some studies \r suggest that the reduced fuel consumption over the lifetime of the lightweighted vehicle may provide a net mitigation effect in \r comparison to a non-lightweighted vehicle (Kim and Wallington 2013; Hottle et al. 2017; Milovanoff et al. 2019; Upadhyayula et al. \r 2019; Wolfram et al. 2020). However, multiple recent publications have found that in some cases, depending on, for example, vehicle \r [...]"


id: f3cb6dfd98e74e4bcb46aba8d3fd9525
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40269
content:
"[...] size and carbon intensity of the lightweighting materials employed, the GHG emissions avoided due to improved fuel efficiency do not "


id: 7821f05d32b552f9f3cff948a14f428b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18347
content:
"FCVs represent the most expensive solution for LDV, mainly due to \r the currently higher purchase price of the vehicle itself. However, \r given the lower technology readiness level of FCVs and the current \r efforts in the research and development of this technology, FCVs \r could become a viable technology for LDVs in the coming years. The \r issues regarding the extra energy involved in creating the hydrogen \r and its delivery to refuelling sites remain, however. The levelised \r cost of hydrogen on a per GJ basis is lower than conventional fossil \r fuels but higher than electricity. In addition, within the levelised \r cost of hydrogen, there are significant cost differences between the \r hydrogen-producing technologies. Conventional technologies such \r as coal gasification and steam methane reforming of natural gas, \r both with and without carbon capture and storage, represent the \r cheapest options (Bekel and Pauliuk 2019; Parkinson et  al. 2019; \r [...]"


id: 9caadf3f194c31426c53080713c36009
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24804
content:
"[...] Khzouz et al. 2020; Al-Qahtani et al. 2021). Hydrogen produced via \r electrolysis is currently the most expensive technology, but with \r significant potential cost reductions due to the current technology \r readiness level."


id: 792ad9501ecf34dc956018e3eaa30309
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18507
content:
"ICEV, HEV, and PHEV technologies, which are powered using \r combustion engines, have limited potential for deep reduction \r of GHG emissions. Biofuels offer good mitigation potential if low \r land-use change emissions are incurred (e.g., the IAM EMF33 and \r partial models, CLC biofuels pathways shown in Figure  10.4). The \r literature shows large variability, depending on the method of \r calculating associated land-use changes. Resolving these apparent \r methodological differences is important to consolidating the role \r biofuels may play in mitigation, as well as the issues raised in \r Chapter 7 about the conflicts over land use. The mitigation potential \r of battery and fuel cell vehicles is strongly dependent on the carbon \r intensity of their production and the energy carriers used in operation. \r However, these technologies likely offer the highest potential for \r reducing emissions from LDVs. Prior work on the diffusion dynamics \r [...]"


id: db2f37404bae423f2239a1d1b3b61617
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35836
content:
"[...] of transport technologies suggests that 'the diffusion of infrastructure \r precedes the adoption of vehicles, which precedes the expansion of \r travel' (Leibowicz 2018). These dynamics reinforce the argument \r for strong investments in both the energy infrastructure and the \r vehicle technologies."


id: 26d57bca2b745ad85c925eb2a77371aa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3991
content:
"Buses provide urban and peri-urban transport services to millions of \r people around the world and a growing number of transport agencies \r are exploring alternative-fuelled buses. Alternative technologies to \r conventional diesel-powered buses include buses powered with \r CNG, LNG, synthetic fuels, and biofuels (e.g.,  biodiesel, renewable \r diesel, dimethyl ether); diesel hybrid-electric buses; battery electric \r buses; electric catenary buses; and hydrogen fuel cell buses. Rail is \r an alternative mode of transit that could support decarbonisation \r of land-based passenger mobility. Electric rail systems can provide \r urban services (light rail and metro systems), as well as longer\u0002distance transport. Indeed, many cities of the world already have \r extensive metro systems, and regions like China, Japan and Europe \r have a  robust high-speed intercity railway network. Intercity rail \r transport can be powered with electricity, however, fossil fuels are \r [...]"


id: d524dbefeeb12a52673b2d1c0b2d8154
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34823
content:
"[...] still prevalent for long-distance rail passenger transport in some \r regions. Battery electric long-distance trains may be a future option \r for these areas."


id: 4c5f388d1bb21f79fe07a6afc37a71e5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10698
content:
"Figure  10.6 shows the lifecycle GHG emissions from different \r powertrain and fuel technologies for buses and passenger rail. The \r data in each panel came from a number of relevant scientific studies \r (Cai et al. 2015; Tong et al. 2015a; Dimoula et al. 2016; de Bortoli et al. \r 2017; Valente et al. 2017; Meynerts et al. 2018; IEA 2019e; de Bortoli \r and Christoforou 2020; Hill et al. 2020; Liu et al. 2020a; Valente et al. \r 2021). The width of the bar represents the variability in available \r estimates, which is primarily driven by variability in reported vehicle \r efficiency, size, or drive cycle. While some bars overlap, the Figure \r may not fully capture correlations between results. For example, low \r efficiency associated with aggressive drive cycles may drive the upper \r end of the emission ranges for multiple technologies; thus, an overlap \r does not necessarily suggest uncertainty regarding which vehicle \r [...]"


id: fb49fcd3b325c8c81e03ebde14653cff
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41586
content:
"[...] type would have lower emissions for a comparable trip. Additionally, \r reported lifecycle emissions do not include embodied GHG emissions \r associated with infrastructure construction and maintenance. \r These embodied emissions are potentially a  larger fraction of "


id: 947e94ffddecb04673fda043f3c1638a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23331
content:
"Figure 10.7 shows the results of a parametric analysis of the LCCs \r of transit technologies with the highest potential for GHG emissions \r reductions. As with Figure 10.5, the vehicle efficiency ranges are the \r same as those from the LCA estimates (80% occupancy). Vehicle, \r fuel, and maintenance costs represent ranges in the literature \r (Eudy and Post 2018b; IEA 2019e; Argonne National Laboratory \r 2020; BNEF 2020; Eudy and Post 2020; Hydrogen Council 2020; IEA \r 2020b; IEA 2020c; IRENA 2020; Johnson et al. 2020; Burnham et al. \r 2021; IEA 2021c; IEA 2021d; US Energy Information Administration \r 2021), and the discount rate is 3% where applicable. Appendix 10.2 \r provides the details behind these estimates. The panels for the ICEV \r can represent buses and passenger trains powered with any form \r of diesel, whether derived from petroleum, synthetic hydrocarbons, \r or biofuels. For reference, global average automotive diesel prices \r [...]"


id: d80fdefc7495e0fb42acc80fabf5a111
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35312
content:
"[...] from 2015-2020 fluctuated around USD1 per  litre, and the 2019 \r world average industrial electricity price was approximately \r USD100 per MWh (IEA 2021d). Retail hydrogen prices in excess of \r USD13 per  kilogram have been observed (Eudy and Post 2018a; \r Argonne National Laboratory 2020; Burnham et  al. 2021) though \r current production cost estimates for hydrogen produced from \r electrolysis are far lower (IRENA 2020) (and as reported in Chapter 6), \r at around USD5-7 per kg with future forecasts as low as USD1 per kg \r (BNEF 2020; Hydrogen Council 2020; IRENA 2020) (and as reported \r in Chapter 6)."


id: f23c4d2c0269cec6b3aeadbbd50ae18d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40013
content:
"Figure 10.6 highlights that BEV and FCV buses and passenger rail \r powered with low-carbon electricity or low-carbon hydrogen, could \r offer reductions in GHG emissions compared to diesel-powered buses \r or diesel-powered passenger rail. However, and not surprisingly, \r these technologies would offer only little emissions reductions if \r power generation and hydrogen production rely on fossil fuels. While \r buses powered with CNG and LNG could offer some reductions \r compared to diesel-powered buses, these reductions are unlikely to \r be sufficient to contribute to deep decarbonisation of the transport \r sector and they may slow down conversion to low- or zero-carbon \r options already commercially available. Biodiesel and renewable \r diesel fuels (from sources with low upstream emissions and low \r risk of induced land-use change) could offer important near-term \r reductions for buses and passenger rail, as these fuels can often be \r [...]"


id: 14e02b21818803e4b5909f991dc782c7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 900
content:
"[...] used with existing vehicle infrastructure. They could also be used for \r long haul trucks and trains, shipping and aviation as discussed below \r and in later sections."


id: 881d26de5651351dec0252fc2a1b5039
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21097
content:
"There has been growing interest in the production of synthetic fuels \r from CO2 produced by direct air capture (DAC) processes. Figure 10.6 \r includes the lifecycle GHG emissions from buses and passenger \r rail powered with synthetic diesel produced through a DAC system \r paired with a Fischer-Tropsch (FT) process, based on Liu et al. (2020a). \r This process requires the use of hydrogen (as shown in Figure 10.2), \r so the emissions factors of the resulting fuel depend on the emissions \r intensity of hydrogen production. An electricity emissions factor less \r than 140 gCO2-eq kWh-1 would be required for this pathway to \r achieve lower emissions than petroleum diesel (Liu et al. 2020a); for \r example, this would be equivalent to a 75% wind and 25% natural \r gas electricity mix (Appendix 10.1). If the process relied on steam \r methane reforming for hydrogen production or fossil-based power \r generation, synthetic diesel from the DAC-FT process would not \r [...]"


id: 3cce81c4d4bb349eeab996bafe8bd127
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7882
content:
"[...] provide GHG emissions reductions compared to conventional diesel. \r DAC-FT from low-carbon energy sources appears to be promising \r from an emissions standpoint and could warrant the R&D and \r demonstration attention outlined in the rest of the chapter, but it \r cannot be contemplated as a decarbonisation strategy without the \r availability of low-carbon hydrogen."


id: 8fd0d95eee9e5948d66db28df04d2de5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22509
content:
"Under most parameter combinations, rail is the most cost-effective \r option, followed by buses, both of which are an order of magnitude \r cheaper than passenger vehicles. Note that costs per  pkm are \r strongly influenced by occupancy assumptions; at low occupancy \r (e.g.,  <20% for buses and <10% for rail), the cost of transit \r approaches the LCC for passenger cars. For diesel rail and buses, cost \r ranges are driven by fuel costs, whereas vehicles are both important \r drivers for electric or hydrogen modes due to high costs (but also \r large projected improvements) associated with batteries and fuel \r cell stacks. Whereas the current state of ICEV technologies is best \r represented by cheap vehicles and low fuel costs for diesel (top left \r of each panel), these costs are likely to rise in future due to stronger \r emission/efficiency regulations and rising crude oil prices. On the \r contrary, the current status of alternative fuels is better represented \r [...]"


id: 298f12a943fa7a36e60390f79e442270
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4535
content:
"[...] by high capital costs and mid-to-high fuel costs (right side of each \r panel; mid-to-bottom rows), but technology costs are anticipated \r to fall with increasing experience, research, and development. \r Thus, while electric rail is already competitive with diesel rail, and \r electric buses are competitive with diesel buses in the low efficiency \r case, improvements are still required in battery costs to compete \r against modern diesel buses on high efficiency routes, at current \r diesel costs. Similarly, improvements to both vehicle cost and fuel \r costs are required for hydrogen vehicles to become cost effective \r compared to their diesel or electric counterparts. At either the \r upper end of the diesel cost range (bottom row of ICEV panels), or \r within the 2030-2050 projections for battery costs, fuel cell costs \r and hydrogen costs (top left of BEV and FCV panels), both battery\u0002and hydrogen-powered vehicles become financially attractive."


id: d097861fc65c67ad99fef82de746d805
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34047
content:
"Figure 10.6 | Lifecycle greenhouse gas intensity of land-based bus and rail technologies. Each bar represents the range of the lifecycle estimates, bounded by \r minimum and maximum energy use per passenger-kilometre, as reported for each fuel/powertrain combination. The ranges are driven by differences in vehicle characteristics \r and operating efficiency. For energy sources with highly variable upstream emissions, low, medium and/or high representative values are shown as separate rows. The primary \r x-axis shows lifecycle GHG emissions, in gCO2-eq pkm-1, assuming 80% occupancy; the secondary x-axis assumes 20% occupancy. The values in the figure rely on the 100-year \r GWP value embedded in the source data, which may differ slightly from the updated 100-year GWP values from WGI. For buses, the main bars show full lifecycle, with vertical \r [...]"


id: 53ac674f81b76324d57ff3cd60f6ae82
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11992
content:
"[...] bars disaggregating the vehicle cycle. 'Diesel, high' references emissions factors for diesel from oil sands. 'advanced biofuels', refers to the use of second-generation biofuels and \r their respective conversion and cultivation emissions factors. 'IAM EMF33' refers to emissions factors for advanced biofuels derived from simulation results from the integrated \r assessment models EMF33 scenarios. 'PM' refers to partial models, where 'CLC' is with constant land cover and 'NRG' is with natural regrowth. 'DAC FT-Diesel, wind electricity' \r refers to Fischer-Tropsch diesel produced via a CO2 direct air capture process that uses wind electricity. 'Hydrogen, low-carbon renewable' refers to fuels produced via electrolysis \r [...]"


id: a1b5799963d44dc696180fbc7003bcee
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25671
content:
"[...] using low-carbon electricity. 'Hydrogen, natural gas SMR' refers to fuels produced via steam methane reforming of natural gas. Results for ICEVs with 'high emissions DAC FT\u0002Diesel from natural gas' are not included here since the lifecycle emissions are estimated to be substantially higher than petroleum diesel ICEVs."


id: 770b68f7c62af086f9813745cc8c848c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18144
content:
"Figure 10.8 (continued): Lifecycle greenhouse gas intensity of land-based freight technologies and fuel types. Each bar represents the range of the lifecycle \r estimates, bounded by minimum and maximum energy use per  tkm, as reported for each fuel/powertrain combination. The ranges are driven by differences in vehicle \r characteristics and operating efficiency. For energy sources with highly variable upstream emissions, low, medium and/or high representative values are shown as separate \r rows. For trucks, the primary x-axis shows lifecycle GHG emissions, in gCO2-eq tkm-1, assuming 100% payload; the secondary x-axis assumes 50% payload. The values in the \r figure rely on the 100-year GWP value embedded in the source data, which may differ slightly from the updated 100-year GWP values from WGI. For rail, values represent \r [...]"


id: bdb78d6bcf5b0a31f624f78d3b5d2491
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30638
content:
"[...] average payloads. For trucks, main bars show full lifecycle, with vertical bars disaggregating the vehicle cycle. 'Diesel, high' references emissions factors for diesel from oil sands. \r 'Advanced biofuels' refers to the use of second-generation biofuels and their respective conversion and cultivation emission factors. 'IAM EMF33' refers to emissions factors for \r advanced biofuels derived from simulation results from the EMF33 scenarios. 'PM' refers to partial models, where 'CLC' is with constant land cover and 'NRG' is with natural \r regrowth. DAC FT-Diesel, wind electricity refers to Fischer-Tropsch diesel produced via a CO2 direct air capture process that uses wind electricity. 'Ammonia and Hydrogen, low\u0002carbon renewable' refers to fuels produced via electrolysis using low-carbon electricity. 'Ammonia and Hydrogen, natural gas SMR' refers to fuels produced via steam methane \r reforming of natural gas."


id: e782e9e081f3e3638eeaa21d34eed156
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38041
content:
"Figure 10.8 presents a review of lifecycle GHG emissions from land\u0002based freight technologies (heavy- and medium-duty trucks, and \r rail). Each panel within the figure represents data in GHG emissions \r per  tonne-kilometre of freight transported by different technology \r and/or fuel types, as indicated by the labels to the left. The data in \r each panel came from a number of relevant scientific studies (Tong \r et al. 2015a; Frattini et al. 2016; Nahlik et al. 2016; Zhao et al. 2016; \r CE Delft 2017; Isaac and Fulton 2017; Song et  al. 2017; Valente \r et  al. 2017; Cooper and Balcombe 2019; Lajevardi et  al. 2019; \r Hill et al. 2020; Liu et al. 2020a; Merchan et al. 2020; Prussi et al. 2020; \r Gray et al. 2021; Valente et al. 2021). Similar to the results for buses, \r technologies that offer substantial emissions reductions for freight \r include: ICEV trucks powered with the low-carbon variants for \r biofuels, ammonia or synthetic diesel; BEVs charged with low-carbon \r [...]"


id: c19d81eb8d632e97088812e6f24cf81a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31367
content:
"[...] electricity; and FCVs powered with renewable-based electrolytic \r hydrogen, or ammonia. Since ammonia and Fischer-Tropsch diesel \r are produced from hydrogen, their emissions are higher than the \r source hydrogen, but their logistical advantages over hydrogen are \r also a consideration (Section 10.3)."


id: f29bf2533788c621a3c1a9d773ddb8f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40087
content:
"Figure 10.9 shows the results of a parametric analysis of the LCC \r of trucks and freight rail technologies with the highest potential \r for deep GHG reductions. As with Figure 10.8, the vehicle efficiency \r ranges are the same as those from the LCA estimates (80% payload \r for trucks; effective payload as reported by original studies for \r rail). Vehicle, fuel and maintenance costs represent ranges in the \r literature (Moultak et  al. 2017; Eudy and Post 2018b; IEA 2019e; \r Argonne National Laboratory 2020; BNEF 2020; IRENA 2020; \r Burnham et al. 2021; IEA 2021c), and the discount rate is 3% where \r applicable (Appendix 10.2). The panels for the ICEV can represent \r trucks and freight trains powered with any form of diesel, whether \r derived from petroleum, synthetic hydrocarbons, or biofuels. See \r discussion preceding Figure 10.7 for additional details about current \r global fuel costs. Under most parameter combinations, rail is the \r [...]"


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vector_id: 17280
content:
"[...] more cost-effective option, but the high efficiency case for trucks \r (representing fuel-efficient vehicles, favourable drive cycles and high \r payload) can be more cost-effective than the low efficiency case for \r rail (representing systems with higher fuel consumption and lower \r payload). For BEV trucks, cost ranges are driven by vehicle purchase \r price due to the large batteries required and the associated wide \r range between their current high costs and anticipated future cost \r reductions. For all other truck and rail technologies, fuel cost ranges \r play a larger role. Similar to transit technologies, the current state \r of freight ICEV technologies is best represented by cheap vehicles \r and low fuel costs for diesel (top left of each panel), and the current \r status of alternative fuels is better represented by high capital costs \r and mid-to-high fuel costs (right side of each panel; mid-to-bottom \r rows), with expected future increases in ICEV LCC and decreases in \r [...]"


id: 9daa231900e50cd72595908549804699
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24970
content:
"[...] alternative fuel vehicle LCC. Electric and hydrogen freight rail are \r potentially already competitive with diesel rail (especially electric \r catenary (IEA 2019e)), but low data availability (especially for \r hydrogen efficiency ranges) and wide ranges for reported diesel \r rail efficiency (likely encompassing low capacity utilisation) makes \r this comparison challenging. Alternative fuel trucks are currently \r more expensive than diesel trucks, but future increases in diesel \r costs or a respective decrease in hydrogen costs or in BEV capital "


id: 6b7719bd33fbf23e7eb1936b05d16f8a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16208
content:
"Trucks exhibit economies of scale in fuel consumption, with \r heavy-duty trucks generally showing lower emissions per tkm than \r medium-duty trucks. Comparing the lifecycle GHG emissions from \r trucks and rail, it is clear that rail using internal combustion engines \r is more carbon efficient than using internal combustion trucks. Note \r that the rail emissions are reported for an average representative \r payload, while the trucks are presented at 50% and 100% \r payload, based on available data. The comparison between trucks \r and rail powered with electricity or hydrogen is less clear  - \r especially considering that these values omit embodied GHG \r from infrastructure construction. One study reported embodied \r rail infrastructure emissions of 15 gCO2 per tonne-kilometre for rail \r (International Union of Railways 2016), although such embodied \r emissions from rail are known to vary widely across case studies \r [...]"


id: b98f213619b401dbad341955d965357d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29855
content:
"[...] (Olugbenga et  al. 2019). Regardless, trucks and rail with low\u0002carbon electricity or low-carbon hydrogen have substantially lower \r emissions than incumbent technologies."


id: 1ab975630dde130cd611970c42fddd1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1906
content:
"The non-CO2 effects of aviation on climate fall into the category of \r short-lived climate forcers (SLCFs). Emissions of NOx currently result \r in net positive warming from the formation of short-term ozone \r (warming) and the destruction of ambient methane (cooling). If the \r conditions are suitable, emissions of soot and water vapour can \r trigger the formation of contrails (Karcher 2018), which can spread \r to form extensive contrail-cirrus cloud coverage. Such cloud coverage \r is estimated to have a combined ERF that is about 57% of the current \r net ERF of global aviation (Lee et al. 2021), although a comparison \r of cirrus cloud observations under pre- and post-COVID-19 pandemic \r conditions suggest that this forcing could be smaller (Digby et  al. \r 2021). Additional effects from aviation from aerosol-cloud interactions \r on high-level ice clouds through soot (Chen and Gettelman 2013; \r Zhou and Penner 2014; Penner et al. 2018), and lower-level warm \r [...]"


id: a1bae24d3badc8b87ae620b9015bb187
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25675
content:
"[...] clouds through sulphur (Righi et al. 2013; Kapadia et al. 2016) are \r highly uncertain, with no best estimates available (Lee et al. 2021). \r In total, the net ERF from aviation's non-CO2 SLCFs is estimated to be \r approximately 66% of aviation's current total forcing. It is important \r to note that the fraction of non-CO2 forcing to total forcing is not \r a fixed quantity and is dependent on the recent history of growth (or \r otherwise) of CO2 emissions (Klower et al. 2021). The non-CO2 effects \r from aviation are the subject of discussion for mitigation options \r (Arrowsmith et al. 2020). However, the issues are complex, potentially \r involving technological and operational trade-offs with CO2."


id: b09271f7744ba2f8a743451b7bdb1ca0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28295
content:
"Operational improvements for navigation. From a  global \r perspective, aircraft navigation is relatively efficient, with many long\u0002haul routes travelling close to great circle trajectories, and avoiding \r headwinds that increase fuel consumption. The ICAO estimates that \r flight inefficiencies on a global basis are currently of the order 2% \r to 6% (ICAO 2019), while Fleming and de Lepinay (2019) project \r operational improvements (air traffic management) of up to 13% on \r a regional basis by 2050. 'Intermediate stop operations' have been \r suggested, whereby longer-distance travel is broken into flight legs, \r obviating the need to carry fuel for the whole mission. Linke et al. \r (2017) modelled this operational behaviour on a  global basis and \r calculated a fuel saving of 4.8% over a base case in which normal \r fuel loads were carried. However, this approach increases the number \r of landing/take-off cycles at airports. 'Formation flying', which has \r [...]"


id: e8a3b971da2cf4a14d3f84e8e4420c82
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38271
content:
"[...] the potential to reduce fuel burn on feasible routes, has also been \r proposed (Xu et al. 2014; Marks et al. 2021)."


id: 8223228f72d65539e6114192b5a1b0ac
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20021
content:
"Alternative biofuels, synthetic fuels, and liquid hydrogen. As \r noted above, the scope for reducing CO2 emissions from aviation \r through improved airplane technology or operations is limited and \r unable to keep up with the projected growth, let al.ne reduce beyond \r the present emission rate at projected levels of demand (assuming \r post-pandemic recovery of traffic). Thus, the literature outlined here \r suggests that the only way for demand for aviation to continue to \r grow without increasing CO2 emissions is to employ alternative \r lower-carbon bio- or synthetic aviation fuels (Klower et al. 2021). For \r shorter ranges, flights of light planes carrying up to 50 passengers \r may be able to use electric power (Sahoo et  al. 2020) but these \r planes are a  small proportion of the global aviation fleet (Epstein \r and O'Flarity 2019; Langford and Hall 2020) and account for less \r [...]"


id: 9b0d1bbc0d65e822c24eadb6865a8d73
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24531
content:
"[...] than 12% of current aviation CO2 emissions. Alternative lower\u0002carbon footprint fuels have been certified for use over recent years, \r principally from bio-feedstocks, but are not yet widely available at \r economic prices (Kandaramath Hari et al. 2015; Capaz et al. 2021a). \r In addition, alternative fuels from bio-feedstocks have variable \r carbon footprints because of different lifecycle emissions associated \r with various production methods and associated land-use change \r (de Jong et al. 2017; Staples et al. 2018; Capaz et al. 2021b; Zhao \r et al. 2021)."


id: 89d7cd20cc67591e33f3c86ede6f4f56
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21419
content:
"Technology options for engine and airframe. For every kilogram \r of jet fuel combusted, 3.16 kg CO2 is emitted. Engine and airframe \r manufacturers' primary objective, after safety issues, is to reduce \r direct operating costs, which are highly dependent on fuel burn. \r Large investments have gone into engine technology and aircraft \r aerodynamics to improve fuel burn per  kilometre (Cumpsty et  al. \r 2019). There have been major step changes in engine technology \r over time, from early turbojet engines to larger turbofan engines. \r However, the basic configuration of an aircraft has remained more \r or less the same for decades and will likely remain at least to 2037 \r (Cumpsty et  al. 2019). Airframes performance has improved over \r the years with better wing design, but large incremental gains have \r become much harder as the technology has matured. For twin\u0002aisle aircraft, generally used for long ranges, fuel-burn is a pressing \r [...]"


id: f71a332f5a0dd437bc40f9280193160
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40845
content:
"[...] concern and there have been several all-new aircraft designs with \r improvements in their lift-to-drag ratio (Cumpsty et  al. 2019). The \r principal opportunities for fuel reduction come from improvements \r in aerodynamic efficiency, aircraft mass reduction, and propulsion \r system improvements. In the future, Cumpsty et al. (2019) suggest \r that the highest rate of fuel burn reduction achievable for new aircraft \r is likely to be no more than about 1.3% per year, which is well short of \r ICAO's aspirational goal of 2% global annual average fuel efficiency \r improvement. Radically different aircraft shapes, like the blended \r wing body (where the wings are not distinct from the fuselage), are \r likely to use about 10% less fuel than future advanced aircraft of \r conventional form (Cumpsty et al. 2019). Such improvements would \r be 'one-off' gains, do not compensate for growth in emissions of CO2\r expected to be in excess of 2% per annum, and would take a decade "


id: f2e54a0afa8de963a7f4d9fb548cc519
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40126
content:
"Bio-based fuels can be produced using a  variety of feedstocks \r including cultivated feedstock crops, crop residues, municipal solid \r waste, waste fats, oils and greases, wood products and forestry \r residues (Staples et  al. 2018). Each of these different sources can \r have different associated lifecycle emissions, such that they are \r not net zero CO2 emissions but have associated emissions of CO2\r or other GHGs from their production and distribution (Section 10.3, \r Box 10.2). In addition, associated land-use change emissions of CO2\r represent a  constraint in climate change mitigation potential with \r biofuel (Staples et  al. 2017) and have inherent large uncertainties \r (Plevin et al. 2010). Other sustainability issues include food vs fuel \r arguments, water resource use, and impacts on biodiversity. Cost\u0002effective production, feedstock availability, and certification costs are \r also relevant (Kandaramath Hari et al. 2015). Nonetheless, bio-based \r [...]"


id: 94e91107bdaaaaad03550a39a2afb6b5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23404
content:
"[...] SAFs have been estimated to achieve lifecycle emissions reductions \r ranging between approximately 2% and 70% under a wide range \r of scenarios (Staples et  al. 2018). For a  set of European aviation \r demand scenarios, Kousoulidou and Lonza (2016) estimated that \r the fuel demand in 2030 would be about 100 million tonnes of oil \r equivalent and biokerosene (HEFA/HVO) penetration would provide \r around 2% of the total fuel demand at that date. Several issues limit \r the expansion of biokerosene for aviation, the primary one being the \r current cost of fossil fuel compared to the costs of SAF production \r (Capaz et  al. 2021a). Other hybrid pathways, for example the \r hydrogenation of biofuels (the hydrogen assumed to be generated \r with low-carbon energy), could increase the output and improve \r the economic feasibility of bio-based SAF (Hannula 2016; Albrecht \r et al. 2017)."


id: e0c4e2f4b267ba58543e695e2e52597b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36804
content:
"Liquid hydrogen (LH2) as a fuel has been discussed for aeronautical \r applications since the 1950s (Brewer 1991) and a few experimental \r aircraft have flown using such a  fuel. Experimental, small aircraft \r have also flown using hydrogen fuel cells. Although the fuel has an \r energy density per unit mass about three times greater than kerosene, \r it has a much lower energy density per unit volume (approximately \r factor 4 (McKinsey 2020)). The increased volume requirement makes \r the fuel less attractive for aviation since it would require the wings \r to be thickened or fuel to take up space in the fuselage. Bicer and \r Dincer (2017) found that LH2-powered aircraft compared favourably \r to conventional kerosene-powered aircraft on a  lifecycle basis, \r providing that the LH2 was generated from low-carbon energy sources \r (0.014  kgCO2 per  tkm compared with 1.03 kgCO2 per  tkm for an \r unspecified passenger aircraft). However, Ramos Pereira et al. (2014) \r [...]"


id: 7b2452a9ec63925c42efcde9d9741016
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18863
content:
"[...] also made a lifecycle comparison and found much smaller benefits \r of LH2-powered aircraft (manufactured from low-carbon energy) \r compared with conventional fossil kerosene. The two studies expose \r the sensitivities of boundaries and assumptions in the analyses. \r Shreyas Harsha (2014) and Rondinelli et  al. (2017) conclude that \r there are many infrastructural barriers but that the environmental \r benefits of low-carbon-based LH2 could be considerable. Khandelwal \r et  al. (2013) take a  more optimistic view of the prospect of \r LH2-powered aircraft but envisage them within a hydrogen-oriented \r energy economy. A recently commissioned study by the European \r Union (EU)'s Clean Sky undertaking, (McKinsey 2020) addresses \r many of the aspects of the opportunities and obstacles in developing \r LH2-powered aircraft. The report provides an optimistic view of the \r feasibility of developing such aircraft for short to medium haul but \r [...]"


id: 608bc5241d4bab083fabc3e20be400c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14288
content:
"[...] makes clear that new aircraft designs (such as blended-wing body \r aircraft) would be needed for longer distances."


id: 20cd2d20749e67501ec22cd8e3e7cdfa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2992
content:
"By its nature, CORSIA does not lead to a  reduction in in-sector \r emissions from aviation since the programme deals mostly in \r approved offsets. At its best, CORSIA is a transition arrangement to \r allow aviation to reduce its impact in a more meaningful way later. \r From 2021 onwards, operators can reduce their CORSIA offsetting \r requirements by claiming emissions reductions from 'CORSIA \r Eligible Fuels' that have demonstrably reduced lifecycle emissions. \r These fuels are currently available at greater costs than the offsets \r (Capaz et al. 2021a). As a result, most currently approved CORSIA \r offsets are avoided emissions, which raises the issue of additionality \r (Warnecke et al. 2019). The nature of avoided emissions is to prevent \r an emission that was otherwise considered to be going to occur, \r for example, prevented deforestation. Avoided emissions are \r 'reductions' (over a counterfactual) and purchased from other sectors \r [...]"


id: d158b5899b8890c02229a333e90fa739
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34184
content:
"[...] that withhold from an intended emission (Becken and Mackey 2017), \r such that if additionality were established, a maximum of 50% of \r the intended emissions are avoided. Some researchers suggest that \r avoided deforestation offsets are not a meaningful reduction, since \r deforestation continues to be a net source of CO2 emissions (Mackey \r et al. 2013; Friedlingstein et al. 2020)."


id: 4186b1e3a6076c9b69abca34af027a5e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8719
content:
"A widely discussed opportunity for mitigation of non-CO2 emissions \r from aviation is the avoidance of persistent contrails that can form \r contrail cirrus. Contrails only form in ice-supersaturated air below \r a  critical temperature threshold (Karcher 2018). It is therefore \r feasible to alter flight trajectories to avoid such areas conducive \r to contrail formation, since ice-supersaturated areas tend to be \r tens to  hundreds of kilometres in the horizontal and only a  few \r 100 metres in the vertical extent (Gierens et al. 1997). Theoretical \r approaches show that avoidance is possible on a  flight-by-flight \r basis (Matthes et  al. 2017; Teoh et  al. 2020). Case studies have \r shown that flight planning according to trajectories with minimal \r climate impact can substantially (up to 50%) reduce the aircraft's \r net climate impacts despite small additional CO2 emissions (Niklass \r et al. 2019). However, any estimate of the net benefit or disbenefit \r [...]"


id: 7ff3d6e411f25fde5b534aaaa27615e1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19648
content:
"[...] depends firstly on the assumed magnitude of the contrail cirrus \r ERF effect (itself rather uncertain, assessed with a  low confidence \r level) and upon the choice of metric and time horizon applied. While \r this is a potentially feasible mitigation option, notwithstanding the \r CO2 per  contrail trade-off question, meteorological models cannot \r currently predict the formation of persistent contrails with sufficient \r accuracy in time and space (Gierens et  al. 2020); this mitigation \r option is speculated to take of the order of up to a decade to mature \r (Arrowsmith et al. 2020)."


id: 1c5b4e24506f8b6a53035b19face0ffc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2176
content:
"Modal shift to high-speed rail. Due to the limitations of the current \r suite of aviation mitigation strategies, the potential for high-speed \r rail (HSR) is of increasing interest (Givoni and Banister 2006; Chen \r 2017; Bi et al. 2019). The IEA's Net Zero by 2050 roadmap suggests \r significant behavioural change, with more regional flights shifting to \r HSR in the Net Zero Emissions by 2050 scenario pathway (IEA 2021e). \r For HSR services to be highly competitive with air travel, the optimal \r distance between the departure and arrival points has been found \r to be in the approximate range of 400 to 800 km (Bows et al. 2008; \r Rothengatter 2010), although in the case of China's HSR operations, \r this range can be extended out to 1000 km, with corresponding air \r services having experienced significant demand reduction upon HSR \r service commencement (Lawrence et  al. 2019). In some instances, \r negative effects on air traffic, air fare, and flight frequency have \r [...]"


id: fef7cd0236bda3033e63b95ac06ec2c7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42258
content:
"[...] occurred at medium-haul distances such as HSR services in China on \r the Wuhan-Guangzhou route (1069 km) and the Beijing-Shanghai \r route (1318 km) (Fu et al. 2015; Zhang and Zhang 2016; Chen 2017; \r Li et  al. 2019; Ma et  al. 2019). This competition at medium-haul \r distances is contrary to that which has been experienced in European "


id: ed14c90f552a37f735392d8acc89cd09
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39085
content:
"The LCA literature suggests that the GHG emissions associated with \r HSR vary depending on spatial, temporal, and operational specifics \r (Akerman 2011; Baron et al. 2011; Chester and Horvath 2012; Yue \r et  al. 2015; Hoyos et  al. 2016; Jones et  al. 2017; Robertson 2016; \r Robertson 2018; Lin et al. 2019). These studies found a wide range of \r approximately 10 to 110 gCO2 pkm-1 for HSR. This range is principally \r attributable to the sensitivity of operational parameters such as the \r HSR passenger seating capacity, load factor, composition of renewable \r and non-renewable energy sources in electricity production, rolling \r stock energy efficiency and patronage (i.e.,  ridership both actual \r and forecast), and line-haul infrastructure specifics (e.g., tunnelling \r and aerial structure requirements for a particular corridor) (Akerman \r 2011; Chester and Horvath 2012; Yue et  al. 2015; Newman et  al. \r 2018; Robertson 2018). The prospect for HSR services providing \r [...]"


