# document

id: b475cd96c4d0151f80d77e9a00ef3d94
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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"This AFOLU flux is the net of anthropogenic emissions of CO2, CH4 and \r\nN2O, and anthropogenic removals of CO2. The contribution of AFOLU \r\nto total emissions varies regionally with highest in Latin America and \r\nCaribbean with 58% and lowest in Europe and North America with each \r\n7% (Chapter 2, Section 2.2.3). There is a discrepancy in the reported \r\nCO2 AFOLU emissions magnitude because alternative methodological "


id: 46255c624e935ff7d1d6ee39cba0d79c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
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"Table  7.1 | Net anthropogenic emissions (annual averages for 2010-2019a) from Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU). For context, the \r\nnet flux due to the natural response of land to climate and environmental change is also shown for CO2 in column E. Positive values represent emissions, negative values \r\nrepresent removals."


id: 1dfefeddb0b6fe5d0bee05d5a1f5e3f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
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"a\r\n Estimates are given until 2019 as this is the latest date when data are available for all gases, consistent with Chapter 2, this report. Positive fluxes are emission from land to \r\nthe atmosphere. Negative fluxes are removals."


id: 742c3e7851b61cdc792d235e337ad3f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
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"d\r\n Total non-AFOLU emissions are the sum of total CO2-eq emissions values for energy, industrial sources, waste and other emissions with data from the Global Carbon Project \r\nfor CO2, including international aviation and shipping, and from the PRIMAP database for CH4 and N2O averaged over 2007-2014, as that was the period for which data \r\nwere available."


id: 932df687429c4bd34b5d1b6adfc069bb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
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"e\r\n The modelled CO2 estimates include natural processes in vegetation and soils and how they respond to both natural climate variability and to human-induced environmental \r\nchanges, for example, the response of vegetation and soils to environmental changes such as increasing atmospheric CO2 concentration, nitrogen deposition, and climate \r\nchange (indirect anthropogenic effects) on both managed and unmanaged lands. The estimate shown represents the average from 17 Dynamic Global Vegetation Models with \r\n1SD uncertainty (Friedlingstein et al. 2020)."


id: 6b90d3c12a71929876e9624d25630509
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
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content:
"f\r\n The NGHGIs take a different approach to calculating 'anthropogenic' CO2 fluxes than the models (Section 7.2.2). In particular the sinks due to environmental change (indirect \r\nanthropogenic fluxes) on managed lands are generally treated as anthropogenic in NGHGIs and non-anthropogenic in models such as bookkeeping and IAMs. A reconciliation \r\nof the results between IAMs and NGHGIs is presented in Cross-Chapter Box 6 in this chapter. If applied to this table, it would transfer approximately -5.5 GtCO2 yr-1 (a sink) \r\nfrom Column E (which would become -7.0 GtCO2 yr-1) to Column A (which would then be 0.4 GtCO2 yr-1)."


id: 6f6dd48989910e25c16acd6c49717fb1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
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"g\r\n All values expressed in units of CO2-eq are based on IPCC AR6 100-year Global Warming Potential (GWP100) values with climate-carbon feedbacks (CH4 = 27, N2O = 273) \r\nChapter 2, Supplementary Material 2.SM.3; IPCC AR6 WGI Section 7.6)."


id: 4503678c6777eff4b8757d01e9c5218a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
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"i\r\n While it is acknowledged that soils are a natural CH4 sink (Jackson et al. 2020) with soil microbial removals estimated to be 30 +- 19 MtCH4 yr-1 for the period 2008-2017 \r\n(according to bottom-up estimates), natural CH4 sources are considerably greater (371 (245-488) MtCH4 yr-1) resulting in natural processes being a net CH4 source (IPCC AR6 \r\nWGI Section 5.2.2). The soil CH4 sink is therefore omitted from Column E."


id: 370e2c0d3a17fbc16a21904084656ab1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
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"j Total GHG emissions concerning non-AFOLU sectors and all sectors combined (Columns B and C) include fluorinated gases in addition to CO2, CH4 and N2O. Therefore, total \r\nvalues do not equal the sum of estimates for CO2, CH4 and N2O."


id: df13eb3c60a1a61759d86dab9bf0b7a1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
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"approaches that incorporate different assumptions are used \r\n(Section 7.2.2.2). While there is low agreement in the trend of global \r\nAFOLU CO2 emissions over the past few decades (Section 7.2.2), they \r\nhave remained relatively constant (medium confidence) (Chapter 2). \r\nAverage non-CO2 emission (aggregated using GWP100 IPCC AR6 \r\nvalues) from agriculture have risen from 5.2 +- 1.4 GtCO2-eq yr-1 for \r\nthe period 1990 to 1999, to 6.0 +- 1.7 GtCO2-eq yr-1 for the period \r\n2010 to 2019 (Crippa et al. 2021) (Section 7.2.3)."


id: 5d6cf713d57eb6fc2ce52f16af78b7b7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
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"and atmospheric observations concur that, when combining both \r\nanthropogenic (AFOLU) and natural processes on the entire land \r\nsurface (the total 'land-atmosphere flux'), the land was a  global \r\nnet sink for CO2 of -6.6 +- 4.6 GtCO2 yr-1 with a range for 2010 to \r\n2019 from -4.4 to -8.4 GtCO2 yr-1. (Rodenbeck et al. 2003, 2018; \r\nChevallier et al. 2005; Feng et al. 2016; van der Laan-Luijkx et al. \r\n2017; Niwa et al. 2017; Patra et al. 2018). The natural land sink is \r\nhighly likely to be affected by both future AFOLU activity and climate \r\nchange (IPCC AR6 WGI Box 5.1 and Figure SPM. 7), whereby under \r\nmore severe climate change, the amount of carbon stored on land \r\nwould still increase although the relative share of the emissions that \r\nland takes up, declines."


id: 169b4427d14313af6512456ed21fa3a0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
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"Comparison of estimates of the global net AFOLU flux of CO2\r\nfrom diverse approaches (Figure  7.4) show differences on the \r\norder of several GtCO2 yr-1. When considering the reasons for the \r\ndifferences, and an approach to reconcile them (Grassi et al. 2021) \r\n(Section 7.2.2.3), there is medium confidence in the magnitude of \r\nthe net AFOLU CO2 flux. There is a discrepancy in the reported CO2"


id: b6c569698b6662e990d27fd40ee0e322
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
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"Figure 7.5 | Regional net flux of CO2 due to AFOLU estimated using different methods for the period 1990-2019 (GtCO2 yr-1). Positive numbers represent \r\nemissions. The upper-central panel depicts the world map shaded according to the IPCC AR6 regions corresponding to the individual graphs.  For each regional panel; \r\nbrown line: Total net flux data from FAOSTAT (Tubiello et al. 2020); yellow line: Net emissions estimates from National Greenhouse Gas Inventories based on country \r\nreports to the UNFCCC for LULUCF (Grassi et al. 2021); dark-blue line: The mean estimate and minimum and maximum (dark-blue shading) from three bookkeeping models. \r\n(Hansis et al. 2015; Houghton and Nassikas 2017; Gasser et al. 2020). Regional estimates from bookkeeping models are available at: https://zenodo.org/record/5548333#.\r\nYVwJB2LMJPY (Minx et al. 2021). See the legend in Figure 7.4 for a detailed explanation of flux components for each dataset."


id: da0d306fab34043eb600553fdfdc36d9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
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"Regionally (Figure  7.5), there is high confidence of net emissions \r\nlinked to deforestation in Latin America, Africa and South-East Asia \r\nfrom 1990 to 2019. There is medium confidence in trends indicating \r\na  decrease in net emissions in Latin America since 2005 linked to \r\nreduced gross deforestation emissions, and a small increase in net \r\nemissions related to increased gross deforestation emissions in Africa \r\nsince 2000 (Figure 7.5). There is high confidence regarding the net "


id: 1fc82b6fbee017a3fb89def553f76758
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
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content:
"AFOLU emissions magnitude because alternative methodological \r\napproaches that incorporate different assumptions are used \r\n(Section  7.2.2.2). While the mean of the bookkeeping and DGVM \r\nmodel's show a  small increase in global CO2 net emissions since \r\nyear 2000, individual models suggest opposite trends (Friedlingstein \r\net al. 2020). The latest FAOSTAT and NGHGI estimates show a small \r\nreduction in net emission. Overall, the trends are unclear."


id: 77d8574d5584abc7cd509850324e73da
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
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"The bookkeeping models by Houghton and Nassikas (2017), Hansis \r\net al. (2015), and Gasser et al. (2020) and the DGVMs used in the \r\nGlobal Carbon Budget (Friedlingstein et al. 2020) use either the LUH2 \r\ndataset (Hurtt et al. 2020), HYDE (Goldewijk et al. 2017), FRA 2015 \r\n(FAO 2015) or a combination. The LUH2 dataset includes a new wood \r\nharvest reconstruction, new representation of shifting cultivation, \r\ncrop rotations, and management information including irrigation and \r\nfertiliser application. The area of forest subject to harvest in LUH2 \r\nis much less than the area of forest considered 'managed' in the \r\nNGHGIs (Grassi et al. 2018). The model datasets do not yet include \r\nthe FAO FRA 2020 update (FAO 2020a). The DGVMs consider CO2\r\nfertilisation effects on forest growth that are sometimes confirmed \r\nfrom the ground-based forest inventory networks (Nabuurs et al. \r\n2013) and sometimes not at all (van der Sleen et al. 2015)."


id: 638f48cacbbef0eed21b0a54b010eea5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
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"AFOLU CO2 sink in Europe due to forest regrowth and known other \r\nsinks in managed forests, and medium confidence of a net sink in \r\nNorth America and Eurasia since 2010."


id: 9bd3d981106d875b52786b3f24d2e0d5
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"The processes responsible for fluxes from land have been divided \r\ninto three categories (IPCC 2006, 2010): (i) the direct human-induced \r\neffects due to changing land cover and land management; (ii) the \r\nindirect human-induced effects due to anthropogenic environmental \r\nchange, such as climate change, CO2 fertilisation, nitrogen deposition, \r\nand so on; and (iii) natural effects, including climate variability and \r\na background natural disturbance regime (e.g., wildfires, windthrows, \r\ndiseases or insect outbreaks)."


id: 934fd8cebaeff2585e116dc49ec11575
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"Further, the DGVMs and bookkeeping models do not include a wide \r\nrange of practices which are implicitly covered by the inventories; for \r\nexample: forest dynamics (Pugh et al. 2019; Le Noe et al. 2020), forest \r\nmanagement including wood harvest (Nabuurs, et al. 2013; Arneth \r\net al. 2017), agricultural and grassland practices (Pugh et al. 2015; \r\nSanderman et al. 2017; Pongratz et al. 2018); or, for example, fire \r\nmanagement (Andela et al. 2017; Arora and Melton 2018)."


id: 7bc75518f55950e9fa10206d0c84dbe0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
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"Global models estimate the anthropogenic land CO2 flux considering \r\nonly the impact of direct effects, and only those areas that were subject \r\nto intense and direct management such as clear-cut harvest. It is \r\nimportant to note, that DGVMs also estimate the non-anthropogenic \r\nland CO2 flux (Land Sink) that results from indirect and natural \r\neffects (Table 7.1). In contrast, estimates of the anthropogenic land \r\nCO2 flux in NGHGIs (LULUCF) include the impact of direct effects and, \r\nin most cases, of indirect effects on a much greater area considered \r\n'managed' than global models (Grassi et al. 2021)."


id: 278a3e6f98f79f9623d9c4c8a83665a4
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"Increasingly, higher emissions estimates are expected from DGVMs \r\ncompared to bookkeeping models, because DGVMs include a  loss \r\nof additional sink capacity of 3.3 +- 1.1 GtCO2 yr-1 on average \r\nover 2009-2018, which is increasing with larger climate and CO2 \r\nimpacts (Friedlingstein et al. 2020). This arises because the DGVM \r\nmethodological setup requires a  reference simulation including \r\nclimate and environmental changes but without any land-use change \r\nsuch as deforestation, so DGVMs implicitly include the sink capacity \r\nforests would have developed in response to environmental changes \r\non areas that in reality have been cleared (Gitz and Ciais 2003; \r\nPongratz et al. 2014) (IPCC AR6 WGI Chapter 5)."


id: 2433e3d49b9e2ddc231de95407b6e891
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"Carbon emissions from peat burning have been estimated based \r\non the Global Fire Emission Database (GFED4s; van der Werf et al. \r\n2017). These were included in the bookkeeping model estimates and \r\nadded 2.0 GtC over 1960-2019 (e.g.,  causing the peak in South\u0002East Asia in 1998) (Figure  7.5). Within the Global Carbon Budget \r\n(Friedlingstein et al. 2020), peat drainage from agriculture accounted \r\nfor an additional 8.6 GtC from 1960-2019 according to FAOSTAT \r\n(Conchedda and Tubiello, 2020) used by two of the bookkeeping \r\nmodels (Hansis et al. 2015; Gasser et al. 2020)."


id: 84b9f1701968d2f81ff7d2dc059fdb93
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"The FAOSTAT approach is conceptually similar to NGHGIs. FAOSTAT \r\ndata on forests are based on country reports to FAO-FRA 2020 \r\n(FAO 2020a), and include changes in biomass carbon stock in \r\n'forest land' and 'net forest conversions' in five-year intervals. \r\n'Forest land' may include unmanaged natural forest, leading to \r\npossible overall overestimation of anthropogenic fluxes for both \r\nsources and sinks, though emissions from deforestation are likely \r\nunderestimated (Tubiello et al. 2020). FAOSTAT also estimate \r\nemissions from forest fires and other land uses (organic soils), \r\nfollowing IPCC methods (Prosperi et al. 2020). The FAO-FRA 2020 \r\n(FAO 2020b) update leads to estimates of larger sinks in Russia \r\nsince 1991, and in China and the USA from 2011, and larger \r\ndeforestation emissions in Brazil and smaller in Indonesia than \r\nFRA 2015 (FAO 2015; Tubiello et al. 2020)."


id: f7e08c12940d3b9285da5e0121fae25a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
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"Remote-sensing products provide valuable spatial and temporal \r\nland-use and biomass data globally (including in remote areas), at \r\npotentially high spatial and temporal resolutions, that can be used to \r\ncalculate CO2 fluxes, but have mostly been applied only to forests at \r\nthe global or even regional scale. While such data can strongly support \r\nmonitoring reporting and verification, estimates of forest carbon \r\nfluxes directly from Earth Observation (EO) data vary considerably \r\nin both their magnitude and sign (i.e., whether forests are a  net \r\nsource or sink of carbon). For the period 2005-2017, net tropical \r\nforest carbon fluxes were estimated as -0.4 GtCO2 yr-1 (Fan et al. \r\n2019); 0.58 GtCO2 yr-1 (Grace et al. 2014); 1.6 GtCO2yr-1 (Baccini \r\net al. 2017) and 2.87 GtCO2 yr-1 (Achard et al. 2014). Differences "


id: d500a34ea8fcc79aae8e2ee35a02c84d
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"Heinrich et al. 2021; Reiche et al. 2021). For example, secondary \r\nforest regrowth in the Brazilian Amazon offset 9 to 14% of gross \r\nemissions due to deforestation1\r\n (Aragao et al. 2018; Silva Junior \r\net al. 2021). Yet disturbances such as fire and repeated deforestation \r\ncycles due to shifting cultivation over the period 1985 to 2017, were \r\nfound to reduce the regrowth rates of secondary forests by 8 to 55% \r\ndepending on the climate region of regrowth (Heinrich et al. 2021)."


id: 15b2381268d155ad82e898738dcdf200
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
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"can in part be explained by spatial resolution of the datasets, the \r\ndefinition of 'forest' and the inclusion of processes and methods used \r\nto determine degradation and growth in intact and secondary forests, \r\nor the changes in algorithm over time (Palahi et al. 2021). A recent \r\nglobal study integrated ground observations and remote sensing \r\ndata to map forest-related GHG emissions and removals at a high \r\nspatial resolution (30 m spatial scale), although it only provides an \r\naverage estimate of annual carbon loss over 2001-2019 (Harris \r\net al. 2021). The estimated net global forest carbon sink globally was \r\n-7.66 GtCO2 yr-1, being -1.7 GtCO2yr-1 in the tropics only."


id: 3b9994df5a5809fb955635e80817629
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
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"Remote sensing products can help to attribute changes to \r\nanthropogenic activity or natural inter-annual climate variability \r\n(Fan et al. 2019; Wigneron et al. 2020). Products with higher spatial \r\nresolution make it easier to determine forest and carbon dynamics \r\nin relatively small-sized managed forests (e.g., Y. Wang et al. 2020; "


id: f8ff549ceb4e93845a3f3718baf9eefa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
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"There is about 5.5 GtCO2 yr-1 difference in the anthropogenic \r\nAFOLU estimates between NGHGIs and global models (this number \r\nrelates to an IAMs comparison for the period 2005-2015  - see \r\nCross-Chapter Box  6 in this chapter; for comparison with other "


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"Authors: Giacomo Grassi (Italy/European Union), Joeri Rogelj (Belgium/Austria), Joanna I. House (United Kingdom), Alexander Popp \r\n(Germany), Detlef van Vuuren (the Netherlands), Katherine Calvin (the United States of America), Shinichiro Fujimori (Japan), Petr \r\nHavlik (Austria/the Czech Republic), Gert-Jan Nabuurs (the Netherlands)"


id: 17a9a7d01086b0954e42e2c46e3e566e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
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"The Global Stocktake aims to assess countries' collective progress towards the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement in the light \r\nof the best available science. Historic progress is assessed based on NGHGIs, while expectations of future progress are based on \r\ncountry climate targets (e.g., NDCs for 2025 or 2030 and long-term strategies for 2050). Scenarios consistent with limiting warming \r\nwell-below 2degC and 1.5degC developed by IAMs (Chapter 3) are expected to play a key role as benchmarks against which countries' \r\naggregated future mitigation pledges will be assessed. This, however, implies that estimates by IAMs and country data used to \r\nmeasure progress are comparable."


id: 7e9abb6cea32010be2e670794f44c91a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
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"In fact, there is about 5.5 GtCO2 yr-1 difference during 2005-2015 between global anthropogenic land CO2 net flux estimates of IAMs \r\nand aggregated NGHGIs, due to different conceptual approaches to what is 'anthropogenic'. This approach and its implications when \r\ncomparing climate targets with global mitigation pathways are illustrated in this Box Figure 1a-e."


id: 9ca0f5d2eb0859bdff187a4c1f6d52fe
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
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content:
"By adjusting the original IAM output (Cross-Chapter Box  6, Figure  1a) with the indirect effects from countries' managed forest \r\n(Cross-Chapter Box 6, Figure 1b, estimated by DGVMs, see also Figure 7.6), NGHGI-comparable pathways can be derived (Cross\u0002Chapter Box 6, Figure 1c). The resulting apparent increase in anthropogenic sink reflects simply a reallocation of a CO2 flux previously \r\nlabelled as natural, and thus does not reflect a  mitigation action. These changes do not affect non-LULUCF emissions. However, \r\nsince the atmosphere concentration is a combination of CO2 emissions from LULUCF and from fossil fuels, the proposed land-related \r\nadjustments also influence the NGHGI-comparable economy-wide (all sector) CO2 pathways (Cross-Chapter Box 6, Figure 1d)."


id: 96486a94ae8c52be6bf1d5d509b6f6c2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
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content:
"The UNEP's annual assessment of the global 2030 'emission gap' between aggregated country NDCs and specific target mitigation \r\npathways (UNEP 2020), is only affected to a limited degree. This is because some estimates of global emissions under the NDCs \r\nalready use the same land-use definitions as the IAM mitigation pathways (Rogelj et al. 2017), and because historical data of global \r\nNDC estimates is typically harmonised to the historical data of global mitigation pathway projections (Rogelj et al. 2011). This latter \r\nprocedure, however, is agnostic to the reasons for the observed mismatch, and often uses a constant offset. The adjustment described \r\nhere allows this mismatch to be resolved by drawing on a scientific understanding of the underlying reasons, and thus provides a more \r\ninformed and accurate basis for estimating the emission gap."


id: 376fc5ae22e2606dd0aacf338fb3435f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
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"The approach to deriving a NGHGI-comparable emission pathways presented here can be further refined with improved estimates of \r\nthe future forest sink. Its use would enable a more accurate assessment of the collective progress achieved and of mitigation pledges \r\nunder the Paris Agreement."


