# document

id: d672afb25a2d9054a7e59c1bb4593b3c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35031
content:
"[...] necessary; first and foremost on national and regional levels, including \r the requirements for low-carbon heat and power, water and material \r demand, availability of geological storage and the need for land in \r case of low-density energy sources such as solar or wind power."


id: eab93174794d4b389e740f6617fdc9ec
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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vector_id: 38655
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"Status: There are some demonstration projects by start-up companies \r and academic researchers, who are developing various types of DAC, \r including aqueous potassium solvent with calcium carbonation and \r solid sorbents with heat regeneration (NASEM 2019). These projects \r are supported mostly by private investments and grants or sometimes \r serve utilisation niche markets (e.g., CO2 for beverages, greenhouses, \r enhanced oil recovery). As of 2021, there are more than ten plants \r worldwide, with a scale of ktCO2 yr-1 or smaller (Larsen et al. 2019; \r NASEM 2019; IEA 2020b). Because of the fundamental difference in \r the CO2 concentration at the capture stage, DACCS does not benefit \r directly from research, development and demonstration (RD&D) of \r conventional CCS. Public RD&D programmes dedicated to DAC have \r therefore been proposed (Larsen et al. 2019; NASEM 2019). Possible \r research topics include development of new liquid solvents, novel \r [...]"


id: 2b141c757adde9602d25f53df422119d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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vector_id: 4815
content:
"[...] solid sorbents, and novel equipment or system designs, and the need \r for third-party evaluation of techno-economic aspects has also been \r emphasised (NASEM 2019). However, since basic research does \r not appear to be a primary barrier, both NASEM (2019) and Larsen \r et al. (2019) argue for a stronger focus on demonstration in the US \r context. Though the US and UK governments have begun funding \r DACCS research (IEA 2020b), the scale of R&D activities is limited."


id: bd36765ab2b0a37049ca883edd906dee
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30539
content:
"Risks and impacts: DACCS requires a considerable amount of energy \r (high confidence), depending on the type of technology, water, and \r make-up sorbents, while its land footprint is small compared to other \r CDR methods (Smith et al. 2016). Yet, depending on the source of \r energy for DACCS (e.g., renewables vs nuclear), DACCS could require \r a significant land footprint (NASEM 2019; Sekera and Lichtenberger \r 2020). The theoretical minimum energy requirement for separating \r CO2 gas from the air is about 0.5 GJ tCO2\r -1 (Socolow et al. 2011). \r Fasihi et al. (2019) reviewed the published estimates of energy \r requirements and found that for the current technologies, the total \r energy requirement is about 4-10 GJ tCO2\r -1, with heat accounting \r for about 80% and electricity about 20% (McQueen et al. 2021). \r At a  10  GtCO2 yr-1 sequestration scale, this would translate into \r 40-100 exajoules (EJ) yr-1 of energy consumption (32-80 EJ yr-1 for \r [...]"


id: a0df872a99e7faa377fb514bd2e708a5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:18
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vector_id: 25526
content:
"[...] heat and 8-20 EJ yr-1 electricity), which can be contrasted with the \r current primary energy supply of about 600  EJ yr-1 and electricity \r generation of about 100 EJ yr-1. For the solid sorbent technology, \r low-temperature heat could be sourced from heat pumps powered \r by low-carbon sources such as renewables (Breyer et al. 2020), waste \r heat (Beuttler et al. 2019), and nuclear energy (Sandalow et al. 2018). \r Unless sourced from a clean source, this amount of energy could cause \r environmental damage (Jacobson 2019). Because DACCS is an open \r system, water lost from evaporation must be replenished. Water loss \r varies, depending on technology (including adjustable factors such \r as the concentration of the liquid solvent) as well as environmental \r conditions (e.g., temperate vs tropical climates). For a liquid solvent "


id: d2b424bebe12479020bd6b45543093f4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
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"and that DACCS substitutes for BECCS under stringent targets. In their \r analysis, DACCS captures up to 38.3 GtCO2 yr-1 in 2100. Realmonte \r et al. (2019) modelled two types of DACCS (based on liquid and solid \r sorbents) with two IAMs (TIAM-Grantham and WITCH), and showed \r that in deep mitigation scenarios, DACCS complements, rather than \r substitutes, other CDR methods such as BECCS, and that DACCS is \r effective at containing mitigation costs. At the national scale, Larsen \r et al. (2019) utilised the Regional Investment and Operations (RIO) \r Platform coupled with the Energy PATHWAYS model, and explicitly \r represented DAC in US energy systems scenarios. They found that in \r a scenario that reaches net zero emissions by 2045, about 0.6 GtCO2\r or 1.8  GtCO2 of DACCS would be deployed, depending on the \r availability of biological carbon sinks and bioenergy. The modelling \r supporting the European Commission's initial proposal for net zero \r [...]"


id: 19301589b196d695b36a756dd5debc3f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
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"[...] GHG emissions by 2050 incorporated DAC, with the captured CO2\r used for both synthetic fuel production (DACCU) and storage (DACCS) \r (Capros et al. 2019). Fuhrman et al. (2021a) evaluated the role of \r DACCS across five shared socio-economic pathways with the GCAM \r modelling framework and identified a substantial role for DACCS in \r mitigation and a  decreased pressure on land and water resources \r from BECCS, even under the assumption of limited energy efficiency \r improvement and conservative cost declines of DACCS technologies. \r The newest iteration of the World Economic Outlook by IEA (2021b) \r deploys CDR on a limited scale, and DACCS removes 0.6 GtCO2 in \r 2050 for its Net Zero CO2 Emissions scenario."


id: 52fa0809e2d69d3980636c8eabb516f6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
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vector_id: 11856
content:
"system, it can be 0-50 tH2O tCO2\r -1 (Fasihi et al. 2019). A water loss \r rate of about 1-10 tH2O tCO2\r -1 (Socolow et al. 2011) would translate \r into about 10-100 GtH2O (10-100 km3\r ) to capture 10 GtCO2 from \r the atmosphere. Some solid sorbent technologies actually produce \r water as a by-product, for example 0.8-2 tH2O tCO2\r -1 for a solid\u0002sorbent technology with heat regeneration (Beuttler et al. 2019; \r Fasihi et al. 2019). Large-scale deployment of DACCS would also \r require a  significant quantity of materials, and energy to produce \r them (Chatterjee and Huang 2020). Hydroxide solutions are currently \r being produced as a  by-product of chlorine but replacement \r (make-up) requirement of such materials at scale exceeds the current \r market supply (Realmonte et al. 2019). The land requirements for \r DAC units are not large enough to be of concern (Madhu et al. 2021). \r Furthermore, these can be placed on unproductive lands, in contrast \r [...]"


id: 789cc96a43a3739471e03f2c63ae3c3f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18414
content:
"[...] to biological CDR. Nevertheless, to ensure that CO2-depleted air does \r not enter the air contactor of an adjacent DAC system, there must be \r enough space between DAC units, similar to wind power turbines. \r Considering this, Socolow et al. (2011) estimated a land footprint of \r 1.5 km2 MtCO2\r -1. In contrast, large energy requirements can lead to \r significant footprints if low-density energy sources (e.g., solar PV) are \r used (Smith et al. 2016). For the issues associated with CO2 utilisation \r and storage, see Chapter 6."


id: 26cd8c4c8d914beac612a60ea4b5cf97
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
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vector_id: 3985
content:
"Enhanced weathering involves (i) the mining of rocks containing \r minerals that naturally absorb CO2 from the atmosphere over \r geological timescales (as they become exposed to the atmosphere \r through geological weathering), (ii) the comminution of these rocks \r to increase the surface area, and (iii) the spreading of these crushed \r rocks on soils (or in the ocean/coastal environments; Section 12.3.1.3) \r so that they react with atmospheric CO2 (Schuiling and Krijgsman \r 2006; Hartmann et al. 2013; Beerling et al. 2018; Goll et al. 2021). \r Construction waste and waste materials from mining can also be used \r as a  source material for enhanced weathering. Silicate rocks such \r as basalt, containing minerals rich in calcium and magnesium and \r lacking metal ions such as nickel and chromium, are most suitable for \r enhanced weathering (Beerling et al. 2018); they reduce soil solution \r acidity during dissolution, and promote the chemical transformation \r [...]"


id: 8502a7a4492ba39620ef8a40012e867a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
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"[...] of CO2 to bicarbonate ions. The bicarbonate ions can precipitate in \r soils and drainage waters as a  solid carbonate mineral (Manning \r 2008), or remain dissolved and increase alkalinity levels in the ocean \r when the water reaches the sea (Renforth and Henderson 2017). The \r modelling study by Cipolla et al. (2021) found that rate of weathering \r is greater in high rainfall environments, and was increased by organic \r matter amendment."


id: 17cb02cce31ca2f5d8c8300860db6a01
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
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vector_id: 1394
content:
"The chemical reactions are well understood (Manning 2008; Gillman \r 1980; Gillman et al. 2001), but the behaviour of the crushed rocks \r in the field and potential co-benefits and adverse side effects of \r enhanced weathering require further research (Beerling et al. 2018). \r Small-scale laboratory experiments have calculated weathering \r rates that are orders of magnitude slower than the theoretical limit \r for mass transfer-controlled forsterite (Renforth et al. 2015; Amann \r et al. 2020) and basalt dissolution (Kelland et al. 2020). Uncertainty \r surrounding silicate mineral dissolution rates in soils, the fate of the \r released products, the extent of legacy reserves of mining by-products \r that might be exploited, location and availability of rock extraction \r sites, and the impact on ecosystems remain poorly quantified and \r require further research to better understand feasibility (Renforth \r 2012; Moosdorf et al. 2014; Beerling et al. 2018). Closely monitored, \r [...]"


id: df3ba699f20e7bbcc71069898e6829c8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
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"[...] large-scale demonstration projects would allow these aspects to be \r studied (Smith et al. 2019a; Beerling et al. 2020)."


id: c696f81775e4a5910e9f0f20cf550e31
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
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"Co-benefits: Enhanced weathering can improve plant growth by \r pH modification and increased mineral supply (Kantola et al. 2017; \r Beerling et al. 2018), can enhance SCS in some soils (Beerling et al. \r 2018) thereby protecting against soil erosion (Wright and Upadhyaya \r 1998), and increasing the cation exchange capacity, resulting \r in increased nutrient retention and availability (Gillman 1980; \r Baldock and Skjemstad 2000; Gillman et al. 2001; Manning 2010; \r Guntzer et al. 2012; Tubana et al. 2016; Yu et al. 2017; Haque et al. \r 2019; Smith et al. 2019a). Through these actions, it can contribute \r to SDG  2  (zero hunger), SDG  15 (life on land) (by reducing land \r demand for croplands), SDG  13 (climate action) (through CDR), \r SDG 14 (life below water) (by ameliorating ocean acidification) and \r SDG  6  (clean water and sanitation) (Smith et al. 2019a). To more \r directly ameliorate ocean acidification while increasing CDR and \r [...]"


id: a71deeeed3a00f82a7257a054df88e55
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
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content:
"[...] reducing impacts on land ecosystems, alkaline minerals could instead \r be directly added to the ocean (Section 12.3.1.3). There are potential \r benefits in poverty reduction through employment of local workers \r in mining (Pegg 2006)."


id: af1e106ab762171e2186d97132b8b82a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
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"Costs: Fuss et al. (2018), in a  systematic review of the costs and \r potentials of CDR methods including enhanced weathering, note \r that costs are closely related to the source of the rock and the \r technology used for rock grinding and material transport (Renforth \r 2012; Hartmann et al. 2013; Strefler et al. 2018). Due to differences \r in the methods and assumptions between studies, literature \r ranges are highly uncertain and range from USD15-40 tCO2\r -1 to \r USD3460 tCO2\r -1 (Kohler et al. 2010; Taylor et al. 2016). Renforth \r (2012) reported operational costs in the UK of applying mafic \r rocks (rocks with high magnesium and iron silicate mineral \r concentrations) of USD70-578 tCO2\r -1, and for ultramafic rocks \r (rocks rich in magnesium and iron silicate minerals but with very low \r silica content  - the low silica content enhances weathering rates) \r of USD24-123 tCO2\r -1. Beerling et al. (2020) combined a  spatially \r [...]"


id: 887fdd2c720ebdb8e89ff3e5db3ea7ed
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
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"[...] resolved weathering model with a  techno-economic assessment \r to suggest costs of between USD54-220 tCO2\r -1 (with a  weighted \r mean of USD118-128 tCO2\r -1). Fuss et al. (2018) suggested an \r author judgement cost range of USD50-200 tCO2\r -1 for a potential of \r 2-4 GtCO2 yr-1 from 2050, excluding biological storage."


id: 9f44d373a762ae82a130f9da88fd7f23
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25244
content:
"Potentials: In a  systematic review of the costs and potentials \r of enhanced weathering, Fuss et al. (2018) report a wide range of \r potentials (limited evidence, low agreement). The highest reported \r regional sequestration potential, 88.1  GtCO2 yr-1, is reported for \r the spreading of pulverised rock over a very large land area in the \r tropics, a region considered promising given the higher temperatures \r and greater rainfall (Taylor et al. 2016). Considering cropland areas \r only, the potential carbon removal was estimated by Strefler et al. \r (2018) to be 95 GtCO2 yr-1 for dunite and 4.9 GtCO2 yr-1 for basalt. \r Slightly lower potentials were estimated by Lenton (2014) where \r the potential of carbon removal by enhanced weathering (including \r adding carbonate and olivine to both oceans and soils) was estimated \r to be 3.7  GtCO2 yr-1 by 2100, but with mean annual removal an \r order of magnitude less at 0.2 GtC-eq yr-1 (Lenton 2014). The \r [...]"


id: 494576308332bc93a071a338c8dc3353
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10108
content:
"[...] estimates reported in Smith et al. (2016) are based on the potential \r estimates of Lenton (2014). Beerling et al. (2020) estimate that up \r to 2 GtCO2 yr-1 could be removed by 2050 by spreading basalt onto \r 35-59% (weighted mean 53%) of agricultural land of 12 countries. \r Fuss et al. (2018) provide an author judgement range for potential of \r 2-4 GtCO2 yr-1 for 2050."


id: 16083aa24df81a111545bc56d755b259
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1093
content:
"anthropogenic carbon could potentially be stored in the ocean for \r centuries to millennia for methods that increase deep ocean-dissolved \r carbon concentrations or temporarily bury the carbon; or essentially \r permanently (over ten thousand years) for methods that store the \r carbon in mineral forms or as ions by increasing alkalinity (Siegel \r et al., 2021) (Cross-Chapter Box 8, Figure 1). A wide range of methods \r and implementation options for marine CDR have been proposed \r (Gattuso et al. 2018; Hoegh-Guldberg et al. 2018; GESAMP 2019). \r The most studied ocean-based CDR methods are ocean fertilisation, \r alkalinity enhancement (including electrochemical methods) and \r intensification of biologically-driven carbon fluxes and storage in \r marine ecosystems, referred to as 'blue carbon'. The mitigation \r potentials, costs, co-benefits and trade-offs of these three options are \r discussed below. Less well studied are methods including artificial \r [...]"


id: ae3487279e4ccc3fdea1ecb7df495985
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27886
content:
"[...] upwelling, terrestrial biomass dumping into oceans, direct CO2\r removal from seawater (with CCS), and sinking marine biomass into \r the deep ocean or harvesting it for bioenergy (with CCS) or biochar \r (GESAMP 2019). These methods are summarised briefly below. \r Potential climate response and influence on the carbon budget of \r ocean-based CDR methods are discussed in WGI AR6, Chapter 5."


id: de29d60ae2c3cad6a8392ae8fecb20fa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36348
content:
"Potentials: Theoretical calculations indicate that organic carbon \r export increases 2-20 kg per gram of iron added, but experiments \r indicate much lower efficiency: a  significant part of the CO2 can \r be emitted back the atmosphere because much of the organic \r carbon produced is remineralised in the upper ocean. Efficiency also \r varies with location (Bopp et al. 2013). Between studies, there are \r substantial differences in the ratio of iron added to carbon  fixed \r photosynthetically, and in the ratio of iron added to carbon \r eventually sequestered (Trull et al. 2015), which has implications \r both for the success of this strategy and its cost. Estimates indicate \r potentially achievable net sequestration rates of 1-3 GtCO2 yr-1 for \r iron fertilisation, translating into cumulative CDR of 100-300 GtCO2\r by 2100 (Ryaboshapko and Revokatova 2015; Minx et al. 2018), \r whereas OF with macronutrients has a  higher theoretical \r [...]"


id: afa1423323e85ca29e9d01d96c837ca3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28137
content:
"[...] potential of 5.5  GtCO2 yr-1 (Harrison 2017; Gattuso et al. 2021). \r Modelling studies show a maximum effect on atmospheric CO2 of \r 15-45  parts  per  million volume in 2100 (Zeebe and Archer 2005; \r Aumont and Bopp 2006; Keller et al. 2014; Gattuso et al. 2021)."


id: a58978250fb1c8075e4b9e59116c1653
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26357
content:
"One natural mechanism of carbon transfer from the atmosphere to \r the deep ocean is the ocean biological pump, which is driven by the \r sinking of organic particles from the upper ocean. These particles \r derive ultimately from primary production by phytoplankton and \r most of them are remineralised within the upper ocean with only \r a small fraction reaching the deep ocean where the carbon can be \r sequestered on centennial and longer timescales. Increasing nutrient \r availability would stimulate uptake of CO2 through phytoplankton \r photosynthesis producing organic matter, some of which would be \r exported into the deep ocean, sequestering carbon. In areas of the \r ocean where macronutrients (nitrogen, phosphorus) are available \r in sufficient quantities (about 25% of the total area), the growth \r of phytoplankton is limited by the lack of trace elements such as \r iron. Thus, OF CDR can be based on two implementation options \r [...]"


id: 9836bfc00341cd1834705f2df60af324
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23988
content:
"[...] to increase the productivity of phytoplankton (Minx et al. 2018): \r macronutrient enrichment and micronutrient enrichment. A  third \r option, highlighted in GESAMP (2019), is based on fertilisation for \r fish stock enhancement, for instance, as naturally occurs in eastern \r boundary current systems. Iron fertilisation is the best-studied OF \r option to date, but knowledge so far is still inadequate to predict \r global ecological and biogeochemical consequences."


id: fee4949fd673c131bb469a6c65f16fbc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42240
content:
"CDR through 'ocean alkalinity enhancement' or 'artificial ocean \r alkalinisation' (Renforth and Henderson 2017) can be based on: \r (i) the dissolution of natural alkaline minerals that are added directly \r to the ocean or coastal environments; (ii) the dissolution of such \r minerals upstream from the ocean (e.g.,  enhanced weathering, \r Section  12.3.1.2); (iii) the addition of synthetic alkaline materials \r directly to the ocean or upstream; and (iv) electrochemical processing \r of seawater. In the case of (ii), minerals are dissolved on land and the \r dissolution products are conveyed to the ocean through runoff and \r river flow. These processes result in chemical transformation of CO2\r and sequestration as bicarbonate and carbonate ions (HCO3\r -\r , CO3\r 2-) \r in the ocean. Imbalances between the input and removal fluxes \r of alkalinity can result in changes in global oceanic alkalinity and \r [...]"


id: 26514cddb2c2398c4e5be7af1a585d8c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
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vector_id: 3911
content:
"[...] therefore the capacity of the ocean to store carbon. Such alkalinity\u0002induced changes in partitioning of carbon between atmosphere and \r ocean are thought to play an important role in controlling climate \r change on timescales of 1000 years and longer (e.g., Zeebe 2012). \r The residence time of dissolved inorganic carbon in the deep ocean \r is around 100,000 years. However, residence time may decrease \r if alkalinity is reduced by a  net increase in carbonate minerals by \r either increased formation (precipitation) or reduced dissolution of \r carbonate (Renforth and Henderson 2017). The alkalinity of seawater \r could potentially also be increased by electrochemical methods, \r either directly by reactions at the cathode that increase the alkalinity \r of the surrounding solution that can be discharged into the ocean, or \r by forcing the precipitation of solid alkaline materials (e.g., hydroxide \r minerals) that can then be added to the ocean (e.g., Rau et al. 2013; \r [...]"


id: 8742a062e9683e845d344ed2b441d2cd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20957
content:
"Potentials: For OAE, the ocean theoretically has the capacity to \r store thousands of  GtCO2 (cumulatively) without exceeding pre\u0002industrial levels of carbonate saturation (Renforth and Henderson \r 2017) if the impacts were distributed evenly across the surface ocean. \r The potential of increasing ocean alkalinity may be constrained by the \r capability to extract, process, and react minerals (Section  12.3.1.2); \r the demand for co-benefits (see below), or to minimise impacts \r around points of addition. Important challenges with respect to the \r detailed quantification of the CO2 sequestration efficiency include \r nonstoichiometric dissolution, reversed weathering and potential pore \r water saturation in the case of adding minerals to shallow coastal \r environments (Meysman and Montserrat 2017). Fuss et al. (2018) \r suggest storage potentials of 1-100 GtCO2 yr-1. (Gonzalez and Ilyina \r 2016) suggested that addition of 114 picomoles of alkalinity to the \r [...]"


id: fdb0e61b1c7c6fda8c8322f9e4eab2f9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41993
content:
"Risks and impacts: For OAE, the local impact of increasing alkalinity \r on ocean chemistry can depend on the speed at which the impacted \r seawater is diluted/circulated and the exchange of CO2 from the \r atmosphere (Bach et al. 2019). Also, more extreme carbonate \r chemistry perturbations due to non-equilibrated alkalinity could \r affect local marine biota (Bach et al. 2019), although biological \r impacts are largely unknown. Air-equilibrated seawater has a much \r lower potential to perturb seawater carbonate chemistry. However, \r seawater with slow air-sea gas exchange, in which alkalinity increases, \r consumes CO2 from the surrounding water without immediate \r replenishment from the atmosphere, which would increase seawater \r pH and saturation states and may impact marine biota (Meysman \r and Montserrat 2017; Montserrat et al. 2017). It may be possible \r to use this effect to ameliorate ocean acidification. Like enhanced \r [...]"


id: 65568b00b62383cd85b85fc861dae026
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15102
content:
"[...] weathering, some proposals may result in the dissolution products of \r silicate minerals (e.g., silicon, iron, potassium, nickel) being supplied \r to ocean ecosystems (Meysman and Montserrat 2017; Montserrat \r et al. 2017). Ecological and biogeochemical consequences of OAE \r largely depend on the minerals used. When natural minerals such \r as olivine are used, the release of additional Si and Fe could have \r fertilising effects (Bach et al. 2019). In addition to perturbations \r to marine ecosystems via reorganisation of community structure, \r potentially adverse effects of OAE that should be studied include "


id: 33bb4eb1d2ed538f5f5da02ca81550f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6346
content:
"Status: OAE has been demonstrated by a small number of laboratory \r experiments (in addition to enhanced weathering, Section 12.3.1.2). \r The use of enhanced ocean alkalinity for carbon storage was first \r proposed by Kheshgi (1995) who considered the creation of highly \r reactive lime that would readily dissolve in the surface ocean and \r sequester CO2. An alternative method proposed the dissolution of \r carbonate minerals (e.g., calcium carbonate) in the presence of waste \r flue gas CO2 and seawater as a means capturing CO2 and converting \r it to bicarbonate ions (Rau and Caldeira 1999; Rau 2011). House \r et al. (2007) proposed the creation of alkalinity in the ocean through \r electrolysis. The fate of the stored carbon is the same for these \r proposals (i.e., HCO3\r -\r  and CO3\r 2- ions), but the reaction pathway is \r different. Enhanced weathering of silicate minerals such as olivine \r could add alkalinity to the ocean, for example, by placing olivine sand \r [...]"


id: 34ff4a825be9a4f79b8ccdd85c11a89e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6568
content:
"Trade-offs and spillover effects: There is a  paucity of research \r on biological effects of alkalinity addition. The very few studies that \r have explored the impact of elevated alkalinity on ocean ecosystems \r have largely been limited to single species experiments (Cripps et al. \r 2013; Gore et al. 2019) and a  constrained field study quantifying \r the net calcification response of a  coral reef flat to alkalinity \r enhancement (Albright et al. 2016). The addition rate would have \r to be great enough to overcome mixing of the local seawater \r with the ambient environment, but not sufficient to detrimentally \r impact ecosystems. More research is required to assess locations in \r which this may be feasible, and how such a  scheme may operate \r (Renforth and Henderson 2017). The environmental impact of \r large-scale release of natural dissolution products into the coastal \r environment will strongly depend on the scale of olivine application, \r [...]"


id: 195c1e004417d56a48a0b2cd76666310
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1677
content:
"[...] the characteristics of the coastal water body (e.g., residence time) \r and the particular biota present (e.g., coral reefs will react differently \r compared with seagrasses) (Meysman and Montserrat 2017). Model \r simulations (Gonzalez et al. 2018) suggest that termination of OAE \r implemented on a massive scale under a high CO2 emission scenario \r (Representative Concentration Pathway 8.5) might pose high risks to \r biological systems sensitive to rapid environmental changes because \r it would cause a sharp increase in ocean acidification. For example, \r OAE termination would lead to a  decrease in surface pH in warm \r shallow regions where vulnerable coral reefs are located, and a drop \r in the carbonate saturation state. However, other studies with lower \r levels of OAE have shown no termination effect (Keller et al., 2014)."


id: 3f204ac5d371d509b6cb39baccc5e46c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8295
content:
"Marine biomass CDR options: Proposals have been made to grow \r macroalgae (Duarte et al., 2017) for BECCS (N'Yeurt et al. 2012; Duarte \r et al. 2013; Chen et al., 2015), to sink cultured macroalgae into the \r deep sea, or to use marine algae for biochar (Roberts et al., 2015). \r Naturally-growing sargassum has also been considered for these \r purposes (Bach et al., 2021). Froehlich et al. (2019) found a substantial \r area of the ocean (about 48 million km2\r ) suitable for farming seaweed. \r N'Yeurt et al. (2012) suggested that converting 9% of the oceans to \r macroalgal aquaculture could take up 19 GtCO2 in biomass, generate \r 12 Gt per annum of biogas, and the CO2 produced by burning the \r biogas could be captured and sequestered. Productivity of farmed \r macroalgae in the open ocean could potentially be enhanced through \r fertilising via artificial upwelling (Fan et al., 2020) or through cultivation \r platforms that dive at night to access nutrient-rich waters below the, \r [...]"


id: ca5fd80d6132f818481914c664e79ed4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32945
content:
"[...] often nutrient-limited, surface ocean. If the biomass were sunk, it is \r unknown how long the carbon would remain in the deep ocean and \r what the additional impacts would be. Research and development on \r macroalgae cultivation and use is currently underway in multiple parts \r of the world, though not necessarily directly focused on CDR. "


id: a4ca90e9af075f7ed6df11f0d3f0992a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26221
content:
"Trade-offs and spillovers: Some land-based biological CDR \r methods, such as BECCS and A/R, demand land. Combining \r mitigation strategies has the potential to increase overall carbon \r sequestration rates (Humpenoder et al. 2014). However, these \r CDR methods may also compete for resources (Frank et al. 2017). \r Land-based mitigation approaches currently propose the use of \r forests (i) as a source of woody biomass for bioenergy and various \r biomaterials and (ii)  for  carbon sequestration in vegetation, soils, \r and forest products. Forests are therefore required to provide \r both provisioning (biomass feedstock) and regulating (carbon \r sequestration) ecosystem services. This multifaceted strategy has \r the potential to result in trade-offs (Makkonen et al. 2015). Some \r land-based mitigation options could conflict with biodiversity goals, \r e.g., A/R using monoculture plantations can reduce species richness \r when introduced into (semi-)natural grasslands (Smith et al. 2019a; \r [...]"


id: ebdeb5588cd3818eb6d734fca59e1822
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38861
content:
"[...] Dooley et al. 2021). When trade-offs exist between biodiversity \r protection and mitigation objectives, biodiversity is typically given \r a lower priority, especially if the mitigation option is considered risk\u0002free and economically feasible (Portner et al. 2021). Approaches that \r promote synergies, such as sustainable forest management, reducing \r deforestation rates, cultivation of perennial crops for bioenergy in \r sustainable farming practices, and mixed-species forests in A/R, can "


id: f44e1d838440e0fa133483771babe22
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40355
content:
"For countries with emissions targets aiming for net zero or lower, the \r core governance question is not whether CDR should be mobilised \r or not, but which CDR methods governments want to see deployed \r by whom, by when, at which volumes and in which ways (Minx et al. \r 2018; Bellamy and Geden 2019). The choice of CDR methods and the \r scale and timing of their deployment will depend on the respective \r ambitions for gross emissions reductions, how sustainability and \r feasibility constraints are managed, and how political preferences \r and social acceptability evolve (Bellamy 2018; Forster et al. 2020; \r Fuss et al. 2020; Waller et al. 2020; Clery et al. 2021; Iyer et al. 2021; \r Rogelj et al. 2021). As examples of emerging CDR policymaking \r at (sub-)national levels show, policymakers are beginning to \r incorporate CDR methods beyond those currently dominating global \r mitigation scenarios, that is, BECCS and afforestation/reforestation \r [...]"


id: 92dd6299048989aecbf75c7d47326f1d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23053
content:
"[...] (Bellamy and Geden 2019; Buylova et al. 2021; Schenuit et al. 2021; \r Uden et al. 2021) (Box  12.1). CDR policymaking is faced with the \r need to consider method-specific timescales of CO2 storage, as \r well as challenges in MRV and accounting, potential co-benefits, \r adverse side effects, interactions with adaptation and trade-offs \r with SDGs (Dooley and Kartha 2018; McLaren et al. 2019; Buck \r et al. 2020; Honegger et al. 2020; Brander et al. 2021; Dooley et al. \r 2021; Mace et al. 2021) (Table  12.6). Therefore, CDR governance \r and policymaking are expected to focus on responsibly incentivising \r RD&D and targeted deployment, building on both technical and \r governance experience with already widely practised CDR methods \r like afforestation/reforestation (Lomax et al. 2015; Field and Mach \r 2017; Bellamy 2018; Carton et al. 2020; VonHedemann et al. 2020), as \r well as learning from two decades of slow-moving CCS deployment \r [...]"


id: cbc1b5cddee4499b230c82c4b8558fb2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33174
content:
"[...] (Buck 2021; Martin-Roberts et al. 2021; Wang et al. 2021). For some \r less well-understood methods and implementation options, such as \r ocean alkalinisation or enhanced weathering, investment in RD&D \r can help in understanding the risks, rewards, and uncertainties of \r deployment (Nemet et al. 2018; Fajardy et al. 2019; Burns and Corbett \r 2020; Goll et al. 2021)."


id: 5ced995477595b886797711817772da1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13613
content:
"As shown in Cross-Chapter Box  8  in this chapter, CDR fulfils \r multiple functions in different phases of ambitious mitigation: \r (i) further reducing net CO2 or GHG emission levels in the near term; \r (ii)  counterbalancing residual emissions (from hard-to-transition \r sectors like transport, industry, or agriculture) to help reach net zero \r CO2 or GHG emissions in the mid term; (iii) achieving and sustaining \r net-negative CO2 or GHG emissions in the long term. While inclusion \r of emissions and removals on managed land (LULUCF) is mandatory \r for developed countries under UNFCCC inventory rules (Grassi et al. \r 2021), not all Annex I countries have included land-based biological \r removals when setting domestic mitigation targets in the past, \r but updated NDCs for 2030 indicate a  shift, most notably in the \r European Union (Gheuens and Oberthur 2021; Schenuit et al. 2021). \r The early literature on CDR governance and policy has been mainly \r [...]"


id: a3ee18ac82e82cbb9e48b05453c3cfe7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26034
content:
"[...] conceptual rather than empirical, focusing on high-level principles \r (see the concerns listed in the introduction to Section 12.3) and the \r representation of CDR in global mitigation scenarios (Section 3.2.2). \r However, with the widespread adoption of net zero targets and the \r recognition that CDR is a necessary element of mitigation portfolios to \r achieve net zero CO2 or GHG emissions, countries with national net\u0002zero emissions targets have begun to integrate CDR into modelled \r national mitigation pathways, increase research, development and \r demonstration (RD&D) efforts on CDR methods, and consider CDR\u0002specific incentives and policies (Honegger et al. 2021b; Schenuit et al. \r 2021) (Box 12.1). Nevertheless, this increasing consideration of CDR \r has not yet extended to net-negative targets and policies to achieve \r these. While the use of CDR at levels that would lead to net negative "


id: 733f0b9d05768beab2725c6213053f63
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17527
content:
"Since the enhancement of carbon sinks is a form of climate change \r mitigation (Honegger et al. 2021a), CDR governance challenges will \r in many respects be similar to those around emissions reduction \r measures, as will policy instruments like RD&D funding, carbon pricing, \r tax or investment credits, certification schemes, and public procurement \r (Sections 13.4, 13.6, 14.4 and 14.5). Effectively integrating CDR into \r mitigation portfolios can build on already existing rules, procedures \r and instruments for emissions abatement (Torvanger 2019; Fridahl \r et al. 2020; Zakkour et al. 2020; Honegger et al. 2021b; Mace et al. 2021; \r Rickels et al. 2021). Additionally, to accelerate RD&D and to incentivise \r CDR deployment, a  political commitment to formal integration into \r existing climate policy frameworks is required (robust evidence,\r high agreement) (Lomax et al. 2015; Geden et al. 2018; Honegger \r and Reiner 2018; VonHedemann et al. 2020; Schenuit et al. 2021). \r [...]"


id: a52da301989f19898eec981a475ad706
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26289
content:
"[...] To avoid CDR being misperceived as a substitute for deep emissions \r reductions, the prioritisation of emissions cuts can be signalled and \r achieved with differentiated target setting for reductions and removals \r (Geden et al. 2019; McLaren et al. 2019). Similarly, sub-targets are \r conceivable for different types of CDR, to prioritise preferred methods \r according to characteristics such as removal processes or timescales of \r storage (Smith 2021)."


id: 57994e8f7aebb22703771fa995407882
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12677
content:
"Private capital and companies, impact investors, and philanthropy \r will play a  role in technical demonstrations and bringing down \r costs, as well as creating demand for carbon removal products on \r voluntary markets, which companies may purchase to fulfil corporate \r social responsibility-driven targets (Friedmann 2019; Fuss et al. 2020; \r Joppa et al. 2021). Niche markets can provide entry points for limited \r deployment of novel CDR methods (Cox and Edwards 2019), but \r targeting currently existing revenue streams by using CO2 captured \r from the atmosphere in Enhanced Oil Recovery and other utilisation \r routes (Mackler et al. 2021; Meckling and Biber 2021) is contested, \r and highlights the importance of choosing appropriate system \r boundaries when assessing supply chains (Tanzer and Ramirez 2019; \r Brander et al. 2021). While the private sector will play a distinct role \r in scaling CDR, governments will need to commit to developing \r [...]"


id: 3d225e5d2a5308a73a59ba366fddd3f4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7939
content:
"[...] infrastructure for the transport and storage of CO2, including \r financing, permitting, and regulating liabilities (Sanchez et al. 2018; \r Mace et al. 2021; Mackler et al. 2021)."


id: 1660011328012ca6a56b200aca401450
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1152
content:
"globally (Gomez and Ricketts 2013; HLPE 2017). A  'food system' \r includes all food chain activities (production, processing, distribution, \r preparation, consumption of food) and the management of food \r loss and wastes. It also includes institutions and infrastructures \r influencing any of these activities, as well as people and systems \r impacted (HLPE 2017; FAO 2018a). Food choices are determined \r by the food environment, consisting of the 'physical, economic, \r political and socio-cultural context in which consumers engage with \r the food system to acquire, prepare and consume food' (HLPE 2017). \r Food system outcomes encompass food and nutrition, productivity, \r profit and livelihood of food producers and other actors in food value \r chains, but also social outcomes and the impact on the environment \r (Zurek et al. 2018). 'Sustainable healthy diets' have been defined \r by FAO and WHO (FAO and WHO 2019) as 'dietary patterns that \r [...]"


id: 81fece23ae1e48a76fa7b50b8b486d0f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19991
content:
"[...] promote all dimensions of individuals' health and wellbeing; have \r low environmental pressure and impact; are accessible, affordable, \r safe and equitable; and are culturally acceptable'."


id: f403e589143a00212a8ab08d62ca6e19
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40304
content:
"Engagement of civil society organisations and publics will be important \r for shaping CDR policy and deployment (medium evidence, high \r agreement). Public awareness of CDR and its role in national net \r zero emissions strategies is generally very low (Cox et al. 2020a), and \r perceptions differ across countries and between methods (Bertram \r and Merk 2020; Spence et al. 2021; Sweet et al. 2021; Wenger et al. \r 2021). When awareness increases, social processes will shape political \r attitudes on CDR (Shrum et al. 2020), as will efforts to frame particular \r CDR methods as 'natural' or 'technological' (Osaka et al. 2021), and the \r policy instruments chosen to support CDR (Bellamy et al. 2019). Lack \r of confidence in CDR implementation options from both publics and \r investors, and lack of trust in project developers (Cox et al. 2020b) have \r hampered support for CCS (Thomas et al. 2018) and are expected to \r affect deployment of CDR methods with geological storage (Gough and \r [...]"


id: 85ac68e2fd52a49e13d2bbe040822e10
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20660
content:
"[...] Mander 2019). On local and regional scales, CDR projects will need to \r consider air and water quality, impacts to human health, energy needs, \r land use and ecological integrity, and local community engagement \r and procedural justice. Bottom-up and community-driven strategies \r are important for deploying equitable carbon removal projects (Batres \r et al. 2021; Hansson et al. 2021)."


id: f66cd87eec4a42a8c9cd71a34757557c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40722
content:
"The SRCCL estimated overall global anthropogenic emissions from \r food systems to range between 10.8 and 19.1  GtCO2-eq yr-1, \r equivalent to 21-37% of total anthropogenic emissions (Mbow \r et al. 2019; Rosenzweig et al. 2020a). The authors identified major \r knowledge gaps for the GHG emissions inventories of food systems, \r particularly in providing disaggregated emissions from the food \r industry and transportation. The food system approach taken in \r the SRCCL (Mbow et al. 2019) evaluates the synergies and trade\u0002offs of food system response options and their implications for food \r security, climate change adaptation and mitigation. This integrated \r framework allows the identification of fundamental attributes of \r responses to maximise co-benefits, while avoiding maladaptation \r measures and adverse side effects. A  food system approach \r supports the design of interconnected climate policy responses to \r tackle climate change, incorporating perspectives of producers \r [...]"


id: 82963ed48509e7ba40d695f0a8354cfb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20101
content:
"[...] and consumers. The SRCCL (Mbow et al. 2019) found that the \r technical mitigation potential by 2050 of demand-side responses \r at 0.7-8.0  GtCO2-eq yr-1 is  comparable to supply-side options at \r 2.3-9.6 GtCO2-eq yr-1. This shows that mitigation actions need to go \r beyond food producers and suppliers to incorporate dietary changes \r and consumers' behavioural patterns and reveals that producers and \r consumers need to work together to reduce GHG emissions."


