# document

id: 49cef7a490ec4a287d5b0b88d8864b83
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10220
content:
"[...] 2020). Hydrogen produced from electrolysis could also be seen as \r an electricity energy carrier. This is an example of the PtX processes \r (Section 6.4.4), entailing the conversion of electricity to other energy \r carriers for subsequent use."


id: 6ad1d42791716ec8e1f58367e3e4c129
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16074
content:
"Ammonia is a  promising cost-effective hydrogen carrier (Creutzig \r et  al. 2019). Onsite generation of hydrogen for the production of \r ammonia already occurs today, and the ammonia (NH3) could be \r subsequently 'cracked' (with a  15-25% energy loss) to reproduce \r hydrogen (Hansgen et  al. 2010; Montoya et  al. 2015; Bell and \r Torrente-Murciano 2016). Because the energy density of ammonia \r is 38% higher than liquid hydrogen (Osman and Sgouridis 2018), it \r is potentially a  suitable energy carrier for long-distance transport \r and storage (Salmon et  al. 2021). Moreover, ammonia is more \r easily condensable (liquefied at 0.8 MPa, 20degC), which provides \r economically viable hydrogen storage and supply systems. \r Ammonia production and transport are also established industrial \r processes (about 180 MMT yr -1) (Valera-Medina et  al. 2017), and \r hence ammonia is considered to be a  scalable and cost-effective \r hydrogen-based energy carrier. At present, most ammonia is used \r [...]"


id: ce56d54f05d2822d1a531a940b14e4bc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33641
content:
"[...] in fertilisers (about 80%), followed by many industrial processes, \r such as the manufacturing of mining explosives and petrochemicals \r (Jiao and Xu 2018). In contrast to hydrogen, ammonia can be used \r directly as a fuel without any phase change for internal combustion \r engines, gas turbines, and industrial furnaces (Kobayashi et al. 2019). \r Ammonia can also be used in low- and high-temperature fuel cells \r (Lan and Tao 2014), whereby both electricity and hydrogen can be \r produced without any nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions. Furthermore, \r ammonia provides the flexibility to be dehydrogenated for hydrogen\u0002use purposes. Ammonia is considered a  carbon-free sustainable \r fuel for electricity generation, since in a complete combustion, only \r water and nitrogen are produced (Valera-Medina et al. 2017). Like \r hydrogen, ammonia could facilitate management of VRE, due to its \r cost-effective grid-scale energy storage capabilities. In this regard, \r [...]"


id: 989159ec1fe854c4f5cc80997c1a3015
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24056
content:
"[...] production of ammonia via hydrogen from low- or zero-carbon \r generation technologies along with ammonia energy recovery "


id: a7e2e4d05666961288a97d1bc7e4e924
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26747
content:
"Hydrogen can be liquefied and transported at volume over the ocean \r without pressurisation. This requires a temperature of -253degC and is \r therefore energy-intensive and costly (Niermann et al. 2021). Once \r it reaches its destination, the hydrogen needs to be re-gasified, \r adding further cost. A demonstration project is under development \r exporting liquid hydrogen from Australia to Japan (Yamashita et al. \r 2019). Hydrogen could also be transported as ammonia by ocean in \r liquid form. Ammonia is advantageous because it is easier to store \r than hydrogen (Zamfirescu and Dincer 2008; Soloveichik 2016; Nam \r et al. 2018). Liquid ammonia requires temperatures below -33degC and \r is therefore more straightforward and less costly to transport than \r liquefied hydrogen and even liquefied natural gas (Singh and Sahu \r 2018). A project exporting ammonia from Saudi Arabia to Japan is \r under consideration (Nagashima 2018). LOHCs could also be used \r [...]"


id: 7cc1da12f52f823b2cb021c45905d2fa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19147
content:
"[...] to transport hydrogen at ambient temperature and pressure. This \r advantageous property of LOHCs makes them similar to oil products, \r meaning they can be transported in existing oil infrastructure \r including oil tankers and tanks (IEA 2019; Niermann et  al. 2019). \r A project is under development to export hydrogen from Brunei to \r Japan using LOHCs (Kurosaki 2018)."


id: a1a3bd02c0b7a2d6e24ef0845b8f630
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25653
content:
"Given the significant geographical variations in the efficiency of \r renewable resources across different regions and continents, electricity \r transmission could facilitate cost-effective deployment of renewable \r generation, enhance resilience and security of supply, and increase \r operational efficiency (high confidence). The diurnal and  seasonal \r characteristics of different renewable energy sources such as wind, \r solar, and hydropower can vary significantly by location. Through \r enhanced electricity transmission infrastructure, more wind turbines \r can be deployed in areas with high wind potential and more solar \r panels in areas with larger solar irradiation. Increases in electricity \r transmission and trade can also enhance operational efficiency and \r reduce or defer the need for investment in peaking plants, storage, or \r other load management techniques needed to meet security of supply \r requirements associated with localised use of VRE sources. Increased \r [...]"


id: 27db7c191d5c60c9962fb71252acff39
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4206
content:
"[...] interconnectivity of large-scale grids also allows the aggregation of \r 'smart grid' solutions such as flexible heating and cooling devices \r for flexible demand in industrial, commercial, and domestic sectors \r (Hakimi et al. 2020) and EVs (Muratori and Mai 2020; Li et al. 2021). \r In general, interconnection is more cost-optimal for countries that are \r geographically close to each other and can benefit from the diversity \r of their energy mixes and usage (Schlachtberger et al. 2017). Such \r developments are not without price, however, and among other \r concerns, raise issues surrounding land use, public acceptance, \r and resource acquisition for materials necessary for renewable \r developments (Capellan-Perez et al. 2017; Vakulchuk et al. 2020)."


id: c9039a5d680f9351c2f75009a4bdcc9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32684
content:
"Figure 6.18 | Range of LCOE (in USD kWh-1) from recent studies for different electricity-generating technologies circa 2020 and in the future between \r 2020-2040. LCOEs are primarily taken from recent studies, because the costs of some technologies are changing rapidly. To make the figure more tractable across the studies, \r we highlight the data from IEA WEO 2020 STEPS scenario in yellow (IEA 2020), the EIA AEO 2021 in light blue (EIA 2021), NREL ATB 2021 in brown, (NREL 2021), and \r IRENA's 2020 Renewable Power Generation Costs in dark blue (IRENA 2021). All other studies are shown in light grey markers. Marker shapes identify the regions included in \r the studies. Studies that included several regions are labelled as global. Only sources that provided LCOEs are included. Ranges for studies frequently reflect variations among \r [...]"


id: dcb1a93e365a4728ba3b34408a4a3878
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36087
content:
"[...] regional estimates. Studies that are shown as a mid-point and a solid line represent studies that reported either a median or an average, and that had either a confidence \r interval or a minimum and a maximum reported. Dashed lines with markers at the end represent the range of values reported in studies that had several point estimates for \r either different regions or used different assumptions. All estimates were converted to USD2020. The publication year was used if no USD year was provided. Some studies \r included transmissions costs, and some of the CCS studies included storage and sequestration costs, while others did not. Vertical axis is capped at USD2020 0.30 kWh-1, but \r some estimates for hydro, geothermal, natural gas and bioelectricity were higher than 0.30. The grey horizontal band denotes the range of fossil fuel electricity LCOEs circa 2020."


id: b5d515b1b14fc8b525b0dbd3ae3da592
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29213
content:
"The literature provides multiple LCOE estimates for mitigation options \r today and in the future (see Table  6.9 for electricity  generation \r options). LCOE ranges for low- and zero-carbon electricity technologies \r overlap with LCOE's of fossil generation without CCS. For example, \r LCOEs for utility solar and wind today and in the future overlap with \r those of new coal and gas without CCS (IEA WEO 2020; Lazard, 2020; \r NREL 2021) (Figure 6.18). Some of the overlap stems from differences \r in assumptions or regional conditions that apply to all technologies \r (e.g.,  variations in assumed discount rates), but the overlap also \r reflects the fact that low- and zero-carbon electricity generation \r options are, and will be, less expensive than emitting options in \r many regions. Future cost projections also illustrate that several \r technologies are anticipated to experience further cost declines over \r the coming decades, reinforcing the increasingly competitiveness of \r [...]"


id: 3cf066d68cf3390551bcfe01338b098a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7900
content:
"[...] low- and zero-carbon electricity. For example, IEA's LCOEs estimates \r for offshore wind halve between 2020 and 2040 in several regions \r (IEA WEO 2020)."


id: 9474c5cafa4eb873592dac6d230be6cd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23325
content:
"(IHA 2019). In general, increased precipitation will increase water \r availability and hydropower production. Increased precipitation \r intensity, however, may impact on the integrity of dam structures \r and affect power production by increasing debris accumulation and \r vegetation growth. Additionally, increased precipitation intensity \r results in the silting of the reservoirs or increases the amount of \r water spilt, resulting in erosion (Schaeffer et  al. 2012; IHA 2019). \r Climate change will likely lead to higher air temperatures, resulting \r in more surface evaporation, less water storage, and loss of \r equipment efficiency (Ebinger and Vergara 2011; Mukheibir 2013; \r Fluixa-Sanmartin et  al. 2018; Hock et  al. 2019). Climate change \r may alter the demands for water use by other sectors that often \r rely on stored water in multi-purpose reservoirs, and may therefore \r generate conflicts over water use. The increased need for water \r [...]"


id: 1cb83fb1a82feda2ad9555f28bdd94f5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2237
content:
"[...] for irrigation and/or industry can affect the availability of water for \r hydropower generation (Spalding-Fecher et  al. 2016; Solaun and \r Cerda 2017). Higher temperatures increase glacier melt, increasing \r water availability for hydropower while the glaciers exist. Changes \r in the timing of snow and ice melt may require upgrading in storage \r capacity and adaptation of the hydropower plant management for \r fully exploiting the increase in water availability."


id: 5ccb32ee613d26e4696bb33ce19102be
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13587
content:
"Regional changes in hydropower are estimated from 5-20% \r increases for most areas in high latitudes (van Vliet et  al. 2016b; \r Turner et al. 2017) to decreases of 5-20% in areas with increased \r drought conditions (Cronin et al. 2018). Models show a consistent \r increase in streamflow and hydropower production by 2080 in \r high latitudes of the northern hemisphere and parts of the tropics \r (Figure 6.20) (e.g., central Africa and southern Asia) while decreasing \r in the USA, southern and central Europe, Southeast Asia and southern \r South America, Africa and Australia (van Vliet et  al. 2016c,a). \r Decreases in hydropower production are indicated for parts of North \r America, central and southern Europe, the Middle East, central Asia \r and Southern South America. Studies disagree on the changes in \r hydropower production in China, central South America, and partially \r in southern Africa (Hamududu and Killingtveit 2012; van Vliet et al. \r [...]"


id: ec5099b75d42ac5eaa4ab4eb1cbce613
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38941
content:
"Future wind generation in Europe could decrease in summer and \r autumn, increasing in winter in northern-central Europe but decreasing \r in southernmost Europe (Carvalho et al. 2017). Towards 2100, intra\u0002annual variations increase in most of Europe, except around the \r Mediterranean area (Reyers et al. 2016), but this may reflect natural \r multi-decadal variability (Wohland et  al. 2019b). Wind speeds may \r become more homogeneous over large geographical regions in \r Europe due to climate change, increasing the likelihood of large areas \r experiencing high or low wind speeds simultaneously (Wohland et al. \r 2017). These changes could result in fewer benefits in the transmission \r of wind generation between countries and increased system integration \r costs. Europe could require a modest increase (up to 7%) in backup \r energy towards the end of the 21st century due to more homogeneous \r wind conditions over Europe (Wohland et al. 2017; Weber et al. 2018). \r [...]"


id: 1cac0198b58da2406aa5250162822f13
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2219
content:
"[...] However, other studies report that the impact of climate change is \r substantially smaller than interannual variability, with no significant \r impact on the occurrence of extreme low wind production events \r in Europe (Van Der Wiel et al. 2019). If European electricity systems \r are designed to manage the effects of existing weather variability on \r wind power, they can likely also cope with climate change impacts \r on wind power (Ravestein et al. 2018). Changes in wind-generation \r variability caused by climate change are also reported for North \r America (Haupt et al. 2016; Losada Carreno et al. 2018), with modest \r impacts on electricity system operation (Craig et al. 2019)."


id: 85df262324c711d62fbad437e69075b9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20697
content:
"changes on solar insolation due to variations in water vapour and \r clouds in most regions. Also, future PV technologies will likely \r have higher efficiency, which would offset temperature-related \r declines (Muller et  al. 2019). Cloud cover is projected to decrease \r in the subtropics (around -0.05% per year), including parts of North \r America, vast parts of Europe and China, South America, South \r Africa and Australia (medium agreement, medium evidence). Thus, \r models project modest (<3%) increases in solar PV by the end of \r the century for southern Europe, northern and southern Africa, \r Central America, and the Caribbean (Emodi et al. 2019). There are \r several studies projecting decreasing solar production, but these \r are generally influenced by other factors, for example, increasing air \r pollution (Ruosteenoja et al. 2019). The multi-model means for solar \r insolation in regional models decrease 0.60 W m-2 per decade from \r [...]"


id: d49db32ce7a37fea6980858c05da7506
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34725
content:
"[...] 2006 to 2100 over most of Europe (Bartok et al. 2017), with the most \r significant decreases in the Northern countries (Jerez et al. 2015)."


id: 8caa88f11794a9afa87441d53032572d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21934
content:
"The operation of thermal power plants will be affected by climate \r change, deriving from changes in the ambient conditions like \r temperature, humidity and water availability (Schaeffer et al. 2012) \r (high confidence). Changes in ambient temperature have relatively \r small impacts on coal-fired and nuclear power plants (Rankine \r cycle); however, gas-fired power plants (Brayton or combined-cycle) \r may have their thermal efficiency and power output significantly \r decreased (De Sa and Al Zubaidy 2011; Schaeffer et  al. 2012). \r Droughts decrease potential cooling water for thermal power plants \r and increase the probability of water outlet temperatures exceeding \r regulatory limits, leading to lower production or shutdowns. Thermal \r power utilisation has been reported to be, on average, 3.8% lower \r during drought years globally (van Vliet et  al. 2016c), and further \r significant decreases in available thermal power plant capacity due \r [...]"


id: f9d30368c393bdeed6bb8e283ea8eebe
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41312
content:
"[...] to climate change are projected (Koch et  al. 2014; van Vliet et  al. \r 2016b; Yalew et  al. 2020). An increase in climate-related nuclear \r power disruptions has been reported in the past decades globally \r (Ahmad 2021)."


id: 8c069d9974eb4adfb1c8be612e49373b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21806
content:
"Older thermal power plants can be retrofitted to mitigate climate \r impacts by altering and redesigning the cooling systems (Westlen \r 2018), although the costs for these solutions may be high. For example, \r dry cooling may be used instead of once-through cooling; however, \r it lowers thermal efficiency and would leave plants vulnerable to \r ambient temperature increase (Ahmad 2021). Closed-circuit cooling \r is much less sensitive to water temperature than once-through \r cooling (Bonjean Stanton et  al. 2016). Modifying policies and \r regulation of water and heat emissions from power plants may also \r be used to mitigate plant reliability problems induced by climate \r change (Eisenack 2016; Mu et al. 2020), albeit with potential impacts \r for other water users and ecology. Improvements in water use and \r thermal efficiencies and the use of transmission capabilities over \r large geographical regions to mitigate risks on individual plants are \r [...]"


id: 437f71d500889056943e9f3b43aa6373
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9100
content:
"While many studies have focused on energy consumption, climate \r extremes are expected to alter peak energy demands, with the \r potential for blackouts, brownouts, and other short-term energy system \r impacts (Yalew et al. 2020). For example, peak energy demand during \r heatwaves can coincide with reduced transmission and distribution \r capacity at higher temperatures. In large cities, extreme heat events \r increase cooling degree days significantly, with the urban heat island \r effect compounding the impact (Morakinyo et  al. 2019). One study \r found that total electricity consumption at the end of the century in the \r USA could increase on average by 20% during summer months and \r decrease on average by 6% in the winter (Ralston Fonseca et al. 2019). \r While the average increase in consumption is modest, climate change \r is projected to have severe impacts on the frequency and intensity of \r peak electricity loads (Auffhammer et al. 2017). Bartos et al. (2016) find \r [...]"


id: 62368d0ec3c730431e5bd6664b4ba17e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14554
content:
"[...] that peak per-capita summertime load in the USA may rise by 4.2-15% \r by mid-century. Efficient cooling technologies and other demand-side \r measures can limit cooling energy loads during periods of particularly \r high demand (IEA 2018; Dreyfus et al. 2020)."


id: 2d9c40c612faef80da71c9253bcd9f94
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5319
content:
"But some aspects of low-carbon energy systems will make them more resilient. Wind and solar farms are often spread geographically, \r which reduces the chances of being affected by the same extreme weather event (Perera et al. 2020). The diversification of energy \r sources, in which each component has different vulnerabilities, increases resilience. Less reliance on thermal electricity generation \r technologies will reduce the risks of curtailment or efficiency losses from droughts and heat waves (Lohrmann et  al. 2019). \r More generally, increased electricity system integration and flexibility (Section 6.4.3) and weatherisation of generators increases \r electricity system resilience (Busby et al. 2021; Heffron et al. 2021). Likewise, local district micro-grids with appropriate enabling \r technologies (e.g., distributed generation, energy storage, greater demand-side participation, electric vehicles) may ensure access \r [...]"


id: ae2017867303d1d31665222e7390b2e2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27874
content:
"[...] to electricity during major long-duration power outage events and radically enhance the resilience of supply of essential demand \r (Stout et al. 2019)."


id: 8a15204547e2a6ecf3ae469c13726497
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21467
content:
"Solar energy. Observations and model simulations have addressed whether large-scale solar PV power plants can alter the local \r and regional climate. In rural areas at the local scale, large-scale solar PV farms change the surface characteristics and affect air \r temperatures (Taha 2013). Measurements in rural Arizona, USA show local night-time temperatures 3degC-4degC warmer at the PV \r farm than surroundings (Barron-Gafford et al. 2016). In contrast, measurements in urban settings show that solar PV panels on \r roofs provide a cooling effect (Taha 2013; Ma et al. 2017). On the regional scale, modelling studies suggest cooling in urban areas \r (0.11-0.53degC) and warming in rural areas (up to 0.27degC) (Millstein and Menon 2011). Global climate model simulations show that \r solar panels induce regional cooling by converting part of the incoming solar energy to electricity (Hu et al. 2016). However, converting \r [...]"


id: e493f6fa2c8130dde11c7159363b1954
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37501
content:
"[...] the generated electricity to heat in urban areas increases regional and local temperatures, compensating for the cooling effect."


id: a70d5e4e157a2a0b2c465bc0fcd403af
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26601
content:
"Precisely describing a  net-zero energy system is complicated by the \r fact that different scenarios attribute different future CO2 emissions \r to the energy system, even under scenarios where economy-wide CO2\r emissions reach net zero. It is also complicated by the dependence \r of energy system configurations on unknown future conditions such \r as population and economic growth, and technological change. The \r energy system is not the only source or sink of CO2 emissions. Terrestrial \r systems may store or emit carbon, and CDR options like BECCS or \r DACCS can be used to store CO2, relieving pressure on the energy \r system (Chapter 3). The location of such CDR options is ambiguous, as it \r might be deployed within or outside of the energy sector (Figure 6.21), \r and many CDR options, such as DACCS, would be important energy \r consumers (Bistline and Blanford 2021a) (Section  6.6.2). If CDR \r methods are deployed outside of the energy system (e.g., net negative \r [...]"


id: 99f8907c52622d43b1f99b750b7d99fe
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24319
content:
"[...] agriculture, forestry, and land-use CO2 emissions), it is possible for the \r energy system to still emit CO2 but have economy-wide emissions of \r zero or below. When global energy and industrial CO2 emissions reach \r net zero, the space remaining for fossil energy emissions is determined \r by deployment of CDR options (Figure 6.21)."


id: d22bf3faf61cbdc55375169557cfecbc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34330
content:
"The literature on the configuration of net-zero energy systems is \r limited in a few respects. On the one hand, there is a robust integrated \r assessment literature that provides characterisations of these systems \r in broad strokes (the AR6 database), offering internally consistent \r global scenarios to link global warming targets to regional/national \r goals. All integrated assessment scenarios that discuss net-zero \r energy system CO2 emissions provide high-level characterisations of \r net-zero systems. Because these characterisations have less temporal, \r spatial, technological, regulatory, and societal detail, however, they \r may not consider the complexities that could ultimately influence \r regional, national, or local pathways. High-fidelity models and \r analyses are needed to assess the economic and environmental \r characteristics and the feasibility of many aspects of net-zero or \r net-negative emissions energy systems (high confidence) (Blanford \r [...]"


id: 2408295879dbd3cae75543ec0264e45a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3519
content:
"[...] et al. 2018; Bistline and Blanford 2020). For example, evaluating the \r competitiveness of electricity sector technologies requires temporal, \r spatial, and technological detail to accurately represent system \r investments and operations (Collins et al. 2017; Santen et al. 2017; \r Helistoe et al. 2019; Bistline 2021c; Victoria et al. 2021)."


id: 688a4a97c1300c4a98d0874e76ad2b83
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15662
content:
"Net-zero energy systems will use far less fossil fuel than today (high \r confidence). The precise quantity of fossil fuels will largely depend \r on the relative costs of such fuels, electrification, alternative fuels, \r and CDR (Section 6.6.2.4) in the energy system (high confidence). All \r of these are affected by regional differences in resources (McGlade \r and Ekins 2015), existing energy infrastructure (Tong et  al. 2019), \r demand for energy services, and climate and energy policies. Fossil \r fuel use may persist, for example, if and where the costs of such \r fuels and the compensating carbon management (e.g.,  CDR, CCS) \r are less than non-fossil energy. For most applications, however, it is \r likely that electrification (McCollum et al. 2014; Madeddu et al. 2020; \r Zhang and Fujimori 2020) or use of non-fossil alternative fuels (Zeman \r and Keith 2008; Graves et al. 2011; Hanggi et al. 2019; Ueckerdt et al. \r 2021) will prove to be the cheapest options. Most residual demand \r [...]"


id: 3bf98ee04fbb553857d2a22e2cefd1dd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7742
content:
"[...] for fossil fuels is likely to predominantly be petroleum and natural \r gas given their high energy density (Davis et al. 2018), while demand \r for coal in net-zero energy systems is likely to be very low (Luderer \r et al. 2018; Jakob et al. 2020, Section 6.7.4) (high confidence)."


id: 5ee90092b9029bfca73bb01bd35fc332
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13993
content:
"Figure 6.22 (continued): Characteristics of global net-zero energy systems when global energy and industrial CO2 emissions reach net-zero. Scenarios \r reaching net-zero emissions show differences in residual emissions and carbon removal (a), energy resources (b), electrification (c), energy intensity (as measured here by \r energy GDP-1) (d), and emissions trajectory (e), particularly with respect to warming levels (light blue = scenarios that limit warming to 1.5degC (>50%) with no or limited \r overshoot and scenarios that return warming to 1.5degC (>50%) after a high overshoot; yellow = scenarios that limit warming to 2degC (>67%) and scenarios that limit warming \r to 2degC (>50%); dark blue = scenarios that limit warming to 2.5degC (>50%), scenarios that limit warming to 3degC (>50%), scenarios that limit warming to 4degC (>50%), and \r [...]"


id: 9d341a4f5ea74300ba9e9ce9408dab0c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24894
content:
"[...] scenarios that exceed warming of 4degC (>=50%); grey = unspecified warming). Points represent individual scenarios from the AR6 Scenarios Database, with probability density \r distributions shown along each axis for each warming level (colours corresponding to warming levels) and for all scenarios (black)."


id: 678eca482ff2b1300977dab573639cd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15487
content:
"There are many possible configurations and technologies for zero- or net\u0002negative-emissions electricity systems (high confidence). These systems \r could entail a  mix of variable renewables, dispatchable  renewables \r (e.g.,  biomass, hydropower), other firm, dispatchable ('on-demand') \r low-carbon generation (e.g., nuclear, CCS-equipped capacity), energy \r storage, transmission, carbon removal options (e.g., BECCS, DACCS), \r and demand management (Luderer et  al. 2017; Bistline et  al. 2018; \r Jenkins et al. 2018b; Bistline and Blanford 2021b). The marginal cost of \r deploying electricity sector mitigation options increases as electricity \r emissions approach zero; in addition, the most cost-effective mix of \r system resources changes as emissions approach zero and, therefore, \r so do the implications of electricity sector mitigation for sustainability \r and other societal goals (Mileva et  al. 2016; Bistline et  al. 2018; \r [...]"


id: 58b1714312441e89271a4de0cc95463a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12846
content:
"[...] Sepulveda et al. 2018; Jayadev et al. 2020; Cole et al. 2021). Key factors \r influencing the electricity mix include relative costs and system benefits, \r local resource bases, infrastructure availability, regional integration \r and trade, co-benefits, societal preferences and other policy priorities, \r all of which vary by country and region (Section 6.6.4). Many of these \r factors depend on when the net-zero point is reached (Figure 6.22)."


id: d84b1b8dbe2760447f602efeec3277f8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35357
content:
"Energy storage will be increasingly important in net-zero energy \r systems, especially in systems with shares of VRE (high confidence). \r Deployment of energy storage will vary based on the system benefits \r and values of different options (Arbabzadeh et al. 2019; Denholm and \r Mai 2019). Diurnal storage options like lithium-ion batteries have \r different value than storing and discharging electricity over longer \r periods through long-duration energy storage with less frequent \r cycling, which require different technologies, supporting policies, \r and business models (Gallo et  al. 2016; Blanco and Faaij  2017; \r Albertus  et  al. 2020; Dowling et  al. 2020; Sepulveda et  al. 2021) \r (Section 6.4.4). The value of energy storage varies with the level of \r deployment and on the competitiveness of economic complements \r such as VRE options (Mileva et al. 2016; Bistline and Young 2020) and \r substitutes such as flexible demand (Brown et al. 2018; Merrick et al. \r [...]"


id: a6be2ce11995338fefd906a71d75fb95
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26552
content:
"[...] 2018), transmission (Schlachtberger et al. 2017; Brown et al. 2018; \r Merrick et  al. 2018; Bistline and Young 2019), trade (Bistline et  al. \r 2020b), dispatchable generators (Hittinger and Lueken 2015; Gils \r et al. 2017; Arbabzadeh et al. 2019), direct air capture (DAC) (Daggash \r et al. 2019), and efficiencies in system operations (Tuohy et al. 2015)."


id: b5cf9ccff2d5af06f45cb217d737ce23
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29210
content:
"Based on their increasing economic competitiveness, VRE technologies, \r especially wind and solar power, will likely comprise large shares of \r many regional generation mixes (high confidence) (Figure  6.22). \r While wind and solar will likely be prominent electricity resources, \r this does not imply that 100% renewable energy systems will be \r pursued under all circumstances, since economic and operational \r challenges increase nonlinearly as shares approach 100% (Box 6.8) \r (Frew et al. 2016; Imelda et al. 2018b; Shaner et al. 2018; Bistline and \r Blanford 2021a; Cole et  al. 2021). Real-world experience planning \r and operating regional electricity systems with high instantaneous \r and annual shares of renewable generation is accumulating, but \r debates continue about how much wind and solar should be included \r in different systems, and the cost-effectiveness of mechanisms for \r managing variability (Box 6.8). Either firm, dispatchable generation \r [...]"


id: e221c5f81b0c513ef071f0d95155b84f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37063
content:
"[...] (including nuclear, CCS-equipped capacity, dispatchable renewables \r such as geothermal, and fossil units run with low capacity factors \r and CDR to balance emissions) or seasonal energy storage (alongside "


id: d7a7b6e460b880bb188cce9adb3aaac7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35249
content:
"It is technically feasible to use very high renewable shares (e.g., above 75% of annual regional generation) to meet hourly electricity \r demand under a range of conditions, especially when VRE options, notably wind and solar, are complemented by other resources (high \r confidence). There are currently many grids with high renewable shares and large anticipated roles for VRE sources, in particular wind \r and solar (Section 6.4), in future low-carbon electricity systems. An increasingly large set of studies examines the feasibility of high \r renewable penetration and economic drivers under different policy, technology, and market scenarios (Cochran et al. 2014; Deason \r 2018; Jenkins et al. 2018b; Bistline et al. 2019; Hansen et al. 2019; Dowling et al. 2020; Blanford et al. 2021; Denholm et al. 2021). \r High wind and solar penetration involves technical and economic challenges due to their unique characteristics such as spatial and \r [...]"


id: f01472dc1f049c182ee7eb8eb6b8b322
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39618
content:
"[...] temporal variability, short- and long-term uncertainty, and non-synchronous generation (Cole et al. 2017). These challenges become \r increasingly important as renewable shares approach 100% (Sections 6.6.2.2 and 6.4.3)."


id: ac60aec722731ff2f016b17b7e7aa279
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27565
content:
"Energy systems that are 100% renewable (including all parts of the energy sector, and not only electricity generation) raise a range \r of technological, regulatory, market, and operational challenges that make their competitiveness uncertain (high confidence). \r These systems require decarbonising all electricity, using this zero-carbon electricity broadly, and then utilising zero-carbon energy \r carriers for all end uses not served by electricity, for example, air travel, long-distance transport, and high-temperature process heat. \r Broader questions emerge regarding the attractiveness of supplying all energy, and not just electricity, with renewables (Figure 6.22). \r Integrated assessment and energy systems research suggest large roles for renewables, but energy and electricity shares are far from \r 100%, even with stringent emissions reductions targets and optimistic assumptions about future cost reductions (Bauer et al. 2018; \r [...]"


id: 11f09ca157553cdf0e7f5437a08c1edc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 345
content:
"[...] Bistline et al. 2018; Jenkins et al. 2018b; Huntington et al. 2020) (Section 6.7.1). Scenarios with 100% renewable energy systems \r are an emerging subset in the decarbonisation literature, especially at regional levels (Hansen et al. 2019; Denholm et al. 2021). \r Many 100% renewables studies focus more heavily on electrification for decarbonising end uses, and include less biofuels and \r hydrogen than the broader literature on deep decarbonisation (Bauer et al. 2018a). These studies typically assume a constrained set of \r available technologies to demonstrate the technical feasibility of very high renewable systems and do not optimise to find least-cost, \r technology-neutral decarbonisation pathways, and many 100% renewables studies focus on the electricity sector or a limited number \r [...]"


id: f54add2352b4ce90dbff24309e282ebf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40524
content:
"[...] of sectors (Jenkins et al. 2018a; Hansen et al. 2019). In addition to renewables, studies broadly agree that including additional low\u0002carbon options - including not only low-carbon electricity but also targeted use of fossil fuels with and without CCS (Section 6.6.2.1) \r and alternative fuels for sectors that are difficult to electrify (Section 6.6.2.4) - can lower the cost of decarbonisation, even with very \r high shares of renewables (Figure 6.22). However, there is disagreement about the magnitude of cost savings from larger portfolios, \r which depend on context- and scenario-specific assumptions about technologies, markets, and policies."


id: 8ac1d9fef65ee20583ca14e3d2f511c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21585
content:
"Net-zero energy systems will rely more heavily on increased use of \r electricity (electrification) in end uses (high confidence). The literature \r on net-zero energy systems almost universally calls for increased \r electrification (Sugiyama 2012; Williams et  al. 2012; Kriegler et  al. \r 2014a; Williams et  al. 2014; Rogelj et  al. 2015a; Sachs et  al. 2016; \r Luderer et al. 2018; Sven et al. 2018; Schreyer et al. 2020). At least \r 30% of the global final energy needs are expected to be served by \r electricity, with some estimates suggesting upwards of 80% of \r total energy use being electrified (Figure  6.22, panel c). Increased \r electrification is especially valuable in net-zero energy systems in \r tandem with decarbonised electricity generation or net-negative \r emissions electricity generation (Section 6.5.4.2). Flexible electric loads \r (electric vehicles, smart appliances) can in turn facilitate incorporation \r [...]"


id: 8563ecef1145719b4e3399f8d5f39103
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20605
content:
"[...] of VRE electricity options, increase system flexibility, and reduce needs \r for grid storage (Section 6.4.3) (Mathiesen et al. 2015; Lund et al. 2018)."


id: de700951bb8decbd10b690a59308d0bf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36400
content:
"A significant share of transportation, especially road transportation, \r is expected to be electrified in net-zero energy systems (high \r confidence). In road transportation, two- and three-wheelers, \r light-duty vehicles (LDVs), and buses, are especially amenable to \r electrification, with more than half of passenger LDVs expected to be \r electrified globally in net-zero energy systems (medium confidence) \r (Fulton et al. 2015; Sven et al. 2018; Khalili et al. 2019; Bataille et al. \r 2020). Long-haul trucks, large ships, and aircraft are expected to be \r harder to electrify without technological breakthroughs (Fulton et al. \r 2015; Mathiesen et al. 2015), although continued improvements in \r battery technology may enable electrification of long-haul trucks \r (Nykvist and Olsson 2021) (Chapter 10). Due to the relative ease of \r rail electrification, near complete electrification of rail and a  shift \r of air and truck freight to rail is expected in net-zero energy systems \r [...]"


id: 5ab64e884a602ecbd7b9d29dd59c049e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13212
content:
"[...] (Fulton et al. 2015; Rockstrom et al. 2017; Sven et al. 2018; Khalili \r et al. 2019). The degree of modal shifts and electrification will depend \r on local factors such as infrastructure availability and location \r accessibility. Due to the challenges associated with electrification of \r some transport modes, net-zero energy systems may include some \r residual emissions associated with the freight sector that are offset \r through CDR technologies (Muratori et al. 2017b), or reliance on low \r and zero-carbon fuels instead of electrification."


id: b2b8cfe78e17bf1e3bfe631aec5416aa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28683
content:
"CO2 emissions from some energy services are expected to be particularly \r difficult to cost-effectively avoid, among them: aviation; long-distance \r freight by ships; process emissions from cement and steel production; \r high-temperature heat (e.g.,  >1000degC); and electricity reliability in \r systems with high penetration of variable renewable energy sources \r (NAS) (Davis et al. 2018; Luderer et al. 2018; Sepulveda et al. 2018; \r Chiaramonti 2019; Bataille 2020; Madeddu et al. 2020; Rissman et al. \r 2020; Thiel and Stark 2021). The literature focused on these services and \r sectors is growing, but remains limited, and provides minimal guidance \r on the most promising or attractive technological options and systems \r for avoiding these sectors' emissions. Technological solutions do exist, \r but those mentioned in the literature are prohibitively expensive, \r exist  only at an early stage, and/or are subject to much broader \r [...]"


id: aac2dca46c1284e30eea9c396950b66a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27266
content:
"Liquid biofuels today supply about 4% of transportation energy \r worldwide, mostly as ethanol from grain and sugar cane and biodiesel \r from oil seeds and waste oils (Davis et al. 2018). These biofuels could \r conceivably be targeted to difficult-to-electrify sectors, but face \r substantial challenges related to their lifecycle carbon emissions, \r cost, and further scalability (Tilman et  al. 2009; Staples et  al. 2018), \r (Section 6.4.2). The extent to which biomass will supply liquid fuels or \r high temperature heat for industry in a future net-zero energy system will \r thus depend on advances in conversion technology that enable use of \r feedstocks such as woody crops, agricultural residues, algae, and wastes, \r as well as competing demands for bioenergy and land, the feasibility \r of other sources of carbon-neutral fuels, and integration of bioenergy \r production with other objectives, including CDR, economic development, \r [...]"


id: ea9b598f8a0a8979f973b09f72b5e670
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38637
content:
"[...] food security, ecological conservation, and air quality (Fargione 2010; \r Williams and Laurens 2010; Creutzig et al. 2015; Chatziaras et al. 2016; \r Laurens 2017; Lynd 2017; Bauer et  al. 2018a, b; Strefler et  al. 2018; \r Muratori et al. 2020b; Fennell et al. 2021) (Section 6.4.2.6)."


id: 8cff3f44ec4f8a46ef33193d081ea79a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21989
content:
"A non-trivial number of industry applications could be electrified as \r a part of a net-zero energy system, but direct electrification of heavy \r industry applications such as cement, primary steel manufacturing, \r and chemical feedstocks is expected to be challenging (medium \r confidence) (Davis et al. 2018; Philibert 2019; Madeddu et al. 2020; \r van Sluisveld et  al. 2021). Process and boiler heating in industrial \r facilities are anticipated to be electrified in net-zero energy systems. \r Emissions intensity reductions for cement and concrete production \r can be achieved through the use of electrified cement kilns, while \r emissions associated with steel production can be reduced through \r the use of an electric arc furnace (EAF) powered by decarbonised \r electricity (Rissman et  al. 2020). Electricity can also be used to \r replace thermal heat such as resistive heating, EAFs, and laser \r sintering (Madeddu et  al. 2020; Rissman et  al. 2020). One study \r [...]"


id: d421618c394104f095424db630dd8563
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34651
content:
"[...] found that as much as 60% of the energy end-use in European \r industry could be met with direct electrification using existing and \r emerging technologies (Madeddu et al. 2020). Industry electrification \r for different regions will depend on the economics and availability \r of alternative emissions mitigation strategies such as carbon neutral \r fuels and CCS (Davis et al. 2018; Madeddu et al. 2020)."


id: eca6bc5c4348ccf8b8a285246f2cf993
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38993
content:
"The phrase 'hydrogen economy' is often used to describe future energy systems in which hydrogen plays a prominent role. These \r future energy systems would not use hydrogen for all end uses; they would use hydrogen to complement other energy carriers, mainly \r electricity, where hydrogen might have advantages. Hydrogen could provide long-term electricity storage to support high-penetration \r of intermittent renewables and could enable trading and storage of electricity between different regions to overcome seasonal or \r production capability differences (Dowling et al. 2020; Sepulveda et al. 2021). It could also be used in lieu of natural gas for peaking \r generation, provide process heat for industrial needs, or be used in the metal sector via direct reduction of iron ore (Chapter 11). Clean \r hydrogen could be used as a feedstock in the production of various chemicals and synthetic hydrocarbons. Finally, hydrogen-based \r [...]"


id: 3687ccb1889a03ecfa4e7e32f4ae9df
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6825
content:
"[...] fuel cells could power vehicles. Recent advances in battery storage make electric vehicles the most attractive alternative for light-duty \r transport. However, fuel cell technology could complement electric vehicles in supporting the decarbonisation of heavy-duty transport \r segments (e.g., trucks, buses, ships, and trains) (Chapter 10)."


id: e435879d874f4cfc7c33f2df0bfed2de
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37453
content:
"However, the potential role of hydrogen in future energy systems depends on more than just production methods and costs. For \r some applications, the competitiveness of hydrogen also depends on the availability of the infrastructure needed to transport and \r deliver it at relevant scales (Lee et al. 2021). Transporting hydrogen through existing gas pipelines is generally not feasible without \r changes to the infrastructure itself (Gumber and Gurumoorthy 2018; Muratori et al. 2018). Existing physical barriers, such as steel \r embrittlement and degradation of seals, reinforcements in compressor stations, and valves, require retrofitting during the conversion \r to H2 distribution or new dedicated pipelines to be constructed (Dohi et al. 2016). The capacity to leverage and convert existing \r gas infrastructure to transport hydrogen will vary regionally, but in many cases could be the most economically viable pathway \r [...]"


id: 1bfe8a8fc1f744b76fe9fd3025dd3789
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2112
content:
"[...] (Cerniauskas et al. 2020; Brandle et al. 2021; Brooks 2021; Wettengel 2021). Hydrogen could also be transported as liquid gas or as \r liquid organic hydrogen carriers such as ammonia, for which industry knowledge exists (Demir et al. 2018; Wulf et al. 2018; Hong et al. \r 2021). Additionally, improvements in fuel cell technologies are needed to make hydrogen-based transport economically viable. There \r are also safety concerns associated with the flammability (Nilsson et al. 2017) and storage (Andersson and Gronkvist 2019; Caglayan \r et al. 2019) of hydrogen which will need to be considered."


