# document

id: 643dfe22ef80ff8940ff14df5c9101e9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14920
content:
"There is an urgency and demand to meet the financial needs of the \r\nclimate change actions not only at the national level but also at \r\nthe  subnational level, to achieve low-carbon and climate-resilient \r\ncities and communities (high confidence) (Barnard 2015; Moro \r\net al. 2018). Scaling up subnational climate finance and investment \r\nis a necessary condition to achieve climate change mitigation and \r\nadaptation action (Ahmad et al. 2019)."


id: c50bc8562a41640c6205932b2ca7be69
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31979
content:
"In the literature, there are two attempts at systematic evaluation \r\nor comprehensive assessment of regional climate risk pools: \r\na  comprehensive study by Scherer (2017) and FCDO's ten-year \r\nevaluation (2015-2024). Overall, neither of these studies draw \r\nadverse conclusions about regional climate risk pooling initiatives/\r\nmechanisms. According to Scherer, 'it appears that insurances work \r\nin principle and there is certainly success' and 'initial experiences \r\ndemonstrate regional climate risk insurances works'. The author \r\ncited the 28 pay-outs to 16 countries of USD106 million arguing that \r\nit provides cash-starved countries with much needed cash (Scherer \r\n2017, p. 4). The FCDO study (Scott 2017) examines the uptake of "


id: 417122ef6864b78206a2883c7d1b4fc8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8702
content:
"The importance of exploring effective subnational climate \r\nfinance. Stronger subnational climate action is indispensable to \r\nadapt cities to build more sustainable, climate-positive communities \r\n(Kuramochi et  al. 2020). It has transformative potential as a  key \r\nenabler of inclusive urban economic development through the \r\nbuilding of resilient communities (high confidence) (Floater et  al. \r\n2017a; Colenbrander et  al. 2018b; Ahmad et  al. 2019). Yet the \r\nsignificant potential of subnational climate finance mechanisms \r\nremains unfulfilled. Policy frameworks, governance, and choices at "


id: e830e0e08661080f9ee0cb3efe860cd3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38179
content:
"along with regulation and standards on negative externalities, such \r\nas pollution, to steer investment towards climate financing (World \r\nBank Group 2019)."


id: b51575441f843881343177567d691fa3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29094
content:
"higher levels underpin subnational climate investments (Colenbrander \r\net al. 2018b; Hadfield and Cook 2019). To scale climate investment, \r\na systematicunderstanding of the preconditions to mobilising high\u0002potential financing instruments at the national and subnational \r\nlevels is necessary."


id: a4a00b1c515dc7f3d78512ef165a904c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26180
content:
"Debt financing via subnational bonds and borrowing, including \r\nmunicipal bonds, is another potential tool for raising upfront capital, \r\nespecially for rich cities (high confidence). The share of subnational, \r\nsub-sovereign, and sovereign bonds could grow over time, given \r\nefforts to expand the creditworthiness and ensure a  sufficient \r\nsupply of own-source revenue to reduce the default risk. As of now, \r\nsubnational and sub-sovereign bonds are constrained by public \r\nfinance limits and the fiscal capacities of governments. However, \r\nwhile green bonds have potential for growth at the subnational level \r\nand may result in a lower cost of capital in some cases, the market \r\nfaces challenges related to scaling up and has been associated with \r\nlimited measurable environmental impact to date (Section 15.6.8). \r\nFurther, bonds with lower credit ratings drive higher issuance costs \r\nfor climate risk cities, for example, costs related to disclosure and \r\nreporting (Painter 2020)."


id: eeb07867cfa4173ae8a1f985b4889cd0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39373
content:
"Subnational climate finance needs and flows. Subnational \r\nclimate finance covers financing mechanisms reaching or utilising \r\nsubnational actors to develop climate positive investment in urban \r\nareas. The fragility of interconnected national and subnational \r\nfinances affects subnational finance flows, including the impact \r\nof the social-economic crisis (Canuto and Liu 2010; Ahrend et  al. \r\n2013). The effect of deficit in investment for global infrastructure \r\ntowards the growing subnational-level debt also creates pressure on \r\nsubnational finances and constrains future access to financing (high \r\nconfidence) (Smoke 2019)."


id: b0acc0cdc1034f6eb639659fd9876042
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28310
content:
"The International Finance Corporation estimates a  cumulative \r\nclimate investment opportunity of USD29.4 trillion across six urban \r\nsectors (waste, renewable energy, public transportation, water, EVs, \r\nand green buildings) in emerging market cities, cities in developing \r\ncountries with more than 500,000 population, to 2030 (IFC 2018). \r\nHowever, the State of Cities Climate Finance report estimated that \r\nan average of USD384 billion was invested in urban climate finance \r\nannually in 2017-2018 (Negreiros et  al. 2021). The International \r\nInstitute for Environment and Development estimates that out of the \r\nUSD17.4 billion total investments in climate finance, less than 10% \r\n(USD1.5 billion) was approved for locally-focused climate change \r\nprojects between 2003 and 2016 (Soanes et al. 2017)."


id: abc9a986e737486b829d6833bb95fbd0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
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content:
"Key challenges of subnational climate finance. Across all types \r\nof cities, five key challenges constrain the flow of subnational climate \r\nfinance (high confidence): (i) difficulties in mobilising and scaling\u0002up private financing (Granoff et  al. 2016); (ii) deficient existing \r\narchitecture in providing investment on the scale and with the \r\ncharacteristics needed (Anguelovski and Carmin 2011; Brugmann \r\n2012); (iii) political-economic uncertainties, primarily related to \r\ninnovation and lock-in barriers that increase investment risks (Unruh \r\n2002; Cook and Chu 2018; White and Wahba 2019); (iv) the deficit in \r\ninvestment for global infrastructure affects the growing subnational\u0002level debt (Canuto and Liu 2010); and (v) insufficient positive value \r\ncapture (Foxon et al. 2015)."


id: d723a89d982b8a177d77ae44a8fe8976
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"Subnational climate public and private finance. Urban climate \r\nfinance and investment are prominent in the subnational \r\nclimate  finance landscape (CCFLA 2015; Buchner et  al. 2019). \r\nFinance mechanisms that can support climate investment for the \r\nurban sector include public-private partnerships (PPPs); international \r\nfinance; national investment vehicles; pricing, regulation, standards; \r\nland value capture; debt finance; and fiscal decentralisation (Granoff \r\net al. 2016; Floater et al. 2017b; Gorelick 2018; White and Wahba \r\n2019). Among these mechanisms, PPPs, debt finance, and land value \r\ncapture have the potential to mobilise private finance (Ahmad et al. \r\n2019). Better standardisation in processes is needed, including those \r\nbearing on contracts and regulatory arrangement, to reflect local \r\nspecificities (Bayliss and Van Waeyenberge 2018) (Section 15.6.1.1)."


id: 9babf83f9ee529c207c74b6f7feff12f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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"PPPs are particularly important in cities with mature financial systems \r\nas the effectiveness of PPPs depends on appropriate investment \r\narchitecture at scale and government capacity (high confidence). Such \r\ncities can enable infrastructure such as renewable energy production \r\nand distribution, water networks, and building developments to \r\ngenerate consumer revenue streams that incentivise private investors \r\nto purchase equity as a long-term investment (Floater et al. 2017b)."


id: 61eceb5542f8e33860806568da47a45
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
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vector_id: 14503
content:
"National-level investment vehicles can provide leadership for \r\nsubnational climate financing and crowd in private finance by \r\nproviding early-stage market support to technologies or evidence \r\nrelated to asset performance and costs-benefits (high confidence). \r\nThe use of carbon pricing is increasing at the subnational level "


id: 6673f5e436e8175a89b6cb70aa0da8dc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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"The depth and character of the local capital market also affect \r\ncities differently in generating bonds (high confidence). Challenges "


id: 30cf51b5239931ab16780e579f18cae8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
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"facing cities in developing countries include insufficient appropriate \r\ninstitutional arrangements, the issues of minimum size, and high \r\ntransaction costs associated with green bonds (Banga 2019). \r\nGreen projects and project pipelines are generally smaller in scale \r\nfeasible for a bond market transaction (Saha and D'Almeida 2017; \r\nDFID 2020). De-risking in the different phases of long-term project \r\nfinancing can be promoted to improve the appetite of capital markets \r\n(Section in 15.6.7)."


id: b2611a03be58c232e36df97043db51eb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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vector_id: 28619
content:
"are not necessarily 'new' in terms of financial design but are \r\npackaged or labelled in an innovative way to attract responsible and \r\nimpact-oriented institutional investors."


id: 540460d5892d46110ea75c1d09dc0660
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"The growth and diversity of the green bond market illustrates how \r\ninnovative financial products can attract both public and private \r\ninvestors (high confidence). Demand for green financial products \r\ninitially stemmed from public sector pension funds. Pension funds and \r\ninsurance companies in OECD countries have traditionally favoured \r\nbonds as an asset class with lower risk (OECD and Bloomberg 2015)."


id: e2bc11ef0070d2a1e30663fd6496103d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37193
content:
"Since AR5, labelled green bonds have grown significantly, exceeding \r\nUSD290 billion issued in 2020 with a  total of USD1.1 trillion in \r\noutstanding bonds (CBI 2021a) (Section 15.6.7). Corporates, financial \r\ninstitutions and government-backed entities (for example in real \r\nestate, retail, manufacturing, energy utilities) issued the largest \r\nvolumes, with use of proceeds focused primarily on GHG mitigation \r\nin energy, buildings and transport projects (CBI 2021a). Given \r\ntheir focus on GHG mitigation, green bonds are also sometimes \r\nreferred to as climate bonds, but the common market terminology \r\nis 'green'. Municipal green bond issuance has also been growing \r\n(Section  15.6.7). Beyond green bonds, additional products such as \r\ngreen loans, green commercial paper, green initial public offerings \r\n(IPOs), green commodities, and sustainability-linked bonds and loans \r\nhave also been introduced in the market (CBI 2019a) (Section 15.6.7)."


id: f0f2ced34c6e73666de33c9e4b8b691a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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"Investor demand for green bonds is evidenced by over-subscription \r\nof deals. Recent studies indicate an over-subscription for green\u0002labelled bonds by an average of between three and five times, as \r\ncompared to non-labelled bonds (Gore and Berrospi 2019; Nauman \r\n2020). Results of a  survey of global treasurers showed a  higher \r\ndemand for green bonds than non-labelled bonds for 70% of the \r\nrespondents (CBI 2020a)."


id: bcadb616012598d9225dcd41a84602a5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
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vector_id: 30442
content:
"Implications for the transformation pathway. Cities often have \r\ncapacity constraints on planning and preparing capital investment \r\nplans. Integrated urban capital investment planning is an option \r\nto develop cross-sectoral solutions that reduce investment needs, \r\nboost coordination capacity, and increase climate-smart impacts \r\n(high confidence) (Negreiros et  al. 2021). In countries with weak \r\nand poorly functioning intergovernmental systems, alliances and \r\nnetworks may influence their organisational ability to translate \r\nadaptive capacity for transformation into actions (Leck and Roberts \r\n2015; Colenbrander et  al. 2018a). Deepening understanding of \r\ncountry-specific enabling environment for mobilising urban climate \r\nfinance among and within cities and communities, design of policy, \r\ninstitutional practices and intergovernmental systems are needed to \r\nreduce negative implications of transformation (Steele et al. 2015)."


id: 285f297254a580a4a62a7abceb110c92
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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"The financial crisis associated with COVID-19 has put increased \r\npressure on debt issuers, and the extent to which the increase in \r\nindebtedness for sovereigns and corporates has been financed via \r\nclimate-related-labelled debt products is not known. Further, at this \r\ntime there is no identified literature assessing the degree to which \r\ninternational versus domestic investors are financing sovereign \r\ngreen debt in developing countries (Section 15.6.7) However, since \r\nthe onset of the COVID-19 crisis, continued steady growth in issuance \r\nhas been observed broadly across sustainable bonds (including \r\ngreen, social and sustainability bonds), with more significant growth \r\nin social bonds to support the COVID-19 recovery (Maltais and \r\nNykvist 2020; CBI 2021a)."


id: 3d05b02d58b7ba2e59c085b3086d7926
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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"Innovative financial products with increased transparency on \r\nclimate risk have attracted investor demand, and can facilitate \r\ninvestor identification of low-carbon investments (high confidence). \r\nInnovative products may not necessarily increase financial flows \r\nfor climate solutions in the near term, however they can help build \r\ncapacity on climate risk and opportunities within institutions and \r\ncompanies to pave the way for increased flows over time."


id: a1cd2a1e00c9021bdbbf16ba87419beb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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vector_id: 25686
content:
"Index providers and exchanges can also play a  supporting role in \r\ntransparency for identification of benchmarks and innovative financial \r\nproducts for climate action. Low-carbon indices have proliferated in \r\nrecent years, with varying approaches including reduced exposure \r\nto fossil, best-in-class performers within a sector, and fossil-free (UN \r\nPRI 2018) (see discussion on ESG index performance that follows \r\nin this section). Indices can provide transparency on low-carbon \r\nopportunities, making it simpler for funds and investors to identify \r\ngreen investment options. Exchanges can also play a  supporting \r\nrole to the uptake of green financial products through transparent "


id: a1f4244fcdbfab8ad01a449d0a8f1b4f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"Investor demand is driving developments in innovative \r\nfinancial products (high confidence). Since AR5, innovative \r\nfinancial products such as sustainability and green-labelled financial \r\nproducts have proliferated (Section 15.3). These financial products "


id: c93d0fea84b3c4d0d526b03ae4cb8e8d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"for example with respect to transition activities (Pfaff et  al. 2021) \r\n(Section 15.6.7). While standardisation can help reduce uncertainty \r\nin markets with imperfect knowledge, the green bond market is \r\ncurrently developing and is expected to continue to reflect regional \r\ndifferences in economic governance approaches (Nedopil et al. 2021). \r\nRegulations may also have trade-offs in terms of transaction costs for \r\ngreen financial product issuers. Classification approaches can also \r\nface challenges, depending on how they are designed, in their ability \r\nto capture new technologies and social impacts (Section 15.4)."


id: b510ef634cb6bc0a07373605cd76cc32
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"listings and requirements to improve credibility of green labelling. \r\nThe number of green or sustainability bond listing segments tripled \r\nfrom five in 2016 to 15 in 2018 (SSE 2018). Green security listings \r\ncan also be used to enhance local capital markets (Section 15.6.7)."


id: 7f260db7ddcd2badef504e81040de36b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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"Significant potential exists for continued growth in innovative \r\nfinancial products, though some challenges remain (high \r\nconfidence). Despite recent growth and diversification, green bonds \r\nface several challenges in scaling up. Issuance of green-labelled \r\nbonds constitutes approximately 1% of the global bond market \r\nissuance (ICMA 2020b; CBI 2021a) Potential exists to increase \r\nissuance amongst corporates, for instance, and across a  broader \r\nregional scope (although subject to limitations of local capital \r\nmarkets). Yet there remain several challenges to growing the green \r\nbond market, including inter alia concerns about greenwashing and \r\nlimitations in application to developing countries (Shishlov et  al. \r\n2018; Banga 2019)."


id: 39d457638a69a54930f38929978cd12f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"Green bonds have been primarily targeting climate mitigation projects, \r\nwith far fewer projects identified as adaptation. Green bonds mainly \r\nfinance projects in the energy, buildings and transportation sectors, \r\nwhich constituted 85% of the use of proceeds of green bonds in \r\n2020 (CBI 2020b, 2021a). Agriculture and forestry projects, including \r\nadaptation projects, have been less suited to be financed in a bond \r\nstructure, which could be in part due to the more dispersed and \r\nsmaller nature of the projects and in part due to project 'bankability' \r\nor ability to contribute steady streams of financing to pay back the \r\nterms of a bond. However, adaptation projects may not be identified \r\nas such as resiliency becomes more mainstreamed into infrastructure \r\nplanning (Section 15.3.2)."


id: 157755c1cfa26c0cb5534391ceb4fda5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"There is no globally accepted definition of green bonds, and varied \r\ndefinitions of eligible green activities are evolving across regional \r\nbond markets. Beyond the most commonly used green label, other \r\nrelated labels such as blue, sustainable, transition, sustainable \r\ndevelopment goal (SDG), social and environmental, social and \r\ngovernance (ESG) have some overlapping applications (Schumacher \r\n2020). The degree to which these labels represent climate-relevant \r\ninvestments depends on underlying criteria and how they are applied \r\n(Section 15.6.4)."


id: 7f350a487ad67ffc23ec98e729734729
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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"While green bonds have the potential to further support financial \r\nflows to developing countries, local capital markets can be at varying \r\nstages of development (Banga 2019) (Sections 15.6.2 and 15.6.7). \r\nWhile multilateral and bilateral development finance institutions \r\nhave been active in the green bond market, global issuance in \r\n2020 in the top 10 countries included only one developing country \r\n(CBI 2021a). Targeting international investors can be enhanced via \r\nde-risking activities (15.6.4)."


id: 54cb80cc1af549b09ac411d1f7f6d41d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"Identifying green financial products can increase uptake and \r\nmay result in a lower cost of capital in certain parts of the \r\nmarket (high confidence). Investors face a systematic underpricing \r\nof climate risk in financial markets (Krogstrup and Oman 2019; \r\nKumar et al. 2019). Transparent identification of financial products \r\ncan make it easier for investors to include low-carbon products in \r\ntheir portfolios. Investors with mandates that include or are focused \r\non climate change are showing an interest in green-labelled financial \r\nproducts. Investors that identify themselves as green constitute \r\napproximately 53% of the investor base for green bonds in the first \r\nhalf of 2019 (CBI 2019b)."


id: afbcbd026b998f9df1ed061bf510f375
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
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content:
"There is some evidence of a  premium, or an acceptance of lower \r\nyields by the investor, for green bonds (medium confidence). A survey \r\nof recent literature finds some consensus of the existence of a green \r\npremium in 56% of the studies on the primary markets (with \r\na  wide variance of premium amount), and 70% of the studies on \r\nthe secondary market (with an average premium of -1 to -9 basis \r\npoints), particularly for government issued, investment grade and \r\ngreen bonds that follow defined governance and reporting practices \r\n(MacAskill et al. 2021). In the US municipal bond market, as credit \r\nquality for green-labelled bonds has increased in the past few years, \r\nsome studies show a  positive premium for green bonds is arising \r\n(Baker et  al. 2018; Karpf and Mandel 2018), or appearing only in \r\nthe secondary market (Partridge and Medda 2020), while others "


id: e116e1ccf2096e515c0b60556ddf0f0d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"Financial disclosure regulatory developments can help further \r\nalign and specify definitions of green in the financial sector but are \r\nnot a  substitute for climate policy (high confidence). Developing \r\na common basis for understanding a green label could further reduce \r\nuncertainty or concerns of greenwashing. Regulatory developments in \r\nsome regions seek to further guard against greenwashing with more \r\nspecific definitions. The EU sustainable finance package, including \r\nthe EU Taxonomy and EU Green Bond Standard draft regulations, is \r\nthe broadest reaching, but not the only, regional initiative focused on \r\ndisclosure of climate risk (Section 15.6.3). Taxonomies across regions \r\nare not always aligned on what can constitute a  green project, "


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created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"find no evidence of a premium (Hyun et al. 2019; Larcker and Watts \r\n2020). Several studies also show a recent emergence of a premium \r\nand oversubscription for some green-labelled bonds denominated in \r\nEUR (CBI 2019b), in some cases for both USD or EUR green bonds \r\n(Ehlers and Packer 2017), with a wide variation in the range of the \r\nobserved difference in basis points focusing on the secondary market \r\n(Gianfrate and Peri 2019; Nanayakkara and Colombage 2019; Zerbib \r\n2019), with financial institution and corporate green bonds exhibiting \r\na  marginal premium compared with their non-green comparisons \r\n(Hachenberg and Schiereck 2018; Kempa et al. 2021)."


id: 5554db54b32ae3026941d384c9d9b3d0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
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vector_id: 12292
content:
"Spillover effects of green bonds may also impact equity markets and \r\nother financing conditions. Stock prices have been shown to positively \r\nrespond to green bond issuance (Tang and Zhang 2020). One study \r\nlinked enhanced credit quality induced by issuing green-labelled \r\nbonds to a lower cost of capital for corporate issuers (Agliardi and \r\nAgliardi 2019). Issuers' reputation and use of third-party verification \r\ncan also improve financing conditions for green bonds (Bachelet \r\net al. 2019). Green bonds are strongly dependent on fixed income \r\nmarket movements and are impacted by significant price spillover \r\nfrom the corporate and treasury bond markets (Reboredo 2018). \r\nA simulation of future green sovereign bond issuances shows that \r\nthis can promote green finance via firm's expectations and the credit \r\nmarket (Monasterolo and Raberto 2018)."


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vector_id: 13967
content:
"Green-labelled products may not necessarily result in increased \r\nfinancial flows to climate projects, although there can be benefits \r\nfrom capacity building with issuing institutions. Green bonds \r\ncan be used  to finance new climate projects or refinance existing \r\nclimate  projects, and thus do not necessarily result in finance \r\nfor new  climate projects constituting additional GHG reductions \r\n(a framing used in the Clean Development Mechanism). The labelling \r\nprocess itself may not necessarily lead to additional financing (Dupre \r\net al. 2018; Nicol et al. 2018b). However, the labelling process has \r\nmerit in contributing to building capacity within issuing institutions \r\non climate change (Schneeweiss 2019), which could support \r\nidentification of new green projects in the pipeline."


id: 3e064020925b361e7e6a61a639816d51
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8080
content:
"Financial flows via these instruments have limited measurable \r\nenvironmental impact to date, however they can support \r\ncapacity building on climate risk and opportunities within \r\ninstitutions to realise future impacts (high confidence). There \r\nis a  lack of evidence to date that green and sustainable financial \r\nproducts have significant impacts in terms of climate change \r\nmitigation and adaptation Box 15.7). Further, new products must be \r\ncoupled with tightened climate policy and a reduction in investments \r\nassociated with GHG-emitting activities to make a difference on the \r\nclimate (Section 15.3.3.2)."


id: 6ea92b76baadcef272f3698e7d1f5aa7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16738
content:
"Climate risk disclosure initiatives, some of which are voluntary in nature, \r\nmay have a limited direct climate impact. Transparency on climate risk \r\nmay not change investor decisions nor result in divestment, especially \r\nin the emerging economies, as support and clear direction from \r\nregulatory and policy mechanisms are required to drive institutional \r\ninvestors at large (Ameli et  al. 2021b). On the other hand, there is \r\nevidence of reduced fossil fuel investments following mandatory \r\nclimate risk disclosure requirements, indicating a  broader signalling \r\neffect of transparency (Mesonnier and Nguyen 2021)."


id: b751fcd2ff9f01a30574bd324b831e7a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29467
content:
"It is challenging to link specific emission reductions with specific \r\ninstruments that mainly target climate activities such as green bonds. "


id: 3b532ee36709eb6b44e22fc5b4ad7c60
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7626
content:
"On the other hand, there is growing evidence for a sustainable investment lens having a broader positive impact on creating an \r\nenabling environment and strengthening the case for such investments. For instance, corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities \r\nand investments on the environment dimension, specifically in the areas of emission and resource reduction, were found to be \r\nprofitable and a predictor of future abnormal returns in the longer term, from additional cash flow and additional demand (Dorfleitner \r\net al. 2018). These factors could be contributing to the increasing trend of sustainable and green investments, and can be said to be \r\nfurther reiterated by the spate of investor-led collaborative initiatives and recent announcements by leading finance institutes in the \r\ndeveloped economies, which is well recorded in a range of recent grey literature, including new climate-aligned investment strategies \r\nand ambition towards net zero targets."


id: 924f259a2aa5b5a0a21c9ce94391afaa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22961
content:
"Yet there is also a risk of companies announcing projected sustainability or net zero targets and claiming the associated positive \r\nreputational impact, while having no clear action plan in place to achieve these. The lack of mandatory reporting frameworks, which \r\nresults in an over-reliance on self-reported carbon data by companies for ESG assessments, can be a primary contributor (In and \r\nSchumacher 2021)."


id: 227e92601af05962c4f3e18e20506690
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3285
content:
"Challenges remain with regards to overlapping definitions of sustainable and ESG investment opportunities, which also vary \r\ndepending on social norms and pathways. There is also a general need for more extensive ESG disclosure at a corporate level, against \r\nthe background of emerging mandatory impact reporting for asset managers in some regions. A  movement is building towards \r\nsustainable investment strategies and increased sustainable development awareness in the financial sector (Muhmad and Muhamad \r\n2020; Maiti 2021), which points to the ability of civil society movements, such as divestment campaigns, to have some influence on \r\ninvestor behaviour, although there are other influences such as climate risk disclosure initiatives and regulations."


id: 727a51cb9825f25d40d6fad73576e4d2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17380
content:
"De-risking tools to lower capital costs and mobilise diverse \r\ninvestors. Paris-aligned NDCs that integrate policies on COVID-19 \r\npandemic recovery, climate action, sustainable development, just \r\ntransition and equity can harness co-benefits including contribution \r\nto Invisible UN SDG 7  energy poverty sectors (high confidence).\r\nDeveloping countries require access to affordable finance for projects \r\nranging from clean cooking solutions (Accenture 2018; World Bank \r\net  al. 2021); decentralised energy systems, intra-country power \r\nstations and regionally shared power pools with their associated \r\nenergy distribution networks (IEA 2020d; IRENA 2020c). Close \r\nto 3 billion people in Africa and developing Asia have no access to \r\nclean cooking. For sub-Saharan Africa, the acute lack of electricity \r\naccess lags behind all regions on SDG 7 indicators, impacting mostly "


id: d6b68357e6fb9d392949f81f2f732acc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35079
content:
"Options to mobilise institutional investors currently remain small \r\npilots, relative to Paris and SDG ambitions (high confidence). In terms "


id: 8a30a8bfbd9d5d6a59a844ee48c7988a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21490
content:
"Combining approaches: (i) developed countries meeting \r\nUNFCCC USD100 billion commitment on a  grant-equivalent \r\nbasis, (ii) stepped up technical assistance, (iii) infrastructure \r\ncoordination, (iv) knowledge sharing by project preparation \r\nentities, and (iv) harnessing project risk facilities such as \r\nguarantees could be instrumental for scaling climate finance \r\nfor Paris-SDGs (high confidence). Figure 15.7 illustrates the interplay \r\nbetween infrastructure project financing phases, bond refinancing \r\nand opportunities for developing bond yield curve benchmarks in \r\nnurturing local capital markets and mobilising diverse investors. \r\nThese project financing phases have varying risk-return profiles \r\nand different benchmarks to track performance are often required \r\nby investors for different securities that might be created (Ketterer \r\nand Powell 2018)."


id: 73bdd61b56e6026c3009f6dc63820240
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17614
content:
"An ODI (2018) survey of private and public project preparation facilities \r\ninternationally showed high failure rates in early project preparation \r\nphases with recommendations on 'one-stop-shops' and knowledge \r\nsharing on effective approaches. During the very high-risk concept \r\nphase (Figure  15.7) - grants and technical assistance de-risk with \r\ndesign concepts, project proposals and feasibility studies completed \r\nto 'kick-start' the right projects. The early-stage developmental phase \r\nis characterised by short-term debt in the two to five years phase to "


id: 1b63154580d10ee0320448a120253179
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1996
content:
"Technical assistance options would benefit from coordination. \r\nLabelled bond costs remain high. Developing countries \r\nare using fiscal incentives, grants, and guarantees to \r\nsupport nascent bond markets with most taxonomies under \r\ndevelopment (high confidence). Technical assistance requirements \r\nto improve the investment climate and bond market development \r\nwill vary across national capacities. These would benefit from \r\nthe USD100 billion UNFCCC grant equivalent basis to develop \r\n(i) regulatory and policy frameworks; (ii) UN national statistical \r\nsystems (Singh et al. 2016; MacFeely and Barnat 2017; Paris21 2018; \r\nBleeker and Abdulkadri 2020); (iii) credible NDC and SDG investment \r\nplans; (iv) project assessment certification and taxonomies; (v) bond \r\nmarket guidelines; and (vi) public finance management (US DoJ \r\n2009; US DoJ 2019). Other technical assistance channels include \r\ndiaspora entities, universities and learned societies (ICEAW 2012; "


id: e8fa72f634e2e762678d15ba2da0eb23
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38341
content:
"Payment method: Pay-as-you-go (PayGo). PayGo business \r\nmodels emerged to address the energy access challenge and \r\nprovide chiefly solar energy at affordable prices, using mobile \r\ntelecommunication to facilitate payment through instalments; Yadav \r\net al. 2019). However, PayGo has the technology and product risk, \r\nrequires a  financially viable and large customer base, and the \r\nsystem supplier must provide a significant portion of the finance \r\nand requires substantial equity and working capital (C40 Cities \r\nClimate Leadership Group 2018)."


id: 425b8b33b86f89a53e7e9c123c948848
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8873
content:
"New and innovative business models and financing approaches have \r\nemerged to help overcome barriers related to transactions costs by \r\naggregating and/or transferring financing needs and establishing \r\nsupply of finance for stakeholder groups lacking financial inclusion\r\n(high confidence)."


id: 6b177016458b175c87e877c17f9d50d2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16136
content:
"Transport sector business models. Analog to EaaS, mobility as \r\na service (MaaS) offers a business model whereby customers pay for \r\na  mobility service without making any upfront capital investment \r\n(e.g., buying a car). MaaS tends to deliver significant urban benefits \r\n(e.g., cleaner air) and brings in efficiency gains in the use of resources \r\n(high confidence). However, the switch to MaaS hardly improves the \r\ncarbon footprint and further tempted on-demand mobility is likely \r\nto nurture carbon emissions (Suatmadi et  al. 2019). Therefore, to \r\nsupport climate change mitigation, MaaS must be integrated with \r\nthe deployment of smart charging of electric (autonomous) vehicles \r\ncoupled to renewable energy sources (IRENA 2019d; Jones and \r\nLeibowicz 2019)."


id: ffb066d145f4cf2a14092e9a2f94a8ac
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42377
content:
"Energy as a service (EaaS) is a business model whereby customers \r\npay for an energy service without having to make any upfront capital \r\ninvestment (PwC 2014; Hamwi and Lizarralde 2017; Cleary and \r\nPalmer 2019). EaaS performance-based contracts can also be a form \r\nof 'creative financing; for capital improvement that makes it possible \r\nto fund energy upgrades from cost reductions and deployment \r\nof decentralised renewable energy (KPMG 2015; Moles-Grueso \r\net al. 2021). Innovation in EaaS has started at the household level, \r\nwhere smart meters using real-time data are used to predict peak \r\ndemand levels and optimise electricity dispatch (Chasin et al. 2020; \r\nGovernment of UK 2016; Smart Energy International 2018)."


id: e4eca3d3ea39b6b196ba56137cfe9780
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37565
content:
"Aggregators. An aggregator is a  grouping of agents in a  power \r\nsystem to act as a  single entity when engaging in power system \r\nmarkets (MIT 2016). Aggregators can use operation optimisation \r\nplatforms to provide real-time operating reserve capacity and \r\na range of balancing services to integrate higher shares of variable \r\nrenewable energy (Zancanella et  al. 2016; Ma et  al. 2017; Enbala \r\n2018; Research and Markets 2017; IRENA 2019b). This makes \r\na  business case for deferred investments in grid infrastructure \r\n(medium confidence). Aggregating and managing demand-response \r\nof heat systems (micro CHP and heat pumps) has shown reduction in \r\npeak demand (TNO 2016)."


id: 79508f75c68cc52578b4d01e23ae2294
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18538
content:
"Peer-to-peer (P2P) electricity trading. Producers and consumers \r\ncan directly trade electricity with other consumers in an online \r\nmarketplace to avoid the relatively high tariffs and the relatively \r\nlow buy-back rates of traditional utilities (Liu et  al. 2019; IRENA \r\n2020f). P2P models trading with distributed energy resources reduce \r\ntransmission losses and congestion (Mengelkamp et al. 2018; SEDA \r\n2020; Lumenaza 2020; Sonnen 2020; UNFCCC 2020)."


id: 16e7780b20b0e707fda69a9d5999241f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1248
content:
"Community ownership models. Community ownership models \r\nrefer to the collective ownership and management of energy-related \r\nassets with lower levels of investment, usually distributed renewable \r\nenergy resources but also recently in heating systems and energy \r\nservices (e.g., storage and charging) (Gall 2018; IRENA 2018; Kelly \r\nand Hanna 2019; Singh et al. 2019; Bisello et al. 2021; Maclurcan and \r\nHinton 2021). Community ownership projects may need significant \r\nupfront investments, and the ability of communities to raise the \r\nrequired financing might prove insufficient, which can be supported \r\nby microcredits in the initial stages of the projects (Aitken 2013; \r\nFederici 2014; REN21 2016; Rescoop 2020)."


id: f3416d5ae2ff7ef209235d619d372474
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40175
content:
"Nature-based solutions are 'actions to protect, sustainably manage \r\nand restore natural or modified ecosystems that address societal \r\nchallenges effectively and adaptively, simultaneously providing \r\nhuman well-being and biodiversity benefits' (Cohen-Shacham et al. \r\n2016). Nature-based solutions consist of a wide range of measures \r\nincluding ecosystem-based mitigation and adaptation."


id: bb06d2463cc7d571557ac4c5d9582309
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30124
content:
"The studies on investment and finance for nature-based solutions \r\nis still limited. However, frameworks and schemes to incentivise \r\nthe implementation of nature-based solutions, such as reducing \r\nemissions from deforestation and forest degradation and the role of \r\nconservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement \r\nof forest carbon stocks in developing countries (REDD+), which \r\ncontributes to climate change mitigation, has been actively \r\ndiscussed under the UNFCCC, with lessons from finance for REDD+ \r\nbeing available."


id: 92b8ba977b63861328762511ab593ff2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23029
content:
"If effectively implemented, nature-based solutions can be cost\u0002effective measures and able to provide multiple benefits, such as \r\nenhanced climate resilience, enhanced climate change mitigation, \r\nbiodiversity habitat, water filtration, soil health, and amenity values \r\n(high confidence) (Griscom et al. 2017; Keesstra et al. 2018; OECD \r\n2019d; Griscom et al. 2020; Dasgupta 2021)."


id: 7151aa48bbd72e5aca77e2a5abcb4417
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17196
content:
"Nature-based solutions have large potential to address climate \r\nchange and other sustainable development issues (high confidence). \r\nNature-based solutions are undercapitalised and the limited \r\ninvestment and finance, especially limited private capital, is widely \r\nrecognised as one of the main barriers to the implementation and \r\nmonitoring of the nature-based solutions (Seddon et  al. 2020; \r\nToxopeus and Polzin 2021; UNEP et al. 2021) Finance and investment \r\nmodels that generate their own revenues or consistently save costs \r\nare necessary to reduce dependency on grants (Schafer et al. 2019; \r\nWamsler et al. 2020)."


id: 67d5267feeb53a7925a80cbd4523dc5e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15543
content:
"bonds, and insurance), and creating standard metrics, baselines and \r\ncommon characteristics for nature-based solutions to promote the \r\ncreation of a new asset class (Thiele et al. 2021; UNEP et al. 2021)."


id: f5669ad6c82b081168dea8e04e1ce50f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40540
content:
"included some gender dimensions'. And, 'gender is not integrated into \r\nthe operations of the Clean Technology Fund (CTF), which finances \r\nlarge-scale mitigation in large economies and accounts for 70% of \r\nthe CIFs' pledged funding portfolio of 8.2 billion USD' (Schalatek \r\n2018). However, both the Forest Investment Program (FIP) and the \r\nScaling-Up Renewable Energy in Low-Income Countries Program \r\n(SREP) have integrated gender equality as either a co-benefit or core \r\ncriteria of these programmes (Schalatek 2018)."


id: 44e0b02fdbef7c26ddfece554cf09c9d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9348
content:
"climate strategies that can contribute to the global goals of the Paris \r\nAgreement (Minniti and Naude 2010; Bird et al. 2013; Barrett 2014; \r\nEastin 2018). This is particularly, so in the case of female-owned "


id: 933c4a16de998bb9c7b34b5730b2ee38
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23102
content:
"MSMEs, who, the literature increasingly shows, are key to promoting \r\nresilience at micro and macro scale in many developing countries \r\n(Omolo et al. 2017; Atela et al. 2018; Crick, F. et al. 2018)."


id: 4ad70e0bd8e54c0a553982ccf832ca0a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10408
content:
"There is no agreed definition of climate finance. The term 'climate finance' is applied to the financial resources devoted to addressing \r\nclimate change by all public and private actors from global to local scales, including international financial flows to developing \r\ncountries to assist them in addressing climate change. Total climate finance includes all financial flows whose expected effect aims \r\nto reduce net greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and/or to enhance resilience to the impacts of current and projected climate change. \r\nThis includes private and public funds, domestic and international flows and expenditures. Tracking of climate finance flows faces \r\nlimitations, in particular for national climate finance flows."


id: c81416e1d0b34813ee3bc14b9642a585
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32510
content:
"A financing gap is defined as the difference between current flows and average needs to meet the long-term goals of the Paris \r\nAgreement. Gaps are driven by various barriers inside (short-termism, information gaps, home bias, limited visibility of future \r\npipelines) and outside (e.g., missing pricing of externalities, missing regulatory frameworks) of the financial sector. Current mitigation \r\nfinancing flows come in significantly below average needs across all regions and sectors despite the availability of sufficient capital \r\non a global basis. Globally, yearly climate finance flows have to increase by a factor between three and six to meet average annual \r\nneeds between 2020 and 2030."


id: addf6d008884bad7580ac3217ee3d950
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27832
content:
"Gaps are in particular concerning for many developing countries, with COVID-19 exacerbating the macroeconomic outlook and \r\nfiscal space for governments. Also, limited institutional capacity represents a key barrier for many developing countries, burdening \r\nrisk perceptions and access to appropriately priced financing as well as limiting their ability to actively manage the transformation. \r\nExisting fundamental inequities in access to finance, as well as its terms and conditions, and countries' exposure to physical impacts \r\nof climate change, overall result in a worsening outlook for a global just transition."