id: 3401c50b18a0499bb5eeed107553c5a2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6395
content:
"This section complements Chapter 7 by reviewing recent estimates of \r food system emissions and assessing options beyond the agriculture, \r forestry and land use sectors to mitigate food systems GHG \r emissions. A food system approach enables identification of cross\u0002sectoral mitigation opportunities including both technological and \r behavioural options. Further, a system approach permits evaluation \r of policies that do not necessarily directly target primary producers \r or consumers, but other food system actors, with possibly higher \r mitigation efficiency. A food system approach was introduced in the \r IPCC Special Report on Climate Change and Land (SRCCL) (Mbow et al. \r 2019). Besides major knowledge gaps in the quantification of food \r system GHG emissions (Section 12.4.2), the SRCCL authors identified \r as major knowledge gaps the understanding of the dynamics \r of  dietary change (including behavioural patterns, the adoption of \r [...]"


id: 60640053d0ef4f50fb004da5adbb95ad
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14265
content:
"[...] plant-based dietary patterns, and interaction with human health and \r nutrition of sustainable healthy diets and associated feedbacks); \r and instruments and mechanisms to accelerate transitions towards \r sustainable and healthy food systems."


id: f2912562c4eb008706efe8a22d9fa9cd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40076
content:
"Though total production of calories is sufficient for the world \r population (Wood et al. 2018; Benton et al. 2019), availability and \r access to food is unequally distributed, and there is a lack of nutrient\u0002dense foods, fruit and vegetables (Berners-Lee et al. 2018; KC et al. \r 2018). In 2019, close to 750 million people were food insecure. An \r estimated 2  billion people lacked adequate access to safe and \r nutritious food in both quality and quantity (FAO et al. 2020). Two \r billion adults are overweight or obese through inadequate nutrition, \r with an upward trend globally (FAO et al. 2019). Low intake of fruit \r and vegetables is further aggravated by high intake rates of refined \r grains, sugar and sodium, together leading to a  high risk of non\u0002communicable diseases such as cardiovascular disease and type \r 2  diabetes (Springmann et al. 2016; Clark et al. 2018; Clark et al. \r 2019; GBD 2017 Diet Collaborators et al. 2019; Willett et al. 2019)\r [...]"


id: b361977a37ea328c9a116033d04a380d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28800
content:
"[...] (robust evidence, high agreement). At least 340 million children \r under five years of age experience lack of vitamins or other essential "


id: eb8ab57f10a0db1cf0ec34b2d2f995d7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38805
content:
"Bodirsky et al. (2020) find that the global prevalence of overweight \r will increase to 39-52% of world population in 2050 (from 29% in \r 2010; range across the Shared Socio-economic Pathways studied), \r and the prevalence of obesity to 13-20% (9% in 2010). The \r prevalence of underweight people was predicted to approximately \r halve, with absolute numbers stagnating at 0.4-0.7 billion. Although \r many studies represent future pathways of diets and food systems, \r there are few holistic and consistent narratives and quantification \r of the future pathways of diets and food systems (Mitter et al. 2020; \r Mora et al. 2020). Alternative pathways for improved diets and food \r systems have been developed, emphasising climate, environmental \r and  health co-benefits (Bajzelj et al. 2014; Hedenus et al. 2014; \r Damerau et al. 2016; Weindl et al. 2017a; Weindl et al. 2017b; \r Springmann et al. 2018a; Bodirsky et al. 2020; Prudhomme et al. \r [...]"


id: a8704263b03017a711f8eea3c5d3479f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26841
content:
"[...] 2020; Hamilton et al. 2021), reduced food waste and closing yield \r gaps (Bajzelj et al. 2014; Pradhan et al. 2014), nitrogen management \r (Bodirsky et al. 2014), urban and peri-urban agriculture (Kriewald \r et al. 2019) and different sustainability targets (Henry et al. 2018b). \r The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has examined \r three alternative food system scenarios: 'business as usual', 'towards \r sustainability', and 'stratified societies' (FAO 2018b). Others have \r identified research priorities or changes in legislation needed to \r support adoption of improved food systems (Mylona et al. 2018)."


id: 1dc80de133984b3c74eae81f87465450
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2426
content:
"New calculations using the EDGAR v6.0 (Crippa et al. 2021a) and \r FAOSTAT (FAO 2021) databases provide territorial-based food \r system GHG emissions by country globally for the period 1990 \r to 2018 (Crippa et al. 2021b). The data are calculated based on \r a combination of country-specific data and aggregated information \r as described by Crippa et al. (2021b) and Tubiello et al. (2021). The \r data show that, in 2018, 17 GtCO2-eq yr-1 (95% confidence range \r 13-23 GtCO2-eq yr-1, calculated according to Solazzo et al. (2020)) \r were associated with the production, processing, distribution, \r consumption of food and management of food system residues. \r This corresponded to 31% (range 23-42%) of total anthropogenic \r GHG emissions of 54  GtCO2-eq yr-1. Based on the IPCC sectoral \r classification (Table 12.7 and Figure 12.5), the largest contribution \r of food systems GHG emissions in 2018 was from agriculture, that \r is, livestock and crop production systems (6.3 GtCO2-eq yr-1, range \r [...]"


id: e7806cfbe3e0b99593ef099f99edec6d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38033
content:
"[...] 2.6-11.9) and land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) \r (4.0  GtCO2-eq yr-1, range 2.1-5.9) (Figure  12.5). Emissions from \r energy use were 3.9  GtCO2-eq yr-1 (3.6-4.4), waste management \r 1.7  GtCO2-eq yr-1 (0.9-2.6), and industrial processes and product \r use 0.9 GtCO2-eq yr-1 (0.6-1.1). The share of GHG emissions from \r food systems generated outside the AFOLU (agriculture and LULUCF) \r sectors has increased over recent decades, from 28% in 1990 \r to 39% in 2018."


id: 5a2e485eb45143bc28628c8d5cfaf1d0
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
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vector_id: 13113
content:
"Malnutrition aggravates susceptibility of children to various \r infectious diseases (Franca et al. 2009; Farhadi and Ovchinnikov \r 2018), and infectious diseases can also decrease nutrient uptake, \r thereby promoting malnutrition (Farhadi and Ovchinnikov 2018). \r Contamination of food with bacteria, viruses, parasites and microbial \r toxins can cause foodborne illnesses (Ricci et al. 2017; Abebe \r et al. 2020; Gallo et al. 2020), foodborne substances such as food \r additives and specific proteins can cause adverse reactions, and \r contamination with toxic chemical substances used in agriculture \r and food processing can lead to poisoning or chronic diseases (Gallo \r et al. 2020). Further, health risks from food systems may originate \r from the use of antibiotics in livestock production and the occurrence \r of anti-microbial resistance in pathogens (ECDC et al. 2015; Bennani \r et al. 2020), or zoonotic diseases such as COVID-19 (Gan et al. 2020; \r [...]"


id: 49af54cd8de76ef8dd8dd1a998a0e243
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10196
content:
"refrigeration also contributes to GHG emissions through leakage of \r refrigerants (fluorinated gases, or F-gases), although their contribution \r to food system GHG emissions is estimated to be minor (Crippa et al. \r 2021b). The cold chain accounts for approximately 1% of global GHG \r emissions, but as the volume of refrigerators per capita in developing \r countries is reported to be one order of magnitude lower than in \r developed countries (19 m3\r  versus 200 m3 refrigerated storage \r capacity per 1000 inhabitants), the importance of refrigeration \r to total GHG emissions is expected to increase (James and James \r 2010). Although refrigeration gives rise to GHG emissions, both \r household refrigeration and effective cold chains could contribute \r to a substantial reduction in losses of perishable food and thus in \r emissions associated with food provision (University of Birmingham \r 2018; James and James 2010). A trade-off exists between reducing \r [...]"


id: ee719092f251ff4ff3b63be4b800baad
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39326
content:
"[...] food waste and increased refrigeration emissions, with the benefits \r depending on type of produce, location and technologies used \r (Sustainable Cooling for All 2018; Wu et al. 2019)."


id: 22a1165aacb77a739612fbdd856dbdaa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3308
content:
"There is high variability in the GHG emissions of different food \r products and production systems (Figure  12.6). GHG emissions \r intensities  - measured using attributional lifecycle assessment, \r considering the full supply chain, expressed as CO2-eq per kg of \r product or per kg of protein  - are generally highest for ruminant \r meat, cheese, and certain crustacean species (e.g.,  farmed shrimp \r and prawns, trawled lobster) (Nijdam et al. 2012; Clark and Tilman \r 2017; Clune et al. 2017; Hilborn et al. 2018; Poore and Nemecek \r 2018) (robust evidence, high agreement). Generally, beef from dairy \r systems has a lower footprint (8-23 kgCO2-eq per 100 g protein than \r beef from beef herds (17-94 kgCO2-eq per 100 g protein (Figure 12.6, \r re-calculated from Poore and Nemecek (2018) using AR6 GWPs \r based on a  100year horizon) (medium evidence, high agreement). \r The wide variation in emissions from beef reflects differences in \r [...]"


id: b7be6a4f87e13f155a44571ef1c8e08f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29546
content:
"[...] production systems, which range from intensive feedlots with stock \r raised largely on grains through to rangeland and transhumance \r production systems. Dairy systems are generally more intensive \r production systems, with higher digestibility feed than beef systems. \r Further, emissions from dairy systems are shared between milk and "


id: 6ee007dd8e664aa64965bef1973a437b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16780
content:
"Emissions intensities for farmed fish ranged from 2.4-11 kgCO2-eq \r per 100 g protein (Poore and Nemecek 2018). For Norwegian seafood, \r large differences have been found ranging from 1.1 kgCO2-eq kg-1\r edible product for herring to more than 8  kgCO2-eq kg-1 edible \r product for salmon shipped by road and ferry from Oslo to Paris \r (Winther et al. 2020). For capture fish, large differences in emissions \r have been found, ranging from 0.2-7.9 kgCO2-eq kg-1 landed fish \r (Parker et al. 2018), although an environmental comparison of \r capture fish to farmed foods should include other indicators such as \r overfishing. Plant-based foods generally have lower GHG emissions \r (-2.2 to +4.5 kgCO2-eq per 100 g protein) than farmed animal-based \r foods (Nijdam et al. 2012; Clark and Tilman 2017; Clune et al. 2017; \r Hilborn et al. 2018; Poore and Nemecek 2018) (robust evidence, high \r agreement). Several plant-based foods are associated with emissions \r [...]"


id: facf03e9dc813a177ead9ecdbb8e0b65
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41501
content:
"[...] from land use change, for example, palm oil, soy and coffee (Poore \r and Nemecek 2018), although emissions intensities are context "


id: 9c81a4565357802b99e77c8c5dcb6488
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24786
content:
"In traditional production systems, especially in developing countries, \r livestock serve multiple functions, providing draught power, fertiliser, \r investment and social status, besides constituting an important source \r of nutrients (Weiler et al. 2014). In landscapes dominated by forests \r or cropland, semi-natural pastures grazed by ruminants provide \r heterogeneity that supports biodiversity (Roos et al. 2016). Grazing \r on marginal land and the use of crop residues and food waste can \r provide human-edible food with lower demands for cropland (Roos \r et al. 2016; Van Zanten et al. 2018; Van Hal et al. 2019). Animal protein \r requires more land than vegetable protein, so switching consumption \r from animal to vegetable proteins could reduce the pressure on \r land resources and potentially enable additional mitigation through \r expansion of natural ecosystems, storing carbon  while supporting \r biodiversity, or reforestation to sequester carbon and enhance wood \r [...]"


id: 112f7d37313ecc2a90b07e9b517b0cd1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 216
content:
"[...] supply capacity for the production of bio-based products substituting \r fossil fuels, plastics, cement, etc. (Schmidinger and Stehfest 2012; \r Searchinger et al. 2018b; Hayek et al. 2021). At the same time, \r alternatives to animal-based meat and other livestock products are \r being developed (Figure 12.6). Their increasing visibility in supermarkets \r and catering services, as well as falling production prices, could make \r meat substitutes competitive in one to two decades (Gerhardt et al. \r 2019). However, uncertainty around their uptake creates uncertainty \r around their effect on future GHG emissions."


id: 1f15be5e98c09ccabfdface332642eee
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2676
content:
"inventories: emissions are assigned to the country where they occur, \r not where food is consumed (Crippa et al. 2021a; Crippa et al. 2021b) \r (Section 12.4.2.1). The colours of the bubbles indicate the relative \r contribution of the following risk factors to deaths, according to \r the classification used in the Global Burden of Disease Study: child \r and maternal malnutrition (red, deficiencies of iron, zinc or Vitamin \r A, or low birth weight or child growth failure), dietary risks (yellow, \r for example diets low in vegetables, legumes, whole grains or diets \r high in red and processed meat and sugar-sweetened beverages) \r or high body mass index (blue). The combined contribution \r of these three risk factors to total deaths varies strongly and is \r between 28% and 88% of total deaths. Figure  12.7 shows that \r dietary risk factors are prevalent throughout all regions. Though \r not a complete measure of the health impact of food, these were \r [...]"


id: 9f7c6af58f98371ae007eaf7731a160b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25277
content:
"[...] selected as a proxy for nutritional adequacy and balance of diets, \r avoidance of food insecurity, over- or mal-nutrition and associated "


id: 746e93f94913f6f4b9c8a4ba80da2ba7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17718
content:
"coincide with a significant change in food choices. They are based \r on technologies that are not yet mature and are expected to \r require further innovation (Klerkx and Rose 2020), and/or mature \r technologies that might already be part of some food systems but are \r not yet widely accepted and have transformative potential if applied \r at large scale, for example consumption of insects (Raheem et al. \r 2019a). Many emerging technologies might be seen as a further step \r in agronomic development where land-intensive production methods \r relying on the availability of naturally-available nutrients and water \r are successively replaced with crop variants and cultivation practices \r reducing these dependencies at the cost of larger energy input \r (Winiwarter et al. 2014). Others suggest a  shift to agroecological \r approaches combining new scientific insights with local knowledge \r and cultural values (HLPE 2019). Food system transformation can \r [...]"


id: 5c94113f9036b72dda338857da824f37
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13548
content:
"[...] lead to regime shifts or (fast) disruptions (Pereira et al. 2020) if driven \r by events that are out of control of private or public measures and \r have a 'crisis' character (e.g., BSE) (Skuce et al. 2013)."


id: 49f7c6603f856a3dc9ce02bfd2683d22
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10258
content:
"Pulses such as beans, chickpeas, or lentils, have a protein composition \r complementary to cereals, providing together all essential amino \r acids (Foyer et al. 2016; McDermott and Wyatt 2017). Bio-availability \r of proteins in foods is influenced by several factors, including \r amino acid composition, presence of anti-nutritional factors, and \r preparation method (Hertzler et al. 2020; Weindl et al. 2020; Semba \r et al. 2021). Soy beans, in particular, have a  well-balanced amino \r acid profile with high bio-availability (Leinonen et al. 2019). Pulses \r are part of most traditional diets (Semba et al. 2021) and supply up \r to 10-35% of protein in low-income countries, but consumption \r decreases with increasing income and they are globally only a minor \r share of the diet (McDermott and Wyatt 2017). Pulses play a key role \r in crop rotations, fixing nitrogen and breaking disease cycles, but \r yields of pulses are relatively low and have seen small yield increases \r [...]"


id: 9e8b106ee0e71d05e1539524105c49fe
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25119
content:
"[...] relative to those of cereals (Foyer et al. 2016; McDermott and Wyatt \r 2017; Barbieri et al. 2021; Semba et al. 2021)."


id: 73399b3fab90bddfcd96821bf0b16187
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17521
content:
"A diverse range of novel food products and production systems \r are emerging, that are proposed to reduce GHG emissions from \r food production, mainly by replacing conventional animal-source food \r with alternative protein sources. Assessments of the potential of \r dietary changes are given in Sections  5.3 and 7.4. Here, we assess \r the GHG intensities of emerging food production technologies. This \r includes products such as insects, algae, mussels and products from \r bio-refineries, some of which have been consumed in certain societies \r and/or in smaller quantities (Pikaar et al. 2018; Jonsson et al. 2019; \r Govorushko 2019; Raheem et al. 2019a; Souza Filho et al. 2019). The \r novel aspect considered here is the scale at which they are proposed to \r replace conventional food with the aim to reduce both negative health \r and environmental impacts. To fully realise the health benefits, dietary \r shifts should also encompass a  reduction in consumption of added \r [...]"


id: e3606782d9814f1a25c12b1b184474f8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37301
content:
"[...] sugars, salt, saturated fats, and potentially harmful additives (Curtain \r and Grafenauer 2019; Fardet and Rock 2019; Petersen et al. 2021)."


id: 9bc69ac2b636a00d6bddc454afdbee38
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24662
content:
"products include cell tissues such as muscle cells to grow cultured\r meat, fish or other cells (Post 2012; Rischer et al. 2020) and products \r where the micro-organisms will be eaten themselves (Pikaar et al. \r 2018; Sillman et al. 2019; Schade et al. 2020). Single cell proteins, \r combined with photovoltaic electricity generation and direct air \r capture of carbon dioxide, are proposed as highly land- and energy\u0002efficient alternatives to plant-based protein (Leger et al. 2021). \r Some microbial proteins are produced in a  'bioreactor' and use \r Haber-Bosch nitrogen and vegetable sugars or atmospheric CO2 as \r source of nitrogen and carbon (Pikaar et al. 2018; Simsa et al. 2019). \r Cultured meat is currently at the research stage and some challenges \r remain, such as the need for animal-based ingredients to ensure fast \r and effective growth of muscle cells; tissue engineering to create \r different meat products; production at scale and at competitive \r [...]"


id: 828698dd0aec8295cf43c72938f478bb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20094
content:
"[...] costs; and regulatory barriers (Post 2012; Stephens et al. 2018; Rubio \r et al. 2019; Tuomisto 2019; Post et al. 2020). Only a few studies to \r date have quantified the GHG emissions of microbial proteins or \r cultured meat, suggesting GHG emissions at the level of poultry meat \r (Tuomisto and Teixeira de Mattos 2011; Mattick et al. 2015; Souza \r Filho et al. 2019; Tuomisto 2019)."


id: 522717b26b3b0d8f69fcbd99173285d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11725
content:
"Plant-based meat, milk and egg analogues: Demand for plant\u0002based proteins is increasing and incentivising the development of \r protein crop varieties with improved agronomic performance and/\r or nutritional quality (Santo et al. 2020). There is also an emerging \r market for meat replacements based on plant proteins, such as \r pulses, cereals, soya, algae and other ingredients mainly used \r to imitate the taste, texture and nutritional profiles of animal\u0002source food (Kumar et al. 2017; Boukid 2021). Currently, the \r majority of plant-based meat analogues is based on soy (Semba \r et al. 2021). While other products still serve a niche market, their \r share is growing rapidly and some studies project a  sizeable \r share within a decade (Kumar et al. 2017; Jonsson et al. 2019). In \r particular, plant-based milk alternatives have seen large increases \r in market share (Jonsson et al. 2019). A  LCA of 56 plant-based \r meat analogues showed mean GHG intensities (farm to factory) \r [...]"


id: 462d5bf49c89cdccb893bb9d7a0ef30d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9569
content:
"[...] of 0.21-0.23 kgCO2-eq per 100 g of product or 20 g of protein for \r all assessed protein sources (Fresan et al. 2019). Higher footprints \r were found in the meta-review by Santo et al. (2020). Including \r preparation, Meija et al. (2019) found higher emissions for burgers \r and sausages as compared to minced products."


id: 914e3c372af356562dffd77ed8517656
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22771
content:
"Different elements of food systems are currently governed by separate \r policy areas that in most countries scarcely interact or cooperate \r (Termeer et al. 2018; iPES Food 2019). This compartmentalisation \r makes the identification of synergetic and antagonistic effects \r difficult and faces the possibility of failure due to unintended \r and unanticipated negative impacts on other policy areas and \r consequently lack of agreement and social acceptance (Mylona \r et al. 2018; Brouwer et al. 2020; Mausch et al. 2020; Hebinck et al. \r 2021) (Section 12.4.5). This could be overcome through cooperation \r across several policy areas (Sections 12.6.2 and 13.7), in particular \r agriculture, nutrition, health, trade, climate and environment, and an \r inclusive and transparent governance structure (Termeer et al. 2018; \r Bhunnoo 2019; Diercks et al. 2019; Herrero et al. 2021; iPES Food \r 2019; Mausch et al. 2020; Kugelberg et al. 2021), making use of \r [...]"


id: 32392fb2397bc24192b5d007a252d525
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6092
content:
"Taxes and subsidies: Food-based taxes have largely been \r implemented to reduce non-communicable diseases and sugar intake, \r particularly those targeting sugar-sweetened beverages (WHO 2019). \r Many health-related organisations recommend the introduction of \r such taxes to improve the nutritional quality of marketed products \r and consumers' diets (Wright et al. 2017; Park and Yu 2019; WHO \r 2019), even though the impacts of food taxes are complex due to \r cross-price and substitution effects and supplier reactions (Cornelsen \r et al. 2015; Gren et al. 2019; Blakely et al. 2020) and can have \r a  regressive effect (WHO 2019). Subsidies and taxes are found to \r be effective in changing dietary behaviour at levels above 20% price \r increase (Cornelsen et al. 2015; Niebylski et al. 2015; Nakhimovsky \r et al. 2016; Hagenaars et al. 2017; Mozaffarian et al. 2018), even \r though longer-term effects are scarcely studied (Cornelsen et al. \r [...]"


id: 399942375b5eee3ac46824d7f20222fa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7344
content:
"[...] 2015) and effects of sugar tax with tax rates lower than 20% have \r been observed for low-income groups (Temme et al. 2020)."


id: 6d4b6d3a1a37a368b06c27c602ed1740
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16507
content:
"Where calories and ruminant animal-source food are consumed in \r excess of health guidelines, reduction of excess meat (and dairy) \r consumption is among the most effective measures to mitigate \r GHG emissions, with a high potential for environment, health, food \r security, biodiversity, and animal welfare co-benefits (Hedenus \r et al. 2014; Springmann et al. 2018a; Chai et al. 2019; Chen et al. \r 2019; Kim et al. 2019; Willett et al. 2019; Semba et al. 2020; Theurl \r et al. 2020; Hamilton et al. 2021; Stylianou et al. 2021) (robust \r evidence, high agreement). Dietary changes are relevant for several \r SDGs, in addition to SDG 13 (climate action), including SDG 2 (zero \r hunger), SDG 3 (good health and well-being), SDG 6 (clean water \r and sanitation), SDG 12 (responsible consumption and production), \r SDG 14 (life below water) and SDG 15 (life on land) (Bruce M et al. \r 2018; Mbow et al. 2019; Vanham et al. 2019; Herrero et al. 2021) \r [...]"


id: 799cdfd3f0c8decf3e2c510828259e78
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18600
content:
"[...] (Section 12.6.1). However, behavioural change towards diets of lower \r environmental impact and higher nutritional qualities faces barriers \r both from agricultural producers and consumers (Apostolidis and \r McLeay 2016; Aiking and de Boer 2018; de Boer et al. 2018; Milford \r et al. 2019), and requires policy packages that combine informative \r instruments with behavioural, administrative and/or market-based \r instruments, and are attentive to the needs of, and engage, all food \r system stakeholders including civil society networks, and change \r the food environment (Cornelsen et al. 2015; Kraak et al. 2017; "


id: aaec42ac44eeea01543500901a7422ee
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27295
content:
"Trade: Since the middle of the last century, global trade in agricultural \r products has contributed to boosting productivity and reducing \r commodity prices, while also incentivising national subsidies for \r farmers to remain competitive in the global market (Benton et al. \r 2019). Trade liberalisation has been coined as an essential element \r of sustainable food systems, and as one element required to achieve \r sustainable development, that can shift pressure to regions where \r the resources are less scarce (Wood et al. 2018; Traverso and Schiavo \r 2020). However, Clapp (2017) argues that the main economic benefit \r of trade liberalisation flows to large transnational firms. Benton and \r Bailey (2019) argue that low food prices in the second half of last \r century contributed to both yield and food waste increases, and to \r a focus on staple crops to the disadvantage of nutrient-dense foods. \r However, global trade can also contribute to economic benefits such \r [...]"


id: deaa0f241eaada7bab691ef1b74ab83b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36436
content:
"[...] as jobs and income, reduce food insecurity and facilitate access to \r nutrients (Wood et al. 2018; Hoff et al. 2019; Traverso and Schiavo \r 2020; Geyik et al. 2021) and has contributed to increased food \r supply diversity (Kummu et al. 2020). The relevance of trade for food \r security, and adaptation and mitigation of agricultural production, \r has also been discussed in Mbow et al. (2019)."


id: 5c022416802a0e299f0ad0b9cb7a47d5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13449
content:
"Trade policies can be used to protect national food system measures, \r by requiring front-of-package labels, or to impose border taxes on \r unhealthy products (Thow and Nisbett 2019). For example, in the \r frame of the Pacific Obesity Prevention in Communities project, \r the Fijian government implemented three measures (out of seven \r proposed) that eliminated import duties on fruits and vegetables, \r and imposed 15% import duties on unhealthy oils (Latu et al. \r 2018). Trade agreements, however, have the potential to undermine \r national efforts to improve public health (Unar-Munguia et al. 2019). \r GHG  mitigation efforts in food supply chains can be counteracted \r by GHG leakage, with a  general increase of environmental and \r social impact in developing countries exporting food products, and \r a  decrease in the developed countries importing food products \r (Fellmann et al. 2018; Sandstrom et al. 2018; Wiedmann and Lenzen \r [...]"


id: 21849c19b6dd53f5a16d2a70696ccc42
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3109
content:
"[...] 2018). The demand for agricultural commodities has also been \r associated with tropical deforestation, though a robust estimate on \r the extent of embodied deforestation in food commodities is not \r available (Pendrill et al. 2019)."


id: f75fae810683d442120e0929f9268e30
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40897
content:
"Voluntary sustainability standards: Voluntary sustainability \r standards are developed either by a  public entity or by private \r organisations to respond to consumers' demands for social and \r environmental standards (Fiorini et al. 2019). For example, the Dutch \r Green Protein Alliance, an alliance of government, industry, NGOs and \r academia, formulated a goal to shift the ratio of protein consumption \r from 60% animal source proteins currently to 40% by 2050 (Aiking \r and de Boer 2020), and Cool Food Pledge signatories (organisations \r that serve food, such as restaurants, hospitals and universities) \r committed to a 25% reduction in GHG emissions by 2030, compared \r with 2015 (Cool Food 2020). For firms, obtaining certification under \r such schemes can be costly, and costs are generally borne by the \r producers and/or supply chain stakeholders (Fiorini et al. 2019). The \r effectiveness of private voluntary sustainability standards is uncertain. \r [...]"


id: 5e1ba00d420106c58930e6c5ae04e260
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13852
content:
"[...] Cazzolla Gatti et al. (2019) have investigated the effectiveness of \r the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil on halting forest loss and "


id: 6bdebe048bda8db37bae97cc763860b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16280
content:
"Despite the fact that 1.5 billion people follow a vegetarian diet from \r choice or necessity, and that the position statements of various \r nutrition societies point out that vegetarian diets are adequate if \r well planned, few FBDGs give recommendations for vegetarian diets \r (Costa Leite et al. 2020). An increase in consumption of plant-based \r food is a  recurring recommendation in FBDGs, though an explicit \r reduction or limit of animal-source proteins is not often included, \r with the exception of red or processed meat (Temme et al. 2020). \r To account for changing dietary trends, however, FBDGs need to \r incorporate sustainability aspects (Herforth et al. 2019). A  healthy \r diet respecting planetary boundaries has been proposed by Willett \r et al. (2019), though some authors have questioned the validity of the \r nutritional (Zagmutt et al. 2019) or environmental implications, such \r as water use (Vanham et al. 2020). In October 2019, 14 global cities \r [...]"


id: c2e174db55026b431b0055458dabdfc6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31564
content:
"Education on food/nutrition and environment: Some consumers \r are reluctant to adopt sustainable healthy dietary patterns because of \r a lack of awareness of the environmental and health consequences \r of what they eat, but also out of suspicion towards alternatives that \r are perceived as not 'natural' and that seem to be difficult to integrate \r into their daily dietary habits (Hartmann and Siegrist 2017; Stephens \r et al. 2018; McBey et al. 2019; Siegrist and Hartmann 2020) or simply \r lack of knowledge on how to prepare or eat unfamiliar foods (El Bilali \r 2019; Aiking and de Boer 2020; Temme et al. 2020). Misconceptions \r may contribute, for example, to the belief that packaging or 'food \r miles' dominate the climate impact of food (Macdiarmid et al. 2016). \r However, spillover effects can induce sustainable behaviour from \r 'entry points' such as concerns about food waste (El Bilali 2019). \r Early-life experiences are crucial determinants for adopting healthy \r [...]"


id: 8c5bc2d60dbdef27f87faf263b58a9c7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21871
content:
"[...] and sustainable lifestyles (Bascope et al. 2019; McBey et al. 2019), so \r improved understanding of sustainability aspects in the education of \r public health practitioners and in university education is proposed \r (Wegener et al. 2018). Investment in education, particularly of \r women (Vermeulen et al. 2020), might lower the barrier for stronger \r policies to be accepted and effective (McBey et al. 2019; Temme et al. \r 2020) (medium evidence, high agreement)."


id: a447667d2b459c52bf12b7dcdcfda9bc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26096
content:
"as energy, sugar, saturated fat and fibre content; other labels warn \r against frequent consumption (e.g., in the 1990s Finland introduced \r a  mandatory warning for products high in salt; the keyhole label \r was introduced in Sweden in 1989 (Storcksdieck genannt Bonsmann \r et al. 2020); and 'high in' (energy/saturated fat/sugar) labels were \r introduced in Chile in 2016 to reduce obesity (Corvalan et al. 2019)). \r Front-of-package labels serve also as an incentive to industry to \r produce healthier or more sustainable products, or can serve as \r a marketing strategy (Van Loo et al. 2014; Apostolidis and McLeay \r 2016; Kanter et al. 2018b). Carbon footprint labels can be difficult \r for consumers to understand (Hyland et al. 2017), and simple, \r interpretative summary indicators used on front-of-package labels \r (e.g.,  traffic lights) are more effective than more complex ones \r (Bauer and Reisch 2019; Ikonen et al. 2019; Temple 2019; Torris and \r [...]"


id: 587e7eaac6b02276d651e8e365da7ae0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12811
content:
"[...] Mobekk 2019) (robust evidence, high agreement). Reviews find \r mixed results but overall a positive effect of food labels in improving \r direct purchasing decisions (Hieke and Harris 2016; Sarink et al. 2016; \r Anastasiou et al. 2019; Shangguan et al. 2019; Temple 2019), and \r in raising levels of awareness, thus possibly increasing success of \r other policy instruments (Apostolidis and McLeay 2016; Samant and \r Seo 2016; Al-Khudairy et al. 2019; Miller et al. 2019; Temple 2019) \r (medium evidence, high agreement)."


id: 6a90aa45fe11165332cd420175d86863
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16035
content:
"To support the policies outlined in Section  12.4.4, food system \r governance depends on the cooperation of actors across traditional \r sectors in several policy areas, in particular agriculture, nutrition, \r health, trade, climate, and environment (Termeer et al. 2018; Bhunnoo \r 2019; Diercks et al. 2019; iPES Food 2019; Rosenzweig et al. 2020b). \r Top-down integration, mandatory mainstreaming, or boundary\u0002spanning structures like public-private partnerships may be introduced \r to promote coordination (Termeer et al. 2018). 'Flow-centric' rather \r than territory-centric governance combined with private governance \r mechanisms has enabled codes of conduct and certification schemes \r (Eakin et al. 2017), for example the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm \r Oil (RSPO), as well as commodity chain transparency initiatives and \r platforms like Trase (Meijaard et al. 2020; Pirard et al. 2020). Trade \r agreements are an emerging arena of governance in which improving \r [...]"


id: ff99b8f9fa9d6efebea2f9ab72c9d5e9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42368
content:
"[...] GHG performance may be an objective, and trade agreements can \r involve sustainability assessments."


id: 867de57c23899765468dcecba7114b4e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20832
content:
"Environmental considerations rank behind financial, health, or sensory \r factors for determining citizens' food choices (Leach et al. 2016; \r Hartmann and Siegrist 2017; Neff et al. 2018; Rose 2018; Gustafson \r et al. 2019). There is evidence that choice architecture ('nudging') can \r be effective in influencing purchase decisions, but regulators do not \r normally explore this option (Broers et al. 2017). Examples of green \r nudging include making the sustainable option the default option, \r enhancing visibility, accessibility of, or exposure to, sustainable \r products and reducing visibility and accessibility of unsustainable \r products, or increasing the salience of healthy sustainable choices \r through social norms or food labels (Bucher et al. 2016; Wilson et al. \r 2016; Broers et al. 2017; Al-Khudairy et al. 2019; Bauer and Reisch \r 2019; Ferrari et al. 2019; Weinrich and Elshiewy 2019; Cialdini and \r Jacobson 2021). Available evidence suggests that choice architecture \r [...]"


id: 1d8f9bd695b63a42a3f0dd53f324317f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2385
content:
"[...] measures are relatively inexpensive and easy to implement (Ferrari \r et al. 2019; Torris and Mobekk 2019), they are a preferred solution \r if a restriction of choices is to be avoided (Wilson et al. 2016; Kraak \r et al. 2017; Vecchio and Cavallo 2019), and can be effective (Arno \r and Thomas 2016; Bucher et al. 2016; Bianchi et al. 2018b; Cadario \r and Chandon 2018) if embedded in policy packages (Wilson et al. \r 2016; Torris and Mobekk 2019) (medium evidence, high agreement)."


id: 3c8b50c05656b25e500cfaf0f7b69b8e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7842
content:
"Food systems governance has multiple targets and objectives, not \r least contributing to the achievement of the SDGs. GHG emissions \r from food systems can be impacted by both interventions targeted at \r different parts of the food system and interventions in other systems, \r such as reducing deforestation or promoting reforestation (Lee \r et al. 2019). For example, policies targeting health can contribute \r to diet shifts away from red meat, while also influencing GHG \r emissions (Springmann et al. 2018b; Semba et al. 2020); national \r and local food self-sufficiency policies may also have GHG impacts \r (Kriewald et al. 2019; Loon et al. 2019). Cross-sectoral governance \r could enhance synergies between reduced GHG emissions from food \r systems and other goals; however, integrative paradigms for cross\u0002sectoral governance between food and other sectors have faced \r implementation challenges (Delaney et al. 2018). For example, in the \r [...]"


id: 2abb57423b84d1bc8c8c86fcbee83028
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4744
content:
"[...] late 2000s, the water-energy-food nexus emerged as a framework \r for cross-sectoral governance, but has not been well integrated into \r policy (Urbinatti et al. 2020), perhaps because of perceptions that it \r is an academic concept, or that it takes a technical-administrative \r view of governance; simply adopting the paradigm is not sufficient "


id: c5f77cdfdfe78cdfe2bd31c3e276a71
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32136
content:
"Early characterisations of food systems governance featured a binary \r distinction between global and local scales, but this has been \r replaced by a relational approach where the local governance is seen \r as a process that relies on the interconnections between scales (Lever \r et al. 2019). Cross-scalar governance is not simply an aggregation \r of local groups, but involves the telecoupling of distant systems; for \r example, transnational NGO networks have been able to link coffee \r retailers in the global North with producers in the global South via \r international NGOs concerned about deforestation and social justice \r (Eakin et al. 2017). Global governance institutions like the Committee \r on World Food Security can promote policy coherence globally and \r reinforce accountability at all levels (McKeon 2015), as can norm\u0002setting efforts like the Voluntary Guidelines for the Responsible \r Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests (FAO 2012). \r [...]"


id: 15f9eacb1dcb924f792b52ea51598203
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1083
content:
"[...] Global multi-stakeholder processes like the UN Food Systems Summit \r can foster the development of principles for guiding further actions \r based on sound scientific evidence. The European Commission's Farm \r to Fork strategy aims to promote policy coherence in food policy at \r EU and national levels, and could be the exemplar of a  genuinely \r integrated food policy (Schebesta and Candel 2020)."


id: 47d4947ecec7c2c77a5d4719117ea342
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9848
content:
"The specific policy mix covers a  range of policy instruments to enable changes in agro-food supply, processing and societal norms \r (Kugelberg et al. 2021). The government provides targeted funding and knowledge support to drive technological innovations on climate \r solutions to reduce emissions from food and in the agriculture, forestry and land use sectors. In addition, the Finnish government applies \r administrative means, such as legislation, advice, guidance on public procurement and support schemes to diversify and increase organic \r food production to 20% of arable land, which in turn improve the opportunities for small-scale food production and steer public bodies \r to purchase local and organic food. The Finnish government applies educational and informative instruments to enable a shift to healthy \r and sustainable dietary behaviours. The policy objective is to reduce consumption of meat and replace it with other sources of protein, \r [...]"


id: 9b0b74015107377fcb98ee147a2394ac
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24530
content:
"[...] aligned with nutrition recommendations and avoiding food waste. The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, in collaboration with the \r Finnish Farmer's unions and the Union of Swedish-speaking Farmers and Forest Owners in Finland, ran a two-year multi-media campaign \r in 2018 with key messages on the sustainability, traceability and safety of locally-produced food (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry \r 2021). A 'Food Facts' website project (Luke 2021), funded by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry in collaboration with the Natural \r Resources Institute Finland and the Finnish Food Safety Authority, helps to raise knowledge about food, which could shape responsible \r individual food behaviour, for example choosing local and sustainable foods and reducing food waste."


id: 910f32333dbd5ea233f048cade2f24f4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22721
content:
"A critical enabler for developing a shared food system strategy across sectors and political party boundaries was the implementation \r of a one-year inclusive, deliberative and consensual stakeholder engagement process. A wide range of stakeholders could exert real \r influence during the vision-building process, resulting in strong agreement on key policy objectives, and subsequently an important \r leverage point to policy change (Kugelberg et al. 2021). Moreover, cross-sectoral coordination of Food2030 and the government's \r wider climate action programmes are enabled by a number of institutional mechanisms and collaborative structures, for example the \r advisory board for the food chain, formally established during the agenda-setting stage of Food2030, inter-ministerial committees \r to guide and assess policy implementation, and Our Common Dining Table, a multi-stakeholder partnership that assembles 18 food \r [...]"