id: 9157da2be4f3c7f16f02b241c1c2b6d3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22776
content:
"[...] freight carriage (especially online purchases) is also growing rapidly \r (Strale 2016; Bi et al. 2019; Liang and Tan 2019) with a demonstrated \r emissions reduction potential from such operations (Hoffrichter \r et al. 2012). However, additional supportive policies will most likely \r be required (Strale 2016; Watson et  al. 2019). Limiting emissions \r avoidance assessments for HSR modal substitution to account only \r for CO2 emissions ignores aviation's non-CO2 effects (Section 10.5.2), \r and likely results in an under-representation of the climate benefits \r of HSR replacing flights."


id: 4aeb22c714a22fca77f36f02ed73cab
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10420
content:
"HSR modal substitution can generate a contra-effect if the air traffic \r departure and arrival slots that become available as the result of the \r modal shift are simply reallocated to additional air services (Givoni and \r Banister 2006; Givoni and Dobruszkes 2013; Jiang and Zhang 2016; \r Cornet et al. 2018; Zhang et al. 2019a). Furthermore, HSR services have \r the potential to increase air traffic at a hub airport through improved \r networks but this effect can vary based on the distance of the HSR \r stations from airports (Jiang and Zhang 2014; Xia and Zhang 2016; \r Zhang et  al. 2019b; Liu et  al. 2019). Such rebound effects could be \r managed through policy interventions. For example, in 2021 the French \r government regulated that all airlines operating in France suspend \r domestic airline flights on routes if a direct rail alternative with a travel \r time of less than 2.5 hours is available. Other air travel demand \r [...]"


id: 600616655f1b10a8ac59f3ac247cddb8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14201
content:
"[...] reduction measures that have been proposed include regulations to \r ban frequent flyer reward schemes, mandates that all marketing of air \r travel declare flight emissions information to the prospective consumer \r (i.e., the carbon footprint of the nominated flight), the introduction of \r a progressive 'Air Miles Levy' as well as the inclusion of all taxes and \r duties that are presently exempt from air ticketing (Carmichael 2019). \r Moreover, China has the highest use of HSR in the world in part due to \r its network and competitive speeds and in part due to heavy regulation \r of the airline industry, in particular restrictions imposed on low-cost air \r carrier entry and subsidisation of HSR (Li et al. 2019). These air travel \r demand reduction strategies may induce shifts to other alternative \r modes in addition to stimulating HSR ridership."


id: abccd953f1379868e487e04338109349
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27468
content:
"The IEA has more recently presented aviation scenarios to 2070 in \r their 'Sustainable Development Scenario' that assume some limited \r reduction in demand post-COVID-19, and potential technology \r improvements in addition to direct reductions in fossil kerosene \r usage from substitution of biofuels and synthetic fuels (IEA 2021b). \r There is much uncertainty in how aviation will recover from the \r COVID-19 pandemic but, in this scenario, air travel returns to 2019 \r levels in three years, and then continues to expand, driven by income. \r Government policies could dampen demand (12% lower by 2040 \r than the IEA 'Stated Policies Scenario', which envisages growth at \r 3.4% per year, which in turn is lower than ICAO at 4.3%). Mitigation \r takes place largely by fuel substitution with lower-carbon biofuels \r and synthetic fuels, with a  smaller contribution from technology. \r Approximately 85% of the actual cumulative CO2 emissions (to 2070) \r [...]"


id: f98f80bf16be6b496e410cd8f207a522
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41274
content:
"[...] are attributed to use of fuel at their lowest technology readiness level \r of 'Prototype', which is largely made up of biofuels and synthetic \r fuels, as shown in Figure 10.12. Details of the technological scenarios \r and the fuel availability/uptake assumptions are given in IEA (2021b), \r which also makes clear that the relevant policies are not currently in \r place to make any such scenario happen."


id: 1f6d4b4c970e1801d5bbdfe3a95c7805
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2732
content:
"Under Article 2.2 of the Kyoto Protocol, Annex I countries were \r called to '...pursue limitation or reduction of emissions of GHGs not \r controlled by the Montreal Protocol from aviation and marine bunker \r fuels, working through the International Civil Aviation Organization \r and the International Maritime Organization, respectively.' The Paris \r Agreement is different, in that ICAO (and the IMO) are not named. \r As a result, the Paris Agreement, through the NDCs, seemingly covers \r CO2 emissions from domestic aviation (currently 35% of the global \r total from aviation) but does not cover emissions from international \r flights. A number of states and regions, including the UK, France, \r Sweden, and Norway, have declared their intentions to include \r international aviation in their net zero commitments, while the EU, \r New Zealand, California, and Denmark are considering doing the \r same (Committee on Climate Change 2019). The Paris Agreement \r [...]"


id: e3dbad63fb0ecf1f20e973ee98dbfd41
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37377
content:
"[...] describes temperature-based goals, such that it is unclear how \r emissions of GHGs from international aviation would be accounted \r for. Clearly, this is a less than ideal situation for clarity of governance \r of international GHG emissions from both aviation and shipping. At \r its 40th General Assembly (October 2019) the ICAO requested its \r Council to '...continue to explore the feasibility of a long-term global \r aspirational goal for international aviation, through conducting \r detailed studies assessing the attainability and impacts of any goals \r proposed, including the impact on growth as well as costs in all "


id: bf1d9f0615081257e9f3b030f38d0ca5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30899
content:
"The COVID-19 pandemic of 2020 has changed many activities and, \r consequentially, associated emissions quite dramatically (Le Quere \r et al. 2018b; Friedlingstein et al. 2020; Liu et al. 2020c; UNEP 2020). \r Aviation was particularly affected, with a  reduction in commercial \r flights in April 2020 of about 74% over 2019 levels, with some \r recovery over the following months, remaining at 42% lower as of \r October 2020 (Petchenik 2021). The industry is considering a range \r of potential recovery scenarios, with the International Air Transport \r Association (IATA) speculating that recovery to 2019 levels may take \r up until 2024 (Earley and Newman 2021) (Cross-Chapter Box 1 in \r Chapter 1). Others suggest, however, that the COVID-19 pandemic \r and increased costs as a  result of feed-in quotas or carbon taxes \r could slow down the rate of growth of air travel demand, though \r global demand in 2050 would still grow 57%-187% between 2018 \r [...]"


id: c40fc874c1109cba789cc82b34c60325
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31776
content:
"Shipping in the Arctic is a topic of increasing interest. The reduction \r of Arctic summer sea ice increases the access to the northern sea \r routes (Smith and Stephenson 2013; Melia et al. 2016; Aksenov et al. \r 2017; Fox-Kemper et al. 2021). Literature and public discourse has \r sometimes portrayed this trend as positive (Zhang et al. 2016b), as \r it allows for shorter shipping routes, for example between Asia and \r Europe, with estimated travel time savings of 25-40% (Aksenov \r et al. 2017). However, the acceleration of Arctic cryosphere melt and \r reduced sea ice that enable Arctic shipping reduce surface albedo \r and amplify climate warming (Eyring et al. 2021). Furthermore, local \r air pollutants can play different roles in the Arctic. For example, black \r carbon emissions reduce albedo and absorb heat in air, on snow \r and ice (Browse et al. 2013; Kang et al. 2020; Messner 2020; Eyring \r et  al. 2021). Finally, changing routing from Suez to the northern \r [...]"


id: 8a2e86a949023f58ae9f153248f47644
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21487
content:
"[...] sea routes may reduce total emissions for a voyage, but also shifts \r emissions from low to high latitudes. Changing the location of the \r emissions adds complexity to the assessment of the climatic impacts \r of Arctic shipping, as the local conditions are different and the SLCF \r may have a  different impact on clouds, precipitation, albedo and \r local environment (Dalsoren et  al. 2013; Fuglestvedt et  al. 2014; \r Marelle et  al. 2016). Observations have shown that 5-25% of air \r pollution in the Arctic stems from shipping activity within the Arctic \r itself (Aliabadi et al. 2015). Emissions outside the Arctic can affect \r Arctic climate, and changes within the Arctic may have global climate \r impacts. Both modelling and observations have shown that aerosol \r emissions from shipping can have a significant effect on air pollution \r and shortwave radiative forcing (Odemark et al. 2012; Peters et al. \r 2012; Dalsoren et  al. 2013; Roiger et  al. 2014; Righi et  al. 2015; \r [...]"


id: aaf995ab6f7525121d9fac08d7a406c5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27305
content:
"A range of vessel mitigation options for the international fleet \r exist and are presented in this section. A variety of feedstocks and \r energy carriers can be considered for shipping. As feedstocks, fuels \r from biomass (advanced biofuels), fuels produced from renewable \r electricity and CO2 capture from flue gas or the air (electro-, e-, or \r power-fuels), and fuels produced via thermochemical processes \r (solar fuels) can be considered. As energy carriers, synthetic fuels \r and the direct use of electricity (stored in batteries) are of relevance. \r The most prominent synthetic fuels discussed in the literature are \r hydrogen, ammonia, methane, methanol, and synthetic hydrocarbon \r diesel. Figure  10.15 shows the emissions reductions potential for \r alternative energy carriers that have been identified as having the \r highest potential to mitigate operational emissions from the sector \r (Chatzinikolaou and Ventikos 2014; Brynolf et al. 2014; Teeter and \r [...]"


id: 8919db88bde4a46ceb66559f58db8d98
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21289
content:
"[...] Cleary 2014; Traut et al. 2014; Lindstad et al. 2015; Psaraftis 2015; \r Seddiek 2015; Tillig et al. 2015; Winkel et al. 2016; DNV GL 2017; \r Bicer and Dincer 2018a; Biernacki et  al. 2018; Bongartz et  al. \r 2018; Gilbert et al. 2018; Hua et al. 2018; ITF 2018b; Singh et al. 2018; \r Balcombe  et  al. 2019; Hansson et  al. 2019; Sharafian et  al. 2019; \r Winebrake et  al. 2019; Czermanski et  al. 2020; Faber et  al. 2020; \r Hansson et al. 2020; Kim et al. 2020; Liu et al. 2020a; Nguyen et al. \r 2020; Percic et al. 2020; Sadeghi et al. 2020; Seithe et al. 2020; Xing \r et al. 2020; Valente et al. 2021; Stolz et al. 2021)."


id: 640a4f290f093966594206e1b34936a0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14888
content:
"In addition to fuels, there are other measures that may aid the \r transition to low-carbon shipping. The amounts and speed of uptake \r of alternative low- or zero-carbon fuels in ports depend upon \r investments in infrastructure  - including bunkering infrastructure, \r refinery readiness, reliable supply of the fuels, as well as sustainable \r production. The ship lifetime and age also play a  role; retrofitting \r ships to accommodate engines and fuel systems for new fuel types \r may not be an option for older vessels. As such, operational efficiency \r becomes more important (Bullock et  al. 2020). There is some \r potential to continue to improve the energy efficiency of vessels \r through operational changes (Traut et al. 2018), reducing the speed \r or 'slow steaming' (Bullock et al. 2020), and improved efficiency in \r port operations (Viktorelius and Lundh 2019; Poulsen and Sampson \r 2020). There is also a growing interest in onboard technologies for \r [...]"


id: c5e1fd8fe54e92dc733f1714fc0f1490
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32123
content:
"[...] capturing carbon, with prototype ships underway showing 65-90% \r potential reduction in CO2 emissions (Luo and Wang 2017; Awoyomi \r et al. 2020; Japan Ship Technology Research Association et al. 2020). \r Challenges identified include CO2 capture efficiency (Zhou and Wang \r 2014), increased operating costs, and limited onboard power supply \r (Fang et  al. 2019). Furthermore, designing CO2 storage tanks for \r transport to shore may pose a challenge, as the volume and weight \r of captured CO2 could be up to four times more than standard oil \r (Decarre et al. 2010)."


id: 31d7ab0735af0eb23a9a76cf89b7bcc5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6020
content:
"As noted in Section 10.3, LNG has been found to have a relatively \r limited mitigation potential and may not be viewed as a low-carbon \r alternative, but has a  higher availability than other fuel options \r (Gilbert et al. 2018). Emissions reductions across the full fuel lifecycle \r are found in the order of 10%, with ranges reported from -30% \r (reduction) to +8% (increase), if switching from heavy fuel oil to LNG, \r as indicated in Figure 10.15 (Bengtsson et al. 2011). Regardless of the \r production pathway, the literature points to the risk of methane slip \r (emissions of unburnt methane especially at low engine loads and \r from transport to ports) from LNG-fuelled vessels, with no current \r regulation on emissions caps (Anderson et al. 2015; Ushakov et al. \r 2019; Peng et al. 2020). Leakage rates are a critical point for the total \r climate impact of LNG as a fuel, where high pressure engines remedy \r this more than low pressure ones. As discussed in Section 10.3, some \r [...]"


id: e163a1b2682d3ed4f238fb6f140b3d3c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36918
content:
"[...] consider LNG as a  transition fuel, while some literature points to \r the risk of stranded assets due to the increasing decarbonisation \r regulation from IMO and the challenge of meeting IMO's 2030 \r emissions reductions targets using this fuel."


id: d5bfe6658fab28a96f5b102fcab564a0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34917
content:
"Changes in design and engineering provide potential for reducing \r emissions from shipping through a range of measures, for example \r by optimising hull design and vessel shape, power and propulsion \r systems that include wind- or solar-assisted propulsion, and through \r improved operations of vessels and ports. Figure 10.15 shows that \r such measures may decrease emissions by 5-40%, though with \r a broad range in potential (Bouman et al. 2017). Nuclear propulsion \r could decrease emissions from individual vessels by 98%. Battery\u0002or hybrid-electric ships have been identified as a means to reduce \r emissions in short-sea shipping such as ferries and inland waterways \r (Gagatsi et  al. 2016), which may also importantly reduce near\u0002shore SLCF pollution (Nguyen et al. 2020). Figure 10.15 shows that \r the median emissions from electric ships can be about 40% lower \r than equivalent fossil-based vessels but can vary widely. The wide \r [...]"


id: e9a0263cd1f36e36f5530943ac419fcb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38454
content:
"[...] reduction potential of battery electric propulsion is due to different \r assumptions about the CO2 intensity of the electricity used and the \r levels of CO2 footprints associated with battery production."


id: 50bd978128ef41022666371cd24a2b5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11479
content:
"In addition to fossil and e-fuels, advanced biofuels might play a role to \r provide the energy demand for future shipping. Biomass is presently \r used to produce alcohol fuels (such as ethanol and methanol), liquid \r biogas, or biodiesel that can be used for shipping and could reduce \r CO2 emissions from this segment. As explained in Box  10.2 and \r Chapter  7, the GHG footprint associated with biofuels is strongly \r dependent on the incurred land use and land-use change emissions. \r Advanced biofuels from processing cellulose rather than sugar are \r likely to be more attractive in terms of the quantities required but \r are not commercially available (Section  10.3). The estimates of \r emissions reductions from biofuels shown in Figure  10.15 rely on \r data from the Integrated Assessment Models  - Energy Modelling \r Forum 33 (IAM EMF33), partial models assuming constant land cover \r (CLC), and partial models using natural growth (NRG). Box 10.2 and \r [...]"


id: 47a3587da90661a2983de2dec3cdb1ee
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9825
content:
"[...] Section 10.4 include a more detailed description of the assumptions \r underlying these models and their estimates. The results based on \r IAM EMF33 and CLC suggests median mitigation potential of around \r 73% for advanced biofuels in shipping, while the NRG-based results \r suggest increased emissions from biofuels. The EMF33 and CLC \r results rely on modelling approaches compatible with the scenarios \r in the AR6 database (Chapter 6 and Box 7.7)."


id: 7bbec843990a7ae3b0fd5cbf7c35865e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18979
content:
"Figure 10.15 | Emissions reductions potential of alternative fuels compared to conventional fuels in the shipping sector. The x-axis is reported in %. Each \r individual marker represents a data point from the literature, where the brown square indicates a full LCA CO2-eq value; light blue triangles tank-to-wake CO2-eq; red triangles \r well-to-wake CO2-eq; yellow triangles well-to-wake CO2; and dark blue circles tank-to-wake CO2 emissions reduction potentials. The values in the Figure rely on the 100-year \r GWP value embedded in the source data, which may differ slightly with the updated 100-year GWP values from WGI. 'n' indicates the number of data points per sub-panel. Grey \r shaded boxes represent data where the energy comes from fossil resources, and blue from low-carbon renewable energy sources. 'Advanced biofuels EMF33' refers to emissions \r [...]"


id: c6e2d28932c7bf377ed4867cd2fcf096
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32304
content:
"[...] factors derived from simulation results from the integrated assessment models EMF33 scenarios (darkest coloured box in top left panel). Biofuels partial models CLC refers to \r partial models with constant land cover. Biofuels partial models NRG refers to partial models with natural regrowth. For ammonia and hydrogen, low-carbon fuel is produced \r via electrolysis using low-carbon electricity, and 'fossil' refers to fuels produced via steam methane reforming of natural gas."


id: 19f98e9f3662f6d0b18c2ea97c0eef59
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1770
content:
"The coming decade is projected to be costly for the shipping sector, \r as it is preparing to meet the 2030 and 2050 emissions reduction \r targets set by the IMO (UNCTAD 2018). With enough investments, \r incentives, and regulation, substantial reductions of CO2 emissions \r from shipping could be achieved through alternative energy carriers. \r The literature suggests that their cost could be manyfold higher \r than for conventional fuels, which in itself could reduce demand \r for shipping, and hence its emissions, but could make the transition \r difficult. R&D may help reduce these costs. The literature points to the \r need for developing technology roadmaps for enabling the maritime \r transport sector to get on to pathways for decarbonisation early \r enough to reach global goals (Kuramochi et  al. 2018). Accounting \r for the full lifecycle emissions of the vessels and the fuels is required \r to meet the overall long-term objectives of cutting GHG and SLCF \r [...]"


id: a4f786e5527125ed1f61fb0f6241d741
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26245
content:
"[...] emissions. The urgency of implementing measures for reducing \r emissions is considered to be high, considering the lifetime of vessels \r is typically 20 years, if not more."


id: 1293347e9b3c18a743dca50b158a7b30
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 469
content:
"In 2020, the IMO approved the short-term goal-based measure \r to reduce the carbon intensity of existing international vessels. \r This  measure addresses both technical and operational strategies. \r The operational element is represented by a  Carbon Intensity \r Indicator (CII), and the technical element is represented by the Energy \r Efficiency Existing Ship Index (EEXI), which will apply to ships from \r 2023. The EEXI builds upon the Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI), \r which is a legally-binding mitigation regulation for newbuild ships, \r established as a series of baselines for the amount of fuel ships may \r burn for a particular cargo-carrying capacity. The EEDI differs per ship \r segment. For example, ships built in 2022 and beyond should be \r 50% more energy efficient than those built in 2013. This legislation \r aims to reduce GHG emissions in particular. Energy efficiency may \r be improved by several of the mitigation options outlined above. \r [...]"


id: e755d691948d33c5b5e773767c3b22ec
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37991
content:
"[...] The Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP) is seen as the \r international governance instrument to improve energy efficiency and \r hence emissions from ships. SEEMP is a measure to enable changes \r to operational measures and retrofits (see Johnson et al. 2013). The \r combination of EEXI, EEDI, and SEEMP may reduce emissions by \r 23% by 2030 compared to a 'no policy' scenario (Sims et al. 2014). \r With regards to accountability, it is mandatory for ships greater than \r or equal to 5000 gross tonnage to collect fuel consumption data, \r as well as specified data. Such as for transport work. Similarly, \r the EU Monitoring, Reporting and Verification Regulation requires \r mandatory reporting of a vessel's fuel consumption when operating \r in European waters."


id: 2600e5a6f8a0061c54e8a49c3f134c81
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3863
content:
"the 21st century after a high overshoot. By 2080, median values for \r the same set of scenarios reach net zero CO2 emissions. IAMs often \r do not report emissions pathways for shipping transport and the \r sector is underrepresented in most IAMs (Esmeijer et al. 2020). Hence \r pathways established outside IAMs can be different for the sector. \r Indeed, the IMO projections for growth in transport demand (Faber \r et al. 2020) indicate increases of 40-100% by 2050 for the global \r fleet. Faber and et al. (2020), at the same time predict reductions in \r trade for fossil fuels dependent on decarbonisation trajectories. The \r energy efficiency improvements of the vessels in these scenarios are \r typically of 20-30%. This offsets some of the increases from higher \r demand in the future scenarios. Fuels assessed by the Fourth IMO \r GHG study were limited to heavy fuel oil, marine gasoil, LNG, and \r methanol, with a fuels mix ranging from 91-98% conventional fuel \r [...]"


id: 7a1de021c7fe4b5b4f9607e3607f368a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18684
content:
"[...] use and a small remainder of alternative fuels (primarily LNG and \r some methanol). Panel (b) shows average fleetwide emissions of CO2\r based on these aggregate growth and emissions trajectories from \r the IMO scenarios. In these scenarios, CO2 emissions from shipping \r remain stable or grow compared to 2020 modelled levels. These \r results contrast with the low emissions trajectories in the C1-C2 bin \r in panel (a). It seems evident that the scenarios in the AR6 database \r explore a  broader solutions space for the sector than the Fourth \r GHG study by the IMO. However, the 1.5degC-2degC warming goal has \r led to an IMO 2050 target of 40% reduction in carbon intensity \r by 2030, which would require emissions reduction efforts to begin \r immediately. Results from global models suggest the solutions space \r for deep emissions reductions in shipping is available."


id: 48742ebf022b84756c338d263d1222c0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9956
content:
"In 2018, transport emitted 8.5 GtCO2-eq, reaching a near doubling \r from 1990 levels after two decades of 2% per year emissions growth \r (Section 10.1). Assessing future trajectories, Figure 10.17 provides an \r overview of direct CO2 emissions estimates from the transport sector \r across IAMs (colour bars) and selected global transport models (grey \r bars). The results from the IAMs are grouped in bins by temperature \r goal. Global transport energy models are grouped into reference and \r policy bins, since the transport sector cannot by itself achieve fixed \r global temperature goals. The policy scenarios in GTEMs and NTEMs \r cover a wide range of 'non-reference' scenarios, which include, for \r example, assumptions based on the 'fair share action' principles. In \r these scenarios, transport emissions reach reductions consistent with \r the overall emissions trajectories aligning with warming levels of 2degC. \r These scenarios may also consider strengthening existing transport \r [...]"


id: 42b6ea748d64c773d2a87e256ef03fd2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8933
content:
"[...] policies, such as increasing fuel economy standards or large-scale \r deployments of electric vehicles. In most cases, these Policy scenarios \r are not necessarily in line with the temperature goals explored by \r the IAMs."


id: 861cc54bf66eb66be3ddd7e0697875e2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20744
content:
"IAMs integrate factors from other sectors that interact with the \r transport system endogenously, such as fuel availability and costs. \r IAMs minimise mitigation costs to achieve a  temperature goal \r across all sectors of the economy over a long time horizon (typically \r to 2100). IAMs typically capture mitigation options for energy \r and carbon intensity changes with greater technology/fuel details and \r endogeneity linked to the other sectors. In the scenarios with very \r large-scale electrification of the transport sector, the coupling with the \r other sectors in fuel production, storage, and utilisation becomes more \r important. G-/NTEMs and related regional transport sectoral models \r have more details on transport demand, technology, behaviours, and \r policies than IAMs, but treat the interactions with the other sectors \r exogenously, potentially missing some critical interactions, such as \r the fuel prices and carbon intensity of electricity. National models \r [...]"


id: a089a6b4f5078bb81e91a78f4a91c12d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25453
content:
"[...] have detailed representation of national policies related to transport \r and energy, sometimes with greater spatial resolution. Compared \r with IAMs, G-/NTEMs typically have greater detailed representation \r to explore mitigation options along the activity and mode dimensions \r where spatial, cultural, and behavioural details can be more explicitly \r represented. Section 5 in Annex III provides more details about these \r types of models. Scenarios for shipping and aviation are handled in \r more detail in sections 10.5 and 10.6, respectively."


id: a49c76091af17da6dcf96cb4084395e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26176
content:
"According to the collection of simulations from the IAM and GTEM \r models shown in Figure 10.17, global transport emissions could grow \r up to 2-47% (5-95th percentile) by 2030 and -6-130% by 2050 \r under the C7 scenarios that limit warming to 4degC (>50%) throughout \r the 21st century and C8 scenarios that exceed 4degC (>=50%) during the \r 21st century. Population and GDP growth and the secondary effects, \r including higher travel service demand per  capita and increased \r freight activities per  GDP, drive the growth in emissions in these \r scenarios (Section 10.7.3). Though transport efficiencies (energy use \r per pkm travelled and per tkm of goods delivered) are expected to \r continue to improve in line with the historical trends (Section 10.7.4), \r total transport emissions would grow due to roughly constant carbon \r intensity (Section 10.7.5) under the C7 and C8 scenarios that limit \r warming to 4degC (>50%) throughout the 21st  century or exceed \r [...]"


id: 1dc2919858bf302ca90db7fea194978d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2420
content:
"[...] 4degC (>=50%) during the 21st century. In these scenarios, Significant \r increases in emissions (>150% for the medium values by 2050) would \r come from Asia and Pacific, the Middle East, and Africa. Compared \r to estimated 2020 levels, in 2050 Developed Countries would have \r median 25% decrease in transport emissions in the C7 scenarios that \r limit warming to 4degC (>50%) throughout the 21st century or median \r 15% increase in transport emissions in the C8 scenarios that exceed \r warming of 4degC (>=50%) during the 21st century."


id: 9313d798a85cbcf124b41bc87e71461c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23083
content:
"studies have generally used bottom-up models (see Annex III) for the \r analysis, but in some cases, they are run by national teams using \r global models (e.g., the Global Change Assessment Model (GCAM) \r for China and India). National studies show that transport CO2\r emissions could decline significantly in low-carbon scenarios in all \r the developed countries reviewed (Bataille et  al. 2015; Kainuma \r et al. 2015; Hillebrandt et al. 2015; Mathy et al. 2015; Pye et al. 2015; \r Virdis et al. 2015; Williams et al. 2015; Zhang et al. 2016a) in 2050 \r from the emissions in 2010 and reductions could vary from 65% to \r 95%. However, in developing countries reviewed (Di Sbroiavacca \r et al. 2014; Altieri et al. 2015; Buira and Tovilla 2015; Rovere et al. \r 2015; Shukla et al. 2015; Siagian et al. 2015; Teng et al. 2015; Dhar \r et al. 2018), emissions could increase in 2050 in the range of 35% \r to 83% relative to 2010 levels. Transport CO2 emissions per capita \r [...]"


id: 299b45acd0bb3fc9fbf1e9249f7e493e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4546
content:
"[...] in the developing countries were much lower in 2010 (varying \r from 0.15 to 1.39 tCO2 per capita) relative to developed countries \r (varying from 1.76 to 5.95 tCO2 per capita). However, results from \r national modelling efforts suggest that, by 2050, the CO2 emissions \r per capita in developed countries (varying from 0.19 to 1.04 tCO2\r per  capita) could be much lower than in developing countries \r (varying from 0.21 to 1.7 tCO2 per capita)."


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vector_id: 30896
content:
"To meet temperature goals, by 2050 global transport emissions \r would need to decrease by 17% (+67% to -23% for the 5-95th \r percentile) below 2020Mod levels in the scenarios that limit warming \r to 2degC (>67%), 2degC (>50%) and 2.5 degC (>50%) throughout the \r 21st century (C3-C5 scenarios - orange bars), and 47% (14-80% for \r the 5-95th percentile) in the scenarios that limit warming to 1.5degC \r (>50%) during the 21st  century with no or limited overshoot or \r return to 1.5degC (>50%) during the 21st century after high overshoot \r during the 21st  century (C1-C2 scenarios  - green bars). However, \r transport-related emission reductions may not happen uniformly \r across regions. For example, transport emissions from the Developed \r Countries and Eastern Europe and West Central Asia would decrease \r from 2020 levels by 2050 across all C1-C2 scenarios, but could \r increase in Africa, Asia and Pacific, Latin America and Caribbean, and \r [...]"


id: 80e19fe4eaf8fb5a5d269735935db1b1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19812
content:
"[...] the Middle East, in some of these scenarios. In particular, the median \r transport emissions in India and Africa could increase by 2050 in C1-\r C2 scenarios, while the 95th percentile emissions in Asia and Pacific, \r Latin America and Caribbean, and the Middle East, could be higher \r in 2050 than in 2020."


id: 77767b72fe87a7d256f8a9141e5ee6cc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18222
content:
"The Reference scenario emission pathways from GTEMs described in \r Figure 10.17 have similar ranges to C7-C8 scenario groups in 2050. \r The Policy scenarios are roughly in line with C6-C7 scenarios for \r the world region. The results suggest that the majority of the Policy \r scenarios examined by the GTEMS reviewed here are in the range of \r the C3-C6 scenarios examined by the IAMs (Gota et al. 2016; IEA \r 2017b; Yeh et al. 2017; Fisch-Romito and Guivarch 2019). The NDCs \r in the transport sector include a mix of measures targeting efficiency \r improvements of vehicles and trucks; improving public transit \r services; decarbonising fuels with alternative fuels and technologies \r including biofuels, fossil- or bio-based natural gas, and electrification; \r intelligent transport systems; and vehicle restrictions (Gota et  al. \r 2016). Because of the long lag-time for technology turnover, these \r measures are not expected to change 2030 emissions significantly. \r [...]"


id: bb62d6950f6589542997b7f8ba6b5475
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30184
content:
"The transport scenario literature's mean outcomes suggest that \r the transport sector may take a  less steep emissions reduction \r trajectory than the cross-sectoral average and still be consistent \r with the 2degC goal. For example, most of the scenarios that limit or \r return warming to 1.5degC (>50%) during the 21st century (C1-C2) \r reach zero emissions by 2060, whereas transport sector emissions \r are estimated in the range of 20% of the 2020Mod level (4-65% \r for the 10th to 90th percentiles) by 2100. This finding is in line with \r perspectives in the literature suggesting that transport is one of the \r most difficult sectors to decarbonise (Davis et  al. 2018). There is, \r however, quite a spread in the results for 2050. Since temperature \r warming levels relate to global emissions from all sectors, modelling \r results from IAMs tend to suggest that in the short and medium term, \r there might be lower cost mitigation options outside the transport \r [...]"


id: 8349d720f010bc8c510da00a0dcbbbb6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20224
content:
"[...] sector. On the other hand, compared with GTEMs/NTEMs, some IAMs \r may have limited mitigation options available, including technology, \r behavioural changes, and policy tools especially for aviation and \r shipping. The models therefore rely on other sectors and/or negative \r emissions elsewhere to achieve the overall desired warming levels. \r This potential shortcoming should be kept in mind when interpreting \r the sectoral results from IAMs."


id: eb37d148abc4b6cfbbd107dba86565b0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38738
content:
"GTEMs show broad ranges for future travel demand, particularly for \r the freight sector. These results show more dependency on models \r than on baseline or policy scenarios. According to ITF Transport \r Outlook (ITF 2019), global passenger transport and freight demand \r could more than double by 2050 in a  business-as-usual scenario. \r Mulholland et  al. (2018) suggest the freight sector could grow \r 2.4-fold over 2015-2050 in the reference scenario, with the majority \r of growth attributable to developing countries. The IEA suggests \r a more modest increase in passenger transport, from 51 trillion pkm \r in 2014 to 110 trillion pkm in 2060, in a reference scenario without \r climate policies and a climate scenario that would limit emissions \r below 2degC. The demand for land-based freight transport in 2060 \r is, however, slightly lower in the climate scenario (116 trillion tkm) \r compared to the reference scenario (130 trillion tkm) (IEA 2017b). \r [...]"


id: 55b9eb0833dcfc125083e03f77e6e1f1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12353
content:
"[...] The ITF, however, suggests that ambitious decarbonisation policies \r could reduce global demand for passenger transport by 13-20% \r in 2050, compared to the business-as-usual scenario (ITF 2019; ITF \r 2021). The reduction in vehicle travel through shared mobility could \r reduce emissions from urban passenger transport by 30% compared \r to the business-as-usual scenario. Others suggest that reductions \r larger than 25%, on average, for both passenger and freight in 2030 \r and 2050 may be needed to achieve very low carbon emissions \r pathways (Fisch-Romito and Guivarch 2019). In the absence of large\u0002scale carbon dioxide removal, few global studies highlight the need \r for significant demand reduction in critical sectors (aviation, shipping \r and road freight) in well below 2degC scenarios (van Vuuren et al. 2018; \r Grant et al. 2021; Sharmina et al. 2021)."


id: 8b34b63f7bd8dd69fb1571c8425f5a90
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21654
content:
"Figure  10.18 shows activity trajectories for both freight and \r passenger transport based on the AR6 database for IAMs. According \r to demand projections from the IAMs, global passenger and freight \r transport demand could increase relative to a modelled year 2020 \r across temperature goals. The median transport demand from IAMs \r for all the scenarios in line with warming levels below 2.5degC (C1-C5) \r suggests that global passenger transport demand could grow by \r 1.14-1.3 times in 2030 and by 1.5-1.8 times in 2050 (1.27-2.33 for \r the 5-95th percentile across C1-C5 scenarios) relative to modelled \r 2020 level. Developed regions including North America and Europe \r exhibit lower growth in passenger demand in 2050 compared to \r developing countries across all the scenarios. In 2030, most of the \r global passenger demand growth happens in Africa (44% growth \r relative to 2020), and Asia and Pacific (57% growth in China and 59% \r [...]"


id: 59e684309581c4f94896ae0c24836760
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13064
content:
"[...] growth in India relative to 2020) in the scenarios that limit warming \r below 2.5degC (>50%) throughout the 21st century (C5). These regions \r start from a low level of per capita demand. For example, in India, \r demand may grow by 84%. However, the per capita demand in 2010 \r was under 7000  km per  person per  year (Dhar and Shukla 2015). \r Similarly, in China, demand may grow by 52%, starting from per capita \r demand of 8000 km per person per year in 2010 (Pan et al. 2018). \r The per capita passenger demand in these regions was lower than in \r developed countries in 2010, but it converges towards the per capita \r passenger transport demand of advanced economies in less stringent \r climate scenarios (C6-C7). Demand for passenger travel would grow \r at a  slower rate in the stricter temperature stabilisation scenarios \r (<2.5degC and 1.5degC scenarios, C1-C5) compared to the scenarios \r with higher warming levels (C7-C8). The median global passenger \r [...]"


id: 1741019dcc960c8148bb0f03e6d4aa6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1312
content:
"[...] demand in the scenarios that limit or return warming to 1.5degC during \r the 21st century (C1-C2) is 27% lower in 2050 relative to C8."


id: 88ac40d4ec563e2f01d779540ffa07ee
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21207
content:
"Due to limited data availability, globally consistent freight data is \r difficult to obtain. In 2015, global freight demand was estimated to \r be 108 trillion tkm, most of which was transported by sea (ITF 2019). \r The growth rates of freight service demand vary dramatically among \r different regions: over the 1975-2015 period, road freight activity \r in India increased more than 9-fold, 30-fold in China, and 2.5-fold \r in the US (Mulholland et al. 2018). Global freight demand continues \r to grow but at a slower rate compared to passenger demand across \r all the scenarios in 2050 compared to modelled 2020 values. Global \r median freight demand could increase by 1.17-1.28 times in 2030 \r and 1.18-1.7 times in 2050 in all the scenarios with warming below \r 2.5degC (C1-C5). Like passenger transport, the models suggest that \r a  large share of growth occurs in Africa and Asian regions (59% \r growth in India and 50% growth in China in 2030 relative to \r [...]"