id: 80974f7615dc56836481088aa4e1b9f0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19751
content:
"IEA, 2019a: World Energy Investment 2019. Flagship Report, May 2019. \r\nOECD, Paris, France 176 pp."


id: 1053f0d0d6d144f0f7d2c695d1ea0b62
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 61
content:
"IEA, 2019c: Africa Energy Outlook 2019. 288 pp. https://www.iea.org/reports/\r\nafrica-energy-outlook-2019 (Accessed November 1, 2021).\r\nIEA, 2020a: World Energy Investment 2020. OECD Publishing, Paris, France, \r\n176 pp.\r\nIEA, 2020b: The Oil and Gas Industry in Energy Transitions: Insights from IEA "


id: ed2a9d994a5e0802c5de6dcca2424558
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39101
content:
"en/311561624871430872/pdf/Understanding-Market-Based-Solutions\u0002and-Access-to-Finance-Options-for-Clean-Cooking-Technologies-in\u0002Bangladesh.pdf (Accessed September 21, 2021)."


id: 45ee67ebb59812bae8eef2c15428b443
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9528
content:
"Lawrence Agbemabiese (Ghana/the United States of America), El Hadji Mbaye Diagne (Senegal), \r\nLaura Diaz Anadon (Spain/United Kingdom), Yun Seng Lim (Malaysia), Walter Alberto Pengue \r\n(Argentina), Ambuj D. Sagar (India), Taishi Sugiyama (Japan), Kenji Tanaka (Japan), Elena Verdolini \r\n(Italy), Jan Witajewski-Baltvilks (Poland)"


id: ecb0f5c54a7fb5ba4baaf505e9ea7f41
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38999
content:
"Blanco, G., H. de Coninck, L. Agbemabiese, E. H. Mbaye Diagne, L. Diaz Anadon, Y. S. Lim, W.A. Pengue, A.D. Sagar, \r\nT. Sugiyama, K. Tanaka, E. Verdolini, J. Witajewski-Baltvilks, 2022: Innovation, technology development and transfer. \r\nIn IPCC, 2022: Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Sixth \r\nAssessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [P.R. Shukla, J. Skea, R. Slade, A. Al Khourdajie, \r\nR. van Diemen, D. McCollum, M. Pathak, S. Some, P. Vyas, R. Fradera, M. Belkacemi, A. Hasija, G. Lisboa, S. Luz, J. Malley, \r\n(eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA. doi: 10.1017/9781009157926.018"


id: 72b1645f387df4198f70a3605c762815
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17420
content:
"Consistent with innovation system approaches, the sharing \r\nof knowledge and experiences between developed and \r\ndeveloping countries can contribute to addressing global \r\nclimate and SDGs. The effectiveness of such international \r\ncooperation arrangements, however, depends on the way \r\nthey are developed and implemented (high confidence). The \r\neffectiveness and sustainable development benefits of technology \r\nsharing under market conditions appear to be determined primarily \r\nby the complexity of technologies, local capabilities and the \r\npolicy regime. This suggests that the development of planning \r\nand innovation capabilities remains necessary, especially in least\u0002developed countries and SIDS. International diffusion of low-emission \r\ntechnologies is also facilitated by knowledge spillovers from regions \r\nengaged in clean R&D (medium confidence). {16.6}"


id: 70df6244a48f79d7d412c1ecda964d94
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17123
content:
"The evidence on the role of intellectual property rights (IPR) \r\nin innovation is mixed. Some literature suggests that it is \r\na  barrier, while other sources suggest that it is an enabler \r\nto the diffusion of climate-related technologies (medium \r\nconfidence). There is agreement that countries with well-developed \r\ninstitutional capacity may benefit from a strengthened IPR regime, "


id: 7065b3375a12c41c706410b8a5997614
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"A systemic perspective on technological change can provide \r\ninsights to policymakers supporting their selection of effective \r\ninnovation policy instruments (high confidence). A combination \r\nof scaled-up innovation investments with demand-pull interventions \r\ncan achieve faster technology unit cost reductions and more rapid \r\nscale-up than either approach in isolation (high confidence). These "


id: ce4af768411e1d5549abfc0ee2021c8f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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vector_id: 33629
content:
"of adequate governance in many countries can lead to harsh \r\nworking conditions and unregulated disposal of electronic waste. \r\nDigitalisation also affects firms' competitiveness, the demand for \r\nskills, and the distribution of, and access to, resources. The existing \r\ndigital divide, especially in developing countries, and the lack of \r\nappropriate governance of the digital revolution can hamper the \r\nrole that digitalisation could play in supporting the achievement of \r\nstringent mitigation targets. At present, the understanding of both \r\nthe direct and indirect impacts of digitalisation on energy use, carbon \r\nemissions and potential mitigation, is limited (medium confidence). \r\n{Cross-Chapter Box 11 in this chapter, 16.2}"


id: 635b2373a784654d882c7bcf33270ed4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"but that countries with limited capabilities might face greater barriers \r\nto innovation as a consequence. This enhances the continued need for \r\ncapacity building. Ideas to improve the alignment of the global IPR \r\nregime and address climate change include specific arrangements for \r\nleast-developed countries, case-by-case decision-making and patent\u0002pooling institutions. {16.2.3.3, 16.5, Box 16.9}"


id: 14b086a017be3d44d66317974bf4fdfa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 866
content:
"Strategies for climate change mitigation can be most effective \r\nin accelerating transformative change when actions taken to \r\nstrengthen one set of enabling conditions also reinforce and \r\nstrengthen the effectiveness of other enabling conditions \r\n(medium confidence). Applying transition or system dynamics \r\nto decisions can help policymakers take advantage of such high\u0002leverage intervention points, address the specific characteristics of \r\ntechnological stages, and respond to societal dynamics. Inspiration \r\ncan be drawn from the global unit cost reductions of solar PV, which \r\nwere accelerated by a combination of factors interacting in a mutually \r\nreinforcing way across a limited group of countries (high confidence). \r\n{Box 16.4, Cross-Chapter Box 12 in this chapter}"


id: a2da2107c7064f03466bf4ccf5314b67
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25869
content:
"An area where sustainable development, climate change \r\nmitigation and technological change interact is digitalisation. \r\nDigital technologies can promote large increases in energy \r\nefficiency through coordination and an economic shift to \r\nservices, but they can also greatly increase energy demand \r\nbecause of the energy used in digital devices. System-level \r\nrebound effects may also occur (high confidence). Digital \r\ndevices, including servers, increase pressure on the environment due \r\nto the demand for rare metals and end-of-life disposal. The absence "


id: cce558a1fef9cd8ff565adab35f93a78
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33386
content:
"Technological change is not exogenous to social and economic \r\nsystems; technologies are not conceived, selected, and applied \r\nautonomously (Grubler et al. 2018). Underlying driving forces of \r\nthe problem, such as more resource-intensive lifestyles and larger \r\npopulations (Hertwich and Peters 2009; UNEP 2014), remain largely \r\nunchallenged. Comprehensive knowledge of the direct and indirect \r\neffects of technological changes on physical and social systems \r\ncould improve decision-making, including in those cases where \r\ntechnological change mitigates environmental impacts."


id: 9fcc88c476066100fbc391e6867f9074
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25323
content:
"Technological change and innovation are considered key drivers of \r\neconomic growth and social progress (Brandao Santana et al. 2015; \r\nHeeks and Stanforth 2015). Increased production and consumption \r\nof goods and services creates economic benefits through higher \r\ndemands for improved technologies (Gossart 2015). Since the \r\nIndustrial Revolution, however, and notwithstanding the benefits, this \r\nproduction and consumption trend and the technological changes \r\nassociated with it have also come at the cost of long-term damage \r\nto the life support systems of our planet (Alarcon and Vos 2015; \r\nSteffen et al. 2015). The significance of such impacts depends on the \r\ntechnology, but also on the intrinsic characteristics of the country or \r\nregion analysed (Brandao Santana et al. 2015)."


id: 6ae3b1ea1f4ba1989dcc69498f16e199
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16090
content:
"A sustainable global future for people and nature requires rapid and \r\ntransformative societal change by integrating technical, governance \r\n(including participation), financial and societal aspects of the solutions \r\nto be implemented (Sachs et al. 2019; Portner et al. 2021). A growing \r\nbody of interdisciplinary research from around the world can inform \r\nimplementation of adaptive solutions that address the benefits and \r\ndrawbacks of linkages in social-ecological complexity, including \r\nexternalities and rebound effects from innovation and technological \r\ntransformation (Balvanera et al. 2017; Portner et al. 2021)."


id: 55d86cdef9638e804603791ab4f0fa1c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"Other chapters in this volume have discussed technological change in \r\nvarious ways, including as a framing issue (Chapter 1), in the context \r\nof specific sectors (Chapters 6-11), for specific purposes (Chapter 12) \r\nand as a  matter of policy, international cooperation and finance \r\n(Chapters  13-15). Chapter  2  discusses past trends in technological \r\nchange and chapters 3 and 4 discuss it in the context of future modelling. \r\nIn general, implicitly or explicitly, technological change is assigned an \r\nimportant role in climate change mitigation and achieving sustainable \r\ndevelopment (Thacker et al. 2019), as also discussed in past IPCC reports \r\n(IPCC 2014, 2018a). Chapter  16 describes how a  well-established \r\ninnovation system at a national level, guided by well-designed policies, \r\ncan contribute to achieving mitigation and adaptation targets along \r\nwith broader Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), while avoiding \r\nundesired consequences of technological change."


id: 19d89eb39214c607a1e069a9b58a320b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"Technological change and transitional knowledge can reinforce \r\neach other. The value of traditional wisdom and its technological \r\npractices provide examples of sustainable and adaptive systems \r\nthat could potentially adapt to and mitigate climate change (Kuoljok \r\n2019; Singh et al. 2020). Peasants and traditional farmers have been \r\nable to respond well to climate changes through their wisdom and \r\ntraditional  practices (Nicholls and Alteri 2013). The integration of \r\nthe traditional wisdom with new technologies can offer new and \r\neffective solutions (Galloway McLean 2010)."


id: a0b2b2046bd13d42ca242c810d5fe8f9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25477
content:
"The environmental impacts of social and economic activities, \r\nincluding emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs), are greatly \r\ninfluenced by the rate and direction of technological changes (Jaffe \r\net al. 2000). Technological changes usually designed and used to \r\nincrease productivity and reduce the use of natural resources can \r\nlead to increased production and consumption of goods and services \r\nthrough different rebound effects that diminish the potential benefits \r\nof reducing the pressure on the environment (Kemp and Soete 1990; \r\nGrubler 1998; Sorrell 2007; Barker et al. 2009; Gossart 2015)."


id: d3fdf78a5dcd6334a2bf7e08fdadb5eb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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vector_id: 34629
content:
"Achieving climate change mitigation and other SDGs thus also \r\nrequires rapid diffusion of knowledge and technological innovations. \r\nHowever, these are hampered by various barriers, some of which are \r\nillustrated in Table 16.1 (Markard et al. 2020)."


id: d4bc54d6d830980a1fd4cc06d39dafaa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"The literature has been growing rapidly over the past decades on \r\nhow, in a systemic way, the barriers to sustainability transition can be \r\novercome in various circumstances. A central element is that national \r\nsystems of innovation can help achieve both climate change goals and \r\nSDGs, by integrating new ideas, devices, resources, new and traditional \r\nknowledge, and technological changes for more effective and adaptive \r\nsolutions (Lundvall 1992). At the organisational level, innovation is seen "


id: 5af85f263ec18dfcdc806d2444822bd4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13256
content:
"Those environmental impacts depend not only on which technologies \r\nare used, but also on how they are used (Grubler et al. 1999a). "


id: f5aa87ac9e93d31b8555709d03bba7c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"Section  16.3 discusses innovation as a  systemic process based on \r\nrecent literature. While the innovation process is often stylised as \r\na linear process, innovation is now predominantly seen as a systemic \r\nprocess in that it is a result of actions by, and interactions among, \r\na  large set of actors, whose activities are shaped by, and shape, \r\nthe context in which they operate and the user group with which \r\nthey are engaging."


id: 49c198e6a2367d9afede960a72e05265
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"as a process that can bring value by means of creating more effective \r\nproducts, services, processes, technologies, policies and business \r\nmodels that are applicable to commercial, business, financial and even \r\nsocietal or political organisations (Brooks 1980; Arthur 2009)."


id: a1fbd171cfe9772ce4a34f3a908f1486
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"Section  16.4 presents innovation and technology policy, including \r\ntechnology push (e.g.,  publicly funded R&D) and demand-pull \r\n(e.g.,  governmental procurement programmes) instruments \r\nthat address potential market failures related to innovation and \r\ntechnology diffusion. The section also assesses the cost-effectiveness \r\nof innovation policies as well as other policy assessment criteria \r\nintroduced in Chapter 13."


id: c620d0863029f0255e86cb5738846fd5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"Section  16.5 assesses the role of international cooperation in \r\ntechnology development and transfer, in particular the mechanisms \r\nestablished under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change \r\n(UNFCCC), but also other international initiatives for technology \r\ncooperation. The discussion on international cooperation includes \r\ninformation exchange, research, development and demonstration \r\ncooperation, access to financial instruments, intellectual \r\nproperty rights, as well as promotion of domestic capacities and \r\ncapacity building."


id: 7cde9d2fbbbc86c0e8ef592c47f85efd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Section  16.6 describes the role of technology in sustainable \r\ndevelopment, including unintended effects of technological changes, \r\nand synthesises the chapter."


id: 1008f3a539bdc8b5b734a55fff0c554
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"Models of the innovation process, its drivers and incentives \r\nprovide a  tool for technology assessment, constructing projections \r\nof technological change and identifying which macro conditions \r\nfacilitate development of low-carbon technologies. The distinction \r\nbetween stages of the innovation process allows for assessment of \r\ntechnology readiness (Section 16.2.1). Qualitative and quantitative \r\nanalysis of the main elements underpinning innovation  - research \r\nand development (R&D), learning by doing, and spillovers - allows \r\nfor an explanation of past and projected future technological changes \r\n(Section 16.2.2). In addition, general purpose technologies can play \r\na role in climate change mitigation."


id: 77d5ab8d2d6fd6a07bab4014efe55cc0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"Coupling technological innovation with sustainable development \r\nand the SDGs would need to address overall social, environmental, and \r\neconomic consequences, given that public policy is intertwined with \r\ninnovation, technological changes and other factors in a  complex \r\nmanner. Chapter 16 is organised in the following manner to provide \r\nan overview of innovation and technology development and transfer \r\nfor climate change and sustainable development."


id: 5f0935aa3cfe7421e171ce1cdadf070
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"Section  16.2 discusses drivers of innovation process, including \r\nmacro factors that can redirect technological change towards low\u0002carbon options. Representations of these drivers in mathematical \r\nand statistical models allow for explaining the past and constructing \r\nprojections of future technological change. They also integrate the \r\nanalysis of drivers and consequences of technological change within \r\neconomic-energy-economy (or integrated assessment) models \r\n(Chapter  3). The section also describes the different phases of \r\ninnovation and metrics, such as the widely used but also criticised \r\ntechnology readiness levels (TRLs)."


id: 7ae972f58664a71ec8bb684f4fcf04a4
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"In the context of mitigation pathways, the feasibility of any emission \r\nreduction targets depends on the ability to promote innovation \r\nin low- and zero-carbon technologies, as opposed to any other \r\ntechnology. For this reason, Section 16.2.3 reviews the literature of \r\nthe levers influencing the direction of technological change in favour \r\nof low- and zero-carbon technologies. Moreover, representation of \r\ndrivers in mathematical and statistical models from Section 16.2.2 \r\nallows integration of its analysis with economic and climate effects "


id: e23988f350b9041569ab8e80be226ed9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"within integrated assessment models (IAMs), hence permitting more \r\nprecise modelling of decarbonisation pathways (Section 16.2.4)."


id: 3d58b01fb143f950f6fce3a4844ecc73
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"(Skea et al. 2019). Successfully passing from each stage to the next \r\none in the innovation cycle requires overcoming 'valleys of deaths' \r\n(Auerswald and Branscomb 2003; UNFCCC 2017), most notably the \r\ndemonstration phase (Frank et al. 1996; Weyant 2011; Nemet et al. \r\n2018). Over time, new and improved technologies are discovered; \r\nthis often makes the dominant technology obsolete, but this is not \r\ndiscussed in this report."


id: 1b0d17c6567369b992e528342f13cb35
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"In addition to technological innovation, other innovation approaches \r\nare relevant in the context of climate mitigation and more broadly \r\nsustainable development (Section  16.6). Frugal innovations, that \r\nis, 'good enough' innovations that fulfil the needs of non-affluent \r\nconsumers mostly in developing countries (Hossain 2018), are \r\ncharacterised by low costs, concentration on core functionalities, and \r\noptimised performance level (Weyrauch and Herstatt 2016) and are \r\nhence often associated with (ecological and social) sustainability \r\n(Albert 2019). Grassroots innovations are products, services \r\nand  processes developed to address specific local challenges and \r\nopportunities, and which can generate novel, bottom-up solutions \r\nresponding to local situations, interests and values. (Pellicer-Sifres \r\net al. 2018; Dana et al. 2021)."


id: 7d40f2db086700740cc535156e0a9da8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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vector_id: 19214
content:
"Table  16.2 summarises the different innovation stages and main \r\nfunding actors, and maps phases into the technology readiness levels \r\n(TRLs) discussed in Section 16.2.1.4."


id: 2b65917e50bcf59ed12e469c647b791a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"The innovation cycle is commonly thought of as having three \r\ndistinct innovation phases on the path between basic research \r\nand commercial application: Research and development (R&D); \r\ndemonstration; and deployment and diffusion (IPCC 2007). Each \r\nof these phases differs with respect to the kind of activity carried \r\nout, the type of actors involved and their roles, financing needs, and \r\nthe associated risks and uncertainties. All phases involve a process \r\nof trial and error, and failure is common; the share of innovation \r\nthat successfully reaches the deployment phase is small. The path \r\noccurring between basic research and commercialisation is not linear \r\n(Section 16.3); it often requires a long time and is characterised by \r\nsignificant bottlenecks and roadblocks. Furthermore, technologies \r\nmay regress in the innovation cycle, rather than move forward "


id: 979a3d7ec6efd05cc9b4b5875c57ce57
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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vector_id: 23887
content:
"to indicate that technologies needs to be co-developed and adapted \r\nto local contexts (Pandey et al. 2021). Innovation cooperation is an \r\nimportant component of stringent mitigation strategies as well as \r\ninternational agreements (Section 16.5)."


id: 1ad8b90af7816ff41338ae1f030f361a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"of technological innovation are referred to as the 'formative phase', \r\nduring which the conditions are shaped for a technology to emerge \r\nand become established in the market (Wilson and Grubler 2013) and \r\nthe constitutive elements of the innovation system emerging around \r\na  particular technology are set up (Bento and Wilson 2016; Bento \r\net al. 2018) (Section 16.3)."


id: 3d31e9da98b01848d5da1833cc9c7d77
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"Diffusion is often sluggish due to lock-in of dominant technologies \r\n(Liebowitz and Margolis 1995; Unruh 2000; Ivanova et al. 2018), as \r\nwell as the time needed to diffuse information about the technologies, \r\nheterogeneity among adopters, the incentive to wait until costs fall \r\neven further, the presence of behavioural and institutional barriers, \r\nand the uncertainty surrounding mitigation policies and long\u0002term commitments to climate targets (Gillingham and Sweeney \r\n2012; Corey 2014; Jaffe 2015; Haelg et al. 2018). In addition, novel \r\ntechnology has been hindered by the actions of powerful incumbents \r\nwho accrue economic and political advantages over time, as in the \r\ncase of renewable energy generation (Unruh 2002; Supran and \r\nOreskes 2017; Hoppmann et al. 2019)."


id: 48490efcfefa8916c80044478035ad08
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9930
content:
"Technologies have been shown to penetrate the market with a gradual \r\nnon-linear process in a  characteristic logistic (S-shaped) curve \r\n(Grubler 1996; Rogers 2003). The time needed to reach widespread \r\nadoption varies greatly across technologies relevant for adaptation \r\nand mitigation (Gross et al. 2018); in the case of energy technologies, \r\nthe time needed for technologies to get from a  10-90%  market \r\nshare of saturation ranges between 5 to over 70 years (Wilson 2012). \r\nInvestment in commercialisation of low-emission technology is largely \r\nprovided by private financiers; however, governments play a key role \r\nin ensuring incentives through supportive policies, including R&D \r\nexpenditures providing signals to private investors (Haelg et al. 2018), \r\npricing carbon dioxide emissions, public procurement, technology \r\nstandards, information diffusion and the regulation for end-lifecycle \r\ntreatment of products (Cross and Murray 2018) (Section 16.4)."


id: cd4140035511466dc75ba0a3aaed84c2
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content:
"Deployment entails producing a technology at large scale and scaling \r\nup its adoption and use across individual firms or households in a given \r\nmarket, and across different markets (Jaffe 2015). In the context of \r\nclimate change mitigation and adaptation technologies, the purposeful \r\ndiffusion to developing countries, is referred to as 'technology transfer'. \r\nMost recently, the term 'innovation cooperation' has been proposed "


id: aa0c1ebc27f8806a365b1dee5c434147
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content:
"The purpose of TRLs is to support decision-making. They are applied \r\nto avoid the premature application of technologies, which would lead "


id: a5fcd189884905be48dddbadd17f80c7
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content:
"1 For example, see Spence (1981) and Bhattacharya (1984) for a discussion of first-mover advantages."


id: 47989e7dbe65c11b9cfcaad4324dea5a
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vector_id: 9817
content:
"to increased costs and project schedule extensions (US Department \r\nof Energy 2011). They are used for risk management, and can also be \r\nused to make decisions regarding technology funding, and to support \r\nthe management of the R&D process within a given organisation or \r\ncountry (De Rose et al. 2017)."


id: 7f7147a722a61be6e6a151baa3ae42ef
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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vector_id: 19572
content:
"Learning by doing and R&D are interdependent. Young (1993) \r\npostulates that learning by doing cannot continue forever without \r\nR&D because it is bounded by an upper physical productivity limit of \r\nan existing technology. R&D can shift this limit because it allows for \r\nreplacing the existing technology with a new one. On the other hand, \r\nincentives to invest in R&D depend on the future cost of manufacturing, \r\nwhich in turn depends on the scale of learning by doing. The empirical \r\nevidence for virtuous circle between cost reduction, market growth and \r\nR&D were found in the case of the photovoltaic (PV) market (Watanabe \r\net al. 2000) (Box 16.4), but could also lead to path dependency and \r\nlock-in (Erickson et al. 2015). Sections 16.4.4 and 13.7.3.1 discuss how \r\nsimultaneous use of technology push and pull policies could amplify \r\nthe effects of research and learning."


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"In practice, the usefulness of TRLs is limited by several factors. These \r\ninclude limited applicability in complex technologies or systems, \r\nthe fact that they do not define obsolescence, nor account for \r\nmanufacturability, commercialisation or the readiness of organisations \r\nto implement innovations (European Association of Research \r\nTechnology Organisations 2014) and do not consider any type of \r\ntechnology-system mismatch or the relevance of the products' operation \r\nenvironment to the system under consideration (Mankins 2009). Many \r\nof these limitations can be eased by using TRLs in combination with \r\nother indicators such as system readiness levels and other economic \r\nindicators on, for example, investments and returns (IEA 2020b)."


id: 5b8a0dfd63ba264e9f2404bcc9e51870
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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"The speed of technological change could be explained with the \r\nkey drivers of innovations process: R&D effort; learning by doing; \r\nand spillover effects. In addition, new innovations are sometimes \r\nenabled by the development of general purpose technologies, such \r\nas digitalisation."


id: 1126693450cab230cb1a80548325887
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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"Learning by doing and R&D efforts are two factors commonly \r\nused by the literature to explain past and projected future speed \r\nof technological change (Klaassen et al. 2005; Mayer et al. 2012; \r\nBettencourt et al. 2013). Learning by doing is the interaction \r\nof workers with new machines or processes that allows more \r\nefficient use (Arrow 1962b). R&D effort is dedicated to looking for \r\nnew solutions (e.g.,  blueprints) that could increase the efficiency \r\nof existing production methods or result in entirely new methods, \r\nproducts or services (Section 16.2.1.1)."


id: 3baeaaffe5e37207080df7856d738cb5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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"The failure of markets to deliver the size of R&D investment and \r\nlearning by doing that would be socially optimal is one of the \r\njustifications of government intervention. Policies to address these \r\nmarket failures can be categorised as technology-push and demand\u0002pull policies. The role of these policies is explained in Table 16.3."


id: 579d03e175652cabccd786feed8b566f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"Table  16.3 |  Categories of policies and interventions accelerating technological changes, the factors promoting them and slowing them down, \r\nillustrated with examples."


id: 4676a156cfc5f52dbce33470549bd242
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"gives an opportunity for others to create new innovations and \r\nincrease the knowledge stock even further. The constant growth of \r\nknowledge stock through spillovers translates into constant growth \r\nof productivity and cost reduction."


id: 6edcab53e737265bb31c73589196a121
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"The size of the learning-by-doing effect is quantified in literature \r\nusing learning rates, that is estimates of negative correlation between \r\ncosts and size of deployment of technologies. The results from this \r\nliterature include estimates for energy technologies (McDonald \r\nand Schrattenholzer 2001), electricity generation technologies \r\n(Rubin et al. 2015; Samadi 2018), for storage (Schmidt 2017), for \r\nend-of-pipe control (Kang et al. 2020) and for energy demand and \r\nenergy supply technologies (Weiss et al. 2010). Meta-analyses find \r\nthat learning rates vary across technologies, within technologies, \r\nand over time (Nemet 2009a; Rubin et al. 2015; Wei et al. 2017). \r\nMoreover, different components of one technology have different \r\nlearning rates (Elshurafa et al. 2018). Central tendencies are around \r\n20% cost reduction for each doubling of deployment (McDonald and \r\nSchrattenholzer 2001)."


id: 84d8f7062cee57e98f86898197a6c8d9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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"Studies of correlation between cumulative deployment of \r\ntechnologies and costs are not sufficiently precise to disentangle \r\nthe causal effect of increase in deployment from the causal effects \r\nof R&D and other factors (Nemet 2006). Numerous subsequent \r\nstudies attempted to, among others issues, separate the effect \r\nof learning by doing and R&D (Klaassen et al. 2005; Mayer et al. \r\n2012; Bettencourt et al. 2013), economies of scale (Arce 2014), and \r\nknowledge spillovers (Nemet 2012). Once those other factors are \r\naccounted for, some empirical studies find that the role of learning \r\nby doing in driving down the costs becomes minor (Nemet 2006; \r\nKavlak et al. 2018). In addition, the relation could reflect reverse \r\ncausality: increase in deployment could be an effect (and not \r\na  cause) of a  drop in price (Nordhaus 2014; Witajewski-Baltvilks \r\net al. 2015). Nevertheless, in some applications, learning curves can \r\nbe a useful proxy and heuristic (Nagy et al. 2013)."


id: bb451a531e02ca029dbab537c51f8e41
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"The spillover effect associated with innovation in carbon-intensive \r\ntechnologies may lead to lock-in of fossil-fuel technologies. \r\nContinuous technological change of carbon-intensive industry raises \r\nthe bar for clean technologies: a larger drop in clean technologies' \r\ncost is necessary to become competitive (Acemoglu et al. 2012; \r\nAghion et al. 2016). The implication is that delaying climate policy \r\nincreases the cost of that policy (Aghion 2019)."


id: 427a6d0f8a120622c8db27d6ff52247d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"On the other hand, the spillover effect associated with innovation \r\nin low-emission technologies increases the potency of climate policy \r\n(Aghion 2019). For instance, a policy that encourages clean innovation \r\nleads to accumulation of knowledge in clean industry which, through \r\nspillover effects, encourages further innovation in clean industries. \r\nOnce the stock of knowledge is sufficiently large, the value of clean \r\nindustries will be so high that technology firms will invest there, \r\neven without policy incentives. Once this point is reached, the policy \r\nintervention can be discontinued (Acemoglu et al. 2012)."


id: e8ad644a5a7f7d380f47c43b1ce6b21c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"In addition, the presence of spillovers implies that a  unilateral \r\neffort to reduce emissions in one region could reduce emissions \r\nin other regions (medium confidence) (Golombek and Hoel 2004; \r\nGerlagh and Kuik 2014). For instance, in the presence of spillovers, \r\na carbon tax that incentivises clean technological change increases \r\nthe competitiveness of clean technologies not only locally, but also \r\nabroad. The size of this effect depends on the size of the spillovers. \r\nIf they are sufficiently strong, the reduction of emissions abroad due \r\nto clean technological change could be larger than the increase of \r\nemissions due to carbon leakage (Gerlagh and Kuik 2014). Different \r\ntypes of carbon leakage are discussed in Chapter 13, Section 13.7.1, \r\nand other consequences of spillovers for the design of policy are \r\ndiscussed in Chapter 13, Section 13.7.3."


id: a05593efb963540bbf4869752375203f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Knowledge spillovers drive continuous technological change (Romer \r\n1990; Rivera-Batiz and Romer 1991) and are for that reason relevant \r\nto climate technologies as well as incumbent, carbon-intensive \r\ntechnologies. Knowledge embedded in innovations by one innovator "


id: a121348d5b27d4edd20e6e3a9c80f44a
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content:
"digital worlds are converging increases the relevance of disruptive \r\ndigitalisation in the context of climate mitigation and sustainability \r\nchallenges (European Commission 2020) (Cross-Chapter Box  11 in \r\nthis chapter and Chapter 4, Section 4.4.1)."


id: 9881105b2bd561a2dd8aa3e63f140574
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"General-purpose technologies (GPTs) provide solutions that could \r\nbe applied across sectors and industries (Goldfarb 2011) by creating \r\ntechnological platforms for a  growing number of interrelated \r\ninnovations. Examples of GPTs relevant to climate change mitigation \r\nare hydrogen and fuel cell technology, which may find applications \r\nin transport, industry and distributed generation (Hanley et al. 2018), \r\nand nanotechnology which played a significant role in advancement \r\nof all the different types of renewable energy options (Hussein 2015). \r\nAssessing the environmental, social and economic implications of \r\nsuch technologies, including increased emissions through energy \r\nuse, is challenging (Section  5.3.4.1 and Cross-Chapter Box  11 in \r\nthis chapter)."


id: f7378a04025a1fcbbc32da637047f8c0
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"Several GPTs relevant for climate mitigation and adaptation emerged \r\nas a  result of digitalisation, namely the adoption or increase in \r\nthe use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) by \r\ncitizens, organisations, industries or countries, and the associated \r\nrestructuring of several domains of social life and of the economy \r\naround digital technologies and infrastructures (Brennen and \r\nKreiss 2016; IEA 2017b). The digital revolution is underpinned by \r\ninnovation in key technologies, for example, ubiquitous connected \r\nconsumer devices such as mobile phones (Grubler et al. 2018), rapid \r\nexpansions of global internet infrastructure and access (World Bank \r\n2014), and steep cost reductions and performance improvements in \r\ncomputing devices, sensors, and digital communication technologies \r\n(Verma et al. 2020). The increasing pace at which the physical and "


id: 9419c49b02da0b34497ee3e74debdbfc
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content:
"Yet, increased digitalisation could increase energy demand, thus \r\nwiping away potential efficiency benefits, unless appropriately \r\ngoverned (IPCC 2018a). Moreover, digital technologies could \r\nnegatively impact labour demand and increase inequality (Cross\u0002Chapter Box 11 in this chapter)."


id: 14205cbe64867aec258af24b7111f330
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"Authors: Felix Creutzig (Germany), Elena Verdolini (Italy), Paolo Bertoldi (Italy), Luisa F. Cabeza (Spain), Maria Josefina Figueroa \r\nMeza (Venezuela/Denmark), Kirsten Halsnaes (Denmark), Joni Jupesta (Indonesia/Japan), Siir Kilkis (Turkey), Michael Konig \r\n(Germany), Eric Masanet (the United States of America), Nikola Milojevic-Dupont (France), Joyashree Roy (India/Thailand), Ayyoob \r\nSharifi (Iran/Japan)"


id: 3893a8a882cf3992627411fdb17731ac
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Digital technologies impact positively and negatively on GHG emissions through: their own carbon footprint; technology \r\napplication for mitigation; and induced larger social change. Digital technologies also raise broader sustainability \r\nconcerns due to their use of rare materials and associated waste, and their potential negative impact on inequalities \r\nand labour demand."


id: ea24b7c6e243165c83b129b0ab3703fa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38547
content:
"and smart charging (Cross-Chapter Box 11, Table 1). Data centres can also play a role in energy system management, for example, \r\nby increasing renewable energy generation through predictive control (Dabbagh et al. 2019), and by helping to drive the market for \r\nbattery storage and fuel cells (Riekstin et al. 2014). Temporal and spatial scheduling of electricity demand can provide about 10 GW \r\nin demand response in the European electricity system in 2030 (Wahlroos et al. 2017, 2018; Koronen et al. 2020; Laine et al. 2020)."


id: 66150df0a36b5494660ab5678fec7b38
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15221
content:
"Cross-Chapter Box  11, Table  1  | Selected sector approaches for reducing GHG emissions that are supported by new digital technologies. \r\nContributions of digitalisation include a) supporting role (+), b) necessary role in mix of tools (++), c) necessary unique contribution (+++), but digitalisation may \r\nalso increase emissions (-). (Chapters 5, 8, 9 and 11)."


id: d9c8e2b468289be5e8f13dbe317a907a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"integrated holistically within policy design (Kunkel and Matthess 2020), but they are difficult to quantify and investigate (Bieser and \r\nHilty 2018). Policies and adequate infrastructures and choice architectures can help manage and contain the negative repercussions \r\nof systemic effects (Sections 5.4, 5.6 and 9.9)."


id: 5daa10164afee897387dccb8e5f80374
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Closing the digital gap in developing countries and rural communities enables an opportunity for leapfrogging (medium \r\nevidence, medium agreement). Communication technologies (such as mobile phones) enable the participation of rural communities, \r\nespecially in developing countries, and promote technological leapfrogging, for example, decentralised renewable energies and smart \r\nfarming (Ugur and Mitra 2017; Foster and Azmeh 2020; Arfanuzzaman 2021). Digital technologies have sector-specific potentials and \r\nbarriers, and may benefit certain regions/areas/socio-economic groups more than others. For example, integrated mobility services \r\nbenefit cities more than rural and peripheral areas (OECD 2017)."


id: 25855812686f0d67c292572818ac3c96
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"efficiency of the dirty resource relative to the efficiency of other \r\ninputs (Hassler et al. 2012; Andre and Smulders 2014; Witajewski\u0002Baltvilks et al. 2017). For instance, energy efficiency improvement \r\nleads to a drop in relative demand for energy (Hassler et al. 2012; \r\nWitajewski-Baltvilks et al. 2017)."


id: 9767ecb904ff665df5b2f0a1bc15bc1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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"Researchers and policymakers alike are interested in using observed \r\nempirical patterns of learning to project future reductions in costs \r\nof technologies. Studies cutting across a  wide range of industrial \r\nsectors (not just energy) have tried to relate cost reductions to \r\ndifferent functional forms, including cost reductions as a function of \r\ntime (Moore's law) and cost reductions as a  function of production \r\nor deployment (Wright's law, also known as Henderson's law), finding \r\nthat those two forms perform better than alternatives combining \r\ndifferent factors, with costs as a function of production (Wright's law) \r\nperforming marginally better (Nagy et al. 2013). A comparison of expert \r\nelicitation and model-based forecasts of the future cost of technologies \r\nfor the energy transition indicates that model-based forecast medians \r\nwere closer to the average realised values in 2019 (Meng et al. 2021)."


id: ade667b5b507c445fe967a6b271b8fcb
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content:
"Firms change their choice of technology upon change in prices: when \r\none input (e.g.,  energy) becomes relatively expensive, firms pick \r\ntechnologies that allow them to economise on that input, according \r\nto price-induced technological change theory (Reder and Hicks \r\n1965; Samuelson 1965; Sue Wing 2006). For example, an increase \r\nin oil price will lead to a  choice of fuel-saving technologies. Such \r\na response of technological change was evident during the oil-price \r\nshocks in the 1970s (Hassler et al. 2012). Technological change that \r\nis induced by an increase in price of a resource can never lead to \r\nan increase in use of that resource. In other words, rebound effects \r\nassociated with induced technological change can never offset \r\nthe saving effect of that technological change (Antosiewicz and \r\nWitajewski-Baltvilks 2021)."


id: ba299557e34c2417e8edde9d92e54ef5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Technological change is characterised not only by its speed, but also \r\nits direction. The early works that considered the role of technology \r\nin economic and productivity growth (Solow 1957; Nelson and Phelps \r\n1966) assumed that technology can move forward along only one \r\ndimension - every improvement led to an increase in efficiency and \r\nincreased demand for all factors of production. This view, however, \r\nignores the potency of technological change to alter the otherwise \r\nfixed relation between economic growth and the use of resources."


id: 66c351d0cd57c80dcc3a39c041161f57
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"The direction of technological change depends also on the market size \r\nfor dirty technologies relative to the size of other markets (Acemoglu \r\net al. 2014). Due to this dependence, climate and trade policy choices \r\nin a single region can alter the direction of technological change at \r\nthe global level (Section 16.2.3.3)."


id: 85cf03611b2f00aa35d8761f8e62fe4c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"The value of the market for clean technologies is determined not only \r\nby current profit, but also by a  firm's expectation of future profits \r\n(Alkemade and Suurs 2012; Greaker et al. 2018; Aghion 2019). \r\nOne implication is that bolstering the credibility and durability of \r\npolicies related to low-carbon technology is crucial to accelerating \r\ntechnological change and inducing the private sector investment \r\nrequired (Helm et al. 2003), especially in the rapidly growing \r\neconomies of Asia and Africa which are on the brink of making major \r\ndecisions about the type of infrastructure they build as they grow, \r\ndevelop, and industrialise (Nemet et al. 2017)."


id: 535c6b8401d2a050591e59ff0db0463
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11939
content:
"Technological change that saves fossil fuels could decouple economic \r\ngrowth and CO2 emissions (Acemoglu et al. 2012, 2014; Hemous \r\n2016; Greaker et al. 2018). Saving of fossils could be obtained with \r\nincreasing efficiency of producing alternatives to fossils (Acemoglu \r\net al. 2012, 2014). This is the case of oil consumption by combustion \r\nengine cars which could be substituted with electric cars (Aghion \r\net al. 2016). If there is no close substitute for a 'dirty resource', then \r\nits intensity in production could still be reduced by increasing the "


id: 5fd8eb57c53fe8a05b349ac794410786
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"If governments commit to climate policies, firms expect that the future \r\nsize of markets for clean technologies will be large and they are eager \r\nto redirect research effort towards development of these technologies \r\ntoday. The commitment would also incentivise acquiring skills that \r\ncould further reduce the costs of those technologies (Aghion 2019). \r\nHowever, historical evidence shows that policies related to energy \r\nand climate over the long term have tended to change (Taylor 2012; \r\nNemet et al. 2013; Koch et al. 2016). Still, where enhancing policy \r\ndurability has proven infeasible, multiple uncorrelated potentially \r\noverlapping policies can provide sufficient incentives (Nemet 2010)."


id: 387406487f441eb9bffa73747aae4da9
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"The challenges of investing in innovation in energy when compared \r\nto other important areas, such as ICT and medicine are also reflected \r\nin the trends in venture capital funding. Research found that early\u0002stage investments in cleantech companies were more likely to fail \r\nand returned less capital than comparable investments in software \r\nand medical technology (Gaddy et al. 2017). This led to investors \r\nretreating from hardware technologies required for renewable energy \r\ngeneration and storage, and moving to software-based technologies \r\nand demand-side solutions (Bumpus and Comello 2017)."


id: 61477bc3d26339ba94c2c38d7cd83034
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"However, this chain breaks if the regions that are behind the \r\ntechnological frontier (i.e., technological followers) are not able \r\nto absorb the solutions developed by regions at the frontier. New \r\ntechnologies might fail due to deficiencies of political, commercial, \r\nindustrial, and financial institutions, which we list in Table  16.4. \r\nFor instance, countries might not benefit fully from international \r\nknowledge spillovers due to insufficient domestic R&D investment, \r\nsince local knowledge is needed to determine the appropriateness \r\nof technologies for the local market, adapting them, installing and \r\nusing effectively (Gruebler et al. 2012). From the policy perspective, \r\nthis implies that simple transfer of technologies could be insufficient \r\nto guarantee adoption of new technologies (Gruebler et al. 2012)."


