# document

id: e8887058065a16a17e581b09611ab02c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38249
content:
"Long-term deep emission reductions, including the reduction \r\nof emissions to net zero, is best achieved through institutions \r\nand governance that nurture new mitigation policies, while \r\nat the same time reconsidering existing policies that support \r\nthe continued emission of GHGs (high confidence). To do so \r\neffectively, the scope of climate governance needs to include both \r\ndirect efforts to target GHG emissions and indirect opportunities to \r\ntackle GHG emissions that result from efforts directed towards other \r\npolicy objectives. {13.2, 13.5, 13.6, 13.7, 13.9} "


id: 71d83a92d975100e68c6026962d42368
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17272
content:
"Climate governance is constrained and enabled by domestic \r\nstructural factors, but it is still possible for actors to make \r\nsubstantial changes (medium evidence, high agreement). Key \r\nstructural factors are domestic material endowments (such as fossil \r\nfuels and land-based resources); domestic political systems; and \r\nprevalent ideas, values and belief systems. Developing Countries \r\nface additional material constraints in climate governance due to \r\ndevelopment challenges and scarce economic or natural resources. \r\nA broad group of actors influence how climate governance develop \r\nover time, including a  range of civic organisations, encompassing \r\nboth pro- and anti-climate action groups. {13.3, 13.4}"


id: e928f686fc2b8bf47e1087821623bc3a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38373
content:
"Institutions and governance underpin mitigation by providing \r\nthe legal basis for action. This includes setting up implementing \r\norganisations and the frameworks through which diverse \r\nactors interact (medium evidence, high agreement). Institutions \r\ncan create mitigation and sectoral policy instruments; policy packages \r\nfor low-carbon system transition; and economy-wide measures for \r\nsystemic restructuring. {13.2, 13.7, 13.9}"


id: 8eecef664f03009592b4ec0dc2ba1957
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22333
content:
"Policies have had a  discernible impact on mitigation for \r\nspecific countries, sectors, and technologies (high confidence), \r\navoiding emissions of several GtCO2-eq yr -1 (medium \r\nconfidence). Both market-based and regulatory policies have distinct \r\nbut complementary roles. The share of global GHG emissions subject \r\nto mitigation policy has increased rapidly in recent years, but big gaps \r\nremain in policy coverage, and the stringency of many policies falls \r\nshort of what is needed to achieve the desired mitigation outcomes. \r\n(Box TS.13) {13.6, Cross-Chapter Box 10 in Chapter 14}"


id: ec9cfcb63e9c3cc0af8a9816eba1311d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38987
content:
"Sub-national actors are important for mitigation because \r\nmunicipalities and regional governments have jurisdiction \r\nover climate-relevant sectors such as land use, waste and \r\nurban policy. They are able to experiment with climate \r\nsolutions and can forge partnerships with the private \r\nsector and internationally to leverage enhanced climate \r\naction (high confidence). More than 10,500 cities and nearly \r\n250 regions representing more than 2 billion people have pledged \r\nlargely voluntary action to reduce emissions. Indirect gains include \r\ninnovation, establishing norms and developing capacity. However, \r\nsub-national actors often lack national support, funding, and \r\ncapacity to mobilise finance and human resources, and create new \r\ninstitutional competences. {13.5}"


id: df81a0203f3b2b9e293edccaba71aad8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36568
content:
"Climate laws enable mitigation action by signalling the \r\ndirection of travel, setting targets, mainstreaming mitigation \r\ninto sector policies, enhancing regulatory certainty, \r\ncreating law-backed agencies, creating focal points for \r\nsocial mobilisation, and attracting international finance \r\n(medium evidence, high agreement). By 2020, 'direct' climate \r\nlaws primarily focused on GHG reductions were present in \r\n56 countries covering 53% of global emissions (Figure TS.24). More \r\nthan 690  laws, including 'indirect' laws, however, may also have \r\nan  effect on mitigation. Among direct laws, 'framework' laws set \r\nan overarching legal basis for mitigation either by pursuing a target \r\nand implementation approach, or by seeking to mainstream climate \r\nobjectives through sectoral plans and integrative institutions. \r\n(Figure TS.24) {13.2}"


id: 7d99428072c89e06ceee7b6183b66419
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19269
content:
"Climate litigation is growing and can affect the outcome \r\nand ambition of climate governance (medium evidence, high \r\nagreement). Since 2015, at least 37 systemic cases have been \r\ninitiated against states that challenge the overall effort of a  state \r\nto mitigate or adapt to climate change. If successful, such cases \r\ncan lead to an increase in a  country's overall ambition to tackle \r\nclimate change. Climate litigation has also successfully challenged \r\ngovernments' authorisations of high-emitting projects, setting \r\nprecedents in favour of climate action. Climate litigation against \r\nprivate sector and financial institutions is also on the rise. {13.4}"


id: ff134c831b71e4c8f0b31daaf1a16be
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42281
content:
"The media shapes the public discourse about climate \r\nmitigation. This can usefully build public support to \r\naccelerate mitigation action but may also be used to impede \r\ndecarbonisation (medium evidence, high agreement). Global \r\nmedia coverage (across a study of 59 countries) has been growing, \r\nfrom about 47,000 articles in 2016-17 to about 87,000 in 2020-21.\r\nGenerally, the media representation of climate science has increased \r\nand become more accurate over time. On occasion, the propagation \r\nof scientifically misleading information by organised counter\u0002movements has fuelled polarisation, with negative implications for \r\nclimate policy. {13.4}"


id: 6942388126f0fcc53bab46888d8767e4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15785
content:
"Regulatory instruments play an important role in achieving \r\nspecific mitigation outcomes in sectoral applications (high \r\nconfidence). Regulation is effective in particular applications \r\nand often enjoys greater political support, but tends to be more \r\neconomically costly than pricing instruments (robust evidence,\r\nmedium agreement). Flexible forms of regulation (e.g., performance \r\nstandards) have achieved aggregate goals for renewable energy \r\ngeneration, vehicle efficiency and fuel standards, and energy efficiency \r\nin buildings and industry. Infrastructure investment decisions are \r\nsignificant for mitigation because they lock-in high- or low-emissions \r\ntrajectories over long periods. Information and voluntary programs \r\ncan contribute to overall mitigation outcomes (medium evidence,\r\nhigh agreement). Designing for overlap and interactions among \r\nmitigation policies enhances their effectiveness. {13.6}"


id: 408187fbbe82f374ea5dec7fd44c1037
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8538
content:
"Explicit attention to equity and justice is salient to both social \r\nacceptance and fair and effective policymaking for mitigation \r\n(high confidence). Distributional implications of alternative climate \r\npolicy choices can be usefully evaluated at city, local and national \r\nscales as an input to policymaking. It is anticipated that institutions \r\nand governance frameworks that enable consideration of justice and \r\nJust Transitions can build broader support for climate policymaking.\r\n{13.2, 13.6, 13.8, 13.9}"


id: 755facedf2bb990cee0385935c7bb6d6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17876
content:
"National mitigation policies interact internationally with \r\neffects that both support and hinder mitigation action \r\n(medium evidence, high agreement). Reductions in demand for \r\nfossil fuels tend to negatively affect fossil fuel-exporting countries. \r\nCreation of markets for emission reduction credits tends to benefit \r\ncountries able to supply credits. Policies to support technology \r\ndevelopment and diffusion tend to have positive spillover effects.\r\nThere is no consistent evidence of significant emissions leakage or \r\ncompetitiveness effects between countries, including for emissions\u0002intensive trade-exposed industries covered by emission-trading \r\nsystems (medium confidence). {13.6}"


id: 8053ad8aa51d3690ec03deb238f97144
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19709
content:
"Carbon pricing is effective in promoting implementation of low\u0002cost emissions reductions (high confidence). While the coverage \r\nof emissions trading and carbon taxes has risen to over 20 percent \r\nof global CO2 emissions, both coverage and price are lower than is \r\nneeded for deep reductions. Market mechanisms ideally are designed \r\nto be effective as well as efficient, balance distributional goals and find \r\nsocial acceptance. Practical experience has driven progress in market \r\nmechanism design, especially of emissions trading schemes. Carbon \r\npricing is limited in its effect on adoption of higher-cost mitigation \r\noptions, and where decisions are often not sensitive to price incentives, \r\nsuch as in energy efficiency, urban planning, and infrastructure (robust \r\nevidence, medium agreement). Subsidies have been used to improve \r\nenergy efficiency, encourage the uptake of renewable energy and other \r\nsector-specific emissions-saving options. {13.6}"


id: bdc401ca66d8da373aa2df651536679e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30647
content:
"Policy packages are better able to support socio-technical \r\ntransitions and shifts in development pathways toward \r\nlow-carbon futures than are individual policies (high \r\nconfidence). For best effect, they need to be harnessed to a clear \r\nvision for change and designed with attention to local governance \r\ncontext. Comprehensiveness in coverage, coherence to ensure \r\ncomplementarity, and consistency of policies with the overarching \r\nvision and its objectives are important design criteria. Integration \r\nacross objectives occurs when a policy package is informed by a clear \r\nproblem framing and identification of the full range of relevant policy \r\nsubsystems. The climate policy landscape is outlined in Table TS.8, \r\nwhich maps framings of desired national policy outcomes to \r\npolicymaking approaches. {13.7, Figure 13.6}"


id: 19c076c20d8235a244b58a4842076fdb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1728
content:
"Carbon pricing is most effective if revenues are redistributed \r\nor used impartially (high confidence). A carbon levy earmarked \r\nfor green infrastructures or saliently returned to taxpayers \r\ncorresponding to widely accepted notions of fairness increases the \r\npolitical acceptability of carbon pricing. {5.6, Box 5.11} "


id: bfe3f764e724fbad95ea4ec271406cfc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31050
content:
"Removing fossil fuel subsidies would reduce emissions, \r\nimprove public revenue and macroeconomic performance, \r\nand yield other environmental and sustainable development \r\nbenefits. Subsidy removal may have adverse distributional impacts \r\nespecially on the most economically vulnerable groups which, in \r\nsome cases can be mitigated by measures such as redistributing \r\nrevenue saved, all of which depend on national circumstances (high \r\nconfidence); fossil fuel subsidy removal is projected by various studies \r\n(using alternative methodologies) to reduce global CO2 emissions by \r\n1-4%, and GHG emissions by up to 10% by 2030, varying across \r\nregions (medium confidence). {6.3, 13.6} {13.6}"


id: 4009427cdce9d5692d4e180a5fe395ec
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8456
content:
"Economy-wide packages, including economic-stimulus \r\npackages, can contribute to shifting sustainable development \r\npathways and achieving net zero outcomes whilst meeting short\u0002term economic goals (medium evidence, high agreement). The \r\n2008-9 global recession showed that policies for sustained economic \r\nrecovery go beyond short-term fiscal stimulus to include long-term \r\ncommitments of public spending on the low-carbon economy, pricing \r\nreform, addressing affordability, and minimising distributional impacts. \r\nCOVID-19 spurred stimulus packages and multi-objective recovery \r\npolicies may also have potential to meet short-term economic goals \r\nwhile enabling longer-term sustainability goals. (Table TS.8) {13.9}"


id: e9e89d79098df30148a52fc8d257874f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38504
content:
"The co-benefits and trade-offs of integrating adaptation and \r\nmitigation are most usefully identified and assessed prior \r\nto policymaking rather than being accidentally discovered \r\n(high confidence). This requires strengthening relevant national \r\ninstitutions to reduce silos and overlaps, increasing knowledge \r\nexchange at the country and regional levels, and supporting \r\nengagement with bilateral and multilateral funding partners. Local \r\ngovernments are well placed to develop policies that generate social \r\nand environmental co-benefits but to do so require legal backing and \r\nadequate capacity and resources. {13.8}"


id: c0044030c9d6102783f934778595bc5f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31073
content:
"Table TS.9 | Case studies of integrated policymaking for sectoral transitions. Real-world sectoral transitions reinforce critical lessons on policy integration: a high-level \r\nstrategic goal (column A), the need for a clear sectoral outcome framing (column B), a carefully coordinated mix of policy instruments and governance actions (column C), \r\nand the importance of context-specific governance factors (column D). Illustrative examples, drawn from sectors, help elucidate the complexity of policymaking in driving \r\nsectoral transitions. {Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 13, Table 1}"


id: 496a2e5532d527104aada65d8f3a92c0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10140
content:
"Policy attribution examines the extent to which GHG emission reductions, the proximate drivers of emissions, and the deployment of \r\ntechnologies that reduce emissions may be reasonably attributed to policies implemented prior to the observed changes. Such policies \r\ninclude regulatory instruments such as energy-efficiency programmes or technical standards and codes, carbon pricing, financial \r\nsupport for low-carbon energy technologies and efficiency, voluntary agreements, and regulation of land-use practices."


id: 31415fa1e0bb6568e5ba9176ff47076c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5919
content:
"The vast majority of literature reviewed for this report examines the effect of particular instruments in particular contexts {13.6, 14.3, \r\n16.4}, and only a small number directly or plausibly infer global impacts of policies. Policies also differ in design, scope, and stringency, \r\nmay change over time as they require amendments or new laws, and often partially overlap with other instruments. These factors \r\ncomplicate analysis, because they give rise to the potential for double counting emissions reductions that have been observed. These \r\nlines of evidence on the impact of polices include: "


id: 542f4603a29bda34a5c5773c4e930d6f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12089
content:
"As illustrated in Box TS.13, Figure 1, these multiple lines of evidence point to policies having had a discernible impact on mitigation for \r\nspecific countries, sectors, and technologies (high confidence), avoiding emissions of several GtCO2-eq yr -1 globally (medium confidence)."


id: de612d0fc1515f3db46c8d1421b42277
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36389
content:
"Box TS.13, Table 1 | The effects of policy on GHG emissions, drivers of emissions, and technology deployment."


id: 75ba19b10b635f03e8c02b29201491a8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17943
content:
"Note: statements describe the effects of policies across those countries where policies are in place. Unless otherwise noted, all findings are of high confidence."


id: 666a3e56db179880d8319629138d6482
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15282
content:
"International cooperation is having positive and measurable \r\nresults (high confidence). The Kyoto Protocol led to measurable and \r\nsubstantial avoided emissions, including in 20 countries with Kyoto \r\nfirst-commitment period targets that have experienced a decade of \r\ndeclining absolute emissions. It also built national capacity for GHG \r\naccounting, catalysed the creation of GHG markets, and increased \r\ninvestments in low-carbon technologies. Other international \r\nagreements and institutions have led to avoided CO2 emissions from \r\nland-use practices, as well as avoided emissions of some non-CO2 \r\ngreenhouse gases (medium confidence). {14.3, 14.5, 14.6}"


id: 4c3ecf73af9a13501982ada2bf758554
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10675
content:
"New forms of international cooperation have emerged since \r\nAR5 in line with an evolving understanding of effective \r\nmitigation policies, processes, and institutions. Both new and \r\npre-existing forms of cooperation are vital for achieving climate \r\nmitigation goals in the context of sustainable development (high \r\nconfidence). While previous IPCC assessments have noted important \r\nsynergies between the outcomes of climate mitigation and achieving \r\nsustainable development objectives, there now appear to be synergies \r\nbetween the two processes themselves (medium confidence). Since \r\nAR5, international cooperation has shifted towards facilitating national\u0002level mitigation action through numerous channels, including though \r\nprocesses established under the UNFCCC regime and through regional \r\nand sectoral agreements and organisations. {14.2, 14.3, 14.5, 14.6}"


id: 6d4337e64f57e7c880fc2293ef4af4fb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16501
content:
"Participation in international agreements and transboundary \r\nnetworks is associated with the adoption of climate policies \r\nat the national and sub-national levels, as well as by non-state \r\nactors (high confidence). International cooperation helps countries \r\nachieve long-term mitigation targets when it supports development \r\nand diffusion of low-carbon technologies, often at the level of \r\nindividual sectors, which can simultaneously lead to significant \r\nbenefits in the areas of sustainable development and equity (medium \r\nconfidence). {14.2, 14.3, 14.5, 14.6}"


id: 1a0b8aa42fceda29f3fff07beaff2523
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1781
content:
"International cooperation will need to be strengthened in several \r\nkey respects in order to support mitigation action consistent \r\nwith limiting temperature rise to well below 2degC in the context \r\nof sustainable development and equity (high confidence).\r\nMany developing countries' NDCs have components or additional \r\nactions that are conditional on receiving assistance with respect to \r\nfinance, technology development and transfer, and capacity-building, \r\ngreater than what has been provided to date. Sectoral and sub-global \r\ncooperation is providing critical support, and yet there is room for \r\nfurther progress. In some cases, notably with respect to aviation and \r\nshipping, sectoral agreements have adopted climate mitigation goals \r\nthat fall far short of what would be required to achieve the long-term "


id: 474ba800b2d7c72b51f1255622cd6642
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9751
content:
"temperature goal of the Paris Agreement. Moreover, there are cases \r\nwhere international cooperation may be hindering mitigation efforts, \r\nnamely evidence that trade and investment agreements, as well as \r\nagreements within the energy sector, impede national mitigation \r\nefforts (medium confidence). International cooperation is emerging but \r\nso far fails to fully address transboundary issues associated with solar \r\nradiation modification (SRM) and carbon dioxide removal (CDR). {14.2, \r\n14.3, 14.4, 14.5, 14.6, Cross-Working Group Box 4 in Chapter 14}"


id: 2ac548c6e2fe3aa724b7876b4404a47f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4751
content:
"Complementarity in policies helps in the design of an optimal \r\ndemand-side policy mix (medium confidence). In the case of \r\nenergy efficiency, for example, this may involve CO2 pricing, standards \r\nand norms, and information feedback. {5.3, 5.4, 5.6}"


id: e117ad5d000f312c245519230caa6350
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36868
content:
"Social equity reinforces capacity and motivation for mitigating \r\nclimate change (medium confidence). Impartial governance \r\nsuch as fair treatment by law-and-order institutions, fair treatment \r\nby gender, and income equity, increases social trust, thus enabling \r\ndemand-side climate policies. High-status (often high-carbon) item \r\nconsumption may be reduced by taxing absolute wealth without \r\ncompromising well-being. {5.2, 5.4.2, 5.6}"


id: 7a141ffad114accc7e553bfb445cf797
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18677
content:
"Policies that increase the political access and participation \r\nof women, racialised, and marginalised groups, increase the \r\ndemocratic impetus for climate action (high confidence).\r\nIncluding more differently situated knowledge and diverse perspectives \r\nmakes climate mitigation policies more effective. {5.2, 5.6}"


id: cb7a08ce840bf3db451cc0aede991ea0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33127
content:
"Greater contextualisation and granularity in policy approaches \r\nbetter addresses the challenges of rapid transitions towards \r\nzero-carbon systems (high confidence). Larger systems take \r\nmore time to evolve, grow, and change compared to smaller ones.\r\nCreating and scaling up entirely new systems takes longer than \r\nreplacing existing technologies and practices. Late adopters tend to \r\nadopt faster than early pioneers. Obstacles and feasibility barriers \r\nare high in the early transition phases. Barriers decrease as a result \r\nof technical and social learning processes, network building, scale \r\neconomies, cultural debates, and institutional adjustments. {5.5, 5.6}"


id: 84a76e917059f9b253884652e31c7f39
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20481
content:
"Mitigation policies that integrate and communicate with the \r\nvalues people hold are more successful (high confidence).\r\nValues differ between cultures. Measures that support autonomy, \r\nenergy security and safety, equity and environmental protection, \r\nand fairness resonate well in many communities and social groups. \r\nChanging from a  commercialised, individualised, entrepreneurial \r\ntraining model to an education cognisant of planetary health \r\nand human well-being can accelerate climate change awareness \r\nand action. {5.4.1, 5.4.2}"


id: 6fa5566d15c11615f45683ec15276f31
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16900
content:
"Changes in consumption choices that are supported by structural \r\nchanges and political action enable the uptake of low-carbon \r\nchoices (high confidence). Policy instruments applied in coordination \r\ncan help to accelerate change in a consistent desired direction. Targeted \r\ntechnological change, regulation, and public policy can help in steering \r\ndigitalisation, the sharing economy, and circular economy towards \r\nclimate change mitigation. (Boxes TS.12 and TS.14) {5.3, 5.6}"


id: 3dd3d9402bb1e5f368bccccdc246917b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8045
content:
"Progress on the alignment of financial flows with low-GHG \r\nemissions pathways remains slow. There is a climate financing "


id: dcece1e493510c4f10933c56214f70b9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36132
content:
"2 Climate finance flows refers to local, national, or transnational financing from public, private, and alternative sources, to support mitigation and adaptation actions addressing climate change."


id: 5e52e3f463df2cdacb291c0ddc449847
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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vector_id: 13887
content:
"(high confidence). Estimates of climate finance flows32 exhibit highly \r\ndivergent patterns across regions and sectors and a slowing growth \r\n{15.3}. When the perceived risks are too high, the misallocation of \r\nabundant savings persists and investors refrain from investing in \r\ninfrastructure and industry in search of safer financial assets, even \r\nearning low or negative real returns (high confidence). {15.2, 15.3}"


id: 67125115406ea218cebb6b56fca81b48
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15402
content:
"gap which reflects a persistent misallocation of global capital \r\n(high confidence) {15.2, 15.3}. Persistently high levels of both \r\npublic and private fossil fuel-related financing continue to be of \r\nmajor concern despite promising recent commitments. This reflects \r\npolicy misalignment, the current perceived risk-return profile of \r\nfossil fuel-related investments, and political economy constraints "


id: 10c0f7e5bf0beabf02880d0aac3c6d1c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 126
content:
"Given the multiple sources and lack of harmonised methodologies, the data can only be indicative of the size and pattern of investment gaps. The gap between most recent \r\nflows and required investments is only a single indicator. A more comprehensive (and qualitative) assessment is required in order to understand the magnitude of the challenge \r\nof scaling up investment in sectors and regions. The analysis also does not consider the effects of misaligned flows. {15.3, 15.4, 15.5, Table 15.2, Table 15.3, Table 15.4}"


id: 7fd917521ee1aaeca8aa8ff84cfa9e98
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19631
content:
"is investors' preference for scalable and identifiable low-carbon \r\ninvestment opportunities. These relatively new labelled financial \r\nproducts will help by allowing a smooth integration into existing asset \r\nallocation models (high confidence). Green bond markets and markets \r\nfor sustainable finance products have also increased significantly \r\nsince AR5, but challenges nevertheless remain, in particular, there are \r\nconcerns about 'greenwashing' and the limited application of these \r\nmarkets to developing countries (high confidence). {15.6.2, 15.6.6}"


id: e5f062f7ee7e380e698610f1b2a010de
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37751
content:
"The relatively slow implementation of commitments by countries \r\nand stakeholders in the financial sector to scale up climate finance \r\nreflects neither the urgent need for ambitious climate action, \r\nnor the economic rationale for ambitious climate action (high \r\nconfidence). Delayed climate investments and financing - and limited \r\nalignment of investment activity with the Paris Agreement - will result \r\nin significant carbon lock-ins, stranded assets, and other additional \r\ncosts. This will particularly impact urban infrastructure and the energy \r\nand transport sectors (high confidence). A common understanding \r\nof debt sustainability and debt transparency, including negative \r\nimplications of deferred climate investments on future GDP, and how \r\nstranded assets and resources may be compensated, has not yet been \r\ndeveloped (medium confidence). {15.6}"


id: b6e6e79d920b96a692a56532afa62f6e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29383
content:
"There is a  mismatch between capital availability in the \r\ndeveloped world and the future emissions expected in \r\ndeveloping countries (high confidence). This emphasises the \r\nneed to recognise the explicit and positive social value of global \r\ncross-border mitigation financing. A significant push for international \r\nclimate finance access for vulnerable and poor countries is particularly \r\nimportant given these countries' high costs of financing, debt stress \r\nand the impacts of ongoing climate change (high confidence). {15.2, \r\n15.3.2.3, 15.5.2, 15.6.1, 15.6.7}"


id: 3e684188c4ff5a38775430d22317b98c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8161
content:
"Innovative financing approaches could help reduce the \r\nsystemic under-pricing of climate risk in markets and foster \r\ndemand for investment opportunities aligned with the Paris \r\nAgreement goals. Approaches include de-risking investments, \r\nrobust 'green' labelling and disclosure schemes, in addition \r\nto a  regulatory focus on transparency and reforming \r\ninternational monetary system financial sector regulations \r\n(medium confidence). Green bond markets and markets for \r\nsustainable finance products have grown significantly since AR5 \r\nand the landscape continues to evolve. Underpinning this evolution "


id: 20fd5958573c59a0244a8f6337df8a6a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3025
content:
"The greater the urgency of action to remain on a  1.5degC \r\npathway, the greater need for parallel investment decisions \r\nin upstream and downstream parts of the value chain (high \r\nconfidence). Greater urgency also reduces the lead times to build \r\ntrust in regulatory frameworks. Consequently, many investment \r\ndecisions will need to be made based on the long-term global \r\ngoals. This highlights the importance of trust in political leadership \r\nwhich, in turn, affects risk perception and ultimately financing costs \r\n(high confidence). {15.6.1, 15.6.2}"


id: 5bc83025484d524dca411916b0d9c481
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13408
content:
"Accelerated international cooperation on finance is a critical \r\nenabler of a  low-carbon and Just Transition (very high \r\nconfidence). Scaled-up public grants for adaptation and mitigation, \r\nand funding for low-income and vulnerable regions, especially in \r\nSub-Saharan Africa, may have the highest returns. Key options include: \r\nincreased public finance flows from developed to developing countries \r\nbeyond USD100 billion a year; shifting from a direct lending modality \r\ntowards public guarantees to reduce risks and greatly leverage private \r\nflows at lower cost; local capital markets development; and, changing \r\nthe enabling operational definitions. A coordinated effort to green \r\nthe post-pandemic recovery is also essential in countries facing much \r\nhigher debt costs (high confidence). {15.2, 15.6}"


id: 8a50dde72583eaa8884194b2dc1c784b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21508
content:
"A systemic view of innovation to direct and organise the \r\nprocesses has grown over the last decade. This systemic view \r\nof innovation takes into account the role of actors, institutions, \r\nand their interactions, and can inform how innovation systems \r\nthat vary across technologies, sectors and countries, can be \r\nstrengthened (high confidence) {16.2, 16.3, 16.5}. Where \r\na systemic view of innovation has been taken, it has enabled the \r\ndevelopment and implementation of indicators that are better able \r\nto provide insights in innovation processes. This, in turn, has enabled \r\nthe analysis and strengthening of innovation systems. Traditional \r\nquantitative innovation indicators mainly include R&D investments \r\nand patents. Figure TS.26 illustrates that energy-related research, \r\ndevelopment and demonstration (RD&D) has risen slowly in the last "


id: 49278b942c9e581929b4a5d0dca5be32
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10096
content:
"Innovation in climate mitigation technologies has seen \r\nenormous activity and significant progress in recent years. \r\nInnovation has also led to, and exacerbated, trade-offs in \r\nrelation to sustainable development. Innovation can leverage "


id: 4517566b4fcf05ace2a75600e89b7b57
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9381
content:
"Figure TS.27 | Technology innovation process and the (illustrative) roles of different public policy instruments (on the right-hand side). {Figure 16.1} Note \r\nthat demand-pull instruments in the regulatory instrument category, for instance, can also shape the early stages of the innovation process. Their position in the latter stages is \r\nhighlighted in this figure because typically these instruments have been introduced in latter stages of the development of the technology. {16.4.4}"


id: 1fd5c4f222c42049f8be16d7adc366a1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2806
content:
"trading schemes, taxes and renewable portfolio standards, vary \r\nfrom negligible to positive for climate change mitigation. Some \r\nspecific designs of environmental taxation can also result in negative \r\ndistributional outcomes {16.4.4}. Most of the available literature and \r\nevidence on innovation systems come from industrialised countries \r\nand larger developing countries. However, there is a growing body \r\nof evidence from developing countries and Small Island Developing \r\nStates (SIDS). {16.4, 16.5, 16.7}"


id: 44b3f5fdc9868c7826497d784ec2bd82
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9316
content:
"two decades, and that there has been a reorientation of the portfolio \r\nof funded energy technologies. Systemic indicators of innovation, \r\nhowever, go well beyond these approaches. They include structural \r\ninnovation system elements including actors and networks, as well \r\nas indicators for how innovation systems function, such as access \r\nto finance, employment in relevant sectors, and lobbying activities \r\n{16.3.4, Table  16.7}. For example, in Latin America, monitoring \r\nsystemic innovation indicators for the effectiveness of agroecological \r\nmitigation approaches has provided insights on the appropriateness \r\nand social alignment of new technologies and practices {Box 16.5}. \r\nClimate-energy-economy models, including integrated assessment \r\nmodels (IAMs), generally employ a  stylised and necessarily \r\nincomplete view of innovation, and have yet to incorporate a systemic \r\nrepresentation of innovation systems. {16.2.4, Box 16.1}"


id: fa0d1bce7b5554b6552340eb4c3fabe1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41356
content:
"control and benefit from existing technologies, and governance \r\nstructures that continue to reproduce unsustainable patterns of \r\nproduction and consumption (medium confidence). Studies also \r\nhighlight the potential of cultural factors to strongly influence the \r\npace and direction of technological change. Sustainable solutions \r\nrequire adoption and mainstreaming of locally novel technologies \r\nthat can meet local needs, and simultaneously address the SDGs. \r\nAcknowledging the systemic nature of technological innovation  - \r\nwhich involve many levels of actors, stages of innovation and \r\nscales - can lead to new opportunities to shift development pathways \r\ntowards sustainability. {16.4, 16.5, 16.6}"


id: 791cd0d3a16ad0a831e4b5bd3a8090b2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18496
content:
"Consistent with innovation system approaches, the sharing \r\nof knowledge and experiences between developed and \r\ndeveloping countries can contribute to addressing global \r\nclimate and the SDGs. The effectiveness of such international \r\ncooperation arrangements, however, depends on the way \r\nthey are developed and implemented (high confidence). The \r\neffectiveness and sustainable development benefits of technology \r\nsharing under market conditions appears to be determined \r\nprimarily by the complexity of technologies, local capabilities and \r\nthe policy regime. This suggests that the development of planning \r\nand innovation capabilities remains necessary, especially in Least\u0002Developed Countries (LDCs) and SIDS. International diffusion of \r\nlow-emission technologies is also facilitated by knowledge spillovers \r\nfrom regions engaged in clean R&D (medium confidence). {16.2} "


id: b12f23bbef81cdaf71ca7acad6cc67f8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28400
content:
"The evidence on the role of intellectual property rights (IPR) \r\nin innovation is mixed. Some literature suggests that it is \r\na  barrier while other sources suggests that it is an enabler \r\nto the diffusion of climate-related technologies (medium \r\nconfidence). There is agreement that countries with well-developed \r\ninstitutional capacity may benefit from a strengthened IPR regime, \r\nbut that countries with limited capabilities might face greater \r\nbarriers to innovation as a consequence. This enhances the continued \r\nneed for capacity-building. Ideas to improve the alignment of the \r\nglobal IPR regime and addressing climate change include specific \r\narrangements for LDCs, case-by-case decision-making and patent\u0002pooling institutions. {16.2.3, 16.5, Box 16.10} "


id: 94d79b96c625606db0d958b100968af2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23392
content:
"Countries are exposed to sustainable development challenges \r\nin parallel with the challenges that relate to climate change. \r\nAddressing both sets of challenges simultaneously presents \r\nmultiple and recurrent obstacles that systemic approaches \r\nto technological change could help resolve, provided they \r\nare well managed (high confidence). Obstacles include both \r\nentrenched power relations dominated by vested interests that "


id: 6636b4ef71176cd45ab4a08ef8be6c5c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15249
content:
"Digital technologies can promote large increases in energy efficiency through coordination and an economic shift to services, but they \r\ncan also greatly increase energy demand because of the energy used in digital devices (high confidence). {Cross-Chapter Box 11 in \r\nChapter 16, 16.2}"


id: f4ec200039f69bf22ecb176cf35ef86e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40453
content:
"Digital devices, including servers, increase pressure on the environment due to the demand for rare metals and end-of-life disposal. The \r\nabsence of adequate governance in many countries can lead to harsh working conditions and unregulated disposal of electronic waste. \r\nDigitalisation also affects firms' competitiveness, the demand for skills, and the distribution of, and access to resources. The existing \r\ndigital divide, especially in developing countries, and the lack of appropriate governance of the digital revolution can hamper the role \r\nthat digitalisation could play in supporting the achievement of stringent mitigation targets. At present, the understanding of both the \r\ndirect and indirect impacts of digitalisation on energy use, carbon emissions and potential mitigation is limited (medium confidence). "


id: 12b1059afab93a04b87227e8a7ad6404
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 490
content:
"Digital technologies have the potential to reduce energy demand in all end-use sectors through steep improvements in energy \r\nefficiency. This includes material input savings and increased coordination as they allow the use of fewer inputs to perform a given \r\ntask. Smart appliances and energy management, supported by choice architectures, economic incentives and social norms, effectively \r\nreduce energy demand and associated GHG emissions by 5-10% while maintaining equal service levels. Data centres can also play \r\na role in energy-system management, for example by waste-heat utilisation where district heat systems are close by; temporal and \r\nspatial scheduling of electricity demand can provide about 6% of the total potential demand response. {5.5, Cross-Chapter Box 11, \r\nTable 1 in Chapter 16}"


id: ce204f6f18bc640a3049e78c7ef399ea
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33596
content:
"Digital technologies, analytics and connectivity consume large amounts of energy, implying higher direct energy demand and related \r\ncarbon emissions. Global energy demand from digital appliances reached 7.14 EJ in 2018. The demand for computing services increased \r\nby 550% between 2010 and 2018 and is now estimated at 1% of global electricity consumption. Due to efficiency improvements, the \r\nassociated energy demand increased only modestly, by about 6% from 2000 to 2018. {Box 9.5}"


id: f63246803ecae8e0c53c7000c99dcaf5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40675
content:
"System-wide effects endanger energy and GHG-emission savings. Rising demand can diminish energy savings, and also produce \r\nrun-away effects associated with additional consumption and GHG emissions if left unregulated. Savings are varied in smart and \r\nshared mobility systems, as ride-hailing increases GHG emissions due to deadheading, whereas shared pooled mobility and shared \r\ncycling reduce GHG emissions, as occupancy levels and/or weight per person kilometre transported improve. Systemic effects have \r\nwider boundaries of analysis and are more difficult to quantify and investigate but are nonetheless very relevant. Systemic effects \r\ntend to have negative impacts, but policies and adequate infrastructures and choice architectures can help manage and contain these. \r\n{5.3, 5.4, 5.6}"


id: 60c8b6b9dded0691b7e1def68017986b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14327
content:
"33 The 17 SDGs are at the heart of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, adopted by all United Nations Member States in 2015."


id: b8e77e52a0db7d2da987962c1a6fb0cb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29737
content:
"policies and investments, for example, in the areas of healthy \r\nnutrition, sustainable consumption and production, and international \r\ncollaboration, can support climate change mitigation policies and \r\nresolve or alleviate trade-offs. Trade-offs can also be addressed by \r\ncomplementary policies and investments, as well as through the \r\ndesign of cross-sectoral policies integrating mitigation with the SDGs, \r\nand in particular: good health and well-being (SDG 3), zero hunger \r\nand nutrition (SDG 2), responsible consumption and production \r\n(SDG 12), reduced inequalities (SDG 10), and life on land (SDG 15).\r\n(Figures TS.29 and TS.30) {3.7}"


id: 88236b6e2a981ea6d779ea98f3320401
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21102
content:
"Accelerating climate mitigation in the context of sustainable \r\ndevelopment  involves not only expediting the pace of change but \r\nalso addressing the underlying drivers of vulnerability and emissions. \r\nAddressing these drivers can enable diverse communities, sectors, \r\nstakeholders, regions and cultures to participate in just, equitable and \r\ninclusive processes that improve the health and well-being of people \r\nand the planet. Looking at climate change from a justice perspective \r\nalso means placing the emphasis on: (i) the protection of vulnerable \r\npopulations from the impacts of climate change, (ii) mitigating \r\nthe  effects of low-carbon transformations, and (iii)  ensuring an \r\nequitable decarbonised world (high confidence). {17.1}"


id: 89a6120d68d6a6611b41e4033a07aa01
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21391
content:
"Decent living standards, which encompasses many SDG \r\ndimensions, are achievable at lower energy use than \r\npreviously thought (high confidence). Mitigation strategies \r\nthat focus on lowering demand for energy and land-based \r\nresources exhibit reduced trade-offs and negative consequences for \r\nsustainable development relative to pathways involving either high \r\nemissions and climate impacts or pathways with high consumption \r\nand emissions that are ultimately compensated by large quantities \r\nof BECCS. Figure  TS.30 illustrates how, in the case of pathways \r\nlimiting warming to 1.5degC (>67%), sustainable development policies \r\ncan lead to overall benefits compared to mitigation policies alone. \r\n(Figures TS.22 and TS.30) {3.7, 5.2}"


id: 260a0d893d0e59920bc742e321b6757
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3866
content:
"The timing of mitigation actions and their effectiveness \r\nwill have significant consequences for broader sustainable \r\ndevelopment outcomes in the longer term (high confidence).\r\nAmbitious mitigation can be considered a precondition for achieving \r\nthe SDGs. {3.7}"


id: 41017d25a42af515b0b47209d93275d1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8623
content:
"The beneficial and adverse impacts of deploying climate\u0002change mitigation and adaptation responses are highly \r\ncontext-specific and scale-dependent. There are synergies \r\nand trade-offs between adaptation and mitigation as well \r\nas synergies and trade-offs with sustainable development \r\n(high confidence). Strong links also exist between sustainable \r\ndevelopment, vulnerability and climate risks, as limited economic, \r\nsocial and institutional resources often result in low adaptive \r\ncapacities and high vulnerability, especially in developing countries. \r\nResource limitations in these countries can similarly weaken the \r\ncapacity for climate mitigation and adaptation. The move towards \r\nclimate-resilient societies requires transformational or deep systemic \r\nchange. This has important implications for countries' sustainable \r\ndevelopment pathways (medium evidence, high agreement).\r\n(Box TS.3, Figure TS.29) {4.5, Figure 4.9, 17.3.3}"


id: dabf9cb03464ca975a56c69ff4872a05
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35777
content:
"Many of the potential trade-offs between mitigation and \r\nother sustainable development outcomes depend on policy \r\ndesign and can be compensated or avoided with additional \r\npolicies and investments, or through policies that integrate \r\nmitigation with other SDGs (high confidence). Targeted SDG "


id: 2c1cd3b7109668e25fa2bd0d7404c3be
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5019
content:
"Figure TS.29 | Mitigation options have synergies with many Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), but there are trade-offs associated with some \r\noptions especially when implemented at scale."