id: 99fe60bc0f8d3205da7d63dcf9937b64
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24329
content:
"[...] a modelled year 2020) in the C5 scenarios that limit warming below \r 2.5degC (>50%) throughout the 21st  century. Global median freight \r demand grows more slowly in the stringent temperature stabilisation \r scenarios, and is 40% and 22% lower in 2050 in the scenarios that "


id: 56dd9ec138420bfa90c7fea679b1e912
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12532
content:
"road passenger transport, scenarios that limit or return warming \r to 1.5degC during the 21st  century (C1-C2) have a  smaller increase \r from modelled 2020 levels (median increase of 2.4 times modelled \r 2020 levels) than do scenarios with higher warming levels (C3-C8) \r (median increase of 2.7-2.8 times modelled 2020 levels). There are \r similar patterns for passenger road transport via light-duty vehicle, \r for which median increases from modelled 2020 levels are smaller \r for C1-C2 (3 times larger) than for C3-C5 (3.1 times larger) or C6-C7 \r (3.2 times larger). Passenger transport via aviation exhibits a  2.2 \r times median increase relative to modelled 2020 levels under C1-C2 \r and C3-C5 scenarios but exhibits a 6.2 times increase under C6-C8. \r The only passenger travel mode that exhibits a decline in its median \r value through 2100 according to IAMs is walking/bicycling, in C3-\r C5 and C6-C8 scenarios. However, in C1-C2 scenarios, walking/\r [...]"


id: 8fceae769476faa9180eaa2ab809c18
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22507
content:
"[...] bicycling increases by 1.4 times relative to modelled 2020 levels. \r At the 5th percentile of IAM solutions (lower edge of bands in \r Figure 10.19), buses and walking/bicycling for passenger travel both \r exhibit significant declines."


id: 94b27debfc1e7d066402f0d5c27cbca1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23366
content:
"For freight, Figure  10.19 shows that the largest growth occurs in \r transport via road (Mulholland et al. 2018). By 2100, global transport \r models suggest a  roughly four-fold increase in median-heavy-duty \r trucking levels relative to modelled 2020 levels, while IAMs suggest \r a  two- to four-fold increase in freight transport by road by 2100. \r Notably, the 95th percentile of IAM solutions see road transport \r by up to 4.7 times through 2100 relative to modelled 2020 levels, \r regardless of warming level. Other freight transport modes - aviation, \r international shipping, navigation, and railways - exhibit less growth \r than road transport. In scenarios that limit or return warming to \r 1.5degC (>50%) during the 21st  century (C1-C2), navigation and \r rail transport remain largely unchanged and international shipping \r roughly doubles by 2100. Scenarios with higher warming (i.e., moving \r from C1-C2 to C6-C8) generally lead to more freight by rail and less \r [...]"


id: 34252dbcb88bf523c7f47226841a23ef
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6412
content:
"Globally over the last century, shares of faster transport modes have \r generally increased with increasing passenger travel demand (Schafer \r 2017; Schafer and Victor 2000). For short- to medium-distance travel, \r private cars have displaced public transit, particularly in OECD \r countries, due to a variety of factors, including faster travel times in \r many circumstances (Liao et al. 2020); consumers increasingly valuing \r time and convenience with GDP growth; and broader transport \r policies, such as provision of road versus public transit infrastructure \r (Mattioli et al. 2020). For long-distance travel, travel via aviation for \r leisure and business has increased (Lee et al. 2021). These trends do \r not hold in all countries and cities, as many now have rail transit \r that is faster than driving (Newman et  al. 2015). For instance, \r public transport demand rose from 1990 through to 2016 in France, \r Denmark, and Finland (eurostat 2019). In general, smaller and denser \r [...]"


id: 53d88b52f91acb2800093b0b87fc23f2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12022
content:
"[...] countries and cities with higher or increasing urbanisation rates tend \r to have greater success in increasing public transport share. However, \r other factors, like privatisation of public transit (Bayliss and Mattioli \r 2018) and urban form (ITF 2021), also play a role. Different transport \r modes can provide passenger and freight services, affecting the \r emissions trajectories for the sector."


id: 5bd12c941b5640a41377363b1b7e64c1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13413
content:
"Relative to global trajectories, upper-income regions  - including \r North America, Europe, and the Pacific OECD  - generally see less \r growth in passenger road via light-duty vehicle and passenger \r aviation, given more saturated demand for both. Other regions like \r China exhibit similar modal trends as the global average, whereas \r regions such as the African continent and Indian subcontinent exhibit \r significantly larger shifts, proportionally, in modal transport than the \r globe. In particular, the African continent represents the starkest \r departure from global results. Freight and passenger transport modes \r exhibit significantly greater growth across Africa than globally in all \r available scenarios. Across Africa, median freight and passenger \r transport via road from IAMs increases by 5 to 16 times and 4 to \r 28 times, respectively, across warming levels by 2100 relative \r to modelled 2020 levels. Even C1 has considerable growth in Africa \r [...]"


id: 581b86b98e4043f1072f19c542d3090f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12758
content:
"[...] via both modes (3 to 16 times increase for freight and 4 to 29 times \r increase for passenger travel at 5th and 95th percentiles of IAM \r solutions by 2100)."


id: 58b04e5de0be9fd433aad13c8429af7e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12845
content:
"The scenarios in line with warming levels of 1.5degC or 2degC goals \r (C1 to C4) show different trends for freight's energy intensity. The \r amount of overshoot and differences in demand for freight services \r and, to some extent, fuel carbon intensities contribute to these \r differences. For the two scenarios aligning with the warming levels \r of 1.5degC, the trajectories in 2030 and 2050 are quite different. The \r median C2 scenario that returns warming to 1.5degC (>50%) during \r the 21st century after high overshoot takes a trajectory with lower \r energy intensity improvements in the first half of the century. In \r contrast, the C1 scenario that limits warming to 1.5degC (>50%) during \r the 21st century with no or limited overshoot take on a more steadily \r declining trajectory across the means. The IAMs provide a less clear \r picture of required energy intensity improvements for freight than \r for passenger transport associated with different temperature \r [...]"


id: ec6df26f6fb25fb61cfba98360c2bd09
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38955
content:
"[...] targets. As for the carbon intensity of direct energy used across \r both passenger and freight, the modelling scenarios suggest very \r moderate reductions by 2030. The interquartile ranges for the C1 \r scenarios suggest global average reductions in carbon intensity of \r 5-10%. Across the other scenarios compatible with warming levels \r of 1.5degC or 2degC (C2-C4), the interquartile ranges span from 1-6% \r reductions in carbon intensity of direct energy used for transport. For \r 2050, the scenarios suggest that dependence on fuel decarbonisation \r increases with more stringent temperature targets. For the scenarios \r that limits warming to 1.5degC (>50%) during the 21st century with no \r or limited overshoot (C1), global carbon intensity of energy used for \r transport decreases by 37-60% (interquartile range) by 2050 with \r a mean of 50% reduction. The IAM scenarios in the AR6 database \r do not suggest full decarbonisation of transport fuels by 2100. The \r [...]"


id: 5eff3bfb919f57c445209008b50f52f6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14011
content:
"[...] interquartile ranges across the C1-C4 set of scenarios, compatible \r with warming levels of 2degC and less, span from 61-91% reduction \r from 2020Mod levels."


id: 302210db667f8649038cd2285240580b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5730
content:
"travel (Creutzig et al. 2018; Grubler et al. 2018; Wilson et al. 2019), \r improved logistics efficiency, green logistics, and streamlined supply \r chains for the freight sector (Mulholland et  al. 2018). NDCs often \r prioritise options like bus improvements and enhanced mobility that \r yield pollution, congestion, and urban development co-benefits, \r especially in medium- and lower-income countries (Fulton et  al. \r 2017). Conversely, high-income countries, most of which have \r saturated and entrenched private vehicle ownership, typically focus \r more on technology options, such as electrification and fuel efficiency \r standards (Gota et al. 2016). Available IAM and regional models are \r limited in their ability to represent modal shift strategies. As a result, \r mode shifts alone do not differentiate climate scenarios. While this \r lack of representation is a limitation of the models, it is unlikely that \r such interventions would completely negate the increases in demand \r [...]"


id: cc8b23acaac165d64d1e257fa6d38af5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33308
content:
"[...] the models suggest. Therefore, transport via light-duty vehicle and \r aviation, freight transport via road, and other modes will likely \r continue to increase through to the end of the century. Consequently, \r fuel and carbon efficiency and fuel energy and technology will \r probably play crucial roles in differentiating climate scenarios, as \r discussed in the following sub-sections."


id: 84057b78447c1dd182d744ba969cb62b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20379
content:
"This section explores what vehicle energy efficiencies and fuel \r carbon intensity trajectories, from the data available in the AR6 \r database from IAMs and GTEMs, could be compatible with different \r temperature goals. Figure 10.20 shows passenger and freight energy \r intensity, and fuel carbon intensity, indexed relative to 2020Mod \r values. The top panel shows passenger energy intensity across all \r modes. LDVs constitute a  major share of this segment. Yeh et  al. \r (2017) report 2.5-2.75 MJ vkm-1 in 2020 across models for the LDV \r segment, which is very close to the IEA estimate of 2.5 MJ vkm-1 for \r the global average fuel consumption for LDVs in 2017 (IEA 2020d). \r For reference, these numbers correspond to 1.6-1.7  MJ  pkm-1 for \r an occupancy rate of 1.5. The following results of the AR6 database \r are conditional on the corresponding reductions in fuel carbon \r intensity. Figure  10.20 shows that the scenarios suggest that \r [...]"


id: 5ee0c0fd069c251bb3d456482217eae3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13988
content:
"[...] passenger transport's energy intensity drops to between 10-23% \r (interquartile ranges across C1-C4) in 2030 for scenarios in line with \r warming levels below 2degC. In 2050, the medians across the group \r of scenarios that limit or return warming to 1.5degC (>50%) during \r the 21st century (C1-C2), and scenarios that limit warming to 2degC\r (>67% or >50%) throughout the 2st century (C3-C4) suggest energy \r intensity reductions of 51% and 45-46% respectively. These values \r correspond to annual average energy efficiency improvement rates \r of 2.3-2.4% and 2.0-2.1%, respectively, from 2020 to 2050. For \r reference, the IEA reports an annual energy efficiency improvement \r rate of 1.85% per  year in 2005-16 (IEA 2020d). In contrast, the \r results from GTEMs suggest lower energy efficiency improvement, \r with median values for policy scenarios of 39% reduction in 2050, \r corresponding to annual energy efficiency improvement rates close to \r [...]"


id: a0c1daf1ebf59b25e768e927a146919b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25489
content:
"[...] 1.6%. The IAM scenarios suggest median energy intensity reductions \r of passenger transport of 57-61% by the end of the century would \r align with warming levels of both 1.5degC and 2degC (C1-C4) given the \r corresponding decarbonisation of the fuels."


id: 27477bbcd1a8451448f7699a186e607c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4081
content:
"considerable climate benefits. Their scenarios reach nearly 100% \r electrification of LDVs globally, leading to global GHG emissions from \r LDVs ranging from 0% to 50% of 2010 levels in 2050 (Lutsey 2015). \r Khalili et  al.(2019) estimate transport stocks through 2050 under \r aggressive climate mitigation scenarios that nearly eliminate road \r transport emissions. They find the demand for passenger transport \r could triple through 2050, but emissions targets could be met \r through widespread adoption of BEVs (80% of LDVs) and, to a lesser \r extent, fuel cell and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles. Contrary to these \r estimates, the US Energy Information Administration finds small \r adoption of electrification for LDVs and instead identifies diffusion of \r natural gas-fuelled LDVs in OECD and, to a greater extent, non-OECD \r countries through 2040. This trend occurs in a reference and a 'low \r liquids' case, which lowers LDV ownership growth rates and increases \r [...]"


id: f2794699f4c11f72c37cc2b5920f3df9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40052
content:
"[...] preferences for alternative fuel vehicles. A comprehensive overview \r of regional technology adoption models across many methodological \r approaches can be found in Jochem et al. (2018)."


id: e135a68ae9bbccebc420636502ec9e99
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36891
content:
"IAM and GTEM scenarios indicate that fuel and technology shifts \r are crucial to reduce carbon emissions to achieve lower levels of \r warming (Edelenbosch et al. 2017; IEA 2017b). Across the transport \r sector, a  technology shift towards advanced fuel vehicles is the \r dominant driver of decarbonisation in model projections. This trend is \r consistent across climate scenarios, with larger decreases in the final \r energy share of oil in scenarios that achieve progressively lower levels \r of warming. Due to efficiency improvements, the higher efficiency \r of advanced fuel vehicles, and slower progress in the freight sector, \r the final energy share of oil decreases more rapidly after 2030. By \r 2050, the final energy shares of electricity, biofuels, and alternative \r gaseous fuels increase, with shares from electricity generally about \r twice as high (median values from 10-30% across warming levels) \r as the shares from biofuels and gases (median values from 5-10%). \r [...]"


id: 804c2db6009f2749e7a0bb61b28a30f8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19703
content:
"[...] While IAMs suggest that the final energy share of hydrogen will \r remain low in 2050, by 2100 the median projections include 5-10% \r hydrogen in transport final energy."


id: ff837d3cc74783c4d3a5632af17c02d4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42355
content:
"In freight transport, studies indicate a  shift toward alternative \r fuels would need to be supplemented by efficiency improvements. \r The IEA suggests efficiency improvements would be essential for \r decarbonisation of trucks, aviation, and shipping in the short-to\u0002medium term. At the same time, the IEA suggests that fuel switching \r to advanced biofuels would be needed to decarbonise freight in \r the long term (IEA 2019d). Mulholland et  al. (2018) investigated \r the impacts of decarbonising road freight in two scenarios: countries \r complying with COP21 pledges and a  second more ambitious \r reduction scenario in line with limiting global temperature rise to \r 1.75degC. Despite the deployment of logistics improvements, high\u0002efficiency technologies, and low-carbon fuels, activity growth leads \r to a 47% increase in energy demand for road freight while overall \r GHG emissions from freight increase by 55% (4.8 GtCO2-eq) in 2050 \r [...]"


id: d030cc575e2e3cc47f15854a4660b048
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33988
content:
"[...] (relative to 2015) in the COP21 scenario. In the 1.75degC scenario, \r decarbonisation happens primarily through a  switch to alternative \r fuels (hybrid electric and full battery electric trucks), which leads \r to a 60% reduction in GHG emissions from freight in 2050 relative \r to 2015. Khalili et al. (2019) also find substantial shifts to alternative \r fuels in HDVs under aggressive climate mitigation scenarios. Battery \r electric, hydrogen fuel cell, and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles \r constitute 50%, 30%, and 15% of heavy-duty vehicles respectively \r in 2050. They also find 90% of buses would be electrified by 2050."


id: 1a2b1a8dfb2d2c73c6c1ca9109f12d3a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1795
content:
"the COVID-19 pandemic. For the low demand scenarios IMP-LD and renewables pathway IMP-Ren, CO2 emissions from the transport \r sector decreases to 10% and 20% of modelled 2020 levels by 2050 respectively. In contrast, the IMP-SP has a steady decline of \r transport sector CO2 emissions over the century. By 2050, this scenario has a 50% reduction in emissions compared to modelled 2020 \r levels. Panels (b), (c) and (d) show energy by different fuels for the three selected IMPs. The IMP-SP yields a drop in energy for transport \r of about 40% by the end of the century. CO2 emissions reductions are obtained through a phase-out of fossil fuels with electricity and \r biofuels, complemented by a minor share of hydrogen, by the end of the century. In IMP-Ren, the fuel energy demand at the end of \r the century is on a par with the 2020 levels, but the fuel mix has shifted towards a larger share of electricity complimented by biofuels \r [...]"


id: c4b60a45edd5fe394f85c0c047394d34
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31917
content:
"[...] and a minor share of hydrogen. For the IMP-LD scenario, the overall fuel demand decreases by 45% compared to 2020 levels by the \r end of the century. Oil is largely phased out by mid century, with electricity and hydrogen becoming the major fuels in the second half \r of the century. Across the three IMPs, electricity plays a major role, in combination with biofuels, hydrogen, or both."


id: cbe03ce08b6d60b6e1975943a6301822
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33193
content:
"Transport is becoming a major focus for mitigation as its GHG emissions \r are large and growing faster than those of other sectors, especially in \r aviation and shipping. The scenarios literature suggests that without \r mitigation actions, transport emissions could grow by up to 65% by \r 2050. Alternatively, successful deployment of mitigation strategies \r could reduce sectoral emissions by 68%, which would be consistent \r with the goal of limiting temperature change to 1.5degC above pre\u0002industrial levels. This chapter has reviewed the literature on all aspects \r of transport and has featured three special points of focus: (i) a survey of \r lifecycle analysis from the academic and industry community that uses \r these tools; (ii) surveying the modelling community for top-down and \r bottom-up approaches to identify decarbonisation pathways for the \r transport sector, and (iii) for the first time in the IPCC, separate sections \r [...]"


id: dc509c2e698d96e587802ea89c31b96
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36034
content:
"[...] on shipping and aviation. The analysis of the literature suggests three \r crucial components for the decarbonisation of the transport sector: \r demand and efficiency strategies, electromobility, and alternative fuels \r for shipping and aviation."


id: 32bb459c2e8d0d3457a1d50cf5fdfb7f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6191
content:
"The scenario literature suggests that serious attempts at carbon \r mitigation in the transport sector must examine the uptake of \r alternative fuels. The scenarios described in the IAMs and GTEMs \r literature decarbonise through a  combination of fuels. Across the \r scenarios, electrification plays a key role, complemented by biofuels \r and hydrogen. In general terms, electrification tends to play the key \r role in passenger transport while biofuels and hydrogen are more \r prominent in the freight segment. The three illustrative mitigation \r pathways described in Box  10.4 exemplify different ways these \r technologies may be combined and still be compatible with warming \r levels of 1.5degC with low or no overshoot. Shifts towards alternative \r fuels must occur alongside shifts towards clean technologies \r in other sectors, as all alternative fuels have upstream impacts. \r Without considering other sectors, fuel shifts would not yield their \r [...]"


id: ac150e55d9b45259c2441eae29c84612
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27513
content:
"[...] full mitigation potentials. These collective efforts are particularly \r important for the electrification of transport, as the transformative \r mitigation potential is strongly dependent on the decarbonisation of \r the power sector. In this regard, the scenario literature is well aligned \r with the LCA literature reviewed in Section 10.4."


id: 2631c8108e4eb89bf83c65a2bfbe7244
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3887
content:
"The challenge of decarbonisation requires a  transition of the \r socio-technical system, which depends on the combination of \r technological innovation and societal change (Geels et  al. 2017). \r A socio-technical system includes technology, regulation, user \r practices and markets, cultural meaning, infrastructure, maintenance \r networks, and supply networks (Geels 2005) (Cross Chapter Box 12 \r in Chapter 16). The multi-level perspective (MLP) is a framework that \r provides insights to assist policymakers when devising transformative \r transition policies (Rip and Kemp 1998; Geels 2002). Under the MLP \r framework, strategies are grouped into three different categories. \r The Micro level (niche) category includes strategies where innovation \r differs radically to that of the incumbent socio-technical system. \r The niche provides technological innovations a  protected space \r during development and usually requires considerable R&D and \r [...]"


id: 29d37d40e9fc0d325b37dbf015ef1d6c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4585
content:
"[...] demonstrations. In the Meso level (regime) state, demonstrations \r begin to emerge as options that can be adopted by leading groups \r who begin to overcome lock-in barriers from previous technological \r dependence. Finally, in the Macro level (landscape) stage, \r mainstreaming happens, and the socio-technical system enables \r innovations to break through. Figure 10.22 maps the MLP stages for \r the major mitigation strategies identified in this chapter."


id: a5112c3736a3970d0df5e50b1b67e9c5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26268
content:
"The models reviewed in this section would all generally be considered \r to have a good representation of fuels, technologies, and costs, but \r they often better represent land transport modes than shipping and \r aviation. While these models have their strengths in some areas, they \r have some limitations in other areas, like behavioural aspects. These \r models are also limited in their ability to account for unexpected \r technological innovation, such as a  breakthrough in heavy vehicle \r fuels, artificial intelligence, autonomy and big data, even the extent \r of digital communications replacing travel (Section 10.2). As a result \r of these limitations, the models cannot yet provide an exhaustive set \r of options for decarbonising the transport sectors. These limitations \r notwithstanding, the models can find solutions encompassing the \r transport sector and its interactions with other sectors that are \r compatible with stringent emissions mitigation efforts. The solutions \r [...]"


id: ad93306ea28b5beb4a73c5c2bff41a1c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27780
content:
"[...] space of transportation technology trajectories is therefore wider than \r explored by the models, so there is still a need to better understand \r how all options in combination may support the transformative \r mitigation targets."


id: 4ed1bc5d8db76db97d1438c92394ed7b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11147
content:
"Deployment of electromobility is not limited to developed \r countries. The transportation sector in low- and middle-income \r countries includes millions of gas-powered motorcycles within cities \r across Africa, South-East Asia, and South America (Posada et  al. \r 2011; Ehebrecht et al. 2018). Many of these motorcycles function as \r taxis. In Kampala, Uganda, estimates place the number of motorcycle \r taxis, known locally as boda bodas, at around 40,000 (Ehebrecht et al. \r 2018). The popularity of the motorcycle for personal and taxi use is \r due to many factors including lower upfront costs, lack of regulation, \r and mobility in highly congested urban contexts (Posada et al. 2011; \r UNECE 2018). While motorcycles are often seen as a  more fuel\u0002efficient alternative, emissions can be worse from two-wheelers than \r cars, particularly nitrogen oxides (NOx), carbon monoxide (CO), and \r hydrocarbon emissions (Vasic and Weilenmann 2006; Ehebrecht et al. \r [...]"


id: eabccd1fe115d4855e7718a4f5cce0e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38656
content:
"[...] 2018). These two-wheeler emissions contribute to dangerous levels of \r air pollution across many cities in low- and middle-income countries. \r In Kampala, for example, air pollution levels frequently exceed levels \r deemed safe for humans by the World Health Organization (Kampala \r Capital City Authority 2018; World Health Organization 2018; Airqo \r 2020). To mitigate local and environmental impacts, electric boda \r boda providers are emerging in many cities, including Zembo in \r Kampala and Ampersand in Kigali, Rwanda."


id: 353c635b0e929dc7ab16fd7f84b89f1d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6612
content:
"Figure 10.23 sets out the feasibility of the core mitigation options using \r the six criteria created for the cross-sectoral analysis. This feasibility \r assessment outlines how the conclusions outlined in Section 10.8.1 \r fit into the broader criteria created for feasibility in the whole AR6 \r report and that emphasise the SDGs. Figure  10.23 highlights that \r there is high confidence that demand reductions and mode shift can \r be feasible as the basis of a GHG emissions mitigation strategy for \r the transport sector. However, demand-side interventions work best \r when integrated with technology changes. The technologies that can \r support such changes have a range of potential limitations as well \r as opportunities. EVs have a reliance on renewable resources (wind, \r solar, and hydro) for power generation, which could pose constraints \r on geophysical resources, land use, and water use. Furthermore, \r expanding the deployment of EVs requires a rapid deployment of new \r [...]"


id: 1009a110cc079fdd5d0290487fb3b44c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8
content:
"[...] power generation capacity and charging infrastructure. The overall \r feasibility of electric vehicles for land transport is likely high and their \r adoption is accelerating. HFCVs for land transport would also have \r constraints related to geophysical resource needs, land use, and water \r use. These constraints are likely higher than for EVs, since producing \r hydrogen with electricity reduces the overall efficiency of meeting \r travel demand. Furthermore, the infrastructure needed to produce, \r transport, and deliver hydrogen is under-developed and would require \r significant R&D and a  rapid scale-up. Thus, the feasibility of HFCV \r is likely lower than for EVs. Biofuels could be used in all segments \r of the transport sector, but there may be some concerns about their \r feasibility. Specifically, there are concerns about land use, water use, \r impacts on water quality and eutrophication, and biodiversity impacts. \r [...]"


id: 356d85ccb5756f8c5b09217304d34312
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6646
content:
"[...] Advanced biofuels could mitigate some concerns and the feasibility of \r using these fuels likely varies by world region. The feasibility \r assessment for alternative fuels for shipping and aviation suggests \r that hydrogen-based fuels like ammonia and synthetic fuels have the \r lowest technology readiness of all mitigation options considered in \r this chapter. Reliance on electrolytic hydrogen for the production of \r these fuels poses concerns about land and water use. Using ammonia \r for shipping could pose risks for air quality and toxic discharges to the \r environment. The DAC/BECCS infrastructure that would be needed to \r produce synthetic fuel does not yet exist. Thus, the feasibility suggests \r that the technologies for producing and using these hydrogen-based \r fuels for transport are in their infancy."


id: 7ae58cc7f21bbfe7f7eaae4a4620d026
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18819
content:
"Bulawayo, the second-largest city in Zimbabwe, is also looking at \r opportunities for deploying electromobility solutions. The city is now \r growing again after a  difficult recent history, and there is a  new \r emphasis on achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (City \r of Bulawayo 2020a; City of Bulawayo 2020b). With these goals in \r mind, Bulawayo is seeking opportunities for investment that can \r enable leapfrogging in private, fossil fuel vehicle ownership. In \r particular, trackless trams, paired with solar energy, have emerged \r as a potential pathway forward (Kazunga 2019). Trackless trams are \r a new battery-based mid-tier transit system that could enable urban \r development around stations and that use solar energy for powering \r both transit and the surrounding buildings (Newman et  al. 2019). \r The new trams are rail-like in their capacities and speed, providing \r a vastly better mobility system that is decarbonised and enables low \r [...]"


id: 9f43ddcf959846dd7f141f6692c86610
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25242
content:
"[...] transport costs (Ndlovu and Newman 2020). While this concept is \r only under consideration in Bulawayo, climate funding could enable \r the wider deployment of such projects in developing countries."


id: e3eee8ebe25d4dc3e497e5f79ea9b5d0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37391
content:
"The global transition towards renewable energy technologies and battery systems necessarily involves materials, markets, and supply \r chains on a hitherto unknown scale and scope. This has raised concerns regarding mineral requirements central to the feasibility of \r the energy transition. Constituent materials required for the development of these low-carbon technologies are regarded as 'critical' \r materials (US Geological Survey 2018; Commonwealth of Australia 2019; Lee et al. 2020; Marinaro et al. 2020; Sovacool et al. 2020). \r 'Critical materials' are critical because of their economic or national security importance, or high risk of supply disruption. Many of \r these materials and rare earth elements (REEs) as 'technologically critical', not only due to their strategic or economic importance but \r the risk of short supply or price volatility (Marinaro et al. 2020). In addition to these indicators, production growth and market dynamics \r [...]"


id: 896fda9db3f6bf674788ebfb405bd8ee
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21356
content:
"[...] are also incorporated into screening tools to assess emerging trends in material commodities that are deemed as fundamental to the \r well-being of the nation (NSTC 2018)."


id: 6b40ca939857a53fabedc9afd6b8cc60
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16167
content:
"There have been many instances since the 1950s when the supply of essential minerals has been restricted by nations in times of \r conflict and world tensions, but international trade has continued under the framework of the World Trade Organization. Keeping \r access open to critical minerals needed for the low-carbon transition will be an essential role of the international community as the \r need for local manufacture of such renewable and electromobility technologies will be necessary for local economies. Nassar et al. \r (2020) report that over the past 30 years the US has become increasingly reliant in imports to meet domestic demand for minerals, \r including REEs. In terms of heavy REEs, essential for permanent magnets for wind turbines, China has a  near-monopoly on REE \r processing, though other mines and manufacturing facilities are now responding to these constrained markets (Stegen 2015; Gulley \r [...]"


id: 169e04fe191606daa3b77c17a5bcf12b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1194
content:
"[...] et al. 2018; Gulley et al. 2019; Yan et al. 2020). China, on the other hand, is reliant on other nations for the supply of other critical \r metals, particularly cobalt and lithium for batteries."


id: 38a0a5521fc73570a00540e6e10f88e7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7167
content:
"Enabling transport climate emergency plans, local pledges \r and net zero strategies: National, regional and local governments \r are now producing transport plans with a climate emergency focus \r (Jaeger et  al. 2015; Pollard 2019). Such plans are often grounded \r in the goals of the Paris Agreement, based around local low\u0002carbon transport roadmaps that contain targets for and involve \r commitments or pledges from local stakeholders, such as workplaces, \r local community groups, and civil society organisations. Pledges often \r include phasing out fossil fuel-based cars, buses, and trucks (Plotz \r et  al. 2020), strategies to meet the targets through infrastructure, \r urban regeneration and incentives, and detailed programmes to \r help citizens adopt change. These institution-led mechanisms could \r include bike-to-work campaigns, free transport passes, parking \r charges, or eliminating car benefits. Community-based solutions like \r [...]"


id: 14bda2819bc71b912f4c66b87e94e87c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 876
content:
"[...] solar sharing, community charging, and mobility as a  service can \r generate new opportunities to facilitate low-carbon transport futures. \r Cities in India and China have established these transport roadmaps, \r which are also supported by the United Nations Centre for Regional \r Development's Environmentally Sustainable Transport programme \r (Baeumler et al. 2012; Pathak and Shukla 2016; UNCRD 2020). There \r have been concerns raised that these pledges may be used to delay "


id: df61c132e296739a1199d89b1fbbbe1b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36545
content:
"Laboratory 2020) is assumed. Maintenance costs were assumed to \r be USD0.63 per km for ICEV buses and USD0.38 per km for BEV and \r ICEV buses, also based on data from the AFLEET model (Argonne \r National Laboratory 2020). For ICEV and BEV purchase costs, data \r from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (Johnson et  al. \r 2020) is used for bounding ranges (USD430,000 to 500,000 for \r ICEV and USD579,000 to 1,200,000 for BEV), which encompass the \r default values from AFLEET model (Argonne National Laboratory \r 2020). Note that wider ranges are available in the literature (e.g., as \r low as USD120,000 per bus in Burnham et al. (2021) and Harris et al. \r (2020)); but these are not included in the sensitivity analysis to avoid \r conflating disparate vehicles. For FCV buses, the upper bound of the \r purchase price range (USD1,200,000) represents current costs in \r the US (Argonne National Laboratory 2020; Eudy and Post 2020), \r [...]"


id: 8e3f950bbe06d19a8bec355362b71590
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22218
content:
"[...] and the lower bound represents the target future value from the US \r Department of Energy (Eudy and Post 2020)."


id: 533acdd75437d811a6674e7546f1d6e6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11911
content:
"For diesel, a range of USD0.5-2.5 per litre is used based on historic \r diesel costs across all OECD countries reported in the IEA Energy Prices \r and Taxes Statistics database (IEA 2021c) since 2010. The lower end \r of this range is consistent with the minimum projected value from the \r 2021 US Annual Energy Outlook (low oil price scenario, USD0.55 l-1) \r (US Energy Information Administration 2021). The upper end of \r the range encompasses both the maximum diesel price observed \r in the  2021 US Annual Energy Outlook projections (high oil price \r scenario, USD1.5 l-1) (US Energy Information Administration 2021), \r and the diesel price that would correspond to the 2020 IEA World \r Energy Outlook crude oil price projections (Stated Policies scenario) \r (IEA 2020b), assuming the historical price relationship between \r crude oil and diesel is maintained (USD1.5 l-1). For reference, the IEA \r reports current world-average automotive diesel costs to be around \r [...]"


id: 3622e7b05fe4cb4fcd777f2beb12b33d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6775
content:
"[...] 1 USD l-1 (IEA 2021d). The selected range also captures the current \r range of production costs for values for bio-based and synthetic \r diesels (EUR51-144 MWh-1, corresponding to USD0.6-1.70 l-1), \r which are generally still higher than wholesale petroleum diesel \r costs (EUR30-50 MWh-1, corresponding to USD0.35-0.6 l-1), as \r reported by IEA (IEA 2020c). This range also encompasses costs for \r synthesised electrofuels from electrolytic hydrogen, as reported in \r Chapter 6 (USD1.6 l-1)."


id: f8bfff8e0d28a2055c7090cbd03a162a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41124
content:
"For freight and passenger rail, powertrain and vehicle operation and \r maintenance costs in USD per km from the IEA Future of Rail report \r (IEA 2019e) (IEA Figure 2.14 for passenger rail and IEA Figure 2.15 \r for freight rail) are used as a proxy for non-fuel costs. The ranges span \r conservative and forward-looking cases. In addition, the range  for \r BEV rail ranges encompass short- and long-distance trains  - \r corresponding to 100-200 km for passenger rail, and 400-750 km \r for freight rail. Note that all values exclude the base vehicle costs, \r but they are expected not to be significant as they are amortised \r over the lifetime distance travelled. For freight rail, a network that \r is representative of North America is assumed, with a  payload of \r 2800 tonnes per train (IEA Figure 1.17), assumed to be utilised at \r 100%, with a lifetime of 10 years, and an average distance travelled \r of 120,000  km yr-1. For BEV freight rail, the range in powertrain \r [...]"


id: 93813c579933eee9daec21d2033d88e2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23159
content:
"[...] costs is driven by battery costs of USD250-600 kWh-1, while for \r FCV freight rail, the range in powertrain costs is driven by fuel cell \r stack costs of USD50-1000 kW-1. For passenger rail, a network that \r is representative of Europe is assumed, with an average occupancy of \r 180 passengers per train (IEA Figure 1.14), with a lifetime of 10 years, \r and an average distance travelled of 115,000 km per year."


id: 46cbe39829a1c59b272bbe2617fb6447
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9659
content:
"Net zero CO2 emissions from the industrial sector are possible \r but challenging (high confidence). Energy efficiency will continue \r to be important. Reduced materials demand, material efficiency, \r and circular economy solutions can reduce the need for primary \r production. Primary production options include switching to new \r processes that use low to zero GHG energy carriers and feedstocks \r (e.g., electricity, hydrogen, biofuels, and carbon capture and utilisation \r (CCU) for carbon feedstock), and carbon capture and storage (CCS) \r for remaining CO2. These options require substantial scaling up of \r electricity, hydrogen, recycling, CO2, and other infrastructure, as \r well as phase-out or conversion of existing industrial plants. While \r improvements in the GHG intensities of major basic materials \r have nearly stagnated over the last 30 years, analysis of historical \r technology shifts and newly available technologies indicate these \r [...]"


id: 5ba86566e1fc0775229d83795f92ad9a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13378
content:
"There are several current and near-horizon options to \r greatly reduce cement and concrete emissions. Producer, \r user, and regulator education, as well as innovation and \r commercialisation policy are needed (medium confidence).\r Cement and concrete are currently overused because they are \r inexpensive, durable, and ubiquitous, and consumption decisions \r typically do not give weight to their production emissions. Basic \r material efficiency efforts to use only well-made concrete thoughtfully \r and only where needed (e.g.,  using right-sized, prefabricated \r components) could reduce emissions by 24-50% through lower \r demand for clinker. Cementitious material substitution with various \r materials (e.g.,  ground limestone and calcined clays) can reduce \r process calcination emissions by up to 50% and occasionally much \r more. Until a very low GHG emissions alternative binder to Portland \r cement is commercialised, which does not look promising in the near \r [...]"


id: d356dd33cd8a6330318a56bce6748377
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34525
content:
"[...] to medium term, CCS will be essential for eliminating the limestone \r calcination process emissions for making clinker, which currently \r represent 60% of GHG emissions in best available technology plants. \r {11.3.2, 11.3.6, 11.4.1.2}"


id: 97f7b3bef58493d2b029a2f11118023d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23951
content:
"The Kaya identity offers a useful tool of decomposing emission sources \r and their drivers, as well as of weighing the mitigation options. \r The one presented below (Equation 11.1) builds on the previous \r assessments (IPCC 2014, 2018b; Hoegh-Guldberg et al. 2018), and \r reflect a  material stock-driven services-oriented vision to better \r highlight the growing importance of industrial processes (dominated \r in emissions increments in 2010-2019), product use and waste in \r driving emissions. Services delivery (nutrition, shelter, mobility, \r education, etc.; see Chapter 5 for more detail) not only requires energy \r and material flows (fuels, food, feed, fertilisers, packaging, etc.), but \r also material stocks (buildings, roads, vehicles, machinery, etc.), the \r mass of which has already exceeded 1000 Gt (Krausmann et al. 2018). \r As material efficiency appears to be an important mitigation option, \r material intensity or productivity (material extraction or consumption \r [...]"