id: cd39f8e9d84227aadba31680c65d3672
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33443
content:
"A study (DeAngelo et  al. 2021) reviewed 153 integrated asset \r management scenarios that attain net-zero energy sector CO2\r emissions and found that, under a scenario with net-zero emissions: \r global final energy per  capita lies between 21-109 GJ per  person \r (median: 57), in comparison to 2018 global final energy use of \r 55  GJ per  person; many countries use far more energy per  capita \r than today as their incomes increase; global final energy use \r per unit of economic output ranges from 0.7-2.2 EJ per trillion USD \r (median: 1.5), in comparison to 5 EJ per trillion USD in 2018; and \r the median final energy consumption is 529 EJ. By comparison, final \r energy consumption would be 550 EJ if current energy consumption \r per capita continued under a future population of 10 billion people. \r Across all scenarios, total final energy consumption is higher today \r than in the year in which net-zero emissions are attained, and \r [...]"


id: 70fdd94d242d40ea99e440903a3cd048
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17142
content:
"[...] regionally, only the OECD+EU and Eurasia have lower median total \r final energy than in 2010."


id: 7503b8503abe1a359bc199a728730730
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17825
content:
"Energy systems integration refers to connected planning and \r operations across energy carriers, including electricity, fuels, \r and  thermal resources. Coordinated planning could be important \r in lowering system costs, increasing reliability, minimising \r environmental impacts, and ensuring that costs of R&D and \r infrastructure account for not just current needs but also for those \r of future energy systems (Section  6.4.3). Integration includes not \r only the physical energy systems themselves but also simultaneous \r societal objectives (e.g., sustainable development goals), innovation \r processes (e.g.,  coordinating R&D to increase the likelihood of \r beneficial technological spillovers), and other institutional and \r infrastructural transformations (Sachs et  al. 2019). Given system \r variability and differences in regional resources, there are economic \r and technical advantages to greater coordination of investments \r [...]"


id: af8e78de9bd98154af572bf4c602c83c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28123
content:
"[...] and policies across jurisdictions, sectors, and levels of government \r (Schmalensee and Stavins 2017). Coordinated planning and \r operations can improve system economics by sharing resources, \r increasing the utilisation of capital-intensive assets, enhancing the \r geographical diversity of resource bases, and smoothing demand. \r But integration could require regulatory and market frameworks \r to facilitate and appropriate price signals to align incentives and to \r coordinate investments and operations."


id: 86547b4750670ed9c8ca75f7e37b7d31
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20796
content:
"Net-zero energy systems will be characterised by greater efficiency \r and more efficient use of energy across all sectors (high confidence). \r Road transportation efficiency improvements will require a shift from \r liquid fuels (Chapters 5 and 10). Emissions reductions will come \r from a transition to electricity, hydrogen, or synthetic fuels produced \r with low-carbon energy sources or processes. Vehicle automation, \r ride-hailing services, online shopping with door delivery services, \r and new solutions like last mile delivery with drones may result in \r increased service share. Lighter vehicles, a shift to public transit, and \r incorporation of two- and three-wheelers will be features of a net\u0002zero energy system (Chapter  10). Teleworking and automation of \r work may provide reductions in driving needs. Other sectors, such \r as air travel and marine transportation may rely on alternative fuels \r such as biofuels, synthetic fuels, ammonia, produced with zero carbon \r [...]"


id: 625a2389c77edbbf156a7ac00e153d45
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14584
content:
"sectoral coupling are increasingly relevant to ensure that net-zero \r energy systems are reliable, resilient, and affordable (EPRI 2017; \r Martin et al. 2017; Buttler and Spliethoff 2018; O'Malley et al. 2020). \r Deep decarbonisation offers new opportunities and challenges for \r integrating different sectors as well as supply- and demand-side \r options. For instance, increasing electrification will change daily \r and seasonal load shapes, and end-use flexibilities and constraints \r could impact the desirability of different supply-side technologies \r (Brown et al. 2018; EPRI 2019b). The feasibility of net-zero energy \r system configurations could depend on demonstrating cross-sector \r benefits like balancing VRE sources in the electricity sector, and on \r offering the flexibility to produce multiple products. For instance, \r low-emissions synthetic fuels could help to bridge stationary and \r mobile applications, since fuel markets have more flexibility than \r [...]"


id: c5bafee3a2a39ab7bbac5fc42b0dface
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32096
content:
"[...] instantaneously balanced electricity markets due to the comparative \r ease and cost of large-scale, long-term storage of chemical fuels \r (Davis et al. 2018)."


id: b33f8580e2478a0c97e3954341f78cf9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28775
content:
"CDR covers a  broad set of methods and implementation options \r (Chapters 7 and 12). The two CDR methods most relevant to the energy \r sector are BECCS, which is used to produce energy carriers, and DACCS \r which is an energy user (Smith et al. 2016; Singh and Colosi 2021). \r BECCS has value as an electricity generation technology, providing \r firm, dispatchable power to support electricity grids with large amounts \r of VRE sources, and reducing the reliance on other means to manage \r these grids, including electricity storage (Mac Dowell et  al. 2017; \r Bistline and Blanford 2021a). BECCS may also be used to produce \r liquid fuels or gaseous fuels, including hydrogen (Section  6.4.2.6) \r (Muratori et  al. 2020b). For instance, CO2 from bio-refineries could \r be captured at <USD45 tCO2\r -1 (Sanchez et al. 2018). Similarly, while \r CO2 capture is expensive in the electricity sector, its integration with \r hydrogen via biomass gasification can be achieved at an incremental \r [...]"


id: 7bd10d3ccf971d0dedc7add48f5f32a2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18993
content:
"[...] capital cost of 3-35% (Muratori et al. 2020b) (Section 6.4). As with all \r uses of bioenergy, linkages to broad sustainability concerns may limit \r the viable development, as will the presence of high-quality geologic \r sinks in close proximity (Melara et al. 2020)."


id: 77c3d4cb2e1a47ae867a72a91c44b8ba
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18277
content:
"There are few detailed archetypes of integrated energy systems that \r provide services with zero- or net-negative CO2 emissions (such as \r Jacobson et  al. 2019), so there is considerable uncertainty about \r integration and interactions across parts of the system. Although \r alternate configurations, trade-offs, and pathways are still being \r identified, common elements include fuels and processes like zero\u0002or negative-CO2 electricity generation and transmission, hydrogen \r production and transport, synthetic hydrocarbon production \r and transport, ammonia production and transport, and carbon \r management, where linkages across pathways could include the use \r of electricity to produce hydrogen via electrolysis (Smith et al. 2016; \r Moore 2017; Davis et al. 2018; Jenkins et al. 2018b; Shih et al. 2018; \r van Vuuren et al. 2018). Linked analytical frameworks are increasing \r being used to understand the potential role for system coupling with \r [...]"


id: be4dcee9395bb1155b7898c2c692bd30
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30749
content:
"[...] greater temporal resolution, spatial resolution, and heterogeneity \r of consumer and firm decisions (Bohringer and Rutherford 2008; \r Bistline and de la Chesnaye 2017; Collins et al. 2017; Gerboni et al. \r 2017; Santen et al. 2017; Pye et al. 2021)."


id: 74136b6df0a4ab90e82f3d268e45c24f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17662
content:
"For example, one energy system characterised by differentiated \r institutional interactions is the USA, where delivery of liquid fuels \r is lightly regulated, while electricity delivery is closely regulated \r (Dworkin et  al. 2013). Reforming this two-pronged system for \r decarbonisation would require four types of institutional change: \r (i) changes to the control systems that coordinate generation and \r transmission through a  pyramidal architecture for the operational \r control, dispatch, and delivery of electricity with a primary emphasis \r on reliability; (ii) changes to the financing of central-station power \r plants through long-term bonds, as valued by Wall Street ratings \r analysts; (iii) changes to the structure of investor-owned utilities \r that attract private investors who expected decades of technological \r stability to yield long-term, low-risk revenues; and (iv) changes to \r regulations to restructure and limit excessive returns and easy \r [...]"


id: 458c0acd92416d7bce68178a64ee39ac
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9455
content:
"[...] entry of new retail competitors, all recognising local and national \r concerns through state and federal regulatory agencies. The example \r shows how decision-making and the infrastructures involved are \r layered, and can create 'nested hierarchies' where institutions fulfil \r multiple roles for energy governance or regulation simultaneously "


id: 7c965c5756b1c8e21897fc69fdef56a6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19113
content:
"Societal preferences. Citizens in every country have preferences for \r certain technological options or mitigation approaches over others \r that will influence energy system choices. The public generally prefers \r a  future energy system based largely on renewables. Preferences \r for non-renewable energy differ across regions and groups. For \r example, studies have found that people in the UK, Germany, the \r Netherlands, and Switzerland prefer renewable energy and personal \r energy efficiency and savings to nuclear, fossil fuels and CCS (Jones \r et al. 2012; Scheer et al. 2013; Demski et al. 2017; Bessette and Arvai \r 2018; Steg 2018; Volken et al. 2018). Studies have found that people \r with higher education levels, higher incomes, females, and liberals \r prefer renewables to fossil fuels and nuclear (Van Rijnsoever et al. \r 2015; Bertsch et  al. 2016; Blumer et  al. 2018; Jobin et  al. 2019). \r The  willingness to pay for renewable electricity differs by source \r [...]"


id: 48c569060262e48e1b83a8f3f86c7f62
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10017
content:
"Warming cannot be limited to well below 2degC without rapid and \r deep reductions in energy system GHG emissions (high confidence). \r Energy sector CO2 emissions fall by 87-97% (interquartile range) \r by 2050 in scenarios limiting warming to 1.5degC (>50%) with no or \r limited overshoot and 60-79% in scenarios limiting warming to 2degC \r (>67%) with action starting in 2020 (Figure 6.26). Energy sector GHG \r emissions fall by 85-95% (interquartile range) in scenarios limiting \r warming to 1.5degC (>50%) with no or limited overshoot, and 62-78% \r in scenarios limiting warming to 2degC (>67%) with action starting in \r 2020 (Figure 6.26). In 2030, in scenarios limiting warming to 1.5degC \r (>50%) with no or limited overshoot, net CO2 and GHG emissions \r fall by 35-51% and 38-52% respectively. Key characteristics of \r emissions pathways  - the year of peak emissions, the year when \r net emissions  reach zero, and the pace of emissions reductions  - \r [...]"


id: 2f25487fbabef3163b8415ff3a425ecf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5564
content:
"[...] vary widely across countries and regions. These differences arise \r from differences in economic development, demographics, resource \r endowments, land use, and potential carbon sinks (Schaeffer, \r et  al. 2020; Schreyer, et  al. 2020; van Soest, Heleen et  al. 2021) \r (Figure 6.27, Figure 6.28, Box 6.11). If countries do not move quickly "


id: 15e26fb7626ee40211b530daf88b77a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1067
content:
"Without additional efforts to reduce emissions, it is very unlikely \r that energy system CO2 emissions will decrease sufficiently to limit \r warming to well below 2degC (high confidence). Scenarios assuming \r improvements in technology but no additional climate policies \r beyond those in place today provide a  benchmark for comparison \r against energy-related CO2 emissions in mitigation scenarios \r (Figure  6.26). Emissions in these reference scenarios increase \r through 2050 but span a broad range (Riahi et al. 2017; Wei et al. \r 2018) (Chapter 3, Figure 3.16). The highest emission levels are about \r four times current emissions; the lowest are modestly below today's \r emissions. Emissions in these scenarios increase in most regions, but \r they diverge significantly across regions (Bauer et  al. 2017). Asia \r and the Middle East and Africa account for the majority of increased \r emissions across these scenarios (Figure 6.27). While it is unlikely that \r [...]"


id: c931c04406a49276daafed6afff50330
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32720
content:
"There are multiple possible strategies to transform the energy system to reach net-zero CO2 emissions and to limit warming to 2degC \r (>67%) or lower. All pathways rely on the strategies for net-zero CO2 energy systems highlighted in Section 6.6.2, but they vary in the \r emphasis that they put on different aspects of these strategies and the pace at which they approach net-zero emissions. The pathway \r that any country or region might follow will depend on a wide variety of factors (Section 6.6.4), including, for example, resource \r endowments, trade and integration with other countries and regions, carbon sequestration potential, public acceptability of various \r technologies, climate, the nature of domestic industries, the degree of urbanisation, and the relationship with other societal priorities \r such as energy access, energy security, air pollution, and economic competitiveness. The Illustrative Mitigation Pathways presented in \r [...]"


id: 8c864e78aa88300cbb1bc8247f4301e3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21905
content:
"[...] this box demonstrate four distinct strategies for energy system transformations and how each plays out for a different region, aligned \r with global strategies that would limit warming to 2.0degC (>67%) or to 1.5degC (>50%). Each pathway represents a very different vision \r of a net-zero energy system. Yet, all these pathways share the common characteristic of a dramatic system-wide transformation over \r the coming decades. "


id: c902c2485fb740ed1e2f465656badb49
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32682
content:
"CDR technologies can offset emissions from sectors that are difficult \r to decarbonise (Section 6.6), altering the timeline and character of \r energy sector transitions. A number of studies suggest that CDR is \r no longer a choice, but rather a necessity to limit warming to 1.5degC \r (Rogelj et  al. 2015a; Detz et  al. 2018; Luderer et  al. 2018; Strefler \r et al. 2018; van Vuuren et al. 2018). The reliance on CDR varies across \r scenarios and is tightly linked to future energy demand and the rate \r of emission reductions in the next two decades: deeper near-term \r emissions reductions will reduce the need to rely on CDR to constrain \r cumulative CO2 emissions. Some studies have argued that only with \r a transition to lower energy demands will it be possible to largely \r eliminate the need for engineered CDR options (Grubler et al. 2018; \r van Vuuren et al. 2018). Overall, the amount of CDR will depend on \r CO2 capture costs, lifestyle changes, reduction in non-CO2 GHGs, and \r [...]"


id: 12d41443effea2cb5f73e27ae658d785
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 521
content:
"[...] utilisation of zero-emission end-use fuels (Muratori et al. 2017; van \r Vuuren et al. 2018)."


id: 188be70d975daa0efcc073394fe279c8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1530
content:
"There is substantial uncertainty about the amount of CDR that might \r ultimately be deployed. In most scenarios that limit warming to 1.5degC, \r CDR deployment is fairly limited through 2030 at less than 1 GtCO2 yr-1. \r The key projected increase in CDR deployment (BECCS and DAC only) \r occurs between 2030 and 2050, with annual CDR in 2050 projected \r at 2.5-7.5 GtCO2 yr-1 in 2050 (interquartile range) in scenarios \r limiting warming to 1.5degC (>50%) with limited or no overshoot, and \r 0.7-1.4 GtCO2 yr-1 in 2050 in scenarios limiting warming to 2degC \r (>67%) with action starting in 2020. This characteristic of scenarios \r largely reflects substantial capacity addition of BECCS power plants. \r BECCS is also deployed in multiple ways across sectors. For instance, \r the contribution (interquartile range) of BECCS to electricity is 1-5% \r in 2050 in scenarios limiting warming to 1.5degC (>50%) with no or \r limited overshoot, and 0-5% in scenarios that limit warming to 2degC \r [...]"


id: 93b60cad3fd3c428d32b683e119bb11d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23194
content:
"[...] (>67%) with action starting in 2020. The contribution (interquartile \r range) of BECCS to liquid fuels is 9-21% in 2050 in scenarios limiting "


id: 5ce3911dc60c929ff9a4c149ec5dc6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13609
content:
"CO2 emissions from fuel combustion are the bottom line on energy system progress. Beyond CO2 emissions, primary energy demand \r by energy sources, final energy consumption by sectors, and total electricity demand provide a first order assessment of energy system \r transitions. The year at which CO2 emissions peak is also important. The Kaya Identity can be used to decompose energy system CO2\r emissions into carbon intensity of the energy system (CO2 emissions from fossil-fuel combustion and industry divided by energy \r use), energy intensity (energy use divided by economic output), and economic output. The impacts of energy and climate policy are \r reflected in the changes of carbon intensity and energy intensity. Carbon intensity captures decarbonisation of energy supply systems, \r for example, through fuel switching from fossil fuels to non-fossil fuels, upscaling of low-carbon energy sources, and deploying carbon \r [...]"


id: 327c424dc2a03b0071f0125516ba05f3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6136
content:
"[...] dioxide removal technologies. The carbon intensity of electricity is specifically important, given the role of the electricity sector in near\u0002term mitigation. Economy-wide energy intensity represents efforts of demand-side energy, such as energy conservation, increase of \r energy performance of technologies, structural change of economy, and development of efficient urban infrastructure."


id: bcd6ce1957e31efbd799d8acb774680a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30464
content:
"Such innovation also involves pervasive uncertainty around technical \r potential, cost, consumer demand, and social acceptance. Such \r uncertainty carries governance challenges. Policy approaches facing \r deep uncertainty must protect against and/or prepare for unforeseeable \r developments, whether it is through resistance (planning for the \r worst possible case or future situation), resilience (making sure you \r can recover quickly), or adaptation (changes to policy under changing \r conditions). Such uncertainty can be hedged in part by learning by \r firms, consumers, and policymakers. Social interactions and network \r building (e.g., supply and distribution chains, intermediary actors) and \r the articulation of positive visions, such as in long-term, low-emission \r development strategies, all play a crucial role. This uncertainty extends \r to the impacts of low-carbon innovations on energy demand and \r other variables, where unanticipated and unintended outcomes are \r [...]"


id: 5e3b9ef3ae7bb231a7c3c5a4e6035ae1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13869
content:
"[...] the norm. For instance, rapid investments in public transport networks \r could restrict car ownership from becoming common in developing \r countries (Du and Lin 2017)."


id: 59671e2a9a4c7c1b11233acfd8b54fa8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12965
content:
"Near-term policy choices are particularly consequential for fast\u0002growing economies. For example, Malik et  al. (2020) found that \r 133 to 227 GW of coal capacity would be stranded after 2030 if \r India were to delay ambitious mitigation through 2030 and then \r pursue an ambitious, post-2030 climate strategy. Cui et  al. (2021) \r identified 18% of old, small, inefficient coal plants for rapid near\u0002term retirement in China to help achieve air quality, health, water, \r and other societal goals and a feasible coal phase-out under climate \r goals. Comparable magnitudes of stranded assets may also be \r created in Latin America when adding all announced, authorised, \r and procured power plants up to 2060 (Gonzalez-Mahecha et  al. \r 2019). Options to reduce carbon lock-in include reducing fossil fuels \r subsidies (Box  6.3), building CCS-ready facilities, or ensuring that \r facilities are appropriately designed for fuel switching (Budinis et al. \r [...]"


id: ea35d14fe159826b8c2bf69905b8c29
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38557
content:
"[...] 2018). Substantial lock-in may necessitate considerable deployment \r of CDR to compensate for high cumulative emissions."


id: 2af8c0d7f83791aa2514f8e2220b6b30
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4796
content:
"Stronger near-term mitigation will reduce premature retirements of fossil infrastructure, because more rapid mitigation will decrease \r new builds of fossil infrastructure that might later be stranded (Johnson et al. 2015; Bertram et al. 2018) (high confidence). For example, \r if warming is limited to 2degC, strengthening the NDC pledges beyond their 2015 levels could decrease stranded electricity sector assets \r by more than 50% (Iyer et al. 2015). By contrast, if countries fail to meet their NDCs and continue to build fossil infrastructure, \r mitigation will need to be accelerated beyond 2030, resulting up to double the amount of stranded electricity generation capacity (Iyer \r et al. 2015). This corresponds to a total undiscounted cost of about USD2 trillion from electricity infrastructure alone, from the period \r 2015 to 2050 (IRENA 2017). CCS (6.4) could potentially help reduce hundreds of gigawatts stranded power plant capacity along with \r [...]"


id: 12ec1bbe0e9e3a5ba119e27dcda247a8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 534
content:
"consumption declines 130 EJ yr-1 to 140 EJ yr-1 in 2050 (78-99% \r compared to 2020 levels, interquartile range) in scenarios limiting \r warming to 1.5degC (>50%) with no or limited overshoot and 118 EJ yr-1\r to 139 EJ yr-1 (65% to 98% compared to 2020 levels) in scenarios \r limiting warming to 2degC (>67%) with action starting in 2020. Coal \r consumption without CCS falls by 67% to 82% (interquartile range) in \r 2030 in scenarios limiting warming to 1.5degC (>50%) with no or limited \r overshoot. Studies indicate that coal use may decline substantially in \r the USA and Europe over the coming decade, based on the increasing \r competitiveness of low-carbon sources and near-term policy actions \r (Grubert and Brandt 2019; Oei et  al. 2020). In several developing \r economies, the relative youth of the coal-fired electricity fleet will make \r a complete phase-out before 2050 difficult (Garg and Shukla 2009; \r Jewell et  al. 2016). There are considerable differences in projected \r [...]"


id: 42212a75ed07c8916925cd93aec43587
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8835
content:
"[...] coal phase-out timelines in major Asian economies. Some studies \r suggest that coal may continue to be a part of the Chinese energy mix \r composing around one-third of the total primary energy consumption \r by 2050, even if emissions are reduced by 50% by 2030 (He et al. \r 2020). Others indicate that a strategic transition would decrease the \r risk of stranded assets and enable a  near-complete phase-out by \r 2050 (Wang et al. 2020a; Cui et al. 2021). This would entail prioritising "


id: 30db8942d6712090500c54992974d3e2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5851
content:
"Natural gas may remain part of energy systems through mid-century, \r both for electricity generation and use in industry and buildings, and \r particularly in developed economies, even if warming is limited to \r 2degC (>67%) or lower (medium confidence). The decline in natural gas \r use from 2020 to 2050 is 38 EJ yr-1 to 78 EJ yr-1 (21-62% decline \r from 2020 levels, interquartile range) in scenarios limiting warming \r to 1.5degC (>50%) with no or limited overshoot and -22 EJ yr -1 to \r 46  EJ yr -1 (-14% to 36% decline from 2020 levels, interquartile \r range) in scenarios limiting warming to 2degC (>67%) with action \r starting in 2020. Scenarios indicate that gas use in electricity will \r likely peak around 2035 and 2050 if warming is limited to 1.5degC \r (>50%) with limited or no overshoot or to 2degC (>67%) with action \r starting in 2020, respectively. There is variability in the role gas would \r play in future scenarios based on national climate commitments and \r [...]"


id: 79729bdbf6119ebbcb15523ffd57557f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18568
content:
"[...] availability of cheap renewables (Malik et  al. 2020; Vishwanathan \r and Garg 2020; Vrontisi et al. 2020). Note that these differences are \r not only present in the electricity sector but also in other end uses."


id: aad197321da8ba7f1b5cd4e9df3e477c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27280
content:
"While oil use is anticipated to decline substantially, due to changes \r in the transport sector, its use will likely continue through the mid\u0002century, even if warming is limited to 2degC (>67%) or lower (medium \r confidence). Oil use declines by 73 EJ yr-1 to 145 EJ yr-1 (30-78% \r from 2020 levels, interquartile range) in scenarios that limit warming \r to 1.5degC (>50%) with no or limited overshoot and 26 EJ yr-1 to \r 86 EJ yr -1 (14-45% from 2020 levels) by 2050 in scenarios that limit \r warming to 2degC (>67%) with action starting in 2020. While oil use \r is anticipated to decline immediately in scenarios limiting warming \r to 1.5degC (>50%), it is likely to continue to be used through 2050. Oil \r use continues to be a significant source of transport fuels in most \r scenarios limiting warming to 2degC (Welsby et al. 2021). Oil use may \r drop to about half of current levels as a transport fuel by 2050 if \r warming is limited to 2degC, because of the availability of other options \r [...]"


id: 44bfa83947ae991dfee706dd448aebeb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9322
content:
"[...] (biofuels, green hydrogen) and rapid deployment of EVs (Feijoo et al. \r 2020). In the absence of rapid transport electrification, the decline \r is slower with some studies projecting peak oil use around 2035 \r (Delgado et al. 2020; Pan et al. 2020)."


id: 10ac53be6758ae6f9aa44aba318e66e1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 116
content:
"These policy mixes (or policy packages) are shaped by different \r factors, including policy goals and objectives (including political, \r social and technological influences), multiple market, governance \r or behavioural failures or previous policy choices of earlier policy \r eras (Rogge 2017). When pursuing multiple policy goals or targeting \r some type of imperfection, well designed policy mixes can, in \r principle, reduce mitigation costs (Corradini et al. 2018) or address \r distributional concerns, especially vulnerable populations. For \r example, the interaction between carbon pricing and the support \r for clean energy technologies in the EU clean low-carbon strategy for \r 2050 can reduce mitigation costs and allow for the early adoption of \r more stringent climate targets (Vandyck et al. 2016). Policy efforts to \r promote adoption of low-carbon technologies are more successful if \r they focus not only on economic incentives but include behavioural \r [...]"


id: 8b495605fffb7cb4b2fe84faf44bdb18
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21665
content:
"[...] interventions that target relevant cognitive and motivational \r factors (Mundaca et  al. 2019; Khanna et  al. 2021) (Section  6.7.6). \r Overlapping nudges might not necessarily lead to lower effectiveness \r (Brandon et al. 2019)."


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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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content:
"Well-designed policy mixes can support the pursuit of multiple \r policy goals, target effectively different types of imperfections and \r framework conditions and take into account the technological, \r economical, and societal situation (high confidence). Accounting for \r the different development stages of new technologies will enhance \r low-emissions transitions (Graaf and Sovacool 2020). For prototype \r technologies and technologies in the demonstration phase, research \r subsidies and demonstration projects are most important. For \r technologies experiencing early adoption, infrastructure development \r and strengthening of markets are increasingly important, while \r retiring or repurposing of existing assets is important for mature \r technologies (IEA 2020h) Effective policy mixes will address different \r market frictions and deal with various uncertainties, for example, \r those pertaining to technological, climate, and socio-economic \r [...]"


id: 9273b70e299dc3ff8dc68f6fb828b835
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22985
content:
"[...] developments (Aldy 2020), but also with respect to outcomes of \r individual policies (e.g.,  Borenstein et  al. 2019). Therefore, policy \r mixes may balance the trade-off between stability and the flexibility \r to change individual policies (Gawel and Lehmann 2019) and the \r policy mix over time (Rayner et al. 2017). Some policy instruments \r may become feasible over time, for example, as technological \r advancements reduce the transaction costs of comprehensive market\u0002based approaches (Andoni et al. 2019; Di Silvestre et al. 2020), or \r as weakened barriers to stringency enable policy sequencing (Pahle \r et al. 2018). Energy system policy mixes often include sector-specific \r regulation. Compared to economy-wide approaches, sectoral policies \r may be able to directly target specific sectors or mitigation options. \r However, uncoordinated implementation or limited coordination \r across sectors may lead to efficiency losses (e.g. Rosendahl et al. 2017). \r [...]"


id: b548e577eb265a4761830f26babc1075
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29131
content:
"[...] These losses also depend on other policies, such as pre-existing taxes \r (Goulder et al. 2016; Marten et al. 2018) or research and development \r policies (Acemoglu et al. 2016). Moreover, unilateral policies - those \r taken by individual countries in the absence of coordination with \r other countries - could raise carbon leakage risks, while balancing "


id: 2cbaed967f275a47a32b37f46c5007e5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5133
content:
"Financial incentives can motivate mitigation actions (Santos 2008; \r Thogersen 2009; Bolderdijk et  al. 2011; Eliasson 2014; Maki et  al. \r 2016), particularly when actions are costly (Mundaca 2007). \r In many countries, more residential solar PV were installed after the \r introduction of favourable financial schemes such as feed-in-tariffs, \r federal income tax credits, and net metering (Wolske and Stern \r 2018). Similarly, many programs have promoted the installation of \r lower-carbon household options such as heat pumps, district heating, \r or solar water heaters across Europe, the Asia-Pacific and Africa (Hu \r et  al. 2012; Sovacool and Martiskainen 2020; Ahmed et  al. 2021). \r Yet, financial incentives may underperform expectations when \r other factors are overlooked. For example, people may not respond \r to financial incentives when they do not trust the organisation \r sponsoring the programme, or when it takes too much effort to \r [...]"


id: 3f47ea3b2d8032e85421f18b7396b32b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8325
content:
"[...] receive the incentive (Mundaca 2007; Stern et al. 2016a). Financial \r incentives are more effective if combined with strategies addressing \r non-financial barriers."


id: 34d80115274c189bf0ce590e5d37231a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6538
content:
"Effective assessment of policy mixes requires comprehensive, validated \r international data, methodologies, and indicators. Existing policy \r mixes are difficult to evaluate because they target multiple objectives, \r and the evaluation must consider various criteria (Chapter  13 and \r Section  6.7.7), such as environmental and economic effectiveness, \r distributional effects, transformative potential, institutional \r requirements, and feasibility. Economic outcomes depend on policy \r goals and implementation. Existing studies on policy mixes suggest \r the benefits of a  comprehensive approach (Rosenow et  al. 2017), \r while also highlighting that an 'excessive' number of instruments \r may reduce overall effectiveness (Costantini et al. 2017). Combining \r environmental regulation and innovation policies may be of particular \r importance to tackle both emissions and innovation market failures \r (Fabrizi et al. 2018). The consistency and credibility of policy mixes is \r [...]"


id: 29e1408e545eff1ee4dad6910627d59d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4593
content:
"Providing information on the causes and consequences of climate \r change or on effective mitigation actions increases people's \r knowledge and awareness, but generally does not promote mitigation \r actions by individuals (Abrahamse et  al. 2005) or organisations \r (Anderson and Newell 2004). Fear-inducing representations of \r climate change may inhibit action when they make people feel \r helpless (O'Neill and Nicholson-Cole 2009). Energy-related advice \r and feedback can promote energy savings, load shifting in electricity \r use and sustainable travel, particularly when framed in terms of \r losses rather than gains (Gonzales et al. 1988; Wolak 2011; Bradley \r et al. 2016; Bager and Mundaca 2017). Also, credible and targeted \r information at the point of decision can promote action (Stern et al. \r 2016a). Information is more effective when delivered by a trusted \r source, such as peers (Palm 2017), advocacy groups (Schelly 2014), \r [...]"


id: 3cdae9e1362187b60398fdb6c3195ddf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7889
content:
"[...] and community organisations (Noll et al. 2014), and when tailored \r to actors' personal situations and core values (Daamen et al. 2001; \r Abrahamse et al. 2007; Bolderdijk et al. 2013; Boomsma and Steg \r 2014; Wolsko et al. 2016; van den Broek et al. 2017). This explains why \r home energy audits promoted energy savings (Delmas et al. 2013; \r Alberini and Towe 2015), and investments in resource efficiency and \r renewable energy generation (Kastner and Stern 2015)."


id: 642730697dde0b31b561d60a7a41a317
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14903
content:
"Public acceptability reflects the extent to which the public \r evaluates climate policy, mitigation options, and system changes \r (un)favourably, which can shape, enable, or prevent low-carbon \r energy system transitions. Public acceptability of policy and mitigation \r options is higher when people expect these have more positive and \r less negative consequences for self, others, and the environment \r (Perlaviciute and Steg 2014; Demski et al. 2015; Drews and Van den \r Bergh 2016). Public opposition may result when a culturally valued \r landscape is affected by renewable energy development (Warren \r et al. 2005; Devine-Wright and Howes 2010), particularly when place\u0002based identities are threatened (Devine-Wright 2009, 2013; Boudet \r 2019). Acceptability can increase after a policy or change has been \r implemented and the consequences appear to be more positive than \r expected (Schuitema et al. 2010; Eliasson 2014; Weber 2015; Carattini \r [...]"


id: 15efdf2641d7e3d10637203e6cf20d4e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1078
content:
"Energy use feedback can promote energy saving behaviour within \r households (Fischer 2008; Gronhoj and Thogersen 2011; Delmas \r et al. 2013; Karlin et al. 2015; Zangheri et al. 2019) and at work (Young \r et al. 2015), particularly when provided in real time or immediately \r after the action so that people learn the impact of different actions \r (Abrahamse et al. 2005; Faruqui et al. 2009; Delmas et al. 2013; Yu et al. \r 2015; Stern et al. 2016a; Tiefenbeck et al. 2016). Energy labels (Banerjee \r and Solomon 2003; Stadelmann 2017), visualisation techniques (Pahl \r et al. 2016), and ambient persuasive technology (Midden and Ham \r 2012) can encourage energy savings as they immediately make sense \r and hardly require users' conscious attention. Feedback can make \r people aware of their previous mitigation behaviours, which can \r strengthen their environmental self-identity, and motivate them to \r engage in other mitigation actions, to act in line with their self-image \r [...]"


id: 5d97f2ab307f022cbbb110f5a24142e4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13752
content:
"Public acceptability of climate policy and low-carbon options differs \r across individuals. Climate policy and low-carbon options are more \r acceptable when people strongly value protecting other people and \r the environment, and support egalitarian worldviews, left-wing or \r green political ideologies, while acceptability is lower when people \r strongly endorse self-centred values, and support individualistic \r worldviews (Dietz et  al. 2007; Perlaviciute and Steg 2014; Drews \r and Van den Bergh 2016). Similarly, public decision-makers support \r climate policy more when they endorse environmental values \r (Nilsson et al. 2016). Climate and energy policy is more acceptable \r when people are more concerned about climate change (Hornsey \r et  al. 2016), when they believe their actions would help mitigate \r climate change, and feel responsible to mitigate climate change (Steg \r 2005; Eriksson et al. 2006; Jakovcevic and Steg 2013; Drews and Van \r [...]"


id: e0d2c5c839b0c7007f4d2f8a58bf60b0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36815
content:
"The long-term economic characteristics of low-emissions energy \r system transitions are not well understood, and they depend on \r policy design and implementation along with future costs and \r availability of technologies in key sectors (e.g., process heat, long\u0002distance transport), and the ease of electrification in end-use sectors \r (high confidence). The long-term aggregate economic outcomes from \r a low-emissions future are not likely to be substantially worse than \r in an emissions-intensive future and may prove superior (Child et al. \r 2019, Farmer et al. 2020; Bogdanov et al. 2021) (medium confidence). \r For the whole economy, the interquartile range of estimated \r mitigation costs is between 140 USD2015 and 340 USD2015 tCO2\r -1\r in 2050 in scenarios limiting warming to 2degC (>67%) and between \r 430 USD2015 and 990 USD2015 tCO2\r -1 in scenarios limiting \r warming to 1.5degC (>50%) with no or limited overshoot (Chapter 3). \r [...]"


id: c1e1f6aa678da98e3772b64d9b111c67
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31412
content:
"[...] For energy sectors in various regions and globally, different \r scenarios show a  wide range of implied carbon prices in 2050 to \r limit warming to 1.5degC, from below USD50 tCO2\r -1 to more than \r USD900 tCO2\r -1 (Brouwer et al. 2016; Rogelj et al. 2018a). Mitigation \r costs for scenarios limiting warming to 2degC (>67%) were 3-11% in \r consumption losses in AR5, but the median in newer studies is about \r 3% in GDP losses (Su et al. 2018; Gambhir et al. 2019)."


id: d1ab63c2d19b1efc69aeca9956a777c2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34241
content:
"Efficient end-use technologies are likely to be particularly cost\u0002effective in developing countries where new infrastructure is \r rapidly getting built and there is an opportunity to create positive \r path dependencies (Section  6.7.3). Aside from reducing energy \r consumption, efficient end-use technologies reduce resource \r extraction, for example, fossil fuel extraction or mining for materials \r used in wind turbines or solar PV cells (Luderer et  al. 2019). \r Reduced resource extraction is an important precursor to SDG 12 \r on sustainable consumption and production of minerals. End-use \r efficiency strategies also reduce the need for, and therefore SDG trade\u0002offs associated with, CDR towards the end of the century and avoid \r temperature overshoot (van Vuuren et al. 2018). But fully leveraging \r the demand-side efficiency would entail behavioural changes and \r thus rely on strong partnerships with communities (SDG  17). For \r [...]"


id: 1c115e3043207420e14ad857d52dccea
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2118
content:
"[...] instance, approaches that inform households of the economic value \r of conservation strategies at home could be particularly useful \r (Niamir et al. 2018). Improved energy efficiency is interlinked with \r higher economic growth in Africa (Lin and Abudu 2020; Ohene-Asare \r et al. 2020). An important distinction here between SDGs focusing \r on infrastructural and behavioural interventions is the temporal \r context. Improving building heat systems or the electricity grid with \r reduced T&D losses would provide climate mitigation with one-time \r investments and minor maintenance over decades. On the other \r hand, behavioural changes would be an ongoing process involving \r sustained, long-term societal interactions."


id: 20d7dad955481d63ad83b2f328ad7bc4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2997
content:
"Focusing only on aggregate economic outcomes neglects distributional \r impacts, impacts on broader SDGs, and other outcomes of broad \r societal importance. Strategies to increase energy efficiency and \r energy conservation are, in most instances, mutually reinforcing with \r strategies to support sustainable development. Improving efficiency \r and energy conservation will promote sustainable consumption \r and production of energy and associated materials (SDG 12) (high \r confidence). Contrastingly, successful implementation of demand\u0002side options requires sustainable partnerships (SDG 17) between \r different actors in energy systems, for example, governments, utilities, \r distributors, and consumers. Many authors have argued that energy \r efficiency has a large untapped potential in both supply and demand \r (Lovins 2018; Mejean et  al. 2019). For example, improved fossil \r power plant efficiency has been estimated to lower the costs of CCS \r from USD80-100 tCO2\r [...]"


id: 90ee100d24bc5f0d0a39e85a2b2ac6c3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22705
content:
"[...] -1 for a subcritical plant to <USD40 tCO2-1 for \r a high-efficiency plant (Hu and Zhai 2017; Singh et al. 2017). This \r could enhance energy access and affordability. Eliminating electricity "


id: 2c3ccfea48be869d946e1a5c7ae3ea72
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5046
content:
"Increasing electrification will support and reduce the costs of key \r elements of human development, such as education, health, and \r employment (high confidence). Greater access to electricity might \r offer greater access to irrigation opportunities for agricultural \r communities (Peters and Sievert 2016) which could have the potential \r for increasing farmer incomes in support of SDG 1. Coordinated \r electrification policies also improve enrolment for all forms of \r education (Kumar and Rauniyar 2018; Lopez-Gonzalez et al. 2020). \r Empirical evidence from India suggests that electrification reduced \r the time for biomass collection, and thus increased the time children \r have available for schooling (SDGs 4 and 5) (Khandker et al. 2014). \r Reduced kerosene use in developing countries has improved indoor air \r quality (SDG 3) (Barron and Torero 2017; Lewis and Severnini 2020). \r These positive linkages between climate change mitigation and other \r [...]"


id: 24603eabecf2913bbb4872f9a7413c5d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3592
content:
"[...] goals have improved perceptions of solar PV among the public and \r policymakers. 'Goodwill' towards solar PV is the highest among all the \r major mitigation options considered in this chapter (Section 6.4.2)."


id: 1fe8abd31a3092abd3e092230d7269a0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2824
content:
"Phasing out fossil fuels in favour of low-carbon sources is likely to \r have considerable SDG benefits, particularly if trade-offs such as \r unemployment to fossil fuel workers are minimised (high confidence). \r A phase-out of coal (Box 6.2) will support SDGs 3, 7 and 14, but it is \r also anticipated to create large job losses if not properly managed. \r At the same time, there are large potential employment opportunities \r that may be created in alternative sectors such as renewables and \r bioenergy for both skilled and unskilled workers. 'Sustainable \r transition' pathways have indicated a  complete fossil phase-out \r which could entail numerous other co-benefits. For instance, fossil \r fuels are estimated to generate only 2.65 jobs per million USD as \r compared to projected 7.49 from renewables (Garrett-Peltier 2017). \r Similar synergies may also emerge for nuclear power in the long \r term, though the high costs create trade-offs in developing country \r [...]"