id: 9f26a08be0efecec88ac3fa0b3b95367
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25219
content:
"Critical barriers to strategy and policy formulation include a lack of attention to integrated impact assessments (Kugelberg et al. 2021), \r which blurs a transparent overview of potential trade-offs and hidden conflicts. There were few policy evaluations from independent \r organisations to inform policymaking, reducing the opportunities for more progressive policy approaches. Monitoring and food policy \r evaluation is very close to the ministry in charge, which hampers critical thinking about policy measures (Hilden et al. 2014). In \r addition, there is a lack of standardised indicators covering the whole food system, which hinders comprehensive oversight of progress \r towards a sustainable food system (Kanter et al. 2018a). Some of the problems related to monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) \r are typical for countries in the EU. To improve, MRV will probably require structural changes, such as efforts to build up institutional \r [...]"


id: 5fd47b64b92bb46a4a565889624dcb2d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14167
content:
"[...] capacity and application of new technology, development of standardised indicators covering the whole food system, regulations \r on transparency and verification, and mechanisms to enable reflexive discussions between business, farmers, public, NGOs and the \r government (Meadowcroft and Steurer 2018; Kanter et al. 2020)."


id: 3a39ae3167ba991ac7382c64dec3ad5c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7451
content:
"As reported in Chapter  3, in scenarios limiting warming to 1.5degC \r (>50%) with no or limited overshoot, median area dedicated for \r energy crops in 2050 is 1.99 (0.56 to 4.82) million square kilometres \r (Mkm2\r ) and median forest area increased 3.22 (-0.67 to 8.90) Mkm2\r in the period 2019 to 2050 (5-95th percentile range, scenario category \r C1). For comparison, the total global areas of forests, cropland and \r pasture (in 2015) are in the SRCCL estimated at about 40 Mkm2\r , \r 15.6 Mkm2\r , and 27.3 Mkm2, respectively (additionally, 21 Mkm2 of \r savannahs and shrublands are also used for grazing) (IPCC 2019a). \r The SRCCL concluded that conversion of land for A/R and bioenergy \r crops at the scale commonly found in pathways limiting warming to \r 1.5degC or 2degC is associated with multiple feasibility and sustainability \r constraints, including land carbon losses (high confidence). Pathways \r in which warming exceeds 1.5degC require less land-based mitigation, \r [...]"


id: 6e0e8c481f4049fb3cf5b72c19473dee
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16623
content:
"[...] but the impacts of higher temperatures on regional climate and \r land, including land degradation, desertification, and food insecurity, \r become more severe (Smith et al. 2019b)."


id: 48e8b782e4b12fab7378f59013ed9815
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10048
content:
"Global integrated assessment models (IAMs) provide insights into \r the roles of land-based mitigation in pathways limiting warming to \r 1.5degC or 2degC; interaction between land-based and other mitigation \r options such as wind and solar power; influence of land-based \r mitigation on food markets, land use and land carbon; and the role \r of BECCS vis-a-vis other CDR options (Chapter 3). However, IAMs do \r not capture more subtle changes in land management and in the \r associated industrial/energy systems due to relatively coarse temporal \r and spatial resolution, and limited representation of land quality and \r feedstocks/management practices, interactions between biomass \r production and conversion systems, and local context, for example, \r governance of land use (Daioglou et al. 2019; Rose et al. 2020; Welfle \r et al. 2020; Calvin et al. 2021). A/R have generally been modelled as \r forests managed for carbon sequestration alone, rather than forestry \r [...]"


id: f6a2e5b790c87347bcce16e9c26314a7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40762
content:
"[...] providing both carbon sequestration and biomass supply (Calvin et al. \r 2021). Because IAMs do not include options to integrate new biomass \r production with existing agricultural and forestry systems (Pare et al. \r 2016; Mansuy et al. 2018; Cossel et al. 2019; Braghiroli and Passarini \r 2020; Djomo et al. 2020; Moreira et al. 2020; Strapasson et al. 2020; \r Rinke Dias de Souza et al. 2021), they may over-estimate the total \r additional land area required for biomass production. On the other \r hand, some integrated biomass production systems may prove less \r attractive to landholders than growing biomass crops in large blocks, \r from logistic, economic, or other points of view (Ssegane et al. 2016; \r Busch 2017; Ferrarini et al. 2017)."


id: 63145cbcae68833d2d55657f1951742c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14723
content:
"The character of land occupation, and, consequently, the associated \r impacts (Section 12.5.3), vary considerably among mitigation options \r and also for the same option depending on geographic location, \r scale, system design and deployment strategy (Olsson et al. 2019; \r Ioannidis and Koutsoyiannis 2020; van de Ven et al. 2021). Land \r occupation associated with different mitigation options can be large \r uniform areas (e.g., large solar farms, reservoir hydropower dams, or \r tree plantations), or more distributed, such as wind turbines, solar PV, \r and patches of biomass cultivation integrated with other land uses in \r heterogeneous landscapes (Cacho et al. 2018; Jager and Kreig 2018; \r Correa et al. 2019; Englund et al. 2020a). Studies with broader scope, \r covering total land use requirement induced by plant infrastructure, \r provide a  more complete picture of land footprints. For example, \r Wu et al. (2021) quantified a land footprint for the infrastructure of \r [...]"


id: 4c54a47eabf3a2363c061ab4c7d3b2a4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10691
content:
"[...] a pilot solar plant being three times the onsite land area. Sonter et al. \r (2020b) found significant overlap of mining areas (82% targeting \r materials needed for renewable energy production) and biodiversity \r conservation sites and priorities, suggesting that strategic planning \r is critical to address mining threats to biodiversity (Section 12.5.4) \r along with recycling and exploration of alternative technologies that \r use that use abundant minerals (Box 10.6)."


id: f5d543378b89b0e2663e67ae078dc603
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40611
content:
"Land occupation associated with mitigation options other than A/R \r and bioenergy is rarely quantified in global scenarios. Stressing \r large uncertainties (e.g.,  type of biomass used and share of solar \r PV integrated in buildings), Luderer et al. (2019) modelled land \r occupation and land transformation associated with a  range of \r alternative power system decarbonisation pathways in the context \r of a  global 2degC climate stabilisation effort. On a  per-megawatt \r hour (MWh) basis, bioelectricity with CCS was most land intensive, \r followed by hydropower, coal with CCS, and concentrated solar \r power (CSP), which in turn were around five times as land-intensive \r as wind and solar photovoltaics (PV). A review of studies of power \r densities (electricity generation per unit land area) confirmed the \r relatively larger land occupation associated with biopower, although \r hydropower overlaps with biopower (van Zalk and Behrens 2018). \r [...]"


id: bdaafe0512a939ec9ac6341bf9fee90d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30631
content:
"[...] This study also quantifies the low land occupation of nuclear energy, \r similar to fossil energy sources."


id: baa5ec3f76ae4e27a139461057d66d93
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30050
content:
"There are also situations where expanding mitigation is more \r or less decoupled from additional land use. The use of organic \r consumer waste, harvest residues and processing side-streams in \r the agriculture and forestry sectors can support significant volumes \r of bio-based products with relatively lower land-use change risks \r than dedicated biomass production systems (Hanssen et al. 2019; \r Spinelli et al. 2019; Mouratiadou et al. 2020). Such uses can provide \r waste management solutions while increasing the mitigation \r achieved from the land that is already used for agricultural and \r forest production. Bioenergy accounts for about 90% of renewable \r heat used in industrial applications, mainly in industries that can use \r their own biomass waste and residues, such as the pulp and paper \r industry, food industry, and ethanol production plants (IEA 2020c) \r (Chapters  6  and 11). Heat and electricity produced on-site from \r [...]"


id: 940839a414521b05e2b852ca1095fe4b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23248
content:
"[...] side-streams but not needed for the industrial processes can be sold \r to other users, such as district heating systems. Surplus waste and \r residues can also be used to produce solid and liquid biofuels, or \r be used as feedstock in other industries such as the petrochemical \r industry (IRENA 2018; Lock and Whittle 2018; Thunman et al. 2018; \r IRENA 2019; Haus et al. 2020) (Chapters 6 and 11). Electrification \r and improved process efficiencies can reduce GHG emissions and \r increase the share of harvested biomass that is used for production \r of bio-based products (Johnsson et al. 2019; Madeddu et al. 2020; \r Lipiainen and Vakkilainen 2021; Rahnama Mobarakeh et al. 2021; \r Silva et al. 2021) (Chapter  11). Besides integrating solar thermal \r panels and solar PV into buildings and other infrastructure, floating \r solar PV panels in, for example, hydropower dams (Ranjbaran et al. \r 2019; Cagle et al. 2020; Haas et al. 2020; Lee et al. 2020; Gonzalez \r [...]"


id: 40d45c66d3baeb141248a50a492df8af
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8592
content:
"[...] Sanchez et al. 2021), and over canals (Lee et al. 2020; McKuin et al. \r 2021) could decouple renewable energy generation from land use \r while simultaneously reducing evaporation losses and potentially \r mitigating aquatic weed growth and climate change impacts on \r water body temperature and stratification (Cagle et al. 2020; Exley \r et al. 2021; Gadzanku et al. 2021; Solomin et al. 2021)."


id: daeb6f6fe949b670b9397de09a2aee8b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35802
content:
"Mitigation options that are based on the use of biomass, that is, \r bioenergy/BECCS, biochar, wood buildings, and other bio-based \r products, can have different positive and negative effects depending \r on the character of the mitigation option, the land use, the biomass \r conversion process, how the bio-based products are used and what \r other product they substitute (Leskinen et al. 2018; Howard et al. 2021; \r Myllyviita et al. 2021). The impacts of the same mitigation option can \r therefore vary significantly and the outcome in addition depends on \r previous land/biomass use (Cowie et al. 2021). As biomass-based \r systems commonly produce multiple food, material and energy \r products, it is difficult to disentangle impacts associated with individual \r bio-based products (Ahlgren et al. 2015; Djomo et al. 2017; Obydenkova \r et al. 2021). As for other mitigation options, governance has a critical \r influence on outcome, but larger scale and higher expansion rate \r [...]"


id: 26cc98fe559f20623300c88bd435c3c9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3982
content:
"[...] generally translates into higher risk for negative outcomes such as \r competition for scarce land, freshwater and phosphorous resources, \r displacement of natural ecosystems, and diminishing capacity of \r agroecosystems to support biodiversity and essential ecosystem \r services, especially if produced without sustainable land management \r and in inappropriate contexts (Popp et al. 2017; Dooley and Kartha \r 2018; Hasegawa et al. 2018; Heck et al. 2018; Humpenoder et al. 2018; \r Fujimori et al. 2019; Hurlbert et al. 2019; IPBES 2019; Smith et al. \r 2019b; Drews et al. 2020; Hasegawa et al. 2020; Schulze et al. 2020; \r Stenzel et al. 2021) (medium evidence, high agreement)."


id: 3df25541e06c5ed2c9c56f33364594c9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
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vector_id: 8069
content:
"Removal of crop and forestry residues can cause land degradation \r through soil erosion and decline in nutrients and soil organic matter \r (Cherubin et al. 2018) (robust evidence, high agreement). These risks \r can be reduced by retaining a proportion of the residues to protect the \r soil surface from erosion and moisture loss and maintain or increase \r soil organic matter (Section  7.4.3.6); incorporating a  perennial \r groundcover into annual cropping systems (Moore et al. 2019); \r and by replacing nutrients removed, such as by applying ash from \r bioenergy combustion plants (Kludze et al. 2013; Harris et al. 2015; \r Warren Raffa et al. 2015; de Jong et al. 2017) while safeguarding \r against contamination risks (Pettersson et al. 2020) (medium \r evidence, high agreement). Besides topography, soil, and climate \r conditions, sustainable residue removal rates also depend on the fate \r of extracted biomass. For example, to maintain the same level of soil \r [...]"


id: a54ab3a727dd7dc3fd4b543803571b7d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26310
content:
"[...] organic carbon, the harvest of straw, if used for combustion (which \r would return no carbon to fields), was estimated to be only 26% of the \r rate that could be extracted if used for anaerobic digestion involving \r return of recalcitrant carbon to fields (Hansen et al. 2020). Similarly, \r biomass pyrolysis produces biochar which can be returned to soils to \r counteract carbon losses associated with biomass extraction (Joseph \r et al. 2021; Lehmann et al. 2021)."


id: de652cc5486fd3b3c6d075405b1d9ebb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36391
content:
"Land occupation associated with mitigation options can present \r challenges related to impacts and trade-offs, but can also provide \r opportunities and in different ways support the achievement of \r additional societal objectives, including adaptation to climate \r change. This section focuses on mitigation options that have \r significant risks, impacts and/or co-benefits with respect to land \r resources, food security and the environment. Bioenergy (with or \r without CCS), biochar and bio-based products require biomass \r feedstocks that can be obtained from purpose-grown crops, \r residues from conventional agriculture and forestry systems, or \r from biomass wastes, each with different implications for the land. \r Here we consider separately (i) 'biomass-based systems', including \r dedicated biomass crops (e.g.,  perennial grasses, short rotation \r woody crops) and biomass produced as a co-product of conventional \r agricultural production (e.g.,  maize stover), and (ii) 'afforestation/\r [...]"


id: 130317e9bb65747309ad0d6bc298db51
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 552
content:
"[...] reforestation', including forests established for ecological restoration \r and plantations grown for forest products and agroforestry, where "


id: 246da0c6289cbcc819888e4db1212e20
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3604
content:
"the mitigation value (robust evidence, high agreement) (Liu et al. 2014; \r El Akkari et al. 2018). Cultivation of conventional oil, sugar, and starch \r crops tends to have larger negative impact than lignocellulosic crops \r (Nunez-Regueiro et al. 2020). Social and environmental outcomes can \r be enhanced through integration of suitable plants (such as perennial \r grasses and short rotation woody crops) into agricultural landscapes \r (within crop rotations or through strategic localisation, for example as \r contour belts, along fencelines and riparian buffers). Such integrated \r systems can provide shelter for livestock, retention of nutrients and \r sediment, erosion control, pollination, pest and disease control, and \r flood regulation (robust evidence, high agreement) (Berndes et al. \r 2008; Christen and Dalgaard 2013; Asbjornsen et al. 2014; Holland \r et al. 2015; Ssegane et al. 2015; Dauber and Miyake 2016; Milner et al. \r [...]"


id: 12bc9fd0a70fc9740812f1575fea7393
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 499
content:
"[...] 2016; Ssegane and Negri 2016; Styles et al. 2016; Zheng et al. 2016; \r Ferrarini et al. 2017; Crews et al. 2018; Henry et al. 2018a; Zalesny \r et al. 2019; Osorio et al. 2019; Englund et al. 2020b; Englund et al. \r 2021) (Figure 12.8, Box 12.3, and Cross-Working Group Box 3 in this \r chapter). Many of the land use practices described above align with \r agroecology principles (AR6 WGII Section 5.14, AR6 WGII Box 5.11 \r and AR6 WGII Cross-Chapter Box NATURAL) and can simultaneously \r contribute to climate change mitigation, climate change adaptation \r and reduced risk of land degradation (IPCC 2019a) (robust evidence,\r high agreement)."


id: c9f087e1f6c058334b56128d5259c556
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32853
content:
"waste, manure) produces a nutrient-rich digestate and biogas that can \r be utilised for heating and cooking or upgraded for use in electricity \r generation, industrial processes, or as transportation fuel (Chapter 6) \r (Parsaee et al. 2019; Hamelin et al. 2021). The digestate is a rich source \r of nitrogen, phosphorus and other plant nutrients, and its application \r to farmland returns exported nutrients as well as carbon (Cowie \r 2020b). Studies have identified potential risks, including manganese \r toxicity, copper and zinc contamination, and ammonia emissions, \r compared with application of undigested animal manure  (Nkoa \r 2014). Although the anaerobic digestion process reduces pathogen \r risk compared with undigested manure feedstocks, it does not destroy \r all pathogens (Nag et al. 2019). Leakage of methane is a significant \r risk that needs to be managed, to ensure mitigation potential is \r achieved  (Bruun et al. 2014). Anaerobic digestion of wastewater, \r [...]"


id: bd66e9302d24915679b13b8a346c3a1b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30573
content:
"[...] such as sugarcane vinasse, reduces methane emissions and pollution \r loading as well as producing biogas (Parsaee et al. 2019)."


id: ab5dced39c7f73ca9205c0a3572eaa7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27383
content:
"et al. 2018). Restoration, seeking to establish native vegetation with \r the aim to maximise ecosystem integrity, landscape connectivity, \r and conservation of on-ground carbon stock, will have higher \r biodiversity benefits than rehabilitation measures (Lin et al. 2013). \r However, sequestration rate declines as forests mature, and the \r sequestered carbon is vulnerable to loss through disturbance such as \r wildfire, so there is a higher risk of reversal of the mitigation benefit \r compared with use of biomass for substitution of fossil fuels and \r GHG-intensive building materials (Russell and Kumar 2017; Dugan \r et al. 2018; Anderegg et al. 2020). Trade-offs between different \r ecosystem services, and between societal objectives including \r climate change mitigation and adaptation, can be managed through \r integrated landscape approaches that aim to create a mosaic of land \r uses, including conservation, agriculture, forestry and settlements \r [...]"


id: 9edb268955edb02e5ed674d975252d96
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25174
content:
"[...] (Freeman et al. 2015; Nielsen 2016; Reed et al. 2016; Sayer et al. \r 2017) where each is sited with consideration of land potential and \r socio-economic objectives and context (Cowie et al. 2018) (limited \r evidence, high agreement)."


id: 26a3bfba82aec847d994884e73e57b83
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3959
content:
"Biorefineries can convert biomass  to food, feed and biomaterials \r along with bioenergy  (Aristizabal-Marulanda and Cardona \r Alzate 2019; Schmidt et al. 2019).  Biorefinery plants are \r commonly  characterised  by high process integration to achieve \r high resource use efficiency, minimise waste production and energy \r requirements, and maintain flexibility  towards  changing markets \r for raw materials and products  (Schmidt et al. 2019). Emerging \r technologies can convert biomass that is indigestible for monogastric \r animals or humans (e.g., algae, grass, clover or alfalfa) into food and \r feed products. For example, lactic acid bacteria can facilitate the \r use of green plant biomass such as grasses and clover to produce \r a  protein concentrate suitable for animal feed and other products \r for material or energy use (Lubeck and Lubeck 2019). Selection of \r crops suitable for co-production of protein feed along with biofuels \r [...]"


id: 2ade59f52ae2c1cee3e1c82e29aa0a9d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4776
content:
"[...] and other bio-based products can significantly reduce the land \r conversion pressure by reducing the need to cultivate other crops \r (e.g., soybean) for animal feed (Bentsen and Moller 2017; Solati et al. \r 2018). Thus, such solutions, using alternatives to high-input, high\u0002emissions grain-based feed, can enable sustainable intensification of \r agricultural systems with reduced environmental impacts (Jorgensen \r and Laerke 2016). The use of seaweed and algae as biorefinery \r feedstock can facilitate recirculation of nutrients from waters to \r agricultural land, thus reducing eutrophication while substituting \r purpose-grown feed (Thomas et al. 2021)."


id: c00fe2f1fd59ab7f426c5e98060a34d9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31083
content:
"Impacts of biomass production and A/R on the hydrological cycle \r and water availability and quality depend on scale, location, \r previous land use/cover and type of biomass production system. \r For example, extraction of logging residues in forests managed for \r timber production has little effect on hydrological flows, while land\u0002use change to establish dedicated biomass production can have \r a significant effect (Teter et al. 2018; Drews et al. 2020). Deployment \r of A/R can affect temperature, albedo and precipitation locally and \r regionally, and can mitigate or enhance the effects of climate change \r in the affected areas (Stenzel et al. 2021b) (Section  7.2.4). A/R \r activities can increase evapotranspiration, impacting groundwater \r and downstream water availability, but can also result in increased \r infiltration to groundwater and improved water quality (Farley \r et al. 2005; Zhang et al. 2016; Zhang et al. 2017; Lu et al. 2018) \r [...]"


id: 79151cf0a498c749df05951582b12d66
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18490
content:
"[...] and can be beneficial where historical clearing has caused soil \r salinisation and stream salinity (Farrington and Salama 1996; Marcar \r 2016). There is limited evidence that very large-scale land-use or \r vegetation cover changes can alter regional climate and precipitation \r patterns, for example downwind precipitation depends on upwind \r evapotranspiration from forests and other vegetation (Keys et al. \r 2016; Ellison et al. 2017; van der Ent and Tuinenburg 2017)."


id: baebebf64bc32785bca669a565fc9c3f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30100
content:
"Pyrolysis can convert organic wastes, including agricultural and \r forestry residues, food waste, manure, poultry litter and sewage \r sludge, into combustible gas and biochar, which can be used \r as a  soil amendment (Joseph et al. 2021; Schmidt et al. 2021) \r (Chapter  7). Pyrolysis facilitates nutrient recovery from biomass \r residues, enabling return to farmland as biochar, noting, however, \r that a large fraction of nitrogen is lost during pyrolysis (Joseph et al. \r 2021). Conversion to biochar aids the logistics of transport and land \r application of materials such as sewage sludge, by reducing mass \r and volume, improving flow properties, stability and uniformity, \r and decreasing odour.  Pyrolysis is well suited for materials that \r may be contaminated with pathogens, microplastics, and per- and \r polyfluoroalkyl substances, such as abattoir and sewage wastes, \r removing these risks, and reduces availability of heavy metals in \r [...]"


id: d776e759218160ce41df6ea5a2d9ab4e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35216
content:
"that build carbon in vegetation and soil, and can provide impetus \r for land-use planning to achieve multifunctional landscapes that \r integrate land-based mitigation with other land uses (Box  12.3). \r The application of sustainable land management practices that build \r soil carbon will enhance the productivity and resilience of crop and \r forestry systems, thereby enhancing biomass production (Henry \r et al. 2018a). Non-bio-based mitigation options can enhance land\u0002based mitigation: (i) enhanced weathering, that is, adding ground \r silicate rock to soil to take up atmospheric CO2 through chemical \r weathering (Section 12.3), could supply nutrients and alleviate soil \r acidity, thereby boosting productivity of biomass crops and A/R, \r particularly when combined with biochar application (Haque et al. \r 2019; De Oliveira Garcia et al. 2020; Buss et al. 2021); and (ii) land \r rehabilitation and enhanced landscape diversity through production \r [...]"


id: fef6917caa021d200f96a0bb23fb1d19
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42254
content:
"[...] of biomass crops could simultaneously contribute to climate change \r mitigation, climate change adaptation, addressing land degradation, \r increasing biodiversity and improving food security in the longer \r term (Mackey et al. 2020) (Chapter 7)."


id: 165b1424488c19ed485b8d316743a988
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1150
content:
"biochar-carbon for hundreds to thousands of years and can further \r increase soil carbon by reducing mineralisation of soil organic matter \r and newly added plant carbon (Singh et al. 2012; Wang et al. 2016a; \r Weng et al. 2017; Lehmann et al. 2021). Biochars can improve \r a  range of soil properties, but effects vary depending on biochar \r properties, which are determined by feedstock and production \r conditions (Singh et al. 2012; Wang et al. 2016a), and on the soil \r properties where biochar is applied (Razzaghi et al. 2020). Biochars \r can increase nutrient availability, reduce leaching losses (Singh et al. \r 2010; Haider et al. 2017) and enhance crop yields, particularly in \r infertile acidic soils (Jeffery et al. 2017), thus supporting food security \r under changing climate. Biochars can enhance infiltration and soil \r water-holding capacity, reducing runoff and leaching, increasing \r water retention in the landscape and improving drought tolerance \r [...]"


id: 9d010d623a4d3cd2d0cdce8bcbb6cf0b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24863
content:
"[...] and resilience to climate change (Quin et al. 2014; Omondi et al. \r 2016). (See Chapter 7 for a review of biochar's potential contribution \r to climate change mitigation.)"


id: a36bebfb3dfc64155d470f4cf9747289
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25959
content:
"Mortality and disturbance risks to birds, bats and insects are major \r ecological concerns associated with wind farms (Thaxter et al. \r 2017; Cook et al. 2018; Heuck et al. 2019; Coppes et al. 2020; Choi \r et al. 2020; Fernandez-Bellon 2020; Marques et al. 2020; Voigt 2021). \r Careful siting is critical (May et al. 2021), while painting blades to \r increase the visibility can also reduce mortality due to collision (May \r et al. 2020). Theoretical studies have suggested that wind turbines \r could lead to warmer night temperatures due to atmospheric mixing \r (Keith et al. 2004), later confirmed through observation (Zhou et al. \r 2013), although Vautard et al. (2014) found limited impact at scales \r consistent with climate policies. More recent studies report mixed \r results: indications that the warming effect could be substantial with \r widespread deployment (Miller and Keith 2018b) and conversely \r limited impacts on regional climate at 20% of US electricity from \r [...]"


id: 4a975f49b0d5f0b4e42b1b2fa8ef4576
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10363
content:
"PV can be deployed in ways that enhance agriculture: for example, \r Hassanpour Adeh et al. (2018) found that biomass production and \r water use efficiency of pasture increased under elevated solar \r panels. PV systems under development may achieve significant \r power generation without diminishing agricultural output (Miskin \r et al. 2019). Global mapping of solar panel efficiency showed that \r croplands, grasslands and wetlands are located in regions with the \r greatest solar PV potential (Adeh et al. 2019). Dual-use agrivoltaic \r systems are being developed that overcome previously recognised \r negative impact on crop growth, mainly due to shadows (Marrou et al. \r 2013a; Marrou et al. 2013b; Armstrong et al. 2016), thus facilitating \r synergistic co-location of solar photovoltaic power and cropping \r (Adeh et al. 2019; Miskin et al. 2019). Assessment of the potential for \r optimising deployment of solar PV and energy crops on abandoned \r [...]"


id: 9a635bc0ee3ae6c941b15754d9c99e21
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24403
content:
"[...] cropland areas produced an estimate of the technical potential for \r optimal combination at 125 EJ per year (Leirpoll et al. 2021)."


id: 56f021538e6f493ac5db4aa9339c1cf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12545
content:
"Reservoir hydropower projects submerge areas as dams are \r established for water storage. Hydropower can be associated with \r significant and highly varying land occupation and carbon footprint \r (Poff and Schmidt 2016; Scherer and Pfister 2016a; dos Santos \r et al. 2017; Ocko and Hamburg 2019). The flooding of land causes \r CH4 emissions due to the anaerobic decomposition of submerged \r vegetation and there is also a  loss of carbon sequestration due \r to mortality of submerged vegetation. The size of GHG emissions \r depends on the amount of vegetation submerged. The carbon \r in accumulated sediments in reservoirs may be released to the \r atmosphere as CO2 and CH4 upon decommissioning of dams, and \r while uncertain, estimates indicate that these emissions can make up \r a significant part of the cumulative GHG emissions of hydroelectric \r power plants (Moran et al. 2018; Almeida et al. 2019; Ocko and \r Hamburg 2019). Positive radiative forcing due to lower albedo of \r [...]"


id: 877e37f781dacdecbf687ae5331c842d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20994
content:
"[...] hydropower reservoirs compared to surrounding landscapes can \r reduce mitigation contribution significantly (Wohlfahrt et al. 2021)."


id: ece8e8b5754ec7e4425e02f394453155
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39050
content:
"Deserts can be well suited for solar PV and CSP farms, especially at \r low latitudes where global horizontal irradiance is high, as there is \r lower competition for land and land carbon loss is minimal, although \r remote locations may pose challenges for power distribution (Xu \r et al. 2016). Solar arrays can reduce the albedo, particularly in \r desert landscapes, which can lead to local temperature increases \r and regional impacts on wind patterns (Millstein and Menon 2011). \r Modelling studies suggest that large-scale wind and solar farms, for \r example in the Sahara (Li et al. 2018), could increase rainfall through \r reduced albedo and increased surface roughness, stimulating \r vegetation growth and further increasing regional rainfall (Li et al. \r 2018) (limited evidence). Besides impacts at the site of deployment, \r wind and solar power affect land through mining of critical minerals \r required by these technologies (Viebahn et al. 2015; McLellan et al. \r [...]"


id: 8bc4bcd61f6715121094fa40197f3642
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21759
content:
"Hydropower can have high water usage due to evaporation from \r dams (Scherer and Pfister 2016b). Hydropower projects may impact \r aquatic ecology and biodiversity, necessitate the relocation of local \r communities living within or near the reservoir or construction \r sites, and affect downstream communities (in positive or negative \r ways) (Moran et al. 2018; Barbarossa et al. 2020). Displacement \r as well as resettlement schemes can have both socio-economic \r and environmental consequences including those associated with \r establishment of new agricultural land (Ahsan and Ahmad 2016; \r Nguyen et al. 2017). Dam construction may also stimulate migration \r into the affected region, which can lead to deforestation and other \r negative impacts (Chen et al. 2015). Impacts can be mitigated \r through basin-scale dam planning that considers GHG emissions \r along with social and ecological effects (Almeida et al. 2019). Land \r [...]"


id: 650960a7ab0810bf7287d7270f713f44
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15043
content:
"[...] occupation is minimal for run-of-river hydropower installations, but \r without storage they have no resilience to drought and installations \r inhibit dispersal and migration of organisms (Lange et al. 2018). \r Reservoir hydropower schemes can regulate water flows and reduce \r flood damage to agricultural production (Amjath-Babu et al. 2019). \r On the other hand, severe flooding due to failure of hydropower \r dams has caused fatalities, damage to infrastructure and loss of \r productive land (Farrington and Salama 1996; Farley et al. 2005; \r Zhang et al. 2016; Marcar 2016; Zhang et al. 2017; Kalinina et al. \r 2018; Lu et al. 2018)."


id: 6dea9a010770f327e65931664dddbb2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16600
content:
"Nuclear power has land impacts and risks associated with mining \r operations (Falck 2015; Winde et al. 2017; Srivastava et al. 2020) and \r disposal of spent fuel (IAEA 2006a; Ewing et al. 2016; Bruno et al. \r 2020), but the land occupation is small compared to many other \r mitigation options. Substantial volumes of water are required for \r cooling (Liao et al. 2016), as for all thermal power plants, but most \r of this water is returned to rivers and other water bodies after use \r (Sesma Martin and Rubio-Varas 2017). Negative impacts on aquatic \r systems can occur due to chemical and thermal pollution loading \r (Fricko et al. 2016; Raptis et al. 2016; Bonansea et al. 2020). The major \r risk to land from nuclear power is that a nuclear accident leads to \r radioactive contamination. An extreme example, the 1986 Chernobyl \r accident in Ukraine, resulted in radioactive contamination across \r Europe. Most of the fallout concentrated in Belarus, Ukraine and \r Russia, where some 125,000 km2\r [...]"


id: 6345f1d701653423c96299a58b598541
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14759
content:
"[...]  of land (more than a third of which \r was in agricultural use) was contaminated. About 350,000 people \r were relocated away from these areas (IAEA 2006b; Sovacool 2008). \r About 116,000 people were permanently evacuated from the 4200 \r km Chernobyl exclusion zone (IAEA 2006a). New reactor designs \r with passive and enhanced safety systems reduce the risk of such \r accidents significantly (Section 6.4.2.4). An example of alternatives \r to land reclamation for productive purposes, a  national biosphere "


id: 53cca9678449ee3b14e7efd2eb069a78
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12011
content:
"Governance challenges include the lack of transparent greenhouse \r gas accounting for mining activities (Lee et al. 2020a), and threats to \r biodiversity from land disturbance, which require strategic planning \r to address (Sonter et al. 2020a). Strategic spatial planning is \r needed more generally to address trade-offs between using land for \r renewable energy and food: for example, agriculture can be co-located \r with solar photovoltaics (Barron-Gafford et al. 2019) or wind power \r (Miller and Keith 2018a). Integrative spatial planning can integrate \r renewable energy with not just agriculture, but mobility and housing \r (Hurlbert et al. 2019). Integrated planning is needed to avoid scalar \r pitfalls, and local and regional contextualised governance solutions \r need to be sited within a  planetary frame of reference (Biermann \r et al. 2016). Greater planning and coordination are also needed to \r ensure co-benefits from land-based mitigation (Box 12.3) as well as \r [...]"


id: f44bcea60ee9b90de6c49893ff49272b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40353
content:
"With respect to renewable energy options that occupy land, the \r focus of governance has been directed to technological adoption \r and public acceptance (Sequeira and Santos 2018), rather than \r land use. Recent work has found that spatial processes shape the \r emerging energy transition, creating zones of friction between \r global investors, national and local governments, and civil society \r (Jepson and Caldas 2017; McEwan 2017). For example, Yenneti et \r al. (2016) have argued that hydropower and ground-based solar \r parks in India, which have involved enclosure of lands designated as \r degraded, displacing pastoral use by vulnerable communities, have \r constituted forms of spatial injustice. Hydropower leads to dam\u0002induced displacement, and though this can be addressed through \r compensation mechanisms, governance is complicated by a lack of \r transparency in resettlement data (Kirchherr et al. 2016; Kirchherr \r et al. 2019). Renewable energy production is resulting in new land \r [...]"


id: 163348aba22f31241fcb2d289c81b9fe
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1115
content:
"[...] conflict frontiers where degraded land is framed as having mitigation \r value such as for palm oil production and wind power in Mexico \r (Backhouse and Lehmann 2020); land use conflict as well as impacts \r on wildlife from large-scale solar installations have also emerged \r in the southwestern United States (Mulvaney 2017). The renewable \r energy transition also involves the extraction of critical minerals \r used in renewable energy technologies, such as lithium and cobalt. "


id: ec243907c7a29d4f272fc958a007586c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38917
content:
"In emerging domains for governance such as land-based mitigation, \r global institutions, private sector networks and civil society \r organisations are playing key roles in terms of norm-setting. The \r shared languages and theoretical frameworks, or cognitive linkages \r (Pattberg et al. 2018), that arise with polycentric governance can not \r only be helpful in creating expectations and establishing benchmarks \r for (in)appropriate practices where enforceable 'hard law' is missing \r (Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen et al. 2018; Gajevic Sayegh 2020), they \r can also form the basis of voluntary guidelines or niche markets \r (Box 12.3) However, the ability to apply participatory processes for \r developing voluntary guidelines and other participatory norm-setting \r endeavours varies from place to place. Social and cultural norms \r shape the ability of women, youth, and different ethnic groups to \r participate in governance fora, such as those around agroecological \r [...]"


id: 3fd726239dc4dd1da430e4c90faf82af
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8426
content:
"[...] transformation (Anderson et al. 2019). Furthermore, establishing \r new norms alone does not solve structural challenges such as lack \r of access to food, nor does it confront power imbalances, or provide \r mechanisms to deal with uncooperative actors (Morrison et al. 2019)."


id: 1b21214038a16bbcbe19259ee8c7034
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1968
content:
"Developing new bio-based solutions while mitigating overall biomass demand growth\r Many existing bio-based products have significant mitigation potential. Increased use of wood in buildings can reduce GHG emissions \r from cement and steel production while providing carbon storage (Churkina et al. 2020). Substitution of fossil fuels with biomass in \r manufacture of cement and steel can reduce GHG emissions where these materials are difficult to replace. Dispatchable power based \r on biomass can provide power stability and quality as the contribution from solar and wind power increases (AR6 WGIII Chapter 6), \r and biofuels can contribute to reducing fossil fuel emissions in the transport and industry sectors (AR6 WGIII Chapters 10 and 11). \r The use of bio-based plastics, chemicals and packaging could be increased, and biorefineries can achieve high resource-use efficiency \r [...]"


id: c0868b858a3838ecf800dc909a8d97e0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31169
content:
"[...] in converting biomass into food, feed, fuels and other bio-based products (Aristizabal-Marulanda and Cardona Alzate 2019; Schmidt \r et al. 2019). There is also scope for substituting existing bio-based products with more benign products. For example, cellulose-based \r textiles can replace cotton, which requires large amounts of water, chemical fertilisers and pesticides to ensure high yields."


id: 31e97cd8127177d6e64d85916108c8cd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6035
content:
"While increasing and diversified use of biomass can reduce the need for fossil fuels and other GHG-intensive products, unfavourable \r GHG balances may limit the mitigation value. Growth in biomass use may in the longer term also be constrained by the need to protect \r biodiversity and ecosystems' capacity to support essential ecosystem services. Biomass use may also be constrained by water scarcity \r and other resource scarcities, and/or challenges related to public perception and acceptance due to impacts caused by biomass \r production and use. Energy conservation and efficiency measures and deployment of technologies and systems that do not rely on \r carbon, such as carbon-free electricity supporting, inter alia, electrification of transport as well as industry processes and residential \r heating (IPCC 2018; UNEP 2019), can constrain the growth in biomass demand when countries seek to phase out fossil fuels and \r [...]"


id: e330e0d44091149a13ff48bcf564835a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37271
content:
"[...] other GHG-intensive products while providing an acceptable standard of living. Nevertheless, demand for bio-based products may \r become high where full decoupling from carbon is difficult to achieve (e.g., aviation, bio-based plastics and chemicals) or where \r carbon storage is an associated benefit (e.g., wood buildings, BECCS, biochar for soil amendments), leading to challenging trade-offs \r (e.g., food security, biodiversity) that need to be managed in environmentally sustainable and socially just ways."


id: b043ae5fd7a106aadd29a1fbe4124a9f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28248
content:
"Circular economy approaches (AR6 WGIII Section 12.6) are commonly depicted by two cycles, where the biological cycle focuses on \r regeneration in the biosphere and the technical cycle focuses on reuse, refurbishment and recycling to maintain value and maximise \r material recovery (Mayer et al. 2019a). Biogenic carbon flows and resources are part of the biological carbon cycle, but carbon-based \r products can be included in, and affect, both the biological and the technical carbon cycles (Kirchherr et al. 2017; Winans et al. 2017; \r Velenturf et al. 2019). The integration of circular economy and bioeconomy principles has been discussed in relation to organic waste \r management (Teigiserova et al. 2020), societal transition and policy development (European Commission 2018; Bugge et al. 2019) \r as well as COVID-19 recovery strategies (Palahi et al. 2020). To maintain the natural resource base, circular bioeconomy emphasises \r [...]"


id: 29ca4be86d4fd2bde232f7aa2da73911
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4578
content:
"[...] sustainable land use and the return of biomass and nutrients to the biosphere when it leaves the technical cycle."


id: a699b070d633de476875b486894d2f06
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26525
content:
"Agroecological approaches can be integrated into a wide range of land management practices to support a sustainable bioeconomy \r and address equity considerations (HLPE 2019). Relevant land-use practices, such as agroforestry, intercropping, organic amendments, \r cover crops and rotational grazing, can provide mitigation and support adaption to climate change via food security, livelihoods, \r biodiversity and health co-benefits (Ponisio et al. 2015; Garibaldi et al. 2016; D'Annolfo et al. 2017; Bezner Kerr et al. 2019; Clark \r et al. 2019b; Cordova et al. 2019; HLPE 2019; Mbow et al. 2019; Renard and Tilman 2019; Sinclair et al. 2019; Bharucha et al. 2020; \r Bezner Kerr et al. 2021) (AR6 WGII Cross-Chapter Box NATURAL). Strategic integration of appropriate biomass production systems \r into agricultural landscapes can provide biomass for bioenergy and other bio-based products while providing co-benefits such as \r [...]"