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content:
"The preference for particular types of investments in renewable \r\nenergy technologies depends on investors attitude to risk (Mazzucato \r\nand Semieniuk 2018). Some investors invest in only one technology, \r\nothers may spread their investments, or invest predominantly in high\u0002risk technologies. The distribution of different types of investors will \r\naffect whether finance goes to support deployment of new high-risk \r\ntechnologies, or diffusion of more mature, less-risky technologies \r\ncharacterised by incremental innovations. The role of finance in \r\ndirecting investment is further discussed in Chapter 15, Section 15.6.2."


id: d39474b5530ea3d8f0a658db5158c9a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Research relying on patent citations has indicated that Foreign \r\nDirect Investment (FDI) is a  mechanism for firms to contribute to \r\nthe recipient country's innovation output as well as benefit from the \r\nrecipient country in industrialised countries (Branstetter 2006) and \r\nin developing countries (Newman et al. 2015). However, insights \r\nspecific for energy or climate change mitigation areas are not \r\navailable, nor is there much information about how other innovation \r\nmetrics may react to FDI."


id: 5536ee5c9dfd86232690f4117ef754bc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"A unilateral effort to reduce emissions (via a combination of climate, \r\nindustrial and trade policies) in a  coalition of regions that are \r\ntechnology leaders will reduce the cost of clean technologies, and \r\ninduce emissions reduction in the countries outside the coalition \r\n(Golombek and Hoel 2004; Di Maria and Smulders 2005; Di Maria \r\nand van der Werf 2008; Hemous 2016; van den Bijgaart 2017). \r\nThe literature suggests various mechanisms leading to this result. \r\nDi Maria and van der Werf (2008) argue that the effort to reduce \r\nemissions in one region reduces global demand for 'dirty goods'. This \r\nwill redirect global innovation towards clean technologies, leading to \r\na drop in the cost of clean production in every region."


id: b88a3f4313f357d95d5fd2761a0b3c84
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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vector_id: 29676
content:
"Finally, technologies could be not efficient in developing countries, \r\neven if they are efficient in countries at the technological frontier. For \r\ninstance, technologies that are highly capital intensive and labour \r\nsaving will be efficient only in countries where costs of capital are \r\nlow and costs of labour are high. Similarly, technologies which \r\nrequire a large number of skilled labour will be more competitive in \r\na country where skilled labour is abundant (and hence cheap) than \r\nwhere it is scarce (Basu and Weil 1998; Caselli and Coleman 2006)."


id: 44b3e46039f6ae2a97c18dd71a39e737
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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"Table 16.4 | Examples of institutional deficiencies preventing deployment of new technologies in countries behind the technological frontier."


id: 841f9a88fdd02965bd175eac5da790fb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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"macroeconomic effects of a  transition (Karkatsoulis et al. 2016). \r\nThe influence of cost and diffusion assumptions may be evaluated \r\nthrough sensitivity analysis. In the second case, costs are a function \r\nof a  choice variable within the model. For instance, technology \r\ncosts decrease as a function of either cumulative installed capacity \r\n(learning by doing) (Seebregts et al. 1998; Kypreos and Bahn 2003) \r\nor R&D investments or spillovers from other sectors and countries."


id: 69115da27eea24e2c4e89a6bb475b20e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"A variety of models are used to generate climate mitigation \r\npathways, compatible with 2degC and well below 2degC targets. \r\nThese  include integrated assessment models (IAMs), energy \r\nsystem models, computable general equilibrium models, and agent \r\nbased models. They range from global (Chapter 3) to national models \r\nand include both top-down and bottom-up approaches (Chapter 4). \r\nInnovation in energy technologies, which comprises the development \r\nand diffusion of low-, zero- and negative-carbon energy options, \r\nbut also investments to increase energy efficiency, is a key driver of \r\nemissions reductions in model-based scenarios."


id: eb9cf98e97ccdac87ad41612fd1ec18b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"Assumptions on energy technology cost developments is one of the \r\nfactors that determine the speed and magnitude of the deployment \r\nin climate-energy-economy models. The modelling is informed by the \r\nempirical literature that estimates the rates of cost reduction for energy \r\ntechnologies. A first strand of literature relies on the extrapolation of \r\nhistorical data, assuming that costs decrease either as a power law \r\nof cumulative production, exponentially with time (Nagy et al. 2013) \r\nor as a function of technical performance metrics (Koh and Magee \r\n2008). Another approach relies on expert estimates of how future \r\ncosts will evolve, including expert elicitations (Verdolini et al. 2018)."


id: aed5038c87fec99665d59eda9ec92862
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"In these models, technology costs may evolve exogenously or \r\nendogenously (Mercure et al. 2016; Krey et al. 2019). In the first case, \r\ntechnology costs are assumed to vary over time at some predefined \r\nrate, generally extrapolated from past observed patterns or based \r\non expert estimates. This formulation of cost dynamics generally \r\nunderestimates future costs (Meng et al. 2021) as, among other things, \r\nit does not capture any policy-induced carbon-saving technological \r\nchange or any spillover arising from the accumulation of national \r\nand international knowledge (Sections 16.2.2 and 16.2.3) or positive "


id: 5b9c42403b90fed67951902975e6c75d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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"To simulate possible paths of energy technology diffusion for different \r\ndecarbonisation targets, models rely on assumptions about the cost of \r\na given technology relative to the costs of other technologies, and its \r\nability to supply the energy demand under the relevant energy system \r\nand physical constraints. These assumptions include, for example, \r\nconsiderations regarding renewable intermittency, inertia on technology \r\nlifetime (for instance, under less stringent temperature scenarios, early \r\nretirement of fossil plants does not take place), distribution, capacity "


id: d45fa60e3006904a602d119f16987a64
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"Another key aspect of decarbonisation regards issues of acceptability \r\nand social inclusion in decision-making. Participatory processes \r\ninvolving stakeholders can be implemented using several methods to \r\nincorporate qualitative elements in model-based scenarios on future \r\nchange (van Vliet et al. 2010; Nikas et al. 2017, 2018; Doukas and \r\nNikas 2020; van der Voorn et al. 2020)."


id: 9bf65bfe2f8eeb6b621f782ec5f07291
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"and market growth constraints, as well as the presence of policies. \r\nThese factors change the relative price of technologies. Furthermore, \r\ntechnological diffusion in one country is also influenced by technology \r\nadvancements in other regions (Kriegler et al. 2015)."


id: f7b1c4389adb070317dd862801553eff
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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"Although the debate is still ongoing, preliminary conclusions indicate \r\nthat integrated assessment models tend to underestimate innovation \r\non energy supply but overestimate the contributions by energy \r\nefficiency (IPCC 2018b). Scenarios emerging from cost-optimal \r\nclimate-energy-economy models are too pessimistic, especially in the \r\ncase of rapidly changing technologies such as wind and batteries in \r\nthe past decade. Conversely, they tend to be too optimistic regarding \r\nthe timing of action, or the availability of a  given technology and \r\nits speed of diffusion (Shiraki and Sugiyama 2020). Furthermore, \r\nsome technological and economic transformations may emerge as \r\ntechnically feasible from IAMs, but are not realistic if taking into \r\naccount political economy, international politics, human behaviours, \r\nand cultural factors (Bosetti 2021)."


id: 83031218b025deb3ea2497439c558942
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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"There is a range of projected energy technology supply costs included \r\nin the IPCC's Sixth Assessment Report (AR6) Scenario Database \r\n(Box  16.1). Variations of costs over time and across scenarios \r\nare within ranges comparable to those observed in recent years. \r\nConversely, model results show that limiting warming to 2degC or \r\n1.5degC will require faster diffusion of installed capacity of low-carbon \r\nenergy options and a  rapid phase-out of fossil-based options. This \r\npoints to the importance of focusing on overcoming real-life barriers \r\nto technology deployment."


id: 7e8dd64e0df900edf75155dcaadf7db7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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"Box 16.1 | Comparing Observed Energy Technology Costs and Deployment Rates with \r\nProjections from AR6 Global Modelled Pathways"


id: d0a6b1e0f5690accd2d4efec1d898111
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"Currently observed costs and deployment for electricity supply technologies from a variety of sources are compared with projections \r\nfrom two different sets of scenarios contained in the AR6 Scenario database: (i) scenarios that limit warming to 3degC (>50%) and \r\nscenarios that limit warming to 4degC (>50%), and (ii) scenarios that limit warming to 2degC (>67%) or lower (AR6 Scenarios Database). \r\nGlobal aggregate costs are shown for the following technologies: coal with carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS), gas with CCS, \r\nnuclear, solar PV, onshore and offshore wind."


id: 5999a573b016c5f2c5ff1a8dc3c1c141
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"The decrease in forecasted capital costs is not large compared to current capital costs for most technologies, and does not differ much \r\nbetween the two sets of scenarios (Box 16.1, Figure 1a). For offshore wind some of the models are more optimistic than the current \r\nreality (Timilsina 2020). Several sources of current solar PV costs report values that are at the low end of the AR6 Scenario Database. \r\nBy 2050, the median technology cost forecasts decrease by between 5% for nuclear and 45-52% for solar (Box 16.1, Figure 1c)."


id: 72f6481c0a61ba8e7a66b09d49454510
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"The higher deployment in scenarios that limit warming to 2degC (>67%) or lower cannot be explained solely as a result of technology \r\ncost dynamics. In IAMs, technology deployment is also governed by system constraints that characterise both 3degC (>50%) and \r\n4degC (>50%) scenarios, for example, the flexibility of the energy system, the availability of storage technologies. From a modelling point \r\nof view, implementing more stringent climate policies to meet the 2degC limit forces models to find solutions, even if costly, to meet \r\nthose intermittency and flexibility constraints and temperature target constraints."


id: 47eedeb544b954d7f6b568a7d9b8e6dd
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"institutions that determine the innovative performance of national \r\nfirms as a  way to understand differences across countries, while \r\nLundvall (1992) focuses on the 'elements and relationships which \r\ninteract in the production, diffusion and use of new, and economically \r\nuseful, knowledge' - that is, notions of interactive learning, in which \r\nuser-producer relationships are particularly important (Lundvall \r\n1988). Building on this, various other applications of the 'innovation \r\nsystem' framework have emerged in the literature."


id: 110197c6d41f14b588592f84b4b38a7f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"The innovation process, which consists of a set of sequential phases \r\n(Section 16.2.1), is often simplified to a linear process. Yet, it is now well \r\nunderstood that it is also characterised by numerous kinds of interactions \r\nand feedbacks between the domains of knowledge  generation, \r\nknowledge translation and application, and knowledge use (Kline \r\nand Rosenberg 1986). Furthermore, it is not just invention that leads \r\nto technological change; the cumulative contribution of incremental \r\ninnovations over time can be very significant (Kline and Rosenberg \r\n1986). Innovations can come, not just from formal research and \r\ndevelopment (R&D) but also sources such as production engineers \r\nand the shop floor (Kline and Rosenberg 1986; Freeman 1995)."


id: e92796fa88e69155ec327d206b3eb52b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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"Technological innovation systems (TIS), with a technology or a set of \r\ntechnologies (more narrowly or broadly defined in different cases) as \r\nthe unit of analysis, focus on explaining what accelerates or hinders \r\ntheir development and diffusion. Carlsson and Stankiewicz (1991) \r\ndefine a  technological system as 'a dynamic network of agents \r\ninteracting in a specific economic/industrial area under a particular \r\ninstitutional infrastructure and involved in the generation, diffusion, \r\nand utilisation of technology'. More recent work takes a 'functional \r\napproach' to TIS (Hekkert et al. 2007; Bergek et al. 2008), which \r\nwas later expanded with explanations of how some of the sectoral, \r\ngeographical and political dimensions intersect with technology \r\ninnovation systems (Bergek et al. 2015; Quitzow 2015)."


id: 577cf4c317ffd0b5ebf05548e3467359
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"This section reviews the literature focusing on innovation as a systemic \r\nprocess. This now predominant view enriches the understanding of \r\ninnovation as presented in Section 16.2; it conceptualises innovation \r\nas the result of actions by, and interactions among, a large set of \r\nactors, whose activities are shaped by, and shape, the context in \r\nwhich they operate and the user group with which they are engaging. \r\nThis section aligns with the discussion of socio-technical transitions \r\n(Section 1.7.3, Chapter 5 Supplementary Material, and Cross-Chapter \r\nBox 12 in this chapter)."


id: d9b4ae0c5018b6a609ff506247010319
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"Sectoral innovation systems (SIS) are based on the understanding \r\nthat the constellation of relevant actors and institutions will vary \r\nacross industrial sectors, with each sector operating under a different \r\ntechnological regime and under different competitive or market \r\nconditions. A sectoral innovation, thus, can be defined as 'that system \r\n(group) of firms active in developing and making a sector's products \r\nand in generating and utilising a sector's technologies' (Breschi and \r\nMalerba 1997)."


id: f33581f6105c50ac7efafde6dce14802
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"The resulting overarching framework that is commonly used in the \r\ninnovation scholarship and in policy analyses is termed an 'innovation \r\nsystem', where the key constituents of the systems are actors, their \r\ninteractions, and the institutional landscape, including formal rules, \r\nsuch as laws, and informal restraints, such as culture and codes of \r\nconduct, that govern the behaviour of the actors (North 1991)."


id: cefdc4bf823f6231e0b71d1e0495ddb7
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"Regional innovation systems (RIS) and global innovation systems \r\n(GIS), recognise that the many innovation processes have a spatial \r\ndimension, where the development of system resources such as \r\nknowledge, market access, financial investment, and technology \r\nlegitimacy may well draw on actors, networks, and institutions within \r\na region (Cooke et al. 1997). In other cases, the distribution of many \r\ninnovation processes are highly internationalised and therefore \r\noutside specific territorial boundaries (Binz and Truffer 2017). \r\nImportantly, Binz and Truffer (2017) note that the GIS framework \r\n'differentiates between an industry's dominant innovation mode... "


id: ad1aa8b43858b6cb89be60ff457487cd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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"One application of this framework, national innovation systems \r\n(NIS), highlight the importance of national and regional relationships \r\nfor determining the technological and industrial capabilities and \r\ndevelopment of a  country (Lundvall 1992; Nelson 1993; Freeman \r\n1995). Nelson (1993) and Freeman (1995) highlight the role of "


id: 61323472ed8fdcd2b45ac234b4e8e482
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"Table 16.5 | Functions that the literature identified as key for well-performing technological innovation systems. Source: based on Hekkert et al. (2007) and \r\nBergek et al. (2008)."


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"The relevance of mission-oriented innovation systems (MIS), comes \r\ninto focus with the move towards mission-oriented programmes as \r\npart of the increasing innovation policy efforts to address societal \r\nchallenges. Accordingly, an MIS is seen as consisting of 'networks of \r\nagents and sets of institutions that contribute to the development \r\nand diffusion of innovative solutions with the aim to define, pursue \r\nand complete a societal mission' (Hekkert et al. 2020)."


id: 37eee8fca19f8190cb9d3ba627f97c44
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"Notably the innovation systems approach has been used in a number of \r\nclimate-relevant areas such as agriculture (Echeverria 1998; Horton and \r\nMackay 2003; Brooks and Loevinsohn 2011; Klerkx et al. 2012), energy \r\n(Sagar and Holdren 2002; OECD 2006; Gallagher et al. 2012; Wieczorek \r\net al. 2013; Darmani et al. 2014; Mignon and Bergek 2016), industry \r\n(Koasidis et al. 2020b) and transport (Koasidis et al. 2020a), and \r\nsustainable development (Anadon et al. 2016b; Clark et al. 2016; \r\nBryden and Gezelius 2017; Nikas et al. 2020)."


id: d3eb4c8f394e7529718360057f195ad1
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content:
"A number of functions can be used to understand and characterise \r\nthe performance of technological innovation systems (Hekkert et al. \r\n2007; Bergek et al. 2008). The most common functions are listed in \r\nTable 16.5."


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"Evidence from empirical case studies indicates that all the above \r\nfunctions are important and that they interact with one another \r\n(Hekkert and Negro 2009). The approach therefore serves as both \r\na rationale for and a guide to innovation policy (Bergek et al. 2010)."


id: c28403ddf2818006ab9711d4d3e6ff4b
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"Systemic failures include: infrastructural failures; hard (e.g.,  laws, \r\nregulation) and soft (e.g., culture, social norms) institutional failures; \r\ninteraction failures (strong and weak network failures); capability \r\nfailures relating to firms and other actors; lock-in; and directional, \r\nreflexivity, and coordination failures (Klein Woolthuis et  al. 2005; \r\nChaminade and Esquist 2010; Negro et  al. 2012; Weber and \r\nRohracher 2012; Wieczorek and Hekkert 2012). Most of the literature \r\nthat unpacks such failures and explores ways to overcome them is on \r\nenergy-related innovation policy. For example, Table 16.6 summarises \r\na meta-study (Negro et al. 2012) that examined cases of renewable \r\nenergy technologies trying to disrupt incumbents across a range of \r\ncountries to understand the roles, and relative importance, of the \r\n'systemic problems' highlighted in Section 16.3.1."


id: fd9fea6cd3faf181511f02d1857092db
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"Depending on the sector, specific technology characteristics, and \r\nnational and regional context, the relevance of these systemic \r\nproblems varies (Trianni et al. 2013; Bauer et al. 2017; Wesseling and \r\nVan der Vooren 2017; Koasidis et al. 2020a, b), suggesting that the \r\ninnovation policy mix has to be tailor-made to respond to the diversity "


id: 3da9e4f8e1d4628f2e1d79abc4a358cf
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"of systemic failures (Rogge et al. 2017). An illustration of how such \r\nsystemic failures have been addressed is given in Box  16.2, which \r\nshows how the Indian government designed its standards and labelling \r\nprogramme for energy-efficient air conditioners and refrigerators. \r\nThe success of this programme resulted from the careful attention to \r\nbring on board and coordinate the relevant actors and resources, the \r\ndesign of the standards, and ensuring effective administration and \r\nenforcement of the standards (Malhotra et al. 2021)."


id: b3d53d6c54f93251ddc74d8332f7a052
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"Table 16.6 | Examination of systemic problems preventing renewable energy technologies from reaching their potential, including number of case \r\nstudies in which the particular 'systemic problem' was identified. Source: Negro et al. (2012)."


id: e623f546b8f3308d20c421bc7da74a2
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"Energy efficiency is often characterised as a 'low-hanging fruit' for reducing energy use. However, systemic failures such as lack \r\nof access to capital, hidden costs of implementation, and imperfect information can result in low investments into adoption and \r\ninnovation in energy efficiency measures (Sorrell et al. 2004). To address such barriers, India's governmental Bureau of Energy \r\nEfficiency (BEE) introduced the Standards and Labelling (S&L) programme to promote innovation in energy efficient appliances in \r\n2006 (Sundaramoorthy and Walia 2017). While context-dependent, the programme's design, policies and scale-up contain lessons for \r\naddressing systemic failures elsewhere too."


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"ggg y y\r\nTo design the S&L programme, BEE drew on the international experiences and technical expertise of the Collaborative Labelling \r\nand Appliance Standards Program (CLASP) - a non-profit organisation that provides technical and policy support to governments in \r\nimplementing S&L programmes. For example, since there was no data on the efficiency of appliances in the Indian market, CLASP \r\nassisted with early data collection efforts, resulting in a focus on refrigerators and air conditioners (McNeil et al. 2008)."


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"Besides drawing from international knowledge, the involvement of manufacturers, testing laboratories, and customers was crucial for \r\nthe functioning of the innovation system."


id: e2b24194044b851de81bc0addb9d1602
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"To involve manufacturers, BEE employed three strategies to set the standards at an ambitious yet acceptable level. First, BEE enlisted \r\nthe Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) Delhi (a public technical university) to engage with manufacturers and to demonstrate \r\ncost-effective designs of energy-efficient appliances. Second, BEE agreed to make the standards voluntary from 2006 to 2010. In \r\nreturn, the manufacturers agreed to mandatory and progressively more stringent standards starting in 2010. Third, BEE established \r\na  multistakeholder committee with representation from BEE, the Bureau of Indian Standards, appliance manufacturers, test \r\nlaboratories, independent experts, and consumer groups (Jairaj et al. 2016) to ensure that adequately stringent standards are \r\nnegotiated every two years."


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"At this time, India had virtually no capacity for independent testing of appliances. Here, too, BEE used multiple approaches towards \r\ncreating the actors and resources needed for the innovation system to function. First, BEE funded the Central Power Research Institute \r\n(CPRI) - a national laboratory for applied research, testing and certification of electrical equipment - to set up refrigerator and AC \r\ntesting facilities. Second, they invited bids from private laboratories, thus creating a demand for testing facilities. Third, BEE developed \r\ntesting protocols in partnership with universities. Australian standards for testing frost-free refrigerators were adopted until local \r\nstandards were developed. Thus, once the testing laboratories, protocols and benchmark prices for testing were in place, the appliance \r\nmanufacturers could employ their services."


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content:
"Finally, a customer outreach programme was conducted from 2006 to 2008 to inform customers about energy-efficient appliances, to \r\nenable them to interpret the labels correctly, and to understand their purchase decisions and information sources (Jain et al. 2018; Joshi \r\net al. 2019). BEE initiated a capacity-building programme for retailers to be an information source for customers. A comprehensive \r\ndocument with details of different models and labels was provided to retailers, together with a condensed booklet to be shared \r\nwith customers."


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content:
"Adapting policies to technologies and local context\r\nWhile many of India's standards and testing protocols were based on international standards, they needed to be adapted to the \r\nIndian context. For example, because of higher temperatures in India, the reference outside temperature of 32degC for refrigerators was \r\nchanged to 36degC."


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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12586
content:
"AC testing protocols also had to be adapted because of the emergence of inverter-based ACs. Existing testing done only at a single \r\ntemperature did not value inverter-based ACs' better average performance as compared to fixed-speed ACs over a range of temperatures. \r\nThus, the Indian Seasonal Energy Efficiency Ratio (ISEER) was developed for Indian temperature conditions in 2015 by studying \r\nInternational Organization for Standardization (ISO) standards and through consultations with manufacturers (Mukherjee et al. 2020)."


id: 44d90242623b696cd6ae78c408f8283e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9340
content:
"These measures had multiple effects on technological change. As a result of stringent standards, India has some of the most efficient \r\nrefrigerators globally. In the case of ACs, the ISEER accelerated technological change by favouring inverter-based ACs over fixed-speed \r\nACs, driving down their costs and increasing their market shares (BEE 2020)."


id: 6d7c499b690d579a7b5df21c570835d6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"As the S&L programme was expanded, BEE took measures to standardise, codify and automate it. For example, to process a high \r\nvolume of applications for labels efficiently, an online application portal with objective and transparent certification criteria was \r\ncreated. This gave certainty to the manufacturers, enabling diversity and faster diffusion of energy-efficient appliances. Thus by 2019, \r\nthe programme expanded to cover thousands of products across 23 appliance types (BEE 2020)."


id: 66c2c289543cf3d491f47cdc58e071d6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Besides issuing labels, the enforcement of standards also needed to be scaled up efficiently. BEE developed protocols for randomly \r\nsampling appliances for testing. Manufacturers were given a fixed period to rectify products that did not meet the standards, failing \r\nwhich they would be penalised and the test results would be made public."


id: 7dbc4f7e8dcd07625214501fa9d5560c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"can (relatively) easily be obtained and compared. In the realm of \r\nenergy-related innovation, RD&D investments remain the single \r\nmost-used indicator to measure inputs into the innovation process \r\n(Box 16.3). Patent counts are a widely used indicator of the outputs \r\nof the innovation process, especially because they are detailed \r\nenough to provide information on specific adaptation and mitigation \r\ntechnologies. Mitigation and adaptation technologies have their own \r\nclassification (Y02) with the European Patent Office (EPO) (Veefkind \r\net al. 2012; Angelucci et al. 2018), which can be complemented with \r\nkeyword search and manual inspection (Persoon et al. 2020; Surana \r\net al. 2020b). However, using energy-related patents as an indicator of \r\ninnovative activities is complicated by several issues (de Rassenfosse "


id: 2f6aca89b1b5df5c095a05e9bb0a0425
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5606
content:
"Assessing the state of technological innovation helps in understanding \r\nthe progress of current efforts and policies in meeting stated \r\nobjectives, and how we might design policies to do better."


id: 3dac79020133f0812c65a92f99ce521b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Traditionally, input measures such as research, development and \r\ndemonstration (RD&D) investments, and output measures such \r\nas scientific publication and patents were used to characterise \r\ninnovation activities (Freeman and Soete 2009). This is partly because \r\nof the successes of specialised R&D efforts (Freeman 1995), the \r\npredominant linear model of innovation, and because such measures "


id: f20077cf3af11b8829285aadb8ccf84e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Public energy R&D investments are a  crucial driver of energy technology innovation (Sections  16.2.1.1 and 16.4.1). Box  16.3, \r\nFigure 1 shows the time profile of energy-related RD&D budgets in OECD countries as well as some key events which coincided with \r\ndevelopments of spending (IEA 2019). Such data on other countries, in particular developing countries, are not available, although \r\nrecent evidence suggests that expenditures are increasing there (IEA 2020c). The IEA collected partial data from China and India in the \r\ncontext of Mission Innovation, but this is only available starting from 2014 and thus not included in Figure 1."


id: 89e771f152c864c822e80da384494952
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"The figure illustrates two points. First, energy-related RD&D has risen slowly in the last 20 years, and is now reaching levels comparable \r\nwith the peak of energy RD&D investments following the two oil crises. Second, over time there has been a reorientation of the \r\nportfolio of funded energy technologies away from nuclear energy. In 2019, around 80% of all public energy RD&D spending was \r\non low-emission technologies - energy efficiency, carbon dioxide capture, use and storage, renewables, nuclear, hydrogen, energy \r\nstorage and cross-cutting issues such as smart grids. A more detailed discussion of the time profile of RD&D spending in IEA countries, \r\nincluding as a share of GDP, is available in IEA (2020b).\r\nFiiTS26"


id: 1f75297bfeb81dfad178a0224dc702d0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2742
content:
"may have contributed to a reduction in private equity and venture \r\ncapital finance for renewable energy technologies after the boom of \r\nthe late 2000s (Frankfurt School-UNEP Centre/BNEF 2019)."


id: b4dbc3c3c65ace5e367018bff17e9393
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29068
content:
"et al. 2013; Hascic and Migotto 2015; Jaffe and de Rassenfosse 2017), \r\nincluding the fact that the scope of what are considered climate \r\nmitigation inventions is not always clear or straightforward."


id: 3336ea87a9151254aaa70f2b73d4c7d0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6266
content:
"Quantitative indicators such as energy-related RD&D spending are \r\ninsufficient for the assessment of innovation systems (David and \r\nForay 1995): they only provide a partial view into innovation activities, \r\nand one that is potentially misleading (Freeman and Soete 2009). \r\nQualitative indicators measuring the more intangible aspects of \r\nthe innovation process and system are crucial to fully understand the \r\ninnovation dynamics in a climate or energy technologies or sectors \r\n(Gallagher et al. 2006), including in relation to adopting an adaptive \r\nlearning strategy and supporting learning through demonstration \r\nprojects (Chan et al. 2017)."


id: 4bbec03c0077a1338321660244ad3d10
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Conversely, private energy R&D investments and investments by \r\nfinancing firms cannot be precisely assessed for a number of reasons, \r\nincluding limited reporting and the difficulty of singling out energy\u0002related investments. This inability to precisely quantify private \r\ninvestments in energy R&D leads to a patchy understanding of the \r\nenergy innovation system, and how private energy R&D investments \r\nresponds to public energy R&D investments. Overall, evidence shows \r\nthat some of the industrial sectors that are important for meeting \r\nclimate goals (electricity, agriculture and forestry, mining, oil and gas, \r\nand other energy-intensive industrial sectors) are investing relatively \r\nsmall fractions of sales on R&D (medium evidence, high agreement) \r\n(Jasmab and Pollitt 2005; Jamasb and Pollitt 2008; Sanyal and Cohen \r\n2009; European Commission 2015; American Energy Innovation \r\nCouncil 2017; Gaddy et al. 2017; National Science Board 2018)."


id: b1dace18b744d6c707b0b59068112c09
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Financing firms also play an important role in the energy innovation \r\nprocess, but data availability is limited. The venture capital (VC) \r\nfinancing model, used to overcome the 'valley of death' in the biotech \r\nand IT space (Frank et al. 1996), has not been as suitable for hardware \r\nstart-ups in the energy space: for example, the percentage of exit \r\noutcomes in cleantech start-ups was almost half of that in medical \r\nstart-ups, and less than a  third of software investments (Gaddy \r\net al. 2017). The current VC model and other private finance do \r\nnot sufficiently cover the need to demonstrate energy technologies \r\nat scale (Anadon 2012; Mazzucato 2013; Nemet et al. 2018). This \r\ngreater difficulty in reaching the market compared to other sectors "


id: cd83f5c680577e69f73a2270242f7d18
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33488
content:
"Table 16.7 | Commonly used quantitative innovation metrics, organised by inputs, outputs and outcomes. Sources: based on Sagar and Holdren (2002); \r\nGallagher et al. (2006, 2011, 2012); Hekkert et al. (2007); Gruebler et al. (2012); Hu et al. (2018); Miremadi et al. (2018); Avelino et al. (2019)."


id: 83e4746f5e98be7d390cf8ec1311019
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"No single country persisted in developing solar photovoltaic (PV): five countries each made a  distinct contribution, \r\nwith each leader relinquishing its lead. The free flow of ideas, people, machines, finance, and products across countries \r\nexplains the success of solar PVs. Barriers to knowledge flow delay innovation."


id: 2805e057397386a4de8643e5b9780572
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4239
content:
"Solar PV has attracted interest for decades, and until recently was seen as an intriguing novelty, serving a niche, but widely dismissed \r\nas a serious answer to climate change and other social problems associated with energy use. Since the IPCC's Fifth Assessment \r\nReport (AR5), PV has become a substantial global industry - a truly disruptive technology that has generated trade disputes among \r\nsuperpowers, threatened the solvency of large energy companies, and prompted reconsideration of electric utility regulation rooted in \r\nthe 1930s. More favourably, its continually falling costs and rapid adoption are improving air quality and facilitating climate change \r\nmitigation. PV is now so inexpensive that it is important in an expanding set of countries. In 2020, 41 countries, in six continents, had \r\neach installed at least 1GW of solar (IRENA 2020a)."


id: 529d7f8f54ba2fba23d58ac533eb5d33
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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content:
"The cost of generating electricity from solar PV is now lower in sunny locations than running existing fossil fuel power plants (IEA \r\n2020c) (Chapter 6). Prices in 2020 were below where even the most optimistic experts expected they would be in 2030."


id: 9ddd9e1c2761a1b181ce9cf03ff2c8a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"The costs of solar PV modules have fallen by more than a factor of 10,000 since they were first commercialised in 1957. This four \r\norders of magnitude cost reduction from the first commercial application in 1958 until 2018 can be summarised as the result of \r\ndistinct contributions by the USA, Japan, Germany, Australia, and China - in that sequence (Green 2019; Nemet 2019). As shown in \r\nBox 16.4, Figure 1, PV improved as the result of:"


id: 1eb295afb9366eebfa58d273e1b92bbe
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2604
content:
"Box 16.4, Figure 1 | Milestones in the development of low-cost solar photovoltaics. Source: Nemet (2019)"


id: 75695552e0dd9f09b9511ab310ecde28
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17888
content:
"vii. a cohort of adopters with high willingness to pay, accessing information from neighbours, and installer firms that learnt from their \r\ninstallation experience as well as that of their competitors, to lower soft costs (Ardani and Margolis 2015; Gillingham et al. 2016)."


id: 5411dfa3c80afb7be13966a525a6b47e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12066
content:
"While many technologies do not fit into the solar model, some - including micro nuclear reactors and direct air capture - also have modular \r\ncharacteristics that make them suitable for following solar's path and benefit from solar's drivers. However, it took solar PV 60 years to \r\nbecome cheap, which is too slow for addressing climate change if a technology is now still at the lab scale. A challenge in learning from \r\nthe solar model is therefore how to use public policy to speed up innovation over much shorter time frames, for example, 15 or fewer years."


id: 7e9c28975acaa336832d726ea474117c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"This section focuses on innovation policies and institutions which are \r\nimplemented at the national level. Whenever relevant, this section \r\nhighlights examples of policies or initiatives that delve more deeply \r\ninto the main high-level sectors: power, transport, industry, buildings, \r\nand agriculture, forestry and other land-use (AFOLU). Whenever \r\npossible, this section also discusses issues in policy selection, design, \r\nand implementation that have been identified as more relevant in \r\ndeveloping countries and emerging economies."


id: 3202b30065ae6b84a3edf2f106da05b0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6053
content:
"Learning from the innovation systems literature, some of the \r\nrecent policy focus is not only directed on innovation policies \r\nthat can optimise the innovation system to improve economic \r\ncompetitiveness and growth, but also policies that can induce \r\nstrategic directionality and guide processes of transformative \r\nchanges towards desired societal objectives (Mitcham 2003; Steneck \r\n2006). Therefore, the aim is to connect innovation policy with societal \r\nchallenges and transformative changes through engagement with \r\na  variety of actors and ideas and incorporating equity, nowadays \r\noften referred to as a 'just transition' (Newell and Mulvaney 2013; \r\nSwilling et al. 2016; Heffron and McCauley 2018; Jasanoff 2018) \r\n(Chapters 1 and 17). This new policy paradigm is opening up a new \r\ndiscursive space, shaping policy outcomes, and giving rise to the \r\nemerging idea of transformative innovation policy (Fagerberg 2018; \r\nDiercks et al. 2019)."


id: abb464dd667104df4c5c9f487f31e675
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Overall, this section shows that national and subnational policies \r\nand institutions are one of the main factors determining the \r\nredirection and acceleration of technological innovation and low\u0002emission technological change (Anadon et al. 2016b; Rogge and \r\nReichardt 2016; Ahman et al. 2017; Anadon et al. 2017; Roberts \r\net al. 2018) (robust evidence, high agreement). Both technology \r\npush (e.g., scientific training, research and development (R&D)) and \r\ndemand pull (e.g., economic and fiscal support and regulatory policy \r\ninstruments), as well as instruments promoting knowledge flows and \r\nespecially research-firm technology transfer, can be part of the mix \r\n(robust evidence, medium agreement) (Sections 16.2 and 16.3)."


id: 1f25d2053ac377000344d10493dee14e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Transformative innovation policy has a  broader coverage of the \r\ninnovation process with a  much wider participation of actors, \r\nactivities and modes of innovation. It is often expressed as socio\u0002technical transitions (Elzen et al. 2004; Turnheim and Sovacool \r\n2020) or societal transformations (Scoones 2015; Roberts et al. \r\n2018). Transformative innovation policy encompasses different \r\nideas and concepts that aim to address the societal challenges \r\ninvolving a  variety of discussions, including social innovation \r\n(Mulgan 2012), complex adaptive systems (Gunderson and \r\nHolling 2002), eco-innovation (Kemp 2011) and a framework for \r\nresponsible innovation (Stilgoe et al. 2013), value-sensitive design \r\n(Friedman and Hendry 2019) and social-technical integration \r\n(Fisher et al. 2006)."