id: 98d3699e5f8d4575418ed62b177c1b37
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24103
content:
"[...] contexts (Agyekum et al. 2020; Castor et al. 2020). While bioenergy \r production may create jobs, it may also be problematic for SDG 2 on \r zero hunger by affecting the supplies and prices of food. Phasing out \r of fossil fuels will also improve air quality (SDG 3) and premature \r deaths by reducing PM2.5 emissions, (He et al. 2020; Li et al. 2020c). \r Energy transitions from fossil fuels to renewables, as well as within \r fossil fuels (coal to gas switching), are already occurring in some \r regions, spurred by climate concerns, health concerns, market \r dynamics, or consumer choice (e.g., in the transport sector)."


id: a4fa67214c519452e92256ee9afbe89c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26247
content:
"the energy intensity of the treatment process and the reusability \r of the treated waters (Klapperich et  al. 2014; Arena et  al. 2017); \r if the produced brine from geologic formations can be treated \r via desalination technologies, there is an opportunity to keep the \r water intensity of electricity as constant (Section  6.4.2.5). Both \r implications of CCS and CDR are related to SDG 6 on clean water. \r CDR discussions in the context of energy systems frequently pertains \r to BECCS which could affect food prices based on land management \r approaches (Daioglou et  al. 2020a). Several CDR processes also \r require considerable infrastructure refurbishment and electrification \r to reduce upstream CO2 emissions (Singh and Colosi 2021). Large\u0002scale CDR could also open the potential for low-carbon transport and \r urban energy (by offsetting emissions in these sectors) use that would \r create synergies with SDG 11 (sustainable cities and communities). \r [...]"


id: ff4e0ba4273d7e0b84b29fbd086dd4eb
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42324
content:
"[...] Effective siting of CDR infrastructure therefore requires consideration \r of trade-offs with other priorities. At the same time, several SDG \r synergies have also been reported to accompany CCS projects, such \r as with reduced air pollution (SDG 3) (Mikunda et al. 2021)."


id: 8eee82e2aeaa96ec6586fdfb719a9305
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22334
content:
"Greater energy system integration (Sections 6.4.3 and 6.6.2) \r would enhance energy-SDG synergies while eliminating trade-offs \r associated with deploying mitigation options (high confidence).\r Energy system integration strategies focus on codependence of \r individual technologies in ways that optimise system performance. \r Accordingly, they can improve economic outcomes and reduce \r negative implications for SDGs. For example, VRE electricity options \r raise intermittency concerns and hydrogen can be expensive due \r to the costs of electricity. Both are relevant to SDG 7 on affordable \r and reliable energy access. Routing excess solar generation during \r daytime for hydrogen production will improve grid stability as lower \r hydrogen costs (Tarroja et al. 2015). Due to the varying patterns of \r solar and wind energy, these two energy sources could be operated \r in tandem, thus reducing the material needs for their construction \r [...]"


id: 6103454338174d80fe2f4c7ef02fe70
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14361
content:
"[...] and for storage, thus promoting SDG 12 on sustainable production \r (Weitemeyer et  al. 2015; Wang et  al. 2019d). For CCS facilities, \r co-firing of fossil fuels and biomass could enable a  more gradual, \r near-term low-carbon transition (Lu et al. 2019). This could enable \r early retirements (associated with SDG 1) while also providing air \r pollution reductions (associated with SDG 3)."


id: 867d4194b96ed2e6ee43090330460f80
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20830
content:
"Low-carbon energy systems will be similar to those of today in that they will provide many of the same services as today - for example, \r heating and cooling homes, travelling to work or on vacation, transporting goods and services, and powering manufacturing. But \r future energy systems may be different in that people may also demand new services that aren't foreseen today, just as people now \r use energy for many information technology uses that were not anticipated 50 years ago. More importantly, low-carbon energy \r systems will be different in the way that energy is produced, transformed, and used to provide these services. In the future, almost \r all electricity will be produced from sources that emit little or no CO2, such as solar power, wind power, nuclear power, bioenergy, \r hydropower, geothermal power, or fossil energy in which the CO2 is captured and stored. Electricity, hydrogen, and bioenergy will \r [...]"


id: 21cc576a81f547add6add2da39b054de
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3162
content:
"[...] be used in many situations where fossil fuels are used today, for example, in cars or heating homes. And energy is likely to be used \r more efficiently than today, for example, through more efficient cars, trucks, and appliances, buildings that use very little energy, \r and greater use or public transportation. All of these changes may require new policies, institutions, and even new ways for people \r to live their lives. And fundamental to all of these changes is that low-carbon energy systems will use far less fossil fuel than today."


id: 2d633745298403859b1de5d011303753
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5270
content:
"Renewable energy technologies harness energy from natural sources that are continually replenished, for example, from the sun \r (solar energy), the wind (wind energy), plants (bioenergy), rainfall (hydropower), or even the ocean. The energy from these sources \r exceeds the world's current and future energy needs many times. But that does not mean that renewable sources will provide all \r energy in future low-carbon energy systems. Some countries have a lot of renewable energy, whereas others do not, and other \r energy sources, such as nuclear power or fossil energy in which CO2 emissions are captured and stored (carbon dioxide capture \r and storage, or CCS) can also contribute to low-carbon energy systems. The energy from sources such as solar energy, wind energy, \r and hydropower can vary throughout the day or over seasons or years. All low-carbon energy sources have other implications for \r [...]"


id: 7afdd401f3b900bf4182f3145e52a843
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18838
content:
"[...] people and countries, some of which are desirable, for example, reducing air pollution or making it easy to provide electricity in \r remote locations, and some of which are undesirable, for example decreasing biodiversity or mining of minerals to produce low\u0002emissions technologies. For all of these reasons, it is unlikely that all low-carbon energy systems around the world will rely entirely \r on renewable energy sources."


id: 8841722eed31d6909488eec369275912
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21125
content:
"To create a low-carbon energy system, emissions must be reduced across all parts of the system, and not just one or two. This \r means, for example, reducing the emissions from producing electricity, driving cars, hauling freight, heating and cooling buildings, \r powering data centres, and manufacturing goods. There are more opportunities to reduce emissions over the next decade in some \r sectors compared to others. For example, it is possible to substantially reduce electricity emissions over the next decade by investing \r in low-carbon electricity sources, while at the same time halting the construction of new coal-fired power plants, retiring existing \r coal-fired power plants or retrofitting them with carbon capture and storage (CCS), and limiting the construction of new gas-fired \r power plants. There are also opportunities to increase the number of electric cars, trucks, and other vehicles on the road, or to use \r [...]"


id: 4d743262fc79b76af1869f18f9c1eef6
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10905
content:
"[...] electricity rather than natural gas or coal to heat homes. And across the whole energy system, emissions can be reduced by using \r more efficient technologies. While these and other actions will be critical over the coming decade, it is also important to remember \r that the low-carbon energy transition needs to extend for many decades into the future to limit warming. This means that it is \r important now to improve and test options that could be useful later on, for example, producing hydrogen from low-carbon sources \r or producing bioenergy from crops that require less land than today."


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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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vector_id: 4709
content:
"Hossein Ameli (Germany), Nils Angliviel de La Beaumelle (France/the United States of America), \r John Bistline (the United States of America), Edward Byers (Austria/Ireland), Katherine Calvin \r (the United States of America), Kiran Chawla (India), Yiyun Ryna Cui (China), Steven  J. Davis \r (the United States of America), Julianne DeAngelo (the United States of America), Subash Dhar \r (India/Denmark), Jacqueline Sophie Edge (Republic of South Africa/United Kingdom), Robert \r Germeshausen (Germany), Mohamad Hejazi (Syria/United States of America), Gokul Iyer (India), \r Louise Jeffery (United Kingdom), Matti Juhani Koivisto (Finland/Denmark), Gunnar Luderer \r (Germany), David McCollum (the United States of America), Matteo Muratori (Italy), Gregory F. \r Nemet (the United States of America/Canada), Omkar Patange (India), Monica Santillan Vera \r (Mexico), Udayan Singh (India), Benjamin Kenneth Sovacool (Denmark/United Kingdom), Loreta \r [...]"


id: 1a1d3fb9800136069c677da8ab225f01
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content:
"[...] Stankeviciute (Lithuania), Falko Ueckerdt (Germany), Cintia B. Uvo (Brazil/Sweden/Italy), Heleen \r van Soest (the Netherlands), Janet Veldstra (the Netherlands)"


id: 5fcf7756161db6ba12f2bc70d2093487
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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vector_id: 14162
content:
"The Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use1 (AFOLU) sector \r encompasses managed ecosystems and offers significant \r mitigation opportunities while delivering food, wood and \r other renewable resources as well as biodiversity conservation, \r provided the sector adapts to climate change. Land-based \r mitigation measures represent some of the most important options \r currently available. They can both deliver carbon dioxide removal \r (CDR) and substitute for fossil fuels, thereby enabling emissions \r reductions in other sectors. The rapid deployment of AFOLU measures \r is essential in all pathways staying within the limits of the remaining \r budget for a  1.5degC target (high confidence). Where carefully and \r appropriately implemented, AFOLU mitigation measures are uniquely \r positioned to deliver substantial co-benefits and help address many \r of the wider challenges associated with land management. If AFOLU \r measures are deployed badly then, when taken together with the \r [...]"


id: e169571dea4d9dd7dfeb3e807bb6fab1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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content:
"[...] increasing need to produce sufficient food, feed, fuel and wood, \r they may exacerbate trade-offs with the conservation of habitats, \r adaptation, biodiversity and other services. At the same time the \r capacity of the land to support these functions may be threatened by \r climate change itself (high confidence). {IPCC AR6 WGI, Figure SPM.7; \r IPCC AR6 WGII, 7.1, 7.6}"


id: 5a72e157ec0a5c526c81905d9c537a66
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13168
content:
"The AFOLU sector offers significant near-term mitigation \r potential at relatively low cost but cannot compensate for \r delayed emission reductions in other sectors (high evidence,\r medium agreement). The AFOLU sector can provide 20-30% \r (interquartile range) of the global mitigation needed for a 1.5degC or \r 2degC pathway towards 2050 (robust evidence, medium agreement), \r though there are highly variable mitigation strategies for how AFOLU \r potential can be deployed for achieving climate targets. The estimated \r likely economic (<USD100 tCO2-eq-1) AFOLU sector mitigation \r potential is 8 to 14 GtCO2-eq yr-1 between 2020 and 2050, with \r the bottom end of this range representing the mean from integrated \r assessment models (IAMs) and the upper end representing the mean \r estimate from global sectoral studies. The economic potential is about \r half of the technical potential from AFOLU, and about 30-50% could \r be achieved under USD20 tCO2-eq-1. The implementation of robust \r [...]"


id: 92d0e7d4f23c0a85f8ae815b4a8ba230
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content:
"[...] measurement, reporting and verification processes is paramount to \r improving the transparency of net-carbon-stock changes per land \r unit to prevent misleading assumptions or claims on mitigation. \r {7.1, 7.4, 7.5}"


id: f743ae94b0d9012760caf6d43f64eabe
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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content:
"The AFOLU (managed land) sector, on average, accounted for \r 13-21% of global total anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) \r emissions in the period 2010-2019 (medium confidence). At the \r same time managed and natural terrestrial ecosystems were \r a carbon sink, absorbing around one third of anthropogenic CO2\r emissions (medium confidence). Estimated anthropogenic net \r CO2 emissions from AFOLU (based on book-keeping models) result in \r a net source of +5.9 +- 4.1 GtCO2 yr-1 between 2010 and 2019 with \r an unclear trend. Based on FAOSTAT or national GHG inventories, \r the net CO2 emissions from AFOLU were 0.0 to +0.8 GtCO2 yr-1\r over the same period. There is a  discrepancy in the reported CO2\r AFOLU emissions magnitude because alternative methodological \r approaches that incorporate different assumptions are used. If the \r managed and natural responses of all land to both anthropogenic \r environmental change and natural climate variability, estimated to \r [...]"


id: ccc3c47531f069bd70738418514b9e98
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content:
"[...] be a gross sink of -12.5 +- 3.2 GtCO2 yr-1 for the period 2010-2019, \r are included with land use emissions, then land overall, constituted \r a net sink of -6.6 +- 5.2 GtCO2 yr-1 in terms of CO2 emissions (medium \r confidence). {7.2, 7.2.2.5, Table 7.1; IPCC AR6 WGI}"


id: 89b0273c715cc0944017e378715a5f75
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content:
"Between 2020 and 2050, mitigation measures in forests and \r other natural ecosystems provide the largest share of the \r economic (up to USD100 tCO2-eq-1) AFOLU mitigation potential, \r followed by agriculture and demand-side measures (high \r confidence). In the global sectoral studies, the protection, improved \r management, and restoration of forests, peatlands, coastal wetlands, \r savannas and grasslands have the potential to reduce emissions and/\r or sequester 7.3 mean (3.9-13.1 range) GtCO2-eq yr-1. Agriculture \r provides the second largest share of the mitigation potential, with \r 4.1 (1.7-6.7) GtCO2-eq yr-1 (up to USD100 tCO2-eq-1) from cropland \r and grassland soil carbon management, agroforestry, use of biochar, \r improved rice cultivation, and livestock and nutrient management. \r Demand-side measures including shifting to sustainable healthy diets, \r reducing food waste, and building with wood and biochemicals and \r [...]"


id: dc9527e8fdeca8e7f0ce3ef59bd22def
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content:
"The deployment of all land-based mitigation measures can \r provide multiple co-benefits, but there are also risks and \r trade-offs from misguided or inappropriate land management \r (high confidence). Such risks can best be managed if \r AFOLU mitigation is pursued in response to the needs and \r perspectives of multiple stakeholders to achieve outcomes \r that maximise synergies while limiting trade-offs (medium \r confidence). The results of implementing AFOLU measures are \r often variable and highly context specific. Depending on local \r conditions (e.g.,  ecosystem, climate, food system, land ownership) \r and management strategies (e.g.,  scale, method), mitigation \r measures have the potential to positively or negatively impact \r biodiversity, ecosystem functioning, air quality, water availability \r and quality, soil productivity, rights infringements, food security, and \r human well-being. Mitigation measures addressing GHGs may also \r [...]"


id: c735669f75714580e3b20cc42aa3e8db
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content:
"[...] affect other climate forcers such as albedo and evapotranspiration. \r Integrated responses that contribute to mitigation, adaptation, and \r other land challenges will have greater likelihood of being successful \r (high confidence); measures which provide additional benefits to \r biodiversity and human well-being are sometimes described as \r 'Nature-Based Solutions'. {7.1, 7.4, 7.6}"


id: adc50635ce61bad83dbd452e23e9d72e
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content:
"The economic and political feasibility of implementing AFOLU \r mitigation measures is hampered by persistent barriers. \r Assisting countries to overcome barriers will help to achieve \r significant short-term mitigation (medium confidence). \r Finance forms a critical barrier to achieving these gains as currently \r mitigation efforts rely principally on government sources and \r funding mechanisms which do not provide sufficient resources to \r enable the economic potential to be realised. Differences in cultural \r values, governance, accountability and institutional capacity are also \r important barriers. Climate change could also emerge as a barrier to \r AFOLU mitigation, although the IPCC AR6 WGI contribution to AR6 \r indicated that an increase in the capacity of natural sinks may occur, \r despite changes in climate (medium confidence). The continued loss \r of biodiversity makes ecosystems less resilient to climate change \r [...]"


id: 6058b22c6508acc9e92d4a74e3834d95
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14256
content:
"[...] extremes and this may further jeopardise the achievement of the \r AFOLU mitigation potentials indicated in this chapter (IPCC AR6 WGII \r and IPBES) (high confidence). {7.4, 7.6; IPCC AR6 WGI, Figure SPM.7}"


id: e3c1dcd2694cb1a0c2fa444e9429ecac
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37359
content:
"AFOLU mitigation measures have been well understood \r for decades but deployment remains slow and emissions \r trends indicate unsatisfactory progress despite beneficial \r contributions to global emissions reduction from forest\u0002related options (high confidence). Globally, the AFOLU sector has \r so far contributed modestly to net mitigation, as past policies have \r delivered about 0.65 GtCO2 yr-1 of mitigation during 2010-2019 \r or 1.4% of global gross emissions (high confidence). The majority \r (>80%) of emission reduction resulted from forestry measures (high \r confidence). Although the mitigation potential of AFOLU measures \r is large from a biophysical and ecological perspective, its feasibility \r is hampered by lack of institutional support, uncertainty over long\u0002term additionality and trade-offs, weak governance, fragmented \r land ownership, and uncertain permanence effects. Despite these \r impediments to change, AFOLU mitigation options are demonstrably \r [...]"


id: 978ccca3bfede60f29a37756bbc3861c
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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vector_id: 23880
content:
"[...] effective and with appropriate support can enable rapid emission \r reductions in most countries. {7.4, 7.6}"


id: d2667744ed012d14fe05dbcbd5386af
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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vector_id: 34372
content:
"Bioenergy and other bio-based options represent an \r important share of the total mitigation potential. The range \r of recent estimates for the technical bioenergy potential \r when constrained by food security and environmental \r considerations is 5-50 and 50-250 EJ yr-1 by 2050 for residues \r and dedicated biomass production system respectively. These \r estimates fall within previously estimated ranges (medium \r agreement). Poorly planned deployment of biomass production \r and afforestation options for in-forest carbon sequestration may \r conflict with environmental and social dimensions of sustainability \r (high confidence). The global technical CDR potential of BECCS by \r 2050 (considering only the technical capture of CO2 and storage \r underground) is estimated at 5.9 mean (0.5-11.3) GtCO2 yr-1, of \r which 1.6 (0.8-3.5) GtCO2 yr-1 is available at below USD100 tCO2\r -1\r (medium confidence). Bioenergy and other bio-based products \r [...]"


id: 5bd65841af403beea5482a61aa7a1cad
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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content:
"[...] provide additional mitigation through the substitution of fossil fuels \r fossil-based products (high confidence). These substitution effects \r are reported in other sectors. Wood used in construction may reduce \r emissions associated with steel and concrete use. The agriculture \r and forestry sectors can devise management approaches that \r enable biomass production and use for energy in conjunction with \r the production of food and timber, thereby reducing the conversion \r pressure on natural ecosystems (medium confidence). {7.4}"


id: 585535c4cef2d7835e20d4c3515c56d4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12798
content:
"Concerted, rapid and sustained effort by all stakeholders, from \r policy makers and investors to land owners and managers is \r a pre-requisite to achieving high levels of mitigation in the \r AFOLU sector (high confidence). To date USD0.7 billion yr-1 is \r estimated to have been spent on AFOLU mitigation. This is well short \r of the more than USD400 billion yr-1 that is estimated to be necessary \r to deliver the up to 30% of global mitigation effort envisaged in \r deep mitigation scenarios (medium confidence). This estimate of the \r global funding requirement is smaller than current subsidies provided \r to agriculture and forestry. Making this funding available would \r require a change in flows of money and determination of who pays. \r A gradual redirection of existing agriculture and forestry subsidies \r would greatly advance mitigation. Effective policy interventions \r and national (investment) plans as part of Nationally Determined \r [...]"


id: 42c1c66d12810fdea95de219ca491699
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8941
content:
"Realising the mitigation potential of the AFOLU sector depends \r strongly on policies that directly address emissions and drive \r the deployment of land-based mitigation options, consistent \r with carbon prices in deep mitigation scenarios (high \r confidence). Examples of successful policies and measures include \r establishing and respecting tenure rights and community forestry, \r improved agricultural management and sustainable intensification, \r biodiversity conservation, payments for ecosystem services, improved \r forest management and wood chain usage, bioenergy, voluntary \r supply chain management efforts, consumer behaviour campaigns, \r private funding and joint regulatory efforts to avoid, for example, \r leakage. The efficacy of different policies, however, will depend on \r numerous region-specific factors. In addition to funding, these factors \r include governance, institutions, long-term consistent execution of \r [...]"


id: da1c02c50b2116388f8c64f530f5e7e5
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35671
content:
"There is a discrepancy, equating to 5.5 GtCO2 yr-1 between \r alternative methods of accounting for anthropogenic land \r CO2 fluxes. Reconciling these methods greatly enhances the \r credibility of AFOLU-based emissions offsetting. It would also \r assist in assessing collective progress in a  global stocktake \r (high confidence). The principal accounting approaches are \r national GHG inventories (NGHGI) and global modelling approaches. \r NGHGI, based on IPCC guidelines, consider a  much larger area of \r forest to be under human management than global models. NGHGI \r consider the fluxes due to human-induced environmental change on \r this area to be anthropogenic and are thus reported. Global models,2\r in contrast, consider these fluxes to be natural and are excluded from \r the total reported anthropogenic land CO2 flux. To enable a like-with\u0002like comparison, the remaining cumulative global CO2 emissions \r budget can be adjusted (medium confidence). In the absence of \r [...]"


id: bb1d99e563e86860fcf4697ef81fb4c3
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vector_id: 30143
content:
"[...] these adjustments, collective progress would appear better than it is. \r {Cross-Chapter Box 6 in this chapter, 7.2}"


id: db9903f41c944e3079ed22e0440a6aed
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35924
content:
"Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Uses (AFOLU) is unique due \r to its capacity to mitigate climate change through greenhouse gas \r (GHG) emission reductions, as well as enhance removals (IPCC \r 2019). However, despite the attention on AFOLU since early 1990s \r it was reported in the IPCC Special Report on Climate Change and \r Land (SRCCL) as accounting for almost a quarter of anthropogenic \r emission (IPCC, 2019), with three main GHGs associated with AFOLU; \r carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O). Overall \r emission levels had remained similar since the publication of AR4 \r (Nabuurs et al. 2007). The diverse nature of the sector, its linkage \r with wider societal, ecological and environmental aspects and the \r required coordination of related policy, was suggested to make \r implementation of known and available supply- and demand-side \r mitigation measures particularly challenging (IPCC 2019). Despite \r [...]"


id: 8c6ca45a2cca5b0320f01265d4edbeda
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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content:
"[...] such implementation barriers, the considerable mitigation potential \r of AFOLU as a sector on its own and its capacity to contribute to \r mitigation within other sectors was emphasised, with land-related \r measures, including bioenergy, estimated as capable of contributing \r between 20% and 60% of the total cumulative abatement to 2030 \r identified within transformation pathways (IPCC 2018). However, \r the vast mitigation potential from AFOLU initially portrayed in \r literature and in Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs), as explored \r in the IPCC Special Report on Climate Change of 1.5degC (SR1.5), is \r being questioned in terms of feasibility (Roe et al. 2021) and a more \r balanced perspective on the role of land in mitigation is developing, \r while at the same time, interest by private investors in land-based \r mitigation is increasing fast."


id: ce72a4f5f7ba8f96d4283865b13643e4
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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content:
"In terms of mitigation, without reductions in overall anthropogenic \r emissions, increased reliance on large-scale land-based mitigation \r was predicted, which would add to the many already competing \r demands on land. However, some mitigation measures were \r suggested to not compete with other land uses, while also having \r multiple co-benefits, including adaptation capacity and potential \r synergies with some Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). As \r in AR5, there was large uncertainty surrounding mitigation within \r AFOLU, in part because current carbon stocks and fluxes are unclear \r and subject to temporal variability. Additionally, the non-additive \r nature of individual measures that are often inter-linked and the highly \r context specific applicability of measures, causes further uncertainty. \r Many AFOLU measures were considered well-established and some \r achievable at low to moderate cost, yet contrasting economic drivers, \r [...]"


id: daccb6a699b4f4164b17204c1e759d0d
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content:
"[...] insufficient policy, lack of incentivisation and institutional support to \r stimulate implementation among the many stakeholders involved, \r in regionally diverse contexts, was recognised as hampering \r realisation of potential."


id: a41ec3906c7b5def0bd75e5349ea069f
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content:
"The SRCCL (IPCC 2019) outlined with medium evidence and medium \r agreement that supply-side agriculture and forestry measures \r had an economic (at USD100 tCO2-eq-1) mitigation potential of \r 7.2-10.6 GtCO2-eq-1 in 2030 (using GWP100 and multiple IPCC values \r for CH4 and N2O) of which about a third was estimated as achievable at \r <USD20 tCO2-eq-1. Agricultural measures were reported as sensitive \r to carbon price, with cropland and grazing land soil organic carbon \r management having the greatest potential at USD20 tCO2-eq-1 and \r restoration of organic soils at USD100 tCO2-eq-1. Forestry measures \r were less sensitive to carbon price, but varied regionally, with \r reduced deforestation, forest management and afforestation having \r the greatest potential depending on region. Although demand-side \r measures related to food could in theory make a large contribution \r to mitigation, in reality the contribution has been very small. Overall, \r [...]"


id: 197576bc94589020ddc6d26aab3313c8
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vector_id: 1693
content:
"[...] the dependency of mitigation within AFOLU on a  complex range \r of factors, from population growth, economic and technological \r developments, to the sustainability of mitigation measures and \r impacts of climate change, was suggested to make realisation highly \r challenging (IPCC 2019)."


id: a44c2e367fa8fba56b77ce4f576c819e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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vector_id: 26101
content:
"Mitigation measures are broadly categorised as those relating \r to (i)  forests and other ecosystems (ii) agriculture (iii) biomass \r production for products and bioenergy and (iv) demand-side levers. \r Assessment is made in the context that land-mitigation is expected to \r contribute roughly 25% of the 2030 mitigation pledged in Nationally \r Determined Contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement (Grassi \r et al. 2017), yet very few countries have provided details on how this \r will be achieved. In light of AR5 and the SRCCL findings, that indicate \r large land-based mitigation potential, considerable challenges to its \r realisation, but also a clear nexus at which humankind finds itself, \r whereby current land management, driven by population growth \r and consumption patterns, is undermining the very capacity of land, \r a finite resource, to support wider critical functions and services on \r which humankind depends. Mitigation within AFOLU is occasionally \r [...]"


id: c8053b2062b9bbb90bb0165baae3eb48
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32501
content:
"[...] and wrongly perceived as an opportunity for in-action within other \r sectors. AFOLU simply cannot compensate for mitigation shortfalls \r in other sectors. As the outcomes of many critical challenges (UNEP \r 2019), including biodiversity loss (IPBES 2019a) and soil degradation \r (FAO and ITPS 2015), are inextricably linked with how we manage \r land, the evaluation and assessment of AFOLU is crucial. This chapter \r aims to address three core topics:"


id: 53bfeb7f1f37b1e02ab0d0f7cda11de3
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content:
"Figure 7.3 | Subdivision of the total AFOLU emissions from Table 7.1 by activity and gas for the period 1990 to 2019. Positive values are emissions from land \r to atmosphere, negative values are removals. Panel A shows emissions divided into major activity and gases. Note that 'biomass burning' is only the burning of agriculture \r residues in the fields. The indicated growth rates between 1990-2000, 2000-2010, 2010-2019 are annualised across each time period. Panel B illustrates regional emissions \r in the years 1990, 2000, 2010, 2019 AFOLU CO2 (green shading) represents all AFOLU CO2 emissions. It is the mean from three bookkeeping models (Hansis et al. 2015; \r Houghton and Nassikas 2017; Gasser et al. 2020) as presented in the Global Carbon Budget (Friedlingstein et al. 2020) and is not directly comparable to LULUCF in NGHGIs \r [...]"


id: af75ca7a145d5c4d8d0df8b429995178
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28100
content:
"[...] (Section 7.2.2). Data on CH4 and N2O emissions are from the EDGAR database (Crippa et al. 2021). See Sections 7.2.2 and 7.2.3 for comparison of different datasets. All values \r expressed are as CO2-eq with GWP100 values: CH4 = 27, N2O = 273."


id: 93f932fb7bc94574e23a8a3b2d10f984
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vector_id: 23236
content:
"b\r  Net anthropogenic flux of CO2 are due to land-use change such as deforestation and afforestation and land management, including wood harvest and regrowth, peatland \r drainage and fires, cropland and grassland management. Average of three bookkeeping models (Hansis et al. 2015; Houghton and Nassikas 2017; Gasser et al. 2020), \r complemented by data on peatland drainage and fires from FAOSTAT (Prosperi et al. 2020) and GFED4s (van der Werf et al. 2017). Bookkeeping based CO2-LULUCF emissions \r (5.7+-4.0) are consistent with AR6 WGI and Chapter 2 of this report. The value of 5.9(+-4.1) includes CO2 emissions from urea application to managed soils and pasture. \r Comparisons with other estimates are discussed in 7.2.2. Based on NGHGIs and FAOSTAT, the range is 0 to 0.8 GtCO2 yr-1.\r c CH4 and N2O emission estimates and assessed uncertainty of 30 and 60% respectively, are based on Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR) data \r [...]"


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"[...] (Crippa et al. 2021) in accordance with Chapter 2, this report (Sections 2.2.1.3 and 2.2.1.4). Both FAOSTAT (Tubiello 2019; USEPA 2019; FAO 2021a) and the USA EPA (USEPA \r 2019) also provide data on agricultural non-CO2 emissions, however, mean global CH4 and N2O values considering the three databases are within the uncertainty bounds of \r EDGAR. EDGAR only considers agricultural and not overall AFOLU non-CO2 emissions. Agriculture is estimated to account for approximately 89 and 96% of total AFOLU CH4\r and N2O emissions respectively. See Section 7.2.3 for further discussion."


id: 36995a1e1c8ea7d6273a3707cac7e43
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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"To present a fuller understanding of land-atmosphere interactions, \r Table  7.1 includes an estimate of the natural sink of land to \r atmospheric CO2 (Jia et al. 2019) (IPCC AR6 WGI Chapter 5). Land \r fluxes respond naturally to human-induced environmental change \r (e.g.,  climate change, and the fertilising effects of increased \r atmospheric CO2 concentration and nitrogen deposition), known as \r 'indirect anthropogenic effects', and also to 'natural effects' such \r as climate variability (IPCC 2010) (Table 7.1 and Section 7.2.2). This \r showed a removal of -12.5 +- 3.2 GtCO2 yr-1 (medium confidence) \r from the atmosphere during 2010-2019 according to global dynamic \r global vegetation model (DGVM) models (Friedlingstein et al. 2020) \r 31% of total anthropogenic net emissions of CO2 from all sectors. \r It is likely that the NGHIs and FAOSTAT implicitly cover some part \r of this sink and thus provide a net CO2 AFOLU balance with some \r [...]"


id: d67b1f897c331e95e55eb827cc58d88f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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"[...] 5 GtCO2 lower net emissions than according to bookkeeping models, \r with the overall net CO2 value close to being neutral. Model results "


id: 8f55879135aaef6dca92c15b931553bd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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"Figure 7.4 | Global net CO2 flux due to AFOLU estimated using different methods for the period 1960 to 2019 (GtCO2 yr-1). Positive numbers represent \r emissions. Light-blue line: The mean from 17 DGVMs all using the same driving data under TrendyV9 used within the Global Carbon Budget 2020 and including different \r degrees of management (Bastos et al. 2020; Friedlingstein et al. 2020). Brown line: Data downloaded 6 June 2021 from FAOSTAT (FAO 2021b; http://www.fao.org/faostat/) \r comprising: net emissions from (i) forest land converted to other land, (ii) net emissions from organic soils in cropland, grassland and from biomass burning, including peat \r fires and peat draining (Prosperi et al. 2020) and (iii) net emissions from forest land remaining forest land, which includes managed forest lands (Tubiello et al. 2020). \r Yellow line: Net flux estimate from National Greenhouse Gas Inventories (NGHGI) based on country reports to the UNFCCC for LULUCF (Grassi et al. 2021) which include \r [...]"


id: ca1f5f5344607251c56bf7f87355fb2d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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content:
"[...] land-use change, and flux in managed lands. Red EO line: The 2001-2019 average net CO2 flux from non-intact forest-related emissions and removals based on ground \r and Earth Observation data (EO) (Harris et al. 2021). Data to mask non-intact forest were used in the tropics (Turubanova et al. 2018) and extra-tropics (Potapov et al. 2017). \r Dark blue line: the mean estimate and minimum and maximum (dark-blue shading) from three bookkeeping models (Hansis et al. 2015; Houghton and Nassikas 2017; \r Gasser et al. 2020). These include land cover change (e.g., deforestation, afforestation), forest management including wood harvest and land degradation, shifting cultivation, \r regrowth of forests following wood harvest or abandonment of agriculture, grassland management, agricultural management. Emissions from peat burning and draining are \r [...]"


id: 60a71c2aa6b9e32181e3bc88b1d57f15
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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"[...] added from external datasets (see text). Both the DGVM and bookkeeping global data is available at: https://www.icos-cp.eu/science-and-impact/global-carbon-budget/2020\r (accessed on 4 October 2021). Data consistent with IPCC AR6 WGI Chapter 5. Dotted lines denote the linear regression from 2000 to 2019. Trends are statistically significant \r (P <0.05) with exception for the NGHGI trend (P <0.01)."


id: abb33d1020273b249171693186bdb3ce
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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content:
"The approach used by countries follows the IPCC methodological \r guidance for NGHGIs (IPCC 2006, 2019). Since separating direct, \r indirect and natural effects on the land CO2 sink is impossible with \r direct observation such as national forest inventories (IPCC 2010), \r upon which most NGHGIs are based, the IPCC adopted the 'managed \r land' concept as a  pragmatic proxy to facilitate NGHGI reporting. \r Anthropogenic land GHG fluxes (direct and indirect effects) are \r defined as all those occurring on managed land, that is, where \r human interventions and practices have been applied to perform \r production, ecological or social functions (IPCC 2006, 2019). GHG \r fluxes from unmanaged land are not reported in NGHGIs because \r they are assumed to be non-anthropogenic. Countries report NGHGI \r data with a range of methodologies, resolution and completeness, \r dependent on capacity and available data, consistent with IPCC \r [...]"


id: baefd666821cfd198db16ee6f48c71ff
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"[...] guidelines (IPCC 2006, 2019) and subject to an international review \r or assessment processes."


id: 6b7e8b6e6625250aefe8e0e71bdddfff
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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"Figure 7.6 | Main conceptual differences between global models (bookkeeping models, IAMs and DGVMs) and NGHGIs definitions of what is considered \r the 'anthropogenic' land CO2 flux, and proposed solution (from Grassi et al. 2021). (a) Differences in defining the anthropogenic land CO2 flux by global models \r ('land use') and NGHGIs ('LULUCF'), including the attribution of processes responsible for land fluxes (IPCC 2006; 2010) in managed and unmanaged lands. The anthropogenic \r land CO2 flux by global models typically includes only the CO2 flux due to 'direct effects' (land-use change, harvest, regrowth). By contrast, most NGHGIs consider anthropogenic \r all fluxes occurring in areas defined as 'managed', including also the sink due to 'indirect effects' (climate change, atmospheric CO2 increase, N deposition etc.) and due to \r [...]"


id: 5b281f4370fd9acff466b462cc51a909
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content:
"[...] 'natural effects' (climate variability, background natural disturbances). (b) Proposed solution to the inconsistency, via disaggregation of the 'Land Sink' flux from DGVMs into \r CO2 fluxes occurring in managed and in unmanaged lands. The sum of 'land use' flux (direct effects from bookkeeping models or IAMs) and the 'Land Sink' (indirect effects from \r DGVMs) in managed lands produces an adjusted global model CO2 flux which is conceptually more comparable with LULUCF fluxes from NGHGIs. Note that the figure may in \r some cases be an oversimplification, in other words, not all NGHGIs include all recent indirect effects."


id: dda94a3deae7739d9a0a5331c6c7ef4b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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"models see Figure 7.4). Reconciling the differences, in other words, \r making estimates comparable, can build confidence in land-related \r CO2 estimates, for example for the purpose of assessing collective \r progress in the context of the Global Stocktake (Cross-Chapter Box 6 \r in this chapter). The difference largely results from greater estimated \r CO2 in NGHGIs, mostly occurring in forests (Grassi et al. 2021). \r This difference is potentially a consequence of: (i) simplified and/or \r incomplete representation of management in global models (Popp \r et al. 2017; Pongratz et al. 2018), for example, concerning impacts of \r forest management in biomass expansion and thickening (Nabuurs \r et al. 2013; Grassi et al. 2017), (ii) inaccurate and/or incomplete \r estimation of LULUCF fluxes in NGHGIs (Grassi et al. 2017), especially \r in developing countries, primarily in non-forest land uses and in soils, \r and (iii) conceptual differences in how global models and NGHGIs \r [...]"


id: 72102d3dc0c056cb92b6a1680e95c7fc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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content:
"[...] define 'anthropogenic' CO2 flux from land (Grassi et al. 2018). The \r impacts of (i) and (ii) are difficult to quantify and result in uncertainties \r that will decrease slowly over time through improvements of both \r models and NGHGIs. By contrast, the inconsistencies in (iii) and its \r resulting biases were assessed as explained below."


id: 8e63c983d0eceeaab3308bca8efdca4a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Since changing the NGHGIs' approach is impractical, an interim \r method to translate and adjust the output of global models was \r outlined for reconciling a bookkeeping model and NGHGIs (Grassi \r et al. 2018). More recently, an improved version of this approach \r has been applied to the future mitigation pathways estimated \r by IAMs (Grassi et al. 2021), with the implications for the Global \r Stocktake discussed in Cross-Chapter Box  6 in this chapter. This \r method implies a post-processing of current global models' results \r that addresses two components of the conceptual differences in \r the 'anthropogenic' CO2 flux; (i) how the impact of human-induced \r environmental changes (indirect effects) are considered, and (ii) the \r extent of forest area considered 'managed'. Essentially, this approach \r adds DGVM estimates of CO2 fluxes due to indirect effects from \r countries' managed forest area (using non-intact forest area maps \r [...]"


id: b79ee349365ce81d842a255583469335
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content:
"This approach does not imply a change in the original decarbonisation pathways, nor does it suggest that indirect effects should be \r considered in the mitigation efforts. It simply ensures that a like-with-like comparison is made: if countries' climate targets use the \r NGHGI definition of anthropogenic emissions, this same definition can be applied to derive NGHGI-comparable future CO2 pathways. \r This would have an impact on the NGHGI-comparable remaining carbon or GHG budget (i.e., the allowable emissions until net zero \r CO2 or GHG emissions consistent with a certain climate target). For example, for SSP2-1.9 and SSP2-2.6 (representing pathways in \r line with 1.5degC and well-below 2degC limits under SSP2 assumptions), carbon budget is 170 GtCO2-eq lower than the original remaining \r carbon budget according to the models' approach (Cross-Chapter Box 6, Figure 1e). Similarly, the remaining carbon (or GHG) budgets \r [...]"


id: 2751cb29f02a248fbe8465ec37824874
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"[...] in Chapter 3 (this report), as well as the net zero carbon (or GHG) targets, could only be used in combination with the definition of \r anthropogenic emissions as used by the IAMs (Cross-Chapter Box 3 in Chapter 3). In the absence of these adjustments, collective \r progress would appear better than it is."


id: e6505ce2578cf86db0389f3bc60c51d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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"Cross-Chapter Box 6, Figure 1 | Impact on global mitigation pathways of adjusting the modelled anthropogenic land CO2 fluxes to be comparable \r with National Greenhouse Gas Inventories (NGHGIs) (from Grassi et al. 2021). (a) The mismatch between global historical LULUCF CO2 net flux from \r NGHGIs (black), and the original (un-adjusted) modelled flux historically and under future mitigation pathways for SSP2 scenarios from Integrated Assessment Models \r (IAMs, Chapter 3). (b) Fluxes due to indirect effects of environmental change on areas equivalent to countries' managed forest (i.e., those fluxes generally considered \r 'anthropogenic' by countries and 'natural' by global models). (c) Original modelled (solid line) LULUCF mitigation pathways adjusted to be NGHGI-comparable \r (dashed line), for example, by adding the indirect effects in panel b. The indirect effects in panel b decline over time with increasing mitigation ambition, mainly \r [...]"