id: d9912251fc73a1c2e46c6d05edb64f91
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35575
content:
"Figure TS.30 | Impacts on SDGs of mitigation limiting warming to 1.5degC (>50%) with narrow mitigation policies vs broader sustainable development \r\npolicies. Left: benefits of mitigation from avoided impacts. Middle: sustainability co-benefits and trade-offs of narrow mitigation policies (averaged over multiple models). \r\nRight: sustainability co-benefits and trade-offs of mitigation policies integrating Sustainable Development Goals. Scale: 0% means no change compared to 3degC (left) or current \r\npolicies (middle and right). Green values correspond to proportional improvements, red values to proportional worsening. Note: only the left panel considers climate impacts on \r\nsustainable development; the middle and right panels do not. 'Res' C&P' stands for Responsible Consumption and Production (SDG 12). {Figure 3.39}"


id: 3dc84787e963daca9e37ef1778d79519
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8035
content:
"The feasibility of deploying response options is shaped \r\nby barriers and enabling conditions across geophysical, \r\nenvironmental-ecological, technological, economic, socio\u0002cultural, and institutional dimensions (high confidence). \r\nAccelerating the deployment of response options depends \r\non  reducing or removing barriers across these dimensions, as well \r\non establishing and strengthening enabling conditions. Feasibility is \r\ncontext-dependent, and also depends on the scale and the speed of \r\nimplementation. For example: the institutional, legal and administrative \r\ncapacity to support deployment varies across countries; the feasibility \r\nof options that involve large-scale land-use changes is highly context\u0002dependent; spatial planning has a higher potential in early stages of \r\nurban development; the geophysical potential of geothermal is site\u0002"


id: f8dc2ecfd60f4104101296df311f4571
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41148
content:
"specific; and cultural and local conditions may either inhibit or enable \r\ndemand-side responses. Figure TS.31 summarises the assessment of \r\nbarriers and enablers for a broad range of sector-specific, and cross\u0002sectoral response options. (Box TS.15) {6.4, 7.4, 8.5, 9.10, 10.8, 12.3}"


id: 13a5e35f2d1d9dba8f2983eb5995db61
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 673
content:
"Alternative mitigation pathways are also associated with \r\ndifferent feasibility challenges (high confidence). These \r\nchallenges are multi-dimensional, context-dependent, malleable \r\nto policy and to technological and societal trends. They can also \r\nbe reduced by putting in place appropriate enabling conditions. \r\nFigure TS.32 highlights the dynamic and transient nature of feasibility \r\nrisks. These risks are transient and concentrated in the decades \r\nbefore mid-century. Figure TS.32 also illustrates how different "


id: ae82c7395057a5f43fd893309dca89ea
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27937
content:
"institutional capacity is a  key limiting factor for a  successful \r\ntransition. Emerging economies appear to have highest feasibility \r\nchallenges in the near to mid-term. This suggests a key role of policy \r\nand technology as enabling factors. (Figure TS.32) {3.8} "


id: 54e3e0460812175db77aef26827d5798
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12204
content:
"feasibility dimensions pose differentiated challenges: for example, \r\ninstitutional feasibility challenges are shown as unprecedented for \r\na high proportion of scenarios, in line with the qualitative literature, \r\nbut moving from 2030 to 2050 and 2100 these challenges decrease. "


id: 625830e04add703bd2158d1a3c615cee
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Pathways relying on a broad portfolio of mitigation strategies \r\nare more robust and resilient (high confidence). Portfolios of \r\ntechnological solutions reduce the feasibility risks associated with \r\nthe low-carbon transition. (Figures TS.31 and TS.32, Box TS.15) {3.8}"


id: 96f0f7e4764a18427614d3b8ae93802e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"The feasibility challenges associated with mitigation pathways \r\nare predominantly institutional and economic rather than \r\ntechnological and geophysical (medium confidence). The rapid \r\npace of technological development and deployment in mitigation \r\nscenarios is not incompatible with historical records, but rather, "


id: 96541b5b10362dcea680b83294ad1bd9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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content:
"The assessment of feasibility in this report aims to identify barriers and enablers to the deployment of mitigation options and \r\npathways. The assessment organises evidence to support policy decisions, and decisions on actions, that would improve the feasibility \r\nof mitigation options and pathways by removing relevant barriers and by strengthening enablers of change."


id: ab09a22b2085b1e924decf0325b82cf9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"The feasibility of mitigation response options\r\nMitigation response options are assessed against six dimensions of feasibility. Each dimension comprises a key set of indicators that \r\ncan be evaluated by combining various strands of literature. {Annex II.IV.11, Table 6.1}"


id: de67838dc5429a7cd53309cb8e54ea6c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36396
content:
"The assessment - undertaken by the sectoral chapters in this report - evaluates to what extent each indicator (listed in Box TS.15, \r\nTable.1) would be an enabler or barrier to implementation using a scoring methodology (described in detail in Annex II.IV.11). When \r\nappropriate, it is also indicated whether the feasibility of an option varies across context, scale, time and temperature goal. The resulting \r\nscores provide insight into the extent to which each feasibility dimension enables or inhibits the deployment of the relevant option. \r\nIt also provides insight into the nature of the effort needed to reduce or remove barriers, thereby improving the feasibility of individual \r\noptions. {Annex II.IV.11}"


id: ce48702931488748a15d3a00d04119f0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33627
content:
"Scenarios provide internally consistent projections of emission-reduction drivers and help contextualise the scale of deployment and \r\ninteractions of mitigation strategies. Recent research has proposed and operationalised frameworks for the feasibility assessment \r\nof mitigation scenarios. In this report the feasibility assessment of scenarios uses an approach that involves developing a set of \r\nmulti-dimensional metrics capturing the timing, disruptiveness and the scale of the transformative change within five dimensions: \r\ngeophysical, technological, economic, socio-cultural and institutional, as illustrated in Box TS.15, Figure 1."


id: 5007b7a5cbe05b94b8619c7c969a41a6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11373
content:
"More than 20 indicators were chosen to represent feasibility dimensions that could be related to scenario metrics. Thresholds of \r\nfeasibility risks of different intensity were obtained through empirical analysis of historical data and assessed literature. Details \r\nof indicators, thresholds, and how they were applied is reported in Annex II.IV.11. {3.8}"


id: 4fcb86a433979a0b92831cea366f2979
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11334
content:
"and capacity of developing countries to achieve sustainable and Just \r\nTransitions (medium evidence, high agreement) {17.1.1}. Reframing \r\ndevelopment objectives and shifting development pathways towards \r\nsustainability can help transform these patterns and practices, \r\nallowing space to transform unsustainable systems (medium \r\nevidence, high agreement). {1.6, Cross-Chapter Box 5 in Chapter 4, \r\n17.1, 17.3} "


id: 9e7f4cc239250830c08e982c9107f5a5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"The landscape of transitions to sustainable development is \r\nchanging rapidly, with multiple transitions already underway. \r\nThis creates the room to manage these transitions in ways \r\nthat prioritise the needs of workers in vulnerable sectors \r\n(e.g., land, energy) to secure their jobs and maintain secure \r\nand healthy lifestyles (medium evidence, high agreement).\r\n{17.3.2}"


id: 735feeb4e66cfece93b55f379a0f3fc9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17554
content:
"Actions aligning sustainable development, climate mitigation \r\nand partnerships can support transitions. Strengthening \r\ndifferent stakeholders' 'response capacities' to mitigate and \r\nadapt to a changing climate will be critical for a sustainable \r\ntransition (high confidence). {17.1}"


id: d7135bb5439783f58dc39b0c2d915671
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"While transition pathways will vary across countries it is \r\nanticipated that they will be challenging in many contexts \r\n(high  confidence). Climate change is the result of decades of \r\nunsustainable production and consumption patterns, as well as \r\ngovernance arrangements and political economic institutions that \r\nlock-in resource-intensive development patterns (high confidence). \r\nResource shortages, social divisions, inequitable distributions \r\nof wealth, poor infrastructure and limited access to advanced \r\ntechnologies and skilled human resources can constrain the options "


id: d1cb946215f0e9d3f2025f5197aae670
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34261
content:
"Accelerating the transition to sustainability will be enabled by \r\nexplicit consideration being given to the principles of justice, \r\nequality and fairness (high confidence). {5.2, 5.4, 5.6, 13.2, 13.6, \r\n13.8, 13.9,17.4}"


id: 5b9a7cca2a14dec228c4b261843faa3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13364
content:
"Grubb, M., C. Okereke, J. Arima, V. Bosetti, Y. Chen, J. Edmonds, S. Gupta, A. Koberle, S. Kverndokk, A. Malik, L. Sulistiawati, \r\n2022: Introduction and Framing. In IPCC, 2022: Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of \r\nWorking Group III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [P.R. Shukla, \r\nJ. Skea, R. Slade, A. Al Khourdajie, R. van Diemen, D. McCollum, M. Pathak, S. Some, P. Vyas, R. Fradera, M. Belkacemi, \r\nA. Hasija, G. Lisboa, S. Luz, J. Malley, (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA. \r\ndoi: 10.1017/9781009157926.003"


id: 12fe7545901bb74c4a0c6acb57899059
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 546
content:
"actors and levels of decision-making, and underpin Just Transition \r\nstrategies in diverse contexts. {1.2.2, 1.7, 1.8}"


id: e4f5190b64cebdbaa6f6003ccf89b9e1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37575
content:
"Strong differences remain in responsibilities for, and capabilities to, \r\ntake climate action within and between countries. These differences, \r\nas well as differences in the impact of climate change, point to the \r\nrole of collective action in achieving urgent and ambitious global \r\nclimate mitigation in the context of sustainable development, with \r\nattention to issues of equity and fairness as highlighted in several \r\nchapters of the report (Chapters 4, 5, 14, 15 and 17)."


id: 452ba3fdac526291099dc530acc7e58a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9397
content:
"This report (AR6 WGIII) aims to assess new literature on climate \r\nmitigation including implications for global sustainable development. \r\nIn this Sixth Assessment Cycle the IPCC has also published three \r\nSpecial Reports,1\r\n all of which emphasise the rising threat of climate \r\nchange and the implications for more ambitious mitigation efforts \r\nat all scales. At the same time, the Paris Agreement (PA) and the UN \r\n2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development with its 17 Sustainable \r\nDevelopment Goals (SDGs), both adopted in 2015, set out a globally \r\nagreed agenda within which climate mitigation efforts must be \r\nlocated. Along with a better understanding of the physical science \r\nbasis of climate change (AR6 WGI), and vulnerabilities, impacts, \r\nand adaptation (AR6 WGII), the landscape of climate mitigation has \r\nevolved substantially since the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5)."


id: 970d1d64cc8746e753a7187c33fa2825
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23767
content:
"Innovation and industrial development of key technologies in \r\nseveral relevant sectors have transformed prospects for mitigation \r\nat much lower cost than previously assessed (Chapters  2 and \r\n6-12). Large reductions in the cost of widely available renewable \r\nenergy technologies, along with energy efficient technologies and \r\nbehavioural changes (Chapters 5 and 9-11), can enable societies to \r\nprovide services with much lower emissions. However, there are still \r\nsignificant differences in the ability to access and utilise low-carbon \r\ntechnologies across the world (Chapters 4, 15 and 16). New actors, \r\nincluding cities, businesses, and numerous non-state transnational \r\nalliances have emerged as important players in the global effort to \r\ntackle climate change (Chapters 13-16)."


id: 6dc8a7734f6e5fa740e6862bf1ba5f68
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Since (IPCC 2014a), climate mitigation policies around the world \r\nhave grown in both number and shape (Chapter 13). However, while \r\nthe average rate of annual increase of CO2 emissions has declined \r\n(Section 1.3.2), GHG emissions globally continued to rise, underlining \r\nthe urgency of the mitigation challenge (Chapters  2 and 3). Over \r\n20  countries have cut absolute emissions alongside sustained \r\neconomic growth, but the scale of mitigation action across countries \r\nremains varied and is generally much slower than the pace required \r\nto meet the goals of the Paris Agreement (Sections 1.3.2 and 2.7.2). \r\nPer capita GHG emissions between countries even at similar stages \r\nof economic development (based on GDP per capita) vary by a factor \r\nof three (Figure 1.6) and by more than two on consumption basis \r\n(Section 2.3)."


id: f0397494f93fa6ebd483b2c8b1984bac
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Along with continued development of concepts, models and \r\ntechnologies, there have been numerous insights from both the \r\nsuccesses and failures of mitigation action that can inform future \r\npolicy design and climate action. However, to date, policies and \r\ninvestments are still clearly inadequate to put the world in line with \r\nthe PA's aims (Chapters 13 and 15)."


id: c8a570d189e0b81782d1ebf9b6eca584
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"The greater the inertia in emission trends and carbon-intensive \r\ninvestments, the more that CO2 will continue to accumulate (Hilaire \r\net al. 2019; IPCC 2019a). Overall, the literature points to the need for \r\na more dynamic consideration of intertwined challenges concerning \r\nthe transformation of key GHG-emitting systems: to minimise \r\nthe trade-offs, and maximise the synergies, of delivering deep \r\ndecarbonisation whilst enhancing sustainable development."


id: b1ae99e352129272ef71c406513b2b01
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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content:
"This chapter introduces readers to the AR6 WGIII Report and provides \r\nan overview of progress and challenges, in three parts. Part  A \r\n(1.1-1.5) introduces the climate mitigation challenge, provides key \r\nfindings and developments since previous assessment, and reviews \r\nthe main drivers for, and constraints against accelerated climate \r\naction. Part B (1.6-1.8) provides an assessment of the key frameworks \r\nfor understanding the climate mitigation challenge covering broad \r\napproaches such as sustainable development and more specific \r\neconomic, political and ethical framings. Part C  (1.9-1.12) briefly \r\nhighlights the role of governance for steering and coordinating efforts \r\nto accelerate globally effective and equitable climate mitigation, \r\nnotes the gaps in knowledge that have been identified in the process \r\nof assessment, and provides a road map to the rest of the report."


id: 65eea0d1fcdfc1c88168f2cafbb9d8eb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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content:
"but were typically three to four times higher than in pathways to \r\n2degC (high confidence), before taking account of benefits, including \r\nsignificant reduction in loss of life and livelihoods, and avoided \r\nclimate impacts (IPCC 2018b)."


id: 61456f7d360b2e193cdac86a0e56a1ff
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Successive WGIII IPCC assessments have emphasised the importance \r\nof climate mitigation along with the need to consider broader societal \r\ngoals especially sustainable development. Key insights from AR5 and \r\nthe subsequent three Special Reports (IPCC 2018b, 2019b, 2019c) are \r\nsummarised below."


id: af7d9027a16ef075679cc83cea2c772
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Previous Assessment Reports (ARs) have detailed the contribution \r\nof various sectors and activities to global GHG emissions. When \r\nindirect emissions (mainly from electricity, heat and other energy \r\nconversions) are included, the four main consumption (end-use) \r\ndrivers are industry, AFOLU, buildings and transport  (Figure  2.14), \r\nthough the magnitude of these emissions can vary widely between \r\ncountries. These - together with the energy and urban systems which \r\nfeed and shape end-use sectors - define the sectoral chapters in this \r\nAR6 WGIII report."


id: 4bd1fdb19c9ecb5bc70f68388a6c8fb1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Estimates of emissions associated with production and transport \r\nof internationally traded goods were first presented in AR5 WGIII, \r\nwhich estimated the 'embodied emission transfers' from upper\u0002middle-income countries to industrialised countries through trade at \r\nabout 10% of CO2 emissions in each of these groups (IPCC 2014a, \r\nFigure TS.5). The literature on this and discussion on their accounting \r\nhas grown substantially since then (Chapters 2 and 8)."


id: b73cc19527c5ad87fb690bcd0b459ef3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29449
content:
"The SR1.5 found that the Nationally Determined Contributions \r\n(NDCs) as declared under the Paris Agreement (PA) would not limit \r\nwarming to 1.5degC; despite significant updates to NDCs in 2020/21, \r\nthis remains the case, although delivery of these more ambitious \r\nNDCs would somewhat enhance the prospects for staying below 2degC \r\n(Section 1.3.3)."


id: 2cb3c535bded65efec31c73e89a5277c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5126
content:
"The atmosphere is a shared global resource and an integral part of \r\nthe 'global commons'. In the depletion/restoration of this resource, \r\nmyriad actors at various scales are involved, for instance, individuals, \r\ncommunities, firms and states. Inter alia, international cooperation to \r\ntackle ozone depletion and acid rain offer useful examples. The AR5 \r\nnoted that greater cooperation would ensue if policies are perceived \r\nas fair and equitable by all countries along the spectrum of economic \r\ndevelopment - implying a need for equitable sharing of the effort. \r\nA  key takeaway from AR5 is that climate policy involves value \r\njudgement and ethics. (IPCC 2014a Box TS.1: 'People and countries \r\nhave rights and owe duties towards each other. These are matters "


id: 649b848e13e8e8f56682df8476d15326
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14978
content:
"The AR5 WGIII and the Special Reports analysed economic costs \r\nassociated with climate action. The estimates vary widely depending \r\non the assumptions made as to how ordered the transition is, \r\ntemperature target, technology availability, and the metric or model \r\nused, among others (Chapter 6). Modelled direct mitigation costs of \r\npathways to 1.5degC, with no/limited overshoot, span a wide range, "


id: 82857c0eab0ea32ea3fc3222e5cb2257
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20091
content:
"In AR6 the IPCC employs a  common risk framing across all three \r\nworking groups and provides guidance for more consistent and \r\ntransparent usage (AR6 WGI Cross-Chapter Box 3 in Chapter 1; AR6 \r\nWGII Section  1.4.1; IPCC risk guidance). AR6 defines risk as 'the \r\npotential for adverse consequences for human or ecological systems, \r\nrecognising the diversity of values and objectives associated with \r\nsuch systems' (Annex I), encompassing risks from both potential \r\nimpacts of climate change and human responses to it (Reisinger et al. \r\n2020). The risk framing includes steps for identifying, evaluating, \r\nand prioritising current and future risks; for understanding the \r\ninteractions among different sources of risk; for distributing effort \r\nand equitable sharing of risks; for monitoring and adjusting actions \r\nover time while continuing to assess changing circumstances; and \r\nfor communications among analysts, decision-makers, and the public."


id: 1aef17d5336c768dfb1ffe7dc3720bca
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"of justice, equity, or fairness. They fall within the subject matter of \r\nmoral and political philosophy, jurisprudence, and economics.' p. 37). \r\nInternational cooperation and collective action on climate change \r\nalongside local, national, regional and global policies will be crucial \r\nto solve the problem, and this report notes cooperative approaches \r\nbeyond simple 'global commons' framings (Chapters 13 and 14)."


id: 52dc97624d902202c01aafd9673e5472
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11847
content:
"The AR5 (all Working Group reports) also underlined that climate \r\npolicy inherently involves risk and uncertainty (in nature, economy, \r\nsociety and individuals). To help evaluate responses, there exists \r\na  rich suite of analytical tools, for example, cost-benefit analysis, \r\ncost-effectiveness analysis, multi-criteria analysis, expected utility \r\ntheory, and catastrophe and risk models. All have pros and cons, and \r\nhave been further developed in subsequent literature and in AR6 \r\n(Sections 1.2.2 and 1.7)."


id: c859019a38b4d613a976bd9ac4ef328c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32553
content:
"Climate change risk assessments face challenges including a tendency \r\nto mischaracterise risks and pay insufficient attention to the potential \r\nfor surprises (Weitzman 2011; Aven and Renn 2015; Stoerk et al. \r\n2018). Concepts of resilience and vulnerability provide overlapping, \r\nalternative entry points to understanding and addressing the societal \r\nchallenges caused and exacerbated by climate change (AR6 WGII, \r\nSection 1.2.1)."


id: a14d0d67b22dad67ddb7145fae3cbf26
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25600
content:
"Recent assessments (IPCC 2014a, 2018b) began to consider the role \r\nof individual behavioural choices and cultural norms in driving energy \r\nand food patterns. Notably, SR1.5 (Section 4.4.3) outlined emerging \r\nevidence on the potential for changes in behaviour, lifestyle and \r\nculture to contribute to decarbonisation (and lower the cost); for the \r\nfirst time, AR6 devotes a whole chapter (Chapter 5) to consider these \r\nand other underlying drivers of energy demand, food choices and \r\nsocial aspects."


id: 9663667fa74ae6eca16f31f2280f11ab
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23660
content:
"The AR6 WGII devotes a full chapter (Chapter 17) to 'Decision-Making \r\nOptions for Managing Risk', detailing the analytic approaches \r\nand drawing upon the Cynefin classification of known, knowable, \r\ncomplex and chaotic systems (Section 17.3.1). With deep uncertainty, \r\nrisk management often aims to identify specific combinations of \r\nresponse actions and enabling institutions that increase the potential \r\nfor favourable outcomes despite irreducible uncertainties (AR6 WGII \r\nChapter  17 Cross-Chapter Box DEEP; also Marchau et al. (2019); \r\nDoukas and Nikas (2020))."


id: 5193cbf5b4fc1c5a76c9b1c0c0f2faa1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11633
content:
"Literature trying to quantify the cost of climate damages has continued \r\nto develop. Different methodologies systematically affect outcomes, \r\nwith recent estimates based on empirical approaches - econometric \r\nmeasurements based on actual impacts - 'categorically higher than \r\nestimates from other approaches' (AR6 WGII, Cross-Working Group \r\nBox ECONOMIC in Chapter  16, and Section  16.6.2). This, along \r\nwith other developments strengthen foundations for calculating \r\na 'social cost of carbon'. This informs a common metric for comparing \r\ndifferent risks and estimating benefits compared to the costs of GHG \r\nreductions and other risk-reducing options (Section 1.7.1); emissions \r\nmitigation itself also involves multiple uncertainties, which alongside \r\nrisks can also involve potential opportunities (Section 1.7.3)."


id: 50bc0dc7e5b8518504ac2752abd8c803
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11477
content:
"Simultaneously, the literature increasingly emphasises the \r\nimportance of multi-objective risk assessment and management \r\n(e.g., representative key risks in AR6 WGII Chapter 16), which may \r\nor may not correlate with any single estimate of economic value \r\n(AR6 WGII, Section  1.4.1; IPCC risk guidance). Given the deep \r\nuncertainties and risks, the goals established (notably in the Paris \r\nAgreement and SDGs) reflect negotiated outcomes informed by the \r\nscientific assessment of risks."


id: 289a06d70dfc187c75923fe91c11fb19
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4356
content:
"In defining the objective of international climate negotiations as \r\nbeing to 'prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference' (UNFCCC \r\n1992, Art. 2), the UNFCCC underlines the centrality of risk framing \r\nin considering the threats of climate change and potential response \r\nmeasures. Against the background of 'unequivocal' (AR4) evidence of \r\nhuman-induced climate change, and the growing experience of direct \r\nimpacts, the IPCC has sought to systematise a robust approach to risk \r\nand risk management."


id: dd611dca6c7993860cc313b4a6f189c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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"and climate-resilient development' (PA Art. 2.1C). In keeping with \r\nthe acknowledged context of global sustainable development and \r\npoverty eradication, and the corresponding aims of aligning finance \r\nand agreed differentiating principles as indicated above, '...the \r\ndeveloped country parties are to assist developing country parties \r\nwith financial resources' (PA Art. 9). The Green Climate Fund (GCF), \r\nan operating entity of the UNFCCC Financial Mechanism to finance \r\nmitigation and adaptation efforts in developing countries (GCF 2020), \r\nwas given an important role in serving the Agreement and supporting \r\nPA goals. The GCF gathered pledges worth USD10.3 billion, from \r\ndeveloped and developing countries, regions, and one city (Paris) \r\n(Antimiani et al. 2017; Bowman and Minas 2019). Financing has \r\nsince increased but remains short of the goal to mobilise USD100 \r\nbillion by 2020 (Chapter 15)."


id: 2e019d4e6918441c4f1297ac3774065e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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"Since AR5, there have been notable multilateral efforts which help \r\ndetermine the context for current and future climate action. This \r\nsection summarises key features of this evolving context."


id: 78905e37dde4a5b39af6df035cf15fb2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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content:
"In 2015 the world concluded four major agreements that are very \r\nrelevant to climate action. These include: the Paris Agreement under \r\nthe 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change \r\n(UNFCCC), the UN agreements on Disaster Risk Reduction (Sendai) \r\nand Finance for Development (Addis Ababa), and the Sustainable \r\nDevelopment Goals (SDGs)."


id: 159e843f00cc7004010f875c2af9b756
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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content:
"Initiatives contributing to the Paris Agreement goals include the \r\nNon-State Actor Zone for Climate Action (NAZCA: now renamed as \r\nGlobal Climate Action) portal, launched at COP20 (December 2014) \r\nin Lima, Peru, to support city-based actions for mitigating climate \r\nchange (IISD 2015) and Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate \r\nAction which is a  UNFCCC-backed series of events intended to \r\nfacilitate collaboration between governments and the cities, regions, \r\nbusinesses and investors that must act on climate change."


id: 7123012aab9feb5b5f36d5528d03e036
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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content:
"The Paris Agreement (PA). The Paris Agreement aims to 'hold the \r\nincrease in the global average temperature to well below 2degC above \r\npre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature \r\nincrease to 1.5degC above pre-industrial levels' (UNFCCC 2015), \r\nalongside goals for adaptation (IPCC AR6 WGII), and 'aligning \r\nfinancial flows' (see 'finance goal', below) , so as 'to strengthen the \r\nglobal response to the threat of climate change, in the context of \r\nsustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty.'"


id: e6413399f5284d88fd4355926fc29938
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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"Details of the Paris Agreement, evaluation of the Kyoto Protocol, and \r\nother key multilateral developments since AR5 that are relevant to \r\nclimate mitigation including the CORSIA aviation agreement adopted \r\nunder ICAO, the IMO shipping strategy, and the Kigali Amendment to \r\nthe Montreal Protocol on hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), are discussed \r\nin Chapter 14."


id: 4de1c4dc67a90ad7c3bca9e781ae9120
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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"The Paris Agreement is predicated on encouraging progressively \r\nambitious climate action from all countries on the basis of Nationally \r\nDetermined Contributions (Clemencon 2016; Rajamani 2016). The \r\nNDC approach requires countries to set their own level of ambitions \r\nfor climate change mitigation but within a collaborative and legally \r\nbinding process to foster ambition towards the agreed goals (Bodansky \r\n2016; Falkner 2016a). The PA entered into force in November 2016 \r\nand as of February 2021 it already had 190 Parties (out of 197 Parties \r\nto the UNFCCC)."


id: f9ddf2728fee556cbf8e74dfc49dc749
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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content:
"The PA also underlines 'the principle of common but differentiated \r\nresponsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different \r\nnational circumstances' (PA Art. 2, para. 2), and correspondingly \r\nthat 'developed country Parties should continue taking the lead by \r\nundertaking economy-wide absolute emission reductions'. It states \r\nthat developing country Parties should continue enhancing their \r\nmitigation efforts, and are encouraged to move over time towards \r\neconomy-wide emission reduction or limitation targets in the light of \r\ndifferent national circumstances."


id: 77dbf175a9889083fcda838d1c2455d
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content:
"In order to achieve the its long term temperature goal, the Paris \r\nAgreement aims 'to achieve a  balance between anthropogenic \r\nemissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in \r\nthe second half of this century' (PA Art. 4 para. 1). The PA provides for \r\nfive-yearly stocktakes in which Parties have to take collective stock \r\non progress towards achieving its purposes and its long-term goal \r\nin the light of equity and available best science (PA Art. 14). The first \r\nglobal stocktake is scheduled for 2023 (PA Art. 14, para. 3)."


id: 50eb653bb10a365d5bbb115e661e57ea
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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"Finance. The Paris Agreement's finance goal (above) reflects \r\na  broadened focus, beyond the costs of climate adaptation and \r\nmitigation, to recognising that a  structural shift towards low\u0002carbon climate-resilient development pathways requires large-scale \r\ninvestments that engage the wider financial system (Sections 15.1 \r\nand 15.2.4). The SR1.5 report estimated that 1.5degC pathways would \r\nrequire increased investment of 0.5-1% of global GDP between now \r\nand 2050, which is up to 2.5% of global savings/investment over \r\nthe period. For low- and middle-income countries, SDG-compatible "


id: 8a3f71625a942ac72c9cc2c0a8f6362c
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content:
"infrastructure investments in the most relevant sectors are estimated \r\nto be around 4-5% of their GDP, and 'infrastructure investment \r\npaths compatible with full decarbonisation in the second half of \r\nthe century need not cost more than more-polluting alternatives' \r\n(Rozenberg and Fay 2019)."


id: 34b606c6e19bf7565e9757a868d85181
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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content:
"The parallel 2015 UN Addis Ababa Conference on Finance for \r\nDevelopment, and its resulting Action Agenda, aims to 'address \r\nthe challenge of financing ...  to end poverty and hunger, and to \r\nachieve sustainable development in its three dimensions through \r\npromoting inclusive economic growth, protecting the environment, \r\nand promoting social inclusion.' The Conference recognises the \r\nsignificant potential of regional cooperation and provides a forum for \r\ndiscussing the solutions to common challenges faced by developing \r\ncountries (Section 15.6.4)."


id: c41909defbc6589f5542aafb2912f8b4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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content:
"Due to its much shorter lifetime, methane has a  disproportionate \r\nimpact on near-term temperature, and is estimated to account for \r\nalmost a third of the warming observed to date (AR6 WGI SPM; AR6 \r\nWGIII Chapter 2, Figure 2.4). Methane reductions could be particularly \r\nimportant in relation to near- and medium-term temperatures, \r\nincluding through counteracting the impact of reducing short-lived \r\naerosol pollutants which have an average cooling effect.2"


id: b874c6ffcc115040e6fe69a3af1d6930
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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content:
"The land-use component of CO2 emissions has different drivers and \r\nparticularly large uncertainties (Figures 2.2 and 2.5), hence is shown \r\nseparately. Also, compared to AR5, new evidence showed that the \r\nAFOLU CO2 estimates by the global models assessed in this report \r\nare not necessarily comparable with national GHG inventories, \r\ndue to different approaches to estimate the 'anthropogenic' \r\nCO2 sink. Possible ways to reconcile these discrepancies are \r\ndiscussed in Chapter 7."


id: 7674d46cf8b1f010fc5fc878b1940f21
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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content:
"Talanoa Dialogue and Just Transition. As mandated at Paris \r\nCOP21 and launched at COP23, the 'Talanoa Dialogue' (UNFCCC \r\n2018a) emphasised holistic approaches across multiple economic \r\nsectors for climate change mitigation. At COP24 also, the Just \r\nTransition Silesia Declaration, focusing on the need to consider \r\nsocial aspects in designing policies for climate change mitigation \r\nwas signed by 56 heads of state (UNFCCC 2018b). This underlined \r\nthe importance of aiming for Just Transitions in reducing emissions, \r\nat the same time preserving livelihoods and managing economic \r\nrisks for countries and communities that rely heavily on emissions\u0002intensive technologies for domestic growth (Markkanen and Anger\u0002Kraavi 2019), and for maintaining ecosystem integrity through \r\nnature-based solutions."


id: 48cf0aa44e4dcd4f15a0e03041a7d7af
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content:
"Regional trends have varied. Emissions from most countries continued \r\nto grow, but in absolute terms, 32 countries reduced energy and \r\nindustry CO2 emissions for at least a decade, and 24 reduced overall \r\nGHG (CO2-eq) emissions over the same period, but only half of them \r\nby more than 10% over the period in each case (Chapter 2).3\r\n In total, "


id: 571e8d8cc006ce6084339de416e42ed6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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"Figure 1.1 | Global emission trends since 2000 by groups of gases: absolute, per capita, and intensity. Note: shows CO2 from fossil fuel combustion and industrial \r\nprocesses (FFI); CO2 from agriculture, forestry and other land use (AFOLU); methane (CH4); nitrous oxide (N2O); fluorinated gases (F-gases). Gases reported in GtCO2-eq \r\nconverted based on AR6 global warming potentials with a 100-year time horizon (GWP100)."


id: 3d0d0ccba239db56590ce37f3be26bab
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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"Figure  1.2 shows the distribution of regional emissions (a) per \r\ncapita and (b) per GDP based on purchasing power parity (GDPppp) \r\nof different country groupings in 2019. Plotted against population \r\nand GDP respectively, the area of each block is proportional to the "


id: d97dc29233c91c6a8f601405121eb1b0
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"region's emissions. Compared to the equivalent presentations in \r\n2004 (AR4 WGIII Figure SPM.3) and 2010 (AR5 WGIII Figure  1.8), \r\nEast Asia now forms substantially the biggest group, whilst at about \r\n8 tCO2-FFI (/10 tCO2-eq all GHGs) per person, its emissions per capita \r\nremain about half that of North America. In contrast, a third of the \r\nworld's population, in Southern Asia and Africa, emit on average \r\nunder 2  (2.5 tCO2-eq) per person, little more than in the previous \r\nassessments. Particularly for these regions, there continue to be \r\nsubstantial differences in GDP, life expectancy and other measures of \r\nwell-being (Figure 1.6)."


id: f2bc00085980efa7a873d31522fc40ce
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"An important recent development has been commitments by many \r\ncountries, now covering a large majority of global emissions, to reach \r\nnet zero CO2 or greenhouse gas emissions (Chapter 3).4\r\n Furthermore, \r\nglobally, net zero targets (whether CO2 or GHG) have been adopted \r\nby about 823 cities and 101 regions (Chapter 8)."


id: 681413278f833ee53207e3bac264972b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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"The COVID-19 pandemic profoundly impacted economy and human \r\nsociety, globally and within countries. As detailed in Cross-Chapter \r\nBox  1  in this chapter, some of its impacts will be long-lasting, \r\npermanent even, and there are also lessons relevant to climate change. \r\nThe direct impact on emissions projected for rest of this decade are \r\nmodest, but the necessity for economic recovery packages creates \r\na central role for government-led investment, and may change the \r\neconomic fundamentals involved for some years to come."


id: e8d7cc531a29dccf8026ecc86075a350
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"Emissions per unit GDP are much less diverse than per capita and \r\nhave also converged significantly. Poorer countries tend to show \r\nhigher energy/emissions per unit GDP partly because of higher \r\nreliance on basic industries, and this remains the case, though in \r\ngeneral their energy/GDP has declined faster."


id: 5cde8362b5bbe06e1ad6444ade53e611
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"Many developed country regions are net importers of energy\u0002intensive goods, and emissions are affected by the accounting of such \r\n'embodied emissions'. Panels (c) and (d) show results (only available \r\nfor CO2-FFI, to 2018) on the basis of consumption footprints which \r\ninclude emissions embodied in traded goods. This makes modest \r\nchanges to the relative position of different regions (for further \r\ndiscussion see Section 2.3)."


id: cff808ad41f6a27486cb96f51e543d6d
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"While extreme poverty has fallen in more than half of the world's \r\neconomies in recent years, nearly one fifth of countries faced poverty \r\nrates above 30% in 2015 (below USD1.90 a  day), reflecting large \r\nincome inequality (Laborde Debucquet and Martin 2017; Rozenberg \r\nand Fay 2019). Diffenbaugh and Burke (2019) find that global \r\nwarming already has increased global economic inequality, even \r\nif between-country inequalities have decreased over recent decades. \r\nThe distributional implications between regional groups in the Shared \r\nSocio-economic Pathways (SSPs) diverge according to the scenario \r\n(Frame et al. 2019)."


id: c6d1adc1391d33b3513219d9bcdcd96b
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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content:
"The COVID-19 pandemic triggered the deepest global economic contraction as well as CO2 emission reductions since the Second \r\nWorld War (Le Quere et al. 2020b), (AR6 WGI, Box  6.1) (Section  2.2.2.1). While emissions and most economies are expected to \r\nrebound in 2021-2022 (IEA 2021), some impacts of the pandemic (e.g., aspects of economy, finance and transport-related emission \r\ndrivers) may last far longer. COVID-19 pushed more than 100 million people back into extreme poverty, and reversed progress towards \r\nsome other SDGs including health, life expectancy and child literacy (UN DESA 2021). Health impacts and the consequences of deep \r\neconomy-wide shocks may last many years even without significant future recurrence (Section 15.6.3). These changes, as well as the \r\npandemic response actions, bring both important risks as well as opportunities for accelerating mitigation (Chapters 1, 5, 10 and 15)."


id: 17b3b4beb32dc1b1d9c6c841a965c6bf
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"Impacts on profitability and investment. COVID-19-induced demand reduction in electricity disproportionally affected coal power \r\nplants, whilst transport reduction most affected oil (IEA 2020a). This accelerated pre-existing decline in the relative profitability of \r\nmost fossil fuel industries (Ameli et al. 2021). Renewables were the only energy sector to increase output (IEA 2020a). Within the \r\ncontext of a wider overall reduction in energy investment this prompted a substantial relative shift towards low-carbon investment \r\nparticularly by the private sector (IEA 2020b; Rosembloom and Markard 2020) (Sections 15.2.1, 15.3.1 and 15.6.1)."


id: 2aa40eb73a8bd416f0c480d35020daaa
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"Post-pandemic recovery pathways provide an opportunity to attract finance into accelerated and transformative low\u0002carbon public investment (Sections 15.2 and 15.6.3). In most countries, COVID-19 has increased unemployment and/or state\u0002supported employment. There is a profound difference between short-term 'bail outs' to stem unemployment, and the orientation of \r\nnew public investment. The public debt is mirrored by large pools of private capital. During deep crises like that of COVID-19, economic \r\nmultipliers of stimulus packages can be high (Hepburn et al., 2020), so much so that fiscal injections can then generate multipliers \r\nfrom 1.5 to 2.5, weakening the alleged crowding-out effect of public stimulus  (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 2012; Blanchard and \r\nLeigh 2013) (Section 15.2.3)."


id: 8476e94370b8e9052cc52391628f531b
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"A study with a global general equilibrium model (Liu et al. 2021) finds that because the COVID-19 economic aftermath combines \r\nnegative impacts on employment and consumption, a shift from employment and consumption taxes to carbon- or other resource\u0002related taxes would enhance GDP by 1.7% in 2021 relative to 'no policy', in addition to reducing CO2 and other pollutants. A post\u0002Keynesian model of wider 'green recovery' policies (Pollitt et al. 2021) finds a short-run benefit of around 3.5% GDP (compared to \r\n'no policy'), and even about 1% above a recovery boosted by cuts in consumption taxes, the latter benefit sustained through 2030 - \r\noutperforming an equivalent conventional stimulus package while reducing global CO2 emissions by 12%."


id: c1b0d47b4316d0192622fc58d5f858d3
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"Orientation of recovery packages. The large public spending on supporting or stimulating economies, exceeding USD12 trillion \r\nby October 2020, dwarfs clean-energy investment needs and hence could either help to solve the combined crises, or result in high\u0002carbon lock-in (Andrijevic et al. 2020). The short-term 'bail outs' to date do not foster climate-resilient long-term investments and have \r\nnot been much linked to climate action, (Sections 15.2.3 and 15.6.3): in the G20 counties, 40% of energy-related support spending \r\nwent to the fossil fuel industry compared to 37% on low-carbon energy (EPT 2020). Recovery packages are also at risk of being \r\n'colourless' (Hepburn et al., 2020), though some countries and regions have prioritised green stimulus expenditures for example as \r\npart of a 'Green New Deal' (Rochedo et al. 2021) (Sections 13.9.6 and 15.6.3)."


id: 5631ad8375698978f0452eec2b7a0b45
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"Integrating analyses. The response to COVID-19 also reflects the relevance of combining multiple analytic frameworks spanning \r\neconomic efficiency, ethics and equity, transformation dynamics, and psychological and political analyses (Section 1.7). As with climate \r\nimpacts, not only has the global burden of disease been distributed unevenly, but capabilities to prevent and treat disease were \r\nasymmetrical and those in greatest vulnerability often had the least access to human, physical, and financial resources (Ruger and \r\nHorton 2020). 'Green' versus 'brown' recovery has corresponding distributional consequences between these and 'green' producers, \r\nsuggesting need for differentiated policies with international coordination (Le Billon et al. 2021). This illustrates the role of Just \r\nTransition approaches to global responses including the value of integrated, multi-level governance (Sections 1.7, 4.5 and 17.1)."


id: b9b0637afbfc6b6663c218912df8dcb9
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"COVID- 19 can thus be taken as a reminder of the urgency of addressing climate change, a warning of the risk of future stranded assets \r\n(Rempel and Gupta 2021) (Chapter 17), but also an opportunity for a cleaner recovery."


id: f48d822b13efbc74d68275d9ceb7beec
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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"more difficult to tackle global challenges including protecting the \r\nenvironment (Schreurs 2016; Parker et al. 2017; WEF 2019)."


id: a7c607af9befede9334b7de3c3fbef60
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26732
content:
"In addition to developments in climate science, emissions, the \r\ninternational agreements in 2015, and the recent impact of \r\nCOVID-19, a few other key developments have strong implications \r\nfor climate mitigation."


id: bbf864329987cbd1bcd48e6003b928ae
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30306
content:
"Transnational alliances. Partly countering this trend, cities, \r\nbusinesses and a  wide range of other non-state actors also have \r\nemerged with important international networks to foster mitigation. \r\nCity-based examples include the Cities Alliance in addressing climate \r\nchange, Carbon Neutral Cities Alliance and the Covenant of Mayors \r\n(Chapter 8); there are numerous other alliances and networks such as \r\nthose in finance (Chapter 15) and technology (Chapter 16), amongst \r\nmany others (Chapters 13 and 14)."


id: dabed48f1ae799d713d32868da68161
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35775
content:
"Cheaper renewable energy technologies. Most striking, the cost \r\nof solar photovoltaic (PV) has fallen by a  factor of 5  to 10 in the \r\ndecade since the IPCC Special Report on Renewable Energy (IPCC \r\n2011a) and other data inputting to the AR5 assessments. The SR1.5 \r\nreported major cost reductions, the IEA (2020) World Energy Outlook \r\ndescribed PV as now 'the cheapest electricity in history' for projects \r\nthat 'tap low cost finance and high quality resources.' Costs and \r\ndeployment both vary widely between different countries (Chapters 6, \r\n9 and 12) but costs are still projected to continue falling (Vartiainen \r\net al. 2020). Rapid technological developments have occurred in \r\nmany other low-carbon technologies including batteries and electric \r\nvehicles (Section 1.4.3), IT and related control systems, with progress \r\nalso where electrification is not possible (Chapters 2, 6 and 11)."


id: 1a5f916a78ad122f96c9daf85cecb5bd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Finally, under the Paris Agreement process, during 2020/21, many \r\ncountries strengthened their Nationally Determined Contributions \r\n(NDCs). Including updates until October 2021, these would imply \r\nglobal GHG emissions declining by 2030 to between 1-4% below \r\n2019 levels (unconditional NDCs), or 4-10% (for NDCs conditional \r\non international support) (Table  4.3). This is a  significant change \r\nbut would still not be compatible with 1.5degC pathways, and even if \r\ndelivered in full, to limit warming to 2degC (>67%), emissions would \r\nhave to fall very rapidly after 2030 (Section 3.2.5)."