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"all countries compile inventories, nor submit annually. Additionally, \r\nNGHGIs may incorporate a  range of methodologies for CH4 and \r\nN2O accounting (e.g., van der Weerden et al. 2016; Ndung'u et al. \r\n2019; Thakuri et al. 2020), making comparison difficult. The analysis \r\nof complete AFOLU emissions presented here, is based on FAOSTAT \r\ndata. For agricultural specific discussion, analysis considers EDGAR, \r\nFAOSTAT and USEPA data."


id: f1788269f03950d8ee601843e31937c1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Using FAOSTAT data, the SRCCL estimated average CH4 emissions \r\nfrom AFOLU to be 161.2 +- 43 MtCH4 yr-1 for the period 2007-2016, \r\nrepresenting 44% of total anthropogenic CH4 emissions, with \r\nagriculture accounting for 88% of the AFOLU component (Jia \r\net al. 2019). The latest data (FAO 2021a, 2020b) highlight a trend of \r\ngrowing AFOLU CH4 emissions, with a 10% increase evident between \r\n1990 and 2019, despite year-to-year variation. Forestry and other land \r\nuse (FOLU) CH4 emission sources include biomass burning on forest \r\nland and combustion of organic soils (peatland fires) (FAO 2020c). \r\nThe agricultural share of AFOLU CH4 emissions remains relatively "


id: c8de458e37595525880d60f181c7bffe
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32667
content:
"with the average share from agriculture remaining approximately \r\nthe same (96%). Agricultural soils were identified in the SRCCL and \r\nin recent literature as a dominant emission source, notably due to \r\nnitrogen fertiliser and manure applications to croplands, and manure \r\nproduction and deposition on pastures (Jia et al. 2019; Tian et al. \r\n2020). There is agreement within latest data that agricultural soils \r\nremain the dominant source (Figure 7.7)."


id: 863d08c109919b0fb15aff26f7971dd7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20773
content:
"unchanged, with the latest data indicating agriculture to have \r\naccounted for 89% of emissions on average between 1990 and 2019. \r\nThe SRCCL reported with medium evidence and high agreement that \r\nruminants and rice production were the most important contributors \r\nto overall growth trends in atmospheric CH4 (Jia et al. 2019). The latest \r\ndata confirm this in terms of agricultural emissions, with agreement \r\nbetween databases that agricultural CH4 emissions continue to \r\nincrease and that enteric fermentation and rice cultivation remain \r\nthe main sources (Figure  7.7). The proportionally higher emissions \r\nfrom rice cultivation indicated by EDGAR data compared to the other \r\ndatabases, may result from the use of a Tier 2 methodology for this \r\nsource within EDGAR (Janssens-Maenhout et al. 2019)."


id: 5deca7d578189bbb62b8031bf16140b1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13826
content:
"Aggregation of CH4 and N2O to CO2 equivalence (using GWP100 IPCC \r\nAR6 values), suggests that AFOLU emissions increased by 15% between \r\n1990 and 2019, though emissions showed trend variability year to year. \r\nAgriculture accounted for 91% of AFOLU emissions on average over \r\nthe period (FAO 2020b, 2021a). EDGAR (Crippa et al. 2021), FAOSTAT \r\n(FAO 2021a) and USEPA (USEPA 2019) data suggest aggregated \r\nagricultural emissions (CO2-eq) to have increased since 1990, by 19% \r\n(1990-2019), 15% (1990-2019) and 21% (1990-2015) respectively, \r\nwith all databases identifying enteric fermentation and agricultural \r\nsoils as the dominant agricultural emissions sources."


id: c9ead101423a94c5f59df4591360eb71
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32851
content:
"The SRCCL also noted a  trend of increasing atmospheric N2O \r\nconcentration, with robust evidence and high agreement that \r\nagriculture accounted for approximately two-thirds of overall global \r\nanthropogenic N2O emissions. Average AFOLU N2O emissions were \r\nreported to be 8.7 +- 2.5 MtN2O yr-1 for the period 2007-2016, \r\naccounting for 81% of total anthropogenic N2O emissions, with \r\nagriculture accounting for 95% of AFOLU N2O emissions (Jia et al. \r\n2019). A  recent comprehensive review confirms agriculture as the \r\nprincipal driver of the growing atmospheric N2O concentration (Tian \r\net al. 2020). The latest FAOSTAT data (FAO 2020b, 2021a) document \r\na 25% increase in AFOLU N2O emissions between 1990 and 2019, "


id: b402a7e7b0fb40485bb152ff68279cbc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"FAOSTAT data (FAO 2020b, 2021a) indicate Africa (+44%), followed \r\nby Southern Asia (+29%) to have the largest growth in AFOLU \r\nCH4 emissions between 1990 and 2019 (Figure  7.8). Eurasia was "


id: 1cb5682c6deb91b1ade0fb933ee882a7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2231
content:
"Figure 7.8 | Estimated average AFOLU CH4 (top) and N2O (bottom) emissions for three decades according to FAOSTAT data by ten global regions, with \r\ndisaggregation of agricultural emissions (FAO 2020b; 2021a). Note for N2O: emissions from manure deposition and application to soils, crop residues and synthetic \r\nfertilisers are combined under 'Agriculture: Soils'."


id: ad428bb0298e292e5419baee42c7f608
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27722
content:
"characterised by notable emission reductions (-58%), principally \r\nas a result of a sharp decline (-63%) between 1990 and 1999. The \r\naverage agricultural share of AFOLU emissions between 1990 and \r\n2019 ranged from 66% in Africa to almost 100% in the Middle East."


id: 2827db6ea26b9ce887e5542ce2ea8aa1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4264
content:
"The latest data suggest growth in AFOLU N2O emissions in most \r\nregions between 1990 and 2019, with Southern Asia demonstrating \r\nhighest growth (+74%) and Eurasia, greatest reductions (-51%), \r\nthe latter mainly a  result of a  61% reduction between 1990 and \r\n2000 (FAO 2020b, 2021a). Agriculture was the dominant emission \r\nsource in all regions, its proportional average share between 1990 \r\nand 2019 ranging from 87% in Africa, to almost 100% in the Middle \r\nEast (Figure 7.8)."


id: fe9d24714501a0f9c6519531a077b7e8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42174
content:
"Studies of biophysical effects have increased since AR5 reaching high \r\nagreement for the effects of changes in land condition on surface \r\nalbedo (Leonardi et al. 2015). Low confidence remains in proposing \r\nspecific changes in land conditions to achieve desired impacts on \r\nlocal, regional and global climates due to: a poor relationship between \r\nchanges in surface albedo and changes in surface temperature (Davin \r\nand de Noblet-Ducoudre 2010), compensation and feedbacks among \r\nbiophysical processes (Bonan 2016; Kalliokoski et al. 2020), climate \r\nand seasonal dependency of the biophysical effects (Bonan 2016), \r\nomittance of short-lived chemical forcers (Unger 2014; Kalliokoski \r\net al. 2020), and study domains often being too small to document \r\npossible conflicts between local and non-local effects (Swann et al. \r\n2012; Hirsch et al. 2018)."


id: 3fa8622b66907b553b832408d03340ef
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8392
content:
"Figure 7.9 | Association of driver variables with more or less deforestation. Source: reproduced with permission from Busch and Ferretti-Gallon (2017)."


id: 19b1b9e51b521eb3651c39d43eec657a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1721
content:
"Globally, the area of the more open, other wooded land is also of \r\nsignificant importance, with almost 1 billion hectares (FAO 2020a). \r\nThe area of other wooded land decreased by 30.6 Mha between \r\n1990 and 2020 with larger declines between 1990-2000 (FAO \r\n2020a). There are still significant challenges in monitoring the \r\narea of other wooded land, largely associated with difficulties in \r\nmeasuring tree-canopy cover in the range of 5-10%.The global area \r\nof mangroves, one of the most productive terrestrial ecosystems \r\n(Neogi 2020a), has also experienced a significant decline (Thomas \r\net al. 2017; Neogi 2020b), with a decrease of 1.0 Mha between 1990 \r\nand 2020 (FAO 2020a) due to agriculture and aquaculture (Bhattarai \r\n2011; Ajonina et al. 2014; Webb et al. 2014; Giri et al. 2015; Thomas \r\net al. 2017; Fauzi et al. 2019). Some relevant direct drivers affecting \r\nemissions and removal in forests and other ecosystems are discussed \r\nin proceeding sections."


id: 57226f6496097e9ca25c209d4f232189
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12583
content:
"Despite a decline in global agricultural area, the latest data document \r\nsome regional expansion between 2000 and 2019, specifically in \r\nAfrica (+3%) and Asia and the Pacific (+1%). Agricultural area \r\ndeclined in all other regions, notably in developed countries (-9%), \r\ndue to multiple factors including among others, urbanisation (see \r\nSection 7.3.1.2)."


id: 380188428db3f3dc6f4e1f4b9940fab9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7060
content:
"Rapidly expanding roads, particularly in tropical regions, are linked to forest loss, degradation, and fragmentation because the land \r\nbecomes more generally accessible. Increase of land values of areas adjacent to roads also drives speculation and deforestation \r\nrelated to land tenure (Fearnside 2015). If poorly planned, infrastructure can facilitate fires, illegal mining, and wildlife poaching with \r\nconsequences for GHG emissions and biodiversity conservation. However, some initiatives are providing new approaches for better \r\nplanning and then limit environmental and societal impacts."


id: e837e366187ade8efe8620b1e0393edf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38186
content:
"Although the number and extent of protected areas has increased markedly in recent decades (Watson et al. 2014), many other \r\nindicators reveal that nature is in broad retreat. For example, the total area of intact wilderness is declining rapidly worldwide (Watson \r\net al. 2016), 70% of the world's forests are now less than 1 km from a forest edge (Haddad et al. 2015), the extent of tropical forest \r\nfragmentation is accelerating exponentially (Taubert et al. 2018). One of the most direct and immediate driver of deforestation and \r\nbiodiversity decline is the dramatic expansion of roads and other transportation infrastructure (Laurance et al. 2014a; Laurance \r\nand Arrea 2017; Alamgir et al. 2017)."


id: e7e523d61fc1116e62e1faf3ddd207c1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
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content:
"From 2010 to 2050, the total length of paved roads is projected to increase by 25 million km (Dulac 2013) including large infrastructure\u0002expansion schemes in Asia (Laurance and Arrea 2017; Lechner et al. 2018) and in South America (Laurance et al. 2001; Killeen 2007), \r\nas well as widespread illegal or unplanned road building (Laurance et al. 2009; Barber et al. 2014). For example, in the Amazon, \r\n95% of all deforestation occurs within 5.5 km of a road, and for every km of legal road there are nearly three km of illegal roads \r\n(Barber et al. 2014)."


id: e7fb7b70db217ca7df1648aea3df5ee9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38125
content:
"More than any other proximate factor, the dramatic expansion of roads is determining the pace and patterns of habitat disruption and \r\nits impacts on biodiversity (Laurance et al. 2009; Laurance and Arrea 2017). Much road expansion is poorly planned. Environmental \r\nImpact Assessments (EIAs) for roads and other infrastructure are typically too short term and superficial to detect rare species or \r\nassess long-term or indirect impacts of projects (Flyvbjerg 2009; Laurance and Arrea 2017). Another limitation is the consideration \r\nof each project in isolation from other existing or planned developments (Laurance et al. 2014b). Hence, EIAs alone are inadequate \r\nfor planning infrastructure projects and assessing their broader environmental, social, and financial impacts and risks (Laurance et al. \r\n2015a; Alamgir et al. 2017, 2018)."


id: d7fae6993d12608d27ea413125ad8ed4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"The large-scale, proactive land-use planning is an option for managing the development of modern infrastructure. Approaches such \r\nas the 'Global Roadmap' scheme (Laurance and Balmford 2013; Laurance et al. 2014a) Strategic Environmental Assessments (Fischer \r\n2007) can be used to evaluate the relative costs and benefits of infrastructure projects, and to spatially prioritise land uses to optimise \r\nhuman benefits while limited new infrastructure in areas of intact or critical habitats. For example, the Global Roadmap strategy has \r\nbeen used in parts of South-East Asia (Sloan et al. 2018), Indochina (Balmford et al. 2016), and sub-Saharan Africa (Laurance et al. \r\n2015b) to devise land-use zoning that can help optimise the many risks and rewards of planned infrastructure projects."


id: 9f9006cd9f916ac572366df6761d79aa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25286
content:
"expansion to support a  growing workforce and development of \r\nmineral commodity supply chains (Sonter et al. 2015). The increasing \r\nconsumption of gold in developing countries, increased prices, and \r\nuncertainty in financial markets is identified as driving gold mining \r\nand associated deforestation in the Amazon region (Alvarez-Berrios \r\nand Mitchell Aide 2015; Dezecache et al. 2017; Asner and Tupayachi \r\n2017; Espejo et al. 2018). The total estimated area of gold mining \r\nthroughout the region increased by about 40% between 2012 and \r\n2016 (Asner and Tupayachi 2017). In the Brazilian Amazon, mining \r\nsignificantly increased forest loss up to 70 km beyond mining lease \r\nboundaries, causing 11,670 km2\r\n of deforestation between 2005 and \r\n2015, representing 9% of all Amazon forest loss during this time \r\n(Sonter et al. 2015)."


id: 990ebc393c3b8d950528d3157bb2bbad
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24146
content:
"The extent and scale of mining is growing due to increased global \r\ndemand (UNEP 2019). Due to declining ore grades, more ore needs \r\nto be processed to meet demand, with extensive use of open cast \r\nmining. A  low-carbon future may be more mineral intensive with, \r\nfor example, clean energy technologies requiring greater inputs in \r\ncomparison to fossil-fuel-based technologies (Hund et al. 2020). \r\nMining presents cumulative environmental impacts, especially in \r\nintensively mined regions (UNEP 2019). The impact of mining on \r\ndeforestation varies considerably across minerals and countries. \r\nMining causes significant changes to the environment, for example, \r\nthrough mining infrastructure establishment, soil erosion, urban "


id: c046a3f8cffb47a398ec73cb61feae20
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31133
content:
"Australia (Ward et al. 2020; Gallagher et al. 2021). Lightning plays \r\nan important role in the ignition of wildfires, with the incidence of \r\nlightning igniting wildfires predicted to increase with rises in global \r\naverage air temperature (Worden et al. 2017)."


id: 2c552224798c19123eac074b39c038a6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5068
content:
"Mining is also an important driver of deforestation in African and Asian \r\ncountries. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, where the second\u0002largest area of tropical forest in the world occurs, mining-related \r\ndeforestation exacerbated by violent conflict (Butsic et al. 2015). \r\nIn India, mining has contributed to deforestation at a district level, \r\nwith coal, iron and limestone having had the most adverse impact \r\non forest area loss (Ranjan 2019). Gold mining is also identified as \r\na driver of deforestation in Myanmar (Papworth et al. 2017)."


id: b476f4c62dfb642f29b45f015342787e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28992
content:
"by 233 Mha (FAO 2020e). In regions representing the majority of \r\nindustrial wood production, forests certified under sustainable forest \r\nmanagement programmes accounted for 51% of total managed \r\nforest area in 2017, an increase from 11% in 2000 (ICFPA 2021)."


id: 80631b56066068db29e269791b9c01b6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19717
content:
"In addition to livestock, both AR5 and the SRCCL identified paddy \r\nrice cultivation as an important emissions source (Smith et al. 2014), \r\nwith medium evidence and high agreement that its expansion is \r\na key driver of growing trends in atmospheric CH4 concentration (Jia \r\net al. 2019). The latest data indicate the global harvested area of rice \r\nto have grown by 11% between 1990 and 2019, with total paddy \r\nproduction increasing by 46%, from 519 Mt to 755 Mt (FAO 2021c). \r\nGlobal rice production is projected to increase by 13% by 2028 \r\ncompared to 2019 levels (OECD/FAO 2019). However, yield increases \r\nare expected to limit cultivated area expansion, while dietary shifts \r\nfrom rice to protein as a result of increasing per capita income, is \r\nexpected to reduce demand in certain regions, with a slight decline \r\nin related emissions projected to 2030 (USEPA 2019)."


id: 36924e2afa0ac0eaf1df785fa4db9481
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Between 1990 and 2019, Africa recorded the greatest increase \r\n(+160%) in area under rice cultivation, followed by Asia and the \r\nPacific (+6%), with area reductions evident in all other regions \r\n(FAO 2021c) broadly corresponding with related regional CH4\r\nemission (Figures  7.3 and 7.8). Data indicate the greatest growth \r\nin consumption (average annual supply per capita) between 1990 \r\nand 2013 to have occurred in Eastern Europe and West Central Asia \r\n(+42%) followed by Africa (+25%), with little change (+1%) observed \r\nin Asia and the Pacific (FAO 2017a). Most of the projected increase \r\nin global rice consumption is in Africa and Asia (OECD/FAO 2019)."


id: 202fbcae681cc06d0bae0135f0e1819f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2873
content:
"Although there are several potential drivers (McDermott et al. 2010; \r\nAlary et al. 2015), increased livestock production is principally in \r\nresponse to growth in demand for animal-sourced food, driven by \r\na growing human population (FAO, 2019) and increased consumption \r\nresulting from changes in affluence, notably in middle-income \r\ncountries (Godfray et al. 2018). Available data document increases \r\nin total meat and milk consumption by 24 and 22% respectively \r\nbetween 1990 and 2013, as indicated by average annual per capita \r\nsupply (FAO 2017a). Updated data indicate that trends of increasing \r\nconsumption continued between 2014 and 2018 (FAO 2021d). \r\nSustained demand for animal-sourced food is expected to drive \r\nfurther livestock sector growth, with global production projected to \r\nexpand by 14% by 2029, facilitated by maintained product prices and \r\nlower feed prices (OECD/FAO 2019)."


id: ab584ba8fd7c24347118e8b32c2392e5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
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content:
"Figure 7.10 | Trends in average global and regional land area under specific land uses (FAO 2021b), inorganic nitrogen fertiliser use (FAO 2021e) (top) \r\nand number of livestock (FAO 2021c) (bottom) for three decades. For land use classification 'cropland' represents the FAOSTAT category 'arable land' which includes \r\nland under temporary crops, meadow, pasture and fallow. 'Forest' and 'permanent meadow and pasture' follow FAOSTAT categories."


id: 5f3c626f4a1fa33a2cfea1073f072c48
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14063
content:
"economic and cultural, scientific and technological, and institutional \r\nand governance drivers. These indirect drivers not only interact with \r\neach other at different temporal and spatial scales but are also subject \r\nto impacts and feedbacks from the direct drivers (Barger et al. 2018)."


id: 798a65bcddfb1af3e27ae75795045fc3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18586
content:
"Land rights: Land tenure often allows communities to exercise traditional governance based on traditional ecological knowledge, devolved \r\nand dynamic access rights, judicious use, equitable distribution of benefits (Mantyka-Pringle et al. 2017; Wynberg 2017; Thomas et al. 2017), \r\nbiodiversity (Contreras-Negrete et al. 2014) and fire and grazing management (Levang et al. 2015; Varghese et al. 2015)."


id: e112ac986f2203098c272d3934bf5847
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36863
content:
"Institutions and governance\r\nAgreements and Finance: Since AR5, global agreements were reached on climate change, sustainable development goals, and the \r\nmobilisation of finance for development and climate action. Several countries adopted policies and commitments to restore degraded \r\nland (Barger et al. 2018). The UN Environment Programme (UNEP) and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO), launched \r\nthe UN Decade on Ecosystem Restoration (https://www.decadeonrestoration.org/)."


id: d0b8b21715761186a872fcd9b7bce742
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34071
content:
"Companies have also made pledges to reduce impacts on forests and on the rights of local communities as well as eliminating deforestation \r\nfrom their supply chains. The finance sector, a crucial driver behind action (Section 7.6, Box 7.12), has also started to make explicit \r\ncommitments to avoiding environmental damage (Barger et al. 2018) and net zero targets (Forest Trends Ecosystem Marketplace 2021), \r\nthough investment is sensitive to market outlook."