id: 6b4f1c0d3f3eae43b08a05a5ccaf7fa2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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"[...] because of the weaker CO2 fertilisation effect. In panel c, the dependency of the adjusted LULUCF pathways on the target becomes less evident after 2030, because \r the indirect effects in countries' managed forest (which are progressively more uncertain with time, as highlighted by the grey areas) compensate the effects of the \r original pathways. (d) NGHGI-comparable pathways for global CO2 emissions from all sectors including LULUCF (obtained by combining global CO2 pathways without \r LULUCF - where no adjustment is needed - and the NGHGI-comparable CO2 pathways for LULUCF (Gutschow et al. 2019; Grassi et al. 2017). (e) Cumulative impact \r of the adjustments from 2021 until net zero CO2 emissions or 2100 (whatever comes first) on the remaining carbon budget."


id: ce1fe74801c1cd33abc9753b990674a0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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content:
"Trends in atmospheric CH4 and N2O concentrations and the \r associated sources, including land and land use are discussed in \r Sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3 of the IPCC AR6 WGI. Regarding AFOLU, the \r SRCCL and AR5 (Jia et al. 2019; Smith et al. 2014) identified three \r global non-CO2 emissions data sources: EDGAR (Crippa et al. 2021), \r FAOSTAT (FAO 2021a; Tubiello, 2019) and the USA EPA (USEPA 2019). \r Methodological differences have been previously discussed (Jia et al. \r 2019). In accordance with Chapter 2, this report, EDGAR data are \r used in Table 7.1 and Figure 7.3. It is important to note that in terms of \r AFOLU sectoral CH4 and N2O emissions, only FAOSTAT provides data \r on AFOLU emissions, while EDGAR and USEPA data consider just the \r agricultural component. However, the mean of values across the three \r databases for both CH4 and N2O, fall within the assessed uncertainty \r bounds (30 and 60% for CH4 and N2O respectively, Section  2.2.1, \r [...]"


id: b35a28c94fde0411161ba452b0bdcb9a
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"[...] in this report) of EDGAR data. NGHGIs annually submitted to the \r UNFCCC (Section 7.2.2.3) provide national AFOLU CH4 and N2O data, \r as included in the SRCCL (Jia et al. 2019). Aggregation of NGHGIs to \r indicate global emissions must be considered with caution, as not "


id: 682d0024b4dbba072ecf0e4e3900c1e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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content:
"Figure 7.7 | Estimated global mean agricultural CH4 (top), N2O (middle) and aggregated CH4 and N2O (using CO2-eq according to GWP100 AR6 values).\r (Bottom) emissions for three decades according to EDGAR v6.0 (Crippa et al. 2021), FAOSTAT (FAO 2021a) and USEPA (USEPA 2019) databases. Latest \r versions of databases indicate historic emissions to 2019, 2019 and 2015 respectively, with average values for the post-2010 period calculated accordingly. For CH4, emissions \r classified as 'Other Ag.' within USEPA data, are re-classified as 'Agricultural Biomass Burning'. Despite CH4 emissions from agricultural soils also being included, this category \r was deemed to principally concern biomass burning on agricultural land and classified accordingly. For N2O, emissions classified within EDGAR as direct and indirect emissions \r from managed soils, and indirect emissions from manure management are combined under 'Agricultural Soils'. Emissions classified by FOASTAT as from manure deposition and \r [...]"


id: 102df453da01a0d329e49a931eaa9d34
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content:
"[...] application to soils, crop residues, drainage of organic soils and synthetic fertilisers are combined under 'Agricultural Soils', while emissions reported as 'Other Ag.' under USEPA \r data are re-classified as 'Agricultural Biomass Burning'."


id: 3bd8c3117825954c4c45d1b5d8fa503a
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7719
content:
"forcers remain the same. Changes in land conditions from land \r cover  change  or  land  management jointly affect water, energy, \r and aerosol fluxes (biophysical fluxes) as well as GHG fluxes \r (biogeochemical fluxes) exchanged between the land and atmosphere \r (high agreement, robust evidence) (Anderson et al. 2011; O'Halloran \r et al. 2012; Alkama and Cescatti 2016; Naudts et al. 2016; Erb et al. \r 2017). There is high confidence that changes in land condition do \r not just have local impacts but also have non-local impacts in \r adjacent and more distant areas (Pielke et al. 2011; Mahmood et al. \r 2014) which may contribute to surpassing climate tipping points \r (Nepstad et al. 2008; Brando et al. 2014). Non-local impacts may \r occur through: GHG fluxes and subsequent changes in radiative \r transfer, changes in atmospheric chemistry, thermal, moisture and \r surface pressure gradients creating horizontal transport (advection) \r [...]"


id: 975a3260d7dcddddcf3271f8a008f515
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content:
"[...] (de  Vrese et al. 2016; Davin and de Noblet-Ducoudre 2010) and \r vertical transport (convection and subsidence) (Devaraju et al. 2018). \r Although regional and global biophysical impacts emerge from \r model simulations (Davin and de Noblet-Ducoudre 2010; de Vrese \r et al. 2016; Devaraju et al. 2018), especially if the land condition \r has changed over large areas, there is very low agreement on the \r location, extent and characteristics of the non-local effects across \r models. Recent methodological advances, empirically confirmed \r changes in temperature and precipitation owing to distant changes \r in forest cover (Cohn et al. 2019; Meier et al. 2021)."


id: cff50d0d7b7e007d4c35829c32dd9ab8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"In agreement with AR5 (Smith et al. 2014), the SRCCL identified \r Asia as having the largest share (37%) of emissions from enteric \r fermentation and manure management since 2000, but Africa to have \r the fastest growth rate. Asia was identified as responsible for 89% of \r rice cultivation emissions, which were reported as increasing (Jia et al. \r 2019). Considering classification by ten IPCC regions, data suggest \r enteric fermentation to have dominated emissions in all regions since \r 1990, except in South-East Asia and Pacific, where rice cultivation \r forms the principal source (FAO 2021; USEPA 2019). The different \r databases broadly indicate the same regional CH4 emission trends, \r though the indicated absolute change differs due to methodological \r differences (Section  7.2.3.1). All databases indicate considerable \r emissions growth in Africa since 1990 and that this region recorded \r the greatest regional increases in emissions from both enteric \r [...]"


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vector_id: 10968
content:
"[...] fermentation and rice cultivation since 2010. Additionally, FAOSTAT \r data suggest that emissions from agricultural biomass burning \r account for a notably high proportion of agricultural CH4 emissions \r in Africa (Figure 7.8)."


id: 6859e0e868ad32104b2e2ffb97174266
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vector_id: 15630
content:
"Following changes in land conditions, CO2, CH4 and N2O fluxes are \r quickly mixed into the atmosphere and dispersed, resulting in the \r biogeochemical effects being dominated by the biophysical effects at \r local scales (high confidence) (Y. Li et al. 2015; Alkama and Cescatti \r 2016). Afforestation/reforestation (Lejeune et al. 2018; Strandberg \r and Kjellstrom 2019), urbanisation (Li and Bou-Zeid 2013) and \r irrigation (Mueller et al. 2016 and Thiery et al. 2017) modulate the \r likelihood, intensity, and duration of many extreme events including \r heatwaves (high confidence) and heavy precipitation events (medium \r confidence) (Haberlie et al. 2015). There is high confidence and high \r agreement that afforestation in the tropics (Perugini et al. 2017), \r irrigation (Alter et al. 2015; Mueller et al. 2016) and urban greening \r result in local cooling, high agreement and medium confidence on \r the impact of tree growth form (deciduous vs evergreen) (Naudts \r [...]"


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content:
"[...] et al. 2016; Luyssaert et al. 2018 and Schwaab et al. 2020), and \r low agreement on the impact of wood harvest, fertilisation, tillage, \r crop harvest, residue management, grazing, mowing, and fire \r management on the local climate."


id: 481d4edefba64d559e4cc0951469965c
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vector_id: 9904
content:
"The SRCCL provided limited discussion on regional variation in \r agricultural N2O emissions but reported with medium confidence\r that certain regions (North America, Europe, East and South Asia) \r were notable sources of grazing land N2O emissions (Jia et al. \r 2019). The AR5 identified Asia as the largest source and as having \r the highest growth rate of N2O emissions from synthetic fertilisers \r between 2000 and 2010 (Smith et al. 2014). Latest data indicate \r agricultural N2O emission increases in most regions, though \r variation between databases prevents definitive conclusions on \r trends, with Africa, Southern Asia, and Eastern Asia suggested to \r have had greatest growth since 1990 according to EDGAR (Crippa \r et al. 2021), FAOSTAT (FAO 2021a) and USEPA (USEPA 2019) data \r respectively. However, all databases indicate that emissions declined \r in Eurasia and Europe from 1990 levels, in accordance with specific \r [...]"


id: c307d0a8983df4049243321d6104e436
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vector_id: 31586
content:
"[...] environmental regulations put in place since the late 1980s (Tubiello \r 2019; European Environment Agency 2020; Tian et al. 2020), but \r generally suggest increases in both regions since 2010."


id: e2fe372db764c1faed05975063937ce5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37232
content:
"Since AR5 several global assessments (IPBES 2018a; NYDF Assessment \r Partners 2019; UNEP 2019; IPCC 2019) and studies (e.g., Tubiello 2019; \r Tian et al. 2020) have reported on drivers (natural and anthropogenic \r factors that affect emissions and sinks of the land-use sector) behind \r AFOLU emissions trends, and associated projections for the coming \r decades. The following analysis aligns with the drivers typology used \r by IPBES (2019b) and the Global Environmental Outlook (UNEP 2019). \r Drivers are divided into direct drivers resulting from human decisions \r and actions concerning land use and land-use change, and indirect \r drivers that operate by altering the level or rate of change of one or \r more direct drivers. Although drivers of emissions in agriculture and \r FOLU are presented separately, they are interlinked, operating in many \r complex ways at different temporal and spatial scales, with outcomes \r depending on their interactions. For example, deforestation in tropical \r [...]"


id: f2c4f32f709d917fdbc64380d89f3cd2
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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vector_id: 40112
content:
"[...] forests is a  significant component of sectorial emissions. A  review \r of deforestation drivers' studies published between 1996 and 2013, \r indicated a wide range of factors associated with deforestation rates \r across many analyses and studies, covering different regions (Busch \r and Ferretti-Gallon 2017) (Figure 7.9). Higher agricultural prices were \r identified as a  key driver of deforestation, while law enforcement, \r area protection, and ecosystem services payments were found to be \r important drivers of reduced deforestation, while timber activity did \r not show a consistent impact."


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"The global forest area in 2020 is estimated at 4.1 billion ha, \r representing 31% of the total land area (FAO 2020a). Most forests \r are situated in the tropics (45%), followed by boreal (27%), \r temperate (16%) and subtropical (11%) domains. Considering \r regional distribution of global forest area, Europe and the Russian \r Federation accounts for 25%, followed by South America (21%), \r North and Central America (19%), Africa (16%), Asia (15%) and \r Oceania (5%). However, a  significant share (54%) of the world's \r forest area concerns five countries - The Russian Federation, Brazil, \r Canada, the USA and China (FAO 2020a). Forest loss rates differ \r among regions though the global trend is towards a net forest loss \r (UNEP 2019). The global forest area declined by about 178 Mha in \r the 30 years from 1990 to 2020 (FAO 2020a). The rate of net forest \r loss has decreased since 1990, a  result of reduced deforestation \r in some countries and forest gains in others. The annual net loss \r [...]"


id: 8fbb6ca67a8f36df9e66795fa3b00031
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content:
"[...] of forest area declined from 7.8 Mha in 1990-2000, to 5.2 Mha \r in 2000-2010, to 4.7 Mha in 2010-2020, while the total growing \r stock in global forests increased (FAO 2020a). The rate of decline \r in net forest loss during the last decade was due mainly to an \r increase in the rate of forest gain (i.e., afforestation and the natural \r expansion of forests)."


id: 2b23e5a10c2279f7e482a5324fd40d8d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Although built-up areas (defined as cities, towns, villages and human \r infrastructure) occupy a  relatively small fraction of land (around \r 1% of global land), since 1975 urban clusters (i.e., urban centres as \r well as surrounding suburbs) have expanded approximately 2.5 times \r (UNEP 2019; Chapter 8, this report). Regional differences are striking. \r Between 1975 and 2015, built-up areas doubled in size in Europe \r while urban population remained relatively constant. In Africa built\u0002up areas grew approximately fourfold, while urban population \r tripled (UNEP 2019). Trends indicate that rural-to-urban migration \r will continue and accelerate in developing countries increasing \r environmental pressure in spite of measures to mitigate some of \r the impacts (e.g., by preserving or enhancing natural systems within \r cities, for example, lakes or natural and urban green infrastructures \r (UNEP 2019). If current population densities within cities remain \r [...]"


id: 8fd31107560a3aef16b0472e2ef11cd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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content:
"[...] stable, the extent of built-up areas in developed countries is expected \r to increase by 30% and triple in developing countries between 2000 \r and 2050 (Barger et al. 2018)."


id: 7b711d0549c08c4fcfc9a4f19589f951
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Previous IPCC reports identify land-use change as an important \r driver of emissions and agriculture as a key driver of land-use change, \r causing both deforestation and wetland drainage (P.  Smith et al. \r 2019a). The AR5 reported a  trend of declining global agricultural \r land area since 2000 (Smith et al. 2014). The latest data (FAO 2021b) \r indicate a 2% reduction in the global agricultural area between 2000 \r and 2019 (Figure 7.10). This area includes (though is not limited to) \r land under permanent and temporary crops or pasture, temporary \r fallow and natural meadows and pasture utilised for grazing or \r agricultural purposes (FAO 2021b), although the extent of land \r used for grazing may not be fully captured (Fetzel et al. 2017). Data \r indicate changes in how agricultural land is used. Between 2000 \r and 2019, the area classified as permanent meadow and pasture \r decreased (-6%) while cropland area (under arable production \r [...]"


id: 22152e8eae6afd5657f27a9ae40becf0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"[...] and temporary crops) increased (+2%). A key driver of this change \r has been a  general trend of intensification, including in livestock \r production (Barger et al. 2018; OECD/FAO 2019; UNEP 2019), \r whereby less grazing land is supporting increasing livestock numbers \r in conjunction with greater use of crops as livestock feed (Barger \r et al. 2018). The share of feed crops, such as maize and soybean, of \r global crop production is projected to grow as the demand for animal \r feed increases with further intensification of livestock production \r (OECD/FAO 2019). Despite increased demand for food, feed, fuel \r and fibre from a  growing human population (FAO 2019b), global \r agricultural land area is projected to remain relatively stable during \r the next decade, with increases in production expected to result from \r agricultural intensification (OECD/FAO 2019)."


id: eb53f70f1060a81018b5254e76cb2c6f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Urban expansion leads to landscape fragmentation and urban sprawl \r with effects on forest resources and land use (Unal et al. 2019) while \r interacting with other drives. For example, in the Brazilian Amazon, \r the most rapid urban growth occurs within cities that are located \r near rural areas that produce commodities (minerals or crops) and \r are connected to export corridors (Richards and VanWey 2015). \r Urbanisation, coastal development and industrialisation also play \r crucial roles in the significant loss of mangrove forests (Hirales-Cota \r 2010; Richards and Friess 2016; Rivera-Monroy et al. 2017). Among \r infrastructural developments, roads are one of the most consistent \r and most considerable factors in deforestation, particularly in tropical \r frontiers (Pfaff et al. 2007; Rudel et al. 2009; Ferretti-Gallon and \r Busch 2014). The development of roads may also bring subsequent \r impacts on further development intensity due to increasing economic \r [...]"


id: 8e985a6833cf1d3a7ee11d0fafcd5857
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22270
content:
"[...] activities (see Chapter 8) mostly in the tropics and subtropics, where \r the expansion of road networks increases access to remote forests \r that act as refuges for biodiversity (Campbell et al. 2017) (Box 7.1). \r Logging is one of the main drivers of road construction in tropical \r forests (Kleinschroth and Healey 2017) which leads to more severe \r long-term impacts that include increased fire incidence, soil erosion, \r landslides, and sediment accumulation in streams, biological \r invasions, wildlife poaching, illicit land colonisation, illegal logging \r and mining, land grabbing and land speculation (Laurance et al. \r 2009; Alamgir et al. 2017)."


id: f830782b37fcc7847c070d34d2be2da3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41042
content:
"The area of forest designated for production has been relatively \r stable since 1990. Considering forest uses, about 30% (1.2 billion ha) \r of all forests is used primarily for production (wood and non-wood \r forest products), about 10% (424 Mha) is designated for biodiversity \r conservation, 398 Mha for the protection of soil and water, and \r 186 Mha is allocated for social services (recreation, tourism, education \r research and the conservation of cultural and spiritual sites) (FAO and \r UNEP 2020). While the rate of increase in the area of forest allocated \r primarily for biodiversity conservation has slowed in the last ten years, \r the rate of increase in the area of forest allocated for soil and water \r protection has grown since 1990, and notably in the last ten years. \r Global wood harvest (including from forests, other wooded land and \r trees outside forests) was estimated to be almost 4.0 billion m3\r  in \r 2018 (considering both industrial roundwood and fuelwood) (FAO, \r [...]"


id: 6afd714bc092b6a7ca0f3bbd503e6e9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16116
content:
"[...] 2019). Overall, wood removals are increasing globally as demand for, \r and the consumption of wood products grows annually by 1% in line \r with growing populations and incomes with this trend expected to \r continue in coming decades. When done in a sustainable way, more \r regrowth will occur and is stimulated by management, resulting in \r a net sink. However illegal and unsustainable logging (i.e., harvesting \r of timber in contravention of the laws and regulations of the country \r of harvest) is a global problem with significant negative economic \r (e.g.,  lost revenue), environmental (e.g.,  deforestation, forest \r degradation, GHG emissions and biodiversity losses) and social \r impact (e.g.,  conflicts over land and resources, disempowerment \r of local and indigenous communities) (World Bank 2019). Many \r countries around the world have introduced regulations for the \r international trade of forest products to reduce illegal logging, with \r [...]"


id: f6e86718f7aec69bc653ada1ce04097a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40809
content:
"Wildland fires account for approximately 70% of the global biomass \r burned annually (van der Werf et al. 2017) and constitute a  large \r global source of atmospheric trace gases and aerosols (Gunsch et al. \r 2018) (IPCC WGI AR6). Although fires are part of the natural system, \r the frequency of fires has increased in many areas, exacerbated by \r decreases in precipitation, including in many regions with humid and \r temperate forests that rarely experience large-scale fires naturally. \r Natural and human-ignited fires affect all major biomes, from \r peatlands through shrublands to tropical and boreal forests, altering \r ecosystem structure and functioning (Arganaraz et al. 2015; Nunes \r et al. 2016; Remy et al. 2017; Mancini et al. 2018; Aragao et al. 2018; \r Engel et al. 2019; Rodriguez Vasquez et al. 2021). However, the degree \r of incidence and regional trends are quite different and a study over \r 14 years indicated, on average, the largest fires in Australia, boreal \r [...]"


id: 71cb5bf5ba2ec1eb13b48cce273ed3f7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17263
content:
"[...] North America and Northern Hemisphere Africa (Andela et al. 2019). \r More than half of the terrestrial surface of the Earth has fire regimes \r outside the range of natural variability, with changes in fire frequency \r and intensity posing major challenges for land restoration and \r recovery (Barger et al. 2018). In some ecosystems, fire prevention \r might lead to accumulation of large fuel loads that enable wildfires \r (Moreira et al. 2020a)."


id: 9aaa2b6a7ce6998864b5e885d545cb69
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24450
content:
"About 98 Mha of forest and savannahs are estimated to have been \r affected by fire in 2015 (FAO and UNEP 2020). Fire is a prevalent \r forest disturbance in the tropics where about 4% of the total forest \r and savannah area in that year was burned and more than two\u0002thirds of the total area affected was in Africa and South America; \r mostly open savanna types (FAO and UNEP 2020). Fires have many \r different causes, with land clearing for agriculture the primary driver \r in tropical regions, for example, clearance for industrial oil-palm and \r paper-pulp plantations in Indonesia (Chisholm et al. 2016), or for \r pastures in the Amazon (Barlow et al. 2020). Other socio-economic \r factors are also associated with wildfire regimes such as land-use \r conflict and socio-demographic aspects (Nunes et al. 2016; Mancini \r et al. 2018). Wildfire regimes are also changing by the influence \r of climate change, with wildfire seasons becoming longer, wildfire \r [...]"


id: dcd2bf9fca2f556166c45f6bacd5532e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36112
content:
"[...] average size increases in many areas and wildfires occurring in areas \r where they did not occur before (Jolly et al. 2015; Artes et al. 2019). \r Human influence has likely increased fire weather in some regions of \r all inhabited continents (IPCC AR6 WGI Technical Summary) and, in \r the last years, fire seasons of unprecedented magnitude occurred \r in diverse regions as California (Goss et al. 2020), the Mediterranean \r basin (Ruffault et al. 2020), Canada (Kirchmeier-Young et al. 2019) \r with unprecedented fires in British Columbia in 2021, the Arctic and \r Siberia (McCarty et al. 2020), Brazilian Amazon (Silva et al. 2021) \r and Pantanal (Leal Filho et al. 2021), Chile (Bowman et al. 2019) and "


id: e0bc6c1faba4f2d4632d4b9b022d4255
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36797
content:
"Over-extraction of wood for timber and fuelwood is identified as \r an important driver of mangrove deforestation and degradation \r (Bhattarai 2011; Ajonina et al. 2014; Webb et al. 2014; Giri et al. 2015; \r Thomas et al. 2017; Fauzi et al. 2019). Unsustainable selective logging \r and over-extraction of wood is a  substantial form of forest and \r mangrove degradation in many tropical and developing countries, \r with emissions associated with the extracted wood, incidental \r damage to the surrounding forest and from logging infrastructure \r (Bhattarai 2011; Ajonina et al. 2014; Webb et al. 2014; Pearson \r et al. 2014, Giri et al. 2015; Thomas et al. 2017; Fauzi et al. 2019). \r Traditional fuelwood and charcoal continue to represent a dominant \r share of total wood consumption in low-income countries (Barger \r et al. 2018). Regionally, the percentage of total wood harvested used \r as fuelwood varies from 90% in Africa, 62% in Asia, 50% in South \r [...]"


id: 28fb82b9420c25a1bd70e72082088ac9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4421
content:
"[...] America to less than 20% in Europe, North America and Oceania. \r Under current projections, efforts to intensify wood production in \r plantation forests, together with increases in fuel-use efficiency and \r electrification, are suggested to only partly alleviate the pressure on \r native forests (Barger et al. 2018). Nevertheless, the area of forest \r under management plans has increased in all regions since 2000 "


id: dca26cd6e3df3a6e5b8f20178b2149ee
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36081
content:
"Enteric fermentation dominates agricultural CH4 emissions \r (Section  7.2.3) with emissions being a  function of both ruminant \r animal numbers and productivity (output per animal). In addition \r to enteric fermentation, both CH4 and N2O emissions from manure \r management (i.e., manure storage and application) and deposition \r on pasture, make livestock the main agricultural emissions source \r (Tubiello 2019). The AR5 reported increases in populations of all \r major livestock categories between the 1970s and 2000s, including \r ruminants, with increasing numbers directly linked with increasing \r CH4 emissions (Smith et al. 2014). The SRCCL identified managed \r pastures as a disproportionately high N2O emissions source within \r grazing lands, with medium confidence that increased manure \r production and deposition was a key driver (Jia et al. 2019). The latest \r data (FAO 2021c) indicate continued global livestock population \r [...]"


id: 4eb3d56c7faf77411dc95e489040a47b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11119
content:
"[...] growth between 1990 and 2019 (Figure  7.10), including increases \r of 18% in cattle and buffalo numbers, and 30% in sheep and goat \r numbers, corresponding with CH4 emission trends. Data also indicate \r increased productivity per animal for example, average increases of \r 16% in beef, 17% in pig meat and 70% in whole (cow) milk per \r respective animal between 1990 and 2019 (FAO 2021c). Despite these \r advances leading to reduced emissions per unit of product (calories, \r meat and milk) (FAO 2016; Tubiello 2019), increased individual \r animal productivity generally requires increased inputs (e.g.,  feed) \r and this generates increased emissions (Beauchemin et al. 2020). \r Manipulation of livestock diets, or improvements in animal genetics \r or health may counteract some of this. In addition, the production of \r inputs to facilitate increased animal productivity, may indirectly drive \r further absolute GHG emissions along the feed supply chain."


id: f13f21371a3aac25031226c0b0bff641
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39830
content:
"Both AR5 and the SRCCL described considerable increases in global \r use of synthetic nitrogen fertilisers since the 1970s, which was \r identified to be a major driver of increasing N2O emissions (Jia et al. \r 2019). The latest data document a 41% increase in global nitrogen \r fertiliser use between 1990 and 2019 (FAO 2021e) corresponding \r with associated increased N2O emissions (Figure  7.3). Increased \r fertiliser use has been driven by pursuit of increased crop yields, with \r for example, a 61% increase in average global cereal yield per hectare \r observed during the same period (FAO 2021c), achieved through \r both increased fertiliser use and varietal improvements. Increased \r yields are in response to increased demand for food, feed, fuel \r and fibre crops which in turn has been driven by a growing human \r population (FAO, 2019), increased demand for animal-sourced food \r and bioenergy policy (OECD/FAO 2019). Global crop production is \r [...]"


id: 4efd12848ba1f66d7923ed35fc6818f
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11182
content:
"[...] projected to increase by almost 15% over the next decade, with low \r income and emerging regions with greater availability of land and \r labour resources expected to experience the strongest growth, and \r account for about 50% of global output growth (OECD/FAO 2019). \r Increases in global nitrogen fertiliser use are also projected, notably \r in low income and emerging regions (USEPA 2019)."


id: 83b9b621738bc0b622b46fc90f5ab8dc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20319
content:
"AFOLU mitigation or land-based climate change mitigation (used in \r this chapter interchangeably) are a variety of land management or \r demand management practices that reduce GHG emissions and/or \r enhance carbon sequestration within the land system (i.e., in forests, \r wetlands, grasslands, croplands and pasturelands). If implemented \r with benefits to human well-being and biodiversity, land-based \r mitigation measures are often referred to as nature-based solutions \r and/or natural climate solutions (Glossary). Measures that result in \r a net removal of GHGs from the atmosphere and storage in either \r living or dead organic material, or in geological stores, are known \r as CDR, and in previous IPCC reports were sometimes referred to as \r greenhouse gas removal (GGR) or negative emissions technologies \r (NETs) (Rogelj et al. 2018a; Jia et al. 2019). This section evaluates \r current knowledge and latest scientific literature on AFOLU \r [...]"


id: d863279b8c12903ec642a3266718a0a5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"[...] mitigation measures and potentials, including land-based CDR \r measures. Section 7.4.1 provides an overview of the approaches for \r estimating mitigation potential, the co-benefits and risks from land\u0002based mitigation measures, estimated global and regional mitigation \r potential and associated costs according to literature published over \r the last decade. Subsequent subsections assess literature on 20 key \r AFOLU mitigation measures specifically providing:"


id: 41b2d8111a1116edb876161d0a341f85
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8748
content:
"Mitigation potentials for AFOLU measures are estimated by \r calculating the scale of emissions reductions or carbon sequestration \r against a counterfactual scenario without mitigation activities. The \r types of mitigation potential estimates in recent literature include: \r (i) technical potential (the biophysical potential or amount possible \r with current technologies); (ii) economic potential (constrained by \r costs, usually by a  given carbon price (Table  7.3); (iii) sustainable \r potential (constrained by environmental safeguards and/or natural \r resources, e.g., limiting natural forest conversion), and (iv) feasible \r potential (constrained by environmental, socio-cultural, and/or \r institutional barriers), however, there are no set definitions used in \r literature. In addition to types of mitigation estimates, there are two \r AFOLU mitigation categories often calculated: supply-side measures \r (land management interventions) and demand-side measures \r [...]"


id: 98e74fd36e767331b50e80efca059dea
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24114
content:
"Two main approaches to estimating mitigation potentials include: \r (i) studies on individual measures and/or sectors  - henceforth \r referred to as sectoral assessments, and (ii) integrated assessment \r models (IAM). Sectoral assessments include studies focusing on one \r activity (e.g.,  agroforestry) based on spatial and biophysical data, \r as well as econometric and optimisation models for a  sector, for \r example, the forest or agriculture sector, and therefore cover a large \r suite of practices and activities while representing a broad body of \r literature. Sectoral assessments, however, rarely capture cross-sector \r interactions or impacts, making it difficult to completely account for \r land competition, trade-offs, and double counting when aggregating \r sectoral estimates across different studies and methods (Smith et al. \r 2014; Jia et al. 2019). On the other hand, IAMs assess the climate \r impact of multiple and interlinked practices across sectors and \r [...]"


id: 7df29d4121e544d0850ed674dca89446
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19341
content:
"[...] therefore, can account for interactions and trade-offs (including land \r competition, use of other resources and international trade) between \r them. However, the number of land-based measures used in IAMs \r are limited compared with the sectoral portfolio (Figure 7.11). The \r resolution of land-based measures in IAMs are also generally coarser \r compared to some sectoral estimates, and as such, may be less \r robust for individual measures (Roe et al. 2021). Given the differences \r between and strengths and weaknesses of the two approaches, it is \r helpful to compare the estimates from both. We combine estimates \r from both approaches to establish an updated range of global land\u0002based mitigation potential."


id: ec185b11326ee1ad151a35f8579f72b0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38901
content:
"Measures are categorised as supply-side activities in: (i) forests and \r other ecosystems (Section  7.4.2); (ii) agriculture (Section  7.4.3); \r (iii) bioenergy and other land-based energy technologies (Section 7.4.4); \r as well as (iv) demand-side activities (Section 7.4.5 and Figure 7.11). \r Several information boxes are dispersed within the section and \r provide supporting material, including case studies exploring a range \r of topics from climate-smart forestry in Europe (Box 7.2), agroforestry \r in Brazil (Box 7.3), climate-smart village approaches (Box 7.4), farm \r systems approaches (Box  7.5), mitigation within Indian agriculture \r (Box 7.6), and bioenergy and BECCS mitigation calculations (Box 7.7). \r Novel measures, including enhanced weathering and novel foods are \r covered in Chapter 12, this report. In addition, as mitigation within \r AFOLU concerns land management and use of land resources, AFOLU \r measures impact other sectors. Accordingly, AFOLU measures are \r [...]"


id: a34047d7359fa82288b86b2333e356c1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25932
content:
"[...] also discussed in other sectoral chapters within this report, notably \r demand-side solutions (Chapter  5), bioenergy and bioenergy with \r carbon capture and storage (BECCS) (Chapter  6), the use of wood \r products and biomass in buildings (Chapter  9), and CDR measures, \r food systems and land related impacts, risks and opportunities of \r mitigation measures (Chapter 12)."


id: efbe0f72063002af1225a0e990d60e7c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39560
content:
"While it is helpful to assess the general benefits, risks and \r opportunities possible for land-based mitigation measures \r (L.G. Smith et al. 2019), their efficacy and scale of benefit or risk \r largely depends on the type of activity undertaken, deployment \r strategy (e.g.,  scale, method), and context (e.g.,  soil, biome, \r climate, food system, land ownership) that vary geographically \r and over time (robust evidence, high agreement) (L.G. Smith et al. \r 2019; P.  Smith et al. 2019a; Hurlbert et al. 2019) (Section  12.5).\r Impacts of land-based mitigation measures are therefore highly \r context specific and conclusions from specific studies may not be \r universally applicable. If implemented at appropriate scales and \r in a  sustainable manner, land-based mitigation practices have \r the capacity to reduce emissions and sequester billions of tonnes \r of carbon from the atmosphere over coming decades, while also \r preserving or enhancing biodiversity, water quality and supply, air \r [...]"


id: 62db2a112a596f619cb7ff83540c5c5c
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14689
content:
"[...] quality, soil fertility, food and wood security, livelihoods, resilience \r to droughts, floods and other natural disasters, and positively \r contributing to ecosystem health and human well-being (high \r confidence) (Toensmeier 2016; Karlsson et al. 2020)."


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"IPCC SRCCL (2019). The SRCCL assessed the full range of technical, \r economic and sustainability mitigation potentials in AFOLU for the \r period 2030-2050 and identified reduced deforestation and forest \r degradation to have greatest potential for reducing supply-side \r emissions (0.4 to 5.8 GtCO2-eq yr-1) (high confidence) followed by \r combined agriculture measures, 0.3 to 3.4 GtCO2-eq yr-1 (medium \r confidence) (Jia et al. 2019). For the demand-side estimates, shifting \r towards healthy, sustainable diets (0.7 to 8.0 GtCO2-eq yr-1) (high \r confidence) had the highest potential, followed by reduced food loss \r and waste (0.8 to 4.5 GtCO2-eq yr-1) (high confidence). Measures \r with greatest potential for CDR were afforestation/reforestation \r (0.5 to 10.1 GtCO2-eq yr-1) (medium confidence), soil carbon \r sequestration in croplands and grasslands (0.4 to 8.6 GtCO2-eq yr-1) \r (medium confidence) and BECCS (0.4 to 11.3 GtCO2-eq yr-1) (medium \r [...]"


id: 2c636a3e746e049c8910f9cb47ace131
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"[...] confidence). The SRCCL did not explore regional potential, associated \r feasibility nor provide detailed analysis of costs."


id: ed6ea6510e94b70ffacd48f216b491b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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"IPCC AR6. This assessment concludes the likely range of global land\u0002based mitigation potential is approximately 8-14 GtCO2-eq yr-1\r between 2020-2050 with carbon prices up to USD100 tCO2-eq-1, \r about half of the technical potential (medium evidence, medium \r agreement). About 30-50% could be achieved <USD20 tCO2-eq-1\r (Table  7.3). The global economic potential estimates in this \r assessment are slightly higher than the AR5 range. Since AR5, there \r have been numerous new global assessments of sectoral land-based \r mitigation potential (Fuss et al. 2018; Griscom et al. 2017, 2020; Roe \r et al. 2019; Jia et al. 2019; Griscom et al. 2020; Roe et al. 2021) as well \r as IAM estimates of mitigation potential (Riahi et al. 2017; Popp et al. \r 2017; Rogelj et al. 2018a; Frank et al. 2019; Johnston and Radeloff \r 2019; Baker et al. 2019), expanding the scope of AFOLU mitigation \r measures included and substantially improving the robustness and \r [...]"


id: b3b93f826b4faf012d490ecd17738d36
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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content:
"[...] spatial resolution of mitigation estimates. A  recent development \r is an assessment of country-level technical and economic \r (USD100 tCO2-eq-1) mitigation potential for 20  AFOLU measures, \r including for demand-side and soil organic carbon sequestration in \r croplands and grasslands, not estimated before (Roe  et al. 2021). \r Estimates on costs, feasibility, sustainability, benefits, and risks \r have also been developed for some mitigation measures, and they \r continue to be active areas of research. Developing more refined \r sustainable potentials at a country-level will be an important next \r step. Although most mitigation estimates still do not consider the \r impact of future climate change, there are some emerging studies "


id: a0fba7e347719d92482a793711c5be5e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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content:
"Overall, measures in the AFOLU sector are uniquely positioned to \r deliver substantial co-benefits. However, the negative consequences \r of inappropriate or misguided design and implementation of \r measures may be considerable, potentially impacting for example, \r mitigation permanence, longevity, and leakage, biodiversity, wider \r ecosystem functioning, livelihoods, food security and human well\u0002being (Section  7.6) (AR6 WGII, Box  2.2). Land-based mitigation \r may also face limitations and trade-offs in achieving sustained \r emission reductions and/or removals due to other land challenges \r including climate change impacts. It is widely recognised that land\u0002use planning that is context-specific, considers other sustainable \r development goals, and is adaptable over time can help achieve \r land-based mitigation that maximises co-benefits, avoids or limits \r trade-offs, and delivers on international policy goals including the \r [...]"


id: d815089be69568fe9dc4dda322b0561b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35316
content:
"[...] SDGs, Land Degradation Neutrality, and Convention on Biological \r Diversity (Section 7.6; Chapter 12)."


id: 463dacaa2738abfcea06a566af2622a4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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"Table 7.3 | Estimated annual mitigation potential (GtCO2-eq yr-1) in 2020-2050 of AFOLU mitigation options by carbon price. Estimates reflect sectoral \r studies based on a comprehensive literature review updating data from (Roe et al. 2019) and integrated assessment models using the IPCC AR6 database (Section 7.5). \r Values represent the mean, and full range of potential. Sectoral mitigation estimates are averaged for the years 2020-2050 to capture a wider range of literature, and the \r IAM estimates are given for 2050 as many model assumptions delay most land-based mitigation to mid-century. The sectoral potentials are the sum of global estimates for \r the individual measures listed for each option. IAM potentials are given for mitigation options with available data; for example, net land-use CO2 for total forests and other \r [...]"


id: e216d99cbf9f7db76d913d32dd2c04c7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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content:
"[...] ecosystems, and land sequestration from A/R, but not reduced deforestation (protect). Sectoral estimates predominantly use GWP100 IPCC AR5 values (CH4 = 28, N2O = 265), \r although some use GWP100 IPCC AR4 values (CH4 = 25, N2O = 298); and the IAMs use GWP100 IPCC AR6 values (CH4 = 27, N2O = 273). The sectoral and IAM estimates \r reflected here do not account for the substitution effects of avoiding fossil fuel emissions nor emissions from other more energy intensive resources/materials. For example, \r BECCS estimates only consider the carbon dioxide removal (CDR) via geological storage component and not potential mitigation derived from the displacement of fossil fuel \r use in the energy sector. Mitigation potential from substitution effects are included in the other sectoral chapters like energy, transport, buildings and industry. The total AFOLU \r [...]"


id: 76930f1440e1ace9d58bd05e9f7db119
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18079
content:
"[...] sectoral estimate aggregates potential from agriculture, forests and other ecosystems, and diverted agricultural production from avoided food waste and diet shifts (excluding \r land-use impacts to avoid double counting). Because of potential overlaps between measures, sectoral values from BECCS and the full value chain potential from demand-side \r measures are not summed with AFOLU. IAMs account for land competition and resource optimisation and can therefore sum across all available categories to derive the total \r AFOLU potential. Key: ND = no data; Sectoral = as assessed by sectoral literature review; IAM = as assessed by integrated assessment models; EJ = exajoule primary energy."


id: f3c3669f0523c9a64ca36993753785e0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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content:
"assessment models (IAMs), the economic potential for land-based \r mitigation (Agriculture, LULUCF and BECCS) for USD100 tCO2-eq-1\r is 7.9 mean (4.1-17.3 range) GtCO2-eq yr-1 in 2050 (Table  7.3). \r We add the estimate for BECCS here to provide the full land\u0002based potential, as IAMs optimise land allocation based on costs, \r which displaces land-based CDR activities for BECCS.  Combining \r both IAM and sectoral approaches, the likely range is therefore \r 7.9-13.6 (rounded to 8-14) GtCO2-eq yr-1 up to USD100 tCO2-eq-1\r between 2020-2050. Considering both IAM and sectoral economic \r potential estimates, land-based mitigation could have the capacity \r to make the AFOLU sector net negative in GHG emissions from 2036 \r (Figure 7.12), although there are highly variable mitigation strategies \r for how AFOLU potential can be deployed for achieving climate \r targets (Illustrative Mitigation Pathways in Section 7.5.5). Economic \r [...]"


id: 49ddee4ca0755d2eb81f543821cb1052
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vector_id: 10234
content:
"[...] potential estimates, which reflect a public willingness to pay, may be \r more relevant for policy making compared with technical potentials \r which reflect a  theoretical maximum that may not be feasible \r or sustainable."