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vector_id: 2610
content:
"Thus, developments since AR5 highlight the complexity of the \r\nmitigation challenge. There is no far-sighted, globally optimising \r\ndecision-maker and indeed climate policymaking at all levels is \r\nsubject to conflicting pressures in multiple ways. The next section \r\noverviews the drivers and constraints."


id: 34f8a057afd683ac4887950c23be124b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6563
content:
"This section provides a brief assessment of key factors and dynamics \r\nthat drive, shape and/or limit climate mitigation in (i) economic \r\nfactors: which include sectors and services, trade and leakage, \r\nfinance and investment, and technological innovation; (ii) socio\u0002political issues: which include political economy, social innovation, \r\nand equity and fairness; and (iii) institutional factors, which \r\ncomprise policy, legal frameworks and international cooperation."


id: f63a09877d854dc253fec4784c219498
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40681
content:
"Climate policies also encounter resistance. However, there \r\nare multiple sources of resistance to climate action in practice. \r\nCorporations and trade associations often lobby against measures \r\nthey deem detrimental (Section 1.4.6). The emblematic 'yellow vest' \r\nmovement in France was triggered by higher fuel costs as a result of \r\na CO2 tax hike (Lianos 2019; Driscoll 2021), though it had broader \r\naspect of income inequality and other social issues. There is often \r\na  mismatch between concerns on climate change and people's \r\nwillingness to pay for mitigation. For example, whilst most Americans \r\nbelieve climate change is happening, 68% said in a  survey they \r\nwould oppose climate policies that added just USD10 per month \r\nto electricity bills (EPIC et al. 2019), and worry about energy costs \r\ncan eclipse those about climate change elsewhere (Poortinga et al. \r\n2018) (Chapter 13)."


id: dfacd0081ba96d1162c9e4eb462711ea
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36598
content:
"Global trends contrary to multilateral cooperation. State\u0002centred politics and geopolitical/geo-economic tensions seem to \r\nhave become more prominent across many countries and issues (WEF \r\n2019). In some cases, multilateral cooperation could be threatened \r\nby trends such as rising populism, nationalism, authoritarianism \r\nand growing protectionism (Abrahamsen et al. 2019), making it "


id: 3d207a5ea47b6ccf913e8b909fd01798
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7938
content:
"5 AFOLU accounted for about 13% of CO2, 44% of CH4 and 82% of N2O global anthropogenic GHG emissions in 2007-2016."


id: fad5c08635888acb6285a6b8f65f3a10
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41510
content:
"matter in different measures with each exacting more or less force \r\ndepending on the prevailing social, economic, cultural and political \r\ncontext. Often achieving accelerated mitigation would require effort \r\nto bring several of the factors in alignment in and across multiple \r\nlevels of political or governance scales."


id: cc0a283539fee3479d1f76ba957031bf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33222
content:
"Human activities drive emissions primarily through the demand \r\nfor a wide range of services such as food, shelter, heating/cooling, \r\ngoods, travel, communication, and entertainment. This demand \r\nis fulfilled by various activities often grouped into sectors such as \r\nagriculture, industry and commerce. The literature uses a wide range \r\nof sectoral definitions to organise data and analysis (Chapter  2). \r\nEnergy sectors are typically organised into primary energy producers, \r\nenergy transformation processes (such as power generation and fuel \r\nrefining), and major energy users such as buildings, industry and \r\ntransport (Chapters 2 and 5). Other research (Chapter 8) organises \r\ndata around interacting urban and rural human activities. Land\u0002based activities can be organised into agriculture, forestry and \r\nother land-use (AFOLU), or land use, land-use change and forestry \r\n(LULUCF) (Chapter 7). Each set of sectoral definitions and analysis \r\noffers its own insights."


id: 326cace9e192a85cbd5e3ebe56dcc0c4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6127
content:
"Human needs and wants evolve over time making the transition \r\ntoward climate and sustainable development goals either more \r\nor less difficult. For example, changes in the composition of goods \r\nconsumed, such as shifting diets toward a more vegetarian balance, \r\ncan reduce land-use emissions without compromising the quality of \r\nlife (Stehfest et al. 2009; Gough 2017; van Vuuren et al. 2018; van den \r\nBerg et al. 2019; Hargreaves et al. 2021; SRCCL SPM B2.3)."


id: e8461e0dfa6e13aab0aba3a9dc1410c3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38199
content:
"Sectoral perspectives help to identify and understand the drivers of \r\nemissions, opportunities for emissions mitigation, and interactions \r\nwith resources, other goals and other sectors, including the \r\nco-evolution of systems across scales (Kyle et al. 2016; Moss et al. \r\n2016; Mori et al. 2017; IPBES 2019). Interactions between sectors \r\nand agents pursuing multiple goals is a  major theme pervading \r\nthis assessment."


id: 5488e8095b998a0f4d9a4acf1a63115b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12149
content:
"Human behaviour and choices, including joint achievement of wider \r\nsocial goals, will play an important part in enabling or hindering \r\nclimate mitigation and sustainable development (Shi et al. 2016), \r\nfor example, shifting passenger transportation preferences in ways \r\nthat combine climate, health and sustainable development goals \r\n(Romanello et al. 2021)."


id: 9c7676b99864330eeb3a7485d647155
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24780
content:
"The 'nexus' between energy, water, and land - all key contributors \r\nto human well-being - also helps to provide, regulate and support \r\necosystem and cultural services (Bazilian et al. 2011; Ringler et al. \r\n2013; Smajgl et al. 2016; Albrecht et al. 2018; Brouwer et al. 2018; \r\nD'Odorico et al. 2018; Van Vuuren et al. 2019), with important \r\nimplications for cities in managing new systems of transformation \r\n(Thornbush et al. 2013; Wolfram et al. 2016) (Chapter  8).  Other \r\nimportant nexuses shaping our planet's future (Fajardy et al. 2018) \r\ninclude agriculture, forestry, land use and ecosystem services \r\n(Chazdon 2008; Settele et al. 2016; Torralba et al. 2016; Nesshover \r\net al. 2017; Keesstra et al. 2018)."


id: b296cfc8e5db87466878ad501c5df435
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28660
content:
"Emissions associated with international trade account for 20-33 % of \r\nglobal emissions, as calculated using multi-regional input-output \r\nanalysis (Wiedmann and Lenzen 2018). Whether international trade \r\ndrives an increase or decrease in global GHG emissions depends on \r\nthe emissions intensity of traded products as well as the influence \r\nof trade on relocation of production, with studies reaching diverse \r\nconclusions about the net effect of trade openness on CO2 emissions \r\n(Section  2.4.5). Tariff reduction of low-carbon technologies could \r\nfacilitate effective mitigation (de Melo and Vijil 2014; Ertugrul et al. \r\n2016; Islam et al. 2016; WTO 2016)."


id: 1ad3675399fbb3bc8e38173fb232a56c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1919
content:
"Historically, energy-related GHG emissions were considered \r\na  by-product of the increasing scale of human activity, driven by \r\npopulation size, economic activity and technology. That simple notion \r\nhas evolved greatly over time to become much more complex and \r\ndiverse, with increasing focus on the provision of energy services \r\n(Cullen and Allwood 2010; Bardi et al. 2019; Brockway et al. 2019; \r\nGarrett et al. 2020). The demand for agricultural products has \r\nhistorically driven conversion of natural lands (land-use change). \r\nAFOLU along with food processing accounts for 21-37% of total net \r\nanthropogenic GHG emissions (SRCCL SPM A3).5"


id: fc7bf8a9e667425f98796bef79aa283e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41787
content:
"The magnitude of carbon leakage (see Glossary) caused by unilateral \r\nmitigation in a fragmented climate policy world depends on trade \r\nand substitution patterns of fossil fuels and the design of policies \r\n(IPCC 2014a, Box 5.4), but its potential significance in trade-exposed \r\nenergy-intensive sectors (Bauer et al. 2013; Carbone and Rivers 2017; \r\nNaegele and Zaklan 2019) can make it an important constraint on \r\npolicy. See Section 13.6.6.1 in Chapter 13 for channels and evidence. \r\nAkimoto et al. (2018) argue that differences in marginal abatement "


id: 997d0ac2d8f751b36916d2cd198aae82
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24231
content:
"costs of NDCs could cause carbon leakage in energy-intensive, trade\u0002exposed sectors, and could weaken effective global mitigation."


id: 7b5bdb569b91042e1a1d1a7204653f5f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18902
content:
"The rapid developments in technology over the past decade enhance \r\npotential for transformative changes, in particular to help deliver \r\nclimate goals simultaneously with other SDGs."


id: f3d867759dc83af28785c8d6bc1db9fa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40279
content:
"Policy responses to cope with carbon leakage include border carbon \r\nadjustment (BCAs) and differentiated carbon taxes (Liu et al. \r\n2020). Some BCA options focusing on levelling the cost of carbon \r\npaid by consumers on products could be designed in line with the \r\nWTO (Ismer et al. 2016), while others may not be (Mehling et al. \r\n2019). All proposals could involve difficulty of tracing and verifying \r\nthe carbon content of inputs (Onder 2012; Denis-Ryan et al. 2016). \r\nAn international consensus and certification practice on the carbon \r\ncontent would help to overcome WTO compatibility (Holzer 2014). \r\nSee Chapter 13 and Mehling et al. (2019) on the context of trade \r\nlaw and the PA."


id: 2d0b0d92848853fb58eb240775c5f3c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5200
content:
"The fall in renewable energy costs alongside rapid growth in capacity \r\n(Figure  1.3; see also Figures  6.8 and 6.11 in Chapter  6) has been \r\naccompanied by varied progress in many other technology areas \r\nsuch as electric vehicles, fuel cells for both stationary and mobile \r\napplications (Dodds 2019), thermal energy (Chapter 6), and battery \r\nand other storage technologies (Freeman et al. 2017) (Chapters 6, \r\n9 and 12; Figure TS.7). Nuclear contributions may be enhanced by \r\nnew generations of reactors (e.g., Generation III) and small modular \r\nreactors (Knapp and Pevec 2018) (Chapter 6)."


id: c86d20ab76735a931f6f77604cdc1346
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32571
content:
"Large-scale hydrogen developments could provide a complementary \r\nenergy channel with long-term storage. Like electricity, hydrogen \r\n(H2) is an energy vector with multiple potential applications, \r\nincluding in industrial processes such as steel and non-metallic \r\nmaterials production (Chapter  11), for long-range transportation \r\n(Chapter 10), and low-temperature heating in buildings (Chapter 9). \r\nEmissions depend on how it is produced, and deploying H2 delivery \r\ninfrastructure economically is a challenge when the future scale of \r\nhydrogen demand is so uncertain (Chapter 6). H2 from natural gas \r\nwith CO2 capture and storage (CCS) may help to kick-start the H2\r\neconomy (Sunny et al. 2020)."


id: f62c8e72c0c221795c9072f711adfc5f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40670
content:
"CO2-based fuels and feedstocks such as synthetic methane, methanol, \r\ndiesel, jet fuel and other hydrocarbons, potentially from carbon \r\ncapture and utilisation (CCU), represent drop-in solutions with limited \r\nnew infrastructure needs (Artz et al. 2018; Bobeck et al. 2019; Yugo \r\nand Soler 2019) (Chapter 10). Deployment and development of CCS \r\ntechnologies (with large-scale storage of captured CO2) have been \r\nmuch slower than projected in previous assessments (IEA 2019b; \r\nPage et al. 2019) (Chapter 11)."


id: 561a0317d24c9474a53fb5f70f968be4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12421
content:
"Increasing international trade has resulted in a general shifting of \r\nfossil fuel-driven emissions-intensive production from developed \r\nto developing countries (Arto and Dietzenbacher 2014; Malik and \r\nLan 2016), and between developing countries (Zhang et al. 2019). \r\nHigh-income developed countries thus tend to be net importers of \r\nemissions, whereas low/middle-income developing countries net \r\nexporters (Peters et al. 2011) (Figure 1.2c, d). This trend is shifting, \r\nwith a  growth in trade between non-OECD countries (Meng et al. \r\n2018; Zhang et al. 2019), and a  decline in emissions intensity of \r\ntraded goods (Wood et al. 2020b)."


id: c2d8ffa94d78246a1248b74bd8aaa398
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31556
content:
"Potential constraints on new energy technologies may include their \r\nmaterial requirements, notably rare earth materials for electronics \r\nor lithium for batteries (Wanger 2011; Flexer et al. 2018), stressing \r\nthe importance of recycling (IPCC 2011b; Rosendahl and Rubiano \r\n2019). Innovation is enabling greater recycling and reuse of energy\u0002intensive materials (Shemi et al. 2018), and introducing radically new \r\nand more environmentally friendly materials, however, still not all \r\nmaterials can be recycled (Allwood 2014)."


id: eec9814324cad2ea217131b5c0279a88
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39387
content:
"The Paris Agreement primarily deals with national commitments \r\nrelating to domestic emissions and removals, hence emissions \r\nfrom international aviation and shipping are not covered. Aviation \r\nand shipping accounted for approximately 2.7% of greenhouse \r\ngas emissions in 2019 (before COVID-19); see Section  10.5.2 for \r\ndiscussion. In addition to CO2 emissions, aircraft-produced contrail \r\ncirrus clouds, and emissions of black carbon and short-lived aerosols \r\n(e.g., sulphates) from shipping are especially harmful for the Arctic \r\n(Section 10.8 and Box 10.6)."


id: 51d3093bbe48bda436c70847ef685e8e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11682
content:
"By sequestering carbon in biomass and soils, soil carbon \r\nmanagement, and other terrestrial strategies could offset hard-to\u0002reduce emissions in other sectors. However, large-scale bioenergy \r\ndeployment could increase risks of desertification, land degradation, \r\nand food insecurity (IPCC 2019a), and higher water withdrawals \r\n(Hasegawa et al. 2018; Fuhrman et al. 2020), though this may be \r\nat least partially offset by innovation in agriculture, diet shifts and \r\nplant-based proteins contributing to meeting demand for food, feed, \r\nfibre and bioenergy (or bioenergy with carbon capture and storage \r\n(BECCS) with CCS) (Havlik et al. 2014; Popp et al. 2017; Koberle et al. \r\n2020) (Chapters 5 and 7)."


id: 8ba698e83af9a842396afd8f4ba24912
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21743
content:
"intensive and will raise demand for energy (Avgerinou et al. 2017) - \r\ncryptocurrencies may be a major global source of CO2 if the electricity \r\nproduction is not decarbonised (Mora et al. 2018)  - and there is \r\nalso a  concern that Information technologies can compound and \r\nexacerbate current inequalities (Chapters  5, 16 and Cross-Chapter \r\nBox 11 in Chapter 16). IT may affect broader patterns of work and \r\nleisure (Boppart and Krusell 2020), and the emissions intensity of \r\nhow people spend their leisure time will become more important \r\n(Chapters  5 and 9). Because higher efficiency tends to reduces \r\ncosts, it often involves some 'rebound' offsetting at least some of \r\nthe emission savings (Sudbury and Hutchinson 2016; Belkhir and \r\nElmeligi 2018; Cohen and Cavoli 2019)."


id: 2c798830d7a860963a122be164b181b1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5090
content:
"Technology can enable both emissions reductions and/or increased \r\nemissions (Chapter 16). Governments play an important role in most \r\nmajor innovations, in both 'technology-push' (Mazzucato 2013) and \r\ninduced by 'demand-pull' (Grubb et al. 2021a), so policy is important \r\nin determining its pace, direction and utilisation (Roberts and Geels \r\n2019a) (Sections 1.7.1 and 1.7.3). Overall, the challenge will be to \r\nenhance the synergies and minimise the trade-offs and rebounds, \r\nincluding taking account of ethical and distributional dimensions \r\n(Gonella et al. 2019)."


id: 7668181ee751c7b2664a2af5e4e6f45b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18056
content:
"Large improvements in information storage, processing, and \r\ncommunication technologies, including artificial intelligence, will \r\naffect emissions. They can enhance energy-efficient control, reduce \r\ntransaction costs for energy production and distribution, improve \r\ndemand-side management (DSM) (Raza and Khosravi 2015), \r\nand reduce the need for physical transport (Smidfelt Rosqvist and \r\nWinslott Hiselius 2016) (Chapters  5, 6  and 9-11). However, data \r\ncentres and related IT systems (including blockchain), are electricity\u0002"


id: 431a29ad7b085df4671f050e9c8ba8e6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9011
content:
"Finance is both an enabler and a constraint on mitigation, and since \r\nAR5, attention to the financial sector's role in mitigation has grown. \r\nThis is partly in the context of the Paris Agreement finance articles and \r\nthe Green Climate Fund, the pledge to mobilise USD100 billion yr-1\r\nby 2020, and the Addis Abbaba Action Agenda (Section  1.3.1). "


id: 76277c64cf52ff88e0940978652e24e6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18017
content:
"only climate-related investment but investment in general (Yamahaki \r\net al. 2020) including in needed infrastructure development (Gray and \r\nIrwin 2003). A Green Climate Fund (GCF) report notes the paradox \r\nthat USD14 trillion of negative-yielding debt in OECD countries might \r\nbe expected to flow to much larger low-carbon, climate-resilient \r\ninvestment opportunities in developing countries, but 'this is not \r\nhappening' (Hourcade et al. 2021b)."


id: 9f3c107cc06bd89d4e257075599ca41f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25238
content:
"However, there is a  persistent but uncertain gap in mitigation \r\nfinance (Cui and Huang 2018) (Table 15.15.1), even though tracked \r\nclimate finance overwhelmingly goes toward mitigation compared \r\nto adaptation (UNEP 2020) (Section 15.3; Working Group II). Green \r\nbond issuance has increased recently in parallel with efforts to reform \r\nthe international financial system by supporting development of local \r\ncapital markets (Section 15.6.4)."


id: 851f93bcdf90885e05d208805b44fb51
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20563
content:
"The economic centrality of fossil fuels raises obvious questions \r\nregarding the possibility of decarbonisation. Economically, this \r\nis well understood as a problem of decoupling. But the constraint is \r\nalso political, in terms of the power of incumbent fossil fuel interests \r\nto block initiatives towards decarbonisation (Jones and Levy 2009; \r\nNewell and Paterson 2010; Geels 2014). The effects of climate policy \r\nare key considerations in deciding the level of policy ambition and \r\ndirection and strategies of states (Lo 2010; Alam et al. 2013; Ibikunle \r\nand Okereke 2014), regions (Goldthau and Sitter 2015), and business \r\nactors (Wittneben et al. 2012), and there is a  widespread cultural \r\nassumption that continued fossil fuel use is central to this (Strambo \r\nand Espinosa 2020). Decarbonisation strategies are often centred "


id: 83f38a2b9372c340c4d93968c6bf9728
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20367
content:
"around projects to develop new sources of economic activity: carbon \r\nmarkets creating new commodities (Newell and Paterson 2010); \r\ninvestment generated in new urban infrastructure (Whitehead 2013); \r\nand/or innovations in a range of new energy technologies (Fankhauser \r\net al. 2013; Lachapelle et al. 2017; Meckling and Nahm 2018)."


id: 9189d8c0e86e862267f3528a4f51eecc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22826
content:
"are considered unfair may be hard to implement (Klinsky et al. 2017; \r\nLiu et al. 2017). Lessons from experimental economics show that \r\npeople may not accept a distribution that is considered unfair, even if \r\nthere is a cost of not accepting (Gampfer 2014). As equity issues are \r\nimportant for reaching deep decarbonisation, the transition towards \r\nsustainable development (Evans and Phelan 2016; Heffron and \r\nMcCauley 2018; Okereke 2018) depends on taking equity seriously \r\nin climate policies and international negotiations (Okereke and \r\nCoventry 2016; Klinsky et al. 2017; Martinez et al. 2019)."


id: 23cbfc1ee7f9b1d34c93a746ef778191
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3490
content:
"The interaction of politics, power and economics is central in explaining \r\nwhy countries with higher per-capita emissions, which logically have \r\nmore opportunities to reduce emissions, in practice often take the \r\nopposite stance, and conversely, why some low-emitting countries \r\nmay find it easier to pursue climate action because they have fewer \r\nvested interests in high-carbon economies. These dynamics can \r\narise from the vested interest of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) \r\n(Wittneben et al. 2012; Polman 2015; Wright and Nyberg 2017), the \r\nalignment and coalitions of countries in climate negotiations (Gupta \r\n2016; Okereke and Coventry 2016), and the patterns of opposition \r\nto or support for climate policy among citizens (Baker 2015; Swilling \r\net al. 2016; Heffron and McCauley 2018; Ransan-Cooper et al. 2018; \r\nTurhan et al. 2019)."


id: b14a1439036d299ffa9c85efb09bc18e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28421
content:
"Taking equity into account in designing an international climate \r\nagreement is complicated as there is no single universally accepted \r\nequity criterion, and countries may strategically choose a  criterion \r\nthat favours them (Lange et al. 2007, 2010). Still, several studies \r\nanalyse the consequences of different social preferences in designing \r\nclimate agreements, such as, for instance, inequality aversion, \r\nsovereignty and altruism (Anthoff et al. 2010; Kverndokk et al. 2014)."


id: 30a566a2c58210be845a08e9a559dd4b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"International transfers from rich to poor countries to support \r\nmitigation and adaptation activities may help with equalising \r\nburdens, as agreed upon in the UNFCCC (1992) (Chapters  14 and \r\n15), such that they may be motivated by strategic as well as equity \r\nreasons (Kverndokk 2018) (Section 1.4.4)."


id: 9c14fdc11be53b50d075000e6da10488
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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content:
"Social and psychological factors affect both perceptions and \r\nbehaviour (Weber 2015; Whitmarsh et al. 2021). Religion, values, \r\nculture, gender, identity, social status and habits strongly influence \r\nindividual behaviours and choices, and therefore sustainable \r\nconsumption (Sections  1.6.3.1 and 5.2). Identities can provide \r\npowerful attachments to consumption activities and objects that \r\ninhibit shifts away from them (Brekke et al. 2003; Benabou and \r\nTirole 2011; Stoll-Kleemann and Schmidt 2017; Ruby et al. 2020). \r\nConsumption is a  habit-driven and social practice rather than \r\nsimply a  set of individual decisions, making shifts in consumption "


id: 457f2121c6d418f19026c7faedde67d1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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content:
"harder to pursue (Evans et al. 2012; Shove and Spurling 2013; Kurz \r\net al. 2015; Warde 2017; Verplanken and Whitmarsh 2021). Finally, \r\nshifts towards low-carbon behaviour are also inhibited by social\u0002psychological and political dynamics that cause individuals to ignore \r\nthe connections from daily consumption practices to climate change \r\nimpacts (Norgaard 2011; Brulle and Norgaard 2019)."


id: 86bc72e1e431dc1b2df44b40712db07d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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content:
"Many hundreds of policies have been introduced explicitly to mitigate \r\nGHG emissions, improve energy efficiency or land use, or to foster \r\nlow-carbon industries and innovation, with demonstrable impact. \r\nThe role of policy to date has been most evident in energy efficiency \r\n(Sections 5.4 and 5.6) and electricity (Chapter 6). The IPCC Special \r\nReport on Renewable Energy already found that: 'Government policies \r\nplay a crucial role in accelerating the deployment of RE technologies' \r\n(IPCC 2011a, p. 24). Policy packages since then have  driven rapid \r\nexpansion in renewables capacity and cost reductions (e.g., through \r\nthe German Energiewende), and emission reductions from electricity \r\n(most dramatically with the halving of CO2 emissions from the UK \r\npower sector, driven by multiple policy instruments and regulatory \r\nchanges), as detailed in Chapter 6 (Section 6.7.5)."


id: 151c1874e979234a85229ad0c9e09333
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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content:
"As a notable example, plant-based alternatives to meat could reduce \r\nemissions from diets (Eshel et al. 2019; Willett et al. 2019). However, \r\ndiets are deeply entrenched in cultures and identities, and hard to \r\nchange (Fresco 2015; Mylan 2018). Changing diets also raises cross\u0002cultural ethical issues, in addition to meat's role in providing nutrition \r\n(Plumwood 2004). Henceforth, some behaviours that are harder to \r\nchange will only be transformed by the transition itself: triggered by \r\npolicies, the transition will bring about technologies that, in turn, will \r\nentrench new sustainable behaviours."


id: 3f4ba3557ef2799ad5c01f3908d1bc3d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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content:
"Behaviour can be influenced through a number of mechanisms besides \r\neconomic policy and regulation, such as information campaigns, \r\nadvertising and 'nudging'. Innovations and infrastructure also impact \r\nbehaviour, as with bicycle lanes to reduce road traffic. Wider social \r\ninnovations also have indirect impacts. Education is increasing \r\nacross the world, and higher education will have impacts on fertility, \r\nconsumption and the attitude towards the environment (Osili and \r\nLong 2008; Hamilton 2011; McCrary and Royer 2011). Reducing \r\npoverty and improvements in health and reproductive choice will also \r\nhave implications for fertility, energy use and consumption globally. \r\nFinally, social capital and the ability to work collectively may have \r\nlarge consequences for mitigation and the ability to adapt to climate \r\nchange (Adger 2009; IPCC 2014a Section 4.3.5)."


id: aa4d4099c3ad88ea68f6650a3e7ef183
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"Chapter 13 charts the international evolution of policies and many \r\nof the lessons drawn. Attributing the overall impact on emissions \r\nis complex, but an emerging literature of several hundred papers \r\nindicates impacts on multiple drivers of emissions. Collectively, \r\npolicies are likely to have curtailed global emissions growth by \r\nseveral GtCO2-eq annually already by the mid-2010s (Cross-Chapter \r\nBox 10 in Chapter 14). This suggests initial evidence that policy has \r\ndriven some decoupling (Figure 1.1d) and started to 'bend the curve' \r\nof global emissions, but more specific attribution to observed trends \r\nis not as yet possible.6"


id: ea2d6358dae1265cf760bedc60002f4a
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"However, some policies (e.g.,  subsidies to fossil fuel production or \r\nconsumption) increase emissions, whilst others (e.g.,  investment \r\nprotection) may constrain efforts at mitigation. Also, wider economic \r\nand developmental policies have important direct and indirect \r\nimpacts on emissions. Policy is thus both a driver and a constraint \r\non mitigation."


id: 44b635a1d00b198646f50812ece8b289
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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content:
"Transformation to different systems will hinge on conscious policy to \r\nchange the direction in which energy, land use, agriculture and other \r\nkey sectors develop (Bataille et al. 2016) (Chapters 13 and 16). Policy \r\nplays a  central role in in land-related systems (Chapter  7), urban \r\ndevelopment (Chapter  8), improving energy efficiency in buildings \r\n(Chapter 9) and transport/mobility (Chapter 10), and decarbonising \r\nindustrial systems (Chapter 11)."


id: a8cc9031da0c9af29b67d85e3b937ba8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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content:
"Synergies and trade-offs arise partly because of the nexus of GHG \r\nemissions with other adverse impacts (e.g., local air pollution) and \r\ncritical resources (e.g., water and food) (Conway et al. 2015; Andrews\u0002Speed and Dalin 2017), which also imply interacting policy domains."


id: 209300176d33446c53eb8207f5d6593c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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content:
"The literature shows increasing emphasis on policy packages, \r\nincluding those spanning the different levels of niche/behaviour; \r\nexisting regimes governing markets and public actors; and strategic \r\nand landscape levels (Section 1.7.3). Chapters 13, 16 and 17 appraise \r\npolicies for transformation in the context of sustainable development, \r\nindicating the importance of policy as a  driver at multiple levels \r\nand across many actors, with potential for benefits as well as costs \r\nat many levels."


id: bea89e3af05aae9c3b67321016c445fb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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content:
"Policy has been and will be central not only because GHG emissions \r\nare almost universally under-priced in market economies (Stern and \r\nStiglitz 2017; World Bank 2019), and because of inadequate economic \r\nincentives to innovation (Jaffe et al. 2005), but also due to various \r\ndelay mechanisms (Karlsson and Gilek 2020) and multiple sources \r\nof path-dependence and lock-in to existing systems (Section 1.8.2), \r\nincluding: 'Infrastructure developments and long-lived products \r\nthat lock societies into GHG-intensive emissions pathways may be \r\ndifficult or very costly to change, reinforcing the importance of early "


id: 6d81dd8dc61d0089277ccaeab0b1da13
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vector_id: 16531
content:
"of finance (Chapters 13 and 15), and for encouraging private-sector \r\ninnovation at scale (Chapter 16), for example, if it offers greater stability \r\nand mid-term predictability for carbon prices; Nash and Steurer (2019) \r\nfind that seven national climate change acts in European countries all \r\nact as 'living policy processes, though to varying extents'."


id: 468a757702104eddc64ef890a272449f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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content:
"second-order effects if commitments are more precise and binding \r\n(Kahler 2017). However, without targets, incentives, defined baselines \r\nor monitoring, reporting, and verification, they are not likely to fill the \r\n'mitigation gap' (Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2017)."


id: 8ba1dcb641928853ffa4b92b3a379105
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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content:
"The importance of policy at multiple levels does not lessen the \r\nimportance of international policy, for reasons including long-term \r\nstability, equity, and scope, but examples of effective implementation \r\npolicy at international levels remain fewer and governance weaker \r\n(Chapter 14)."


id: 8a34ea1e11dc6acd1eb6a9add482fb09
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Institutions are rules and norms held in common by social actors \r\nthat guide, constrain and shape human interaction  (IPCC 2018b). \r\nInstitutions can be formal, such as laws and policies, or informal, \r\nsuch as norms and conventions.  Institutions can both facilitate or \r\nconstrain climate policymaking and implementation in multiple \r\nways. Institutions set the economic incentives for action or inaction \r\non climate change at national, regional and individual levels (Dorsch \r\nand Flachsland 2017; Sullivan 2017)."


id: f921e221f0e782af7a4467af00c657b6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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"Institutions entrench specific political decision-making processes, \r\noften empowering some interests over others, including powerful \r\ninterest groups who have vested interests in maintaining the current \r\nhigh-carbon economic structures (Okereke and Russel 2010; Wilhite \r\n2016; Engau et al. 2017); see also Section  1.4.6 and Chapter  13 \r\non the sub-national and national governance challenges including \r\ncoordination, mediating politics and strategy setting."


id: 645c16beb97fe748b9ad54e75a6d5a7
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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content:
"Some suggest that societal transformation towards a low-carbon future \r\nrequires new politics that involves thinking in intergenerational time \r\nhorizons, as well as new forms of partnerships between private and \r\npublic actors (Westman and Broto 2018), and associated institutions \r\nand social innovations to increase involvement of non-state actors in \r\nclimate governance (Fuhr et al. 2018). However literature is divided \r\nas to how much democratisation of climate politics, with greater \r\nemphasis on equity and community participation, would advance \r\nsocietal transformation in the face of climate change (Stehr 2005), \r\nor may actually hinder radical climate action in some circumstances \r\n(Povitkina 2018)."


id: b1fddde6c083bd9b3573c63cbe2114b5
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Since 2016, the number of climate litigation cases has increased \r\nrapidly. The UN Environment Programme's Global Climate Litigation \r\nReport: 2020 Status Review (UNEP 2020) noted that between \r\nMarch 2017 and 1 July 2020, the number of cases nearly doubled with \r\nat least 1550 climate cases filed in eight countries. Several important \r\ncases such as Urgenda Foundation vs The State of the Netherlands \r\n('Urgenda') and Juliana et al. vs United States ('Juliana') have had \r\nripple effects, inspiring other similar cases (Lin and Kysar 2020)."


id: a609aa2ecb272f798252e727c66c458b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"A common criticism of international institutions is their limited \r\n(if any) powers to enforce compliance (Zahar 2017). As a global legal \r\ninstitution, the PA has little enforcement mechanism (Sindico 2015), \r\nbut enforcement is not a  necessary condition for an instrument \r\nto be legally binding (Bodansky 2016; Rajamani 2016). In reality \r\nimplementation of specific commitments tends to be high once \r\ncountries have ratified and a  treaty or an agreement is in force \r\n(Bodansky 2016; Rajamani 2016). Often, the problem is not so much \r\nof 'power to enforce compliance or sanction non-compliance', but \r\nthe level of ambition (Chapter 14)."


id: bba9ba967789e99e07f9000b201afe61
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30241
content:
"Numerous international climate governance initiatives engage \r\nnational and sub-national governments, NGOs and private \r\ncorporations, constituting a 'regime complex' (Raustiala and Victor \r\n2004; Keohane and Victor 2011). They may have longer-run and "


id: 3660df7168a4d9a0547ad46f8e91bb42
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"private-sector governance initiatives, NGO transnational initiatives, \r\nand sub-national transnational initiatives (Bulkeley and Schroeder \r\n2012; Hsu et al. 2018). Literature is mostly positive about the role \r\nof these transnational initiatives in facilitating climate action across \r\nscales although criticism and caution about their accountability and \r\neffectiveness remain (Chan et al. 2016; Michaelowa and Michaelowa \r\n2017; Roger et al. 2017; Widerberg and Pattberg 2017) (Chapter 14)."


id: f8831529769a8f5a0438ccd766d03b7e
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content:
"However, whilst in most respects a driver, international cooperation \r\nhas also been characterised as 'organised hypocrisy' where \r\nproclamations are not matched with corresponding action (Egnell \r\n2010). Various reasons for inadequate progress after 30 years of \r\nclimate negotiations, have been identified (Stoddard et al. 2021). \r\nInternational cooperation can also seem to be a barrier to ambitious \r\naction when negotiation is trapped in 'relative-gains' calculus, in \r\nwhich countries seek to game the regime or gain leverage over \r\none another (Purdon 2017), or where states lower ambition to the \r\n'least common dominator' to accommodate participation of the least \r\nambitious states (Falkner 2016). Geden (2016) and Dubash (2020) \r\noffer more nuanced assessments."


id: 71bf7ffc0a38ed2e729f73493653e429
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content:
"Scenarios are a powerful tool for exploring an uncertain future world \r\nagainst the background of alternative choices and development. \r\nScenarios can be constructed using both narrative and quantitative \r\nmethods. When these two methods are combined they provide \r\ncomplementary information and insights. Quantitative and narrative \r\nmodels are frequently used to represent scenarios to explore choices \r\nand challenges. The IPCC has a long history of assessing scenarios \r\n(Nakicenovic et al. 2000; van Vuuren et al. 2011, 2014) (see also AR6 \r\nWGI Section 1.6 for a history of scenarios within the IPCC). This WGIII \r\nassessment employs a  wide range of qualitative and quantitative \r\nscenarios including quantitative scenarios developed through a wide \r\nand heterogeneous set of tools ranging from spreadsheets to complex \r\ncomputational models (Annex III: Scenarios and Modelling Methods \r\nprovides further discussion and examples of computational models)."


id: 2db29c08b04012bbd75899c0a796d403
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:09
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content:
"The concept of an illustrative pathway (IP) was introduced in \r\nthe IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5oC (IPCC 2018b) \r\nto highlight a  subset of the quantitative scenarios, drawn from \r\na larger pool of published literature, with specific characteristics that \r\nwould help represent some of the key findings emerging from the \r\nassessment in terms of different strategies, ambitions and options \r\navailable to achieve the Paris goals."


id: f50bf4586355f4b3cac6d7582ba47f2c
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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content:
"The negotiation of the Paris Agreement was thus done in the context \r\nof serious questions about how best to structure international \r\nclimate cooperation to achieve better results. This new agreement \r\nis designed to sidestep the fractious bargaining which characterised \r\ninternational climate cooperation (Marcu 2017). It contains a  mix \r\nof hard, soft and non-obligations, the boundaries between which \r\nare blurred, but each of which plays a  distinct and valuable role \r\n(Rajamani 2016). The provisions of the PA could encourage flexible \r\nresponses to changing conditions, but limit assurances of ambitious \r\nnational commitments and their fulfilment (Pickering et al. 2018). The \r\nextent to which this new arrangement will drive ambitious climate \r\npolicy in the long run remains to be seen (Chapter 14)."


id: 1f3646e33748d6b2c699cf3c4a9430e1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2701
content:
"Integrated assessment models (IAMs) are the primary tools for \r\nquantitatively evaluating the technological and macroeconomic \r\nimplications of decarbonisation, particularly for global long-term \r\npathways. They broadly divide into 'stylised aggregate benefit-cost \r\nmodels', and more complex 'detailed process' IAMs (Weyant 2017), \r\noften mirroring the benefit-cost and cost-effective approaches \r\noutlined in Section  1.7.1, with more detailed classification in, for \r\nexample, Nikas et al. (2019). IAMs embody a number of structural \r\nand socio-demographic assumptions and include multiple modelling \r\napproaches, ranging from economic optimising behaviour to \r\nsimulation (see Annex III). Detailed process models can include \r\nenergy system models used to analyse decarbonisation and 'net zero' \r\nscenarios by international agencies (e.g., IEA 2020a)."


id: f2ec4af7d175b451968066394125df22
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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content:
"Whilst the PA abandoned common accounting systems and time \r\nframes, outside of the UNFCCC many other platforms and metrics for \r\ncomparing mitigation efforts have emerged (Aldy 2015). Countries \r\nmay assess others' efforts in determining their actions through multiple \r\nplatforms including the Climate Change Cooperation Index (C3-I), \r\nClimate Change Performance Index (CCPI), Climate Laws, Institutions \r\nand Measures Index (CLIMI) (Bernauer and Bohmelt 2013) and \r\nEnergy Transition Index (Singh et al. 2019). International cooperative \r\ninitiatives between and among non-state (e.g.,  business, investors \r\nand civil society) and sub-national (e.g., city and state) actors have \r\nalso been emerging, taking the forms of public-private partnerships, "


id: 92e5926c41b90e15d3d1d76f440473c
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content:
"Calculating cost-effective trajectories towards given goals typically \r\ninvolves detailed process IAMs. Often these calculate the dynamic \r\nportfolio of technologies consistent with a  given climate target. \r\nSome track records of technology forecasting in IAMs are outlined \r\nin Section  2.5.4, and Box  16.1. Climate targets may be imposed \r\nin models in a variety of ways that include, but are not limited to, \r\nconstraints on emissions or cumulated emissions (carbon budgets), \r\nand the pricing of emissions. The time-path of mitigation costs "


id: 28f668a489a2a69365e5646cf44f32e4
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content:
"calculated through these models may be translated into 'shadow \r\nprices' that (like the social cost of carbon; SCC) offer a benchmark \r\nto assess the cost-effectiveness of investments, as used by some \r\ngovernments and companies (Section 1.8.2)."


id: ce4288fb7d7a75e945b0d3d3a6f7eb25
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vector_id: 33620
content:
"with remaining emissions of some non-CO2 GHGs compensated by \r\n'net negative' CO2 (see Glossary and FAQ 1.3, and Cross-Chapter \r\nBox 3 in Chapter 3)."