id: cfba51fde344dc7c7d5eabd400b2a901
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33906
content:
"For the 20 land-based mitigation measures outlined in this section, \r\nthe mitigation potential estimates are largely derived from sectoral \r\napproaches, and where data is available, are compared to IAM \r\nestimates. Integrated assessment models and the emissions \r\ntrajectories, cost-effectiveness and trade-offs of various mitigation \r\npathways are detailed in Section  7.5.  It should be noted that the \r\nunderlying literature for sectoral as well as IAM mitigation estimates \r\nconsider GWP100 IPCC AR5 values (CH4 = 28, N2O = 265) as well \r\nas GWP100 IPCC AR4 values (CH4 = 25, N2O = 298) to convert CH4\r\nand N2O to CO2-eq. Where possible, we note the various GWP100"


id: 4774de6c199baae324a592851cfdb12c
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"options across sectors, including positive and negative effects on \r\nland resources, water, biodiversity, climate, and food security."


id: 8cb4a50163a77ab03870784a164216ef
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21940
content:
"values (in IAM estimates, and the wetlands and agriculture sections), \r\nhowever in some instances, the varying GWP100 values used across \r\nstudies prevents description of non-CO2 gases in native units as well \r\nas conversion to AR6 GWP100 (CH4 = 27, N2O = 273) CO2-eq values \r\nto aggregate sectoral assessment estimates."


id: 9c4e5507a87bd268ecb2ad656c47cf59
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
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vector_id: 24756
content:
"IPCC AR5 (2014). In the AR5, the economic mitigation potential \r\nof supply-side measures in the AFOLU sector was estimated \r\nat 7.18-10.60 GtCO2-eq yr-1 in 2030 with carbon prices up to \r\nUSD100 tCO2-eq-1, about a  third of which could be achieved at \r\n<USD20 tCO2-eq-1 (medium evidence, medium agreement) (Smith \r\net al. 2014). The AR5 provided a  summary table of individual \r\nAFOLU mitigation measures, but did not conduct a  detailed \r\nassessment for each."


id: 9576517df87964811f3631e954a109c1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23501
content:
"Land interventions have interlinked implications for climate mitigation, \r\nadaptation, food security, biodiversity, ecosystem services, and other \r\nenvironmental and societal challenges (Section 7.6.5). Therefore, it \r\nis important to consider the net effect of mitigation measures for \r\nachieving both climate and non-climate goals (Section 7.1)."


id: e92851fc391030132a46d95c96cd7455
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
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content:
"Potential co-benefits and trade-offs are outlined for each of the \r\n20 land-based mitigation measures in the proceeding sub-sections \r\nand summarised in Figure 7.12. Section 7.6.5. discusses general links \r\nwith ecosystem services, human well-being and adaptation, while \r\nChapter 12 (Section 12.5) provides an in-depth assessment of the land \r\nrelated impacts, risks and opportunities associated with mitigation "


id: 25d3de387ac2c1585dd4803a4126133d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3837
content:
"about 50% of the technical potential of 24.2 (4.9-58) GtCO2-eq yr-1 \r\n(Table 7.3). Adding 2.1 GtCO2-eq yr-1 from demand-side measures \r\n(accounting only for diverted agricultural production to avoid double \r\ncounting with land-use change effects), total land-based mitigation \r\npotential up to USD100 tCO2-eq-1 is 13.6 (6.7-23.4) GtCO2-eq yr-1. \r\nThis estimate aligns with the most recent regional assessment (Roe \r\net al. 2021), which found the aggregate global mitigation potential \r\nof supply and demand-side measures to be 13.8 +- 3.1 GtCO2-eq yr-1\r\nup to USD100 tCO2-eq-1 for the period 2020-2050. Across integrated "


id: 90bfc280d42a7365e54c8906324d796b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22671
content:
"that do (Sonntag et al. 2016; Doelman et al. 2019). Given the IPCC \r\nWG1 finding that the land sink is continuing to increase although \r\nits efficiency is decreasing with climate change, it will be critical to \r\nbetter understand how future climate will affect mitigation potentials, \r\nparticularly from CDR measures."


id: 2e9b39914efe84cbedee3f484385f63e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5478
content:
"Across global sectoral studies, the economic mitigation potential \r\n(up to USD100 tCO2-eq-1) of supply-side measures in AFOLU for the \r\nperiod 2020-2050 is 11.4 mean (5.6-19.8 full range) GtCO2-eq yr-1, "


id: 583cf6dd385988ae3a8968d986d97aa6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12777
content:
"near-term emissions reductions, they have less economic potential \r\ndue to costs. Demand-side measures may be able to deliver non-CO2\r\nemissions reductions more cost efficiently."


id: f1020ce876054d391d99a2f30c2b538e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39771
content:
"Figure 7.11 (continued): Global and regional mitigation potential (GtCO2-eq yr-1) in 2020-2050 for 20 land-based measures. (a) Global estimates represent \r\nthe mean (bar) and full range (error bars) of the economic potential (up to USD100 tCO2-eq-1) based on a comprehensive literature review of sectoral studies (references are \r\noutlined in the sub-section for each measure in Sections 7.4.2-7.4.5). Potential co-benefits and trade-offs for each of the 20 measures are summarised in icons. (b) Regional \r\nestimates illustrate the mean technical (T) and economic (E) (up to USD100 tCO2-eq-1) sectoral potential based on data from (Roe et al. 2021). IAM economic potential (M) \r\n(USD100 tCO2-eq-1) data is from the IPCC AR6 database."


id: 8d8937ffdd112989ba39cdeec70e413e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22090
content:
"enforcement, forest governance and land tenure, supporting \r\ncommunity forest management and introducing forest certification \r\n(P.  Smith et al. 2019a). Reducing deforestation provides numerous \r\nand substantial co-benefits, preserving biodiversity and ecosystem \r\nservices (e.g., air and water filtration, water cycling, nutrient cycling) \r\nmore effectively and at lower costs than afforestation/reforestation \r\n(Jia et al. 2019). Potential adverse side effects of these conservation \r\nmeasures include reducing the potential for agriculture land \r\nexpansion, restricting the rights and access of local people to forest \r\nresources, or increasing the dependence of local people to insecure \r\nexternal funding. Barriers to implementation include unclear land \r\ntenure, weak environmental governance, insufficient funds, and \r\nincreasing pressures associated to agriculture conversion, resource \r\nexploitation and infrastructure development (Sections 7.3 and 7.6)."


id: ce53f2ee6df4e7601d7e4e50d22c471a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33638
content:
"Activities, co-benefits, risks and implementation opportunities \r\nand barriers. Reducing deforestation and forest degradation \r\nconserves existing carbon pools in forest vegetation and soil by \r\navoiding tree cover loss and disturbance. Protecting forests involves \r\ncontrolling the drivers of deforestation (such as commercial and \r\nsubsistence agriculture, mining, urban expansion) and forest \r\ndegradation (such as overharvesting including fuelwood collection, \r\npoor harvesting practices, overgrazing, pest outbreaks, and extreme \r\nwildfires), as well as by establishing well designed, managed \r\nand funded protected areas (Barber et al. 2014), improving law "


id: 553ab5a52a96068dc7c1e618b43d7d0b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12272
content:
"Conclusions from AR5 and IPCC Special Reports (SR1.5, SROCC \r\nand SRCCL); mitigation potential, costs, and pathways. Reducing \r\ndeforestation and forest degradation represents one of the most effective \r\noptions for climate change mitigation, with technical potential estimated \r\nat 0.4-5.8 GtCO2 yr-1 by 2050 (high confidence) (SRCCL, Chapters 2 and \r\n4, and Table 6.14). The higher technical estimate represents a complete \r\nhalting of land-use conversion in forests and peatland forests (i.e., \r\nassuming recent rates of carbon loss are saved each year) and includes \r\nvegetation and soil carbon pools. Ranges of economic potentials for \r\nforestry ranged in AR5 from 0.01-1.45 GtCO2 yr-1 for USD20 tCO2\r\n-1\r\nto 0.2-13.8 GtCO2 yr-1 for USD100 tCO2\r\n-1 by 2030 with reduced \r\ndeforestation dominating the forestry mitigation potential LAM and \r\nMAF, but very little potential in OECD-1990 and EIT (IPCC AR5)."


id: 70fad0b66f1c0350a7bb690b1b6815dc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17141
content:
"provides multiple co-benefits linked to ecosystem services, biodiversity \r\nand sustainable development (Section  7.6.). Still, ensuring good \r\ngovernance, accountability (e.g., enhanced monitoring and verification \r\ncapacity; Bos 2020), and the rule of law are crucial for implementing \r\nforest-based mitigation options. In many countries with the highest \r\ndeforestation rates, insecure land rights often are significant barriers for \r\nforest-based mitigation options (Gren and Zeleke 2016; Essl et al. 2018)."


id: ca9f0163cb00897040dcfb62d4c2b294
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32989
content:
"Conclusions from AR5 and IPCC Special Reports (SR1.5, SROCC \r\nand SRCCL); mitigation potential, costs, and pathways. The AR5 \r\ndid not provide a new specification of A/R potential, but referred to \r\nIPCC AR4 mostly for forestry measures (Nabuurs et al. 2007). The AR5 \r\ndid view the feasible A/R potential from a diets change scenario that \r\nreleased land for reforestation and bioenergy crops. The AR5 provided \r\ntop-down estimates of costs and potentials for forestry mitigation \r\noptions  - including reduced deforestation, forest management, \r\nafforestation, and agroforestry, estimated to contribute between 1.27 \r\nand 4.23 GtCO2 yr-1 of economically viable abatement in 2030 at \r\ncarbon prices up to USD100 tCO2-eq-1 (Smith et al. 2014)."


id: 24f4f962a98baf5690dd0466c9088db9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3696
content:
"Critical assessment and conclusion. Based on studies since \r\nAR5, the technical mitigation potential for reducing deforestation \r\nand degradation is significant, providing 4.5 (2.3-7) GtCO2 yr-1\r\nglobally by 2050, of which 3.4 (2.3-6.4) GtCO2 yr-1 is available at \r\nbelow USD100 tCO2\r\n-1 (medium confidence) (Figure  7.11). Over the \r\nlast decade, hundreds of subnational initiatives that aim to reduce \r\ndeforestation related emissions have been implemented across the \r\ntropics (Section 7.6). Reduced deforestation is a significant piece of \r\nthe NDCs in the Paris Agreement (Seddon et al. 2020) and keeping \r\nthe temperature below 1.5degC (Crusius 2020). Conservation of forests "


id: 48d0552d7a79e1112253d31a60000fc8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10024
content:
"The SRCCL remained with a  reported wide range of mitigation \r\npotential for A/R of 0.5-10.1 GtCO2 yr-1 by 2050 (medium confidence) \r\n(Kreidenweis et al. 2016; Griscom et al. 2017; Hawken 2017; Fuss et al. \r\n2018; Roe et al. 2019) (SRCCL Chapters 2 and 6). The higher estimate \r\nrepresents a technical potential of reforesting all areas where forests \r\nare the native cover type (reforestation), constrained by food security \r\nand biodiversity considerations, considering above and below-ground "


id: 4363fdd89eac87a66e76da9614d30347
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9074
content:
"of afforestation and reforestation activities by 2050 is 3.9 \r\n(0.5-10.1) GtCO2 yr-1, and the economic mitigation potential \r\n(<USD100 tCO2\r\n-1) is 1.6   (0.5-3.0)  GtCO2  yr-1 (requiring about \r\n200 Mha). Per hectare a long (about 100 year) sustained effect of \r\n5-10 t CO2 ha-1 yr-1 is realistic with ranges between 1-20 t(CO2) ha-1\r\nyr-1. Not all sectoral studies rely on economic models that account for \r\nleakage (Murray et al. 2004; Sohngen and Brown 2004), suggesting \r\nthat technical potential may be overestimated."


id: 12a48235a14aebb89c7df62cf137a7df
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
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vector_id: 484
content:
"Conclusions from AR5 and IPCC Special Reports (SR1.5, SROCC \r\nand SRCCL); mitigation potential, costs, and pathways. In the \r\nSRCCL, forest management activities have the potential to mitigate \r\n0.4-2.1 GtCO2-eq yr-1 by 2050 (medium confidence) (SRCCL: \r\nGriscom et al. 2017; Roe et al. 2019). The higher estimate stems from "


id: a68f13cb7587fd4eb237b9d0c45c60ab
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26517
content:
"assumptions of applications on roughly 1.9 billion ha of already \r\nmanaged forest  which can be seen as very optimistic. It combines \r\nboth natural forest management as well as improved plantations, on \r\naverage with a small net additional effect per hectare, not including \r\nsubstitution effects in the energy sector nor the buildings sector."


id: a3ec4a44901eba8013d7d9bb791abeb7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26032
content:
"(Smyth et al. 2020). In Europe, climate-smart forestry could mitigate \r\nan additional 0.19 GtCO2 yr-1 by 2050 (Nabuurs et al. 2017), in line \r\nwith the regional estimates in (Roe et al. 2021)."


id: 822d47afd31ad28f134fd3c1e3b4fd99
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20028
content:
"In the tropics, estimates of the pantropical climate mitigation potential \r\nof natural forest management (a light intensity management in \r\nsecondary forests), across three tropical regions (Latin America, \r\nAfrica, Asia), is around 0.66 GtCO2-eq yr-1 with Asia responding for \r\nthe largest share followed by Africa and Latin America (Roe et al. \r\n2021). Selective logging occurs in at least 20% of the world's tropical \r\nforests and causes at least half of the emissions from tropical forest \r\ndegradation (Asner et al. 2005; Blaser and Kuchli 2011; Pearson \r\net al. 2017). Reduced-impact logging for climate (RIL-C; promotion \r\nof reduced wood waste, narrower haul roads, and lower impact \r\nskidding equipment) has the potential to reduce logging emissions \r\nby 44% (Ellis et al. 2019), while also providing timber production."


id: bd3f47083a0ed0a889c1e36892df9143
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
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content:
"Developments since AR5 and IPCC Special Reports (SR1.5, \r\nSROCC and SRCCL). The area of forest under management plans \r\nhas increased in all regions since 2000 by 233 Mha (FAO 2020e). The \r\nroughly 1 billion ha of secondary and degraded forests would be ideal \r\nto invest in and develop a sustainable sector that pays attention to \r\nbiodiversity, wood provision and climate mitigation at the same time. \r\nThis all depends on the effort made, the development of expertise, \r\nknow-how in the field, nurseries with adapted provenances, etc as \r\nwas also found for Russian climate-smart forestry options (Leskinen \r\net al. 2020). Regionally, recently updated economic mitigation \r\npotential at USD100 tCO2\r\n-1 have 179-186 MtCO2-eq yr-1 in Africa, \r\n193-313 MtCO2-eq yr-1 in Asia and Pacific, 215-220 MtCO2-eq yr-1 \r\nin Developed Countries , 82-152 MtCO2-eq yr-1 in Eastern Europe \r\nand West-Central Asia, and 62-204 MtCO2-eq yr-1 in Latin America \r\nand Caribbean (Roe et al. 2021)."


id: 3ce0ba04900a11222fb4e874a0147b71
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7895
content:
"Regional studies can take into account the local situation better: \r\nRussia Romanovskaya et al. (2020) estimate the potential of forest \r\nfires management at 220-420 MtCO2 yr-1, gentle logging technology \r\nat 15-59, reduction of wood losses at 61-76 MtCO2 yr-1. In North \r\nAmerica, (Austin et al. 2020) estimate that in the next 30 years, \r\nforest management could contribute 154 MtCO2 yr-1 in the USA and \r\nCanada with 81 MtCO2 yr-1 available at less than USD100 tCO2\r\n-1. In \r\none production region (British Columbia) a cost-effective portfolio of \r\nscenarios was simulated that directed more of the harvested wood \r\nto longer-lived wood products, stopped burning of harvest residues \r\nand instead produced bioenergy to displace fossil fuel burning, and \r\nreduced harvest levels in regions with low disturbance rates. Net \r\nGHG emissions were reduced by an average of -9 MtCO2-eq yr-1"


id: 300ad3d9f1fb52edd45092732ffce860
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5715
content:
"European forests have been regarded as prospering and increasing for the last five decades. However, these views also changed \r\nrecently. Climate change is putting a large pressure on mono species and high stocked areas of Norway spruce in Central Europe \r\n(Hlasny et al. 2021; Senf and Seidl 2021) with estimates of mortality reaching 200 million m3\r\n, biodiversity under pressure, the \r\nMediterranean area showing a weak sector and harvesting pressure in the Baltics and north reaching maxima achievable. A European \r\nstrategy for unlocking the EU's forests and forest sector potential was needed at the time of developing the LULUCF regulation and \r\nwas based on the concept of 'climate-smart forestry' (CSF) (Nabuurs et al. 2017; Verkerk et al. 2020)."


id: 7af9f31a074b01d520fe4f424f1dbb55
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18836
content:
"The idea behind CSF is that it considers the whole value chain from forest to wood products and energy, illustrating that a wide range \r\nof measures can be applied to provide positive incentives for more firmly integrating climate objectives into the forest and forest \r\nsector framework. CSF is more than just storing carbon in forest ecosystems; it builds upon three main objectives; (i) reducing and/\r\nor removing GHG emissions; (ii) adapting and building diverse forests for forest resilience to climate change; and (iii) sustainably \r\nincreasing forest productivity and incomes. These three CSF objectives can be achieved by tailoring policy measures and actions to \r\nregional circumstances in member states' forest sectors."


id: 38aa95fc6e78ed12dc668ad622d56ef2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7173
content:
"The 2015 annual mitigation effect of EU-28 forests via contributions to the forest sink, material substitution and energy substitution is \r\nestimated at 569 MtCO2 yr-1, or 13% of total current EU emissions. With the right set of incentives in place at EU and member states \r\nlevels, it was found that the EU-28 has the potential to achieve an additional combined mitigation impact through the implementation \r\nof CSF of 441 MtCO2 yr-1 by 2050. Also, with the Green Deal and its biodiversity and forest strategy, more emphasis will be placed on \r\nforests, forest management and the provision of renewables. It is the diversity of measures (from strict reserves to more intensively \r\nmanaged systems while adapting the resource) that will determine the success. Only with co-benefits in, for example, nature \r\nconservation, soil protection, and provision of renewables, wood for buildings and income, the mitigation and adaptation measures \r\nwill be successful."


id: db99d9352fb588bbda42d0e5be97fce5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35927
content:
"Climate-smart forestry is now taking shape across Europe with various research and implementation projects (Climate Smart Forest \r\nand Nature Management, 2021). Pilots and projects are being implemented by a variety of forest owners, some with more attention \r\non biodiversity and adaptation, some with more attention on production functions. They establish examples and in longer term the \r\noutreach to the 16 million private owners in Europe. However, the right triggers and incentives are often still lacking. For example, \r\nadapting the spruce forest areas in Central Europe to climate change requires knowledge about different species, biodiversity and \r\ndifferent management options and eventually use in industry. It requires alternative species to be available from the nurseries, as well \r\nas improved monitoring to assess the success and steer activities."


id: 27d319ebff942b58278e7ce113507e51
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4198
content:
"Conclusions from AR5 and IPCC Special Reports (SR1.5, SROCC \r\nand SRCCL); mitigation potential, costs, and pathways. In the \r\nSRCCL, fire management is among the nine options that can deliver \r\nmedium-to-large benefits across multiple land challenges (climate \r\nchange mitigation, adaptation, desertification, land degradation, and \r\nfood security) (high confidence). Total emissions from fires have been \r\non the order of 8.1 GtCO2-eq yr-1 in terms of gross biomass loss for \r\nthe period 1997-2016 (SRCCL, Chapter 2, and Cross-Chapter Box 3 \r\nin Chapter  2). Reduction in fire CO2 emissions was calculated to \r\nenhance land carbon sink by 0.48 GtCO2-eq yr-1 for the 1960-2009 \r\nperiod (Arora and Melton 2018) (SRCCL, Table 6.16)."