id: 622bf3c6ca8a24239f61cf2be4da33b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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content:
"Public R&D investments in energy and climate-related technologies \r\nhave a positive impact on innovation outcomes (medium evidence,\r\nhigh agreement). The evidence on procurement is generally positive, \r\nbut limited. The economic policy instruments that can be classified \r\nas market pull instruments when it comes to the competitiveness \r\noutcome (at least in the short term) is more mixed. The review of the \r\nliterature in this section shows that market pull policy instruments \r\nhad positive but also some negative impacts on outcomes in some \r\ninstances on some aspects of competitiveness and distributional \r\noutcomes (medium evidence, medium agreement) (Penasco et al. \r\n2021). For several of them - such as carbon taxes or feed-in tariffs - \r\nthe evidence of a positive impact on innovation is more consistent \r\nthan the others. Evidence suggests that complementary policies \r\nor improved policy design can mitigate such short-term negative \r\ndistributional impacts."


id: 116b82a301d07cc99258d6ea6776cbff
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 261
content:
"Government policies can influence changes in technologies, as well \r\nas changes to the systems they support (Somanathan et al. 2014) \r\n(Chapter 13 and Sections 16.2 and 16.3)."


id: 1b4ae4dd42e3ccb8cce6ae36b074fdfa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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content:
"Technology-push policy instruments stimulate innovation by increasing \r\nthe supply of new knowledge through funding  and  performing \r\nresearch; increasing the supply of trained scientists and engineers \r\nwhich contribute to knowledge-generation and provide technological \r\nopportunities, which private firms can decide to commercialise \r\n(Mowery and Rosenberg 1979; Anadon and Holdren 2009; Nemet \r\n2009b; Mazzucato 2013)."


id: d788d549778ff8aa9f16209b7762f712
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Governments can also stimulate technological change through \r\ndemand-pull (or market-pull) instruments which support market \r\ncreation or expansion and technology transfer, and thus promote \r\nlearning by doing, economies of scale, and automation (Section 16.2). \r\nDemand-pull policy instruments include regulation, carbon prices, \r\nsubsidies that reduce the cost of adoption, public procurement, \r\nand intellectual property regulation. Typically, technology push is \r\nespecially important for early-stage technologies, characterised \r\nby higher uncertainty and lower appropriability (Section  16.2); \r\ndemand-pull instruments become more relevant in the later stages \r\nof the innovation process (Mowery and Rosenberg 1979; Anadon and \r\nHoldren 2009; Nemet 2009b) (Section 16.2)."


id: 999763f6342d93a41017a65bcfc21139
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24255
content:
"Section  16.3 characterised technological innovation as a  systemic, \r\nnon-linear and dynamic process. Figure 16.1 below presents a stylised \r\n(and necessarily incomplete) view connecting the innovation process \r\nstages presented in Section  16.2, some of the key mechanisms in \r\ntechnology innovation systems, and some of the decarbonisation \r\npolicy instruments that have been assessed in terms of their impact \r\non technological innovation outcomes in Section  16.4.4. As noted \r\nin the caption and discussed in Section  16.4.4, regulatory policy \r\ninstruments also shape the early stages of technology development."


id: 57fa9ea33f5e977fda362df7bb44cf0b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12740
content:
"Table 16.8 | Overview of policy instrument types covered in Chapter 13 and their correspondence to the subset of policy instrument types reviewed \r\nChapter 16 with a focus on innovation outcomes."


id: 89383b18103eeebc077d7fb341ce837a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21310
content:
"Figure 16.1 | Technology innovation process and the (illustrative) and role of different public policy instruments (on the right-hand side). Source: adapted \r\nfrom IEA (2020a). Note that, as shown in Section 16.4.4, demand-pull instruments in the regulatory instrument category, for instance, can also shape the early stages of the \r\ninnovation process. Their position on the latter stages is highlighted in this figure because typically these instruments have been introduced in latter stages of the development \r\nof the technology."


id: 856653d6086e9c6b67c13322bfcff1c7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20608
content:
"As novel technologies become cost-competitive, opposition of \r\nincumbents usually grows, as well as the dangers of lock-in that can \r\nbe posed by the new winner. Addressing this involves adapting policy \r\n(robust evidence, high agreement)."


id: aa044c8755303ed61dbd251acde7ced9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"The emergence of industries and support groups can lead \r\nto more sustained support for innovation policies (Meckling \r\net al. 2015; Schmidt and Sewerin 2017 Stokes and Breetz 2018; \r\nMeckling 2019; Meckling and Nahm 2019; Schmid et al. 2020). \r\nConversely, policies shaping technology innovation contribute to \r\nthe creation and evolution of different stakeholder groups (robust \r\nevidence, high agreement). Most of the literature on the role of \r\nthe politics and interest groups has focused on renewable energy "


id: fc61362265993379ddf9850b98b257e4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41767
content:
"While it is very difficult to attribute a causal relationship between \r\na  particular policy instrument implementation and different \r\ninnovation indicators, given the complexity of the innovation system \r\n(Section 16.3), there is a large volume of quantitative and qualitative \r\nliterature aiming to identify such an impact."


id: a3a96ad069503682a4cd241fca48c703
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25996
content:
"Overall, public procurement has high potential to incentivise \r\ninnovation in climate technologies, but the evidence is mixed, \r\nparticularly in developing countries (limited evidence, medium \r\nagreement). Public procurement accounted for 13% of gross \r\ndomestic product (GDP) in OECD in 2013 and much more in some "


id: e6279472acdd6af7e08fe02e9686739a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Table 16.9 | Outcomes (first row) and indicators (second row) to evaluate the impact of policies shaping innovation to foster carbon neutral economies.\r\nSources: innovation outcomes indicators are sourced from Del Rio and Cerda (2014), Grubb et al. (2021) and Penasco et al. (2021); the indicators under the competitiveness \r\nand distributional effects criteria are sourced from Penasco et al. (2021)."


id: fc11e9d0f4d2353c6920c6cca5dc7e28
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41709
content:
"In 2005, the Dutch national government acknowledged a move in the House of Representatives to utilise their annual spending power \r\nto promote the market for sustainable goods and services, as well as to act as a role model. Hence, a policy for environmentally-friendly \r\nprocurement was developed and implemented across the national, local and provincial governments. Subsequently, sustainable public \r\nprocurement has expanded into a multidimensional policy in The Netherlands, accommodating policies on green public procurement, \r\nbio-based public procurement, international social criteria, social return on investment, innovation-oriented public procurement and \r\ncircular economy."


id: b5affe06161158f91a50931af1910e9f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29191
content:
"Public R&D investments in the energy, renewables, and environment \r\nspace are generally associated with positive impacts on industrial \r\ndevelopment or 'competitiveness outcome' (robust evidence, medium \r\nagreement). In a  number of cases, negligible or negative impacts \r\nemerge (Doblinger et al. 2019; Goldstein et al. 2020; Penasco et al. 2021).\r\nThe majority of the 15 analyses rely on ex post quantitative methods, \r\nwhile only four use ex ante modelling approaches. Also, in this case, \r\nthe vast majority of the evidence is from industrialised countries."


id: cd2dc67940ccbd70fe6ebed0d3c72c06
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33434
content:
"There is limited and mixed evidence regarding the (positive or \r\nnegative) impact of public procurement for low-carbon or climate \r\ntechnologies in developed countries (limited evidence, low \r\nagreement), and none from developing countries. All of the four \r\nevaluations identified in the Penasco et al. (2021) review relied \r\non qualitative methods. One found  a  positive impact, another \r\na negative impact and two others found no impact. All of the studies \r\ncovered European country experiences."


id: a705100d79b9ba9783ad87a76340458d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26591
content:
"R&D and procurement policies have a positive impact on distributional \r\noutcomes (limited evidence, high agreement). Penasco et al. (2021) \r\nidentify three evaluations of the impact of RD&D funding on \r\ndistributional outcomes (two using quantitative methods and one ex \r\nante theoretical methods) and one of procurement on distributional \r\noutcomes (relying on qualitative analysis)."


id: 5542516ffe39ea9f84f8be10abaf95e8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12278
content:
"Block funding, which tends to be more flexible, can lead to research \r\nthat is more productive or novel, but there are other factors that can \r\naffect the extent to which block funding can lead to more or less \r\nnovel outcomes (limited evidence, medium agreement). Research \r\non national research laboratories, which conduct at least 30%  of \r\nall research in 68 countries around the world (Anadon et al. 2016a), \r\nare a widespread mechanism to carry out public R&D and allocate \r\nfunds, but assessments of their performance is limited to developed \r\ncountries. R&D priorities are also guided by institutions, and \r\nresearch focused on general technology innovation policy finds that \r\ninstitutions often do not embody the goals of the poor or marginalised \r\n(Anadon et al. 2016b)."


id: 1449583ec63a670f466029e4b2887f44
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 784
content:
"The ability of a given R&D policy instrument to impact innovation and \r\ncompetitiveness depends to some extent on policy design features \r\n(limited evidence, high agreement). As discussed in Section 16.4.4.4, \r\nthis is not unique to R&D funding. Most of these assessments use \r\na  limited number of indicators (e.g.,  patents and publications and \r\nfollow-on private financing, firm growth and survival, respectively), \r\nand are focused on the energy sector, and on the USA and other \r\nindustrialised countries. Extrapolating to emerging economies and \r\nlow-income countries is difficult. There is no evidence on the impact \r\nof different ways of allocating public energy R&D investments in the \r\ncontext of developing countries."


id: 7df028e3426cffdad67c14af9b896e8b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19338
content:
"In the case of the US Department of Energy, block funding that can be \r\nquickly allocated to novel projects (such as that allocated to National \r\nLabs as part of the Laboratory Directed Research and Development \r\nfunding) has been found to be associated with improved innovation \r\nindicators (Anadon et al. 2016a). Research in Japan on R&D funding \r\nin general (not for climate-related technologies) however, indicates \r\nthat R&D funds allocated competitively result in higher novelty for \r\n'high status' (the term used in the paper to refer to senior male \r\nresearchers), while block funding was associated with research \r\nof higher novelty for 'lower status' researchers (e.g., junior female \r\nresearchers) (Wang et al. 2018)."


id: 7797b60f883fab24fd13052b1015af76
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18242
content:
"As for DARPA, ARPA-E programme managers use an active management approach that involves empowering programme manages to \r\nmake decisions about funding allocation, milestones and goals. ARPA-E managers also differ from other R&D allocation mechanisms \r\nin that ARPA-E staff retain some control on the funded projects after the allocation of funds. As argued by Azoulay et al. (2019), \r\neven though this relative control over the project can result in a reduction in the flexibility of funded researchers, some 'exploration' \r\nhappens at the programme manager level."


id: dfb0014a14697f931ae1a15e1b15c38c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36600
content:
"Research on ARPA-E also sheds light on the process of project selection, or how programme managers decide what projects to fund. \r\nProgramme managers do not just follow the rankings of peer reviewers (sometimes projects with very disparate rankings were funded) \r\nand in many cases programme managers reported using information from review comments instead of the rankings (Goldstein and \r\nKearney 2020). Azoulay et al. (2019) suggest that, if expert disagreement is a useful proxy for uncertainty in research, then the use of \r\nindividual discretion in ARPA-E would result in a portfolio of projects with a higher level of uncertainty, as defined by disagreement \r\namong reviewers. Moreover, under the premise that uncertainty is a corollary to novelty, individual discretion is an antidote to novelty \r\nbias in peer review."


id: 44f4a75643939481b2d8b9d4ca8eb1e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9362
content:
"Narayanamurti 2018). In addition, research analysing the first cohort of cleantech start-ups has found that start-ups supported by \r\nARPA-E had more innovative outcomes when compared to those that had applied but not received funding, with others that had not \r\nreceived any government support, and with others that had received other types of government R&D support (Goldstein et al. 2020). \r\nOverall, the mission-oriented ARPA-E approach has been successful in the USA when it comes to innovation outcomes. The extent to \r\nwhich it can yield the same outcomes in other geographies with different innovation and financing environments remains unknown. \r\n(limited evidence, high agreement)."


id: ded6835eb51de8adec9cbf3fa84a9889
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36469
content:
"Historical analyses of the relative importance of demand pull and \r\ntechnology push are clear: both are needed to provide robust \r\nincentives for investment in innovation. Interactions between them \r\nare central as their combination enables innovators to connect \r\na technical opportunity with a market opportunity (Freeman 1995; \r\nJacobsson et al. 2004; Grubler and Wilson 2013). It is important to \r\nnote that these market pull policies are often put in place primarily \r\nto  meet security and/or environmental goals, although innovation \r\nand competitiveness are sometimes also pursued explicitly."


id: 2d9fb2d37ede916a3a7aa4da84bd7a69
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5321
content:
"Public financing for R&D and research collaboration in the energy \r\nsector is important for small firms, at least in industrialised countries, \r\nand it does not seem to crowd out private investment in R&D (medium \r\nevidence, high agreement). Small US and UK firms accrue more \r\npatents and financing when provided with cash incentives for R&D \r\nin the form of grants (Howell 2017; Pless 2019). US cleantech start\u0002ups which partner with government partners for joint technology \r\ndevelopment or licensing partnerships accrue more patents and \r\nfollow-on financing (Doblinger et al. 2019)."


id: 26802d6ca18c517f384bd70ab719d473
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3939
content:
"Overall, the body of literature on public R&D funding design in \r\nenergy- and climate-related technologies provides some high-level \r\nguidance on how to make the most of these direct RD&D investments \r\nin energy technologies in the climate change mitigation space, \r\nincluding: giving researchers and technical experts autonomy and \r\ninfluence over funding decisions; incorporating technology transfer in \r\nresearch organisations; focusing demonstration projects on learning; \r\nincentivising international collaboration in energy research; adopting \r\nan adaptive learning strategy; and making funding stable and \r\npredictable (Narayanamurti et al. 2009; Narayanamurti and Odumosu \r\n2016; Chan et al. 2017) (medium evidence, high agreement)."


id: 428d0e58cf19220f8924cb3fa640337a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8903
content:
"Overall evidence suggests that the emissions trading schemes, as \r\ncurrently designed, have not significantly contributed to innovation \r\noutcomes (medium evidence, medium/high agreement)."


id: b9070ec8b7ad71c7fc3dc530904bdb71
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29757
content:
"Without carefully designed public funding for demonstration efforts, \r\noften in a  cost-shared manner with industry, the experimentation \r\nat larger scales needed for more novel technologies needed for \r\nclimate change mitigation may not take place. (medium evidence,\r\nhigh agreement). Government funding, specifically for technology \r\ndemonstration projects, for RD&D in energy technologies, plays \r\na crucial supporting role (Section 16.2.1). Governments can facilitate \r\nknowledge spillovers between firms, between countries, and \r\nbetween technologies (Cohen et al. 2002; Baudry and Bonnet 2019) \r\n(Section 16.2)."


id: a9ce15dafe4113973285a20882ad705
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27097
content:
"Demand-pull policies such as tradeable green certificates, taxes, \r\nor auctions, are essential to support scaling-up efforts (Remer and \r\nMattos 2003; Wilson 2012; Nahm and Steinfeld 2014). Just as for \r\nR&D investments, research has indicated that effective demand \r\npull needs to be credible, durable, and aligned with other policies \r\n(Nemet et al. 2017) and that the effectiveness of different demand\u0002pull instruments depends on policy design (del Rio and Kiefer 2021). "


id: 6944e9bb6d92086970975f44a2bfddbc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15786
content:
"The impact of carbon taxes on innovation outcomes is more positive \r\nthan that for emissions trading schemes, but the evidence is more \r\nlimited (limited evidence, medium agreement). Assessments of their \r\nimpact on innovation metrics have been very limited, with only four \r\nstudies (three quantitative and one ex ante). Three of the studies \r\nfound a positive impact of carbon taxes on innovation outcomes, and \r\none found no impact (Penasco et al. 2021)."


id: 49a194cfbdc961380ffa249451f501bb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10183
content:
"There is no explicit literature on the ability of green public banks, and \r\ntargeted loans, and loan guarantees to lead to upstream innovation \r\ninvestments and activities, although there is evidence on their role \r\nin deployment (Geddes et al. 2018). This notwithstanding, the key \r\nrole of these institutions is in the innovation system (OECD 2015b; \r\nGeddes et al. 2018) (Sections 16.2.1 and 16.3) and the belief that \r\nthey can de-risk scale-up and the testing of business models (Geddes \r\net al. 2018; Probst et al. 2021) (Chapter 17)."


id: 17dc53025253d99e53dd8c5f29858ab7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1401
content:
"There is evidence of the impact of building codes on innovation \r\noutcomes (Penasco et al. 2021). Only two studies assessed \r\ncompetitiveness impacts (one identified positive impacts and \r\none negligible ones) and three studies identified distributional \r\nimpacts, all positive."


id: 3f01f855a3d909304b7af84e609103fd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8272
content:
"There is mixed evidence of the impact of tradeable green certificates \r\n(TGCs) on innovation (limited evidence, low agreement) and \r\ncompetitiveness (limited evidence, low agreement). Out of the \r\n11 evaluations in Penasco et al. (2021), six found no impact, \r\ntwo  a  positive impact, and three a  negative impact. All of them \r\nused a qualitative research approach. Of the six studies focusing on \r\ncompetitiveness outcomes, three conclude that TGCs have had no \r\nimpact on competitiveness, while two indicate a negative impact and\r\none a  positive impact. Only one of the studies was quantitative, \r\nand did not identify an impact on competitiveness."


id: c3608a0aecb768739f51817fc9328bd8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31644
content:
"Overall, the evidence on the impact of the market pull policy \r\ninstruments covered in Section  16.4.4.4 when it comes to the \r\ncompetitiveness outcome (at least in the short term) is more mixed. \r\nFor some of them, the evidence of a positive impact on innovation \r\nis more consistent than the others (for carbon taxes or FITs, for \r\nexample). Penasco et al. (2021) found that the disagreements in the \r\nevidence regarding the positive, negative or no impact of a policy on \r\ncompetitiveness or distributional outcomes can often be explained by \r\ndifferences in policy design, differences in geographical or temporal \r\ncontext (since the review included evidence from countries from all \r\nover the world), or on how policy mixes may have affected the ability \r\nof the research design of the underlying papers to separate the \r\nimpact of the policy under consideration from the others."


id: b3ac5fe4c53add5792b936d0be39c7b1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28855
content:
"TGCs are associated with the existence of negative distributional \r\nimpacts in most applications (medium evidence, high agreement). \r\nTen out of 12 studies identify the existence of some negative impacts. \r\nAll but one of these studies (which focused on India) are based on \r\nanalysis of policies implemented in industrialised countries."


id: fffcf13247328fa8501a0dcf786013d6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42430
content:
"There is medium evidence that the introduction of flexible, \r\nperformance-based environmental regulation on energy efficiency in \r\ngeneral (e.g., efficiency standards) can stimulate innovative responses \r\nin firms (Ambec et al. 2013; Popp 2019) (medium evidence, high \r\nagreement). Evidence comes from both observational studies that \r\nexamine patenting, R&D or technological responses to regulatory \r\ninterventions, and from surveys and qualitative case studies in \r\nwhich firms report regulatory compliance as a driving force for the \r\nintroduction of environmentally-beneficial innovations (Grubb et al. \r\n2021). While the literature examining the impact of environmental \r\nregulation on innovation is large, there have been fewer studies on \r\nthe innovation effects of minimum energy or emissions performance \r\nregulations specifically relating to climate mitigation. We discuss in \r\nturn two types of efficiency regulations: on vehicles, and on appliances."


id: 8fa914644e44241ffd48f33283162d80
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22485
content:
"The impact of tradeable white certificates in innovation is largely \r\npositive, but the evidence is limited (limited evidence, medium/\r\nhigh agreement). Out of four evaluations, only one of which was \r\nquantitative, three report a  positive impact and one reports no \r\nimpact (Penasco et al. 2021). The impact of white certificates on \r\ncompetitiveness is positive (limited evidence, high agreement) \r\nwhile the impact on distributional outcomes is very mixed (limited \r\nevidence, low agreement). Two theoretical studies report positive \r\ncompetitiveness impacts. Out of 11 evaluations of distributional \r\noutcomes, eight rely on theoretical ex ante approaches. Of \r\nthe 11 evaluations: seven reported positive impacts (four of \r\nthem  using theoretical methods); three indicated negative impacts \r\n(using theoretical methods); and one reported no impact."


id: a48c6fe89633a6988e0c3058d51adbaa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26162
content:
"The announcement, introduction and tightening of vehicle fleet \r\nefficiency or greenhouse gas (GHG) emission standards either at \r\nthe national or sub-national level positively impacts innovation as \r\nmeasured by patents (Barbieri 2015) or vehicle characteristics (Knittel \r\n2011; Kiso 2019) as summarised in a review by Grubb et al. (2021). \r\nDetailed studies on the innovation effects of national pollutant \r\n(rather than energy) regulations on automotive innovation also \r\nindicate that introducing or tightening performance standards has \r\ndriven technological change (Lee et al. 2010). Some studies in the \r\nUSA that examine periods in which little regulatory change took \r\nplace have found that the effects of performance standards on fuel \r\neconomy have been small (Knittel 2011) or not significant relative "


id: ef7e65a4bfb29d90aca90c304d719b10
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39510
content:
"to the innovation effects of prices (Crabb and Johnson 2010). This \r\nis at least in part because ongoing efficiency improvements during \r\nthis period were offset by increases in other product attributes. For \r\nexample, a  study by Knittel (2011) observed that size and power \r\nincreased without a  corresponding increase in fuel consumption. \r\nIt has also been observed that regulatory design may introduce \r\ndistortions that affect automotive innovation choices: in particular, \r\nfuel economy standards based on weight classes have been observed \r\nto distort light-weighting strategies for fuel efficiency in both China \r\n(Hao et al. 2016) and Japan (Ito and Sallee 2018)."


id: 5818d5bccae4bdf0503af74cc13a707b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12754
content:
"on the USA have highlighted that minimum energy performance \r\nstandards for vehicles tend to be regressive, with poorer households \r\ndisproportionately affected (Jacobsen 2013; Levinson 2019), \r\nparticularly when second-hand vehicles are taken into account (Davis \r\nand Knittel 2019). Similar arguments, though with less evidence, have \r\nbeen made for appliance standards (Sutherland 2006)."


id: 41020eac030bfa2fb7872daf27edb71f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8624
content:
"Overall, the extent to which regulations in energy efficiency \r\nresult in positive or negative competitiveness impacts in firms is \r\nmixed (limited evidence, high disagreement). A  meta-analysis of \r\n107 studies, of which 13 focused on regulations relating to energy \r\nconsumption or GHG emissions, found that around half showed that \r\nregulations resulted in competitiveness impacts, while half did not \r\n(Cohen and Tubb 2018). Cohen and Tubb (2018) also found that \r\nstudies examining performance-based regulations were less likely \r\nto find positive competitiveness impacts than those that examined \r\nmarket-based instruments."


id: 968d720054e74e19f953db204b49f99b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23689
content:
"A number of studies have focused on the impacts of a sub-national \r\ntechnology-forcing policy: the California Zero Emission Vehicle (ZEV) \r\nmandate. When it was introduced in 1990, this policy required \r\nautomotive firms to ensure that 2% of the vehicles they sold in 1998 \r\nwould be zero-emission. In the years immediately after introduction \r\nof the policy, automotive firms reported that it was a  significant \r\nstimulus to their R&D activity in electric vehicles (Brown et al. \r\n1995). Quantitative evidence examining patents and prototypes has \r\nindicated that the stringency of the policy was a significant factor in \r\nstimulating innovation, though this was, in part, dependent on firm \r\nstrategy (Sierzchula and Nemet 2015). As for the previous instruments, \r\nmost of the evidence comes from industrialised countries, and \r\nadditional research on other countries would be beneficial."


id: 2bb0d384b2434104f76fc2c1b1e21f77
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4948
content:
"While most of the literature addresses the extent to which regulation \r\ncan induce innovation, a  number of case studies highlight that \r\ninnovation can also influence regulation, as the costs of imposing \r\nregulation are reduced and political interests emerge that seek to \r\nexploit competitive advantages conferred by successfully developing \r\nenergy-efficient or low-carbon technologies (medium evidence,\r\nhigh agreement). Case studies map the causal mechanisms relating \r\nregulations and innovation responses in specific firms or industries \r\n(Gann et al. 1998; Kemp 2005; Ruby 2015; Wesseling et al. 2015)."


id: 9c0c552abc85a0b7eff5a6b1af43943
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24707
content:
"Regulation-driven deployment of existing technologies can generate \r\ninnovation in those technologies through learning by- doing, induced \r\nR&D and other mechanisms, although not in all cases (medium \r\nevidence, medium agreement) (Grubb et al. 2021). The introduction or \r\ntightening of minimum energy performance standards for appliances \r\n(and for buildings, in Noailly (2012)) have driven innovation \r\nresponses, using direct measures of product attributes (Newell et al. \r\n1999) and patents (Noailly 2012; Kim and Brown 2019), though not \r\nall studies have found a significant relationship (Girod et al. 2017). \r\nThere is also evidence of a  correlation between regulation-driven \r\ndeployment of energy-efficient products with accelerated learning in \r\nthose technologies (Van Buskirk et al. 2014; Wei et al. 2017)."


id: 1b2f22e6aa917ec3f7948743fb92f3d9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1972
content:
"In addition to observational studies, evidence on the relationship \r\nbetween innovation and regulation comes from surveys in which \r\nrespondents are asked whether they have engaged in innovation \r\nleading to energy saving or reduced GHG emissions, and what the \r\nmotivations were for such innovation. Survey evidence has found \r\nthat expected or current regulation can drive both R&D investment \r\nand decisions to adopt or introduce innovations that reduce energy \r\nconsumption or CO2 emissions (Horbach et  al. 2012; Grubb et  al. \r\n2021). Survey-based studies, however, tend not to specify the type \r\nof regulation."


id: badc478cfc076467104c228bed83b267
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30089
content:
"Minimum energy performance standards and appliance standards \r\nhave been known to result in negative distributional impacts \r\n(limited evidence, medium/high agreement). Several studies focused "


id: bfd82ab18408493c66f479c5e98f2a5e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31037
content:
"From 1970 to 2001, China was able to significantly limit energy demand growth through energy-efficiency programmes. Energy use \r\nper unit of gross domestic product (GDP) declined by approximately 5% yr-1 during this period. However, between 2002 and 2005, \r\nenergy demand per unit of GDP increased on average by 3.8% yr-1. To curb this energy growth, in 2005, the Chinese government \r\nannounced a mandatory goal of 20% reduction of energy intensity between 2006 and 2010 (Zhou et al. 2010; Lo 2014)."


id: 550ea1312183401dad35c77dd0354989
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12238
content:
"An energy labelling system was passed in 2004. It requires manufacturers to provide information about the efficiency of their electrical \r\nappliances to consumers. From 2004 to 2010, 23 electrical appliances (including refrigerators, air conditioners and flat-screen TVs) \r\nbeing labelled as energy efficient with five different grades - grade 1 being the most energy efficient and grade 5 the least efficient. \r\nAny appliances with an efficiency grade higher than 5 cannot be sold in the market."


id: f9a0e3be9fb1568aada8ca875cc252e0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"In addition to providing information to consumers, the National Development and Reform Commission, (which was in charge of \r\ndesigning the policies), and the Ministry of Finance launched in 2009 the 'energy-saving products and civilian-benefiting project' \r\n(Zhan et al. 2011). It covered air conditioners, refrigerators, flat panel televisions, washing machines, electrical efficient lighting, energy \r\nsaving and new energy vehicles with the energy grades at 1 or 2. The project also included financial subsidies for the enterprises \r\nproducing these products. The standard design of these financial subsidies involved the government paying for the price difference \r\nof energy-efficient products and general products. The manufacturers that produce the energy-efficient products receive financial \r\nsubsidies directly from the government (Z. Wang et al. 2017)."


id: 365c9e22749428bdded1188cb81eb8eb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6796
content:
"Before 2008, the market share of grade 1 and grade 2 air conditioners was about 5%, and about 70% of all air conditioners were grade \r\n5 (the most inefficient). Driven by the financial subsidies, the selling price of the highly efficient air conditioners became competitive \r\nwith that of the general air conditioners. Hence, the sales of energy-efficient air conditioners increased substantially, making the \r\nmarket share of grade 1 and 2 air conditioners about 80% in 2010 (Z. Wang et al. 2017). According to the information from China's \r\nNational Institute of Standardization, the energy label system saved more than 1.5 hundred billion kWh power between 2005 and \r\nMarch 2010, equivalent to more than 60 million tonnes of standard coal, 1.4 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide emissions, and 60 tonnes \r\nof sulphur dioxide emissions (Zhan et al. 2011), which significantly contributed to energy saving goals of China's 11th Five-Year Plan."


id: fd57d23d5e58fcb9f25c46ba407a64e7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41926
content:
"The outcomes for performance or endorsement labels have been \r\nassociated with positive competitiveness outcomes (medium evidence,\r\nmedium agreement). Out of 19 studies, 89% report positive impact and \r\n11% negligible impact. Although there are several studies analysing \r\ncompetitiveness-related metrics, evidence on most individual metrics \r\nis sporadic, except for housing premiums. A large number of studies \r\nquantitatively assessing competitiveness find that green labels in \r\nbuildings are associated with housing price premiums in multiple \r\ncountries and regions (Fuerst and McAllister 2011; Kahn and Kok 2014; \r\nZhang et al. 2017). Of those studies, 32% were qualitative, associating \r\nappliance labelling programmes with employment and industry \r\ndevelopment (European Commission 2018). There is a research gap in \r\nanalyses of developing countries, and also in quantitatively assessing \r\noutcomes beyond housing price premiums."


id: ceb6d22dbb71eb2b28773b7c506dccfe
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33706
content:
"A few studies on the distributional outcomes of voluntary labelling \r\nprogrammes point to positive impacts (limited evidence, high \r\nagreement). All four studies that focus on benefits for consumers \r\nand tenants report positive impacts (Devine and Kok 2015). Although \r\nthere are benefits for utility companies and other stakeholders, more \r\nresearch is needed to specifically attribute these benefits to voluntary \r\nlabels rather than energy efficiency programmes in general."


id: a165fab465d183e2229420cb3f11b6ad
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Voluntary agreements are associated with positive competitiveness \r\noutcomes (medium evidence, medium agreement): 14 out of 19 \r\nevaluations identified were associated with positive outcomes, \r\nwhile three were associated with negligible outcomes, and \r\ntwo with negative outcomes. Research found an increase in \r\nperceived firm financial performance (de Jong et al. 2014; Moon \r\net al. 2014). Studies also show an association with higher exports \r\nas more environmentally-conscious trade partners increasingly value \r\nenvironmental certifications (Bellesi et al. 2005). More research is \r\nneeded to develop evidence on metrics of competitiveness besides \r\nfirms' financial performance, and especially in developing countries."


id: 69cf72c2b18591df599c3d875c88753e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15887
content:
"Positive impacts have been identified more frequently in some \r\npolicies than in others. There is also a lot of variation in the density \r\nof the literature. Developing countries are severely underrepresented \r\nin the decarbonisation policy instrument evaluation literature \r\naiming to understand the impact on innovation. (high evidence, \r\nhigh agreement)."


id: 8b2dd1fbbf31723c8e356bc327b4675
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21650
content:
"Figure 16.2 below indicates the extent to which some decarbonisation \r\npolicy instruments have been more or less investigated in terms of \r\ntheir impact on innovation outcomes (as described in Table 16.9). For \r\nexample, it indicates the extent to which there has been a greater \r\nfocus of evaluations of the impact of R&D investments, emissions \r\ntrading schemes and voluntary approaches on innovation. It also \r\nshows a  limited amount of evidence on procurement, efficiency \r\nobligations with tradeable green certificates (TGCs), building \r\ncodes and auctions."


id: 2bc841184ea8b27effd32de3a50642aa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4961
content:
"Voluntary agreements are associated with a  positive impact on \r\ndistributional outcomes (limited evidence, high agreement). Five \r\nstudies, mainly using qualitative approaches, report a  positive \r\nassociation between a firm adopting an environmental management \r\nsystem and impacts on its supply chains. There is a need for more \r\nstudies with quantitative assessments and geographical diversity."


id: edde7846895227f05c421ed0c970394f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39216
content:
"Figure  16.2 |  Number of evaluations available for each policy instrument type covered regarding their impact on innovation and direction of the \r\nassessment. The vertical axis displays the number of evaluations claiming to isolate the impact of each policy instrument type on innovation outcomes as listed in Table 16.9. \r\nThe colour indicates whether each evaluation identified a positive impact on the innovation outcome (blue), the existence of a negative impact (in red), and no impact (in grey). \r\nIt builds on Grubb et al. (2021), Lilliestam et al. (2021) and Penasco et al. (2021), and additional studies identified as part of these reviews. TGC stands for tradeable green \r\ncertificates. TWC stands for tradeable white certificates."


id: 6104f62f3acc5022e982691447b7d1d4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14362
content:
"There has been long-standing interest on the impact of Foreign Direct \r\nInvestment (FDI) on domestic capacity, innovation and environmental \r\noutcomes. While this section looks at the impact of trade instruments \r\non innovation, it does not cover the much larger body of evidence on \r\nthe relationship between FDI and economic development and growth."


id: c5134414638d6f0eb283bc2b1295e487
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31983
content:
"Other emerging work investigates the role of local content \r\nrequirements on innovation outcomes and suggests that it can lead to \r\nincreased power costs (negative distributional impacts). The benefits \r\nto the domestic innovation system, measured by patents or exports, \r\nare unclear if the policies are not part of a holistic and longer-lasting \r\npolicy framework (Probst et al. 2020)."


id: 751735f7c8166a9775ead1f3934fdedd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17838
content:
"Virtually all countries around the world have instituted systems for \r\nthe protection of creations and inventions, known as intellectual \r\nproperty rights (IPR) systems (WIPO 2021). While several types \r\nof intellectual property exist  - patents, copyright, design rights, \r\ntrademarks, and more - this section will focus on patents, as the most \r\nrelevant property right for technological innovations (WIPO 2008), \r\nand hence the most relevant for policy instruments in this context."


id: f36e47b2f5a51f33c902163ca0341c87
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40202
content:
"Patent systems aim to promote innovation and economic growth, \r\nby stimulating both the creation of new knowledge and diffusion of \r\nthat knowledge (high evidence, high agreement). National patent \r\nsystems, as institutions, play a  central role in theories on national \r\ninnovation systems (high evidence, strong agreement). Patent \r\nsystems are usually instituted to promote innovation and economic \r\ngrowth (Machlup and Penrose 1950; Nelson and Mazzoleni 1996; \r\nEncaoua et al. 2006). Some countries explicitly refer to this purpose \r\nin their law or legislation - for instance, the US Constitution states \r\nthe purpose of the US IP rights system to 'promote the progress of "


id: 8669a54f914c499bd5c70c885b824af2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20812
content:
"In general, IP protection and enforcement may have different \r\nimpacts on economic growth in different types of countries (limited \r\nevidence, high agreement). There has been a  significant degree of \r\nharmonisation and cooperation between national IP systems over \r\ntime. The most recent milestone is the World Trade Organization \r\n(WTO) 1994 Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights \r\n(TRIPS) Agreement, entered into by all WTO members, which "


id: ca8fabcac84592eb51181965c33fdd67
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32978
content:
"have policies to include patented inventions in their standards only \r\nif the patent holder is willing to commit FRAND licensing conditions \r\nfor those patents (Contreras 2015). While a patent holder can choose \r\nnot to make such a commitment, by doing so, its patent is no longer \r\na candidate for inclusion in the standard. In the (many) fields where \r\nstandards are of key importance, it is very unusual for patent holders \r\nnot to be willing to enter into FRAND commitments (Bekkers 2017). \r\nThird, when a patent holder files at the patent office and opts for the \r\n'licence of right' regime, in return for reduced patent fees, they enter \r\ninto a contractual agreement that obliges them to license the patent \r\nto those who request it. While not all national patent systems feature \r\nthis regime, it is a feature present in the new European Community \r\npatent (EPO 2017), and may therefore increase in importance."


id: a31deff1610ab28fc274d1d7fd5a81e3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25905
content:
"For a discussion on the impact of intellectual property rights (IPR) on \r\ninternational technology diffusion, see Box 16.9 in Section 16.5."


id: c7d6e6e423e60653017daa582c60e73b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32465
content:
"Sub-national deployment policies have been associated with different \r\nimpacts on competitiveness metrics (limited evidence, medium \r\nagreement). Research on green jobs shows positive association \r\nbetween sub-national policies and green jobs or green firms at the \r\nmetropolitan level as well as the state of provincial level, in both \r\nChina and the USA (Yi 2013; Yi and Liu 2015; Lee 2017), while others \r\nfind no impact of renewable portfolio standards on green job growth \r\nin the state (Bowen et al. 2013). Other examples of competitiveness \r\nare in the impact of regional green industrial policy in Brazil's Rio \r\nGrande do Sul region in attracting auctioned contracts for wind \r\nenergy (Adami et al. 2017) or in the changes in net positive state \r\nrevenues associated with removing tax incentives for wind producers \r\nin Idaho in the USA (Black et al. 2014)."