id: 30cf7387a79e34bf8a5eb50572aee4dc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5846
content:
"Scenarios in the IPCC and AR6. For AR6, WGIII received submissions \r\nof more than 2500 model-based scenarios published in the scientific \r\nliterature. Such scenarios, which explore different possible evolutions \r\nof future energy and land use (with or without climate policy) and \r\nassociated emissions, are made available through an interactive \r\nAR6 scenario database. The main characteristics of pathways in \r\nrelation to 'net zero' emissions and remaining 'carbon budgets' \r\nare summarised in Box 3.5 in Chapter 3. The warming contribution \r\nof CO2 is very closely related to cumulative CO2 emissions, but the \r\nremaining 'carbon budget' for a  given warming depends strongly \r\ninter alia on emissions of other GHGs; for targets below 2degC this \r\nmay affect the corresponding 'carbon budget' by about +-220 GtCO2, \r\ncompared to central estimates of around 500 GtCO2 (for 1.5degC) and \r\n1350 GtCO2 (for 2degC) (AR6 WGI, Table SPM.2) (Cross-Working Group \r\nBox 1 in Chapter 3)."


id: 73cc1ec75bdf1a99e996a480ca255bf5
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17626
content:
"The IMPs are organised around two dimensions: the level of \r\nambition consistent with meeting Paris goals, and the scenario \r\nfeatures (Figure 1.4). The IMPs explore different pathways potentially \r\nconsistent with meeting the long-term temperature goals of the Paris \r\nAgreement. As detailed in Section 3.2.5 and in Chapter 4, a pathway \r\nof Gradual Strengthening of current policies (IMP-GS) to 2030, if \r\nfollowed by very fast reductions, may stay below 2degC. The IMP-NEG\r\npathway, with somewhat deeper emission cutbacks to 2030, might \r\nenable 1.5degC to be reached but only after significant overshoot, \r\nthrough the subsequent extensive use of CDR in the energy and "


id: 2e736b6e023f522c6de2c36a4c52baf1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5454
content:
"Pathways and 'net zero'. The date at which the world needs \r\naggregate emissions to reach net zero for Paris-consistent \r\ntemperature goals depends both on progress in reducing non-CO2\r\nGHG emissions and near-term progress in reducing CO2 emissions. \r\nFaster progress in the near term extends the date at which net \r\nzero must be reached, while conversely, slower near-term progress \r\nbrings the date even closer to the present. Some of the modelled \r\n1.5degC pathways with limited overshoot cut global CO2 emissions in \r\nhalf until 2030, which allows for a more gradual decline thereafter, \r\nreaching net zero CO2 after 2050; also, net zero GHGs occurs later, "


id: 811b97670f1efbf131ffd32eea35529b
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19850
content:
"both result in global mean temperature above 2degC.  They provide \r\nbenchmarks against which to compare the IMPs."


id: 47d8a730ed4168f2d355a6459faaa48b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9851
content:
"the industry sectors to achieve net negative global emissions, as \r\ndiscussed in Chapters 3, 6, 7, 10 and 12."


id: 5f706a7c9ce437f4c28954bfd89064b6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Three other IMPs illustrate different features of technology scenarios \r\nwith more short-term rapid emission reductions, which could deliver \r\noutcomes compatible with the temperature range in the Paris \r\nAgreement without large overshoot. Based on the assessment in \r\nSection 5.3.3, one key mitigation strategy would be to rely on the \r\nopportunities for reducing demand (IMP-LD). Chapters 6 and 7-11 \r\nshow how energy systems based on accelerated deep renewable \r\nenergy penetration and electrification can also provide a pathway to \r\ndeep mitigation (IMP-REN). Chapters 3, 4 and 17 provide insights \r\ninto how shifting development pathways can lead to deep emission \r\nreductions and achieve sustainable development goals (IMP-SP)."


id: a43a23356f69ce04e28c8344079a5161
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26083
content:
"What the IMPs do and don't do.  The IMPs are, as their name \r\nimplies, a set of scenarios meant to illustrate some important themes \r\nthat run through the entire WGIII assessment. They illustrate that the \r\nclimate outcomes that individuals and society will face in the century \r\nahead depend on individual and societal choices. In addition, they \r\nillustrate that there are multiple ways to successful achievement of \r\nParis long-term temperature goals."


id: 77a447a664b2c3955a814d0bcfe68771
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18254
content:
"These pathways can be implemented with different levels of ambition, \r\nthat can be measured through the classes (C) of temperature levels \r\nfrom the scenarios database, see Chapter  3  (Table  3.2). In the \r\nIMP framework, Section  3.2.5 presents and explores quantitative \r\nscenarios that can limit warming to 1.5degC (with a probability of 50% \r\nor greater, i.e., C1 for the illustrated quantification of LD, SP and REN, \r\nand C2 for NEG scenario), along with other GS pathways which keep \r\nwarming below 2degC with a  probability of 67% or greater (C3). In \r\naddition to these primary IMPs, the full scenario database contains \r\nsensitivity cases that explore alternative warming levels."


id: 877a7e77226de6f29d6eb984d754f3df
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20993
content:
"In addition to the IMPs two additional scenarios were selected, which \r\nillustrate the consequences of current policies and pledges. Current \r\nPolicies (CurPol) explores the consequences of continuing along the \r\npath of implemented climate policies in 2020 and only a  Gradual \r\nStrengthening after that, drawing on numerous such scenarios in \r\nthe literature. Moderate Action (ModAct) explores the impact of \r\nimplementing NDCs to 2030, but without further strengthening: "


id: 882e587922b3381fb3ed5f99b81baec1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"There are at least two major implications of the very close link \r\nbetween climate change and development as outlined above. The \r\nfirst is that the choice of development paths made by countries and \r\nregions have significant consequences for GHG emissions and efforts \r\nto combat climate change (Chapters 2, 3, 4, 5 and 14). The second is \r\nthat climate mitigation at local, national and global levels cannot be \r\neffectively achieved by a narrow focus on 'climate-specific' sectors, \r\nactors and policies, but rather through a much broader attention to \r\nthe mix of development choices and the resulting development paths \r\nand trajectories (O'Neill et al. 2014) (Chapters 4, 6 and 10)."


id: 9a3e67ffd90ca49318221f8baa0540ad
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24374
content:
"Where are current policies and pledges leading? What is needed to \r\nreach specific temperature goals under varying assumptions? What \r\nare the consequences of different strategies to meet climate targets \r\n(i.e., demand-side strategy, a renewable energy strategy or a strategy \r\nwith a role for net negative emissions)? What are the consequences \r\nof delay? What are the implications for other SDGs of various climate \r\nmitigation pathways?"


id: 5fe647be27d32a209b73c2a87691890
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"As a key staple of IPCC reports and the global climate policy landscape \r\n(IPCC 2007, 2014b; van Vuuren et al. 2017; Gidden et al. 2019; \r\nQuilcaille et al. 2019) (Chapter  2), integrated assessment models \r\nand global scenarios (such as the Shared Socio-economic Pathways - \r\nSSPs) highlight the interaction between development paths, climate \r\nchange and emission stabilisation (Section 3.6). The close links are \r\nalso recognised in the PA (Section 1.3.1)."


id: c049ff2e08743e2e262101baed61e9e0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"This chapter now sets out approaches to understanding the \r\nmitigation challenge, working from its broad location in the context \r\nof wider aspirations for sustainable development, then identifying \r\nspecific analytic approaches, before summarising the corresponding \r\nmain dimensions used for the assessment of options and pathways \r\nin much of the report."


id: 103d3b327eaec442da10ac25955b22b7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"At one level, sustainable development can be seen as a  meta \r\nframework for integrating climate action with other global \r\nsustainability goals (Casadio Tarabusi and Guarini 2013; Antal and \r\nVan Den Bergh 2016). Fundamentally, the concept of sustainable \r\ndevelopment underscores the interlinkages and interdependence \r\nof human and natural systems and the need to balance economic, \r\nsocial, and environmental (including climate pollution) aspects in \r\ndevelopment planning and processes (Nunan 2017; Gomez-Echeverri \r\n2018b; Zhenmin and Espinosa 2019)."


id: a44f2549f846d4e5852823758048ef73
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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content:
"At the same time, rapid and large-scale economic development (which \r\nhas in the past driven climate change through land-use change and \r\ndependence on fossil fuels), is widely seen as needed to improve \r\nglobal well-being and lift millions especially in low- and middle\u0002income countries out of poverty (Chen et al. 2017; Mugambiwa and \r\nTirivangasi 2017; Lu et al. 2019; Baarsch et al. 2020) (Figure  1.6). \r\nThis strand of literature emphasises the importance of economic \r\ngrowth including for tackling climate change itself, pointing to the \r\nrelationship between economic development and climate resilience \r\nas well as the role of industry-powered technologies such as electric \r\nvehicles in reducing GHG levels and promoting well-being (Heinrichs \r\net al. 2014; Kasztelan 2017). Yet, others argue that the character \r\nof social and economic development produced by the nature of \r\ncapitalist society (Pelling and Manuel-Navarrete 2011; Koch 2012; \r\nMalm 2016) is ultimately unsustainable."


id: 7ea1dc7c2b9f28e3fc84ce9d505258fb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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content:
"Despite the appeal of the concept, tensions remain over the \r\ninterpretation and practical application, with acute disagreements \r\nregarding what the balancing entails in real life, how to measure \r\nwell-being, which goals to set, and the means through which such \r\ngoals might be pursued (Arrow et al. 2011; Dasgupta et al. 2015; \r\nMichelsen et al. 2016; Okereke and Massaquoi 2017; UNEP 2018b; \r\nHaberl et al. 2019; Shang et al. 2019; Sugiawan et al. 2019)."


id: 87d0bd18ed6ff815aeb6eced09a8ad4b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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content:
"effort to keep the world along a climate-resilient development path. \r\nA  key feature of development or transformation pathways that \r\nachieve a climate-resilient world is that they maximise the synergies \r\nand minimise the trade-offs between climate mitigation and other \r\nsustainable development goals (Klausbruckner et al. 2016; Thornton \r\nand Comberti 2017; Wustemann et al. 2017; Dagnachew et al. 2018; \r\nFuso Nerini et al. 2018; Mainali et al. 2018). Crucially, the nature of \r\ntrade-offs and timing of related decisions will vary across countries \r\ndepending on circumstances including the level of development, \r\ncapability and access to resources (Cross-Chapter Box  5, Shifting \r\nDevelopment Paths to Increase Sustainability, in Chapter 4)."


id: e07ad3919539764b7e998d20647c5c3f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Moreover, countries differ enormously in their respective situation \r\nregarding their development path  - a condition which affects \r\ntheir capability, goals, priorities and approach to the pursuit of \r\nsustainability (Shi et al. 2016; Ramos-Mejia et al. 2018; Okereke et al. \r\n2019). Most of the literature recognises that despite its limitations, \r\nsustainable development with its emphasis on integrating social, \r\neconomic and environmental goals, provides a more comprehensive \r\napproach to the pursuit of planetary health and human well-being. \r\nSustainable development is then not a static objective but a dynamic \r\nframework for measuring human progress (Costanza et al. 2016; \r\nFotis and Polemis 2018), relevant for all countries even if different \r\ngroups of nations experience the challenge of sustainability in \r\ndifferent ways."


id: da801c22997083f7900d7af297795290
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Much like sustainable development, concepts like low-carbon \r\ndevelopment (Mulugetta and Urban 2010; Yuan et al. 2011; Wang \r\net al. 2017; Tian et al. 2019), climate-compatible development \r\n(CCD) (Mitchell and Maxwell 2010; Tompkins et al. 2013; Stringer \r\net al. 2014; Bickersteth et al. 2017) and more recently climate\u0002resilient development (CRD) (Fankhauser and McDermott 2016; \r\nHenly-Shepard et al. 2018; IPCC 2018b) have all emerged as \r\nideas, tools and frameworks, intended to bring together the goals \r\nof climate mitigation and the SDGs, as well as development more \r\nbroadly. Figure  1.5 suggests that the prospects for realising \r\na climate-resilient and equitable world are enhanced by a process \r\nof transformation and development trajectories that seek to limit \r\nglobal warming while also achieving the SDGs. The SDGs represent \r\nmedium-term goals, and long-term sustainability requires continued "


id: 5c3d972b44c5da3b1993b7589b733f78
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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vector_id: 13483
content:
"Figure  1.5 | A climate-resilient and equitable world requires limiting global warming while achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).\r\nSource: IPCC (2018b)."


id: 14f656a868299ade61f6a567d23473bf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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content:
"justice (Death 2014; Adelman 2015; Kamuti 2015), and challenge \r\nthe central idea that it is possible to decouple economic activity \r\nand growth (measured as GDP increment) from increasing use of \r\nbiophysical resources (raw materials, energy) (Jackson and Victor \r\n2019; Parrique et al. 2019; Haberl et al. 2020; Hickel and Kallis 2020; \r\nVaden et al. 2020)."


id: bbb1e109a6867e3abb8dd15a2a2d2461
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30250
content:
"and developing  - even though the challenge differs between \r\ncountries and regions (Pradhan et al. 2017)."


id: af5a7f0a102bcc3b456aac6fc6443141
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28084
content:
"Historically, the industrialisation associated with economic \r\ndevelopment has involved a strong relationship with GHG emissions \r\n(Section 5.2.1). Figure 1.6 shows per-capita GHG emissions on the \r\nvertical axis and Historical Index of Human Development (HIHD) \r\nlevels (Prados de la Escosura 2015) on the horizontal axis.7\r\n The \r\ngrey line shows historic global average GHG emissions per capita \r\nand levels of human development over time, from 1870 to 2014. \r\nThe current positions of different regions are shown by bubbles, \r\nwith sizes representing total GHG emissions. Figure 1.6 also shows \r\nthe estimated position of the SDGs zone for the year 2030, and \r\na  'sustainable development corridor' as countries reach towards \r\nhigher HDI and lower emissions. To fulfil the SDGs, including SDG 13 \r\n(climate action), the historic relationship needs to change."


id: b241494fadcb5684d026c2166aa19626
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"The top of the SDG zone is situated around the global per-capita GHG \r\nemissions level of 5 tCO2-eq required for the world to be path towards \r\nfulfilling the Paris Agreement.8\r\n The horizontal position of the SDG \r\nzone is estimated based on the HIHD levels (Prados de la Escosura \r\n2015) of countries that have been shown to either have achieved, \r\nor have some challenges, when it comes to SDG 3, SDG 4 and SDG \r\n8 (Sachs et al. 2016), as these SDGs are related to the constituent \r\nparts of the HIHD.  Beyond 2030, the sustainable development \r\ncorridor allows for increasing levels of human development while \r\nlowering per-capita GHG emissions."


id: c624a22879760f3045f3c440d72b98e6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Figure 1.6 shows that at present, regions with HIHD levels of around \r\n0.5 all have emissions at or above about 5 tCO2-eq per capita (even \r\nmore so on a  consumption footprint basis; see Figure  1.1c,d), but \r\nthere are wide variations within this. Indeed, there are regions with \r\nHIHD levels above 0.8 which have GHG per-capita emissions lower \r\nthan several with HIHD levels of around 0.5. The mitigation challenge \r\ninvolves countries at many different stages of development seeking \r\npaths towards higher welfare with low emissions."


id: cb78d8a7b5af50f4d4fb762611bd2f3f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33125
content:
"Climate action can be conceptualised as both a  stand-alone and \r\ncross-cutting issue in the 2030 SDGs (Makomere and Liti Mbeva \r\n2018), given that several of the other goals such as ending poverty \r\n(SDG 1), zero hunger (SDG 2), good health and well-being (SDG 3), \r\nand affordable and clean energy (SDG 7), among many others, are \r\nrelated to climate change (Figure 3.39)."


id: 37b030f128c64fe9dc603af5fdcc3f3a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7005
content:
"From Figure  1.6, there are two distinct dimensions to sustainable \r\ndevelopment pathways for fulfilling the SDGs. In terms of per-capita \r\nGHG emissions (the vertical), some regions have such low levels that \r\nthey could increase and still be below the global average required \r\nin 2030 for the world to be on path to fulfil the Paris Agreement. \r\nMeanwhile, other regions with high per-capita GHG emissions would \r\nrequire a  rapid transformation in technologies and practices. It is \r\nagainst this background that Dubash (2019) emphasises placing the \r\nneed for urgent action on climate change in the context of domestic \r\npolitical priorities and the institutions within which national \r\nframeworks are crystallised."


id: aba2ab2b8a14f467dd38eaeb02fed8a0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"In addition to galvanising global collective action, the SDGs provide \r\nconcrete themes, targets and indicators for measuring human \r\nprogress to sustainability (Kanie and Biermann 2017). The SDGs also \r\nprovide a basis for exploring the synergies and trade-offs between \r\nsustainable development and climate change mitigation (Pradhan \r\net al. 2017; Fuso Nerini et al. 2018; Mainali et al. 2018; Makomere \r\nand Liti Mbeva 2018). Progress to date (Sachs et al. 2016) shows \r\nfulfilling SDGs is a challenge for all groups of countries - developed "


id: b05e1b92417e2b46c6756721f9be2650
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Concerns over equity in the context of growing global inequality \r\nand very tight remaining global carbon budgets have motivated \r\nan emphasis on equitable access to sustainable development \r\n(Peters et al. 2015; Kartha et al. 2018b; Matthews et al. 2019; van den \r\nBerg et al. 2019). This literature emphasises the need for less developed \r\ncountries to have sufficient room for development while addressing \r\nclimate change (Winkler et al. 2013; Pan et al. 2014; Gajevic Sayegh \r\n2017; Robinson and Shine 2018; Warlenius 2018). Meanwhile, many "


id: 85edeb5aafe4a266fecf489d419f554f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20705
content:
"countries reliant on fossil fuels, related technologies and economic \r\nactivities, are eager to ensure tax revenues are maintained, workers \r\nand industries have income and justice is embedded in the economic \r\ntransformations required to limit GHG emissions (Cronin et al. 2021)."


id: 29403a47dd3ab6929a309b8e9a5de338
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4472
content:
"Correlation between CO2 emission intensity, or absolute emission \r\nand gross domestic product growth, is not rigid, unambiguous and \r\ndeterministic (Ojekunle et al. 2015), but the extent to which SDGs "


id: ae082606f8e03ff2a88efef82571dbf7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27858
content:
"and economic growth expectations can be fulfilled while decoupling \r\nGHG emissions remains a  concern (Haberl et al. 2020; Hickel and \r\nKallis 2020). Below some thresholds of absolute poverty, more \r\nconsumption is necessary for development to lead to well-being \r\n(Section  5.2.1.1), which may not be the case at higher levels of \r\nconsumption (Lamb and Steinberger 2017; Steinberger et al. 2020) \r\n(Section 1.7.2)."


id: faf09d4221fdd1956d367708d78c46cb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41534
content:
"Some of the most established and influential approaches to \r\nunderstanding the aggregate causes and consequences of climate \r\nchange and mitigation across societies, draw upon economic \r\ntheories and modelling to generate global emission pathways in \r\nthe absence of climate policies and to study alternative mitigation \r\npathways (described in detail in Section 3.2.5, and Appendix 3). The \r\nunderlying economic concepts aggregate wealth or other measures \r\nof welfare based on utilitarian ethical foundations, and in most \r\napplications, a  number of additional assumptions detailed in AR5 \r\n(Chapters 2 and 3)."


id: 6ec5200cafba38f4d219da6fee73dc19
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16757
content:
"Climate change is unprecedented in its scope (sectors, actors and \r\ncountries), depth (major transformations) and time scales (over \r\ngenerations). As such, it creates unique challenges for analysis. It has \r\nbeen called 'the greatest market failure in history' (Stern 2007); the \r\n'perfect moral storm' (Gardiner 2006) and a 'super wicked problem' \r\n(Lazarus 2009; Levin et al. 2012) - one which appears difficult to solve \r\nthrough the traditional tools and assumptions of social organisation \r\nand analysis."


id: c7d7d6b823d707bb56feda65b1a40e6c
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32467
content:
"For at least 10 to 15 years after the first computed global cost-benefit \r\nestimate (Nordhaus 1992), the dominant conclusions from these \r\ndifferent approaches seemed to yield very different recommendations, \r\nwith cost-benefit studies suggesting lenient mitigation compared \r\nto the climate targets typically recommended from scientific risk \r\nassessments (Weyant 2017). Over the past 10 to 15 years, literature \r\nhas made important strides towards reconciling these two approaches, \r\nboth in the analytic methods and the conclusions arising."


id: c824090a6a35b1ce8efcf6c7bc0a4907
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32527
content:
"Damages and risks. Incorporating impacts which may be extremely \r\nsevere but are uncertain (known as 'fat tails' (Weitzman 2009, \r\n2011)), strengthens the economic case for ambitious action to avoid \r\nrisks of extreme climate impacts (Ackerman et al. 2010; Fankhauser \r\net al. 2013; Dietz and Stern 2015). The salience of risks has also been \r\namplified by improved understanding of climate 'tipping points' \r\n(Lontzek et al. 2015; Lenton et al. 2019); valuations should reflect \r\nthat cutting emissions reduces not only average expected damages, \r\nbut also the risk of catastrophic events (IWG 2021)."


id: 905b781f946241d0e14f4a3720f770fa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22598
content:
"Discounting. The role of time discounting in weighting future climate \r\nchange impacts against today's costs of mitigating emissions has been \r\nlong recognised (Weitzman 1994, 2001; Nordhaus 2007; Stern 2007; \r\nDasgupta 2008). Its importance is underlined in analytical Integrated \r\nAssessment Models (IAMs) (Golosov et al. 2014; van  den Bijgaart \r\net al. 2016; van der Ploeg and Rezai 2019) (Annex III). Economic "


id: 553cfcb00377abdc571205e7712a5cc7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12273
content:
"some reviews additionally critique how IAMs represent abatement \r\ncosts in terms of energy efficiency and innovation (e.g., Farmer et al. \r\n2015; Rosen and Guenther 2015; Keen 2021) (Sections  1.7.3 and \r\n1.7.4). IAMs may better reflect associated 'rebound' at system level \r\n(Saunders et al. 2021), and inefficient implementation would raise \r\nmitigation costs (Homma et al. 2019); conversely, co-benefits - most \r\nextensively estimated for air quality, valued at a  few tens of USD \r\nper tCO2-eq across 16 studies (Karlsson et al. 2020) - complement \r\nglobal with additional local benefits (Table 1.2)."


id: 829953c31a1eac5227549477740515bf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20104
content:
"literature suggests applying risk-free, public, and long-term interest \r\nrates when evaluating overall climate strategy (Weitzman 2001; \r\nDasgupta 2008; Arrow et al. 2013; Groom and Hepburn 2017). Expert \r\nelicitations indicate values around 2% (majority) to 3% (Drupp et al. \r\n2018). This is lower than in many of the studies reviewed in earlier \r\nIPCC assessments, and many IAM studies since, and by increasing the \r\nweight accorded to the future would increase current 'optimal effort'. \r\nThe US Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of Carbon used \r\n3% as its central value (IAWG 2016; Li and Pizer 2018; Adler et al. \r\n2017). Individual projects may require specific risk adjustments."


id: b410f316feb49f6a43dc5305023c577c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28923
content:
"Whereas many of these factors affect primarily cost-benefit \r\nevaluation, discounting also determines the cost-effective trajectory: \r\nEmmerling et al. (2019) find that, for a  remaining budget of \r\n1000 GtCO2, reducing the discount rate from 5% to 2% would more \r\nthan double current efforts, limit 'overshoot', greatly reduce a late \r\nrush to negative emissions, and improve intergenerational justice by \r\nmore evenly distributing policy costs across the 21st century."


id: be0ff5815decc5b24168e238093e1166
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30706
content:
"Distribution of impacts. The economic damages from climate \r\nchange at the nationally aggregated and sub-national level are very \r\ndiverse (Moore et al. 2017; Ricke et al. 2018; Carleton et al. 2020). \r\nA 'global damage function' necessarily implies aggregating impacts \r\nacross people and countries with different levels of income, and over \r\ngenerations, a process which obscures the strategic considerations \r\nthat drive climate policymaking (Keohane and Oppenheimer 2016). \r\nEconomics acknowledges there is no single, objectively defined \r\n'social welfare function' (IPCC 1995, 2014a). This applies also to \r\nthe distribution of responses: both underline the relevance of equity \r\n(next section) and global negotiations to determine national and \r\ncollective objectives."


id: 576dc5cc52cd67b5c556bc264459490a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12646
content:
"Care is required to clarify what is optimised (Dietz and Venmans \r\n2019). Optimising a  path towards a  given temperature goal by \r\na fixed date (e.g., 2100) gives time-inconsistent results backloaded to \r\nlarge, last-minute investment in carbon dioxide removal (CDR). 'Cost\u0002effective' optimisations generate less initial effort than equivalent\r\ncost-benefit models (Dietz and Venmans 2019; Gollier 2021) as they \r\ndo not incorporate benefits of reducing impacts earlier."


id: e86de118987f65a1f28061e225ee3dd7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38228
content:
"Obvious limitations arise from these multiple difficulties in assessing \r\nan objective, globally acceptable single estimate of climate change \r\ndamages (e.g., Arrow et al. 2013; Pindyck 2013; Auffhammer 2018; \r\nStern et al. 2021), with some arguing that agreement on a specific \r\nvalue can never be expected (Rosen and Guenther 2015; Pezzey 2018). \r\nA  new generation of cost-benefits analysis, based on projections \r\nof actual observed damages, results in stronger mitigation efforts \r\nas optimal (Glanemann et al. 2020; Hansel et al. 2020). Overall, \r\nthe combination of improved damage functions with the wider \r\nconsensus on low discount rates (as well as lower mitigation costs \r\ndue to innovation) has increasingly yielded 'optimal' results from \r\nbenefit-cost studies in line with the range established in the Paris \r\nAgreement (Cross-Working Group Box 1 in Chapter 3)."


id: f8c9f6e024afef97a9335e2f9f3cf8dd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41132
content:
"'Efficient pathways' are affected by inertia and innovation. Inertia \r\nimplies amplifying action on long-lived investments and infrastructure \r\nthat could otherwise lock-in emissions for many decades (Vogt-Schilb \r\net al. 2018; Baldwin et al. 2020). Chapter 3 (Section 3.5) discusses \r\ninteractions between near-, medium- and long-term actions in \r\nglobal pathways, particularly vis-a-vis inertia. Also, to the extent \r\nthat early action induces low-carbon innovation, it 'multiplies' the \r\noptimal effort (for given damage assumptions), because it facilitates \r\nsubsequent cheaper abatement. For example, a 'learning-by-doing' \r\nanalysis concludes that early deployment of expensive PV was of net \r\nglobal economic benefit, due to induced innovation (Newbery 2018)."


id: c2048db3a3b95e0be7eb9d966d641c7a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31433
content:
"Hybrid cost-benefit approaches that extend the objective of the \r\noptimisation beyond traditional welfare, adding some form of \r\ntemperature targets as in Llavador et al. (2015) and Held (2019) also \r\nrepresent a step in bridging the gap between the two approaches and \r\nresult in proposed strategies much more in line with those coming \r\nfrom the cost-effectiveness literature. Approaching from the opposite \r\nside, cost-effectiveness studies have looked into incorporating \r\nbenefits from avoided climate damages, to improve the assessment \r\nof net costs (Drouet et al. 2021)."


id: 9874acbeb2734f428d2076388019f5d6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24034
content:
"Research thus increasingly emphasises the need to understand \r\nclimate transformation in terms of dynamic, rather than static, \r\nefficiency (Gillingham and Stock 2018). This means taking account of \r\ninertia, learning and various additional sources of 'path-dependence'. \r\nIncluding induced innovation in stylised IAMs can radically change \r\nthe outlook (Acemoglu et al. 2012, 2016), albeit with limitations \r\n(Pottier et al. 2014); many more detailed-process IAMs now do \r\ninclude endogenous technical change (as reviewed in Yang et al. \r\n2018 and Grubb et al. 2021b) (Annex III)."


id: 660defa2eaea693c7ec449b557aafd64
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15215
content:
"Cost-benefit IAMs utilise damage functions to derive a social cost of \r\nCO2 emissions' (SCC  - the additional cost to society of a  pulse \r\nof  CO2 emissions). One review considered that 'the best estimate' \r\nof the optimal (near-term) level 'still ranges from a few tens to a few \r\nhundreds of dollars per ton of carbon' (Tol 2018), with various recent \r\nstudies in the hundreds, taking account of risks (Taconet et al. 2019), \r\nlearning (Ekholm 2018) and distribution (Ricke et al. 2018). In addition \r\nto the importance of uncertainty/risk, aggregation, and realistic \r\ndamage functions as noted, on which some progress has been made, "


id: b3a516c030a2581b073dae249882e590
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28848
content:
"These dynamic and uncertainty effects typically justify greater upfront \r\neffort (Kalkuhl et al. 2012; Bertram et al. 2015), including accelerated \r\ninternational diffusion (Schultes et al. 2018), and strengthen optimal \r\ninitial effort in cost-benefit models (Baldwin et al. 2020; Grubb et al. \r\n2021b). Approaches to risk premia common in finance would similarly \r\namplify the initial mitigation effort, declining as uncertainties reduce \r\n(Daniel et al. 2019)."


id: 4dc954fbce63803957dc6fa06f352611
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10956
content:
"A large body of literature examines the critical role of values, ethics, \r\nattitudes, and behaviours as foundational frames for understanding \r\nand assessing climate action, sustainable development and societal \r\ntransformation ( IPCC 2014a Chapter 3). Most of this work is offered \r\nas a  counterpoint or critique to mainstream literature's focus on \r\nthe safeguarding of economic growth of nations, corporations \r\nand individuals (Castree 2017; Gunster 2017). These perspectives \r\nhighlight the dominance of economic utilitarianism in western \r\nphilosophical thought as a key driver for unsustainable consumption \r\nand global environmental change (Hoeing et al. 2015; Popescu 2016)."


id: 8881c36b6445efb97465505d22bb964f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21181
content:
"Other approaches to aggregate evaluation draw on various branches \r\nof intrinsically non-equilibrium theories (e.g.,  Chang 2014). These \r\nincluding long-standing theories from the 1930s (e.g., Schumpeter \r\n1934; Keynes 1936) to understand situations of structurally \r\nunderemployed resources, potential financial instabilities (Minsky \r\n1986), and related economic approaches which emphasise time \r\ndimensions (e.g.,  recent reviews in Legrand and Hagemann 2017; \r\nStern 2018). More recently developing have been formal economic \r\ntheories of endogenous growth building on, for example, Romer \r\n(1986), and developments of Schumpeterian creative destruction \r\n(Aghion et al. 2021) and evolutionary economic theories which \r\nabandon any notion of full or stable resource utilisation even \r\nas a  reference concept (Nelson and Winter 1982; Freeman and \r\nPerez 1988; Carlsson and Stankiewicz 1991; Freeman and Louca \r\n2001; Perez 2001)."


id: 32a59ef459a9504177800ed8da8e7bd5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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vector_id: 6171
content:
"Entrenching alternative values that promote deep decarbonisation, \r\nenvironmental conservation and protection across all levels of society \r\nis then viewed as foundational component of climate-resilient and \r\nsustainable development and for achieving human rights, and a safe \r\nclimate world (Evensen 2015; Jolly et al. 2015; Popescu 2016; Tabara \r\net al. 2019). The UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner \r\nhas highlighted the potentially crucial role of human rights in relation \r\nto climate change (UNHCR 2018). While acknowledging the role of \r\npolicy, technology, and finance, the 'managerialist' approaches, that \r\nemphasise 'technical governance' and fail to challenge the deeper \r\nvalues that underpin society, may not secure the deep change \r\nrequired to avert dangerous climate change and other environmental \r\nchallenges (Hartzell-Nichols 2014; Steinberger et al. 2020)."


id: 9f05885e7748088a153ae940091cb3df
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25204
content:
"Social justice perspectives emphasise the distribution of \r\nresponsibilities, rights, and mutual obligations between nations \r\nin navigating societal transformations (Gawel and Kuhlicke 2017; \r\nLeach et al. 2018; Patterson et al. 2018). Current approaches to \r\nclimate action may fail to match what is required by science because \r\nthey tend to circumvent constraints on human behaviour, especially \r\nconstraints on economic interest and activity. Related literature \r\nexplores governance models that are centred on environmental limits, \r\nplanetary boundaries and the moral imperative to prioritise the poor \r\nin earth systems governance (Carley and Konisky 2020; Kashwan \r\net al. 2020), with emphasis on trust and solidarity as foundations \r\nfor global cooperation on climate change (Jolly et al. 2015). A key \r\nobstacle is that the economic interests of states tend to be stronger \r\nthan the drivers for urgent climate action (Bain 2017)."


id: bcc70bd5693b300ee93a6aefd9c8955
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30456
content:
"Gardiner's (2011) book on climate change as 'The Perfect Moral \r\nStorm' identified three 'tempests'. Its global dimension, in a world \r\nof sovereign states which have only fragmentary responsibility \r\nand control, makes it 'difficult to generate the moral consideration \r\nand necessary political will'. Its impacts are intergenerational but \r\nfuture generations have no voice in contemporary affairs, the usual \r\nmechanism for addressing distributional injustices, amplified by \r\nthe intrinsic inequity of wealthy big emitters impacting particularly \r\npoorer victims. He argues that these are exacerbated by a  third, \r\ntheoretical failure to acknowledge a  central need for 'moral \r\nsensitivity, compassion, transnational and transgenerational care, \r\nand other forms of ethical concern to rise to the surface' to help \r\nguide effective climate action. As noted in Section 1.4.6, however, \r\nequity and ethics are both a driver of and constraint on mitigation."


id: 509818dd243635efac3813a15587b82c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11451
content:
"Short-term interests of stakeholders are acknowledged to impede \r\nthe reflection and deliberation needed for climate mitigation \r\nand adaptation planning (Hackmann 2016; Sussman et al. 2016; \r\nSchlosberg et al. 2017; Herrick 2018). Situationally appropriate \r\nmitigation and adaptation policies at both national and international \r\nlevel may require more ethical self-reflection (Herrick 2018), including \r\nself-transcendent values such as universalism and benevolence, \r\nand moderation which are positively related to pro-environmental \r\nbehaviours (Jonsson and Nilsson 2014; Katz-Gerro et al. 2015; Braito \r\net al. 2017; Howell and Allen 2017)."


id: 54ae802cd7565314f3bcaa4eb699a7e9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12173
content:
"poor countries is also essential for reducing the asymmetries between \r\nrich and poor countries (Section 1.6.3 and Chapter 15)."


id: 6cfaff80b1acd064ef1152bf7e6bed88
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16454
content:
"offered as an organising principle for enduring transformation \r\nto sustainability. A  key policy implication of this is moving away \r\nfrom valuing nature only in market and monetary terms to strongly \r\nincorporating existential and non-material value of nature in natural\u0002resource accounting (Neuteleers and Engelen 2015; Shackleton et al. \r\n2017; Himes-Cornell et al. 2018). There has been increasing attention \r\non ways to design climate policy frameworks to help reconcile \r\necological virtue (with its emphasis on the collective) with individual \r\nfreedoms and personal autonomy (Kasperbauer 2016; Nash et al. 2017; \r\nXiang et al. 2019). In such a framework, moderation, fairness, and \r\nstewardship are all understood and promoted as directly contributing \r\nto the 'good life'. Such approaches are deemed vital to counteract \r\ntendencies to 'free ride', and to achieve behavioural changes often \r\nassociated with tackling climate change (Section 5.2.1)."


id: 8db77eeb580f50a14846b953d138d143
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22122
content:
"Equity across generations  - the distribution between the present \r\nand future generations  - also matters. One aspect is discounting \r\n(Section  1.7.1). Another approach has been to study the burdens \r\non each generation following from the transition to low-carbon \r\neconomies (IPCC 2014a Chapter 3) (Cross-Working Group Box 3 in \r\nChapter  12). Suggestions include shifting more investments into \r\n'natural capital', so that future generations will inherit less physical \r\ncapital but a better environment, or financing mitigation efforts today \r\nusing governmental debt redeemed by future generations (Heijdra \r\net al. 2006; Broome 2012; Karp and Rezai 2014; Hoel et al. 2019)."


id: 95700f7143ba595879cbfaf8a29650a7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23496
content:
"Some literature suggests that attention to emotions, especially \r\nwith regards to climate communication, could help societies and \r\nindividuals act in ways that focus less on monetary gain and more \r\non climate and environmental sustainability (Bryck and Ellis 2016; \r\nChapman et al. 2017; Nabi et al. 2018; Zummo et al. 2020)."


id: 1a47f94f3227f0971b9c7d5ad34cd057
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1820
content:
"Equity perspectives highlight three asymmetries relevant for climate \r\nchange (Okereke and Coventry 2016; Okereke 2017) (Section 1.4.6). \r\nAsymmetry in contribution highlights different contributions to climate \r\nchange both in historical and current terms, and applies both within \r\nand between states as well as between generations (Caney 2016; \r\nHeyward and Roser 2016). Asymmetry in impacts highlights the fact \r\nthat the damages will be borne disproportionately across countries, \r\nregions, communities, individuals and gender; moreover, it is often \r\nthose that have contributed the least that stand to bear the greatest \r\nimpact of climate change (IPCC 2014a; Shi et al. 2016). Asymmetry in \r\ncapacity highlights differences of power between groups and nations \r\nto participate in climate decision and governance, including the \r\ncapacity to implement mitigation and adaptation measures."


id: 8e9fb631999cbc90d6a28ebfd6749f58
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22279
content:
"Technological Innovation Systems (TIS) frameworks (Section  16.4) \r\nfocus on processes and policies of early innovation and 'emergence', \r\nwhich combine experimentation and commercialisation, involving \r\nStrategic Niche Management (Rip and Kemp 1998; Geels and Raven \r\n2006). Literatures on the wider processes of transition highlight \r\ndifferent stages (e.g.,  Cross-Chapter Box  12 in Chapter  16) and \r\nscales across three main levels, most generally termed micro, meso \r\nand macro (Rotmans et al. 2001)."


id: 9ed61904a34bc0b6d25e297514bddf88
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25166
content:
"If attention is not paid to equity, efforts designed to tackle climate \r\nchange may end up exacerbating inequities among communities and \r\nbetween countries (Heffron and McCauley 2018). The implication is \r\nthat to be sustainable in the long run, mitigation involves a central \r\nplace for consideration of justice, both within and between countries \r\n(Chapters 4 and 14). Arguments that the injustices following from \r\nclimate change are symptomatic of a more fundamental structural \r\ninjustice in social relations, are taken to imply a need to address the \r\ndeeper inequities within societies (Routledge et al. 2018)."


id: 1430a328f4f0a0ec8e5e378fd26cc566
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 768
content:
"Climate change and climate policies affect countries and people \r\ndifferently, with the poor likely to be more affected (Section 1.6.1). \r\nIdeas of Just Transitions (outlined in Section  1.8.2.) often have \r\na  national focus in the literature, but also imply that mitigation \r\nshould not increase the asymmetries between rich and poor countries, \r\nimplying a  desire for transitions which seek to reduce (or at least \r\navoid adverse) distributional affects. Thus, it comes into play in the \r\ntiming of zero emissions (Chapters 3 and 14). International climate \r\nfinance in which rich countries finance mitigation and adaptation in "


id: 974f599a3d252c49536c58cf3e26bd6b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23819
content:
"In contrast to standard economic metrics of marginal or \r\nsmooth change (e.g.,  elasticities), transition theories emphasise \r\ninterdisciplinary approaches and the non-linear dynamics, social, \r\neconomic and environmental aspects of transitions to sustainability \r\n(Cherp et al. 2018; Kohler et al. 2018). This may explain persistent \r\ntendencies to underestimate the exponential pace of change now \r\nbeing observed in renewable electricity (Chapters  2 and 6) and \r\nemerging in mobility (Chapter 10)."


id: 1203b7040902ae5ec21fbaee7eecb96a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 358
content:
"Recent decades have seen parallel broadening of economic \r\nperspectives and theories. Building also on the New Institutional \r\nEconomics literatures, Building on the New Institutional Economics \r\nliterature (Williamson 2000), Grubb et al. (2014, 2015) classify these \r\ninto three 'domains of economic decision-making' associated with \r\ndifferent branches of economic theory, respectively (i) behavioural \r\nand organisational; (ii) neoclassical and welfare; and (iii) evolutionary \r\nand institutional. Like MLP, these are related to different social and \r\ntemporal scales, as applied also in studying the 'adaptive finance' \r\nin UK electricity transition (Hall et al. 2017). There are significant \r\ndifferences but these approaches all point to understanding the \r\ncharacteristics of different actors, notably, individuals/local actors; \r\nlarger corporate organisations (public or private); and (mainly) public \r\nauthorities, each with different decision-making characteristics."