id: 4ae987377c583425d1e8d9d9cf090f1f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10418
content:
"Forests. Fire is also a prevalent forest disturbance (Falk et al. 2011; \r\nScott et al. 2014; Andela et al. 2019). About 98 Mha of forest were \r\naffected by fire in 2015, affecting about 4% of the tropical (dry) \r\nforests, 2% of the subtropical forests, and 1% of temperate and \r\nboreal forests (FAO 2020a). Between 2001-2018, remote sensing \r\ndata showed that tree-covered areas correspond to about 29% of \r\nthe total area burned by wildfires, most in Africa. Prescribed fires are \r\nalso applied routinely in forests worldwide for fuel reduction and "


id: 3fdc85cfdb0ce671976c8ff4849a4079
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8430
content:
"drivers (e.g., commercial and subsistence agriculture, see Section 7.3) \r\nand improving policies and management. In addition to mitigation, \r\nconserving grasslands provide various socio-economic, biodiversity, \r\nwater cycle and other environmental benefits (Claassen et al. 2010; \r\nRyals et al. 2015; Bengtsson et al. 2019). Annual operating costs, and \r\nopportunity costs of income foregone by undertaking the activities \r\nneeded for avoiding conversion of grasslands making costs one of \r\nthe key barriers for implementation (Lipper et al. 2010)."


id: afd94e6ef692d5b94fc447bc107b7314
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28174
content:
"Critical assessment and conclusion. There is low confidence that \r\nthe global technical mitigation potential for reduced grassland and \r\nsavanna conversion by 2050 is 0.2 (0.1-0.4) GtCO2 yr-1, and the "


id: 7a418abf9770327b1bcb7ecc74e55a71
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18704
content:
"Conclusions from AR5 and IPCC Special Reports (SR1.5, SROCC \r\nand SRCCL); mitigation potential, costs, and pathways. In \r\nthe SRCCL (Chapters 2 and 6), it was estimated that avoided peat \r\nimpacts could deliver 0.45-1.22 GtCO2-eq yr-1 technical potential \r\nby 2030-2050 (medium confidence) (Hooijer et al. 2010; Griscom \r\net al. 2017; Hawken 2017). The mitigation potential estimates cover \r\ntropical peatlands and include CO2, N2O and CH4 emissions. The \r\nmitigation potential is derived from quantification of losses of carbon \r\nstocks due to land conversion, shifts in GHG fluxes, alterations in \r\nnet ecosystem productivity, input factors such as fertilisation needs, \r\nand biophysical climate impacts (e.g., shifts in albedo, water cycles, \r\netc.). Tropical peatlands account for only about 10% of peatland area "


id: c3b4b20dda5d399d198478fd0c30d196
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31708
content:
"of this mitigation strategy (Roe et al. 2019). Feasibility of reducing \r\npeatland conversion may depend on countries' governance, financial \r\ncapacity and political will."


id: a62cf3de85dd71c6b1ee92eaf3fa2254
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26458
content:
"meet 1.5degC-2degC pathways which is unlikely to happen (Leifeld et al. \r\n2019); immediate rewetting and restoration minimises the warming \r\nfrom cumulative CO2 emissions (Nugent et al. 2019)."


id: 25c0377b204a98208f1b952ee76cc844
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3827
content:
"According to recent data, the technical mitigation potential for global \r\npeatland restoration is estimated at 0.5-1.3 GtCO2-eq yr-1 (Leifeld \r\nand Menichetti 2018; Griscom et al. 2020; Bossio et al. 2020; Roe et al. \r\n2021) (Figure  7.11), with 80% of the mitigation potential derived \r\nfrom improvements to soil carbon (Bossio et al. 2020). The regional \r\nmitigation potentials of all peatlands outlined in Roe et al. (2021) \r\nreflect the country-level estimates from (Humpenoder et al. 2020)."


id: 7f53375ad4276f8b75a8d78cf425412
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19555
content:
"Climate mitigation effects of peatland rewetting depend on the \r\nclimate zone and land use. Recent analysis shows the strongest \r\nmitigation gains from rewetting drained temperate and boreal \r\npeatlands used for agriculture and drained tropical peatlands (Ojanen \r\nand Minkkinen 2020). However, estimates of emission factors from \r\nrewetting drained tropical peatlands remain uncertain (Wilson et al. \r\n2016; Murdiyarso et al. 2019). Topsoil removal, in combination with \r\nrewetting, may improve restoration success and limit CH4 emissions \r\nduring restoration of highly degraded temperate peatlands (Zak et al. \r\n2018). In temperate and boreal regions, co-benefits mentioned above \r\nare major motivations for peatland restoration (Chimner et al. 2017; \r\nTanneberger et al. 2020a)."


id: 5b5957a82b2e04fce1096d592ab2f78a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13315
content:
"Critical assessment and conclusion. Based on studies to date, \r\nthere is medium confidence that peatland restoration has a technical \r\npotential of 0.79 (0.49-1.3) GtCO2-eq yr-1 (median) of which \r\n0.4 (0.2-0.6) GtCO2-eq yr -1 is available up to USD100 tCO2\r\n-1. The large \r\nland area of degraded peatlands suggests that significant emissions \r\nreductions could occur through large-scale restoration especially \r\nin tropical peatlands. There is medium confidence in the large \r\ncarbon stocks of tropical peat forests (1956-14,757 tCO2-eq ha-1) \r\nand large rates of carbon loss associated with land cover change \r\n(640-1650 tCO2-eq ha-1) (Goldstein et al. 2020; Novita et al. \r\n2021). However, large-scale implementation of tropical peatland \r\nrestoration will likely be limited by costs and other demands for these \r\ntropical lands."


id: f7f13d3084c62bb43b8163e030c41a55
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40996
content:
"Conclusions from AR5 and IPCC Special Reports (SR1.5, SROCC \r\nand SRCCL); mitigation potential, costs, and pathways. Large \r\nareas (0.51 Mkm2\r\n) of global peatlands are degraded of which \r\n0.2 Mkm2 are tropical peatlands (Griscom et al. 2017; Leifeld and \r\nMenichetti 2018). According the SRCCL, peatland restoration could \r\ndeliver technical mitigation potentials of 0.15 - 0.81GtCO2-eq yr-1\r\nby 2030-2050 (low confidence) (Couwenberg et al. 2010; Griscom \r\net al. 2017) (Chapters 2 and 6 of the SRCCL), though there could be \r\nan increase in methane emissions after restoration (Jauhiainen et al. \r\n2008). The mitigation potential estimates cover global peatlands and \r\ninclude CO2, N2O and CH4 emissions. Peatlands are highly sensitive \r\nto climate change (high confidence), however there are currently no \r\nstudies that estimate future climate effects on mitigation potential \r\nfrom peatland restoration."


id: 62b12007b341a194150325690dd04d25
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14653
content:
"Developments since AR5 and IPCC Special Reports (SR1.5, \r\nSROCC and SRCCL). The most recent literature and reviews indicate \r\nwith high confidence that restoration would decrease CO2 emissions \r\nand with medium confidence that restoration would decrease net \r\nGHG emissions from degraded peatlands (Wilson et al. 2016; Ojanen \r\nand Minkkinen 2020; van Diggelen et al. 2020). Although rewetting \r\nof drained peatlands increases CH4 emissions, this effect is often \r\noutweighed by decreases in CO2 and N2O emissions but depends \r\nvery much on local circumstances (Gunther et al. 2020). Restoration \r\nand rewetting of almost all drained peatlands is needed by 2050 to "


id: dfb50f7d008cc06f6441f8dbd243117c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36601
content:
"Recent loss rates of mangroves are 0.16-0.39% yr-1 and are highest \r\nin South-East Asia (Hamilton and Casey 2016; Friess et al. 2019; \r\nHamilton and Casey 2016). Assuming loss of soil carbon to 1 m depth \r\nafter deforestation, avoiding mangrove conversion has the technical \r\npotential to mitigate approximately 23.5-38.7 MtCO2-eq yr-1\r\n(Ouyang and Lee 2020); note, this potential is additional to reduced \r\nconversion of forests (Griscom et al. 2020) (Section  7.4.2.1). \r\nRegional estimates show that about 85% of mitigation potential \r\nfor avoided mangrove conversion is in South-East Asia and Pacific \r\n(32 MtCO2-eq yr-1 at USD100 tCO2\r\n-1), 10% is in Latin American and \r\nthe Caribbean (4 MtCO2-eq yr-1), and approximately 5% in other \r\nregions (Griscom et al. 2020; Roe et al. 2021)."


id: 97fec5e5fe6e80a1d1c131a8a91fdb69
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23954
content:
"Key uncertainties remain in mapping extent and conversion rates \r\nfor salt marshes and seagrasses (McKenzie et al. 2020). Seagrass \r\nloss rates were estimated at 1-2% yr-1 (Dunic et al. 2021) with \r\nstabilisation in some regions (de los Santos et al. 2019) (AR6 WGII, \r\nSection 3.4.2.5); however, loss occurs non-linearly and depends on \r\nsite-specific context. Tidal marsh extent and conversion rates remains \r\npoorly estimated, outside of the USA, Europe, South Africa, and \r\nAustralia (Mcowen et al. 2017; Macreadie et al. 2019)."


id: bc901ea7c03a0847e6785b976fbc8a28
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30420
content:
"Critical assessment and conclusion. There is medium confidence\r\nthat coastal wetland protection has a  technical potential of \r\n0.8 (0.06-5.4) GtCO2-eq yr-1 of which 0.17 (0.06-0.27) GtCO2-eq yr-1\r\nis available up to USD100 tCO2\r\n-1. There is a high certainty (robust \r\nevidence, high agreement) that coastal ecosystems have among the \r\nlargest carbon stocks of any ecosystem. As these ecosystems provide \r\nmany important services, reduced conversion of coastal wetlands is \r\na valuable mitigation strategy with numerous co-benefits. However, \r\nthe vulnerability of coastal wetlands to climatic and other anthropogenic \r\nstressors may limit the permanence of climate mitigation."


id: 3543704c75b7917fae6fee4b5c59460b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6618
content:
"Developments since AR5 and IPCC Special Reports (SR1.5, \r\nSROCC and SRCCL). Global technical mitigation potential for \r\nconservation of coastal wetlands from recent literature have \r\nfocused on protection of mangroves; estimates range from \r\n0.06-2.25 GtCO2-eq yr-1 (Griscom et al. 2020; Bossio et al. 2020)\r\nwith 80% of the mitigation potential derived from improvements to \r\nsoil carbon (Bossio et al. 2020). Regional potentials (Roe et al. 2021) \r\nreflect mangrove protection; marsh and seagrass protection were not \r\nincluded due to lack of country-level data on marsh and seagrass \r\ndistribution and conversion."


id: 926d85482dd28e98e885696d4bbf1a3d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22980
content:
"Global estimates show mangroves have the largest per hectare carbon \r\nstocks (see IPCC AR6 WGII Box 3.4 for estimates of carbon stocks, \r\nburial rates and ecosystem extent for coastal wetland ecosystems). \r\nMean ecosystem carbon stock in mangroves is 3131 tCO2-eq ha-1\r\namong the largest carbon stocks on Earth. Recent studies emphasise \r\nthe variability in total ecosystem carbon stocks for each wetland type, \r\nbased on species and climatic and edaphic conditions (Kauffman \r\net al. 2020; Bedulli et al. 2020; Ricart et al. 2020; Alongi et al. 2020; \r\nF. Wang et al. 2021), and highlight the vulnerability of soil carbon \r\nbelow 1 m depth (Arifanti et al. 2019). Sea level strongly influences \r\ncoastal wetland distribution, productivity, and sediment accretion; \r\ntherefore, sea level rise will impact carbon accumulation and "


id: 912dbbf8de8c3c8133387d452000915a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22750
content:
"through enhanced methane and nitrous oxide release and carbonate \r\nformation, and competition with other land uses, including aquaculture \r\nand human settlement and development in the coastal zone (SROCC, \r\nChapter 5). To date, many coastal wetland restoration efforts do not \r\nsucceed due to failure to address the drivers of degradation (van \r\nKatwijk et al. 2016). However, improved frameworks for implementing \r\nand assessing coastal wetland restoration are emerging that emphasise \r\nthe recovery of ecosystem functions (Zhao et al. 2016; Cadier et al. \r\n2020). Restoration projects that involve local communities at all stages \r\nand consider both biophysical and socio-political context are more \r\nlikely to succeed (Brown et al. 2014; Wylie et al. 2016)."


id: 7ba96dec09dadf3406a51f7e4f320d3e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18967
content:
"of their total national carbon stock (Donato et al. 2012). Furthermore, \r\nnon-climatic co-benefits can strongly motivate coastal wetland \r\nrestoration worldwide (UNEP 2021a). Major successes in both active \r\nand passive restoration of seagrasses have been documented in \r\nNorth America and Europe (Lefcheck et al. 2018; de los Santos et al. \r\n2019; Orth et al. 2020); passive restoration may also be feasible for \r\nmangroves (Cameron et al. 2019)."


id: ba7e4651dcc6e6feef686b8afe9ee83
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30027
content:
"There is high site-specific variation in carbon sequestration rates \r\nand uncertainties regarding the response to future climate change \r\n(Jennerjahn et al. 2017; Nowicki et al. 2017) (IPCC AR6 WGII Box 3.4). \r\nChanges in distributions (Kelleway et al. 2017; Wilson and Lotze 2019),\r\nmethane release (Al-Haj and Fulweiler 2020), carbonate formation \r\n(Saderne et al. 2019), and ecosystem responses to interactive climate \r\nstressors are not well-understood (Short et al. 2016; Fitzgerald and \r\nHughes 2019; Lovelock and Reef 2020)."


id: caf0b6fb8d76a7376023c15480d926a8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33045
content:
"Conclusions from AR5 and IPCC Special Reports (SR1.5, \r\nSROCC and SRCCL); mitigation potential, costs, and pathways.\r\nThe SRCCL reported that mangrove restoration has the technical \r\npotential to mitigate 0.07 GtCO2 yr-1 through rewetting (Crooks et al. \r\n2011) and take up 0.02-0.84 GtCO2 yr-1 from vegetation biomass \r\nand soil enhancement through 2030 (medium confidence) (Griscom \r\net al. 2017). The SROCC concluded that cost-effective coastal blue \r\ncarbon restoration had a potential of about 0.15-0.18 GtCO2-eq yr-1, \r\na  low global potential compared to other ocean-based solutions \r\nbut with extensive co-benefits and limited adverse side effects \r\n(Gattuso et al. 2018)."


id: f5867494f8a46fff803417edcefb098c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40561
content:
"Critical assessment and conclusion. There is medium confidence\r\nthat coastal wetland restoration has a  technical potential of \r\n0.3 (0.04-0.84) GtCO2-eq yr-1 of which 0.1 (0.05-0.2) GtCO2-eq yr-1\r\nis available up to USD100 tCO2\r\n-1. There is high confidence that \r\ncoastal wetlands, especially mangroves, contain large carbon stocks \r\nrelative to other ecosystems and medium confidence that restoration \r\nwill reinstate pre-disturbance carbon sequestration rates. There is low \r\nconfidence on the response of coastal wetlands to climate change; \r\nhowever, there is high confidence that coastal wetland restoration \r\nwill provide a suite of valuable co-benefits."


id: 467e91d42357dfca59412cd2869d6ede
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9616
content:
"According to recent data, the technical mitigation potential for global \r\ncoastal wetland restoration is 0.04-0.84 GtCO2-eq yr-1 (Griscom et al. \r\n2020; Bossio et al. 2020; Roe et al. 2021) with 60% of the mitigation \r\npotential derived from improvements to soil carbon (Bossio et al. \r\n2020). Regional potentials based on country-level estimates from \r\nGriscom et al. (2020) show the technical and economic (up to \r\nUSD100 tCO2\r\n-1) potential of mangrove restoration; seagrass and \r\nmarsh restoration was not included due to lack of country-level data \r\non distribution and conversion (but see McKenzie et al. 2020 for \r\nupdates on global seagrass distribution). Although global potential is \r\nrelatively moderate, mitigation can be quite significant for countries \r\nwith extensive coastlines (e.g., Indonesia, Brazil) and for small island \r\nstates where coastal wetlands have been shown to comprise 24-34% "


id: 6aebfe325b0eb304775ceb6c7b5fa0ba
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16098
content:
"Critical assessment and conclusion. In conclusion, there is medium \r\nconfidence that enhanced soil carbon management in croplands has \r\na global technical mitigation potential of 1.9 (0.4-6.8) GtCO2 yr-1, \r\nand in grasslands of 1.0 (0.2-2.6) GtCO2 yr-1, of which, 0.6 (04-0.9) \r\nand 0.9 (0.3-1.6) GtCO2 yr-1 is estimated to be available at up to \r\nUSD100 tCO2\r\n-1 respectively. Regionally, soil carbon management \r\nin croplands and grasslands is feasible anywhere, but effectiveness \r\ncan be limited in very dry regions, and for grasslands it is greatest \r\nin areas where degradation has occurred (e.g.,  by overgrazing) \r\nand soil organic carbon is depleted. Barriers to implementation \r\ninclude regional capacity for monitoring and verification (especially \r\nin developing countries), and more widely through concerns over \r\nsaturation and permanence."


id: 22a03b251e8b265dd048b10b2dbb3abd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3307
content:
"and impacts on leakage, indirect land-use change and foregone \r\nsequestration do not apply (since production in not displaced), the \r\nclimate benefits of soil carbon sequestration in croplands can be \r\nnegated if achieved through additional fertiliser inputs (potentially \r\ncausing increased N2O emissions; (Guenet et al. 2021), and both \r\nsaturation and permanence are relevant concerns. When considering \r\nimplementation barriers, soil carbon management in croplands and \r\ngrasslands is a low-cost option at a high level of technology readiness \r\n(it is already widely deployed globally) with low socio-cultural and \r\ninstitutional barriers, but with difficulty in monitoring and verification \r\nproving a barrier to implementation (Smith et al. 2020a)."


id: 942406baf76b0a548607d976d8cc8e6d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23270
content:
"and verification, and limited knowledge, standardisation and quality \r\ncontrol, restricting user confidence (Gwenzi et al. 2015)."


id: 12fe879714b2c83586b67b0a00c87371
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 547
content:
"Conclusions from AR5 and IPCC Special Reports (SR1.5, SROCC \r\nand SRCCL); mitigation potential, costs, and pathways. Biochar is \r\ndiscussed as a mitigation option in AR5 and CDR strategy in the SR1.5. \r\nConsideration of potential was limited as biochar is not included in IAMs. \r\nThe SRCCL estimated mitigation potential of 0.03-6.6 GtCO2-eq yr-1\r\nby 2050 based on studies with widely varying assumptions, definitions \r\nof potential, and scope of mitigation processes included (SRCCL, \r\nChapters 2 and 4: (Roberts et al. 2010; Pratt and Moran 2010; Hristov \r\net al. 2013; Lee and Day 2013; Dickie et al. 2014a; Hawken 2017; Fuss \r\net al. 2018; Powell and Lenton 2012; Woolf et al. 2010)."


id: a1d6209173d932b23c6fe902c6a42dd3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25692
content:
"Conclusions from AR5 and IPCC Special Reports (SR1.5, \r\nSROCC and SRCCL); mitigation potential, costs, and pathways.\r\nThe SRCCL estimated the global technical mitigation potential of \r\nagroforestry, with medium confidence, to be between 0.08 and \r\n5.6 GtCO2-eq yr-1 by 2050 (Griscom et al. 2017; Dickie et al. 2014a; \r\nZomer et al. 2016; Hawken 2017). Estimates are derived from \r\nsyntheses of potential area available for various agroforestry systems, \r\nfor example, windbreaks, farmer managed natural regeneration, and \r\nalley cropping and average annual rates of carbon accumulation. The \r\ncost-effective economic potential, also with medium confidence, is \r\nmore limited at 0.3-2.4 GtCO2-eq yr-1 (Zomer et al. 2016; Griscom \r\net al. 2017; Roe et al. 2019). Despite this potential, agroforestry is \r\ncurrently not considered in integrated assessment models used for \r\nmitigation pathways (Section 7.5)."