id: 27366e11a1eb9f0517fa86b4696c656a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4064
content:
"[...] versus GDP (Oberle et al. 2019; Hertwich et al. 2020)) is reflected in \r the identity with two dimensions: as material stock intensity of GDP \r (tonnes per dollar) and material intensity of building and operating \r accumulated in-use stock.1\r  For sub-global analysis the ratio of \r domestically used materials to total material production becomes \r important to reflect outsourced materials production and distinguish \r between territorial and consumption-based emissions. The identity \r for industry differs significantly from that for sectors with where \r combustion emissions dominate (Lamb et al. 2021)."


id: 8956723b99db48ef943549bb835588f3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21335
content:
"The AR5 was published in 2014. The Paris Agreement and the \r 17  Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were adopted in 2015. \r An increasing number of countries have since announced ambitions \r to be carbon neutral by 2045-2060. The COVID-19 pandemic shocked \r the global economy in 2020 and motivated economic stimulus with \r demands for green recovery and concerns for economic security. \r All this has created a new context and a growing recognition that all \r industry, including the energy and emissions intensive industries, \r need to reach net zero GHG emissions. There is an ongoing mind \r shift around the opportunities to do so, with electrification and \r hydrogen emerging among key mitigation options as a  result of \r renewable electricity costs falling rapidly. On the demand side there \r has been renewed attention to end-use demand, material efficiency, \r and more and better-quality recycling measures. This chapter takes \r [...]"


id: f3dcc5a179f34e6a11579b834cfeba2d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40284
content:
"[...] its starting point in this new context and emphasises the need for \r deploying innovative processes and practices in order to limit the \r global warming to 1.5degC or 2degC (IPCC 2018a)."


id: fb038097c33779652e128b9a4e34af0b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41543
content:
"The industrial sector includes ores and minerals mining, manufacturing, \r construction and waste management. It is the largest source of global \r GHG and CO2 emissions, which include direct and indirect fuel\u0002combustion-related emissions, emissions from industrial processes \r and products use, as well as from waste. This chapter is focused on \r heavy industry - the high temperature heat and process emissions \r intensive basic materials industries that account for 65% of industrial \r GHG and over 70% of industrial CO2 emissions (waste excluded), \r where deployment of near-zero emissions technologies can be \r more challenging due to capital intensity and equipment lifetimes \r compared with other manufacturing industries. The transition of \r heavy industries to zero emissions requires supplementing the \r traditional toolkit of energy and process efficiency, fuel switching, \r electrification, and decarbonisation of power with material end-use \r [...]"


id: 7d75da783ec13d8c3daabd3404e14bc4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19241
content:
"[...] demand management and efficiency, circular economy, fossil-free \r feedstocks, carbon capture and utilisation (CCU), and carbon capture \r and storage (CCS). Energy efficiency was extensively treated in AR5 and \r remains a key mitigation option. This chapter is focused mainly on \r new options and developments since AR5, highlighting measures \r along the whole value chains that are required to approach zero \r emissions in primary materials production."


id: eb991d56103b3af64dceee71c1e74599
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38817
content:
"improvements to achieve absolute reduction in material use, \r as stock expansion slows down (Streeck et al. 2020). While the \r composition of basic materials within the stock of manufactured \r capital was evolving significantly, overall stock use associated \r with a unit of GDP has been evolving over the last half-century in \r a quite narrow range of 7.7-8.6 t per USD1000 (2017 purchasing \r power parity (PPP))  showing neither signs of decoupling from \r GDP, nor saturation as of yet. Mineral building materials (concrete, \r asphalt, bricks, aggregate, and glass) dominate the stock volume by \r mass (94.6% of the whole stock, with the share of concrete alone \r standing at 43.5%), followed by metals (3.5%) and solid wood \r (1.4%). The largest part of in-use stock of our 'cementing societies' \r (Cao et al. 2017) is constituted by concrete: about 417 Gt in 2015; \r Krausmann et al. (2018) extrapolated this to 478 Gt (65 tonnes \r per capita) in 2018, which contains about 88 Gt of cement.4\r [...]"


id: cbc6c168ebe77f8f0dad5756f441c6e5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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content:
"[...]  The \r iron and steel stock is assessed at 25-35 Gt (Wiedenhofer et al. \r 2019; Gielen et al. 2020; Wang et al. 2021), while the plastics stock \r reached 2.5-3.2 Gt (Geyer et al. 2017; Wiedenhofer et al. 2019; \r Saygin and Gielen 2021) and the aluminium stock approached \r 1.1 Gt (International Aluminium Institute 2021a), or just 0.1% of \r the total. In sharp contrast to global energy intensity, which has \r more than halved since 1900 (Bashmakov 2019), in 2019 material \r stock intensity (in-use stock of manufactured capital per GDP) was \r only 14% below the 1900 level, but 15% above the 1970 level. \r In-use stock per capita has been growing faster than GDP per \r capita since 2000 (Figure  11.3). The growth rate of total in-use \r stock of manufactured capital was 3.8% in 1971-2000 and 3.5% \r in 2000-2019, or 32-35 Gt yr-1, to which concrete and aggregates \r contributed 88%. Recent demand for stockbuilding materials was \r [...]"


id: 76dd35565c812f6a056b06502d027167
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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vector_id: 18123
content:
"[...] 51-54 Gt yr-1, to which recycled materials recently contributed \r only about 10% of material input. About 46-49 Gt yr-1 was virgin \r inputs, which after accounting for processing waste and short\u0002lived products (over 8 Gt yr-1) scale up to 54-58 Gt yr-1 of primary \r extraction (Krausmann et al. 2017, 2018; UNEP and IRP 2020). The \r above indicates that we have only begun to exploit the potential \r for recycling and circularity more broadly."


id: 4c26d10f6b21947b2bc38ffe99f663fa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10657
content:
"There are two major concepts of material efficiency (ME). The \r broader one highlights demand reduction via policies promoting \r more intensive use, assuming sufficient (excluding luxury) living \r space or car ownership providing appropriate service levels  - \r housing days or miles driven and life-time extension (Hertwich et al. \r 2019, 2020). This approach focuses on dematerialisation of society \r (Lechtenbohmer and Fischedick 2020), where a  'dematerialisation \r multiplier' (Pauliuk et al. 2021) limits both material stock and GDP \r growth, as progressively fewer materials are required to build and \r operate the physical in-use stock to deliver sufficient services. \r According to the IRP (2020), reducing floor space demand by 20% \r via shared and smaller housing compared to the reference scenario \r would decrease Group of Seven (G7) countries' GHG emissions from \r the material-cycle of residential construction up to 70% in 2050. \r [...]"


id: 3d795d33b0899745e2902d780a06a5ef
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7990
content:
"[...] The narrower concept ignores demand and sufficiency aspects and \r focuses on supply chains considering ME as less basic materials \r use to produce a certain final product, for example, a car or a metre \r squared of living space (OECD 2019a; IEA 2020a). No matter if the \r broader or the narrower concept of ME is applied, in 1970-2019 it \r did not contribute much to the decoupling of industrial emissions \r from GDP. This is expected to change in the future (Figure 11.2)."


id: 97702add9502455504a38b279f8e618a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23856
content:
"Material efficiency analysis mostly uses material intensity \r or  productivity indicators, which compare material extraction or \r consumption with GDP (Oberle et al. 2019; Hertwich et al. 2020). \r Those indicators are functions of material stock intensity of GDP\r (tonnes per dollar) and material intensity of building and operating \r accumulated in-use stock. Coupling services or GDP with the built \r stock allows for a  better evaluation of demand for primary basic \r materials (Muller et al. 2011; Liu et al. 2013; Liu and Muller 2013; \r Pauliuk et al. 2013a; Cao et al. 2017; Wiedenhofer et al. 2019; Hertwich \r et al. 2020; Krausmann et al. 2020). Since 1970 material stock growth \r driven by industrialisation and urbanisation slightly exceeded that of \r GDP and there was no decoupling,3\r  so in Kaya-like identities material \r stock may effectively replace GDP. There are different methods to \r estimate the former (see reviews in Pauliuk et al. (2015, 2019) and \r [...]"


id: 7001fdcff1f804ec7204f2d3e3f02c60
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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content:
"[...] Wiedenhofer et al. (2019), the results of which are presented for major \r basic materials with some geographical resolution (Liu and Muller \r 2013; Pauliuk et al. 2013a) or globally (Graedel et al. 2011; Geyer \r et al. 2017; Krausmann et al. 2018; Pauliuk et al. 2019; Wiedenhofer \r et al. 2019; International Aluminium Institute 2021a)."


id: 4c59cef077d291fb9d88a44c6d2f4e34
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10695
content:
"China12 (IEA 2020b,d). Whatever metric is applied, industry (coal \r transformation, mining, quarrying, manufacturing and construction) \r driven mostly by material production, dominates global energy \r consumption. About two fifths of energy produced globally goes to \r industry, directly or indirectly. Direct energy use (including energy \r used in coal transformation) accounts for nearly 30% of total final \r energy consumption. When supplemented by non-energy use, the \r share for the post-AR5 period (2015-2019) stands on average close \r to 40% of final energy consumption, and at 28.5% of primary energy \r use.13 With an account of indirect energy use for the generation \r of power and centralised heat to be consumed in industry, the \r latter scales up to 37%. Industrial energy use may be split by: \r material production and extraction (including coal transformation): \r 51% on average for 2015-2019; non-energy use (mostly chemical \r [...]"


id: ade08de543a893db52f5514e6c565c05
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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vector_id: 27833
content:
"[...] feedstock): 22%14; and other energy use (equipment, machinery, \r food and tobacco, textiles, leather, etc.): 27%. Energy use for material \r production and feedstock15 makes about three quarters (73%) of \r industrial energy consumption and is responsible for 77% of its \r increment in 2015-2019 (based on IEA 2021a)."


id: 8217d29b44852a45d8a0ff619c72a0c1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20007
content:
"The limited impacts of material efficiency factors on industrial \r GHG emissions trends reflect the lack of integration of material \r efficiency in energy and climate policies which partly results from the \r inadequacy of monitored indicators to inform policy debates and set \r targets;11 lack of high-level political focus and industrial lobbying; \r uncoordinated policy across institutions and sequential nature of \r decision-making along supply chains; carbon pricing policy lock-in \r with upstream sectors failing to pass carbon costs on to downstream \r sectors (due to compensation mechanisms to reduce carbon leakage) \r and so have no incentives to exploit such options as light-weighting, \r reusing, remanufacturing, recycling, diverting scrap, extending \r product lives, using products more intensely, improving process yields, \r and substituting materials (Skelton and Allwood 2017; Gonzalez \r Hernandez et al. 2018b; Hilton et al. 2018). Poor progress with \r [...]"


id: 49c0cd6657725e10c5b51743e5a6fe56
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10209
content:
"[...] material efficiency is part of the reason why industrial GHG emissions \r are perceived as 'hard to abate', and many industrial low-carbon \r trajectories to 2050 leave up to 40% of emissions in place (Material \r Economics 2019; IEA 2021a). The importance of this factor activation \r rises as in-use material stock is expected to scale up by a factor of \r 2.2-2.7 to reach 2215-2720 Gt by 2050 (Krausmann et al. 2020). \r Material extraction in turn is expected to rise to 140-200 Gt yr-1 by \r 2060 (OECD 2019a; Hertwich et al. 2020) providing unsustainable \r pressure on climate and environment and calling for fundamental \r improvements in material productivity."


id: 43d4072c4de2da9e560f49013edf12fc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9166
content:
"For over a  century, industrial energy efficiency improvements \r have partially offset growth in GHG emissions. Industrial energy \r use per tonne of extracted materials (ores and building materials as \r a proxy for materials going through the whole production chain to \r final products) fell by 20% in 2000-2019 and by 15% in 2010-2019, \r accelerated driven by high energy prices to 2.4% yr-1 in 2014-2019, \r matching the values observed back in 1990-2000 (Figure  11.2). \r Assessed per value added using market exchange rates, industrial \r energy intensity globally dropped by 12% in 2010-2018, after its \r 4% decline in 2000-2010, resulting in 2000-2018 decline by 15% \r (IEA 2020b,a). The 2020 COVID crisis slowed down energy intensity \r improvements by shifting industrial output towards more energy\u0002intensive basic materials (IEA 2020e). Specific energy consumption \r per tonne of iron and steel, chemicals and cement production in 2019 \r [...]"


id: 89b60bffdcbafb6cd476bfd69311ebc5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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vector_id: 21403
content:
"[...] was about 20% below the 2000 level (IEA 2020b,a). This progress \r is driven by moving towards best available technologies (BATs) for \r each product through new and highly efficient production facilities \r in China, India and elsewhere, and by the contribution from recycled \r scrap metals, paper and cardboard."


id: 2c8c2126361ea451f337bb24819dc7a9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5104
content:
"fundamental process changes (e.g., towards electricity and hydrogen\u0002based steel making). Improved recycling rates allow for a substantial \r reduction in energy use along the whole production chain - material \r extraction, production, and assembling  - which is in great excess \r of energy used for collection, separation, treatment, and scrap \r recycling minus energy used for scrap landfilling. The International \r Energy Agency (IEA 2019b) estimates that by increasing the recycling \r content of fabricated metals, average specific energy consumption \r (SEC) for steel and aluminium may be halved by 2060. Focusing on \r whole systems 'integrative design' expands efficiency resource much \r beyond the sum of potentials for individual technologies. Material \r efficiency coupled with energy efficiency can deliver much greater \r savings than energy efficiency alone. Gonzalez Hernandez et al. \r (2018b) stress that presently about half of steel or aluminium are \r [...]"


id: d28d4644307fa5713b1e20aa0249534c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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vector_id: 34398
content:
"[...] scrapped in production or oversized for targeted services. They show \r that resource efficiency expressed in exergy as a single metric for both \r material and energy efficiency for the global iron and steel sector is \r only 33%, while secondary steel-making is about twice as efficient \r (66%) as ore-based production (29%). While shifting globally in ore\u0002based production from the average to the best available level can \r save 6.4 EJ yr-1, the saving potential of shifting to secondary steel\u0002making is 8 EJ yr-1, and is limited mostly by scrap availability and \r steel quality requirements."


id: 2d24e53b551d751cb7c44117bf853477
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5225
content:
"GHG emissions attributable to the industrial sector (see Chapter 2) \r in 2019 originate from industrial fuel combustion (7.1 GtCO2-eq \r directly and about 5.9 Gt indirectly from electricity and heat \r generation16); industrial processes (4.5 GtCO2-eq) and products \r use (0.2 Gt), as well as from waste (2.3 Gt) (Figure  11.4a,b). \r Overall industrial direct GHG emissions amount to 14.1 GtCO2-eq \r (Figure 11.4c and Table 11.1), and scales up to 20 GtCO2-eq after \r indirect emissions are added,17 putting industry (24%, direct \r emissions) second after the energy sector in total GHG emissions \r and lifting it to the leading position after indirect emissions are \r allocated (34% in 2019).18 The corresponding shares for 1990-2000 \r were 21% for direct emissions and 30% for both direct and indirect \r (Crippa et al. 2021; Lamb et al. 2021; Minx et al. 2021). As the \r industrial sector is expected to decarbonise slower than other \r [...]"


id: 8fc9c77cd38bd187fad66dac580e84ce
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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content:
"[...] sectors it will keep this leading position for the coming decades \r (IEA 2021a). In 2000-2010, total industrial emissions grew faster \r (3.8% yr-1) than in any other sector (see Chapter 2), mostly due to "


id: f4cbd1b477863e920fe694863c1a6887
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40438
content:
"of industrial emissions is production of energy-intensive materials, \r such as iron and steel, chemicals and petrochemicals, non-ferrous \r metals and non-metallic products. Steel and cement are key inputs \r to urbanisation and infrastructure development (buildings and \r infrastructure are responsible for about three fourths of the steel \r stock). Application of a  'services-stock-flow-emissions' perspective \r (Wiedenhofer et al. 2019; Bashmakov 2021; Haberl et al. 2021) shows \r that relationship patterns between stages of economic development, \r per capita stocks and flows of materials are not trivial with some \r clear transition points. Cao et al. (2017) mapped countries by four \r progressive stages in cement stock per capita S-shape evolution as \r a function of income and urbanisation: initial stage for developing \r countries with a  low level and slow linear growth; take-off stage \r with accelerated growth; slowdown stage; and finally a  shrinking \r [...]"


id: e48c99db94ead2618fb3467295e6c41a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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vector_id: 37495
content:
"[...] stage (represented by just a few countries with very high incomes \r exceeding 40,000 USD2010 per capita) and urbanisation levels \r above 80%. Bleischwitz et al. (2018) use a similar approach with five \r stages to study material saturation effects for apparent consumption "


id: 2d42c2ad224da3e847d0b457f984098c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5250
content:
"and stocks per capita for steel, cement, aluminium, and copper. This \r logic may be generalised to other materials from which in-use stock \r is built. While globally cement in-use stock is about 12 tonnes per \r capita, in developed countries it is 15-30 tonnes per capita, but the \r order of magnitude is lower in developing states with high per capita \r escalation rates (Cao et al. 2017). When stocks for some materials \r saturate - per capita stock peaks - the 'scrap age' is coming (Pauliuk \r et al. 2013a). Steel in-use stock has already saturated in advanced \r economies at 14 +-  2 tonnes per capita due to largely completed \r urbanisation and infrastructure developments, and a switch towards \r services-dominated economy. This saturation level is three to four \r times that of the present global average, which is below 4 tonnes \r per capita (Pauliuk et al. 2013a; Graedel et al. 2011; Wiedenhofer \r et al. 2019). China is entering the maturing stage of steel and cement \r [...]"


id: d8bc770c0f5a14f66e17f3b27bc64d67
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35428
content:
"[...] consumption, resulting in a moderate projection of additional demand \r followed by expected industrial emissions peaking in the next \r 10 to 15 years (Zhou et al. 2013; Bleischwitz et al. 2018; OECD 2019a; \r Wu et al. 2019; Zhou et al. 2020). But many developing countries \r are still urbanising, and the growing need for infrastructure services \r results in additional demand for steel and cement. Materials intensity \r of the global economy is projected by OECD (2019a) to decline at \r 1.3% yr-1 until 2060, driven by improving resource efficiency and \r the switch to circular economy, but with a projected tripling of global \r GDP it means a doubling of projected materials use (OECD 2019a). \r Under the business-as-usual scenario, India's demand for steel may \r more than quadruple over the next 30 years (de la Rue du Can et al. \r 2019; Dhar et al. 2020). In the IEA (2021a) net-zero-energy scenario, \r the saturation effect along with material efficiency counterbalances \r [...]"


id: fdd9f0c1bba3842a99bdfe6782e6d117
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42023
content:
"[...] activity effects and keeps demand growth for basic materials modest \r while escalate demand for critical materials (copper, lithium, nickel, \r graphite, cobalt and others)."


id: 5abf06b0abac15377473714712208f36
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13218
content:
"(Dm) by a third for China and Russia (OECD.Stat 2019; IEA 2020f). In \r most OECD economies, the amount of CO2 embodied in net import \r from non-OECD countries is equal to, or even greater than, the size \r of their Paris 2030 emissions reduction commitments. In the UK, the \r Parliament Committee on Energy and Climate Change requested that \r a consumption-based inventory be complementarily used to assess \r the effectiveness of domestic climate policy in delivering absolute \r global emissions reductions (Barrett et al. 2013; UKCCC 2019a). It \r should be noted that the other side of the coin is that exports from \r countries with lower production carbon intensities can lead to overall \r less emissions than if production took place in countries with high \r carbon intensities, which may become critical in the global evolution \r toward lower emissions. The evolution of Dm to the date was driven \r mostly by factors other than carbon regulation often equipped with \r [...]"


id: 1985b28627eab5eb8e4f1ee4eadf5c5b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1702
content:
"[...] carbon leakage prevention tools. Empirical tests have failed to date \r to detect meaningful 'carbon leakage' and impacts of carbon prices \r on net import, direct foreign investments, volumes of production, \r value added, employment, profits, and innovation in industry (Sartor \r 2013; Branger et al. 2016; Saussay and Sato 2018; Ellis et al. 2019; \r Naegele and Zaklan 2019; Acworth et al. 2020; Carratu et al. 2020; \r Pyrka et al. 2020; Zachmann and McWilliams 2020). In the coming \r years, availability of large low-cost renewable electricity potential \r and cheap hydrogen may become a  new driver for relocation of \r such carbon intensive industries as steel production (Bataille 2020a; \r Gielen et al. 2020; Bataille et al. 2021a; Saygin and Gielen 2021)."


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"Secondly, many ME interventions result in immediate GHG emissions \r savings (short-term), for example, light-weighting products, reusing \r today's product components, and improving manufacturing yields. \r Yet, for other ME actions emissions savings are delayed temporally \r (long-term). For example, designing a  product for future reuse, or \r with a  longer life, only reaps emissions savings at the end of the \r product life, when emissions for a replacement product are avoided. \r Many durable products have long lifetimes (cars >10 years, buildings \r >40 years) which requires dynamic modelling of material stocks, over \r time, to enable these actions to be included in scenario modelling \r activities. Consequently, much effort has been invested recently \r to model material stocks in use, to estimate their lifetimes, and \r anticipate the future waste and replenishment materials to maintain \r existing stocks and grow the material stock base. Dynamic material \r [...]"


id: 1b5865a16d4953fd9cf0b25d3cf320cd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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"[...] models have been applied to material and product sectors, at the \r country and global level. These include, for example: vehicles stocks \r in the UK (Serrenho et al. 2017; Craglia and Cullen 2020) and in \r China (Liu et al. 2020); buildings stocks in the UK (Cabrera Serrenho \r et al. 2019), China (Hong et al. 2016; Cao et al. 2018, 2019) and \r the European Union (Sandberg et al. 2016); electronic equipment \r in Switzerland (Thiebaud et al. 2017); specific material stocks, such \r as cement (Cao et al. 2020, 2017), construction materials (Sverdrup \r et al. 2017; Habert et al. 2020), plastics (Geyer et al. 2017), copper \r (Daehn et al. 2017), and all metals (Elshkaki et al. 2018); all materials \r in China (Jiang et al. 2019), Switzerland (Heeren and Hellweg 2019) \r and the world (Krausmann et al. 2017)."


id: 9be6d0b0bfe1bdd32064692536e4a0a0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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content:
"These two advances in the knowledge base have allowed the initial \r inclusion of some ME strategies in energy and climate change \r scenario models. The International Energy Agency (IEA) first created \r a  ME scenario (MES) in 2015, with an estimated 17% reduction \r in industrial energy demand in 2040 (IEA 2015). The World Energy \r Outlook report includes a  dedicated sub-chapter with calculations \r explicitly on industrial material efficiency (IEA 2019c). They also \r include ME options in their modelling frameworks and reporting, \r for example for petrochemicals (IEA 2018a), and in the Material \r Efficiency in Clean Energy Transitions report (IEA 2019b). In Grubler \r et al. (2018) 1.5degC Low Energy Demand (LED) scenario, global \r material output decreases by 20% from today, by 2050, with one\u0002third due to dematerialisation, and two-thirds due to ME, resulting \r in significant emissions savings. Material Economics' analysis of \r [...]"


id: 86fd5c40b0eec5d905866d7e8743ca3b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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"[...] Industrial Transformation 2050 (Material Economics 2019), found \r that resource efficiency and circular economy measures (i.e.,  ME) \r could almost halve the 530 MtCO2 yr-1emitted by the basic materials \r sectors in the EU by 2050. Finally, the Emissions Gap Report, UNEP \r (2019) includes an assessment of potential material efficiency \r savings in residential buildings and cars."


id: 8dc0be01acc8836aaf6eddffa9129418
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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content:
"Micro level: More firms have begun to implement the concept of CE, \r particularly multi-national companies, since they believe that multiple \r benefits can be obtained from CE efforts, and it has become common \r across sectors (D'Amato et al. 2019). Typical CE tools and policies \r at this level include cleaner production, eco-design, environmental \r labelling, process synthesis, and green procurement. For instance, \r leading chemical companies are incorporating CE into their industrial \r practices, for example, through the design of more recyclable \r plastics, a differentiated and market-driven portfolio of resins, films \r and adhesives that deliver a total package that is more sustainable, \r cost-efficient and capable of meeting new packaging and plastics \r preferences. Problematically, at the same time the plastics industry \r is improving recyclability, it has, for example, been expanding into \r markets without recycling capacity (Mah 2021). Similarly, automakers \r [...]"


id: 8b9669ea228ab7870757cc4de9aabc5b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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"[...] are pursuing strategies to increase the portion of new vehicles that \r are fully recyclable when they reach the end of life, with increasing \r ambitions for using recycled material, largely motivated by end-of\u0002life vehicle regulations. This will require networks that are available \r to collect and sort all the materials in vehicles, and policy incentives \r to do it (Wiebe et al. 2019; Soo et al. 2021)."


id: 83bb7e87db97e42fa1fac02c51a1d19f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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content:
"Circular economy (CE) is another effective approach to mitigate \r industrial GHG emissions and has been widely promoted worldwide \r since the fourth IPCC assessment report (AR4). From an industrial \r point of view, CE focuses on closing the loop for materials and energy \r flows by incorporating policies and strategies for more efficient \r energy, materials and water consumption, while emitting minimal \r waste to the environment (Geng et al. 2013). Moving away from \r a linear mode of production (sometimes referred to as an 'extract\u0002produce-use-discard' model), CE promotes the design of durable \r goods that can be easily repaired, with components that can be \r reused, remanufactured, and recycled (Wiebe et al. 2019). In particular, \r since CE promotes reduction, reuse and recycling, a large amount of \r energy and GHG-intense virgin material processing can be reduced, \r leading to significant carbon emission reductions. For example, in \r [...]"


id: bb748995440be6815f9ab6262b18f27f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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"[...] the case of aluminium, the energy efficiency of primary production \r is relatively close to best available technology (Figure 11.8), while \r switching to production using recycled materials requires only about \r 5% as much energy (Section 11.4.1.4). However, careful evaluation \r is needed from a lifecycle perspective since some recycling activities "


id: 3fc88b2fb40b4fd4f01143396e3ed477
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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content:
"exchanges among tenant companies, which can specifically help \r small- and medium-sized enterprises to improve their growth and \r competitiveness. From a climate perspective, this indicates significant \r industrial emission mitigation since the extraction, processing \r of virgin materials and the final disposal of industrial wastes are \r more energy intensive. Also, careful site selection of such parks can \r facilitate the use of renewable energy. Due to these advantages, \r eco-industrial parks have been actively promoted, especially in East \r Asian countries, such as China, Japan and the Republic of Korea \r (South Korea), where national indicators and governance exist (Geng \r et al. 2019). For instance, the successful implementation of industrial \r symbiosis at Dalian Economic and Technological Development \r Zone has achieved significant co-benefits, including GHG-emission \r reduction, economic and social benefits, and improved ecosystem \r [...]"


id: 46d457568fb0fe6a2eb4b57e18ee7cb0
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content:
"[...] functions (Liu et al. 2018). Another case at Ulsan industrial park, \r South Korea, estimated that 60,522 tonnes of CO2 were avoided \r annually through industrial symbiosis between two companies \r (Kim et al. 2018b). The case of China shows the great potential of \r implementing these measures, estimating 111 million tonnes of CO2\r equivalent will be reduced in 213 national-level industrial parks in \r 2030 compared with 2015 (Guo et al. 2018). As such, South Korea's \r national eco-industrial park project has reduced over 4.7 million \r tonnes of CO2 equivalent through their industrial symbiosis efforts \r (Park et al. 2019). Meso-level CE solutions have been identified as \r essential for industrial decarbonisation (Section  11.4.3). Moreover, \r waste prevention as the top of the so-called 'waste hierarchy' can be \r promoted on the meso level for specific materials or product systems. \r For instance, the European Environment Agency published a report \r [...]"


id: 32a2e990243cd0e487e7d5befefb3971
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"[...] on plastic waste prevention approaches in all 28 EU-member states \r (Wilts and Bakas 2019). However, challenges exist for industrial \r symbiosis activities, such as inter-firm contractual uncertainties, \r the lack of synergy infrastructure, and the regulations that hamper \r reuse and recycling. Therefore, necessary legal reforms are needed to \r address these implementation barriers."


id: b55aa580316c036b679b9bac571d708e
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content:
"of about 27% in metal extraction to 8% in fossil fuel extraction \r and use, 8% in forestry products, and about 7% in non-metallic \r minerals, indicating significant climate change benefits. A macro\u0002perspective calculation on the circulation of iron in Japan's future \r society shows that CO2 emissions from the steel sector can be \r reduced by 56% as per the following assumptions: the amount \r recovered from social stock is the same as the amount of inflow, \r and all scrap was used domestically, and the export of steel \r products is halved (LCS 2018). A  key challenge is to go beyond \r ensuring proper waste management to setting metrics, targets \r and incentives to preserve the incorporated value in specific waste \r streams. Estimations for Germany have shown that despite recycling \r rates of 64% for all solid-waste streams, these activities only lead \r to a  resource-use reduction of only 18% (Steger et al. 2019). In \r general, the identification of the most appropriate CE method \r [...]"


id: f33d5c807f3570d4800997febbcd1e03
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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"[...] for different countries requires understanding and information \r exchange on background conditions, local policies and myriad \r other factors influencing material flows from the local up to the \r global level (Tapia Carlos et al. 2019). Also, an information platform \r should be created at the national level so that all the stakeholders \r can share their CE technologies and expertise, information (such \r as materials/energy/water consumption data), and identify the \r potential synergy opportunities."


id: c2a8d6421bde2449c417a40fce40ebeb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31532
content:
"Macro level: The macro level uses both micro- and meso-level \r tools within a  broader policy strategy, addressing the specific \r challenge of CE as a cross-cutting policy (Wilts et al. 2016). More \r synergy opportunities exist beyond the boundary of one industrial \r park. This indicates the necessity of scaling up industrial symbiosis \r to urban symbiosis. Urban symbiosis is defined as the use of by\u0002products (waste) from cities as alternative raw materials for energy \r sources for industrial operations (Sun et al. 2017). It is based on \r synergistic opportunity arising from geographic proximity through \r the transfer of physical sources (waste materials) for environmental \r and economic benefits. Japan is the first country to promote urban \r symbiosis. For instance, the Kawasaki urban symbiosis efforts can \r save over 114,000 tonnes of CO2 emissions annually (Ohnishi \r et al. 2017). Another simulation study indicates that Shanghai (the \r [...]"


id: c4733e0ea8e56402b792d1ffa9bcf77a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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content:
"[...] largest Chinese city) has the potential to save up to 16.8 MtCO2\r through recycling all the available wastes (Dong et al. 2018). \r As such, the simulation of urban-energy-symbiosis networks in \r Ulsan, South Korea, indicates that 243,396 tCO2\r -1 yr-1 emission \r and USD48 million yr-1 fuel cost can be saved (Kim et al. 2018a). \r Moreover, Wiebe et al. (2019) estimate that the adoption of the \r CE can lead to a  significantly lower global material extraction \r compared to a baseline. Their global results range from a decrease "


id: 3ccd99f4dd043fac159b3fd6ce7af140
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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content:
"Waste heat to power (WHP), or Recycle in NEDO's terms, is also an \r under-utilised option. For example, a study for the cement, glass and \r iron industries in China showed that current technology enables only \r 7-13% of waste heat to be used for power generation. With improved \r technologies, potentially 40-57% of waste heat with temperatures \r above 150degC could be used for power generation via heat recovery. \r Thermal power fluctuations can be a challenge and negatively affect \r the operation and economic feasibility of heat recovery power \r systems such as steam and/or organic Rankine cycle. In such cases, \r latent heat storage technology and intermediate storage units \r may be applied (Jimenez-Arreola et al. 2018). The development of \r thermoelectric conversion materials that produce power from unused \r heat and energy harvested from a higher temperature environment \r is also progressing, with several possible applications in industrial \r [...]"


id: dbc7cba77068d7a8b878704706133708
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"[...] processes (Gayner and Kar 2016; Jood et al. 2018; Lv et al. 2018; \r Ohta et al. 2018). A potential early application in industry is to power \r wireless sensors, a  niche that uses microwatts or milliwatts, and \r avoid power cables (Champier 2017)."


id: 5fdf7293d385144b393ae8014071901f
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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content:
"Reduce refers to reducing heat needs via improved thermal insulation, \r for example, where porous type insulators have been developed \r with thermal conductivity half of what is traditionally achieved by \r heat-resistant bricks under conditions of high compressive strength \r (Fukushima and Yoshizawa 2016). Reuse refers to waste heat \r recovery. A  study for the EU identified a  waste heat potential of \r about 300 TWh yr-1, corresponding to about 10% of total energy \r use in industry. About 50% of this was below 200degC, about 25% at \r temperatures 200degC-500degC, and 25% at temperatures of 500degC and \r above (Papapetrou et al. 2018). A survey conducted in Japan showed \r that 9% of the input energy is lost as waste heat, of which heat below \r 199degC accounts for 68% and that below 149degC was 29% (NEDO \r 2019). McBrien et al. (2016) identified that in the steel sector process \r heat recovery presently saves 1.8 GJ per tonne of hot rolled steel, \r [...]"


id: 9fe0d5f29026127389a6ec1d37f05cdc
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content:
"[...] while integrated across all production processes heat recovery with \r conventional heat exchange could save 2.5 GJ t-1, and it scales up to "


id: 1d3721b9f257ae2c7b9f83a04104112b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2318
content:
"Energy management systems to reduce energy costs in an integrated \r and systematic manner were first developed in the 1970s, mainly in \r low-energy-resource countries, for example, by establishing energy \r managers and institutionalising management targets (Tanaka 2011). \r Strategic energy management has since then evolved and been \r promoted through the establishment of dedicated organisational \r infrastructures for energy-use optimisation, such as ISO-50001 \r which specifies the requirements for establishing, implementing, \r maintaining, and improving an energy management system (Biel and \r Glock 2016; Tunnessen and Macri 2017). Digitalisation, sometimes \r referred to as Industry 4.0, facilitates further improvements in process \r control and optimisation through technology development involving \r sensors, communications, analytics, digital twins, machine learning, \r virtual reality, and other simulation and computing technologies \r [...]"


id: 1573654b0b8e9af76d716cd555dda76c
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vector_id: 988
content:
"[...] (Rogers 2018), all of which can improve energy efficiency. One \r example is combustion control systems, where big data analysis of \r factors affecting boiler efficiency, operation optimisation and load \r forecasting have shown that it can lead to energy savings of 9% \r (Wang et al. 2017)."


id: a507e4849b4e611bbcecaeed5c68bdd6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26255
content:
"Biofuels come in many forms, including ones that are nearly identical \r to fossil fuels but sourced from biogenic sources. Solid biomass, either \r direct from wood chips, lignin or processed pellets, is the most commonly \r used renewable fuel in industry today and  is occasionally used in \r cement kilns and boilers. Biomethane, biomethanol, and bioethanol \r are all commercially made today using fermentation and anaerobic \r digestion techniques and are mostly 'drop-in' compatible with \r fossil fuel equivalents. In principle they cycle carbon in and out of \r the atmosphere, but their lifecycle GHG intensities are typically not \r GHG neutral due to land-use changes, soil carbon depletion, fertiliser \r use, and other dynamics (Hepburn et al. 2019), and are highly case \r specific. Most commercial biofuel feedstocks come from agricultural \r (e.g.,  corn) and food waste sources, and the feedstock is limited; \r to meet higher levels of biomass use a  transition to using higher \r [...]"


id: 1cc84567bc8f86b187b1132f5d97ba10
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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content:
"[...] cellulose feedstocks like straw, switchgrass and wood waste, available \r in much larger quantities, must be fully commercialised and deployed. \r Significant efforts have been made to make ethanol from cellulosic \r biomass, which promises much higher quantities, lower costs, and \r lower intensities, but commercialisation efforts, with a few exceptions, \r have largely not succeeded (Padella et al. 2019). The IEA estimates, \r however, that up to 20% of today's fossil methane use, including by \r industry, could be met with biomethane (IEA 2020g) by 2040, using \r a mixture of feedstocks and production techniques. Biofuel use may \r also be critical for producing negative emissions when combined with \r carbon capture and storage (i.e., bioenergy with carbon capture and \r storage - BECCS). Most production routes for biofuels, biochemicals \r and biogas generate large side streams of concentrated CO2 which \r is easily captured, and which could become a  source of negative \r [...]"


id: 3197eea0b00caec2cfed64f4ae6411a2
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content:
"[...] emissions (Sanchez et al. 2018) (Section 11.3.6). Finally, it should be \r noted that biofuel combustion can, if inadequately controlled, have \r substantial negative local air quality effects, with implications for \r SDGs 3, 7 and 11."


id: 78e8f069d75c8ca462cdb297c3520886
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content:
"(Lechtenbohmer et al. 2016; Palm et al. 2016; Ahman et al. 2017; \r Axelson et al. 2018; Bataille et al. 2018a; Davis et al. 2018; UKCCC \r 2019b; Material Economics 2019). Electricity is a flexible energy carrier \r that can be made from many forms of primary energy, with high \r potential process improvements in terms of end-use efficiency (Eyre \r 2021), quality and process controllability, digitisability, and no direct \r local air pollutants (McMillan et al. 2016; Jadun et al. 2017; Deason \r et al. 2018; Mai et al. 2018). The net-GHG effect of electrification \r is contingent on how the electricity is made, and because total \r output increases can be expected, for full effect it should be made \r with a very low GHG intensity primary source (i.e., <50 g CO2 kWh-1: \r e.g.,  hydroelectricity, nuclear energy, wind, solar photovoltaics, or \r fossil fuels with 95+% carbon capture and storage (IPCC 2014)). This \r has strong implications for the electricity sector and its generation \r [...]"