id: 7ed69e32d7a3cb01f175cad072d10364
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19472
content:
"Sub-national policies also directly support innovation and \r\ncompetitiveness through green incubators and direct grants or R&D \r\nfunding for local companies working on clean energy, intending to \r\npromote local economic development (limited evidence, medium \r\nagreement). The literature on the impacts of such policies on innovation "


id: 1f5118c377bab666594c84d7b85f68c1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2713
content:
"and competitiveness is sparse. Some case studies and programme \r\nevaluation reports, primarily in the USA, have identified the impacts \r\nof sub-national policies on competitiveness --  for example, job \r\ncreation from direct R&D funding in North Carolina (Hall and Link \r\n2015), perceptions for local industry development and support for \r\nfollow-on financing for companies receiving state-funded grants in \r\nColorado (Surana et al. 2020b), and return on investments for the \r\nstate in research and innovation spending from the New York state's \r\nenergy agency (NYSERDA 2020). There is a general paucity of metrics \r\non innovation and competitiveness for systematic assessments of \r\nsuch programmes in developed countries, and even more so in India \r\nand other developing countries where such programmes have been \r\nincreasing (Gonsalves and Rogerson 2019; Surana et al. 2020a)."


id: ec16619154e4dfb043126c2cc6d3aeb7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38900
content:
"This section covers international transfer and cooperation in relation \r\nto climate-related technologies, 'the flows of know-how, experience \r\nand equipment for mitigating and adapting to climate change \r\namongst different stakeholders' (IPCC 2000) as well as innovation \r\nto support transformative change compared to AR5 (IPCC 2014) \r\nand the IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5degC (SR1.5) \r\n(IPCC 2018a). This complements the discussion on international \r\ncooperation on science and technology in Chapter 14."


id: bc30e9f9bf916b9a4a577a2425c1d93e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30353
content:
"This section first outlines the needs and opportunities for \r\ninternational transfer and cooperation on low-emission technologies. \r\nIt then describes the main objectives and roles of these activities, \r\nand then reviews recent institutional approaches within and outside \r\nthe UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to \r\nsupport international technology transfer and cooperation. Finally, it \r\ndiscusses emerging ideas for international technology transfer and \r\ncooperation, and possible modifications to support the achievement \r\nof climate change and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), \r\nbuilding up to Section 16.6."


id: 3b662e14b6f9f4d0d2ede0e9aaaf557
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7641
content:
"Although states and local governments increasingly support clean \r\nenergy deployment as well as directly support innovation, given its \r\nlink with economic development goals, there is a lack of systematic \r\nresearch on the impacts of these policies at the subnational level. \r\nMore research  - qualitative and quantitative, and in developed \r\nand developing countries  - is needed to systematically develop \r\nevidence on these impacts and to understand the reasons behind \r\nregional differences in terms of the type of policy as well as the \r\ncapabilities in the region."


id: 566f9009650e2522300cf20b91e8882d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12467
content:
"A growing body of research aims to understand how different \r\npolicies interact and how to characterise policy mixes (del Rio 2010; \r\nHowlett and del Rio 2015; Rogge and Reichardt 2016; del Rio and \r\nCerda 2017). The empirical impact on the innovation outcomes \r\nis not yet discussed. A more detailed discussion of this literature is \r\nlocated in Chapter 13."


id: 1a0162e030dabe4ef08f7e36d514e829
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1773
content:
"The climate technology transition can also yield other development \r\nbenefits, for instance better health, increased energy access, \r\npoverty alleviation and economic competitiveness (Deng et al. \r\n2018), including industrial development, job creation and economic \r\ngrowth (Porter and Van der Linde 1995; Altenburg and Rodrik \r\n2017; Lema et al. 2020; Pegels and Altenburg 2020) (Section 16.6). \r\nThe growing complexity of technologies and global competition \r\nhave made technology development a globalised process involving \r\nthe flow of knowledge and products across borders (Lehoux et al. \r\n2014; Koengkan et al. 2020). For instance, in electronics production, \r\nAsian economies have captured co-location synergies and dominate "


id: 224aecf6b221f06f6c6486612d670b07
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3253
content:
"An emerging stream of research in complex systems suggests that \r\nrelatively small changes in policy near a  possible tipping point in \r\nclimate impacts in areas, including changing strategies related \r\nto investments in innovation, could trigger large positive societal \r\nfeedbacks in the long term (Farmer et al. 2019; Otto et al. 2020)."


id: 7006a08873fb61d31e9729dad2adc9e9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16966
content:
"production and assembly of product components, whereas American \r\nfirms have adopted 'design-only' strategies (Tassey 2014). In the \r\ncontext of renewable energy technologies, 'green global division of \r\nlabour' has been observed, with countries specialising in investments \r\nin research and development (R&D), manufacturing or deployment of \r\nrenewables (Lachapelle et al. 2017). In the case of solar photovoltaic \r\n(PV), for example, while many technical innovations emerged from \r\nthe USA, Japan and China emphasised the manufacture of physical \r\nmodules (Deutch and Steinfeld 2013) (Box 16.4)."


id: 5db800da5adb5f9a194cd6af92451101
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13778
content:
"International efforts involving technology transfer can have different \r\nobjectives and roles. These include access to knowledge and \r\nfinancial resources as well as promotion of new industries in both \r\nthe developed and recipient country (Huh and Kim 2018). Based \r\non an econometric analysis of international technology transfer \r\nfactors and characteristics of Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) \r\nprojects, Gandenberger et al. (2016) find that complexity and novelty \r\nof technologies explain whether a CDM project includes hardware \r\ntechnology transfer, and that factors like project size and absorptive \r\ncapacity of the host country do not seem to be drivers. Halleck Vega \r\nand Mandel (2018) argue that 'long-term economic relations', for \r\ninstance being part of a customs union, affect technological diffusion \r\nbetween countries in the case of wind energy, and indicate that this \r\nhas resulted in low-income countries being largely overlooked."


id: cf9e9a10c74f487333a8db9ca4a5d4e2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33886
content:
"There is some literature studying whether technology cooperation \r\ncould complement or replace international cooperation based on \r\nemission reductions, such as in the Kyoto Protocol, and whether \r\nthat would have positive impacts on climate change mitigation and \r\ncompliance. A handful of papers conducted game-theoretic analysis on \r\ntechnology cooperation, sometimes as an alternative for cooperation \r\non emission reductions, and found partially positive effects (Bosetti \r\net al. 2017; Narita and Wagner 2017; Rubio 2017; Verdolini and \r\nBosetti 2017). However, Sarr and Swanson (2017) model that, due to \r\nthe rebound effect, technology development and transfer of resource\u0002saving technologies may not lead to envisioned emission reductions."


id: c0eb08d283ea57066cd6780b8e2d1484
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31243
content:
"While technology cooperation can be aimed at emission reduction \r\nthrough mitigation projects, as indicated above, not all cooperative \r\nactions directly result in mitigation outcomes. Overall, technology \r\ntransfer broadly has focused on: (i) enhanced climate technology \r\nabsorption and deployment in developing countries; and \r\n(ii)  enhanced research, development and demonstration (RD&D) \r\nthrough cooperation and knowledge spillovers."


id: 146321ab60caf48fd1424deafeecfc10
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 810
content:
"This is consistent with literature that suggests that greenhouse \r\ngas (GHG) mitigation in developing countries can be enhanced by: \r\n(i) technology development and transfer collaboration and a 'needs\u0002driven' approach; (ii) development of the specific types of capacity \r\nrequired across the entire innovation chain; and (iii) strengthening of \r\nthe coordination and agendas across and between governance levels \r\n(including domestic and international levels) (Khosla et al. 2017; \r\nZhou 2019; Upadhyaya et al. 2020)."


id: cc3ed200420732d55e2510597a1dc3db
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33257
content:
"imported climate technologies; lack of domestic capacities to \r\ndeploy and maintain imported technologies; the weak regulatory \r\nenvironment to stimulate clean technology entrepreneurship; the \r\nabsence or inadequacy of climate change laws; and weak legal \r\nprotection for imported technologies. Moreover, Ziervogel et al. \r\n(2021) indicate that, for transformative adaptation, transdisciplinary \r\napproaches and capacity-building shifting, 'the co-creation of \r\ncontextual understandings' instead of top-down transfer of existing \r\nknowledge would deliver better results. Despite the understanding of \r\nthe importance of the capacity issue, significant gaps still remain on \r\nthis front (TEC 2019) (Section 16.5.4)."


id: 257ed9958aebc54219df28570355f643
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3780
content:
"The sections below discuss the literature on various categories of \r\ninternational technology cooperation and transfer."


id: 9d95d9f90426f005f5b842847fd5d434
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24961
content:
"There are multiple studies drawing on empirical work that also \r\nsupport this conclusion. For South-South technology transfer between \r\nIndia and Kenya, not just technical characteristics, but also mutual \r\nlearning on how to address common problems of electricity access \r\nand poverty, was suggested as an important condition for success \r\n(Ulsrud et al. 2018). Olawuyi (2018) discusses the specific capability \r\ngap in Africa, despite decades of technology transfer efforts under \r\nvarious mechanisms and programmes of the UNFCCC.  The study \r\nsuggests that barriers need to be resolved by African countries \r\nthemselves, in particular: inadequate access to information about "


id: 24925b59730b9a248a17b7dd4169a39
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3627
content:
"Technology development and transfer have been a part of UNFCCC \r\ndiscussions and developments in the context of the international \r\nclimate negotiations ever since its agreement in 1992, as assessed in \r\nAR5 (Stavins et al. 2014). Support on 'Technology Needs Assessment' \r\nto developing countries was the first major action undertaken by \r\nthe UNFCCC, and this has undergone different cycles of learning "


id: caf071029c3fb32a7d92ed0cbc3234da
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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vector_id: 33043
content:
"Box 16.8 | Capacity Building and Innovation for Early Warning Systems in Small Island \r\nDeveloping States"


id: cb43317e399931dbda9f4d581b987256
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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vector_id: 33095
content:
"One of the areas of international cooperation on capacity building is adaptation, which has been highlighted by both the Technology \r\nExecutive Committee (TEC) (Ockwell et al. 2015; TEC 2015) and the Paris Committee on Capacity-building (UNFCCC 2020b) as an area \r\nwhere capacity gaps remain, especially in Small Island Developing States (SIDS)."


id: 46ddc29d5c5bc54c498b1040971fdb83
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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"While adaptation was initially conceived primarily in terms of infrastructural adjustments to long-term changes in average conditions \r\n(e.g., rising sea levels), a key innovation in recent years has been to couple such long-term risk management to existing efforts to \r\nmanage disaster risk, specifically including early warning systems, enabling early action in the face of climate- and weather-risk at \r\nmuch shorter timescales (IPCC 2012), with potentially significant rates of return (Rogers and Tsirkunov 2010; Hallegatte 2012; Global \r\nCommission on Adaptation 2019)."


id: 1790a312f4dd387c582a1d70fe5be2bc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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content:
"One of several helpful innovations in these efforts is impact-based forecasting (Harrowsmith et al. 2020), which provides forecasts \r\ntargeted at the impact of the hazard rather than simply the meteorological variable. This enables a much easier coupling to early \r\naction in response to the information, and a more appropriate response afterwards. Automatic responses to warnings have also \r\nbeen adopted in the humanitarian field for anticipatory action ahead of (rather than simply in response to) disasters triggered by \r\nnatural hazards (Coughlan de Perez et al. 2015). This has resulted in a rapid scale-up of such anticipatory financing mechanisms to \r\ntens of countries over the past few years, and emerging evidence of its effectiveness. Still, the response is lacking in coherence and \r\ncomprehensiveness, resulting in calls for a more systematic evidence agenda for anticipatory action (Weingartner et al. 2020)."


id: 755ed874a4f7a7aa65627b93bdb7be74
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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content:
"establish the Climate Innovation Facility to support and accelerate \r\nearly-stage innovations and climate technologies through the \r\nestablishment of regional innovation hubs and climate accelerators \r\nas well as a climate growth fund (Green Climate Fund 2020)."


id: 61b8c47c09b213a75b91e441c2675ae9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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content:
"The 'technology' discussion has been further strengthened by the \r\nParis Agreement, in which Article 10 is fully devoted to technology \r\ndevelopment and transfer (UNFCCC 2015). However, the political \r\ndiscussions around technology continue to be characterised by \r\nviewing technology mostly as hardware (Haselip et al. 2015), and \r\nrelatively limited in scope (de Coninck and Sagar 2017). The workplans \r\nof the TEC and the CTCN do, however, indicate a broadening of the \r\nperspective on technology (CTCN 2019; TEC 2019)."


id: 3e6053eb7bc2607d963f6cdc71ed9fd4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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"Since the Kyoto Protocol's CDM has been operational, studies have \r\nassessed its hypothesised contribution to technology transfer, \r\nincluding transfer of knowledge. Though not an explicit objective \r\nof the CDM, numerous papers have investigated whether CDM \r\nprojects contribute to technology transfer (Michaelowa et al. 2019). \r\nThe literature varies in its assessment. Some find extensive use \r\nof domestic technology and hence lower levels of international \r\ntechnology transfer (Doranova et al. 2010), while others indicate "


id: c12dd3b047a45a432bf9f3b8dda6dd5f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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content:
"An example of how innovative technologies combined with capacity \r\ndevelopment, and how institutional innovation is combined in the \r\ncontext of adaptation to extreme weather in SIDS can be found in \r\nBox 16.8."


id: a165c6a4a80f1abfcee0bf3e1f513522
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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"Besides the UNFCCC mechanisms, there are numerous other initiatives \r\nthat promote international cooperation on RD&D as well as capacity \r\nbuilding. Some of them are based on the notion of 'mission-oriented \r\ninnovation policy' (Mazzucato and Semieniuk 2017; Mazzucato 2018), \r\nwhich shapes markets rather than merely corrects market failures."


id: 43b4d6e0800a00e570766dacb0191e19
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"For instance, Mission Innovation is a global initiative consisting of 23 \r\nmember countries and the European Commission working together \r\nto reinvigorate and accelerate global clean energy innovation \r\nwith the objective to make clean energy widely affordable with \r\nimproved reliability and secured supply of energy. The goal is to \r\naccelerate clean energy innovation in order to limit the rise in \r\nthe global temperature to well below 2degC. The members seek to \r\nfoster international collaboration among its members and increase \r\npublic investments in clean energy R&D with the engagement \r\nof the private sector. A  recent assessment shows that, although "


id: f4166466d4d83fa68be9fd74a8aba53c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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"In the global context of climate mitigation technologies, it has been noted that technologies have been developed primarily in \r\nindustrialised countries but are urgently required in fast-growing emerging economies (Dechezlepretre et al. 2011). International \r\ntechnology transfers can take place via three primary channels: (i) trade in goods, where technology is embedded in products; \r\n(ii) Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), where enterprises transfer firm-specific technology to foreign affiliates; and (iii) patent licences, \r\nwhere third parties obtain the right to use technologies. IPRs are relevant for all these three channels."


id: 9224a881d3410c7961e616c5957ad4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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content:
"Not surprisingly, the role of IPRs in international transfer of climate mitigation technologies has been much discussed but also \r\ndescribed as particularly controversial (Abdel-Latif 2015). The relationships between IPR, innovation, international technology transfer \r\nand local mitigation and adaptation are complex (Maskus 2010; Abdel-Latif 2015; Li et al. 2020) and there is no clear consensus on \r\nwhat kind of an IPR regime will be most beneficial for promoting technology transfer."


id: 6260687a565c1cbe6e2c3b0c12710029
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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content:
"Several studies argue that, particularly in developing nations, the global IPR regime has resulted in delayed access, reduced competition \r\nand higher prices (Littleton 2008; Zhuang 2017) and that climate-change-related technology transfer is insufficiently stimulated under \r\nthe current IPR regime. Compulsory licensing (as already used in medicine) is one of the routes proposed to repair this (Littleton 2008; \r\nAbdel-Latif 2015)."


id: 2cdf2de4f5d0b6a7a424239427be1850
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"There is little systematic evidence that patents and other IPRs restrict access to environmentally-sound technologies, since these \r\ntechnologies are mostly in sectors based on mature technologies where numerous substitutes among global competitors are available \r\n(Maskus 2010). This might, however, change in the future - for instance, with new technologies based on plants, via biotechnologies \r\nand synthetic fuels (Maskus 2010), for which Correa et al. (2020) already find some evidence."


id: 8c9014fa8e709b7d31655510f2dd5621
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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"In terms of ways forward to meet the challenge of climate change, different suggestions are made in the context of IPR that can help \r\nto further improve international technology transfer of climate mitigation technologies, including through the Trade-Related Aspects of \r\nIntellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement, by making decisions on IPR to developing countries on a case-by-case basis, by developing \r\ncountries experimenting more with policies on IPR protection, or through brokering or patent-pooling institutions (Littleton 2009; Maskus \r\nand Reichman 2017; Dussaux et al. 2018). Others also suggest that distinctions among country groups be made on the basis of levels \r\nof technological and economic development, with least-developed countries getting particular attention (Zhuang 2017; Abbott 2018)."


id: faa87f36d6f8de9dc64d3860f7bd89be
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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"expenditures are rising, the aims were not met by 2020 (Myslikova \r\nand Gallagher 2020). Gross et al. (2018) caution against too much \r\nfocus on R&D efforts for energy technologies to address climate \r\nchange, including for Mission Innovation. They argue that, given the \r\ntimescales of commercialisation, developing new technologies now \r\nwould mean they would be commercially too late for addressing \r\nclimate change. Huh and Kim (2018) discuss two 'knowledge and \r\ntechnology transfer' projects that were eventually not pursued \r\nbeyond the feasibility study phase due to cooperation and \r\ncommitment problems between national and local governments, \r\nand they highlight the need for ownership and engagement of local \r\nresidents and recipient governments."


id: 1d6b5ff2ae22dc2a87132ea9a71f2279
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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"developing countries with the climate technology transition (TEC \r\n2015; Ockwell and Byrne 2016). This has given rise to several \r\nproposals, discussed here and summarised in Figure 16.3."


id: 985d19a4294497f69fcb751b3d82e4cd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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"Enhancing deployment and diffusion of climate technologies in \r\ndeveloping countries would require a variety of actors with sufficient \r\ncapabilities (robust evidence, medium agreement) (Kumar et al. 1999; \r\nSagar et al. 2009; Ockwell et al. 2018). This may include strengthening \r\nexisting actors (Malhotra et al. 2021), supporting science, technology, \r\nand innovation-based start-ups to meet social goals (Surana et al. \r\n2020b), and developing entities and programmes that are intended \r\nto address specific gaps relating to technology development and \r\ndeployment (Sagar et al. 2009; Ockwell et al. 2018)."


id: 2fc425f81458e500c98cebeb1ac6e4bc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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content:
"Intellectual property rights (IPR) regimes (Box 16.9) can be an enabler \r\nor a barrier to energy transition. For more background on IPR and \r\nimpact on innovation, see Section 16.4.6."


id: 931c88ccf8b77d0dc2bc46ef0fc4b5dd
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"There is also an increasing emphasis on the relevance of \r\nparticipative social innovation, local grounding and policy learning \r\nas a replacement of the expert-led technological change (Chaudhary \r\net al. 2012; Disterheft et al. 2015; Kowarsch et al. 2016). Others have \r\nsuggested a shift to international innovation cooperation rather than \r\ntechnology transfer, which implies a donor-recipient relationship. The \r\nnotion of innovation cooperation also makes more explicit the focus \r\non innovation processes and systems (Pandey et al. 2021). A broad \r\ntransformative agenda therefore proposes that contemporary societal \r\nchallenges are complex and multivariegated in scope and will require \r\nthe actions of a diverse set of actors to formulate and address the "


id: 84f5b72107cb5961be3298bd44ca408c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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content:
"As with the broader innovation literature (Section 16.3), and drawing \r\non such literature, there has been an emergence of a  greater \r\nunderstanding of, and emphasis on, the role of innovation systems \r\n(at national, sectoral, and technological levels) as a  way to help "


id: 98a40618bc50fa4750d2202ba47cfb15
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content:
"policy, implying that social, institutional and behavioural changes \r\nnext to technological innovations are the possible solutions (Geels \r\n2004) (see also Cross-Chapter Box 12 in this chapter)."


id: 7bdb7088524389638a1e9d9423c69f4e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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content:
"Building on an earlier discussion of technology-oriented and \r\nsectoral agreements (Meckling and Chung 2009) and the potential \r\nfor international cooperation in energy-intensive industry (Ahman \r\net al. 2017), where deep emission reduction measures require \r\ntransformative changes (Chapter 11), Oberthur et al. (2021) propose \r\nthat that a  way forward for the global governance for energy\u0002intensive industry could be through sub-sector 'clubs' that include \r\ngovernmental, private and societal actors (Oberthur et al. 2021)."


id: 5a97f93e553f9cbd2cdf8bfd06efe2e1
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"Several authors have proposed new mechanisms for international \r\ncooperation on technology. Ockwell and Byrne (2016) argue that \r\na role for the UNFCCC Technology Mechanism could be to support \r\nClimate Relevant Innovation-system Builders (CRIBs) in developing \r\ncountries, institutions locally that develop capabilities that 'form \r\nthe bedrock of transformative, climate-compatible, technological \r\nchange and development'. Khan et al. (2020) propose a  specific \r\nvariant with universities in developing countries serving as 'central \r\nhubs' for capacity building to implement the NDCs as well as other \r\nclimate policy and planning instruments; they also suggest that \r\ndeveloping countries outline their capacity-building needs more \r\nclearly in their NDCs."


id: ef522851741b04a4f9add771449fb7cb
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"Figure 16.3 summarises examples of emerging ideas for international \r\ncooperation on climate technology, their relation to the objectives \r\nand existing efforts, and the level of development of the innovation \r\nsystem around a technology (Hekkert et al. 2007; Bergek et al. 2008) \r\nor in nations (Lundvall et al. 2009)."


id: 220bd1c6b3678067ae04a861f3148675
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"Also, the concentration of technology in few hands has boosted \r\nconsumption of goods and services which are not necessarily aligned \r\nwith the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (Walsh et al. 2020). It \r\nhas been suggested that, in order to address sustainable development \r\nchallenges, science and technology actors would have to change their \r\nrelation to policymakers (Ravetz and Funtowicz 1999) as well as the \r\npublic (Jasanoff 2003). This has been further elaborated for the SDGs. \r\nThe scale and ambition of the SDGs call for a change in development \r\npatterns that require a  fundamental shift in: current best practices; \r\nguidelines for technological and investment decisions; and the wider \r\nsocio-institutional systems (UNCTAD 2019; Pegels and Altenburg \r\n2020). This is needed as not all innovation will lead to sustainable \r\ndevelopment patterns (Altenburg and Pegels 2012; Lema et al. 2015)."


id: 203bbd30913b4b43b0864725bf4f83cc
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"This section considers technological innovation in the broader \r\ncontext of sustainable development, recognising that technological \r\nchange happens within social and economic systems, and therefore \r\ntechnologies are conceived and applied in relation to those systems \r\n(Grubler 1998). Simplifications of complex interactions between \r\nphysical and social systems and incomplete knowledge of the \r\nindirect effects of technological innovation may systematically lead \r\nto underestimation of environmental impacts and overestimation of \r\nour ability to mitigate climate change (Hertwich and Peters 2009; \r\nArvesen et al. 2011)."


id: ae23723127a3bfc5192728c7f492ae3b
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"Current SDG implementation gaps reflect, to some extent, \r\ninadequate understanding of the complex relationships among the \r\ngoals (Waiswa et al. 2019; Skene 2020), as well as their synergies and \r\ntrade-offs, including how they limit the range of responses available \r\nto communities and governments, and potential injustices (Thornton \r\nand Comberti 2017). These relationships have been approached by \r\nfocusing primarily on synergies and trade-offs while lacking the \r\nholistic perspective necessary to achieve all the goals (Nilsson et al. \r\n2016; Roy et al. 2018)."


id: d32afa4a553c2ef6da583fd31b0eaa12
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"Previous sections of the chapter discussed how a systemic approach, \r\nappropriate public policies and international cooperation on \r\ninnovation can enhance technological innovation. This section \r\nprovides more details on how innovation and technological change, \r\nsustainable development and climate change mitigation intertwine."


id: e86995088533fca787f2136509043e71
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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content:
"Sustainable development and technological change are deeply \r\nrelated (UNCTAD 2019). Technology has been critical for increasing \r\nproductivity as the dominant driving force for economic growth. "


id: 4a86beade3ae8bde851890c551487d25
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content:
"Figure 16.4 | Considerations and typology of innovations for sustainable development. Source: Silvestre and Tirca (2019)."


id: 4d1c33272d83755fa92cb2c2ae787a71
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content:
"environmental aims is not possible, but that sustainable innovations \r\ninclude satisfactory solutions for social, environmental and economic \r\npillars (Figure 16.4)."


id: 3947b4b5f5aa215810974270abdbbb1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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"There is evidence that technological changes can catalyse \r\nimplementation of the reforms needed to the manner in which goods \r\nand services are distributed among people (Fu et al. 2019). A recently \r\ndeveloped theoretical framework based on a  capability approach \r\n(CA) has been used to evaluate the quality of human life and the \r\nprocess of development (Haenssgen and Ariana 2018). Variations of \r\nthe CA have been applied to exploratory studies of the link between \r\ntechnological change, human development, and economic growth \r\n(Mayer 2001; Mormina 2019). This suggests that the transformative \r\npotential of technology as an enabling condition is not intrinsic, \r\nbut is assigned to it by people within a given technological context. \r\nA failure to recognise and account for this property of technology is \r\na  root cause of many failed attempts at techno-fixing sustainable \r\ndevelopment projects (Stilgoe et al. 2013; Fazey et al. 2020)."


id: 5af09914a3390d59712bb5fd37069550
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"The basic rationale for governance of technological change is the \r\ncreation and maintenance of an enabling environment for climate \r\nand SDG-oriented technological change (Avelino et al. 2019). Such \r\nan environment poses high demands on governance and policy to \r\ncoordinate with actors and provide a  direction for innovation and \r\ntechnological change. Cross-Chapter Box  12 illustrates how the \r\ndynamics of socio-technical transitions and shifting development \r\npathways towards sustainable development offer options for \r\npolicymakers and other actors to accelerate the system transitions \r\nneeded for both climate change mitigation and sustainable \r\ndevelopment. Governance interventions to implement the SDGs will \r\nneed to be operationalised at sub-national, national and global levels \r\nand support integration of resource concerns in policy, planning and \r\nimplementation (UNEP 2015; Williams et al. 2020)."


id: 649972a2fe0a555cf7f2d2f3354e7980
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"Authors: Anthony Patt (Switzerland), Heleen de Coninck (the Netherlands), Xuemei Bai (Australia), Paolo Bertoldi (Italy), Sarah Burch \r\n(Canada), Clara Caiafa (Brazil/the Netherlands), Felix Creutzig (Germany), Renee van Diemen (the Netherlands/United Kingdom), \r\nFrank Geels (United Kingdom/the Netherlands), Michael Grubb (United Kingdom), Maria Josefina Figueroa Meza (Venezuela/Denmark), \r\nSiir Kilkis (Turkey), Jonathan Kohler (Germany), Catherine Mitchell (United Kingdom), Lars J. Nilsson (Sweden), Patricia Perkins (Canada), \r\nYamina Saheb (France/Algeria), Harald Winkler (South Africa)"


id: 8145547b3bc1fa2316e1d63d6a18fdee
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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vector_id: 19877
content:
"Numerous studies suggest that transformational changes would be required in many areas of society if climate change is to be limited \r\nto 2degC warming or less. Many of these involve shifts to low-carbon technologies, such as renewable energy, which typically involve \r\nchanges in associated regulatory and social systems; others more explicitly concern behavioural shifts, such as towards plant-based \r\ndiets or cleaner cooking fuels, or, at the broadest level, a shift in development pathways. Chapter 1 establishes an analytic framework \r\nfocusing on transitions, which chapters 5, 13, 14, 15 and 16 further develop. In this Cross-Chapter Box, we provide a complementary \r\noverview of the dynamics of different kinds of transformational changes for climate mitigation and sustainable development. We first \r\nfocus on insights from socio-technical transitions approaches, and then expand to broader system transitions."


id: 6f5fb8a52c0bdf8b8accc20328b8f28d
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"A large volume of literature documents the processes associated with transformational changes in technology and the social systems \r\nassociated with their production and use (Geels 2019; Kohler et al. 2019). Transformational technological change typically goes hand \r\nin hand with shifts in knowledge, behaviour, institutions, and markets (Geels and Schot 2010; Markard et al. 2012); stickiness in these "


id: 274e9a641569e25b8b3c8514b91252c2
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"The emergence stage is marked by experimentation, innovation in the laboratory, and demonstration in the field, to produce \r\ntechnologies and system architectures (Geels 2005). By its very nature, experimentation includes both successes and failures, and \r\nimplies high risks. Because of these risks, especially in the case of fundamentally new technologies, government funding for research, \r\ndevelopment and demonstration (RD&D) projects is crucial to sustaining development (Mazzucato 2015b)."


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"The second stage is early adoption, during which successful technologies jump from the laboratory to limited commercial application \r\n(Pearson and Foxon 2012). Reaching this stage is often described as crossing the 'Valley of Death', because the cost/performance ratio "


id: 5d4c25dff5b434a2936630a3e82fd431
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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content:
"The fourth stage is stabilisation, in which the new technologies, systems, and behaviours are both standardised and insulated from \r\nrebound effects and backsliding (Andersen and Gulbrandsen 2020). Sectoral bans on further investment in high-carbon technologies \r\nmay become politically feasible at this point (Breetz et al. 2018; Economidou et al. 2020). The decline of previously dominant products \r\nor industries can lead to calls for policymakers to help those negatively affected, enabling a just transition (McCauley and Heffron \r\n2018; Newell and Simms 2020). Political opposition to the system reconfiguration that comes with integration and stabilisation can \r\nalso be overcome by offering incumbent actors an attractive exit strategy (de Gooyert et al. 2016)."


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vector_id: 19999
content:
"Dynamics between enabling conditions for system transitions\r\nAbson et al. (2017) argue that it is possible to make use of 'leverage points' inherent in system dynamics in order to accelerate \r\nsustainability transitions. Otto et al. (2020) argue that interventions geared towards the social factors driving change can 'activate "


id: 84999c66f53a64340185d11377378f09
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20475
content:
"contagious processes' leading to the transformative changes required for climate mitigation. These self-reinforcing dynamics involve \r\nthe interaction of enabling conditions, including public policy and governance, institutional and technological innovation capacity, \r\nbehaviour change, and finance. For example, Mercure et al. (2018) simulated financial flows into fossil-fuel extraction, and showed \r\nhow investors taking into account transition risk in combination with technological innovation would lead to the enhancement of \r\ninvestments in low-carbon assets and further enhanced innovation. As another example, behaviour, lifestyle, and policy can also \r\ninitiate demand-side transitions (Tziva et al. 2020) (Chapter 5), such as with food systems (Rust et al. 2020) (Section 7.4.5), and can \r\ncontribute to both resilience and carbon storage (Sendzimir et al. 2011) (Box 16.5)."


id: 66124860d5d114f7928c8e084a642cd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15219
content:
"Policies shifting innovation in climate-compatible directions can also reinforce other development benefits, for instance better health, \r\nincreased energy access, poverty alleviation and economic competitiveness (Deng et al. 2018; IPCC 2018a; Karlsson et al. 2020). \r\nDevelopment benefits, in turn, can create feedback effects that sustain public support for subsequent policies, and hence help to \r\nsecure effective long-term climate mitigation (Geels 2014; Meckling et al. 2015; Schmidt and Sewerin 2017; Breetz et al. 2018), \r\nincreasing legitimacy of environmental sustainability actions (Hansen et al. 2018; Herslund et al. 2018; van Welie and Romijn 2018) \r\nand addressing negative socio-economic impacts (Deng et al. 2018; McCauley and Heffron 2018; Eisenberg 2019; Henry et al. 2020)."


id: fee112eb09905580f9a71bd7e6f4ea0b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42239
content:
"Strategies to accelerate climate mitigation can be most effective at accelerating and achieving transformative change when they are \r\nsynchronised with transition processes in systems. They address technological stage characteristics, take advantage of high-leverage \r\nintervention points, and respond to societal dynamics (Abson et al. 2017; Geels et al. 2017; Kohler et al. 2019). Gaps in knowledge \r\nremain on how to tailor policy mixes, the interaction of enabling conditions, the generalisability of socio-technical transition insights \r\nto other types of systems, and how to harness these insights to better shift development pathways."


id: 38ca914fbf95bda9174ed8835742c7a6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7195
content:
"Taeihagh 2020), and gaps between expected and actual performance \r\nof building-integrated photovoltaic (BIPV) technology (Boyd and \r\nSchweber 2018; Gram-Hanssen and Georg 2018). In the agricultural \r\nsector, new technologies and associated practices that target the \r\nfitness of crop pests have been found to favour resistant variants. \r\nUnintended consequences of digitalisation are reported as well \r\n(Lynch et al. 2019) (Cross-Chapter Box 11 in this chapter)."


id: 9429992664cd93bb309f3679ff3f9722
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23275
content:
"Therefore, even though science, technology and innovation is an \r\nexplicit focus of SDG 9, it is an enabler of most SDGs (UNCTAD 2019). \r\nStriving for synergies between innovation and technological change \r\nfor climate change mitigation with other SDGs can help to secure \r\neffective long-term climate mitigation, as development benefits can \r\ncreate feedback effects that sustain public and political support for \r\nsubsequent climate mitigation policies (Geels 2014; Meckling et al. \r\n2015; Cross-Chapter Box 12 in this chapter). However, innovation is \r\nnot always geared to sustainable development - for instance, firms \r\ntend to know how to innovate when value chains are left intact (Hall \r\nand Martin 2005), which is usually not the case in systemic transitions."


id: 706cf263595a2bacd167e5a276c1db25
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17041
content:
"The opportunities and challenges of technological change can \r\nalso differ within country regions and between countries (Garcia\u0002Casals et al. 2019). Within countries, Vasconcellos and Caiado \r\nCouto (2021) show that, in the absence of policies and capacity\u0002building activities which promote local recruiting, a significant part \r\nof total benefits of wind projects, especially high-income jobs and \r\nhigh value-added activities, is captured by already higher-income \r\nregions. Between countries, developing countries usually have lower \r\ninnovation capabilities, which means they need to import low\u0002emission technology from abroad and are also less able to adapt \r\nthese technologies to local conditions and create new markets and \r\nbusiness models. This can lead to external dependencies and limit \r\nopportunities to leverage economic benefits from technology transfer \r\n(Section 16.5.1)."


id: 128e02e38065ccf4163c24a3172e94f1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 466
content:
"A comprehensive study of these effects distinguishes among \r\n'... anticipated-intended, anticipated-unintended, and unanticipated\u0002unintended consequences' (Tonn and Stiefel 2019). Theoretical and \r\nempirical studies have demonstrated that unintended consequences \r\nare typical of complex adaptive systems, and while a  few are \r\npredictable, a  much larger number are not (Sadras 2020). Even \r\nwhen unintended consequences are unanticipated, they can be \r\nprevented through actor responses, for instance, rebound effects \r\nfollowing the introduction of energy-efficient technologies. Other \r\nexamples of unintended consequences include worse-than-expected \r\nphysical damage to infrastructure and resistance from communities \r\nin the rapidly growing ocean renewable energy sector (Quirapas and "


id: 64a8b4ddffdc94fe0fcc053cbab65197
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14993
content:
"relations based on clientelism and patronage, and no independent \r\njudiciary (Jasanoff 2018), although in particular contexts, non-elites \r\nmanage to exert influence (Moldalieva and Heathershaw 2020). \r\nThe dominance of incumbents, however, implies that sustainable \r\ntechnological transitions could be achieved without yielding any \r\nsocial and democratic benefits (Hansen et al. 2018). In the cultural \r\ndomain, a  recurrent policy challenge that has been observed in \r\nmost countries is the limited public support for development and \r\ndeployment of low-carbon technologies (Bernauer and McGrath \r\n2016). The conventional approach to mobilising such support has \r\nbeen to portray technological change as a  means of minimising \r\nclimate change. Empirical studies show that simply reframing climate \r\npolicy is highly unlikely to build and sustain public support (Bernauer \r\nand McGrath 2016)."


id: 134bfd4d402b23cee2a16b8a66126bda
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 609
content:
"economic and welfare benefits from rapid technological change \r\n(UNCTAD 2019). The adoption of consumer information and \r\ncommunication technology (ICT) (Baller et al. 2016) or renewable \r\nenergy technology (Lema et al. 2021) cannot bring least-developed \r\neconomies close to the technological frontier without appropriate \r\ntechnological capabilities in other sectors, and an enabling innovation \r\nsystem (Ockwell and Mallett 2012; Sagar and Majumdar 2014; \r\nOckwell et al. 2018; UNCTAD 2019; Malhotra et al. 2021; Vasconcellos \r\nand Caiado Couto 2021). It has been argued widely that both hard \r\nand soft infrastructure, as well as appropriate policy frameworks \r\nand capability building, would facilitate developing countries' \r\nengagement in long-term technological innovation and sustainable \r\nindustrial development, and eventually in achieving the SDGs \r\n(Ockwell and Byrne 2016; Altenburg and Rodrik 2017; UNCTAD 2019)."


id: 2c0788b443a443efb2128656655cfec1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5002
content:
"Finally, there is a link between social and technological innovation; any \r\ninnovation is grounded in complex socio-economic arrangements, to \r\nwhich governance arrangements would need to respond (Sections 5.5 \r\nand 5.6, Chapter 13, and Cross-Chapter Box 12 in this chapter). Social \r\ninnovation can contribute to maximising synergies and minimising \r\ntrade-offs in relation to technological and other innovative practices, \r\nbut for this to materialise, national, regional and local circumstances \r\nneed to be taken into account and, if needed, changed. Even in \r\ncircumstances of high capabilities, the extent that social innovation \r\nmight help to promote synergies and avoid trade-offs is not easy to \r\nevaluate (Grimm et al. 2013)."