id: d0c819948a35a5cd90f066b201e6da2d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34083
content:
"Developments since AR5 and IPCC Special Reports (SR1.5, SROCC \r\nand SRCCL). Updated estimates of agroforestry's technical mitigation \r\npotential and synthesised estimates of carbon sequestration across \r\nagroforestry systems have since been published. The most recent global \r\nanalysis estimates technical potential of 9.4 GtCO2-eq yr-1 (Chapman \r\net al. 2020) of agroforestry on 1.87 and 1.89 billion ha of crop and \r\npasture lands below median carbon content, respectively. This estimate \r\nis at least 68% greater than the largest estimate reported in the SRCCL \r\n(Hawken 2017) and represents a  new conservative upper bound as \r\nChapman et al. (2020) only accounted for above-ground carbon. \r\nConsidering both above- and below-ground carbon of windbreaks, \r\nalley cropping and silvopastoral systems at a  more limited areal \r\nextent (Griscom et al. 2020), the economic potential of agroforestry "


id: d425928fec1a43b3591f48024e1d8461
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34653
content:
"Critical assessment and conclusion. Biochar has significant \r\nmitigation potential through CDR and emissions reduction, and can \r\nalso improve soil properties, enhancing productivity and resilience \r\nto climate change (medium agreement, robust evidence). There \r\nis medium evidence that biochar has a  technical potential of \r\n2.6 (0.2-6.6) GtCO2-eq yr-1, of which 1.1 (0.3-1.8) GtCO2-eq yr-1 is \r\navailable up to USD100 tCO2\r\n-1. However, mitigation and agronomic \r\nco-benefits depend strongly on biochar properties and the soil to \r\nwhich biochar is applied (strong agreement, robust evidence). While \r\nbiochar could provide moderate to large mitigation potential, it is not \r\nyet included in IAMs, which has restricted comparison and integration \r\nwith other CDR strategies."


id: 78084c58e8e8d721a3c731b9acd3327f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18329
content:
"health, regarding infiltration and structural stability (Muchane et al. \r\n2020); reduces ambient temperatures and crop heat stress (Arenas\u0002Corraliza et al. 2018; Sida et al. 2018); increases groundwater \r\nrecharge in drylands when managed at moderate density (Ilstedt \r\net al. 2016; Bargues-Tobella et al. 2020); positively influences human \r\nhealth (Rosenstock et al. 2019); and can improve dietary diversity \r\n(McMullin et al. 2019). Along with previously mentioned barriers, low \r\nsocial capital, assets, and labour availability have been identified as \r\npertinent to adoption. Practically all barriers are interdependent and \r\nsubject to the context of implementation."


id: da3a1e371e91514c51f54c6b40f3939b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35691
content:
"was estimated to be only about 0.8 GtCO2-eq yr-1. Variation in \r\nestimates primarily result from assumptions on the agroforestry \r\nsystems including, extent of implementation and estimated carbon \r\nsequestration potential when converting to agroforestry."


id: b7cbbf0ab97dc65efdb6590c0480969d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29554
content:
"Critical assessment and conclusion. There is medium \r\nconfidence that agroforestry has a  technical potential of \r\n4.1  (0.3-9.4) GtCO2-eq yr-1 for the period 2020-2050, of which \r\n0.8 (0.4-1.1) GtCO2-eq yr-1 is available at USD100 tCO2\r\n-1. Despite \r\nuncertainty around global estimates due to regional preferences \r\nfor management systems, suitable land availability, and growing \r\nconditions, there is high confidence in agroforestry's mitigation \r\npotential at the field scale. With countless options for farmers and land \r\nmanagers to implement agroforestry, there is medium confidence in \r\nthe feasibility of achieving estimated regional mitigation potential. \r\nAppropriately matching agroforestry options, to local biophysical \r\nand social contexts is important in maximising mitigation and co\u0002benefits, while avoiding risks (Sinclair and Coe 2019)."


id: 28d786efb2df34d289121cbf65ffe0b7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4404
content:
"Recent research has also highlighted co-benefits and more precisely \r\nidentified implementation barriers. In addition to aforementioned \r\nco-benefits, evidence now shows that agroforestry can improve soil "


id: bc0602c74f8fb9536e52ffbf8f0769aa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30315
content:
"Brazilian farmers are integrating trees into their croplands in various ways, ranging from simple to highly complex agroforestry \r\nsystems. While complex systems are more effective in the mitigation of climate change, trade-offs with scalability need to be resolved \r\nfor agroforestry systems to deliver on their potential. The Brazilian-Dutch CANOPIES project (Janssen 2020) is exploring transition \r\npathways to agroforestry systems optimised for local ecological and socio-economic conditions."


id: 670a2612c5e3bff42e7074f8c9766fdf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15394
content:
"The climate change mitigation potential of agroforestry systems is widely recognised (Zomer et al. 2016; FAO 2017b) and Brazilian \r\nfarmers and researchers are pioneering diverse ways of integrating trees into croplands, from planting rows of eucalyptus trees in \r\npastures up to highly complex agroforests consisting of >30 crop and tree species. The degree of complexity influences the multiple \r\nfunctions that farmers and societies can attain from agroforestry: the more complex it is, the more it resembles a natural forest with \r\nassociated benefits for its carbon storage capacity and its habitat quality for biodiversity (Santos et al. 2019). However, trade-offs \r\nexist between the complexity and scalability of agroforestry as complex systems rely on intensive manual labour to achieve high \r\nproductivity (Tscharntke et al. 2011). To date, mechanisation of structurally diverse agroforests is scarce and hence, efficiencies of \r\nscale are difficult to achieve."


id: 503077cc31031065265ebc13d1f120f0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11397
content:
"These synergies and trade-offs between complexity, multifunctionality and scalability are studied in the CANOPIES (Co-existence of \r\nAgriculture and Nature: Optimisation and Planning of Integrated Ecosystem Services) project, a collaboration between Wageningen \r\nUniversity (NL), the University of Sao Paulo and EMBRAPA (both Brazil). Soil and management data are collected on farms of varying \r\ncomplexity to evaluate carbon sequestration and other ecosystem services, economic performance and labour demands."


id: f36da2fb2ef0cba3897ddd1fbdcd9fac
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40201
content:
"The trade-off between complexity and labour demand is less pronounced in EMBRAPA's integrated crop-livestock-forestry (ICLF) \r\nsystems, where grains and pasture are planted between widely spaced tree rows. Here, barriers for implementation relate mostly to \r\nlivestock and grain farmers' lack of knowledge on forestry management and financing mechanisms5\r\n (Gil et al. 2015). Additionally, linking \r\nthese financing mechanisms to carbon sequestration remains a Monitoring, Reporting and Verification challenge (Smith et al. 2020b)."


id: 8718008bf2212dfb7a0f2f31b375b9aa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20929
content:
"Successful examples of how more complex agroforestry can be upscaled do exist in Brazil. For example, on farm trials and consistent \r\ninvestments over several years have enabled Rizoma Agro to develop a citrus production system that integrates commercial and \r\nnative trees in a large-scale multi-layered agroforestry system. The success of their transition resulted in part from their corporate \r\nstructure that allowed them to tap into the certified Green Bonds market (CBI 2020). However, different transition strategies need to \r\nbe developed for family farmers and their distinct socio-economic conditions."


id: d113e239eed88f959ad513cd670ed03d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34136
content:
"Conclusions from AR5 and IPCC Special Reports (SR1.5, SROCC \r\nand SRCCL); mitigation potential, costs, and pathways. The AR5 \r\nindicated medium (5-15%) technical mitigation potential from both \r\nfeeding and breeding related measures (Smith et al. 2014). More \r\nrecently, the SRCCL estimated with medium confidence, a  global \r\npotential of 0.12-1.18 GtCO2-eq yr-1 between 2020 and 2050, with \r\nthe range reflecting technical, economic and sustainability constraints \r\n(SRCCL, Chapter 2: Hristov et al. 2013; Dickie et al. 2014a; Herrero \r\net al. 2016; Griscom et al. 2017). The underlying literature used \r\na  mixture of IPCC GWP100 values for CH4, preventing conversion \r\nof CO2-eq to CH4. Improved livestock feeding and breeding were \r\nincluded in IAM emission pathway scenarios within the SRCCL and \r\nSR1.5, although it was suggested that the full mitigation potential of \r\nenteric CH4 measures is not captured in current models (Rogelj et al. \r\n2018b; IPCC 2018)."


id: 9840a3e3e7ca650b1573e90c0e0ec70a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23996
content:
"Developments since AR5 and IPCC Special Reports (SR1.5, \r\nSROCC and SRCCL). Recent reviews generally identify the same \r\nmeasures as those outlined in the SRCCL, with the addition of early \r\nlife manipulation of the ruminal biome (Grossi et al. 2019; Eckard \r\nand Clark 2020; Thompson and Rowntree 2020; Beauchemin \r\net al. 2020; Ku-Vera et al. 2020; Honan et al. 2021). There is \r\nrobust evidence and high agreement that chemically synthesised \r\ninhibitors are promising emerging near-term measures (Patra 2016; \r\nJayanegara et al. 2018; Van Wesemael et al. 2019; Beauchemin et al. "


id: 170e4290e0b3a4f75ac6b2e966f4c72a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1274
content:
"Critical review and conclusion. Based on studies to date, \r\nusing a  range of IPCC GWP100 values for CH4, there is medium \r\nconfidence that activities to reduce enteric CH4 emissions have \r\na global technical potential of 0.8 (0.2-1.2) GtCO2-eq yr-1, of which \r\n0.2 (0.1-0.3) GtCO2-eq yr-1 is available up to USD100 tCO2-eq-1\r\n(Figure 7.11). The CO2-eq value may also slightly differ if the GWP100 \r\nIPCC AR6 CH4 value was uniformly applied within calculations. Lack \r\nof comparable country and sub-sector studies to assess the context \r\napplicability of measures, associated costs and realistic adoption \r\nlikelihood, prevents verification of estimates."


id: 995d0cc77d55ac3485e6f23210c350a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24202
content:
"Conclusions from AR5 and IPCC Special Reports (SR1.5, SROCC \r\nand SRCCL); mitigation potential, costs, and pathways. The AR5 \r\noutlined emissions from rice cultivation of 0.49-0.723 GtCO2-eq yr-1\r\nin 2010 with an average annual growth of 0.4% yr-1. The SRCCL \r\nestimated a global mitigation potential from improved rice cultivation \r\nof 0.08-0.87 GtCO2-eq yr-1 between 2020 and 2050, with the \r\nrange representing the difference between technical and economic \r\nconstraints, types of activities included (e.g.,  improved water \r\nmanagement and straw residue management) and GHGs considered \r\n(Dickie et al. 2014a; Beach et al. 2015; Paustian et al. 2016; Griscom \r\net al. 2017; Hawken 2017) (SRCCL, Chapter 2)."


id: e32f0ed52bb3407fdadc7147c82626b0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37268
content:
"Critical assessment and conclusion. There is medium confidence\r\nthat improved rice management has a  technical potential of \r\n0.3  (0.1-0.8) GtCO2-eq yr-1 between 2020 and 2050, of which \r\n0.2 (0.05-0.3) GtCO2-eq yr-1 is available up to USD100 tCO2-eq-1\r\n(Figure 7.11). Improving rice cultivation practices will not only reduce \r\nGHG emissions, but also improve production sustainability in terms \r\nof resource utilisation including water consumption and fertiliser \r\napplication. However, emission reductions show high variability and \r\nare dependent on site specific conditions and cultivation practices."


id: 14831430093c815306a9420ad79b24b8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 835
content:
"Critical assessment and conclusion. There is medium confidence\r\nthat crop nutrient management has a  technical potential of \r\n0.3 (0.06-0.7) GtCO2-eq yr-1 of which 0.2 (0.05-0.6) GtCO2-eq yr-1\r\nis available up to USD100 tCO2-eq-1. This value is based on GWP100 \r\nusing a  mixture of IPCC values for N2O and may slightly differ if \r\ncalculated using AR6 values. The development of national roadmaps \r\nfor sustainable fertiliser (nutrient) management can help in scaling\u0002up related practices and in realising this potential. Crop nutrient \r\nmanagement measures can contribute not only to mitigation, but food \r\nand nutrition security and wider environmental sustainability goals."


id: ef3b6b69aadba3bc224cc4e83276a66c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39459
content:
"A potential risk under certain circumstances, is yield reduction, while \r\nimplementation of practices should consider current soil nutrient \r\nstatus. There are significant regional imbalances, with some regions \r\nexperiencing nutrient surpluses from over fertilisation and others, \r\nnutrient shortages and chronic deficiencies (FAO 2021e). Additionally, \r\ndepending on context, practices may be inaccessible, expensive or \r\nrequire expertise to implement (Hedley 2015; Benson and Mogues \r\n2018) while impacts of climate change may influence nutrient use \r\nefficiency (Amouzou et al. 2019) and therefore, mitigation potential."


id: 9febea2a0dbfa2e7f65339845f5cb957
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25345
content:
"Conclusions from AR5 and IPCC Special Reports (SR1.5, SROCC \r\nand SRCCL); mitigation potential, costs, and pathways. The \r\nSRCCL broadly identified the same practices as outlined in AR5 \r\nand estimated that improved cropland nutrient management could \r\nmitigate between 0.03 and 0.71 GtCO2-eq yr-1 between 2020 and \r\n2050 (SRCCL Chapter  2) (Dickie et al. 2014a; Beach et al. 2015; \r\nPaustian et al. 2016; Griscom et al. 2017; Hawken 2017)."


id: 9eff2f61ad6ce98c99d8ad442bcfa005
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25201
content:
"The climate-smart villages (CSV) approach aims to generate local knowledge, with the involvement of farmers, researchers, practitioners, \r\nand governments, on climate change adaptation and mitigation while improving productivity, food security, and farmers' livelihoods \r\n(Aggarwal et al. 2018). This knowledge feeds a global network that includes 36 climate-smart villages in South and South-East Asia, \r\nWest and East Africa, and Latin America."


id: ba1ed1e98e30bb01b04af36d50a586b3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29970
content:
"It is expected that agricultural production systems across the world will change in response to climate change, posing significant \r\nchallenges to the livelihoods and food security of millions of people (Kennedy et al. 2014). Maintaining agricultural growth while \r\nminimising climate shocks is crucial to building a resilient food production system and meeting sustainable development goals in \r\nvulnerable countries."


id: e9bb8818a13fc4e73839de533c11a168
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38475
content:
"The CSV approach seeks an integrated vision so that sustainable rural development is the final goal for rural communities. At the \r\nsame time, it fosters the understanding of climate change with the implementation of adaptation and mitigation actions, as much as \r\npossible. Rural communities and local stakeholders are the leaders of this process, where scientists facilitate their knowledge to be \r\nuseful for the communities and learn at the same time about challenges but also the capacity those communities have built through \r\ntime. The portfolio includes weather-smart activities, water-smart practices, seed/breed smart, carbon-/nutrient-smart practices, and \r\ninstitutional-/market-smart activities."


id: fa2094d3fbf81cd331fadbc5616545af
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41377
content:
"The integration of technologies and services that are suitable for the local conditions resulted in many gains for food security and \r\nadaptation and for mitigation where appropriate. It was also shown that, in all regions, there is considerable yield advantage when \r\na portfolio of technologies is used, rather than the isolated use of technologies (Govaerts et al. 2005; Zougmore et al. 2014). Moreover, \r\nfarmers are using research results to promote their products as climate-smart leading to increases in their income (Acosta-Alba\r\net al. 2019). However, climatic risk sites and socio-economic conditions together with a lack of resource availability are key issues \r\nconstraining agriculture across all five regions."


id: fb1eb01844e6702de773756a0df8972f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41554
content:
"The assessment of the implementation of the CSA options should be done together with community leaders to understand changes \r\nin livelihoods and climate vulnerability. Also, knowledge appropriation by community leaders has led to farmer-to-farmer knowledge \r\nexchange within and outside the community (Ortega Fernandez and Martinez-Baron 2018)."


id: e157faa0788bc339bf94742c7418ca21
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36909
content:
"(iv) improved storage and application practices, (v) grazing practices \r\nand (vi) alteration of livestock diets to reduce nitrogen excretion \r\n(Mbow et al. 2019; Jia et al. 2019). Implementation of manure \r\nmanagement with other livestock and soil management measures \r\ncan enhance system resilience, sustainability, food security and help \r\nprevent land degradation (Smith et al. 2014; Mbow et al. 2019; \r\nP.  Smith et al. 2019a), while potentially benefiting the localised \r\nenvironment, for example, regarding water quality (Di and Cameron \r\n2016). Risks include increased N2O emission from the application "


id: d76742dd1a51cc0de3d8b141e1abe50f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35201
content:
"Activities, co-benefits, risks and implementation opportunities \r\nand barriers. Manure management measures aim to mitigate CH4\r\nand N2O emissions from manure storage and deposition. Mitigation \r\nof N2O considers both direct and indirect (i.e., conversion of ammonia \r\nand nitrate to N2O) sources. According to the SRCCL, measures may \r\ninclude (i) anaerobic digestion, (ii) applying nitrification or urease \r\ninhibitors to stored manure or urine patches, (iii) composting, "


id: 327471f151f140fddb099ce08f5797f9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6132
content:
"of manure to poorly drained or wet soils, trade-offs between N2O \r\nand ammonia emissions and potential eco-toxicity associated with \r\nsome measures."


id: f37441d2774c5f351a539991956b8517
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40208
content:
"restricted in some jurisdictions due to concerns regarding residues \r\nin food products (Di  and Cameron 2016; Eckard and Clark 2020) \r\nwhile limited evidence suggests eco-toxicity risk under certain \r\ncircumstances (Kosler et al. 2019). Some forage crops may naturally \r\ncontain inhibitory substances (Simon et al. 2019, 2020; de Klein et al. \r\n2020), though this warrants further research (Podolyan et al. 2020; \r\nGardiner et al. 2020)."


id: 42f06a53a4999b26c11b480529f6f9fb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8973
content:
"Conclusions from AR5 and IPCC Special Reports (SR1.5, SROCC \r\nand SRCCL); mitigation potential, costs, and pathways. The\r\nAR5 reported manure measures to have high (>10%) mitigation \r\npotential. The SRCCL estimated a  technical global mitigation \r\npotential between 2020 and 2050 of 0.01-0.26 GtCO2-eq yr-1, with \r\nthe range depending on economic and sustainable capacity (Dickie \r\net al. 2014a; Herrero et al. 2016) (SRCCL, Chapter 2). Conversion of \r\nestimates to native units is restricted as a mixture of GWP100 values \r\nwas used in underlying studies. Measures considered were typically \r\nmore suited to confined production systems (Jia et al. 2019; Mbow \r\net al. 2019), while improved manure management is included within \r\nIAM emission pathways (Rogelj et al. 2018b)."


id: ab8ab194deefd4d76078b543447a1310
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27413
content:
"Critical assessment and conclusion. There is medium confidence\r\nthat manure management measures have a global technical potential \r\nof 0.3 (0.1-0.5) GtCO2-eq yr-1, (using a range of IPCC GWP100 values \r\nfor CH4 and N2O), of which 0.1 (0.09-0.1) GtCO2-eq yr-1 is available \r\nat up to USD100 tCO2-eq-1 (Figure  7.11). As with other non-CO2\r\nGHG mitigation estimates, values may slightly differ depending upon \r\nwhich IPCC GWP100 values were used. There is robust evidence and\r\nhigh agreement that there are measures that can be applied in all \r\nregions, but greatest mitigation potential is estimated in Developed \r\nCountries in more intensive and confined production systems."


id: 2b7d71a9cbf4a1ba3b9fb14ba880f473
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4905
content:
"Box 7.5, Figure 1 | Potential mitigation mechanisms and associated management practices. N = nitrogen, SOM = soil organic matter, LUC = land-use \r\nchange. a The farming system approaches outlined are not necessarily mutually exclusive. b Only agricultural emissions are considered. Mitigation may also result from \r\nreduced production of fertilisers and agrochemicals. c Reduced emissions intensity per unit of milk/meat will only result in a reduction in absolute emissions where \r\nincreased productivity facilitates a reduction in animal numbers. 1 = Altieri et al. 2015; 2 = Altieri and Nicholls 2017; 3 = Powlson et al. 2016; 4 = Corbeels et al. \r\n2019; 5 = Lal 2015; 6 = Gonzalez-Sanchez et al. 2019; 7 = Thierfelder et al. 2017; 8 = Hendrickson et al. 2008; 9 = Weindl et al. 2015; 10 = Thornton and Herrero \r\n2015; 11 = Lal al. 2020; 12 = Scialabba and Muller-Lindenlauf 2010; 13 = Goh 2011; 14 = IFOAM 2016."