id: 2d0ce29ef554aa9f82a82d324cb367b9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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content:
"Regionally, economic mitigation potential up to USD100 tCO2-eq-1\r is estimated to be greatest in tropical countries in Asia and Pacific \r (34%), Latin America and the Caribbean (24%), and Africa and the \r Middle East (18%) because of the large potential from reducing \r deforestation and sequestering carbon in forests and agriculture \r (Figure  7.11). However, there is also considerable potential in \r Developed Countries (18%) and more modest potential in Eastern \r Europe and West-Central Asia (5%). These results are in line with the \r IAM regional mitigation potentials (Figure 7.11). The protection of \r forests and other ecosystems is the dominant source of mitigation \r potential in tropical regions, whereas carbon sequestration \r in  agricultural land and demand-side measures are important in \r Developed Countries and Asia and Pacific. The restoration and \r management of forests and other ecosystems is more geographically \r [...]"


id: 40679b7a4c101256099417b91ce867e7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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content:
"[...] distributed, with all regions having significant potential. Regions \r with large livestock herds (Developed Countries, Latin America) and \r rice paddy fields (Asia and Pacific) have potential to reduce CH4. As \r expected, the highest total potential is associated with countries and \r regions with large land areas, however when considering mitigation \r density (total potential per hectare), many smaller countries, \r particularly those with wetlands have disproportionately high levels \r of mitigation for their size (Roe et al. 2021). As global commodity \r markets connect regions, AFOLU measures may create synergies and \r trade-offs across the world, which could make national demand-side \r measures for example, important in mitigating supply-side emissions \r elsewhere (Kallio et al. 2018)."


id: a80e53e1df357f085ee3bd864fd1fed
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26779
content:
"Among the mitigation options, the protection, improved management, \r and restoration of forests and other ecosystems (wetlands, savannas \r and grasslands) have the largest potential to reduce emissions \r and/or sequester carbon at 7.3 (3.9-13.1) GtCO2-eq yr-1 (up to \r USD100 tCO2-eq-1), with measures that 'protect' having the single \r highest total mitigation and mitigation densities (mitigation per \r area) in AFOLU (Table 7.3 and Figure 7.11). Agriculture provides the \r second largest share of mitigation, with 4.1 (1.7-6.7) GtCO2-eq yr-1 \r potential (up to USD100 tCO2-eq-1), from soil carbon management \r in croplands and grasslands, agroforestry, biochar, rice cultivation, \r and livestock and nutrient management (Table 7.3 and Figure 7.11). \r Demand-side measures including shifting to sustainable healthy diets, \r reducing food waste, and improving wood products can mitigate \r 2.2 (1.1-3.6) GtCO2-eq yr-1 when accounting only for diverted \r [...]"


id: 9ca00dba8d6127363698710e2da7583a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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content:
"[...] agricultural production from diets and food waste to avoid double \r counting with measures in forests and other ecosystems (Table 7.3 \r and Figure 7.11). The potential of demand-side measures increases \r three-fold, to 6.5 (4-9.5) GtCO2-eq yr-1 when accounting for the \r entire value chain including land-use effects, but would overlap with \r other measures and is therefore not additive."


id: 403388c1cfe619a298fa5de155b32845
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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vector_id: 8486
content:
"Although economic potentials provide more realistic, near-term \r climate mitigation compared to technical potentials, they still do not \r account for feasibility barriers and enabling conditions that vary by \r region and country. For example, according to most models, including \r IAMs, avoided deforestation is the cheapest land-based mitigation \r option (Table 7.3, Sections 7.5.3 and 7.5.4), however implementing \r interventions aimed at reducing deforestation (including REDD+) \r often have higher transaction and implementation costs than \r expected due to various barriers and enabling conditions (Luttrell \r et al. 2018) (Section  7.6). The feasibility of implementing AFOLU \r mitigation measures, including those with multiple co-benefits, \r depends on varying economic, technological, institutional, socio\u0002cultural, environmental and geophysical barriers (high confidence) \r (L.G.  Smith et al. 2019). The section for each individual mitigation \r [...]"


id: f47da753dcfec3a30c07bea10abe99f5
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vector_id: 40389
content:
"[...] measure provides an overview of co-benefits and risks associated \r with the measure and Section 7.6.6 outlines key enabling factors and \r barriers for implementation."


id: 98904b79010c5623fd780a19114dda5a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24055
content:
"Most mitigation options are available and ready to deploy. \r Emissions reductions can be unlocked relatively quickly, whereas \r CDR need upfront investment to generate sequestration over \r time. The protection of natural ecosystems, carbon sequestration \r in agriculture, sustainable healthy diets and reduced food waste \r have especially high co-benefits and cost efficiency. Avoiding the \r conversion of carbon-rich primary peatlands, coastal wetlands and \r forests is particularly important as most carbon lost from those \r ecosystems are irrecoverable through restoration by the 2050 \r timeline of achieving net zero carbon emissions (Goldstein et al. \r 2020). Sustainable intensification, shifting diets, reducing food waste \r could enhance efficiencies and reduce agricultural land needs, and \r are therefore critical for enabling supply-side measures such as \r reduced deforestation, restoration, as well as reducing N2O and CH4\r [...]"


id: c504f9714f3148f58b6ebaa2ea648955
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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vector_id: 31973
content:
"[...] emissions from agricultural production - as seen in the Illustrative \r Mitigation Pathway (IMP-SP) (Section  7.5.6). Although agriculture \r measures that reduce non-CO2, particularly of CH4, are important for "


id: fddb4d8ca25b3696472c30d45ec65b42
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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content:
"Figure 7.12 | Historic land sector GHG flux estimates and illustrative AFOLU mitigation pathways to 2050, based on data presented in Sections 7.2, 7.4 \r and 7.5. Historic trends consider both A anthropogenic (AFOLU) GHG fluxes (GtCO2-eq yr-1) according to FAOSTAT (FAO 2021a; 2021b) and B the estimated natural land CO2\r sink according to (Friedlingstein et al. 2020). Note that for the anthropogenic net land CO2 flux component, several approaches and methods are described within the literature \r (Section 7.2.2) with a wide range in estimates. For clarity, only one dataset (FAOSTAT) is illustrated here. It is not intended to indicate preference for one particular method \r over others. Historic flux trends are illustrated to 2019, the latest year for which data is available. Projected economic mitigation potential (at costs of up to USD100 tCO2-eq-1) \r [...]"


id: 431bda6c4346d843acd2f98b16a85c61
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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content:
"[...] includes estimates from IAMs and sectoral studies (Table 7.3). The 'sectoral studies' are disaggregated into several cumulative parts: first 'sectoral studies' involves measures \r in agriculture, forests and other ecosystems, then an additional BECCS share ('+ BECCS'), then the additional effect of demand-side measures and BECCS ('+BECCS and \r demand-side measures'). The latter only accounting for diverted agricultural production to avoid double counting. Projected mitigation assumes adoption of measures to achieve \r increasing, linear mitigation, reaching average annual potential in 2050, although this does not reflect deployment rates for most measures. For illustrative purposes, a pathway \r to projected emissions in 2050 according to a scenario of current policy (C7 - above 3.0degC - Model: GCAM 5.3) is additionally included for reference."


id: 5d8adb0a4bcc006c4d095297fdc44497
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Activities, co-benefits, risks and implementation opportunities \r and barriers. Afforestation and reforestation (A/R) are activities that \r convert land to forest, where reforestation is on land that has previously \r contained forests, while afforestation is on land that historically has \r not been forested (Box  7.2). Forest restoration refers to a  form of \r reforestation that gives more priority to ecological integrity as well, \r even though it can still be a managed forest. Depending on the location, \r scale, and choice and management of tree species, A/R activities have \r a wide variety of co-benefits and trade-offs. Well-planned, sustainable \r reforestation and forest restoration can enhance climate resilience \r and biodiversity, and provide a variety of ecosystem services including \r water regulation, microclimatic regulation, soil erosion protection, \r as well as renewable resources, income and livelihoods (Locatelli \r [...]"


id: 441822ef9fcda3bf1389821d173702a3
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"[...] et al. 2015; Stanturf et al. 2015; Ellison et al. 2017; Verkerk et al. 2020). \r Afforestation, when well planned, can help address land degradation \r and desertification by reducing runoff and erosion and lead to cloud \r formation however, when not well planned, there are localised trade\u0002offs such as reduced water yield or biodiversity (Teuling et al. 2017; \r Ellison et al. 2017). The use of non-native species and monocultures may \r have adverse impacts on ecosystem structure and function, and water \r availability, particularly in dry regions (Ellison et al. 2017). A/R activities \r may change the surface albedo and evapotranspiration regimes, \r producing net cooling in the tropical and subtropical latitudes for local \r and global climate and net warming at high latitudes (Section 7.4.2). \r Very large-scale implementation of A/R may negatively affect food \r security since an increase in global forest area can increase food prices \r [...]"


id: 981293ad17dc1f7e64ef524537c737e9
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content:
"Developments since AR5 and IPCC Special Reports (SR1.5, \r SROCC and SRCCL). Since the SRCCL, several studies have provided \r updated and convergent estimates of economic mitigation potentials \r by region (Busch et al. 2019; Griscom et al. 2020; Austin et al. 2020; \r Roe et al. 2021). Tropical forests and savannas in Latin America \r provide the largest share of mitigation potential (3.9 GtCO2 yr-1\r technical, 2.5 GtCO2 yr-1 at USD100 tCO2\r -1) followed by South-East \r Asia (2.2 GtCO2 yr-1 technical, 1.5 GtCO2 yr-1 at USD100 tCO2\r -1) and \r Africa (2.2 GtCO2 yr-1 technical, 1.2 GtCO2 yr-1 at USD100 tCO2\r -1) \r (Roe et al. 2021). Tropical forests continue to account for the \r highest rates of deforestation and associated GHG emissions. While \r deforestation shows signs of decreasing in several countries, \r in others, it continues at a  high rate or is increasing (Turubanova \r et al. 2018). Between 2010-2020, the rate of net forest loss was \r [...]"


id: e33f57370b32f31731c066d1527f1681
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content:
"[...] 4.7 Mha yr-1 with Africa and South America presenting the largest \r shares (3.9 Mha and 2.6 Mha, respectively) (FAO 2020a)."


id: 7d0418b267b18abd81a5724192c65e43
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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"A major uncertainty in all studies on avoided deforestation potential \r is their reliance on future reference levels that vary across studies and \r approaches. If food demand increases in the future, for example, the \r area of land deforested will likely increase, suggesting more technical \r potential for avoiding deforestation. Transboundary leakage due to \r market adjustments could also increase costs or reduce effectiveness \r of avoiding deforestation (e.g., Ingalls et al. 2018; Gingrich et al. 2019). \r Regarding forest regrowth, there are uncertainties about the time for \r the secondary forest carbon saturation (Houghton and Nassikas 2017; \r Zhu et al. 2018). Permanence of avoided deforestation may also be \r a  concern due to the impacts of climate change and disturbance of \r other biogeochemical cycles on the world's forests that can result in \r [...]"


id: 8bdfe7c850f98a1ee6dd2eb062ee1473
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content:
"[...] future potential changes in terrestrial ecosystem productivity, climate\u0002driven vegetation migration, wildfires, forest regrowth and carbon \r dynamics (Ballantyne et al. 2012; Kim et al. 2017b; Lovejoy and Nobre \r 2018; Aragao et al. 2018)."


id: 15dde4aaf84a3a0d9a34ba55f766ebb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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content:
"carbon pools and implementation on a rather theoretical maximum \r of 678 Mha of land (Griscom et al. 2017; Roe et al. 2019). The lower \r estimates represent the minimum range from an Earth System Model \r and a  sustainable global CDR potential (Fuss et al. 2018). Climate \r change will affect the mitigation potential of reforestation due to \r impacts in forest growth and composition, as well as changes in \r disturbances including fire. However, none of the mitigation estimates \r included in the SRCCL account for climate impacts.\r Developments since AR5 and IPCC Special Reports (SR1.5, \r SROCC and SRCCL). Since SRCCL, additional studies have been \r published on A/R mitigation potential by Bastin et al. (2019), Lewis \r et al. (2019), Doelman et al. (2019), Favero et al. (2020) and Austin \r et al. (2020). These studies are within the range reported in the \r SRCCL stretching the potentials at the higher range. The rising public \r [...]"


id: 975bf750e426fbeb12847fbbad497bc7
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content:
"[...] interest in nature-based solutions, along with high profile initiatives \r being launched (UN Decade on Restoration announced in 2019, the \r Bonn challenge on 150 million ha of restored forest in 2020 and the \r one trillion trees campaign launched by the World Economic Forum in \r 2020), has prompted intense discussions on the scale, effectiveness, \r and pitfalls of A/R and tree planting for climate mitigation (Luyssaert \r et al. 2018; Bond et al. 2019; Anderegg et al. 2020; Heilmayr et al. \r 2020; Holl and Brancalion 2020). The sometimes sole attention on \r afforestation and reforestation - suggesting it may solve the climate \r problem to large extent, in combination with the very high estimates \r of potentials - have led to polarisation in the debate, resulting in \r criticism to these measures or an emphasis on nature restoration only \r (Lewis et al. 2019). Our assessment based on most recent literature \r produced regional economic mitigation potential at USD100 tCO2\r -1\r [...]"


id: b270eaa2b6f446f02e8a478e8b80c004
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content:
"[...] estimate of 100-400 MtCO2 yr-1 in Africa, 210-266 MtCO2 yr-1 in Asia \r and Pacific, 291 MtCO2-eq yr-1 in Developed Countries (87% in North \r America), 30 MtCO2-eq yr-1 in Eastern Europe and West-Central Asia, \r and 345-898 MtCO2-eq yr-1 in Latin America and Caribbean (Roe \r et al. 2021), which totals to about 1200 MtCO2 yr-1, leaning to the \r lower range of the potentials in earlier IPCC reports. A recent global \r assessment of the aggregate costs for afforestation and reforestation \r suggests that at USD100 tCO2\r -1, 1.6 GtCO2 yr-1 could be sequestered \r globally for an annual cost of USD130 billion (Austin et al. 2020). \r Sectoral studies that are able to deal with local circumstances and \r limits estimate A/R potentials at 20 MtCO2 yr-1 in Russia (Eastern \r Europe and West-Central Asia) (Romanovskaya et al. 2020) and \r 64 MtCO2 yr-1 in Europe (Nabuurs et al. 2017). (Domke et al. 2020) \r estimated for the USA an additional 20% sequestration rate from \r [...]"


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content:
"[...] tree planting to achieve full stocking capacity of all understocked \r productive forestland, in total reaching 187 MtCO2 yr-1 sequestration. \r A new study on costs in the USA estimates 72-91 MtCO2 yr-1 could be \r sequestered between now and 2050 for USD100 tCO2\r -1 (Wade et al. \r 2019). The tropical and subtropical latitudes are the most effective \r for forest restoration in terms of carbon sequestration because of the \r rapid growth and lower albedo of the land surface compared with \r high latitudes (Lewis et al. 2019). Costs may be higher if albedo is \r considered in North America, Russia, and Africa (Favero et al. 2017). \r In addition, a wide variety of sequestration rates have been collected \r and published in the IPCC Good Practice Guidance for the AFOLU \r sector (IPCC 2006).\r Critical assessment and conclusion. There is medium \r confidence that the global technical mitigation potential "


id: d8faa6b51ebf4f33e8e63ca1df99576b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35470
content:
"Activities, co-benefits, risks and implementation opportunities \r and barriers. Improved sustainable forest management of already \r managed forests can lead to higher forest carbon stocks, better \r quality of produced wood, continuously produced wood, while \r maintaining and enhancing the forest carbon stock, and can also \r partially prevent and counteract the impacts of disturbances (Kurz \r et al. 2008; Marlon et al. 2012; Abatzoglou and Williams 2016; Seidl \r et al. 2017; Nabuurs et al. 2017; Tian et al. 2018; Ekholm 2020). \r Furthermore, it can provide benefits for climate change adaptation, \r biodiversity conservation, microclimatic regulation, soil erosion \r protection and water and flood regulation with reduced lateral \r carbon fluxes (Ashton et al. 2012; Martinez-Mena et al. 2019; Verkerk \r et al. 2020). Often, in existing (managed) forests with existing \r carbon stocks, large changes per hectare cannot be expected, \r [...]"


id: 5ae72af01d5d5810a21f0d56e80f9647
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13241
content:
"[...] although many forest owners may respond to carbon price incentives \r (Favero et al. 2020; Ekholm 2020). The full mitigation effects can be \r assessed in conjunction with the overall forest and wood use system \r i.e., carbon stock changes in standing trees, soil, harvested wood \r products (HWPs) and its bioenergy component with the avoided \r emissions through substitution. Forest management strategies aimed \r at increasing the biomass stock may have adverse side effects, such \r as decreasing the stand-level structural complexity, large emphasis \r on pure fast-growing stands, risks for biodiversity and resilience to \r natural disasters."


id: 79295a5f693ababeaaaf5dcbe46028a2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18505
content:
"Generally, measures can consist of one or combination of longer \r rotations, less intensive harvests, continuous-cover forestry, mixed \r stands, more adapted species, selected provenances, high quality \r wood assortments, and so on. Further, there is a trade-off between \r management in various parts of the forest product value chain, \r resulting in a wide range of results on the role of managed forests in \r mitigation (Agostini et al. 2013; Braun et al. 2016; Soimakallio et al. \r 2016; Gustavsson et al. 2017; Erb et al. 2017; Favero et al. 2020; \r Hurmekoski et al. 2020). Some studies conclude that reduction in \r forest carbon stocks due to harvest exceeds for decades the joint \r sequestration of carbon in harvested wood product stocks and \r emissions avoided through wood use (Soimakallio et al. 2016; Seppala \r et al. 2019), whereas others emphasise country level examples where \r investments in forest management have led to higher growing stocks \r [...]"


id: 93475dd12ce9356a452fa4c2bbe75681
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23109
content:
"Critical assessment and conclusion. There is medium confidence\r that the global technical mitigation potential for improved forest \r management by 2050 is 1.7 (1-2.1) GtCO2 yr-1, and the economic \r mitigation potential (<USD100 tCO2\r -1) is 1.1 (0.6-1.9) GtCO2 yr-1. \r Efforts to change forest management do not only require, for example, \r a carbon price incentive, but especially require knowledge, institutions, \r skilled labour, good access and so on. These requirements outline \r that although the potential is of medium size, we estimate a feasible \r potential towards the lower end. The net effect is also difficult to \r assess, as management changes impact not only the forest biomass, \r but also the wood chain and substitution effects. Further, leakage can \r arise from efforts to change management for carbon sequestration. \r Efforts, for example to set aside large areas of forest, may be partly \r counteracted by higher harvesting pressures elsewhere (Kallio \r [...]"


id: 7cd3805b13f97a7f7a7f3b831238b30a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19155
content:
"[...] et al. 2018). Studies such as (Austin et al. 2020) implicitly account \r for leakage and thus suggest higher costs than other studies. We \r therefore judge the mitigation potential at medium potential with \r medium agreement."


id: 45ce20bb7cd33e384e85f151c40cf33b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9501
content:
"Activities, co-benefits, risks and implementation opportunities \r and barriers. Fire management objectives include safeguarding life, \r property, and resources through the prevention, detection, control, \r restriction, and management of fire for diverse purposes in natural \r ecosystems (SRCCL, Chapter  6). Controlled burning is an effective \r economic method of reducing fire danger and stimulating natural \r regeneration. Co-benefits of fire management include reduced air \r pollution compared to much larger, uncontrolled fires, prevention \r of soil erosion and land degradation, biodiversity conservation \r in rangelands, and improvement of forage quality (Hurteau and \r Brooks 2011; Falk 2017; Hurteau et al. 2019). Fire management is \r still challenging because it is not only fire suppression at times of \r fire, but especially proper natural resource management in between \r fire events. Furthermore, it is challenging because of legal and \r [...]"


id: 16513a3620bfc396ea97db2511bac44f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1142
content:
"[...] policy issues, equity and rights concerns, governance, capacity, and \r research needs (Wiedinmyer and Hurteau 2010; Goldammer 2016; \r Russell-Smith et al. 2017). It will increasingly be needed under future \r enhanced climate change."


id: e1e25ee5b9499753ea71f79f2454ddef
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37025
content:
"Savannas. Savannas constitute one of the most fire-prone vegetation \r types on Earth and are a significant source of GHG emissions. Savanna \r fires contributed 62% (4.92 PgCO2-eq yr-1)) of gross global mean \r fire emissions between 1997 and 2016. Regrowth from vegetation \r postfire sequesters the CO2 released into the atmosphere, but not \r the CH4 and N2O emissions which contributed an approximate \r net of 2.1 PgCO2-eq yr-1 (Lipsett-Moore et al. 2018). Therefore, \r implementing prescribed burning with low intensity fires, principally \r in the early dry season, to effectively manage the risk of wildfires \r occurring in the late dry season is associated with reducing emissions \r (Whitehead et al. 2014). Considering this fire management practice, \r estimates of global opportunities for emissions reductions were \r estimated at 69.1 MtCO2-eq yr-1 in Africa (29 countries, with 20 least \r developed African countries accounting for 74% of the mitigation \r [...]"


id: de9c6b58f15f3073112d7b2e02db130e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36428
content:
"[...] potential), 13.3 MtCO2-eq yr-1 in South America (six countries), and \r 6.9 MtCO2-eq yr-1 in Australia and Papua New Guinea (Lipsett-Moore \r et al. 2018). In Australia, savanna burning emissions abatement \r methodologies have been available since 2012, and abatement has \r exceeded 9.3 MtCO2-eq mainly through the management of low \r intensity early dry season fire. Until September 2021, 78 projects were \r registered (Australian Government, Clean Energy Regulator, 2021)."


id: 1a4cc97697cdf5ad422e42c7f33af5dd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1825
content:
"ecological reasons (Kalies and Yocom Kent 2016). Fire resilience is \r increasingly managed in Southwestern USA forest landscapes, which \r have experienced droughts and widespread, high-severity wildfires \r (Keeley et al. 2019). In these forests, fire exclusion management, \r coupled with a  warming climate, has led to increasingly severe \r wildfires (Hurteau et al. 2014). However, the impacts of prescribed \r fires in forests in reducing carbon emissions are still inconclusive. \r Some positive impacts of prescribed fires are associated with other \r fuel reduction techniques (Loudermilk et al. 2017; Flanagan et al. \r 2019; Stephens et al. 2020), leading to maintaining carbon stocks and \r reducing carbon emissions in the future where extreme fire weather \r events are more frequent (Krofcheck et al. 2018, 2019; Hurteau \r et al. 2019; Bowman et al. 2020a,b; Goodwin et al. 2020). Land \r management approaches will certainly need to consider the new \r [...]"


id: 1dc329a7fdce1f43876554cb179c37b1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2421
content:
"[...] climatic conditions (e.g., the proportion of days in fire seasons with \r the potential for unmanageable fires more than doubling in some \r regions in northern and eastern boreal forest) (Wotton et al. 2017)."


id: 245b7aaf39b0768ae5d6c91cdd7ef6d5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3587
content:
"Conclusions from AR5 and IPCC Special Reports (SR1.5, SROCC \r and SRCCL); mitigation potential, costs, and pathways. The \r SRCCL reported a  mitigation potential for reduced conversion of \r grasslands and savannas of 0.03-0.12 GtCO2-eq yr-1 (Griscom et al. \r 2017; IPCC 2019) considering the higher loss of soil organic carbon in \r croplands (Sanderman et al. 2017). Assuming an average starting soil \r organic carbon stock of temperate grasslands (Poeplau et al. 2011), \r and the mean annual global cropland conversion rates (1961-2003) \r (Krause et al. 2017), the equivalent loss of soil organic carbon \r over 20 years would be 14 GtCO2-eq, for example, 0.7 GtCO2 yr-1\r (SRCCL, Chapter 6). IPCC AR5 and AR4 did not explicitly consider the \r mitigation potential of avoided conversion of grasslands-savannas \r but the management of grazing land is accounted for considering \r plant, animal, and fire management with a mean mitigation potential \r [...]"


id: 129c5be1ca361ad368e21bb8e12d5cb2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 476
content:
"[...] of 0.11-0.80 tCO2-eq ha-1 yr-1 depending on the climate region. This \r resulted in 0.25 GtCO2-eq yr-1 at USD20 tCO2\r -1 to 1.25 GtCO2-eq yr-1\r at USD100 tCO2\r -1 by 2030."


id: 80dc2d8c39cfc086e3003669104a2f99
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19805
content:
"Critical assessment and conclusion. There is low confidence\r that the global technical mitigation potential for grassland and \r savanna fire management by 2050 is 0.1 (0.09-0.1) GtCO2 yr-1, \r and the economic mitigation potential (<USD100 tCO2\r -1) is 0.05 \r (0.03-0.07) GtCO2 yr-1. Savanna fires produce significant emissions \r globally, but prescribed fires in the early dry season could mitigate \r emissions in different regions, particularly Africa. Evidence is less \r clear for fire management of forests, with the contribution of \r GHG mitigation depending on many factors that affect the carbon \r balance (e.g.,  Simmonds et al. 2021). Although prescribed burning \r is promoted to reduce uncontrolled wildfires in forests, the benefits \r for the management of carbon stocks are unclear, with different \r studies reporting varying results especially concerning its long-term \r effectiveness (Wotton et al. 2017; Bowman et al. 2020b). Under \r [...]"


id: 78e87e665d2c16dbd87dcb998e54265a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18461
content:
"[...] increasing climate change however, an increased attention on fire \r management will be necessary."


id: 5614804faaaec7a56819200ec16d84ee
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12417
content:
"Developments since AR5 and IPCC Special Reports (SR1.5, \r SROCC and SRCCL). Unlike most of the measures covered in \r Section 7.4, there are currently no global, spatially explicit mitigation \r potential estimates for reduced grassland conversion to generate \r technical and economic potentials by region. Literature developments \r since AR5 and SRCCL are studies that provide mitigation estimates \r in one or a  few countries or regions. Modelling experiments \r comparing Californian forests and grasslands found that grasslands \r resulted in a more resilient carbon sink than forests to future climate \r change (Dass et al. 2018). However, previous studies indicated \r that precipitation is a key controller of the carbon storage in these \r grasslands, with the grassland became a carbon sink in 2005, when \r the region received relatively high spring precipitation (Ma et al. \r 2007). In North America, grassland conversion was the source for \r [...]"


id: ced1e059b48bfa3d34400b66f65ed6a0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33729
content:
"[...] 77% of all new croplands from 2008-2012 (Lark et al. 2015). Avoided \r conversion of North American grasslands to croplands presents an \r economic mitigation potential of 0.024 GtCO2-eq yr-1 and technical \r potential of 0.107 GtCO2-eq yr-1 (Fargione et al. 2018). This potential \r is related mainly to root biomass and soils (81% of emissions from \r soils). Estimates of GHG emissions from any future deforestation in \r Australian savannas also point to the potential mitigation of around \r 0.024 GtCO2-eq yr-1 (Bristow et al. 2016). The expansion of the \r Soy Moratorium (SoyM) from the Brazilian Amazon to the Cerrado \r (Brazilian savannas) would prevent the direct conversion of 3.6 Mha \r of native vegetation to soybeans by 2050 and avoid the emission of \r 0.02 GtCO2-eq yr-1 (Soterroni et al. 2019)."


id: b725979e4fdcbc4255a84f983c0bc7f1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29433
content:
"Activities, co-benefits, risks and implementation opportunities \r and barriers. Grasslands cover approximately 40.5% of the \r terrestrial area (i.e., 52.5 million km2\r ) divided as 13.8% woody \r savanna and savanna; 12.7% open and closed shrub; 8.3% non\u0002woody grassland; and 5.7% is tundra (White et al. 2000). Sub\u0002Saharan Africa and Asia have the most extensive total area, 14.5 \r and 8.9 million km2\r , respectively. A review by Conant et al. (2017) \r reported based on data on grassland area (FAO 2013) and grassland \r soil carbon stocks (Sombroek et al. 1993) a global estimate of about \r 343 PgC (in the top 1 m), nearly 50% more than is stored in forests \r worldwide (FAO 2007). Reducing the conversion of grasslands and \r savannas to croplands prevents soil carbon losses by oxidation, and \r to a smaller extent, biomass carbon loss due to vegetation clearing \r (SRCCL, Chapter  6). Restoration of grasslands through enhanced \r [...]"


id: 728a0894dbcd209613095906a155bf19
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17393
content:
"[...] soil carbon sequestration, including (i) management of vegetation, \r (ii) animal management, and (iii) fire management, was also \r included in the SRCCL and is covered in Section 7.4.3.1. Similar to \r other measures that reduce conversion, conserving carbon stocks in \r grasslands and savannas can be achieved by controlling conversion "


id: c6acba9fbad02b6d8a1ab980cd078464
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32253
content:
"economic mitigation potential (<USD100 tCO2\r -1) is 0.04 GtCO2 yr-1. \r Most of the carbon sequestration potential is in below-ground \r biomass and soil organic matter. However, estimates of potential \r are still based on few studies and vary according to the levels of \r soil carbon, and ecosystem productivity (e.g., in response to rainfall \r distribution). Conservation of grasslands presents significant benefits \r for desertification control, especially in arid areas (SRCCL, Chapter 3). \r Policies supporting avoided conversion can help protect at-risk \r grasslands, reduce GHG emissions, and produce positive outcomes \r for biodiversity and landowners (Ahlering et al. 2016). In comparison \r to tropical rainforest regions that have been the primary target for \r mitigation policies associated to natural ecosystems (e.g., REDD+), \r conversion grasslands and savannas has received less national and \r international attention, despite growing evidence of concentrated \r [...]"


id: 38e751ff8a8514b68b678b7372bda02
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7215
content:
"and about 20% of peatland carbon stock but about 80% of peatland \r carbon emissions, primarily from peatland conversion in Indonesia \r (about 60%) and Malaysia (about 10%) (Hooijer et al. 2010; Page \r et al. 2011; Leifeld and Menichetti 2018). While the total mitigation \r potential of peatland conservation is considered moderate, the \r per hectare mitigation potential is the highest among land-based \r mitigation measures (Roe et al. 2019).\r Developments since AR5 and IPCC Special Reports (SR1.5, \r SROCC and SRCCL). Recent studies continue to report high \r carbon stocks in peatlands and emphasise the vulnerability \r of peatland carbon after conversion. The carbon stocks of \r tropical peatlands are among the highest of any forest, \r 1,211-4,257 tCO2-eq ha-1 in the Peruvian Amazon (Bhomia \r et al. 2019) and 1,956-14,757 tCO2-eq ha-1 in Indonesia (Novita \r et al. 2021). Ninety percent of tropical peatland carbon stocks \r are vulnerable to emission during conversion and may not be \r [...]"


id: d87584304788ccf15ede88a757c19f02
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35379
content:
"[...] recoverable through restoration; in contrast, boreal and temperate \r peatlands hold similar carbon stocks  (1,439-5,619 tCO2-eq ha-1) \r but only 30% of northern carbon stocks are vulnerable to emission \r during conversion and irrecoverable through restoration (Goldstein \r et al. 2020). A  recent study shows global mitigation potential of \r about 0.2 GtCO2-eq yr-1 at costs up to USD100 tCO2\r -1 (Roe et al. \r 2021). Another study estimated that 72% of mitigation is achieved \r through avoided soil carbon impacts, with the remainder through \r avoided impacts to vegetation (Bossio et al. 2020). Recent model \r projections show that both peatland protection and peatland \r restoration (Section 7.4.2.7) are needed to achieve a 2degC mitigation \r pathway and that peatland protection and restoration policies \r will have minimal impacts on regional food security (Leifeld et al. \r 2019, Humpenoder et al. 2020). Global studies have not accounted \r [...]"


id: a071f0123d75fd96790d70a5dd8ccc0b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25440
content:
"[...] for extensive peatlands recently reported in the Congo Basin, \r estimated to cover 145,500 km2\r  and contain 30.6 PgC, as much as \r 29% of total tropical peat carbon stock (Dargie et al. 2017). These \r Congo peatlands are relatively intact; continued preservation is \r needed to prevent major emissions (Dargie et al. 2019). In northern \r peatlands that are underlain by permafrost roughly 50% of the \r total peatlands north of 23deg latitude, (Hugelius et al. 2020), climate \r change (i.e., warming) is the major driver of peatland degradation \r (e.g., through permafrost thaw) (Schuur et al. 2015, Goldstein et al. \r 2020). However, in non-permafrost boreal and temperate peatlands, \r reduction of peatland conversion is also a cost-effective mitigation \r strategy. Peatlands are sensitive to climate change and there is \r low confidence about the future peatland sink globally (SRCCL, \r Chapter  2). Permafrost thaw may shift northern peatlands from \r [...]"


id: fb8d89a37d43bceb0f2b0c6aaca4f99c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41628
content:
"[...] a net carbon sink to net source (Hugelius et al. 2020). Uncertainties \r in peatland extent and the magnitude of existing carbon stocks, in \r both northern (Loisel et al. 2014) and tropical (Dargie et al. 2017) \r latitudes limit understanding of current and future peatland carbon \r dynamics (Minasny et al. 2019).\r Critical assessment and conclusion. Based on studies to date, \r there is medium confidence that peatland conservation has \r a  technical potential of 0.86 (0.43-2.02) GtCO2-eq yr-1 of which \r 0.48  (0.2-0.68) GtCO2-eq yr-1 is available at USD100 tCO2\r -1\r (Figure 7.11). High per hectare mitigation potential and high rate of \r co-benefits particularly in tropical countries, support the effectiveness "


id: 9f65f380c03c5898b0af4c3364899770
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25265
content:
"Peatlands are carbon-rich wetland ecosystems with organic soil \r horizons in which soil organic matter concentration exceeds 30% \r (dry weight) and soil carbon concentrations can exceed 50% \r (Page and Baird 2016, Boone Kauffman et al. 2017). Reducing the \r conversion of peatlands avoids emissions of above- and below\u0002ground biomass and soil carbon due to vegetation clearing, fires, \r and peat decomposition from drainage. Similar to deforestation, \r peatland carbon stocks can be conserved by controlling the drivers \r of conversion and degradation (e.g.,  commercial and subsistence \r agriculture, mining, urban expansion) and improving governance \r and management. Reducing conversion is urgent because peatland \r carbon stocks accumulate slowly and persist over millennia; loss of \r existing stocks cannot be easily reversed over the decadal time scales \r needed to meet the Paris Agreement (Goldstein et al. 2020). The main \r [...]"


id: 3b638614c02f1b978a0a1ab768cc4d7d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7636
content:
"[...] co-benefits of reducing conversion of peatlands include conservation \r of a unique biodiversity including many critically endangered species, \r provision of water quality and regulation, and improved public health \r through decreased fire-caused pollutants (Griscom et al. 2017). \r Although reducing peatland conversion will reduce land availability \r for alternative uses including agriculture or other land-based \r mitigation, drained peatlands constitute a small share of agricultural \r land globally while contributing significant emissions (Joosten 2009). \r Mitigation through reduced conversion of peatlands therefore has \r a high potential of avoided emissions per hectare (Roe et al. 2019)."


id: ef8fcf399d32ce92f9a2ea59169de5f1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39527
content:
"Activities, co-benefits, risks and implementation barriers.\r Peatland restoration involves restoring degraded and damaged \r peatlands, for example through rewetting and revegetation, which \r both increases carbon accumulation in vegetation and soils and \r avoids ongoing CO2 emissions. Peatlands only account for about \r 3% of the terrestrial surface, predominantly occurring in boreal \r ecosystems (78%), with a  smaller proportion in tropical regions \r (13%), but may store about 600 GtC or 21% of the global total soil \r organic carbon stock of about 3000 Gt (Page et al. 2011; Leifeld \r and Menichetti 2018). Peatland restoration delivers co-benefits \r for biodiversity, as well as regulating water flow and preventing \r downstream flooding, while still allowing for extensive management \r such as paludiculture (Tan et al. 2021). Rewetting of peatlands also \r reduces the risk of fire, but may also mobilise salts and contaminants \r [...]"


id: c749a4a7123dfeb8ccf5c157db92e210
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32376
content:
"[...] in soils (van Diggelen et al. 2020) and in severely degraded peatlands, \r restoration of peatland hydrology and vegetation may not be feasible \r (Andersen et al. 2017). At a  local level, restoration of peatlands \r drained for agriculture could displace food production and damage \r local food supply, although impacts to regional and global food \r security would be minimal (Humpenoder et al. 2020). Collaborative \r and transparent planning processes are needed to reduce conflict \r between competing land uses (Tanneberger et al. 2020b). Adequate \r resources for implementing restoration policies are key to engage \r local communities and maintain livelihoods (Resosudarmo et al. \r 2019; Ward et al. 2021)."


id: 39d4b26f60f852d0cb5132a5a8d014c6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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vector_id: 7388
content:
"Activities, co-benefits, risks and implementation barriers.\r Reducing conversion of coastal wetlands, including mangroves, \r marshes and seagrass ecosystems, avoids emissions from above and \r below ground biomass and soil carbon through avoided degradation \r and/or loss. Coastal wetlands occur mainly in estuaries and deltas, \r areas that are often densely settled, with livelihoods closely linked \r to coastal ecosystems and resources (Moser et al. 2012). The \r carbon stocks of these highly productive ecosystems are sometimes \r referred to as 'blue carbon'. Loss of existing stocks cannot be easily \r reversed over decadal time scales (Goldstein et al. 2020). The main \r drivers of conversion include intensive aquaculture, agriculture, salt \r ponds, urbanisation and infrastructure development, the extensive \r use of fertilisers, and extraction of water resources (Lovelock \r [...]"


id: 9dd44fa4276306d98b61a47fd9ebba49
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25004
content:
"[...] et al. 2018). Reduced conversion of coastal wetlands has many co\u0002benefits, including biodiversity conservation, fisheries production, \r soil stabilisation, water flow and water quality regulation, flooding "


id: 7c6c3fd9720962a6097f8c431c669bee
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19090
content:
"and storm surge prevention, and increased resilience to cyclones \r (Windham-Myers et al. 2018a; UNEP 2020). Risks associated with \r the mitigation potential of coastal wetland conservation include \r uncertain permanence under future climate scenarios, including \r the effects of coastal squeeze, where coastal wetland area may be \r lost if upland area is not available for migration as sea levels rise \r (Lovelock and Reef 2020) (AR6 WGII, Section 3.4.2.5). Preservation \r of coastal wetlands also conflicts with other land use in the coastal \r zone, including aquaculture, agriculture, and human development; \r economic incentives are needed to prioritise wetland preservation \r over more profitable short-term land use. Integration of policies \r and efforts aimed at coastal climate mitigation, adaptation, \r biodiversity conservation, and fisheries, for example through \r integrated coastal zone management and marine spatial planning, \r [...]"


id: cdcc60200cbedfdff1a14416d65c5f38
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33534
content:
"[...] will bundle climate mitigation with co-benefits and optimise \r outcomes (Herr et al. 2017)."


id: 8130be8bdfd79870ad9d09145bde43c2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19862
content:
"Conclusions from AR5 and IPCC Special Reports (SR1.5, \r SROCC and SRCCL); mitigation potential, costs, and pathways.\r Coastal wetlands contain high, yet variable, organic carbon stocks, \r leading to a range of estimates of the global mitigation potential of \r reduced conversion. The SRCCL (Chapter 2) and SROCC (Chapter 5), \r report a technical mitigation potential of 0.15-5.35 GtCO2-eq yr-1\r by 2050 (Pendleton et al. 2012; Lovelock et al. 2017; Howard et al. \r 2017; Griscom et al. 2017). The mitigation potential is derived from \r quantification of losses of carbon stocks in vegetation and soil \r due to land conversion, shifts in GHG fluxes associated with land \r use, and alterations in net ecosystem productivity. The wide range \r in estimates mostly relate to the scope (all coastal ecosystems vs \r mangroves only) and different assumptions on decomposition rates. \r Loss rates of coastal wetlands have been estimated at 0.2-3% yr-1, \r [...]"