id: 4b29eab6f7f9aa698a71df40cb7d6007
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10468
content:
"Dominant economic systems and centralised governance structures \r\ncontinue to reproduce unsustainable patterns of production and \r\nconsumption, reinforcing many economic and governance structures \r\nfrom local through national and global scales (Johnstone and Newell \r\n2018). Technological change, as an inherently complex process \r\n(Funtowicz 2020), poses governance challenges (Bukkens et al. 2020) \r\nrequiring social innovation (Repo and Matschoss 2019) (Section 5.6 \r\nand Chapter 13)."


id: d95f41cf620f8f0940dc999faec3b598
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35543
content:
"Prospects for effectively governing SDG-oriented technological \r\ntransformations require, at a minimum, balanced views and new tools \r\nfor securing the scientific legitimacy and credibility to connect public \r\npolicy and technological change in society (Jasanoff 2018; Sadras \r\n2020). Many frameworks of governance have been proposed, such \r\nas reflexive governance (Voss et al. 2006), polycentric governance \r\n(Ostrom 2010), collaborative governance (Bodin 2017), adaptive \r\ngovernance (Munene et al. 2018) and transformative governance \r\n(Rijke et al. 2013; Westley et al. 2013) (Chapters 13 and 14)."


id: 530f034de4858176c8ebe976219306d0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11880
content:
"A particular class of barriers to the development and adoption of new \r\ntechnologies comprises entrenched power relations dominated by \r\nvested interests that control and benefit from existing technologies \r\n(Chaffin et al. 2016; Dorband et al. 2020). Such interests can generate \r\nbalancing feedbacks within multilevel social-technological regimes \r\nthat are related to technological lock-in, including allocations of \r\ninvestment between fossil and renewable energy technologies \r\n(Unruh 2002; Sagar et al. 2009; Seto et al. 2016)."


id: bb9153ab68c92bae37124d2acd5ad720
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30219
content:
"Weaker coordination and implementation capacity in some developing \r\ncountries can undermine the ability to avoid trade-offs with other \r\ndevelopment objectives - such as reinforced inequalities or excessive \r\nindebtedness and increased external dependency  - and can limit \r\nthe potential of leveraging economic benefits from technologies \r\ntransferred from abroad (Section  16.5 and Cross-Chapter Box  12 \r\nin this chapter). Van Welie and Romijn (2018) show that, in a low\u0002income setting, the exclusion of some local stakeholders from the \r\ndecision-making process may undermine sustainability transitions \r\nefforts. Countries with high levels of inequality can be more prone \r\nto elite capture, non-transparent political decision-making processes, "


id: bc356bbfce97309130a145c6e079ef10
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30357
content:
"Box  16.10 provides insights on how a  systemic approach to \r\ntechnological innovation can contribute to reconcile synergies and \r\ntrade-offs to achieve sustainable development and mitigation goals."


id: 9e89e2e3d13a0fd5a962b681aa734eb0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25118
content:
"Other actions with the potential to maximise synergies are those \r\nrelated to community or grassroots technological innovation. The "


id: cf90cf12053469079eaa40c3c928d586
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33878
content:
"Major improvements in agricultural productivity have been recorded over recent decades (FAO 2018a). However, progress has also \r\ncome with social and environmental costs, high levels of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and rising demand for natural resources \r\n(UNEP 2013; UNEP 2017; FAO 2018a; Bringezu 2019; Diaz et al. 2019)."


id: 60d55d4497a7a9af17f95d4f8642c8f9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Trend analysis indicates that a large share of the global demand for land is projected to be supplied by South America, in particular the \r\nAmazon (Lambin and Meyfroidt 2011; TEEB 2018) and Gran Chaco forests (Grau et al. 2015). In developing countries, land use change \r\nfor satisfying international meat demand is leading to deforestation. In Brazil, the amount of GHGs emitted by the beef cattle sector \r\nalone represents 65% of the agricultural sector's emissions and 15% of the country's overall emissions (May 2019)."


id: 1c64f144d08fc67e9669f21ca31f50d1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2186
content:
"Agricultural and food systems are complex and diverse; they include traditional food systems, mixed food systems and modern food \r\nsystems (Pengue et al. 2018). Multiple forms of visible and invisible flows of natural resources exist in global food systems (Pascual \r\net al. 2017; TEEB 2018; IPBES 2019)."


id: fe525df382c1b5c55b789ac933571bd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42113
content:
"Technological practices, management and changes in the food chain could help adapt to climate change, reduce emissions and absorb \r\ncarbon in soil, thus contributing to carbon dioxide removal (IPCC, 2018, 2019). A range of technologies can be implemented - from \r\nhighly technological options, such as transgenic crops resistant to drought (Gonzalez et al. 2019), salt or pesticides (OECD 2011b; \r\nKim and Kwak 2020) or smart and 4.0 agriculture (Klerkx et al. 2019), to more frugal, low-cost technologies such as agroecological \r\napproaches adapted to local circumstances (Francis et al. 2003; FAO 2018b). These agroecological approaches are the subject of this box."


id: e764050cf59ab1b801651a009f16512b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38009
content:
"For developing countries, agroecological approaches could tackle climate change challenges and food security (WGII-report, Chapter 5, \r\nBox 5.10). Small Island Developing States (SIDS) support livelihoods to develop local food value chains that can promote sustainable \r\nmanagement of natural resources, preserve biodiversity and help build resilience to climate change impacts and natural disasters \r\n(FAO 2019). Other advantages of agroecological practices include their adaptation to different social, economic and ecological \r\nenvironments (Altieri and Nicholls 2017), the fact that they are physical and financial capital-extensive, and are well-integrated \r\nwith the social and cultural capital of rural territories and local resources (knowledge, natural resources, etc.), without leading to \r\ntechnological dependencies (Cote et al. 2019)."


id: cfcbfb62606b794553eff6be386d720a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33918
content:
"Agroecology is a dynamic concept that has gained prominence in scientific, agricultural and political discourses in recent years (Wezel \r\net al. 2020; Anderson et al. 2021) (Chapter 7, Chapter 5, WGII Box 5.10). Three of the different agroecological approaches are briefly \r\ndiscussed here: agroecological intensification; agroforestry; and biochar use in rice paddy fields."


id: d8ac0b8dd90bbdcc0d8d4ff138726b8c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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vector_id: 35412
content:
"Agricultural intensification provides ways to use land, water and energy resources to ensure adequate food supply while also \r\naddressing concerns about climate change and biodiversity (Cassman and Grassini 2020). The term ecological intensification \r\n(Tittonell 2014) focuses on biological and ecological processes and functions in agroecosystems. In line with the development of the \r\nconcept of agroecology, agroecological intensification integrates social and cultural perspectives (Wezel et al. 2015). Agroecological \r\nintensification (Mockshell and Villarino 2019) for sub-Saharan Africa aims to address employment and food security challenges (Pretty \r\net al. 2011; Altieri et al. 2015)."


id: 8916fb73b4004b931b1c9ebd5e52759f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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content:
"Another example of an agroecological approach is agroforestry. Agroforestry provides examples of positive agroecological feedbacks, \r\nsuch as 'the regreening of the Sahel' in Niger. The practice is based on the assisted natural regeneration of trees in cultivated fields, an \r\nold method that was slowly dying out, but which innovative public policies (the transfer of property rights over trees from the state to \r\nfarmers) helped restore (Sendzimir et al. 2011)."


id: 6576adadf3ca68cec04fc00cda293b68
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15116
content:
"Rice paddy fields are a major source of methane. Climate change impacts and adaptation strategies can affect rice production and \r\nrice farmers' net income. Biochar use in rice paddy fields has been advocated as a potential strategy to reduce GHG emissions from \r\nsoils, enhance soil carbon stocks and nitrogen retention, and improve soil function and crop productivity (Mohammadi et al. 2020)."


id: 4d2c5a6322ee627a0a41e0bf4605298
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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content:
"The contributions of indigenous people (Diaz et al. 2019), heritage agriculture (Koohafkan and Altieri 2010) and peasants' agroecological \r\nknowledge (Holt-Gimenez 2002) to technological innovation offer a wide array of options for management of land, soils, biodiversity \r\nand enhanced food security without depending on modern, foreign agricultural technologies (Denevan 1995). In farming agriculture \r\nand food systems, innovation and technology based on nature could help to reduce climate change impacts (Griscom et al. 2017). \r\nEvidence suggests that there are benefits to integrating tradition with new technologies in order to design new approaches to \r\nfarming, and that these are greatest when they are tailored to local circumstances (Nicholls and Altieri 2018)."


id: 119b5e95316928223911b2dbe46b24e5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 288
content:
"holistic way, could make innovation policy more effective, and avoid \r\nand minimise misalignments between climate change mitigation, \r\ntechnological innovation, and other societal goals (medium evidence,\r\nhigh agreement)."


id: 23f995767b2c4f036f0b80e45512ccd8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3510
content:
"This section gives a  synthesis of this chapter on innovation \r\nand technology development and transfer, connecting it to \r\nsustainable development."


id: e252408a0ddded1bd5b97b32e34e0e54
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37106
content:
"A special feature is the dynamics of transitions. Like other enabling \r\nconditions, technological innovation plays a  balancing role  - by \r\ninhibiting change as innovation strengthens incumbent technologies \r\nand practices - and a reinforcing role, by allowing new technologies \r\nand practices to disrupt the existing socio-technical regimes (high \r\nconfidence). Appropriate innovation policies can help to better \r\norganise innovation systems, while other policies (technology push \r\nand demand pull) can provide suitable resources and incentives to \r\nsupport and guide these innovation systems towards societally\u0002desirable outcomes, ensure the innovations are deployed at scale, \r\nand direct these dynamics towards system transitions for climate \r\nchange mitigation, and also towards addressing other SDGs. This \r\nmeans taking into account the full lifecycle or value chain as well as \r\nanalysis of synergies and trade-offs."


id: c4ad0281385ab1ad9bd763fc81b6b060
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31907
content:
"In conjunction with other enabling conditions, technological \r\ninnovation can support system transitions to limit warming, help \r\nshift development pathways, and bring about new and improved \r\nways of delivering goods and services that are essential to human \r\nwell-being (high confidence). At the same time, however, innovation \r\ncan result in trade-offs that undermine progress on mitigation \r\nand towards other SDGs. Trade-offs include negative externalities, \r\nsuch as environmental impacts and social inequalities, rebound \r\neffects leading to lower net emission reductions or even increases \r\nin emissions, and increased dependency on foreign knowledge and \r\nproviders (high confidence). Digitalisation, for example, holds both \r\nopportunity for emission reduction and emission-saving behaviour \r\nchange, but at the same time causes significant environmental, social \r\nand greenhouse gas (GHG) impacts (high confidence)."


id: 459dc0881a95ffa85fe66cc4d74c78bb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9464
content:
"Against this backdrop, international cooperation on technological \r\ninnovation is one of the enablers of climate action in developing \r\ncountries on both mitigation and adaptation (high confidence). \r\nExperiences with international cooperation on technology \r\ndevelopment and deployment suggest that such activities are most \r\neffective when they: are approached as 'innovation cooperation' that \r\nengenders a holistic, systemic view of innovation requirements; are \r\nan equitable partnership between donors and recipients; and develop \r\nlocal innovation capabilities (medium evidence, high agreement)."


id: bc81f8330e4cafade70292572684c16d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30411
content:
"A systemic view of innovation that takes into account the roles \r\nof actors, institutions, and their interactions, can contribute to \r\nenhanced understanding of processes and outcomes of technological \r\ninnovation, and to interventions and arrangements that can help \r\ninnovation. It can also play a  role in clarifying the synergies and \r\ntrade-offs between technological innovation and the SDGs. Effective \r\ngovernance and policy, implemented in an inclusive, responsible and "


id: fd30f30ae4c1e2cac041dc446f526cdd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41893
content:
"Chapter  17, in particular Section  17.4, connects technological \r\ninnovation with other enabling conditions, such as behaviour, \r\ninstitutional capacity and multilevel governance, to clarify the actions \r\nthat could be taken, holistically and in conjunction, to strengthen and \r\naccelerate the system transitions required to limit warming to be in \r\nline with the Paris Agreement and to place countries in sustainable \r\ndevelopment pathways."


id: c1be0da236c25598622295b99e642cb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31388
content:
"national contexts. Important knowledge gaps need to be filled \r\nregarding the impact of 'green' public procurement, lending, 'green' \r\npublic banking, and building code policies on innovation outcomes."


id: 5ebadc1e94d2ce3c0b7f0c1cb73b1455
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13954
content:
"There is also a superficial understanding of the potential and actual \r\ncontributions of businesses, educational institutions and socially \r\nresponsible programmes, particularly in developing countries, as \r\nsources of innovation and early adopters of new technologies, and \r\na notable lack of knowledge about indigenous practices."


id: b58af6165eb9c426061786543668afaa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29165
content:
"Filling gaps in literature availability, data collection, modelling, \r\napplication of frameworks and further analysis in several sectors \r\nwill improve knowledge on innovation and technology development \r\nand transfer, including research and development (R&D) to support \r\npolicymaking in climate change mitigation as well as adaptation. \r\nThese policies and related interventions need to benefit from data \r\nand methodologies for the ex post evaluation of their effectiveness."


id: 7688443965cffecbb1a352e5b81652a7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18072
content:
"Current literature has a strong bias to studies originating from and \r\nbased on developed countries. Also, innovation and technology \r\nliterature is skewed to mitigation and, specifically, energy. Literature \r\non technology innovation for adaptation is largely missing."


id: 4f1e0d146480be1c75eead67a2261dde
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11203
content:
"In the area of innovation studies, data are limited on the different \r\nindicators used to assess the strength of the innovation system, (even \r\nfor energy), including global figures on R&D and demonstration \r\nspending, also for developing countries, and their effectiveness. There \r\nis also a lack of a comprehensive framework and detailed data to \r\nassess the strengths of low-emission innovation systems, including \r\ninteractions among actors, innovation policy implementation, and \r\nstrength of institutions."


id: a9f6c5816b2d8f5f3090d56cc8427986
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27123
content:
"This section addresses identified knowledge gaps related to: \r\nwhat extent developing countries are represented in studies on \r\ninnovation and technology development and transfer; national \r\ncontexts and local innovation capacity; potential and actual \r\ncontributions of businesses; literature emphasis on mitigation; \r\nindicators to assess innovation systems; non-technical barriers for \r\nthe feasibility of decarbonisation pathways; the role of domestic \r\nintellectual property rights (IPR) policy; digitalisation in low\u0002emissions pathways; and Paris Agreement compliance regarding \r\ntechnology and capacity building."


id: 2d862fd5bec7d71ac443be6e4c634206
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5303
content:
"Another gap in knowledge remains between the results from energy\u0002climate-economy models and those emerging from systems and \r\nsustainability transition approaches, empirical case studies, and the \r\ninnovation system literature. If this gap is filled, understanding \r\ncould be improved of the feasibility of decarbonisation pathways in \r\nlight of the many non-technical barriers to technology deployment \r\nand diffusion."


id: 1e0fba9b450337736eceeb09811831a2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2484
content:
"In the field of policy instruments, existing evaluations provide \r\ninsufficient evidence to assess the impact of decarbonisation policy \r\ninstruments on innovation, as these evaluations mainly focus on \r\nenvironmental or technological effects."


id: 8372432e661d75ed7ca40150ce8cde50
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20261
content:
"The potential positive or negative role of domestic IPR policy in \r\ntechnology transfer to least-developed countries remains unclear as \r\nthe literature does not show agreement. Moreover, gaps remain in \r\nimpact evaluations of sub-national green industrial policies, which \r\nare of growing importance. The interaction between subnational and \r\nnational decarbonisation policies to advance innovation would also \r\nbenefit from further research, particularly in developing countries."


id: 3667d4651547268542fab01983238a34
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6807
content:
"The understanding of the role of digitalisation in decarbonisation \r\npathways is lacking and needs to be studied from several angles. \r\nExisting studies do not sufficiently take into account knowledge on \r\nthe energy impact of digital technologies, in particular the increase \r\nin energy demand by digital devices, and the increase in energy \r\nefficiency. Studies would benefit from being technology/sector/\r\ncountry-specific."


id: 49a4d9eeb6a06e65e4658edfd561ceef
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10185
content:
"Further exploration is needed into the way digitalisation influences \r\nthe framework conditions that cause decarbonisation, the socio\u0002economic and behavioural barriers influencing the diffusion of \r\ntechnologies in the long-term scenarios, and the relationship with \r\nsociety and its effects."


id: 18a79f126958f13946b96379b93f5b8d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1551
content:
"Given the implications of the digital revolution for sustainability, \r\na  better characterisation of governance aspects would increase \r\nunderstanding of the implications for policymakers of digitalisation \r\nand the possibilities for it and other general-purpose technologies."


id: 2b8e4ab4c73b84cf5549c953bf5d8c9c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4917
content:
"Research (theoretical and empirical) on the impacts of imitation, or \r\nadaptation of new technological solutions invented in one region \r\nand used in other regions, could fill knowledge gaps and accelerate \r\ndiffusion of climate-related technologies, while taking care not to \r\nreduce the incentive for inventors to search for new solutions."


id: a31f5269450e2bba9ef49990a19fa99d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25908
content:
"An independent assessment is underway to look at the compliance \r\nof the Paris Agreement with regard to technology and capacity \r\nbuilding as means of implementation. The Enhanced Transparency \r\nFramework for action and support is developing a methodology for \r\nmonitoring, reporting and verification. There is a lack of analysis of \r\nthe full landscape of international cooperation, of the effectiveness \r\nof the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and \r\nthe Paris Agreement, and what is needed to meet their objectives."


id: aa7798cd21071fdd829f37fbf554ea1e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27215
content:
"The Paris Agreement stressed the importance of development and transfer of technologies to improve resilience to climate change \r\nand to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. However, innovation and even fast technological change will not be enough to achieve \r\nParis Agreement mitigation objectives. Other changes are necessary across the production and consumption system and the society \r\nin general, including behavioural changes."


id: d71ed2aeaa16592fe7f89bc09376d645
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35155
content:
"Technological changes never happen in a vacuum; they are always accompanied by, for instance, people changing habits, companies \r\nchanging value chains, or banks changing risk profiles. Therefore, technological changes driven by holistic approaches can contribute \r\nto accelerate and spread those changes towards the achievement of climate and sustainable development goals."


id: 44c80bb5a986dfa934622d4162372b62
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9326
content:
"In innovation studies, such systemic approaches are said to strengthen the functions of technological or national innovation systems, \r\nso that climate-friendly technologies can flourish. Innovation policies can help respond to local priorities and prevent unintended \r\nand undesirable consequences of technological change, such as unequal access to new technologies across countries and between \r\nincome groups, environmental degradation and negative effects on employment."


id: 3c0e921f10f78cef3ae5d088820f99bd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7755
content:
"The speed and success of innovation processes could be enhanced with the involvement of a  wider range of actors from the \r\nindustry, research and financial communities working in partnerships at national, regional and international levels. Public policies \r\nplay a critical role to bring together these different actors and create the necessary enabling conditions, including financial support, \r\nthrough different instruments as well as institutional and human capacities."


id: 63dc0de189a9cfd9940f9191571b5966
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14856
content:
"The increasing complexity of technologies requires cooperation if their widespread diffusion is to be achieved. Cooperation includes \r\nthe necessary knowledge flow within and between countries and regions. This knowledge flow can take the form of exchanging \r\nexperiences, ideas, skills, and practices, among others."


id: c40a28ddc0030fead91f3a8114c4dcf4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31771
content:
"Technologies that are currently known but not yet widely used need to be spread around the world, and adapted to local preferences \r\nand conditions. Innovation capabilities are required not only to adapt new technologies for local use, but also to create new markets \r\nand business models. International technology cooperation can serve that purpose."


id: 21d725ea64fc9b62af04005bc1943804
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3174
content:
"In fact, evidence shows that international cooperation on technology development and transfer can help developing countries to \r\nachieve their climate goals more effectively and, if this is done properly, can also help to addressing other sustainable development \r\ngoals. Many initiatives exist both regionally and globally to help countries in achieving technology development and transfer \r\nthrough partnerships and research collaboration that include developed and developing countries, with a key role for technological \r\ninstitutions and universities. Enhancing current activities would help an effective, long-term global response to climate change, \r\nwhile promoting sustainable development."


id: 1a994868e3ffe1542788341c90d376d5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1881
content:
"Globalisation of production and supply of goods and services, including innovation and new technologies, may open up opportunities \r\nfor developing countries to advance technology diffusion; however, so far not all countries have benefitted from the globalisation \r\nof innovation due to different barriers, such as access to finance and technical capabilities. These asymmetries between countries in \r\nthe globalisation process can also lead to dependencies on foreign knowledge and providers."


id: 233523a27c2478089e9d5ccdff558992
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3394
content:
"Not all technology cooperation directly results in mitigation outcomes. Overall, technology transfer broadly has focused on enhancing \r\nclimate technology absorption and deployment in developing countries as well as research, development and demonstration, and \r\nknowledge spillovers."


id: 34607c2cc945a388612ea239e26f5e6a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6450
content:
"The Paris Agreement also reflects this view by noting that countries shall strengthen cooperative action on technology development \r\nand transfer regarding two main aspects: (i) promoting collaborative approaches to research and development; and (ii) facilitating \r\naccess to technology to developing country Parties."


id: a09c13752549c934ed3ebceae1ba4f17
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25462
content:
"Denton, F., K. Halsnaes, K. Akimoto, S. Burch, C. Diaz Morejon, F. Farias, J. Jupesta, A. Shareef, P. Schweizer-Ries, F. Teng, \r\nE. Zusman, 2022: Accelerating the transition in the context of sustainable development. In IPCC, 2022: Climate \r\nChange 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the \r\nIntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [P.R. Shukla, J. Skea, R. Slade, A. Al Khourdajie, R. van Diemen, D. McCollum, \r\nM. Pathak, S. Some, P. Vyas, R. Fradera, M. Belkacemi, A. Hasija, G. Lisboa, S. Luz, J. Malley, (eds.)]. Cambridge University \r\nPress, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA. doi: 10.1017/9781009157926.019"


id: bc96fca62bbae821d74cf4eaa0a7b7c7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30426
content:
"Views nonetheless differ on how much market-correcting policies; \r\nshift preferences (economics); shifts in individual and collective \r\nmindsets (psychology); and multi-level governance arrangements \r\nand inclusive political institutions (governance) contribute to system \r\ntransitions (medium evidence, high agreement). {17.2}"


id: 7064d750504d9a43c697c9055b0255b4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17033
content:
"While economics, psychology, governance and systems \r\nthinking emphasise different enablers of transitions, they \r\noften share a view that strengthening synergies and avoiding \r\ntrade-offs between climate and sustainable development \r\npriorities can overcome barriers to transitions (medium \r\nevidence, high agreement). A  growing body of research and \r\nevidence can show which factors in the views from economics, \r\npsychology, governance and systems affect how interrelationships \r\nare managed between climate, mitigation policies and sustainable \r\ndevelopment. Greater integration between studies based on different \r\nmethodological approaches can show how to construct an enabling \r\nenvironment that increases the feasibility and sustainability of \r\ntransitions. {17.2, 17.3, 17.4}"


id: 2d155d15199e8c557b5bddf12128f28b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5210
content:
"While transition pathways will vary across countries, they are \r\nlikely to be challenging in many contexts (robust evidence,\r\nhigh agreement). Climate change is the result of decades of \r\nunsustainable production and consumption patterns (for example, \r\nenergy production and land use), as well as governance arrangements \r\nand political economic institutions that lock in resource-intensive \r\ndevelopment patterns (robust evidence, high agreement). Reframing \r\ndevelopment objectives and shifting development pathways towards \r\nsustainability can help transform these patterns and practices, \r\nallowing space for transitions to transform unsustainable systems \r\n(medium evidence, high agreement). {17.1.1.2}"


id: 555f4d185e3f83b8de3472dd2eab8269
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12299
content:
"Short- and long-term studies of transformations using \r\nmacroeconomic models and integrated assessment models \r\n(IAMs) have identified synergies and trade-offs of mitigation \r\noptions in the context of development pathways that align \r\nsustainable development and climate change (robust evidence,\r\nhigh agreement). IAMs often look at climate change mitigation \r\nand Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in an aggregate manner: \r\nsupplementing this aggregate view with detail-rich studies involving \r\nSDGs can build support for transitions within and across countries \r\n(medium evidence, medium agreement). {17.3.2}"


id: fc824c8db03abbc2107695f6d2d60723
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41790
content:
"Sustainable development can enhance sectoral integration \r\nand social inclusion (robust evidence, high agreement). \r\nInclusion merits attention because equity within and across \r\ncountries is critical to transitions that are not simply rapid but also \r\nsustainable and just. Resource shortages, social divisions, inequitable \r\ndistributions of wealth, poor infrastructure and limited access to \r\nadvanced technologies can constrain the options and capacities \r\nfor developing countries to achieve sustainable and just transitions \r\n(medium evidence, high agreement). {17.1.1.2}"


id: c58425781223bdc0d3e0049bba5e2e83
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32054
content:
"The impacts of climate change mitigation and adaptation \r\nresponses, are highly context-specific and scale-dependent. \r\nThere are synergies and trade-offs between adaptation and \r\nmitigation as well as synergies and trade-offs with sustainable \r\ndevelopment (robust evidence, high agreement). A strong link \r\nexists between sustainable development, vulnerability and climate \r\nrisks, as limited economic, social and institutional resources often \r\nresult in low adaptive capacities and high vulnerability, especially \r\nin developing countries. Resource limitations in these countries \r\ncan similarly weaken the capacity for climate mitigation and \r\nadaptation. The move towards climate-resilient societies requires \r\ntransformational or deep systemic change. This has important \r\nimplications for countries' sustainable development pathways \r\n(medium evidence, high agreement). {17.3.3.6}"


id: db0478edf9e0a2ca16337ac1f0999313
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35813
content:
"Concrete actions aligning sustainable development and \r\nclimate mitigation and partnerships can support transitions. \r\nStrengthening different stakeholders' 'response capacities' to \r\nmitigate and adapt to a changing climate will be critical for \r\na  sustainable transition (robust evidence, high agreement). \r\nResponse capacities can be increased by means of alignment across \r\nmultiple stakeholders at different levels of decision-making. This \r\nalignment will also help achieve synergies and manage trade-offs \r\nbetween climate and sectoral policies by breaking down sectoral \r\nsilos and overcoming the multiple barriers that prevent transitions \r\nfrom gaining traction and gathering momentum (medium evidence, \r\nhigh agreement). {17.1.1.1}"


id: fa59d4649e7f97f63b562e7301fcee
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41409
content:
"Sectoral mitigation options present synergies with the SDGs, \r\nbut there are also trade-offs, which can become barriers to \r\nimplementation. Such trade-offs are particularly identified \r\nin relation to the use of land for bioenergy crops, water and \r\nfood access, and competition for land between forest or \r\nfood production (robust evidence, high agreement). Many \r\nindustrial mitigation options, such as efficiency improvements, waste \r\nmanagement and the circular economy, have synergies with the SDGs \r\nrelating to access to food, water and energy (robust evidence, high \r\nagreement). The promotion of renewable energy in some industrial \r\nsectors can imply stranded energy supply investments, which need to "


id: 1934b4ac98754318198c3cb74de0cc93
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1652
content:
"Economics, psychology, governance, and systems research have \r\npointed to a range of factors that influence the speed, scale \r\nand quality of transitions (robust evidence, high agreement). "


id: e562ffd3535dea462c80ac666cd7a57
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37659
content:
"exposed to heavy industrial jobs and associated outcomes \r\n(medium evidence, high agreement). A  just transition \r\nincorporates key principles, such as respect and dignity for vulnerable \r\ngroups, the creation of decent jobs, social protection, employment \r\nrights, fairness in energy access and use, and social dialogue and \r\ndemocratic consultation with the relevant stakeholders, while coping \r\nwith the effects of asset-stranding and the transition to green and \r\nclean economies (medium evidence, medium agreement). The \r\neconomic implications of the transition will be felt especially strongly \r\nby developing countries, with high dependence on hydrocarbon \r\nproducts for revenue streams, as they will be exposed to reduced \r\nfiscal incomes given a low demand for oil and consequent fall in oil \r\nprices (limited evidence, medium agreement). {17.3.2, 17.3.2.3}"


id: fea07c8db6a6f778870565635deea07e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42181
content:
"Digitalisation could facilitate a fast transition to sustainable \r\ndevelopment and low-emission pathways by contributing \r\nto efficiency improvements, cross-sectoral coordination \r\nand a circular economy with new IT services and decreasing \r\nresource use (low evidence, medium agreement). Several \r\nsynergies with SDGs could emerge in terms of energy, food and water \r\naccess, health and education, as well as trade-offs, for example, in \r\nrelation to reduced employment, increasing energy demand and \r\nincreasing demand for services, all implying increased GHG emissions. \r\nHowever, developing countries with limited internet access and poor \r\ninfrastructure could be excluded from the benefits of digitalisation \r\n(medium evidence, medium agreement). {17.3.3}"


id: 834f74f75bf4233454545953ced9b9e5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20231
content:
"Actions aligning sustainable development and climate \r\nmitigation and partnerships can support transitions. \r\nStrengthening different stakeholders' 'response capacities' to \r\nmitigate and adapt to a changing climate will be critical for \r\na  sustainable transition (robust evidence, high agreement). \r\nResponse capacities can be increased by means of alignment across \r\nmultiple stakeholders at different levels of decision-making. This \r\nalignment will also help achieve synergies and manage trade-offs \r\nbetween climate and sectoral policies by breaking down sectoral \r\nsilos and overcoming the multiple barriers that prevent transitions \r\nfrom gaining traction and gathering momentum (medium evidence, \r\nhigh agreement). {17.1.1.1}"


id: 6a01e995b4c805d5ed85a2fb37600d7d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15917
content:
"Sustainable development and deep decarbonisation will \r\ninvolve people and communities being connected through \r\nvarious means, including globally via the internet and digital \r\ntechnologies, in ways that prompt shifts in thinking and \r\nbehaviour consistent with climate change goals (medium \r\nevidence, medium agreement). Individuals and organisations "


id: 9921c317883535ebd26695cb5e7a8539
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24153
content:
"The landscape of transitions to sustainable development is \r\nchanging rapidly, with multiple transitions already underway. \r\nThis creates the room to manage these transitions in ways \r\nthat prioritise the needs for workers in vulnerable sectors \r\n(land, energy) to secure their jobs and maintain secure and \r\nhealthy lifestyles, especially as the risks multiply for those "


id: 957d25b35b47c24accf3786ab773b1c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23502
content:
"like institutional entrepreneurs can function to build transformative \r\ncapacity through collective action (robust evidence, high agreement), \r\nbut private-sector entrepreneurs can also play an important \r\nrole in fostering and accelerating the transitions to sustainable \r\ndevelopment (robust evidence, medium agreement). Ultimately, \r\nthe adoption of coordinated, multi-sectoral policies targeting new \r\nand rapid innovation can help national economies take advantage \r\nof widespread decarbonisation. Green industrial policies that focus \r\non building domestic supply chains and capacities can help states \r\nprepare for the influx of renewable CDR-methods, or mechanisms \r\nfor carbon capture and storage (CCS) (medium evidence, medium \r\nagreement). {17.4.2}"


id: 9b378e9d15af13d5170e08249893ac3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24557
content:
"Accelerating the transition to sustainability will be enabled \r\nby explicit consideration being given to the principles of \r\njustice, equality and fairness. Interventions to promote \r\nsustainability transitions that account for local context \r\n(including unequal access to resources, capacity and \r\ntechnology) in the development process are necessary but \r\nnot sufficient in creating a just transition (low evidence, high \r\nagreement). {17.4.6}"


id: 30705c13a465435e5bd16239303443fd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5779
content:
"The Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) (Denton et al. 2014; Fleurbaey et al. \r\n2014) and the Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5degC (SR1.5) \r\n(IPCC 2018; Roy et al. 2018a) have arguably made the strongest \r\nlinks between climate and sustainable development to date. One of \r\nthe key messages of AR5 was that the implementation of climate \r\nmitigation and adaptation actions could help promote sustainable \r\ndevelopment, and it emphasised the need for transformational \r\nchanges in this regard. The AR5 also concluded that the link between \r\nclimate change and sustainable development is cross-cutting and \r\ncomplex, and that thus the impacts of climate change are threatening \r\nthe efforts being made to achieve sustainable development. The \r\nSR1.5 helped systematise these links by mapping the synergies and \r\ntrade-offs between selected SDG indicators and climate mitigation \r\n(IPCC 2018; Roy et al. 2018b) (Section 17.3)."


id: 12a6f7bc703bfbac6722fa036ca7503e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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"Despite the clear links between sustainable development and climate \r\nchange being recognised from the early stages of the IPCC, \r\nclimate  change has often been portrayed as an environmental \r\nproblem to be addressed chiefly by environmental ministries (Brown \r\net al. 2007; Munasinghe 2007; Swart and Raes 2007). However, this \r\nperception has evolved over time. It is now increasingly common to \r\nsee governments and other actors understand the wider ramifications \r\nof a  changing climate for sustainable development. In a  growing \r\nnumber of studies, work on climate policies and just transitions \r\ntowards sustainable development are framed as going hand in \r\nhand (Fuso Nerini et al. 2019; Dugarova and Gulasan 2017; Sanchez \r\nRodriguez et al. 2018; Schramade 2017; Zhenmin and Espinosa 2019)."


id: 7f5febbb350b42f37eb966e35b5d81fc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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content:
"Section  17.1 begins by reviewing how climate and sustainability \r\nissues have been discussed in the Intergovernmental Panel on \r\nClimate Change (IPCC), as well as international climate change \r\nand sustainable development processes at different levels. It \r\nfurther introduces key themes addressed in the chapter's remaining \r\nsubsections. Section 17.2 provides an overview of how key theories \r\nunderstand transitions and transformation, and notes a  shared \r\nconcern over leveraging synergies and managing trade-offs between \r\nclimate change and sustainable development across different \r\ndisciplines. Section  17.3 provides an assessment of the mitigation \r\noptions that can help achieve these synergies and avoid trade-offs. \r\nSection 17.4 pulls together the theoretical and empirical aspects by \r\ndetailing the essential elements of an enabling environment that \r\nhelps drive forward transitions that are quick, deep, broad and, \r\nultimately, sustainable."


id: c1dd682bad65bb6ed3184bcb103c3e34
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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"Among the reasons for the growing realisation of these \r\ninterdependencies are milestones in international climate and \r\nsustainable development processes. As outlined in Chapter  14, \r\nthe year 2015 was a  turning point due to two agreements: \r\n(i) the Paris Agreement; and (ii) the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable \r\nDevelopment and its 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) \r\n(Farzaneh et al. 2021)."


id: 17743fd2774139240c5ddac085f5969d
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"Following a long history of references to sustainable development in \r\nthe UNFCCC and related agreements, the Paris Agreement helped to \r\nstrengthen the links between climate and sustainable development \r\nby emphasising that sustainability is related to its objectives \r\n(Sindico 2016; UNFCCC 2016). One of the ways that it helped \r\ntighten this link is by institutionalising bottom-up pledges and the \r\nreview architecture. Toward this end, the Paris Agreement instituted \r\nNationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) as vehicles through \r\nwhich countries make pledges and demonstrate their commitment to \r\nclimate action. Although there was no clear guidance on what should \r\nbe included in the NDCs, some of the requirements were elaborated \r\nin the Paris Rulebook . Some of the submitted NDCs included only \r\nmitigation efforts, but others set out mitigation and adaptation goals \r\naligning NDC commitments to national planning processes, while yet \r\nothers mentioned links with the SDGs."


id: 97e2accc507bdde3dbaa3d488d511f7e
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"Yet another way that the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development \r\nunderlines the importance of capturing synergies is its calls for \r\npolicy coherence (SDGs 14 and 17). Policy coherence and integration \r\nbetween sectors are two of the most critical factors in breaking down \r\nthe silo mode of working of different sectors. Working across climate \r\nand other sustainability agendas is essential to coherence."


id: 6bdaf0c5943684c8212d2aff48a95990
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"Another way that the Paris Agreement and the NDCs could strengthen \r\ntheir links to sustainable development is to update country-specific \r\nclimate pledges. Countries are free to choose their targets and the \r\nmeans and instruments with which to implement them. A  core \r\nfeature of the NDCs was that countries submit NDCs every five \r\nyears, giving them an opportunity to assess themselves relative to \r\nother countries, raise their ambitions and learn from their peers. \r\nMoreover, it was emphasised that countries should not 'backslide' \r\nin subsequent NDCs, thus ensuring that countries should always be \r\nforward-looking in respect of increasing their ambitions to deliver the \r\nParis Goals. (Hohne et al. 2017) found that, in developing countries \r\nespecially, the NDC preparation process has improved national \r\nclimate policymaking."


id: ac19f6414b93e555b22509d7aca8285b
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"A final way that the sustainability and climate agendas have been \r\nlinked is through vertical integration. Following a similar trend that \r\nappeared with Agenda 21, for which many cities adopted local plans, \r\na growing number of cities have introduced Voluntary Local Reviews \r\n(VLRs). The VLRs resemble the VNRs, but place the emphasis on local \r\nactions and needs regarding the SDGs (and some links to climate \r\nchange) (Ortiz-Moya et al. 2021). The 2019 SDG Report shows that \r\n150 countries have developed national urban plans, almost half \r\nof them also being in the implementation phase (United Nations \r\nGeneral Assembly 2019)."


id: 77f744a5194b8216d28127dd9a16b56
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"Despite some favourable reviews, several assessments of specific \r\ncountries' NDCs (Andries et al. 2017; Rogelj et al. 2016; Vandyck \r\net al. 2016) have assessed that those submitted for 2020-2030 are \r\ninsufficient for delivering on the Paris goals. Updated and/or new \r\nNDCs were therefore submitted by the end of 2020. However, an \r\nassessment of those NDCs revealed that the level of ambition was \r\nsignificantly lower than the goals of the Paris Agreement (UNFCCO \r\n2020) (see also this chapter). One of the urgent calls in Paris was to \r\nassess the impacts and efforts that need to be undertaken to keep \r\nglobal warming well below 2degC in relation to pre-industrial levels \r\nand evaluate related global GHG emission pathways (UNFCCC 2015). \r\nAlthough the initial NDCs fell short of these goals, the idea was that \r\nNDCs would be living documents that could ratchet up climate \r\naction and ambition."