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content:
"[...] mix when the goal is a net-zero-emissions electricity system. Despite \r their falling costs, progressively higher mixes of variable wind and \r solar on a given grid will require support from grid flexibility sources, \r including demand response, more transmission, storage on multiple \r time scales, or firm low-to-negative emissions generation sources \r (e.g., nuclear energy, hydrogen fuel cells or turbines, biofuels, fossil or \r biofuels with CCS, and geothermal) to moderate costs (Jenkins et al. \r 2018; Sepulveda et al. 2018; Williams et al. 2021). Regions that may \r be slower to reduce the GHG intensity of their electricity production \r will likely need to consider more aggressive use of other measures, \r like energy and material efficiency or bioenergy."


id: 12364b8b8e721d6c4cc0f9b6578df379
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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content:
"Increased electrification of industry will result in increased overall \r demand for electricity. For example, 75 TWh of electricity was \r used by steel in the EU in 2015 (out of the 1000 TWh total used \r by industry), Material Economics (2019), varying between their new \r process, circularity and CCUS scenarios, projects increased demand \r to 355 (+373%), 214 (+185%) and 238 (+217%) TWh. These values \r are consistent with Vogl et al. (2018), which projects a  tripling of \r electricity demand in the German or Swedish steel industries if \r hydrogen-direct reduced iron and electric arc furnace steel-making \r (DRI EAFs) replaces BF-BOFs. Material Economics (2019) was \r conservative with its use of electricity in chemical production, making \r preferential use of biofeedstocks and some CCUS, and electricity \r demand still rose from 118 TWh to 510, 395 and 413 TWh in their \r three scenarios. Bazzanella and Ausfelder (2017), exploring deeper \r [...]"


id: 90bc2ae39af79229772836ad244d36da
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content:
"[...] reductions from the chemical sector using more electrochemistry, \r projected scenarios with higher electricity demands of 960-4900 TWh \r (140% of the projected available clean electricity at the time) with \r maximum electricity use. In counterpoint, however, with revised \r wind capabilities and costs, the IEA (2019e) Offshore Wind Outlook \r indicates that ten times the current EU electricity use could be \r produced if necessary. Greater use of electro-catalytic versus thermo\u0002catalytic chemistry, as projected by De Luna et al. (2019), could \r greatly reduce these electricity needs, but the technology readiness \r levels are currently low. Finally, the UKCCC (2019b), which focused \r primarily on CCS for industry in its 'Further Ambition' scenario (the \r UK currently consumes about 300 TWh), in its supplementary 'Further \r Electrification' scenario projects an additional 300 TWh for general \r electrolysis needs and another 200 TWh for synthetic fuel production."


id: b9dd6dfaa75260942efee0dc146949a4
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vector_id: 29920
content:
"For these reasons, lighter, manufacturing-orientated industries are \r more readily electrifiable than heavier industry like steel, cement, \r chemicals and other sectors with high heat and feedstock needs. \r Steam boilers, curing, drying and small-scale process heating, with \r typically lower maximum heat temperature needs (<200degC-250degC) \r are readily electrifiable with appropriate fossil-fuel-to-electricity \r price ratios (accounting for capital costs and efficiencies), and direct \r induction and infrared heating are available for higher temperature \r needs. These practices are uncommon outside regions with ample \r hydroelectric power due to the currently relatively low cost of \r coal, natural gas and heating oil, and especially when there is no \r carbon combustion cost. Madeddu et al. (2020) argue up to 78% of \r Europe's industrial energy requirements are electrifiable through \r existing commercial technologies. In contrast, Mai et al. (2018) \r [...]"


id: e28df8041caad40d9f82e90c9d488f94
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vector_id: 37164
content:
"[...] saw only a  moderate industrial heat supply electrification in their \r high-electrification scenario for the US. Electrification has also been \r explored in: raw and recycled steel (Fischedick et al. 2014b; Vogl et al. \r 2018); ammonia (Bazzanella and Ausfelder 2017; Philibert 2017a); \r and chemicals (Palm et al. 2016; Bazzanella and Ausfelder 2017). "


id: 5dc2337808211fa1c80e964f56d23401
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vector_id: 13785
content:
"Around 70 Mt yr-1 of pure hydrogen is produced today: 76% from \r natural gas and 23% from coal, resulting in emissions of roughly \r 830 MtCO2 yr-1 in 2016/17 (IEA 2019f), or 4.7% of global industrial \r direct and indirect emissions (waste excluded; Table  11.1). Fuels \r refining (about 410 MtCO2 yr-1) and production of ammonia \r (420 MtCO2 yr-1) largely dominate its uses. Another 45 Mt hydrogen is \r being produced along with other gases, on purpose or as by-products, \r and used as fuel, to make methanol or as a chemical reactant (IEA \r 2019f). Very low and potentially zero GHG (depending on the energy \r source) hydrogen can be made via: electrolysis separation of water \r into hydrogen and oxygen (Glenk and Reichelstein 2019), also known \r as 'green H2'; electrothermal separation of water, as done in some \r nuclear plants (Bicer and Dincer 2017); partial oxidation of coal or \r naphtha or steam/auto methane reforming (SMR/ATR) combined \r [...]"


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content:
"[...] with CCS (Leeson et al. 2017), or 'blue H2'; methane pyrolysis, where \r the hydrogen and carbon are separated thermally and the carbon \r is left as a solid (Abbas and Wan Daud 2010; Ashik et al. 2015), or \r via biomass gasification (Ericsson 2017), which could be negative \r emissions if the CO2 from the gasification process is sequestered. "


id: c95e15a9f1b12f115cc1b50fe06420d2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32750
content:
"Carbon is an important and highly flexible building block for a wide \r range of fuels, organic chemicals and materials including methanol, \r ethanol, olefins, plastics, textiles, and wood and paper products. In this \r chapter we define CCS as requiring return of CO2 from combustion \r or process gases or ambient air to the geosphere for geological time \r periods (i.e., thousands of years) (IPCC 2005; IEA 2009; Bruhn et al. \r 2016; IEA 2019g). CCU is defined as being where carbon (as CO or \r CO2) is captured from one process and reused for another, reducing \r emissions from the initial process, but is then potentially but not \r necessarily released to the atmosphere in following processes (Bruhn \r et al. 2016; Detz and van der Zwaan 2019; Tanzer and Ramirez 2019). \r In both cases the net effect on atmospheric emissions depends on the \r initial source of the carbon, be it from a fossil fuel, from biomass, or \r from direct air capture (Cuellar-Franca and Azapagic 2015; Hepburn \r [...]"


id: 91f2aa74e1161d5ed95acd67d200625
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22897
content:
"While CCS and CCU share common capture technologies, what \r happens to the CO2 and therefore the strategies that will employ \r them can be very different. CCS can help maintain near-CO2 neutrality \r for fossil CO2 that passes through the process, with highly varying \r partially negative emissions if the source is biogenic (Hepburn et al. \r 2019), and fully negative emissions if the source is air capture, all \r not considering the energy used to drive the above processes. CCS \r has been covered in other IPCC publications at length, for example, \r IPCC (2005), and in most mitigation-oriented assessments since, \r for example, the IEA's Energy Technology Perspectives (ETP) 2020 \r and Net Zero scenario reports (IEA 2021a, 2020a). The potentials and \r costs for CCS in industry vary considerably due to the diversity of \r industrial processes (Leeson et al. 2017), as well as the volume and \r purity of different flows of CO2 (Naims 2016); Kearns et al. (2021) \r [...]"


id: e8927a880e8499fe534a2a42e12a6de7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38257
content:
"[...] provide a recent review. As a general rule it is not possible to capture \r all the CO2 emissions from an industrial plant. To achieve zero or \r negative emissions, CCS would need to be combined with some use of \r sustainably sourced biofuel or feedstock, or the remaining emissions \r would need to be offset by carbon dioxide removal (CDR) elsewhere."


id: 21cb98e1e2bc6fb12d94ae1dc68f4b73
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3161
content:
"In the case of CCU, CO and CO2 are captured and subsequently \r converted into valuable products (e.g., building materials, chemicals \r and synthetic fuels) (Styring et al. 2011; Bruhn et al. 2016; Artz et al. \r 2018; Brynolf et al. 2018; Daggash et al. 2018; Breyer et al. 2019; \r Katelhon et al. 2019; Vreys et al. 2019). CCU has been envisioned as part \r of the 'circular economy' but conflicting expectations on CCU and its \r association or not with CCS leads to different and contested framings \r (Palm and Nikoleris 2021). The duration of the CO2 storage in these \r products varies from days to millennia according to the application, \r potentially but not necessarily replacing new fossil, biomass or direct \r air capture feedstocks, before meeting one of several possible fates: \r permanent burial, decomposition, recycling or combustion, all with \r differing GHG implications. While the environmental assessment \r of CCS projects is relatively straightforward, however, this is not \r [...]"


id: 5c37b374cb12bc57361171f3aab1a9f5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13480
content:
"[...] the case for CCU technologies. The net-GHG mitigation impact of \r CCU depends on several factors (e.g., the capture rate, the energy \r requirements, the lifetime of utilisation products, the production \r route that is substituted, and associated room for improvement \r along the traditional route) and has to be determined by lifecycle CO2\r or GHG analysis (e.g., Nocito and Dibenedetto 2020; and Bruhn et al. \r 2016). For example, steel-mill gases containing carbon monoxide and \r carbon dioxide can be used as feedstock together with hydrogen for \r producing chemicals. In this way, the carbon originally contained in \r the coke used in the blast furnace is used again, or cascaded, and \r emissions are reduced but not brought to zero. If fossil-sourced CO2\r is only reused once and then emitted, the maximum reduction is 50% \r (Tanzer and Ramirez 2019). The logic of using steel-mill CO and CO2\r could equally be applied to gasified biomass, however, with a  far \r [...]"


id: e1717a7ebdcf5e98b3d1da7f02856064
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36932
content:
"[...] lower net-GHG footprint, likely negative, which CCU fed by fossil \r fuels cannot be if end-use combustion is involved.\r Partly because of the complexity of the lifecycle analysis accounting, \r the literature on CCU is not always consistent in terms of the net\u0002GHG impacts of strategies. For example, Artz et al. (2018), focused not "


id: dd75412b90a8360b1747d511c262d7a7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36229
content:
"For concentrated CO2 sources (e.g., cleaning of wellhead formation \r gas to make it suitable for the pipeline network, hydrogen \r production using steam methane reforming, ethanol fermentation, \r or from combustion of fossil fuels with oxygen in a  nitrogen-free \r environment, i.e.,  'oxycombustion') CCS is already amenable to \r commercial oil and gas reinjection techniques used to eliminate \r hydrogen sulphide gas and brines at prices of USD10-40 tCO2-eq-1\r sequestered (Wilson et al. 2003; Leeson et al. 2017). Most currently \r operating CCS facilities take advantage of concentrated CO2 flows, \r for example, from formation gas cleaning on the Snoevit and Sleipner \r platforms in Norway, from syngas production for the Al Reyadah \r DRI steel plant in Abu Dhabi, and from SMR hydrogen production \r on the Quest upgrader in Alberta. Since concentrated process CO2\r emissions are often exempted from existing cap and trade systems, \r [...]"


id: c521a80e697cfe9647f921816585a24f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31992
content:
"[...] these opportunities for CCS have largely gone unexploited. Many \r existing projects partially owe their existence to the utilisation of \r the captured CO2 for enhanced oil recovery, which in many cases \r counts as both CCS and CCU because of the permanent nature of "


id: 888b5b78cfcbd727e024451ee9c80561
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21187
content:
"USD40 to 80 tCO2\r -1, increasing over time. The high end represents \r a future in which synthetic fuels have sizeable market shares, due \r to cost reductions and policy drivers. The low end - which is itself \r considerable - represents very modest penetration into the methane \r and fuels markets, but it could also be an overestimate if CO2-\r derived products do not become cost competitive with alternative \r clean energy vectors such as hydrogen or ammonia, or with direct \r sequestration. Brynolf et al. (2018) indicates that a key cost variable \r will be the cost of electrolysers for producing hydrogen. Katelhon \r et al. (2019) estimate that up to 3.5 GtC yr-1 could be displaced from \r chemical production by 2030 using CCU, but this would require clean \r electricity equivalent to 55% of estimated global power production, \r at the same time other sectors' demand would also be rising. \r Mac Dowell et al. (2017) suggest that while CCU, and specifically \r [...]"


id: b918fe28e5e83997e0f6450fea646e9b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"[...] CO2-based enhanced oil recovery, may be an important economic \r incentive for early CCS projects (up to 4-8% of required mitigation \r by 2050), it is unlikely the chemical conversion of CO2 for CCU will \r account for more than 1% of overall mitigation."


id: 89de76e6161d9808a0d6df4ee6b60369
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21424
content:
"There are several potential crucial transitional roles for synthetic \r hydrocarbons and alcohols (e.g., methane, methanol, ethanol, ethylene, \r diesel and jet fuel) constructed using fossil, biomass or direct carbon \r capture (DAC) and CCU (Breyer et al. 2015; Dimitriou et al.  2015; \r Sternberg and Bardow 2015; Fasihi et al. 2017; Bataille et al. 2018a; \r Bataille 2020a). They can allow reductions in the GHG intensity of \r high-value legacy transport, industry and real estate that currently \r runs on fossil fuels but cannot be easily or readily retrofitted. They can \r be used by existing long-lived energy and feedstock infrastructure, \r transport and storage, which can compensate for seasonal supply \r fluctuations and contribute to enhancing energy security (Ampelli \r et al. 2015). Finally, they can reduce the GHG intensity of end uses \r that are very difficult to run on electricity, hydrogen or ammonia \r (e.g.,  long-haul aviation). However, their equivalent mitigation \r [...]"


id: 12e69f229125fb7dfaf3052addbdd89a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 529
content:
"[...] cost today would be very high (USD960-1440 tCO2-eq-1), with \r the potential to fall to USD24-324 tCO2-eq-1) with commercial \r economies of scale, with very high uncertainty (Hepburn et al. 2019; \r IEA 2020a; Ueckerdt et al. 2021)."


id: e4dad9866447e980715f7b001559b331
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37545
content:
"Finally, there is another class of CCU activities associated with \r carbonation of alkaline industrial wastes (including iron and steel \r slags, coal fly ash, mining and mineral processing wastes, incinerator \r residues, cement and concrete wastes, and pulp and paper mill \r wastes) using waste or atmospheric CO2. Given the large volume \r of alkaline wastes produced by industry, capture estimates are as \r high as 4 GtCO2 yr-1 (Cuellar-Franca and Azapagic 2015; Ebrahimi \r et al. 2017; Kaliyavaradhan and Ling 2017; Pasquier et al. 2018; \r Huang et al. 2019c; Pan et al. 2020; Zhang et al. 2020) However, as \r some alkaline wastes are already used directly as supplementary \r cementitious materials to reduce clinker-to-cement ratios, and their \r abundant availability in the future is questionable (e.g., steel blast \r furnace slag and coal fly ash), there will be a  strong competition \r between mitigation uses (Section  11.4.2), and the potential for \r [...]"


id: 94bf212890f8ee574059a182a384465c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23380
content:
"A very large and important uncertainty is the long-term demand \r for hydrocarbon and alcohol fuels (whether fossil-, biomass- or \r DAC-based), chemical feedstocks (e.g.,  methanol and ethylene) \r and materials, and competition for biomass feedstock with other \r priorities, including agriculture, biodiversity and other proximate \r land-use needs, as well as need for negative emissions through \r BECCS. The current global plastics production of around 350 Mt yr-1\r is almost entirely based on petroleum feedstock and recycling rates \r are very low. If this or future demand were to be 100% biomass\u0002based it would require tens of exajoules of biomass feedstock (Meys \r et al. 2021). If demand can be lowered and recycling increased \r (mechanical as well as chemical) the demand for biomass feedstock \r can be much lower (Material Economics 2019). Promising routes in \r the short-term would be to utilise CO2 from anaerobic digestion for \r [...]"


id: b5c39bdb318db42bc62b4c981f1a2e93
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29205
content:
"[...] biogas and fermentation for ethanol in the production of methane or \r methanol (Ericsson 2017); methanol can be converted into ethylene \r and propylene in a  methanol-to-olefins process and used in the \r production of plastics (Box 11.2). New process configurations where \r hydrogen is integrated into biomass conversion routes to increase \r yields and utilise all carbon in the feedstock are relatively unexplored \r (Ericsson 2017; De Luna et al. 2019)."


id: 7f1e4d5ec70aa1ce22a3219d8156ce1b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19515
content:
"and interactive technical deep decarbonisation pathways for GHG\u0002intense industrial sectors, and how they interact with the rest of the \r economy (Denis-Ryan et al. 2016; Ahman et al. 2017; Wesseling et al. \r 2017; Axelson et al. 2018; Davis et al. 2018; Bataille et al. 2018a; \r Bataille 2020a). It is a  common finding across this literature and \r a  related scenario literature (Energy Transitions Commission 2018; \r Material Economics 2019; UKCCC 2019a,b; IEA 2019b, 2020a; CAT \r 2020; IEA 2021a) that deep decarbonisation of industry requires \r integrating all available options. There is no 'silver bullet' and so \r all behavioural and technological options have to be mobilised, \r with more emphasis required on the policy mechanisms necessary \r to engage a challenging transition in the coming decades in highly \r competitive, currently GHG-intense, price-sensitive sectors with \r long-lived capital stock (Wesseling et al. 2017; Bataille et al. 2018a; \r [...]"


id: fd513e16ac31aba5d1e0bc1e6ce63919
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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vector_id: 41919
content:
"Circular economy introduces itself throughout, but mainly at the front \r end when designing materials and processes to be more materially \r efficient, efficient in use, and easy to recycle, and at the back end, \r when a material or product's services life has come to end, and it \r is time for recycling or sustainable disposal (Murray et al. 2017; \r Korhonen et al. 2018). The entire chain's potential will be maximised \r when these strategies are designed in ahead of time instead of \r considered on assembly, or as a retrofit (Allwood et al. 2012; Gonzalez \r Hernandez et al. 2018a; IEA 2019b; Material Economics 2019; Bataille \r 2020a). For example, when designing a building: (i) Is the building \r shell, interior mass and ducting orientated for passive heating and \r cooling, and can the shell and roof have building-integrated solar PV \r or added easily, with hard-to-retrofit wiring already incorporated? \r (ii) Are steel and high-quality concrete only used where really needed \r [...]"


id: 1f2a6f934d1f5f14fa54732284a6e188
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2690
content:
"[...] (i.e., for shear, tension and compression strength), can sections be \r prefabricated off-site, can other materials be substituted, such as \r wood? (iii) Can the interior fittings be built with easy-to-recycle \r plastics or other sustainably disposable materials (e.g.,  wood)? \r (iv) Can this building potentially serve multiple purposes through its \r anticipated lifetime, are service conduits oversized and easy to access \r for retrofitting? (v) When it is time to be taken apart, can pieces \r be reused, and all componnents recycled at high purity levels, for \r example, can all the copper wiring be easily be found and removed, "


id: b0140d6905af80466fce8ace0cde04e5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28218
content:
"For the period leading up to 2020, in terms of end-use allocation \r globally, approximately 40% of steel is used for structures, \r 20%  for industrial equipment, 18% for consumer products, \r 13% for infrastructure, and 10% for vehicles (Bataille 2020b). The \r global production of crude steel increased by 41% between 2008 \r and 2020 (World Steel Association 2021) and its GHG emissions, \r depending on the scope covered, is 3.7-4.1 GtCO2-eq. It represented \r 20% of total global direct industrial emissions in 2019 accounting \r for coke oven and blast furnace gases use (Crippa et al. 2021; Lamb \r et al. 2021; Minx et al. 2021; Olivier and Peters 2018; World Steel \r Association 2021; IEA 2020a) (Figure  11.4 and Table  11.1). \r Steel production can be divided into primary production based on iron \r ore and secondary production based on steel scrap. The blast furnace\u0002basic oxygen furnace route (BF-BOF) is the main primary steel route \r [...]"


id: 5488d02ae41f498017fef5afc5f3a57b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12148
content:
"[...] globally, while the electric arc furnace (EAF) is the preferred process \r for the less energy and emissions-intensive melting and alloying of \r recycled steel scrap. The direct reduced iron (DRI) route is a lesser\u0002used route that replaces BFs for reducing iron ore, usually followed by \r an EAF. In 2019, 73% of global crude steel production was produced \r in BF-BOFs, while 26% was produced in EAFs, a nominal 5.6% of \r which is DRI (World Steel Association 2021)."


id: 90873a73dbd88cf76aff086ad9fa769e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22634
content:
"The cement sector is regarded as a sector where mitigation options \r are especially narrow (Energy Transitions Commission 2018; Habert \r et al. 2020). Cement is used as the glue to hold together sand, \r gravel and stone aggregates to make concrete, the most consumed \r manufactured substance globally. The production of cement has been \r increasing faster than the global population since the middle of the \r last century (Scrivener et al. 2018). Despite significant improvements \r in energy efficiency over the last couple of decades (e.g., a systematic \r move from wet to dry kilns with calciner preheaters feeding off the \r kilns), the direct emissions of cement production (the sum of energy \r and process emissions) are estimated to be 2.1-2.5 GtCO2-eq in 2019 \r or 14-17% of total global direct industrial GHG emissions (Lehne \r and Preston 2018; Bataille 2020a; Sanjuan et al. 2020; Crippa et al. \r 2021; Hertwich 2021; Lamb et al. 2021) (Figure 11.4). Typically, about \r [...]"


id: 160a9294d103f3dd6785a4c1822c698d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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vector_id: 1094
content:
"[...] 40% of these direct emissions originate from process heating (e.g., for \r calcium carbonate (limestone) decomposition into calcium oxide at \r 850degC or higher, directly followed by combination with cementitious \r materials at about 1450degC to make clinker), while 60% are process \r CO2 emissions from the calcium carbonate decomposition (Kajaste \r and Hurme 2016; IEA and WBCSD 2018; Andrew 2019). Some of the \r CO2 is reabsorbed into concrete products and can be seen as avoided \r during the decades-long life of the products; estimates of this flux \r vary between 15 and 30% of the direct emissions (Stripple et al. \r 2018; Andersson et al. 2019; Schneider 2019; Cao et al. 2020; GCCA \r 2021a). Some companies are mixing CO2 into hardening concrete, \r both to dispose of the CO2 and more importantly reduce the need for \r binder (Lim et al. 2019)."


id: 50d09ca63a664f7e823efbc9becf1be4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11494
content:
"In addition, increases in material efficiency (e.g., more targeted steel \r use per vehicle, building or piece of infrastructure) and increases in \r the intensity of product use (e.g., sharing cars instead of owning them) \r can contribute significantly to reduce emissions by reducing the need \r for steel production. The IEA (2019b) suggested that up to 24% of \r cement and 40% of steel demand could be plausibly reduced through \r strong material efficiency efforts by 2060. Potential material efficiency \r contribution for the EU is estimated to be much higher - 48% (Material \r Economics 2019). Recycling would cut the average CO2 emissions \r per tonne of steel produced by 60% (Material Economics 2019), but \r globally by 2050 secondary steel production is limited to 40-56% in \r various scenarios (IEA 2019b), with 46% in the IEA (2021a) and up \r to 56% in 2050 in Xylia et al. (2016). It may scale up to 68% by 2070 \r (Xylia et al. 2016). CCU and more directly CCS are other options to \r [...]"


id: d30ea82d9ac86f9e3184d556fa09d2df
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34474
content:
"[...] reduce GHG emissions but depend on the full lifecycle net GHGs that \r can be allocated to the process (Section 11.3.6). Bio-based fuels can \r also substitute for some of the coal input, but due to other demands for \r biomass this strategy is likely to be limited to specific cases."


id: 4b2cf3f47f722b0d784c51ab0b8f5c05
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10472
content:
"Ordinary Portland cement process CO2 emissions cannot be \r avoided or reduced through the use of non-fossil energy sources. \r For this reason, CCS technology, which could capture just the \r process emissions (e.g., the EU LEILAC project, which concentrates \r the process emissions from the limestone calciner, see following \r paragraph) or both the energy and process-related CO2 emissions, is \r often mentioned as a potentially important element of an ambitious \r mitigation strategy in the cement sector. Different types of CCS \r processes can be deployed, including post-combustion technologies \r such as amine scrubbing and membrane-assisted CO2-liquefation, \r oxycombustion in a  low-to-zero nitrogen environment (full or \r partial) to produce a  concentrated CO2 stream for capture and \r disposal, or calcium-looping (Dean et al. 2011). The IEA puts cement \r CCS technologies at the technology readiness level (TRL) 6-8 (IEA \r 2020h). These approaches have different strengths and weaknesses \r [...]"


id: 3832805ada7929a96f071bb7ae3a1a7e
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7092
content:
"[...] concerning emission abatement potential, primary energy \r consumption, costs and retrofittability (Hills et al. 2016; Gardarsdottir \r et al. 2019; Voldsund et al. 2019). Use of biomass energy combined \r with CCS has the possibility of generating partial negative emissions, \r with the caveats introduced in Section 11.3.6 (Hepburn et al. 2019)."


id: 44a01f173dc100ab040f2b443120307e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9308
content:
"The energy-related emissions of cement production can also be reduced \r by using bioenergy solids, liquids or gases (TRL 9) (IEA and WBCSD \r 2018), hydrogen or electricity (TRL 4  according to IEA (2020h)) for \r generating the high-temperature heat at the calciner - hydrogen and \r bioenergy co-burning could be complementary due to their respective \r fast-vs-slow combustion characteristics. In an approach pursued by the \r LEILAC research project, the calcination process step is carried out in \r a steel vessel that is heated indirectly using natural gas (Hills et al. \r 2017). The LEILAC approach makes it possible to capture the process\u0002related emissions in a comparatively pure CO2 stream, which reduces \r the energy required for CO2 capture and purification. This technology \r (LEILAC in combination with CCS) could reduce total furnace emissions \r by up to 85% compared with an unabated, fossil fuelled cement plant, \r depending on the type of energy sources used for heating (Hills et al. \r [...]"


id: 5293f340599ea63496d4f4eb459cd7f7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11811
content:
"[...] 2017). In principle, the LEILAC approach allows the eventual potential \r electrification of the calciner by electrically heating the steel enclosure \r instead of using fossil burners."


id: adb18a73d5035bb322d0633b4eb7a1a5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27802
content:
"The production of ammonia causes most CO2 emissions in the \r chemical industry, about 30% according to the IEA (2018a) and \r nearly one third according to Crippa et al. (2021), Lamb et al. (2021) \r and Minx et al. (2021). Ammonia is produced in a catalytic reaction \r between nitrogen and hydrogen  - the latter most often produced \r through natural gas reforming (Stork et al. 2018; Material Economics \r 2019) and in some regions through coal gasification, which has \r several times higher associated CO2 emissions. Future low-carbon \r options include hydrogen from electrolysis using low- or zero-carbon \r energy sources (Philibert 2017a), natural gas reforming with CCS, or \r methane pyrolysis, a process in which methane is transformed into \r hydrogen and solid carbon (Bazzanella and Ausfelder 2017; Material \r Economics 2019; (Section 11.3.5 and Box 11.1). Electrifying ammonia \r production would lead to a decrease in total primary energy demand \r [...]"


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"[...] compared to conventional production, but a  significant efficiency \r improvement potential remains in novel synthesis processes (Wang \r et al. 2018; Faria 2021). Combining renewable energy sources \r and flexibility measures in the production process could allow for \r low-carbon ammonia production on all continents (Fasihi et al. \r 2021). Steam cracking of naphtha and natural gas liquids for the \r production of olefins (i.e.,  ethylene, propylene and butylene), and \r other high-value chemicals is the second most CO2-emitting process \r in the chemical industry, accounting for another almost 20% of "


id: 35ba3c354e33359e886836ffadc551d5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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"In a net zero world carbon will still be needed for many chemical \r products, but the sector must also address the lifecycle emissions of \r its products which arise in the use phase, for example, CO2 released \r from urea fertilisers, or at the end of life, for example, the incineration \r of waste plastics which was estimated to emit 100 Mt globally in \r 2015 (Zheng and Suh 2019). Reducing lifecycle emissions can partly \r be achieved by closing the material cycles starting with material and \r product design planning for reuse, remanufacturing, and recycling of \r products - ending up with chemical recycling which yields recycled \r feedstock that substitutes virgin feedstocks for various chemical \r processes (Rahimi and Garcia 2017; Smet and Linder 2019).However, \r the chemical recycling processes which are most well-studied are \r pyrolytic processes which are energy intensive and have significant \r losses of carbon to off-gases and solid residues (Dogu et al. 2021; \r [...]"


id: 8eb6912b69d563275264857c3b082c0a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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"[...] Davidson et al. 2021). They are thus associated with significant CO2\r emissions, which can even be larger in systems with chemical recycling \r than energy recovery (Meys et al. 2020). Further, the products from \r many pyrolytic chemical recycling processes are primarily fuels, \r which then in their subsequent use will emit all contained carbon \r as CO2 (Vollmer et al. 2020). Achieving carbon neutrality would thus \r require this CO2 either to be recirculated through energy-consuming \r synthesis routes or to be captured and stored (Geyer et al. 2017; \r Lopez et al. 2018; Material Economics 2019; Thunman et al. 2019). \r As all chemical products are unlikely to fit into chemical recycling \r systems, CCS can be used to capture and store a large share of their \r end-of-life emissions when combined with waste combustion plants \r or heat-demanding facilities like cement kilns (Leeson et al. 2017; \r Tang and You 2018)."


id: e82d70e60b1a2d3220b59e45fbcdbd7f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Reflecting the diversity of the sector, the listed options can only be \r illustrative. The above-listed strategies all rely on low-carbon energy \r to reach near-zero emissions. In considering mitigation strategies for \r the sector it will be key to focus on those for which there is a clear \r path towards (close to) zero emissions, with high (carbon) yields over \r the full product value chain and minimal fossil resource use for both \r energy and feedstocks (Saygin and Gielen 2021), with CCU and CCS \r employed for all remnant carbon flows. The necessity of combining \r mitigation approaches in the chemicals industry with low-carbon \r energy was recently highlighted in an analysis (Figure 11.10) which \r showed how the combined use of different recycling options, carbon \r capture, and biomass feedstocks was most effective at reducing \r global lifecycle emissions from plastics (Meys et al. 2021). While most \r of the chemical processes for doing all the above are well known \r [...]"


id: 8a27f306483ec19c3084990173ca079a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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vector_id: 21481
content:
"[...] and have been used commercially at least partly, they have not been \r used at large scale and in an integrated way. In the past, external \r conditions (e.g., availability and price of fossil feedstocks) have not \r set the necessary incentives to implement alternative routes and to \r avoid emitting combustion- and process-related CO2 emissions to the \r atmosphere. Most of these processes will very likely be more costly \r than using fossil fuels and full-scale commercialisation would require \r significant policy support and the implementation of dedicated \r lead markets (Wesseling et al. 2017; Bataille et al. 2018a; Material \r Economics 2019; Wyns et al. 2019). As in other subsectors, abatement \r costs for the various strategies vary considerably across regions and \r products, making it difficult to establish a plausible cost range for \r each (Bazzanella and Ausfelder 2017; Philibert 2017a; Philibert \r 2017b; Axelson et al. 2018; IEA 2018a; De Luna et al. 2019; Saygin \r [...]"


id: 461b9bcb66f6a065ebdd09ea0f02743f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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"The global production of plastics has increased rapidly over the past 70 years, with a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 8.4%, \r about 2.5 times the growth rate for global GDP (Geyer et al. 2017) and higher than other materials since 1970 (IEA 2019b). Global \r production of plastics is now more than 400 million tonnes, including synthetic fibres (IEA 2019b) The per capita use of plastics \r is still up to 20 times higher in developed countries than in developing countries with low signs of saturation and the potential \r for an increased use is thus still very large (IEA 2018a). Plastics is the largest output category from the petrochemical industry, \r which as a  whole currently uses about 14% of petroleum and 8% of natural gas (IEA 2018a). Forecasts for plastic production \r assuming continued growth at recent rates of about 3.5% point towards a doubled production by 2035, following record-breaking \r [...]"


id: e3e1f047c9c6583d0da71e00f9d5cbdf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"[...] investments in new and increased production capacity based on petroleum and gas in recent years (CIEL 2017; Bauer and Fontenit \r 2021). IEA forecasts show that even in a world where transport demand for oil falls considerably by 2050 from the current about \r 100 mbpd, feedstock demand for chemicals will rise from about 12 mbpd to 15-18 mbpd (IEA 2019b). Projections for increasing \r plastic production as well as petroleum use, together with the lack of investments in breakthrough low-emission technologies, do not \r align with necessary emission reductions."


id: 4c6bda1bdb8e7c6c5e941586116c4d45
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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"About half of the petroleum that goes into the chemical industry is used for producing plastics, and a significant share of this is \r combusted or lost in the energy-intensive production processes, primarily the steam cracker. GHG emissions from plastic production \r depend on the feedstock used (ethane-based production is associated with lower emissions than naphtha-based), the type of plastic \r produced (production of simple polyolefins is associated with lower emissions than more complex plastics such as polystyrene), \r and the contextual energy system (e.g., the GHG intensity of the electricity used) but weighted averages have been estimated to \r be 1.8 tCO2-eq t-1 for North American production (Daniel Posen et al. 2017) and 2.3 tCO2-eq t-1 for European production (Material \r Economics 2019). In regions more dependent on coal electricity production the numbers are likely to be higher, and several times \r [...]"