id: d48375f43764e470c25985c8f9abeb6a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34708
content:
"The SRCCL noted both positive and inconclusive results regarding CA and soil carbon, with sustained sequestration dependent on \r\nproductivity and residue returns (Jia et al. 2019; Mirzabaev et al. 2019; Mbow et al. 2019). Recent research is in broad agreement \r\n(Ogle et al. 2019; Corbeels et al. 2020, 2019; Gonzalez-Sanchez et al. 2019; Munkholm et al. 2020) with greatest mitigation potential \r\nsuggested in dry regions (Sun et al. 2020). Theoretically, CA may facilitate improved nitrogen use efficiency (limited evidence) (Lal \r\n2015; Powlson et al. 2016), though CA appears to have mixed effects on soil N2O emission (Six et al. 2004; Mei et al. 2018). CA is \r\nnoted for its adaptation benefits, with wide agreement that CA can enhance system resilience to climate related stress, notably in dry \r\nregions. There is evidence that CA can contribute to mitigation, but its contribution is depended on multiple factors including climate \r\nand residue returns (high confidence)."


id: 9b2e5d10045b0c3e746c05fc6e2f6890
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24550
content:
"The integration of different enterprises in space and time (e.g., diversified cropping, crop and livestock production, agroforestry), \r\ntherefore facilitating interaction and transfer of recourses between systems, is suggested to enhance sustainability and adaptive \r\ncapacity (Hendrickson et al. 2008; Franzluebbers et al. 2014; Lemaire et al. 2014; Weindl et al. 2015; Gil et al. 2017; Olsson et al. 2019; \r\nPeterson et al. 2020; Walkup et al. 2020; Garrett et al. 2020). Research indicates some mitigation potential, including by facilitating \r\nsustainable intensification (Box 7.11), though benefits are likely to be highly context specific (Herrero et al. 2013; Carvalho et al. 2014; \r\nPiva et al. 2014; de Figueiredo et al. 2017; Rosenstock et al. 2014; Weindl et al. 2015; Thornton and Herrero 2015; Descheemaeker et al. \r\n2016; Lal 2020; Guenet et al. 2021). The other systems outlined within this Box may form or facilitate IPS."


id: a74f9dd4132716fa72230921ce24a549
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26658
content:
"To assess the technical mitigation potentials of Indian agriculture and costs under a business as usual scenario (BAU) and Mitigation \r\nscenario up to 2030 (Sapkota et al. 2019)."


id: bd8138abca76cb96f7a4696d661dc2c9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30600
content:
"combined with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) and biochar \r\nproduction, bioenergy systems may provide CDR by durably storing \r\nbiogenic carbon in geological, terrestrial, or ocean reservoirs, or \r\nin products, further contributing to mitigation (Chum et al. 2011; \r\nCabral et al. 2019; Hammar and Levihn 2020; Emenike et al. 2020; \r\nMoreira et al. 2020b; Y. Wang et al. 2020: Johnsson et al. 2020) \r\n(Section 7.4.3.2, Chapters 3, 4, 6 and 12)."


id: 794c1a4b3cfcee6ce8b10d87142c3fa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18533
content:
"Activities, co-benefits, risks and implementation \r\nopportunities and barriers. Bioenergy refers to energy products \r\n(solid, liquid and gaseous fuels, electricity, heat) derived from \r\nmultiple biomass sources including organic waste, harvest residues \r\nand by-flows in the agriculture and forestry sectors, and biomass \r\nfrom tree plantations, agroforestry systems, lignocellulosic crops, \r\nand conventional food/feed crops. It may reduce net GHG emissions \r\nby displacing the use of coal, oil and natural gas with renewable \r\nbiomass in the production of heat, electricity, and fuels. When "


id: 727cf67a3191646d9fb2f1756af8e6c7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17382
content:
"This section addresses especially aspects related to land use and \r\nbiomass supply for bioenergy and BECCS. The mitigation potential \r\npresented here and in Table 7.3, includes only the CDR component of "


id: eac309339be76fa342c39fbcfc4d4e48
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38660
content:
"BECCS. The additional mitigation achieved from displacing fossil fuels \r\nis covered elsewhere (Chapters 6, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12)."


id: 46c0dbc3f9b472b9eaf10314645a0f86
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9653
content:
"Modern bioenergy systems (as opposed to traditional use of fuelwood \r\nand other low-quality cooking and heating fuels) currently provide \r\napproximately 30 EJ yr-1 of primary energy, making up 53% of total \r\nrenewable primary energy supply (IEA 2019). Bioenergy systems \r\nare commonly integrated within forest and agriculture systems that \r\nproduce food, feed, lumber, paper and other bio-based products. \r\nThey can also be combined with other AFOLU mitigation options: \r\ndeployment of energy crops, agroforestry and A/R can provide \r\nbiomass while increasing land carbon stocks (Sections 7.4.2.2 and \r\n7.4.3.3) and anaerobic digestion of manure and wastewater, to \r\nreduce methane emissions, can produce biogas and CO2 for storage \r\n(Section 7.4.3.7). But ill-deployment of energy crops can also cause \r\nland carbon losses (Hanssen et al. 2020) and increased biomass \r\ndemand for energy could hamper other mitigation measures such as \r\nreduced deforestation and degradation (Sections 7.4.2.1)."


id: f2577124346a1e120dcec67e18ece85c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40032
content:
"Developments since AR5 and IPCC Special Reports (SR1.5, \r\nSROCC and SRCCL). The role of bioenergy and BECCS in mitigation \r\npathways has been reduced as IAM-based studies have incorporated \r\nbroader mitigation portfolios and have explored non-CO2 emissions \r\nreduction and a  wider variation of underlying assumptions about \r\nsocio-economic drivers and associated energy and food demand, \r\nas well as deployment limits such as land availability for A/R and \r\nfor cultivation of crops used for bioenergy and BECCS (Grubler et al. \r\n2018; Van Vuuren et al. 2018)."


id: 8438b61a61309e0d6d502c04e9af5a9c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20416
content:
"Conclusions from AR5 and IPCC Special Reports (SR1.5, SROCC \r\nand SRCCL); mitigation potential, costs, and pathways. Many \r\nmore stringent mitigation scenarios in AR5 relied heavily on bioenergy \r\nand BECCS. The SR1.5 reported a  range for the CDR potential of \r\nBECCS (2100) at 0.5 to 5 GtCO2-eq yr-1 when applying constraints \r\nreflecting sustainability concerns, at a cost of 100-200 USD tCO2\r\n-1\r\n(Fuss et al. 2018). The SRCCL reported a technical CDR potential for \r\nBECCS at 0.4-11.3 GtCO2 yr-1 (medium confidence), noting that \r\nmost estimates do not include socio-economic barriers, the impacts \r\nof future climate change, or non-GHG climate forcing (IPCC. 2019). \r\nThe SR1.5 and SRCCL highlighted that bioenergy and BECCS can be "


id: 59e1aece9be4367320b1c679f7f7463d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13055
content:
"Box 7.7, Figure 1 shows emissions associated with biomass supply (residues and crops grown on cropland not needed for food) in \r\n2050, here designated emission-supply curves. The curves are constructed assuming that additional biomass supply consistently comes \r\nfrom the available land/biomass resource that has the lowest GHG emissions, for example, the marginal GHG emissions increase with \r\nincreasing biomass use for bioenergy. Net negative emissions indicate cases where biomass production increases land carbon stocks. "


id: 41dcb8cfd7cf384b5d1e3248487704ba
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8781
content:
"Box 7.7, Figure 1 | Emissions associated with primary biomass supply in 2050 (residues and crops grown on cropland not needed for food), \r\nas determined from sectoral models (Daioglou et al. 2017; Kalt et al. 2020), and stylised scenarios from the EMF-33 project using Integrated \r\nAssessment Models (Rose et al. 2020). All methods include LUC (direct and indirect) emissions. Emissions associated with Natural Regrowth include counterfactual \r\ncarbon fluxes (see text). The sectoral models include a more detailed representation of the emissions, including lifecycle emissions from fertiliser production. IAM \r\nmodels may include economic feedbacks such as intensification as a result of increasing prices. As an indication: for natural gas the emission factor is around 56, for \r\ncoal around 95 kgCO2 GJ-1."


id: 9e833c7d4f6d60a4df20f9e214baedc6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25111
content:
"One curve (EMF-33) is determined from stylised scenarios using IAMs (Rose et al. 2020). One of the two curves determined from \r\nsectoral models, Constant Land Cover, reflects supply chain emissions and changes in land carbon storage caused by the biomass \r\nsupply system itself. These two curves are obtained with modelling approaches compatible with the modelling protocol used for the \r\nscenarios in the AR6 database, which accounts for the land-use change and all other GHG emissions along a given transformation \r\ntrajectory, enabling assessments of the warming level incurred."


id: 28894e95ea1bbd6046fcd2f7582599a0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4342
content:
"The Natural Regrowth curve attribute additional 'counterfactual emissions' to the bioenergy system, corresponding to estimated \r\nuptake of CO2 in a counterfactual scenario where land is not used for bioenergy but instead subject to natural vegetation regrowth. \r\nThis curve does not show actual emissions from the bioenergy system, but it provides insights in the mitigation value of the bioenergy \r\noption compared to alternative land-use strategies. To illustrate, if biomass is used instead of a primary energy source with emission \r\nfactor 75 kgCO2 GJ-1, and the median values in the Natural Regrowth curve are adopted, then the curve indicates that up to about \r\n150 EJ of biomass can be produced and used for energy while achieving higher net GHG savings than the alternative to set aside the \r\nsame land for natural vegetation regrowth (assuming same conversion factor)."


id: a62602502d14bf9ec0316593856556e7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26454
content:
"The large ranges in the bars signify the importance of uncertainties and how the biomass is deployed. Variation in energy conversion \r\nefficiencies and uncertainty about magnitude, timing, and permanence of land carbon storage further complicate the comparison. \r\nFinally, not shown in Box 7.7, Figure 1, the emission-supply curves would be adjusted downwards if displacement of emission intensive \r\nenergy was included or if the bioenergy is combined with CCS to provide CDR."


id: 15f8af642435249f4f94af8ed1965ea2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1081
content:
"based products, providing climate change mitigation while enabling \r\nmultiple co-benefits including for nature conservation (Nabuurs \r\net al. 2017; Parodi et al. 2018; Springmann et al. 2018; Rosenzweig \r\net al. 2020; Clark et al. 2020; Favero et al. 2020; Hanssen et al. 2020) \r\n(Section 7.4 and Cross-Working Group Box 3 in Chapter 12)."


id: 5f2218787df6960d9ee69157d24a197
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14040
content:
"Strategies to enhance the benefits of bioenergy and BECCS \r\ninclude (i)  management practices that protect carbon stocks and \r\nthe productive and adaptive capacity of lands, as well as their \r\nenvironmental and social functions (van Ittersum et al. 2013, Gerssen\u0002Gondelach et al. 2015; Moreira et al. 2020b) (ii) supply chains from \r\nprimary production to final consumption that are well managed and \r\ndeployed at appropriate levels (Fajardy et al. 2018; Donnison et al. \r\n2020); and (iii) development of a cross-sectoral agenda for bio-based \r\nproduction within a circular economy, and international cooperation \r\nand governance of global trade in products to maximise synergies \r\nwhile limiting trade-offs concerning environmental, economic \r\nand social outcomes (very high confidence). Finally, the technical \r\nfeasibility of BECCS depends on investments in and the roll-out of \r\nadvanced bioenergy technologies currently not widely available \r\n(Baker et al. 2015; Daioglou et al. 2020b)."


id: 9bad6933f9a4d9fa3842524a7648efb4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24643
content:
"Technical land availability does not imply that dedicated biomass \r\nproduction for bioenergy and BECCS is the most effective use of this \r\nland for mitigation. Further, implications of deployment for climate \r\nchange mitigation and other sustainability criteria are context \r\ndependent and influenced by many factors, including rate and total \r\nscale. While governance has a critical influence on outcome, larger \r\nscale and higher expansion rate generally translates into higher risk \r\nfor negative outcomes for GHG emissions, biodiversity, food security \r\nand a  range of other sustainability criteria (Searchinger 2017; \r\nVaughan et al. 2018; Rochedo et al. 2018; de Oliveira Garcia et al. \r\n2018; Daioglou et al. 2019; Junginger et al. 2019; Galik et al. 2020; \r\nStenzel et al. 2020)."


id: 2a959861933027e96b45e41964aaaaef
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4724
content:
"Activities, co-benefits, risks and implementation opportunities \r\nand barriers. The term 'sustainable healthy diets' refers to dietary \r\npatterns that 'promote all dimensions of individuals' health and well\u0002being; have low environmental pressure and impact; are accessible, \r\naffordable, safe and equitable; and are culturally acceptable' \r\n(FAO and WHO 2019). In addition to climate mitigation gains, "


id: c59b631eb986497e80bfe5194ee74229
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32068
content:
"for a vegan diet, of 0.01-1.5 for a vegetarian diet, and of 0.1-2.0 for \r\nMediterranean or similar healthy diet."


id: b1c733d73d3474745b40564a22278513
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28493
content:
"Activities, co-benefits, risks and implementation opportunities \r\nand barriers. Food loss and waste (FLW) refer to the edible parts \r\nof plants and animals produced for human consumption that are \r\nnot ultimately consumed (UNEP 2021b). Food loss occurs through \r\nspoilage, spilling or other unintended consequences due to limitations \r\nin agricultural infrastructure, storage and packaging (Parfitt et al. "


id: 742c9654e988868eec46a1135499328d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17676
content:
"Critical assessment and conclusion. There is medium confidence \r\nthat reduced FLW has large global technical mitigation potential \r\nof 2.1 (0.1-5.8) GtCO2-eq yr-1 including savings in the full value \r\nchain and using GWP100 and a range of IPCC values for CH4 and \r\nN2O.  Potentials at 3.7 (2.2-5.1) GtCO2-eq yr-1 are considered \r\nplausible. When accounting for diverted agricultural production only, \r\nthe feasible potential is 0.5 (0.0-0.9) GtCO2-eq yr-1. See the section \r\nabove for the joint land-use effects of food related demand-side \r\nmeasures which increases three-fold when accounting for the land\u0002use effects as well. But this would overlap with other measures and is \r\ntherefore not additive. Regionally, FLW reduction is feasible anywhere \r\nbut its potential needs to be understood in a wider and changing \r\nsocio-cultural context that determines nutrition (high confidence)."


id: 37e6917cdb3dc27010c6566c3a6615e8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7041
content:
"Conclusions from AR5 and IPCC Special Reports (SR1.5, SROCC \r\nand SRCCL); mitigation potential, costs, and pathways. In AR5, \r\nreduced FLW was considered as a  mitigation measure that could \r\nsubstantially lower emissions, with estimated mitigation potential of \r\n0.6-6.0 GtCO2-eq yr-1 in the food supply chain (Smith et al. 2014). \r\nIn the SRCCL, the technical mitigation potential of reducing food \r\nand agricultural waste was estimated at 0.76-4.5 GtCO2-eq yr-1\r\n(Bajzelj et al. 2014; Dickie et al. 2014b; Hawken 2017) (SRCCL, \r\nChapter 2 and 6)."


id: 405509180a0f57e409054bdcf4c688f4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8515
content:
"Developments since AR5 and IPCC Special Reports (SR1.5, \r\nSROCC and SRCCL). Since the SRCCL, there have been very few \r\nquantitative estimates of the mitigation potential of FLW reductions. \r\nEvidence suggests that reducing FLW together with overall food \r\nintake could have substantial mitigation potential, equating to an \r\naverage of 0.3 tCO2-eq capita-1 (Ivanova et al. 2020). Some regional \r\nsectoral studies indicate that reducing FLW in the EU can reduce \r\nemissions by 186 MtCO2-eq yr-1, the equivalent of around 15% of the \r\nenvironmental impacts (climate, acidification, and eutrophication) \r\nof the entire food value chain (Scherhaufer et al. 2018). In the UK, \r\ndisruptive low-carbon innovations relating to FLW reduction were "


id: 1dfb865dba1b6b0a8acbc241fbacb5dc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2467
content:
"The benefits and risks of improved and enhanced improved use of \r\nwood products are closely linked to forest management. First of all, \r\nthe enhanced use of wood products could potentially activate or \r\nlead to improved sustainable forest management that can mitigate "


id: 1a5d3cc89e5566c85edffa33d7559b5e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1836
content:
"intensive and non-renewable materials (Sathre and O'Connor 2010; \r\nGeng et al. 2017; Leskinen et al. 2018)."


id: 9bdba5a9fde7f993d07423127a88eb78
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24673
content:
"and adapt (Verkerk et al. 2020). Secondly, carbon storage in wood \r\nproducts and the potential for substitution effects can be increased \r\nby additional harvest, but with the risk of decreasing carbon storage \r\nin forest biomass when not done sustainably (P. Smith et al. 2019a). \r\nConversely, reduced harvest may lead to gains in carbon storage \r\nin forest ecosystems locally, but these gains may be offset through \r\ninternational trade of forest products causing increased harvesting \r\npressure or even degradation elsewhere (Kastner et al. 2011; Kallio \r\net al. 2018; Pendrill et al. 2019b). There are also environmental \r\nimpacts associated with the processing, manufacturing, use and \r\ndisposal of wood products (Adhikari and Ozarska 2018; Baumgartner \r\n2019). See Section 9.6.4 of this report for additional discussion on \r\nbenefits and risks."


id: 5ae9d49614209cda6e76a2248ca8e922
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13244
content:
"Conclusions from AR5 and IPCC Special Reports (SR1.5, SROCC \r\nand SRCCL); mitigation potential, costs, and pathways. There \r\nis strong evidence at the product level that wood products from \r\nsustainably managed forests are associated with less greenhouse \r\nemissions in their production, use and disposal over their life-time \r\ncompared to products made from emission-intensive and non\u0002renewable materials. However, there is still limited understanding of \r\nthe substitution effects at the level of markets, countries (Leskinen \r\net al. 2018). The AR5 did not report on the mitigation potential of \r\nwood products. The SRCCL (Chapters 2 and 6) finds that some studies \r\nindicate significant mitigation potentials for material substitution, \r\nbut concludes that the global, technical mitigation potential for \r\nmaterial substitution for construction applications ranges from \r\n0.25-1 GtCO2-eq yr-1 (medium confidence) (Miner 2010; McLaren \r\n2012; Roe et al. 2019)."


id: 4fa511a967806eae41d05dd85d0a9898
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11299
content:
"This section assesses the literature and data available on potential \r\nfuture GHG dynamics in the AFOLU sector, the cost-effectiveness of \r\ndifferent mitigation measures, and consequences of climate change \r\nmitigation pathways on land-use dynamics as well as relevant \r\nsustainable development indicators at the regional and global level \r\nbased on global integrated models."


id: 47cb354f0a1db637d6ae92d0ff63479
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9845
content:
"The limited availability or absence of estimates of the future mitigation \r\npotential of improved use of wood products for many world regions \r\nrepresents an important knowledge gap, especially with regards to \r\nmaterial substitution effects. At the product level, wood products are \r\noften associated with lower fossil-based emissions from production, \r\nuse and disposal, compared to products made from emission\u0002"


id: a0bbf2f262207792681e3ac2b80fdbcb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25482
content:
"management (Humpenoder et al. 2020) which have the potential to \r\nalter the contribution of land-based mitigation in terms of timing, \r\npotential and sustainability consequences (Frank et al. 2017)."


id: 5e19984186269814634e905804964c51
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13850
content:
"Figure 7.14 | Regional change of major land cover types by 2050 (top) and 2100 (bottom) relative to 2020 for scenarios from the AR6 Database with \r\n<1.5degC (C1, C2), <2degC (C3, C4), <3degC (C5, C6) and <4degC (C7) global warming in 2100 (scenario type is indicated by colour). The data is summarised in boxplots \r\n(Tukey style), which show the median (vertical line), the interquartile range (IQR box) and the range of values within 1.5 x IQR at either end of the box (horizontal lines) across all \r\nmodels and scenarios. The number of data points available for each land cover type, scenario type, region and year is shown at the right edge of each panel. Regional definitions: \r\nAFRICA = sub-Saharan Africa, ASIA = Asia, LAM = Latin America and Caribbean, MID_EAST = Middle East, OECD90+EU = OECD 90 and EU, REF = Reforming Economies of \r\nEastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union."