id: 146e9b8eadbaff172248b03f20b632d0
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"Other non-UN-led initiatives involving international organisations or \r\nclusters of countries have also helped to raise the issue of sustainable \r\ndevelopment as a framework for mitigation. The OECD, for instance, \r\nassesses different types of investments and economic activities \r\nwith reference to their significance for environmental sustainability \r\n(OECD 2020), while G20 countries have drawn up action agendas \r\nwith sustainable development (UToronto 2016). Meanwhile, the \r\nPetersberg Climate Dialogue, a  political movement convened by \r\nmajor country-group representatives and launched in 2010 by the \r\nGerman government, has also called for sustainability to be an \r\nintrinsic part of the transition (UNFCCO 2020) (BMU 2018)."


id: bb45463a03bd578e27cbf2cdb9f85039
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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"Countries have also started to take actions on the SDGs themselves \r\n(Antwi-Agyei et al. 2018a; UNDESA 2016, 2017, 2018). The SDGs were \r\nperceived as a novel approach to development and as establishing \r\na universal agenda for the transformation of development patterns \r\nand socio-economic systems. At their core, the SDGs hold that \r\nbuilding an integrated framework for action necessitates addressing \r\nthe economic, social and environmental dimensions of sustainable \r\ndevelopment in an integrated manner (Biermann et al. 2017; Kanie \r\nand Biermann 2017). The SDGs take multiple elements of development \r\ninto account in aiming to offer coherent, well-integrated, overarching \r\napproaches to a  range of sustainability challenges, including \r\nclimate change."


id: d6f7d9c210ea62dc74e99a7520af5bfb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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"One way a link is made between climate and the SDGs is through \r\nVoluntary National Reviews (VNRs). Paralleling the bottom-up \r\norientation of the Paris Agreement and the NDCs, every year \r\napproximately forty countries voluntarily share their VNRs with the \r\ninternational community at the High-Level Political Forum (HLPF). \r\nEven more flexible than the NDCs, the VNRs can include content \r\nsuch as a summary of key policies and measures that are intended to \r\nachieve the SDGs, a list of the means of implementation that support \r\nthe SDGs, and related challenges and needs. The VNRs also often \r\ncover SDG 13 (climate action) as well as many other issues connected \r\nwith climate change. Even with these links, implementation of the \r\nSDGs should be mentioned as part of national development processes \r\nreflecting different countries' different priorities, visions and plans \r\n(Hanson and Korbla P. Puplampu 2018; Marcotullio et al. 2018; OECD \r\n2016; P. Puplampu et al. 2017; Srikanth 2018)."


id: 1fafca0dc7b8a83f8f0f8addd8dd3d3d
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"There has also been a shift to actors outside government aligning \r\nclimate with sustainable development. An assessment by (Hoyer 2020) "


id: ca8c4a68ef67820c1c205c0cabc605b3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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"become more sustainable as decision-makers adopt targeted policies \r\nand other interventions. Many disciplines have reflected on the roles of \r\nand relative influence on the policies and interventions that can drive \r\ntransitions. The following discussion describes this diversity of views \r\nwith a  survey of how prominent lines of economic, psychological, \r\ninstitutional and systems thinking explain transitions. Though these \r\ndisciplines differ greatly, they often stress that leveraging synergies \r\nand managing trade-offs between climate change and sustainable \r\ndevelopment can help advance a transition."


id: 2c03ee284dde5724e3350dd7d6a558dc
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"This section concentrates on economic explanations for transitions. \r\nAt the core of many of these explanations is the assumption that \r\neconomic development can deliver multiple economic, social and \r\nenvironmental benefits. Many modern economic systems may \r\nnonetheless struggle to deliver these benefits due to major disruptions \r\nand shocks such as climate change (Heal 2020). One way to limit \r\ndisruptions to free markets are targeted interventions in free markets \r\nsuch as taxes or regulation. These targeted interventions motivate \r\nfirms and other entities to internalise GHGs and other pollutants, \r\npotentially paving the way for a sustainable transition (Arrow et al. \r\n2004; Chichilnisky and Heal 1998)."


id: ac9dce9aab81303b54d0ab917747a3e0
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"This section focuses on  how different theoretical frameworks can \r\nhelp us understand and explain what is meant by accelerating \r\ntransitions in the context of sustainable development. As suggested \r\nin Section  17.1, the reference to 'in the context of sustainable \r\ndevelopment' suggests that sustainable transitions require more \r\nthan speed, also necessitating removing  the underlying drivers of \r\nvulnerability and high emissions (quality and depth of transitions), \r\nwhile also aligning the interests of different individuals, communities, \r\nsectors, stakeholders and cultures (scale and breadth of transitions)."


id: 2247aeb255361a727b94e798aa519ac9
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"While there may be a relatively consistent set of transition dynamics \r\nfor all countries, pathways are likely to vary across and even within \r\ncountries. This variation is due to different development levels, \r\nstarting points, capacities, agencies, geographies, power dynamics, \r\npolitical economies, ecosystems and other contextual factors. Given \r\nthe diversity of contributing factors, a sustainable transition is likely \r\nto be a complex and multi-faceted process which cannot be reduced \r\nto a  single dimension (Kohler et al. 2019). Even with this multi\u0002dimensionality, transition processes are likely to gain speed and "


id: cb0ff2ffa2be100f09d8756a8f0da266
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"As suggested above, aligning climate investments with other \r\nsustainable development objectives is critical to a  transition. In \r\norder to support better investments in sustainable development, \r\nfinancing schemes, including environmental, social and governance \r\n(ESG) disclosure schemes and the Task Force on Climate-related \r\nFinancial Disclosures (TCFD), can play important roles (Executive \r\nSummary in Chapter  15 of this report). After COVID-19, economic "


id: bc8c7d72b689fc8003d587aa31e11ac2
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content:
"energy, material and labour, these are likely to deliver sustainable \r\ndevelopment and climate mitigation benefits."


id: 60301c49b959d7bc9011b1c8378417f6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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"This subsection focuses on institutions, governance and the political \r\neconomy. Institutional and governance arrangements can influence \r\nwhich actors possess authority, as well as how motivated they are \r\nto cooperate in transition processes that are directed at finding \r\nsolutions to climate change and other sustainability challenges. Often \r\ncooperation is enabled when policy frameworks or institutions align \r\nclimate change with the political and economic interests of national \r\ngovernments, cities or businesses, and when institutional and \r\ngovernance arguments that support that alignment expand the scale \r\nof the transitions. However, there may also be political and economic \r\ninterests and structures that can lock-in unsustainable development \r\npatterns, frustrate this alignment and slow down transitions (Haas \r\n2021; Mattioli et al. 2020; Newell and Mulvaney 2013; Power 2016)."


id: 8a3578707b5b7cfe85d3b072b23d464b
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"An extensive literature has examined how the international \r\nclimate agreements and architecture influence collaboration across \r\ncountries regarding climate and sustainable development to support \r\na  transition (Bradley 2005). For example, international institutions \r\noffer opportunities for governments and other actors to share new \r\nperspectives on integrated solutions (Cole 2015). For some observers, \r\nhowever, decades of difficulties in crafting a comprehensive climate \r\nchange agreement and the resulting fragmented climate policy \r\nlandscape have been inimical to the collaboration needed for \r\na  transition (van Asselt 2014; Nasiritousi and Backstrand 2019) \r\n(Chapters 1 and 13). Yet others see the potential for more incremental \r\ncooperation across countries, even without a single, integrated form \r\nof climate governance (Keohane and Victor 2016)."


id: 10ae0e0954c44d0a851ef336f37cbef
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"A related argument suggests that fragmentation at the global level \r\nprovides opportunities for cooperation at the national level (Kanie \r\nand Biermann 2017). For example, in contrast to the relatively top\u0002down Kyoto Protocol, the bottom-up pledge and review architecture \r\nof the Paris Agreement has prompted national governments to \r\nintegrate climate change with other sustainable development \r\npriorities (Nachmany and SetzerJoana 2018; Townshend et al. \r\n2013). Concrete examples included incorporating the SDGs into the \r\nNDCs as an international response to climate change (The Energy \r\nand Resources Institute 2017) or bringing climate into sustainable \r\ndevelopment strategies and so-called Voluntary National Reviews \r\n(VNRs) as part of the SDGs and the 2030 Agenda process (Elder and \r\nKing 2018; Elder and Bartalini 2019)."


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"It is nonetheless important to highlight a caveat to the above logic on \r\ninnovation. Whether a technological innovation is wholly sustainable \r\nor not becomes less clear when considering its effects on the wider \r\neconomy. To illustrate, some models predict that CO2 marginal \r\nabatement costs in the power sector will be USD240 and USD565 \r\ntCO2 for the 2oC and below 2oC goals, respectively (IEA 2017)."


id: 48a4c018b6cdb4ce58eb40c02cd236a0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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"In theory, if marginal abatement costs meet marginal climate damage, \r\nmitigation measures are economically optimal in the long run. Yet \r\nmarginal damage from climate change is notoriously uncertain, and \r\neconomic theories do not always reflect climate-related damage. \r\nOn the other hand, marginal abatement mitigation costs impose \r\nadditional costs in the short term. These added costs can cause \r\nproductivity in capital to decline through increases in the prices of \r\nenergy and products in which the energies are embodied. These \r\nincreased costs can restrict the ability to invest in and achieve the \r\nsustainable development priorities. However, precisely the opposite \r\ncan occur when innovation reduces additional costs or achieves \r\nnegative costs. If technological innovation leads to the accumulation \r\nof capital and productivity increases due to the substitution of "


id: ba1152cfd1e73d8fc671cd8b2abd7ffa
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"Another branch of institutional research is concerned with the \r\ninteractions between multiple levels of governance. In this multi-level \r\ngovernance perspective, cities and other sub-national governments \r\noften lead transitions by devising innovative solutions to contribute \r\nto climate and local energy, transport, the environment, resilience \r\nand other forms of sustainability (Bellinson and Chu 2019; Doll and \r\nPuppim De Oliveira 2017; Geels 2011; Koehn 2008; Rabe 2007; \r\nvan der Heijden et al. 2019). A complementary perspective suggests \r\nthat national governments can help scale up transitions by allocating "


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"Thornton  and Comberti 2017). Policy coherence between climate \r\nand other development objectives is often considered essential to \r\nsustainable development (Sovacool 2018). A similar discussion about \r\nsynergies and conflicts has been raised on the relationship between \r\nresilience and sustainability (Marchese et al. 2018). To help achieve \r\ncoherence, there have been some efforts to develop suitable tools \r\nand decision-making frameworks (Scobie 2016)."


id: 8ae6d90e92c3100971b8f423706b1303
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"A related line of reasoning has suggested that sustainable \r\ndevelopment often requires not one but a mix of policy instruments \r\nto bring about the multiple policy effects needed for social and \r\ntechnological change (Edmondson et al. 2019; Rogge and Johnstone \r\n2017). Following these calls, some governments have aimed to \r\naddress climate change and sustainability jointly with coherent and \r\nintegrated approaches to achieving these agendas (Chimhowu et al. \r\n2019), although for some countries Small Island Developing States \r\n(SIDS) this has proven more challenging (Scobie 2016)."


id: b1c563aae0861f5d3b5bcc6499881e09
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"Yet another set of channels facilitating integration between climate \r\nand other concerns are networks of like-minded actors working \r\nacross administrative borders and physical boundaries. For instance, \r\ncity networks such as the Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate \r\n& Energy (Covenant of Mayors 2019), the World Mayors Council on \r\nClimate Change (ICLEI 2019; C40 Cities 2019) and the United Nations \r\nOffice for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR 2019) have agreed to \r\nshare decision-making tools and good practices, and to sponsor \r\nambition-raising campaigns that help align climate and sustainable \r\ndevelopment concerns within and across cities (Betsill and Bulkeley \r\n2006) (Chapter  8 and Section  17.3.3.5). This can be particularly \r\nimportant for less capable 'following' and 'laggard' cities needing \r\ngreater financing and other forms of support to move a transition \r\nforward (Fuhr et al. 2018)."


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"This suggests that politics can be an impediment to change: other \r\nstudies argue instead that politics can be harnessed to drive \r\ntransitions forward. For example, some observers contend that \r\nbuilding coalitions around green industrial policies and sequencing \r\nreforms to reward industries in such coalitions can align otherwise \r\ndivergent interests and inject momentum into transitions (Meckling \r\net al. 2015). Others see the effects of political economy varying \r\nover time depending upon external market conditions. To illustrate, \r\nrenewable feed-in tariffs in Europe persisted for over two decades \r\nand were crucial in wind and solar power technologies making the \r\nbreakthrough. But once competition from China led to the demise \r\nof European technology providers, and once European populations \r\nstarted to oppose surcharges on their electricity bills, feed-in \r\ntariffs were abolished by politicians in the purely national interest \r\n(Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2017)."


id: 4efbaea7644c73f34b7f3b4435775a7c
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"Furthermore, sub-national governments may often work together with \r\ncivil-society groups to create new networked forms of governance \r\n(Biermann et al. 2012). Other forms of multi-stakeholder partnerships \r\nfocusing on issues with strong climate synergies, such as forms of \r\nair pollution known as short-lived climate pollutants (Climate and \r\nClean Air Coalition (CCAC)) or transport (Sustainable Low Carbon \r\nTransport Partnership (SLoCaT)), take their cue from global scientific \r\ncommunities or civic-minded advocacy groups that transmit \r\nknowledge across boundaries (Keck and Sikkink 1999). There is also \r\nscope for suggesting that the international climate regime serves \r\na Global Framework for Climate Action (GFCA) in helping orchestrate \r\nthe multilateral climate regime and non-state and sub-national \r\ninitiatives (Chan and Pauw 2014), though questions remain about its \r\nactual impacts on mitigation (Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2017)."


id: f2c9779298141dee5dfc94d7cadc23f9
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"Policymaking institutions and networks are themselves policies. \r\nA significant literature has looked at integrated policy frameworks \r\nand efforts across sectors, including climate adaptation and \r\nmitigation, as drivers of transitions (Landauer et al. 2015; Favretto \r\net al. 2018; Obersteiner et al. 2016; Steen and Weaver 2017; "


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content:
"to the creation of social fields that allow changes to happen (see \r\ne.g., Gillard et al. 2016) or has promoted low-carbon thinking and \r\nrelated behavioural changes (O'Brien 2018; Veciana and Ottmar \r\n2018). Studies of social contagions may also offer insights into the \r\nmechanisms that lead to the adoption of new values and related \r\nclimate actions (see e.g.,  Iacopini et al. 2019). It is nonetheless \r\nworth highlighting that communication networks and other \r\nmechanisms promoting the spread of interpersonal communication \r\nthat can spread pro-climate views may also lead to the proliferation \r\nof climate scepticism and denial (Leombruni 2015). At the same \r\ntime, some studies suggest that such scepticism can be countered \r\nby the generation of more credible information on climate change \r\n(Samantray and Pin 2019)."


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"psychology, transformative science and similarly focused disciplines \r\n(Wamsler et al. 2021). These approaches frequently encourage \r\nresearchers to participate in transitions that induce changes in the \r\nresearcher's own beliefs while triggering wider shifts in social norms \r\n(including human stewardship for the natural environment) (Adger \r\net al. 2013; Hulme 2009; Ives et al. 2019; O'Brien 2018). This research \r\nalso emphasises how changes in individual beliefs could lead to \r\nclimate actions that contribute to more sustainable, equitable and \r\njust societies (e.g., 'the mind- & paradigm shifts') (Gopel et al. 2016). \r\nThey further suggest the potential for virtuous cycles of individual\u0002level and wider social changes that ultimately benefit the climate \r\n(Banks 2007; Day et al. 2014; Lockhart 2011; Montuori and Donnelly \r\n2018; Power 2016)."


id: 96aa036247e61db700a48cf32c0bb961
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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content:
"Examples have also been seen in relation to a similar set of inner \r\ntransitions to individuals, organisations and societies, which involve \r\nembracing post-development, degrowth, or non-material values \r\nthat challenge carbon-intensive lifestyles and development models \r\n(D'Alisa 2014; Kothari 2019; Neuteleers and Engelen 2015; Paech \r\n2017). These shifts in values can occur when humans reconnect \r\nwith nature, deepen their consciousness and take responsibility for \r\nprotecting the planet and its climate (Cross et al. 2019; Martinez\u0002Juarez et al. 2015; Speldewinde et al. 2015). Changes in both \r\nvalues and beliefs may also emerge through consciousness-raising \r\nprocesses where people cooperate in ways that would protect the \r\nclimate ((Banks 2007; Hedlund-de Witt et al. 2014; Woiwode and \r\nWoiwode 2019) (Section 1.6.4)."


id: 5881d099caf559395622ef2d19568c2c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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content:
"Systems explanations help explain the dynamics of transitions toward \r\nsustainable development while explicitly uncovering links between \r\nthe human and natural worlds, the socio-cultural embeddedness \r\nof technology, and the inertia behind high-carbon development \r\npathways. This line of thinking often envisages transitions emerging \r\nfrom complex systems in which many different elements interact at \r\nsmall scales and spontaneously self-organise to produce behaviour \r\nthat is unexpected, unmanaged and fundamentally different from the \r\nsum of the system's constituent parts."


id: 7856212383bd2e7c13c811823dd22659
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18379
content:
"Many of the above-mentioned beliefs and values that support \r\nclimate actions have spread through expanding interests in \r\nconservationist world views, indigenous cultures (see, for example, \r\nLockhart 2011) and branches of neuroscience and psychology that \r\nsuggest different notions of the self (Huther 2018; Lewis 2016; \r\nSeligman and Csikszentmihalyi 2014). These beliefs and values \r\ncan also be spread through meditation, yoga or other social \r\npractices that encourage lower-carbon lifestyles (Woiwode and \r\nWoiwode 2019). Another channel for spreading climate concerns is \r\nsustainability culture, which is premised on connecting people and \r\ncommunities, and has also benefited from the internet and digital \r\ntechnologies that support these connections (see e.g.,  Bradbury \r\n2015; Scharmer 2018). The spread of this culture, in turn, has led "


id: 856f8b2e2c536705b7c82d4994a76776
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Social-ecological systems theory describes the processes of \r\nexchange and interaction between human and ecological systems, \r\ninvestigating in particular non-linear feedback occurring across \r\ndifferent scales (Folke 2006; Holling 2001). This approach has \r\ninformed subsequent theoretical and empirical developments, \r\nincluding the 'planetary boundaries' approach (Rockstrom et al. \r\n2009), conceptualisations of vulnerability and adaptive capacity \r\n(Hinkel 2011; Pelling 2010) and more recent explorations of \r\nurban resilience (Romero-Lankao et al. 2016) and regenerative \r\nsustainability (Clayton and Radcliffe 2018; Robinson and Cole \r\n2015). Employing a  systems lens to address the 'root causes' of \r\nunsustainable development pathways (such as dysfunctional social "


id: 1842d43f05ffead87920fc453ac4068f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
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content:
"while economic, psychological and governance theories offer more \r\nspecific insights. Moving a  transition forward will often require \r\ndrawing upon insights from multiple schools of thought. Though it \r\nis unlikely that a one-size-fits-all set of factors will drive a transition, \r\nthere is a  growing body of empirical evidence shedding light on \r\nthe factors that can strengthen synergies between climate and the \r\nbroader sustainable development agenda."


id: 83de913c5c350e85db9d8ef289c0ad49
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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vector_id: 20345
content:
"or economic arrangements) rather than the 'symptoms' (dwelling \r\nquality, vehicle efficiency, etc.) can trigger the non-linear change \r\nneeded for a  transformation to take place (Pelling et al. 2015). \r\nExploring synergies between climate change adaptation, mitigation \r\nand other sustainability priorities (such as biodiversity and social \r\nequity, for instance) (Beg 2002; Burch et al. 2014; Shaw et al. 2014) \r\nmay help to yield these transformative outcomes, though data \r\nregarding the specific nature of these synergies is still emerging."


id: d2a34986a2ce23d7093f4be9e93b39e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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content:
"Socio-technical transition theory, on the other hand, explores \r\nthe ways in which technologies such as low-carbon vehicles or \r\nregenerative buildings are bound up in a  web of social practices, \r\nphysical infrastructure, market rules, regulations, norms and habits \r\n(see, e.g, (Loorbach et al. 2017). Radical social and technical \r\ninnovations can emerge that ultimately challenge destabilised \r\nor increasingly ineffective and undesirable incumbents, but path \r\ndependencies often stymie these transition processes, suggesting an \r\nimportant role for governance actors (Burch 2017; Frantzeskaki et al. \r\n2012; Holscher et al. 2019)."


id: c5f86d4e9e6a58f7c878060f845bbfe1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"This section assesses studies based on the links between sustainable \r\ndevelopment and climate change mitigation in order to facilitate \r\nrobust conclusions on synergies and trade-offs between different \r\npolicy objectives across methodologies, scenarios and sectors. \r\nConclusions are drawn based on national and sub-national, sectoral \r\nand cross-sectoral, short- and long-term transition studies presented \r\nin this and other sections of the report as a basis for establishing an \r\noverall picture of how sustainable development and climate change \r\npolicies can be linked as a basis for accelerated transitions."


id: 6a6b1b690ee367f430fd14f485336019
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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content:
"This also reveals the large-scale macroeconomic, political and \r\ncultural trends (or contexts) that may reinforce or call into question \r\nthe usefulness of current systems of production and consumption. \r\nOne branch of this theory, transition management (Kern and Smith \r\n2008; Loorbach 2010), explores ways of guiding a socio-technical \r\nsystem from one path to another. In particular, it highlights \r\ninteractions between actors, technologies and institutions, and the \r\ncomplex governance mechanisms that facilitate them (Smith et al. \r\n2005). The challenge, in part, becomes linking radical short-term \r\ninnovations with longer-term visions of sustainability (Loorbach \r\nand Rotmans 2010) and creating opportunities for collaborative \r\ncourse-correction in light of new information or unexpected \r\noutcomes (Burch 2017)."


id: 7a8d9a5d436f554c6f057ac70471f5fb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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content:
"This section focuses initially on issues related to short- and long-term \r\ntransitions to meet climate change and sustainable development \r\ngoals in the context of the UNFCCC and the UN 2030 Agenda for \r\nSustainable Development. Global-modelling results and economy\u0002wide studies are then assessed, followed by a discussion of specific \r\nchallenges in relation to renewable-energy penetration and phasing \r\nout fossil fuels, stranded assets and just transitions. Key synergies and \r\ntrade-offs between meeting the UN 2030 Sustainable Development \r\nGoals (SDGs) and mitigation are then illustrated by means of cross\u0002sectoral examples. Finally, this section presents an overview of the \r\nassessment of SDG synergies and trade-offs based on all sectoral \r\nchapters in this report for a range of key mitigation options."


id: 6f01e94c8994240c5f882ff93f64eb6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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content:
"This section has surveyed several explanations for interventions that \r\ncan give rise to transitions. The review suggests that there are several \r\ndifferences between these various perspectives. Whether individuals, \r\norganisations, markets or socio-technical systems drive or undermine \r\ntransitions is a key distinction. These differences have implications \r\nfor the evidence these claims draw on in support of their arguments. \r\nFor instance, some of the explanations tend to employ qualitative \r\nevidence to explain changes in attitudes at the individual or \r\ncommunity levels as paving the way for broader changes to cultures \r\nand belief systems. Others assess how institutional arrangements \r\ncan be reformed in order to align climate with the sustainable \r\ndevelopment agenda to enable a transition."


id: 284a219576618c5dddbda4e2705e853e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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content:
"While there are indeed significant differences between explanations, \r\nthere are also important parallels. Such parallels begin with a shared \r\nemphasis on synergies and trade-offs between climate and sustainable \r\ndevelopment. Most explanations tend to underline the importance of \r\nsynergies in aligning the climate with broader sustainability agendas. \r\nMost importantly, many of the explanations are complementary with \r\nthe systems-level discussion in that they offer a broad framework, "


id: 2ef38ceb269d43e661667022152923b5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5534
content:
"development perspectives, climate change and natural systems. \r\nWhile all countries share the totality of the SDGs, development \r\npriorities differ across countries and over time. These priorities are \r\nstrongly linked to local contexts and depend on which dimension \r\nof the improvement in the well-being of people is considered to be \r\nthe most urgent. Eradicating poverty and reducing inequality are key \r\ndevelopment priorities for many low- and middle-income countries \r\n(Section 4.3.2.1)."


id: 9763ffadad947dd74e09bcd9eb246de3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Based on the Paris Agreement, the UNFCCC has invited countries to \r\ncommunicate their mid-century and long-term low-GHG emission\u0002development strategies by 2020 (UNFCCC 2019). National long-term \r\nlow-emission development strategies and their global stocktake in \r\nthe UNFCCC context provide a platform for informing the long-term \r\nstrategic thinking on transitions towards low-carbon societies. One \r\nspecific value of these plans is that they reflect how specific transition \r\npathways, policies and measures can work in different parts of the \r\nworld in a  very context-specific way, that is, by taking context\u0002specific issues and stakeholder perspectives into consideration. Many \r\nnations have submitted national long-term strategies to the UNFCCC, \r\nincluding sustainable development perspectives (see Section  4.2.4 \r\nfor a review of the plans and scientific assessments)."


id: bea9572cf72d88730ad4d2ec4891dfe7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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"This section assesses the model evaluations of the sustainable \r\ndevelopment pathways for decarbonisation, including the \r\nco-benefits and trade-offs involving explorations of alternative future \r\ndevelopment pathways as a  basis for clarifying societal objectives \r\nand understanding the restrictions. Shifting development pathways to \r\nincreased sustainability involves a number of complex issues, which \r\nare difficult to integrate into models. For a more detailed discussion \r\nabout this, see Section 4.4.1 and Cross-Chapter Box 5 in Chapter 4."


id: 879823676dfac65af0d01634bfaa3ad3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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content:
"An example of a  project that assesses the economy-wide impacts \r\nof linking sustainable development with deep decarbonisation is \r\nthe Deep Decarbonisation Pathways Project (DDPP) (Bataille et al. \r\n2016), which is undertaking a  comparative assessment of studies \r\nof 16 countries representing more than 74% of global energy\u0002related emissions for the pathway to 2oC stabilisation scenarios. \r\nThe DDPP's methodology is to combine scenario analysis in different \r\nnational contexts using macroeconomic models and sectoral models \r\nand to facilitate a  consistent cross-country analysis using a  set of \r\ncommon assumptions."


id: 3486a3b1ec50be41341298b7360befc8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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"There is an emerging modelling literature focusing on the synergies \r\nand trade-offs between low-carbon development pathways and \r\nvarious aspects of sustainable development. The early literature, \r\nincluding that on IAMs, and macroeconomic and sectoral models, \r\nmainly focused on the co-benefits of mitigation policies in terms of \r\nreduced air pollution, energy security and to some extent employment \r\ngeneration security (IPCC 2014, 2018c) (Chapter  6). Some models \r\nhave been developed further with assessments of a broader range \r\nof the joint benefits of mitigation, health, water, land use and food \r\nsecurity (Clarke et al. 2014; IPCC 2014, 2018; Kolstad et al. 2014). \r\nAccording to Chapter 1, there is a need to incorporate issues and \r\nenablers further, including a wide range of non-climate risks, varying \r\nforms of innovation, possibilities for behavioural and social change, \r\nfeasible policies and equity issues (Executive Summary in Chapter 1)."


id: 9a88349cc7fba0bae30994d2d4ecebf7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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"The key conclusions of the DDPP team on the economy-wide impacts \r\nare that country-based studies such as South Africa's demonstrate \r\nthat it is possible to improve income distribution, alleviate poverty \r\nand reduce unemployment while simultaneously transitioning \r\nto a  low-carbon economy (Altieri et al. 2016). The DDPP in Japan \r\nexplores whether energy security can be enhanced through increases \r\nin renewable energy (Oshiro et al. 2016). The reduction of uncontrolled \r\nfossil fuel emissions has significant public-health benefits according \r\nto the  Chinese and Indian DDPPs, as fossil fuel combustion is the \r\nmajor source of air pollution."


id: e10a3aa0a1ba1b33f8ced2b1fd295123
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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content:
"IAMs and macroeconomic models typically calculate mitigation costs \r\nbased on the assumption that markets internalise externalities like \r\nGHG emissions through carbon prices (Barker et al. 2016; IEA 2017, \r\n2019). Yet, there are legitimate questions to be asked about whether \r\ncarbon pricing will be efficient if markets are inefficient (World \r\nBank 2019). However, market inefficiencies are difficult to integrate \r\ninto the models. How GHG emissions taxes would actually work is \r\nthus quite uncertain based on the modelling studies (Barker et al. \r\n2016; Fontana and Sawyer 2016; Meyer et al. 2018). Despite these \r\nlimitations, the use of GHG emission taxes as an effective instrument \r\nbased on modelling results in practice has implications for public \r\npolicies and private-sector investments."


id: ab95f866a55197205517f4f2f6e9dfec
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"For example, in the Chinese DDPP, deep decarboniation scenarios \r\nhave resulted in reductions of 42-79% in primary air pollutants \r\n(e.g.,  SO2, NOx, particulate matter (PM2.5), volatile organic \r\ncompounds (VOCs), and NH3), thus meeting air-quality standards in \r\nmajor cities. The deep decarbonisation scenarios include the large \r\nand fast energy-efficient improvements required to improve energy \r\naccess and affordability. The DDPP studies are thus an example of an \r\napproach in which national deep-carbonisation scenarios are linked \r\nto the development goals of income generation, energy access and \r\naffordability, employment, health and environmental policy."


id: 8fe836a715f07e39f5be4e03335f5774
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Despite the shortcomings of conventional economic thought and \r\nmodels already pointed out, improved models have demonstrated \r\nnew perspectives on how mitigation costs can be assessed \r\nin macroeconomic models. For instance, while a  conventional \r\nperspective might suggest that climate change mitigation costs \r\ncan limit investments in sustainability because they reduce the \r\nproductivity of capital by increasing energy prices and the products in \r\nwhich energies are embodied, another perspective is that innovation \r\ncan imply increases in efficiency and that the substitution of energy, \r\nmaterial and labour can lead to the accumulation of capital and \r\nproductivity gains. This appears to occur with innovations in end-use \r\nenergy applications generating emissions reductions and delivering "


id: 519c9763fe0adc65419926d99c5fbb2c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Sustainable development scenarios have also been developed by \r\nthe Low-Carbon Society's (LCS) assessments (Kainuma et al. 2012), \r\nin which multiple sustainable development and climate change \r\nmitigation goals were assessed jointly. The scenario analysis was \r\nconducted for Asian countries such as South Korea, Japan, India, \r\nChina and Nepal with a  soft linked IAM using economy-wide and \r\nsectoral models and linked to very active stakeholder engagement \r\nin order to reflect national policy perspectives and priorities. Some of "


id: 57fb07619df0d1631651f290abad8507
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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content:
"co-benefits, but a few studies have also covered other aspects, such \r\nas the health effects of dietary change and biodiversity impacts \r\n(Sections  3.6.3 and 17.3). Mitigation has implications for global \r\neconomic inequalities through different channels and can compound \r\nor lessen inequalities, avoid impacts and create co-benefits that \r\nreduce inequalities (Section  3.6.4). There are, however, several \r\nchallenges involved in balancing the dilemmas associated with \r\nmeeting the SDGs, such as, for example, energy access, equity and \r\nsustainability. Fossil fuel-dependent developing countries cannot \r\ntransition to low-carbon economics without considering the wider \r\nimpacts on development by doing so (Section 3.7.3)."


id: 8c618b6fb9fe4a93590ab4108698d365
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"the models are economy-wide global IAMs, while others are national \r\npartial equilibrium models."


id: 6735f1a6df2b4ac53c68edfe2a502391
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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"The LCS scenarios also include a specific attempt to include ongoing \r\ndialogues with policymakers and stakeholders in order to reflect \r\ngovernance and enabling factors, and to enable the modelling \r\nprocesses to reflect political realism as far as possible. Diverse \r\nstakeholders who acted as validators of the scientific process were \r\nincluded, stakeholder preferences were revealed, and recipients and \r\nusers of the LCS outputs were included in ongoing dialogues on \r\noutputs and in interpreting the results. The aim of the stakeholder \r\ninteractions was thus to fill the gap between typical laboratory\u0002style IAMs and down-scaled but unaligned practical assessments \r\nperformed at disaggregated geographical and sector-specific scales."


id: a31e3de83daa5c0b7d653e68d686d552
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25907
content:
"The costs of energy-system transitions have been assessed by \r\nseveral energy-system studies. The economic costs of meeting the \r\ndifferent goals depend on the stringency of the mitigation target, as \r\nwell as economic (fuel prices, etc.) and technological developments \r\n(technology availability, capital costs, etc.). In addition, changes in \r\ninfrastructure and behavioural patterns and lifestyles matter. Model\u0002based assessments vary, depending on these assumptions and \r\ndifferences in modelling approaches (Krey et al. 2019) (Section 6.7.7). \r\nCountry characteristics determine the social, economic and technical \r\npriorities for low-emission pathways. Domestic policy circumstances \r\nimpact on pathways and costs, for example, when affordability and \r\nenergy-security concerns are emphasised (Oshiro et al. 2016)."


id: cf63d3036986d212c896505244e1c619
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33840
content:
"Mitigation policies can have important distributive effects between \r\nand within countries, and may affect impact on the poorest through \r\ntheir effects on energy and food prices (Hasegawa et al. 2018; \r\nFujimori et al. 2019) (Section 3.6.4), while higher levels of warming \r\nare projected to generate higher inequality between countries as well \r\nas within them (Chapter 16). Mitigation thus can reduce economic \r\ninequalities and poverty by avoiding such impacts (Section 3.6.4)."


id: efb9510ba55dc1299f36c0e14f6ceaf5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39555
content:
"(Vandyck et al. 2018) estimate that the 2degC pathway would \r\nreduce air pollution and avoid 0.7-1.5 million premature deaths \r\nin 2050 compared to current levels. It is generally agreed that in \r\nboth developed and developing countries there are additional \r\nbenefits of climate change mitigation in terms of improved air \r\nquality (Section 3.7.4). (Markandya et al. 2018) assessed the health \r\nco-benefits of air pollution reductions and the mitigation costs of \r\nthe Paris Agreement using global scenarios for up to 2050. They "


id: d713cbbd66fc2cb3f972e9e7de5a8da3
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content:
"unison. Studies using global IAMs that were presented in the GEO6 \r\nreport (United Nations Environment Programme 2019, Chapter 22) \r\nconcluded that transitions to low-carbon pathways will require \r\na broad portfolio of measures, including a mixture of technological \r\nimprovements, lifestyle changes and localised solutions. The many \r\ndifferent challenges require dedicated measures to improve access \r\nto, for example, food, water and energy, while at the same time \r\nreducing the pressure on environmental resources and ecosystems. \r\nA  key contribution may be a  redistribution of access to resources, \r\nwhere both physical access and affordability play a role. The IAMs \r\ncover large countries and regions, and localised solutions are not \r\nproperly addressed in the modelling results. This implies that, for \r\nexample, trade-offs between energy access and affordability are not \r\nfully represented in aggregate modelling results."


id: 7accbb9953c41a799bd634dc3797ef91
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
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content:
"concluded that the health co-benefits substantially outweighed the \r\npolicy costs of achieving the NDC targets and either 2degC or 1.5degC \r\nstabilisation. The ratio of health co-benefits to the mitigation costs \r\nranged from 1.4 to 2.45, depending on the scenario. The extra \r\neffort of trying to pursue the 1.5degC target instead of the 2degC target \r\nwould generate a substantial net benefit in some areas. In India, the \r\nco-health benefits were valued at USD3.28-8.4 trillion and those \r\nin China at USD0.27-2.31 trillion. (Gi et al. 2019) also show that \r\ndeveloping countries such as India have a huge potential to produce \r\nco-benefits. In addition, this implies that while the cost advantages of \r\nsimultaneously achieving reductions of CO2 emissions and of PM2.5\r\nare clear, the advantages for integrated measures could be limited, \r\nas the costs greatly depend on the CO2 emissions reduction target."