id: b683fbf4f627d0134ab8e3aa9f211c7d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29319
content:
"[...] enhanced landscape diversity, habitat quality, retention of nutrients and sediment, erosion control, climate regulation, flood regulation, \r pollination and biological pest and disease control (Christen and Dalgaard 2013; Asbjornsen et al. 2014; Holland et al. 2015; Ssegane \r et al. 2015; Dauber and Miyake 2016; Milner et al. 2016; Ssegane and Negri 2016; Styles et al. 2016; Zumpf et al. 2017; Cacho et al. \r 2018; Alam and Dwivedi 2019; Cubins et al. 2019; HLPE 2019; Olsson et al. 2019; Zalesny et al. 2019; Englund et al. 2020) (AR6 WGIII \r Box 12.3). Such approaches can help limit environmental impacts from intensive agriculture while maintaining or increasing land \r productivity and biomass output."


id: 7ee840928d8fcd819dc1a222ae1cabdf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19481
content:
"Transitions from conventional to new biomass production and conversion systems include challenges related to cross-sector \r integration and limited experience with new crops and land use practices, including needs for specialised equipment (Thornton and \r Herrero 2015; HLPE 2019) (AR6 WGII Section 5.10). Introduction of agroecological approaches and integrated biomass/food crop \r production can result in lower food crop yields per hectare, particularly during transition phases, potentially causing indirect landuse \r change, but can also support higher and more stable yields, reduce costs, and increase profitability under climate change (Muller et al. \r 2017; Seufert and Ramakutty 2017; Barbieri et al. 2019; HLPE 2019; Sinclair et al. 2019; Smith et al. 2019a; Smith et al. 2020). Crop \r diversification, organic amendments, and biological pest control (HLPE 2019) can reduce input costs and risks of occupational pesticide \r [...]"


id: 72784bdcfcea61354f8bb5b3b272b468
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17376
content:
"[...] exposure and food and water contamination (Gonzalez-Alzaga et al. 2014; EFSA 2017; Mie et al. 2017), reduce farmers' vulnerability \r to climate change (e.g., droughts and spread of pests and diseases affecting plant and animal health) (Delcour et al. 2015; FAO 2020) \r and enhance provisioning and sustaining ecosystem services, such as pollination (D'Annolfo et al. 2017; Sinclair et al. 2019)."


id: 56b02d56912dbe038a9637e29c5ada6a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12504
content:
"Barriers toward wider implementation include absence of policies that compensate land owners for providing enhanced ecosystem \r services and other environmental benefits, which can help overcome short-term losses during the transition from conventional practices \r before longer-term benefits can accrue. Other barriers include limited access to markets, knowledge gaps, financial, technological or \r labour constraints, lack of extension support and insecure land tenure (Jacobi et al. 2017; Kongsager 2017; Hernandez-Morcillo et al. \r 2018; Iiyama et al. 2018; HLPE 2019). Regional-level agroecology transitions may be facilitated by co-learning platforms, farmer \r networks, private sector, civil society groups, regional and local administration and other incentive structures (e.g., price premiums, \r access to credit, regulation) (Coe et al. 2014; Perez-Marin et al. 2017; Mier y Teran Gimenez Cacho et al. 2018; HLPE 2019; Valencia \r [...]"


id: 3daed0a809c93a55e776905af5fee11d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8021
content:
"[...] et al. 2019; SAEPEA 2020). With the right incentives, improvements can be made with regard to profitability, making alternatives more \r attractive to land owners."


id: 578e66f1f4e868514494c2ab03ef106e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12669
content:
"Literature analysing the synergies and trade-offs between competing demands for land suggest that solutions are highly contextualised \r in terms of their environmental, socio-economic and governance-related characteristics, making it difficult to devise generic solutions \r (Haasnoot et al. 2020). Aspects of spatial and temporal scale can further enhance the complexity, for instance where transboundary \r effects across jurisdictions or upstream-downstream characteristics need to be considered, or where climate change trajectories might \r alter relevant biogeophysical dynamics (Postigo and Young 2021). Nonetheless, there is broad agreement that taking the needs and \r perspectives of multiple stakeholders into account in a transparent process during negotiations improves the chances of achieving \r outcomes that maximise synergies while limiting trade-offs (Ariti et al. 2018; Metternicht 2018; Favretto et al. 2020; Kopacek 2021; \r [...]"


id: b7872de94d94b546c7b5d25efd0e8b95
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29496
content:
"[...] Muscat et al. 2021). Yet differences in agency and power between stakeholders or anticipated changes in access to or control of \r resources can undermine negotiation results even if there is a common understanding of the overarching benefits of more integrated \r environmental agreements and the need for greater coordination and cooperation to avoid longer-term losses to all (Aarts and \r Leeuwis 2010; Weitz et al. 2017). There is also the risk that strong local participatory processes can become disconnected from broader \r national plans, and thus fail to support the achievement of national targets. Thus, connection between levels is needed to ensure that \r ambition for transformative change is not derailed at local level (Aarts and Leeuwis 2010; Postigo and Young 2021)."


id: 36ab2b9ac0c3728fff83b80a5fc62071
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6849
content:
"International trade in the global economy today provides important opportunities to connect producers and consumers, effectively \r buffering price volatilities and potentially offering producer countries access to global markets, which can be seen as an effective \r adaptation measure (Baldos and Hertel 2015; Costinot et al. 2016; Hertel and Baldos 2016; Gouel and Laborde 2021) (AR6 WGII \r Section 5.11). But there is also clear evidence that international trade and the global economy can enhance price volatility, lead \r to food price spikes and affect food security due to climate and other shocks, as seen recently due to the COVID-19 pandemic \r (Cottrell et al. 2019; WFP-FSIN 2020; Verschuur et al. 2021) (AR6 WGII Section 5.12). The continued strong demand for food and \r other bio-based products, mainly from high- and middle-income countries, therefore requires better cooperation between nations \r [...]"


id: 5731803f85c07b3b3b66db4e529bdfc3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12592
content:
"[...] and global governance of trade to more accurately reflect and disincentivise their environmental and social externalities. Trade in \r agricultural and extractive products driving land-use change in tropical forest and savanna biomes is of major concern because of \r the biodiversity impacts and GHG emissions incurred in their provision (Hosonuma et al. 2012; Forest Trends 2014; Smith et al. 2014; \r Henders et al. 2015; Curtis et al. 2018; Pendrill et al. 2019; Seymour and Harris 2019; Kissinger et al. 2021) (AR6 WGII Tropical Forests \r Cross-Chapter Paper)."


id: cb88ffc309a2e1cdc171315110445021
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33138
content:
"A number of mitigation measures find application in more than \r one sector. Renewable energy technologies such as solar and wind \r may be used for grid electricity supply, as embedded generation in \r the buildings sector and for energy supply in the agriculture sector \r (Shahsavari and Akbari 2018) (Chapters 6, 7 and 8). Hydrogen and \r fuel cells, coupled with low-carbon energy technologies for producing \r the hydrogen, are being explored in transport, urban heat, industry \r and for balancing electricity supply (Dodds et al. 2015; Staffell et al. \r 2019) (Chapters  6, 8  and 11). Electric vehicles are considered an \r option for balancing variable power (Kempton and Tomic 2005; Liu \r and Zhong 2019). Carbon capture and storage (CCS) and carbon \r capture and utilisation (CCU) have potential application in a number \r of industrial processes (cement, iron and steel, petroleum refining \r and pulp and paper) (Leeson et al. 2017; Garcia and Berghout 2019) \r [...]"


id: 63c273ed7411e23611737455b3d91682
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14843
content:
"[...] (Chapters 6 and 11) and the fossil fuel electricity sector (Chapter 6). \r When coupled with energy recovery from biomass, CCS can provide \r a carbon sink (BECCS) (Section 12.5). On the demand side, energy \r efficiency options find application across the sectors (Chapters  6, \r 8, 9, 10, and 11), as do reducing demand for goods and services \r (Chapter 5) and improving material efficiency (Section 11.3.2)."


id: 4f30c7b1446a891ba45bc0dab17ec332
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11220
content:
"At the same time, saving electricity in all sectors reduces the demand \r for electricity, thereby reducing mitigation potential of renewables and \r CCS.  Demand-side flexibility measures and electrification of vehicle \r fleets are supportive of more intermittent renewable energy supply \r options (Sections 6.3.7, 6.4.3.1 and 10.3.4). Production of maize, wheat, \r rice and fresh produce requires lower energy inputs on a lifecycle basis \r than poultry, pork and ruminant-based meats (Clark and Tilman 2017) \r (Section 12.4). It also requires less land area per kilocalorie or protein \r output (Clark and Tilman 2017; Poore and Nemecek 2018), so replacing \r meat with these products makes land available for sequestration, \r biodiversity or other societal needs. However, production of co-products \r of the meat industry, such as leather and wool, is reduced, resulting \r [...]"


id: b8e4d9e3e32f40d1d55aea22549d884d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29733
content:
"[...] in a need for substitutes. Further discussion and examples of cross\u0002sectoral implications of mitigation, with respect to cost and potentials, \r are presented in Section 12.2. One final example on this topic included \r here is that of circular economy (Box 12.4)."


id: 3468cc2e4bdb653b9288e7caed63ada8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6458
content:
"A range of examples where mitigation measures result in cross\u0002sectoral interactions and integration is identified. The mitigation \r potential of electric vehicles, including plug-in hybrids, is linked to \r the extent of decarbonisation of the electricity grid, as well as to the \r liquid fuel supply emissions profile (Lutsey 2015). Making buildings \r energy positive, where excess energy is used to charge vehicles, can \r increase the potential of electric and hybrid vehicles (Zhou et al. \r 2019). Advanced process control and process optimisation in industry \r can reduce energy demand and material inputs (Section 11.3), which \r in turn can reduce emissions linked to resource extraction and \r manufacturing. Reductions in coal-fired power generation through \r replacement with renewables or nuclear power result in a reduction \r in coal mining and its associated emissions. Increased recycling \r results in a reduction in emissions from primary resource extraction. \r [...]"


id: 97a06ad747f0a38e057d6f57f46a8a24
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23894
content:
"[...] CCU can contribute to the transition to more renewable energy \r systems via power-to-X technologies, which enables the production \r of CO2-based fuels/e-fuels and chemicals using carbon dioxide and "


id: f3e7832861c602e2e64e546439636cc7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40288
content:
"Finally, in terms of competition among sectors for scarce resources, \r this issue is often considered in the assessments of mitigation \r potentials linked to bioenergy and diets (vegetable vs animal food \r products), land use and water (robust evidence, high agreement) \r (Section 12.5 and Cross-Working Group Box 3 in this Chapter). It is, \r however, also relevant elsewhere. Constraints have been identified \r in the supply of indium, tellurium, silver, lithium, nickel and platinum \r that are required for implementation of some specific renewable \r energy technologies (Watari et al. 2018; Moreau et al. 2019). Other \r studies have shown constraints in supply of cobalt, one of the key \r elements used in production of lithium-ion batteries, which has been \r assessed for mitigation potential in energy, transport and buildings \r sectors (medium evidence, high agreement) (Jaffe 2017; Olivetti et al. \r 2017), although alternatives to cobalt are being developed (Olivetti \r [...]"


id: d51cc2caaa8c0804c380d6bb34fe7515
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34817
content:
"Circular economy approaches consider the entire lifecycle of goods and services, and seek to design out waste and pollution, keep \r products and materials in use, and regenerate natural systems (The Ellen MacArthur Foundation 2013; CIRAIG 2015). The use of \r circular economy for rethinking how society's needs for goods and services is delivered in such a way as to minimise resource use \r and environmental impact and maximise societal benefit has been discussed elsewhere in this assessment report (Chapter 5 and \r Section 5.3.4). A wide range of potential application areas is identified, from food systems to bio-based products to plastics to metals \r and minerals to manufactured goods. Circular economy approaches are implicitly cross-sectoral, impacting the energy, industrial, \r AFOLU, waste and other sectors. They will have climate and non-climate co-benefits and trade-offs. The scientific literature mainly \r [...]"


id: 992777d8a35c0a5b9b4651721983e27
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24157
content:
"[...] investigates incremental measures claiming but not demonstrating mitigation; highest mitigation potential is found in the industry, \r energy, and transport sectors; mid-range potential in the waste and building sectors; and lowest mitigation gains in agriculture \r (Cantzler et al. 2020). Circular economy thinking has been identified to support increased resilience to the physical effects of climate \r change and contribute to meeting other SDGs, notably SDG  12 (responsible consumption and production) (The Ellen MacArthur \r Foundation 2019)."


id: 83766de2de9ebebccc008b91410500f8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20264
content:
"Circular economy approaches to deployment of low-carbon infrastructure have been suggested to be important to optimise resource\r use and mitigate environmental and societal impacts caused by extraction and manufacturing of composite and critical materials \r as well as infrastructure decommissioning (Jensen and Skelton 2018; Sica et al. 2018; Salim et al. 2019; Watari et al. 2019; Jensen \r et al. 2020; Mignacca et al. 2020). The circular carbon economy is an approach inspired by the circular economy principles that rely \r on a  combination of technologies, including CCU, CCS and CDR, to enable transition pathways especially relevant in economies \r dependent on fossil fuel exports (Lee et al. 2017; Alshammari 2020; Morrow and Thompson 2020; Zakkour et al. 2020). The integration \r of circular economy and bioeconomy principles (Cross-Working Group Box 3 in this chapter) is conceptualised in relation to policy \r [...]"


id: b241c9e8e39cf8582bfa0b763a2c7707
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28596
content:
"[...] development (European Commission 2018) as well as COVID-19 recovery strategies (Palahi et al. 2020), emphasising the use of \r renewable energy sources and sustainable management of ecosystems with transformation of biological resources into food, feed, \r energy and biomaterials."


id: 1b7f6fa0c837fd78b716f1af565aa58
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2024
content:
"Interest in hydrogen as an intermediary energy carrier has grown rapidly in the years since the 5th Assessment Report of WGIII (AR5) \r was published. This is reflected in this WGIII assessment report, where the term 'hydrogen' is used more than five times more often than \r in AR5. In Chapter 6 of this report, it is shown that hydrogen can be produced with low carbon impact from fossil fuels (Section 6.4.2.6), \r renewable electricity and nuclear energy (Section 6.4.5.1), or biomass (Section 6.4.2.5). In the energy sector, hydrogen is one of the \r options for storage of energy in low-carbon electricity systems (Sections 6.4.4.1 and 6.6.2.2). But, also importantly, hydrogen can be \r produced to be used as a fuel for sectors that are hard to decarbonise; this is possible directly in the form of hydrogen, but also in \r the form of ammonia or other energy carriers (Section 6.4.5.1). In the transport sector, fuel cell engines (Section 10.3.3) running on \r [...]"


id: 5af76880a21b9843b183e83f2d5d5aee
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13255
content:
"[...] hydrogen can become important, especially for heavy duty vehicles (Section 10.4.3). In the industry sector hydrogen already plays an \r important role in the chemical sector (for ammonia and methanol production) (Box 11.1 in Chapter 11) and in the fuel sector (in oil \r refinery processes and for biofuel production) (IEA 2019b). Beyond the production of ammonia and methanol for both established \r and novel applications, the largest potential industrial application for low-carbon hydrogen is seen in steel-making (Section 11.4.1.1). \r Hydrogen and hydrogen derivatives can play a further role as substitute energy carriers (Section 11.3.5) and for the production of \r intermediate chemical products such as methanol, ethanol and ethylene when combined with CCU (Section 11.3.6). For the building \r sector, the exploration of the usefulness of hydrogen is at an early stage (Box 9.4)."


id: 24aca31769596563f6bb5ad6e515b5db
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3646
content:
"An overview report (IEA 2019b) already sees opportunities in 2030 for buildings, road freight and passenger vehicles. This report also \r suggests a high potential application in iron and steel production, aviation and maritime transport, and for electricity storage. Several \r industry roadmaps have been published that map out a possible role for hydrogen until 2050. The most well known and ambitious \r is the roadmap by the Hydrogen Council (2017), which sketches a global scenario leading to 78 EJ hydrogen use in 2050, mainly for \r transport, industrial feedstock, industrial energy and to a lesser extent for buildings and power generation. Hydrogen makes up 18% of \r total final energy use in this vision. An analysis by IRENA on hydrogen from renewable sources comes to a substantially lower number: \r 8 EJ (excluding hydrogen use in power production and feedstock uses). On a regional level, most roadmaps and scenarios have been \r [...]"


id: e38519d969b4e82cef91a9cc17961250
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37321
content:
"[...] published for the European Union, for example by the Fuel Cell and Hydrogen Joint Undertaking (Blanco et al. 2018; EC 2018; FCH \r 2019; Navigant 2019). All these reports have scenario variants with hydrogen share in final energy use of 10% to over 20% by 2050."


id: d5c0c7c45c31ac1f27c775ddc0f74dd3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34918
content:
"As already reported in Chapter 6 (Section 6.2.4.1), production costs of green hydrogen are expected to come down from the current \r levels of above USD100 MWh-1. Price expectations are: EUR40-60 MWh-1 for both green and blue hydrogen production in the EU \r by 2050 (Navigant 2019) with production costs already being lower in North Africa; 42-87 USD MWh-1 for green hydrogen in 2030 \r and 20-41 USD MWh-1 in 2050 (BNEF 2020); EUR75 MWh-1 in 2030 (Glenk and Reichelstein 2019). For fossil-based technologies \r combined with CCS, prices may range from USD33-80 MWh-1 (Table 6.8). Such prices can make hydrogen competitive for industrial \r feedstock applications, and probably for several transportation modes in combination with fuel cells, but without further incentives, not \r necessarily for stationary applications in the coming decades: wholesale natural gas prices are expected to range from USD7-31 MWh-1\r [...]"


id: e4a6eea0c0c606e926e618dba2943274
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37511
content:
"[...] across regions and scenarios, according to the World Energy Outlook (IEA 2020a); coal prices mostly are even lower than natural gas \r prices (all fossil fuel prices refer to unabated technology and untaxed fuels). The evaluation of macro-economic impacts is relatively \r rare. A study by Mayer et al. (2019b) indicated that a shift to hydrogen in iron and steel production would lead to regional GDP losses \r in the range of 0.4-2.7% in 2050 across EU+3, with some regions making gains under a low-cost electricity scenario."


id: 4e6de9e2aaba6925d2a3b854b260c482
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11076
content:
"The consequences  of large-scale land-based mitigation  for food \r security, biodiversity (Dasgupta 2021), the state of soil, water \r resources, and so on can be significant, depending on many factors, \r such as economic development (including distributional aspects), \r international trade patterns, agronomic development, diets, land\u0002use governance and policy design, and not least climate change \r itself  (Winchester and Reilly 2015; Fujimori et al. 2018; Hasegawa \r et al. 2018; Van Meijl et al. 2018). Policies and regulations that address \r other aspects apart from climate change can indirectly influence the \r attractiveness of land-based mitigation options. For example, farmers \r may find it attractive to shift from annual food/feed crops to perennial \r grasses and short rotation woody crops (suitable for bioenergy) if \r the previous land uses become increasingly restricted due to impacts \r on groundwater quality and eutrophication of water bodies (robust \r [...]"


id: fd6696401918696a4a21851ddea67ed8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41935
content:
"Cross-sectoral effects of carbon leakage also occur through the \r multiplier effect, when the mitigation policy in any sector in country \r A leads to the increase of relative competitiveness and therefore \r production of the same sector in country B, which automatically \r leads to the expansion of economic activity in other sectors of \r country B. This expansion may in turn lead to the rise of production \r and emissions in country A as a result of feedback effects. These \r spillovers should be taken into consideration while designing \r climate policy, along with potential synergies that may appear due \r to joint efforts. However, the scale of these effects with regards \r to leakage should not be overestimated. Even for intrasectoral \r leakage, many ex ante modelling studies generally suggest limited \r carbon leakage rates (Chapter 13). Intersectoral leakage should be \r even less significant. Interregional spillover and feedback effects \r [...]"


id: 4a0e3e25f0c72c975f5839b22cb0994e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10268
content:
"[...] are well studied in China (Zhang 2017; Ning et al. 2019). Even \r within a  single country, interregional spillover effects are much \r lower than intraregional effects, and feedback effects are even less \r intense. Cross-sectoral spillovers across national borders as a result \r of mitigation policy should be even smaller, although these are less \r well studied. In future, if the differences in carbon price between \r regions increase, leakage through cross-sectoral multipliers may \r play a more important role."


id: a6d87b3fac09028814c9fd7702df3a42
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26566
content:
"conflicting social, developmental and environmental policy goals at \r the sectoral level. True measures of mitigation policy impacts  and \r hence plans for resource mobilisation that properly address costs \r and benefits  cannot be developed  in isolation from their  cross\u0002sectoral  implications.  Unaddressed cross-sectoral coordination and \r interdependency issues are identified as major constraints in raising \r the necessary financial resources for mitigation in a  number of \r countries (Bazilian et al. 2011; Welsch et al. 2014; Hoff et al. 2019a).\r Integrated financial solutions to leverage synergies between sectors, \r as opposed to purely sector-based financing, at international, \r national,  and local levels are needed to scale  up  GHG mitigation \r potentials.  At the international level,  finance from multilateral \r development banks (MDBs) is a  major source of  GHG  mitigation \r finance in developing countries (medium evidence, medium \r [...]"


id: de3a8baeb1406fe2cb43864d7bab5b3e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36358
content:
"[...] agreement) (World Bank Group 2015; Ha et al. 2016; Bhattacharya \r et al. 2016; Bhattacharya et al. 2018). In 2018, MDBs reported a total \r of USD30.165 billion in financial commitments to climate change \r mitigation, with 71%  of total mitigation finance being committed \r through investment loans and the rest in the form of equity, guarantees, \r and other instruments.  GHG  reduction activities eligible for MDB \r finance are limited to those compatible with low-emission pathways \r recognising the importance of long-term structural changes, such as \r the shift in energy production to low-carbon energy technologies \r and the modal shift to low-carbon modes of transport leveraging \r both greenfield and energy efficiency projects. Sector-wise, the \r MDBs' mitigation finance for 2018 is allocated to renewable energy \r (29%), transport (18%), energy efficiency (18%), lower-carbon and \r efficient energy generation (7%), agriculture, forestry and land use \r [...]"


id: 3ff5f45d0a8f30d0e61db36ceb660b96
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8444
content:
"[...] (8%), waste and wastewater (8%), and other sectors (12%) (MDB \r 2019). Unfortunately, due to institutional and incentives issues, MDB \r finance has mostly focused on sectoral solutions and has not been able \r to properly leverage cross-sectoral synergies. At the national level, \r applied research has shown that integrated modelling of land, energy \r and water resources not only has the potential to identify superior \r solutions, but also reveals important differences in terms of investment \r requirements and  required financing arrangements  compared \r to  the  traditional sectoral  financing  toolkits  (Welsch et al. \r 2014). Agriculture, forestry, nature-based solutions and other forms \r of land use are promising sectors for leveraging financing solutions \r to scale up  GHG  mitigation efforts (Section  15.4).  Moving to \r more productive and resilient forms of land use is a  complex \r task, given the cross-cutting nature of land use, which necessarily \r [...]"


id: ce174f28250bf95328ece6a7b7977610
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33586
content:
"[...] results in apparent trade-offs between mitigation, adaptation, and \r development objectives. Finance is one area to manage these trade\u0002offs where there may be opportunities to redirect the hundreds \r of billions spent annually on land use around the world towards \r green activities, without sacrificing either productivity or economic \r development  (Falconer et al. 2015).  Nonetheless,  that  would \r require active public support in  design of land-use mitigation and \r adaptation strategies, coordination between public and private \r instruments across land use sectors, and leveraging of  policy  and \r financial instruments to redirect finance toward greener land-use \r practices  (limited evidence, medium agreement).  For example,  the \r Welsch et al. (2014) study on Mauritius shows that the promotion \r of a  local biofuel industry from sugar cane could be economically \r favourable in the absence of water constraints, leading to a reduction "


id: 230fe7fefed6ef6338f91592d8a5dacb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3363
content:
"Availability and access to finance are among the major barriers to \r GHG emissions mitigation across various sectors and technology \r options  (robust evidence, high agreement).  Resource maturity \r mismatches and risk exposure are two main factors limiting ability \r of commercial banks and other private lenders to contribute to \r green finance  (Mazzucato and Semieniuk 2018).  At all levels, \r mobilising the necessary resources  to leverage cross-sectoral \r mitigation synergies  would  require the combination of public and \r private financial sources (Jensen and Dowlatabadi 2018). Traditional \r public financing would be  required to synergise mitigation across \r sectors  where the risk-return and time profiles of investment are \r not sufficiently attractive for the business sector.  Over the years, \r private development financing through public-private partnerships \r and other related variants has been  a growing source of finance \r [...]"


id: a50b997c709509378daccb5753a07bc6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26258
content:
"[...] to leverage cross-sectoral  synergies and manage trade-offs \r (Anbumozhi and Timilsina 2018; Attridge and Engen 2019; Ishiwatari \r et al. 2019). Promoting such blended approaches to finance along \r with result-based financing architectures to strengthen delivery \r institutions are advocated as effective means to mainstream cross\u0002sectoral mitigation finance (limited evidence, high agreement)\r (Attridge and Engen 2019; Ishiwatari et al. 2019). The World Bank \r group and the International Financial Corporation have  used \r the blended  finance results-based approach  to climate financing \r that addresses institutional, infrastructure, and service needs \r across sectors targeting  developing  countries and marginalised \r communities (GPRBA 2019; IDA 2019)."


id: 71a1e9c69ae66f519342b8e7ba865e31
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17240
content:
"Alaa Al Khourdajie (United Kingdom/Syria), Almut Arneth (Germany), Ines M.L.  Azevedo \r (Portugal/the United States of America), Christopher Bataille (Canada), David Beerling \r (United  Kingdom), Rachel  Bezner Kerr (the United States of America), Jessie Bradley \r (the  Netherlands), Holly  Jean  Buck (the United States of America), Luisa F.  Cabeza \r (Spain), Katherine Calvin (the  United States of America), Donovan Campbell (Jamaica), \r Jofre  Carnicer Cols (Spain), Vassilis  Daioglou (Greece), Mathijs  Harmsen (the Netherlands), \r Lena  Hoglund-Isaksson (Sweden), Joanna I.  House (United  Kingdom), David Keller (Germany/\r the United States of America), Kiane de Kleijne (the Netherlands), Susanna Kugelberg (Sweden), \r Igor Makarov (the Russian Federation), Francisco Meza (Chile), Jan Christoph Minx (Germany), \r Michael  Morecroft (United Kingdom), Gert-Jan  Nabuurs (the  Netherlands), Henry Neufeldt \r [...]"


id: be04b2f74c5b3c2fadfd9fe1cc8b00d9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30695
content:
"[...] (Denmark/Germany), Aleksandra Novikova (Germany), Sudarmanto Budi Nugroho (Indonesia), \r Andreas Oschlies (Germany), Camille Parmesan (United Kingdom/the United States of America), \r Glen  P.  Peters (Norway/Australia), Joseph  Poore (United Kingdom), Joana Portugal-Pereira \r (Brazil), Julio C. Postigo (the United States of America/Peru), Prajal Pradhan (Germany/Nepal), \r Phil Renforth (United  Kingdom), Marta  G.  Rivera-Ferre (Spain), Stephanie Roe (the United \r States of America/the Philippines), Pramod K. Singh (India), Raphael Slade (United Kingdom), \r Stephen M. Smith (United Kingdom), Maria Cristina Tirado von der Pahlen (the United States \r of America/Spain), Daniela Toribio Ramirez (Mexico)"


id: a327138004e2f6e626ce4d030d75cae
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25915
content:
"For onshore wind and utility solar energy, the mitigation costs \r end up in the negative cost bins, if we compare the full levelised \r cost of electricity (LCOE) of these technologies with the full LCOE \r of conventional power production. However, if solar and wind \r energy develop rapidly, they will not necessarily replace existing \r capacity, but rather just avoid the fuel and other operational costs \r of existing power plants. Taking that into account, the mitigation \r costs will become higher. In many cases negative costs still occur, \r but also costs in the ranges of 0 to 50 USD tCO2-eq-1 (for wind) \r and 0 to 100 USD tCO2-eq-1 (for solar) occur. This full range of cost \r bins is used, noting that the majority of the potential will be in the \r negative cost bin. The latter is also confirmed by the analysis of the \r historic development of electricity production costs in Chapter  6 \r (Figure SPM.5). Offshore wind currently is more expensive, but also \r [...]"


id: e2597e46c9d6f7a6a1b161e46e88567c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37114
content:
"[...] here negative costs are expected by 2030. For nuclear energy, costs \r can vary widely, largely region-dependent, the cases end up in the \r cost bins ranging from negative to over 100 USD tCO2-eq-1. For \r bioenergy, carbon capture and storage and bioenergy combined with \r carbon capture and storage (BECCS), mitigation costs virtually all end \r up in the range of 50 to 200 USD tCO2-eq-1. For hydropower and \r geothermal, energy costs in the range of 0 to 100 USD tCO2-eq-1 are \r assumed. It should be stressed that costs vary widely depending on "


id: 3f4fe29eb1fef49178527d582b03872d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8330
content:
"Data for the technical options for passenger cars were taken from ICCT1\r (2019). The authors explore the potential of rapid further fuel economy \r technologies (50% reduction in per kilometre CO2 emissions for new \r passenger vehicles in 2030 compared to 2005) and fast adoption of \r electric vehicles (35% of sales in 2030). This share in new vehicle sales is \r comparable with what is assumed in Chapter 10 (30%) and estimated \r in BNEF (2021). For heavy duty trucks the reduction in per kilometre \r CO2 emissions for new vehicles is 35% in 2035 compared to 2005, \r and the share of electric vehicles sales is 19% in 2030. The emissions \r reduction in freight transport is comparable to the potential calculated \r in IEA (2020b). According to ICCT (2019) the fuel economy measures \r are cost effective, that is, negative costs per tonne of CO2 avoided. \r Electric light duty vehicles currently still are often more expensive over \r [...]"


id: c9b6200b99d32e0f3c5f9da20f8fdfd3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32813
content:
"[...] the lifetime than vehicles with internal combustion engines. Costs of \r batteries are falling rapidly (Section 2.5.3) and it is expected that price \r parity with conventional vehicles is reached in the late 2020s (BNEF, \r 2021), meaning that lifecycle benefits will already exceed costs prior to \r that date. This means that mitigation costs will be highly variable until \r 2030, so no mitigation costs could be assigned to this technology. The \r same is valid for electric heavy duty vehicles."


id: 85486502fce783959a455e3662283bec
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20588
content:
"The following tables include the line of sight on which the feasibility \r assessment of the carbon dioxide removal methods (direct air \r carbon capture and storage (DACCS), enhanced weathering (EW), \r ocean fertilisation and 'blue carbon') was based, presented in \r Section  12.3.1.4, Figure  12.4. The identification of barriers and \r enablers of the deployment of these carbon dioxide removal \r methods is organised according to six dimensions of feasibility, \r each comprised of a number of indicators (Annex II.12): geophysical \r feasibility (Table  12.SM.2.1), environmental-ecological feasibility \r (Table  12.SM.2.2), technological feasibility (Table  12.SM.2.3), \r economic feasibility (Table  12.SM.2.4), socio-cultural feasibility \r (Table 12.SM.2.5) and institutional feasibility (Table 12.SM.2.6). The \r tables also provide an overview of the factors affecting the feasibility \r of DACCS, EW, ocean fertilisation and 'blue carbon' and how they \r [...]"


id: 8ca750d1d81cca647ef97a01241d84ea
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21932
content:
"[...] differ across context (e.g.,  region), time (e.g.,  2030 versus 2050), \r and scale (e.g.,  small versus large). See Section  6.4, Annex II.11 \r and Annex II.12 for the full methodology adopted for assessing the \r feasibility of mitigation response options, including the descriptions \r of the indicators. For ease of reference note that the level of \r evidence is denoted as LE to mean \"Limited Evidence\", NE to mean \r \"No Evidence\", and NA to mean \"Not Applicable\"."


id: 2c0506b35abe30edf854c14586cf492c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4996
content:
"Marianne Aasen (Norway), Igor Bashmakov (the Russian Federation), Paolo  Bertoldi (Italy), \r Parth Bhatia (India), Maxwell Boykoff (the United States of America), Jessica Britton (United \r Kingdom), Sarah Burch (Canada), Charlotte Burns (United Kingdom), Mercedes Bustamante \r (Brazil), Vanesa Castan Broto (United Kingdom/Spain), Basia Cieszewska (Poland/United \r Kingdom), Michael Craig (the United States of America), Stephane de la Rue du Can (the United \r States of America), Manfred Fischedick (Germany), Dana R. Fisher (the United States of America), \r Amit Garg (India), Oliver Geden (Germany), Robert Germeshausen (Germany), Niklas  Hohne \r (Germany), Angel Hsu (the United States of America/Singapore), Gabriela Iacobuta (Germany), \r Sebastien Jodoin (Canada), Siir Kilkis (Turkey), Susanna Kugelberg (Sweden), Matthew Lockwood \r (United Kingdom), Andreas Loschel (Germany), Cheikh Mbow (Senegal), Brendan Moore \r [...]"


id: 2bed3ddcefbb71b61db09a58ac4d06aa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4979
content:
"[...] (the United States of America/United Kingdom), Yacob Mulugetta (Ethiopia/United Kingdom), \r Gert-Jan Nabuurs (the Netherlands), Vinnet Ndlovu (Zimbabwe/Australia), Gregory  F.  Nemet \r (the  United States of America/Canada), Peter Newman (Australia), Lars  J.  Nilsson (Sweden), \r Karachepone N. Ninan (India), Grzegorz Peszko (Poland/the United States of America), Marina \r Povitkina (Sweden), Wang Pu (China), Simone Pulver (the United States of America), Karoline \r Rogge (Germany/United Kingdom), Joana Setzer (Brazil/United Kingdom), Jale Tosun (Germany)"


id: 1c60fe037de410ae74248568aef29967
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2183
content:
"Carbon pricing is effective in promoting implementation \r of low-cost emissions reductions (robust evidence, high \r agreement). While the coverage of emissions trading and carbon \r taxes has risen to over 20% of global CO2 emissions, both coverage \r and price are lower than is needed for deep reductions. The design of \r market mechanisms should be effective as well as efficient, balance \r distributional goals and find social acceptance. Practical experience \r has driven progress in market mechanism design, especially of \r emissions trading schemes (robust evidence, high agreement). \r Carbon pricing is limited in its effect on adoption of higher-cost \r mitigation options, and where decisions are often not sensitive to \r price incentives such as in energy efficiency, urban planning, and \r infrastructure (robust evidence, medium agreement). Subsidies have \r been used to improve energy efficiency, encourage the uptake of \r [...]"


id: 8ac23d745ac23ad89285233ab7c6e95e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21586
content:
"[...] renewable energy and other sector-specific emissions saving options\r (robust evidence, high agreement). {13.6}"


id: 79ac51e61ca6e0fd0222a41a152311cc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18608
content:
"Regulatory instruments play an important role in achieving \r specific mitigation outcomes in sectoral applications (robust \r evidence, high agreement). Regulation is effective in particular \r applications and often enjoys greater political support, but tends to be \r more economically costly, than pricing instruments (robust evidence,\r medium agreement). Flexible forms of regulation (for example, \r performance standards) have achieved aggregate goals for renewable \r energy generation, vehicle efficiency and fuel standards, and energy \r efficiency in buildings and industry (robust evidence, high agreement). \r Infrastructure investment decisions are significant for mitigation \r because they lock-in high- or low- emissions trajectories over long \r periods. Information and voluntary programmes can contribute to \r overall mitigation outcomes (medium evidence, high agreement).\r Designing for overlap and interactions among mitigation policies \r [...]"


id: d9aeebd3e00bf85b3cbe819ccd41e994
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35593
content:
"This chapter assesses national and sub-national policies and \r institutions. Given the scale and scope of the climate challenge, \r an immediate challenge for this assessment is defining its scope. \r Because a  very wide range of institutions and policies at multiple \r scales carry implications for climate change, the approach followed \r here is to embrace a broad approach. Consequently, institutions and \r policies discussed include dedicated climate laws and organisations \r (Section  13.2) and direct mitigation policies such as carbon taxes \r (Section 13.6), but also those, such as sectoral ministries and their \r policies (Sections  13.6 and 13.7) and sub-national entities such \r as regional bodies, cities, and their policies (Section  13.5), the \r implications of which are salient to mitigation outcomes. This approach \r recognises that there are important linkages with international \r climate governance (Chapter 14), notably the role of internationally \r [...]"


id: 45e9ac0478d9eb0b3b24959d114e361f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9519
content:
"[...] mandated Nationally Determined Contributions' in stimulating \r domestic policy development (Section 13.2), transnational networks \r in spurring sub-national action (Section  13.5), and international \r effects of domestic policies (Section 13.6)."


id: 2b07223963e72be6b89a40203ad75f6c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4805
content:
"and Setzer 2018). Direct climate laws  - with greenhouse gas \r limitation as a direct objective - had been passed in 56 countries \r (of 194 studied) covering 53% of emissions in 2020, with most of \r that rise happening between 2010 and 2015 (Figure  13.1). Both \r direct and indirect laws - those that have an effect on mitigation \r even if this is not the primary outcome - is most closely captured by \r the 'Climate Change Laws of the World' database, which illustrates \r the same trend of growing prevalence, documenting 694 mitigation\u0002related laws by 2020 versus 558 in 2015 and 342 in 2010 (Nachmany \r and Setzer 2018; LSE Grantham Research Institute on Climate \r Change and the Environment 2021).1\r  Among these, the majority \r are accounted for by sectoral indirect laws. For example, a study of \r Commonwealth countries finds that a  majority of these countries \r have not taken the route of a single overarching law, but rather have \r [...]"


id: 43415aa6adae830598de34e9a679c915
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9045
content:
"[...] an array of laws across different areas, for example, Indian laws on \r energy efficiency and Ghana's laws on renewable energy promotion \r (Scotford et al. 2017)."


id: 9c6e67e546415663f1fd471d9f397f69
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24774
content:
"Some direct climate laws may serve as 'framework' laws \r (Averchenkova et al. 2017; Rumble 2019) that set an overarching \r legal context within which other legislation and policies operate. \r Framework laws are intended to provide a  coherent legal basis \r for action, to integrate past legislation in related areas, set clear \r directions for future policy, and create necessary processes and \r institutions (medium evidence, medium agreement) (Townshend \r et al. 2013; Averchenkova et al. 2017; Fankhauser et al. 2018; Rumble \r 2019; Averchenkova et al. 2021). There are a variety of approaches to \r framework laws. Reviews of climate legislation, many of which draw \r particularly from the long-standing UK Climate Change Act, suggest \r the need for statutory targets with a  long-term direction, shorter \r term instruments such as carbon budgets to induce action toward \r targets, a clear assignment of duties and responsibilities including \r [...]"