id: 190a2c3590ba436814cc8446b289450c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1621
content:
"Activities, co-benefits, risks and implementation barriers.\r Coastal wetland restoration involves restoring degraded or damaged \r coastal  wetlands including mangroves, salt marshes, and seagrass \r ecosystems, leading to sequestration of 'blue carbon' in wetland \r vegetation and soil (SRCCL, Chapter 6; SROCC, Chapter 5). Successful \r approaches to wetland restoration include: (i) passive restoration, \r the removal of anthropogenic activities that are causing degradation \r or preventing recovery; and (ii) active restoration, purposeful \r manipulations to the environment in order to achieve recovery to \r a  naturally functioning system (Elliott et al. 2016) (IPCC AR6 WGII \r Chapter  3). Restoration of coastal wetlands delivers many valuable \r co-benefits, including enhanced water quality, biodiversity, aesthetic \r values, fisheries production (food security), and protection from rising \r sea levels and storm impacts (Barbier et al. 2011; Hochard et al. 2019; \r [...]"


id: 70f0c24e7cf925eac155e4ecf52d2cfe
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17132
content:
"[...] Sun and Carson 2020; Duarte et al. 2020). Of the 0.3 Mkm2\r  coastal \r wetlands globally, 0.11 Mkm2\r  of mangroves are considered feasible \r for restoration (Griscom et al. 2017). Risks associated with coastal \r wetland restoration include uncertain permanence under future \r climate scenarios (IPCC AR6 WGII, Box 3.4), partial offsets of mitigation "


id: 44f7503b0fec6d164ca74e2fbcc9df1f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9364
content:
"Developments since AR5 and IPCC Special Reports (SR1.5, \r SROCC and SRCCL). Recent studies emphasise the time frame needed \r to achieve the full mitigation potential (Duarte et al. 2020; Taillardat \r et al. 2020). The first project-derived estimate of the net GHG benefit \r from seagrass restoration found 1.54 tCO2-eq (0.42 MgC) ha-1 yr-1\r 10 years after restoration began (Oreska et al. 2020); comparable \r to the default emission factor in the Wetlands Supplement (Kennedy \r et al. 2014). Recent studies of rehabilitated mangroves also indicate \r that annual carbon sequestration rates in biomass and soils can \r return to natural levels within decades of restoration (Cameron et al. \r 2019; Sidik et al. 2019). A  meta-analysis shows increasing carbon \r sequestration rates over the first 15 years of mangrove restoration \r with rates stabilising at 25.7 +- 7.7 tCO2-eq (7.0 +- 2.1 MgC) ha-1 yr-1\r through forty years, although success depends on climate, sediment \r [...]"


id: 8c1da2af9767b219447c2f8874e654ff
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21825
content:
"[...] type, and restoration methods (Sasmito et al. 2019). Overall, 30% of \r mangrove soil carbon stocks and 50-70% of marsh and seagrass \r carbon stocks are unlikely to recover within 30 years of restoration, \r underscoring the importance of preventing conversion of coastal \r wetlands (Goldstein et al. 2020) (Section 7.4.2.8)."


id: 8c16a4b33173d65a46f053acea1517da
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21818
content:
"Activities, co-benefits, risks and implementation opportunities \r and barriers. Increasing soil organic matter in croplands are \r agricultural management practices that include (i) crop management: \r for example, high input carbon practices such as improved crop \r varieties, crop rotation, use of cover crops, perennial cropping systems \r (including agroforestry; see Section  7.4.3.3), integrated production \r systems, crop diversification, agricultural biotechnology; (ii) nutrient \r management including fertilisation with organic amendments/green \r manures (Section 7.4.3.6); (iii) reduced tillage intensity and residue \r retention, (iv) improved water management: including drainage of \r waterlogged mineral soils and irrigation of crops in arid/semi-arid \r conditions, (v) improved rice management (Section  7.4.3.5) and \r (vi) biochar application (P.  Smith et al. 2019a) (Section  7.4.3.2). \r For increased soil organic matter in grasslands, practices include \r [...]"


id: aec6a6be6c9a01c50c812b696c6919df
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27987
content:
"[...] (i) management of vegetation: including improved grass varieties/\r sward composition, deep rooting grasses, increased productivity, \r and nutrient management, (ii) livestock management: including \r appropriate stocking densities fit to carrying capacity, fodder banks, \r and fodder diversification, and (iii) fire management: improved use of \r fire for sustainable grassland management, including fire prevention \r and improved prescribed burning (Smith et al. 2014, 2019b). All these \r measures are recognised as Sustainable Soil Management Practices \r by FAO (Baritz et al. 2018). While there are co-benefits for livelihoods, \r biodiversity, water provision and food security (P. Smith et al. 2019a), "


id: 631ca4bed74dc5b32938400a2bd47aa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14733
content:
"Conclusions from AR5 and IPCC Special Reports (SR1.5, SROCC \r and SRCCL); mitigation potential, costs, and pathways. Building \r on AR5, the SRCCL reported the global mitigation potential for soil \r carbon management in croplands to be 1.4-2.3 GtCO2-eq yr-1 (Smith \r et al. 2014), though the full literature range was 0.3-6.8 GtCO2-eq yr-1\r (Sommer and Bossio 2014; Powlson et al. 2014; Dickie et al. 2014b; \r Henderson et al. 2015; Herrero et al. 2016; Paustian et al. 2016; \r Zomer et al. 2016; Frank et al. 2017; Conant et al. 2017; Griscom et al. \r 2017; Hawken 2017; Sanderman et al. 2017; Fuss et al. 2018; Roe \r et al. 2019). The global mitigation potential for soil organic carbon \r management in grasslands was assessed to be 1.4-1.8 GtCO2-eq yr-1, \r with the full literature range being 0.1-2.6 GtCO2-eq yr-1 (Herrero \r et al. 2013; 2016; Conant et al. 2017; Roe et al. 2019). Lower values \r in the range represented economic potentials, while higher values \r [...]"


id: 41e35f5e7ba8dfd636e4bb8463ff0281
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8786
content:
"[...] represented technical potentials - and uncertainty was expressed by \r reporting the whole range of estimates. The SR1.5 outlined associated \r costs reported in literature to range from USD -45 to 100 tCO2\r -1, \r describing enhanced soil carbon sequestration as a  cost-effective \r measure (IPCC 2018). Despite significant mitigation potential, there \r is limited inclusion of soil carbon sequestration as a response option \r within IAM mitigation pathways (Rogelj et al. 2018a)."


id: 45c5944aa185b2f77d1ff1e0271186a9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9493
content:
"Activities, co-benefits, risks and implementation opportunities \r and barriers. Biochar is produced by heating organic matter in \r oxygen-limited environments (pyrolysis and gasification) (Lehmann \r and Joseph 2012). Feedstocks include forestry and sawmill residues, \r straw, manure and biosolids. When applied to soils, biochar is \r estimated to persist from decades to thousands of years, depending \r on feedstock and production conditions (J. Wang et al. 2016; Singh \r et al. 2015). Biochar systems producing biochar for soil application \r plus bioenergy, generally give greater mitigation than bioenergy \r alone and other uses of biochar, and are recognised as a  CDR \r strategy. Biochar persistence is increased through interaction with \r clay minerals and soil organic matter (Fang et al. 2015). Additional \r CDR benefits arise through 'negative priming' whereby biochar \r stabilises soil carbon and rhizodeposits (Weng et al. 2015; J. Wang \r [...]"


id: 59b4528b7436e4a93a6eab67ec85db60
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13022
content:
"[...] et al. 2016; Archanjo et al. 2017; Hagemann et al. 2017; Han Weng \r et al. 2017; Weng et al. 2018). Besides CDR, additional mitigation \r can arise from displacing fossil fuels with pyrolysis gases, lower \r soil N2O emissions (Cayuela et al. 2014, 2015; Song et al. 2016; He \r et al. 2017; Verhoeven et al. 2017; Borchard et al. 2019), reduced \r nitrogen fertiliser requirements due to reduced nitrogen leaching \r and volatilisation from soils (Liu et al. 2019; Borchard et al. 2019), \r and reduced GHG emissions from compost when biochar is added \r (Agyarko-Mintah et al. 2017; Wu et al. 2017). Biochar application \r to paddy rice has resulted in substantial reductions (20-40% on \r average) in N2O (Song et al. 2016; Awad et al. 2018; Liu et al. 2018) \r (Section 7.4.3.5) and smaller reduction in CH4 emissions (Song et al. \r 2016; Kammann et al. 2017; Kim et al. 2017a; He et al. 2017; Awad \r et al. 2018). Potential co-benefits include yield increases particularly \r [...]"


id: 6ad14ac01a42c2cef776f7365965cc69
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16072
content:
"[...] in sandy and acidic soils with low cation exchange capacity (Woolf \r et al. 2016; Jeffery et al. 2017); increased soil water-holding capacity \r (Omondi et al. 2016), nitrogen use efficiency (Liu et al. 2019; Borchard \r et al. 2019), biological nitrogen fixation (Van Zwieten et al. 2015); \r adsorption of organic pollutants and heavy metals (e.g., Silvani et al. \r 2019); odour reduction from manure handling (e.g.,  Hwang et al. \r 2018) and managing forest fuel loads (Puettmann et al. 2020). Due to \r its dark colour, biochar could decrease soil albedo (Meyer et al. 2012), \r though this is insignificant under recommended rates and application \r methods. Biochar could reduce enteric CH4 emissions when fed to \r ruminants (Section 7.4.3.4). Barriers to upscaling include insufficient \r investment, limited large-scale production facilities, high production \r costs at small scale, lack of agreed approach to monitoring, reporting "


id: 6845b97ab3ff92f3468f9138d1539c72
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15615
content:
"Developments since AR5 and IPCC Special Reports (SR1.5, \r SROCC and SRCCL). No recent literature has been published which \r conflict with the mitigation potentials reported in the SRCCL. Relevant \r papers include Lal et al. (2018) which estimated soil carbon \r sequestration potential to be 0.7-4.1 GtCO2-eq yr-1 for croplands \r and 1.1-2.9 GtCO2-eq yr-1 for grasslands. Bossio et al. (2020)\r assessed the contribution of soil carbon sequestration to natural \r climate solutions and found the potential to be 5.5 GtCO2 yr-1 across \r all ecosystems, with only small portions of this (0.41 GtCO2-eq yr-1\r for cover cropping in croplands; 0.23, 0.15, 0.15 GtCO2-eq yr-1 for \r avoided grassland conversion, optimal grazing intensity and legumes \r in pastures, respectively) arising from croplands and grasslands. \r Regionally, soil carbon management in croplands is feasible \r anywhere, but effectiveness can be limited in very dry regions \r [...]"


id: fed86b4bd9756f49550bbe2d65a410c5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42234
content:
"[...] (Sanderman et al. 2017). For soil carbon management in grasslands \r the feasibility is greatest in areas where grasslands have been \r degraded (e.g., by overgrazing) and soil organic carbon is depleted. \r For well managed grasslands, soil carbon stocks are already high and \r the potential for additional carbon storage is low. Roe et al. (2021) \r estimate the greatest economic (up to USD100 tCO2\r -1) potential \r between 2020 and 2050 for croplands to be in Asia and the Pacific \r (339.7 MtCO2 yr-1) and for grasslands, in Developed Countries \r (253.6 MtCO2 yr-1)."


id: 932f27ad41e550876e080bd827a3c51f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23099
content:
"Activities, co-benefits, risks and implementation opportunities \r and barriers. Agroforestry is a set of diverse land management systems \r that integrate trees and shrubs with crops and/or livestock in space \r and/or time. Agroforestry accumulates carbon in woody vegetation and \r soil (Ramachandran Nair et al. 2010) and offers multiple co-benefits \r such as increased land productivity, diversified livelihoods, reduced \r soil erosion, improved water quality, and more hospitable regional \r climates (Ellison et al. 2017; Kuyah et al. 2019; Mbow et al. 2020; Zhu \r et al. 2020). Incorporation of trees and shrubs in agricultural systems, \r however, can affect food production, biodiversity, local hydrology and \r contribute to social inequality (Amadu et al. 2020; Fleischman et al. \r 2020; Holl and Brancalion 2020). To minimise risks and maximise co\u0002benefits, agroforestry should be implemented as part of support \r systems that deliver tools, and information to increase farmers' agency. \r [...]"


id: aeb3449d1049c16f19d5139f58767a17
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27973
content:
"[...] This may include reforming policies, strengthening extension systems \r and creating market opportunities that enable adoption (Jamnadass \r et al. 2020; Sendzimir et al. 2011; P. Smith et al. 2019a). Consideration \r of carbon sequestration in the context of food and fuel production, as \r well as environmental co-benefits at the farm, local, and regional scales \r can further help support decisions to plant, regenerate and maintain \r agroforestry systems (Kumar and Nair 2011; Miller et al. 2020). In spite \r of the advantages, biophysical and socio-economic factors can limit the \r adoption (Pattanayak et al. 2003). Contextual factors may include, but \r are not limited to; water availability, soil fertility, seed and germplasm \r access, land policies and tenure systems affecting farmer agency, \r access to credit, and to information regarding the optimum species for \r a given location."


id: 2c5729ebbca8a77350826c7e73dd6c9a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5070
content:
"Developments since AR5 and IPCC Special Reports (SR1.5, SROCC \r and SRCCL). Developments include mechanistic understanding \r of 'negative priming' and biochar-soil-microbes-plant interactions \r (DeCiucies et al. 2018; Fang et al. 2019). Indirect climate benefits are \r associated with persistent yield response to biochar (Katterer et al. \r 2019; Ye et al. 2020), improved crop water use efficiency (Du et al. \r 2018; Gao et al. 2020) and reduced GHG and ammonia emissions \r from compost and manure (Sanchez-Monedero et al. 2018; Bora \r et al. 2020a,b; Zhao et al. 2020). A quantification method based on \r biochar properties is included in the IPCC guidelines for NGHGIs \r (Domke et al. 2019). Studies report a range of biochar responses, from \r positive to occasionally adverse impacts, including on GHG emissions, \r and identify risks (Tisserant and Cherubini 2019). This illustrates the \r expected variability (Lehmann and Rillig 2014) of responses, which \r [...]"


id: 1bd7f5c4203e833305c6777c29c77894
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2085
content:
"[...] depend on the biochar type and climatic and edaphic characteristics \r of the site (Zygourakis 2017). Biochar properties vary with feedstock, \r production conditions and post-production treatments, so mitigation \r and agronomic benefits are maximised when biochars are chosen to \r suit the application context (Masek et al. 2018). A recent assessment \r finds greatest economic potential (up to USD100 tCO2\r -1) between \r 2020 and 2050 to be in Asia and the Pacific (793 MtCO2 yr-1) \r followed by Developed Countries (447 MtCO2 yr-1) (Roe et al. 2021). \r Mitigation through biochar will be greatest where biochar is applied \r to responsive soils (acidic, low fertility), where soil N2O emissions \r are high (intensive horticulture, irrigated crops), and where the \r syngas co-product displaces fossil fuels. Due to the early stage of \r commercialisation, mitigation estimates are based pilot-scale facilities, \r leading to uncertainty. However, the long-term persistence of biochar \r [...]"


id: c35164420836910bc4a52011df1e28f0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31634
content:
"[...] carbon in soils has been widely studied (Singh et al. 2012; Fang et al. \r 2019; Zimmerman and Ouyang 2019). The greatest uncertainty is the \r availability of sustainably-sourced biomass for biochar production."


id: 526c767905e3c563bd8ed36fcaf0a31d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11782
content:
"Regional estimates of mitigation potential are scant with agroforestry \r options differing significantly by geography (Feliciano et al. 2018). For \r example, multi-strata shaded coffee and cacao are successful in the \r humid tropics (Somarriba et al. 2013; Blaser et al. 2018), silvopastoral \r systems are prevalent in Latin American (Peters et al. 2013; Landholm \r et al. 2019) while agrosilvopastoral systems, shelterbelts, hedgerows, \r and windbreaks are common in Europe (Joffre et al. 1988; Rigueiro\u0002Rodriguez 2009). At the field scale, agroforestry accumulates between \r 0.59 and 6.24 t ha-1 yr-1 of carbon above-ground. Below-ground \r carbon often constitutes 25% or more of the potential carbon gains \r in agroforestry systems (De Stefano and Jacobson 2018; Cardinael \r et al. 2018). Roe et al. (2021) estimate greatest regional economic \r (up to USD100 tCO2\r -1) mitigation potential for the period 2020-2050 \r to be in Asia and the Pacific (368.4 MtCO2-eq yr-1) and Developed \r [...]"


id: d0a1c996e1b086bdfdfd1256cc7684cd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34057
content:
"2020) with high (e.g.,  16-70% depending on study) mitigation \r potential reported (e.g.,  Hristov et al. 2015; McGinn et al. 2019; \r Melgar et al. 2020) and commercial availability expected within \r two years in some countries (Reisinger et al. 2021). However, their \r mitigation persistence (McGinn et al. 2019), cost (Carroll and \r Daigneault 2019; Alvarez-Hess et al. 2019) and public acceptance \r (Jayasundara et al. 2016) or regulatory approval is currently \r unclear while administration in pasture-based systems is likely \r to be challenging (Patra et al. 2017; Leahy et al. 2019). Research \r into other inhibitors/feeds containing inhibitory compounds, such \r as macroalga or seaweed (Chagas et al. 2019; Kinley et al. 2020; \r Roque et al. 2019), shows promise, although concerns have been \r raised regarding palatability, toxicity, environmental impacts and \r the development of industrial-scale supply chains (Abbott et al. \r [...]"


id: e09042fcb720e8d2ebae5b36f9eb8352
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36760
content:
"[...] 2020; Vijn et al. 2020). In the absence of CH4 vaccines, which are still \r under development (Reisinger et al. 2021) pasture-based and non\u0002intensive systems remain reliant on increasing production efficiency \r (Beauchemin et al. 2020). Breeding of low emitting animals may \r play an important role and is a  subject under ongoing research \r (Pickering et al. 2015; Jonker et al. 2018; Lopez-Paredes et al. 2020)."


id: a834d77b87a8f0baaf2d569e02052f63
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26810
content:
"Activities, co-benefits, risks and implementation opportunities \r and barriers. Mitigating CH4 emissions from enteric fermentation \r can be direct (i.e., targeting ruminal methanogenesis and emissions \r per animal or unit of feed consumed) or indirect, by increasing \r production efficiency (i.e., reducing emission intensity per unit of \r product). Measures can be classified as those relating to (i) feeding, \r (ii) supplements, additives and vaccines, and (iii) livestock breeding \r and wider husbandry (Jia et al. 2019). Co-benefits include enhanced \r climate change adaptation and increased food security associated \r with improved livestock breeding (Smith et al. 2014). Risks include \r mitigation persistence, ecological impacts associated with improving \r feed quality and supply, or potential toxicity and animal welfare \r issues concerning feed additives. Implementation barriers include \r feeding/administration constraints, the stage of development of \r [...]"


id: 6f6237fd9d226067ddfd5a450203c8a5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16859
content:
"[...] measures, legal restrictions on emerging technologies and negative \r impacts, such as the previously described risks (Smith et al. 2014; Jia \r et al. 2019; P. Smith et al. 2019a)."


id: b783d81f675b72242b9e8da85cd9a06e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
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vector_id: 29494
content:
"Approaches differ regionally, with more focus on direct, technical \r options in Developed Countries, and improved efficiency in \r developing countries (Caro Torres et al. 2016; Mottet et al. 2017b; \r MacLeod et al. 2018; Frank et al. 2018). A recent assessment finds \r greatest economic (up to USD100 tCO2-eq-1) potential (using \r the IPCC AR4 GWP100 value for CH4) for 2020-2050 in Asia and \r the Pacific (32.9 MtCO2-eq yr-1) followed by Developed Countries \r (25.5 MtCO2-eq yr-1) (Roe et al. 2021). Despite numerous country \r and sub-sector specific studies, most of which include cost analysis \r (Hasegawa and Matsuoka 2012; Hoa et al. 2014; Jilani et al. 2015; \r Eory et al. 2015; Pradhan et al. 2017; Pellerin et al. 2017; Ericksen and \r Crane 2018; Habib and Khan 2018; Kashangaki and Ericksen 2018; \r Salmon et al. 2018; Brandt et al. 2019b; Kiggundu et al. 2019; \r Kavanagh et al. 2019; Mosnier et al. 2019; Pradhan et al. 2019; Sapkota \r [...]"


id: 60d1ff9377e94b1f9b7c2f2d81940233
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14333
content:
"[...] et al. 2019; Carroll and Daigneault 2019; Leahy et al. 2019; Dioha and \r Kumar 2020), sectoral assessment of regional technical and notably \r economic (Beach et al. 2015; USEPA 2019) potential is restricted by \r lack comprehensive and comparable data. Therefore, verification of \r regional estimates indicated by global assessments is challenging. \r Feed quality improvement, which may have considerable potential \r in developing countries (Caro et al. 2016; Mottet et al. 2017a), may \r have negative wider impacts. For example, potential land-use change \r and greater emissions associated with production of concentrates \r (Brandt et al. 2019b)."


id: 2235962309c5d8c18bfcc0aed29b35ef
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3238
content:
"Developments since AR5 and IPCC Special Reports (SR1.5, \r SROCC and SRCCL). Since AR5 and the SRCCL, studies on mitigation \r have principally focused on water and nutrient management \r practices with the aim of improving overall sustainability as well as \r measurements of site-specific emissions to help improve the resolution \r of regional estimates. Intensity of emissions show considerable \r spatial and temporal variation, dependent on site specific factors \r including degradation of soil organic matter, management of water \r levels in the field, the types and amount of fertilisers applied, rice \r variety and local cultivation practices. Variation in CH4 emissions have \r been found to range from 0.5-41.8 mg m2\r  hr-1 in South-East Asia \r (Sander et al. 2014; Chidthaisong et al. 2018; Setyanto et al. 2018; \r Sibayan et al. 2018; J. Wang et al. 2018; Maneepitak et al. 2019), \r 0.5-37.0 mg m2\r  hr-1 in Southern and Eastern Asia (Zhang et al. 2010; \r [...]"


id: d07e69285d3777b2ba011c58543f755b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34032
content:
"[...] Wang et al. 2012; Oo et al. 2018; J. Wang et al. 2018; Takakai et al. \r 2020), and 0.5-10.4 mg m2\r  hr-1 in North America (J. Wang et al. 2018). \r Current studies on emissions of N2O also showed high variation in \r the range of 0.13-654 ug/m2\r /hr (Akiyama et al. 2005; Islam et al. \r 2018; Kritee et al. 2018; Zschornack et al. 2018; Oo et al. 2018)."


id: f1fb2e6cb954f31230f0d29fcba6f77c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39962
content:
"Activities, co-benefits, risks and implementation opportunities \r and barriers. Emissions from rice cultivation mainly concern CH4\r associated with anaerobic conditions, although N2O emission also \r occur via nitrification and denitrification processes. Measures to \r reduce CH4 and N2O emissions include (i) improved water management \r (e.g., single drainage and multiple drainage practices), (ii) improved \r residue management, (iii) improved fertiliser application (e.g., using \r slow release fertiliser and nutrient specific application), and (iv) soil \r amendments (including biochar and organic amendments) (Pandey \r et al. 2014; Kim et al. 2017b; Yagi et al. 2020; Sriphirom et al. \r 2020). These measures not only have mitigation potential but can \r improve water use efficiency, reduce overall water use, enhance \r drought adaptation and overall system resilience, improve yield, \r reduce production costs from seed, pesticide, pumping and labour, \r [...]"


id: bd189de8aed289bcb477a310c6b64952
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30522
content:
"[...] increase farm income, and promote sustainable development \r (Quynh and Sander 2015; Yamaguchi et al. 2017; Tran et al. 2018; \r Sriphirom et al. 2019). However, in terms of mitigation of CH4 and \r N2O, antagonistic effects can occur, whereby water management \r can enhance N2O emissions due to creation of alternate wet and dry \r conditions (Sriphirom et al. 2019), with trade-offs between CH4 and \r N2O during the drying period potentially offsetting some mitigation \r benefits. Barriers to adoption may include site-specific limitations \r regarding soil type, percolation and seepage rates or fluctuations \r in precipitation, water canal or irrigation infrastructure, paddy \r surface level and rice field size, and social factors including farmer \r perceptions, pump ownership, and challenges in synchronising water \r management between neighbours and pumping stations (Quynh and \r Sander 2015; Yamaguchi et al. 2017; Yamaguchi et al. 2019)."


id: 366905767bc18de5076f18e3088a2518
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6809
content:
"Recent studies on water management have highlighted the potential \r to mitigate GHG emissions, while also enhancing water use efficiency \r (Tran et al. 2018). A  meta-analysis on multiple drainage systems \r found that Alternative Wetting and Drying (AWD) with irrigation \r management, can reduce CH4 emissions by 20-30% and water use by \r 25.7%, though this resulted in a slight yield reduction (5.4%) (Carrijo \r et al. 2017). Other studies have described improved yields associated \r with AWD (Tran et al. 2018). Water management for both single and \r multiple drainage can (most likely) reduce methane emissions by \r about 35% but increase N2O emissions by about 20% (Yagi et al. \r 2020). However, N2O emissions occur only under dry conditions, \r therefore total reduction in terms of net GWP is approximately \r 30%. Emissions of N2O are higher during dry seasons (Yagi et al. \r 2020) and depend on site specific factors as well as the quantity \r [...]"


id: a45c3329b1aa8422d214ccf133b5476f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26121
content:
"[...] of fertiliser and organic matter inputs into the paddy rice system. \r Variability of N2O emissions from single and multiple drainage can \r range from 0.06-33 kg/ha (Hussain et al. 2015; Kritee et al. 2018). \r AWD in Vietnam was found to reduce both CH4 and N2O emissions \r by 29-30 and 26-27% respectively with the combination of net \r GWP about 30% as compared to continuous flooding (Tran et al. \r 2018). Overall, greatest average economic mitigation potential (up \r to USD100 tCO2-eq-1) between 2020 and 2050 is estimated to be in \r Asia and the Pacific (147.2 MtCO2-eq yr-1) followed by Latin America \r and the Caribbean (8.9 MtCO2-eq yr-1) using the IPCC AR4 GWP100 \r value for CH4 (Roe et al. 2021)."


id: f17ca5545b2dbcfc3a83f8df78c2779b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39871
content:
"7.4.3.6 Crop Nutrient Management\r Activities, co-benefits, risks and implementation opportunities \r and barriers. Improved crop nutrient management can reduce N2O \r emissions from cropland soils. Practices include optimising fertiliser \r application delivery, rates and timing, utilising different fertiliser \r types (i.e., organic manures, composts and synthetic forms), and \r using slow or controlled-released fertilisers or nitrification inhibitors \r (Smith et al. 2014; Griscom et al. 2017; P.  Smith et al. 2019a). In \r addition to individual practices, integrated nutrient management that \r combines crop rotations including intercropping, nitrogen biological \r fixation, reduced tillage, use of cover crops, manure and bio-fertiliser \r application, soil testing and comprehensive nitrogen management \r plans, is suggested as central for optimising fertiliser use, enhancing \r nutrient uptake and potentially reducing N2O emissions (Bationo \r [...]"


id: 1d0676090f48084b54aac61d4f7cde3d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2290
content:
"[...] et al. 2012; Lal et al. 2018; Bolinder et al. 2020; Jensen et al. 2020; \r Namatsheve et al. 2020). Such practices may generate additional \r mitigation by indirectly reducing synthetic fertiliser manufacturing \r requirements and associated emissions, though such mitigation \r is accounted for in the Industry Sector and not considered in this \r chapter. Tailored nutrient management approaches, such as 4R \r nutrient stewardship, are implemented in contrasting farming \r systems and contexts and supported by best management practices \r to balance and match nutrient supply with crop requirements, \r provide greater stability in fertiliser performance and to minimise \r N2O emissions and nutrient losses from fields and farms (Fixen 2020; \r Maaz et al. 2021). Co-benefits of improved nutrient management \r can include enhanced soil quality (notably when manure, crop \r residues or compost is utilised), carbon sequestration in soils and \r [...]"


id: 8904ebc77fe9450a20f3606df9655e58
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21270
content:
"[...] biomass, soil water holding capacity, adaptation capacity, crop \r yields, farm incomes, water quality (from reduced nitrate leaching \r and eutrophication), air quality (from reduced ammonia emissions) \r and in certain cases, it may facilitate land sparing (Sapkota et al. \r 2014; Johnston and Bruulsema 2014; Zhang et al. 2017; P. Smith et al. \r 2019a; Mbow et al. 2019)."


id: fd80c3b8577d36582f93451d5d208a2b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41956
content:
"Developments since AR5 and IPCC Special Reports (SR1.5, \r SROCC and SRCCL). Research since the SRCCL highlights the \r mitigation potential and co-benefits of adopting improved nutrient \r management strategies, notably precision fertiliser application \r methods and nutrient expert systems, and applicability in both \r large-scale mechanised and small-scale systems (USEPA 2019; \r Hijbeek et al. 2019; Griscom et al. 2020; Tian et al. 2020; Aryal et al. \r 2020; Sapkota et al. 2021). Improved crop nutrient management is \r feasible in all regions, but effectiveness is context dependent. Sub\u0002Saharan Africa has one of the lowest global fertiliser consumption \r rates, with increased fertiliser use suggested as necessary to meet \r projected future food requirements (Mueller et al. 2012; ten Berge \r et al. 2019; Adam et al. 2020; Falconnier et al. 2020). Fertiliser use \r in Developed Countries is already high (Figure 7.10) with increased \r [...]"


id: e6563da70ce06a2c472642a96d11b298
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37829
content:
"[...] nutrient use efficiency among the most promising mitigation \r measures (Roe et al. 2019; Hijbeek et al. 2019). Considering that \r Asia and Pacific, and Developed Countries accounted for the greatest \r share of global nitrogen fertiliser use, it is not surprising that these \r regions are estimated to have greatest economic mitigation potential \r (up to USD100 tCO2-eq-1) between 2020 and 2050, at 161.8 and \r 37.1 MtCO2-eq yr-1 respectively (using the IPCC AR4 GWP100 value \r for N2O) (Roe et al. 2021)."


id: 6216ae35cca5fe19881fce265a8ac9fa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14529
content:
"Country specific studies provide insight into regionally applicable \r measures, with emphasis on small-scale anaerobic digestion \r (e.g.,  dome digesters), solid manure coverage and daily manure \r spreading in Asia and the Pacific, and Africa (Hasegawa and Matsuoka \r 2012; Hoa et al. 2014; Jilani et al. 2015; Hasegawa et al. 2016; Pradhan \r et al. 2017; Ericksen and Crane 2018; Pradhan et al. 2019; Kiggundu \r et al. 2019; Dioha and Kumar 2020). Tank/lagoon covers, large-scale \r anaerobic digestion, improved application timing, nitrogen inhibitor \r application to urine patches, soil-liquid separation, reduced livestock \r nitrogen intake, trailing shoe, band or injection slurry spreading and \r acidification are emphasised in Developed Countries (Kaparaju and \r Rintala 2011; Eory et al. 2015; Pape et al. 2016; Jayasundara et al. \r 2016; Pellerin et al. 2017; Liu and Liu 2018; Lanigan et al. 2018; \r Carroll and Daigneault 2019; Eckard and Clark 2020). Using IPCC \r [...]"


id: cb83a15e9c7c1963b5a166985cece533
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33134
content:
"[...] AR4 GWP100 values for CH4 and N2O, a recent assessment finds 69% \r (63.4 MtCO2-eq yr-1) of economic potential (up to USD100 tCO2-eq-1) \r between 2020-2050, to be in Developed Countries (Roe et al. 2021)."


id: e7595e1d9c96aaac13f60679a47d7ece
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37996
content:
"Developments since AR5 and IPCC Special Reports (SR1.5, \r SROCC and SRCCL). Research published since SRCCL broadly \r focuses on measures relevant to intensive or confined systems \r (e.g., (Hunt et al. 2019; Kavanagh et al. 2019; Sokolov et al. 2020; \r Im et al. 2020; Adghim et al. 2020; Mostafa et al. 2020), highlighting \r co-benefits and risks. For example, measures may enhance nutrient \r recovery, fertiliser value (Sefeedpari et al. 2019; Ba et al. 2020; Yao \r et al. 2020) and secondary processes such as biogas production \r (Shin et al. 2019). However, the potential antagonistic relationship \r between GHG and ammonia mitigation and need for appropriate \r management is emphasised (Aguirre-Villegas et al. 2019; Grossi et \r al. 2019; Kupper et al. 2020; Ba et al. 2020). In some circumstances, \r fugitive emissions may reduce the potential mitigation benefits of \r biogas production (Scheutz and Fredenslund 2019; Bakkaloglu et al. \r [...]"


id: ff32ca40d8ba71a7918ee7703d0a7ed3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42303
content:
"[...] 2021), while high implementation cost is identified as an adoption \r barrier, notably of anaerobic digestion (Liu and Liu 2018; Niles and \r Wiltshire 2019; Ndambi et al. 2019; Ackrill and Abdo 2020; Adghim \r et al. 2020). Nitrification inhibitors have been found to be effective \r at reducing N2O emissions from pasture deposited urine (Lopez\u0002Aizpun et al. 2020), although the use of nitrification inhibitors is "


id: 3494eba9f620829666dc707ee8c68ab7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6488
content:
"There is robust evidence and high agreement that agriculture needs to change to facilitate environment conservation while \r maintaining and where appropriate, increase overall production. The SRCCL identified several farming system approaches, deemed \r alternative to conventional systems (Olsson et al. 2019; Mbow et al. 2019; L.G. Smith et al. 2019). These may incorporate several of the \r mitigation measures described in Section 7.4.3, while potentially also delivering environmental co-benefits. This Box assesses evidence \r specifically on the mitigation capacity of some such system approaches. The approaches are not mutually exclusive, may share similar \r principles or practices and can be complimentary. In all cases, mitigation may result from either (i) emission reductions or (ii) enhanced \r carbon sequestration, via combinations of management practices as outlined in Figure 1 within this Box. The approaches will have \r [...]"


id: 5a73fb7c00ead599b40a6acfddc2213d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13170
content:
"[...] pros and cons concerning multiple factors, including mitigation, yield and co-benefits, with trade-offs subject to the diverse contexts \r and ways in which they are implemented."


id: 45d3991f21d699ec4174d857ad31b15b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9505
content:
"There is limited discussion on the mitigation potential of AE (Gliessman 2013; Altieri and Nicholls 2017), but robust evidence that \r AE can improve system resilience and bring multiple co-benefits (Altieri et al. 2015; Mbow et al. 2019; Aguilera et al. 2020; Tittonell \r 2020; Wanger et al. 2020) (AR6 WGII Box 5.10). Limited evidence concerning the mitigation capacity of AE at a system level (Saj \r et al. 2017; Snapp et al. 2021) makes conclusions difficult, yet studies into specific practices that may be incorporated, suggest AE \r may have mitigation potential (medium confidence) (Section 7.4.3). However, AE, that incorporates management practices used in \r organic farming (see below), may result in reduced yields, driving compensatory agricultural production elsewhere. Research into \r GHG mitigation by AE as a system and impacts of wide-scale implementation is required. Despite absence of a universally accepted \r [...]"


id: 8f51b2b1d205c389cf6e014ba2408d2d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22426
content:
"[...] definition (see Annex I), RA is gaining increasing attention and shares principles of AE. Some descriptions include carbon sequestration \r as a specific aim (Elevitch et al. 2018). Few studies have assessed mitigation potential of RA at a system level (e.g., Colley et al. 2020). \r Like AE, it is likely that RA can contribute to mitigation, the extent to which is currently unclear and by its case-specific design, will \r vary (medium confidence)."


id: 5a86e2a7f07808e7ba8ede0dcee2da2b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13181
content:
"OF can be considered a form of AE (Lampkin et al. 2017) though it is discussed separately here as it is guided by specific principles \r and associated regulations (Annex I). OF is perhaps noted more for potential co-benefits, such as enhanced system resilience and \r biodiversity promotion, than mitigation. Several studies have reviewed the emissions footprint of organic compared to conventional \r systems (Mondelaers et al. 2009; Tuomisto et al. 2012; Skinner et al. 2014; Meier et al. 2015; Seufert and Ramankutty 2017; Clark and \r Tilman 2017; Meemken and Qaim 2018; Bellassen et al. 2021). Acknowledging potential assessment limitations (Meier et al. 2015; \r van der Werf et al. 2020), evidence suggests organic production to typically generate lower emissions per unit of area, while emissions \r per unit of product vary and depend on the product (high agreement, medium evidence). OF has been suggested to increase soil \r [...]"


id: 6bb56bdd3f44380b238246a0e92ac7bf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16257
content:
"[...] carbon sequestration (Gattinger et al. 2012), though definitive conclusions are challenging (Leifeld et al. 2013). Fewer studies consider \r impacts of large-scale conversion from conventional to organic production globally. Though context specific (Seufert and Ramankutty \r 2017), OF is reported to typically generate lower yields (Seufert et al. 2012; De Ponti et al. 2012; Kirchmann 2019; Biernat et al. 2020). \r Large-scale conversion, without fundamental changes in food systems and diets (Muller et al. 2017; Theurl et al. 2020), may lead to \r increases in absolute emissions from land-use change, driven by greater land requirements to maintain production (L.G. Smith et al. \r 2019; Leifeld 2016; Meemken and Qaim 2018)."


id: c4278d7e18330a7b6219139f3cb04503
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31796
content:
"The study shows that by 2030 under BAU scenario GHG emissions from the agricultural sector in India would be 515 MtCO2-eq yr-1\r (using GWP100 and IPCC AR4 values) with a technical mitigation potential of 85.5 MtCO2-eq yr-1 through the adoption of various \r mitigation practices. About 80% of the technical mitigation potential could be achieved by adopting cost-saving measures. \r Three mitigation options, for example, efficient use of fertiliser, zero-tillage, and rice-water management, could deliver more than 50% \r of the total technical abatement potential. Under the BAU scenario the projected GHG emissions from major crop and livestock species \r is estimated at 489 MtCO2-eq in 2030, whereas under mitigation scenario GHG emissions are estimated at 410 MtCO2-eq implying \r a technical mitigation option of about 78.67 MtCO2-eq yr-1 (Box 7.6, Figure 1). Major sources of projected emissions under the BAU \r [...]"


id: 825e2012c31280ae24c18aacea7da9ec
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20063
content:
"[...] scenario, in order of importance, were cattle, rice, buffalo, and small ruminants. Although livestock production and rice cultivation \r account for a major share of agricultural emissions, the highest mitigation potential was observed in rice (about 36 MtCO2-eq yr-1) \r followed by buffalo (about 14 MtCO2-eq yr-1), wheat (about 11 MtCO2-eq yr-1) and cattle (about 7 MtCO2-eq yr-1). Crops such as \r cotton and sugarcane each offered mitigation potential of about 5 MtCO2-eq yr-1 while the mitigation potential from small ruminants \r (goat/sheep) was about 2 MtCO2-eq yr-1."


id: ad459decf6d6d59b2dbd4830f64fb8df
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27724
content:
"Sapkota et al. (2019) also estimated the magnitude of GHG savings \r per year through adoption of various mitigation measures, together \r with the total cost and net cost per unit of CO2-eq abated. When \r the additional benefits of increased yield due to adoption of the \r mitigation measures were considered, about 80% of the technical \r mitigation potential (67.5 out of 85.5 MtCO2-eq) could be achieved \r by cost-saving measures. When yield benefits were considered, \r green fodder supplements to ruminant diets were the most cost\u0002effective mitigation measure, followed by vermicomposting \r and improved diet management of small ruminants. Mitigation \r measures such as fertigation and micro-irrigation, various methods \r of restoring degraded land and feed additives in livestock appear \r to be cost-prohibitive, even when considering yield benefits, if \r any. The study accounted for GHG emissions at the farm level \r and excluded emissions arising due to processing, marketing or \r [...]"