id: bfa54ff7995cdf43006a35e87634b15c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30989
content:
"The overall land dynamics in <1.5degC, <2degC and <3degC mitigation \r\npathways are shaped by land-demanding mitigation options such \r\nas bioenergy and afforestation, in addition to the demand for other \r\nagricultural and forest commodities. Bioenergy production and \r\nafforestation take place largely in the (partly) tropical regions ASIA, \r\nLAM and AFRICA, but also in OECD90+EU. Land for dedicated second \r\ngeneration bioenergy crops and afforestation displace agricultural \r\nland for food production (cropland and pasture) and other natural \r\nland. For instance, in the <1.5degC mitigation pathway in ASIA, \r\nbioenergy and forest area together increased by about 2.1 million km2\r\nbetween 2020 and 2100, mostly at the cost of cropland and pasture \r\n(median values). Such large-scale transformations of land use have \r\nrepercussions on biogeochemical cycles (e.g.,  fertiliser and water) \r\nbut also on the economy (e.g.,  food prices) and potential socio\u0002political conditions."


id: f4e50d4a187178255fa6f57d712b74b4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40450
content:
"production are almost exclusively caused by ASIA.  N2O emissions \r\nfrom animal waste management and soils are more equally \r\ndistributed across region."


id: 43647d35bbd237b1e288ae02ec081aa1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9075
content:
"In most regions, CH4 and N2O emission are both lower in mitigation \r\npathways that limit warming to 3degC (>50%) or lower (C1-C6) \r\ncompared to scenarios with <4degC (Popp et al. 2017; Rogelj et al. \r\n2018a). In particular, the reduction of CH4 emissions from enteric \r\nfermentation in ASIA and AFRICA is profound. Land-related CO2\r\nemissions, which include emissions from deforestation as well \r\nas removals from afforestation, are slightly negative (i.e., AFOLU \r\nsystems turn into a  sink) in <1.5degC, <2degC and <3degC mitigation \r\npathways compared to <4degC scenarios. Carbon sequestration via \r\nBECCS is most prominent in ASIA, LAM, AFRICA and OECD90+EU, \r\nwhich are also the regions with the highest bioenergy area."


id: 2b4e76129ee7d742d7383ea735efca51
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4866
content:
"Figure 7.14 indicates that regional land-use dynamics in scenarios with \r\n<4degC warming in 2100 are characterised by rather static agricultural \r\nland (i.e., cropland and pasture) in ASIA, LAM, OECD90+EU and \r\nREF, and increasing agricultural land in AFRICA.  Bioenergy area is \r\nrelatively small in all regions. Agricultural land in AFRICA expands at \r\nthe cost of forests and other natural land."


id: 98ab7d2a390e98909b4b59b35e6cdbe7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24074
content:
"potentials, scenarios are compared to a benchmark scenario which \r\nusually assumes business-as-usual trends and no explicit additional \r\nmitigation efforts. Scenarios have been excluded, if they do not have \r\nan associated benchmark scenario or fail the vetting according to the \r\nAR6 scenario database, or if they do not report carbon prices and CO2\r\nemissions from AFOLU. Scenarios with contradicting assumptions (for \r\nexample, fixing some of the emissions to baseline levels) are excluded. \r\nFurthermore, only scenarios with consistent3\r\n regional and global \r\nlevel results are considered. Mitigation potentials are computed by \r\nsubtracting scenario specific emissions and sequestration amounts \r\nfrom their respective benchmark scenario values. This difference "


id: cfb1a5bc899f429026b1655fbe1f0126
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33900
content:
"the level of five world regions. This review provides a complementary \r\nview on the economic mitigation potentials estimated in Section 7.4 \r\nby implicitly taking into account the interlinkages between the land\u0002based mitigation options themselves as well as the interlinkages with \r\nmitigation options in the other sectors such as BECCS. The review \r\nsystematically evaluates a  range of possible economic potential \r\nestimates across gases, time, and carbon prices."


id: 3cd1e0dec688de5e265b2fc3022c9758
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7885
content:
"For different models and scenarios from the AR6 database, \r\nthe amount of mitigated emissions is presented together with the \r\nrespective carbon price (Figure  7.15). To determine mitigation "


id: 63f7e47437a801f3e25cebda69645da3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14878
content:
"N2O emissions show the smallest economic potential of the \r\nthree different gases in 2030 as well as in 2050. The mitigation \r\npotential increases until a  price range of USD150-200 and to \r\na median value of around 0.6 GtCO2-eq yr-1 mitigation in 2030 and \r\n0.9 GtCO2-eq yr-1 in 2050, respectively, while afterwards with higher \r\nprices the expansion is very limited. Mitigation of CH4 emissions has \r\na  higher potential, also with increasing mitigation potentials until \r\na price range of USD150-200 in both years, with median mitigation \r\nof around 1.3 GtCO2-eq yr-1 in 2030 and around 2.4 GtCO2-eq yr-1\r\nin 2050, respectively. The highest mitigation potentials are observed \r\nfor CO2, but also the highest ranges of observations among the three \r\ngases. In 2030, a median of 4 GtCO2-eq yr-1 mitigation potential is \r\nreported for the price range of USD200-250. In 2050, for the carbon \r\nprice range of between USD100 and USD200, a median of around \r\n4.8 GtCO2-eq yr-1 can be observed."


id: 771e754d02054a3af22e9ab07d7d7075
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18155
content:
"accounts for the mitigation that can be credited to the carbon price \r\nwhich is applied in a scenario. A few benchmark scenarios, however, \r\napply already low carbon prices. For consistency reasons, a carbon \r\nprice that is applied in a benchmark scenario is subtracted from the \r\nrespective scenario specific carbon price. This may generate a bias \r\nbecause low carbon prices tend to have a stronger marginal impact \r\non mitigation than high carbon prices. Scenarios with carbon prices \r\nwhich become negative due to the correction are not considered. The \r\nanalysis considers all scenarios from the AR6 database which pass \r\nthe criteria and should be considered as an ensemble of opportunity \r\n(Huppmann et al. 2018)."


id: e5681a02799c7e504055f2d5ec2f8b96
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37662
content:
"Economic CO2 mitigation potentials from land-use change and forestry \r\nare larger compared to potentials from non-CO2 gases, and at the \r\nsame time reveal high levels of variation in absolute terms. The 66th \r\npercentile in 2050 goes up to 5.2 GtCO2-eq yr-1 mitigation, while \r\nthe lowest observations are even negative, indicating higher CO2\r\nemissions from land use in scenarios with carbon price compared to \r\nscenarios without (counterintuitive dynamics explained below)."


id: 964b30c3f6da83dccbfb65702030749b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23636
content:
"In the individual cases, the accounting of all these effects is \r\ndependent on the respective underlying model and its coverage of \r\ninter-relations of different sectors and sub-sectors. The presented \r\npotentials cover a  wide range of models, and additionally, a  wide \r\nrange of background assumptions on macro-economic, technical, \r\nand behavioural developments as well as policies, which the models \r\nhave been fed with. Subsequently, the range of the resulting marginal \r\nabatement costs is relatively wide, showing the full range of expected \r\ncontributions from land-use sector mitigation and sequestration in \r\napplied mitigation pathways."


id: 3859a60cd59b6176d28f02eff7b5319
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7123
content:
"Land use is at the centre of the interdependencies with other sectors, \r\nincluding energy. Some models see a  strong competition between \r\nBECCS deployment with its respective demand for biomass, and \r\nCO2 mitigation/sequestration potentials in the land sector. Biomass \r\ndemand may lead to an increase in CO2 emissions from land use \r\ndespite the application of a carbon price when land-use expansion \r\nfor dedicated biomass production, such as energy plantations, comes \r\nfrom carbon rich land use/land cover alternatives, or when increased \r\nextraction of biomass from existing land uses, such as forest \r\nmanagement, leads to reduction of the carbon sink (Daioglou 2019; \r\nLuderer et al. 2018) and can explain the high variety of observations \r\nin some cases. Overall, the large variety of observations shows a large \r\nvariety of plausible results, which can go back to different model \r\nstructures and assumptions, showing a  robust range of plausible \r\noutcomes (Kriegler et al. 2015)."


id: 51a373567563f54f77d754765621ebf2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11645
content:
"At the global level, the analysis of the economic mitigation potentials \r\nfrom N2O and CH4 emissions from AFOLU (which mainly can be related \r\nto agricultural activities) and CO2 emissions (which mainly can be \r\nrelated to LULUCF emissions) reveals a relatively good agreement of \r\nmodels and scenarios in terms of ranking between the gases. On the \r\nright-hand side panels of Figure 7.15, only small overlaps between \r\nthe ranges (showing the 10-90% intervals of observations) and \r\nmainly for lower price levels, can be observed, despite all differences \r\nin underlying model structure and scenario assumptions."


id: fb3baf486a77c339863d323ec2cddc7d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41574
content:
"forestry measures enhancing woody biomass supply for bioenergy may \r\nhave synergies with improving ecosystems conditions, many represent \r\na threat to biodiversity (Camia et al. 2020) (Sections 7.6.5 and 17.3.3.7, \r\nFigure 17.1 and Supplementary Material Table 17.SM.1)."


id: efeaea10b4eb9b8328dfa04601f9462c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39593
content:
"Besides the level of biomass supply for bioenergy, the adoption of \r\nSDGs may also significantly impact AFOLU emissions and the land\u0002use sector's ability for GHG abatement (Frank et al. 2021). Selected \r\nSDGs are found to have positive synergies for AFOLU GHG abatement \r\nand to consistently decrease GHG emissions for both agriculture and \r\nforestry, thereby allowing for even more rapid and deeper emissions \r\ncuts. In particular, the decreased consumption of animal products \r\nand less food waste (SDG 12), and the protection of high biodiversity \r\necosystems such as primary forests (SDG 15) deliver high synergies \r\nwith GHG abatement. On the other hand, protection of highly \r\nbiodiverse ecosystems from conversion (SDG 15) limits the global \r\nbiomass potentials for bioenergy (Frank et al. 2021), and while several "


id: a0dc0eb1c82c81cefc721f63d45f35e6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25521
content:
"At the regional level (Figure 7.16), the highest potential from non-CO2\r\nemissions abatement, and mostly from CH4, is reported for ASIA with \r\nthe median of mitigation potential observations from CH4 increasing \r\nup to a  price of USD200 in the year 2050, reaching a  median of \r\n1.2 GtCO2-eq yr-1. In terms of economic potential, ASIA is followed \r\nby LAM, AFRICA, and OECD+EU, where emission reduction mainly is \r\nachieved in the livestock sector."


id: 497e09c707f456b9b46e70d6165c731a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10155
content:
"Figure 7.16 | Regional mitigation efforts for CO2, CH4 and N2O emissions (in CO2-eq yr-1 using IPCC AR6 GWP100 values) from the AFOLU sector for \r\nincreasing carbon price levels for 2030 and 2050. Underlying datapoints are generated by comparing emissions between a policy scenario and a related benchmark \r\nscenario, mapping these differences with the respective carbon price differences. Boxplots show Medians (vertical line within the boxes), Means (dots), 33%-66% intervals \r\n(box) and 10%-90% intervals (horizontal lines) for respective scenarios of carbon prices implemented in intervals of USD50 from a price of USD0 to USD250. Regions: Asia \r\n(ASIA), Latin America and Caribbean (LAM), Middle East (MIDDLE_EAST), Africa (AFRICA), Developed Countries (OECD 90 and EU) (OECD+EU) and Reforming Economies of \r\nEastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union (REF)."


id: 1e7bc4c7548a63b65197abb31b529539
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2568
content:
"The highest potentials from land-related CO2 emissions, including \r\navoided deforestation as well as afforestation, can be observed in \r\nLAM and AFRICA with strong responses of mitigation (indicated \r\nby the median value) to carbon prices mainly in the lower range \r\nof displayed carbon prices. In general, CO2 mitigation potentials \r\nshow a wide range of results in comparison to non-CO2 mitigation \r\npotentials, but mostly also a higher median value. The most extreme \r\nranges are reported for the regions LAM and AFRICA. A medium \r\npotential is reported for ASIA and OECD+EU, while REF has the \r\nsmallest potential according to model submissions. These estimates \r\nreflect techno-economic potentials and do not necessarily include \r\nfeasibility constraints which are discussed in Chapter 7.6."


id: aff1daa963ad7bef1b933e765375dfc6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28193
content:
"Different mitigation strategies can achieve the net emission reductions \r\nthat would be required to follow a pathway limiting global warming, \r\nwith very different consequences for the land system. Figure  7.17 \r\nshows Illustrative Mitigation Pathways (IMPs) for achieving different \r\nclimate targets highlighting AFOLU mitigation strategies, resulting \r\nGHG and land-use dynamics as well as the interaction with other \r\nsectors. For consistency this chapter discusses IMPs as described in \r\ndetail in chapters 1 and 3 of this report but focusing on the land-use \r\nsector. All pathways are assessed by different IAM realisations and do \r\nnot only reduce GHG emissions but also use CDR options, whereas "


id: 8da76a088700a120e93942c4f602ac64
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22112
content:
"the amount and timing varies across pathways, as do the relative \r\ncontributions of different land-based CDR options."


id: 151d022e223372d53c00f622239ba4e3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 928
content:
"Following COP 13 in Bali, effort shifted to advancing policies to \r\nreduce deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) in developing \r\ncountries. According to Simonet et al. (2019), nearly 65 Mha have \r\nbeen enrolled in REDD+ type programmes or projects funded \r\nthrough a variety of sources, including United Nations Programme \r\non Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation \r\n(UN-REDD), the World Bank Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, and \r\nbi-lateral agreements between countries with Norway being the \r\nlargest donor. While there has been considerable focus on forest and "


id: 8bf598afd6115bcd92831d38068fcfba
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21797
content:
"IMP-Ren is similar to IMP Neg-2.0 in terms of socio-economic \r\nsetting (SSP2) but differs substantially in terms of mitigation target \r\nand mitigation efforts in the energy sector. Even under the more \r\nambitious climate change mitigation target (1.5degC with no or low \r\novershoot (OS), C1), the high share of renewable energy in IMP Ren\r\nstrongly reduces the need for large-scale land-based CDR, which is \r\nreflected in smaller bioenergy and afforestation areas compared to \r\nIMP Neg-2.0. However, CH4 and N2O emissions from AFOLU persist \r\nthroughout the century, similar to ModAct scenario and IMP Neg-2.0."


id: f6aecf1e4f775fce6ca1c2a2e9e78aef
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40772
content:
"agricultural project-based mitigation actions, national governments \r\nwere encouraged to incorporate project-based approaches with other \r\nsectoral strategies in their Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions \r\n(NAMAs) after 2012. NAMAs reflect the country's proposed strategy \r\nto reduce net emissions across various sectors within their economy \r\n(e.g.,  forests or agriculture). More recently, Nationally Determined \r\nContributions (NDCs) indicate whether individual countries plan to \r\nuse forestry and agricultural policies or related projects amongst a set \r\nof measures in other sectors, to reduce their net emissions as part of \r\nthe Paris Agreement (e.g., Forsell et al. 2016; Fyson and Jeffery 2019)."


id: 55e7498211bbea062a8739ceb632089f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12385
content:
"voluntary offset markets (Hamrick and Gallant 2017a). Although \r\nAFOLU measures have been deployed across a range of projects and \r\nprogrammes globally to reduce net carbon emissions, debate about \r\nthe net carbon benefits of some projects continues (e.g., Krug 2018)."


id: 50b239219c67cfc1430c0ff1858bc865
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11470
content:
"A new assessment of projects over the last two decades finds \r\nemission reductions or offsets of at least 7.9 GtCO2-eq (using \r\nGWP100 and a mix of IPCC values for CH4 and N2O) over the last 12 \r\nyears due to agricultural and forestry activities (Table 7.4). More than \r\n80% of these emission reductions or offsets have been generated \r\nby forest-based activities. The total amounts to 0.66 GtCO2 yr-1 for \r\nthe period 2010-2019, which is 1.2% of total global, and 5.5% of \r\nAFOLU emissions reported in Table 7.1, over the same time period \r\n(high confidence)."


id: 994630d9dcebb393f8c3672b15b5568c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24185
content:
"The many protocols now available can be used to quantify the \r\npotential mitigation to date resulting from various projects or \r\nprograms. For instance, carbon registries issue credits using protocols \r\nthat typically account for additionality, permanence and leakage, thus \r\nproviding evidence that the projects are a net carbon benefit to the \r\natmosphere. Protocol development engages the scientific community, \r\nproject developers, and the public over a  multi-year period. Some \r\nprotocols have been revised multiple times, such as the USA State of \r\nCalifornia's forest carbon protocol, which is in its fifth revision, with \r\nthe latest in 2019 (see http://www.climateactionreserve.org/how/\r\nprotocols/forest/). Credits from carbon registries feed into regulatory \r\nprograms, such as the cap and trade programme in California, or "


id: 8bf608570b2724b13beda4ba111641a5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21798
content:
"The array of activities in Table 7.4 includes the Clean Development \r\nMechanism, REDD+ activities reported in technical annexes of \r\ncountry biennial update reports to the UNFCCC, voluntary market \r\ntransactions, and carbon stored as a  result of carbon markets in \r\nAustralia, New Zealand and California in the USA. Although other \r\ncountries and sub-national units have developed programmes \r\nand policies, these three regions are presented due to their focus \r\non forest and agricultural carbon mitigation, their use of generally "


id: bfc69603fe11db78d8e9728ad003c336
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31023
content:
"For New Zealand, the carbon reduction in Table 7.4 represents forest \r\nremovals that were surrendered from post-1989 forests between 2008 \r\nand the 2020. Unlike offsets in voluntary markets or in California, \r\nwhere permanence involves long-term contracts or insurance \r\npools, forests in the New Zealand market liable for emissions when \r\nharvested or following land-use change. This means sellers account \r\nfor future emission risks related to harvesting when they enter forests \r\ninto carbon contracts. Offset prices were around USD13 tCO2\r\n-1 in \r\n2016 but have risen to more than USD20 tCO2\r\n-1 in 2020."


id: 3fa1514b08f26d5b710e67a2c58a0184
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8388
content:
"The largest share of emission reductions or carbon offsets in Table 7.4 \r\nhas been from slowing deforestation and REDD+, specifically \r\nfrom efforts in Brazil (86% of total), which substantially reduced \r\ndeforestation rates between 2004 and 2012 (Nepstad et al. 2014), \r\nas well as other countries in Latin America. With the exception of \r\nRoopsind et al. (2019), estimated reductions in carbon emissions from \r\nREDD+ in Table 7.4 are measured relative to a historical baseline. As \r\nnoted in Brazil's Third Biennial Update Report (Ministry of Foreign \r\nAffairs 2019), estimates are made in accordance with established \r\nmethodologies to determine the benefits of results-based REDD+ \r\npayments to Brazil. REDD+ estimates from other countries also have \r\nbeen derived from biennial update reports."


id: 6c23f4867ea6ae7f8a4f8c84e08e38da
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16324
content:
"Regulatory markets provide the next largest share of carbon removal \r\nto date. Data from the Australia Emissions Reduction Fund are \r\ncarbon credits issued in for agricultural, and vegetation and savanna \r\nburning projects. In the case of California, offset credits from forest \r\nand agricultural activities, using methods approved by a third-party \r\ncertification authority (Climate Action Reserve), have been allowed as \r\npart of their state-wide cap and trade system. Transaction prices for \r\nforest and agricultural credits in California were around USD13 tCO2\r\n-1\r\nin 2018, and represented 7.4% of total market compliance. By the \r\nend of 2018, 80 MtCO2 had been used for compliance purposes."


id: d6d9b57a247db976944088e123df001f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35109
content:
"a\r\n Clean Development Mechanism Registry: https://cdm.unfccc.int/Registry/index.html (accessed 22 June 2021)."


id: f233a4acf36e3f8558763825f187749a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40005
content:
" Data for Australia carbon credit units (ACCUs) from Australia Emissions Reduction Fund Registry for agricultural and vegetation and savanna burning projects through \r\nFY2018/19 (downloaded on 24/10/2019): (http://www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/ERF/project-and-contracts-registers/project-register) and from Emissions Reduction Fund \r\nauction results to December 2018: (http://www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/ERF/auctions-results/december-2018)."