id: dedc271d4d7abf3c83d88aa85103f69
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36471
content:
"[...] identification of policies and responsibility for their implementation, \r annual reporting to Parliament; an independent body to support \r evidence-based decision-making and rules to govern information \r collection and provision (Barton and Campion 2018; Fankhauser \r et al. 2018; Abraham-Dukuma et al. 2020; Averchenkova et al. 2021). "


id: c4122d7d61742103b38244cf01c0d197
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
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vector_id: 31779
content:
"National laws that govern climate action often set the legal basis for \r climate action (Averchenkova et al. 2021). This legal basis can serve \r several functions: establish a platform for transparent target setting \r and implementation (Bennett 2018); provide a  signal to actors by \r indicating intent to harness state authority behind climate action \r (Scotford and Minas 2019); promise enhanced regulatory certainty \r (Scotford et al. 2017); create law-backed agencies for coordination, \r compliance and accountability (Scotford and Minas 2019); provide \r a  basis for mainstreaming mitigation into sector action, and \r create focal points for social mobilisation (medium evidence, high \r agreement) (Dubash et al. 2013). For lower/middle income countries, \r in particular, the existence of a  law may also attract international \r finance by serving as a signal of credibility (Fisher et al. 2017). The \r realisation of these potential governance gains depends on local \r [...]"


id: 76156fd336d7baa6aae0ed0a789b3cae
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18002
content:
"[...] context, legal design, successful implementation, and complementary \r action at different scales."


id: 6ebe6bec266f81156235cf602738146a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16748
content:
"They frequently set out long term emission goals and possible \r trajectories over time, with analysis of technological and economic \r factors (Levin et al. 2018; WRI 2020). This can include quantitative \r modelling of low-emissions transitions and their economic effects \r to inform policymakers and stakeholders of potential outcomes \r (Waisman et al. 2019; Weitzel et al. 2019). Scenario analysis can be \r used to explore how to make strategies more robust in the face of \r uncertainty (Sato and Altamirano 2019). Strategies and their regular \r revision can support long-term structural change by stimulating \r deliberation and learning (Voss et al. 2009), and to make the link \r between mitigation and adaptation objectives and actions (Watkiss \r and Klein 2019; Hans et al. 2020). As part of the Paris Agreement \r process, several countries have prepared and submitted long-term \r low-emissions development strategies (Levin et al. 2018), while \r [...]"


id: 37947364b3ea2758247f9e4bbd0bcd5f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6990
content:
"[...] others have different forms of national climate change strategies \r independently of the UNFCCC process. Strategies set over time by \r the European Union are discussed in Box 13.1."


id: eaad00cf1f7b0165e88c15244f0ccfc8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38647
content:
"example across countries, and domestic factors such as business \r cycles (medium evidence, medium agreement). Major landmark \r events under the UNFCCC have been associated with increases \r in  national legislation (Iacobuta et al. 2018), with a  stronger \r effect in countries where international commitments are binding \r (Fankhauser et al. 2016). Diffusion through example of legislation \r from other countries has been documented (Fankhauser et al. 2016; \r Fleig et al. 2017; Torney 2017; Inderberg 2019; Torney 2019). For \r example, the UK Climate Change Act was an important influence \r in pursuing similar acts in Finland and Ireland (Torney 2019) and \r was also considered in the formulation of Mexico's General Law \r on Climate Change (Averchenkova and Guzman Luna 2018). The \r presence of a framework law is positively associated with creation of \r additional supportive legislation (Fankhauser et al. 2015). Domestic \r contextual factors can also affect the likelihood of legislation such \r [...]"


id: cca7b0d1b916fb39639a690aa2248748
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33331
content:
"[...] as a weak business cycle that can impact the political willingness to \r pass legislation (Fankhauser et al. 2015). In some cases, civil society \r groups play a  role as advocates for legislation, as occurred in the \r UK (Lockwood 2013; Lorenzoni and Benson 2014; Carter and Childs \r 2018; Devaney et al. 2020) and in Germany in the build up to passage \r of their respective Climate Change Act (Flachsland and Levi 2021)."


id: 115e33c751f3e04b7e6ee8a28b9acd08
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 252
content:
"The NDCs vary in their scope, content and time frame, reflecting \r different national circumstances, and are widely heterogeneous \r in both stringency and coverage of mitigation efforts (UNFCCC \r Secretariat 2016, 2021; Pauw et al. 2018; Campagnolo and Davide \r 2019; Pauw et al. 2019). The mitigation targets in the new or updated \r NDCs range from economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets \r to strategies, plans and actions for low-emission development, with \r specific time frames or implementation periods specified. Less than \r 10% of parties' NDCs specify when their emissions are expected \r to peak and some of these parties express their target as a carbon \r budget (UNFCCC Secretariat 2021). Many long-term strategies \r submitted by Parties to the UNFCCC refer to net zero emissions or \r climate neutrality, carbon neutrality, or GHG neutrality with reference \r to 2050, 2060 or mid-century targets (UNFCCC Secretariat 2021). The \r [...]"


id: fc1d226ecc064aef2f8352a239b6b202
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41717
content:
"Figure 13.2 | Prevalence of targets by emissions and number of countries across region. Top: Shares of global GHG emissions under national climate emission \r targets - in 2010, 2015 and 2020. Emissions data used are for 2019, since emissions shares across regions deviated from past patterns in 2020 due to COVID. Bottom: Number \r of countries with national climate emission targets - in 2010, 2015, and 2020. Emissions reductions targets were taken into account as a legislative target when they were \r defined in a law or as part of a country's submission under the Kyoto Protocol, or as an executive target when they were included in a national policy or official submissions \r under the UNFCCC. Targets were included if they were economy wide or included at least the energy sector. The proportion of national emissions covered are scaled to reflect \r [...]"


id: 476739ae7bed56513511a4c199f12dec
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9773
content:
"[...] coverage and whether targets are in GHG or CO2 terms. AR6 regions: DEV = Developed countries; APC = Asia and Pacific; EEA = Eastern Europe and West-Central Asia; AFR \r = Africa; LAM = Latin America and the Caribbean; MDE = Middle East. Source: updated and adapted with permission from Iacobuta et al. (2018) to reflect AR6 regional \r aggregation and recent data."


id: 27ae7be601f4e7ad0b88d6ed9d90139e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4164
content:
"The European Union (EU)1 has developed an encompassing climate governance framework (Kulovesi and Oberthur 2020), having \r ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2002. In 2003 the EU adopted an Emissions Trading System for sectors with large GHG emitters, which \r started in 2005. From 2007 to 2009, the EU revised its climate policies, including for vehicle emissions, renewable energy and energy \r efficiency, and adopted targets for 2020 for GHG emissions reductions, renewable energy shares and energy efficiency improvements. \r It also adopted in 2009 an Effort Sharing Decision for Member States' emissions reductions for the period 2013-2020 in sectors not \r covered by the ETS (Boasson and Wettestad 2013; Bertoldi 2018). The ETS has been improved multiple times, including through a 2015 \r Market Stability Reserve to reduce the surplus of emission allowances (Chaton et al. 2018; Wettestad and Jevnaker 2019). In 2010, the \r [...]"


id: e2f0496cf4fe72b2fa1fca314b3123a3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37222
content:
"[...] European Commission created a directorate-general (equal to a ministry at the domestic level) for Climate Action. Between 2014 and \r 2018, the EU agreed on emission reduction targets for 2030 of 30% GHG emission reductions compared to 1990, and again revised \r its climate policy portfolio including new targets for renewable energies and energy efficiency and a new Effort Sharing Regulation \r (Fitch-Roy et al. 2019a; Oberthur 2019). "


id: 70f2391015d9561e541b91a312cbbc2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17133
content:
"From 2018, climate planning and reporting has been regulated by the EU Governance Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2018/1999), \r requiring member states to develop detailed and strategic National Energy and Climate Plans (Knodt et al. 2020). In 2019, the \r European Commission, backed by the European Council (heads of states and government in the EU) and the European Parliament, \r launched a new broad climate and environment initiative; the 'European Green Deal', implying the revision of many EU polices and \r introducing the Climate Pact (European Commission 2019a). This roadmap develops a 'new growth strategy for the EU' aimed at \r reaching climate neutrality by 2050 and spans multiple sectors. In 2020, the European Commission introduced a new climate law \r establishing the framework for achieving the climate neutrality by 2050 principle, and upgraded its 2030 GHG emission reduction \r [...]"


id: b84a767de251e17173b073471d97ef5e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29635
content:
"[...] target to at least net 55% reduction, which was adopted in June 2021 (European Commission 2020a). In June 2021, the new policy \r package 'Fit for 55' was adopted by the Commission; the packages included a proposal for the revision of the ETS, including its \r extension to shipping and a  separate emission trading system for road transport and buildings, a  revision of the effort sharing \r regulation, an amendment of the regulation setting CO2 emission standards for cars and vans, a revision of the energy tax directive, \r a new carbon border adjustment mechanism, a revision of renewable energy and energy efficiency targets and directives, and a new \r social fund to make the transition to climate neutrality fair."


id: f36ed380ee5ab7bec8641a42213a34f9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40203
content:
"Climate governance in China features a combination of top-down planning and vertical accountability (Sims Gallagher and Xuan 2019; \r Teng and Wang 2021). An overarching coordination role is performed by the Leading Group on Carbon Peaking and Carbon Neutrality, \r appointed by and reporting to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, and the National Leading Group on Climate \r Change Response, Energy Conservation, and Emissions Reduction (NLGCCR), headed by the Premier and consisting of more than \r 30 ministers (Wang et al. 2018a). The Department of Climate Change (DCC) under the Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE) is \r the primary agency in charge of climate issues, with a corresponding local Bureau of Ecology and Environment in each province or \r city. While MEE is the leading agency for climate policy, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) is the leading \r [...]"


id: 1740c134562960a84327bdb4f2c8c679
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1311
content:
"[...] agency for setting overall and industry-specific targets in five-year plans, and thus has a key role in coordinating carbon emissions \r targets with energy and industrial development targets (Wang et al. 2019; Yu 2021). Involvements of ministries related to foreign \r affairs, public finance, science and technology, as well as sector ministries such as transportation, construction, and manufacturing \r industries are also needed to push forward sector-specific climate initiatives. At subsidiary levels of government carbon intensity targets \r are enforced through a 'targets and responsibilities' system that is directly linked to the evaluation of governments' performances (Lin \r 2012a; Li et al. 2016). "


id: c0c2e656787f78c3269684a48e8106c1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31210
content:
"Where new dedicated organisations have not emerged, countries \r may layer climate responsibilities on existing institutions; the \r addition of mitigation to the responsibilities of the US Environmental \r Protection Agency is an example (Mildenberger 2021). Layering \r is also a  common approach when climate change is embedded \r within consideration of multiple objectives of policy. In these cases, \r climate institutions tend to be layered on sectoral institutions for the \r pursuit of co-benefits or broader development concerns. Examples \r include India, where energy security was an important objective of \r renewable energy promotion policy (Pillai and Dubash 2021), Brazil's \r mitigation approach focused on sectoral forest policy (Hochstetler \r 2021) and South Africa's emphasis on job creation as a necessary \r factor in mitigation policy (Chandrashekeran et al. 2017; Rennkamp \r 2019). Prior to this process of layering, sectoral institutions, such as \r [...]"


id: 64d621b198704772b67fda89673cdbee
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15014
content:
"[...] in forest and energy sectors, may play an important latent role in \r shaping climate outcomes, before climate considerations are part of \r their formal mandate."


id: 3dc5cc26e6306b440e0897303fe11bfd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8032
content:
"Because transition to a low-carbon future is likely to create winners \r and losers over different time scales; institutions are needed to \r mediate these interests and build consensus on future pathways \r (Kuzemko et al. 2016; Lockwood et al. 2017; Finnegan 2019; \r Mildenberger 2020). Institutions that provide credible knowledge \r can help support ambition. For example, analysis by the UK Climate \r Change committee has been harnessed, including by non-state \r actors, to prevent backsliding on decisions (Lockwood 2021a). \r Institutions can also help create positive feedback by providing \r spaces in decision-making for low-carbon interests (Aklin and \r Urpelainen 2013; Roberts et al. 2018; Lockwood et al. 2017; Finnegan \r 2019). For example, a renewable energy policy community emerged \r in China through key agenda setting meetings (Shen 2017), and in \r India, a National Solar Mission provided a platform for the renewable \r [...]"


id: e9ac9fff54b62ff08e46be132702aaa0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38462
content:
"[...] energy industry (Pillai and Dubash 2021). Conversely, institutions can \r also exert a drag on change through 'regulatory inertia', as in the \r case of the UK energy regulator Ofgem, which has exercised veto \r powers in ways that may limit a low-carbon transition (Lockwood \r et al. 2017)."


id: 48d95b539b549649654c9fda64b5219
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10029
content:
"Creation of a  high-level coordinating body to coordinate across \r departments and mainstream climate into sectoral actions is \r another common approach (Oulu 2015). For example, Kenya \r has created a  National Climate Change Council, which operates \r through a  climate change directorate in the environment ministry \r to mainstream climate change at the county level (Guey and Bilich \r 2019). Zhou and Mori (2011) suggest that well-functioning inter\u0002agency coordination mechanisms require support from heads of \r government, involvement by industry and environment agencies; and \r engagement by multiple sectoral agencies. However, coordination \r mechanisms without a clear authority and basis for setting directions \r run the risk of 'negative coordination', a  process through which \r ministries comment on each other's proposals, removing any ideas \r that run counter to the interests of their own ministry, leading to \r even weaker decisions (Flachsland and Levi 2021). Countries with \r [...]"


id: a044c66095aaacfe99ea7461fa28f4eb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25407
content:
"[...] dedicated, new climate institutions tend to have a more explicit and \r authorised body for climate coordination, such as China's National \r Leading Group (Box 13.3)."


id: f2a68d2002f62b57dd2e5260a6975dbd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40093
content:
"Decision-making consistent with energy and climate justice requires attention to procedural justice (McCauley and Heffron 2018), which \r includes how decisions are made, and who is involved and has influence on decisions (Sovacool and Dworkin 2015). Procedural justice \r emphasises the importance of equitable access to decision-making processes and non-discriminatory engagement with all stakeholders \r (Jenkins et al. 2016), attention to the capability, particularly of marginalised groups, to shape decisions (Holland 2017) and recognition \r of their specific vulnerabilities in collective political processes (Schlosberg 2012). Consensus-building institutions should avoid reducing \r normative questions to technical ones, recognising that values, interests and behaviours are all shaped by ongoing climate governance \r (Ryder 2018; Schwanen 2021). Additionally, communities affected by low-carbon transition may face challenges in articulating their \r [...]"


id: 1875b261ccc508048c636ce3c4b39cd3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1517
content:
"[...] understandings and experiences, which needs to be addressed in the design of climate institutions (Ryder 2018; Schwanen 2021). "


id: 7d72da7a9d0659711231d5a99c156974
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19238
content:
"identify and manage synergies and trade-offs across climate and \r development objectives (Urge-Vorsatz et al. 2014; von Stechow et al. \r 2015; McCollum et al. 2018); identify and choose amongst possible \r policy options (Howlett and Oliphant 2010); identify areas for \r transformation and the means to induce innovation (Patt 2017; UNEP \r 2018); and developing the ability to monitor and evaluate outcomes \r (Upadhyaya et al. 2021) (Box 13.5). Domorenok et al. (2021) highlight \r different aspects of the capacity challenge particularly necessary \r for integrated policy making including: the capacity for horizontal \r and vertical coordination; implementation capacity including the \r independence of the state from interests; and administrative capacity \r required to address compound problems. At a basic level, questions \r of governmental capacity - the numbers and training of personnel - \r can shape the choices available for climate institutions and their \r [...]"


id: 2b0ab4785da92a888d00a2e41c6d7d95
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4807
content:
"[...] ability to be strategic (Richerzhagen and Scholz 2008; Harrison and \r Kostka 2014; Kim 2016). Box 13.5 describes South Africa's approach \r to building monitoring and evaluation capacity."


id: 4554119d347dc371c65ca9010488df14
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9418
content:
"In addition, expert driven, technical solutions such as infrastructural \r interventions can undermine the knowledge of lower income \r countries, communities or indigenous knowledge holders, yet are \r often used by sub-national governments (Ford et al. 2016; Brattland \r and Mustonen 2018; Nagorny-Koring 2019; Whyte 2017, 2020). \r Technical solutions, such as electric vehicles or smart grids rarely \r address the needs and capabilities of disadvantaged communities \r that may not be able to afford these technologies (Mistry 2014; \r Romero-Lankao and Nobler 2021). However, mitigation strategies \r in sectors such as transport and buildings have often focused on \r technical and market outcomes, the benefits of which are limited \r to some, while others experience negative externalities or face \r health risks (Markard 2018; Williams and Doyon 2019; Carley and \r Konisky 2020). Delivering climate justice requires community\u0002driven approaches to understanding the problem addressing \r [...]"


id: 49808e17415cbc3a6d11f6c77adcd75d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10157
content:
"[...] structural inequities and fostering justice, while reducing carbon \r emissions (Romero-Lankao et al. 2018b; Carley and Konisky 2020; \r Lewis et al. 2020). "


id: d61c4199e4eb427a1dc758d307cc932f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34988
content:
"Since countries are not bound by their material endowment, countries \r with similar material endowments may differ in climate governance, \r whereas those with notable differences in material endowments \r may have similar policies. For instance, countries with rich fossil fuel \r endowments are found either adopting rather ambitious emission \r reduction targets and measures, or remaining weak in developing \r domestic climate policies (Eckersley 2013; Farstad 2019). Further, \r countries with radically different electricity systems and energy \r resource potentials are found developing rather similar renewables \r support schemes such as feed-in-tariff subsidies and competitive \r tendering programmes (Dobrotkova et al. 2018; Vanegas Cantarero \r 2020; Boasson et al. 2021). Some policy instruments are widely \r applied in both developed and developing countries with similar \r or different material endowment. For example, renewable energy \r [...]"


id: 79f051a032f6dff6b4b96f9fcc2b87ef
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18653
content:
"Election systems based on proportional representation tend to have \r lower emissions, higher energy efficiency, higher renewable energy \r deployment, and more climate friendly investment than systems \r where leadership candidates have to secure a majority of the votes \r to be elected (medium evidence, high agreement) (Fredriksson and \r Millimet 2004; Lachapelle and Paterson 2013; Finnegan 2019). Such \r systems better enable voters supporting ambitious climate positions \r to influence policymaking (Harrison and Sundstrom 2010; Willis 2018), \r place less political risks on legislators from additional costs incurred \r from climate actions on voters (Finnegan 2018, 2019), and strengthen \r credible commitments to climate policy (Lockwood 2021b). Similarly, \r rules that govern the relationship between governments and civic \r societies in decision-making have also been shown to matter in \r climate governance. Corporatist societies, where economic groups \r [...]"


id: d8e72cd42157be07b2cc92e9b145447c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35454
content:
"[...] are formally involved in public policy making, have better climate\u0002related outcomes (lower CO2 emissions and higher low-carbon \r investments) than liberal-pluralist countries, where a  larger array \r of non-governmental organisations compete for informal influence, \r often through lobbying (medium evidence, medium agreement) \r (Liefferink et al. 2009; Jahn 2016; Finnegan 2018). "


id: 58236749d0a16fb45bc7162a941699be
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12763
content:
"Political parties with similar ideological roots in different countries \r (for instance social democratic or conservative parties) may \r have different positions on climate governance across countries \r (Boasson et al. 2021). Nevertheless, on average, a higher share of \r green parties in a parliament is associated with lower greenhouse \r gas emissions (Neumayer 2003; Jensen and Spoon 2011; Mourao \r 2019), and left-wing parties tend to adopt more pro-climate \r policy positions (medium evidence, high agreement) (Carter 2013; \r Tobin 2017; Farstad 2018; Ladrech and Little 2019). There is also \r evidence, however, that conservative parties in some countries \r support climate measures (Batstrand 2015) and consensus can be \r achieved on climate actions across the political spectrum (Thonig \r et al. 2021). At the same time, it seems harder to get support for \r new climate governance initiatives in systems where many political \r groups can block decision due to many veto points, for instance \r [...]"


id: 12bbd555eb0836250209d7f4b447b26
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 498
content:
"[...] in systems with bicameralism (the legislature is divided into two \r separate assemblies) and/or in federalist governments (where \r regions have national political representation, e.g. USA and Brazil) \r (medium evidence, high agreement) (Madden 2014; von Stein \r 2020) although federal systems hold out the possibility of sub\u0002national action when federal agreement is limited (Section 13.2). \r There remains a  limited literature on the role of green parties \r and veto points in developing countries (Haynes 1999; Kernecker \r and Wagner 2019). "


id: 8301786772ac94e0a4b8ea575d98715c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20176
content:
"Different sets of beliefs can shape climate-related policies, targets, \r and instruments (Boasson and Wettestad 2013; Boasson 2015; \r Boasson et al. 2021). First, beliefs link climate governance with social \r justice concerns; policies, targets and instruments may therefore \r reflect justice issues (Fuller and McCauley 2016; Reckien et al. 2017; \r McCauley and Heffron 2018; Routledge et al. 2018; Backstrand and \r Lovbrand 2006, 2019). Second, climate mitigation may be seen as \r primarily a market correction issue and mitigation compatible with \r economic growth, as exemplified by ecological modernisation (Mol \r et al. 2009; Backstrand and Lovbrand 2006, 2019), climate capitalism \r (Newell and Paterson 2010), market logics (Boasson 2015; Boasson \r et al. 2021) or a global commons approach (Bernstein and Hoffmann \r 2019). Third, climate governance may be understood relative to policies \r on technological innovation and progress, often conceptualised as \r [...]"


id: ce990d2c6c1eacb04134e972b3b04654
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33687
content:
"In any political system, climate policy adoption and implementation \r may be obstructed by corrupt practices (Rafaty 2018; Fredriksson \r and Neumayer 2016) that entail an abuse of entrusted power for \r private gain (medium evidence, high agreement) (Treisman 2000). \r Evidence shows that CO2 emissions levels can be affected by \r corruption, either through the direct negative effect of corruption \r on law enforcement, including in the forestry sector (Sundstrom \r 2016), or through the negative effect of corruption on countries' \r income (Welsch 2004).These early findings are reinforced by \r studies of a global sample of countries (Cole 2007) and from across \r the developing world (Sahli and Rejeb 2015; Bae et al. 2017; Wang \r et al. 2018b; Ridzuan et al. 2019; Habib et al. 2020). Corruption \r also disrupts public support of climate policies by affecting the \r levels of trust (medium evidence, high agreement) (Harring 2013; \r [...]"


id: f659d648b40058ad08af98e6d100e746
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40709
content:
"[...] Fairbrother et al. 2019; Davidovic and Harring 2020), which then \r impact on the compliance of climate policies. More research is \r required to further understand the causal mechanisms between \r corrupt practices and emissions."


id: 2cbf5d04917077506f7b6506492571cc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5139
content:
"Citizen engagement has also become common among indigenous \r groups who tend to have limited structural power but often aim to \r shape the formation and effects of projects that have implications \r to  climate change. These include opposing extraction and \r transportation of fossil fuels on their traditional lands (especially \r in the Americas) (Bebbington and Bury 2013; Hindery 2013; Coryat \r 2015; Claeys and Delgado Pugley 2017; Wood and Rossiter 2017); \r large-scale climate mitigation projects that may affect traditional \r rights (Brannstrom et al. 2017; Moreira et al. 2019; Zarate-Toledo \r et al. 2019); supporting deployment of small-scale renewable energy \r initiatives (Thornton and Comberti 2017); seeking to influence the \r development of REDD+ policies through opposition (Reed 2011); \r and participation in consultation processes and multi-stakeholder \r bodies (Bushley 2014; Gebara et al. 2014; Astuti and McGregor 2015; \r [...]"


id: 38eef1879773a692eaa6b5802029bcd3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7223
content:
"[...] Kashwan 2015; Jodoin 2017). Indigenous groups have been reported \r to have had some influence on some climate discussions, particularly \r forest management and siting of renewable energy (Claeys and \r Delgado Pugley 2017; Jodoin 2017; Thornton and Comberti 2017). \r Further, more scientific assessments are required on the role of \r indigenous groups in climate activism and policy (Jodoin 2017; \r Claeys and Delgado Pugley 2017; Thornton and Comberti 2017)."


id: 711a0729bbd26b082b88269e5efa1f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17159
content:
"Civil society actors can involve citizens working collectively to \r change individual behaviours that have climate implications. For \r example, environmental movements that involve various forms of \r collective efforts encourage their members to make personal lifestyle \r changes that reduce their individual carbon footprints (Ergas 2010; \r Middlemiss 2011; Haenfler et al. 2012; Cronin et al. 2014; Saunders \r et al. 2014; Buchs et al. 2015; Wynes et al. 2018). These efforts seek \r to change individual members' consumer behaviours by reducing \r car-use and flying, shifting to non-fossil fuel sources for individual \r sources of electricity, and eating less dairy or meat (Cherry 2006; \r Ergas 2010; Middlemiss 2011; Haenfler et al. 2012; Stuart et al. 2013; \r Cronin et al. 2014; Saunders et al. 2014; Buchs et al. 2015; Wynes and \r Nicholas 2017; Wynes et al. 2018; Thogersen et al. 2021). Consumer/\r citizen engagement is sometimes encouraged through governmental \r [...]"


id: 35b1d28e13622eb88be749759fa8da2f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6700
content:
"[...] directives, such as the 'renewable energy communities' granted by the \r EU renewable energy directive 2018/2001 (The European Parliament "


id: f88e307b38863232d3e8afd4a8ae1979
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41091
content:
"In March 2019, the first global climate strike took place, turning out more than one million people around the world (Carrington 2019). \r Six months later in September 2019, young people and adults responded to a call to participate in climate strikes as part of the 'Global \r Week for Future' surrounding the UN Climate Action Summit (Thunberg 2019), and the number of participants globally jumped \r to an estimated six million people (Taylor et al. 2019). Although a handful of studies have reported on who was involved in these \r strikes, how they were connected, and their messaging (Marris 2019; Wahlstrom et al. 2019; Evensen 2019; D. Fisher 2019; Boulianne \r et al. 2020; Bevan et al. 2020; Han and Ahn 2020; Holmberg and Alvinius 2020; Jung et al. 2020; Martiskainen et al. 2020; Thackeray et al. \r 2020; Trihartono et al. 2020; de Moor et al. 2021; Fisher and Nasrin 2021b), its consequences in terms of political outcomes and \r [...]"


id: 887442446ddae1076aaaed59f0945e13
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21165
content:
"Outside the formal climate policy processes, climate litigation is \r another important arena for various actors to confront and interact \r over how climate change should be governed (robust evidence,\r high agreement) (Wilensky 2015; Peel and Osofsky 2015, 2018; \r Bouwer 2018; Setzer and Byrnes 2019; Calzadilla 2019; Setzer and \r Vanhala 2019; Paiement 2020; Wegener 2020). Climate litigation is \r an attempt to control, order or influence the behaviour of others in \r relation to climate governance, and it has been used by a wide variety \r of litigants (governments, private actors, civil society and individuals) \r at multiple scales (local, regional, national and international) \r (Osofsky 2007; Lin 2012b; Keele 2017; McCormick et al. 2018; Peel \r and Osofsky 2018; Setzer and Vanhala 2019). Climate litigation \r has become increasingly common (UNEP2020b), but its prevalence \r varies across countries (medium evidence, high agreement) (Peel \r [...]"


id: c8160b85e61d7a1546dd2d441a8fa24b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
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vector_id: 32515
content:
"[...] and Osofsky 2015; Wilensky 2015; Bouwer 2018; Lin and Kysar 2020; \r Setzer and Higham 2021). This is not surprising, given that courts \r play differing roles across varying political systems and law traditions \r (La Porta et al. 1998). "


id: d50e87446704e91044b6ad6b070a7b19
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34808
content:
"The judgement in Urgenda vs State of the Netherlands established the linkage between a state's international duty, domestic actions, \r and human rights commitments as to the recommendations of IPCC's AR5 (Burgers and Staal 2019; Antonopoulos 2020). It was the \r first to impose a specific emissions reduction target on a state (de Graaf and Jans 2015; Cox 2016; Loth 2016). The District Court of The \r Hague ordered the Dutch Government to reduce emissions by at least 25% by the end of 2020. Following the decision of the district \r court of The Hague in 2015 the Dutch government announced that it would adopt additional measures to achieve the 25% emissions \r reduction target by 2020 (Mayer 2019). The decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal in 2018 and the Supreme Court in 2019. \r Since the first judgment in 2015 significant changes in the climate policy environment have been reported, the results of which have \r [...]"


id: c0f88f7ee60a6c763d7248d0e113ddb0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31254
content:
"[...] included the introduction of a Climate Act and the decision to close all remaining coal fired power plants by 2030 (Verschuuren 2019; \r Wonneberger and Vliegenthart 2021). "


id: 1f817d399bf81ee7d1660d0c43d13a32
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2752
content:
"Climate change litigation has also been brought against corporations \r by regional or local governments and non-governmental \r organisations (Wilensky 2015; Ganguly et al. 2018; Foerster 2019). \r One type of private climate change litigation alleges climate change\u0002related damage and seeks compensation from major carbon polluters \r (Ganguly et al. 2018; Wewerinke-Singh and Salili 2020). The litigators \r claim that major oil producers are historically responsible for \r a significant portion of global greenhouse gas emissions (Heede 2014; \r Frumhoff et al. 2015; Ekwurzel et al. 2017; Stuart-Smith et al. 2021). \r These cases rely on advancements in climate science, specifically \r climate attribution (Marjanac et al. 2017; Marjanac and Patton 2018; \r McCormick et al. 2018; Minnerop and Otto 2020; Burger et al. 2020b; \r Stuart-Smith et al. 2021). It is alleged that major carbon emitters had \r knowledge and awareness of climate change and yet took actions \r [...]"


id: 2b69c9c564f669ded375f713cf0319d5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4886
content:
"[...] to confound or mislead the public about climate science (Supran \r and Oreskes 2017). Strategic climate change litigation has also been \r used to hold corporations to specific human rights responsibilities \r (Savaresi and Auz 2019; Savaresi and Setzer 2021) (Box 13.8). "


id: f4210eb0f691066de815984829a551a9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40324
content:
"The outcomes of climate litigation can affect the stringency and \r ambitiousness of climate governance (McCormick et al. 2018; \r Eskander et al. 2021). In the United States, pro-regulation litigants \r more commonly win in relation to renewable energy and energy \r efficiency cases, and more frequently lose in relations to coal-fired \r power plant cases (McCormick et al. 2018). Outside the US, more \r than half (58%) of litigation have outcomes that are aligned with \r climate action (Setzer and Higham 2021). But these cases can also \r have impacts outside of the legal proceedings before, during and \r after the case has been brought and decided (Setzer and Vanhala \r 2019). These impacts include changes in the behaviour of the parties \r (Peel and Osofsky 2015; Pals 2021), public opinion (Hilson 2019; \r Burgers 2020), financial and reputational consequences for involved \r actors (Solana 2020), and impact on further litigation (Barritt 2020). \r [...]"


id: aada60b4215a05103780e874bd4343f4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27286
content:
"[...] Individual cases have also attracted considerable media attention, \r which in turn can influence how climate policy is perceived (Nosek \r 2018; Barritt and Sediti 2019; Hilson 2019; Paiement 2020). While \r there is evidence to show the influence of some key cases on climate \r agenda-setting (Wonneberger and Vliegenthart 2021), it is still \r unclear the extent to which climate litigation actually results in new \r climate rules and policies (Peel and Osofsky 2018; Setzer and Vanhala \r 2019; Peel and Osofsky 2020) and to what degree this holds true \r for all cases (Jodoin et al. 2020). However, there is now increasing \r academic agreement that climate litigation has become a powerful \r force in climate governance UNEP 2020b; Burgers 2020). In general, \r litigations can be applied to constrain both public and private entities, \r and to shape structural factors mentioned in Section 13.3, such as \r the beliefs and institutions around climate governance."


id: cf7d16891a2f1ee6a5ca7ce22fce1ea3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33860
content:
"Who dominates the debate on media, and how open the debate can be \r varies significantly across countries (Takahashi 2011; Poberezhskaya \r 2015) based on participants' material and technological power. Fossil \r fuel industries have unique access to mainstream media (Geels 2014) \r via advertisements, shaping narratives of media reports, and exerting \r political influence in countries like Australia and the USA (Holmes \r and Star 2018; Karceski et al. 2020). For social media, novel technical \r tools, such as automated bots, are emerging to shape climate change \r discussion on major online platforms such as Twitter (Marlow et al. \r 2021). Open debates can underpin the adoption of more ambitions \r climate policy (Lyytimaki 2011). Media coverage on energy saving, \r patriotism, and social justice in the countries like USA and the UK have \r helped connect mitigation of climate change with other concerns, \r thereby raising support to climate action (Leiserowitz 2006; Trope \r [...]"


id: c7187d989d8f1521f15203b30052a5ab
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32348
content:
"[...] et al. 2007; Doyle 2016; Corner and Clarke 2017; Whitmarsh and \r Corner 2017; Markowitz and Guckian 2018). Further, media coverage \r of climate change mitigation has influenced public opinions through \r discussions on political, economic, scientific and cultural themes \r about climate change (medium evidence, high agreement) (Irwin and \r Wynne 1996; Smith 2000; Boykoff 2011; O'Neill et al. 2015). "


id: 4280e7cac803a3e8b718715691f44da3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8893
content:
"of EVs; a  carbon tax in British Columbia; and a  cap-and-trade \r scheme in Metropolitan Tokyo (Houle et al. 2015; Murray and \r Rivers 2015; Hibbard et al. 2018; Bernard and Kichian 2019; \r Raymond 2019; Xiang and Lawley 2019; Chan and Morrow 2019). \r b) Regulatory instruments: policies such as land use and \r transportation planning, performance standards for buildings, \r utilities, transport electrification, and energy use by public \r utilities, buildings and fleets are widely prevalent (Bulkeley \r 2013; Jones 2013; C40 and ARUP 2015; Martinez et al. 2015; \r Hewitt and Coakley 2019; Palermo et al. 2020b). Policies such \r as regulatory restrictions, low emission zones, parking controls, \r delivery planning and freight routes, focus on traffic management \r and reduction of local air pollution but also have a mitigation \r impact (Slovic et al. 2016; Khreis et al. 2017; Letnik et al. 2018). \r [...]"


id: 764f2e0f394716f946fa838fe31d991b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18036
content:
"[...] For instance, in coordination with national governments, sub\u0002national actors in China, Europe and USA have introduced access \r to priority lanes, free parking and other strategies fostering the \r roll-out of EVs (Creutzig 2016; Zhang and Bai 2017; Teske et al. \r 2018; Zhang and Qin 2018; Romero-Lankao et al. 2021). "


id: c8aff47b93bce5631e89334529ed28c5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32627
content:
"(Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy 2018), and \r ICLEI's - Local Governments for Sustainability carbon registry (Hsu \r et al. 2018). In Europe alone, more than 6000 cities have adopted \r their own climate action plans (Palermo et al. 2020a) and nearly \r 300 US sub-national actors  - cities and states  - were committed \r to maintaining momentum for climate action as part of the 'We Are \r Still In' coalition (We Are Still In coalition 2020) in the absence of \r national US climate legislation. Further, as of October 2020, more \r than 826  cities and 103 regional governments had made specific \r pledges to decarbonise, whether in a specific sector (e.g., buildings, \r electricity, or transport) or through their entire economies, pledging \r to reduce their overall emissions by at least 80% (NewClimate \r Institute and Data Driven EnviroLab 2020). Cities such as Barcelona, \r Spain and Seattle, Washington have adopted net zero goals for 2050 \r [...]"


id: c74a87fba5010f05c2db733f8837fec1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32379
content:
"[...] in policy legislation, while many more cities throughout the world, \r including the Global South such as Addis Ababa in Ethiopia, have net \r zero targets under consideration (ECIU 2019, 2021)."


id: cbda17732fd33f886ee122f8b208cb88
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33188
content:
"The performance of sub-national actors' mitigation policies have \r been measured using criteria such as existence of mitigation targets, \r incentives for mitigation, definition of a  baseline, and existence \r of a  monitoring, reporting, and verification procedure (Hsu et al. \r 2019). Existing evaluations range from small-scale studies assessing \r the mitigation potential of commitments by sub-national regions, \r cities and companies in the USA or in 10 high-emitting economies \r (Roelfsema 2017; Hsu et al. 2019), to larger studies finding that over \r 9149 cities worldwide could mitigate 1400 MtCO2-eq in 2030 (Global \r Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy 2018; Hsu et al. 2018, \r 2019). These sub-national mitigation potential estimates vary since \r a  range of approaches exists for accounting for overlaps between \r sub-national governments and their nested jurisdictions (e.g., states, \r provinces, and national governments) (Roelfsema et al. 2018; Hsu et al. \r [...]"


id: edf4e183514dfd5c07246df86b362797
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39235
content:
"[...] 2019). One analysis found that the cities of New York, Berlin, London, \r Greater Toronto, Boston, and Seattle have achieved on average \r a 0.27 tCO2-eq per capita per year reduction (Kennedy et al. 2012). \r Hsu et al. (2020c) found that 60% of more than 1000 European cities, \r representing 6% of the EU's total emissions, are on track to achieving \r their targets, reducing more than 51 MtCO2-eq. While evidence is "


id: 4c8573522f33fed0253508fe8eb6c5be
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10720
content:
"Sub-national actors have also been associated with experiments and \r laboratories, which promise to achieve the deep change required to \r address the climate mitigation gap (Smeds and Acuto 2018; Marvin \r et al. 2018). Experiments span smart technologies, for example, in \r Malmo, Sweden (Parks 2019), Eco-Art, Transformation-Labs and \r other approaches that question the cultural basis of current energy \r regimes and seek reimagined or reinvented futures (Castan Broto and \r Bulkeley 2013; Guy et al. 2015; Voytenko et al. 2016; Hodson et al. \r 2018; Peng and Bai 2018; Smeds and Acuto 2018; Culwick et al. 2019; \r Pereira et al. 2019; Sengers et al. 2019). They may include governance \r experiments, from formally defined policy experiments to informal \r initiatives that mobilise new governance concepts (Kivimaa et al. \r 2017a; Turnheim et al. 2018), and co-design initiatives and grassroots \r innovations (Martiskainen 2017; Sheikh and Bhaduri 2021). These \r [...]"