id: 2b6ec02d3621829c3372a13af4d73bf6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4890
content:
"[...] consumption post farm-gate. It also did not include emissions \r from feed production, since livestock in India mostly rely on crop \r by-products and concentrates. Further the potential of laser land \r levelling seems exaggerated which may also be redundant with \r already accounted potential from 'improved water management \r in rice'. The mitigation potential of agroecological approaches/\r technologies such as natural farming which is picking up in India in \r recent years has also been overlooked."


id: d6b7b3a5dbbd5a78eebc8406f992b404
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35082
content:
"Increased availability of spatially explicit data and advances in \r the modelling of crop productivity and land use, land carbon \r stocks, hydrology, and ecosystem properties, have enabled more \r comprehensive analyses of factors that influence the contribution of \r bioenergy and BECCS in IAM-based mitigation scenarios, and also \r associated co-benefits and adverse side effects (Turner et al.2018a; \r Wu et al. 2019, Li et al. 2020, Hanssen et al. 2020; Drews et al. 2020; \r Ai et al. 2021; Hasegawa et al. 2021). Yet, IAMs are still coarse in \r local land-use practices. (Daioglou et al. 2019; Wu et al. 2019; \r Moreira et al. 2020b). Literature complementary to IAM studies \r indicate opportunities for integration of biomass production systems \r into agricultural landscapes (e.g.,  agroforestry, double cropping) \r to produce biomass while achieving co-benefits (Section  12.5). \r Similarly, climate-smart forestry puts forward measures (Box  7.3) \r [...]"


id: 9c7da89611c57801fcec3eb4c4d43820
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24783
content:
"[...] adapted to regional circumstances in forest sectors, enabling co\u0002benefits in nature conservation, soil protection, employment and \r income generation, and provision of wood for buildings, bioenergy \r and other bio-based products (Nabuurs et al. 2017)."


id: ca72cc0b7c99944c7c1420ea45d531fa
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vector_id: 32955
content:
"Bioenergy and BECCS can be associated with a range of co-benefits \r and adverse side effects (Smith et al. 2016; Jia et al. 2019; Calvin \r et al. 2021) (Section  12.5). It is difficult to disentangle bioenergy \r development from the overall development in the AFOLU sector \r given its multiple interactions with food, land, and energy systems. It \r is therefore not possible to precisely determine the scale of bioenergy \r and BECCS deployment at which negative impacts outweigh \r benefits. Important uncertainties include governance systems, \r future food and biomaterials demand, land-use practices, energy \r systems development, climate impacts, and time scale considered \r when weighing negative impacts against benefits (Robledo-Abad \r et al. 2017; Turner et al. 2018b; Daioglou et al. 2019; Wu et al. 2019; \r Kalt et al. 2020; Hanssen et al. 2020; Calvin et al. 2021; Cowie et al. \r 2021) (SRCCL, Cross-Chapter Box 7; Box 7.7). The use of municipal \r [...]"


id: e17d920bd8a75e1ca2dce5942658d6ab
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36942
content:
"[...] organic waste, harvest residues, and biomass processing by-products \r as feedstock is commonly considered to have relatively lower risk, \r provided that associated land-use practices are sustainable (Cowie \r et al. 2021). Deployment of dedicated biomass production systems \r can have positive and negative implications on mitigation and \r other sustainability criteria, depending on location and previous \r land use, feedstock, management practice, deployment strategy \r and scale (Rulli et al. 2016; Popp et al. 2017; Daioglou et al. 2017; \r Staples et al. 2017; Carvalho et al. 2017; Humpenoder et al. 2018; \r Fujimori et al. 2019; Hasegawa et al. 2020; Drews et al. 2020; Schulze \r et al. 2020; Stenzel et al. 2020; Mouratiadou et al. 2020; Buchspies et al. \r 2020; Hanssen et al. 2020, IPBES 2019b) (Sections 12.5 and 17.3.3.1)."


id: badc9271784401f4679286452231f6c0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30090
content:
"Studies have also investigated the extent and possible use of \r marginal, abandoned, and degraded lands, and approaches to help \r restore the productive value of these lands (Awasthi et al. 2017; \r Fritsche et al. 2017; Chiaramonti and Panoutsou, 2018; Fernando \r et al. 2018; Elbersen et al. 2019; Rahman et al. 2019; Naess et al. \r 2021). In the SRCCL, the presented range for degraded or abandoned \r land was 32-1400 Mha (Jia et al. 2019). Recent regional assessments \r not included in the SRCCL found up to 69 Mha in EU-28, 185 Mha \r in China, 9.5 Mha in Canada, and 127 Mha in the USA (Emery et al. \r 2017; Liu et al. 2017; Elbersen et al. 2019; Zhang et al.2020; Vera \r et al. 2021). The definitions of marginal/abandoned/degraded land, \r and the methods used to assess such lands remain inconsistent \r across studies (Jiang et al. 2019), causing large variation amongst \r them (Jiang et al. 2021). Furthermore, the availability of such lands \r [...]"


id: 5a0f6e6b91e21eac5a96a08e6706f92f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13091
content:
"[...] has been contested since they may serve other functions, such as: \r subsistence, biodiversity protection, and so on (Baka 2014)."


id: 911089917657fe01c7b2f7c1f929ae80
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22722
content:
"Besides emissions, and possible avoided emissions, related to the supply chain, the GHG effects of using bioenergy depend on: \r (i) change in GHG emissions when bioenergy substitutes another energy source; and (ii) how the associated land use and possible land\u0002use change influence the amount of carbon that is stored in vegetation and (Calvin et al. 2021) soils over time. Studies arrive at varying \r mitigation potentials for bioenergy and BECCS due to the large diversity of bioenergy systems, and varying conditions concerning \r where and how they are deployed (Elshout 2015; Harper et al.2018; Muri 2018; Kalt et al.2019; Brandao et al. 2019; Buchspies et al. \r 2020; Cowie et al. 2021; Calvin et al. 2021). Important factors include feedstock type, land management practice, energy conversion \r efficiency, type of bioenergy product (and possible co-products), emissions intensity of the products being displaced, and the land use/\r [...]"


id: 3080b8792652da459cb6230dc389e3d2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5788
content:
"[...] cover prior to bioenergy deployment (Zhu et al. 2017; Staples et al. 2017; Daioglou et al. 2017; Carvalho et al. 2017; Hanssen et al. \r 2020; Mouratiadou et al. 2020). Studies arrive at contrasting conclusions also when similar bioenergy systems and conditions are \r analysed, due to different methodologies, assumptions, and parametrization (Harper et al.2018; Kalt et al.2019; Brandao et al. 2019; \r Albers et al. 2019; Buchspies et al. 2020; Bessou et al. 2020; Rolls and Forster 2020; Cowie et al. 2021)."


id: 3e7b3b2397b7f37a7128052cd0e7cb42
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8174
content:
"Critical assessment and conclusion. Recent estimates of technical \r biomass potentials constrained by food security and environmental \r considerations fall within previous ranges corresponding to medium \r agreement, (e.g.,  Turner et al. 2018b; Daioglou et al. 2019; Wu \r et al. 2019, Hansen et al.2020; Kalt et al. 2020) arriving at 4-57 \r and 46-245 EJ yr-1 by 2050 for residues and dedicated biomass \r crops, respectively. Based on studies to date, the technical net \r CDR potential of BECCS (including LUC and other supply chain \r emissions, but excluding energy carrier substitution) by 2050 is \r 5.9 (0.5-11.3) GtCO2 yr-1 globally, of which 1.6 (0.5-3.5) GtCO2 yr-1\r is available at below USD100 tCO2\r -1 (medium confidence) (Lenton \r 2010; Koornneef et al. 2012; McLaren 2012; Powell and Lenton 2012; \r Fuss et al. 2018; Turner et al. 2018a; Hanssen et al. 2020; Roe et al. \r 2021) (Figure  7.11). The equivalent economic potential as derived \r [...]"


id: f7e775e7316ffb40e06bb1c3f1fbb9ec
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40991
content:
"a  transition towards more plant-based consumption and reduced \r consumption of animal-based foods, particularly from ruminant \r animals, could reduce pressure on forests and land used for feed, \r support the preservation of biodiversity and planetary health (FAO \r 2018c; Theurl et al. 2020), and contribute to preventing forms of \r malnutrition (i.e.,  undernutrition, micronutrient deficiency, and \r obesity) in developing countries (Section  12.4). Other co-benefits \r include lowering the risk of cardiovascular disease, type 2 diabetes, \r and reducing mortality from diet-related non-communicable diseases \r (Toumpanakis et al. 2018; Satija and Hu 2018; Faber et al. 2020; \r Magkos et al. 2020). However, transition towards sustainable healthy \r diets could have adverse impacts on the economic stability of the \r agricultural sector (MacDiarmid 2013; Aschemann-Witzel 2015; \r Van Loo et al. 2017). Therefore, shifting toward sustainable and \r [...]"


id: 42ef36b8d03d6832746b25c87883d7a1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8970
content:
"[...] healthy diets requires effective food-system oriented reform policies \r that integrate agriculture, health, and environment policies  to \r comprehensively address synergies and conflicts in co-lateral sectors\r (agriculture, trade, health, environment protection etc.) and capture \r spill-over effects, for example, climate change, biodiversity loss, food \r poverty (FAO and WHO 2019; Galli et al. 2020)."


id: 65675676f90856f5a998ea6f6cdf395b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15110
content:
"Regionally, mitigation potentials for shifting towards sustainable \r healthy diets (50% convergence to <60g of meat-based protein, \r only accounting for diverted production) vary across regions. \r A recent assessment finds greatest economic (up to USD100 tCO2\r -1) \r potential for 2020-2050 in Asia and the Pacific (609 MtCO2-eq yr-1) \r followed by Developed Countries (322 MtCO2-eq yr-1) based on \r IPCC AR4 GWP100 values for CH4 and N2O) (Roe et al. 2021). In the \r EU, (Latka et al. 2021) found that moving to healthy diets through \r price incentives could bring about annual reductions of non-CO2\r emissions from agriculture of 12-111 MtCO2-eq yr-1. At the country \r level, recent studies show that following National Dietary Guidelines \r (NDG) would reduce food system GHG emissions by 4-42%, confer \r large health gains (1.0-1.5 million quality-adjusted life-years) and \r lower health care system costs (NZD 14-20 billion) in New Zealand \r [...]"


id: 9a64573599a94daf2db0ee57be67e203
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24405
content:
"[...] Drew et al. (2020); reduce 28% of GHG emissions in Argentina \r Arrieta and Gonzalez (2018); about 25% in Portugal Esteve-Llorens \r et al. (2020) and reduce GHG emissions, land use and blue water \r footprint by 15-60% in Spain (Batlle-Bayer et al. 2020). In contrast, \r Aleksandrowicz et al. (2019) found that meeting healthy dietary \r guidelines in India required increased dietary energy intake overall, \r which slightly increased environmental footprints by about 3-5% \r across GHG emissions, blue and green water footprints and land use."


id: 24feb122cf9a1a7e2b04ab51117c7c72
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3709
content:
"Conclusions from AR5 and IPCC Special Reports (SR1.5, SROCC \r and SRCCL); mitigation potential, costs, and pathways.According \r to the AR5, changes in human diets and consumption patterns can \r reduce emissions 5.3 to 20.2 GtCO2-eq yr-1 by 2050 from diverted \r agricultural production and avoided land-use change (Smith et al. \r 2014). In the SRCCL, a 'contract and converge' model of transition \r to sustainable healthy diets was suggested as an effective approach, \r reducing food consumption in over-consuming populations and \r increasing consumption of some food groups in populations where \r minimum nutritional needs are not met (P. Smith et al. 2019a). The \r total technical mitigation potential of changes in human diets was \r estimated as 0.7-8 GtCO2-eq yr-1 by 2050 (Tilman and Clark 2014; \r Springmann et al. 2016; Hawken 2017) (SRCCL, Chapter 2 and 6), \r ranging from a 50% adoption of healthy diets (<60g of animal-based \r [...]"


id: d3ff37a6eb0bff8af1daa5aa60f7c8b9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34631
content:
"[...] protein) and only accounting for diverted agricultural production, to \r the global adoption of a vegetarian diet."


id: 39330b43b0d55d7253d86510efbee54b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7273
content:
"Critical assessment and conclusion. Shifting to sustainable healthy \r diets has large potential to achieve global GHG mitigation targets as \r well as public health and environmental benefits (high confidence). \r Based on studies to date, there is medium confidence that shifting \r toward sustainable healthy diets has a technical potential including \r savings in the full value chain of 3.6 (0.3-8.0) GtCO2-eq yr-1 of \r which 2.5 (1.5-3.9) GtCO2-eq yr-1 is considered plausible based \r on a range of GWP100 values for CH4 and N2O. When accounting \r for diverted agricultural production only, the feasible potential is \r 1.7 (1-2.7) GtCO2-eq yr-1. A shift to more sustainable and healthy \r diets is generally feasible in many regions (medium confidence). \r However, potential varies across regions as diets are location- and \r community- specific, and thus may be influenced by local production \r practices, technical and financial barriers and associated livelihoods, \r [...]"


id: c0242780b6bfdb5c1002fab578f3084c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31097
content:
"[...] everyday life and behavioural and cultural norms around food \r consumption (Meybeck and Gitz 2017; Creutzig et al. 2018; FAO \r 2018b). Therefore, a  transition towards low-GHG emission diets \r and achieving their mitigation potential requires a  combination \r of appropriate policies, financial and non-financial incentives and \r awareness-raising campaigns to induce changes in consumer \r behaviour with potential synergies between climate objectives, \r health and equity (Rust et al. 2020)."


id: 74590e7c30ddf152a791abfaa6b4bf7f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17703
content:
"Developments since AR5 and IPCC Special Reports (SR1.5, \r SROCC and SRCCL). Since the SRCCL, global studies continue to \r find high mitigation potential from reducing animal-source foods \r and increasing proportions of plant-rich foods in diets. Springmann \r et al. (2018) estimated that diet changes in line with global dietary \r guidelines for total energy intake and consumption of red meat, \r sugar, fruits, and vegetables, could reduce GHG emissions by 29% \r and other environmental impacts by 5-9% compared with the \r baseline in 2050. Poore and Nemecek (2018) revealed that shifting \r towards diets that exclude animal-source food could reduce \r land use by 3.1 billion ha, decrease food-related GHG emissions \r by 6.5 GtCO2-eq yr-1, acidification by 50%, eutrophication by \r 49%, and freshwater withdrawals by 19% for a  2010 reference \r year. Frank et al. (2019) estimated non-CO2 emissions reductions \r of 0.4 GtCO2-eq yr-1 at a  carbon price of USD100 tCO2\r -1 and \r [...]"


id: 5d50cfc7a9d3bd041330611d6a7f8d50
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13700
content:
"[...] 0.6 GtCO2-eq yr-1 at USD20 tCO2\r -1 in 2050 from shifting to lower \r animal-source diets (430 kcal of livestock calorie intake) in developed \r and emerging countries. From a systematic literature review, Ivanova \r et al. (2020) found mitigation potentials of 0.4-2.1 tCO2-eq capita-1"


id: 454c7d9c0d85fa2118487287debbb777
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9416
content:
"2010). Food waste typically takes place at the distribution (retail \r and food service) and consumption stages in the food supply chain \r and refers to food appropriate for human consumption that is \r discarded or left to spoil (HLPE 2014). Options that could reduce FLW \r include: investing in harvesting and post-harvesting technologies in \r developing countries, taxing and other incentives to reduce business \r and consumer-level waste in developed countries, mandatory FLW \r reporting and reduction targets for large food businesses, regulation \r of unfair trading practices, and active marketing of cosmetically \r imperfect products (van Giesen and de Hooge 2019; Sinclair Taylor \r et al. 2019). Other studies suggested providing options of longer\u0002lasting products and behavioural changes (e.g., through information \r provision) that cause dietary and consumption changes and motivate \r consumers to actively make decisions that reduce FLW. Reductions \r [...]"


id: bea09958a40c60b5ac6a13c766d3ccab
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30795
content:
"[...] of FLW along the food chain bring a range of benefits beyond GHG \r mitigation, including reducing environmental stress (e.g., water and \r land competition, land degradation, desertification), safeguarding \r food security, and reducing poverty (Galford et al. 2020; \r Venkatramanan et al. 2020). Additionally, FLW reduction is crucial for \r achieving SDG 12 which calls for ensuring 'sustainable consumption \r and production patterns' through lowering per capita global food \r waste by 50% at the retail and consumer level and reducing food \r losses along food supply chains by 2030. In line with these SDG \r targets, it is estimated that reducing FLW can free up several million \r km2\r  of land (high confidence). The interlinkages between reducing \r FLW and food system sustainability are discussed in Chapter  12. \r Recent literature identifies a  range of barriers to climate change \r mitigation through FLW reduction, which are linked to technological, \r [...]"


id: ad7c3777013725679bdc390d2f3ff76d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27762
content:
"[...] biophysical, socio-economic, financial and cultural contexts at \r regional and local levels (Vogel and Meyer 2018; Gromko and \r Abdurasalova 2019; Rogissart et al. 2019; Blok et al. 2020). Examples \r of these barriers include infrastructural and capacity limitations, \r institutional regulations, financial resources, constraining resources \r (e.g., energy), information gaps (e.g., with retailers), and consumers' \r behaviour (Gromko and Abdurasalova 2019; Blok et al. 2020)."


id: 2467b3dee93e6b7654b0c216d01ad3ba
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3599
content:
"found to be associated with potential emissions reductions ranging \r between 2.6 and 3.6 MtCO2-eq (Wilson et al. 2019). Other studies \r investigated the effect of tax mechanisms, such as 'pay as you \r throw' for household waste, on the mitigation potential of reducing \r FLW.  Generally, these mechanisms are recognised as particularly \r effective in reducing the amount of waste and increasing the \r recycling rate of households (Carattini et al. 2018; Rogissart et al. \r 2019). Technological FWL mitigation opportunities exist throughout \r the food supply chain; post-harvest opportunities for FLW reductions \r are discussed in Chapter  12. Based on IPCC AR4 GWP100 values \r for CH4 and N2O, greatest economic mitigation potential (up to \r USD100 tCO2\r -1) for the period 2020-2050 from FLW reduction is \r estimated to be in Asia and Pacific (192.3 GtCO2-eq yr-1) followed by \r Developed Countries (101.6 GtCO2-eq yr-1) (Roe et al. 2021). These \r [...]"


id: 1ecb88affe20a606fc92b913e6284d92
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2619
content:
"[...] estimates reflect diverted agricultural production and do not capture \r potential from avoided land-use changes."


id: e44453fd390b35e07b50f51084840823
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37458
content:
"Activities, co-benefits, risks and implementation opportunities \r and barriers. The use of wood products refers to the fate of \r harvested wood for material uses and includes two distinctly different \r components affecting the carbon cycle, including carbon storage in \r wood products and material substitution. When harvested wood is \r used for the manufacture of wood products, carbon remains stored \r in these products depending on their end use and lifetime. Carbon \r storage in wood products can be increased through enhancing \r the inflow of products in use, or effectively reducing the outflow \r of the products after use. This can be achieved through additional \r harvest under sustainable management (Pilli et al. 2015; Johnston \r and Radeloff 2019), changing the allocation of harvested wood to \r long-lived wood products or by increasing products' lifetime and \r increasing recycling (Brunet-Navarro et al. 2017; Jasinevicius et al. \r [...]"


id: 6597d29b2e13df7c7f127d83b854c897
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15139
content:
"[...] 2017; Xu et al. 2018; Xie et al. 2021). Material substitution involves \r the use of wood for building, textiles, or other applications instead \r of other materials (e.g.,  concrete or steel, which consume more \r energy to produce) to avoid or reduce emissions associated with the \r production, use and disposal of those products it replaces."


id: f3f6f06e4285f8897a92dbe8471b75a1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40296
content:
"Critical assessment and conclusion. Based on studies to \r date, there is strong evidence and medium agreement that \r the improved use of wood products has a  technical potential \r of 1.0 (0.04-3.7) GtCO2-eq yr-1 and economic potential of \r 0.4  (0.3-0.5) GtCO2-eq yr-1. There is strong evidence and high \r agreement at the product level that material substitution provides \r on average benefits for climate change mitigation as wood products \r are associated with less fossil-based GHG emissions over their \r lifetime compared to products made from emission-intensive and \r non-renewable materials. However, the evidence at the level of \r markets or countries is uncertain and fairly limited for many parts \r of the world. There is medium confidence that material substitution \r and carbon storage in wood products contribute to climate change \r mitigation when also the carbon balances of forest ecosystems are \r considered of sustainably managed large areas of forests in medium \r [...]"


id: 617fd4022419c5dc788143adb7697352
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14450
content:
"[...] term. The total future mitigation potential will depend on the forest \r system considered, the type of wood products that are produced and \r substituted and the assumed production technologies and conversion \r efficiencies of these products."


id: 415e7ec3105ff1f230fffe4937b22a4a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8687
content:
"Developments since AR5 and IPCC Special Reports (SR1.5, \r SROCC and SRCCL). Since the SRCCL, several studies have \r examined the mitigation potential of the enhanced and improved use \r of wood products. A global forest sector modelling study (Johnston \r and Radeloff 2019) estimated that carbon storage in wood products \r represented a  net carbon stock increase of 0.34 GtCO2-eq yr-1\r globally in 2015 and which could provide an average mitigation \r potential (by increasing the HWP pool) of 0.33-0.41 GtCO2-eq yr-1\r for the period 2020-2050, based on the future socio-economic \r development (SSP scenarios) and its effect on the production and \r consumption of wood products. Traded feedstock provided another \r 0.071 GtCO2 yr-1 of carbon storage in 2015 and 0.12 GtCO2 yr-1\r by 2065. These potentials exclude the effect of material substitution. \r Another recent study estimated the global mitigation potential of \r mid-rise urban buildings designed with engineered wood products \r [...]"


id: 69bde7ef14a7ceaa0cffef8dfa440bcd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15871
content:
"[...] at 0.04-3.7 GtCO2 yr-1 (Churkina et al. 2020). Another study (Oliver \r et al. 2014) estimated that using wood to substitute for concrete \r and steel as building materials could provide a technical mitigation \r potential of 0.78-1.73 GtCO2 yr-1 achieved through carbon storage \r in wood products and through material and energy substitution."


id: fdc1f49f08687086874c8901a65193be
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42006
content:
"Land-based mitigation options interact and create various trade\u0002offs, and thus need to be assessed together as well as with \r mitigation options in other sectors, and in combination with other \r sustainability goals (Popp et al. 2014; Obersteiner et al. 2016; \r Roe et al. 2019; Van Vuuren et al. 2019; Prudhomme et al. 2020; \r Strefler et al. 2021). The assessments of individual mitigation \r measures or sectoral estimates used to estimate mitigation \r potential in Section 7.4, when aggregated together, do not account \r for interactions and trade-offs. Integrative land-use models (ILMs) \r combine different land-based mitigation options and are partially \r included in Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) which combine \r insights from various disciplines in a single framework and cover \r the largest sources of anthropogenic GHG emissions from different \r sectors. Over time, ILMs and IAMs have extended their system \r coverage (Johnson et al. 2019). However, the explicit modelling \r [...]"


id: 63805c8e48abe929db4ec28ad3ef0b0a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14800
content:
"[...] and analysis of integrated land-use systems is relatively new \r compared to other sectoral assessments such as the energy system \r (Jia et al. 2019). Consequently, ILMs as well as IAMs differ in their \r portfolio and representation of land-based mitigation options, the \r representation of sustainability goals other than climate action as \r well as the interplay with mitigation in other sectors (van Soest \r et al. 2019; Johnson et al. 2019). These structural differences have \r implications for the regional and global deployment of different \r mitigation options as well as their sustainability impacts."


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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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vector_id: 6769
content:
"As a consequence of the relative novelty of land-based mitigation \r assessment in ILMs and IAMs, the portfolio of land-based mitigation \r options does not cover the full option space as outlined in Section 7.4. \r The inclusion and detail of a  specific mitigation measure differs \r across models. Land-based mitigation options are only partially \r included in ILM and IAM analyses, which mostly rely on afforestation/\r reforestation and bioenergy with CCS (BECCS). Most ILM and IAM \r scenarios are based on the Shared Socio-economic Pathways (SSPs) \r (Riahi et al. 2017), which is a  set of contrasting future scenarios \r widely used in the research community such as in the CMIP6 exercise, \r the SRCCL and the IPBES global assessment. However, the coverage \r of land-based mitigation options in these scenarios is mostly limited \r to dietary changes, higher efficiency in food processing (especially \r in livestock production systems), reduction of food waste, increasing \r [...]"


id: 2cda1eb086981f65e21cb4b16fd11aa3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5158
content:
"[...] agricultural productivity, methane reductions in rice paddies, \r livestock and grazing management for reduced methane emissions \r from enteric fermentation, manure management, improvement of \r N-efficiency, international trade, first generation of biofuels, avoided \r deforestation, afforestation, bioenergy and BECCS (Popp et al. 2017; \r Van Meijl et al. 2018; Frank et al. 2019). Hence, there are mitigation \r options not being broadly included in integrated pathway modelling \r as soil carbon, forest management, agroforestry or wetland "


id: 18edcebfd492fa940ccdb32e3cede925
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1602
content:
"In most of the assessed mitigation pathways, the AFOLU sector is \r of great importance for climate change mitigation as it (i) turns \r from a  source into a  sink of atmospheric CO2 due to large-scale \r afforestation and reforestation, (ii) provides high amounts of biomass \r for bioenergy with or without CCS and (iii), even under improved \r agricultural management, still causes residual non-CO2 emissions \r from agricultural production and (iv) interplays with sustainability \r dimensions other than climate action (Popp et al. 2017; Rogelj \r et al. 2017; Van Vuuren et al. 2018; Frank et al. 2018; Hasegawa \r et al. 2018; van Soest et al. 2019). Regional AFOLU GHG emissions \r in scenarios with <4degC warming in 2100 (scenario category C7), \r as shown in Figure  7.13, are shaped by considerable CH4 and \r N2O emissions throughout 2050 and 2100, mainly from ASIA and \r AFRICA. CH4 emissions from enteric fermentation are largely caused \r [...]"


id: 363111912c379df5ecb8970217bb8759
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6783
content:
"Figure 7.13 | Land-based regional GHG emissions and removals in 2050 (top) and 2100 (bottom) for scenarios from the AR6 Database with <1.5degC (C1, \r C2), <2degC (C3, C4), <3degC (C5, C6) and <4degC (C7) global warming in 2100 (scenario type is indicated by colour). The categories shown include CH4 emissions \r from enteric fermentation (EntF) and rice production (Rice), N2O emissions from animal waste management (AWM) and fertilisation (Soil). The category CO2 Land includes CO2\r emissions from land-use change as well as removals due to afforestation/reforestation. BECCS reflects the CO2 emissions captured from bioenergy use and stored in geological \r deposits. The annual GHG emission data from various models and scenarios is converted to CO2 equivalents using GWP factors of 27 for CH4 and 273 for N2O. The data is \r [...]"


id: 1eddcfcd461fbf57c6cb926ef70d1e63
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2635
content:
"[...] summarised in boxplots (Tukey style), which show the median (vertical line), the interquartile range (IQR box) and the range of values within 1.5 x interquartile range at either \r end of the box (horizontal lines) across all models and scenarios. The number of data points available for each emission category, scenario type, region and year is shown at the \r edge of each panel. Regional definitions: AFRICA = sub-Saharan Africa, ASIA = Asia, LAM = Latin America and Caribbean, MID_EAST = Middle East, OECD90+EU = OECD 90 \r and EU, REF = Reforming Economies of Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union."


id: 19914208341d6033ceecb33acdbf7a20
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1709
content:
"Figure 7.15 | Mitigation of CO2, CH4 and N2O emissions (in CO2-eq yr-1 using IPCC AR6 GWP100 values) from the AFOLU sector for increasing carbon \r price levels for 2030 and 2050. In the left-hand panels, single data points are generated by comparing emissions between a policy scenario and a related benchmark \r scenario, and mapping these differences with the respective carbon price difference. Plots only show the price range of up to 250 USD2010 tCO2-eq-1 and the mitigation range \r between -2000 and 6000 MtCO2-eq yr-1 for better visibility. At the right-hand side, based on the same data as left-hand side panels, boxplots show medians (vertical line \r within the boxes), means (dots), 33%-66% intervals (box) and 10%-90% intervals (horizontal lines). Numbers on the very right indicate the number of observations falling \r [...]"


id: 653bb6ccbc6b419658b18752a9879ae1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15084
content:
"[...] into the respective price range per variable. A wide range of carbon price induced mitigation options (such as technical, structural and behavioural options in the agricultural \r sector, afforestation, reforestation, natural re-growth or avoided deforestation in the LULUCF sector, excluding carbon capture and sequestration from BECCS) are reflected in \r different scenarios."


id: efd4136658ea2e215fb46c67e5954154
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39581
content:
"This approach is close to integrated assessment marginal abatement \r cost curves (MACCs) as described in the literature (Fujimori et al. \r 2016; Frank et al. 2018, 2019; Harmsen et al. 2019) in the sense \r that it incorporates besides the technical mitigation options also \r structural options, as well as behavioural changes and market \r feedbacks. Furthermore, indirect emission changes and interactions \r with other sectors can be highly relevant (Daioglou et al. 2019; Kalt \r et al. 2020) and are also accounted for in the presented potentials. \r Hereby, some sequestration efforts can occur in other sectors, while \r leading to less mitigation in the AFOLU sector. For instance, as an \r integral part of many scenarios, BECCS deployment will lead to \r overall emissions reductions, and even provision of CDR as a result of \r the interplay between three direct components (i) LULUCF emissions/\r sinks, (ii) reduction of fossil fuel use/emissions, (iii) carbon capture \r [...]"


id: 170520b0f810f492566d85504a3e64e6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1270
content:
"[...] and sequestration. Since the latter two effects can compensate for \r the LULUCF effect, BECCS deployment in ambitious stabilisation \r scenarios may lead to reduced sink/increased emissions in LULUCF \r (Kalt et al. 2020). The same holds for trade-offs between carbon \r sequestration in forests versus harvested wood products both for \r enhancing the HWP pool and for material substitution. The strengths \r of the competition between biomass use and carbon sequestration \r will depend on the biomass feedstocks considered (Lauri et al. 2019)."


id: 94bf1da4c05168985f9d8d6531ce23a8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23379
content:
"When compared with the sectoral estimates from Harmsen et al. \r (2019), the integrated assessment median potentials are broadly \r comparable for the N2O mitigation potential; Harmsen et al. \r 2050 mitigation potential at USD125 is 0.6 GtCO2-eq yr-1 while \r the integrated assessment estimate for the same price range is \r 0.7 GtCO2-eq yr-1. The difference is substantially larger for the CH4\r mitigation potential; 0.9 GtCO2-eq yr-1 in Harmsen et al. while \r 2 GtCO2-eq yr-1 the median integrated assessment estimate. While \r the Harmsen et al. MACCs consider only technological mitigation \r options, integrated assessments typically include also demand side \r response to the carbon price and GHG efficiency improvements \r through structural change and international trade. These additional \r mitigation options can represent more than 60% of the total non-CO2\r mitigation potential in the agricultural sector, where they are more \r [...]"


id: bf80aa13e571435495417f65ea50251a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30955
content:
"[...] important in the livestock sector, and thus the difference between \r sectoral and integrated assessments is more pronounced for the CH4\r emissions (Frank et al. 2019)."


id: d4f67d892b6b9276b9bd52345081fff2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34791
content:
"Figure 7.17 | Evolution and breakdown of (a) global land-based GHG emissions and removals and (b) global land-use dynamics under four Illustrative \r Mitigation Pathways, which illustrate the differences in timing and magnitude of land-based mitigation approaches including afforestation and \r BECCS. All pathways are based on different IAM realisations: ModAct scenario (below 3.0degC, C6) from IMAGE 3.0; IMP Neg-2.0 (limit warming to 2degC (>67%), C3) from AIM/\r CGE 2.2; IMP Ren (1.5degC with no or low overshoot, C1) from REMIND-MAgPIE 2.1-4.3; IMP SP (1.5degC with no or low overshoot, C1) from REMIND-MAgPIE 2.1-4.2. In panel \r A the categories CO2 AFOLU, CH4 AFOLU and N2O AFOLU include GHG emissions from land-use change and agricultural land use (including emissions related to bioenergy \r production). In addition, the category CO2 Land includes removals due to afforestation/reforestation. BECCS reflects the CO2 emissions captured from bioenergy use and stored \r [...]"


id: 90f72d026a069b26641ebeb39f600227
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22710
content:
"[...] in geological deposits. CH4 and N2O emissions are converted to CO2-eq using GWP100 factors of 27 and 273 respectively."


id: f27279701bad042434ceed20b9da11af
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40045
content:
"In contrast to IMPs Neg-2.0 and Ren, IMP SP (Soergel et al. 2021; 1.5degC \r with no or low OS, C1) displays a future of generally low resource and \r energy consumption (including healthy diets with low animal-calorie \r shares and low food waste) as well as significant but sustainable \r agricultural intensification in combination with high levels of \r nature protection. This pathway shows a strong near-term decrease \r of CO2 emissions from land-use change, mainly due to reduced \r deforestation, and in difference to all other IMPs described in this \r chapter strongly decreasing N2O and CH4 emissions from agricultural \r production due to improved agricultural management but also based \r on dietary shifts away from emissions-intensive livestock products \r as well as lower shares of food waste. In consequence, comparably \r small amounts of land are needed for land demanding mitigation \r activities such as BECCS and afforestation. In particular, the amount \r [...]"


id: a20c4fb5ad3137333929a95f9d70516
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25748
content:
"[...] of agricultural land converted to bioenergy cropland is smaller \r compared to other mitigation pathways. Forest area increases either \r by regrowth of secondary vegetation following the abandonment \r of agricultural land or by afforestation/reforestation at the cost of \r agricultural land."


id: 58bf3d0d3f17569f1d6183f697a24677
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12855
content:
"The scenario ModAct (limit warming to 3degC (>50%), C6) is based on \r the prolongation of current trends (SSP2) but contains measures to \r strengthen policies for the implementation of National Determined \r Contributions (NDCs) in all sectors including AFOLU (Grassi et al. \r 2018). This pathway shows a strong decrease of CO2 emissions from \r land-use change in 2030, mainly due to reduced deforestation, as well \r as moderately decreasing N2O and CH4 emissions from agricultural \r production due to improved agricultural management and dietary \r shifts away from emissions-intensive livestock products. However, \r in contrast to CO2 emissions, which turn net-negative around 2050 \r due to afforestation/reforestation, CH4 and N2O emissions persist \r throughout the century due to difficulties of eliminating these \r residual emissions based on existing agricultural management \r methods (Frank et al. 2017; Stevanovic et al. 2017). Comparably small \r [...]"


id: 9a403e347ec00caa810896b102e14a83
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24378
content:
"[...] amounts of BECCS are applied by the end of the century. Forest area \r increases at the cost of other natural vegetation."


id: 7ecee8ecc6f1698c8bed27dfa13f1ef0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19462
content:
"IMP-Neg is similar to ModAct scenario in terms of socio-economic \r setting (SSP2) but differs strongly in terms of the mitigation target \r (limit warming to 2degC (>67%), C3) and its strong focus on the supply \r side of mitigation measures with strong reliance on net-negative \r emissions. Consequently, all GHG emission reductions as well as \r afforestation/reforestation and BECCS-based CDR start earlier in \r time at a  higher rate of deployment. However, in contrast to CO2\r emissions, which turn net-negative around 2030 due to afforestation/\r reforestation, CH4 and N2O emissions persist throughout the century, \r similar to ModAct, due to ongoing increasing demand for total \r calories and animal-based commodities (Bodirsky et al. 2020) and \r difficulties of eliminating these residual emissions based on existing \r agricultural management methods (Stevanovic et al. 2017; Frank \r et al. 2017). In addition to abating land-related GHG emissions \r [...]"


id: 206b83a617b8629fd09aa3764d80aba3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2923
content:
"[...] as well as increasing the terrestrial sink, this example also shows \r the potential importance of the land sector in providing biomass \r for BECCS and hence CDR in the energy sector. Cumulative CDR \r (2020-2100) amounts to 502 GtCO2 for BECCS and 121 GtCO2 for \r land-use change (including afforestation and reduced deforestation). \r In consequence, compared to ModAct scenario, competition for \r land is increasing and much more other natural land as well as \r agricultural land (cropland and pasture land) is converted to forest or \r bioenergy cropland with potentially severe consequences for various \r sustainability dimensions such as biodiversity (Hof et al. 2018) and \r food security (Fujimori et al. 2019)."


id: c2db9052757a0eba068e1a38ad8f6ef8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31557
content:
"Since the establishment of the UNFCCC, international agencies, \r countries, sub-national units and NGO's have developed policies to \r facilitate and encourage GHG mitigation within AFOLU (Figure 7.18). \r Early guidance and policies focused on developing GHG inventory \r methodology with some emphasis on afforestation and reforestation \r projects, but the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) in the Kyoto \r Protocol focused attention on emission reduction projects, mostly \r outside of AFOLU. As successive IPCC AR6 WGIII reports illustrated \r large potential for AFOLU mitigation, methods to quantify and \r verify carbon emission reductions emerged within several projects \r in the early 2000s, through both voluntary (e.g.,  the Chicago \r Climate Exchange (CCX)) and regulated (e.g., New South Wales and \r California) markets. The CDM dedicated large attention to LULUCF, \r including dedicated methodologies and bodies. The reasons for \r [...]"


id: d5e8f5e768f5c847d3aa26186812185c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34951
content:
"[...] limited uptake of CDM afforestation/reforestation projects were \r multiple and not limited to the regulatory constraints, but also due to \r the low abatement potential (poor cost/performance ratio) compared \r to other mitigation opportunities."


id: b140abf13a9fea9131fbc261bd4b8924
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28414
content:
"The voluntary market data in Table  7.4 are offsets developed \r under the major standard-setting organisations, and issued from \r 2008-2018 (e.g., Hamrick and Gallant 2018). Note that there is some \r potential for double counting of voluntary offsets that may have \r been transacted in the California compliance market, however this \r would only have applied to transactions of US-issued offsets, and \r the largest share of annual transactions of voluntary AFOLU credits \r occurs with credits generated in Latin America, followed by Africa, \r Asia and North America. Europe and Oceania have few voluntary \r carbon market transactions. Within forestry and agriculture, most \r of the voluntary offsets were generated by forestry projects. Using \r historical transaction data from various Forest Trends reports, the \r offsets generated were valued at USD46.9 million yr-1. Prices for \r voluntary offset transactions in the period 2014-2016 ranged from \r USD4.90 to USD5.40 tCO2\r [...]"


id: 6e906c78754f1e50a62c94a255a059e1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16716
content:
"Canadian provinces have developed a range of policy options that can \r include carbon offsets. Quebec has an emissions trading programme \r that plans to allow forest and agricultural offsets generated within \r the province to be utilised. Alberta also allows offsets to be utilised by \r regulated sectors while British Columbia allows offsets to be utilised \r by the government for its carbon neutrality goals (Government of \r Alberta, 2021). Over 20 countries and regions have adopted explicit \r carbon taxes on carbon emission sources and fossil fuels, however, \r the charges have not been applied to non-CO2 agricultural emissions \r (OECD 2021a). California may implement regulations on methane \r emissions from cattle, however, regulations if approved, will not \r go into effect until 2024. Institutional and trade-related barriers \r (e.g., leakage) likely will limit widespread implementation of taxes \r on emissions in the food sector globally. Many countries exempt \r [...]"