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content:
"There are also several country-level studies for deep emissions \r\nreductions (see Chapter 4 for an overview of the results). The studies \r\nfind significant impacts of mitigation policies at the sectoral level, \r\nreflecting the fact that the sectoral scope does not allow for as much \r\nflexibility in mitigation measures despite macroeconomic impacts \r\nbeing assessed to be small (Executive Summary in Chapter  4). \r\nAnother key lesson is that the detailed design of mitigation policies \r\nis critical for the distributional impacts (Executive Summary in \r\nChapter 4). The potential mitigation measures, the potential economic \r\ngrowth, the political priorities and so forth are different among \r\nnations, and there may be several emissions-reduction transition \r\npathways to long-term goals among nations (Figure 4.2)."


id: 995e98e959e1d41b2b276b05c2199848
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24205
content:
"As pointed out in Chapter  6, the achievement of long-term \r\ntemperature goals in line with the Paris Agreement requires the \r\nrapid penetration of renewable energy and a timely phasing out of \r\nfossil fuels, especially coal, from the global energy system. Limiting \r\nwarming to 1.5degC (>50%) with no or limited overshoot means that \r\nglobal CO2 emissions must reach 'net zero' in 2050/2060 (IPCC \r\n2018). Net zero emissions imply that fossil fuel use is minimised \r\nand replaced by renewables and other low-carbon primary forms of \r\nenergy, or that the residual emissions from fossil fuels are offset by \r\ncarbon dioxide removal (CDR). The 1.5degC scenario requires a 2-3% \r\nannual improvement rate in carbon intensities till 2050. The historical \r\nrecord only shows a slight improvement in the carbon intensity rate \r\nof global energy supplies, far from what is required to limit global \r\nwarming to 2degC (>67%), or limit warming to 1.5degC (>50%) with no \r\nor limited overshoot."


id: f00e539e6f4b2cc5ef15bed1264c1f0f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39611
content:
"The role of coal in the global energy system is changing fast. Given \r\nthe global temperature goals of the Paris Agreement, the global \r\ncoal sector needs a transition to near zero by 2050 - earlier in some \r\nregions (Bauer et al. 2018; IEA 2017; IPCC 2018). Other global trends, \r\nincluding air quality, water shortages, the improved cost efficiencies \r\nof renewables, the technical availability of energy storage and the \r\neconomic rebalancing of emerging countries, are also driving global \r\ncoal consumption to a plateau followed by a reverse (Sator 2018; \r\nSpencer et al. 2018). The world should be prepared for a managed \r\ntransition away from coal and should identify appropriate transition "


id: 25ebc26a6f3d9f414a3875297b4e39a7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3850
content:
"The World in 2050 Initiative (TWI2050) includes a  comprehensive \r\nassessment of technologies, economies and societies embodied in \r\nthe SDGs (IIASA 2018). The assessment addresses social dynamics, \r\ngovernance and sustainable development pathways within the areas \r\nof human capacity and demography, consumption and production, \r\ndecarbonisation and energy, food, the biosphere and water, smart \r\ncities and digitalisation. The report concludes that the 17 SDGs \r\nare integrated and complementary and need to be addressed in "


id: 808fba9eccaf67202a4482b2b0554f1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19747
content:
"some areas and economies, these impacts will often not directly \r\nreplace or offset activities in areas that have been heavily dependent \r\non the fossil fuel industry."


id: 75dd40651e45d4c97f9270bf13cb4c2d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17963
content:
"options for the future of coal, which can include both the penetration \r\nof renewable energy and improvements in energy efficiency \r\n(Shah et al. 2015)."


id: 1eb59de74e46dbadd5287284870e81e5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2607
content:
"Phasing out fossil fuels from energy systems is technically possible \r\nand is estimated to be relatively low in cost (Chapter 6). The cost of \r\nlow-carbon alternatives, including onshore and offshore wind, solar \r\nphotovoltaic (PV) and electric vehicles, has been reduced substantially \r\nin recent years and has become competitive with fossil fuels (Shen \r\net al. 2020). However, studies show that replacing fossil fuels with \r\nrenewables can have major synergies and trade-offs with a broader \r\nagenda of sustainable development (Swain and Karimu 2020), \r\nincluding land use and food security (McCollum et al. 2018), decent \r\njobs and economic growth (Swain and Karimu 2020). Clarke et al. \r\n(AR5 WG III Table  6.7) provides detailed mapping of the sectoral \r\nco-benefits and adverse side-impacts of and links to transformation \r\npathways. In Section 17.3.3.7, this is supplemented with a mapping \r\nof the synergies and trade-offs between the deployment of renewable \r\nenergy and the SDGs."


id: 25548cf0620861f5c3b20f89e82afcaf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3754
content:
"The general conclusion is that the potential co-benefits of renewable\u0002energy end-use measures outweigh the adverse impacts in most \r\nsectors and in relation to the SDGs, though this is not the case for the \r\nAFOLU (agriculture, forestry and other land use) sectors. Some locally \r\nnegative economic impacts can result in increased energy costs and \r\ncompetition over land areas and water resources. Some sectors may \r\nalso experience increasing unemployment as a consequence of the \r\ntransition process. Although the deployment of renewable energy \r\nwill generate a  new industry and associated jobs and benefits in "


id: 62210f769a8db43bee24820c5520feaf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14537
content:
"Even though the transition away from fossil fuels is desirable and \r\ntechnically feasible, it is still largely constrained by existing fossil \r\nfuel-based infrastructure and stranded investments. The 'committed' \r\nemissions from existing fossil fuel infrastructure may consume all \r\nthe remaining carbon budget in the 1.5degC scenario, or two thirds of \r\nthe carbon budget in the 2degC scenario (Tong et al. 2019). (Kefford \r\net al. 2018) assess the early retirement of fossil fuel power plants \r\nin the US, EU, China and India based on the IEA 2degC scenario and "


id: 68d70fb2301e361ef76fda35e0be09d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15710
content:
"Chapter 10 includes a more detailed assessment of the issues with \r\nmining these rare metals, as well as the associated social problems, \r\nincluding exploitative working conditions and child labour, the latter \r\na major issue that needs to be taken into consideration in transitions. \r\nRecycling batteries is also highlighted as a  major supplementary \r\npolicy if negative environmental side impacts are to be avoided \r\n(Rosendahl and Rubiano 2019). In the future, more attention should \r\nbe paid to reducing vulnerability through subsidising R&D in rare\u0002metals recycling, establishing systems to incentivise the collection \r\nof rare-metal waste and promoting technological progress using \r\nabundant metals as a  replacement for rare metals (Rosendahl \r\nand Rubiano 2019)."


id: 3b34ec08607ed8170eebf0daba9ed5fc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7603
content:
"conclude that a massive early retirement of coal-fired power plants \r\nis needed, and that two to three standard 500 MW generators will \r\nneed to come offline every week for fifteen years. This high rate is \r\nthe result of a  very large deployment of coal-fired power plants \r\nfrom 2004 to 2012. The early phasing out of this infrastructure will \r\nresult in a  significant share of stranded assets (Ansari and Holz \r\n2020) with an impact on workers, local communities, companies and \r\ngovernments (van der Ploeg and Rezai 2020). The challenge is thus to \r\nmanage a transition which delivers the rapid phasing out of existing \r\nfossil fuel-based infrastructure while also developing a new energy \r\nsystem based on low-carbon alternatives within a very short window \r\nof opportunity."


id: ac113b58685116ba6a4d93e974d62f95
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27511
content:
"Chapter  6 similarly concludes that the transition towards a  high \r\npenetration of renewable systems faces various challenges in the \r\ntechnical, environmental and socio-economic fields. The integration \r\nof renewables into the grid requires not only sufficient flexibility \r\nin power grids and intensive coordination with other sources of \r\ngeneration, but also a  fundamental change in long-term planning \r\nand grid operation (see Chapter 6 for more detail on these issues)."


id: 1334dd79f8baf4ec0d73abc837c5cef2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 590
content:
"As the momentum towards achieving carbon neutrality grows, the risk \r\nof certain assets becoming stranded is on the increase. International \r\npolicies and the push for low-carbon technologies in the context \r\nof climate change are reducing the demand for and value of fossil \r\nfuel products. Stranded assets become devalued before the end of \r\ntheir economic life or can no longer be monetised due to changes in \r\npolicies and regulatory frameworks, technological change, security, \r\nor environmental disruption. In short, stranded assets are 'assets \r\nthat have suffered from unanticipated or premature write-down, \r\ndevaluations or conversions to liabilities' (Caldecott et al. 2013)."


id: 859f847b7c47ae0b1c269db81a1b47ee
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20651
content:
"Examples from various countries show that, compared with top\u0002down decision-making, bottom-up policymaking involving local \r\nstakeholders could enable regions to benefit and reduce their \r\nresistance to transitions. (Kainuma et al. 2012) conclude that social \r\ndialogue is a  critical condition for engaging local workers and \r\ncommunities in managing the transitions with the necessary support \r\nfrom transition assistance. They also point out that macro-level \r\npolicies, training programmes, participatory processes and specific \r\nprogrammes to support employment creation for workers in fossil \r\nfuel-dependent industries are needed."


id: 9880cdac6b8fc2800fc5be7853debd76
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24042
content:
"Stranded assets are likely to 'lose economic value ahead of their \r\nanticipated useful life' (Bos and Gupta 2019). They are often \r\ndescribed as creative when they become stranded because of \r\ninnovation, competition or economic growth (Gupta et al. 2020). \r\nDivestment refers to 'the action or process of selling off subsidiary \r\nbusiness interests or investments'. This often occurs due to changing \r\nsocial norms and perceptions of climate change."


id: aa259fc47904c65de881fc02c53fa9a8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27158
content:
"The transition towards a  high-penetration renewable system also \r\nraises concerns over the availability of rare metals for batteries like \r\nlithium and cobalt. While metal reserves are unlikely to limit the \r\ngrowth rate or total amount of solar and wind energy, used battery \r\ntechnologies and the known reserves currently being exploited are \r\nnot compatible with the transition scenario due to insufficient cobalt \r\nand lithium reserves (Manberger and Stenqvist 2018). Global lithium \r\nproduction rose by roughly 13% from 2016 to 2017, to 43,000 Mt \r\nin 2018 (Golberg 2021). Africa has rich reserves of lithium and is \r\nexpected to produce 15% of the world's supply soon (Rosenberg \r\net al. 2019). Such reserves are found in Zimbabwe, Botswana, \r\nMozambique, Namibia, South Africa (Steenkamp 2017) and the \r\nDemocratic Republic of Congo (Roker 2018)."


id: 622b3c5bd6329dafac629ffc192a3167
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14545
content:
"The demand for these resources as ingredients in rechargeable \r\nbatteries is growing rapidly, with global demand for cobalt set to \r\nquadruple to over 190,000 tons by 2026. The DRC is a mineral-rich \r\ncountry (Smith et al. 2019a) with rich reserves of fossil fuels (coal \r\nand oil) (Buzananakova 2015). The extraction of lithium and cobalt \r\ncan be environmentally and socially damaging, though its use as \r\na  principal component in most rechargeable batteries for electric \r\nvehicles and electronic smart grids affords it high sustainability value. "


id: 4c92f8f1bf66a077c61f0d1fa6dc9718
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10735
content:
"is the risk of lock-in effects related to grandfathering when emitters \r\ncomply with less stringent standards."


id: 7fc0673b0368de10e28282cd14bdebb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19612
content:
"current practices in the fossil fuel industry, shape a  'disruptive \r\ninnovation' and contribute to a strategy for decarbonising economies \r\nglobally (Bergman 2018). Divestment is contributing to the political \r\nsituation that is 'weakening the political and economic stronghold of \r\nthe fossil fuel industry' (Grady-Benson and Sarathy 2016)."


id: be13fe7ca19e6717da97dbad6fe9bc05
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30710
content:
"Overcoming the carbon lock-in is not simply a matter of the right \r\npolicies or switching to low-carbon technologies. Indeed, it would \r\nmean a radical change in the existing power relations between fossil \r\nfuel industries and their governments and social structural behaviour \r\n(Seto et al. 2016). Some actions to fix the climate change problem \r\ncan themselves create injustices, thereby challenging sustainable \r\ndevelopment (Cronin et al. 2021). Not paying sufficient attention to \r\nperceptions of injustice related to the rights to development, energy \r\nand resource sovereignty can further create resistance to climate \r\naction (Cronin et al. 2021)."


id: 76d18d88a31d3c26adbb7fac2e659f2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18116
content:
"The stranded assets narrative has focused overwhelmingly on \r\nconsumption by companies: not much emphasis has been placed \r\non  the commercialisation- and investment-related aspects. In \r\naddition, other carbon-intensive activities can also run the risk of \r\nbeing stranded, such as cement, petrochemicals, steel and aviation \r\n(Baron and David 2015). This is why stranded assets are often \r\nreferred to as having a cascading impact on several other sectors."


id: 9b013601768dcff81fb5a00342694873
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24519
content:
"expected to shrink by 20% in 2021, this has created fiscal challenges \r\nfor countries that are heavily reliant on fossil fuel products as their \r\nmain source of revenue."


id: 2f59666256b4bc22c9a62cad09bdc617
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5595
content:
"The transition to a  low-carbon development is wired in issues of \r\njustice and equity: how do you align carbon reductions to meet the \r\nneeds of humanity? Distributive justice calls for a fairer sharing of \r\nthe benefits and burdens of the transition process, while procedural \r\njustice is essentially about ensuring that the demands of vulnerable \r\ngroups are not ignored in the pull to the transition. The impacts \r\nof climate change and the mitigation burdens are experienced \r\ndifferently by different social actors, with indigenous communities \r\nfacing multiple threats and being subjected to unequal power \r\ndynamics (Sovacool 2021)."


id: 5573a65bb5b3d41aa3739493489bfe7c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12308
content:
"A poorly managed transition will reproduce inequalities, thus \r\ncontradicting the very essence of a  just, sustainable, inclusive \r\ntransition. Revenues from oil and gas have been ploughed into social \r\nsafety nets and are supporting free senior high-school education \r\nin countries such as Ghana, thus enabling the realisation of SDG \r\n4 (quality education) (UNU-INRA 2020). The move from fossil fuels \r\ntowards a low-carbon economy has economic implications for lower\u0002income countries that are dependent on hydrocarbon resources, are \r\nendowed with significant untapped oil and gas reserves, and may not \r\nhave the transitional tools to move towards low-carbon technologies \r\nor economies (Peszko et al. 2020)."


id: 2919ecb083b9bd0569da660b234902f0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4441
content:
"Fossil fuel-dependent countries are doubly exposed to the vulnerability \r\nrelated to climate change impacts and are being targeted in the global \r\neffort to address the problem (Peszko et al. 2020). Countries that are \r\nheavily reliant on oil, coal and gas are also those most at risk from \r\na low-carbon transition that may curtail the activities of their fossil \r\nfuel industries and render the value chains and economies associated \r\nwith the exploitation of fossil fuels unviable (Peszko et al. 2020)."


id: db5a54082e741896fded35040bed49db
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35863
content:
"The energy transition landscape is changing rapidly, and we are \r\nwitnessing multiple transitions. This creates room to manage the \r\ntransition in ways that will prioritise the need for workers in vulnerable \r\nsectors (land, energy) to secure their jobs and to maintain a secure \r\nand healthy lifestyle, especially as the risks multiply for those who \r\nare exposed to heavy industrial jobs and all the associated outcomes. \r\nThe shift to carbon neutrality is being driven by convergent factors \r\nrelated to energy security and the benefits of climate mitigation, \r\nincluding the health impacts of air pollution and consumer demand \r\n(Svobodova et al. 2020)."


id: 90195595b0f78bfc4a0a6c1608ea03d4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22562
content:
"Developing countries in Latin America and Africa that are reliant \r\non revenue streams from fossil fuels may not see these returns \r\nconverted into much-needed infrastructure and other social and \r\neconomic amenities that can reduce poverty. However, given the \r\nfalling prices of renewables, developing countries do not have to face \r\nthe burden of retrofitting their infrastructure to align with new low\u0002carbon industries, since they can leapfrog technologies and shape \r\na sustainable trajectory that is more resilient and fit for the future."


id: 1bccf340059c8ea6db43e2eca015c271
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2075
content:
"Climate change is high on the global agenda, as is energy's role in \r\ndecarbonising the economy, giving rise to a number of equality issues. \r\n(Oswald et al. 2020) have shown that economic inequality translates \r\ninto inequality in energy consumption, as well as emissions. This is \r\nlargely because people with different levels of purchasing power \r\nmake use of different goods and services, which are sustained by \r\ndifferent energy quantities and carriers (Oswald et al. 2020; Poblete\u0002Cazenave et al. 2021)."


id: 95535e8719b8df90115996341d2238c4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23473
content:
"However, the transition towards a carbon-neutral world is complex \r\nand non-linear, and it will likely result in some disruptions, with \r\nmanifest equality implications, given the scale of the transformation \r\nenvisaged. There are parallel movements that can be observed. On \r\nthe one hand, divestment initiatives are underway to move away \r\nfrom carbon-intensive investments. On the other hand, hydrocarbon\u0002rich countries in some parts of the developing world are identifying \r\nnew opportunities to reduce the fiscal loss associated with the loss \r\nof fossil fuel revenues. Indeed, with global investment in energy "


id: 706229631702308320bb38b7ca15d33e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17029
content:
"A study by (Bai et al. 2020) shows that an increase in income inequality \r\nin China hinders the carbon abatement effect of innovations in "


id: 65e15681051846dca2ebe30eaa2dd542
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15187
content:
"low-carbon development should not replace old forms of injustice \r\nwith new ones (Setyowati 2021)."


id: fcfe2d0866b919b97af9853bf2bc7d7e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41869
content:
"renewable-energy technologies, possibly even leading to an increase \r\nin carbon emissions, while a  decrease in inequality of incomes is \r\nconducive to giving play to the role of this carbon abatement effect, \r\nthereby indicating that there is an important correlation between \r\nthe goals of 'sustainable social development' and 'sustainable \r\necological development'."


id: 9788ba7c51896711f444f0da96ed72e1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23873
content:
"India is home to one sixth of world's population but accounts for only \r\n6.8% of global energy use and consumes only 5.25% of electricity \r\nproduced globally. During the period 1990-1991 to 2014-2015, \r\noverall energy intensity in India declined from 0.007 Mtoe per billion \r\nINR of GDP to 0.004 Mtoe per billion INR of GDP, an annual average \r\ndecline of 2%. The industrial sector is making the highest contribution \r\nCO2 mitigation by reducing its energy intensity (Roy et al. 2021)."


id: 7323c69076b24d236f6e107c96a45526
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17505
content:
"Household carbon emissions are mainly affected by incomes and \r\nother key demographic factors. Understanding the contribution \r\nof these factors can inform climate responsibilities and potential \r\ndemand-side climate-mitigation strategies. A  study by (Feng et al. \r\n2021) on inequalities in household carbon the in USA shows that \r\nthe per-capita carbon footprint (CF) of the highest income group \r\n(>USD200,000 yr-1) with 32.3 tonnes is about 2.6 times the per\u0002capita CF of the lowest income group (<USD15,000 yr-1) with 12.3 \r\ntonnes. Most contributors of high carbon footprints across income \r\ngroups in the US are heating, cooling and private transport, which \r\nreflects US settlement structures and lifestyles, heavily reliant as they \r\nare on cars and living in large houses."


id: 6e23b2bf595f2352f59e782ef2421899
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16638
content:
"Studies by (Jaccard et al. 2021) on energy in Europe shown a top-to\u0002bottom decile ratio (90:10) of 7.2 for expenditure, 3.1 for net energy \r\nand 2.6 for carbon. Given such inequalities, these two targets can \r\nonly be met through the use of carbon capture and storage (CCS), \r\nlarge efficiency improvements and an extremely low minimum final \r\nenergy use of 28 GJ per adult equivalent. Assuming a more realistic \r\nminimum energy use of about 55 GJ per adult equivalent and no \r\nCCS deployment, the 1.5degC target can only be achieved at near full \r\nequality. The authors conclude that achieving both stated goals is \r\nan immense and widely underestimated challenge, the successful \r\nmanagement of which requires far greater room for manoeuvre in \r\nmonetary and fiscal terms than is reflected in the current European \r\npolitical discourse."


id: 3410881d11d5f3ebfeb2a34dd7ae08d0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6405
content:
"2020). Transition decisions and policies may also have far-reaching \r\ngendered implications, as the closure of mines is often linked to \r\nseveral ancillary business impacts where men are laid off and women \r\nmay have to take on multiple jobs to compensate for the reduction in \r\nthe household's income (Piggot et al. 2019; UNU-INRA 2020)."


id: fff8c4734d68f295214b2db40ff5dfba
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42426
content:
"in one region than another given existing regional disparities in \r\nhuman capital, infrastructure, finance and technological development \r\n(Cronin et al. 2021)."


id: ea7a349906790a8875137518a36b522a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38618
content:
"Low-carbon transitions and equality implications will depend on \r\nlocal contexts, regional priorities, the points of departure of different \r\ncountries in the transition and the speed at which they will want \r\nto travel. Hence, timing and scope are important elements that are \r\nassociated more with a quality transition than a race to the bottom. \r\nTo date, the debate has had some obvious blind spots, not least \r\nconsiderations of power, politics and political economy (Denton et al. \r\n2021). Certainly, the transition will create winners and losers, as \r\nwell as stakeholders that can frame their economic interests so as to \r\ndetermine the orientation, pace, timing and scope of the transition."


id: 2421018252a64577d9f3edebce59146d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3537
content:
"A just transition holds out the prospects for alternative high-quality \r\njobs, public-health improvements and an opportunity to focus on \r\nwell-being and prosperity, with spillover benefits to urban areas and \r\neconomic systems. Nonetheless, countries that transition from fossil \r\nfuels experience different challenges, different levels of dependence \r\nand have different capacities to transition. There will be countries \r\nwith lower capacity and higher dependence, and vice versa (UNEP/\r\nSEI 2020)."


id: 878e831300fd48447ee07e5610bf022e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21005
content:
"Deciding on matters of justice is essential to the transition, and there \r\nare several inherent questions to consider when thinking through \r\nthe allocation of costs and benefits, as is the case with distributive \r\njustice. How matters are defined and who defines matters such as \r\nthe timing of phasing out, prioritising which energy sources need to \r\nbe phased out and who might be affected are all political economy \r\nquestions (Piggot et al. 2019)."


id: d54a878fb8f37a7a12e9995b2359c79c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34848
content:
"Similarly, when considering issues of procedural justice, there are \r\nmatters related to interests, participation and power dynamics that \r\nare essential to the process, but that might also subvert the process, \r\ndepending on whose rights, whose participation and whose power \r\nare being put in jeopardy (Forsyth 2014; Piggot et al. 2019). Hence, \r\nboth distribution and procedure matter, as do inter-generational \r\nand intra-generational equity in planning transitions. Six critical \r\nvariables can shape or inhibit the transition process. These \r\nare dependence, timing, capacity, agency, scope and inclusion \r\n(Denton et al. 2021)."


id: cb7c7dab75d9d7bb3f4e2d8a8c6335a0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33128
content:
"Dependence, or the extent to which a  country may depend on \r\nrevenue streams from fossil fuels, will determine its ability to \r\nmanage the transition from fossil fuels. Countries who rely on the \r\nproceeds from hydrocarbon resources as economic rents to support \r\nfiscal income and spending on public service-related needs such as \r\neducation, health and infrastructure, export earnings and foreign \r\nexchange reserves will have greater difficulties in foregoing their \r\nfossil fuel resources."


id: 2b0d0beeaffa368cb5c7f49700c8937d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4811
content:
"Timing: the transition pathway has to be aligned with a timetable \r\nwhich is anchored in national development priorities. For example, \r\nSouth Africa's Integrated Resource Planning indicates that the \r\ntransition away from coal, if not aligned with national development \r\npriorities, will reproduce new forms of inequality. In addition, if the \r\ntransition is imposed and its timing is not organic, then this might \r\nalso produce social inequalities."


id: cdb2ccbc1a721b6c0aed021149fc9b05
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33518
content:
"Capacity: transitions need to reflect spaces and planning. If \r\nknowledge about the transition pathway is not adequately mastered \r\nor in place, this can disable the process or steer it in the wrong \r\ndirection. Capacity also relates to several attributes, including \r\ntechnical, governance, institutional, technologies, and economic \r\nresources to manage the transition. Poorer countries will have "


id: 90d26902ee0dd809983f78109b8e1cbd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22687
content:
"Ambitious climate goals can increase the urgency of mitigation \r\nand accelerate the speed at which carbon neutrality is achieved. \r\nHowever, if the transition is done with speed, then this will leave \r\ndiversification efforts stymied, particularly in developing countries \r\nthat are highly dependent on fossil fuel revenue streams (UNEP/SEI "


id: da71f12def88ede796f1e5acef6ed7b0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35733
content:
"has a significant mitigation potential, with many scenarios showing \r\na shift to net-negative CO2 emissions during the 21st century. Total \r\ncumulative AFOLU CO2 sequestration varies widely across scenarios, \r\nwith as much as 415 GtCO2 being sequestered between 2010 and \r\n2100 in the most stringent mitigation scenarios. The largest share \r\nof net-GHG emissions reductions from AFOLU in both the 1.5degC \r\nand 2degC scenarios is from forestry-related measures, such as \r\nafforestation, reforestation and reduced deforestation. Afforestation, \r\nreforestation and forest management result in substantial CDR in \r\nmany scenarios. CO2 and CH4 show larger and more rapid declines \r\nthan N2O, an indication of the difficulties of reducing N2O emissions \r\nin agriculture (Chapter 3)."


id: 6a092fb7679bc670557097d6dbb24a28
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15926
content:
"difficulties in managing all these resources, as well as absorbing the \r\ncosts associated with the transition (UNEP/SEI 2020)."


id: 4c390a7ffc4044bffbe52805b1556bed
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10671
content:
"Agency: transitions are inherently about the sovereign right to \r\ndetermine one's orientation towards low-carbon development. \r\nHowever, given the urgency to stick to the Paris Agreement and the \r\nnew conditionalities related to post-COVID stimulus packages, \r\nthe absence of agency to deal with the transition might jeopardise its \r\nflow, orientation and pace (Newell and Mulvaney 2013)."


id: e3dbc6c029df2222cc7c3709841bde61
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37378
content:
"Scope: the extent to which the transition is rolled out and its potential \r\nimpacts. If transition policies are ambitious in making commensurate \r\ndiversification investments, this may enable job creation, but it may \r\nalso affect employees who are insufficiently prepared to undertake \r\nnew jobs and skills."


id: 4bbd735ffcff23297bb2f184ee4e4825
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10582
content:
"Inclusion: who is considered in the transition process and how \r\ntheir interests and risks are assessed are important aspects of \r\ntransition pathways. Stakeholders with strong vested interests may \r\nresist the transition, especially as it moves towards diversification \r\nactivities and policies."


id: 5690dc861b3dd44c2d1095bc862545c5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12484
content:
"Transitions will involve multiple sectoral- and cross-sectoral policies. \r\nSection 17.3.3 presents a range of studies and conclusions on the \r\nrelationship between climate change mitigation goals and meeting \r\nthe SDGs in order to identify major synergies and trade-offs. \r\nThe interactions are manifold and complex (Nilsson et al. 2016; \r\nPradhan et al. 2017) (Section 4.3.1.2). Here we draw on conclusions \r\nfrom sectoral chapters and add additional studies as a  basis for \r\ndrawing more general conclusions about agriculture, food and land \r\nuse, the water-energy-food nexus, industry, cities, infrastructure \r\nand transportation, cross-sectoral digitalisation, and mitigation and \r\nadaptation relations."


id: 4ad367a5caa32a25133f6137534b72fd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10405
content:
"The potential joint contribution of food and land-use systems to \r\nsustainable development and climate change has also been addressed \r\nin policy programmes by the UN, local governments and the private \r\nsector. These programmes address options for pursuing sustainable \r\ndevelopment and climate change jointly, such as agroforestry, \r\nagricultural intensification, better agriculture practices and avoided \r\ndeforestation. (Griggs and Stafford-Smith 2013) assess production\u0002and consumption-based methods of achieving joint sustainability and \r\nclimate-change mitigation in food systems, concluding that efficiency \r\nimprovements in agricultural production systems can provide large \r\nbenefits. Given the expectations of high levels of population growth \r\nand the strong increase in the demand for meat and dairy products, \r\nthere is also a need for the careful management of dietary changes, \r\nas well for those areas which could be used most effectively for \r\nlivestock and plant production."


id: 2606e611a6b0a8b93fea9fce9f50d0a0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3865
content:
"Sustainable development and mitigation policies are closely linked in \r\nthe agriculture, food and land-use sectors. We assess synergies and \r\ntrade-offs between meeting the SDGs and reducing GHG emissions \r\nwithin the sectors based on modelling studies and case studies \r\nillustrating how trade-offs between SDG 2 (zero hunger, biomass for \r\nenergy) and SDG 15 (life on land) can be addressed by cross-sectoral \r\nmitigation options."


id: dd94815d0d0338847190844ecae15846
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36250
content:
"Loss of biodiversity has been highlighted in several studies as \r\na  major trade-off of the low stabilisation scenarios (Prudhomme \r\net al. 2020). A wide range of mitigation and adaptation responses - \r\nfor example, preserving natural ecosystems such as peatland, \r\ncoastal lands and forests, reducing the competition for land, \r\nfire management, soil management and most risk-management \r\noptions  - have the potential to make positive contributions to \r\nsustainable development, ecosystems services and other social \r\ngoals (McElwee et al. 2020). (Smith et al. 2019a) also stressed \r\nthat agricultural practices (e.g.,  improving yields, agroforestry), \r\nforest conservation  (e.g.,  afforestation, reforestation), soil carbon \r\nsequestration (e.g.,  biochar addition to soils) and the removal of "


id: f9e409c220b26b8d20e016502e23b57a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41327
content:
"Chapter  7 emphasises the high expectations on land to deliver \r\nmitigation, yet the pressures on land have grown with population, \r\ndietary changes, the impacts of climate change and the conversion \r\nof uncultivated land to agriculture and other land uses. Agriculture, \r\nforestry and other land uses (AFOLU) are expected to play a vital role \r\nin the portfolio of mitigation options across all sectors. The AFOLU \r\nsector is also the only one in which it is currently feasible to achieve \r\ncarbon dioxide removal (CDR) from the atmosphere, including \r\nafforestarion/reforestation (A/R), improved forest management and \r\nsoil carbon sequestration (SCR) (Chapters 7 and 12). The AFOLU sector "


id: 40f719f5f81f98a0754d508729c469cc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8614
content:
"carbon dioxide (e.g.,  BECCS) could contribute to climate change \r\nmitigation (Smith et al. 2019a). However, there are also options that \r\ncould improve biodiversity if they were implemented jointly with \r\nclimate change mitigation in AFOLOU. In their study, (Leclere et al. \r\n2020) show that increasing conservation management, restoring \r\ndegraded land and generalised landscape-level conservation \r\nplanning could be positive for biodiversity. In general, the ambitious \r\nconservation efforts and transformations of food systems are central \r\nto an effective post-2020 biodiversity strategy."


id: bbc5c003cd652ead851182ef3f9dbd1f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30266
content:
"of oil-palm plantations has provided limited benefits to indigenous \r\nand Afro-descended communities. Even when oil-palm expansion \r\nimproves rural livelihoods, the benefits are unevenly distributed \r\nacross the rural population (Andrianto et al. 2019; Castellanos\u0002Navarrete et al. 2021). In any case, while oil-palm production can \r\nimprove smallholders' livelihoods in certain circumstances, this sector \r\noffers limited opportunities for agricultural labourers, especially \r\nwomen (Castellanos-Navarrete et al. 2019)."


id: b2f60590260ccdee2ab7e9015be5ac7b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28726
content:
"Economy-wide mitigation costs can be effectively limited by \r\nlifestyle, technology and policy choices, as well as benefitting from \r\nsynergies with the SDGs. Synergies come from the consumption side \r\nby managing demand. For example, reducing food waste leads to \r\nresources being saved because water, land use, energy consumption \r\nand greenhouse gas emissions are all reduced (Chapter 3)."


id: aacaebfcce1fb8e8238078727d24e954
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27275
content:
"The IPCC Special Report on Climate Change and Land (IPCC 2019) \r\nemphasises the need for governance in order to avoid conflict \r\nbetween sustainable development and land-use management. It \r\nstates: 'Measuring progress towards goals is important in decision\u0002making and adaptive governance to create common understanding \r\nand advance policy effectiveness'. The report concludes that \r\nmeasurable indicators are very useful in linking land-use policies, the \r\nNDCs and the SDGs."


id: c73585fbe81445e7d58752ce74114907
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32366
content:
"Chapter  12 emphasised that diets high in plant protein and low \r\nin meat, in particular red meat, are associated with lower GHG \r\nemissions. Emerging food-chain technologies such as microbial, \r\nplant, or insect-based protein promise substantial reductions in direct \r\nGHG emissions from food production. The full mitigation potential of \r\nsuch technologies can only be realised in low-GHG energy systems."


id: 9754fece0f6d08b7f32f0b63d0c23b19
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23826
content:
"One example of an area where special governance efforts have been \r\ncalled for is the protection of forestry, ecosystem services and local \r\nlivelihoods in a context of the large-scale deployment of high-value \r\ncrops like palm oil, short-term, high income-generating activities and \r\nsustainable development. Serious challenges are already being seen \r\nwithin these areas according to (IPBES 2019)."


id: feca951d65c78d849ac935409856ccc4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42218
content:
"Palm oil is one example of a product with potentially major trade\u0002offs between meeting the SDGs and climate change mitigation in \r\nthe agriculture, forest and other land uses (AFOLU) sector. Currently \r\nthe area under oil palms is showing a tremendous increase, mostly \r\nin forest conversions to oil-palm plantations (Austin et al. 2019; \r\nGaveau et al. 2016; Schoneveld et al. 2019). The conversion of peat \r\nswamp forest and mineral forest to oil palms will yield different \r\namounts of CO2. A  study by (Novita et al. 2020) shows that the \r\ncarbon stock of primary peat-swamp forest was 1770 MgC ha-1\r\ncompared to a carbon stock of oil palm of 759 MgC ha-1. The study \r\nconducted by Guillaume et al. shows that the carbon stock in mineral \r\nsoils was 284 MgC ha-1 compared to that in rainforest, which was \r\n110.76  Mg C ha-1 (Guillaume et al. 2018)."


id: 845e5b4917bbaa47e7544278bc0a56b7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20437
content:
"A similar study also found a positive impact form zero food waste. \r\nThe 'no food waste' scenario could decrease global average food \r\ncalorie availability by 120 kcal person-1 d-1 and protein availability \r\nby 4.6 g protein person-1 d-1 relative to their baseline levels, thus \r\nreducing required crop and livestock production by 490 and 190 Mt \r\nrespectively. This lower level of production reduces agricultural \r\nland use by 57 Mha and thus mitigates the associated side effects \r\non the environment. The lower levels of production also reduce \r\nthe requirements for fertilisers and water by 10 Mt and 110 km3\r\nrespectively, and GHG emissions are reduced by 410 MtCO2-eq yr-1\r\nrelative to the 2030 baseline. Reducing food waste can contribute \r\nto lessening the demand for food, feed and other resources such \r\nas water and nitrogen, reducing the pressure on land and the \r\nenvironment while ending hunger (Hasegawa et al. 2019)."


id: 6d25264604bbac1b4f4913791b0fd958
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16481
content:
"Restoring peatlands is one of the most promising strategies for \r\nachieving nature-based CDR (Girardin et al. 2021; Seddon et al. 2021). \r\nA study by (Novita et al. 2021) shows that significantly different CO2\r\nemissions for different land-use categories are influenced more \r\nby the water-table depth and latitude position for those locations \r\nrelative to other observed parameters, such as bulk density, air \r\ntemperature and rainfall."


id: 6d71823f03fc8124d4c637d89afed434
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16521
content:
"Given that the frequent peatland fires in Indonesia were caused \r\nby land clearances in the replanting season, multi-stakeholder \r\ncollaboration between oil-palm plantations, local communities \r\nand local governments over practices such as zero burning when \r\nclearing land might be one of the most effective ways to reduce the \r\ndeforestation impact of oil palm (Jupesta et al. 2020). Behavioural \r\nchanges as a  mitigation option have been suggested as a  major \r\nfactor in aligning sustainable development, climate change and land \r\nmanagement. In the absence of the policy intervention, the expansion "


id: 99b63a5f483a64631ccc7970af3942ba
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24271
content:
"This section addresses the links between water, energy and food in the \r\ncontext of sustainable development and the associated synergies and \r\ntrade-offs, with links to related chapters. The focus outline includes \r\nscoping and the relationship with the SDGs, general climate change \r\nimpacts on global water resources, energy-system impacts and the \r\nrelationship to renewables, enabling strategies, trade-offs and cross\u0002sectoral implications (see also Chapter 12), nexus-management tools \r\nand strategies, and a box with examples from India and South Africa."


id: 9c07fb747687da8dc4dce5c8c97b17e5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24702
content:
"The continually increasing pressures on natural resources, such \r\nas land and water, due to the rising demands from increases in \r\npopulation and living standards, which also require more energy, \r\nemphasises the need to integrate sustainable planning and \r\nexploitation (Bleischwitz et al. 2018)."


id: 54654599e29a64cf52a83ee3e940c318
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12126
content:
"The water-energy-food nexus (WEFN) is at the epicentre of these \r\nchallenges, which are of global relevance and are the focus of policies \r\nand planning at all levels and sectors of global society. The nexus \r\nbetween water, energy and food (Zhang et al. 2018) is tight and \r\ncomplex, and needs careful attention and deciphering across spatio\u0002temporal scales, sectors and interests to balance proper management \r\nand trade-offs and to pursue sustainable development (Biggs et al. \r\n2015; Dai et al. 2018; Hamiche et al. 2016). The WEFN touches upon \r\nthe majority of the UN's SDGs, such as SDG 2, SDG 6, SDG 7 and SDGs \r\n11-15 (Bleischwitz et al. 2018), and deals with basic commodities, \r\nthus guaranteeing the basic livelihoods of the global population."


id: f1afa4d77bf20f6dc95e5f2fbb8822c0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39903
content:
"The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group of countries \r\nhas also created several types of public-private partnership to \r\ntackle food waste and reduce losses. Most of these partnerships are \r\nfocused on food-waste recycling in both developed and developing \r\ncountries (Rogelj et al. 2018). APEC members stated that knowledge\u0002sharing and improved policy and project management were the most \r\nimportant advantages of public-private partnerships."


id: 3967badeaa248a3eec93a5e5a40a7ae5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7313
content:
"The inextricably intertwined factors in decision-making are \r\ninfluenced by the characteristics of the person, in interaction with \r\nthe characteristics of more sustainable practices and products, \r\nwhich interact with a particular context that includes the immediate \r\nenvironment (e.g.,  household, farm), the indirect environment \r\n(e.g.,  community) and macro-environmental factors (e.g.,  the \r\npolitical, financial and economic contexts) (Hoek et al. 2021). Hence, \r\nto influence people to make decisions in favour of sustainable \r\nfood production or consumption, a  wider perspective is needed \r\non decision-making processes and behavioural change, in which \r\nindividuals are not targeted in isolation, but in interaction with this \r\nwider systemic environment."