id: 281825d932c631d925d227f3b255c7c6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4251
content:
"[...] initiatives often expand the scope for citizen participation. For \r example, Urban Living Labs foster innovation, coproducing responses \r to existing problems of energy use, energy poverty and mobility that \r integrate scientific and expert knowledge with local knowledge \r and common values (Voytenko et al. 2016; Marvin et al. 2018). The "


id: 44b30cdaef67ada054162baadedc3b0a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9314
content:
"Where ETS or carbon taxes exist, they apply to different proportions \r of the jurisdiction's greenhouse gas emissions. The share of emissions \r covered by ETSs in 2020 varied widely, ranged from 9% (Canada) \r to 80% (California) while the share of emissions covered by carbon \r taxes ranged from 3% (Latvia and Spain) to 80% (South Africa) \r (World Bank 2021a).Where carbon pricing policies are effective in \r reducing GHG emissions, they usually also generate co-benefits \r including better air quality. For example, a Chinese study of air quality \r benefits from lower fossil fuel use under carbon pricing suggests that \r prospective health co-benefits would partially or fully offset the cost \r of the carbon policy (Li et al. 2018). Depending upon the jurisdiction \r (for example, if there are fossil fuel subsidies) carbon pricing could \r also reduce the economic distortions of fossil fuel subsidies, improve \r energy security through greater reliance on local energy sources and \r [...]"


id: 3a06cc9c2a8568f7f2ef031270504101
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7421
content:
"[...] reduce exposure to fossil fuel market volatility. Substantial carbon \r prices would be in the domestic self-interest of many countries if \r co-benefits were fully factored in (Parry et al. 2015)."


id: fe984fc99311e15e2ff6f341ad487758
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42165
content:
"The most commonly studied distributional impact is the direct impact \r of a carbon tax on household income. Typically it is regressive; the tax \r induced increase in energy expenditures represents a larger share of \r household income for lower income households (Grainger and Kolstad \r 2010; Timilsina 2018; Dorband et al. 2019; Ohlendorf et al. 2021). \r Governments can rebate part or all of the revenue to low-income \r households, or implement other changes to taxation and transfer \r systems to achieve desired distributional outcomes (Jacobs and van \r der Ploeg 2019; Saelim 2019; Sallee 2019) (Box 5.11). The full impact \r of the tax - after any distribution of tax revenue to households and \r typically adverse effects on investors - generally is less regressive or \r progressive (Williams III et al. 2015; Goulder et al. 2019). Where the \r tax revenue is treated as general revenue the government relies on \r existing income redistribution policies (such as income taxes) and \r [...]"


id: ccc4d1660ea3a7dd01080a534ec997a9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33361
content:
"Reducing fossil fuel subsidies would lower CO2 emissions, \r increase government revenues (Jakob et al. 2015; Dennis 2016; \r Gass and Echeverria 2017; Rentschler and Bazilian 2017; Monasterolo \r and  Raberto 2019), improve macroeconomic performance \r (Monasterolo  and Raberto 2019), and yield other environmental \r and sustainable development benefits (robust evidence, medium \r agreement) (Jakob et al. 2015; Rentschler and Bazilian 2017; Solarin \r 2020). The benefits of gasoline subsidies in developing countries \r accrue mainly to higher income groups, so subsidy reduction usually \r will reduce inequality (Coady et al. 2015; Dennis 2016; Monasterolo \r and Raberto 2019; Labeaga et al. 2021). Some subsidies, like tiered \r electricity rates, benefit low-income groups. Reductions of broad \r subsidies lead to price increases for fuels, electricity, transport, food and \r other goods and services that adversely affect the most economically \r [...]"


id: d7f753a4ed0df1353c383b5a5d0b1b72
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35300
content:
"[...] vulnerable (Coady et al. 2015; Zeng and Chen 2016; Rentschler and \r Bazilian 2017). Distributing some of the revenue saved can mitigate \r the adverse economic impacts on low-income groups (Dennis 2016; \r Zeng and Chen 2016; Labeaga et al. 2021; Schaffitzel et al. 2020). "


id: f6d9eecb1c52aa1e123ef2370c8350c8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40800
content:
"Since AR5, the literature on climate policies and policymaking \r has expanded in two significant directions. First, there is growing \r recognition that mitigation policy occurs in the context of multiple \r climate and development objectives (Chapter  4). Different aspects \r of these linkages are discussed across the AR6 WGIII report, \r including concepts and framings (Section 1.6.2), shifting sustainable \r development pathways (Section  4.3 and Cross-Chapter Box  5 in \r Chapter 4), cross-sectoral interactions (Sections 12.6.1 and 12.6.2), \r evidence of co-impacts (Section  17.3), links with adaptation \r (Section 4.4.2) and accelerating the transition (Sections 13.9, 17.1.1, \r 17.4.5 and 17.4.6). While the concept of development pathways is \r salient in all countries, it may particularly resonate with policymakers \r in developing countries focused on providing basic needs and \r addressing poverty and inequality, including energy poverty (Ahmad \r [...]"


id: 45b3d17ba6713c16edd30469bd611b5e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9478
content:
"[...] 2009; Fuso Nerini et al. 2019; Bel and Teixido 2020; Caetano et al. \r 2020; Roser et al. 2020). Consequently, some countries may frame \r policies predominantly in terms of accelerating mitigation, while \r in others a  multiple objectives approach linked to development \r pathways may dominate, depending on their specific socio-economic \r contexts and priorities, governance capacities (McMeekin et al. 2019) \r and perceptions of historical responsibility (Winkler and Rajamani \r 2014; Friman and Hjerpe 2015; Winkler et al. 2015; Pan et al. 2017)."


id: e26b83eb2bdcb5e10bc2ee655f4a473a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37130
content:
"carbon technologies and a  moratorium on coal-fired power plants \r may not only be politically more feasible than stringent carbon pricing \r alone, but may also limit efficiency losses and lower distributional \r impacts  (Bertram et al. 2015b). Balance captures whether policy \r instruments are deployed in complementary ways given their different \r purposes, combining for example technology-push approaches such \r as public R&D with demand-pull approaches such as an energy tax. \r A combination of technology-push and demand-pull approaches has \r been shown to support innovation in energy efficient technologies \r in OECD countries (Costantini et al. 2017). Consistency addresses \r the alignment of policy instruments among each other and with the \r policy strategy, which may have multiple and not always consistent \r objectives (Rogge 2019). Consistency of policy mixes has been \r identified as an important driver of low-carbon transformation, \r [...]"


id: d5d263ea0773a3a35ea201baefe89fd
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
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vector_id: 34927
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"[...] particularly for renewable energy (Lieu et al. 2018; Rogge and \r Schleich 2018). Box 13.14 summarises the economics literature on \r how policies interact, to inform design of packages. "


id: c3f84e9671ddfbefa6c5bc2717c3dc51
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31760
content:
"Policy packages aimed at low-carbon transitions are more effective \r when they include elements to enhance the phase out of carbon\u0002intensive technologies and practices - often called exnovation - in \r addition to supporting low-carbon niches (Kivimaa and Kern 2016; \r David 2017). Such policies include stringent carbon pricing; changes \r in regime rules such as design of electricity markets; reduced support \r for dominant regime technologies such as removing tax deductions \r for private motor transport based on internal combustion engines; \r and changes in the balance of representation of incumbents versus \r new entrants in deliberation and advisory bodies. For example, CGE \r modelling for China's fossil fuel subsidy reform found that integrating \r both creation and destabilisation policies is able to reduce rebound \r effects and make the policy mix more effective (Li et al. 2017). \r Sweden's pulp and paper industry shows that destabilisation policies \r [...]"


id: 13b7d66ac73115a0416fe26d04729d16
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 679
content:
"[...] including deregulation of the electricity market and a  carbon tax \r were an important complement to support policies (Scordato et al. \r 2018), and other studies show complementary results for Finland's \r building sector (Kivimaa et al. 2017b) and Norway's transport and \r energy sector (Cetkovic and Skjaerseth 2019)."


id: 5986a0c556322a0ebb993c6110b30666
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12985
content:
"Policy packages for low-carbon transitions are more successful \r if they take into account the potential for political contestation \r and resistance from incumbents who benefit from high-carbon \r systems (medium evidence, high agreement) (Geels 2014; Roberts \r et al. 2018; Kern and Rogge 2018; Rosenbloom 2018). To do so, \r policies can be sequenced so as to address political obstacles, for \r example, by initially starting with policies to facilitate the entry \r of new firms engaged in low-carbon technologies (Pahle et al. \r 2018). Such policies can generate positive feedbacks by creating \r constituencies for continuation of those policies, but need to be \r designed to do so from the outset (Edmondson et al. 2019, 2020). \r For example, supporting renewable energies through feed-in tariffs \r can buttress coalitions for more ambitious climate policy, such as \r through carbon pricing (Meckling et al. 2015). However, negative \r [...]"


id: 3db5d976b55a7c518c0da19b77491446
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8024
content:
"[...] policy feedback may also arise from ineffective policy instruments \r that lose public support, or create concentrated losses that arouse \r oppositional coalitions (Edmondson et al. 2019). Feedback loops \r can operate through changes in resources available to actors; \r changes in expectations; and changes in government capacities \r (Edmondson et al. 2019). "


id: 8171d2c1b6a1313e3ab0327976a61652
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19902
content:
"In many countries, and particularly when climate policy occurs in the \r context of sustainable development, policymakers seek to address \r climate mitigation in the context of multiple economic and social \r policy objectives (medium evidence, robust agreement) (Halsnaes \r et al. 2014; Campagnolo and Davide 2019; Cohen et al. 2019). Studies \r suggest that co-benefits of climate policies are substantial, especially \r in relation to air quality, and can yield better mitigation and overall \r welfare, yet these are commonly overlooked in policymaking (robust \r evidence, robust agreement) (Nemet et al. 2010; Urge-Vorsatz et al. \r 2014; von Stechow et al. 2015; Mayrhofer and Gupta 2016; Roy \r et al. 2018; Bhardwaj et al. 2019; Karlsson et al. 2020). Other studies \r have shown the existence of strong complementarities between the \r SDGs and realisation of NDC pledges by countries (McCollum et al. \r 2018). An explicit attention to development pathways can enhance \r [...]"


id: c39e0fce90e301219b1033ff6c57dd90
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31688
content:
"[...] the scope for mitigation, by paying explicit attention to development \r choices that lock-in or lock-out opportunities for mitigation, such as \r around land use and infrastructure choices (Cross-Chapter Box 5 in \r Chapter 4). While the pay-offs are considerable to an approach to \r mitigation that takes into account linkages to multiple objectives \r and the opportunity to shift development pathways, there are \r also associated challenges with implementing this approach \r to policymaking."


id: aa64cf89313ae08d93bd5e8ac6b17d8d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27205
content:
"tries to design an optimal policy package for the 'best guess' future \r scenario (Maier et al. 2016). Moreover, policy packages can usefully \r be adapted dynamically to changing circumstances as part of the \r policy process (Haasnoot et al. 2013; Hamarat et al. 2014; Maier \r et al. 2016) including by using exploratory modelling techniques that \r allow comparison of trade-offs across alternative future scenarios \r (Hamarat et al. 2014). Another approach is to link quantitative \r models with a  participatory process that enables decision-makers \r to test the implications of alternative interventions (Moallemi and \r Malekpour 2018). Rosenbloom et al. (2019) suggest that because \r policy mixes should adapt to changing circumstances, instead of \r stability of a particular mix, transitions require embedding policies \r within a  long-term orientation toward a  low-carbon economy, \r including a transition agenda, social legitimacy for this agenda, and \r [...]"


id: 7aee52430ba0c28a892d905416e78ca
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18828
content:
"First, spanning policy arenas and addressing multiple objectives \r places considerable requirements of coordination on the policymaking \r process (Howlett and del Rio 2015; Obersteiner et al. 2016). Climate \r policy integration suggests several steps should precede actual policy \r formulation, beginning with a clear articulation of the policy frame or \r problem statement (Adelle and Russel 2013; Candel and Biesbroek \r 2016). For example, a greenhouse gas limitation framework versus \r a co-benefits framing would likely yield different policy approaches. It \r is then useful to identify the range of actors and institutions involved \r in climate governance - the policy subsystem, the goals articulated, \r the level at which goals are articulated and the links with other \r related policy goals such as energy security or energy access (Candel \r and Biesbroek 2016). The adoption of specific packages of policy \r instruments should ideally follow these prior steps that define the \r [...]"


id: e613cb0a4b99e3989ac79953c5c8f59
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"In practice, integration has to occur in the context of an already \r existing policy structure, which suggests the need for finding \r windows of opportunity to bring about integration, which can \r be created by international events, alignments with domestic \r institutional procedures, and openings created by policy \r entrepreneurs (Garcia Hernandez and Bolwig 2020). Integration \r also has to occur in the context of existing organisational routines \r and cultures, which can pose a barrier to integration (Uittenbroek \r 2016). Experience from the EU suggests that disagreements \r at the level of policy instruments are amenable to resolution \r by deliberation, while normative disagreements at the level of \r objectives require a  hierarchical decision structure (Skovgaard \r 2018). As this discussion suggests, the challenge of integration \r operates in two dimensions: horizontal  - between sectoral \r authorities such as ministries or policy domains such as forestry - \r [...]"


id: 58cb77ba371a267f9cdaf8839d483b1f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12864
content:
"[...] or vertical - either between constitutional levels of power or within \r the internal mandates and interactions of a  sector (Howlett and \r del Rio 2015; Di Gregorio et al. 2017). There are also important \r temporal dimensions to policy goals, as policy and benchmarks \r have to address not just immediate success but also indications of \r future transformation (Dupont and Oberthur 2012; Dupont 2015). "


id: 3e8f3a225034dfd73b48a7a54fbd1f90
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8193
content:
"Common to all the sectoral cases in Cross-Chapter Box  9 is \r a  future-oriented vision of sectoral transition often focused on \r multiple objectives, such as designing tram-based public transport \r systems in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe to simultaneously stimulate \r urban centers, create jobs and enable low-carbon transportation. \r Sectoral transitions are enabled by policy mixes that bring together \r different combinations of instruments  - including regulations, \r financial incentives, convening, education and outreach, voluntary \r agreements, procurement and creation of new institutions  - to \r work together in a  complementary manner. The effectiveness of \r a  policy mix depends on conditions beyond design considerations \r and also rests on the larger governance context within which sector \r transitions occur, which can include enabling and disabling elements. \r Enabling factors illustrated in Cross-Chapter Box  9 include strong \r [...]"


id: cd7eedda03fa61775df36dd4f9b8f1b9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33484
content:
"[...] high level political support, for example to address deforestation in \r Brazil despite powerful logging and farmer interests, or policy design \r to win over existing private interests, for example, by harnessing \r distribution networks of kerosene providers to new LPG technology \r in Indonesia. Disabling conditions include local institutional contexts, \r such as the lack of tree and land tenure in Ghana, which, along \r with the monopoly of the state marketing board, posed obstacles \r to Ghana's low-carbon cocoa transition. These examples emphasise \r the  importance of attention to local context if policy integration \r and the design of policy mixes are to effectively lead to transitions \r guided by multiple climate and development objectives."


id: 3c5438baf26f96e7ed0964b96bd95aa4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7804
content:
"There is growing consensus that integration of adaptation and \r mitigation will advance progress towards sustainable development, \r and that ambitious mitigation efforts will reduce the need for \r adaptation in the long term (robust evidence, high agreement) (IPCC \r 2014a). There is no level of mitigation, however, that will completely \r erase the need for adaptation to climate change (robust evidence,\r high agreement) (Mauritsen and Pincus 2017). It is therefore urgent \r to design and implement a  multi-objective policy framework for \r mitigation, adaptation, and sustainable development that considers \r issues of equity and long-term developmental pathways across \r regions (robust evidence, high agreement) (Jordan et al. 2018; \r Mills-Novoa and Liverman 2019; Wang and Chen 2019). This section \r explores the logic behind the integration of adaptation and mitigation \r in practice (Section  13.8.1), the approaches to this integration \r [...]"


id: 38394ebdc03ce14dff3a13acea67a5fd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:19
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7096
content:
"[...] including climate-resilient pathways, ecosystem-based solutions, \r and a nexus approach (Section 13.8.2); examples of the adaption and "


id: abe7b94a8d677c27679e7b7419466598
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27483
content:
"Synergies between adaptation and mitigation are included in \r many of the NDCs submitted to the UNFCCC, as part of overall \r low-emissions climate-resilient development strategies (UNFCCC \r Secretariat 2016). a majority of developing countries have agreed to \r develop National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) in which many initiatives \r contribute simultaneously to the SDGs (Schipper et al. 2020) as well \r to mitigation efforts (Honle et al. 2019; Atteridge et al. 2020). For \r example, developing countries recognise that adaptation actions \r in sectors such as agriculture, forestry and land-use management \r can reduce GHGs. Nevertheless, other more complex trade-offs \r also exist between bioenergy production or reforestation and \r the land needed for agricultural adaptation and food security \r (African Development Bank 2019; Honle et al. 2019; Nyiwul 2019) \r (Chapter 7). For some of the Small Islands Development States (SIDS), \r forestry and coastal management, including mangrove planting, \r [...]"


id: 93c85c4de867675dcede27ee18c982e2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23207
content:
"[...] saltmarsh and seagrass are sectors that intertwine both mitigation \r and adaptation (Duarte et al. 2013; Atteridge et al. 2020). Integrated \r efforts also occur at the city level, such as the Climate Change Action \r Plan of Wellington City, which includes enhancing forest sinks to \r increase carbon sequestration while at the same time protecting \r biodiversity and reducing groundwater runoff as rainfall increases \r (Grafakos et al. 2019)."


id: 724a895e0784429432168f632efec06
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17353
content:
"Thirty-three countries in the Latin American region have submitted their NDCs, and 70% of their initiatives have included mitigation \r and adaptation options focusing on sustainable development (Barcena et al. 2018; Kissinger et al. 2019). However, most of these \r policies are disconnected across sectors (Loaiza et al. 2017; Locatelli et al. 2017). National governments have identified their relevant \r sectors as: energy, agriculture, forestry, land-use change, biodiversity, and water resources (see Figure 1 below). The region houses \r 57% of the primary forest of the planet. REDD+ aims to reduce GHG while provide ecosystems services to vulnerable communities \r (Barcena et al. 2018). Lessons from successful REDD+ programmes include the benefits of a multilevel structure from international to \r national down to strong community organisation, as well as secure resources funding, with most of the projects relying on external \r [...]"


id: 3da58fdf6af81a555b5162514a3c687d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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content:
"[...] sources of funding (medium evidence, high agreement) (Loaiza et al. 2017; Kissinger et al. 2019). However, there is limited evidence \r of effective adaptation co-benefits, which may be related to the lack of provision of forest standards; a disproportionate focus on \r mitigation and lack of attention to the well-being of the population in rural and agricultural areas (Kongsager and Corbera 2015)."


id: cfb37160fba8ad918026f69be09bbe0d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Supranational levels of action such as the EU climate change policy \r have influenced the development and implementation of Climate \r Change Action Plans (CCAPs) at the sub-national level (Heidrich \r et al. 2016; Villarroel Walker et al. 2017; Reckien et al. 2018). While \r adaptation is gaining prominence and is increasingly included in the \r NDCs of EU nations, the implementation of adaptation and mitigation \r by EU states are at different stages (Fleig et al. 2017). Fleig et al. \r (2017) found that all EU states, with the exception of Hungary, have \r adopted a framework of laws tackling mitigation and adaptation to \r climate change. However, an assessment of climate legislation in \r Europe pointed out that there has been little coordination between \r mitigation and adaptation, and that implementation varies according \r to different national conditions (Nachmany et al. 2015). More recently, \r however, integrated adaptation/mitigation plans have been prepared \r [...]"


id: aac52e92e054dd46a78b9f0c7af6577d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27270
content:
"[...] in Europe under the Covenant of Mayors, in which synergies and \r trade-offs can be better revealed and assessed (Bertoldi et al. 2020)."


id: f02a3aa291ce64170d714765dca39a6b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39638
content:
"Local governments and cities are increasingly emerging as important \r climate change actors (Gordon and Acuto 2015) (Section  13.5). \r While cities and local governments are developing Climate Change \r Action Plans (CCAPs), plans that explicitly integrate the design and \r implementation of adaptation and mitigation are a minor percentage, \r with few cities establishing inter-relationships between them (Nordic \r Council of Ministers 2017; Grafakos et al. 2018). Compared to national \r climate governance, local governments are more likely to develop and \r advance climate policies, generating socio-economic or environmental \r co-benefits, and improve communities' quality of life (Gill et al. 2007; \r Bowen et al. 2014; Duguma et al. 2014b; Mayrhofer and Gupta 2016; \r Deng et al. 2017; Hennessey et al. 2017). There may be a disconnect, \r however, between the responsibility that a particular jurisdiction has \r over mitigation and adaptation (city officials, for instance) and the \r [...]"


id: 1f1d22ba7b4c8fbf36c30bf32112f592
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2681
content:
"[...] scale of resources or capacities that they have available to bring to \r bear on the problem (regional to national provision of energy and \r transport) (Di Gregorio et al. 2019; Dale et al. 2020). "


id: ec78d9da0bd03449aeae1cd161ee62de
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38962
content:
"Justice principles are rarely incorporated in climate change framing \r and action (Sovacool and Dworkin 2015; Genus and Theobald 2016; \r Heikkinen et al. 2019; Romero-Lankao and Gnatz 2019). Yet, equity \r is salient to mitigation debates, because climate change mitigation \r policies can have also negative impacts (Brugnach et al. 2017; \r Ramos-Castillo et al. 2017; Klinsky 2018), exacerbated by poverty, \r inequality and corruption (Reckien et al. 2018; Markkanen and \r Anger-Kraavi 2019). The siting of facilities and infrastructure that \r advance decarbonisation (such as public transit infrastructure, \r renewable energy facilities and so on) may have implications for \r environmental justice. Integrated attention to justice in climate, \r environment and energy, as well as involvement of host communities \r in siting assessments and decision-making processes, can help to \r avoid such conflict (McCord et al. 2020; Hughes and Hoffmann 2020). \r [...]"


id: aab2f167670bf041f15bb0bbbe1aeae4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27256
content:
"[...] As a  result, successful policy integration goes beyond optimising \r public management routines, and must resolve key trade-offs \r between actors and objectives (Meadowcroft 2009; Nordbeck and \r Steurer 2016). "


id: 955faea358df0746d3bedc8c860a5b38
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23481
content:
"IPCC AR6 WG3, particularly Chapter  4, following on from the IPCC \r WG3 SR1.5 (IPCC 2018), has highlighted the importance of enabling \r conditions for delivering successful climate mitigation actions. The \r AR6 Glossary term for enabling conditions is: 'enabling conditions \r include finance, technological innovation, strengthening policy \r instruments, institutional capacity, multi-level governance, and changes \r in human behaviour and lifestyles (medium evidence, high agreement) \r (see Glossary). The IPCC SR1.5 report adds to these six dimensions \r saying enabling conditions also includes 'inclusive processes, attention \r to power asymmetries and unequal opportunities for development and \r reconsideration of values' (medium evidence, high agreement) (IPCC \r 2018). Not only is the presence of enabling conditions necessary for \r delivering the successful implementation of single policy instruments \r and policy packages, but also for delivering systemic change (medium \r [...]"


id: d16a8b9ccdfa20949b4ed6d126fb708c
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34198
content:
"[...] evidence, high agreement) (de Coninck et al. 2018; IPCC 2018; Waisman \r et al. 2019). The feasibility of 1.5degC compatible pathways is contingent \r upon enabling conditions for systemic change (medium evidence, high \r agreement) (de Coninck et al. 2018; Waisman et al. 2019)."


id: 2de5a604a09fd990aceff427e5057aa6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5354
content:
"At the same time, again following on from SR1.5 report, Section 1.8.1 \r explains that there are six feasibility dimensions of successful delivery \r of climate goals. These feasibility dimensions include geophysical; \r environmental and ecological; technological; economic; behaviour \r and lifestyles and institutional dimensions. The presence or absence \r of enabling conditions would affect the feasibility of mitigation \r as well as adaptation pathways and can reduce trade-offs while \r amplifying synergies between options (Waisman et al. 2019). Policies \r and institutions, which are two of the six enabling conditions, are \r therefore central to accelerated mitigation and systemic change. \r Identifying, and ensuring, the presence of all the enabling conditions \r for any given goal, including systemic transformation and acceleration \r of climate mitigation, is an important first step (medium evidence,\r medium agreement) (Roberts et al. 2018; Le Treut et al. 2021; Singh \r [...]"


id: e272aa218d5b7eb74d158da1db2c58a3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37137
content:
"Others argue for thinking about mitigation in even wider ways. O'Brien \r (2018) posits that sector-focused, or a silo approach, to mitigation \r may need to give way to decisions and policies which reach across \r sectoral, geographic and political boundaries and involve a  broad \r set of interrelated processes  - practical, political and personal. \r Gillard et al. (Gillard et al. 2016) argue that a response to climate \r change has to move beyond incremental responses, aiming instead \r for a  society-wide transformation which goes beyond a  system \r perspective to include learning from social theory; while Eyre et al. \r (2018) argue that moving beyond incremental emissions reductions \r will require expanding the focus of efforts beyond the technical to \r include people, and their behaviour and attitudes. Stoddard et al. \r (2021) argue that 'more sustainable and just futures require a radical \r reconfiguration of long-run socio-cultural and political economic \r [...]"


id: a5d7ce5984dda98928695215ec14de39
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26402
content:
"[...] norms and institutions'. They focus on nine themes: international \r climate governance, the vested interests of the fossil fuel industry, \r geopolitics and militarism, economics and financialisation, mitigation \r modelling, energy supply systems, inequity, high carbon lifestyles and \r social imaginaries. "


id: 533e188c6c55387ea343cb8018698c0b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11915
content:
"Of the USD17.2 trillion so far spent on stimulus packages, \r USD4.8  trillion (28% of the total as of July 2021) is linked to \r environmental outcomes (Vivid Economics 2021). This study relates \r to 30 countries: the G20 and 10 others. The packages in EU, Denmark, \r Canada, France, Spain, the UK, Sweden, Finland and Germany \r (German Federal Ministry of Finance 2020; Vivid Economics 2021) \r result in net benefits for the environment. a number of studies provide \r differing conclusions with respect to net benefits or otherwise for the \r environment for a number of countries (Climate Action Tracker 2020; \r UNEP 2020a; Vivid Economics 2021). An OECD database found that, \r as of mid-July 2021, 21% of economic recovery spending in OECD, EU \r and Key Partners is allocated to environmentally positive measures \r (OECD 2021c). O'Callaghan and Murdock (2021) reviewed the \r 50 countries with the greatest stimulus spend in 2020 and find that \r [...]"


id: 68261f5bb77498006a0957e0ac5f8907
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15588
content:
"[...] 13% of the spend is directed to long-term recovery type measures, of \r which 18% is spent on green recovery. This is a total of 2.5% of total \r spend or 368 billion USD on green initiatives. "


id: 82d7b45cf3642cf4c1049bd8d513ebd0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20146
content:
"With the outbreak of the COVID-19 Pandemic in 2020, past stimulus \r packages have been further investigated. One study interviewed \r 231 central bank officials and identified five key policies for both \r economic multipliers and climate impacts metrics (Hepburn \r et al. 2020). These were expenditure on clean physical infrastructure; \r building energy efficiency retrofits; investment in education and \r training; natural capital investment; and clean R&D. However, the mix \r of effective policies may differ in lower and middle income countries: \r rural support spending was more relevant, while clean R&D was less \r so. The study illuminated that there were different phases to recovery \r packages: the initial 'rescue' spending but then a second 'recovery' \r phase that can be more fairly rated green or not green. Recovery \r phase policies can deliver both economic and climate goals  - \r co-benefits can be captured (i.e. support for EV infrastructure can \r [...]"


id: 871a563d4551e4c81d57482a7d7542af
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20932
content:
"[...] also reduce local air pollution etc.) - but package design is important \r (Hepburn et al. 2020). "


id: 359c3c1063b6b762bdc5c1884c877880
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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"Other disciplines argue that social transformation is likely to be \r as important as the technical challenges in a  coordinated, cross\u0002economy approach to acceleration. For example, some argue for \r social tipping interventions (STI) alongside other technical and \r political interventions so that they can 'activate contagious processes \r of rapidly spreading technologies, behaviours, social norms, and \r structural reorganisation' (Otto et al. 2020). They argue that these \r STIs are inter alia: removing fossil fuel subsidies and incentivising \r decentralised energy generation; building carbon neutral cities; \r divesting from assets linked to fossil fuels; revealing the moral \r implications of fossil fuels; strengthening climate education and \r engagement; and disclosing information of GHG emissions (Otto et al. \r 2020). Others illuminate the importance of narratives and framings \r in the take-up (or not) of acceleration actions (Sovacool et al. 2020). \r [...]"


id: bcb34b5d15c569d8ed1f44e3423cb5bc
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"[...] Others are optimistic about the possibilities of transformation but \r also highlight the importance of political economy for rapid and just \r transitions (Newell and Simms 2020; Newell 2021)."


id: fa4f4b3e8a75cdffa7e9ea2440357d41
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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content:
"In summary, a  synthesis of the multidisciplinary, acceleration \r literature suggests that climate mitigation is a multifaceted problem \r which spans cross-economy and society issues, and that solutions to \r acceleration may lie in coordinated systemic approaches to change \r and strategic targeting of leverage points. Broadly, this literature \r agrees on a dual approach of non-incremental systemic change and \r a targeting of specific acceleration challenges, with tailored actions \r drawing on enabling conditions. The underlying argument of this is \r that there is a strategic logic to focusing on actions which undermine \r high carbon systems at the same time as encouraging low-carbon \r systems. If high carbon systems are weakened then this may \r reduce the opposition to policies and actions aimed at accelerating \r climate mitigation, enabling more support for low-carbon systems. \r In addition, targeting of actions which may create 'tipping point \r [...]"


id: f0e2a5e23a771fac09b8d29b97e1032f
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"[...] cascades' which increase the rate of decarbonisation may also be \r beneficial. Finally, new modes of governance may be better suited to \r this approach in the context of transformative change."


id: c6c5306cb25202302f701d58204fb9d4
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"There are conflicting views on whether the Paris Agreement's \r commitments and mechanisms will lead to the attainment of \r its stated goals. Arguments in support of the Paris Agreement are \r that the processes it initiates and supports will in multiple ways lead, \r and indeed have already led, to rising levels of ambition over time. \r The recent proliferation of national mid-century net zero GHG targets \r can be attributed in part to the Paris Agreement (medium confidence). \r Moreover, its processes and commitments will enhance countries' \r abilities to achieve their stated level of ambition, particularly among \r developing countries (medium confidence). Arguments against \r the Paris Agreement are that it lacks a  mechanism to review the \r adequacy of individual Parties' Nationally Determined Contributions \r (NDCs), that collectively current NDCs are inconsistent in their level \r of ambition with achieving the Paris Agreement's temperature goal, \r [...]"


id: 6f88cd36c8f68eb895dd0fd99972f22b
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"[...] that its processes will not lead to sufficiently rising levels of ambition \r in the NDCs, and that NDCs will not be achieved because the targets, \r policies and measures they contain are not legally binding at the \r international level (medium confidence). To some extent, arguments \r on both sides are aligned with different analytic frameworks, \r including assumptions about the main barriers to mitigation that \r international cooperation can help overcome (medium confidence). \r The extent to which countries increase the ambition of their NDCs \r and ensure they are effectively implemented will depend in part \r on the successful  implementation of the support mechanisms in \r the Paris Agreement, and in turn will determine whether the goals \r of the Paris Agreement are met (high confidence). {14.2, 14.3, 14.4} "


id: 1c8c86ec65e6ad825bf89e22b4fa51b9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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"New forms of international cooperation have emerged \r since the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's \r Fifth Assessment Report (IPCC AR5) in line with an evolving \r understanding of effective mitigation policies, processes, and \r institutions. Both new and pre-existing forms of cooperation \r are vital for achieving climate mitigation goals in the context \r of sustainable development (high confidence). While previous \r IPCC assessments have noted important synergies between \r the outcomes of climate mitigation and achieving sustainable \r development objectives, there now appear to be synergies between \r the two processes themselves (medium confidence). Since AR5, \r international cooperation has shifted towards facilitating national\u0002level mitigation action through numerous channels. These now \r include both processes established under the United Nations \r Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) regime and \r regional and sectoral agreements and organisations. {14.2, 14.3, \r [...]"


id: 8db8eed2535cae74d41579e39edadb47
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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content:
"International cooperation outside the UNFCCC processes \r and agreements provides critical support for mitigation \r in particular regions, sectors and industries, for particular \r types of emissions, and at the sub- and transnational levels \r (high confidence). Agreements addressing ozone depletion, \r transboundary air pollution, and release of mercury are all leading \r to reductions in the emissions of specific greenhouse gases (high \r confidence). Cooperation is occurring at multiple governance levels \r including cities. Transnational partnerships and alliances involving \r non-state and sub-national actors are also playing a  growing role \r in stimulating low-carbon technology diffusion and emissions \r reductions (medium confidence). Such transnational efforts include \r those focused on climate litigation; the impacts of these are unclear \r but promising. Climate change is being addressed in a  growing \r number of international agreements operating at sectoral levels, \r [...]"


id: 90b85f8203c8a235f1650bd945c64192
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"[...] as well as within the practices of many multilateral organisations \r and institutions (high confidence). Sub-global and regional \r cooperation, often described as climate clubs, can play an important \r role in accelerating mitigation, including the potential for reducing \r mitigation costs through linking national carbon markets, although \r actual examples of these remain limited (high confidence). {14.2, \r 14.4, 14.5, 14.6} "


id: 61b17ce0e05521b25b256b9e6815108
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"consistent with limiting temperature rise to well below 2degC \r in the context of sustainable development and equity (high \r confidence). Many developing countries' NDCs have components \r or additional actions that are conditional on receiving assistance \r with respect to finance, technology development and transfer, and \r capacity building, greater than what has been provided to date (high \r confidence). Sectoral and sub-global cooperation is providing critical \r support, and yet there is room for further progress. In some cases, \r notably with respect to aviation and shipping, sectoral agreements \r have adopted climate mitigation goals that fall far short of what \r would be required to achieve the temperature goal of the Paris \r Agreement (high confidence). Moreover, there are cases where \r international cooperation may be hindering mitigation efforts, \r namely evidence that trade and investment agreements, as well as \r [...]"


id: 5fbe6f0edf893be9a1986c399993e0b4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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content:
"[...] agreements within the energy sector, impede national mitigation \r efforts (medium confidence). International cooperation is emerging \r but so far fails to fully address transboundary issues associated with \r Solar Radiation Modification and CO2 removal (high confidence). \r {14.2, 14.3, 14.4, 14.5, 14.6}"


id: ffc3ce45fde915a9cb8469114b6ed70
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content:
"the global scale;  and  that given the global diversity with respect \r to  opportunities for and cost of mitigation, there are economic \r efficiencies associated with cooperative solutions (Section  13.2.1.1). \r Consequently, AR5 found  evidence  to  suggest that climate policies \r that are implemented across geographical regions would be more \r effective in terms of both their environmental consequences and \r their economic costs (Sections 13.6, 13.13 and 14.4). The AR5 also \r suggested  that regional cooperation  could  offer opportunities \r beyond what countries may be able to achieve by themselves. These \r opportunities are due to geographic proximity, shared infrastructure \r and policy frameworks, trade, and cross-border investments, and \r examples included renewable energy pools across borders, networks \r of energy infrastructure and coordinated forestry policies (Sections 1.2, \r 6.6, 14.2 and 15.2). The AR5 also suggested that policy linkages exist \r [...]"


id: e0d6fdafdbe885df050f5666d6d645cd
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"[...] across regional, national, and sub-national scales (Sections 13.3.1 and \r 13.5.1.3). For these reasons, AR5 suggested that although the UNFCCC \r remains the primary international forum for climate negotiations, \r many other institutions engaged at the global, regional, and local \r levels do and should play an active role (Sections  13.3.1, 13.4.1.4 \r and 13.5).  AR5 also noted that the inclusion of climate change \r issues across a variety of forums often creates institutional linkages \r between mitigation and adaptation (Sections 13.3-13.5). In addition \r to centralised cooperation and governance, with a primary focus on \r the UNFCCC and its associated institutions, AR5 noted the emergence \r of new transnational climate-related institutions of decentralised \r authority such as public-private sector partnerships, private sector \r governance initiatives, transnational non-governmental organisation \r (NGO) programmes, and city-led initiatives (Sections 13.2, 13.3.1 and \r [...]"


id: ca959131ca11188e1822d30702acd83c
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content:
"[...] 13.12). It noted that these have resulted in a multiplicity of cooperative \r efforts in the form of multilateral agreements, harmonised national \r policies and decentralised but coordinated  national  and  regional \r policies (Sections 13.3.2, 13.4.1 and 14.4). Finally, it suggested that \r international cooperation may  also  have a  role in promoting active \r engagement of the private sector in technological innovation and \r cooperative efforts leading to technology transfer and the development \r of new technologies (Sections 13.3, 13.9 and 13.12). "


id: 2cecc94ea8ff57bbd199446be707f6f3
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content:
"The rest of this chapter describes existing cooperative international \r agreements, institutions, and initiatives with a view to clarifying how \r they operate, what effects they have, and ultimately, whether they \r work. At the heart of this international institutional architecture lies \r the Paris Agreement, which sets the overall approach for international \r cooperation under the UNFCCC at the global level. In many ways, \r the Paris Agreement reshapes the structure of such cooperation, \r from one oriented primarily towards target setting, monitoring, and \r enforcement, to one that is oriented towards supporting and enabling \r nationally determined actions (including targets), monitoring as well \r as catalysing non-state and sub-national actions at multiple levels \r of governance. In addition to the Paris Agreement, many forms of \r cooperation have taken shape in parallel: those designed to address \r other environmental problems that have a  significant impact on \r [...]"


id: 8911640a17d20d7e4f97f8a903b5b71a
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content:
"[...] climate mitigation; those operating at the sub-global or sectoral \r level; and those where the main participants are non-state actors. \r The chapter ends with an overall assessment of the effectiveness of \r current international cooperation and identifies areas that would \r benefit from improved and enhanced action."


id: 7780d45e81d1ac140b8580ebad54f3a
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content:
"inequality (Denton at al. 2014), but there is an emerging attempt to \r harmonise mitigation actions with those oriented towards social and \r economic development. A key development since AR5 is the adoption \r in 2015 of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which \r contains 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This Agenda \r offers an aspirational narrative, coherent framework and actionable \r agenda for addressing diverse issues of development through goals \r that balance the economic, social and environmental dimensions \r of sustainable development as well as issues of governance and \r institutions (ICSU ISSC 2015). Scholars have noted that these \r dimensions of sustainable development are inter-dependent (Nilsson \r et al. 2016), and, as such it is difficult if not impossible to achieve \r economic and social gains while neglecting environmental concerns, \r including climate change (Le Blanc 2015). The SDGs are closely \r [...]"


id: 9badfaa7d07ed6d5c893a10e79121a45
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content:
"[...] linked to the Paris Agreement, adopted a few weeks later. There is \r a growing body of literature that examines the interlinkages between \r SDGs, including SDG 13 (taking urgent action to combat climate \r change) and others, concluding that without a proper response to \r climate change, success in many of the other SDGs would be difficult \r if not impossible (ICSU ISSC 2015; Le Blanc 2015; Nilsson et al. \r 2016; Weitz et al. 2018). Likewise, failure to achieve the SDGs will \r have a detrimental effect on the ability to limit climate change to \r manageable levels. Initiatives such as The World in 2050 (TWI2050 \r 2018), a large research initiative by a global consortium of research \r and policy institutions, work on the premise that pursuing climate \r action and sustainable development in an integrated and coherent \r way, based on a sound understanding of development pathways and \r dynamics, is the strongest approach to enable countries to achieve \r [...]"


id: 98d7089adadb81db7734f1088ccec31b
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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content:
"Further key developments since AR5 include the release of three \r IPCC special reports. The first of these assessed the differential \r impacts of limiting climate change to 1.5degC global average warming \r compared to 2degC warming, indicated the emissions reductions and \r enabling conditions necessary to stay within this limit (IPCC 2018a). \r While the events that have unfolded since the report are not yet \r comprehensively documented in literature, arguably the report has \r led to a  renewed perception of the urgency of climate mitigation \r (Wolf et al. 2019). In particular, the report appears to have crystalised \r media coverage in some parts of the world around a need to reduce \r emissions to net zero by 2050 (whether of GHGs or CO2), rather than \r delaying such reductions until the latter half of the century, as had \r been previously understood and indicated in the Paris Agreement. \r Its release is hence one factor explaining the rise in transnational \r [...]"


id: 5a1e526ceeba00bd2fe29556e5bef464
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content:
"[...] climate mobilisation efforts (Boykoff and Pearman 2019). It has also \r played a  role, in addition to the Paris Agreement (Geden 2016a), \r in the numerous announcements, pledges and indications by \r governments, including by all G7 countries, of their adoption of net \r zero GHG targets for 2050. The other two special reports focused on \r ocean and the cryosphere (IPCC 2019a), and the potential of land\u0002related responses to contribute to adaptation and mitigation (IPCC \r 2019b). There has been no literature directly tying the publication \r of these latter two reports to changes in international cooperation. \r However, the 25th UNFCCC Conference of Parties in Madrid in 2019 \r convened a  dialogue on ocean and climate change to consider "


id: c63b2a5ac7e22ea7a9b7f8c49cedf5c6
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content:
"Theoretical economists have shown that reaching such a  global \r agreement is difficult, due to countries' incentives to free-ride, \r namely benefit from other countries' abatement efforts while \r failing to abate themselves (Barrett 1994; Gollier and Tirole 2015). \r Numerical models that integrate game theoretic concepts, whether \r based on optimal control theory or on dynamic programming, \r consistently confirm this insight, at least in the absence of transfers \r (Germain et al. 2003; Lessmann et al. 2015; Chander 2017). Recent \r contributions suggest that regional or sectoral agreements, or \r agreements focused on a  particular subset of GHGs, can be seen \r as building blocks towards a global approach (Asheim et al. 2006; \r Froyn and Hovi 2008; Sabel and Victor 2017; Stewart et al. 2017). In \r a  dynamic context, this gradual approach through building blocks \r can alleviate the free-riding problem and ultimately lead to global \r [...]"


id: 54fec45959367e9f1a04389ec131f2ba
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content:
"[...] cooperation (Caparros and Pereau 2017). Much of this literature is \r subsumed under the concept of 'climate clubs' described in the next \r section. Other developments based on dynamic game theory suggest \r that the free-riding problem can be mitigated if the treaties do not \r prescribe countries' levels of green investment and the duration of "


id: 6cb3fd5664573cd13237f704c4fce939
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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content:
"Within the global commons framing, the primary indicator of \r progress is the actual level of GHG emissions, and the effectiveness \r of policies can be measured in terms of whether such emissions rise \r or fall (Patt 2017; Hanna and Victor 2021). The fact that the sum of \r all countries' emissions has continued to grow (IPCC 2018a), even \r as there has been a  global recognition that they should decline, \r is seen as being consistent with the absence of a  strong global \r agreement. Within this framing, there is traditionally an emphasis on \r treaties' containing self-enforcing agreements (Olmstead and Stavins \r 2012), ideally through binding commitments, as a  way of dealing \r with the overarching problem of free-ridership (Barrett 1994; Finus \r and Caparros 2015; Tulkens 2019). However, as discussed above, \r the emphasis has now shifted to a gradual cooperation approach, \r [...]"


id: 6c5690bc6bb5f1f1050ee62d471bb68f
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content:
"[...] either regional or sectoral, as an alternative way of dealing with free\u0002riding incentives (Caparros and Pereau 2017; Sabel and Victor 2017; \r Stewart et al. 2017). The gradual linkage of emissions trading systems \r (discussed in Section 14.4.4), goes in the same direction. There is also \r literature suggesting that the diversity of the countries involved may \r in fact be an asset to reduce the free-rider incentive (Pavlova and De \r Zeeuw 2013; Finus and McGinty 2019), which argues in favour of \r a system where all countries, irrespectively of their income levels, are \r fully involved in mitigation, unlike the Kyoto Protocol and in line with \r the Paris Agreement. Finally, recent efforts have discussed potential \r synergies between mitigation and adaptation efforts in a strategic \r context (Bayramoglu et al. 2018) (Section  14.5.1.2) In general, \r [...]"