id: d31d17293699e54fb0ccde11add2c751
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34484
content:
"The continued increase in global emissions to 2019, despite three \r\ndecades of scientific warnings of ever-greater clarity and urgency, \r\nmotivates growing attention in the literature to the psychological \r\n'faults of our rationality' (Bryck and Ellis 2016), and the political \r\nnature of climate mitigation."


id: 9b96f36260f70be63843dd3073c12cc6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24626
content:
"Experimental economics (Allcott 2011) also helps explain why \r\ncost-effective energy efficiency measures or other mitigation \r\ntechnologies are not taken up as fast or as widely as the benefits \r\nmight suggest, including procrastination and inattention, as \r\n'we often resist actions with clear long-term benefits if they are \r\nunpleasant in the short run' (Allcott and Mullainathan 2010). \r\nIncorporating behavioural and social dynamics in models is required \r\nparticularly to better represent the demand side (Nikas et al. 2020), \r\nfor example, Safarzynska (2018) demonstrates how behavioural "


id: 8c5106d83a5638b8ec7f5c7765aa003f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21863
content:
"factors change responses to carbon pricing relative to other \r\ninstruments. A  key perspective is to eschew 'either/or' between \r\neconomic and behavioural frameworks, as the greatest effects \r\noften involve combining behavioural dimensions (e.g.,  norms, \r\nsocial influence networks, convenience and quality assurance) with \r\nfinancial incentives and information (Stern et al. 2010). Randomised, \r\ncontrolled field trials can help predict the effects of behavioural \r\ninterventions (Levitt and List 2009; McRae and Meeks 2016; Gillan \r\n2017). Chapter 5 explores both positive and negative dimensions \r\nof behaivour in more depth, including the development of norms \r\nand interactions with the wider social context, with emphasis upon \r\nthe services associated with human well-being, rather than the \r\neconomic activities per se."


id: 677bd4865f4f893ec5b9646f2d3a86bf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15475
content:
"2018; Newell et al. 2020; Paterson 2021). Attempts to depoliticise \r\nclimate change may narrow the space for democratic participation \r\nand contestation, thus impacting policy responses (Swyngedouw \r\n2010, 2011; Kenis and Lievens 2014). Some institutional innovations \r\nhave more directly targeted enhanced public deliberation and \r\nparticipation, notably in citizens' climate assemblies (Howarth et al. \r\n2020) and in the use of legal institutions to litigate against those \r\nopposing climate action (Peel and Osofksy 2020). This literature \r\nshows that transformative pathways are possible within a  variety \r\nof institutional settings, although institutional innovation will be \r\nnecessary everywhere to pursue zero carbon transitions (Section 4.4, \r\nChapter 13 and Cross-Chapter Box 12)."


id: 27472cd5ff532fb98a220ef9c68e69fd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4080
content:
"Political and institutional dynamics shape climate change responses in \r\nimportant ways, not least because incumbent actors have frequently \r\nblocked climate policy (Section  1.4.5). Institutional perspectives \r\nprobe networks of opposition (Brulle 2019) and emphasise that \r\ntheir ability to block - as well as the ability of others to foster low\u0002carbon transitions  - are structured by specific institutional forms \r\nacross countries (Lamb and Minx 2020). National institutions \r\nhave widely been developed to promote traditionally fossil fuel\u0002based sectors like electricity and transport as key to economic \r\ndevelopment, contributing to carbon lock-in (Seto et al. 2016) and \r\ninertia (Rosenschold et al. 2014)."


id: fa6f3483615a300eb768912f2eb93c6b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41427
content:
"The influence of interest groups on policymaking varies across \r\ncountries. Comparative political economy approaches tend to \r\nfind that countries where interests are closely coordinated by \r\ngovernments ('coordinated market economies') have been able to \r\ngenerate transformative change more than those with a more arms\u0002length, even combative relationship between interest groups and \r\ngovernments ('liberal market economies') (Lachapelle and Paterson \r\n2013; Cetkovic and Buzogany 2016; Zou et al. 2016; Meckling 2018). \r\n'Developmental states' often have the capacity for strong intervention \r\nbut any low-carbon interventions may be overwhelmed by other \r\npressures and very rapid economic growth (Wood et al. 2020a)."


id: fe9fc071363f4069894a534949ac79d0
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42180
content:
"Integration. Politics is ultimately the way in which societies make \r\ndecisions  - which in turn, reflect diverse forces and assumed \r\nframeworks. Effective policy requires understandings which combine \r\neconomic efficiency, ethics and equity, the dynamics and processes \r\nof large-scale transitions, and the role of psychology and politics. \r\nNo one framework is adequate to such a  broad-ranging goal, nor \r\nare single tools. Chapter  13 (Figure  13.6) presents a  'framing' \r\ntable for policy instruments depending on the extent to which they \r\nfocus on mitigation per se or wider socio-economic development, \r\nand whether they aim to shift marginal incentives or drive larger \r\ntransitions. Holistic analysis needs to bridge modelling, qualitative \r\ntransition theories illuminated by case studies, and practice-based \r\naction research (Geels et al. 2016)."


id: db5fd3322a0e42e7c6a746b4af2908c3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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content:
"Institutional features affecting climate policy include levels and \r\ntypes of democracy (Povitkina 2018), electoral systems, or levels \r\nof institutional centralisation (federal vs unitary states, presidential \r\nvs parliamentary systems) (Lachapelle and Paterson 2013; Steurer \r\nand Clar 2018; Clulow 2019). Countries that have constructed \r\nan overarching architecture of climate governance institutions \r\n(e.g.,  cross-department and multi-level coordination, and semi\u0002autonomous climate agencies), are more able to develop the strategic \r\napproaches to climate governance needed to foster transformative \r\nchange (Dubash 2021)."


id: 6027565eed38e3b809e295b0afcf0a0c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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content:
"These analytic frameworks also point to arenas of potential \r\nsynergies and trade-offs (when broadly known), and opportunities \r\nand risks (when uncertainties are greater), associated with \r\nmitigation. This offers theoretical foundations for mitigation \r\nstrategies which can also generate co-benefits. Climate policy \r\nmay help to motivate policies with beneficial synergies (such as "


id: 66960dffe87c7ace75ee829bfcaed418
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Access of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to policy \r\nprocesses enables new ideas to be adopted, but too close an NGO\u0002government relation may stifle innovation and transformative action \r\n(Dryzek et al. 2003). NGO campaigns on fracking (Neville et al. \r\n2019) or divestment (Mangat et al. 2018) have raised attention to \r\nideas such as 'stranded assets' in policy arenas (Green 2018; Piggot "


id: b2067ed3a3369d143a7e8a24c8f9b4da
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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content:
"Table 1.2 | Potential for net co-benefits arising from synergies and trade-offs, opportunities and risks."


id: 8a24713c24bc3d29591bf7e469b46f4e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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content:
"the consumer cost savings from energy efficiency, better forest \r\nmanagement, transitions to cleaner vehicles) and opportunities \r\n(such as stimulating innovation), by focusing on options for \r\nwhich the positives outweigh the negatives, or can be made to \r\nbe, through smart policy (e.g., Karlsson et al. 2020). More broadly, \r\nclimate concerns may help to attract international investment, and \r\nhelp overcoming bureaucratic or political obstacles to better policy, \r\nand support synergies between mitigation, adaptation, and other \r\nSDGs, a  foundation for shifting development pathways towards \r\nsustainability (Chapter 17 and Section 1.6.1)."


id: c6630bd6824b1a261963523312ea16ba
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"The AR6 emphasises that all pathways involve different challenges \r\nand require choices to be made. Continuing 'business as usual' is \r\nstill a  choice, which in addition to the obvious geophysical risks, \r\ninvolves not making the best use of new technologies, risks of \r\nfuture stranded assets, greater local pollution, and multiple other \r\nenvironmental threats."


id: 45ed0006a1d70a59a6d2c58373e6a79d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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"The dimensions as listed provide a  basis for this assessment both \r\nin the sectoral chapters (6-11), providing a common framework for \r\ncross-sectoral assessment detailed further in Chapter 12, and in the \r\nevaluation of global pathways (Section 3.2). More specific indicators \r\nunder each of these dimensions offer consistency in assessing the \r\nchallenges, choices, and enabling requirements facing different \r\naspects of mitigating climate change."


id: a4723a85e91410679490196331d20dc7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"While previous ARs dealt with the definition of alternative mitigation \r\npathways mostly exploring the technological potentials, the latest \r\nresearch focused on what kind of mitigation pathways are feasible \r\nin a broader sense, underlining the multi-dimensional nature of the \r\nmitigation challenge. Building on frameworks introduced by Majone \r\n(1975) and Gilabert and Lawford-Smith (2012), SR1.5 introduced \r\nmulti-dimensional approaches to analysing 'feasibility' and 'enabling \r\nconditions', which AR6 develops and applies broadly in relation to \r\nsix 'dimensions of feasibility assessment' (Figure 1.8). Two reflect the \r\nphysical environment:"


id: 3de3dd2ebd0b3751d537626033abd9f1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Figure 1.8 also illustrates variants on these dimensions appropriate \r\nfor evaluating domestic and international policies (Chapters 13 and \r\n14). The SR1.5 (Section 4.4) also introduced a framework of 'Enabling \r\nConditions for systemic change', which as illustrated also has key \r\ndimensions in common with those of our feasibility assessment. In \r\nAR6 these enabling conditions are applied particularly in the context \r\nof shifting development pathways (Chapter 4.4)."


id: 16468f36088f9a9aa483ff05b3ce3f69
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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content:
"Some fundamental criteria may span across several dimensions. \r\nMost obviously, issues of ethics and equity are intrinsic to the \r\neconomic, socio-cultural (values, including intergenerational justice) \r\nand institutional (e.g.,  procedural justice) dimensions. Geopolitical \r\nissues could also clearly involve several dimensions, for example, \r\nconcerning the politics of international trade, finance and resource \r\ndistribution (economic dimension); international versus nationalistic \r\nidentity (socio-cultural); and multilateral governance (institutional)."


id: 277e267be6778d8f187d929f4854757b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"The other four dimensions correspond broadly to the four analytic \r\nframeworks outlined in Section 1.7:"


id: 4fad86c0b69394909a0dda22d5a9d3b1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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content:
"In this report, chapters with a strong demand-side dimension also \r\nsuggest a simple policy hierarchy, reflecting that avoiding wastage - \r\ndemands superfluous to human needs and wants  - can carry \r\nbenefits across multiple indicators. Consequently, Chapters 5 and 10 \r\norganise key actions in a hierarchy of Avoid (unnecessary demand) - \r\nShift (to less resource-intensive modes)  - Improve (technologies \r\nfor existing modes), with a  closely-related policy hierarchy in \r\nChapter 9 (buildings)."


id: e360727a06032a614f2caee0fc6398b7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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content:
"The fact that investors anticipate a  level of fossil fuel use that is \r\nnot compatible with severe climate constraints creates a clear risk \r\nof 'stranded assets' facing these investors (Box  6.2), and others \r\nwho depend on them, which itself raises issues of equity. A multi\u0002dimensional/multi-framework assessment helps to explain why \r\nsuch investments have continued, even in rich countries, and the \r\nconsequent risks, and the complexity of shifting such investments \r\nin all countries. It may also inform approaches that could exploit \r\npath-dependence in clean energy systems, if there is sufficient \r\ninvestment in building up the low-GHG industries, infrastructures \r\nand networks required."


id: e585fd6a469adff13bfed7bd7f231372
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"The rest of this section illustrates briefly how such multi-dimensional \r\nassessment, utilising the associated analytic frameworks, can shed \r\nlight on a  few key issues which arise across many chapters of \r\nthis assessment."


id: c935f8fe1df4a0bc06963b106f69dd87
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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content:
"Carbon Lock-in. The continued rise of global emissions reflects in \r\npart the strongly path-dependent nature of socio-economic systems, \r\nwhich implies a historic tendency to 'carbon lock-in' (Unruh 2000). \r\nAn interdisciplinary review (Seto et al. 2016) identifies a dozen main \r\ncomponents organised into four types, across the relevant dimensions \r\nof assessment as summarised in Table 1.3."


id: ac8efb8558e0ccb222afbe4f7c7ad50d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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vector_id: 27595
content:
"Along with the long lifetime of various physical assets detailed \r\nin AR5, AR6 underlines the exceptional degree of path-dependence \r\nin urban systems (Chapter 8) and associated buildings (Chapter 9) \r\nand transport (Chapter 10) sectors, but it is a feature across almost \r\nall the major emitting sectors. The (typically expected) operating \r\nlifetimes of existing carbon-emitting assets would involve anticipated \r\nemissions (often but inaccurately called 'committed' emissions in the \r\nliterature), substantially exceeding the remaining carbon budgets \r\nassociated with 1.5degC pathways (Chapter  2.7). Ongoing GHG\u0002intensive investments, including those from basic industrialisation in \r\npoorer countries, are adding to this."


id: 2e716e82750ec98a9e52cc423e38e0dc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5451
content:
"Table 1.3 | Carbon lock-in - types and key characteristics. Source: adapted from Seto et al. (2016)."


id: b50da6f21ef044e20ca7fbbd8cab4d2d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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content:
"evaluate government and regulatory decisions, to compensate for \r\ninadequate carbon prices in actual markets, and by companies to \r\nreflect the external damage of their emissions and strategic risks of \r\nfuture carbon controls (Zhou and Wen 2020). An agreed 'social value \r\nof mitigation activities' could form a basic index for underwriting risks \r\nin low-carbon investments internationally (Hourcade et al. 2021a)."


id: 990eba8a553ceba7efa7ab4a0a342b49
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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content:
"than most economic analyses now recommend (Section 3.6.1), and \r\nnowhere is carbon pricing the only instrument deployed."


id: 8bef01512cf9dd1fe8769942c06cb4ee
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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content:
"Thus, practical assessment of carbon pricing inherently needs multi\u0002dimensional analysis. The realities of political economy and lobbying \r\nhave to date severely limited the implementation of carbon pricing \r\n(Mildenberger 2020), leading some social scientists to ask 'Can we \r\nprice carbon?' (Rabe 2018). Slowly growing adoption (World Bank \r\n2019) suggests 'yes', but only through complex evolution of efforts: \r\na study of 66 implemented carbon-pricing policies show important \r\neffects of regional clustering, international processes, and seizing \r\npolitical windows of opportunity (Skovgaard et al. 2019)."


id: c2bfeda2ed72a9693f2076981fc9647f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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vector_id: 31547
content:
"Just Transitions. Finally, whilst 'transition' frameworks may \r\nexplain potential dynamics that could transform systems, a  multi\u0002dimensional/multi-framework assessment underlines the motivation \r\nfor Just Transitions (Sections 1.6.2.3 and 4.5). This can be defined as \r\na transition from a high-carbon to a low-carbon economy which is \r\nconsidered sufficiently equitable for the affected individuals, workers, \r\ncommunities, sectors, regions and countries (Jasanoff 2018; Newell \r\nand Mulvaney 2013). As noted, sufficient equity is not only an ethical \r\nissue but an enabler of deeper ambition for accelerated mitigation \r\n(Klinsky and Winkler 2018; Urpelainen and Van de Graaf 2018; \r\nHoegh-Guldberg et al. 2019). Perception of fairness influences the \r\neffectiveness of cooperative action (Winkler et al. 2018), and this can \r\napply to affected individuals, workers, communities, sectors, regions \r\nand countries (Newell and Mulvaney 2013; Jasanoff 2018)."


id: 4be98bb2892fbf2d74c07eaf616f42e0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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content:
"Technological and transitions perspectives in turn find carbon\u0002pricing incentives may only stimulate incremental improvements, \r\nbut other instruments may be much more effective for driving \r\ndeeper innovation and transitions (Chapters 14, 15 and 16), whilst \r\npsychological and behavioural studies emphasise many factors \r\nbeyond only pricing (Sections  5.4.1 and 5.4.2). In practice, a  wide \r\nrange of policy instruments are used (Chapter 13)."


id: 1ea480b1ce438024acc25fcc3a980798
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Finally, in economic theory, negotiations on a common carbon price \r\n(or other common policies) may have large benefits (less subject to \r\n'free riding') compared to a  focus on negotiating national targets \r\n(Cramton et al. 2017a). The fact that this has never even been \r\nseriously considered (outside some efforts in the EU) may reflect the \r\nexceptional sovereignty sensitivities around taxation and cultural \r\ndifferences around the role of markets. However, carbon-pricing \r\nconcepts can be important outside of the traditional market ('tax \r\nor trading') applications. A  'social cost of carbon' can be used to "


id: 305a7925e8b9ea5295c70d059c97762d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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content:
"A Just Transitions framing can also enable coalitions which integrate \r\nlow-carbon transformations with concerns for climate adaptation \r\n(Patterson et al. 2018). All this explains the emergence of 'Just \r\nTransition Commissions' in several of the more ambitious developed \r\ncountries and complex social packages for coal phase-out in Europe "


id: 83120d24d9c68beff3ac8d5dd9b8f587
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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content:
"(Sovacool et al. 2019; Green and Gambhir 2020) (Section 4.5), as well \r\nas reference to the concept in the PA and its emphasis in the Talanoa \r\nDialogue and Silesia Declaration (Section 1.2.2)."


id: 8221ffcc6d878d13a76a53457d5de14f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
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vector_id: 20019
content:
"change are no longer the exclusive preserve of government actors \r\nbut rather involve a range of non-nation state actors such as cities, \r\nbusinesses, and civil society organisations (IPCC 2014a; Backstrand \r\net al. 2017; Jordan et al. 2018) (Chapter 13, and Sections 13.3.1 and \r\n13.5.2). Increased multi-level participation of sub-national actors, \r\nalong with a  diversity of other transnational and non-state actors \r\nhas helped to facilitate increased awareness, experimentation, \r\ninnovation, learning and achieving benefits at multiple scales. Multi\u0002level participation in governance systems can help to build coalitions \r\nto support climate change mitigation policies (Roberts et al. 2018) \r\nand fragmentation has the potential to take cooperative and even \r\nsynergistic forms (Biermann et al. 2009)."


id: 1f5ba8a9104c24d82799e4f1a500ea97
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Whilst the broad concepts of Just Transitions have roots going \r\nback decades, its specific realisation in relation to climate change \r\nis of course complex: Section  4.5 identifies at least eight distinct \r\nelements proposed in the literature, even before considering the \r\ninternational dimensions."


id: 89592877f3d7caafc8a4423eff161f63
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"However, there is no guarantee that multi-level governance can \r\nsuccessfully deal with complex human-ecological systems (York \r\net al. 2005; Biermann et al. 2017; Di Gregorio et al. 2019). Multi\u0002level governance can contribute to an extremely polarised discussion \r\nand policy blockage rather than enabling policy innovation (Fisher \r\nand Leifeld 2019). A fragmented governance landscape may lead to \r\ncoordination and legitimacy gaps undermining the regime (Nasiritousi \r\nand Backstrand 2019). The realities of the 'drivers and constraints' \r\ndetailed in Section 4, the 'glocal' nature of climate change, the divided \r\nauthority in world politics, diverse preferences of public and private \r\nentities across the spectrum, and pervasive suspicions of free riding, \r\nimply the challenge as how to incrementally deepen cooperation in \r\na polycentric global system, rather than seeking a single, integrated \r\ngovernance (Keohane and Victor 2016)."


id: dc8671716724a54ce9dff0a3a3eafe90
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Climate change governance has been projected as conscious \r\ntransformation at unprecedented scale and speed involving \r\na  contest of ideas and experimentation across scales of authority \r\nand jurisdiction (Hilden et al. 2017; Kivimaa et al. 2017; Laakso et al. \r\n2017; Gordon 2018; van der Heijden 2018). Yet, there remains a sense \r\nthat achieving the urgent transition to a low-carbon, climate-resilient \r\nand sustainable world requires significant innovation in governance \r\n(Hoffmann 2011; Stevenson and Dryzek 2013; Aykut 2016)."


id: d38886a972c47cd238054387a31a2f59
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34556
content:
"Starting from an initial focus on multilateral agreements, climate \r\nchange governance has long evolved into a  complex polycentric \r\nstructure that spans from the global to national and sub-national \r\nlevels, with 'multiple parallel initiatives involving a range of actors at \r\ndifferent levels of governance' (Okereke et al. 2009) and relying on \r\nboth formal and informal networks and policy channels (Bulkeley et al. \r\n2014; Jordan et al. 2015). At the international level, implementation \r\nof the Paris Agreement and the UNFCCC more broadly is proceeding \r\nin parallel with other activities in an increasingly diverse landscape \r\nof loosely coordinated institutions, constituting 'regime complex' \r\n(Keohane and Victor 2011), and new cooperative efforts demonstrate \r\nan evolution in the shifting authority given to actors at different \r\nlevels of governance (Chan et al. 2018)."


id: 492b19b0ef2501fcd3d2e055b0a1e6ca
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content:
"responsibilities, related financial systems, and domestic policy design \r\nin all countries. Explicit frameworks for analysing transition and \r\ntransformation across multiple sectors need to draw on both socio\u0002technical transition literatures, and those on social transformation. \r\nFinally, literatures on psychology, behaviour and political sciences\r\ncan illuminate obstacles that have impeded progress to date and \r\nsuggest ways to overcome them."


id: 21e647126579a74dbaf55579d04cb8f7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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content:
"No single analytical framework, or single discipline, on its own can \r\noffer a  comprehensive assessment of climate change mitigation. \r\nTogether they point to the relevance of growing literatures and \r\ndiscourses on Just Transitions, and the role of governance at multiple \r\nlevels. Ultimately all these frameworks are needed to inform the \r\ndecisions required to deepen and connect the scattered elements \r\nof progress to date, and hence accelerate progress towards agreed \r\ngoals and multiple dimensions of climate change mitigation in the \r\ncontext of sustainable development."


id: c3022a31ca0128f4138af9286648a953
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Despite huge expansion in the literature (Callaghan et al. 2020), \r\nknowledge gaps remain. Modeling still struggles to bring together \r\ndetailed physical and economic climate impacts and mitigation, \r\nwith limited representation of financial and distributional dynamics. \r\nThere are few interdisciplinary tools which apply theories of \r\ntransition and transformation to questions of economic and social \r\nimpacts, compounded by remaining uncertainties concerning the \r\nrole of new technological sets, international instruments, policy and \r\npolitical evaluation."


id: e95f89794455b51322b3a502e36f03a6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38416
content:
"One scan of future research needs suggests three priority areas (Roberts \r\net al. 2020): (i) human welfare-focused development (e.g., reducing \r\ninequality); (ii) how the historic position of states within international \r\npower relations conditions their ability to respond to climate change; \r\n(iii) transition dynamics and the flexibility of institutions to drive \r\ntowards low-carbon development pathways. There remain gaps in \r\nunderstanding how international dynamics and agreements filter \r\ndown to affect constituencies and local implementation. Literature \r\non the potential for supply-side agreements, in which producers \r\nagree to restrict the supply of fossil fuels (e.g., Asheim et al. 2019) is \r\nlimited but gaining increasing academic attention."


id: f9cf4952e5ccbe5b809ccf0dd41a98fe
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41308
content:
"Nature is under pressure both at land and at sea, as demonstrated by \r\ndeclining biodiversity (IPBES 2019). Climate policies could increase \r\nthe pressure on land and oceans (IPCC 2019c,b), with insufficient \r\nattention to relationships between biodiversity and climate \r\nagreements and associated policies. IPBES aims to coordinate with \r\nthe IPCC more directly, but literature will be required to support \r\nthese reports."


id: d6cac761e220ed74a9767beb05e01263
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35099
content:
"Multiple frameworks of analytic assessment, adapted to the \r\nrealities of climate change mitigation, are therefore required. We \r\nidentified four main groups. Aggregate economic frameworks  - \r\nincluding environmental costs or goals, and with due attention to \r\nimplied behavioural, distributional and dynamic assumptions - can \r\nprovide insights about trade-offs, cost-effectiveness and policies for \r\ndelivering agreed goals. Ethical frameworks are equally essential \r\nto inform both international and domestic discourse and decisions, \r\nincluding the relationship with international (and intergenerational) "


id: 6d939e8376063449949a52acf8394f7c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16542
content:
"Compounding these gaps is the fact that socially oriented, agriculture\u0002related options, where human and non-human systems intersect most \r\nobviously, remain under-researched (e.g., Balasubramanya and Stifel \r\n2020). Efforts to engage with policies here, especially framed around \r\necosystem services, have often neglected their 'practical fitness' in "


id: e73bd37ebefcae6d666b8c58dc4341de
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37979
content:
"favour of focusing on their 'institutional fitness', which needs to be \r\naddressed in future research (Stevenson et al. 2021)."


id: 4bbfb679d887e72cc9d7a52dd22c853
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10587
content:
"The relative roles of short-term mitigation policies and long-term \r\ninvestments, including government and financial decision-making \r\ntools, remains inadequately explored. Strategic investments may \r\ninclude city planning, public transport, EV-charging networks, and \r\nCCU/CCS.  Understanding how international treaties can increase \r\nincentives to make such investments is all the more salient in the \r\naftermath of COVID-19, on which research is necessarily young but \r\nrapidly growing. Finally, the economic, institutional and political \r\nstrategies to close the gap between NDCs, actual implementation, \r\nand mitigation goals - informed by the PA and the UNFCCC Global \r\nStocktake - require much further research."


id: b199728ada66497c381e09567ab14d35
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28470
content:
"This Sixth Assessment Report covers mitigation in five main parts \r\n(Figure 1.9), namely: introduction and frameworks; emission trends, \r\nscenarios and pathways; sectors; institutional dimensions including \r\nnational and international policy, financial and technological \r\nmitigation drivers; and conclusions."


id: 9740cebf79b03ad2f8dd013b96c475fc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23805
content:
"Finally, Chapter  17 considers accelerating the transition in the \r\ncontext of sustainable development, including practical pathways \r\nfor joint responses to climate change and sustainable development \r\nchallenges. This includes major regional perspectives, mitigation\u0002adaptation interlinkages, and enabling conditions including the roles \r\nof technology, finance and cooperation for sustainable development."


id: 218100ed6d09b6be42ff0b288d8eda2d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3104
content:
"Chapters 2 to 5 cover the big picture trends, drivers and projections \r\nat national and global levels. Chapter  2  analyses emission trends \r\nand drivers to date. Chapter 3 presents long-term global scenarios, \r\nincluding the projected economic and other characteristics of \r\nmitigation through to the balancing of sources and sinks through \r\nthe second half of this century, and the implications for global \r\ntemperature change and risks. Chapter 4 explores the shorter-term \r\nprospects including NDCs, and the possibilities for accelerating \r\nmitigation out to 2050 in the context of sustainable development \r\nat the national, regional and international scales. Chapter 5, a new \r\nchapter for IPCC Assessments, focuses upon the role of services and \r\nderived demand for energy and land use, and the social dimensions."


id: 3ba2d5de1d61a9a5eec3619086c916f5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7676
content:
"Climate change mitigation refers to actions or activities that limit emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) from entering the \r\natmosphere and/or reduce their levels in the atmosphere. Mitigation includes reducing the GHGs emitted from energy production \r\nand use (e.g., that reduces use of fossil fuels), and land use, and methods to mitigate warming, for example, by carbon sinks which \r\nremove emissions from the atmosphere through land-use or other (including artificial) mechanisms (Sections 12.3 and 14.4.5; see \r\nAR6 WGI for physical science, and WGIII Chapter 7 for AFOLU mitigation)."


id: 71e55b16ef289dd75a74c6eea22dca12
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17285
content:
"The ultimate goal of mitigation is to preserve a biosphere which can sustain human civilisation and the complex of ecosystem \r\nservices which surround and support it. This means reducing anthropogenic GHG emissions towards net zero to limit the warming, \r\nwith global goals agreed in the Paris Agreement. Effective mitigation strategies require an understanding of mechanisms that \r\nunderpin release of emissions, and the technical, policy and societal options for influencing these."


id: ddbb20da0aebcbd10124d8e89003f0dd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36271
content:
"Anthropogenic GHGs such as carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), and fluorinated gases (e.g., hydrofluorocarbons, \r\nperfluorocarbons, sulphur hexafluoride) are released from various sources. CO2 makes the largest contribution to global GHG \r\nemissions, but some have extremely long atmospheric lifetimes extending to tens of thousands of years, such as F-gases (Chapter 2)."


id: 81b17a7ea1ebec2b2138124f59829f85
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19947
content:
"Annex I (Glossary) states that 'carbon neutrality and net zero CO2 emissions are overlapping concepts' which 'can be applied at the \r\nglobal or sub-global scales (e.g., regional, national and sub-national)'. At the global scale the terms are equivalent. At sub-global \r\nscales, net zero CO2 typically applies to emissions under direct control or territorial responsibility of the entity reporting them \r\n(e.g., a country, district or sector); while carbon neutrality is also applied to firms, commodities and activities (e.g., a service or an \r\nevent) and generally includes emissions and removals beyond the entity's direct control or territorial responsibility, termed 'Scope \r\n3' or 'value chain emissions' (Bhatia et al. 2011)."


id: 294c2a0361b63e27f11b022799c720b7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4484
content:
"This means the emissions and removals that should be included are wider for 'neutrality' than for net zero goals, but also that offset \r\nmechanisms could be employed to help achieve neutrality through abatement beyond what is possible under the direct control \r\nof the entity. Rules and environmental integrity criteria are intended to ensure additionality and avoid double counting of offsets \r\nconsistent with 'neutrality' claims (see 'carbon neutrality' and 'offset' in Glossary, for detail and a list of criteria)."


id: 423bb3669a39703e202f4e766da1b733
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8854
content:
"While the term 'carbon' neutrality in this report is defined as referring specifically to CO2 neutrality, use of this term in practice can \r\nbe ambiguous, as some users apply it to neutrality of all GHG emissions. GHG neutrality means an entity's gross emissions of all \r\nGHG must be balanced by the removal of an equivalent amount of CO2 from the atmosphere. This requires the selection of a suitable \r\nmetric that aggregates emissions from non-CO2 gases, such as the commonly used GWP100 metric (for a discussion of GHG metrics, \r\nsee AR6 WGI Box 1.3 and Cross-Chapter Box 2 in Chapter 2 of this report)."


id: e61cf1887c30c7bbd67d1f03903b038b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37782
content:
"Amr Abdel-Aziz (Egypt), Maria Josefina Figueroa Meza (Venezuela/Denmark), Klaus Hubacek (the \r\nNetherlands/the United States of America), Inge G.C. Jonckheere (Italy/Belgium), Yong-Gun Kim \r\n(Republic of Korea), Gregory F. Nemet (the United States of America/Canada), Shonali Pachauri \r\n(India), Xianchun C. Tan (China), Thomas Wiedmann (Australia/Germany)"


id: a918cf1790713fea2a9f8721c5470317
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26962
content:
"Dhakal, S., J.C. Minx, F.L. Toth, A. Abdel-Aziz, M.J. Figueroa Meza, K. Hubacek, I.G.C. Jonckheere, Yong-Gun Kim, G.F. Nemet, \r\nS. Pachauri, X.C. Tan, T. Wiedmann, 2022: Emissions Trends and Drivers. In IPCC, 2022: Climate Change 2022: Mitigation \r\nof Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on \r\nClimate Change [P.R. Shukla, J. Skea, R. Slade, A. Al Khourdajie, R. van Diemen, D. McCollum, M. Pathak, S. Some, P. Vyas, \r\nR. Fradera, M. Belkacemi, A. Hasija, G. Lisboa, S. Luz, J. Malley, (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and \r\nNew York, NY, USA. doi: 10.1017/9781009157926.004"


id: e1bf9178c4f9d5e3d3afc9bdaa82283d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36994
content:
"Cumulative net CO2 emissions of the last decade (2010-2019) \r\nare about the same size as the remaining carbon budget for \r\nkeeping warming to 1.5degC (medium confidence). Cumulative \r\nnet CO2 emissions since 1850 are increasing at an accelerating rate: \r\nabout 62% of total cumulative CO2 emissions from 1850 to 2019 \r\noccurred since 1970 (1500 +- 140 GtCO2); about 43% since 1990 \r\n(1000 +- 90 GtCO2); and about 17% since 2010 (410 +- 30 GtCO2). For \r\ncomparison, the remaining carbon budget for keeping warming to \r\n1.5degC with a 67% (50%) probability is about 400 (500) +- 220 GtCO2\r\n(medium confidence). {2.2.2, Figure  2.7; AR6 WGI 5.5; AR6 WGI \r\nTable 5.8}"


id: 2b71c89bc7810f466d593ef7ae424903
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4893
content:
"Global net anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions \r\nduring the last decade (2010-2019) were higher than at any \r\nprevious time in human history (high confidence). Since 2010, \r\nGHG emissions have continued to grow, reaching 59 +- 6.6 GtCO2-eq \r\nin 2019,1\r\n but the average annual growth in the last decade \r\n(1.3%, 2010-2019) was lower than in the previous decade (2.1%, \r\n2000-2009) (high confidence). Average annual GHG emissions were \r\n56 +- 6.0 GtCO2-eq yr -1 for the decade 2010-2019 growing by about \r\n9.1 GtCO2-eq yr-1 from the previous decade (2000-2009)  - the \r\nhighest decadal average on record (high confidence). {2.2.2, Table 2.1, \r\nFigure 2.2, Figure 2.5}"


id: 46a0d027a8cbfbd54b7f94161e386401
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9630
content:
"A growing number of countries have achieved GHG emission \r\nreductions longer than 10 years - a few at rates that are broadly \r\nconsistent with climate change mitigation scenarios that limit \r\nwarming to well below 2degC (high confidence). There are at least \r\n18 countries that have reduced CO2 and GHG emissions for longer than \r\n10 years. Reduction rates in a few countries have reached 4% in some \r\nyears, in line with rates observed in pathways that limit warming to \r\n2degC (>67%). However, the total reduction in annual GHG emissions of \r\nthese countries is small (about 3.2 GtCO2-eq yr-1) compared to global \r\nemissions growth observed over the last decades. Complementary \r\nevidence suggests that countries have decoupled  territorial \r\nCO2  emissions from GDP, but fewer have decoupled consumption\u0002based emissions from GDP. This decoupling has mostly occurred in \r\ncountries with high per capita GDP and high per capita CO2 emissions. \r\n{2.2.3, 2.3.3, Figure 2.11, Table 2.3, Table 2.4}"


id: df11f2942e7fdb2ba7d3332f27c4b49a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36496
content:
"Consumption-based CO2 emissions in Developed Countries \r\nand the Asia and Pacific region are higher than in other \r\nregions (high confidence). In Developed Countries, consumption\u0002based CO2 emissions peaked at 15 GtCO2 in 2007, declining to about \r\n13 GtCO2 in 2018. The Asia and Pacific region, with 52% of current \r\nglobal population, has become a major contributor to consumption\u0002based CO2 emission growth since 2000 (5.5% yr -1 for 2000-2018); \r\nit exceeded the Developed Countries region, which accounts for 16% \r\nof current global population, as the largest emitter of consumption\u0002based CO2. {2.3.2, Figure 2.14}"


id: 8b46c18a72da4b8cf6ceaae6bb64e199
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21664
content:
"Globally, gross domestic product (GDP) per  capita and \r\npopulation growth remained the strongest drivers of CO2\r\nemissions from fossil fuel combustion in the last decade \r\n(robust evidence, high agreement). Trends since 1990 continued \r\nin the years 2010 to 2019 with GDP per capita and population growth \r\nincreasing emissions by 2.3% and 1.2% yr -1, respectively. This \r\ngrowth outpaced the reduction in the use of energy per unit of GDP \r\n(-2% yr-1, globally) as well as improvements in the carbon intensity \r\nof energy (-0.3% yr-1) (high confidence). {2.4.1, Figure 2.16}"


id: 883b1ae26441a06648f0b2984f7ec828
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21118
content:
"Carbon intensity improvements in the production of traded \r\nproducts have led to a net reduction in CO2 emissions embodied \r\nin international trade (robust evidence, high agreement).\r\nA  decrease in the carbon intensity of traded products has offset \r\nincreased trade volumes between 2006 and 2016. Emissions embodied \r\nin internationally traded products depend on the composition of the \r\nglobal supply chain across sectors and countries and the respective \r\ncarbon intensity of production processes (emissions per  unit of \r\neconomic output). {2.3, 2.4}"


id: 28a13b9a86db4ae90d6247e954ce4692
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4360
content:
"The global COVID-19 pandemic led to a  steep drop in CO2\r\nemissions from fossil fuel and industry (high confidence).\r\nGlobal CO2-FFI emissions dropped in 2020 by about 5.8% (5.1-6.3%) \r\nor about 2.2 (1.9-2.4) GtCO2 compared to 2019. Emissions, however, \r\nhave rebounded globally by the end of December 2020 (medium \r\nconfidence). {2.2.2, Figure 2.6}"


id: 33e2b2b677bb94a4f2e72b58ae160226
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6367
content:
"Developed Countries tend to be net CO2 emission importers, \r\nwhereas developing countries tend to be net emission exporters \r\n(robust evidence, high agreement). Net CO2 emission  transfers \r\nfrom developing to Developed Countries via global supply chains \r\nhave decreased between 2006 and 2016. Between 2004 and 2011, \r\nCO2 emission embodied in trade between developing countries have \r\nmore than doubled (from 0.47 to 1.1 Gt) with the centre of trade \r\nactivities shifting from Europe to Asia. {2.3.4, Figure 2.15}"


id: a90d7e74d202137bdc86a846f1934fa4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26954
content:
"GHG emissions in the industry, buildings and transport \r\nsectors continue to grow, driven by an increase in the global \r\ndemand for products and services (high confidence). These final \r\ndemand sectors make up 44% of global GHG emissions, or 66% when \r\nthe emissions from electricity and heat production are reallocated as \r\nindirect emissions to related sectors, mainly to industry and buildings. \r\nEmissions are driven by the large rise in demand for basic materials \r\nand manufactured products, a global trend of increasing floor space \r\nper capita, building energy service use, travel distances, and vehicle \r\nsize and weight. Between 2010 and 2019, domestic and international \r\naviation were particularly fast growing at average annual rates of \r\n+3.3% and +3.4%. Global energy efficiencies have improved in \r\nall three demand sectors, but carbon intensities have not. {2.2.4; \r\nFigures 2.18 to 2.20}"


id: 82df41b09b38afe626cd0882c3084a73
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20154
content:
"Providing access to modern energy services universally would \r\nincrease global GHG emissions by, at most, a  few percent \r\n(medium confidence). The additional energy demand needed \r\nto support decent living standards3\r\n for all is estimated to be well \r\nbelow current average energy consumption (medium evidence, high \r\nagreement). More equitable income distributions can reduce carbon \r\nemissions, but the nature of this relationship can vary by level of income \r\nand development (limited evidence, medium agreement). {2.4.3}"


id: 15462f37725e19e10a0af8f8c4fadca4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 960
content:
"Evidence of rapid energy transitions exists, but only at \r\nsub-global scales (medium evidence, medium agreement).\r\nEmerging evidence since the Fifth Assessment Report of the \r\nIntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC AR5) on past \r\nenergy transitions identifies a growing number of cases of accelerated \r\ntechnology diffusion at sub-global scales and describes mechanisms \r\nby which future energy transitions may occur more quickly than \r\nthose in the past. Important drivers include technology transfer \r\nand cooperation, intentional policy and financial support, and \r\nharnessing synergies among technologies within a sustainable energy \r\nsystem perspective (medium evidence, medium agreement). A  fast \r\nglobal low-carbon energy transition enabled by finance to facilitate \r\nlow-carbon technology adoption in developing, and particularly in \r\nleast-developed countries, can facilitate achieving climate stabilisation \r\ntargets (robust evidence, high agreement). {2.5.2, Table 2.5}"


id: 9a4643b0d5b6b59824f433057aa5c3f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24387
content:
"Multiple low-carbon technologies have shown rapid progress \r\nsince AR5 - in cost, performance, and adoption - enhancing \r\nthe feasibility of rapid energy transitions (robust evidence, \r\nhigh agreement). The rapid deployment and cost decrease of \r\nmodular technologies like solar, wind, and batteries have occurred \r\nmuch faster than anticipated by experts and modelled in previous \r\nmitigation scenarios (robust evidence, high agreement). The political, \r\neconomic, social, and technical feasibility of solar energy, wind energy \r\nand electricity storage technologies has improved dramatically over \r\nthe past few years. In contrast, the adoption of nuclear energy and \r\ncarbon capture and storage (CCS) in the electricity sector has been \r\nslower than the growth rates anticipated in stabilisation scenarios. \r\nEmerging evidence since AR5 indicates that small-scale technologies \r\n(e.g., solar, batteries) tend to improve faster and be adopted more "


id: db8f9539c5afad3bc7d789fe10cd2782
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35912
content:
"Average annual growth in GHG emissions from energy supply \r\ndecreased from 2.3% for 2000-2009 to 1.0% for 2010-2019 \r\n(high confidence). This slowing of growth is attributable to further \r\nimprovements in energy efficiency (annually, 1.9% less energy per unit \r\nof GDP was used globally between 2010 and 2019). Reductions in \r\nglobal carbon intensity by -0.2% yr-1 contributed further - reversing \r\nthe trend during 2000 to 2009 (+0.2% yr -1) (medium confidence). \r\nThese carbon intensity improvements were driven by fuel switching \r\nfrom coal to gas, reduced expansion of coal capacity, particularly in \r\nEastern Asia, and the increased use of renewables. {2.2.4, 2.4.2.1, \r\nFigure 2.17}"


id: 34a973f6e0074352e7c35fb2d26b1d43
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6501
content:
"A broad range of climate policies, including instruments like \r\ncarbon pricing, play an increasing role in GHG emissions \r\nreductions. The literature is in broad agreement, but the \r\nmagnitude of the reduction rate varies by the data and \r\nmethodology used, country, and sector (robust evidence, \r\nhigh agreement). Countries with a lower carbon pricing gap (higher \r\ncarbon price) tend to be less carbon intensive (medium confidence). \r\n{2.8.2, 2.8.3}"


id: a48f11cc9d4f23d557085a6ab422f27
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26164
content:
"quickly than large-scale technologies (nuclear, CCS) (medium \r\nevidence, medium agreement). {2.5.3, 2.5.4, Figures 2.22 and 2.23}"


id: e2e0be041ffd593defef4e5a01f9c92b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37213
content:
"Robust incentives for investment in innovation, especially \r\nincentives reinforced by national policy and international \r\nagreements, are central to accelerating low-carbon \r\ntechnological change (robust evidence, medium agreement).\r\nPolicies have driven innovation, including instruments for technology \r\npush (e.g.,  scientific training, research and development) and \r\ndemand pull (e.g.,  carbon pricing, adoption subsidies), as well as \r\nthose promoting knowledge flows and especially technology transfer. \r\nThe magnitude of the scale-up challenge elevates the importance of \r\nrapid technology development and adoption. This includes ensuring \r\nparticipation of developing countries in an enhanced global flow of \r\nknowledge, skills, experience, and equipment. Also, technology itself \r\nrequires strong financial, institutional, and capacity-building support \r\n(robust evidence, high agreement). {2.5.4, 2.5, 2.8}"


id: 8765e4f4d0aa156456605e6df6031dd9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20981
content:
"Climate-related policies have also contributed to decreasing \r\nGHG emissions. Policies such as taxes and subsidies for clean \r\nand public transportation, and renewable policies have \r\nreduced GHG emissions in some contexts (robust evidence, \r\nhigh agreement). Pollution control policies and legislations that \r\ngo beyond end-of-pipe controls have also had climate co-benefits, \r\nparticularly if complementarities with GHG emissions are considered \r\nin policy design (medium evidence, medium agreement). Policies on \r\nAFOLU and sector-related policies such as afforestation can have \r\nimportant impacts on GHG emissions (medium evidence, medium \r\nagreement). {2.8.4}"


id: 8e44cfbe805da67c9cb9088f3f088797
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22222
content:
"The global wealthiest 10% contribute about 36-45% of \r\nglobal GHG emissions (robust evidence, high agreement).\r\nThe  global  10% wealthiest consumers live in all continents, with \r\ntwo-thirds in high-income regions and one-third in emerging \r\neconomies (robust evidence, medium agreement). The lifestyle \r\nconsumption emissions of the middle-income and poorest citizens \r\nin emerging economies are between 5 and 50 times below their \r\ncounterparts in high-income countries (medium evidence, medium \r\nagreement). Increasing inequality within a  country can exacerbate \r\ndilemmas of redistribution and social cohesion, and affect the \r\nwillingness of rich and poor to accept lifestyle changes for mitigation \r\nand policies to protect the environment (medium evidence, medium \r\nagreement) {2.6.1, 2.6.2, Figure 2.25}"


id: 71c7c5302aaf04d7cc10a900ed7ae674
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17259
content:
"While AR5 has mostly assessed GHG emissions trends and drivers \r\nbetween 1970 and 2010, this assessment focuses on the period \r\n1990-2019 with the main emphasis on changes since 2010. \r\nCompared to Chapter  5 in the contribution of WG III to AR5 \r\n(Blanco  et  al. 2014), the scope of the present chapter is broader. \r\nIt presents the historical background of global progress in climate \r\nchange mitigation for the rest of the report and serves as a starting \r\npoint for the assessment of long-term as well as near- and medium\u0002term mitigation pathways in Chapters 3 and 4, respectively. It also \r\nprovides a systemic perspective on past emissions trends in different \r\nsectors of the economy (Chapters 6-12), and relates GHG emissions \r\ntrends to past policies (Chapter  13) and observed technological \r\ndevelopment (Chapter  16). There is also a  greater focus on the \r\nanalysis of consumption-based sectoral emissions trends, empirical "


id: 6827bc57801526cc69bbe61ca90b39af
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15590
content:
"As demonstrated by the contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth \r\nAssessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change \r\n(AR6 WGI) (IPCC 2021a), greenhouse gas4\r\n (GHG) concentrations \r\nin the atmosphere and annual anthropogenic GHG  emissions \r\ncontinue  to grow and have reached a  historic high, driven mainly \r\nby continued fossil fuels use (Jackson et al. 2019; Friedlingstein et al. \r\n2020; Peters et  al. 2020). Unsurprisingly, a  large volume of new \r\nliterature has emerged since AR5 on the trends and underlying drivers \r\nof anthropogenic GHG emissions. This chapter provides a structured \r\nassessment of this new literature and establishes the most important \r\nthematic links to other chapters in this report."