id: 934d7b9438bfe1ad9d563781e4943df9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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content:
"[...] higher for chemical production using coal as a feedstock - coal-based MTO has seven times higher emissions than olefins from steam \r cracking (Xiang et al. 2014). Coal-based plastic and chemicals production has over the past decade been developed and deployed \r primarily in China (Yang et al. 2019). The production of plastics was thus conservatively estimated to emit 1085 MtCO2-eq yr-1 in 2015 \r (Zheng and Suh 2019). Downstream compounding and conversion of plastics was estimated to emit another 535 MtCO2-eq yr-1, while \r end-of-life treatment added 161 MtCO2-eq yr-1. While incineration of plastic waste was the cause of only 5% of global plastic lifecycle \r emissions, in regions with waste-to-energy infrastructures this share is significantly larger, for example, 13% of lifecycle emissions \r in Europe (Ive Vanderreydt et al. 2021). The effective recycling rate of plastics remains low relating to a wide range of issues such as \r [...]"


id: c8515d439dd365e274bec29331d9fef1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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content:
"[...] insufficient collection systems, sorting capacity, contaminants and quality deficiencies in recycled plastics, design of plastics integrated \r in complex products such as electronics and vehicles, heterogenous plastics used in packaging, and illegal international trade."


id: e3707e4a3d1293c32fee901ab94bd951
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37313
content:
"containers. As fuel economy has become more desirable and \r design improvements have allowed crush bodies made of \r aluminium instead of steel, aluminium has become progressively \r more attractive for cars. Primary aluminium demand is total \r demand (100 Mt yr-1 in 2020) net of manufacturing waste reuse \r (14% of virgin and recycled input) and end-of-life recycling (about \r 20% of what reaches market). Primary aluminium consumption \r rose from under 20 Mt yr-1 in 1995 to over 66 Mt primary ingot \r production in 2020 (International Aluminium Institute change to \r 2021c). The International Aluminium Institute (2021a) expects total \r aluminium consumption to reach 150-290 Mt yr-1 by 2050 with \r primary aluminium contributing 69-170 Mt and secondary recycled \r 91-120 Mt (as in-use stock triples or quadruples). The OECD \r forecasts increases in demand by 2060 for primary aluminium to \r 139 Mt yr-1 and for secondary aluminium to 71 Mt yr-1 (OECD \r [...]"


id: 70dbba58b3a7dd29c665701171bb8710
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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vector_id: 17117
content:
"[...] 2019a).  Primary (as opposed to recycled) aluminium is generally \r made in a  two-stage process, often geographically separated. In \r the first stage aluminium oxide is extracted from bauxite ore (often \r with other trace elements) using the Bayer hydrometallurgical \r process, which requires up to 200degC heat when sodium hydroxide \r is used to leach the aluminium oxide, and up to 1000degC for kilning. \r This is followed by electrolytic separation of the oxygen from the \r elemental aluminium using the Hall-Heroult process, by far the most \r energy-intense part of making aluminium. This process has large \r potential emissions from the electricity used (12.5 MWh per tonne \r aluminium BAT, 14-15 MWh per tonne average). From bauxite mine \r to aluminium ingot, reported total global average emissions are \r between 12 and 17.6 tCO2-eq per tonne of aluminium, depending \r on estimates and assumptions made22 (Saevarsdottir et al. 2020). \r [...]"


id: 1d5e9702c2b8e19f05b9519b0763dd59
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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content:
"[...] About 10% of this, 1.5 tonnes of direct CO2 per tonne of aluminium \r are currently emitted as the graphite electrodes are depleted and \r combine with oxygen, and if less than optimal conditions are \r maintained, perfluorocarbons can be emitted with widely varying \r GHG intensity, up to the equivalent of 2  tCO2-eq per tonne of \r aluminium. PFC emissions, however, have been greatly reduced \r globally and almost eliminated in well-run facilities. Aluminium, if \r it is not contaminated, is highly recyclable and requires 1/20 of the \r energy required to produce virgin aluminium; increasing aluminium \r recycling rates from the 20-25% global average is a key emissions \r reduction strategy (Haraldsson and Johansson 2018)."


id: 6a0df87a279c415014a10f105d810afa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15932
content:
"The pulp and paper industry (PPI) is a  small net-emitter of CO2,\r assuming the feedstock is sustainably sourced (Chapter 7), but it has \r large emissions of biogenic CO2 from feedstock (700-800 Mt yr-1) \r (Tanzer et al. 2021). It includes pulp mills, integrated pulp and paper \r mills, and paper mills using virgin pulpwood and other fibre sources, \r residues and co-products from wood products manufacturing, and \r recycled paper as feedstock. Pulp mills typically have access to \r bioenergy in the chemical pulping processes to cover most or all of \r heat and electricity needs, for example, through chemicals recovery \r boilers and steam turbines in the kraft process. Mechanical pulping \r mainly uses electricity for energy; decarbonisation thus depends on \r grid emission factors. With the exception of the lime kiln in kraft \r pulp mills, process temperature needs are typically less than or \r equal to 150degC to 200degC, mainly steam for heating and drying. This \r [...]"


id: b2eb4a58227b8d7645408f2880938692
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"[...] means that this sector can be relatively easily decarbonised through \r continued energy efficiency, fuel switching and electrification, \r including use of high-temperature heat pumps (Ericsson and Nilsson \r 2018). Electrification of pulp mills could, in the longer term, make \r bio-residues currently used internally for energy, available as \r a carbon source for chemicals (Meys et al. 2021). The PPI also has the \r capabilities, resources and knowledge, to implement these changes. \r Inertia is mainly caused by equipment turnover rates, relative fuel \r and electricity prices, and the profitability of investments."


id: bf9ed30b846832a0d2f3ed9735122c59
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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"In Material Economics (2019), costs are provided for separate \r technologies and subsectors, and also by pathways, each including \r new industrial processes, circular economy and CCS components \r in different proportions, allowing for the transition to net zero \r industrial emission in the EU by 2050. That means that the study \r provides information about the three main mid- to long-term \r options which could enable a  wide abatement of GHG emissions. \r Given different electricity-price scenarios, average abatement costs \r associated with the circular economy-dominated pathway are: \r 12-75  EUR2019 tCO2-eq-1; for the carbon capture-dominated \r pathway 79 EUR2019 tCO2-eq-1; and for the new processes\u0002dominated scenario 91 EUR2019 tCO2-eq-1. Consequently, net\u0002zero-emission pathways are about 3-25% costlier compared to \r the baseline (Material Economics 2019). According to the Energy \r Transitions Commission (2018), cement decarbonisation would cost \r on average USD110-130 tCO2\r [...]"


id: 57f2959b000e9f8c7d12a8a355881d5b
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"[...] -1 depending on the cost scenario. \r Rootzen and Johnsson (2016) state that CO2 avoidance costs for \r the cement industry vary from 25 to 110 EUR tCO2\r -1, depending on \r the capture option considered and on the assumptions made with \r respect to the different cost items involved. According to the Energy \r Transitions Commission (2018), steel can be decarbonised on average \r at USD60 tCO2\r -1, with highly varying costs depending on low-carbon \r electricity prices."


id: 431fede2ba8f51a87e3a2af3582d1e3b
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content:
"Climate-policy-related literature focusing on deep industrial emission \r reductions has expanded rapidly since AR5. An increasing body of \r research proposes deep decarbonisation pathways for energy\u0002intensive industries (Figure 11.13). Bataille et al. (2018a) address the \r question of whether it is possible to reduce GHG emissions to very \r low, zero, or negative levels, and identifies preliminary technological \r and policy elements that may allow the transition, including \r the use of policy to drive technological innovation and uptake. \r Material Economics (2019), the IEA (2019b), the Energy Transitions \r Commission (2018) and Climate Action Tracker (CAT; 2020) take \r steps to identify pathways integrating energy efficiency, material \r efficiency, circular economy and innovative technologies options to \r cut GHG emissions across basic materials and value chains. The key \r conclusion is that net zero CO2 emissions from the largest sources \r [...]"


id: c4a9a9376a1a5f68798bfc15258532e
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"[...] (steel, plastics, ammonia, and cement) could be achieved by 2050 by \r deploying already available multiple options packaged in different \r ways (Davis et al. 2018; Material Economics 2019; UKCCC 2019b). \r The studies assume that for those technologies that have a kind of \r breakthrough technology status further technological development \r and significant cost reduction can be expected."


id: 73585cc46a30b20eaac8efad1330f4
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"For customers of final products, information on the potential \r impact of supply-side decarbonisation on final prices may be more \r useful than that of CO2 abatement costs. A different approach has \r been developed to assess the costs of mitigation by estimating \r the potential impacts of supply-side decarbonisation on final \r product prices. Material Economics (2019) shows that with deep \r decarbonisation, depending on the pathway, steel costs grow by \r 20-30%; plastics by 20-45%; ammonia by 15-60%; and cement \r (not concrete) by 70-115%. While these are large and problematic \r cost increases for material producers working with low margins in \r a competitive market, final end-use product price increases are far \r less, for example, a  car becomes 0.5% more expensive, supported \r by both Rootzen and Johnsson (2016) and the Energy Transitions \r Commission (2018). For comparison, Rootzen and Johnsson (2017) \r found that decarbonising cement-making, while doubling the cost \r [...]"


id: 37f390b44012fe0f592c9ca78d9099e3
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"[...] of cement, would add <1% to the costs of a  residential building; \r the Energy Transitions Commission (2018) found concrete would be \r 10-30% more expensive, adding USD15,000 or 3% to the price of \r a house including land value. Finally, the IEA (2020a) estimated the \r impact on end-use prices are rather small, even in a net zero scenario; \r they find price increases of 0.2% for a car and 0.6% for a house, \r based on higher costs for steel and cement respectively."


id: debb49ff56f7799e46984a38621d5c79
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"With growing mitigation ambition final energy demand is significantly \r lower in comparison of a current policy pathway (CurPol) and a scenario \r that explores the impact of further moderate actions (ModAct). Based \r on the underlying assumptions, scenarios IMP-SP and IMP-LD are \r characterised by the lowest final energy demand, triggered by high \r energy efficiency improvement rates as well as additional demand side \r measures, while a scenario with extensive use of CDR in the industry \r and the energy sectors to achieve net-negative emissions (IMP-Neg) \r leads to a significant increase in final energy demand. Scenario IMP-GS \r represents a pathway where mitigation action is gradually strengthened \r by 2030 compared to pre-COP 26 Nationally Determined Contributions \r (NDCs) shows the lowest final energy demand. All ambitious IMPs show \r substantially increasing contributions from electricity, with electricity's \r end-use share more than doubling for some of them by 2050 and more \r [...]"


id: a80dd15e45c40333b1e5c8720c5c03c8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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content:
"[...] than tripling by 2100. The share of hydrogen shows a flatter curve for \r many scenarios, reaching 5% (IMP-Ren) in 2050 and up to 20% in 2100 \r for some scenarios (Ren, LD). Those scenarios that have a strong focus \r on renewable energy electrification show high shares of hydrogen in \r the sector. In comparison to sector-specific and national studies which \r show typically a range between 5 and 15% by 2050, many IAM IMPs \r expect hydrogen to play a less important role. Results for industrial CCS "


id: 8aad48fce02b1a8334beb8f91133015c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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content:
"Figure 11.12 | Comparison of industry-sector-related CO2 emissions (including process emissions), final energy demand, share of electricity and hydrogen \r in the final energy mix, and industrial carbon capture and storage (CCS) for different mitigation scenarios representing illustrative mitigation pathways \r and the full sample of integrated assessment models (IAM) scenario results for three temperature categories (figure based on scenario database).\r Indicators in the Illustrative Mitigation Pathways (lines) and the 5-95% range of reference, 1.5degC and 2degC scenarios (shaded areas). The selected IMPs reflect the following \r characteristics: opportunities for reducing demand (IMP-LD; low demand), the role of deep renewable energy penetration and electrification (IMP-Ren; renewables), extensive \r use of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) in the industry and the energy sectors to achieve net-negative emissions (IMP-Neg), insights into how shifting development can lead \r [...]"


id: 840a11a747af28394e7f49d7fdb068a0
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vector_id: 20384
content:
"[...] to deep emission reductions and achieve sustainable development goals (IMP-SP; shifting pathways), and insights into how slower short-term emissions reductions can be \r compensated by very fast emission reductions later on (IMP-GS; gradual strengthening). Furthermore, two scenarios were selected to illustrate the consequences of current \r policies and pledges; these are CurPol (Current Policies) and ModAct (Moderate Action), and are referred to as Pathways Illustrative of Higher Emissions. Source: data are from \r the AR6 database; only scenarios that pass the vetting criteria are included (Section 3.2)."


id: e99b0fcea99f18d695be02bece602ff0
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content:
"concentrates on scenarios from the IEA. It has to be acknowledged \r that they only represent a small segment of the huge scenario family \r (see the scenario database in Chapter 3), but this approach enables \r to show the chronological evolution of scenarios coming from the \r same institution, using the same modelling approach (which allows \r a  technology-rich analytical backcasting approach), but reflect \r additional requests that emerge over time (Table 11.5). In the 2DS \r scenario from the 'Energy Technology Perspectives (ETP)' study (IEA \r 2017), which intends to describe in great technological detail how \r the global energy system could transform by 2060 so as to be in line \r with limiting global warming to below 2degC, total CO2 emissions are \r 74% lower in 2060 than in 2014, while only 39% lower in the industry \r sector. The Beyond 2degC Scenario (B2DS) of the same study intends \r to show how far known clean energy technologies (including those \r [...]"


id: fe3c01855a3cc3ceb0cddf5ac2bf00e0
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content:
"[...] that lead to negative emissions) could go if pushed to their practical \r limits, allowing the future temperature increase to be limited to 'well \r below' 2degC and lowering total CO2 emissions by 100% by 2060 and \r by 75% relative to 2014 in the industry sector."


id: 3d49afc694eab2b7c1b512c62eb41507
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7964
content:
"Since AR5 a number of studies providing a high technological level \r of detail for the industry sector have been released which describe \r how the industry sector can significantly reduce its GHG emissions \r until the middle of the century. Many of these studies try to \r specifically reflect the particular industry sector characteristics and \r barriers that hinder industry to follow an optimal transformation \r pathway. They vary in respect to different characteristics. In respect \r to their geographical scope, some studies analyse the prospects \r for industry sector decarbonisation on a global level (IEA 2017a; \r Energy Transitions Commission 2018; Grubler et al. 2018; IEA 2020a, \r 2019b, 2020c; Tchung-Ming et al. 2018); regional level, for example, \r European Commission (2018) and Material Economics (2019); or \r country level - studies for China, from where most industry-related \r emissions come (e.g.,  Zhou et al. 2019).23 In regard to sectoral \r [...]"


id: dc9556c5480a985e0393811dd445ad90
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vector_id: 36073
content:
"[...] scope, some studies include the entire industry sector, while others \r focus on selected GHG emission intensive sectors, such as steel, \r chemicals and/or concrete. Most of the scenarios focus solely on \r CO2 emissions, that is non-CO2 emissions of the industrial sector \r are neglected.24"


id: b3b70aa89a7b2dd18984ab400440e8eb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28864
content:
"Technologies penetration assumed in the CTS scenario by 2060 allows \r for an industrial emission cut of 45% from 2017 levels and a 50% \r cut against projected 2060 emissions in the Reference Technology \r Scenario (RTS) from the same study (IEA 2019b), similar to IEA's \r 2DS scenario. Energy efficiency improvements and deployment \r of BATs contribute 46% to cumulative emission reduction in \r 2018-2060, while fuel switching (15%), material efficiency (19%) \r and deployment of innovative processes (20%) provide the rest. \r IEA (2020a,c) which continues the Energy Technology Perspectives \r series include the new Sustainable Development Scenario (SDS) \r to describe a  trajectory for emissions consistent with reaching \r global 'net zero' CO2 emissions by around 2070.25 In 2070 the net \r zero balance is reached through a compensation of the remaining \r CO2 emissions (fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes \r still lead to around 3 GtCO2) by a combination of BECCS and to \r [...]"


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"[...] a lesser degree direct air capture and storage. In IEA (2020c) the \r Faster Innovation Case (FIC) shows a possibility to reach a net zero \r emissions level globally already in 2050, assuming that technology \r development and market penetration can be significantly \r accelerated. Innovation plays a major role in this scenario as almost \r half of all the additional emissions reductions in 2050 relative to \r the reference case would be from technologies that are in an early \r stage of development and have not yet reached the market today \r (IEA 2020c). The most ambitious IEA scenario NZE2050 (IEA 2021a) \r describes a pathway reaching net zero emissions at system level by \r 2050. With 0.52 GtCO2 industry-related CO2 emissions (including \r process emissions) it ends up 94% below 2018 levels in 2050. \r Remaining emissions in the industry sector have to be compensated \r by negative emissions (e.g., via DAC)."


id: a8df253ad501f0c8ad94ae97171c233e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26920
content:
"Industry sector mitigation studies also differ in regard to whether \r they develop coherent scenarios or whether they focus on discussing \r and analysing selected key mitigation strategies, without deriving full \r energy and emission scenarios. Coherent scenarios are developed \r in IEA (2017); Energy Transitions Commission (2018); Grubler et al. \r (2018); Tchung-Ming et al. (2018); IEA (2019b, 2020a,c); IEA (2021a); \r and IRENA (2021) on the global level, and in Climact (2018); \r European Commission (2018); and Material Economics (2019) on the \r European level. Recent literature analysing selected key mitigation \r strategies, for example IEA (2019b) and Material Economics (2019) \r has focused either exclusively or to a large extent on analysing the \r potential of materials efficiency and circular economy measures to \r reduce the need for primary raw materials relative to a  business\u0002as-usual development. The IEA (2021a, 2020a) also provides deep \r [...]"


id: a92a9bee96bfe27e43fabfd2821dbe30
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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vector_id: 26987
content:
"[...] insights in to single mitigation strategies for the industry sector, \r particularly the role of CCS.  The following discussion mainly "


id: 90f95a360ebe8e7162704fc6f7a7c3c1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22711
content:
"while it is explicitly excluded in the LED scenario. In the latter scenario, \r on the other hand, considerable emission reductions are assumed to \r be achieved by far-reaching reductions in material demand relative \r to a baseline development. In other words, the analysed scenarios \r also suggest that to reach very strong emission reductions from the \r industry sector either CCS needs to be deployed to a great extent or \r considerable material demand reductions will need to be realised. \r Such demand reductions only play a minor role in the 2DS scenario \r and no role in the ETC Supply Side scenario. The SDS described in IEA \r (2020a) provides a pathway where both CCS and material efficiency \r contribute significantly. In SDS material efficiency is a relevant factor \r in several parts of industry, explicitly steel, cement, and chemicals. \r Combining the different material efficiency options including \r a substantial part lifetime extension (particularly of buildings) leads \r [...]"


id: 2951fde538af47083a029086b3c877c1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4488
content:
"[...] to 29% less steel production by 2070, 26% less cement production, \r and 25% less chemicals production respectively in comparison to \r the reference line used in the study (Stated Policy Scenario: STEPS). \r Sector- or subsector-specific analysis supports the growing role of \r material efficiency. For the global chemical and petrochemical sector, \r Saygin and Gielen (2021) point out that circular economy (including \r recycling) has to cover 16% of the necessary reduction that is needed \r for the implementation of a 1.5degC scenario."


id: 7bd3a262c5436e9edf0560a1144c3a4d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18997
content:
"The comparative analysis leads to the point that the relevance of \r individual mitigation strategies in different scenarios depends not \r only on a  scenario's level of ambition. Instead, implicit or explicit \r assumptions about: (i) the costs associated with each strategy, \r (ii) future technological progress and availability of individual \r technologies, and (iii) the future public or political acceptance of \r individual strategies are likely to be main reasons for the observed \r differences between the analysed scenarios. For many energy\u0002intensive products, technologies capable of deep emission cuts are \r already available. Their application is subject to different economic \r and resources constraints (incremental investment needs, product \r prices escalation, requirements for escalation of new low-carbon \r power generation). To fully exploit potential availability of carbon-free \r energy sources (e.g., electricity or hydrogen and related derivates) is \r [...]"


id: af0137ea16504470a319dab0c7af0b3f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28034
content:
"[...] a fundamental prerequisite and marks the strong interdependencies \r between the industry and the energy sector."


id: 8fc66129c621e352628c8ef352f4afe1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22504
content:
"In all scenarios, the relevance of biomass and electricity in industrial \r final energy demand increases, especially in the more ambitious \r scenarios NZE2050, SDS, ETC Supply Side and LED.  While in all \r scenarios, electrification becomes more and more important, hydrogen \r or hydrogen-derived fuels, on the other hand, do not contribute to \r industrial final energy demand by the middle of the century in 2DS \r and B2DS, while LED (1% final energy share in 2050) and particularly \r ETC Supply Side (25% final energy share in 2050) consider hydrogen \r or hydrogen-derived fuels as a significant option. In the updated IEA \r scenarios hydrogen and hydrogen-based fuels already play a  more \r important role. In the SDS share in industry, final energy is around \r 10% (IEA 2020a) and in the Faster Innovation Case around 12% (IEA \r 2020c) in 2050. In the latter case this is based on the assumption \r that by 2050 on average each year 22 hydrogen-based steel plants \r [...]"


id: da474832532f9656183742b3ca394edc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35703
content:
"[...] come into operation (IEA 2020c). In SDS around 60% of the hydrogen \r is produced on-site via water electrolysis while the remaining 40% is \r generated in fossil fuel plants (methane reforming) coupled with CCS \r facilities. In the NZE2050 scenario biomass/biomethane (13%/3%), \r hydrogen (3%), natural gas with CCUS (4%), and coal with CCUS \r (4%) are responsible for 27% of the final energy demand of the \r sector. This is much more than in 2018, starting here from roughly 6% \r (only biomass). Direct use of electricity still plays a bigger role in the \r analysis, as share of electricity increases in NZE2050 from 22% in 2018 \r to 28% in 2030 and 46% in 2050 (with 15% a part of the electricity \r is used to produce hydrogen). This is reflecting the effect that since \r the publication of older IEA reports more direct electric applications \r for the sector become available. In NZE2050 approximately 25% of \r total heat used in the sector is electrified directly with heat pumps or \r [...]"


id: fb25d9a0eabc4963bb73176bf8d97412
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41560
content:
"[...] indirectly with synthetic fuels already by 2030.\r For B2DS it is assumed that most of the available abatement options \r in the industry sector are pushed to their feasible limits. That leads to \r cumulative direct CO2 emissions reductions compared to 2DS which \r come from: energy efficiency improvements and BAT deployment "


id: 6ef3fd43fcf024a9a4cfe0d9031870c8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16794
content:
"about preparatory measures which are able to flank the changes \r and to foster the establishment of new structures (Section  11.6). \r The right sequencing of the various mitigation options and building \r appropriate bridges between the different strategies are important. \r Rissman et al. (2020) proposes three phases of technologies \r deployment for the industry sector: (i) energy/material efficiency \r improvement (mainly incremental) and electrification in combination \r with demonstration projects for new technologies potentially \r important in subsequent phases (2020-2035), (ii) structural shifts \r based on technologies which reach maturity in phase (i) such as CCS \r and alternative materials (2035-2050), (iii) widespread deployment \r for technologies that are nascent today like molten oxide electrolysis\u0002based steel-making. There are no strong boundaries between the \r different phases and all phases have to be accompanied by effective \r [...]"


id: fc463ce5445251989a7478ea47eb51eb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41752
content:
"It is worth mentioning the flexibility of implementing transformational \r changes not the least depends on the age profile and projected \r longevity of existing capital stock, especially the willingness to accept \r the intentional or market-based stranding of high GHG intensity \r investments. This is a relevant aspect in all producing countries, but \r particularly in those countries with a rather young industry structure \r (i.e., comparative low age of existing facilities on average). Tong et al. \r (2019) suggest that in China, using the survival rate as a proxy, less \r than 10% of existing cement or steel production facilities will reach \r their end of operation time by 2050. Vogl et al. (2021b) argue that \r the mean blast furnace campaign is considerably shorter than used \r in Tong et al.(2019), at only 17 years between furnace relining, which \r suggests there is more room for retrofitting with clean steel major \r process technologies than generally assumed. Bataille et al. (2021b) \r [...]"


id: dca0f76539a64706bc22c8839cba6b63
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36080
content:
"[...] found if very low carbon intensity processes were mandatory starting \r in 2025, given the lifetimes of existing facilities, major steel process \r lifetimes of up to 27 years would still make a full retrofit cycle with \r low-carbon processes possible."


id: ae8fb2ad78fb9ecfdafbd21429e8f66b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27945
content:
"Taking the steel sector as an illustrative example, sector-specific \r scenarios examining the possibility to reach GHG reduction beyond \r 80% (CAT 2020; Bataille et al. 2021b; IEA 2021a; Vogl et al. 2021b) \r indicate that robust measures comprise direct reduction of iron (DRI) \r with hydrogen in combination with efforts to further close the loops \r and increase availability of scrap metal (reducing the demand for \r primary steel). As hydrogen-based DRI might not be a fully mature \r technology before 2030 (depending on further developments of \r the policy framework and technological progress), risk of path \r dependencies has to be taken into consideration when reinvestments \r in existing production capacities will be required in the coming years. \r For existing plants, implementation of energy efficiency measures \r (e.g.,  utilisation of waste heat, improvement of high-temperature \r pumps) could build a  bridge for further mitigation measures but \r [...]"


id: b0455278fe5b8aa7cf2290f0f080a2d2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28249
content:
"[...] have only limited unexhausted potential. As many GHG mitigation \r measures are associated with high investment costs and missing \r operating experience, a  step-by-step implementing process might \r be an appropriate strategy to avoid investment leakage (given the "


id: b746976f0e89e9de6c7ab8c4cecf0053
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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vector_id: 29460
content:
"Figure 11.13 | Potentials and costs for zero-carbon mitigation options for industry and basic materials: CIEL - carbon intensity of electricity for indirect emissions; \r EE - energy efficiency; ME - material efficiency; Circularity - material flows (clinker substituted by coal fly ash, blast furnace slag or other by-products and \r waste, steel scrap, plastic recycling, etc.); FeedCI - feedstock carbon intensity (hydrogen, biomass, novel cement, natural clinker substitutes); FSW+El - fuel \r switch and processes electrification with low-carbon electricity. Ranges for mitigation options are shown based on bottom-up studies for grouped technologies packages, \r not for single technologies. In circles, contribution to mitigation from technologies based on their readiness are shown for 2050 (2040) and 2070. Direct emissions include fuel \r [...]"


id: db8948c77c7a84e6ef63bad80f9e5143
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35905
content:
"[...] combustion and process emissions. Indirect emissions include emissions attributed to consumed electricity and purchased heat. For basic chemicals only methanol, ammonia and \r high-value chemicals are considered. The total for industry doesn't include emissions from waste. Base values for 2020 for direct and indirect emissions were calculated using 2019 \r GHG emission data (Crippa et al. 2021) and data for materials production from World Steel Association (2020a) and IEA (2021d). Negative mitigation costs for some options like \r Circularity are not reflected. Data from sources: Pauliuk et al. (2013a); Fawkes et al. (2016); WBCSD (2016); Bazzanella and Ausfelder (2017); IEA (2018a, 2019b,g,h, 2020a,c, \r 2021a); Lehne and Preston (2018); Scrivener et al. (2018); EUROFER (2019); Friedmann et al. (2019); Material Economics (2019); Sandalow et al. (2019); CAT (2020); CEMBUREAU \r [...]"


id: efd8e68ad4fa6a26e183aec381c759fe
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39584
content:
"[...] (2020); Gielen et al. (2020); Habert et al. (2020); World Steel Association (2020b); Bataille (2020a); GCCA (2021a); and Saygin and Gielen (2021)."


id: 7f56d007b00617af92e8389fe351e2aa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19557
content:
"Mitigation involves greater integration and coupling between sectors. \r This is widely recognised, for example, in the case of electrification of \r transport (Sections 6.6.2 and 10.3.1), but it has been less explored for \r industrial decarbonisation. Industry is a complex web of subsectors and \r intersectoral interaction and dependence, with associated mitigation \r opportunities and co-benefits and costs (OECD 2019b; Mendez-Alva \r et al. 2021). Implementation of the mitigation options assessed in \r Section 11.3 will result in new sectoral couplings, value chains, and \r business models but also in the phasing out of old ones. Notably, \r electrification in industry, hydrogen and sourcing of non-fossil carbon \r involves profound changes to how industry interacts with electricity \r systems and how industrial subsectors interact. For example, the \r chemicals and forestry industries will become much more coupled if \r various forms of biogenic carbon become an important feedstock for \r [...]"


id: 2c56e6757deff5a246b36d0edaba1d48
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5069
content:
"[...] plastics (Figure 11.10). Clinker substitution with blast furnace slag \r in the cement industry is a  well-established way of reducing CO2\r emissions (Fechner and Kray 2012), but this slag will no longer be \r available if blast furnaces are phased out. Furthermore, additional \r material demand resulting from mitigation in other sectors, as well as \r adaptation and the importance of material efficiency improvements, \r are issues that have attracted increasing attention since AR5 (IEA \r 2019b; Bleischwitz 2020; Hertwich et al. 2020). How future material \r will be affected under different climate scenarios is underexplored \r and typically not accounted for in modelling (Bataille et al. 2021a)."


id: 61458f71212cc2039c8ccc3c3d357372
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14416
content:
"While sector-specific cost analyses are rare in general, there are \r scenarios indicating that pathways to net zero CO2 emissions in the \r emissions-intensive sectors can be realised with limited additional \r costs. According to the Energy Transitions Commission (2018), deep \r decarbonisation from four major industry subsectors (plastics, steel, \r aluminium and cement) is achievable on a global level with cumulative \r incremental capital investments (2015-2050) limited to about 0.1% \r of aggregate GDP over that period. UKCCC (2019a) assesses that \r total incremental costs (compared to a theoretical scenario with no \r climate change policy action at all) for cutting industrial emissions \r by 90% by 2050 is 0.2% of expected 2050  UK  GDP (UKCCC \r 2019a). The additional investment is 0.2% of gross fixed capital \r formation (Material Economics 2019). The IEA (2020a) indicates the \r required annual incremental global investment in heavy industry is \r [...]"


id: 363e7fd8e6c20f732a94fc3ece72e170
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6785
content:
"[...] approximately 40 billion 2019USD yr-1 moving from STEPS to the \r SDS scenario (2020-2040), rising to USD55 billion yr-1 (2040-2070), \r effectively 0.05-0.07% of global annual GDP today."


id: 716ab2e463b26b0497214c105efccfa3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17207
content:
"Sectors that are particularly vulnerable to climate change include \r agriculture, forestry, fisheries and aquaculture, and their downstream \r processing industries (Bezner et al. 2021). Many of the energy\u0002intensive industries are located based on access to fresh water \r (e.g., pulp and paper) or sea transport (e.g., petrochemicals). Risks \r of major concern for industry include disrupted supply chains and \r energy supplies due to extreme weather events, as well as risks \r associated with droughts, floods with dirty water, sea level rise and \r storm surges (Dodman et al. 2021). Adaptation measures may in \r turn affect the demand for basic materials (e.g., steel and cement), \r for example, increased demand to build sea walls and protect \r infrastructure, but we have not found any estimates of the potential \r demand. Increased heat stress is unsafe for outdoor labourers and \r can reduce worker productivity, for example, in outdoor construction, \r [...]"


id: 6c9c5d6171b68a03c4c325ca802ef7d7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16397
content:
"With increasing shares of renewable electricity production there is \r a growing interest in industrial demand response, storage and hybrid \r solutions with on-site PV and combined heat and power (CHP) (Shoreh \r et al. 2016; Scheubel et al. 2017; Schriever and Halstrup 2018). With \r future industrial electrification, and in particular with hydrogen used \r as reduction agent in iron-making or as feedstock in the chemicals \r industry, the level of interaction between industry and power systems \r becomes very high. Large amounts of coking coal, or oil and gas as \r petrochemical energy and feedstock, are then replaced by electricity. \r For example, Meys et al. (2021) estimates a staggering future electricity \r demand of 10,000 TWh in a scenario for a net zero emissions plastics \r production of 1100 Mt in 2050 (see Section 11.3.5 for other estimates \r of electricity demand). Much of this electricity is used to produce \r hydrogen to allow for CCU and this provides a very large potential \r [...]"


id: cc401bf223430d11a41fba44e87b85a1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33258
content:
"[...] flexible demand if electrolysers are combined with hydrogen storage. \r Vogl et al. (2018) describe how hydrogen DRI and EAF steel plants can \r be highly flexible in their electricity demand by storing hydrogen or hot\u0002briquetted iron and increasing the share of scrap in EAF. The IEA (2019f) \r Future of Hydrogen report suggests that hydrogen production and \r storage networks could be in locations with already existing hydrogen \r production and storage, for example, chemical industries, and that \r these could be ideal for system load balancing and demand response, \r and in the case of district heating systems - for heat cascading."


id: ef4eed532a996ac5f06f0d8f4bb8b509
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39472
content:
"Countries are at different stages of different economic development \r paths. Some are already industrialised, while developing and \r emerging economies are on earlier take-off stages or accelerated \r growth stages and have yet to build the basic infrastructure needed \r to allow for basic mobility, housing, sanitation, and other services \r (Section 11.2.3). The available in-use stock of material per capita and \r in each country therefore differs significantly, and transition pathways \r will require a different mix of strategies, depending on each country's \r material demand to build, maintain, and operate stock of long-lived \r assets. Industrialised economies have much greater opportunities \r for reusing and recycling materials, while emerging economies have \r greater opportunities to avoid carbon lock-in. The IEA projected that \r more than 90% of the additional 2050 production of key materials \r will originate in non-OECD countries (IEA 2017). As incomes rise in \r [...]"


id: fa3d3906a75d858fb2fea059ee07be80
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41398
content:
"[...] emerging economies, the industry sector will grow in tandem to meet \r the increased demand for the manufactured goods and raw materials \r essential for infrastructure development. The energy and feedstocks \r needed to support this growth are likely to constitute a large portion \r of the increase in the emerging economies' GHG emissions in the \r future unless new low-carbon pathways are identified and promoted."


id: bcf12da581b8ed371e38834cf3543ccc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30485
content:
"The climate awareness that investors, shareholders, and customers \r demand from companies has been increasing steadily. It is reflected \r in the growing number of environmental management, carbon \r footprint accounting, benchmarking and reporting schemes (e.g., the \r Carbon Disclosure Project, Task Force on Climate-Related Financial \r Disclosures, Environmental Product Declarations, and others, \r e.g.,  Qian et al. 2018) requiring companies to disclose both direct \r and indirect GHG emissions, and creating explicit (for regulatory \r schemes) as well as implicit GHG liabilities. This requires harmonised \r and widely accepted methods for environmental and carbon footprint \r accounting (Bashmakov et al. 2021b). From an investor perspective \r there are both physical risks (e.g., potential damages from climate \r change to business) and transition risks (e.g., premature devaluation \r of assets driven by new policies and technologies deployment and \r [...]"


id: 6592dab066ba318a9d06c55359c7af9c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15137
content:
"[...] changes in public and private consumer preferences (NGFS 2019a)). \r Accompanied by reputational risks this leads to increased attention \r to Sustainable and Responsible Investment (SRI) principles and \r increased demands from investors, consumers and governments on \r climate and sustainability reporting and disclosure (NGFS 2019b). "


id: d9cda5c6592ba81f3ae5229f20711155
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35617
content:
"Both studies come to similar estimates on the average age of cement \r plants and blast furnaces in China of around 10-12 years old, which \r are the figures for which they have overlapping coverage. Both studies \r also use the same assumption of the typical lifetime of assets in these \r sectors of 40 years, whereas the IEA (2020a) study uses 30 years for \r chemical sector assets and 25 years for other industrial sectors. The \r studies come to differing estimates of cumulative emissions by 2050 \r from the industry sector; 196 GtCO2 in the IEA (2020a) study, and \r 162 GtCO2 in the Tong et al. (2019) study. This difference is attributable \r to a differing scope of emissions, with the IEA (2020a) study including \r industrial process emissions (which for the cement sector in particular \r are substantial) in addition to the energy-related emissions quantities \r accounted for in the Tong et al. (2019) study. After correcting for this \r [...]"


id: e144100c5b76449c25606a8e1ba61fa7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36893
content:
"Details of the methodologies to assess 'carbon lock-in' or 'committed \r emissions' differ across studies but the core components of the \r approaches adopted are common to each: an account of the existing \r level of emissions for the scope being assessed is established; this \r level is projected forward with a  stylised decay function that is \r informed by assessments of the current age and typical lifetimes of \r the underlying assets. From this, a cumulative emissions estimate is \r calculated. The future emissions intensity of the operated assets \r is  usually assumed to remain constant, implying that nothing is \r done to retrofit with mitigating technologies (e.g., carbon capture) \r or alter the way in which the plant is operated (e.g., switching to \r an alternative fuel or feedstock). While the quantities of emissions \r derived are often referred to as 'committed' or 'locked-in', their \r occurrence is of course dependent on a suite of economic, technology \r [...]"


id: 2062adfa625841746e8e52e56f2b4d2e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2918
content:
"The IEA (2020a) study provides supplementary analysis for the industry \r sector, examining the impact of considering investment cycles alongside \r the typical lifetimes assumed in its core analysis of emissions from \r existing industrial assets. For three heavy industry sectors - iron and \r steel, cement, and chemicals - the decay function applied to emissions \r from existing assets is re-simulated using a 25-year investment cycle \r assumption (Figure  11.14). This is 15 years shorter than the typical \r lifetimes assumed for assets in the iron and steel and cement sectors, \r and five years shorter than that considered for the chemical sector. \r The shorter timeframe for the investment cycle is a simplified way of \r representing the intermediate investments that are made to extend the \r life of a plant, such as the re-lining of a blast furnace, which can occur \r multiple times during the lifetime of an installation. These investments \r [...]"