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content:
"[...] current efforts go beyond considering climate policy as a mitigation\u0002only issue, much in line with the discussion about linkages between \r climate change and sustainable development policies described in \r detail in Chapters 1 and 4 of this report. "


id: eb241efe72ce174f9070deaf008bc66b
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content:
"In addition to mitigation in the form of emissions abatement, \r innovation in green technologies also has public good features, \r leading for the same reasons to less innovation than would be \r globally ideal (Jaffe et al. 2005). Here as well, theory suggests that \r there are benefits from cooperation on technology development \r at the regional or sectoral levels, but also that cooperation on \r technology, especially for breakthrough technologies, may prove \r to be easier than for abatement (El-Sayed and Rubio 2014; Rubio \r 2017). In a dynamic context, the combination of infrastructure lock\u0002in, network effects with high switching cost, and dynamic market \r failures suggests that deployment and adoption of clean technologies \r is path dependent (Acemoglu et al. 2012; Aghion et al. 2014), with \r a  multiplicity of possible equilibria. This implies that no outcome \r is guaranteed, although the most likely pathway will depend on \r [...]"


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content:
"[...] economic expectations and initial conditions of the innovation \r process (Krugman 1991). Therefore, the government has a  role \r to play, either by shifting expectations (e.g., credibly committing to \r climate policy), or by changing initial conditions (e.g.,  investing in \r green infrastructure or subsidising clean energy research) (Acemoglu \r et al. 2012; Aghion et al. 2014). This result is exacerbated by the \r irreversibility of energy investments and the extremely long periods \r of operation of the typical energy investment (Caparros et al. 2015; \r Baldwin et al. 2020)."


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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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vector_id: 6107
content:
"While the public goods and global commons framing concentrates \r on free-riding incentives as the primary barrier to mitigation taking \r place at a pace that would be globally optimal, other factors arise \r across the four analytic frameworks. For example, within the political \r framework, Beiser-McGrath and Bernauer (2021) highlight that not \r just the incentive to free-ride, but also the knowledge that another \r major emitter is free-riding, could lessen a country's political incentive \r to mitigate. Aklin and Mildenberger (2020) present evidence to \r suggest that distributive conflict within countries, rather than free\u0002riding across countries, is the primary barrier to ambitious national\u0002level action. Another barrier could be a lack of understanding and \r experience with particular policy approaches; there is evidence that \r participation in cooperative agreements could facilitate information \r exchange across borders and lead to enhanced mitigation policy \r [...]"


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content:
"In the transitions framing, by contrast, global emissions levels are \r viewed as the end (and often greatly delayed) result of a  large \r number of transformative processes. International cooperation may \r be effective at stimulating such processes, even if a change in global \r emissions is not yet evident, implying that short-term changes in \r emissions levels may be a misleading indicator of progress towards \r long-term goals (Patt 2017). Hanna and Victor (2021) suggest \r a  particular focus on technical advances and deployment patterns \r in niche low-carbon technologies, such as wind and solar power, \r and electric vehicles. However, this is one among many suggestions: \r the literature does not identify a single clear indicator to use, and \r there are many metrics of technological progress and transformation, \r described in Section 16.3.3 of this report. These can include national\u0002level emissions among countries participating in particular forms of \r [...]"


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content:
"[...] cooperation, as well as leading indicators of such emissions such as \r changes in low-carbon technology deployment and cost. "


id: c58275d13928cc2b8e1e3dd2615d8ad4
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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vector_id: 32053
content:
"carbon markets, suggesting that these can delay transformative \r processes within countries that are key drivers of technological \r change (Cullenward and Victor 2020). For similar reasons, achieving \r cross-sectoral cost-effectiveness, a goal of many carbon markets, is \r not seen as a high priority. Instead, within the transitions framing, \r the emphasis with respect to treaty design is often on providing \r mechanisms to support Parties' voluntary actions, such as with \r financial and capacity-building support for new technologies and \r technology regimes (Victor et al. 2019). The transitions literature also \r highlights impediments to transformation as being sector specific, \r and hence the importance of international cooperation addressing \r sector-specific issues (Victor et al. 2019). While such attention \r often starts with promoting innovation and diffusion of low-carbon \r technologies that are critical to a sector's functioning, it often ends \r [...]"


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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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content:
"[...] with policies aimed at phasing out the high-carbon technologies \r once they are no longer needed (Markard 2018). In line with this, \r many scholars have suggested value in supply-side international \r agreements, aimed at phasing out the production and use of fossil \r fuels (Collier and Venables 2014; Piggot et al. 2018; Asheim et al. \r 2019; Newell and Simms 2020)."


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"A recent development in the literature on international climate \r governance has been increased attention to the potential for climate \r clubs (Victor 2011). Hovi et al. (2016) define these as 'any international \r actor group that (1) starts with fewer members than the UNFCCC \r has and (2) aims to cooperate on one or more climate change\u0002related activities, notably mitigation, adaptation, climate engineering \r or climate compensation'. While providing public goods (such as \r mitigation), they also offer member-only benefits (such as preferential \r tariff rates) to entice membership. In practice, climate clubs are sub\u0002global arrangements, and formal agreement by interstate treaty is not \r a prerequisite. Actors do not have to be states, although in the literature \r on climate clubs states have hitherto dominated. The literature has an \r essentially static dimension that focuses on the incentives for actors \r to join such a club, and a dynamic one which focuses on the 'building \r [...]"


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"The literature focusing on the static aspects of clubs highlight that \r they represent 'coalitions of the willing' (Falkner 2016a; Gampfer \r 2016; Falkner et al. 2021), which offer a package of benefits, part of \r which are pure public goods (available also to non-club members), \r and others are club benefits that are only available to members (Hovi \r et al. 2016). The members-only or excludable part can be a system \r of transfers within the club to compensate the countries with higher \r costs. For example, the benefit from participating in the club can be to \r have access to a common emissions trading system, which in general \r is more attractive the larger the diversity of the countries involved, \r although this is not a general result, as discussed in detail in Doda \r and Taschini (2017). However, as costs and effort-sharing agreements \r are unsuccessful in a static context (Barrett 1994), mainly due to free\u0002rider incentives, several studies have proposed using tariffs on trade \r [...]"


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"[...] or other forms of sanctions to reduce incentives for free-riding (Helm \r and Sprinz 2000; Eyland and Zaccour 2012; Anoulies 2015; Nordhaus \r 2015; Al Khourdajie and Finus 2020). For example, Nordhaus (2015) \r uses a  coalition formation game model to show that a  uniform \r percentage tariff on the imports from nonparticipants into the club \r region (at a relatively low tariff rate of about 2%) can induce high \r participation within a range of carbon price values. More recently, \r Al Khourdajie and Finus (2020) show that border carbon adjustments "


id: 1e6d22c585acc47f43ad9fac9b5f28f5
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"Analytic approaches centred on equity and development figure \r prominently within this report, with many of the key concepts \r addressed in Chapter  4. Primarily the focus is on aligning climate \r policy at the international level with efforts to shift development \r pathways towards improved quality of life and greater sustainability \r (Cross-Chapter Box 5 in Chapter 4). There are also overlaps between \r the equity framework and the others. Within the global commons \r framing, the emphasis is on international carbon markets to \r reduce the costs from climate policies, and as way of generating \r financial flows to developing countries (Michaelowa et al. 2019a). \r The transitions framing, while focused empirically primarily on \r industrialised countries, nevertheless aligns with an understanding of \r climate mitigation taking place within a wider development agenda; \r in many cases it is a lack of development that creates a barrier to rapid \r [...]"


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"[...] system transformation, which international cooperation can address \r (Delina and Sovacool 2018) (Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 16)."


id: 87bb237356ce515aa88877848c2ef90b
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"are stable against a leader willing to change its status, for example, \r from leader to follower, or even completely leaving the climate club, \r finding in most cases such stability to exist. Related studies on the \r macroeconomic incentives for climate clubs by Paroussos et al. \r (2019) show that climate clubs are reasonably stable, both internally \r and externally (i.e., no member willing to leave and no new member \r willing to join), and climate clubs that include obligations in line \r with the 2degC goal combined with financial incentives can facilitate \r technology diffusion. The authors also show that preferential trade \r arrangements for low-carbon goods can reduce the macroeconomic \r effects of mitigation policies. Aakre et al. (2018) show numerically \r that small groups of countries can limit black carbon in the Arctic, \r driven mainly for reasons of self-interest, yet reducing methane \r requires larger coalitions due to its larger geographical dispersal and \r [...]"


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"In a  dynamic context, the literature on climate clubs highlights the \r co-called 'building blocks' approach (Stewart et al. 2013a,b, 2017). \r This is a bottom-up strategy designed to create an array of smaller\u0002scale, specialised initiatives for transnational cooperation in particular \r sectors and/or geographic areas with a wide range of participants. As \r part of this literature, Potoski and Prakash (2013) provide a conceptual \r overview of voluntary environmental clubs, showing that many climate \r clubs do not require demanding obligations for membership and that \r a  substantial segment thereof are mostly informational (Weischer \r et al. 2012; Andresen 2014). Also crafted onto the building blocks \r approach, Potoski (2017) demonstrates the theoretical potential for \r green certification and green technology clubs. Green (2017) further \r highlights the potential of 'pseudo-clubs' with fluid membership \r and limited member benefits to promote the diffusion and uptake \r [...]"


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"[...] of mitigation standards. Falkner et al. (2021) suggest a  typology of \r normative, bargaining, and transformational clubs. Before the adoption \r of the Paris Agreement, some literature suggested that the emergence \r of climate clubs in parallel to the multilateral climate regime would lead \r to 'forum shopping', with states choosing the governance arrangement \r that best suits their interests (McGee and Taplin 2006; van Asselt \r 2007; Biermann et al. 2009; Oh and Matsuoka 2017). However, more \r recent literature suggests that climate clubs complement rather than \r challenge the international regime established by the UNFCCC (van \r Asselt and Zelli 2014; Falkner 2016a; Draguljic 2019). "


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"In this dynamic context, one question is whether to negotiate a single \r global agreement or to start with smaller agreements in the hope that \r they will eventually evolve into a larger agreement. It has been debated \r extensively in the context of free trade whether a multilateral (global) \r negotiating approach is preferable to a  regional approach, seen as \r a building block towards global free trade. Aghion et al. (2007) analysed \r this issue formally for trade, showing that a  leader would always \r choose to move directly to a global agreement. In the case of climate \r change, it appears that even the mildest form of club discussed above \r (an efforts and costs sharing agreement, as in the case of the linkage \r of emissions trading systems) can yield global cooperation following \r a building blocks approach, and that the sequential path relying on \r building blocks may be the only way to reach global cooperation over \r [...]"


id: 38572af13b5db6b5cfcbdf714b23bb8
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"[...] time (Caparros and Pereau 2017). While the existence of a  nearly \r universal agreement such as the Paris Agreement may arguably have \r rendered this discussion less relevant, the Paris Agreement co-exists, \r and will likely continue to do so, with a  multitude of sectoral and \r regional agreements, meaning that this discussion is still relevant for \r the evolution of these complementary regimes. "


id: 9b09919d21569fae3091ddda58e4be9f
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"Many have pointed to the Montreal Protocol, addressing stratospheric \r ozone loss, as an example of a  successful treaty because of its \r ultimate environmental effectiveness, and relevance for solving \r climate change. Scholarship emerging since AR5 emphasises that \r the Paris Agreement has a greater 'bottom-up' character than many \r other MEAs, including the Montreal or Kyoto Protocols, allowing for \r more decentralised 'polycentric' forms of governance that engage \r diverse actors at the regional, national and sub-national levels \r (Ostrom 2010; Jordan et al. 2015; Falkner 2016b; Victor 2016). \r Given the differences in architecture, lessons drawn from studies \r of MEA regimes need to be supplemented with assessments of the \r effectiveness of cooperative efforts at other governance levels and in \r other forums. Emerging research in this area proposes methodologies \r for this task (Hsu et al. 2019a). Findings highlight the persistence \r [...]"


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"[...] of similar imbalances between developed and developing countries \r as at the global level, as well as the need for more effective ways \r to incentivise private sector engagement in transnational climate \r governance (Chan et al. 2018)."


id: 393c9e0b171157d23b9eb1dd75ff4969
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"The international climate change regime, in evolution for three \r decades, comprises the 1992 UNFCCC, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, and \r the 2015 Paris Agreement. The UNFCCC is a 'framework' convention, \r capturing broad convergence among states on an objective, a set of \r principles, and general obligations relating to mitigation, adaptation, \r reporting and support. The UNFCCC categorises Parties into Annex \r I and Annex II. Annex I Parties, comprising developed country Parties, \r have a goal to return, individually or jointly, their GHG emissions to \r 1990 levels by 2000. Annex II Parties, comprising developed country \r Parties except for those with economies in transition, have additional \r obligations relating to the provision of financial and technology \r support. Parties including developing country Parties, characterised as \r non-Annex-I Parties, have reporting obligations, as well as obligations \r to take policies and measures on mitigation and adaptation. The \r [...]"


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"[...] UNFCCC also establishes the institutional building blocks for global \r climate governance. Both the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and the 2015 Paris \r Agreement are distinct but 'related legal instruments' in that only \r Parties to the UNFCCC can be Parties to these later instruments."


id: dff6662b2890e85060a034f66438f225
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"Finally, the literature on the performance of other MEAs highlights \r the importance of institutional strength, which can include regulative \r quality, mechanisms to enhance transparency and accountability, \r and administrative capacity. Regulative quality includes guidance \r and signalling (Oberthur et al. 2017), as well as clear rules and \r standards to facilitate collective action (Oberthur and Bodle 2016). \r The literature is clear that legally-binding obligations (which \r require the formal expression of state consent) and non-binding \r recommendations can each be appropriate, depending on the \r particular circumstances (Skjaerseth et al. 2006), and indeed it has \r been argued that for climate change non-binding recommendations \r may better fit the capacity of global governance organisations (Victor \r 2011). Mechanisms to enhance transparency and accountability are \r essential to collect, protect, and analyse relevant data about Parties' \r [...]"


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"[...] implementation of their obligations, and to identify and address \r challenges in implementation (Kramarz and Park 2016; Kinley et al. \r 2020). Administrative capacity refers to the strength of the formal \r bodies established to serve the Parties to the regime and help \r ensure compliance and goal attainment (Andler and Behrle 2009; \r Bauer et al. 2017). "


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"The 2015 Paris Agreement was negotiated in a  starkly different \r geopolitical context to that of the 1992 UNFCCC and the 1997 Kyoto \r Protocol (Streck and Terhalle 2013; Ciplet et al. 2015). The 'rupturing \r binary balance of superpowers' of the 1980s had given way to \r a multipolar world with several distinctive trends: emerging economies \r began challenging US dominance (Ciplet et al. 2015); industrialised \r countries' emissions peaked in the 2010s and started declining, \r while emissions from emerging economies began to grow (Falkner \r 2019); the EU stretched eastwards and became increasingly supra\u0002national (Kinley et al. 2020); disparities within the group of developing \r countries increased (Ciplet et al. 2015); and the role of non-state actors \r in mitigation efforts has grown more salient (Backstrand et al. 2017; \r Kuyper et al. 2018b; Falkner 2019). The rise of emerging powers, many \r of whom now have 'veto power', however, some noted, did not detract \r [...]"


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"[...] from the unequal development and inequality at the heart of global \r environmental politics (Hurrell and Sengupta 2012)."


id: ede7dff9c72090bf2ba744f6bd074703
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"Although both the Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement are under \r the UNFCCC, they are generally seen as representing fundamentally \r different approaches to international cooperation on climate change \r (Held and Roger 2018; Falkner 2016b). The Paris Agreement has been \r characterised as a 'decisive break' from the Kyoto Protocol (Keohane \r and Oppenheimer 2016). Some note that the mitigation efforts under \r the Kyoto Protocol take the form of targets that, albeit based on \r national self-selection, were part of the multilateral negotiation process, \r whereas under the Paris Agreement Parties make Nationally Determined \r Contributions. The different approaches have been characterised by \r some as a distinction between a 'top down' and 'bottom up' approach \r (Bodansky and Rajamani 2016; Bodansky et al. 2016; Chan et al. 2016; \r Doelle 2016) but others disagree with such a characterisation, pointing \r to continuities within the regime, for example, in terms of rules for \r [...]"


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"[...] reporting and review, and crossover and use of common institutional \r arrangements (Depledge 2017; Allan 2019). Some note, in any case, \r that the Kyoto Protocol's core obligations are substantive obligations \r of result, while many of the Paris Agreement's core obligations are \r procedural obligations, complemented by obligations of conduct \r (Rajamani 2016a; Mayer 2018a). "


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"In this altered context, unlike in the 1990s when the main cleavages \r were between the EU and the US (Hurrell and Sengupta 2012), US-\r China 'great power politics' came to be seen as determinative of \r outcomes in the climate change negotiations (Terhalle and Depledge \r 2013). The US-China joint announcement (Whitehouse 2014), \r for instance, before the 2014 Lima climate conference, brokered \r the deal on differentiation that came to be embodied in the Paris \r Agreement (Rajamani 2016a; Ciplet and Roberts 2017). Others have \r identified, on the basis of economic standing, political influence, and \r emissions levels, three influential groups - the first comprising the \r USA with Japan, Canada, and Russia, the second comprising the \r EU and the third comprising China, India and Brazil (Brenton 2013). \r The emergence of the Major Economies Fora, among other climate \r clubs (discussed in Section 14.2.2) reflects this development (Brenton \r [...]"


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"[...] 2013). It also represents a 'minilateral' forum, built on a recognition \r of power asymmetries, in which negotiating compromises are \r politically tested and fed into multilateral processes (Falkner 2016a). "


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"The differences between and continuities in the three treaties that \r comprise the UN climate regime are summarised in Table  14.3. \r The Kyoto targets apply only to Annex I Parties, but the procedural \r obligations relating to NDCs in the Paris Agreement apply to all \r Parties, with flexibilities in relation to some obligations for Least \r Developed Countries (LDCs), Small Island Developing States (SIDS), \r and developing countries that need them in light of their capacities. \r The Kyoto targets are housed in its Annex B, therefore requiring \r a formal process of amendment for revision, whereas the Paris NDCs \r are located in an online registry that is maintained by the Secretariat, \r but to which Parties can upload their own NDCs. The Kyoto Protocol \r allows Annex B  Parties to use three market-based mechanisms \r - the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), Joint Implementation \r and International Emissions Trading - to fulfil a part of their GHG \r [...]"


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"[...] targets. The Paris Agreement recognises that Parties may choose \r to cooperate voluntarily on markets, in the form of cooperative \r approaches under Article 6.2, and a mechanism with international \r oversight under Article 6.4, subject to guidance and rules that are \r yet to be adopted. These rules relate to integrity and accounting "


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"not wholly developing' (Hochstetler and Milkoreit 2013). This fissure \r in part led to the High Ambition Coalition in Paris between vulnerable \r countries and the more progressive industrialised countries (Ciplet \r and Roberts 2017). A  division also emerged between the BASIC \r countries (Hurrell and Sengupta 2012), that each have distinctive \r identities and positions (Hochstetler and Milkoreit 2013). In the lead \r up to the Paris negotiations, China and India formed the Like-Minded \r Developing Countries with the Organization of the Petroleum \r Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the Bolivarian Alliance for the \r Peoples of our Americas (ALBA) countries, to resist the erosion of \r differentiation in the regime. Yet, the 'complex and competing' \r identities of India and China, with differing capacities, challenges \r and self-images, have also influenced the negotiations (Ciplet and \r Roberts 2017; Rajamani 2017). Other developing countries' coalitions \r [...]"


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"[...] also played an important role in striking the final deal in Paris. The \r Alliance of Small Island States, despite their lack of structural power, \r played a leading role, in particular in relation to the inclusion of the \r 1.5degC long-term temperature goal in the UN climate regime (Agueda \r Corneloup and Mol 2014; Ourbak and Magnan 2018). The Association \r of the Latin American and Caribbean Countries (AILAC) that emerged \r in 2012 also played a decisive role in fostering ambition (Edwards \r et al. 2017; Watts and Depledge 2018)."


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"negotiating process (Rajamani 2015; Maljean-Dubois and Wemaere \r 2016; Bodansky et al. 2017b; Klein et al. 2017), the Paris Agreement \r is a treaty containing provisions of differing levels of 'bindingness' \r (Bodansky 2016; Oberthur and Bodle 2016; Rajamani 2016b). The \r legal character of provisions within a treaty, and the extent to which \r particular provisions lend themselves to assessments of compliance \r or non-compliance, depends on factors such as the normative content \r of the provision, the precision of its terms, the language used, and \r the oversight mechanisms in place (Werksman 2010; Bodansky \r 2015; Oberthur and Bodle 2016; Rajamani 2016b). Assessed on these \r criteria, the Paris Agreement contains the full spectrum of provisions, \r from hard to soft law (Rajamani 2016b; Pickering et al. 2019) and even \r 'non-law', provisions that do not have standard-setting or normative \r content but which play a narrative-building and context-setting role \r [...]"


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"[...] (Rajamani 2016b). The Paris Agreement, along with the  UNFCCC \r and the Kyoto Protocol, can be interpreted in light of the customary \r international law principle of harm prevention according to which \r states must exercise due diligence in seeking to prevent activities \r within their jurisdiction from causing extraterritorial environmental \r harm (Mayer 2016a; Maljean-Dubois 2019). The key features of the \r Paris Agreement are set out in Box 14.1."


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"on human rights' (UNFCCC 2015a, preambular recital 14), a first for \r an environmental treaty (Knox 2016). The 'respective obligations' \r referred to in the Paris Agreement could potentially include those \r relating to the right to life (UNGA 1948, Art. 3, 1966, Art. 6), right \r to health (UNGA 1966b, Art. 12), right to development, right to \r an adequate standard of living, including the right to food (UNGA \r 1966b, Art. 11), which has been read to include the right to water \r and sanitation (CESCR 2002, 2010), the right to housing (CESCR \r 1991), and the right to self-determination, including as applied in the \r context of indigenous peoples (UNGA 1966a,b, Art. 1). In addition, \r climate impacts contribute to displacement and migration (Mayer \r and Crepeau 2016; McAdam 2016), and have disproportionate \r effects on women (Pearse 2017). There are differing views on the \r value and operational impact of the human rights recital in the Paris \r [...]"


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"[...] Agreement (Adelman 2018; Boyle 2018; Duyck et al. 2018; Rajamani \r 2018; Savaresi 2018; Knox 2019). Notwithstanding proposals from \r some Parties and stakeholders to mainstream and operationalise \r human rights in the climate regime post-Paris (Duyck et al. 2018), and \r references to human rights in COP decisions, the 2018 Paris Rulebook \r contains limited and guarded references to human rights (Duyck \r 2019; Rajamani 2019) (Section 14.5.1.2). In addition to the reference \r to human rights, the preamble also notes the importance of 'ensuring \r the integrity of all ecosystems, including oceans and the protection \r of biodiversity' which provides opportunities for integrating and \r mainstreaming other environmental protections."


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"Figure  14.1 illustrates graphically the key features of the Paris \r Agreement. The Paris Agreement is based on a  set of binding \r procedural obligations requiring Parties to 'prepare, communicate, \r and maintain' 'Nationally Determined Contributions' (NDCs) \r (UNFCCC 2015a, Art. 4.2) every five years (UNFCCC 2015a, Art. 4.9). \r These obligations are complemented by: (1) an 'ambition cycle' that \r expects Parties, informed by five-yearly global stocktakes (Art. 14), to \r submit successive NDCs representing a progression on their previous \r NDCs (UNFCCC 2015a; Bodansky et al. 2017b), and (2) an 'enhanced \r transparency framework' that places extensive informational \r demands on Parties, tailored to capacities, and establishes review \r processes to enable tracking of progress towards achievement of \r NDCs (Oberthur and Bodle 2016). In contrast to the Kyoto Protocol \r with its internationally inscribed targets and timetable for emissions \r [...]"


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"[...] reduction for developed countries, the Paris Agreement contains \r Nationally Determined Contributions embedded in an international \r system of transparency and accountability for all countries (Doelle \r 2016; Maljean-Dubois and Wemaere 2016) accompanied by a shared \r global goal, in particular in relation to a temperature limit. "


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"The overall purpose of international cooperation through the Paris \r Agreement is to enhance the implementation of the UNFCCC, \r including its objective of stabilising atmospheric GHG concentrations \r 'at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference \r with the climate system' (UNFCCC 1992, Art. 2). The Paris Agreement \r aims to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate \r change, in the context of sustainable development and efforts to \r eradicate poverty, by inter alia '[h]olding the increase in the global \r average temperature to well below 2degC above pre-industrial levels \r and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5degC \r above pre-industrial levels' (UNFCCC 2015a, Art. 2(1)(a)). There is an \r ongoing structured expert dialogue under the UNFCCC in the context \r of the second periodic review of the long-term global goal (the first \r was held between 2013-2015) aimed at enhancing understanding \r [...]"


id: 767de76f99be8a8c4f0bd5e43fc94e9
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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content:
"[...] of the long-term global goal, pathways to achieving it, and assessing \r the aggregate effect of steps taken by Parties to achieve the goal."


id: 2a2ed27046af7f7e8f3bc89b8192ebaa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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content:
"Albeit non-binding, Article 4.1 has acted as a  catalyst for several \r national net-zero GHG targets, as well as net-zero CO2 and GHG \r targets across local governments, sectors, businesses, and other actors \r (Day et al. 2020). There is a wide variation in the targets that have \r been adopted - in terms of their legal character (policy statement, \r executive order or national legislation), scope (GHGs or CO2) and \r coverage (sectors or economy-wide). National net-zero targets could \r be reflected in the long-term strategies that states are urged to \r submit under Article 4.19, but only a few states have submitted such \r strategies thus far. The Paris Rulebook, agreed at the Agreement's first \r meeting of the Parties in 2018, further strengthens the operational \r relevance of the temperature goal by requiring Parties to provide \r information when submitting their NDCs on how these contribute \r towards achieving the objective identified in UNFCCC Article 2, and \r [...]"


id: 242209a7e612d5b972bef8d6f358d6f6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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content:
"[...] Paris Agreement Articles 2.1 (a) and 4.1 (UNFCCC 2019b, Annex I, \r para. 7). Parties could in this context include information on how their \r short-term actions align with their long-term net zero GHG or CO2\r targets, thereby enhancing the credibility of their long-term goals."


id: a6ff35c36a42430e72a77cb8be4cc7a0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26587
content:
"As the risks of adverse climate impacts, even with a 'well below' 2degC \r increase, are substantial, the purpose of the Paris Agreement extends \r to increasing adaptive capacity and fostering climate resilience \r (UNFCCC 2015a, Art. 2(1)(b)), as well as redirecting investment and \r finance flows (UNFCCC 2015a, Art. (2)(1)(c); Thorgeirsson 2017). \r The finance and adaptation goals are not quantified in the Paris \r Agreement itself but the temperature goal and the pathways they \r generate may, some argue, enable a  quantitative assessment of \r the resources necessary to reach these goals, and the nature of the \r impacts requiring adaptation (Rajamani and Werksman 2018). The \r decision accompanying the Paris Agreement resolves to set a new \r collective quantified finance goal prior to 2025 (not explicitly limited \r to developed countries), with USD100 billion yr-1 as a floor (UNFCCC \r 2016a, para. 53; Bodansky et al. 2017b). Article 2  also references \r [...]"


id: 1d742aff606dd83c5eea42a682b250e6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2360
content:
"[...] sustainable development and poverty eradication, and thus implicitly \r underscores the need to integrate the SDGs in the implementation of \r the Paris Agreement (Sindico 2016). "


id: d992c3184dadccf6d489ebeab1c23902
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35579
content:
"The Paris Agreement's purpose is accompanied by an expectation \r that the Agreement 'will be' implemented to 'reflect equity and \r the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and \r respective capabilities (CBDRRC), in the light of different national \r circumstances' (UNFCCC 2015a, Art. 2.2). This provision generates \r an expectation that Parties will implement the agreement to \r reflect CBDRRC, and is not an obligation to do so (Rajamani \r 2016a). Further, the inclusion of the term 'in light of different \r national circumstances' introduces a  dynamic element into the \r interpretation of the CBDRRC principle. As national circumstances \r evolve, the application of the principle will also evolve (Rajamani \r 2016a). This change in the articulation of the CBDRRC principle is \r reflected in the shifts in the nature and extent of differentiation \r in the climate change regime (Maljean-Dubois 2016; Rajamani \r [...]"


id: ce378e9f238b43014652b05c66220b7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33611
content:
"[...] 2016a; Voigt and Ferreira 2016a), including through a shift towards \r 'procedurally-oriented differentiation' for developing countries \r (Huggins and Karim 2016)."


id: 91efd8730b4f2027285581a418e0c0c9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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vector_id: 22896
content:
"It is worth noting that Article 4.1 recognises that 'peaking will take \r longer for developing countries' and that the balance between \r emissions and removals needs to be on the 'basis of equity, and \r in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate \r poverty'. This suggests that not all countries are expected to reach \r net zero GHG emissions at the same time, or in the same manner. \r If global cost-effective 1.5degC and 2degC scenarios from integrated \r assessment models are taken, without applying an equity principle, \r the results suggest that domestic net zero GHG and CO2 emissions \r would be reached a decade earlier than the global average in Brazil \r and the USA and later in India and Indonesia (van Soest et al. 2021). \r By contrast, if equity principles are taken into account countries like \r Canada and the EU would be expected to phase out earlier than \r the cost-optimal scenarios indicate, and countries like China and \r [...]"


id: 7eef0dc1f3529968c269af4d6db766f6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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content:
"[...] Brazil could phase out emissions later, as well as other countries with \r lower per-capita emissions (van Soest et al. 2021). Some suggest that \r the application of such fairness considerations could bring forward \r the net zero GHG date for big emitting countries by up to 15 to \r 35 years as compared to the global least-cost scenarios (Lee et al. \r 2021b). In any case, reaching net zero GHG emissions requires to \r some extent the use of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) methods as \r there are important sources of non-CO2 GHGs, such as methane and \r nitrous oxide, that cannot be fully eliminated (IPCC 2018b). However, \r there are divergent views on different CDR methods, policy choices \r determine the degree to which and the type of CDR methods that \r are considered and there is a  patchwork of applicable regulatory \r instruments. There are also uncertainties and governance challenges \r associated with CDR methods which render tracking progress against \r [...]"


id: e81357504b151d2c334d6252463e0eaa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"number of NDCs include adaptation, and several NDCs have \r conditional components, for instance, being conditional on the use of \r market mechanisms or on the availability of support (UNFCCC 2016b). \r There are wide variations across NDCs. Uncertainties are generated \r through interpretative ambiguities in the assumptions underlying \r NDCs (Rogelj et al. 2017). According to the assessment in this report, \r current policies lead to median global GHG emissions of 63 gigatonnes \r of CO2 equivalent (GtCO2-eq), with a full range of 57-70 by 2030 and \r unconditional and conditional NDCs to 59 (55-65) and 56 (52-61) \r GtCO2-eq, respectively (Table  4.1). Many omit important mitigation \r sectors, provide little detail on financing implementation, and are not \r effective in meeting assessment and review needs (Pauw et al. 2018). \r Although, it is estimated that the land use sector could contribute as \r much as 20% of the full mitigation potential of all the intended NDC \r [...]"


id: 58cef033d19a8ea671510fb7301f2e64
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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content:
"[...] targets (Forsell et al. 2016), there are variations in how the land use \r component is included, and the related information provided, leading \r to large uncertainties on whether and how these will contribute to \r the achievement of the NDCs (Forsell et al. 2016; Grassi et al. 2017; \r Obergassel et al. 2017a; Benveniste et al. 2018; Fyson and Jeffery \r 2019). All these variations make it challenging to aggregate the efforts \r of countries and compare them to each other (Carraro 2016). Although \r Parties attempted to discipline the variation in NDCs, including whether \r they could be conditional, through elaborating the 'features' of NDCs \r in the Rulebook, no agreement was possible on this. Thus, Parties \r continue to enjoy considerable discretion in the formulation of NDCs \r (Rajamani and Bodansky 2019; Weikmans et al. 2020). "


id: b7ee63312681ec23d652fdc932398404
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content:
"In communicating their NDCs every five years (UNFCCC 2015a, \r Art. 4.9), all Parties have an obligation to 'provide the information \r necessary for clarity, transparency and understanding' (UNFCCC \r 2015a, Art. 4.8). These requirements are further elaborated in \r the Paris Rulebook (Doelle 2019; UNFCCC 2019b). This includes \r requirements -  for Parties' second and subsequent NDCs -  to \r provide quantifiable information on the reference point, for example \r base year, reference indicators and target relative to the reference \r indicator (UNFCCC 2019b, Annex I, para. 1). It also requires Parties to \r provide information on how they consider their contribution 'fair and \r ambitious in light of different national circumstances', and how they \r address the normative expectations of developed country leadership, \r progression and highest possible ambition (UNFCCC 2019b, Annex I, \r para. 6). However, Parties are required to provide the enumerated \r [...]"