id: 4ab8e44fc3ffab26d3c310b700b1de63
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"Figure 2.1 | Chapter 2 road map and linkages to other chapters. Black arrows show the causal chain driving emissions. Blue lines indicate key linkages to other chapters \r\nin this report."


id: 2b1739acf49647daf8425b30be09da5b
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"5 Industrial processes relate to CO2 releases from fossil fuel oxidation and carbonate decomposition."


id: 19df410f457a8f283736382b50a9ddd
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content:
"here. Other substances, including ozone and aerosols, that further \r\ncontribute climate forcing are only treated very briefly, but a  full \r\nchapter is devoted to this subject in the Working Group I contribution \r\nto AR6 (Szopa et al. 2021a; 2021b)."


id: 5452b128c8f85ab803f7526074810b2f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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"evidence of  emissions consequences of behavioural choices and \r\nlifestyles, and the social aspects of mitigation (Chapter  5). Finally, \r\na  completely new section discusses the mitigation implications of \r\nexisting and planned long-lived infrastructure and carbon lock-in."


id: 158a2d9b4a6d9e9a74433483ee3c40bd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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content:
"Figure  2.1 presents the road map of this chapter. It is a  simplified \r\nillustration of the causal chain driving emissions along the black \r\narrows. It also highlights the most important linkages to other \r\nchapters in this volume (blue lines). The logic of the figure is that the \r\nmain topic of this chapter is GHG emissions trends (discussed only \r\nin this chapter at such level of detail), hence they are at the top of \r\nthe figure in grey-outlined boxes. The secondary theme is the drivers \r\nbehind these trends, depicted in the second line of grey-outlined \r\nboxes. Four categories of drivers highlight key issues and guide readers \r\nto chapters in which more details are presented. Finally, in addition \r\nto their own motivations and objectives, climate and non-climate \r\npolicies and measures shape the aspirations and activities of actors in \r\nthe main driver categories, as shown in the grey-outlined box below."


id: 38e5bc881a6aaef9e00380db665738b6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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"Net CO2-LULUCF estimates are added to the dataset as the average \r\nof estimates from three bookkeeping models of land-use emissions \r\n(Hansis et al. 2015; Houghton and Nassikas 2017; Gasser et al. 2020) \r\nfollowing the Global Carbon Project (Friedlingstein et al. 2020). This \r\nis different to AR5, where land-based CO2 emissions from forest fires, \r\npeat fires, and peat decay, were used as an approximation of the \r\nnet-flux of CO2-LULUCF (Blanco et al. 2014). Note that the definition \r\nof CO2-LULUCF emissions by global carbon cycle models, as used \r\nhere, differs from IPCC definitions (IPCC 2006) applied in national \r\ngreenhouse gas inventories (NGHGI) for reporting under the climate \r\nconvention (Grassi et al. 2018, 2021) and, similarly, from estimates \r\nby the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) \r\nfor carbon fluxes on forest land (Tubiello et al. 2021). The conceptual "


id: 447da6574f7922f83ce3b827bdb4b1f2
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"Total anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions as discussed \r\nin this chapter comprise CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion \r\nand industrial (FFI) processes,5\r\n net CO2 emissions from land \r\nuse, land-use change, and forestry (CO2-LULUCF) (often named \r\nFOLU  - forestry and other land-use  - in previous IPCC reports), \r\nmethane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O) and fluorinated gases (F-gases) \r\ncomprising hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), \r\nsulphur hexafluoride (SF6) as well as nitrogen trifluoride (NF3). \r\nThere are other major sources of F-gas emissions that are regulated \r\nunder the Montreal Protocol such as chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) \r\nand hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) that also have considerable \r\nwarming impacts (Figure  2.4), however they are not considered "


id: c09725e1913e86dfac36c5ecc199a174
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content:
"across parameter values (e.g.,  Monni et  al. 2007; Robert J. Andres \r\net al. 2014; Tian et al. 2019; Solazzo et al. 2021)."


id: 96a254491a4c434dd9baa25230f5b8dd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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content:
"difference in approaches reflects different scopes. We use the \r\nglobal carbon cycle models' approach for consistency with Working \r\nGroup I (Canadell et  al. 2021) and to comprehensively distinguish \r\nnatural from anthropogenic drivers, while NGHGI generally report \r\nas anthropogenic all CO2 fluxes from lands considered managed \r\n(Section  7.2.2). Finally, note that the CO2-LULUCF estimate from \r\nbookkeeping models as provided in this chapter is indistinguishable \r\nfrom the CO2 from agriculture, forestry and other land use (AFOLU) \r\nas reported in Chapter 7, because the CO2 emissions component from \r\nagriculture is negligible."


id: f92407f8bbb29ed55707f0c6a505c935
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content:
"The resulting synthetic dataset used here has undergone additional \r\npeer review and is publicly available (Minx et al. 2021). Comprehensive \r\ninformation about the dataset as well as underlying uncertainties \r\n(including a  comparison with other datasets) can be found in the \r\nSupplementary Material to this chapter and in Minx et al. (2021)."


id: a0dee26430e592263ce4db75c5003c42
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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content:
"For this report, a  comprehensive assessment of uncertainties is \r\nprovided in the Supplementary Material (2.SM.2) to this chapter \r\nbased on Minx et al. (2021). The uncertainties reported here combine \r\nstatistical analysis, comparisons of global emissions inventories \r\nand an expert judgement of the likelihood of results lying outside \r\na  defined confidence interval, rooted in an understanding gained \r\nfrom the relevant literature. This literature has improved considerably \r\nsince AR5, with a growing number of studies that assess uncertainties \r\nbased on multiple lines of evidence (Saunois et  al. 2016, 2020; \r\nTian et al. 2020; Petrescu et al. 2021a, 2021b)."


id: 7cc1574c9b8b3ff2a130dd3cc08eb14f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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"To report the uncertainties in GHG emissions estimates, a  90% \r\nconfidence interval (5th-95th percentile) is adopted - that is, there \r\nis a 90% likelihood that the true value will be within the provided \r\nrange if the errors have a  Gaussian distribution, and no bias is \r\nassumed. This is in line with previous reporting in IPCC AR5 (Blanco \r\net al. 2014; Ciais et al. 2014). Note that national emissions inventory \r\nsubmissions to the UNFCCC are requested to report uncertainty using \r\na  95% confidence interval. The use of this broader uncertainty \r\ninterval implies, however, a  relatively high degree of knowledge \r\nabout the uncertainty structure of the associated data, particularly \r\nregarding the distribution of uncertainty in the tails of the probability \r\ndistributions. Such a high degree of knowledge is not present over all \r\nregions, emission sectors and species considered here."


id: 417699a5c5a0fa13e8945b93ce551567
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"Figure 2.2 | Estimates of global anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions from different data sources 1970-2019. "


id: b06c90fb5bcc8df9fd44c421e26f7171
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"confidence interval that range from relatively low values for CO2-FFI \r\n(+-8%), to intermediate values for CH4 and F-gases (+-30%), to higher \r\nvalues for N2O (+-60%) and CO2-LULUCF (+-70%). Uncertainties \r\nfor aggregated total GHG emissions in terms of CO2-eq emissions \r\nare calculated as the square root of the squared sums of absolute \r\nuncertainties for individual gases (taking F-gases together), using \r\nGWP100 to weight emissions of non-CO2 gases but excluding \r\nuncertainties in the metric itself."


id: 42a9a87657deee842396a0656544757c
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content:
"in line with the more recent literature (Saunois et  al. 2016, 2020; \r\nJanssens-Maenhout et al. 2019; Friedlingstein et al. 2020; Tian et al. \r\n2020; Solazzo et al. 2021) as well as the underlying synthetic analysis \r\nprovided here (e.g.,  Figures 2.2 and 2.3 in this chapter; and Minx \r\net  al. 2021). As such, reported changes in these estimates do not \r\nreflect changes in the underlying uncertainties, but rather a change \r\nin expert judgement based on an improved evidence base in the \r\nscientific literature. Uncertainty estimates for CO2-FFI and N2O remain \r\nunchanged compared to AR5. The change in the uncertainty estimates \r\nfor CH4 from 20% to 30% is justified by larger uncertainties reported \r\nfor EDGAR emissions (Janssens-Maenhout et al. 2019; Solazzo et al. "


id: 9235cdc54d9856056e34f11fd574c9f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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vector_id: 22943
content:
"This assessment of uncertainties is broadly in line with AR5 WGIII \r\n(Blanco et al. 2014), but revises individual uncertainty judgements "


id: fa9ea2ddeae15a2e2541e53522ac1ef
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content:
"Figure  2.3 | Comparison between top-down estimates and bottom-up EDGAR inventory data on GHG emissions for 1980-2016. Left panel: Total \r\nGWP100-weighted emissions based on IPCC AR6 (Forster et al. 2021a) of F-gases in Olivier and Peters (2020) [EDGARv5FT] (dark-red dotted line, excluding C4F10, C5F12, \r\nC6F14 and C7F16) and EDGARv6 (bright red dashed line) compared to top-down estimates based on AGAGE and NOAA data from WMO (2018) (blue lines; Engel and Rigby \r\n(2018); Montzka and Velders (2018)). Right panel: Top-down aggregated emissions for the three most abundant CFCs (-11, -12 and -113) and HCFCs (-22, -141b, \r\n-142b) not covered in bottom-up emissions inventories are shown in dark blue and yellow. For top-down estimates the shaded areas between two respective lines represent \r\n1s uncertainties. Source: Minx et al. (2021)."


id: 9e3a95152886ebf471458ff48aa0de81
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content:
"F-gas emissions is judged conservatively at 30%  - 10  percentage \r\npoints higher than in AR5 (Blanco et al. 2014)."


id: 8935c1c3b38533195b26c5e107bcd6e0
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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content:
"2021) as well as the wider literature (Kirschke et al. 2013; Tubiello \r\net  al. 2015; Saunois et  al. 2016, 2020). As AR6  - in contrast to \r\nAR5  - uses CO2-LULUCF data from global bookkeeping models, \r\nthe respective uncertainty estimate is based on the reporting in the \r\nunderlying literature (Friedlingstein et al. 2020) as well as Working \r\nGroup I (Canadell et al. 2021). The 70% uncertainty value is at the \r\nhigher end of the range considered in AR5 (Blanco et al. 2014)."


id: be61160c7ebcbc8dd8844483647335ee
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content:
"Aggregate uncertainty across all GHGs is approximately +-11% \r\ndepending on the composition of gases in a particular year. AR5 applied \r\na constant uncertainty estimates of +-10% for total GHG emissions. \r\nThe upwards revision applied to the uncertainties of CO2-LULUCF, \r\nCH4 and F-gas emissions therefore has a limited overall effect on the \r\nassessment of GHG emissions."


id: 19efd2667d4b608b113884ff5a1e2fa
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Finally, for F-gas emissions top-down atmospheric measurements \r\nfrom the 2018 World Meteorological Organization's (WMO) Scientific \r\nAssessment of Ozone Depletion (Engel and Rigby 2018; Montzka and \r\nVelders 2018) are compared to the data used in this report (Crippa \r\net al. 2021; Minx et al. 2021) as shown in Figure 2.3. Due to the general \r\nabsence of natural F-gas fluxes, there is a sound understanding of global \r\nand regional F-gas emissions from top-down estimates of atmospheric \r\nmeasurements with small and well-understood measurement, lifetime \r\nand transport model uncertainties (Engel and Rigby 2018; Montzka \r\nand Velders 2018). However, when species are aggregated into total \r\nF-gas emissions, EDGARv6.0 emissions are around 10% lower than the \r\nWMO 2018 values throughout, with larger differences for individual \r\nF-gas species, and further discrepancies when comparing to older \r\nEDGAR versions. Based on this, the overall uncertainties for aggregate "


id: edf120b9d10427d8023a88b60bd1f9f4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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content:
"GHG emissions metrics such as GWP100 have their own uncertainties, \r\nwhich has been largely neglected in the literature so far. Minx et al. \r\n(2021) report the uncertainty in GWP100 metric values as +-50% for \r\nmethane and other short-lived climate forcers (SLCFs), and +-40% \r\nfor  non-CO2 gases with longer atmospheric lifetimes (specifically, \r\nthose with lifetimes longer than 20 years). If uncertainties in GHG \r\nmetrics are considered, and are assumed independent (which may lead \r\nto an underestimate) the overall uncertainty of total GHG emissions \r\nin 2019 increases from +-11% to +-13%. Metric uncertainties are not \r\nfurther considered in this chapter, but are referred to in Cross-Chapter \r\nBox 2 in this chapter, and Chapter 2 Supplementary Material on GHG \r\nmetrics (2.SM.3)."


id: 762d2778ddabe70b20495a6df09be313
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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content:
"Figure 2.4 | Contribution of different GHGs to global warming over the period 1750 to 2018. Top row: contributions estimated with the FaIR reduced-complexity \r\nclimate model. Major GHGs and aggregates of minor gases as a timeseries in (a) and as a total warming bar chart with 90% confidence interval added in (b). Bottom row: \r\ncontribution from short-lived climate forcers as a time series in (c) and as a total warming bar chart with 90% confidence interval added in (d). The dotted line in (c) gives the \r\nnet temperature change from short-lived climate forcers other than CH4. F-Kyoto/Paris includes the gases covered by the Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement, while F-other \r\nincludes the gases covered by the Montreal Protocol but excluding the HFCs. Source: Minx et al. (2021)."


id: 2002c118fa1e39bf568855138d43d4b
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"6 Emission metrics also exist for aerosols, but these are not commonly used in climate policy. This assessment focuses on GHG emission metrics only."


id: a4b735df9f1ef2a34765ecc75ee5ddf8
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"is consistent with warming from CH4 being short-lived and hence \r\nhaving a  more pronounced effect in the near-term during a  period \r\nof rising emissions. Nonetheless, Figure 2.4 highlights that emissions \r\nweighted by GWP100 do not provide a  fundamentally different \r\ninformation about the contribution of individual gases than modelled \r\nactual warming over the historical period, when emissions of most \r\nGHGs have been rising continuously, with CO2 being the dominant \r\nand CH4 being the second most important contributor to GHG-induced \r\nwarming. Other metrics such as GWP* (or GWP star) (Cain et  al. \r\n2019) offer an even closer resemblance between cumulative CO2-eq \r\nemissions and temperature change. Such a  metric may be more \r\nappropriate when the key objective is to track temperature change \r\nwhen emissions are falling, as in mitigation scenarios."


id: 4d40ef2f0ff79fa184d50bf013f333f9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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"Authors: Andy Reisinger (New Zealand), Alaa Al Khourdajie (United Kingdom/Syria), Kornelis Blok (the Netherlands), Harry Clark \r\n(New Zealand), Annette Cowie (Australia), Jan S. Fuglestvedt (Norway), Oliver Geden (Germany), Veronika Ginzburg (the Russian \r\nFederation), Celine Guivarch (France), Joanna I. House (United Kingdom), Jan Christoph Minx (Germany), Rachid Mrabet (Morocco), \r\nGert-Jan Nabuurs (the Netherlands), Glen P. Peters (Norway/Australia), Keywan Riahi (Austria), Roberto Schaeffer (Brazil), Raphael Slade \r\n(United Kingdom), Anders Hammer Stromman (Norway), Detlef P. van Vuuren (the Netherlands)"


id: 5807452d74ca290a56ade22ea0dc4a67
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"Comprehensive mitigation policy relies on consideration of all anthropogenic forcing agents, which differ widely in their atmospheric \r\nlifetimes and impacts on the climate system. GHG emission metrics6\r\n provide simplified information about the effects that emissions \r\nof different GHGs have on global temperature or other aspects of climate, usually expressed relative to the effect of emitting CO2\r\n(see emission metrics in Annex I: Glossary). This information can inform prioritisation and management of trade-offs in mitigation \r\npolicies and emission targets for non-CO2 gases relative to CO2, as well as for baskets of gases expressed in CO2-eq. This assessment \r\nbuilds on the evaluation of GHG emission metrics from a physical science perspective by WGI (Forster et al. 2021b). For additional \r\ndetails and supporting references, see Chapter 2 Supplementary Material (2.SM.3) and Annex II.8."


id: 6dc94091f77229bde6d9cefb7ef05fd3
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content:
"The global warming potential (GWP) and the global temperature change potential (GTP) were the main metrics assessed in AR5 (Myhre \r\net al. 2013; Kolstad et al. 2014). The GWP with a lifetime of 100 years (GWP100) continues to be the dominant metric used in the scientific \r\nliterature on mitigation assessed by WGIII. The assessment by WGI (Forster et al. 2021) includes updated values for these metrics based \r\non updated scientific understanding of the response of the climate system to emissions of different gases, including changing background \r\nconcentrations. It also assesses new metrics published since AR5. Metric values in AR6 include climate-carbon cycle feedbacks by default; \r\nthis provides an important update and clarification from AR5 which reported metric values both with and without such feedbacks."


id: 8b8a926cd9cca11091b147842b7162a7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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content:
"The choice of metric and time horizon can affect the distribution of costs and the timing of abatement between countries and sectors \r\nin cost-effective mitigation strategies. Sector-specific lifecycle assessments find that different emission metrics and different time \r\nhorizons can lead to divergent conclusions about the effectiveness of mitigation strategies that involve reductions of one gas but an \r\nincrease of another gas with a different lifetime (e.g., Tanaka et al. 2019). Assessing the sensitivity of conclusions to different emission \r\nmetrics and time horizons can support more robust decision-making (Levasseur et al. 2016; Balcombe et al. 2018) (see 2.SM.3 for \r\ndetails). Sectoral and national perspectives on GHG emission metrics may differ from a global least-cost perspective, depending on \r\nother policy objectives and equity considerations, but the literature does not provide a consistent framework for assessing GHG \r\nemission metrics based on equity principles."


id: b5affd54cbede534f524786e4926717
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"Literature since AR5 has emphasised that the GWP100 is not well-suited to estimating the warming effect at specific points in time \r\nfrom sustained SLCF emissions (e.g., Allen et al. 2016; Cain et al. 2019; Collins et al. 2019). This is because the warming caused by \r\nan individual SLCF emission pulse diminishes over time and hence, unlike CO2, the warming from SLCF emissions that are sustained \r\nover multiple decades to centuries depends mostly on their ongoing rate of emissions rather than their cumulative emissions. Treating \r\nall gases interchangeably based on GWP100 within a stated emissions target therefore creates ambiguity about actual global \r\ntemperature outcomes (Fuglestvedt et al. 2018; Denison et al. 2019). Supplementing economy-wide emission targets with information \r\nabout the expected contribution from individual gases to such targets would reduce the ambiguity in global temperature outcomes."


id: 6f7c44c89e9405925554b7295e3a36b3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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"The WGIII contribution to AR6 reports aggregate emissions and removals using updated GWP100 values from AR6 WGI unless stated \r\notherwise. This choice was made on both scientific grounds (the alignment of GWP100 with a cost-benefit perspective under social \r\ndiscount rates and its performance from a global cost-effectiveness perspective) and for procedural reasons, including continuity \r\nwith past IPCC reports and alignment with decisions under the Paris Agreement Rulebook (Annex II.8). A key constraint in the choice \r\nof metric is also that the literature assessed by WGIII predominantly uses GWP100 and often does not provide sufficient detail \r\non emissions and abatement of individual gases to allow translation into different metrics. Presenting such information routinely \r\nin mitigation studies would enable the application of more diverse GHG emission metrics in future assessments to evaluate their \r\ncontribution to different policy objectives."


id: 8ee0008322569b3a1d5634a5aa0c062b
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"All metrics have limitations and uncertainties, given that they simplify the complexity of the physical climate system and its response \r\nto past and future GHG emissions. No single metric is well-suited to all applications in climate policy. For this reason, the WGIII \r\ncontribution to AR6 reports emissions and mitigation options for individual gases where possible; CO2-equivalent emissions are \r\nreported in addition to individual gas emissions where this is judged to be policy-relevant. This approach aims to reduce the ambiguity \r\nregarding mitigation potentials for specific gases and actual climate outcomes over time arising from the use of any specific GHG \r\nemission metric."


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content:
"2.1% between 2000 and 2009. Nevertheless the absolute increase \r\nin average annual GHG emissions for 2010-2019 compared to \r\n2000-2009 was 9.1 GtCO2-eq and, as such, the largest observed in \r\nthe data since 1970 (Table 2.1) - and most likely in human history \r\n(Friedlingstein et al. 2020; Gutschow et al. 2021b). Decade-by-decade \r\ngrowth in average annual GHG emissions was observed across all \r\n(groups of) gas as shown in Table 2.1, but for N2O and CO2-LULUCF \r\nemissions this is much more uncertain."


id: 9d7d3b820a06f15aa83a9c81dbe99569
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24946
content:
"Global GHG emissions continued to rise since AR5, but the rate of \r\nemissions growth slowed (high confidence). GHG emissions reached \r\n59 +- 6.6 GtCO2-eq in 2019 (Table  2.1 and Figure  2.5). In 2019, \r\nCO2  emissions from the FFI were 38 (+-3.0) Gt, CO2 from LULUCF \r\n6.6 +- 4.6 Gt, CH4 11 +- 3.2 GtCO2-eq, N2O 2.7 +- 1.6 GtCO2-eq and \r\nF-gases 1.4 +- 0.41 GtCO2-eq. There is high confidence that average \r\nannual GHG emissions for the last decade (2010-2019) were the \r\nhighest on record in terms of aggregate CO2-eq emissions, but low \r\nconfidence for annual emissions in 2019 as uncertainties are large \r\nconsidering the size and composition of observed increases in the \r\nmost recent years (UNEP 2020a; Minx et al. 2021)."


id: 7bf2fa39a7baa5754d7f082b6e746b92
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19015
content:
"Reported total annual GHG emission estimates differ between \r\nthe WGIII contributions in AR5 (Blanco et  al. 2014) and AR6 \r\n(this chapter) mainly due to differing global warming potentials (high \r\nconfidence). For the year 2010, total GHG emissions were estimated \r\nat 49 +- 4.9 GtCO2-eq in AR5 (Blanco et al. 2014), while we report \r\n53 +- 5.7 GtCO2-eq here. However, in AR5 total GHG emissions were \r\nweighted based on GWP100 values from IPCC's Second Assessment \r\nReport. Applying those GWP values to the 2010 emissions from AR6 \r\nyields 50 GtCO2-eq (Forster et al. 2021a). Hence, observed differences \r\nare mainly due to the use of most recent GWP values, which have \r\nhigher warming potentials for methane (29% higher for biogenic and \r\n42% higher for fugitive methane) and 12% lower values for nitrous \r\noxide (Cross-Chapter Box 2 in this chapter)."


id: 2f8c6c874cb589cc4e133d1acee7460e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5628
content:
"GHG emissions levels in 2019 were higher compared to 10 and \r\n30  years earlier (high confidence): about 12% (6.5 GtCO2-eq) \r\nhigher than in 2010 (53 +- 5.7 GtCO2-eq) (the last year of AR5 \r\nreporting) and about 54% (21 GtCO2-eq) higher than in 1990 \r\n(38 +- 4.8 GtCO2-eq) (the baseline year of the Kyoto Protocol and \r\nfrequent nationally determined contribution (NDC) reference). GHG \r\nemissions growth slowed compared to the previous decade (high \r\nconfidence): From 2010 to 2019, GHG emissions grew on average \r\nby about 1.3% per year compared to an average annual growth of "


id: 589e947c12b63601de0cb9ecb8e94000
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12835
content:
"Emissions growth has been persistent but varied in pace across gases. \r\nThe average annual emission levels of the last decade (2010-2019) \r\nwere higher than in any previous decade for each group of GHGs: "


id: 29c173c93404f1ebedd09eed44bf1c9e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4572
content:
"Table 2.1 | Total anthropogenic GHG emissions (GtCO2-eq yr -1) 1990-2019. CO2 from fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes (FFI); CO2 from Land Use, Land \r\nUse Change and Forestry (LULUCF); methane (CH4); nitrous oxide (N2O); fluorinated gases (F-gases: HFCs, PFCs, SF6, NF3). Aggregate GHG emissions trends by groups of gases \r\nreported in GtCO2-eq converted based on global warming potentials with a 100-year time horizon (GWP100) from the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report (AR6). Uncertainties are \r\nreported for a 90% confidence interval. Source: Minx et al. (2021)."


id: 992cb80a6d71edc0d23184b9ded03515
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24162
content:
"under the Montreal Protocol. The aggregate CO2-eq emissions of \r\nHFCs, HCFCs and CFCs were each approximately equal in 2016, \r\nwith a  smaller contribution from PFCs, SF6, NF3 and some more \r\nminor F-gases. Therefore, the GWP-weighted F-gas emissions \r\nreported here (HFCs, PFCs, SF6, NF3), which are dominated by the \r\nHFCs, represent less than half of the overall CO2-eq F-gas emissions \r\nin 2016 (Figure 2.3)."


id: e78e486c795c36ed78c47f4cd285dd00
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38049
content:
"CO2, CH4, N2O, and F-gases (high confidence). Since 1990, CO2-FFI \r\nhave grown by 67% (15 GtCO2-eq), CH4 by 29% (2.4 GtCO2-eq), \r\nand N2O by 33% (0.65 GtCO2-eq), respectively (Figure 2.5). Growth \r\nin fluorinated gases (F-gas) has been by far the highest with about \r\n254% (1.0 GtCO2-eq), but it occurred from low levels. In 2019, \r\ntotal F-gas levels were no longer negligible with a share of 2.3% of \r\nglobal GHG emissions. Note that the F-gases reported here do not \r\ninclude CFCs and HCFCs, which are groups of substances regulated "


id: 378aee3b4923dd61568afb1e8a0dff51
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6985
content:
"Figure 2.5 | Total anthropogenic GHG emissions (GtCO2-eq yr -1) 1990-2019. CO2 from fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes (FFI); net CO2 from land use, \r\nland use change and forestry (LULUCF); methane (CH4); nitrous oxide (N2O); fluorinated gases (F-gases: HFCs, PFCs, SF6, NF3). Panel (a): Aggregate GHG emissions trends \r\nby groups of gases reported in GtCO2-eq converted based on global warming potentials with a 100-year time horizon (GWP100) from the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report. \r\nPanel (b): Waterfall diagrams juxtaposes GHG emissions for the most recent year (2019) in CO2 equivalent units using GWP100 values from the IPCC's Second, Fifth, and Sixth \r\nAssessment Reports, respectively. Error bars show the associated uncertainties at a 90% confidence interval. Panel (c): individual trends in CO2-FFI, CO2-LULUCF, CH4, N2O and \r\nF-gas emissions for the period 1990-2019, normalised to 1 in 1990. Source: data from Minx et al. (2021)."


id: c183266eea20f64c8b66328401836580
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31350
content:
"(Jackson et al. 2016; Qi et al. 2016; Peters et al. 2017a; Canadell et al. \r\n2021). Subsequently, CO2-FFI emissions started to rise again (Peters \r\net al. 2017b; Figueres et al. 2018; Peters et al. 2020)."


id: be3dc4199e2abaeb8800852343bb47ae
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30738
content:
"The CO2-FFI share in total CO2-eq emissions has plateaued at about \r\n65% in recent years and its growth has slowed considerably since \r\nAR5 (high confidence). The CO2-FFI emissions grew at 1.1% during \r\nthe 1990s and 2.5% during the 2000s. For the last decade (2010s) - \r\nnot covered by AR5 - this rate dropped to 1.2%. This included a short \r\nperiod between 2014 and 2016 with little or no growth in CO2-FFI \r\nemissions, mainly due to reduced emissions from coal combustion "


id: 6008722ac3ade6589c9050b9fdbbd379
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14202
content:
"Figure 2.6 | Global CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion and industry (FFI) in 2020 and the impact of COVID-19. Panel (a) depicts CO2-FFI emissions \r\nover the past five decades (GtCO2 yr-1). The single year declines in emissions following major economic and geopolitical events are shown, as well as the decline recorded \r\nin five different datasets for emissions in 2020 (COVID-19) compared to 2019 (no COVID-19). Panel (b) depicts the change in global daily carbon emissions (MtCO2 per day) \r\nin 2020 compared to 2019, showing the impact of COVID-19 lockdown policies. Source: Friedlingstein et al. (2020), Le Quere et al. (2020), Carbon Monitor (Liu et al. 2020b), \r\nBP (2021), Crippa et al. (2021), IEA (2021a)."


id: 7327d02cb37b979af2777bc4d18c3303
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17507
content:
"At current (2019) levels of emissions, it would only take 8 (2-15) \r\nand 25 (18-35)  years to emit the equivalent amount of CO2\r\nfor a  67th  percentile 1.5degC and 2degC remaining carbon budget, \r\nrespectively. Related discussions of carbon budgets, short-term \r\nambition in the context of Nationally Determined Contributions \r\n(NDCs), pathways to limiting warming to well below 2degC and carbon \r\ndioxide removals are mainly discussed in Chapters 3, 4, and 12, but \r\nalso Section 2.7 of this chapter."


id: 12b913863d7e894684cac201b6a70847
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 497
content:
"(Le Quere et al. 2020, 2021), 4.1% (Z. Liu et al. 2020b) and 6.8% \r\n(Bertram et  al. 2021); the latter taking into account the over\u0002proportional reduction of coal generation due to low gas prices \r\nand merit order effects. Due to the very recent nature of this event, \r\nit remains unclear what the exact short- and long-term impacts on \r\nfuture global emissions trends will be."


id: 883d5b7faf1475f29178989d88288c02
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21120
content:
"From 1850 until around 1950, anthropogenic CO2 emissions \r\nwere mainly (>50%) from land use, land-use change and forestry \r\n(Figure 2.7). Over the past half-century CO2 emissions from LULUCF \r\nhave remained relatively constant around 5.1 +- 3.6 GtCO2 but with \r\na large spread across estimates (Le Quere et al. 2018a; Friedlingstein \r\net al. 2019, 2020). By contrast, global annual FFI-CO2 emissions have \r\ncontinuously grown since 1850, and since the 1960s from a decadal \r\naverage of 11 +- 0.9 GtCO2 to 36 +- 2.9 GtCO2 during 2010-2019 \r\n(Table 2.1)."


id: 889946f31c36d93ba84b151880ac899b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21196
content:
"Cumulative CO2 emissions since 1850 reached 2400 +- 240 GtCO2 \r\nin 2019 (high confidence).7 More than half (62%) of total emissions \r\nfrom 1850 to 2019 occurred since 1970 (1500 +- 140 GtCO2), \r\nabout 42% since 1990 (1000 +- 90 GtCO2) and about 17% since \r\n2010 (410  +-  30  GtCO2) (Friedlingstein et  al. 2019; Friedlingstein \r\net al. 2020; Canadell et al. 2021) (Figure 2.7). Emissions in the last \r\ndecade are about the same size as the remaining carbon budget of \r\n400 +- 220 (500, 650) GtCO2 for limiting global warming to 1.5degC \r\nand between one-third and half the 1150 +- 220 (1350, 1700) GtCO2\r\nfor limiting global warming below 2degC with a  67% (50%, 33%) \r\nprobability, respectively (medium confidence) (Canadell et al. 2021). "


id: d43616c094e75f32db09bd1b0d990d3c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34668
content:
"Figure 2.7 | Historic anthropogenic CO2 emission and cumulative CO2 emissions (1850-2019) as well as remaining carbon budgets for limiting warming \r\nto 1.5degC and 2degC. Panel (a) shows historic annual anthropogenic CO2 emissions (GtCO2 yr -1) by fuel type and process. Panel (b) shows historic cumulative anthropogenic \r\nCO2 emissions for the periods 1850-1989, 1990-2009, and 2010-2019 as well as remaining future carbon budgets as of 1 January 2020 to limit warming to 1.5degC and 2degC \r\nat the 67th percentile of the transient climate response to cumulative CO2 emissions. The whiskers indicate a budget uncertainty of +-220 GtCO2-eq for each budget and the \r\naggregate uncertainty range at one standard deviation for historical cumulative CO2 emissions, consistent with Working Group 1. Sources: Friedlingstein et al. (2020) and \r\nCanadell et al. (2021)."


id: 4bf15165dd52f66aeb7e9503eb58d3e5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10627
content:
"tends to increase at rates faster than those observed in the long-term \r\nhistorical evidence - particularly in terms of coal use. For example, \r\nSSP5 envisions a six-fold increase in per capita coal use by 2100 - \r\nagainst flat long-term historical observations  - while the most \r\noptimistic baseline scenario SSP1-Sustainability is associated with \r\ncoal consumption that is broadly in line with historical long-term \r\ntrends (Ritchie and Dowlatabadi 2017). In contrast, models have \r\nstruggled to reproduce historical upscaling of wind and solar and \r\nother granular energy technologies (Wilson et al. 2013; van Sluisveld \r\net al. 2015; Creutzig et al. 2017; Shiraki and Sugiyama 2020; Sweerts \r\net al. 2020; Wilson et al. 2020b)."


id: 8c57b6fe88089f3db26b46e7c762bab9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21868
content:
"until global net zero CO2 emissions are reached. Uncertainties for \r\ntotal carbon budgets have not been assessed and could affect the \r\nspecific calculated fractions (IPCC 2021 [Working Group 1 SPM], \r\nCanadell et al., 2021 [Working Group 1 Ch5])."


id: 88e6d6271a595d7cd76bb3974b23ca40
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21250
content:
"Comparisons between historic GHG emissions and baseline \r\nprojections provide increased evidence that global emissions are \r\nnot tracking high-end scenarios (Hausfather and Peters 2020), and \r\nrather followed 'middle-of-the-road' scenario narratives in the earlier \r\nseries, and by combinations of 'global-sustainability' and 'middle-of\u0002the-road' narratives in the most recent series (IPCC Special Report \r\non Emissions Scenarios (SRES) and Shared Socioeconomic Pathways \r\n(SSP)-baselines) (Pedersen et al. 2020; Strandsbjerg Tristan Pedersen \r\net al. 2021). As countries increasingly implement climate policies and \r\ntechnology costs continue to evolve, it is expected that emissions \r\nwill continually shift away from scenarios that assume no climate \r\npolicy but remain insufficient to limit warming to below 2degC (Vrontisi \r\net  al. 2018; Hausfather and Peters 2020; Roelfsema et  al. 2020; \r\nUNEP 2020b)."