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"[...] can often be similar in magnitude to that of replacing the installation, \r and they represent key points for intervention to reduce emissions. \r The findings of this supplementary analysis are that around 40%, or \r 60 GtCO2, could be avoided by 2050 if near-zero emissions options \r are available to replace this capacity, or units are retired, retrofitted \r or refurbished in a  way that significantly mitigates emissions \r (e.g., retrofitting carbon capture, or fuel or process switching to utilise \r bioenergy or low-carbon hydrogen)."


id: ff207bdc90f7dde9b33a66321c9fd442
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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content:
"In the past ten years there has been increasing interest and attention \r to industrial policy. One driver is the desire to retain industry or \r re-industrialise in regions within Europe and North America where \r industry has a long record of declining shares of GDP. The need for \r economic growth and poverty eradication is a key driver in developing \r countries. An important aspect is the need to meet the 'dual challenge \r of creating wealth for a  growing population while staying within \r planetary boundaries' (Altenburg and Assman 2017). The need for \r industrial policy that supports environmental goals and green growth \r has been analysed by Rodrik (2014); Aiginger (2014); Warwick (2013); \r and Busch et al. (2018). Similar ideas are taken up in OECD reports \r on green growth (OECD 2011) and system innovation (OECD 2015). \r However, these approaches to green industrial policy and innovation \r tend to focus on opportunities for manufacturing industries to \r [...]"


id: 41d504da6ba39924d9c101b394d5ece6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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"[...] develop through new markets for cleaner technologies. They rarely \r include explicit attention to the necessity of zero emissions and the \r profound changes in production, use and recycling of basic materials \r that this entails. This may also involve the phase-out or repurposing \r of industries that currently rely on fossil fuels and feedstock."


id: 2b1184a9d291e10554a5ecd5df3152cf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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content:
"The policy implications of zero emissions for heavy industries are \r relatively unexplored, although some analyses in this direction \r are available (e.g., Ahman et al. 2017; Philibert 2017a; Wesseling \r et al. 2017; Bataille et al. 2018a; Wyns et al. 2019; Bataille 2020a; \r Fan and Friedmann 2021). For industry, there has been a long time \r focus on energy efficiency policies through voluntary and negotiated \r agreements, energy management and audit schemes, and various \r programmes targeting industry (Fischedick et al. 2014a). Since AR5, \r interest in circular economy policies has increased and they have \r become more prevalent across regions and countries, including \r the EU, China, USA., Japan and Brazil (e.g., McDowall et al. 2017; \r Ranta et al. 2018; Geng et al. 2019). For electrification and CCUS, \r efforts are nascent and mainly focused on technology development \r and demonstrations. Policies for demand reduction and materials \r [...]"


id: c9223e901d2368c0827e280f390d8dc
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content:
"[...] efficiency are still relatively unexplored (e.g., Pollitt et al. 2020 and \r IEA 2019b). Since zero emissions in industry is a  new governance \r challenge it will be important to build awareness and institutional \r capacity in industrialised as well as developing countries."


id: 2b0507f8e0035dbffe26a963989dd55f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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content:
"Beyond the very direct links between energy and climate change, \r reliable, clean, and affordable energy (SDG 7) presents a  cross\u0002cutting issue, central to all SDGs and fundamental to development, \r and energy efficiency enables its provision by reducing the direct \r supply and necessary infrastructure required. Energy efficiency \r improvements can be delivered through multiple technical options \r and tested policies, delivering energy and resource savings \r simultaneously with other socio-economic and environmental co\u0002benefits. At the macro level, this includes enhancement of energy \r security (SDG 16, peace, justice and strong institutions) delivered \r through clean low-carbon energy systems (Fankhauser and Jotzo \r 2018). Much of the literature, including Sari and Akkaya (2016), \r Allan et al. (2017) and Garrett-Peltier (2017), points out that energy \r efficiency improvements deliver superior employment opportunities \r [...]"


id: ab1288bf81347a68892db313a4216848
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content:
"[...] (SDG 8 - decent work and economic growth), while a limited number \r of studies have reported that it can negatively impact employment in \r fuel supply sectors (Costantini et al. 2018)."


id: 31f5ce6cd5e0a62f1f0e4a1f8b59ffa5
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content:
"Industrial decarbonisation is technically possible on the mid\u0002century horizon, but requires scale up of technology development \r and deployment, multi-institutional coordination, and sectoral and \r national industrial policies with detailed subsectoral and regional \r mitigation pathways and transparent monitoring and evaluation \r processes (Ahman et al. 2017; Wesseling et al. 2017; Bataille \r et al. 2018a; Rissman et al. 2020; Nilsson et al. 2021). Transitions of \r industrial systems entail innovations, plant and technology phase\u0002outs, changes across and within existing value chains, new sectoral \r couplings, and large investments in enabling electricity, hydrogen, \r and other infrastructures. Low-carbon transitions are likely to be \r contested, non-linear and require a  multi-level perspective policy \r approach that addresses a  large spectrum of social, political, \r cultural and technical changes as well as accompanying phase-out \r [...]"


id: e7b6f5315664ba74339088a63ca12467
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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content:
"[...] policies, and involve a wide range of actors, including civil society \r groups, local authorities, labour unions and industry associations \r e(Geels et al. 2017; Rogge and Johnstone 2017; Yamada and Tanaka \r 2019; Koasidis et al. 2020). See also Cross-Chapter Box 12."


id: 67c7df5d83f73910173c922d8def92b2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Materials efficiency and circular economy are not well understood \r from a policy perspective and were for a long time neglected in low\u0002GHG industry roadmaps although they may represent significant \r potential (Allwood et al. 2011; Gonzalez Hernandez et al. 2018b; IEA \r 2019b, 2020a; Calisto Friant et al. 2021; Polverini 2021). Material \r efficiency is also neglected in products design, architectural and civil \r engineering education, infrastructure and building codes, and \r urban planning (Section  5.6) (Braun et al. 2018; Orr et al. 2019). \r For example, the overuse of steel and concrete in construction is \r well documented but policies or strategies (e.g., design guidelines \r or regulation) for improving the situation are lacking (Dunant et al. \r 2018; Shanks et al. 2019). Various circular economy solutions are \r gaining interest from policymakers with examples such as regulations \r and economic incentives for repair and reuse, initiatives to reduce \r [...]"


id: 153f6a7bef674a29dffad4a4a7101fe9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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content:
"[...] planned obsolescence, and setting targets for recycling. Barriers that \r policies need to address are often specific to the different material \r loops (e.g., copper contamination for steel and lack of technologies \r or poor economics for plastics)."


id: 45d039a82d4728a79d6d68a4ea24e758
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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content:
"Assessments of pricing mechanisms show generally that they lead \r to reduced emissions, even in sectors that receive free allocation \r such as industry (Martin et al. 2016; Haites et al. 2018; Narassimhan \r et al. 2018; Metcalf 2019; Bayer and Aklin 2020). However, questions \r remain as to whether these schemes can bring emissions down fast \r enough to reach the Paris Agreement goals (Boyce 2018; Tvinnereim \r and Mehling 2018; World Bank Group 2019). Most carbon prices \r are well below the levels needed to motivate investments in \r high-cost options that are needed to reach net zero emissions \r (Section 11.4.1.5). Among the 64 carbon-price schemes implemented \r worldwide today, only nine have carbon prices above USD40 (World \r Bank 2020). These are all based in Europe and include EU Emissions \r Trading System (ETS) (above USD40 since March 2021), Switzerland \r [...]"


id: 8a5af7e39864f50d647cd0464ba5fe8e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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content:
"[...] ETS, and seven countries with carbon taxes. Furthermore, emissions\u0002intensive and trade-exposed (EITE) industries are typically allowed \r exemptions and receive provisions that shelter them from any \r significant cost increase in virtually all pricing schemes (Haites 2018). \r These provisions have been allocated due to concerns about loss of \r competitiveness and carbon leakage which result from relocation and \r increased imports from jurisdictions with no, or weak, GHG emission \r regulations (Branger and Quirion 2014a; Branger and Quirion 2014b; \r Jakob 2021a). Embodied emissions in international trade accounts \r for one quarter of global CO2 emissions in 2015 (Moran et al. \r 2018) and has increased significantly over the past few decades, \r representing a  significant challenge to competitiveness related to \r climate policy. CBAM, or CBA are trade-based mechanisms designed \r to 'equalise' the carbon costs for domestic and foreign producers. \r [...]"


id: 9801a87f4e0feb6bdbe81c26ee8169a3
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content:
"minimise the incentives for downstream carbon abatement due to \r the imperfect pass through of carbon costs and therefore overlook \r demand-side solutions such as material efficiency (Skelton and \r Allwood 2017; Baker 2018). An alternative approach is to set the \r carbon pricing downstream on the consumption of carbon-intensive \r materials, whether they are imported or produced locally (Neuhoff \r et al. 2015, 2019; Munnings et al. 2019). However, implementation \r of consumption-based GHG pricing is also challenged by the need \r of product GHG traceability and enforcement transaction costs \r (Jakob et al. 2014; Munnings et al. 2019). Hybrid approaches are \r also considered (Neuhoff et al. 2015; Bataille et al. 2018a; Jakob \r et al. 2021). The efficacy of GHG prices to achieve major industry \r decarbonisation has been challenged by additional real world \r implementation problems, such as highly regionally fragmented \r GHG markets (Boyce 2018; Tvinnereim and Mehling 2018) and the \r [...]"


id: bc7558e8582cd84144c7725c2e17dab6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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content:
"[...] difficult social acceptance of price increases (Bailey et al. 2012; \r Raymond 2019). The higher GHG prices likely needed to incentivise \r industry to adopt low-GHG solutions pose social equity issues \r and resistance (Grainger and Kolstad 2010; Bataille et al. 2018b; \r Hourcade et al. 2018; Huang et al. 2019b; Wang et al. 2019). GHG \r pricing is also associated with promoting mainly incremental low\u0002cost options and not investments in radical technical change or \r the transformation of socio-technical systems (Grubb et al. 2014; \r Vogt-Schilb et al. 2018; Stiglitz 2019; Rosenbloom et al. 2020). \r Transparent and strategic management of cap-and-trade proceeds \r toward inclusive decarbonisation transition that support high \r abatement cost options can contribute toward easing these \r shortcomings (Carl and Fedor 2016; Raymond 2019). In California, \r Senate Bill 535 (De  Leon, Statutes of 2012) require that at least \r [...]"


id: 956878a39cadc555e7229bc0af8b4f8f
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content:
"[...] a quarter of the proceeds go to projects that provide a benefit to \r disadvantaged communities (California Climate Investments 2020)."


id: b84b047f41c603518537837c5f5c2275
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29636
content:
"carbon leakage and create a level playing field for products produced \r in jurisdiction with no, or lower, carbon price (Mehling et al. 2019; \r Markkanen et al. 2021). On 14 July 2021, the European Commission \r adopted a proposal for a CBAM that requires importers of aluminium, \r cement, iron and steel, electricity and fertiliser to buy certificates at \r the ETS price for the emissions embedded in the imported products \r (European Commission 2021; Morsdorf 2021). CBAMs should be \r crafted very carefully, to meet technical and legal challenges (Jakob \r et al. 2014; Sakai and Barrett 2016; Rocchi et al. 2018; Cosbey et al. \r 2019; Joltreau and Sommerfeld 2019; Pyrka et al. 2020). Technical \r challenges arise because estimating the price adjustment requires \r reliable data on the GHG content of products imported as well as \r a  clear understanding of the climate policy implications from the \r countries of imports. Application of pricing tools in industry requires \r [...]"


id: b3f5a32af73902c0adc6b2b618c8a6f1
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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content:
"[...] standardisation (benchmarking) of carbon-intensity assessments at \r products, installations, enterprises, countries, regions, and the global \r level. The limited number of existing benchmarking systems are not \r yet harmonised and thus not able to fulfill this function effectively. \r This limits the scope of products that can potentially be covered by \r CBAM-type policies (Bashmakov et al. 2021a)."


id: 2ba1e8f56c6d970fc7229f2f42d5e1a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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vector_id: 4930
content:
"(iii) GHG pricing or regulations with competitiveness provisions to trigger \r innovation and systemic GHG reduction; (iv) long-run, low-cost finance \r mechanisms to enable investment and reduce risk; (v) infrastructure \r planning and construction (e.g. CO2 transport and disposal, electricity \r and hydrogen transmission and storage), and institutional support \r (e.g., labour market training and transition support; electricity market \r reform). Wesseling et al. (2017b) and (Bataille et al. 2018a) further \r add a  step to conduct ongoing stakeholder engagements, including \r stakeholders with effective 'veto' power (i.e., firms, unions, government, \r communities, indigenous groups), to share and gather information, \r educate, debate, and build consensus for a robust, politically resilient \r policy package. This engagement of stakeholders can also bring on \r new supply chain collaborations and bridge the cost pass-through \r challenge (e.g.,  the Swedish HYBRIT steel project, or the ELYSIS \r [...]"


id: 9aaecb35a62dd1158d38070b990dc363
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content:
"[...] consortium, with plans to bring fully commercialised inert electrodes \r for bauxite electrolysis to market by 2024)."


id: db184a25eeb423fcb5e22ae50df0fcaf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35822
content:
"Governments have traditionally used voluntary agreements \r or mandatory energy or emission reduction targets to achieve \r emission reduction for specific emission-intensive sectors (e.g., UK \r Climate Change Agreements; India Performance, Achieve and Trade \r scheme). Sector visions, roadmaps and pathways combined with \r a  larger context of socio-economic goals, with clear objectives \r and policy direction, are needed for every industrial sector to \r achieve decarbonisation and at the time of writing they are \r emerging for some sectors. Grillitsch et al. (2019b) working from \r the socio-technical transitions literature, focuses on the need \r for maintaining 'directionality' for innovation (e.g.,  towards net \r zero transformation), the capacity for iterative technological \r and policy 'experimentation' and learning, 'demand articulation' \r (e.g., engagement of material efficiency and high value circularity), \r and 'policy coordination' as four main framing challenges. Wesseling \r [...]"


id: c14304a13418a4271ebcdd5f5d8e06ed
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content:
"[...] et al. (2017b) bridges from the socio-technical transitions literature \r to a  world more recognisable by executives and engineers, \r composed of structural components that include actors (e.g., firms, \r trade associations, government, research organisations, consumers, \r etc.), institutions (e.g., legal structures, norms, values and formal \r policies or regulations), technologies (e.g., facilities, infrastructure) \r and system interactions."


id: ce2b343f7deace78cd3bcaf11d3560ce
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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content:
"Applied research is relatively inexpensive compared to piloting, \r demonstrations, and early commercialisation, and arguably a lot of it \r has already been done for the key technologies that need to climb the \r technology readiness ladder (see Table 11.3). This includes electricity \r and hydrogen-based processes, electro-thermal technologies, high\u0002temperature heat pumps, catalysis, lightweight building construction, \r low embodied carbon construction materials, etc. Demonstration to \r market strategies can be particularly successful when the complete \r supply chain is considered. A  prominent example of such an \r integrated supply chain approach is the UK Offshore Wind Accelerator \r Project. Coordinated by the UK Carbon Trust and working with wind \r turbine manufacturers, the project looked across the potential supply \r chain for floating offshore wind and identified what components \r manufacturers could innovate and produce by themselves, and where \r [...]"


id: bfb090affa4ccbe4c1d9a11997ed57cc
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"[...] there were gaps beyond the capability of any one firm. This process \r led to several key areas of work where the government and firms \r could work together; once the concepts were piloted and proven, \r the firms went back into a competitive mode. The project illustrates \r the potential importance of third parties, including government, in \r creating platforms and opportunities for cross-industry exchange and \r collaboration (Tonjes et al. 2020)."


id: 784246eb81f496f5b92f02d1332240cf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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vector_id: 18370
content:
"Investing in RDI for low-GHG process emissions is risky and \r uncompetitive in the absence of convincing climate policy. Research \r investment should be guided by assessing options, technology \r readiness levels, and roadmaps towards technology demonstration \r and commercialisation. The potential GHG and environmental \r implications need to be assessed early on to assess the sustainability \r implications and to direct research needs (Yao and Masanet 2018; \r Zimmerman et al. 2020). Strategic areas for RDI can be focused on \r a set of possible process options for producing basic materials using \r fossil-free energy and feedstock, or CCU and CCS (Sections 11.3.5 \r and 11.3.6). Policies to enhance RDI include public funding for \r applied research, technological and business model experimentation, \r pilot and demonstration projects, as well as support for education \r and training - which further have the positive side effect of leading \r [...]"


id: 2dac6dcc94a72021b2f3e8d1ad9bb1db
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content:
"[...] to spill-overs and network effects through labour market mobility \r and collaboration (Nemet et al. 2018). Innovative business models \r will not emerge if the transition is not considered along the full \r value chain with a  focus on materials efficiency, circularity, and \r new roles for industry in a  transitioning energy system, including \r possibly providing demand response for electricity through designed\u0002in flexibility, for example, by combining electrolysis hydrogen \r production with substantial storage (Vogl et al. 2018)."


id: bbfa3a91574155321f2cce7443515c2
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content:
"Pilot and demonstration projects funded through public-private \r partnerships contributes to risk mitigation for industries and helps \r inform on the feasibility, performance, costs and environmental \r impacts of decarbonisation technologies. Most countries already \r maintain government research and deployment programs. For \r example, Horizon Europe has a  total budget of 95.5 billion EUR \r (USD117 billion) for 2021-2027, of which 30% will be directed \r to green technology research. The EU has conducted several \r demonstration projects for emission-intensive industries, such as \r the Ultra-Low Carbon Steel (ULCOS) project (Abdul Quader et al. \r 2016), which led to several small-scale pilots that are now going \r to larger-scale firm pilots (e.g.,  HISARNA, HYBRIT and SIDERWIN). \r Supported by the EU, several cement firms are working together on \r the cement LEILAC project, where a new form of limestone calciner \r is being developed to concentrate the process CO2 emerging from \r [...]"


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content:
"[...] quicklime production (about 60% of cement emissions) for eventual \r utilisation or geological storage (as one of many options for cement, \r see for example, Plaza et al. 2020). If LEILAC works, it is conceivable \r that existing cement plants globally that are located near CCS \r opportunities could have their emissions reduced by 60% with one \r major retrofit of the kiln."


id: 96ac606f41b83dcd9fd3903d78b4af5a
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"11.6.4.1 Public Procurement\r Governments spend a large portion of their budget on the provision \r of products and material through infrastructure development, general \r equipment, and miscellaneous goods. The OECD estimates that an \r average of 30% of general government expenditure goes to public \r procurements in OECD countries, representing 12.6% of GDP, which \r makes government a  powerful market actor (OECD 2021). Public \r procurement can therefore create a significant market pull and be \r used to pursue strategic environmental goals (Ghisetti 2017). Local, \r regional and national authorities can use their purchasing power \r to create niche markets and to guarantee demand for low-GHG \r products and material (Wesseling and Edquist 2018; Muslemani et al. \r 2021). In some cases, governments will have to adapt government \r procurement policies that are not well suited for the procurement \r of products and services that focus on the decarbonisation benefits \r [...]"


id: 9e2fcf918a602ddba604fa7b734e11b4
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vector_id: 25061
content:
"[...] and longer-term procurement commitments of emissions-reducing \r technologies and projects (Ghisetti 2017). Implementation can \r be challenged by the complexity of criteria, the lack of credible \r information to check GHG intensities and the added time needed \r for selection (Geng and Doberstein 2008; Testa et al. 2012; Bratt \r et al. 2013; Zhu et al. 2013; Cheng et al. 2018; Liu et al. 2019b). To \r ease these hurdles, the EU commission has developed environmental \r criteria that can be directly inserted in tender documents (Igarashi \r et al. 2015; European Commission 2016). These criteria are voluntary, \r and the extent of their application varies across public authorities \r (Michelsen and de Boer 2009; Bratt et al. 2013; Testa et al. 2016). In \r the Netherlands, companies achieving a desirable certification level \r under the national CO2 Performance Ladder obtain a  competitive \r advantage in public procurement (Rietbergen and Blok 2013; \r [...]"


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content:
"[...] Rietbergen et al. 2015). Globally, many countries have implemented \r green product procurement or sustainable procurement following \r Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 12 - 'Responsible consumption \r and production' (UNEP 2017). Public procurement is also developing \r at sub-national levels. For example, the state of California in the \r United States of America passed the Buy Clean California Act (AB 262) \r that establishes maximum acceptable global warming potentials for \r eligible steel and glass construction materials for public procurement \r (USGBC-LA 2018) (Box 11.4)."


id: 7685c5f099963217deae63972e975761
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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vector_id: 18071
content:
"The number of companies producing sustainability reports has \r increased rapidly over the last decade (Jackson and Belkhir 2018) and \r so has the number of pledges to carbon neutrality announced. This \r trend has mainly been driven by consumer concerns, investor requests, \r and as a business strategy to gain a competitive advantage (Higgins \r and Coffey 2016; Ibanez-Fores et al. 2016; Koberg and Longoni 2019). \r For example, Apple and the governments of Quebec and Canada are \r the financier and lead market maker in the Elysis consortium to bring \r inert electrodes to market for bauxite smelting to make zero-GHG \r aluminium. Aluminium is a very small fraction of the cost of a laptop \r or smartphone, so even expensive low-emissions aluminium adds to \r Apple's brand at very little cost per unit sold. Some countries are also \r requiring corporate to report their emissions. For example, the French \r government requires companies with 500 or more employees and \r [...]"


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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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content:
"[...] financial institutions to report Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) \r and disclose publicly Scope 1  (direct emissions), Scope 2  (indirect \r emissions from purchased electricity) and Scope 3 (emissions from \r supply chain impacts and consumer usage and end-of-life recycling \r practices) emissions (Mason et al. 2016)."


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"Construction of buildings represented 11% of energy and process\u0002related CO2 emissions globally in 2018 (IEA and UNEP 2019). The \r share of embodied emissions in construction is increasing as building \r energy efficiency is improving and energy supply is decarbonised \r (Chastas et al. 2016). As a  result, jurisdictions are increasingly \r considering new requirements in building codes to reduce embodied \r emissions. This is the case of France's new building code which is \r shifting from a  thermal regulation (RT 2012) to an environmental \r regulation (RE 2020) to include embodied GHG LCA metrics for \r encouraging use of low-GHG building materials (Ministere de \r la Transition ecologique et solidaire 2018; Schwarz et al. 2020). \r The 2018 International Green Construction Code (IGCC) provides \r technical requirements that can be adopted by jurisdictions for \r encouraging low-GHG building construction, which also covers \r minimum longevity and durability of structural, building envelope, \r [...]"


id: 4a9fc6cceba05358d41c6f5a13a8b852
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"[...] and hardscape materials (Art. 1001.3.2.3) (Celadyn 2014). Low-GHG \r building rating systems, such as LEEDs, are voluntary standards which \r include specific requirements on material resources in their rating \r scale. Trade-offs between energy performance achievement and \r material used in building construction needs to be further assessed \r and considered as low-GHG building code requirements develop. \r Local governments can also lead the way by adopting standards \r for construction. This is the case of the county of Marin in California \r which specifies maximum embodied carbon in kgCO2-eq m-3 and \r maximum ordinary Portland cement content in lbs/yd3\r  for different \r levels of concrete compressive strength (Marin County 2021)."


id: 1211a85c278540228caada7b78aabcd0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 367
content:
"The development of GHG labels corresponds to a growing demand \r from consumers desiring information about the climate impacts of \r their consumption (Darnall et al. 2012; Tan et al. 2014; Feucht and \r Zander 2018). GHG labels fill this information gap by empowering \r consumers' purchasing decisions and creating higher value for \r low-GHG products and materials (Vanclay et al. 2011; Cohen and \r Vandenbergh 2012). The willingness to pay for lower-GHG products \r has been found to be positive but to depend on socio-economic \r consumer characteristics, cultural preferences and the product \r considered (Shuai et al. 2014; de-Magistris and Gracia 2016; Tait \r et al. 2016; Li et al. 2017; Feucht and Zander 2018). Companies and \r governments that favour low-GHG products and who are seeking to \r achieve environmental, social, and governance (ESG) goals also need \r readily available and reliable information about the GHG content of \r [...]"


id: add15f6802d602e82816c60e1db60de6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27825
content:
"[...] products and materials they purchase and produce (Long and Young \r 2016; Munasinghe et al. 2016)."


id: 50ecef709eb0941fa08390172ba6bbf8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11515
content:
"Numerous methodologies have been developed by public and \r private organisations to meet the needs for credible and comparable \r environmental metrics at the product and organisation levels. Most \r follow lifecycle assessment standards as described in ISO 14040 and \r ISO 14044, ISO 14067 for climate change footprint only and ISO 14025 \r (2006) for environmental product declarations (EPD), but the way \r system boundaries are applied in practice varies (Wu et al. 2014; Liu \r et al. 2016). Adoption has been challenged by the complexity and the \r profusion of applications which contribute to confuse stakeholders \r (Gadema and Oglethorpe 2011; Guenther et al. 2012; Brecard 2014). \r The options of applying different system boundaries and allocation \r principles involve value judgements that in turn influence the results \r (Tanaka 2008; Finnveden et al. 2009; McManus et al. 2015; Overland \r 2019). A  more systematic and coordinated international approach \r [...]"


id: 63ca99a34fdc7bcb02a1c01f0663ab6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14847
content:
"[...] based on transparent and reliable data and methodologies is needed \r to induce global low-GHG market development (Pandey et al. 2011; \r Darnall et al. 2012; Tan et al. 2014)."


id: 9d4366bd5652f031690712bddc64dd28
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24902
content:
"Based on how feed-in-tariffs worked, a  contract for difference \r (CfD) could guarantee a  minimum and higher-than-market price \r for a given volume of early low-GHG materials. CfDs could be based \r on a minimum effective GHG price reflecting parity with the costs of \r current higher-emitting technologies, or directly on the higher base \r capital and operating costs for a  lower-GHG material (Richstein \r 2017; Chiappinelli et al. 2019; Sartor and Bataille 2019; Vogl \r et al. 2021a). CfDs can also be offered through low-GHG material \r procurement where an agreed price offsets the incremental cost \r of buying low-GHG content product or material. Private firms, by \r themselves or collectively, can also guarantee a higher than market \r price for low-GHG materials from their supplier for marketing \r purposes (Bataille et al. 2018a; Bataille 2020a). Reverse auctions \r [...]"


id: a998f722469f6db88059b67f9839cd8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27060
content:
"[...] (by which the lowest bidder gets the production subsidy) for low\u0002GHG materials is also an option but it remains to be analysed \r and explored. While these financial incentive schemes have been \r implemented for renewable energy, their application to incentivise \r and support low-GHG material production have yet to be developed \r and implemented. The German government is currently developing \r a draft law which will allow companies that commit to cut GHG \r emissions by more than half using innovative technologies to bid for \r 10-year CfDs with a guaranteed price for low-carbon steel, chemical \r and cement products (Agora Energiewende and Wuppertal Institut \r 2019; BMU 2021)."


id: e850a20296eec07f6086205e9df3c7ea
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38208
content:
"While the economic value of some discarded materials such as steel, \r paper and aluminium is generally high enough to justify the cost \r and efforts of recycling, at current rates of 85%, above 60%, and \r 43%, respectively (Graedel et al. 2011; Cullen and Allwood 2013), \r others like plastic or concrete have a much lower re-circularity value \r (Graedel et al. 2011). Most plastic waste ends up in landfills or \r dumped in the environment, with 9% recycled and 12% incinerated \r globally (Geyer et al. 2017; UNEP 2018). Collected waste plastics \r from OECD countries were largely exported to China until a ban in \r 2018 required OECD countries to review their practices (Qu et al. \r 2019). EPR schemes may thus need to be strengthened to actually \r achieve a  reduced use of virgin GHG-intensive materials. The \r potential for re-circularity of unreacted cement and aggregates in \r concrete is increasing as new standards and requirement develops. \r [...]"


id: 4f8b22b9d90547e69dd2cb85c48074b4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11280
content:
"[...] For example, concrete fines are now standardised as a new cement \r constituent in the European standardisation CEN/TC 51 - 'cements \r and construction limes'."


id: d7dc6c5b4e6b7d8b4a6f1c62b5f3cac
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35285
content:
"It is important that government bodies, academia and other \r actors strengthen their knowledge and capacities for the broad \r transformational changes envisioned for industry. In Japan, industry \r has been voluntarily working on GHG reduction, under the Framework \r of Keidanren's Commitment to a  Low-carbon Society since 2009. \r Government and scientific experts regularly review their commitments \r and discuss results, monitoring methods, and reconsidering goals. \r Industry federations/associations can obtain advice in the follow\u0002up meetings from other industries and academics. The energy and \r transport sectors have decades of building institutions and expertise, \r whereas industrial decarbonisation is largely a new policy domain. \r Most countries have experience in energy efficiency policies, some \r areas of research and innovation, waste management, regulations \r for operational permits and pollution control, worker safety and \r [...]"


id: 894d5678990bfb9b83bc1d23211d9944
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21328
content:
"[...] perhaps fuel switching. There is less experience with market demand \r pull policies although low-GHG public procurement is increasingly \r being tested. Circular economy policies are evolving but potential \r policies for managing material demand growth are less understood. \r Material efficiency policies through, for example, product standards \r or regulation against planned obsolescence are nascent but relatively \r unexplored (Gonzalez Hernandez et al. 2018a)."


id: e1b65d7356f757e9bd5e99727a534697
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36981
content:
"While all climate policy requires topic-specific adaptive governance \r for long-term effectiveness (Mathy et al. 2016), deep decarbonisation \r of heavy industry has special governance challenges, different from \r those for the electricity, transport or buildings sectors (Ahman et al. \r 2017; Wesseling et al. 2017; Bataille et al. 2018a). Competition is \r strong, investments are rare, capital intensive and very 'lumpy'. In an \r atmosphere where transformative innovation is required the process \r is very capital-focused with non-diversifiable risks unless several \r companies are involved. There are significant infrastructure needs for \r electricity, hydrogen, and CCS and CCU. Given there is no 'natural' \r market for low-emissions materials, there is a  need to manage \r both the supply and demand sides of the market, especially in early \r phase through lead supplier and markets. Finally, there is a very high \r probability of surprises and substantial learning, which could affect \r [...]"


id: cb7da6716771e5d18b7213838e3f711
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33129
content:
"Depending on what mixes of deep decarbonisation strategies are \r followed in a given region (e.g., material efficiency, electrification, \r hydrogen, biomass, CCU and CCS), infrastructure will need to be \r planned, financed and constructed. The UKCCC Net Zero Technical \r Report describes the infrastructure needs for achieving net zero \r GHG in the UK by 2050 for every sector of the economy (UKCCC \r 2019b). Transportation would be facilitated with pipelines or ships \r to allow transfer of captured CO2 for utilisation and disposal, and \r associated institutional frameworks (IEAGHG 2021). Electrification \r will require market design and transmission to support increased \r generation, transmission, and flexible demand. Hydrogen, CCU, and \r CCS will require significant new or adapted infrastructure. Hydrogen \r and CO2 pipelines, and expanded electricity transmission, have \r natural monopoly characteristics which are normally governed and \r [...]"


id: 42eb8c313566bd512c750ac07248d84
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8966
content:
"[...] planned by national and regional grid operators and their regulators. \r Industrial clustering (also known as eco-parks), such as those \r planned in Rotterdam (Netherlands) and Teeside (UK), would allow \r more physical and cost-effective sharing of electricity, CCU, CCS, \r and hydrogen infrastructure but is dependent on physical planning, \r permitting, and infrastructure policies."


id: a10d1cc4a6577fa386d418e369365872
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25555
content:
"Industry has a  diverse set of greenhouse gas (GHG) emission sources across subsectors. To decarbonise industry requires that \r we pursue several options simultaneously. These include energy efficiency, materials demand management, improving materials \r efficiency, more circular material flows, electrification, as well as carbon capture and utilisation (CCU) and carbon capture and \r storage (CCS). Improved materials efficiency and recycling reduces the need for primary resource extraction and the energy-intensive \r primary processing steps. Future recycling may include chemical recycling of plastics if quality requirements make mechanical \r recycling difficult. One approach, albeit energy intensive, is to break down waste plastics to produce new monomer building blocks, \r potentially based on biogenic carbon and hydrogen instead of fossil feedstock. Hydrogen can also be used as a reduction agent \r [...]"


id: 65bf7dba8bc702979648f1b3d4640cbd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15162
content:
"[...] instead of coke and coal in ironmaking. Process emissions from cement production can be captured and stored or used as feedstock \r for chemicals and materials. Electricity and hydrogen needs can be very large but the potential for renewable electricity, possibly in \r combination with other low carbon options, is not a limiting factor."


id: 6c78488405bd7d17b4fe82dcad76865d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16376
content:
"In most cases and in early stages of deployment, decarbonisation through electrification or CCS will make the primary production \r of basic materials such as cement, steel, or polyethylene more expensive. However, demand management, energy and materials \r efficiency, and more circular material flows can dampen the effect of such cost increases. In addition, the cost of energy-intensive \r materials is typically a very small part of the total price of products, such as an appliance, a bottle of soda or a building, so the effect \r on consumers is very small. Getting actors to pay more for zero-emission materials is a challenge in supply chains with a strong focus \r on competitiveness and cutting costs, but it is not a significant problem for the broader economy. Reduced demand for services such \r as square metres of living space or kilometres of car travel is an option where material living standards are already high. If material \r [...]"