id: 3525eb5c9b5c78e83f205b18e4c85e65
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content:
"[...] information only 'as applicable' to their NDC (UNFCCC 2019b, \r Annex I, para. 7). This allows Parties to determine the informational \r requirements placed on them through their choice of NDC. In respect \r of Parties' first NDCs or NDCs updated by 2020, such quantifiable \r information 'may' be included, 'as appropriate', signalling a  softer \r requirement, although Parties are 'strongly encouraged' to provide \r this information (UNFCCC 2019b, Annex I, para. 9). "


id: 56508f77b2b6162bfc245f4ac9f59ac4
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content:
"It is clear, however, that the NDCs communicated by Parties for the \r 2020-2030 period are insufficient to achieve the temperature goal \r (den Elzen et al. 2016; Rogelj et al. 2016; Schleussner et al. 2016; \r Robiou du Pont and Meinshausen 2018; UNEP 2018a; Alcaraz et al. \r 2019; UNEP 2019, 2020), and the emissions gap is larger than ever \r (Christensen and Olhoff 2019) (Chapter 4). The IPCC Special Report \r on Global Warming of 1.5degC (SR1.5) notes that pathways that limit \r global warming to 1.5degC with no or limited overshoot show up to \r 40-50% reduction of total GHG emissions from 2010 levels by 2030, \r and that current pathways reflected in the NDCs are consistent with \r cost-effective pathways that result in a  global warming of about \r 3degC by 2100 (IPCC 2018b Summary for Policymakers D.1.1). Analysis \r by the UNFCCC Secretariat of the second round of those NDCs \r submitted by October 2021 suggests that 'total global GHG emission \r [...]"


id: 3e92b55f6f019bc23c8153291964d488
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content:
"Figure 14.2 | The role of international cooperation in the reductions in annual emissions by 2030 needed to follow a 1.5degC (respectively <2degC) cost-effective \r path from 2020 onwards. The figure represents the additional contribution of pledges included in the NDCs over current policies at the global level, and the remaining gap \r in emissions reductions needed to move from current policies to pathways that limit warning to 1.5degC (>50%) with no or limited overshoot, and those to limit warming to \r 2degC (>67%). Median values are used, showing the confidence interval for the total effort. See Figure 1 in Cross-Chapter Box 4 in Chapter 4, and Tables 4.2 and 4.3 for details. \r (i) The grey share represents NDCs with abatement efforts pledged without any conditions (called 'unconditional' in the literature). They are based mainly on domestic abatement \r [...]"


id: 590010bd7f032a90d83354e4130cd963
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content:
"[...] actions, although countries can use international cooperation to meet their targets. (ii) The blue share represents NDCs with conditional components. They require international \r cooperation, for example bilateral agreements under Article 6, financing or monetary and/or technological transfers. (iii) The remaining gap in emissions reductions - the yellow \r share - can potentially be achieved through national and international actions. International coordination of more ambitious efforts promotes global ambition and international \r cooperation provides the cost-saving basis for more ambitious NDCs. "


id: 597b266e789a9ca9e91ecd32fb5a1a5b
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content:
"In this context, it should be noted that many NDCs have been \r formulated with conditional elements, and such NDCs require \r international cooperation on finance, technology and capacity \r building (Kissinger et al. 2019), potentially including through Article \r 6  in the form of bilateral agreements and market mechanisms \r (UNFCCC 2016b). More broadly, some argue that there is a 'policy \r inconsistency' between the facilitative, 'bottom up' architecture \r of the Paris Agreement, and both the setting of the long-term \r temperature goal and expectations that it will be delivered (Geden \r 2016b). As Figure  14.2 shows, there is a  large share of additional \r effort needed to reach a 1.5degC compatible path by 2030 (and even \r a 2degC compatible path). International coordination and cooperation \r are crucial in enhancing the ambition of current pledges, as countries \r will be more willing to increase their ambition if matched by other \r [...]"


id: f111066016112452b2732b510b36f26a
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39788
content:
"[...] countries (coordination) and if cost-minimising agreements between \r developed and developing countries, through Article 6  and other \r means, are fully developed (cooperation) (Saelen 2020)."


id: c6f3d5cbfbe71358998482cb29ffa6
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32314
content:
"Many NDCs with conditional elements may not be feasible as \r the conditions are not clearly defined and existing promises of \r support are insufficient (Pauw et al. 2020). Moreover, 'leadership \r by conditional commitments' (when some states promise to take \r stronger commitments if others do so as well), and the system of \r pledge-and-review, may lead to decreasing rather than deeper \r contributions over time (Helland et al. 2017). Some note, however, \r that many of the NDCs are conservative and may be overachieved, \r that NDCs may be strengthened over time as expected under the \r Paris Agreement, and that there are significant non-state actions \r that have not been adequately captured in the NDCs (Hohne et al. \r 2017). Further, if all NDCs with and without conditional elements are \r implemented, net land use, land use change and forestry emissions \r will decrease in 2030 compared to 2010 levels, but large uncertainties \r [...]"


id: f364e9656e99eba74abe5e51747f2b67
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40194
content:
"[...] remain on how Parties estimate, project and account for emissions \r and removals from this sector (Forsell et al. 2016; Fyson and Jeffery "


id: 4f2d218bf058effdea3e2891e0379ca
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11217
content:
"all emissions contribute to the problem regardless of their relative \r size and there is a  clear articulation under the UNFCCC and Paris \r Agreement for developed countries to 'take the lead' in addressing \r GHG emissions (Preston 2020). Given the limited avenues for \r multilateral determination of fairness, several researchers have \r argued that the onus is on the scientific community to generate \r methods to assess fairness (Herrala and Goel 2016; Lawrence and \r Reder 2019). Peer-to-peer comparisons also potentially create \r pressure for ambitious NDCs (Aldy et al. 2017). \r There are a range of options to assess or introduce fairness. These \r include: adopting differentiation in financing rather than in mitigation \r (Gajevic Sayegh 2017); adopting a carbon budget approach (Hales \r and Mackey 2018; Alcaraz et al. 2019), which may occur through \r the transparency processes (Hales and Mackey 2018); quantifying \r national emissions allocations using different equity approaches, \r [...]"


id: 83cd234774cdcd371075f57559b4b681
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content:
"[...] including those reconciling finance and emissions rights distributions \r (Robiou du Pont et al. 2017); combining equity concepts in a bottom\u0002up manner using different sovereign approaches (Robiou du Pont \r and Meinshausen 2018), using data on adopted emissions targets to \r find an ethical framework consistent with the observed distribution \r (Sheriff 2019); adopting common metrics for policy assessment \r (Bretschger 2017); and developing a  template for organising \r metrics on mitigation effort - emissions reductions, implicit prices, \r and costs - for both ex-ante and ex-post review (Aldy et al. 2017). \r The burden of agricultural mitigation can also be distributed using \r different approaches from effort sharing (responsibility, capability, \r need, equal cumulative per-capita emissions) (Richards et al. 2018). \r Further, there are temporal (inter-generational) and spatial (inter\u0002regional) dimensions to the distribution of the mitigation burden, \r [...]"


id: 617d6d3c4866004ac0efe892c8243623
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content:
"[...] with additional emissions reductions in 2030 improving both inter\u0002generational and inter-regional equity (Liu et al. 2016). Some of the \r equity approaches rely on 'grandfathering' as an allocation principle, \r which some argue has led to 'cascading biases' against developing \r countries (Kartha et al. 2018), and is morally 'perverse' (Caney \r 2011). While no country's NDC explicitly supports the grandfathering \r approach, many countries describe as 'fair and ambitious' NDCs \r that assume grandfathering as the starting point (Robiou du Pont \r et al. 2017). It is worth noting that the existence of multiple metrics \r associated with a range of equity approaches has implications for how \r the ambition and 'fair' share of each state is arrived at; some average \r out multiple approaches and indicators (Hof et al. 2012; Meinshausen \r et al. 2015; Robiou du Pont and Meinshausen 2018), others exclude \r indicators and approaches that do not, in their interpretation, accord \r [...]"


id: 4b36b43731e99fd7054daff2022228e0
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10480
content:
"[...] with principles of international environmental law (Rajamani et al. \r 2021). One group of scholars has suggested that utilitarianism offers \r an 'ethically minimal and conceptually parsimonious' benchmark that \r promotes equity, climate and development (Budolfson et al. 2021)."


id: 76fbfb07b9abd2885a1e377dceb20877
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18138
content:
"In the first round of NDCs, most Parties declared their NDCs as fair \r (Robiou du Pont et al. 2017). Their claims, however, were largely \r unsubstantiated or drawn from analysis by in-country experts \r (Winkler et al. 2018). At least some of the indicators Parties \r have identified in their NDCs as justifying the 'fairness' of their \r contributions, such as a  'small share of global emissions', 'cost\u0002effectiveness' and assumptions that privilege current emissions \r levels ('grandfathering') are not, according to one group of scholars, \r in accordance with principles of international environmental law \r (Rajamani et al. 2021).  Moreover, the NDCs reveal long-standing \r institutional divisions and divergent climate priorities between \r Annex I and non-Annex I Parties, suggesting that equity and fairness \r concerns remain salient (Stephenson et al. 2019). Fairness concerns \r also affect the share of CDR responsibilities for major emitters if they \r [...]"


id: 2b130e0058670430d391c2c2e24269be
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vector_id: 4814
content:
"The information provided by Parties in biennial transparency \r reports and GHG inventories will undergo technical expert review, \r which must include assistance in identifying capacity-building \r needs for developing country Parties that need it in light of their \r capacities. Each Party is also required to participate in a 'facilitative, \r multilateral consideration of progress' of implementation and \r achievement of its NDC. Although the aim of these processes is to \r expose each Party's actions on mitigation to international review, \r thus establishing a  weak form of accountability for NDCs at the \r international level, the Rulebook circumscribes the reach of these \r processes (Rajamani and Bodansky 2019). The technical expert \r review teams are prohibited in mandatory terms from making \r 'political judgments' or reviewing the 'adequacy or appropriateness' \r of a Party's NDC, domestic actions, or support provided (UNFCCC \r [...]"


id: a8e977ba216573ec3fb15b75257df8c2
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content:
"[...] 2019k, Annex, para. 149). This, among other such provisions, has led \r some to argue that the scope and practice of existing transparency \r arrangements reflect rather than mediate ongoing disputes around \r responsibility, differentiation and burden sharing, and thus there \r is limited answerability through transparency (Gupta and van \r Asselt 2019). There are also limits to the extent that the enhanced \r transparency framework will reduce ambiguities and associated \r uncertainties, for instance, in how land use, land-use change \r and forestry (LULUCF) are incorporated into the NDCs (Fyson \r and Jeffery 2019), and lead to increased ambition (Weikmans \r et al. 2020). More broadly, there has been 'weak' translation of \r transparency norms into accountability (Ciplet et al. 2018). Hence, \r the Paris Agreement's effectiveness in ensuring NDCs are achieved \r will depend on additional accountability pathways at the domestic \r [...]"


id: 99c99666f79fc6d6d9e99ececcffb720
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24284
content:
"[...] level involving political processes and civil society engagement \r (Jacquet and Jamieson 2016; van Asselt 2016; Campbell-Durufle \r 2018a; Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen et al. 2018)."


id: d82a2e60b45aad5f698dad4157369632
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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vector_id: 35330
content:
"Article 6.1 recognises the role that cooperative approaches can play, \r on a  voluntary basis, in implementing Parties' NDCs 'in order to \r allow for higher ambition' in their mitigation actions and to promote \r sustainable development and environmental integrity. Article 6.2 \r indicates that ITMOs can originate from a variety of sources, and that \r Parties using ITMOs to achieve their NDCs shall promote sustainable \r development, ensure environmental integrity, ensure transparency, \r including in governance, and apply 'robust accounting' in accordance \r with Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties \r to the Paris Agreement (CMA) guidance to prevent double counting. \r While this provision, unlike Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol, does not \r create an international carbon market, it enables Parties to pursue \r this option should they choose to do so, for example, through the \r linking of domestic or regional carbon markets (Marcu 2016; Muller \r [...]"


id: d7c459c6e5fa098e0ed350d0e969f74a
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35267
content:
"[...] and Michaelowa 2019). Article 6.2 could also be implemented in \r other ways, including direct transfers between governments, linkage \r of mitigation policies across two or more Parties, sectoral or activity \r crediting mechanisms, and other forms of cooperation involving \r public or private entities, or both (Howard 2017). "


id: 2c52c69d63e07c6cb3ebc97f43ce442
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5065
content:
"Article 5.2 encourages Parties to implement and support the existing \r framework for REDD+, including through 'results-based payments', \r that is provision of financial payments for verified avoided or reduced \r forest carbon emissions (Turnhout et al. 2017). The existing REDD+ \r framework set up under decisions of the UNFCCC COP includes \r the Warsaw Framework for REDD+, which specifies modalities for \r measuring, reporting and verifying greenhouse gas emissions and \r removals. This provides an essential tool for linking REDD+ activities \r to results-based finance (Voigt and Ferreira 2015). Appropriate \r finance support for REDD+ is also considered critical to move from \r its inclusion in many countries' NDCs to implementation on the \r ground (Hein et al. 2018). Since public finance for REDD+ is limited, \r private sector participation is expected by some to leverage REDD+ \r (Streck and Parker 2012; Henderson et al. 2013; Pistorius and Kiff \r [...]"


id: e891e9fe1a6d9009f549da44fe8af41b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38256
content:
"[...] 2015; Seymour and Busch 2016; Ehara et al. 2019). Article 5.2 also \r encourages Parties' support for 'alternative policy approaches' to \r forest conservation and sustainable management such as 'joint \r mitigation and adaptation approaches'. It reaffirms the importance \r of incentivising, as appropriate, non-carbon benefits associated \r with such approaches (e.g.,  improvements in the livelihoods of \r forest-dependent communities, facilitating poverty reduction and \r sustainable development). This provision, along with the support for \r non-market mechanisms in Article 6 (discussed below), is seen as an \r avenue for cooperative joint mitigation-adaptation and non-market \r REDD+ activities with co-benefits for biodiversity conservation \r (Gupta and Dube 2018)."


id: b49d647534e7b17e771902fca673dff8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29026
content:
"Assessments of the potential of Article 6.2 generally find that \r ITMOs are likely to result in cost reductions in achieving mitigation \r outcomes, with the potential for such reductions to enhance \r ambition and accelerate Parties' progression of mitigation pledges \r across NDC cycles (Fujimori et al. 2016; Gao et al. 2016; Mehling \r 2019). However, studies applying insights from the CDM highlight \r environmental integrity risks associated with using ITMOs under the \r Paris Agreement given the challenges that the diverse scope, metrics, \r types and timeframes of NDC targets pose for robust accounting \r (Schneider and La Hoz Theuer 2019) and the potential for transfers of \r 'hot air', as occurred under the Kyoto Protocol (La Hoz Theuer et al. \r 2019). These studies collectively affirm that robust governance on \r accounting for ITMOs, and for reporting and review, will be critical \r to ensuring the environmental integrity of NDCs making use of them \r [...]"


id: 4b4de652972290ea2624245400df960d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10495
content:
"Much of the current literature on climate finance and the Paris \r Agreement focuses on the obligations of developed countries to \r provide climate finance to assist the implementation of mitigation and \r adaptation actions by developing countries. The principal provision on \r finance in the Paris Agreement is the binding obligation on developed \r country Parties to provide financial resources to assist developing \r country Parties (UNFCCC 2015a, Art. 9.1). This provision applies to \r both mitigation and adaptation and is in continuation of existing \r developed country Parties' obligations under the UNFCCC. This signals \r that the Paris Agreement finance requirements must be interpreted \r in light of the UNFCCC (Yamineva 2016). The novelty introduced by \r the Paris Agreement is a further expansion in the potential pool of \r donor countries as Article 9.2 encourages 'other Parties' to provide \r or continue to provide such support on a voluntary basis. However, \r [...]"


id: 3a41438e33ea24222b59a9b2f2a1acbb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7455
content:
"[...] 'as part of the global effort, developed countries should continue \r to take the lead in mobilising climate finance', with a 'significant \r role' for public funds, and an expectation that such mobilisation of \r finance 'should represent a  progression beyond previous efforts'. \r Beyond this, there are no new recognised promises (Ciplet et al. \r 2018). In the Paris Agreement, Parties formalised the continuation of \r the existing collective mobilisation goal to raise USD100 billion yr-1\r through to 2025 in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and \r transparency on implementation. The Paris Agreement decision also \r provided for the CMA by 2025 to set a new collective quantified goal \r from a floor of USD100 billion yr-1, taking into account the needs \r and priorities of developing countries (UNFCCC 2016a, para. 53). This \r new collective goal on finance is not explicitly limited to developed \r countries and could therefore encompass finance flows from \r [...]"


id: 5ec3c119b469566193990789fe5335ef
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13963
content:
"[...] developing countries' donors (Bodansky et al. 2017b). Deliberations \r on setting a new collective quantified goal on finance is expected to \r be initiated at COP26 in 2021 (UNFCCC 2019g,e; Zhang 2019)."


id: 62114eeb9db95091e4ec367dfbfe934
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14524
content:
"More broadly, there is recognition of the need for better accounting, \r transparency and reporting rules to allow evaluation of the fulfilment \r of finance pledges and the effectiveness of how funding is used (Xu \r et al. 2016; Roberts et al. 2017; Jachnik et al. 2019; Gupta and van \r Asselt 2019; Roberts et al. 2021). There is also a concern about climate \r finance being new and additional though the Paris Agreement does not \r make an explicit reference to it, nor is there a clear understanding of \r what constitutes new and additional (UNFCCC 2018; Carty et al. 2020; \r Mitchell et al. 2021). Some authors see the 'enhanced transparency \r framework' of the Paris Agreement (Section 14.3.2.4), and the specific \r requirements for developed countries to provide, biennially, indicative \r quantitative and qualitative information as well as report on financial \r support and mobilisation efforts (Articles 9.5 and 9.7), as promising \r [...]"


id: 32900c1af7937d7aab8b7234c5ea8e1a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6153
content:
"[...] marked improvements (Weikmans and Roberts 2019), including for \r the fairness of effort-sharing on climate finance provision (Pickering \r et al. 2015). Others offer a more circumspect view of the transformative \r capability of these transparency systems (Ciplet et al. 2018). "


id: 7dc34e065e9f1a99a4ce6857c50da722
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19300
content:
"Article 10 of the Paris Agreement articulates a shared 'long-term \r vision on the importance of fully realising technology development \r and transfer in order to improve resilience to climate change \r and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions' (UNFCCC 2015, Art. \r 10.1). All Parties are required 'to strengthen cooperative action \r on technology development and transfer' (UNFCCC 2015, Art. \r 10.2). In addition, support, including financial support, 'shall be \r provided' to developing country Parties for the implementation \r of Article 10, 'including for strengthening cooperative action on \r technology development and transfer at different stages of the \r technology cycle, with a  view to achieving a  balance between \r support for mitigation and adaptation' (UNFCCC 2015, Art. 10.6). \r Available information on efforts related to support on technology \r development and transfer for developing country Parties is also one \r of the matters to be taken into account in the global stocktake \r [...]"


id: bdeabd1a13d71ce68c93370dbcb3cf6b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30676
content:
"The more limited literature focusing on the specific finance needs of \r developing countries, particularly those expressed in NDCs conditional \r on international climate finance, suggests that once all countries have \r fully costed their NDCs, the demand for (public and private) finance \r to support NDC implementation is likely to be orders of magnitude \r larger than funds available from bilateral and multilateral sources. \r For some sectors, such as forestry and land use, this could leave 'NDC \r ambitions... in a precarious position, unless more diversified options \r are pursued to reach climate goals' (Kissinger et al. 2019). In addition, \r there is a  need for fiscal policy reform in developing countries to \r ensure international climate finance flows are not undercut by public \r and private finance supporting unsustainable activities (Kissinger \r et al. 2019). During the 2018 Katowice conference, UNFCCC Parties \r requested the Standing Committee on Finance to prepare, every \r [...]"


id: adf6678bcbe702be7005a2b2b3efa136
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27847
content:
"[...] four years, a report on the determination of the needs of developing \r country Parties related to implementing the Convention and the Paris \r Agreement, for consideration by Parties at COP26 (UNFCCC 2019c)."


id: a3346a43e83304c6b59b59a1ac621919
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25923
content:
"The Paris Agreement urges all Parties to cooperate to enhance \r the capacity of developing countries to implement the Agreement \r (UNFCCC 2015a, Art. 11.3), with a particular focus on LDCs and SIDS \r (UNFCCC 2015a, Art. 11.1). Developed country Parties are specifically \r urged to enhance support for capacity-building actions in developing \r country Parties (UNFCCC 2015a, Art. 11.3). Article 12 of the Paris \r Agreement addresses cooperative measures to enhance climate \r change education, training, public awareness, public participation \r and public access to information, which can also be seen as elements \r of capacity building (Khan et al. 2020). Under the Paris Rulebook, \r efforts related to the implementation of Article 12 are referred to as \r 'Action for Climate Empowerment' and Parties are invited to develop \r and implement national strategies on this topic, taking into account \r their national circumstances (UNFCCC 2019i, para. 6). Actions to \r [...]"


id: e02ab278234d03a3000ede224ade9ab5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36686
content:
"[...] enhance climate change education, training, public awareness, \r public participation, public access to information, and regional and \r international cooperation may also be taken into account by Parties in \r the global stocktake process under Article 14 of the Paris Agreement \r (UNFCCC 2019i, para. 9)."


id: b91b4665dbdeb87d8e88841926be5f5f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29769
content:
"inclusiveness, a  results-oriented approach, a  transformational \r approach and transparency. Its 'key themes' include innovation, \r implementation, enabling environment and capacity building, \r collaboration and stakeholder engagement, and support (UNFCCC \r 2019e, Annex). A  number of 'actions and activities' are elaborated \r for each thematic area. These include: enhancing engagement and \r collaboration with relevant stakeholders, including local communities \r and authorities, national planners, the private sector and civil society \r organisations, in the planning and implementation of Technology \r Mechanism activities; facilitating Parties undertaking, updating and \r implementing technology needs assessments (TNAs) and aligning \r these with NDCs; and enhancing the collaboration of the Technology \r Mechanism with the Financial Mechanism for enhanced support for \r technology development and transfer. As regards TNAs, while some \r [...]"


id: bc2b6d0d71a33915d36c0aa706f1dfe3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30347
content:
"[...] developing countries have already used the results of their TNA process \r in NDC development, other countries might benefit from following the \r TNA process, including its stakeholder involvement and multi-criteria \r decision analysis methodology, to strengthen their NDCs (Hofman and \r van der Gaast 2019)."


id: dde2425bce7d6ec590764a0501d11fd5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36299
content:
"Under the Paris Agreement, capacity-building can take a  range of \r forms, including: facilitating technology development, dissemination \r and deployment; access to climate finance; education, training \r and public awareness; and the transparent, timely and accurate \r communication of information (UNFCCC 2015a, Art. 11.1) \r (Section  14.3.2.4). Principles guiding capacity-building support are \r that it should be: country-driven; based on and responsive to national \r needs; fostering country ownership of Parties at multiple levels; \r guided by lessons learned; and an effective, iterative process that is \r participatory, cross-cutting and gender-responsive (UNFCCC 2015a, \r Art. 11.2). Parties undertaking capacity building for developing \r country Parties must 'regularly communicate on these actions or \r measures'. Developing country Parties have a  soft requirement \r [...]"


id: b933b7bcab7d2b8b1ae4449b11041c08
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29786
content:
"[...] ('should') to communicate progress made on implementing capacity\u0002building plans, policies, actions or measures to implement the Paris \r Agreement (UNFCCC 2015a, Art. 11.4). "


id: c00fade3dcacd8a2657e7ec307672d11
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31082
content:
"In its annual synthesis report for 2018, the UNFCCC secretariat \r stressed the importance of capacity building for the implementation \r of the Paris Agreement and NDCs, with a focus on measures already \r in place, regional and cooperative activities, and capacity-building \r needs for strengthening NDCs (UNFCCC 2019h). Of the 168 NDCs \r submitted as of June 2019, capacity building was the most frequently \r requested type of support (113 of 136 conditional NDCs) (Pauw \r et al. 2020). The focus of capacity-building activities is on enabling \r developing countries to take effective climate change action, \r given that many developing countries continue to face significant \r capacity challenges, undermining their ability to effectively or fully \r carry out the climate actions they intend to pursue (Dagnet et al. \r 2016). Content analysis of NDCs shows that capacity building for \r adaptation is prioritised over mitigation for developing countries, \r [...]"


id: ead34f921c1cb4002d8f3f12d1530983
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38674
content:
"[...] with the element of capacity building most indicated in NDCs being \r research and technology (Khan et al. 2020). In addition, developing \r countries' needs for education, training and awareness raising for \r climate change mitigation and adaptation feature prominently in \r NDCs, particularly those of LDCs (Khan et al. 2020). Differences are \r evident though between capacity-building needs expressed in the \r NDCs of LDCs (noting that Khan et al.s review was limited to NDCs \r in English) compared with those of upper-middle-income developing \r countries as categorised by the World Bank (World Bank 2021); the \r latter have more focus on mitigation with an emphasis on technology \r development and transfer (Khan et al. 2020)."


id: c6ce639ba6286ae88dae30d07f119bc0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32285
content:
"Article 11.5 provides that capacity-building activities 'shall be \r enhanced through appropriate institutional arrangements to support \r the implementation of this Agreement, including the appropriate \r institutional arrangements established under the Convention that \r serve this Agreement'. The COP decision accompanying the Paris \r Agreement established the Paris Committee on Capacity-building, \r with the aim to 'address gaps and needs, both current and emerging, \r in implementing capacity-building in developing country Parties and \r further enhancing capacity-building efforts, including with regard \r to coherence and coordination in capacity-building activities under \r the Convention' (UNFCCC 2016a, para. 71). The activities of the \r Committee are discussed further in Section 14.4.3 below. The relevant \r COP decision also established the Capacity-building Initiative for \r Transparency (UNFCCC 2016a, para. 84), which is managed by the \r [...]"


id: 3f95c7a8c04df35124747a6c8365a8a1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8377
content:
"[...] GEF and designed to support developing country Parties in meeting \r the reporting and transparency requirements under Article 13 of the \r Paris Agreement (Robinson 2018). "


id: edc8dbb4d36c3728cabe680cc057c12a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39194
content:
"This mechanism is to operate in a transparent, non-adversarial and \r non-punitive manner (Voigt 2016; Campbell-Durufle 2018b; Oberthur \r and Northrop 2018) that distinguishes it from the more stringent \r compliance procedures of the Kyoto Protocol's Enforcement branch. \r The Paris Rulebook elaborated the modalities and procedures for \r the implementation and compliance mechanism, specifying the \r nature and composition of the compliance committee, the situations \r triggering its procedures, and the facilitative measures it can apply, \r which include a  'finding of fact' in limited situations, dialogue, \r assistance and recommendations (UNFCCC 2019e). The compliance \r committee is focused on ensuring compliance with a  core set of \r binding procedural obligations (UNFCCC 2019j, Annex, Para. 22). This \r compliance committee, characterised as 'one of its kind' and an 'an \r important cornerstone' of the Agreement's legitimacy, effectiveness \r [...]"


id: 3325e0afc7f89e86bb71ba4a8fe8b00e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6254
content:
"[...] and longevity (Zihua et al. 2019), is designed to facilitate compliance \r rather than penalise non-compliance."


id: db959259ccb02f0b161e291cfe456f9e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35919
content:
"Previous assessment reports have assessed the Kyoto Protocol with \r respect to each of the criteria identified in this chapter. However, at \r the time of AR5, it was premature to assess the impact of Kyoto on \r emissions, as these data had not been entirely compiled yet. Since \r AR5, a  number of studies have done so. Chapter 2 of this report \r lists at least 18 countries that have sustained absolute emissions \r reductions for at least a decade, nearly all of which are countries \r that had Kyoto targets for the first commitment period. Most studies \r have concluded that Kyoto did cause emissions reductions. Such \r studies find a positive, statistically significant impact on emissions \r reductions in Annex I countries (Kim et al. 2020), Annex B countries \r (Grunewald and Martinez-Zarzoso 2012; Kumazawa and Callaghan \r 2012; Grunewald and Martinez-Zarzoso 2016; Maamoun 2019), or all \r countries respectively (Aichele and Felbermayr 2013; Iwata and Okada \r [...]"


id: 42fe7165e35f6c054030c60a4fec33e1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8989
content:
"[...] 2014). Overall, countries with emissions reduction obligations emit on \r average less CO2 than similar countries without emissions reduction \r obligations - with estimates ranging from 3-50% (Grunewald and \r Martinez-Zarzoso 2012, 2016). Maamoun (2019) estimates that the \r Kyoto Protocol reduced GHG emissions of Annex B countries by 7% \r on average below a  no-Kyoto scenario between 2005 and 2012. \r Aichele and Felbermayr (2013) conclude that Kyoto reduced CO2 and \r GHG emissions by 10% compared to the counterfactual. By contrast, \r Almer and Winkler (2017) find no evidence for binding emission \r targets under Kyoto inducing significant and lasting emissions \r reductions for any of the Annex B  or non-Annex B  countries. The \r authors identify both negative and positive associations between \r Kyoto and emissions for several countries in several years, but no \r coherent picture emerges. Hartl (2019) calculates a  Kyoto leakage \r share in global CO2 trade of 4.3% for 2002-2009."


id: 43dbbe56f5b5b0814c7adc1352467823
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9170
content:
"potential for international cooperation under the Paris Agreement to \r advance climate change mitigation. \r These assessments are mixed and reflect uncertainty over the outcomes \r the Paris Agreement will achieve (Christoff 2016; Clemencon 2016; \r Keohane and Oppenheimer 2016; Young 2016; Dimitrov et al. 2019; \r Raiser et al. 2020). There is a divide between studies that do not expect \r a positive outcome from the Paris Agreement and those that do. The \r former base this assessment on factors such as: a lack of clarity in \r the expression of obligations and objectives; a lack of concrete plans \r collectively to achieve the temperature goal; extensive use of soft \r law (i.e., non-legally binding) provisions; limited incentives to avoid \r free-riding; and the Agreement's weak enforcement provisions (Allan \r 2019), as well as US non-cooperation under the Trump administration \r and the resulting gap in mitigation, finance and governance (Bang \r [...]"


id: d21ec62e22bd2e188495f4726fd47678
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34320
content:
"[...] et al. 2016; Spash 2016; Tulkens 2016; Chai et al. 2017; Lawrence \r and Wong 2017; Thompson 2017; Barrett 2018; Kemp 2018). Studies \r expecting a positive outcome emphasise factors such as: the breadth \r of participation enabled by self-differentiated NDCs; the 'logic' of \r domestic climate policies driving greater national ambition; the \r multiplicity of actors engaged by the Paris Agreement's facilitative \r architecture; the falling cost of low-carbon technologies; provision \r for financial, technology and capacity-building support to developing \r country Parties; possibilities for voluntary cooperation on mitigation \r under Article 6; and the potential for progressive ratcheting up of \r Parties' pledges over time fostered by transparency of reporting and \r international scrutiny of national justifications of the 'fairness' of \r contributions (Caparros 2016; Chan 2016a; Falkner 2016b; Victor \r 2016; Morgan and Northrop 2017; Urpelainen and Van de Graaf \r [...]"


id: ba585e52b539d4e8df823a8bcfcccf11
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30001
content:
"[...] 2018; Hale 2020; Torstad 2020). Turning to the assessment criteria \r articulated in this chapter, the following preliminary assessments of \r the Paris Agreement can be made. "


id: 8312c77d2f40aee11a723196ab5b9f69
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20186
content:
"Assessing the effectiveness of Kyoto's market mechanisms is \r challenging, and the results have been mixed (Aichele and Felbermayr \r 2013; Iwata and Okada 2014; Kuriyama and Abe 2018). Kuriyama \r and Abe (2018) assessed emissions reduction quantities taking into \r account heightened criteria for additionality. They identified annual \r energy-related emissions reductions of 49 MtCO2-eq yr-1 flowing \r from the CDM, and non-energy related emissions reductions of \r 177 MtCO2-eq yr-1. Others have pointed to issues associated with \r non-energy related emissions reductions that suggest the latter \r estimate may be of questionable reliability, while also noting that \r regulatory tightening led later CDM projects to perform better with \r respect to the additionality criterion (Michaelowa et al. 2019b). \r The  CDM's contribution to capacity building in some developing \r countries has been identified as possibly its most important \r [...]"


id: 77f5c508c389981f3791e9641a028134
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18310
content:
"[...] achievement (Spalding-Fecher et al. 2012; Gandenberger et al. 2015; \r Murata et al. 2016; Xu et al. 2016; Dong and Holm Olsen 2017; \r Lindberg et al. 2018). There is evidence that the CDM lowered \r compliance costs for Annex 1  countries by at least USD3.6 billion \r (Spalding-Fecher et al. 2012). In host countries, the CDM led to the \r establishment of national approval bodies and the development of \r an ecosystem of consultants and auditors (Michaelowa et al. 2019b). "


id: ca459e9c8d8c6ec78cc7336248953798
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32930
content:
"On the negative side, there are numerous findings that the CDM, \r especially at first, failed to lead to additional emissions cuts in host \r countries, meaning that the overall effect of CDM projects was to \r raise global emissions. Cames et al. (2016) concluded that over 70% \r of CDM projects led to emissions reductions that were likely less than \r projected, including the absence of additional reductions, while only \r 7% of projects led to actual additional emissions reductions that \r had a high likelihood of meeting or exceeding the ex-ante estimates. \r The primary reason the authors gave was associated with the low \r price for CDM credits; this meant that the contribution of the CDM \r to project finance was negligible, suggesting that most CDM projects \r would have been built anyway. A meta-analysis of ex-post studies of \r global carbon markets, which include the CDM, found net combined \r effects on emissions to be negligible (Green 2021). Across the board, \r [...]"


id: 5bd2f300f2306797de7dc62de534c698
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13417
content:
"[...] CDM projects have been criticised for lack of 'additionality', problems \r of baseline determination, uneven geographic coverage (Michaelowa \r and Michaelowa 2011a; Cames et al. 2016; Michaelowa et al. 2019b), \r as well as failing to address human rights concerns (Schade and \r Obergassel 2014). "


id: 78c70342d2f661f652fe1ac66553f14
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18436
content:
"In relation to the criterion of environmental effectiveness, the \r Paris Agreement exceeds the Kyoto Protocol in terms of coverage \r of GHGs and participation of states in mitigation actions. In terms \r of coverage of GHGs, the Kyoto Protocol limits its coverage to \r a defined basket of gases identified in its Annex A (carbon dioxide \r (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons \r (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), sulphur hexafluoride (SF6), as well \r as nitrogen trifluoride (NF3)). The Paris Agreement does not specify \r the coverage of gases, thus Parties may cover the full spectrum of \r GHGs in their NDCs as encouraged by the accounting provisions \r in Annex II to Decision  18/CMA.1 (or conversely they may choose \r to exclude important mitigation sectors) and there is also the \r possibility to include other pollutants such as short-lived climate \r forcers like black carbon. Article 4.4 calls on developed countries \r [...]"


id: 43919bb4ddeb615a188d0ff32de84507
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9111
content:
"[...] to undertake economy-wide emissions reduction targets with \r the expectation that developing country Parties will also move to \r introduce these over time. Moreover, the Paris Agreement makes \r express reference to Parties taking action to conserve and enhance \r 'sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases' (Article 5). As under the \r UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol, this allows for coverage of land use, \r land-use change and forestry and agriculture, forestry and other land \r use (AFOLU) emissions, both CO2 and other Kyoto Annex A gases, \r as well as methane (Pekkarinen 2020). A few countries, particularly \r LDCs, include quantified non-CO2 emissions reductions from the "


id: 3f93193c3b275bbf8252a430721544e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8373
content:
"As Figure 14.2 illustrates graphically, communicated unconditional \r NDCs, if achieved, lead to a reduction of about 7% of world emissions \r by 2030 in relation to the Kyoto GHGs, and NDCs with conditional \r elements increase this reduction to about 12% (den Elzen et al. 2016). \r Although there are uncertainties in the extent to which countries will \r meet the conditional elements of their NDCs, the experience with \r the Cancun pledges has been positive, as countries will collectively \r meet their pledges by 2020, and even individual pledges will be met \r in most cases, although arguably helped by the COVID-19 pandemic \r (UNEP 2020). In any case, the main challenge that remains is to close \r the emissions gap, the difference between what has been pledged \r and what needs to be achieved by 2030 to reach a 1.5degC compatible \r path (respectively 2degC) (Roelfsema et al. 2020; UNEP 2020, see \r also Cross-Chapter Box 4 in Chapter 4). In terms of participation of \r [...]"


id: 6f0479b8619cfdba37598a06713521ef
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16804
content:
"[...] states in mitigation actions, the Paris Agreement performs better \r than the Kyoto Protocol. The latter contains mitigation targets \r only for developed countries listed in its Annex B, while the Paris \r Agreement extends binding procedural obligations in relation to \r mitigation contributions to all states. It is noted, however, that the \r Paris Agreement represented a weakening of commitments for those \r industrialised countries that were Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, \r although a strengthening for those that were not, and for developing \r countries (Oberthur and Groen 2020). Finally, some analysts have \r suggested that the recent proliferation of national mid-century net\u0002zero targets - currently 127 countries have considered or adopted \r such targets -  can be attributed, at least in part, to participation \r in the Paris Agreement and having agreed to its Article 4 (Climate \r Action Tracker 2020a; Day et al. 2020)."


id: 3999f7743d0a210d5eae0f28861398c1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7345
content:
"In relation to the criterion of distributive outcomes, the Paris \r Agreement performs well in some respects but less well in others, \r and its performance relative to the Kyoto Protocol is arguably lower in \r respect of some indicators such as industrialised country leadership, \r and differentiation in favour of developing countries. While the \r Kyoto Protocol implemented a multilaterally agreed burden-sharing \r arrangement set out in the UNFCCC and reflected in Annex-based \r differentiation in mitigation obligations, the Paris Agreement relies \r on NDCs, accompanied by self-assessments of the fairness of these \r contributions; some of these do not accord with equity principles of \r international environmental law, although it is worth noting that the \r Kyoto Protocol was also not fully consistent with such principles. At \r present, mechanisms in the Paris Agreement for promoting equitable \r burden sharing and evaluating the fairness of Parties' contributions \r [...]"


id: adaa63d38702bbab5952409b74068f21
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27797
content:
"[...] are undefined, although numerous proposals have been developed \r in the literature Herrala and Goel 2016; (Ritchie and Reay 2017; \r Robiou du Pont et al. 2017; Alcaraz et al. 2019; Sheriff 2019) \r (Section  14.3.2.3). Zimm and Nakicenovic (2020) analysed the first \r set of NDCs and concluded that they would result in a decrease in the \r inequality of per capita emissions across countries. In relation to other \r indicators, such as the provision of support, the distributive outcomes \r of the Paris Agreement are dependent on the availability of support \r through mechanisms such as the GCF to meet the mitigation and \r adaptation financing needs of developing countries (Antimiani et al. \r 2017; Chan et al. 2018). One study suggests that the implementation \r of the emissions reduction objectives stated in the NDCs implies \r trade-offs with poverty reduction efforts needed to achieve SDGs \r (Campagnolo and Davide 2019), while other studies offer evidence \r [...]"