id: 9956c818e49b9786975564911348e96d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24196
content:
"There are other emissions with shorter atmospheric lifetimes that \r\ncontribute to climate changes. Some of them (aerosols, sulphur \r\nemissions or organic carbon) reduce forcing, while others  - such \r\nas black carbon, carbon monoxide or non-methane volatile organic \r\ncompounds (NMVOC)  - contribute to warming (Figure  2.4) as \r\nassessed in WGI (Forster et al. 2021c; Szopa et al. 2021a). Many of \r\nthese other SLCFs are co-emitted during combustion processes in \r\npower plants, cars, trucks, airplanes, but also during wildfires and \r\nhousehold activities such as traditional cooking with open biomass \r\nburning. As these co-emissions have implications for net warming, \r\nthey are also considered in long-term emission reduction scenarios \r\nas covered in the literature (Harmsen et al. 2020; Rauner et al. 2020b; "


id: 2ddd57e4e96d90c7587b25016c1155bd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5347
content:
"The literature since AR5 suggests that compared to historical trends \r\nbaseline scenarios might be biased towards higher levels of fossil \r\nfuel use compared to what is observed historically (Cross-Chapter \r\nBox  1 in Chapter  1; Ritchie and Dowlatabadi 2017, 2018; Ritchie \r\n2019; Creutzig et al. 2021;). Ritchie and Dowlatabadi (2017) show \r\nthat per-capita primary energy consumption in baseline scenarios "


id: 9df94e0c734eda8f46683e5810156fd5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25028
content:
"Average annual GHG emission growth across all regions slowed \r\nbetween 2010 and 2019 compared to 1990-2010, with the \r\nexception of Eastern Europe and West Central Asia. Global \r\nemissions changes tend to be driven by a  limited number of \r\ncountries, principally the G20 Group (Friedlingstein et  al. 2020; \r\nUNEP 2020c; Xia et al. 2021). For instance, the slowing of global \r\nGHG emissions between 2010 and 2019, compared to the previous \r\ndecade, was primarily triggered by substantial reductions in GHG \r\nemissions growth in China. Ten countries jointly contributed about \r\n75% of the net 6.5 GtCO2-eq yr-1 increase in GHG emissions during \r\n2010-2019, of which two countries contributed more than 50% \r\n(Figure 2.9) (see also Minx et al., 2021; Crippa et al., 2021)."


id: 82a51581ed0ba22517a46dff01da46c2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20115
content:
"Smith et al. 2020; Vandyck et al. 2020) as well as Chapter 3 of this \r\nreport. These air pollutants are also detrimental to human health \r\n(e.g.,  Lelieveld et  al. 2015, 2018; Vohra et  al. 2021). For example, \r\nLelieveld et  al. (2015) estimate a  total of 3.3 (1.6-4.8) million \r\npremature deaths in 2010 from outdoor air pollution. Reducing \r\nair pollutants in the context of climate policies therefore leads to \r\nsubstantial co-benefits of mitigation efforts (Von Stechow et al. 2015; \r\nRao et al. 2017; Lelieveld et al. 2019; Rauner et al. 2020a). Here we \r\nbriefly outline the major trends in emissions of SLCFs."


id: 5452ac1ca2b2039f9726f94a8bee21b1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12113
content:
"Conventional air pollutants that are subject to significant emission \r\ncontrols in many countries include sulphur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen \r\noxides (NOx), black carbon (BC) and carbon monoxide (CO). From \r\n2015 to 2019, global SO2 and NOx emissions declined, mainly due \r\nto reductions in energy systems (Figure 2.8). Reductions in BC and \r\nCO emissions appear to have occurred over the same period, but \r\ntrends are less certain due to the large contribution of emissions \r\nfrom poorly quantified traditional biofuel use. Emissions of CH4, OC \r\nand NMVOC have remained relatively stable in the past five years. \r\nOC and NMVOC may have plateaued, although there is additional \r\nuncertainty due to sources of NMVOCs that may be missing in current \r\ninventories (McDonald et al. 2018)."


id: 65d597b8da4b10b7bdd9e6aa3ed8aa28
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15175
content:
"GHG and CO2-FFI levels diverge starkly between countries and regions \r\n(high confidence) (Jackson et  al. 2019; Friedlingstein et  al. 2020; \r\nUNEP 2020c; Crippa et  al. 2021). Developed Countries sustained \r\nhigh levels of per capita CO2-FFI emissions at 9.5 tCO2 per capita in \r\n2019 (but with a wide range of 1.9-16 tCO2 per capita). This is more \r\nthan double that of three developing regions: 4.4 (0.3-12.8) tCO2\r\nper  capita in Asia and Pacific; 1.2  (0.03-8.5) tCO2 per  capita in \r\nAfrica; and 2.7 (0.3-24) tCO2 per capita in Latin America.9\r\n Per capita \r\nCO2-FFI emissions were 9.9 (0.89-15) tCO2 per  capita in Eastern \r\nEurope and West Central Asia, and 8.6 (0.36-38) tCO2 per capita in \r\nthe Middle East. CO2-FFI emissions in the three developing regions \r\ntogether grew by 26% between 2010 and 2019, compared to 260% \r\nbetween 1990 and 2010, while in Developed Countries emissions \r\ncontracted by 9.9% between 2010-2019 and by 9.6% between \r\n1990-2010."


id: 67d092232159985191bdf74f2aa7688d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15536
content:
"Regional contributions to global GHG emissions have shifted since \r\nthe beginning of the international climate negotiations in the 1990s \r\n(high confidence). As shown in Figure  2.9, developed countries \r\n(North America, Europe, and Australia, Japan, New Zealand) as \r\na group have not managed to reduce GHG emissions substantially, \r\nwith fairly stable levels at about 15 GtCO2-eq yr -1 between 1990 \r\nand 2010, while countries in Asia and Pacific (Eastern Asia, Southern \r\nAsia, and South-East Asia and Pacific) have rapidly increased their \r\nshare of global GHG emissions  - particularly since the 2000s \r\n(Jackson et al. 2019; Peters et al. 2020; UNEP 2020c; Crippa et al. \r\n2021; IEA 2021b)."


id: ba55c33382164084b28eb1e74404d36
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30000
content:
"Most global GHG emission growth occurred in Asia and Pacific, which \r\naccounted for 77% of the net 21 GtCO2-eq increase in GHG emissions \r\nsince 1990, and 83% of the net 6.5 GtCO2-eq increase since 2010.8\r\nAfrica contributed 11% of GHG emissions growth since 1990 (2.3 \r\nGtCO2-eq) and 10% (0.7 GtCO2-eq) since 2010. The Middle East \r\ncontributed 10% of GHG emissions growth since 1990 (2.1 GtCO2-\r\neq) and also 10% (0.7 GtCO2-eq) since 2010. Latin America and the \r\nCaribbean contributed 11% of GHG emissions growth since 1990 \r\n(2.2 GtCO2-eq), and 5% (0.3 GtCO2-eq) since 2010. Two regions, \r\nDeveloped Countries, and Eastern Europe and West Central Asia, \r\nreduced emissions overall since 1990, by -1.6  GtCO2-eq and -0.8 \r\nGtCO2-eq, respectively. However, emissions in the latter started \r\nto grow again since 2010, contributing to 5% of the global GHG \r\nemissions change (0.3 GtCO2-eq)."


id: 74b04141bb2ac52395617d2f04ad087f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17765
content:
"by many more countries to keep the goals of the Paris Agreement \r\nin reach (Hohne et  al. 2020; Roelfsema et  al. 2020; Kriegler et  al. \r\n2018a; den Elzen et al. 2019) as analysed by Chapter 4 of this report. \r\nMoreover, observed reductions are not yet consistent and long-term, \r\nnor achieved across all sectors, nor fully aligned with country NDC \r\ntargets (Le Quere et al. 2019; Lamb et al. 2021a; den Elzen et al. 2019; \r\nBurck et al. 2021; Climate Transparency 2021)."


id: 1a409ca1d0934e19b290b186aa3bc76
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1814
content:
"In 2019, 34% (20 GtCO2-eq) of the 59 GtCO2-eq GHG emissions \r\ncame from the energy sector, 24% (14 GtCO2-eq) from industry, \r\n22% (13 GtCO2-eq) from AFOLU, 15% (8.7 GtCO2-eq) from transport \r\nand 6% (3.3 GtCO2-eq) from buildings (Figure 2.12). The relative size \r\nof each sector depends on the exact definition of sector boundaries \r\n(de la Rue du Can et  al. 2015; Lamb et  al. 2021b). The largest \r\nindividual subsector contributing to global GHG emissions in 2019 \r\nwas electricity and heat generation at 14 GtCO2-eq. This subsector \r\ncan be reallocated to consuming sectors as indirect (scope  2) \r\nemissions to emphasise the role of final energy demand and demand\u0002side solutions in climate change mitigation (Creutzig et  al. 2018) \r\n(Chapter 5). This increases the emission share of the industry sector \r\nto 34% and of the buildings sector to 16%."


id: e809ba3a797164d39b202538d88ef931
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38139
content:
"Average annual GHG emissions growth has been fastest in the \r\ntransport sector with about 1.8% for the most recent period \r\n2010-2019, followed by direct emissions in the industry sector (1.4%) \r\nand the energy sector (1%) (Figure 2.13). This is different to growth \r\npatterns observed in the previous decade as reported in AR5 (IPCC \r\n2014a; Blanco et  al. 2014). Between 2000 and 2009 fastest GHG \r\nemissions growth was observed for industry with 3.4% followed by "


id: d0901073f81d4922976fd4082622c452
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34040
content:
"The recent (2010-2019) emissions changes of some countries are \r\nin line with pathways that limit warming to below 2degC (<67%)\r\n(e.g., -4% average annual reductions) (Figure 2.10). Overall, there are \r\nfirst country cases emerging that highlight the feasibility of sustained \r\nemission reductions outside of periods of economic disruption \r\n(Lamb et al. 2021a). However, such pathways will need to be taken "


id: 431e474a3b51f60928195cb695a727eb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9016
content:
"the energy sector with 2.3%. GHG emissions growth in the transport \r\nsector has been stable across both periods at about 1.8%, while direct \r\nbuilding emissions growth averaged below 1% during 2010-2019. \r\nRanking of high-emitting subsectors by direct emissions highlights \r\nthe importance of CO2 emissions from LULUCF (6.6 GtCO2-eq; but \r\nwith low confidence in magnitude and trend), road transport (6.1 \r\nGtCO2-eq), metals (3.1 GtCO2-eq), and other industry (4.4 GtCO2-eq). \r\nOverall, some of the fastest growing sources of subsector emissions \r\nfrom 2010 to 2019 have been international aviation (+3.4%),10\r\ndomestic aviation (+3.3%), inland shipping (+2.9%), metals (+2.3%), \r\ninternational shipping (+1.7%), and road transport (+1.7%)."


id: fd7916633ac2a37478ec3fb1619d5148
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41949
content:
"Figure 2.13 | Total annual anthropogenic GHG emissions by major economic sector and their underlying trends by region. Panel (a): Trends in total annual \r\nanthropogenic GHG emissions (in GtCO2-eq yr -1) by major economic sector. Panel (b): Trends in total annual anthropogenic GHG emissions (in GtCO2-eq yr -1) by major \r\neconomic sector and region. Panels c and d: Largest subsectoral changes in GHG emissions for the reporting period 2010-2019 in relative (% annual change) and absolute \r\nterms (GtCO2-eq yr -1). Emissions are converted into CO2-equivalents based on global warming potentials with a  100-year time horizon (GWP100) from the IPCC Sixth \r\nAssessment Report. Source: based on Lamb et al. (2021b); Data: Crippa et al. (2021); Minx et al. (2021)."


id: 1e6cb5c0e4e659dd72243dbdaad86019
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2551
content:
"chain management, and cities' footprints outside their administrative \r\nboundaries (Davis and Caldeira 2010; Feng et al. 2013). Kander et al. \r\n(2015) proposed a technology-adjusted consumption-based emission \r\naccounting (TCBA) approach to address the issue of carbon intensity \r\nin exports. TCBA incorporates emissions embodied in trade but also \r\nadjusted for differences in carbon efficiency in exports of different \r\ncountries. Unlike PBEs, there are no internationally agreed approaches \r\nto calculate CBEs, making it a major drawback for mainstreaming the \r\nuse of this indicator in policymaking."


id: 9054d388fd3b16c105d93185bb3b59e0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22594
content:
"Consumption is increasingly met by global supply chains often \r\ninvolving large geographical distances and causing emissions in \r\nproducing countries (Hubacek et  al. 2014, 2016; Wiedmann and \r\nLenzen 2018). Therefore, accounting for emissions from production \r\nalong the entire supply chain to fulfil final demand,  - so-called \r\nconsumption-based emissions (CBEs), - is necessary to understand \r\nwhy emissions occur and to what extent consumption choices and \r\nassociated supply chains contribute to total emissions, and ultimately \r\nhow to influence consumption to achieve climate mitigation targets \r\nand environmental justice (Vasconcellos 2020)."


id: 7601600becc95b32b23effc9684ff25a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17989
content:
"Consumption-based emissions provide additional or complementary information to production-based emissions that can be used for \r\na variety of policy applications. These include:"


id: c0d2e4cadea8509b693b5fbd1edfa9bf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31219
content:
"The points above are based on a synopsis of studies (Steininger et al. 2014; Afionis et al. 2017; Hubacek et al. 2017b; Wang and Zhou \r\n2018; Bolea et al. 2020)."


id: e8b51f076d117e7f3e94f147aa704fde
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38288
content:
"* Note, however, that comparing embodied emissions in trade between countries is further complicated by the fact that emission intensities differ \r\nacross countries. Approaches to adjust for these differences and facilitate comparisons have been suggested (Kander et al. 2015; Baumert et al. 2019; \r\nDietzenbacher et al. 2020; Jakob 2021). Many different approaches on how to share responsibility between producers and consumers have been \r\nproposed in designing effective integrated global climate policies (Liu and Fan 2017; Khajehpour et al. 2019; Jakob et al. 2021). Ultimately, assigning \r\nresponsibility is normative."


id: 7911f2de42d71ba6e18da1aaf5cbb585
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18487
content:
"(Wood  et  al.  2019). It  is recommended that CBEs results for such \r\ncountries be interpreted with care."


id: 1bac30497d732110a2594ab49fcc1b7d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2054
content:
"Overall, production accounts showed a slightly higher convergence \r\n(8% average of RSD) than consumption-based accounts (12%). \r\nThe variation across model results can be approximately halved, \r\nwhen normalising national totals to one common value for \r\na  selected base year. The difference between PBEs result variation \r\n(4% average RSD after normalisation) and CBEs results (7%) remains \r\nafter normalisation."


id: ab5b5bb249571cf977c697c7f1cd65f9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27379
content:
"In general, the largest contributors to uncertainty of CBEs results \r\nare - in descending order of priority - the total of territorial GHG \r\nemission accounts, the allocation of emissions to economic sectors, \r\nthe total and composition of final demand, and lastly the structure \r\nof the economy. Harmonising territorial emissions across GMRIO \r\ndatasets is the single most important factor that reduces uncertainty \r\nby about 50% (Tukker et al. 2020). More work is required to optimise \r\nor even institutionalise the compilation of multi-region input-output \r\ndata and models to enhance the accuracy of consumption-based \r\naccounting (Tukker et al. 2018; Wood et al. 2018)."


id: 354dc1321a0ba4ec769d45d51f76604e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6627
content:
"Six global accounts for consumption-based GHG emissions at the \r\ncountry level are widely used (Table  2.2). Each dataset has been \r\nconstructed by different teams of researchers, covering different time \r\nperiods and containing CBEs estimates for different sets of countries \r\nand regions (Owen 2017)."


id: 87d1172e5ecb93630883e3ebcff4ce1b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21051
content:
"Wood et al. (2019) present a comprehensive and systematic model \r\nintercomparison and find a  variation of 5-10% for both PBE and \r\nCBE accounts of major economies and country groups (e.g., EU-28, \r\nOECD). The estimates for the USA were the most closely aligned, \r\nwith 3.7% RSD. For smaller countries, variability is in the order \r\nof 20-30% and can reach more than 40% in cases of very small, \r\nhighly trade-exposed countries such as Singapore and Luxembourg "


id: b69c8b01273a715910f8ea9916064897
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29332
content:
"In comparison to territorial emissions discussed in Section  2.2, \r\nFigure 2.14 shows the trends of global and regional CBEs from 1990 \r\nto 2018. This section uses the PBEs and CBEs data from the Global \r\nCarbon Budget 2020 (Friedlingstein et al. 2020), which are slightly \r\ndifferent from the PBEs used in Section 2.2. The Global Carbon Budget \r\nonly includes CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and cement production."


id: cde341a046125a203d795ffb24b9d27b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33552
content:
"There has been a long-standing discussion on whether environmental \r\nimpacts such as carbon emissions and use of natural resources can \r\nbe decoupled from economic growth. It is controversial whether \r\nabsolute decoupling can be achieved at a  global scale (Ward et \r\nal. 2016; Hickel and Kallis 2020; Haberl et al. 2020). However, \r\na number of studies found that it is feasible to achieve decoupling \r\nat the national level, and they have explored the reasons for such \r\ndecoupling (Schandl et  al. 2016; Ward et  al. 2016; Deutch 2017; \r\nRoinioti and Koroneos 2017; Vaden et al. 2020; Habimana Simbi et al. \r\n2021; Shan et al. 2021b)."


id: 917d8ee7a982eeaa83b95d6865133a9d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22807
content:
"Table  2.3 shows the extent of decoupling of CBEs and GDP \r\nof countries based on CBEs from the Global Carbon Budget \r\n(Friedlingstein et  al. 2020) and GDP data from the World Bank. \r\nTable 2.4 also presents countries' degree of decoupling of PBEs and \r\nGDP. These data allow a comparison of decoupling between GDP \r\nand both PBEs and CBEs. "


id: fa6d064ea6311b2a81b3cd8368544eee
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41426
content:
"Note: CBEs are obtained from the Global Carbon Budget 2020 (Friedlingstein et al. 2020), GDP and population are from the World Bank. One country (Venezuela) does not have \r\nGDP data after 2015, so the degree of decoupling was only calculated for 115 countries. This table is modified from Hubacek et al. (2021)."


id: 7b8842b7a060bf48a61a1b2c1fccdf1d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18942
content:
"Absolute decoupling refers to a decline of emissions in absolute terms \r\nor as being stable while GDP grows (i.e., a decoupling index11 greater \r\nthan 1); relative decoupling refers to growth of emissions being lower \r\nthan growth of GDP (a decoupling index between 0 and 1); and no \r\ndecoupling, which refers to a situation where emissions grow to the \r\nsame extent or faster than GDP (a decoupling index of less than 0) \r\n(Wu et al. 2018)."


id: d9cb4b0b9b8e8531763e0d8ed9dd0ad7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35611
content:
"and the Netherlands) also decoupled PBEs and GDP. Countries with \r\nabsolute decoupling of CBEs tend to achieve decoupling at relatively \r\nhigh levels of economic development and high per capita emissions. \r\nMost of EU and North American countries are in this group. Decoupling \r\nwas not only achieved by outsourcing carbon-intensive production, but \r\nalso improvements in production efficiency and energy mix, leading \r\nto a  decline of emissions. Structural Decomposition Analysis shows \r\nthat the main driver for decoupling has been a reduction in carbon \r\nintensity (i.e., change in energy mix and energy efficiency) from both \r\ndomestic production and imports (Hubacek et  al. 2021). Similarly, \r\nWood et al. (2020b) found that EU countries have reduced their overall \r\nconsumption-based GHG emissions by 8% between 1995 and 2016, "


id: 97891a980ff81d1face07b8157da77d3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23874
content:
"During the most recent three-year period from 2015 to 2018, 23 countries \r\n(or 20% of the 116 sample countries) have achieved absolute \r\ndecoupling of CBEs and GDP, while 32 countries (or 28%) achieved \r\nabsolute decoupling of PBEs and GDP: 14 of them (e.g., the UK, Japan, "


id: 2e7992179fb50a1e3ebc30752e8af2fa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5458
content:
"Note: CBEs are obtained from the Global Carbon Budget 2020 (Friedlingstein et al. 2020), GDP and population are from the World Bank. One country (Venezuela) does not \r\nhave GDP data after 2015, so the degree of decoupling was only calculated for 115 countries. In order to be consistent with the results of CBEs, we calculate the decoupling \r\nof PBE until 2018."


id: e42db13d7eed049e846f3b25e7e0b8c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37448
content:
"decoupling is not sufficient to avoid consuming the remaining CO2\r\nemission budget under the global warming limit of 1.5degC or 2degC and to \r\navoid climate breakdown (Stoknes and Rockstrom 2018; Hickel and \r\nKallis 2020). Even if all countries decouple in absolute terms this might \r\nstill not be sufficient and thus can only serve as one of the indicators \r\nand steps toward fully decarbonising the economy and society."


id: 73615ecf3bafb3d31fb30867a0f6c8a7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17555
content:
"mainly due to the use of more efficient technology. The literature also \r\nshows that changes in the structure of economy with a shift to tertiary \r\nsectors of production may contribute to such decoupling (Kanitkar et \r\nal. 2015; Jiang et al. 2021)."


id: 21a49b218039915322121b93427fd5b8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3126
content:
"A total of 67 (or 58%) countries, including China and India, have \r\nrelatively decoupled GDP and CBEs between 2015 and 2018, \r\nreflecting a slower growth in emissions than GDP. It is worth noting \r\nthat the USA shows relative decoupling of emissions (both CBEs and \r\nPBEs) and GDP over the most recent period, although it strongly \r\ndecoupled economic growth from emissions between 2005 and \r\n2015. Thus decoupling can be temporary and countries' emissions \r\nmay again increase after a period of decoupling."


id: 97a15faffc3ef63893d523373cc66890
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23896
content:
"As global trade patterns have changed over recent decades, so have \r\nemissions embodied in trade (EET) (Jiang & Green 2017). EET refers \r\nto emissions associated with production of traded goods and services \r\nand is equal to the difference between PBEs and CBEs (Wiebe and \r\nYamano 2016). EET includes two parts: emissions embodied in \r\nimports (EEI); and emissions embodied in exports (EEE). For a given \r\ncountry or region with CBEs higher than PBEs, it is a net importer \r\nwith a higher EEI than EEE, and vice versa."


id: dd915a77c63279c395642b1130472547
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36247
content:
"Another 19 (or 16%) countries, such as South Africa and Nepal, \r\nhave experienced no decoupling between GDP and CBEs from 2015 \r\nto 2018, meaning the growth of their GDP is closely tied with the \r\nconsumption of emission-intensive goods. As a  result, a  further \r\nincrease of GDP in these countries will likely lead to higher emissions, \r\nif they follow the historical trend without substantive improvement \r\nin efficiency of production and energy use."


id: ab907bae34a1260990cc43501038163c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27418
content:
"EET have been rising faster since the 1980s due to an increase in \r\ntrade volume (Xu and Dietzenbacher 2014; Wood et al. 2018). CO2\r\nemissions from the production of internationally traded products \r\npeaked in 2006 at about 26% of global CO2 emissions. Since then, \r\ninternational CO2 emissions transfers declined but are likely to \r\nremain an important part of the climate policy agenda (Wood et al. \r\n2020a). About 24% of global economic output and 25% of global \r\nCO2 emissions are embodied in the international trade of goods and \r\nservices as of 2014 (Hubacek et al. 2021)."


id: 407f0136360b79f3c03307dd8d2bd929
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8536
content:
"It is important to note that a country's degree of decoupling changes \r\nover time. For example, 32 countries achieved absolute decoupling \r\nfrom 2010 to 2015 but only 10 of them remained decoupled over the \r\nnext three years. More importantly, although absolute decoupling has \r\nreduced annual emissions, the remaining emissions are still contributing \r\nto an increase in atmospheric carbon concentration. Absolute "


id: 27aaae2d1e922af1995d02ed5ea55d0b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4161
content:
"Figure 2.15 | Total annual CO2 emissions for 116 countries by global region based on consumption- and production-based emissions. The shaded areas \r\nare the net CO2 trade balances (differences) between each of the regions. Yellow shading indicates that the region is a net importer of embodied CO2 emissions, leading to \r\nconsumption-based emission estimates that are higher than traditional territorial emission estimates. Blue shading indicates the reverse. Production-based emissions are \r\ncollected from EDGAR and consumption-based emissions from the Global Carbon Budget 2020 (Friedlingstein et al. 2020). Source: this figure is modified based on Hubacek \r\net al. (2021)."


id: 67029a3c863769d0093aed0e337d8613
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15389
content:
"of globalisation (Meng et al. 2018). Developing countries, therefore, \r\nhave gained importance as global suppliers of goods and services and \r\nhave also become more relevant as global consumers as they grow \r\ntheir domestic demand (Fernandez-Amador et al. 2016). Since 2014, \r\nCO2 emission transfer between developing countries has plateaued \r\nand then slightly declined and seems to have stabilised at around the \r\nsame level of transfers between non-OECD and OECD countries at \r\naround 2.4 GtCO2 yr -1 (Wood et al. 2020a). In both cases, a decrease \r\nin carbon intensity of trade just about offset increased trade volumes \r\n(Wood et al. 2020a)."


id: 55aff9e6da97daff3e85f0d892c1b641
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12346
content:
"This section provides a  summary of the main economic drivers of \r\nGHG emissions (mostly territorial) by regions and sectors, including \r\nthose that are more indirect drivers related to economic activity, such \r\nas inequality and rapid urbanisation. Trade as a driver of global GHG \r\nemissions is described in the Chapter  2 Supplementary Material. \r\nSocio-demographic drivers are described in Section  2.6. The Kaya \r\ndecomposition presented in this section is based on the International \r\nEnergy Agency (IEA) and Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric \r\nResearch (EDGAR) v6 databases and tracks global, regional, and \r\nsectoral GHG emissions from 1990 to 2019 (Crippa et  al. 2021; \r\nIEA 2021c; Lamb et  al. 2021b; Minx et  al. 2021). It shows main \r\ncontributors to GHG emissions as independent factors, although \r\nthese factors also interact with each other."


id: 8b03dc180183a1fdff707bb92aae6747
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21626
content:
"Net emissions transferred between developing and developed \r\ncountries peaked at 7.3% of global CO2 emissions in 2006 and then \r\nsubsequently declined (Wood et  al. 2020a). The main reason for \r\nthe decline was an improvement in the carbon intensity of traded \r\nproducts, rather than a decline in trade volume (Wood et al. 2020a). \r\nDespite continued improvements, developing economies tend to \r\nhave higher emission intensity than developed economies due to \r\nless efficient technologies and a carbon-intensive fuel mix (Jiang and \r\nGuan 2017)."


id: 93ffc5f24a92ce2d4402393be965d442
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23243
content:
"With the rapid growth of developing countries, the geographical \r\ncentre of global trade as well as emissions embodies in trade is \r\nchanging. The fast growth of Asian countries is shifting the global \r\ntrade centre from Europe to Asia (Zhang et al. 2019). Asian exports in \r\nmonetary units increased by 235% from 1996 to 2011, and its share \r\nin global exports increased from 25% to 46%, whereas Europe's \r\nshare in global exports decreased from 51% in 1996 to 39% in 2011. \r\nAfter 2011, global trade has stalled, but Asia's share of global exports \r\nfurther increased to 42% in 2020 (UNCTAD 2021)."


id: 25ad4a3e5e619ef77900e8d233937bf7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3813
content:
"In addition to changes in trade volume, trading patterns have also \r\nbeen changing significantly in Asian countries. These countries are \r\nreplacing traditional trading hubs (such as Russia and Germany) due \r\nto the fast growth in trade flows, especially with countries of the \r\nGlobal South (Zhang et al. 2019). The largest geographical shifts in \r\ntrade-embodied emissions between 1995 and 2011 occurred in high\u0002tech, electronics, and machinery (Malik and Lan 2016; Jiang et  al. \r\n2018). For example, China is shifting its exports to include more \r\nlow-carbon and higher value-added goods and services. As a result, \r\nChina's exported emissions declined by 20% from 2008 to 2015 \r\n(Mi et al. 2018)."


id: 2b4a0ef9f24e2ac5e246e5948ec03f1f
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content:
"Developing countries are increasingly playing an important role \r\nin global trade. EET between developing countries, so-called \r\nSouth-South trade, has more than doubled between 2004 (0.47 Gt) \r\nand 2011 (1.11 Gt), which is seen as a reflection of a new phase "


id: fccf9abde78ed6565903b9145de76be3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41842
content:
"The decades-long trend that efficiency gains were outpaced by \r\nan increase in worldwide GDP (or income) per  capita continued \r\nunabated in the last 10 years (robust evidence, high agreement) \r\n(Wiedmann et al. 2020; Xia et al. 2021). In addition, the emissions\u0002reducing effects of energy efficiency improvements are diminished \r\nby the energy rebound effect, which has been found in several \r\nstudies to largely offset any energy savings (robust evidence, high \r\nagreement) (Rausch and Schwerin 2018; Colmenares et  al. 2020; \r\nStern 2020; Brockway et al. 2021; Bruns et al. 2021). The rebound \r\neffect is discussed extensively in Section 9.9.2."


id: ed252132f9d327afeaf2a3536e6092
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39099
content:
"A significant decarbonisation of the energy system was only \r\nnoticeable in North America, Europe and Eurasia. Globally, the \r\namount of CO2 per  unit of energy used has practically remained \r\nunchanged over the last three decades (Tavakoli 2018; Chang et al. \r\n2019), although it is expected to decrease more consistently in \r\nthe future (Xia et al. 2021). Population growth has also remained \r\na  strong and persistent upward driver in almost all regions \r\n(+1.2%  yr -1 globally from 2010 to 2019) (Lamb et  al. 2021) \r\n(Figure 2.16), although per capita emission levels are very uneven \r\nacross world regions. Therefore, modest population increases in "


id: b5d341a6aca5ded98a505e72af3e9047
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29211
content:
"(c) Average annual change in Kaya factors 2010-2019\r\n(CO2 only, excl. LULUCF CO2, excl. indirect CO2)"


id: d5a2ba480214e2d84a13446ef18c7620
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34900
content:
"Figure 2.16 | Trends and drivers of global GHG emissions, including: (a) trends of GHG emissions by sectors 1990-2019; (b) share of total and per capita \r\nGHG emissions by world region in 2019; and (c) Kaya decomposition of CO2 emissions drivers. The Kaya decomposition is based on the equation F = P(G/P)\r\n(E/G)(F/E), where F is CO2 emissions, P is population, G/P is GDP per capita, E/G is the energy intensity of GDP and F/E is the carbon intensity of energy. The indicated annual \r\ngrowth rates are averaged across the years 2010-2019 (in panel (c), these are for fossil fuel CO2 emissions only, in order to ensure compatibility with underlying energy data). \r\nNote that the energy consumption by itself (primary energy supply) is not part of the decomposition, but is listed here for comparison with the Kaya factors. Source: data from \r\nCrippa et al. (2021), IEA (2021c), Minx et al. (2021)."


id: c81510daa371e098f841dc65ef9245dd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32513
content:
"wealthy countries may have a similar impact on emissions as high \r\npopulation increases in regions with low per capita emission levels."


id: 1ac68d257bd0fa728a68abe5df2f6466
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1911
content:
"Global energy system emissions growth has slowed down in recent \r\nyears, but global oil and gas use was still growing (Jackson et  al. \r\n2019) and the sector remained the single largest contributor to global \r\nGHG emissions in 2019 with 20 GtCO2-eq (34%) (high confidence) \r\n(Figure  2.17). Most of the 14 GtCO2-eq from electricity and heat \r\ngeneration (23% of global GHG emissions in 2019) were due to \r\nenergy use in industry and in buildings, making these two sectors \r\nalso prominent targets for mitigation (Davis et al. 2018; Crippa et al. \r\n2019) (see subsections 2.4.2.2 and 2.4.2.3 below)."


id: 788667a18c96d1703dd06540803b5879
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18403
content:
"Growth in CO2 emissions from energy systems has closely tracked \r\nrising GDP per  capita globally (Lamb et  al. 2021b), affirming the \r\nsubstantial literature describing the mutual relationship between \r\neconomic growth and demand for energy and electricity (robust \r\nevidence, high agreement) (Khanna and Rao 2009; Stern, 2011). \r\nThis relationship has played out strongly in developing regions, \r\nparticularly in Asia, where a massive scale up of energy supply has \r\naccompanied economic growth - with average annual increases of \r\nenergy demand between 3.8-4.3% in 2010-2019 (Figure 2.17). The \r\nkey driver for slowing the growth of energy systems CO2 emissions \r\nhas been declining energy intensities in almost all regions. Annually, \r\n1.9% less energy per unit of GDP was used globally between 2010 \r\nand 2019."


id: 3eeec9865e90544e7714f99c8e511445
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8258
content:
"GHG emissions continued to rise since 2010 across all sectors \r\nand subsectors, most rapidly in electricity production, industry, \r\nand transport. Decarbonisation gains from improvements in energy \r\nefficiency across different sectors and worldwide have been largely \r\nwiped out by increases in demand for goods and services. Prevailing \r\nconsumption patterns have also tended to aggravate energy use \r\nand emissions, with the long-term trend led by developed regions. \r\nDecarbonisation trends in some developed regions are limited in \r\nsize and geographically. Globally, there are enormous unexploited \r\nmitigation potentials from adopting best available technologies."


id: 55b6f18e34d7a3111a4b6b1ee392c22f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12350
content:
"The growth of emissions from coal power slowed after 2010, and \r\neven declined between 2011 and 2019, primarily due to a slowdown \r\nof economic growth and fewer coal capacity additions in China \r\n(Friedlingstein et al. 2019; Peters et al. 2020). Discussions of a global \r\n'peak coal', however, may be premature, as further growth was \r\nobserved in 2019 (Friedlingstein et al. 2019; Peters et al. 2020). Large "


id: 2ad823541cf00516b954aea0014ce7d0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4768
content:
"The following subsections discuss main emissions drivers by sector. \r\nMore detailed analyses of sectoral emissions and mitigation options \r\nare presented in Chapters 6-11."


id: fab3e41f2f4717cb3329684c941f3c51
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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content:
"carbon intensity helped to stabilise direct industrial CO2 emissions in \r\nthis region (-0.3% yr -1 between 2010 and 2019; Figure 2.18). Direct \r\nindustry CO2 emissions have also declined in Latin America, Europe \r\nand Australia, Japan and New Zealand, and - to a smaller extent - \r\nin North America. In all other regions, they were growing  - most \r\nrapidly in southern Asia (+4.3% annually for direct CO2 emissions \r\nsince 2010) (Figure 2.18)."


id: 98e578054cfa2963ee99aa7ae7085e63
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24113
content:
"ongoing and planned capacity increases in India, Turkey, Indonesia, \r\nVietnam, South Africa, and other countries has become a driver of \r\nthermal coal use after 2014 (UNEP 2017; Edenhofer et  al. 2018; \r\nSteckel et al. 2019)."


id: 7ff9600df3d2ccc194274fe0b376952e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19652
content:
"When indirect emissions from electricity and heat production are \r\nincluded, industry becomes the single highest emitting sector of \r\nGHGs (20.0 GtCO2-eq in 2019) (high confidence). Facilitated by \r\nglobalisation, East Asia has been the main source and primary driver \r\nof global industry emissions growth since 2000 (robust evidence,\r\nhigh agreement) (Lamb et  al. 2021). However, while East Asia \r\nhas emitted 45% of the world's industry GHG emissions in 2019, \r\na remarkable decrease of 5.0% yr -1 in energy intensity and 1.6% in "


id: db9fcbd23089be1a30c07d9a8ec3f547
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"The main global driver of industry emissions has been a massive rise \r\nin the demand for products that are indirectly used in production, \r\nsuch as cement, chemicals, steel, aluminium, wood, paper, plastics, \r\nlubricants, fertilisers, and so on. This demand was driven by economic \r\ngrowth, rising affluence, and consumption, as well as a  rapid rise \r\nin urban populations and associated infrastructure development \r\n(robust evidence, high agreement) (Krausmann et al. 2018). There is "


id: ec8769356f4ba9d6593ae8c9aee15857
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38972
content:
"strong evidence that the growing use of concrete, steel, and other \r\nconstruction materials is particularly tightly coupled to these drivers \r\n(Pauliuk et al. 2013; Cao et al. 2017; Krausmann et al. 2017; Plank \r\net al. 2018; Haberl et al. 2020). Per capita stocks of cement and steel \r\nshow a typical pattern of rapid take-off as countries urbanise and \r\nindustrialise, before slowing down to low growth at high levels of \r\nGDP. Hence, in countries that have recently been industrialising and \r\nurbanising  - that is Eastern, Southern and South-Eastern Asia  - \r\na particularly strong increase of emissions from these subsectors can \r\nbe observed. Selected wealthy countries seem to stabilise at high \r\nper capita levels of stocks, although it is unclear if these stabilisations \r\npersist and if they result in significant absolute reductions of material \r\nuse (Wiedenhofer et  al. 2015; Cao et  al. 2017; Krausmann et  al. \r\n2018). Opportunities for prolonging lifetimes and improving end of "


id: 75de2ce111e8c4c50c9da076717aaeaa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17964
content:
"life recycling in order to achieve absolute reductions in extraction \r\nactivities are as yet unexploited (Krausmann et al. 2017; Zink and \r\nGeyer, 2017)."


id: 7956acfe739586207f83bc15b5f64a83
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18541
content:
"On the production side, improvements in the efficiency of material \r\nextraction, processing, and manufacturing have reduced industrial \r\nenergy use per unit of output (J. Wang et al. 2019). These measures, \r\nalongside improved material substitution, lightweight designs, \r\nextended product and servicing lifetimes, improved service efficiency, \r\nand increased reuse and recycling will enable substantial emissions \r\nreductions in the future (Hertwich et al. 2019). In absence of these \r\nimprovements in energy intensity, the growth of population and \r\nGDP per  capita would have driven the industrial CO2 emissions \r\nto rise by more than 100% by 2017 compared with 1990, instead "


id: 10ee478fe4e797ac0f86518c4d26eb7e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 167
content:
"of 56% (Lamb et al. 2021b). Nonetheless, many studies point to deep \r\nregional differences in efficiency levels and large globally unexploited \r\npotentials to improve industrial energy efficiency by adopting best \r\navailable technologies and practices for metal, cement, and chemical \r\nproduction (Gutowski et  al. 2013; Schulze et  al. 2016; Hernandez \r\net al. 2018; Talaei et al. 2018)."


id: 559736f529ea3248622102a5d17d79dc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12329
content:
"in buildings, for instance by gas and coal boilers, and cooking and \r\nlighting devices that burn kerosene, biomass, and other fuels (Lamb \r\net al. 2021). Residential buildings accounted for the majority of this \r\nsector's emissions (64%, 6.3 GtCO2-eq, including both direct and \r\nindirect emissions), followed by non-residential buildings (35%, \r\n3.5 GtCO2-eq) (high confidence)."


id: eb373d4757143cfcd6d524752899f407
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38737
content:
"Global buildings sector GHG emissions increased by 0.7% yr -1\r\nbetween 2010 and 2019 (Figure 2.19), growing the most in absolute \r\nterms in East and South Asia, whereas they declined the most in \r\nEurope, mostly due to the expansion of renewables in the energy \r\nsector and increased energy efficiency (Lamb et  al. 2021). North \r\nAmerica has the highest per capita GHG emissions from buildings \r\nand the second highest absolute level after East Asia (Figure 2.19)."


id: 5c6acedb656a760136d70db88a2f13b7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13513
content:
"Global direct and indirect GHG emissions from the buildings sector \r\nreached 9.7 GtCO2-eq in 2019, or 16% of global emissions). Most of \r\nthese emissions (66%, or 6.4 GtCO2-eq) were upstream emissions \r\nfrom power generation and commercial heat (Figure  2.19). The \r\nremaining 33% (3.3 GtCO2-eq) of emissions were directly produced "


id: 43f1ed092145e2da4ceab042d5641f2f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9187
content:
"emissions (Figure  2.20). Road transport passenger and freight \r\nemissions represented by far the largest component and source of \r\nthis growth (6.1 GtCO2-eq, 69% of all transport emissions in 2019)\r\n(high confidence). National plus international shipping and aviation \r\nemissions together accounted for 2.0 GtCO2-eq or 22% of the \r\nsector's total in 2019. North America, Europe and Eastern Asia stand \r\nout as the main regional contributors to global transport emissions \r\nand together account for 50% of the sector's total."