id: e31f3b0c5a61a6e6f0c4e702a552a2ab
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37256
content:
"[...] living standards are very low, increased material use is often needed for more sustainable development. The options of materials \r and energy efficiency, and more circular material flows, generally have synergies with sustainable development. Increased use of \r electricity, hydrogen, CCU and CCS may have both positive and negative implications for sustainable development and thus require \r careful assessment and implementation for different contexts."


id: db995ff40f5a79bedb2613282f167d7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35926
content:
"Broad and sequential policy strategies for industrial development and decarbonisation that pursue several mitigation options at\r the same time are more likely to result in resource-efficient and cost-effective emission reductions. Industrial decarbonisation is \r a relatively new field and thus building capacity for industrial transition governance is motivated. For example, policy to support \r materials efficiency or fundamental technology shifts in primary processes is less developed than energy efficiency policy and carbon \r pricing. Based on shared visions or pathways for a zero-emission industry, industrial policy needs to support development of new \r technologies and solutions as well as market creation for low- and zero-emission materials and products. This implies coordination \r across several policy domains including research and innovation, waste and recycling, product standards, digitalisation, taxes, \r [...]"


id: 9939f1ce0f1337612f08d6810c3ce5cd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24173
content:
"[...] regional development, infrastructure, public procurement, permit procedures and more to make the transition to a carbon neutral \r industry. International competition means that trade rules must be evolved to not conflict with industrial decarbonisation. Some \r local and regional economies may be disadvantaged from the transition which can motivate re-education and other support."


id: 951adf330e40f717bb1af2953163afec
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23438
content:
"Alaa Al Khourdajie (United Kingdom/Syria), Almut Arneth (Germany), Ines Margarida Lima \r de Azevedo (Portugal/the United States of America), Christopher Bataille (Canada), David \r Beerling (United  Kingdom), Rachel  Bezner Kerr (the United States of America/Canada), Jessie \r Bradley (the  Netherlands), Holly  Jean  Buck (the United States of America), Luisa F.  Cabeza \r (Spain), Katherine Calvin (the  United States of America), Donovan Campbell (Jamaica), \r Jofre  Carnicer Cols (Spain), Vassilis  Daioglou (Greece), Mathijs  Harmsen (the Netherlands), \r Lena  Hoglund-Isaksson (Sweden), Joanna I.  House (United  Kingdom), David Keller (Germany/\r the United States of America), Kiane de Kleijne (the Netherlands), Susanna Kugelberg (Sweden), \r Igor Makarov (the Russian Federation), Francisco Meza (Chile), Jan Christoph Minx (Germany), \r Michael  Morecroft (United Kingdom), Gert-Jan  Nabuurs (the  Netherlands), Henry Neufeldt \r [...]"


id: 4f41fcbcae5822c6cd0b4392a460ed5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11231
content:
"[...] (Denmark/Germany), Aleksandra Novikova (Germany/the Russian Federation), Sudarmanto Budi \r Nugroho (Indonesia), Andreas Oschlies (Germany), Camille Parmesan (United Kingdom/the United \r States of America), Glen  P.  Peters (Norway/Australia), Joseph  Poore (United Kingdom), Joana \r Portugal-Pereira (Brazil), Julio  C.  Postigo (the  United States of America/Peru), Prajal Pradhan \r (Germany/Nepal), Phil Renforth (United Kingdom), Marta G. Rivera-Ferre (Spain), Stephanie Roe \r (the Philippines/the United States of America), Pramod K. Singh (India), Raphael Slade (United \r Kingdom), Stephen M. Smith (United Kingdom), Maria Cristina Tirado von der Pahlen (the United \r States of America/Spain), Daniela Toribio Ramirez (Mexico)"


id: fe03259c75d8998a1ab9198a361abc22
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42058
content:
"Diets high in plant protein and low in meat and dairy are \r associated with lower GHG emissions (robust evidence, high \r agreement). Ruminant meat shows the highest GHG intensity. Beef \r from dairy systems has lower emissions intensity than beef from beef \r herds (8-23 and 17-94  kgCO2-eq per 100 g  protein, respectively) \r when a share of emissions is allocated to dairy products. The wide \r variation in emissions reflects differences in production systems, \r which range from intensive feedlots with stock raised largely on \r grains through to rangeland and transhumance production systems. \r Where appropriate, a  shift to diets with a  higher share of plant \r protein, moderate intake of animal-source foods and reduced intake \r of added sugars, salt and saturated fats could lead to substantial \r decreases in GHG emissions. Benefits would also include reduced \r land occupation and nutrient losses to the surrounding environment, \r [...]"


id: 607ff886e315b09a9ec3306b02647139
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14284
content:
"[...] while at the same time providing health benefits and reducing \r mortality from diet-related non-communicable diseases. {7.4.5, 12.4}"


id: 89849c342fa8f93e2fd107f91d59a441
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21368
content:
"Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) is a  necessary element to \r achieve net zero CO2 and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions both \r globally and nationally, counterbalancing residual emissions \r from hard-to-transition sectors. It is a key element in scenarios \r that limit warming to 2degC (>67%) or lower by 2100 (robust \r evidence, high agreement). Implementation strategies need to \r reflect that CDR methods differ in terms of removal process, timescale \r of carbon storage, technological maturity, mitigation potential, cost, \r co-benefits, adverse side effects, and governance requirements. \r All Illustrative Mitigation Pathways (IMPs) use land-based biological \r CDR (primarily afforestation/reforestation (A/R)) and/or bioenergy with \r carbon capture and storage (BECCS) and some include direct air carbon \r capture and storage (DACCS). As a median value (5-95% range) across \r the scenarios that limit warming to 2degC (>67%) or lower, cumulative \r [...]"


id: cb96210b3c5425efa152b3fa65a5e674
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33146
content:
"[...] volumes of BECCS, CO2 removal from AFOLU (mainly A/R), and \r DACCS reach 328 (168-763) gigatonnes of CO2 equivalent (GtCO2), \r 252  (20-418)  GtCO2, and 29  (0-339)  GtCO2 for the 2020-2100 \r period, with annual volumes at 2.75  (0.52-9.45)  GtCO2 yr-1 for \r BECCS, 2.98 (0.23-6.38) GtCO2 yr-1 for the CO2 removal from AFOLU \r (mainly A/R), and 0.02 (0-1.74) GtCO2 yr-1 for DACCS, in 2050. {12.3, \r Cross-Chapter Box 8 in this chapter} "


id: 777dfd395c5cca57c1c711059cc26e83
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18227
content:
"Scenarios that limit warming to 2degC (>67%) or lower by 2100 \r commonly involve extensive mitigation in the agriculture, \r forestry and other land use (AFOLU) sector that at the \r same time provides biomass for mitigation in other sectors. \r Bioenergy is the most land intensive renewable energy option, \r but the total land occupation of other renewable energy \r options can become significant in high deployment scenarios \r (robust evidence, high agreement). Growing demands for food, \r feed, biomaterials, and non-fossil fuels increase the competition for \r land and biomass while climate change creates additional stresses on \r land, exacerbating existing risks to livelihoods, biodiversity, human \r and ecosystem health, infrastructure, and food systems. Appropriate \r integration of bioenergy and other bio-based systems, and of other \r mitigation options, with existing land and biomass uses can improve \r resource use efficiency, mitigate pressures on natural ecosystems and \r [...]"


id: 5ef3f8ce95ec27523ce7cb1a82085b43
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14002
content:
"[...] support adaptation through measures to combat land degradation, \r enhance food security, and improve resilience through maintenance \r of the productivity of the land resource base (medium evidence, high \r agreement). {3.2.5, 3.4.6, 12.5}  "


id: 7fd0dbfdfb755f1d649903fc866c6803
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19626
content:
"Understanding the co-benefits and trade-offs associated with \r mitigation is key to supporting societies to prioritise among \r the various sectoral policy options (medium evidence, medium \r agreement). For example, CDR options can have positive impacts \r on ecosystem services and the SDGs, but also potential adverse \r side effects; transforming food systems has potential co-benefits for \r several SDGs, but also trade-offs; and land-based mitigation measures \r may have multiple co-benefits but may also be associated with trade\u0002offs among environmental, social, and economic objectives. Therefore, \r the possible implementation of the different sectoral mitigation \r options would depend on how societies prioritise mitigation versus \r other products and services, including food, material well-being, \r nature conservation and biodiversity protection, as well as on other \r considerations such as society's future dependence on CDR and on \r [...]"


id: 72298532d7f4951f55cc45b7b60aa535
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17329
content:
"Coordinated, cross-sectoral approaches to climate change \r mitigation should be adopted to target synergies and minimise \r trade-offs between sectors and with respect to sustainable \r development (robust evidence, high agreement). This requires \r integrated planning using multiple-objective-multiple-impact policy \r frameworks. Strong interdependencies and cross-sectoral linkages \r create both opportunities for synergies and the need to address \r trade-offs related to mitigation options and technologies. This can \r only be done if coordinated sectoral approaches to climate change \r mitigation policies that mainstream these interactions are adopted. \r Integrated planning and cross-sectoral alignment of climate change \r policies are particularly evident in developing countries' Nationally \r Determined Contributions (NDCs) pledged under the Paris Agreement, \r where key priority sectors such as agriculture and energy are closely \r [...]"


id: 8b1f7c7504012d728f83cf2abcae9f41
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21639
content:
"[...] aligned between the proposed mitigation and adaptation actions \r in the context of sustainable development and the Sustainable \r Development Goals (SDGs). {12.6.2}"


id: c5a3dcc4e976578d296f9fdcdb367f04
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32076
content:
"Governance of CDR, food systems and land-based mitigation \r can support effective and equitable policy implementation \r (medium evidence, high agreement). Effectively responding \r to climate change while advancing sustainable development will \r require coordinated efforts among a diverse set of state- and non\u0002state-actors on global, multinational, national, and sub-national \r levels. Governance arrangements in public policy domains that cut \r through traditional sectors are confronted with specific challenges, \r such as establishing reliable systems for monitoring, reporting and \r verification (MRV) that allow evaluation of mitigation outcomes \r and co-benefits. Effectively integrating CDR into mitigation \r portfolios can build on already existing rules, procedures and \r instruments for emissions abatement. Additionally, to accelerate \r research, development, and demonstration, and to incentivise CDR \r deployment, a  political commitment to formal integration into \r [...]"


id: 6b807e8565c567422b37128e23ffcadb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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"[...] existing climate policy frameworks is required, including reliable \r MRV of carbon flows. Food systems governance may be pioneered \r through local food policy initiatives complemented by national \r and international initiatives, but governance on the national level \r tends to be fragmented, and thus have limited capacity to address \r structural issues like inequities in access. The governance of land\u0002based mitigation, including land-based CDR, can draw on lessons \r from previous experience with regulating biofuels and forest carbon; \r however, integrating these insights requires governance that goes \r beyond project-level approaches and emphasises integrated land \r use-planning and management within the frame of the SDGs. {7.4, \r Box 7.2, 7.6, 12.3.3, 12.4, 12.5}"


id: 7138b46799b448a5e31641da66309d5d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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"The scope of this chapter was motivated by the need for a succinct \r bottom-up cross-sectoral view of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions \r mitigation coupled with the desire to provide systemic perspectives \r on critical mitigation potentials and options that go beyond individual \r sectors and cover cross-sectoral topics such as food systems, land \r systems, and carbon dioxide removal (CDR) methods. Driven by this \r motivation, Chapter 12 provides a focused thematic assessment of \r CDR methods and food systems, followed by consideration of land\u0002related impacts of mitigation options (land-based CDR and other \r mitigation options that occupy land) and other cross-sectoral impacts \r of mitigation, with emphasis on synergies and trade-offs between \r mitigation options, and between mitigation and other environmental \r and socio-economic objectives. The systems focus is unique to \r the Sixth Assessment Report (AR6) of the IPCC and is of critical \r [...]"


id: 48d9a8d9789e42ee8ba333b8ec590633
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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"[...] policy relevance as it informs coordinated approaches to planning \r interventions that deliver multiple benefits and minimise trade\u0002offs, and coordinated policy approaches to support such planning, \r to tap relatively under-explored areas for the strengthening and \r acceleration of mitigation efforts in the short to medium term, \r and for dealing with residual emissions in hard-to-transition sectors \r in the medium to long term."


id: 169d14cb2733b62f8a6a0ff0c9171219
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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"In the context of cross-sectoral synergies and trade-offs, the chapter \r identifies a number of mitigation measures that have application in \r more than one sector. Examples include measures involving product \r and material circularity, which contribute to mitigation of  GHG \r emissions in a number of ways, such as treatment of organic waste \r to reduce methane emissions, avoid emissions through generation \r of renewable energy, and reduce emissions through substitution of \r synthetic fertilisers. Low-carbon energy technologies such as solar \r and wind may be used for grid electricity supply, as embedded \r generation in the buildings sector (e.g., rooftop solar) and for energy \r supply in the agriculture sector. Nuclear and bio-based thermal \r electric generation can provide multiple synergies including base \r load to augment solar and wind, district heating, and seawater \r desalination. Grid-integrated hydrogen systems can buffer variability \r [...]"


id: bc0cb7e71af0907e8c162f0d91b6e5fb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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"[...] of solar and wind power and are being explored as a  mitigation \r option in the transport and industry sectors. Carbon capture and \r storage (CCS) has potential application in a  number of industrial \r processes (cement, iron and steel, petroleum refining and pulp and \r paper) and the fossil fuel electricity sector. When coupled with energy \r recovery from biomass (BECCS), CCS can help to provide CO2 removal \r from the atmosphere. On the demand side, electric vehicles are also \r considered an option for balancing variable power, energy efficiency \r options find application across the sectors, as does reducing demand \r for goods and services, and improving material use efficiency. Focused \r inquiry into these areas of cross-sectoral perspectives is provided for \r CDR, food systems, and land-based mitigation options."


id: 1fd5325d726dc4c4097a5117b7834c11
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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"Table 12.1 presents an overview of the cross-sectoral perspectives \r addressed in Chapter 12, mapping the chapter's main themes to the \r sectoral and global chapters in this report. These mappings reflect \r the cross-sectoral aspects of mitigation options in the context of \r sustainable development, sectoral policy interactions, governance, \r implications in terms of international trade, spillover effects, and \r competitiveness, and cross-sectoral financing options for mitigation. \r While some cross-sector technologies are covered in more detail \r in sectoral chapters,  this chapter covers  important cross-sectoral \r linkages and provides synthesis concerning  costs and potentials \r of mitigation  options, and co-benefits and trade-offs that can be \r associated with deployment of mitigation options. Additionally, \r Chapter 12 covers CDR methods and specific considerations related \r to land use and food systems, complementing Chapter  7.  The \r [...]"


id: 4c025aaef2c0b141bd2885b7a3a1b02a
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"[...] literature assessed in the chapter includes both peer-reviewed and \r grey literature since the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) of the IPCC, \r including the IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5degC \r (SR1.5), the IPCC Special Report on Climate Change and Land \r (SRCCL) and the IPCC Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere \r in a Changing Climate (SROCC). Knowledge gaps are identified and \r reflected where encountered, as well as in a separate section. Finally, \r a strong link is maintained with sectoral chapters and the relevant \r global chapters of this report to ensure consistency."


id: 25437d75ce74be8fc65f3c90c4c83723
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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"A range of examples of where mitigation measures result in cross\u0002sectoral interactions and integration is identified. The mitigation \r potential of electric vehicles, including plug-in hybrids, is linked to \r the extent of decarbonisation of the electricity grid, as well as to the \r liquid fuel supply emissions profile. Making buildings energy positive, \r where excess energy is used to charge vehicles, can increase the \r potential of electric and hybrid vehicles. Advanced process control \r and process optimisation in industry can reduce energy demand \r and material inputs, which in turn can reduce emissions linked to \r resource extraction and manufacturing. Trees and green roofs \r planted to counter urban heat islands reduce the demand for energy \r for air conditioning and simultaneously sequester carbon. Material \r and product circularity contributes to mitigation, such as treatment \r of organic waste to reduce methane emissions, generate renewable \r [...]"


id: 115423dc535eeaa74095620e4e22f316
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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"The analysis presented here is based, as far as possible, on \r information contained in Chapters 6, 7, 9, 10 and 11, where costs \r and potentials, referred to here as 'sectoral mitigation potentials' \r have been discussed for each individual sector. In the past, these \r were designated as bottom-up potentials, in contrast to the top\u0002down potentials that are obtained from integrated energy-economic \r models and IAMs. However, IAMs increasingly include 'bottom-up' \r elements, which makes the distinction less clear. Still, sectoral studies \r often have more technical and economic detail than IAMs. They may \r also provide more up-to-date information on technology options \r and associated costs. However, aggregation of results from sectoral \r studies is more complex, and although interactions and overlap are \r corrected for as far as possible in this analysis, it is recognised that \r such systemic effects are much more rigorously taken into account \r [...]"


id: a6097c1462044a64a8c1e925393477ef
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"[...] in IAMs. A comparison is made between the sectoral results and the \r outcomes of the IAMs in Section 12.2.3."


id: e828580245a345da64100eb6f54ad9c0
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"The aim of this section is to provide a consolidated overview of the \r net emissions reduction potentials and costs for mitigation options \r available in the various sectors dealt with in the sectoral Chapters 6, \r 7, 9, 10 and 11 of this assessment report. This overview provides \r policymakers with an understanding of which options are more or \r less important in terms of mitigating emissions in the short term \r (here interpreted as 2030), and which ones are more or less costly. \r The intention is not to provide a  high level of accuracy for each \r technology cost or potential, but rather to indicate relative importance \r on a global scale and whether costs are low, intermediate or high. \r The section starts with an introduction (Section  12.2.1), providing \r definitions and the background. Next, ranges of net emission \r reduction potentials and the associated costs for the year 2030 are \r presented (Section  12.2.2) and compared to earlier estimates and \r [...]"


id: 4f7723c312c5c327dc3f2e25c153e77b
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"[...] with the outputs of IAMs (Section 12.2.3). Finally, an outlook to the \r year 2050 is provided (Section 12.2.4)."


id: f77c2311fab35e340d6fc756387746bc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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"As indicated previously, net emission reduction potentials are \r presented based on comparison with a  reference scenario. \r Unfortunately, not all costs and potentials found in the literature are \r determined against the same reference scenarios. In this assessment, \r reference scenarios are based on what were assumed current-policy \r scenarios in the period 2015-2019. Typical reference scenarios are the \r Shared Socio-economic Pathway (SSP2) scenarios (Fricko et al. 2017) \r and the Current Policies scenario from the World Energy Outlook \r (WEO) 2019 (IEA 2019). They can both be considered scenarios with \r middle-of-the-road expectations on population growth and economic \r development, but there are still some differences between the two \r (Table  12.2). The net emissions reduction potentials reported here \r were generally based on analyses carried out before 2020, so the \r impact of the COVID-19 pandemic was not taken into account. For \r [...]"


id: 26f2d84cc103cdd751ac02b50d51b187
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"[...] comparison, the Stated Policies scenario of the World Energy Outlook \r 2020 (IEA 2020a) is also shown, one of the scenarios in which the \r impact of COVID-19 was considered. Variations of up to 10% between \r the different reference scenarios exist with respect to macro-variables \r such as total primary energy use and total GHG emissions. The \r potential estimates presented below should be interpreted against \r this background. The total emissions under the reference scenarios in \r 2030 are expected to be in the range of 54 to 68 GtCO2-eq yr-1 with \r a median of 60 GtCO2-eq yr-1 (Table 4.1)."


id: 9fdd4b1f284fe2811538eb1f849127fa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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"The term 'mitigation potential' is used here to report the quantity of \r net greenhouse gas emissions reductions that can be achieved by \r a given mitigation option relative to a specified reference scenario. \r The net greenhouse gas emission reduction is the sum of reduced \r emissions and enhanced sinks. Several types of potential can be \r distinguished. The technical potential is the mitigation potential \r constrained by theoretical limits in addition to the availability of \r technology and practices. Quantification of technical potentials \r primarily takes into account technical considerations, but social, \r economic and/or environmental considerations are sometimes also \r considered, if these represent strong barriers to the deployment of \r an option. The economic potential, being the potential reported in \r this section, is the proportion of the technical potential for which the \r social benefits exceed the social costs, taking into account a social \r [...]"


id: 7dea485631b8c93b8656e1516333e45f
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"[...] discount rate and the value of externalities (see Annex I: Glossary). \r In this section, only externalities related to greenhouse gas emissions \r are taken into account. They are represented by using different cost \r cut-off levels of options in terms of USD per tonne of avoided CO2-eq "


id: b5243031f199caa6dd5a080cbf588a05
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"by solar and wind energy in the reference scenario has increased, \r compared to earlier versions of the World Energy Outlook. The net \r effect is a  modest increase in the average value of the potential, \r and a  wider uncertainty range. Costs of electricity-generating \r technologies are discussed in Section 6.4.7, with a summary of LCOEs \r from the literature being presented in Section 6.4.7. Mitigation costs \r of electricity production technology depend on local conditions \r and on the baseline technology being displaced, and it is difficult \r to determine the distribution over the cost ranges used in this \r assessment. However, it is possible to indicate a broad cost range for \r these technologies. These cost ranges are presented in Table 12.3. For \r onshore wind and utility-scale solar energy, there is strong evidence \r that despite regional differences in resource potential and cost, \r a large part of the mitigation potential can be found in the negative \r [...]"


id: f969ea09ffce7385ee8017252da2b7b
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"[...] cost category or at cost parity with fossil fuel-based options. This is \r also the case for nuclear energy in some regions. Other technologies \r show mostly positive mitigation costs, the highest mitigation costs \r are for CCS and bioelectricity with CCS, for details see Supplementary \r Material 12.SM.1.2."


id: 124a501558bf5d0e4c05297f23c2f098
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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content:
"The emissions reduction potentials for the buildings sector were \r based on the analysis by Chapter  9  authors of a  large number of \r sectoral studies for individual countries or regions. In total, the \r chapter analysed the results of 67 studies that assess the potential \r of technological energy efficiency and onsite renewable energy \r production and use, and the results of 11 studies that assess the \r potential of sufficiency measures helping avoid demand for energy \r and materials. The sufficiency measures were included in models by \r reorganisation of human activities; efficient design, planning, and \r use of building space; higher density of building and settlement \r inhabitancy; redefining and downsizing goods and equipment, \r limiting their use to health, living, and working standards, and their \r sharing. Most of these studies targeted 2050 for the decarbonisation \r of buildings; the potentials in 2030 reported here rely on the \r [...]"


id: 261a56913e5d3ee55020097ed42d65ab
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"[...] estimates for 2030 provided by these studies or on the interpolated \r estimates targeting these 2050 figures. Based on these individual \r country studies, regional aggregate emissions reduction percentages \r were found. The potential estimates were assembled in the order \r sufficiency, efficiency, renewable options, correcting the amount \r of the potential at each step for the interaction with preceding \r measures. Note that the option 'Enhanced use of wood products' \r was analysed by Chapter 7, but is listed under the buildings sector in \r Table 12.3, as such enhanced use of wood takes place predominantly \r in the construction sector."


id: 26374bf201d0d477f2328dacd2f90ccf
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"Figure 12.1 | Comparison of sectoral estimates for emissions reduction potential with the emissions reductions calculated using IAMs. Emission reductions \r calculated using IAMs are given as box plots of global emissions reductions for each sector (dark blue and brown) at different global carbon cost levels (horizontal axis) for \r 2030, based on all scenarios that limit warming to 2degC (>67%) or lower (see Chapter 3) in the AR6 scenarios database (IIASA 2021). For IAMs, the cost levels correspond to the \r levels of the carbon price. Hinges in the dark blue box plots represent the interquartile ranges and whiskers extend to 5th and 95th percentiles while the hinges in the brown \r box plots describe the full range, and the middle point indicates the mean, not the median. In yellow, the estimates from the sectoral analysis are given. In all cases, only direct \r [...]"


id: ac9044a04c89d74d55e8f6126fa26980
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"[...] emissions reductions are presented, except for the light-blue boxes (for buildings), which include indirect emissions reductions. The light-blue boxes are only given for reasons of \r completeness. For buildings the dark-blue boxes should be compared with the yellow boxes. Light-blue and yellow boxes represent the full ranges of estimates. For IAMs, global \r carbon prices are applied, which are subject to significant uncertainty."


id: 2a8c287f41e646fd8123d5f55f7985b7
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"The results of the sectoral mitigation potentials are also compared \r with mitigation impacts as calculated by IAMs. To this end, \r cumulative sectoral potentials over cost ranges were determined, \r based on the information in Table  12.3. For options that are in \r various cost ranges, we assumed that they are evenly distributed \r over these cost ranges. The only exception is wind and solar energy, \r for which it is indicated that the majority of the mitigation potential \r is in the negative cost range. It was assumed that the fraction in the \r negative cost range was 60%; the remainder is evenly distributed \r over the other cost ranges. These cumulative potentials were \r compared with emissions reductions realised in IAMs at certain \r price levels for CO2. Note that these price levels selected in IAMs \r are average price levels - not all IAMs use globally uniform carbon \r prices, so underlying these cost levels, there may be regional \r [...]"


id: b2bd039a129397e188cc49dd92588b07
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"[...] differentiation. Data were taken from the AR6 scenarios database. \r Note that, strictly speaking, not all models in the database are \r IAMs; in this analysis all models in the database were used, but "


id: b3d7464a73e29865c1563fc2e496693a
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content:
"Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) is a necessary element of mitigation portfolios to achieve net zero CO2 and GHG emissions both globally \r and nationally, counterbalancing residual emissions from hard-to-transition sectors such as industry, transport and agriculture. CDR \r is a key element in scenarios that limit warming to 2degC (>67%) or lower, regardless of whether global emissions reach near-zero, net \r zero or net-negative levels (Sections 3.3, 3.4, 3.5 and 12.3). While national mitigation portfolios aiming at net zero or net-negative \r emissions will need to include some level of CDR, the choice of methods and the scale and timing of their deployment will depend on \r the ambition for gross emissions reductions, how sustainability and feasibility constraints are managed, and how political preferences \r and social acceptability evolve (Section 12.3.3). This box gives an overview of CDR methods, presents a categorisation based on \r [...]"


id: 471320c38efdbb9fca8e391bc5133c9d
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"[...] the key characteristics of removal processes and storage timescales, and clarifies the multiple roles of CDR in mitigation strategies. \r The term 'negative emissions' is used in this report only when referring to the net emissions outcome at a systems level (e.g., 'net \r negative emissions' at global, national, sectoral or supply chain levels)."


id: 46202162f40bfa848fd41f0e4483731d
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content:
"There are many different CDR methods and associated implementation options (Cross-Chapter Box  8, Figure  1). Some of these \r methods (including afforestation and improved forest management, wetland restoration and soil carbon sequestration (SCS)) have \r been practised for decades to millennia, although not necessarily with the intention of removing carbon from the atmosphere. \r Conversely, methods such as direct air carbon capture and storage (DACCS), bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) \r and enhanced weathering are novel, and while experience is growing, their demonstration and deployment are limited in scale. CDR \r methods have been categorised in different ways in the literature, highlighting different characteristics. In this report, as in AR6 WGI, \r the categorisation is based on the role of CDR methods in the carbon cycle, that is, on the removal process (land-based biological;\r [...]"


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"[...] ocean-based biological; geochemical; chemical) and on the timescale of storage (decades to centuries; centuries to millennia;\r ten thousand years or longer). The time scale of storage is closely linked to the storage medium: carbon stored in ocean reservoirs \r (through enhanced weathering, ocean alkalinity enhancement or ocean fertilisation) and in geological formations (through BECCS or \r DACCS) generally has longer storage times and is less vulnerable to reversal through human actions or disturbances such as drought \r and wildfire than carbon stored in terrestrial reservoirs (vegetation, soil). Furthermore, carbon stored in vegetation or through SCS has "


id: 7244cbb496faebebfddf4b80060f2d3b
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content:
"While many governments have included A/R and other forestry \r measures in their NDCs under the Paris Agreement (Moe and \r Rottereng 2018; Fyson and Jeffery 2019; Mace et al. 2021), and a few \r countries also mention BECCS, DACCS and enhanced weathering \r in their mid-century low emission development strategies (Buylova \r et al. 2021), very few are pursuing the integration of a broad range \r of CDR methods into national mitigation portfolios so far (Schenuit \r et al. 2021) (Box 12.1). There are concerns that the prospect of large\u0002scale CDR could, depending on the design of mitigation strategies, \r obstruct near-term emissions reduction efforts (Lenzi et al. 2018; \r Markusson et al. 2018), mask insufficient policy interventions (Geden \r 2016; Carton 2019), might lead to an overreliance on technologies \r that are still in their infancy (Anderson and Peters 2016; Larkin et al. \r 2018; Grant et al. 2021), could overburden future generations (Lenzi \r [...]"


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"[...] 2018; Shue 2018; Bednar et al. 2019) might evoke new conflicts over \r equitable burden-sharing (Pozo et al. 2020; Lee et al. 2021; Mohan "


id: e71f6347721d6a6060ecf6c54ea5a0ce
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"et al. 2021), could impact food security, biodiversity or land rights \r (Buck 2016; Boysen et al. 2017; Dooley and Kartha 2018; Hurlbert \r et al. 2019; Dooley et al. 2021), or might be perceived negatively \r by stakeholders and broader public audiences (Royal Society and \r Royal Academy of Engineering 2018; Colvin et al. 2020). Conversely, \r without considering different timescales of carbon storage (Fuss \r et al. 2018; Hepburn et al. 2019) and implementation of reliable \r measurement, reporting and verification of carbon flows (Mace et al. \r 2021), CDR deployment might not deliver the intended benefit of \r removing CO2 durably from the atmosphere. Furthermore, without \r appropriate incentive schemes and market designs (Honegger et al. \r 2021b), CDR implementation options could see under-investment. \r The many challenges in research, development and demonstration \r of novel approaches, to advance innovation according to broader \r [...]"


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"[...] societal objectives and to bring down costs, could delay their scaling \r up and deployment (Nemet et al. 2018). Depending on the scale "


id: c6aee2d642dea13c39b25c3426db257b
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content:
"reported annual CO2 removal from AFOLU (mainly A/R) reaches \r 0.86 [0.01-4.11] GtCO2 yr-1 by 2030, 2.98 [0.23-6.38] GtCO2 yr-1\r by 2050, and 4.19 [0.1-6.91]  GtCO2 yr-1 by 2100 (values are the \r medians and bracketed values denote the 5-95th percentile range1\r ). \r The annual BECCS deployment is 0.08 [0-1.09]  GtCO2 yr-1, \r 2.75 [0.52-9.45] GtCO2 yr-1, and 8.96 [2.63-16.15] GtCO2 yr-1 for \r these years, respectively. The annual DACCS deployment eaches \r 0 [0-0.02] GtCO2 yr-1 by 2030, 0.02 [0-1.74] GtCO2 yr-1 by 2050, and \r 1.02 [0-12.6] GtCO2 yr-1 by 2100 (Figure 12.3).2\r  Reported cumulative \r volumes of BECCS, CO2 removal from AFOLU, and DACCS reach \r 328 [168-763] GtCO2, 252 [20-418] GtCO2, and 29 [0-339] GtCO2\r for the 2020-2100 period, respectively. Reaching the higher end \r of CDR volumes is subject to issues regarding their feasibility (see \r below), especially if achieved with only a  limited number of CDR \r [...]"


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content:
"[...] methods. Recent studies have identified some drivers for large\u0002scale CDR deployment in IAM scenarios, including insufficient \r representation of variable renewables, a high discount rate that tends \r to increase initial carbon budget overshoot and therefore inflates \r usage  of  CDR to achieve net-negative emissions at later times, \r omission of CDR  methods aside from BECCS and A/R (Emmerling \r et al. 2019; Hilaire et al. 2019; Koberle 2019), and limited deployment \r of demand-side options (Grubler et al. 2018; van Vuuren et al. \r 2018; Daioglou et al. 2019). The levels of CDR in IAMs in modelled \r pathways would change depending on the allowable overshoot of \r policy targets such as temperature or radiative forcing and the costs \r of non-CDR mitigation options (Johansson et al. 2020; van der Wijst \r et al. 2021) (Section 3.2.2)."


id: 490f41cfa325646e4fee7849c5a91844
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10077
content:
"While many CDR methods are gradually being explored, IAM scenarios \r have focused mostly on BECCS and A/R (Tavoni and Socolow 2013; \r Fuhrman et al. 2019; Rickels et al. 2019; Calvin et al. 2021; Diniz \r Oliveira et al. 2021). Although some IAM studies have also included \r other methods such as DACCS (Chen and Tavoni 2013; Marcucci et al. \r 2017; Realmonte et al. 2019; Fuhrman et al. 2020; Akimoto et al. 2021; \r Fuhrman et al. 2021a), enhanced weathering (Strefler et al. 2021), SCS \r and biochar (Holz et al. 2018) there is much less literature compared \r to studies on BECCS (Hilaire et al. 2019). A  large-scale coordinated \r IAM study on BECCS ('EMF-33') has been conducted (Muratori et al. \r 2020; Rose et al. 2020) but none exists for other CDR methods. A recent \r review proposes a combination of various CDR methods (Fuss et al. \r 2018) but more in-depth literature on such a  portfolio approach is \r limited (Strefler et al. 2021). A  multi-criteria analysis has identified \r [...]"


id: 3bb724fbb805ed0c165836fdf8ba6dc1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7689
content:
"[...] pathways with CDR portfolios different from least-cost pathways often \r dominated by BECCS and A/R (Rueda et al. 2021)."


id: 65249722ea5012903d28293db4ce0dcd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15059
content:
"Direct air capture (DAC) is a  chemical process to capture ambient \r CO2 from the atmosphere. Captured CO2 can be stored underground \r (direct air carbon capture and storage, DACCS) or utilised in \r products (direct air carbon capture and utilisation, DACCU). DACCS \r shares with conventional CCS the transport and storage components \r but is distinct in its capture part. Because CO2 is a well-mixed GHG, \r DACCS can be sited relatively flexibly, though its locational flexibility \r is constrained by the availability of low-carbon energy and storage \r sites. Capturing the CO2 involves three basic steps: (i) contacting the \r air, (ii) capturing on a liquid or solid sorbent or a liquid solvent, and \r (iii) regeneration of the solvent or the sorbent (with heat, moisture \r and/or pressure). After capture, the CO2 stream can be stored \r underground or utilised. The duration of storage is an important \r consideration; geological reservoirs or mineralisation result in removal \r [...]"


id: e83da2416f56273a2e4a2605ac7af366
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38191
content:
"[...] for more than 1000 years. The duration of the removal through DACCU \r (Breyer et al. 2019) varies with the lifetime of respective products \r (Wilcox et al. 2017; Bui et al. 2018; Fuss et al. 2018; Gunnarsson \r et al. 2018; Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering 2018; \r Creutzig et al. 2019), ranging from weeks to months for synthetic \r fuels to centuries or more for building materials (e.g., concrete cured "


id: ecc3ebe93e2f82612d0c491ac026264e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39018
content:
"Potentials: There is no specific study on the potential of DACCS but \r the literature has assumed that the technical potential is virtually \r unlimited provided that high energy requirements could be met \r (medium evidence, high agreement) (Marcucci et al. 2017; Fuss \r et al. 2018; Lawrence et al. 2018) since DACCS encounters fewer \r non-cost constraints than any other CDR method. Focusing only \r on the Maghreb region, Breyer et al. (2020) reported an optimistic \r potential 150 GtCO2 at less than USD61 tCO2\r -1 for 2050. Fuss et al. \r (2018) suggest a potential of 0.5-5 GtCO2 yr-1 by 2050 because of \r environmental side effects and limits to underground storage. In \r addition to the ultimate potentials, Realmonte et al. (2019) noted \r the rate of scale-up as a strong constraint on deployment. Meckling \r and Biber (2021) discuss a policy roadmap to address the political \r economy for upscaling. More systematic analysis on potentials is \r [...]"