id: 50edb9a6a9c7edb7bb464714abc4b6cf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11518
content:
"[...] purchases of fuels used in agricultural or fishery production from \r fuel or carbon taxes, thus lowering the effective tax rate imposed on \r those sectors (OECD 2021a). Furthermore, bioenergy, produced from \r agricultural products, agricultural waste, and wood is often exempted \r from explicit carbon taxes. Colombia recently implemented a carbon \r tax on liquid fuels but allowed domestically produced forestry credits \r to offset the tax. Colombia also is in the process of developing an \r emissions trading scheme (OECD 2021a)."


id: 1241d8edd0e711610541ec4840e23a57
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 409
content:
"A large literature has investigated whether PES programmes have \r successfully protected habitats. Studies in the USA found limited \r additionality for programmes that encouraged conservation tillage \r practices, but stronger additionality for programmes that encouraged \r set-asides for grasslands or forests (Woodward et al. 2016; Claassen \r et al. 2018), although the set-asides led to estimated leakage of \r 20 up to 100% (Pfaff and Robalino 2017; Kallio et al. 2018; Wu 2000). \r Evidence from the EU similarly suggests that payments for some \r agroenvironmental practices may be additional, while others are not \r (Chabe-Ferret and Subervie 2013). Other studies, in particular in Latin \r America where many PES programmes have been implemented, have \r found a wide range of estimates of effectiveness (e.g., Honey-Roses \r et al. 2011; Robalino and Pfaff 2013; Alix-Garcia et al. 2015; Robalino \r et al. 2015; Mohebalian and Aguilar 2016; Jayachandran et al. 2017; \r [...]"


id: e256b86f14b0c1e5cd2d044e3039e868
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37109
content:
"[...] Borner et al. 2017; Burivalova et al. 2019). Despite concerns, the \r many lessons learned from PES programme implementation provide \r critical information that will help policymakers refine future PES \r programmes to increase their effectiveness (medium confidence)."


id: 8503c63c166d0d0a9cb5b4d06ff724d2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20544
content:
"Agroenvironmental Subsidy Programs/PES.  Climate policy \r for agriculture has developed more slowly than in other sectors \r due to concerns with food security and livelihoods, political \r interests,  and difficulties in coordinating diffuse and diverse \r activities and stakeholders (e.g., nutritional health, rural development, \r and biodiversity conservation) (Leahy et al. 2020). However, a review \r of the National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPAs), National \r Adaptation Plans (NAPs), NAMAs, and NDCs in the Paris Agreement \r suggest an increasing focus of policy makers on agriculture and \r food security. The vast majority of parties to the Paris Agreement \r recognise the significant role of agriculture in supporting a secure \r sustainable development pathway (Richards and VanWey 2015) with \r the inclusion of agriculture mitigation in 103 NDCs from a total of \r 160 NDC submissions. Livestock is the most frequently cited specific \r [...]"


id: 4674c2e58aa8afb0a70f282da48e947c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9608
content:
"[...] agricultural sub-sector, with mitigation activities generally focusing \r on increasing efficiency and productivity."


id: 3d718572e08db88981992532c854abf9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7984
content:
"Agriculture is one of the most subsidised industries globally, especially \r in the European Union and the USA. While subsidy payments over \r the last 20 years have shifted modestly to programmes designed \r to reduce the environmental impact of the agricultural sector, \r only 15-20% of the more than USD700 billion spent globally on \r subsidies are green payments (OECD 2021b). Under the Common \r Agricultural Policy in the EU, up to 30% of the direct payments to \r farmers (Pillar 1) have been green payments (Henderson et al. 2020), \r including some actions that could increase carbon storage or reduce \r emissions. Similarly, at least 30% of the rural development payments \r (Pillar 2) are used for measures that reduce environmental impact, \r including reduction of GHG emissions and carbon storage. There is \r limited evidence that these policies contributed to the 20% reduction \r in GHG emissions from the agricultural sector in the EU between \r [...]"


id: 943efe6c6915af783841c9c4fd4c5d76
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23286
content:
"Many OECD countries have strong legal frameworks that influence \r agricultural and forest management on both public and private land. \r These include for example, legal requirements to protect endangered \r species, implement conservation tillage, protect riparian areas, replant \r forests after harvest, maintain historical species composition, forest \r certification, and other approaches. Increasingly, laws support more \r widespread implementation of nature-based solutions for a  range \r of environmental issues (e.g., see European Commission-EU 2021). \r The extent to which the combined influence of these regulations has \r enhanced carbon storage in ecosystems is not quantified although \r they are likely to explain some of the persistent carbon sink that has \r emerged in temperate forests of OECD countries (high confidence). In \r the least developed and developing countries, regulatory approaches \r face challenges in part because environmental issues are a  lower \r [...]"


id: 5f911f1915f96da83232be3596e13a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14119
content:
"[...] priority than many other socio-economic issues (e.g.,  poverty, \r opportunity, essential services), and weak governance (Mayer \r Pelicice 2019; Walker et al. 2020) (Box 7.2)."


id: c9b1974cdd70bda20aaec6f873b567b4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32808
content:
"Set asides and protected areas have been a widely utilised approach \r for conservation, and according to (FAO 2020d), 726 Mha (18%) of \r forests are in protected areas globally. A review of land sparing and \r land sharing policies in developing countries indicated that most of \r them follow land sparing models, sometimes in combination with \r land sharing approaches. However, there is still no clear evidence of \r which policy provides the best results for ecosystem services provision, \r conservation, and livelihoods (Mertz and Mertens 2017). The literature \r contains a  wide range of results on the effectiveness of protected \r areas to reduce deforestation (Burivalova et al. 2019), with studies \r suggesting that protected areas provide significant protection of \r forests (e.g., Blackman 2015), modest protection (Andam et al. 2008), \r as well as increases in deforestation (Blackman 2015) and possible \r leakage of harvesting to elsewhere (Kallio et al. 2018). An estimate \r [...]"


id: b1d03002b4891fb5ceb9fe7ce21ebb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28503
content:
"[...] of the contributions of protected areas to mitigation between 2000 \r and 2012, showed that in the tropics, PAs reduced carbon emissions \r from deforestation by 4.88 PgC, or around 29%, when compared to the \r expected rates of deforestation (Bebber and Butt 2017). In that study, "


id: 1f6cbc588be1c3bdebb730e18dc54c23
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2730
content:
"Identified lessons. The elements of sustainability are intertwined with Menominee history, culture, spirituality, and ethics. The \r balance between the environment, community, and economy for the short term as well as future generations is an example of \r protecting the entire environment as the Menominee land is a non-fragmented remnant of the prehistoric Lake States forest which \r has been dramatically reduced all around the reserve (Schabel and Pecore 1997). These and other types of community forest owner \r associations exist all over the world. Examples are Sodra in Sweden (with 52,000 forest owners) (Sodra, 2021) or Waldbauernverband \r in North-Rhine Westphalia (with 150,000 forest owners and covering 585,000 ha) (AGDW-The Forest Owners, 2021). These are ways \r for small forest owners to educate, jointly put wood on the market, employ better forest management, use machinery together, and \r [...]"


id: 74c64d384cece9735bda48a7cd14cfdc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17784
content:
"[...] apply certification jointly. In this manner and with all their diversity of goals, they manage to maintain carbon sinks and stocks, while \r preserving biodiversity and producing wood."


id: 9995f3b710d281be6d9b9f3737e7aa0f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"There is evidence that the Amazon Soy Moratorium (ASM), an industry\u0002NGO effort whereby large industry consumers agreed voluntarily not \r to purchase soybeans grown on land deforested after 2006, reduced \r deforestation in the legal Amazon (Nepstad et al. 2014; Gibbs et al. \r 2015). However, recent studies have shown that some deforestation \r from the Amazon was displaced to the Cerrado (Brazilian savannas) \r region (Moffette and Gibbs 2021), which is a  global hotspot for \r biodiversity, and has significant carbon stocks. These results illustrate \r the importance of broadening the scope of supply chain management \r to minimise or eliminate displacement (Lima et al. 2019). In addition, \r while voluntary efforts may improve environmental outcomes for a time, \r it is not clear that they are sufficient to deliver long-term reductions in \r deforestation, given the increases in deforestation that have occurred \r in the Amazon in recent years (Box 7.9). Voluntary efforts would be \r [...]"


id: 82340f7249235d7cc01ed2f30012fe06
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20037
content:
"[...] more effective at slowing deforestation if they present stronger \r linkages to regulatory or other approaches (Lambin et al. 2018)."


id: e635a74ba38f0eafa02e202ef7f87238
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37807
content:
"Combating deforestation was a  theme in several programs, government plans, and projects not being more restricted to the \r environmental agenda. This broader inclusion resulted from a long process of insertion and articulation in the government dating \r back to 2003 while elaborating on the Sustainable Amazon Plan. In May 2003, a historic meeting took place in an Amazonian city, \r with the president of the Republic, state governors, ministers, and various business leaders, civil institutions, and social movements. It \r was presented and approved the document entitled 'Sustainable Amazonia - Guidelines and Priorities of the Ministry of Environment \r for the Sustainable Development of the Amazon Brazilian', containing several guidelines for conservation and sustainable use in the \r region. At the meeting, the Union and some states signed a Cooperation Agreement aiming to elaborate a plan for the Amazon, to be \r [...]"


id: 8d80ba0e00e5349c189d1d0805d70219
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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content:
"[...] widely discussed with the various sectors of the regional and national society (Ministerio do Meio Ambiente, MMA, 2013)."


id: ad1d7d2e3c5c548979dd65d1a0c87c8f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27697
content:
"The PPCDAm had three main lines of action: (i) territorial management and land use; (ii) command and control; and (iii) promotion \r of sustainable practices. During the execution of the 1st and 2nd phases of the PPCDAm (2004-2011), important results in the \r territorial management and land-use component included, for example, the creation of 25 Mha of federal Protected Areas (PAs) \r located mainly in front of the expansion of deforestation, as well as the homologation of 10 Mha of Indigenous Lands. Also, states \r and municipalities created approximately 25 Mha, so that all spheres of government contributed to the expansion of PAs in the \r Brazilian Amazon. In the 'command and control' component, agencies performed hundreds of inspection operations against illegal \r activities (e.g., illegal logging) under strategic planning based on technical and territorial priorities. Besides, there was a significant \r [...]"


id: a95dae97220a0ebb354f5222ac1bb242
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27020
content:
"[...] improvement of the environmental monitoring systems, involving the analysis of satellite images to guide actions on the ground. \r Another policy was the restriction of public credit to enterprises linked to illegal deforestation following a resolution of the Brazilian \r Central Bank (2008) (Ministerio do Meio Ambiente, MMA, 2013). Also, in 2008, Brazil created the Amazon Fund, a REDD+ mechanism \r (Government of Brazil, n.d.)."


id: 19ee2aa30543d9e07889ecb086cb2bb5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1763
content:
"However, alternative statistical approaches have been deployed in the \r literature to assess additionality with a quasi-experimental method that \r rely on developing a counterfactual (e.g., Andam et al. 2008; Blackman \r 2015; Sills et al. 2015; Fortmann et al. 2017; Roopsind et al. 2019). In \r several studies, additionality in avoided deforestation was established \r after the project had been developed by comparing land-use change in \r treated plots where the policy or programme was in effect with land\u0002use change in similar untreated plot. Alternatively, synthetic matching \r statistically compares trends in a  treated region (i.e., a  region with \r a policy) to trends in a region without the policy, and has been applied \r in a region in Brazil (e.g., Sills et al. 2015), and at the country level \r in Guyana (Roopsind et al. 2019). While these analyses establish that \r many projects to reduce deforestation have overcome hurdles related \r [...]"


id: bfd79292a2a4d8b6210ead234ad31f9c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31035
content:
"[...] to additionality (high confidence), there has not been a  systematic \r assessment of the elements of project or programme design that lead \r to high levels of additionality. Such assessment could help developers \r design projects to better meet additionality criteria."


id: 2d7bd414fdd0454980b899b425f5c8a1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5295
content:
"carbon benefits and equity for sustainable development (Martius \r et al. 2016). Around USD0.7 billion yr-1 has been invested in land\u0002based carbon offsets (Table 7.4), but as noted in Streck (2012), there \r is a large funding gap between these efforts and the scale of efforts \r necessary to meet 1.5 or 2.0degC targets outlined in SR1.5. As Box 7.12 \r discusses, forestry actions could achieve up to 5.8 GtCO2 yr-1 with \r costs rising from USD178 billion yr-1 to USD400 billion yr-1 by 2050. \r Over half of this investment is expected to occur in Latin America, \r with 13% in SE Asia and 17% in sub-Saharan Africa (Austin et al. \r 2020). Other studies have suggested that similar sized programmes \r are possible, although they do not quantify total costs (e.g., Griscom \r et al. 2017; Busch et al. 2019). The currently quantified efforts \r to reduce net emissions with forests and agricultural actions are \r helpful, but society will need to quickly ramp up investments to \r [...]"


id: 21fd7ac5f902075adb756f956ae8b2ee
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3206
content:
"[...] achieve carbon sequestration levels consistent with high levels of \r mitigation. Only 2.5% of climate mitigation funding goes to land\u0002based mitigation options, an order of magnitude below the potential \r proportional contribution (Buchner et al. 2015)."


id: d6a5c8bf09aa7de02c0b036f2ecaa527
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35068
content:
"Permanence focuses on the potential for carbon sequestered in \r offsets to be released in the future due to natural or anthropogenic \r disturbances. Most offset registries have strong permanence \r requirements, although they vary in their specific requirements. The \r Verified Carbon Standard (VCS) from the Verra programme requires \r a  pool of additional carbon credits that provides a  buffer against \r inadvertent losses. The Climate Action Reserve (CAR) protocol for \r forests requires carbon to remain on the site for 100 years. The carbon \r on the site will be verified at pre-determined intervals over the life \r of the project. If carbon is diminished on a given site, the credits for \r the site have to be relinquished and the project developer has to use \r credits from their reserve fund (either other projects or purchased \r credits) to make up for the loss. Estimates of leakage in forestry \r projects in AR5 suggest that it can range from 10% to over 90% in \r [...]"


id: 943ea9ddad10e3e820b615ddd5a05994
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23285
content:
"[...] the USA (Murray et al. 2004), and 20-50% in the tropics (Sohngen \r and Brown 2004) for forest set-asides and reduced harvesting. \r Carbon offset protocols have made a  variety of assumptions. The \r Climate Action Reserve (CAR) assumes it is 20% in the USA. One of \r the voluntary protocols (Verra) uses specific information about the \r location of the project to calculate a location specific leakage factor."


id: 9e250742a31d165e5b717cbe8668b136
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25054
content:
"More recent literature has developed explicit estimates of leakage \r based on statistical analysis of carbon projects or programs. The \r literature suggests that there are two economic pathways for leakage \r (e.g.,  (Roopsind et al. 2019), either through a  shift in output price \r that occurs when outputs are affected by the policy or programme \r implementation, as described in (Wear and Murray 2004; Murray et al. \r 2004; Sohngen and Brown 2004; Gan and McCarl 2007), or through \r a shift in input prices and markets, such as for labour or capital, as \r analysed in (Andam et al. 2008; Alix-Garcia et al. 2012; Honey-Roses \r et al. 2011; Fortmann et al. 2017). Estimates of leakage through product \r markets (e.g.,  timber prices) have suggested leakage of up to 90% \r (Sohngen and Brown 2004; Murray et al. 2004; Gan and McCarl 2007; \r Kallio et al. 2018), while studies that consider shifts in input markets are \r considerably smaller. The analysis of leakage for the Guyana programme \r [...]"


id: c90c5b63f3020b1a7899f1c5e49e6d4d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32692
content:
"[...] by Roopsind et al. (2019) revealed no statistically significant leakage in \r Suriname. A key design feature for any programme to reduce leakage \r is to increase incentives for complementary mitigation policies to be \r implemented in areas where leakage may occur. Efforts to continue \r to draw more forests into carbon policy initiatives will reduce leakage \r over time Roopsind et al. (2019), suggesting that if NDCs continue to \r encompass a broader selection of policies, measures and forests over \r time, leakage will decline."


id: c368ce89a7c4343863dc45a5ada8ed9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31651
content:
"Although quantified emission reductions in agricultural projects \r are limited to date, a  number of OECD and economy in transition \r parties have reduced their net emissions through carbon storage \r in cropland soils since 2000. These reductions in emissions have \r typically resulted from policy innovations outside of the climate \r space, or market trends. For example, in the USA, there has been \r widespread adoption of conservation tillage in the last 30 years as \r a labour-saving crop management technique. In Europe, agricultural \r N2O and CH4 emissions have declined due to reductions in nutrient \r inputs and cattle numbers (Henderson et al. 2020). These reductions \r may be attributed to mechanism within the Common Agricultural \r Policy (Section 7.6.2.1), but could also be linked to higher nutrient \r prices in the 2000-2014 period. Other environmental policies \r could play a  role, for example, efforts to reduce water pollution \r [...]"


id: f52c6499a2ca9396599bc53c865ab2c8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40499
content:
"[...] from phosphorus in The Netherlands, may ultimately reduce cattle \r numbers, also lowering CH4 emissions."


id: 50967ad0410bcfde2acf2c46a8b18cbe
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11450
content:
"The agricultural sector throughout the world is influenced by many \r policies that affect production practices, crop choices and land use. \r It is difficult to quantify the effect of these policies on reference \r level GHG emissions from the sector, as well as the cost estimates \r presented in Sections 7.4 and 7.5. The presence of significant subsidy \r programmes intended to improve farmer welfare and rural livelihoods \r makes it more difficult to implement regulatory programmes aimed \r at reducing net emissions in agriculture, however, it may increase \r the potential to implement new subsidy programmes that encourage \r practices aimed at reducing net emissions (medium confidence). \r For instance, in the USA, crop insurance can influence both crop \r choices and land use (Miao et al. 2016; Claassen et al. 2017), both \r of which will affect emission trends. Regulations to limit nutrient \r applications have not been widely considered, however, federal \r [...]"


id: 763cccd34c96a2f86898eac389f711f6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18023
content:
"[...] subsidy programmes have been implemented to encourage farmers \r to conduct nutrient management planning."


id: 45496e88ed56ed1b1dd4e4afd9f17892
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9415
content:
"Total global agricultural land area has remained relatively stable while overall production has increased in recent decades (Section 7.3), \r indicating that agricultural intensification, as judged by production per unit of land (Petersen and Snapp 2015; OECD and FAO 2019) has \r taken place. However, changes in agricultural land use and degradation of natural resources (UNEP 2019; IPBES 2019b) suggests that \r not all of this intensification is sustainable. Although agricultural intensification has led to less GHG emissions compared to a scenario \r where that intensification had not taken place (Burney et al. 2010), absolute agriculture related emissions have continued to increase \r (Section 7.2). Active pursuit of SI was found to be expanding, with implementation on an increasing area, notably in developing \r countries (Pretty et al. 2018), yet regional agricultural area expansion at the expense of native habitat also continues in such regions \r [...]"


id: 403973ba8027db72e8c3ded0487445d3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8490
content:
"[...] (Section 7.3). Although there are specific examples of SI (Box 7.13) global progress in achieving SI is acknowledged as slow (Cassman \r and Grassini 2020) with potentially multiple, context specific geophysical and socio-economic barriers to implementation (Firbank \r et al. 2018; da Silva et al. 2021)."


id: b37d3a3e3dac8014662b7a286c006500
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28818
content:
"A factor that will influence future carbon storage in so-called \r land-based reservoirs involves considering short- and long\u0002term climate benefits, as well as interactions among various natural \r climate solution options. The benefits of various natural climate \r solutions depend on a variety of spatially dependent issues as well as \r institutional factors, including their management status (managed or \r unmanaged systems), their productivity, opportunity costs, technical \r difficulty of implementation, local willingness to consider, property \r rights and institutions, among other factors. Biomass energy, as \r described elsewhere in this chapter and in (Cross-Working Group \r Box  3 in Chapter  12), is a  potential example of an option with \r trade-offs that emerge when policies favour one type of mitigation \r strategy over another. Bioenergy production needs safeguards \r to limit negative impacts on carbon stocks on the land base as is \r [...]"


id: e16a53ae260561b203ff2371f1d33676
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36926
content:
"[...] already in place in the EU Renewable Energy Directive and several \r national schemes in Netherlands, UK and Denmark (Buchholz et al. \r 2016; Khanna et al. 2017; DeCicco and Schlesinger 2018; Favero \r et al. 2020). It is argued that a carbon tax on only fossil fuel derived \r emissions, may lead to massive deployment of bioenergy, although \r the effects of such a  policy can be mitigated when combined \r with policies that encourage sustainable forest management and \r protection of forest carbon stocks as well as forest management \r certification (high confidence) (Nabuurs et al. 2017, Baker et al. 2019 \r and Favero et al. 2020)."


id: 9f816bd34588d0d297f48a41bd97a5b3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25281
content:
"The AR5 and other assessments have acknowledged many barriers \r and opportunities to effective implementation of AFOLU measures. \r Many of these barriers and opportunities focus on the context in \r developing countries, where a  significant portion of the world's \r cost-effective mitigation exists, but where domestic financing for \r implementation is likely to be limited. The SSPs capture some of this \r context, and as a  result, IAMs (Section  7.5) exhibit a  wide range \r of land-use outcomes, as well as mitigation potential. Potential \r mitigation, however, will be influenced by barriers and opportunities \r that are not considered by IAMs or by bottom-up studies reviewed \r here. For example, more efficient food production systems, or \r sustainable intensification within agriculture, and globalised trade \r could enhance the extent of natural ecosystems leading to lower \r GHG emissions from the land system and lower food prices (Popp \r [...]"


id: 5eef6d30b2445a58d58c64840d28479f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13999
content:
"[...] et al. 2017), but this (or any) pathway will create new barriers \r to implementation and encourage new opportunities, negating \r potential benefits (Box 7.11). It is critically important to consider the \r current context in any country."


id: b0d22684ad0b88cbbe49075cf6d07040
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28334
content:
"Design and coverage of financing mechanisms. The lack of \r resources thus far committed to implementing AFOLU mitigation, \r income and access to alternative sources of income in rural households \r that rely on agriculture or forests for their livelihoods remains \r a  considerable barrier to adoption of AFOLU (high confidence). \r Section  7.6.1 illustrates that to date only USD0.7  billion  yr-1 has \r been spent on AFOLU mitigation, well short of the more than \r USD400 billion yr-1 that would be needed to achieve the economic \r potential described in Section  7.4. Despite long-term recognition \r that AFOLU can play an important role in mitigation, the economic \r incentives necessary to achieve AFOLU aspirations as part of the \r Paris Agreement or to maintain temperatures below 2.0degC have not \r emerged. Without quickly ramping up spending, the lack of funding \r to implement projects remains a substantial barrier (high confidence). \r [...]"


id: a93d2146914329b2fa9884a6c4e8c9ae
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26996
content:
"[...] Investments are critically important in the livestock sector, which has \r the highest emissions reduction potential among options because \r actions in the sector influence agriculture specific activities, such \r as enteric fermentation, as well as deforestation (Mayberry et al. \r 2019). In many countries with export-oriented livestock industries, \r livestock farmers control large swaths of forests or re-forestable \r areas. Incentive mechanisms and funding can encourage adoption \r of mitigation strategies, but funding is currently too low to make \r consistent progress."


id: 2aca620c4a028666035abf72d14e13bc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4757
content:
"Financing needs in AFOLU, and in particular in forestry, include both the direct effects of any changes in activities - costs of planting \r or managing trees, net revenues from harvesting, costs of thinning, costs of fire management, and so on - as well as the opportunity \r costs associated with land-use change. Opportunity costs are a critical component of AFOLU finance, and must be included in any \r estimate of the funds necessary to carry out projects. They are largest, as share of total costs, in forestry because they play a prominent \r role in achieving high levels of afforestation, avoided deforestation, and improved forest management. In case of increasing soil \r carbon in croplands through reduced tillage, there are often cost savings associated with increased residues because there is less effort \r tilling, but the carbon effects per hectare are also modest. There could, however, be small opportunity costs in cases where residues \r [...]"


id: cd3e6d87546377db49e56257b305529
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33451
content:
"[...] may otherwise be marketed to a biorefinery. The effect of reduced tillage on yields varies considerably across sites and crop types, but \r tends to enhance yields modestly in the longer-run."


id: f506de5ff20edc0bae9257079c1989fc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40473
content:
"Cultural values and social acceptance. Barriers to adoption \r of AFOLU mitigation will be strongest where historical practices \r represent long-standing traditions (high confidence). Adoption \r of new mitigation practices, however, may proceed quickly if the \r technologies can be shown to improve crop yields, reduce costs, \r or otherwise improve livelihoods (Ranjan 2019). AR6 presents new \r estimates of the mitigation potential for shifts in diets and reductions \r in food waste, but given long-standing dietary traditions within most \r cultures, some of the strongest barriers exist for efforts to change \r diets (medium confidence). Furthermore, the large number of \r undernourished who may benefit from increased calories and meat \r will complicate efforts to change diets. Regulatory or tax approaches \r will face strong resistance, while efforts to use educational \r approaches and voluntary measures have limited potential to slow \r [...]"


id: e5c48eee4a2407dcdd08925754b24766
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37731
content:
"[...] changes in consumption patterns due to free-riders, rebound effects, \r and other limitations. Food loss and waste occurs across the supply \r chain, creating significant challenges to reduce it (FAO 2019c). Where \r food loss occurs in the production stage, in other words, in fields \r at harvest, there may be opportunities to align reductions in food \r waste with improved production efficiency, however, adoption of \r new production methods often requires new investments or changes \r in labour practices, both of which are barriers."


id: aad945c318d0fe7c940eefccca923a68
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27284
content:
"Transparent and accountable governance. Good governance and \r accountability are crucial for implementation of forest and agriculture \r mitigation. Effective nature-based mitigation will require large-scale \r estimation, modelling, monitoring, reporting and verification of \r GHG inventories, mitigation actions, as well as their implications for \r sustainable development goals and their interactions with climate \r change impacts and adaptation. Efforts must be made to integrate \r the accounting from projects to the country level. While global \r datasets have emerged to measure forest loss, at least temporarily \r (e.g.,  Hansen et al. 2013), similar datasets do not yet exist for \r forest degradation and agricultural carbon stocks or fluxes. Most \r developing countries have insufficient capacity to address research \r needs, modelling, monitoring, reporting and data requirements \r (Ravindranath et al. 2017), compromising transparency, accuracy, \r [...]"


id: 78382d4e2faf88445bb02a7fd19af089
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18361
content:
"Availability of land and water. Climate mitigation scenarios \r in the two recent special reports (SR1.5 and SRCCL) that aim to \r limit global temperature increase to 2degC or less involve carbon \r dioxide (CO2) removal from the atmosphere. To support large-scale \r CDR, these scenarios involve significant land-use change, due to \r afforestation/reforestation, avoided deforestation, and deployment \r of biomass energy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS). While \r a considerable amount of land is certainly available for new forests \r or new bioenergy crops, that land has current uses that will affect not \r only the costs, but also the willingness of current users or owners, \r to shift uses. Regions with private property rights and a history of \r market-based transactions may be the most feasible for land-use \r change or land management change to occur. Areas with less secure \r tenure or a land market with fewer transactions in general will likely \r [...]"


id: f89a84d1e916233bc746412b8027ea6e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41103
content:
"[...] face important hurdles that limit the feasibility of implementing \r novel nature-based solutions."


id: 4792dd23240980d3a80fa16950367062
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"The linkage between biodiversity, ecosystem services, human \r well-being and sustainable development is widely acknowledged \r (Millenium Ecosystem Assesment 2005; UNEP 2019). Loss of \r biodiversity and ecosystem services will have an adverse impact on \r quality of life, human well-being and sustainable development (IPBES \r 2019a). Such losses will not only affect current economic growth but \r also impede the capacity for future economic growth.\r Population growth, economic development, urbanisation, technology, \r climate change, global trade and consumption, policy and governance \r are key drivers of global environmental change over recent decades \r (Kram et al. 2014; UNEP 2019; WWF 2020). Changes in biodiversity and \r ecosystem services are mainly driven by habitat loss, climate change, \r invasive species, over-exploitation of natural resources, and pollution \r (Millenium Ecosystem Assesment 2005). The relative importance of \r [...]"


id: 7f4c2da5f20f8154f460ee88e9daac74
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"[...] these drivers varies across biomes, regions, and countries. Climate \r change is expected to be a major driver of biodiversity loss in the \r coming decades, followed by commercial forestry and bioenergy \r production (OECD 2012; UNEP 2019). Population growth along with \r rising incomes and changes in consumption and dietary patterns, will \r exert immense pressure on land and other natural resources (IPCC \r 2019). Current estimates suggest that 75% of the land surface has \r been significantly anthropogenically altered, with 66% of the ocean \r area experiencing increasing cumulative impacts and over 85% \r of wetland area lost (IPBES 2019a). As discussed, in Section  7.3, \r land-use change is driven amongst others by agriculture, forestry \r (logging and fuelwood harvesting), infrastructural development and \r urbanisation, all of which may also generate localised air, water, \r and soil pollution (IPBES 2019a). Over a  third of the world's land \r [...]"


id: 4c1d4c8389d55cbf04c964f566c8ee73
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"[...] surface and nearly three-quarters of available freshwater resources \r are devoted to crop or livestock production (IPBES 2019a). Despite \r a  slight reduction in global agricultural area since 2000, regional \r agricultural area expansion has occurred in Latin America and the \r Caribbean, Africa and the Middle East (FAO 2019c; OECD and FAO \r 2019). The degradation of tropical forests and biodiversity hotspots, \r endangers habitat for many threatened and endemic species, \r and reduces valuable ecosystem services. However, trends vary \r considerably by region. As noted in Section 7.3, global forest area \r declined by roughly 178 Mha between 1990 and 2020 (FAO 2020a), \r though the rate of net forest loss has decreased over the period, \r due to reduced deforestation in some countries and forest gains \r in others. Between 1990 to 2015, forest cover fell by almost 13% \r in South-East Asia, largely due to an increase in timber extraction, \r [...]"


id: 33fedf862515dcd3bf9b746c5c1f8ff1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6393
content:
"[...] large-scale biofuel plantations and expansion of intensive agriculture \r and shrimp farms, whereas in North-East Asia and South Asia it \r increased by 23% and 6% respectively, through policy instruments \r such as joint forest management, payment for ecosystem services, \r and restoration of degraded forests (IPBES 2018b). It is lamenting \r that the area under natural forests which are rich in biodiversity \r and provide diverse ecosystem services decreased by 301 Mha \r between 1990 and 2020, decreasing in most regions except Europe \r and Oceania with largest losses reported in sub-Saharan Africa \r (FAO 2020a). The increasing trend of mining in forest and coastal \r areas, and in river basins for extracting has had significant negative "


id: 6340a66ba888bef3490774860e7e8b82
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14755
content:
"An evaluation of eighteen ecosystem services over the past five \r decades (1970-2019) found only four (agricultural production, \r fish harvest, bioenergy production and harvest of materials) to \r demonstrate increased performance, while the remaining fourteen, \r mostly concerning regulating and non-material contributions, were \r found to be in decline (IPBES 2019a). The value of global agricultural \r output (over USD3.54 trillion in 2018) had increased approximately \r threefold since 1970, and roundwood production (industrial \r roundwood and fuelwood) by 27%, between 1980 to 2018, reaching \r some 4 billion m3\r  in 2018. However, the positive trends in these \r four ecosystem services does not indicate long-term sustainability. \r If increases in agricultural production are realised through forest \r clearance or through increasing energy-intensive inputs, gains are \r likely to be unsustainable in the long run. Similarly, an increase in \r [...]"


id: 4a775d75fb9a2269242cf95e409bbf9f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10344
content:
"[...] fish production may involve overfishing, leading to local species \r declines which also impacts fish prices, fishing revenues, and the \r well-being of coastal and fishing communities (Sumaila and Lam \r 2020). Climate change and other drivers are likely to affect future fish \r catch potential, although impacts will differ across regions (Sumaila \r et al. 2017; Domke et al. 2019)."


id: fc676fb7877e7f192c0b5a71e500a4e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41773
content:
"de Groot et al. 2012; Ninan and Kontoleon 2016). The few studies \r that have assessed the trends in the value of ecosystem services \r provided by different ecosystems across regions and countries \r indicate a  declining trend (Costanza et al. 2014; Kubiszewski \r et al. 2017). Land-use change is a  major driver behind loss of \r biodiversity and ecosystem services in most regions (IPBES 2018b; \r IPBES 2018c, IPBES 2018d, Rice et al. 2018). Projected impacts of \r land-use change and climate change on biodiversity and ecosystem \r services (material and regulating services) between 2015 to 2050 \r were assessed to have relatively less negative impacts under global \r sustainability scenarios as compared to regional competition and \r economic optimism scenarios (IPBES 2019a). The projected impacts \r were based on a  subset of Shared Socio-economic Pathway (SSP) \r scenarios and GHG emissions trajectories (RCP) developed in \r [...]"


id: df98f5385b77521c894d429954750ce7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36588
content:
"[...] support of IPCC assessments. There are synergies, trade-offs and co\u0002benefits between ecosystem services and mitigation options with \r impacts on ecosystem services differing by scale and contexts (high \r confidence). Measures such as conservation agriculture, agroforestry, \r soil and water conservation, afforestation, adoption of silvopastoral \r systems, can help minimise trade-offs between mitigations options \r and ecosystem services (Duguma et al. 2014). Climate-smart \r agriculture (CSA) is being promoted to enable farmers to make \r agriculture more sustainable and adapt to climate change (Box 7.4). \r However, experience with CSA in Africa has not been encouraging. \r For instance, a  study of climate-smart cocoa production in Ghana \r shows that due to lack of tenure (tree) rights, bureaucratic and legal \r hurdles in registering trees in cocoa farms, and other barriers small \r cocoa producers could not realise the project benefits (Box  7.13). \r [...]"


id: 61b1bbe20abffdaa36b65df0c29bd1bf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14478
content:
"[...] Experience of CSA in some other sub-Saharan African countries and \r other countries such as Belize too has been constrained by weak \r extension systems and policy implementation, and other barriers \r (Arakelyan et al. 2017; Kongsager 2017)."


id: e9097ae2e6fd34d677bae8b7cc4d0a69
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38355
content:
"1997), such as ignoring ecological feedbacks and non-linearities that \r are central to the processes that link all species to each other and their \r habitats, ignoring substitution effects may also apply to the global \r assessment (Smith 1997; Bockstael et al. 2000; Loomis et al. 2000). \r Land degradation has had a pronounced impact on ecosystem functions \r worldwide (IPBES 2018e). Net primary productivity of ecosystem \r biomass and of agriculture is presently lower than it would have been \r under a natural state on 23% of the global terrestrial area, amounting \r to a  5% reduction in total global net primary productivity (IPBES \r 2018e). Over the past two centuries, soil organic carbon, an indicator \r of soil health, has seen an estimated 8% loss globally (176 GtC) from \r land conversion and unsustainable land management practices (IPBES \r 2018e). Projections to 2050 predict further losses of 36 GtC from soils, \r particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. These losses are projected to come \r [...]"


id: 8ca4dc03f819cb430d6d594712df74b3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21929
content:
"[...] from the expansion of agricultural land into natural areas (16 GtC), \r degradation due to inappropriate land management (11 GtC) and the \r draining and burning of peatlands (9 GtC) and melting of permafrost\r (IPBES 2018e). Trends in biodiversity measured by the global living \r planet index between 1970 to 2016 indicate a  68% decline in \r monitored population of mammals, birds, amphibians, reptiles, and \r fish (WWF 2020). FAO's recent report on the state of the world's \r biodiversity for food and agriculture points to an alarming decline in \r biodiversity for food and agriculture including associated biodiversity \r such as pollination services, microorganisms which are essential for \r production systems (FAO 2019d). These suggest that overall ecosystem \r health is consistently declining with adverse consequences for good \r quality of life, human well-being, and sustainable development."


id: 7059f3abdbc017a127aafd62bfe1844c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17022
content:
"The climate-smart cocoa (CSC) production programme in Ghana involved distributing shade tree seedlings that can protect cocoa \r plants from heat and water stress, enhance soil organic matter and water holding capacity of soils, and provide other assistance with \r agroforestry, giving access to extension services such as agronomic information and agrochemical inputs. The shade tree seedlings \r were distributed by NGOs, government extension agencies, and the private sector free of charge or at subsidised prices and was \r expected to reduce pressure on forests for growing cocoa plants. The CSC programme was mainly targeted at small farmers who \r constitute about 80% of total farm holdings in Ghana. Although the government extension agency (Cocobod) undertook mass spraying \r or pruning of cocoa farms they found it difficult to access the 800,000 cocoa smallholders spread across the tropical south of the \r [...]"


id: 4d404e63c8acd2baf398426ff3a7e23a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10871
content:
"[...] country. The project brought all stakeholders together, in other words, the government, private sector, local farmers and civil society or \r NGOs to facilitate the sustainable intensification of cocoa production in Ghana. Creation of a community-based governance structure \r was expected to promote benefit sharing, forest conservation, adaptation to climate change, and enhanced livelihood opportunities."


id: 27950a4448f3d9a2ecbe4a2e84a80300
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4143
content:
"The policy intervention overlooks the institutional constraints characteristic of the cocoa sector in Ghana where small farmers are \r dominant and have skewed access to resources and markets. Lack of secure tenure (tree rights) where the ownership of shade trees \r and timber vests with the state, bureaucratic and legal hurdles to register trees in their cocoa farms are major constraints that impede \r realisation of the expected benefits of the CSC programme. This is a great disincentive for small cocoa producers to implement CSC \r initiatives and nurture the shade tree seedlings and undertake land improvement measures. The state marketing board has the \r monopoly in buying and marketing of cocoa beans including exports which impeded CREMAs or farming communities from directly \r selling their produce to MNCs and traders. However, many MNCs have been involved in setting up of CREMA or similar structures, \r [...]"


id: 781dd184d5e7df59ed297acb07990bfc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18343
content:
"[...] extending premium prices and non-monetary benefits (access to credit, shade tree seedlings, agrochemicals) thus indirectly securing \r their cocoa supply chains. A biased ecological discourse about the benefits of climate-smart agriculture and sustainable intensive \r narrative, complexities regarding the optimal shade levels for growing cocoa, and dependence on agrochemicals are issues that affect \r the success and sustainability of the project intervention. Dominance of private sector players especially MNCs in the sector may be \r detrimental to the interests of smallholder cocoa producers (Nasser et al. 2020)."


id: 16f7f0c321fe38f9900cd7c3433707cb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1260
content:
"Conservation of biodiversity and ecosystem services is part of the \r larger objective of building climate resilience and promoting good \r quality of life, human well-being and sustainable development. \r While two of the 17 SDGs directly relate to nature (SDGs 14 and 15 \r covering marine and terrestrial ecosystems and biodiversity), most \r other SDGs relating to poverty, hunger, inequality, health and well\u0002being, clean sanitation and water, energy, and so on, are directly or \r indirectly linked to nature (Blicharska et al. 2019). A survey among \r experts to assess how 16 ecosystem services could help in achieving \r the SDGs relating to good environment and human well-being \r suggested that ecosystem services could contribute to achieving \r about 41 targets across 12 SDGs (Wood et al. 2018). They also \r indicated cross-target interactions and synergetic outcomes across \r many SDGs. Conservation of biodiversity and ecosystem services \r [...]"


id: 9cd2a17a41754542333ca8db1f863b9d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24828
content:
"[...] is critical to sustaining the well-being and livelihoods of poor and \r marginalised people, and indigenous communities who depend on \r natural resources (high confidence). Nature provides a broad array of \r goods and services that are critical to good quality of life and human \r well-being. Healthy and diverse ecosystems can play an important \r role in reducing vulnerability and building resilience to disasters \r and extreme weather events (SCBD 2009; The Royal Society Science \r Policy Centre 2014; Ninan and Inoue 2017)."