id: 1b399151e6574a9f64b156f4a9352ffe
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1978
content:
"Rising wealth has been associated with more floor space being \r\nrequired to service growing demand in the retail, office, and hotel \r\nsectors (medium evidence, high agreement) (Daioglou et  al. 2012; \r\nDeetman et  al. 2020). In addition, demographic and social factors \r\nhave driven a cross-national trend of increasing floor space per capita. \r\nAs populations age and decrease in fertility, and as individuals seek \r\ngreater privacy and autonomy, households declined in size, at least \r\nbefore the COVID-19 pandemic (Ellsworth-Krebs 2020). These factors \r\nled to increased floor space per capita, even as populations stabilise. \r\nThis in turn is a  key driver for building sector emissions, because \r\nbuilding characteristics such as size and type, rather than occupant \r\nbehaviour, tend to explain the majority of energy use within dwellings \r\n(Guerra Santin et  al. 2009; Urge-Vorsatz et  al. 2015; Huebner and \r\nShipworth 2017) (Chapter 9)."


id: c52dbbf50f8602838f8048c2f617aa71
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31998
content:
"The proportion of total final energy used in transport (28%) and \r\nits fast expansion over time weighs heavily on climate mitigation \r\nefforts, as 92% of transport energy comes from oil-based fuels (IEA \r\n2020b). These trends situate transport as one of the most challenging \r\nsectors for climate change mitigation - no country has so far been \r\nable to realise significant emissions reductions in the sector. North \r\nAmerica's absolute and per  capita transport emissions are the \r\nhighest amongst world regions, but those of South, South-East and \r\nEast Asia are growing the fastest (high confidence) (between +4.6% \r\nand +5.2% yr -1 for CO2 between 2010 and 2019) (Figure 2.20)."


id: dd09a280429f361bdb408a61bd54701f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36150
content:
"Energy activity levels further drive regional differences. In Eurasia, \r\nEurope and North America, thermal demands for space heating \r\ndominate building energy use, at 66%, 62% and 48% of residential \r\nenergy demand, respectively (IEA 2020a). In contrast, cooking has \r\na much higher share of building energy use in regions of the Global \r\nSouth, including China (Cao et al. 2016). And, despite temperatures \r\nbeing on average warmer in the Global South, electricity use for \r\ncooling is a more prominent factor in the Global North (Waite et al. \r\n2017). This situation is changing, however, as rapid income growth \r\nand demographic changes in the Global South enable households to \r\nheat and cool their homes (Urge-Vorsatz et al. 2015, 2020)."


id: 195c4d1da95cc40d745d8b28e5b14b24
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1678
content:
"Despite some policy achievements, energy use in the global transport \r\nsystem remains to the present deeply rooted in fossil fuels (robust \r\nevidence, high agreement) (Figueroa et al. 2014; IEA 2019). In part \r\nthis is due to the increasing adoption of larger, heavier combustion\u0002based vehicles in some regions, which have tended to far outpace \r\nelectric and hybrid vehicle sales (Chapter 10). Yet, stringent material \r\nefficiency and lightweight design of passenger vehicles alone would \r\nhave the potential to cut cumulative global GHG emissions until \r\n2060 by 16-39 GtCO2-eq (Pauliuk et al. 2021)."


id: 169939f1e9ceb72c8151b491186704ed
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"While global passenger activity has expanded in all world regions, \r\ngreat disparities exist between low- and high-income regions, and \r\nwithin countries between urban and rural areas (ITF 2019). While \r\nprivate car use is dominant in OECD countries (EC 2019), the growth \r\nof passenger-km (the product of number of travellers and distance \r\ntravelled) has considerably slowed there, down to an increase of \r\njust 1% yr-1 between 2000 and 2017 (SLoCaT 2018) (Chapter 10). \r\nMeanwhile, emerging economies in the Global South are becoming \r\nmore car-dependent, with rapidly growing motorisation, on-demand \r\nprivate transport services, urban sprawl, and the emergence of local "


id: 47071fbe863197f212d413197446cb7d
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"With a steady, average annual growth of +1.8% yr-1 between 2010 \r\nand 2019, global transport GHG emissions reached 8.9  GtCO2-eq \r\nin 2019 and accounted for 15% of all direct and indirect "


id: 54784f65afaa2134aecab56f2bfd54ef
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12132
content:
"automotive production, while public transport struggles to provide \r\nadequate services (Dargay et  al. 2007; Hansen and Nielsen 2017; \r\nPojani and Stead 2017)."


id: 7390f1bf46da3de2bc524d3fc3b6d54c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17587
content:
"Minx et al. 2021;). Energy efficiency improvements in aviation were \r\nconsiderably larger than in road transport, but were outpaced by \r\neven larger increases in activity levels (SLoCaT 2018; Lee et al. 2021) \r\n(Chapter 10)."


id: d76cc62e3fb2e1beb1d5f8aa1e0f7073
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Freight travel activity grew across the globe by 68% in the last \r\ntwo decades, driven by global GDP increases, together with the \r\nproliferation of online commerce and rapid (i.e.,  same-day and \r\nnext-day) delivery (SLoCaT 2018). Growth has been particularly rapid \r\nin heavy-duty road freight transport."


id: f289859248376309ecd96ede605a5843
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40071
content:
"GHG emissions from agriculture, forestry and other land use \r\n(AFOLU) reached 13 GtCO2-eq globally in 2019 (medium confidence) \r\n(Figure 2.21). AFOLU trends, particularly those for CO2-LULUCF, are \r\nsubject to a high degree of uncertainty (Section 2.2.1). Overall, the \r\nAFOLU sector accounts for 22% of total global GHG emissions, and \r\nin several regions - Africa, Latin America, and South-East Asia - it \r\nis the single largest emitting sector, which is also significantly "


id: da263963d012dc35609380ced3aa8aaa
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35675
content:
"While accounting for a small share of total GHG emissions, domestic \r\nand international aviation have been growing faster than road \r\ntransport emissions, with average annual growth rates of +3.3% and \r\n+3.4%, respectively, between 2010 and 2019 (Crippa et  al. 2021; "


id: e01b632f7416eb27e3ba7cc9d61ee915
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36677
content:
"Unlike all other sectors, AFOLU emissions are typically higher in \r\ndeveloping compared to developed regions (medium confidence). \r\nIn  Africa, Latin America, and South-East Asia, CO2 emissions \r\nassociated with land-use change and management predominate, \r\ndwarfing other AFOLU and non-AFOLU sources and making AFOLU \r\nthe single largest sector with more than 50% of emissions in these \r\nregions (Lamb et  al. 2021b). Land-use and land-management \r\nemissions are associated with the expansion of agriculture into \r\ncarbon-dense tropical forest areas (Vancutsem et  al. 2021), where \r\nlarge quantities of CO2 emissions result from the removal and burning \r\nof biomass and draining of carbon rich soils (Pearson  et  al.  2017; "


id: df1d60236211ae77ecfba9f68cc97b08
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36506
content:
"affected itself by climate change (AR6 WGI Chapters 8, 11, and 12; \r\nand AR6 WGII Chapter 5). Latin America has the highest absolute and \r\nper capita AFOLU GHG emissions of any world region (Figure 2.21). \r\nCO2 emissions from land-use change and CH4 emissions from \r\nenteric fermentation together account for 74% of sector-wide \r\nGHGs. Note that CO2-LULUCF estimates included in this chapter are \r\nnot necessarily comparable with country GHG inventories, due to \r\ndifferent approaches to estimating anthropogenic CO2 sinks (Grassi \r\net al. 2018) (Chapter 7)."


id: d1b83c91332b8a9c8cb85fcb2b95d8b2
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content:
"Figure 2.21 | Trends and drivers of global AFOLU sector emissions: (a) trends of GHG emissions by subsectors 1990-2019; (b) share of total sector and \r\nper capita GHG emissions by world region in 2019; and (c) Kaya decomposition of GHG emissions drivers. Based on the equation H=P(A/P)(L/A)(H/L), where \r\nP is population, A/P is agricultural output per capita, L/A is the land required per unit of agricultural output (land efficiency), and H/L is GHG emissions per unit of land (GHG \r\nintensity) (Hong et al. 2021). GHG emissions H comprise agricultural CH4 and N2O emissions from EDGAR v6.0. The indicated annual growth rates are averaged across the years \r\n2010-2019 - LULUCF CO2 emissions are excluded in panel (c). (Note: due to different datasets, the population breakdown for AFOLU emissions is slightly different than that \r\nin the other sector figures above)."


id: 61a5c24ec3b75eb5c575069872492264
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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content:
"IPCC 2018; Hong  et  al. 2021). Ruminant livestock rearing takes \r\nplace on vast tracts of pasture land worldwide, contributing to \r\nlarge quantities of CH4 emissions from enteric fermentation in Latin \r\nAmerica (0.8 GtCO2-eq in 2018), Southern Asia (0.6 GtCO2-eq), and \r\nAfrica (0.5 GtCO2-eq), while also playing a sizable role in the total \r\nAFOLU emissions of most other regions (Lamb et al. 2021b)."


id: 4980a061bdc13c60462e864041b345f2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"relationship has important implications for the design of income \r\nredistribution policies aiming to reduce inequalities (Section  2.6 \r\npresents evidence on how affluence and high consumption relate to \r\nemissions). Income inequality and carbon intensity of consumption \r\ndiffers across countries and individuals (Balezentis et  al. 2020) \r\n(Section  2.3.3). Reduced income inequality between nations can \r\nreduce emissions intensity of global income growth, if energy \r\nintensity reductions from income growth in some nations offset \r\nincreases in energy and emissions from higher growth in other \r\nnations (Rao and Min 2018). Increasing income inequality between \r\nindividuals can translate into larger energy and emissions inequality \r\nif higher incomes are spent on more energy-intensive consumption \r\nand affluent lifestyles (Oswald et  al. 2020; Wiedmann et  al. 2020) \r\n(Section 2.6)."


id: f3e1eaa84ab81ea4158da1d866344478
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"In all regions, the amount of land required per unit of agricultural \r\noutput has decreased significantly from 2010 to 2019, with a global \r\naverage of -2.2% yr-1 (land efficiency metric in Figure  2.21). This \r\nreflects agricultural intensification and technological progress. \r\nHowever, in most regions this was mirrored by an increase in output \r\nper capita, meaning that absolute GHG emissions in most regions \r\nincreased over the last decade. A significant increase in total AFOLU \r\nemissions occurred in Africa, driven by both increased GHG emissions \r\nper unit of land and increased populations (Figure 2.21)."


id: 663b19ebcd2d0cdeaa3c1c5f877776c9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15250
content:
"The AFOLU sector and its emissions impacts are closely tied to \r\nglobal supply chains, with countries in Latin America and South-East \r\nAsia using large portions of their land for agricultural and forestry \r\nproducts exported to other countries (Chapter 7). The strong increases \r\nin production per capita and associated GHG emissions seen in these \r\nregions are at least partly attributable to growing exports and not \r\nnational food system or dietary changes. At the same time, efforts to \r\npromote environmental sustainability in regions such as the EU and \r\nthe USA (but also fast-growing emerging economies such as China) \r\ncan take place at the cost of increasing land displacement elsewhere \r\nto meet their own demand (Meyfroidt et  al. 2010; Yu et  al. 2013; \r\nCreutzig et al. 2019)."


id: 5511014a3977f48826f162687a9714c4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12240
content:
"Increasing economic inequality globally has given rise to concern \r\nthat unequal societies may be more likely to pollute and degrade \r\ntheir environments (Masud et al. 2018; Chancel 2020; Hailemariam \r\net al. 2020; Millward-Hopkins and Oswald 2021). The nature of this "


id: 1a0630c3753fcd540f120f1ad4777101
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"ambient air temperature caused by urban land expansion, which \r\nwill likely drive a  substantive increase in air conditioning use and \r\ncold storage for food (Huang et al. 2019). Specific emission drivers, \r\nhowever, depend on city- and place-specific circumstances such \r\nas income, household size, density, or local climate (Baiocchi et al. \r\n2015; H. Wang et al. 2019). Geographical factors, urban form, and \r\ntransport/fuel costs are dependent on each other, and, together with \r\neconomic activity, have been found to explain 37% of urban direct \r\nenergy use and 88% of urban transport energy use in a global sample \r\nof 274 cities (Creutzig et al. 2015)."


id: a26304d672ddb6b8f95a03206944aa24
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25789
content:
"30-100  GJ per  capita yr-1 (Lamb and Rao 2015). There is some \r\nevidence, however, of a  decoupling between energy consumption \r\nand HDI over time (Akizu-Gardoki et  al. 2018). The emissions \r\nconsequences of poverty alleviation and decent living also depend on \r\nwhether improvements in well-being occur via energy- and carbon\u0002intensive industrialisation or low-carbon development (Semieniuk \r\nand Yakovenko 2020; Fu et al. 2021; Huang and Tian 2021)."


id: 8db36cacf7f2d09df8383c12e9fabeaa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22118
content:
"Economic growth and urbanisation go hand in hand and are both \r\ninfluencing GHG emissions. However, the exact role of urban \r\ndevelopment in driving emissions is multi-faceted and heterogeneous, \r\ndepending on development status and other regional factors (medium \r\nevidence, high agreement) (Jorgenson et al. 2014; Lamb et al. 2014; \r\nLiddle and Lung 2014; Creutzig et al. 2015; Pincetl 2017; Azizalrahman \r\nand Hasyimi 2019; Munoz et al. 2020). This calls for a differentiated \r\nassessment. This section assesses the process of rapid urban growth \r\nin developing countries and how emissions change over time when \r\ncities' urban populations and infrastructure expand at fast speed and \r\nat a massive scale (Seto et al. 2017; Elmqvist et al. 2021). To distinguish, \r\nSection 2.6 includes the carbon footprint of urban lifestyles and the \r\ndifference in emissions profiles between already urbanised and less \r\nurbanised areas. Chapter  8 deals with urban strategies for climate \r\nchange mitigation."


id: 965bcc09d7760d9866017bea79f8ee8e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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content:
"Urban development is most significant and rapid in developing and \r\ntransition countries, accompanied by a substantial migration of rural \r\npopulations to urban areas (Apergis and Li 2016; Azizalrahman and \r\nHasyimi 2019; Z. Wang et al. 2019) and associated impacts on land \r\nuse (Richardson et  al. 2015). If the trend of developing countries \r\nfollowing infrastructure stock patterns in industrialised nations \r\ncontinues until 2050, this could cause approximately 350 GtCO2\r\nfrom the production of materials (Muller et al. 2013). This would be \r\nequivalent to 70% of the 500 GtCO2 estimated remaining carbon \r\nbudget from the beginning of 2020 to limit global warming to 1.5degC \r\nwith a likelihood of 50% (IPCC 2021b)."


id: 96547a2fa85b8979cd69ff31cf00e95d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23646
content:
"In many developing countries across the world, the process of urban \r\nexpansion leads to higher per  capita consumption-based GHG \r\nemissions (medium evidence, high agreement) (Jorgenson et al. 2014; \r\nYao et al. 2015; Zhang et al. 2016; Wood et al. 2018a; Munoz et al. \r\n2020). The high disparity between rural and urban personal carbon \r\nfootprints in these countries (Wiedenhofer et al. 2017) (Section 2.6) \r\nmeans that migration to urban areas increases overall emissions as \r\nlevels of income and expenditure rise, leading to further economic \r\ngrowth and infrastructure development in urban areas (Muller \r\net al. 2013; Li et al. 2015; Wang and Yang 2016; Zhang et al. 2016; \r\nWiedenhofer et al. 2017; Cetin and Bakirtas 2019; Fan et al. 2019; \r\nLi and Zhou 2019; Xia et al. 2019; Sarkodie et al. 2020)."


id: 88ec792aacdb99ad195dde46db2032e2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21255
content:
"Technological change that facilitates efficient energy utilisation from \r\nproduction to its final conversion into end-use services is a critical \r\ndriver of carbon emissions reductions(high confidence). Technological \r\nchange can facilitate stringent mitigation, but it can also reduce these \r\neffects by changing consumer behaviour, such as through rebound \r\neffects (Section 2.6 and Chapter 16). AR6 includes an entire chapter \r\non innovation, technology development, and transfer (Chapter 16). \r\nA  focus gained in this section is the extent to which aligned, "


id: bce0c2441e2a7b2a102a8de844fc3fe4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30470
content:
"For total production-based emissions in general, urbanisation is \r\nthought to have a smaller effect than changes in population, GDP \r\nper capita, and energy and emissions intensities, which are all more \r\ninfluential (Lin et al. 2017). Another driver of urban emissions is rising "


id: 279f6bd4dff511b225de591fb718e26d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4149
content:
"credible, and durable policies can accelerate technological change \r\nfactors to put emissions reductions on a trajectory compatible with \r\nreaching United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change \r\n(UNFCCC) goals."


id: 27d84041559a29d0017c17aaa9751528
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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vector_id: 4202
content:
"An illuminating debate on the possibility of faster transitions has \r\nemerged since AR5  - with diverging assumptions about future \r\ntechnological change at the core of the discourse (Bazilian et  al. \r\n2020; Lu and Nemet 2020). Table 2.5 summarises these arguments."


id: b281a6c2d1d65d9142a3c4a4dbb1de82
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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"Technological change has facilitated the provision of more diverse \r\nand efficient energy services (heating, cooling, lighting, and mobility) \r\nwhile generating fewer emissions per  unit of service. As seen in \r\nSection  2.4, in Kaya identity terms (Lima et  al. 2016) (see 'Kaya \r\nidentity' in Glossary): population and economic growth are factors \r\nthat have increased emissions, while technological change has \r\nreduced emissions (Peters et  al. 2017). These Kaya statistics show \r\nthat, while technological change can facilitate the transition to \r\na low-carbon economy, it needs to proceed at a much faster pace \r\nthan historical trends (Peters et al. 2017)."


id: 6ee559f3bbc2f81c5219cbe51e0bb73
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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content:
"Recent work has also reasserted previous claims that the speed \r\nof a  low-carbon transition will follow historical patterns (low \r\nconfidence). Broad transitions involve technological complexity, \r\ntime-consuming technological development, risk-averse adopters, \r\nhigh upfront costs, and low immediate individual adoption benefits, \r\nattributes that are not all present in the examples of rapid change \r\ndescribed above (Grubler et al. 2016). Additional factors that slow \r\ntransitions include: the need for the transition to occur globally, thus \r\nrequiring nations with unequal economic resources and development \r\ncircumstances to engage in near-universal participation; slow \r\nprogress in recent decades; intermittence of renewables, and the time \r\ninvolved in building supporting infrastructure (Smil 2016); difficulty \r\nin decarbonising transportation and industry (Rissman et al. 2020); \r\nand material resource constraints (Davidsson et al. 2014)."


id: f549d7d81acbcbad0368baf4dde29e5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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vector_id: 40522
content:
"Since AR5, multiple low-carbon technologies have shown dramatic \r\nimprovement, particularly solar photovoltaic (PV), wind, and \r\nbatteries (high confidence). The observed pace of these changes \r\nand the likelihood of their continuation support the arguments in \r\nthe previous section that future energy transitions are likely to occur \r\nmore quickly than in the past (medium confidence)."


id: 531faaf716ee8eca5b79ad520fc86389
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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vector_id: 11893
content:
"opportunities for rapid change, but they do not make rapid change \r\ninevitable; a  supportive context, including supportive policy and \r\ncomplementary technologies, can stimulate more favourable \r\ntechnology outcomes (high confidence)."


id: 1f8c5617b88bc6ffdcfb1472497ac2f4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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content:
"There is also evidence that small technologies not only learn \r\nbut become adopted faster than large technologies (medium \r\nconfidence) (Wilson et al. 2020b). Some of the mechanisms related \r\nto the adoption rate difference are associated with cost reductions; \r\nfor example, smaller, less lumpy investments involve lower risk \r\nfor adopters (Dahlgren et al. 2013; Wilson et al. 2020b). The shorter \r\nlifetimes of small technologies allow users to take advantage of new \r\nperformance improvements (Knapp 1999) and access a  large set \r\nof small adopters (Finger et al. 2019). Other mechanisms for faster \r\nadoption are distinctly related to markets: modular technologies can \r\naddress a wide variety of niche markets (Geels 2018) with different \r\nwillingness to pay (Nemet 2019) and strategically find protected \r\nniches while technology is maturing (Coles et al. 2018). "


id: 3437e6d0c567c0241724a782040969dc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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content:
"The overall pattern shows that IAMs expect growth in small-scale \r\nrenewables to fall to less than half of their recent pace, and large\u0002scale CCS to more than double from the limited deployment assessed\r\n(high confidence). The emerging work since AR5 showing the rapid \r\nadoption and faster learning in small-scale technologies should \r\nprompt a keener focus on what technologies the world can depend \r\non to scale up quickly (Grubb et al. 2021). The scenario results make \r\nit quite clear that climate stabilisation depends on rapid adoption of \r\nlow-carbon technologies throughout the 2020-2040 period."


id: 21b66b8ca03e407a74f6ece76f4cbd2c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3145
content:
"The transition to a  more sustainable energy system depends not \r\njust on improvement in technologies, but also on their widespread \r\nadoption. Work since AR5 has also substantiated the bidirectional \r\ncausal link between technology improvement and adoption. Cost \r\nreductions facilitate adoption, which generates opportunities for \r\nfurther cost reductions through a  process of learning by doing\r\n(medium confidence). The rate of adoption is thus closely related to \r\nthe speed at which an energy transition is possible."


id: 99fbcb84c4f0826fcf41d4a1ac1c974f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24323
content:
"This section synthesises how behavioural choices, lifestyles, and \r\nconsumption preferences affect energy use and emissions. Household \r\nconsumption is the largest component of a country's gross domestic \r\nproduct (GDP) and the main contributor to greenhouse gas (GHG) \r\nemissions through direct energy consumption for heating and \r\ncooling or private transportation, and indirectly through carbon \r\nemitted during production of final consumption items. There is \r\ngreat variation in individual, group and household behaviour and \r\nconsumption patterns within and between countries and over time. \r\nA  number of factors affect people's consumption patterns and \r\nassociated carbon emissions, such as: socio-demographics; socio\u0002economic status; infrastructure and access to public services; the \r\nregulatory framework; availability, affordability and accessibility of \r\nmore or less sustainable choices on markets; and individual values \r\nand preferences (Dietz et al. 2009)."


id: d32d5a40f9c813b7bd88979910fe6444
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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"Carbon footprints vary between and within countries and show an \r\nuneven distribution because of differences in development levels, \r\neconomic structure, economic cycle, available public infrastructure, \r\nclimate and residential lifestyles (Bruckner et  al. 2021). Similar \r\nemission characteristics can also be found within a country - see, \r\nfor China; Feng et al. (2013); for the USA: Pizer et al. (2010); Feng \r\net  al. (2013); Miehe et  al. (2016); Hubacek et  al. (2017b); Wang \r\net al. (2018); for Brazil: Sanches-Pereira et al. (2016); and for Latin \r\nAmerican countries: Zhong et al. (2020)."


id: dc4c5d6b0879fdd10987ab65d7575067
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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"In terms of rapidly growing economies, China is the most extensively \r\nresearched country. China's household emissions were primarily \r\nderived from electricity and coal consumption, as well as residents' \r\nconsumption of emission-intensive products, such as housing (33.4%), \r\nfood (23.6%), private transportation and communication (14.8%) \r\n(Wang et al. 2018). Space heating was the largest contributor among \r\nvarious daily energy uses in northern cities (Yang and Liu 2017). In \r\ncomparison, Indonesian rural households have a  larger emission "


id: aef995c1468518afe9f34707e643f954
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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vector_id: 28029
content:
"Figure 2.25 (continued): Carbon footprints per capita income and expenditure category for 109 countries ranked by per capita income (consumption\u0002based emissions). Notes: countries and income categories are dependent on data availability. Light blue dots represent income quintiles (lowest, low, middle, higher, \r\nand highest) of EU countries and the USA. Yellow dots are for the developing country group provided by the World Bank for four expenditure categories: lowest, low, middle \r\nand higher (Hubacek et al. 2017b). Dark blue diamonds represent average per capita carbon footprints. Countries are ranked from the lowest per capita income (bottom) to \r\nthe highest income (top) within each country group. Countries are grouped using the IPCC's six high-level classification categories. Footprint values for higher income groups \r\nin the World Bank data are less reliable."


id: a5e07d9ca83a598d29068f323a5cf489
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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vector_id: 26406
content:
"are responsible for only 13-15% of emissions, depending on the study \r\n(Chancel and Piketty 2015; Hubacek et al. 2017b) (Figure 2.25). The \r\naverage carbon footprint of the high household incomes is more than \r\nan order of magnitudes larger than that of the lowest expenditure \r\ngroup (Feng et al. 2021). For example, Zhang et al. (2016) analysed \r\nthe impact of household consumption across different income \r\nhouseholds on CO2 emissions in China and concluded that the impact \r\non CO2 emissions generated by urban households' consumption is \r\n1.8 times as much as that of rural ones. High-income households \r\nhave higher emissions related to transport and entertainment - such \r\nas recreational expenditure, travel, and eating out - than low-income \r\nhouseholds. Low-income households tend to have a  larger share \r\non necessities such as fuel for heating and cooking (Kerkhof et al. \r\n2009). Figure 2.25 shows the carbon footprint per capita ranked by \r\nper capita income."


id: 1ab5e9a541453e155646ff11156e25a7
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content:
"share on food and a much smaller share on services and recreation \r\nthan urban households (Irfany and Klasen 2017). Urban Indonesian \r\nhouseholds have a much larger share of transport-related emissions \r\n(Irfany and Klasen 2017). Analysis from the Philippines shows that, on \r\naverage, households in urban areas emit twice as much as rural ones \r\nbecause of much lower direct energy use in homes and for transport \r\nin rural areas (Serino 2017). In other emerging economies, such \r\nas India, Brazil, Turkey and South Africa, a high share of transport\u0002related carbon emissions among urban middle- and high-income \r\nhouseholds is evident (Huang and Tian 2021)."


id: 1ed3c120efc68839bdabda23becce4e9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2625
content:
"Demographic characteristics such as age, sex, and education \r\nconstitute an important set of determinants influencing emissions \r\npatterns. People of different genders have different consumption \r\npatterns. For example, men tend to consume more food (especially \r\nmeat) than women, leading to higher food-related emissions. Also, \r\nmen spend more money on vehicles and driving (Wang et al. 2018). \r\nSimilar evidence has been found in Germany, Greece, Norway, and \r\nSweden, where men's energy use is 8%, 39%, 6%, and 22% higher \r\nthan women's, respectively (Raty and Carlsson-Kanyama 2010)."


id: 77ff8bdc227f18c24f75f623bd791aaf
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vector_id: 18319
content:
"Income. Due to the differences that shape individuals' consumption \r\npatterns, there are enormous differences in the associated carbon \r\nfootprints - with income being one of the most important predictors. \r\nGlobally, households with income in the top 10% - income higher \r\nthan USD23.03 purchasing power parity (PPP) per capita per day - \r\nare responsible for 34-45% of GHG emissions, while those in the \r\nbottom 50% - income less than USD2.97 PPP per capita per day - "


id: 8b56dab1cbc3880526b9a0db2e6aa31
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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vector_id: 21676
content:
"the service sector (Wiedenhofer et  al. 2018). Improvements in the \r\nefficiency of time or resource use are diminished by rebound effects \r\nthat have been shown to reduce emissions savings by 20-40% on \r\naverage (Gillingham et  al. 2015), while other authors argue that, \r\npotentially, the size of the rebound effect could be larger (Saunders \r\n2015) (see more coverage of the rebound effect in Chapters 9 and \r\n16). Lifestyle shifts brought about by using information technologies \r\nand socio-technological changes are inducing alterations in people's \r\ndaily activities and time-use patterns."


id: edc6fb47a2dbb90bde77a938736ffe8d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39191
content:
"Household size. Per capita emissions tend to decrease with family \r\nsize, as living together becomes more energy efficient (Qu et  al. \r\n2013). The household size in most countries is decreasing (Liu et al. \r\n2011), but the degree differs across countries - for example, there is \r\na higher decrease rate in China than in Canada and the UK (Maraseni \r\net al. 2015). The evidence shows that shifts to smaller households are \r\nassociated with larger per-capita footprints (Liddle and Lung 2014; \r\nUnderwood and Zahran 2015; Ivanova et al. 2017; Wiedenhofer et al. \r\n2018), at least in developed countries (Meangbua et al. 2019)."


id: 7178010eadebf4b78e5b1af28ed0fd5b
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vector_id: 17214
content:
"The reduction of working hours is increasingly discussed as an \r\napproach to improve well-being and reduce emissions (Fitzgerald \r\net al. 2015, 2018; Melo et al. 2018; Wiedenhofer et al. 2018; Smetschka \r\net  al. 2019). For instance, analysis of differences in working hours \r\nacross the USA for the period 2007-2013 shows that there is a strong \r\npositive relationship between carbon emissions and working hours. \r\nThis relationship holds, even after controlling for other differences in \r\npolitical, demographic and economic drivers of emissions (Fitzgerald \r\net  al. 2018). In other analyses, this relationship is seen to hold in \r\nboth developed and developing countries (Fitzgerald et  al. 2015). \r\nOne recent study, however, finds evidence of nonlinear relationships \r\nbetween working time and environmental pressure in EU15 countries \r\nbetween 1970 and 2010, in cases where non-work time is spent \r\ninstead in carbon-intensive leisure activities (Shao and Shen 2017)."


id: 34cd9334e610c27aa6b3deca45cd5b41
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6533
content:
"Urban living. The carbon footprint of individuals and households \r\nis also significantly influenced by urban-rural differences (Ivanova \r\net al. 2018; Wiedenhofer et al. 2018). In some cases, the difference \r\ncan be explained by the effect of locational and spatial configuration \r\ncharacteristics, such as levels of compactness/density, centrality, \r\nproximity and ease of access to services. In all these parameters, urban \r\nareas score higher compared with rural or peri-urban (outlying and \r\nsuburban) areas, thus influencing household emissions in different \r\nways. Urban households tend to have higher emissions than rural \r\nhouseholds (O'Neill et al. 2010; Liu et al. 2011), but with adifferent \r\nenergy and consumption structures. For example, rural households \r\nhave more diverse energy inputs, such as biomass, biogas, solar, wind, \r\nsmall hydro and geothermal in addition to coal (Maraseni et al. 2016)."


id: dbee2b9a105536600cc15ce4b9b2b7b3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35978
content:
"In terms of indirect emissions, urban households have more service\u0002related emissions  - such as from education and entertainment  - \r\nthan rural households, while rural households tend to have higher \r\nemissions related to food consumption or transportation (Buchs and \r\nSchnepf 2013; Maraseni et al. 2016) but this is strongly dependent \r\non the specific situation of the respective country, as in poorer \r\nregions, rural transport might be mainly based on public transport \r\nwith lower carbon emissions per capita. Centrality and location also \r\nplay a  role on the level of urban household emissions. Studies on \r\nUS  households  found that residents in the urban core have 20% \r\nlower household emissions than residents in suburbs, which show \r\na large range of household emissions (from -50% to +60%) (Kahn \r\n2000; Jones and Kammen 2014). Higher population density tends to \r\nbe associated with lower per capita emissions (Liddle and Lung 2014; \r\nLiu et al. 2017)."


id: 4be725f0f1f7c432962e09c38ae85528
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10614
content:
"Social norms. Evidence from experiments in the US shows that \r\nsocial norms cannot only help in reducing a  household's absolute \r\nlevel of electricity use but also shift the time of use to periods when \r\nmore renewable electricity is in the system (Horne and Kennedy, \r\n2017). Analysis from Sweden shows that adoption of sustainable \r\ninnovations like solar panels is influenced by perceived behaviour \r\nand expectations of others (Palm, 2017). Similar conclusions emerge \r\nfrom analysis in the Netherlands on the adoption of electric vehicles \r\nand smart energy systems (Noppers et al. 2019)."


id: 37d771c90511efe30254e2161fdfc1c0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7032
content:
"Location choices are a significant contributor to household emissions. \r\nSuburbanites tend to own larger, spacious homes with larger heating \r\nand cooling requirements. Commuting distance and access to public \r\ntransportation, recreation areas, city centres, public services, and \r\nshops are other important neighbourhood-specific determinants \r\nof carbon emissions (Baiocchi et  al. 2010) (see more on this in \r\nChapters 8 and 10)."


id: 36fac6536edc17ab07fc261fb2ae9ef6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6899
content:
"Time use. A  study on the emissions implications of time use \r\n(Wiedenhofer et  al. 2018) found that the most carbon-intensive \r\nactivities are personal care, eating and drinking and commuting. \r\nIndirect emissions are also high for repairs and gardening. In \r\ncontrast, home-based activities, such as sleep and resting, cleaning \r\nand socialising at home, have low carbon intensities per  hour of \r\ntime use. The same study also found that households in cities and \r\nareas with higher incomes tend to substitute personal activities \r\nfor contracted services, thus shifting away from households to "


id: 344a4fded642268e9210c33fecc72bcd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6440
content:
"consider a microwave a necessity was about one-third in 1996 but \r\nhad increased to more than two-thirds in 2006, but retreated in \r\nimportance during the recession years 2008-2009 (Morin and Taylor \r\n2009). Similar ups and downs have been observed for television \r\nsets, air conditioning, dishwashers or clothes dryers. (Druckman and \r\nJackson 2009). Basic needs and luxury items are subject to change \r\nover one's lifetime and in relation to others (Horowitz 1988). This \r\nshows that the boundaries of the public's luxury-versus-necessity \r\nperceptions are malleable (Morin and Taylor 2009)."


id: 3dfafc16c5664b70b5623f22f3a1283f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8074
content:
"decarbonisation or to make it worse as it takes away riders from \r\npublic transit (ITF, 2019). The evidence so far shows that the potential \r\npositive impacts of shared mobility with pooled rides in lowering \r\ntravel costs, abating congestion, and reduced GHG emissions have \r\nnot materialised to date (Merlin, 2019) (Chapter 5)."


id: 1738bef81085cb028bbb0222c16b46b9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1303
content:
"Education and environmental knowledge. A positive relationship \r\nwas found between general and carbon-specific knowledge and \r\nthe attitude towards carbon-specific behaviours in US consumers \r\n(Polonsky et  al. 2012). One example, pertaining to students, \r\nfound that the gain of environmental knowledge resulted in more \r\nenvironmentally favourable attitude among these high school \r\nstudents (Bradley et  al. 1999). A  comparison across states in the \r\nUSA, for example, shows that environmental awareness can be \r\na mitigating factor of territorial GHG emissions (Dietz et al. 2015). \r\nA 1% increase in 'environmentalism' - defined as the 'environmental \r\nvoting record of the state's Congressional delegation' (Dietz et  al. \r\n2015) - leads to a 0.45% decrease in emissions."


id: 532186094774aaa43d84c92843fd9bc4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11897
content:
"Environmental knowledge is not always directly translating into \r\ndecreased ecological footprint (Csutora 2012). While pro-environmental \r\naction is lagging behind, research shows that this is not caused by \r\npeople undervaluing the environment, but rather by people structurally \r\nunderestimating how much others care (Bouman and Steg 2019). Other \r\nevidence shows that there are multiple causal pathways through which \r\na more educated population can effect emissions, some of which may \r\nbe positive and others negative (Lutz et al. 2019). A more educated \r\npopulation is more productive and can drive higher economic growth \r\nand therefore emissions (Lenzen and Cummins 2013). Moreover, \r\neducation that is designed to specifically inform decision makers of \r\nthe impacts of their decisions and provide behavioural nudges can be \r\na way to reduce emissions (Duarte et al. 2016)."


id: c5971472ff71f667915f203d506b3475
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32067
content:
"One way of quantifying potential carbon lock-in is to estimate the \r\nfuture CO2 emissions from existing and planned infrastructure (Davis \r\net al. 2010; Davis and Socolow 2014) based on historic patterns of \r\nuse and decommissioning. Such estimates focus on CO2 emissions \r\nfrom operating infrastructure and do not comprise any upstream \r\nor downstream emissions across the lifecycle, which are provided \r\nelsewhere in the literature (Muller et al. 2013; Creutzig et al. 2016; \r\nKrausmann et al. 2020; Fisch-Romito 2021). Estimates tend to focus \r\non energy, while other areas, such as the agricultural sector are \r\nusually not covered. Another strand of literature quantifies lock-in by \r\nestimating fossil-fuel related CO2 emissions that are hard to avoid in \r\nfuture scenarios using integrated assessment models (IAMs) (Kriegler \r\net al. 2018b; Luderer et al. 2018). The remainder of this chapter will \r\nassess potential carbon lock-in through those two related strands \r\nof literature."


id: aa9adb48b6b640666067de635cee99d5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27236
content:
"Table  2.6 summarises studies that apply an accounting approach \r\nbased on plant-level data to quantify future CO2 emissions from long\u0002lived fossil fuel infrastructure (Davis et al. 2010; Davis and Socolow \r\n2014; Rozenberg et  al. 2015; Edenhofer et  al. 2018; Pfeiffer et  al. \r\n2018; Cui et al. 2019; Smith et al. 2019; Tong et al. 2019; Pradhan \r\net al. 2021). Differences between studies arise in the scope of the \r\ninfrastructure covered (including resolution), the inclusion of new \r\ninfrastructure proposals, the exact estimation methodology applied \r\nas well as their assessments of uncertainties. Other studies provide \r\nanalysis with a sectoral focus (Bullock et al. 2020; Vogl et al. 2021) or \r\nwith a regional focus on the power sector (Shearer et al. 2017, 2020; \r\nGonzalez-Mahecha et al. 2019; Grubert 2020; Tao et al. 2020)."


id: 1109b4e6d202afd1586c7a0b64793004
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 193
content:
"There is a broad literature on carbon lock-in related to infrastructure \r\nthat has analysed different geographical scales and sectors, with \r\na  strong focus on the power sector (Fisch-Romito et  al. 2020). \r\nAvailable quantifications differ in the time frames of analysis that can \r\nbe classified as backward-looking, static for a given year, or forward\u0002"


id: 3286272039cd1bf33dee8f812eeab0f1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6145
content:
"Assuming variations in historic patterns of use and decommissioning, \r\ncomprehensive estimates of cumulative future CO2 emissions from \r\ncurrent fossil fuel infrastructures are 720 (550-910) GtCO2 (Smith \r\net al. 2019) and 660 (460-890) (high confidence) (Tong et al. 2019) \r\n(Table  2.6 and Figure  2.26). This is about the same size as the "


id: 35de0b5eb9bea8551f3337f07d2e4b0d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6724
content:
"The global estimate of future CO2 emissions from current and \r\nplanned fossil-fuel infrastructures is 850 (600-1100) GtCO2 (Tong \r\net al. 2019). This already exceeds total cumulative net CO2 emissions \r\nin pathways that limit warming to 1.5degC with no or limited overshoot \r\n(see above). It is about the same size as the total cumulative net \r\nCO2 emissions of 890 (640-1160) GtCO2 from pathways that limit \r\nwarming to 2degC (<67%) (Chapter  3). Hence, cumulative net CO2\r\nemissions to limit warming to 2degC (<67%) or lower could already \r\nbe exhausted by current and planned fossil fuel infrastructure (high \r\nconfidence) even though this estimate only covers a fraction of all \r\ninfrastructure developments over the 21st  century as present in \r\nmitigation pathways, does not cover all sectors (e.g., AFOLU) and \r\ndoes not include currently infrastructure development plans in \r\ntransport, buildings, and industry due to a lack of data."


id: 4c2d13ab1a3bd34bc9fe46beb88153b8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10661
content:
"overall cumulative net CO2 emissions until reaching net zero CO2 of \r\n510 (330-710) Gt in pathways that limit warming to 1.5degC with no \r\nor limited overshoot (Chapter  3). About 50% of cumulative future \r\nCO2 emissions from current fossil fuel infrastructures come from the \r\npower sector and 70% of these (or about 40% of the total) are from \r\ncoal plants only. Like global annual CO2 emissions (Friedlingstein \r\net  al. 2020; Peters et  al. 2020), future CO2 emissions  from fossil \r\nfuel infrastructures have increased over time  - that is, future CO2\r\nemissions from fossil fuel infrastructure additions in a  given year \r\nstill outgrow 'savings' from infrastructure retirements (Davis and \r\nSocolow 2014; Tong et  al. 2019). This could add further inertia to \r\nthe system as it may require more and faster retirement of fossil\u0002fuel based infrastructures later, and lead to higher costs for meeting \r\nclimate goals (e.g., Bertram et al. 2015; Johnson et al. 2015)."