id: d7a8a6f2569e8fe08eba5c7d76bc9b50
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35251
content:
"f\r\n Data from the California Air Resources Board Offset Issuance registry (https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-work/programs/compliance-offset-program) for forestry and agricultural \r\nearly action and compliance credits."


id: 4489b415d7bdf5136111ffbdc6e6e75c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9290
content:
"g\r\n Surrendered forest carbon credits from post-1989 forests in New Zealand. Obtained from New Zealand Environmental Protection Authority. ETS Unit Movement interactive \r\nreport (Excel based). https://www.epa.govt.nz/industry-areas/emissions-trading-scheme/ets-reports/unit-movement/."


id: 58870cfc2fa9abe3f389ffed09e8ffde
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12820
content:
"h\r\n Obtained 13/08/2020. All non-CO2 gases are converted to CO2-eq using IPCC GWP100 values recommended at the time the project achieved approval by the relevant \r\norganisation or agency."


id: 5e926045fbf2335381b2fb35ca36cac1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13927
content:
"Voluntary finance has amounted to USD0.5 billion over a  10-year \r\nperiod for development of forest and agricultural credits. The three \r\nregulatory markets quantified amount to USD2.7 billion in funding \r\nfrom 2010 to 2019. For the most part, this funding has focused on \r\nforest projects and programs, with agricultural projects accounting \r\nfor 5-10% of the total. In total, reported funding for AFOLU \r\nprojects and programmes has been USD4.4 billion over the past \r\ndecade, or about USD569 million yr-1 (low confidence). The largest \r\nshare of the total carbon includes efforts in the Amazon by Brazil. \r\nGovernment expenditures on regulatory programmes and business \r\nexpenditures on voluntary programmes in Brazil (e.g.,  the soy or \r\ncattle moratoriums) were not included in financing estimates due to \r\ndifficulties obtaining that data. If Brazil and CDM (for which we have \r\nno cost estimates) are left out of the calculation, average cost per ton \r\nhas been USD3.20 tCO2\r\n-1."


id: 4f6ad073c203514eed489e9085e1e72
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11258
content:
"The large number of policy approaches described in Table  7.4 \r\ncombined with efforts by other international actors, such as the \r\nGlobal Environmental Facility (GEF), as well as non-state actors \r\n(e.g.,  eco-labelling programmes and corporate social responsibility \r\ninitiatives) illustrate significant policy experimentation over the last \r\nseveral decades. Despite widespread effort, AFOLU measures have \r\nthus far failed to achieve the large potential for climate mitigation \r\ndescribed in earlier IPCC WG III reports (high confidence). The limited \r\ngains from AFOLU to date appear largely to result from lack of \r\ninvestment and other institutional and social barriers, rather than \r\nmethodological concerns (high confidence)."


id: 730cdd818c3bbb94b0a8d363553bbc91
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17493
content:
"REDD+/Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES). PES programmes \r\nfor a  variety of ecosystem services have long been utilised for \r\nconservation (e.g.,  Wunder 2007) and may now be as large as \r\nUSD42  billion yr-1 (Salzman et al. 2018). REDD+ emerged in the \r\nearly 2000s and is a widely recognised example of PES programme \r\nfocused on conservation of tropical forests (Table  7.4). However, \r\nour summation of actually paid funds in Table 7.4 is much smaller \r\nthan what is portrayed by Salzman et al. (2018). REDD+ may \r\noperate at the country level, or for specific programmes or forests \r\nwithin a country. As with other PES programs, REDD+ has evolved \r\ntowards a  results-based programme that involves payments that \r\nare conditioned on meeting certain successes or milestones, such as \r\nrates of deforestation (Angelsen 2017)."


id: 3965f38351d6828e42fc6403d4bd64c6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7310
content:
"Emissions Trading/Carbon Taxes. While emissions trading \r\nprogrammes have been developed across the globe, forest and \r\nagriculture have not been included as part of the cap in any of the \r\nexisting systems. However, offsets from forestry and agriculture \r\nhave been included in several of the trading programs. New Zealand \r\nhas a  hybrid programme where carbon storage in forests can be \r\nvoluntarily entered into the carbon trading program, but once \r\nentered, forests are counted both as a sink for carbon if net gains \r\nare positive, and a  source when harvesting occurs. New Zealand \r\nis considering rules to include agricultural GHG emissions under \r\na future cap (Henderson et al. 2020; see: https://www.agmatters.nz/\r\ntopics/he-waka-eke-noa/)."


id: c4b6779c9e0579ed188ec21555dfd062
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31919
content:
"The state of California has developed a  formal cap and trade \r\nprogramme that allows a limited number of forest and agricultural \r\noffset credits to be used under the cap. All offsets must meet protocols \r\nto account for additionality, permanence and leakage. Forest projects \r\nused as offsets in California currently are located in the USA, but \r\nthe California Air Resources Board adopted a tropical forest carbon \r\nstandard, allowing for avoided deforestation projects from outside \r\nthe USA to enter the California market (CARB 2019)."


id: b2db719db999830f05199c29a295c3be
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28703
content:
"While expectations that carbon-centred REDD+ would be a simple \r\nand efficient mechanism for climate mitigation have not been met \r\n(Turnhout et al. 2017; Arts et al. 2019), progress has nonetheless \r\noccurred. Measuring, monitoring and verification systems have been \r\ndeveloped and deployed, REDD readiness programmes have improved \r\ncapacity to implement REDD+ on the ground in over 50 countries, and \r\na number of countries now have received results-based payments."


id: 3d82fafe6313349dcbbe901461cc108c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7994
content:
"of permanent grass or woodland cover in the Conservation Reserve \r\nProgram (CRP), which has increased soil carbon sequestration by \r\n3 tCO2 ha-1 yr-1 (Conant et al. 2017; Paustian et al. 2019), as well as \r\nother practices that could lower net emissions. Gross GHG emissions \r\nfrom the agricultural sector in the US, however, have increased since \r\n1990 (USEPA 2020) due to reductions in the area of land in the \r\nUS CRP programme and changes in crop rotations, both of which \r\ncaused soil carbon stocks to decline (USEPA 2020). When combined \r\nwith increased non-CO2 gas emissions, the emission intensity of US \r\nagriculture increased from 1.5 to 1.7 tCO2 ha-1 between 2005 and \r\n2018 (high confidence)."


id: cfbd58d666b27a4d628f8ef7e29bceac
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33909
content:
"Empirical evidence that REDD+ funding has slowed deforestation \r\nis starting to emerge. Simonet et al. (2019) showed that a REDD+ \r\nproject in Brazil reduced deforestation certainly until 2018, while \r\nRoopsind et al. (2019) showed that country-level REDD+ payments \r\nto Guyana encouraged reduced deforestation and increased carbon \r\nstorage. Although more impact evaluation (IE) analysis needs to be \r\nconducted on REDD+ payments, these studies support the country\u0002level estimates of carbon benefits from REDD+ shown in Table 7.4. \r\nNearly all of the analysis of PES and REDD+ to date has focused \r\non the presence or absence of forest cover, with little to no analysis \r\nhaving been conducted on forest degradation, conservation, or \r\nenhancement of forest stocks."


id: 774e2a65147d91910291f462b971ef3f
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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vector_id: 18194
content:
"China has implemented large conservation programmes that have \r\ninfluenced carbon stocks. For example, the Sloping Land Conversion \r\nProgram, combined with other programs, has increased forest cover \r\nand carbon stocks, reduced erosion and increased other ecosystem \r\nservices in China in recent years (Ouyang et al. 2016). As part of Brazil's \r\nnational strategy, numerous practices to reduce GHG emissions from \r\nagriculture, and in particular from the animal agriculture industry, \r\nhave been subsidised. Estimates by Manzatto et al. (2020) suggest \r\nthat the programme may have reduced agricultural emissions by \r\n169 MtCO2 between 2010 and 2020. Given the large technical and \r\neconomic potential for agroforestry to be deployed in Africa, subsidy \r\napproaches could be deployed along with other polices to enhance \r\ncarbon through innovative practices such as regreening (Box 7.10)."


id: a7705b2d46e6b1cf573b5a323cf8a219
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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content:
"Regulations on land use include direct controls on how land is \r\nused, zoning, or legally set limits on converting land from one use to \r\nanother. Since the early 2000s, Brazil has deployed various regulatory \r\nmeasures to slow deforestation, including enforcement of regulations \r\non land-use change in the legal Amazon area. Enforcement of these \r\nregulations, among other approaches is credited with encouraging \r\nthe large-scale reduction in deforestation and associated carbon \r\nemissions after 2004 (Nepstad et al. 2014). Empirical evidence has \r\nfound that regulations reduced deforestation in Brazil (Arima et al. \r\n2014) but over time, reversals occurred when enforcement was not \r\nconsistent (Azevedo et al. 2017) (Box 7.9)."


id: 949b65cc71b8c25c98adc709f0c4b432
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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content:
"The USA spends USD4 billion yr-1 on conservation programs, or 12% of \r\nnet farm income (Department of Agriculture 2020). In real terms, this \r\nexpenditure has remained constant for 15 years, supporting 12 Mha "


id: 3cdec68361e465d83651c40f0cc39d77
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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content:
"the tropical Americas (368.8 TgC yr-1) had the largest contribution, \r\nfollowed by Asia (25.0 TgC yr-1) and Africa (12.7 TgC yr-1). The \r\nauthors concluded that local factors had an important influence on the \r\neffectiveness of protected areas. For example, in the Brazilian Amazon, \r\nprotected area effectiveness is affected by the government agency \r\ncontrolling the land (federal indigenous lands, federal PAs, and state \r\nPAs) (Herrera et al. 2019). Because protected areas limit not just land\u0002use change, but also logging or harvesting non-timber forest products, \r\nthey may be relatively costly approaches for forest conservation \r\n(medium confidence)."


id: 698f5c41045eeefaa97e0f35742998a8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Community forest management (CFM) allows less intensive use \r\nof forest resources, while at the same time providing carbon benefits \r\nby protecting forest cover. Community forest management provides \r\nproperty rights to communities to manage resources in exchange \r\nfor their efforts to protect those resources. In many cases, the local \r\ncommunities are indigenous people who otherwise would have \r\ninsecure tenure due to an advancing agricultural frontier or mining "


id: 7db490c344bcd76459b335dd1cf27e43
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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"Summary of the case.Indigenous peoples include more than 5000 different peoples, with over 370 million people, in 70 countries \r\non five continents (UNIPP 2012). For example, in Latin America and Caribbean, forests cover more than 80% of the area occupied by \r\nindigenous peoples (330 million hectares) (FAO and FILAC, 2021) which points to their critical role for forest governance (Garnett et al. \r\n2018; Fa et al. 2020). The Menominee people (Wisconsin, USA) practice sustainable forestry on their reservation according to a land \r\nethic integral to the tribal identity. The Tribe calls themselves 'The Forest Keepers', recognising that the connection of their future to \r\nthe sustainable management of the forest that allowed the forest volume standing today to be higher than when timber harvesting\r\nbegan more than 160 years ago. Management practices are based on continuous forest inventories (Mausel et al. 2017)."


id: c0e5c743c6d67617a39fcc9c07e54912
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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content:
"Introduction to the case. Forest management and timber harvesting operations began shortly after the Menominee Indian Reservation \r\nwas created by treaty in 1854. The Menominee reservation sits on about 95,000 ha of land in Wisconsin that spans multiple forest types \r\nand is more diverse than adjacent forests. The collectively maintained reservation has 87% of its land under sustained yield forestry."


id: 27543190045e96d42a03f9cf80c33f3f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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"Case description. The Tribe, in the 19th century, had already mastered vegetation manipulation with fire, sustainable forestry, \r\nmultiple-use, ecosystem, and adaptive management. The centrepiece of the Tribe's economy has been its forest product industry, \r\nMenominee Tribal Enterprises (MTE) (Pecore 1992). A balance between growth and removals and continuous forest inventories (CFI) \r\nare central for forest management for the past 160 years, aiming not at very large volumes, but at very high-quality trees. During this \r\nsame period, more than 2.3 billion board feet have been harvested from the same area, equivalent to 0.3 m3\r\n ha-1 yr-1."


id: b3f27b91a511be388ba8ed7ec6a70283
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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content:
"Interactions and limitations. In 2013, the Menominee Tribe started a collaboration with the US Forest Service to implement climate \r\nadaptation measures. The Tribe actively works to reduce the risk of forest damage and decided to further promote diversity by \r\nplanting tree seedlings adapted to a warming climate (https://toolkit.climate.gov/case-studies/and-trees-will-last-forever). However, \r\nnew challenges are related to increasing pressures on forest ecosystems such as non-native insects, pathogens, weed invasions, and \r\nthe costs for continuous forest inventories to support long-term forest management. "


id: fd43bc32db5c196bb33840664fcbc69e
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content:
"activity. Other examples are forest owner associations like those \r\ndiscussed in Box 7.8. According to the Rights and Resources Initiative \r\n(2018), the area of forests under community management increased \r\nglobally by 152 Mha from 2002 to 2017, with over 500 Mha under \r\ncommunity management in 2017. Studies have now shown that \r\nimproved property rights with community forest management can \r\nreduce deforestation and increase carbon storage (Deininger and \r\nMinten 2002; Alix-Garcia et al. 2005; Alix-Garcia 2007; Bowler \r\net al. 2012; Blackman 2015; Fortmann et al. 2017; Burivalova et al. \r\n2019). Efforts to expand property rights, especially community forest \r\nmanagement, have reduced carbon emissions from deforestation in \r\ntropical forests in the last two decades (high confidence), although \r\nthe extent of carbon savings has not been quantified globally."


id: b453869c76e4e8c0c5d9492588d8f93f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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content:
"timber harvesting practices, and may reduce emissions from forest \r\ndegradation with reduced impact logging and other approaches \r\n(medium confidence). Forest certification has expanded globally  to \r\nover 440 Mha (Kraxner et al. 2017). As the area of land devoted \r\nto  certification has increased, the amount of timber produced from \r\ncertified land has increased. In 2018, FSC accounted for harvests of \r\n427 million m3\r\n and jointly FSC and PEFC accounted for 689 million m3\r\nin 2016 or around 40% of total industrial wood production (FAO \r\n2018c). There is evidence that reduced impact logging can reduce \r\ncarbon losses in tropical regions (Pearson et al. 2014; Ellis et al. 2019). \r\nHowever, there is conflicting evidence about whether forest certification \r\nreduces deforestation (e.g., Blackman et al. 2018; Tritsch et al. 2020)."


id: 4fef513cbc50b1c318c1208369389f37
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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content:
"Supply chain management in the food sector encourages \r\nmore widespread use of conservation measures in agriculture \r\n(high confidence). The number of private commitments to reduce \r\ndeforestation from supply chains has greatly increased in recent \r\nyears, with at least 865 public commitments by 447 producers, \r\nprocessors, traders, manufacturers and retailers as of December, 2020 \r\n(New York Declaration on Forests 2021). Industry partnerships with \r\nNGOs, such as the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO), have \r\nbecome more widespread and visible in agricultural production. For \r\nexample, RSPO certifies members all along the supply chain for palm \r\noil and claims around 19% of total production. Similar sustainability \r\nefforts exist for many of the world's major agricultural products, \r\nincluding soybeans, rice, sugar cane, and cattle."


id: be301dd86a2788136090c2e8a4b79381
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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content:
"Bioenergy targets. Multiple policies have been enacted at national \r\nand supra-national levels to promote the use of bioenergy in the \r\ntransport sector, and for bioelectricity production. Existing policies \r\nmandate or subsidise the production and use of bioenergy. In \r\nthe past few years, policies have been proposed, put in place or \r\nupdated in Australia (Renewable Energy Target), Brazil (RenovaBio, \r\nNationally Determined Contribution), Canada (Clean Fuel Standard), \r\nChina (Biodiesel Industrial Development Policy, Biodiesel Fuel Blend \r\nStandard), the European Union (Renewable Energy Directive II), the \r\nUSA (Renewable Fuel Standards), Japan (FY2030), Russia (Energy \r\nStrategy Bill 2035), India (Revised National Policy on Biofuels), and \r\nSouth Africa (Biofuels Regulatory Framework)."


id: bdce75fcd73ac390adc4e0a3de6600ac
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content:
"While current policies focus on bioenergy to decarbonise the energy \r\nsystem, some also contain provisions to minimise the potential \r\nenvironmental and social trade-offs from bioenergy production. \r\nFor instance, the EU Renewable Energy Directive (EU-RED II) and \r\nUS Renewable Energy Standard (US-RFS) assign caps on the use \r\nof biofuels, which are associated with indirect land-use change \r\nand food-security concerns. The Netherlands has a stringent set of \r\n36  sustainability criteria to which the certified biomass needs to \r\ncomply. The EU-RED II also sets a timeline for the complete phase\u0002out of high-risk biofuels (Section 7.4.4)."


id: a3f596b9050679998c2126fec33b9593
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"Between 2000 and 2004, deforestation rates in the Brazilian Legal Amazon (is a socio-geographic division containing all nine Brazilian \r\nstates in the Amazon basin) increased from 18,226 to 27,772 km2\r\n yr-1 2008 (INPE, 2021). A  set of public policies designed in \r\nparticipatory process involving federal government, states, municipalities, and civil society successfully reduced deforestation rates \r\nuntil 2012. However, deforestation rates increased after 2013, and particularly between 2019 and 2020. Successful deforestation \r\ncontrol policies are being negatively affected by changes in environmental governance, weak law enforcement, and polarisation of \r\nthe national politics."


id: cde3fad018acf0b88cc5d034c72fdc59
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content:
"In 2004, the Brazilian federal government started the Action Plan for Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Legal Amazon \r\n(PPCDAm) (Ministry of Environment, Government of Brazil, 2018)."


id: cd872aecc15769f402d98e7017c45c15
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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content:
"The PPCDAm was a  benchmark for the articulation of forest conservation policies that included central and state governments, \r\nprosecutor offices, and the civil society. The decline in deforestation after 2008 is mostly attributed to these policy options. In 2012, \r\ndeforestation rates decreased to 4,571 km2\r\n yr-1."


id: 3efab9c166d59b793098065a0626883c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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content:
"However, the country's political polarisation has gradually eroded environmental governance, especially after the Brazilian Forest \r\nCode changes in 2012 (major environmental law in Brazil), the presidential impeachment in 2016, presidential elections in 2018, and \r\nthe start of the new federal administration in 2019. Successful deforestation control policies are being negatively affected by critical \r\nchanges in the political context, and weakening the environmental rule of law, forest conservation, and sustainable development \r\nprogrammes (for example, changes in the Amazon Fund governance in disagreement with the main donors). In 2019, the annual \r\ndeforestation rate reached 10,129 km2\r\n being the first time it surpassed 10,000 km2 since 2008 (INPE, 2021). Besides, there has been \r\nno effective transition from the historical economic model to a sustainable one. The lack of clarity in the ownership of land is still \r\na major unresolved issue in the Amazon."


id: 242837f1f1009d6b3ff85d0c43313f5e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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"The reduction of deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon was possible due to effective political and institutional support for environmental \r\nconservation. The initiatives of the Action Plan included the expansion of the protected areas network (conservation unities and \r\nindigenous lands), improvement of deforestation monitoring to the enforcement of environmental laws, and the use of economic \r\ninstruments, for example, by cutting off public credit for municipalities with higher deforestation rates (Ricketts et al. 2010; Souza et al. \r\n2013; Nepstad et al. 2014; Arima et al. 2014; Blackman and Veit 2018). "


id: 683c641f1327b456878d5dde64e46852
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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content:
"The array of public policies and social engagement was a historical and legal breakthrough in global protection. However, the broader \r\npolitical and institutional context and actions to reduce the representation and independent control of civil society movements in \r\ndecision-making bodies weaken this structure with significant increases in deforestation rates, burnings, and forest fires."


id: 5d9ea4f838c5aa1c3765b6c17d117e48
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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content:
"More than 200 million trees have regenerated on more than 5 Mha in the Sahel (Sendzimir et al. 2011). The Maradi/Zinder region of \r\nNiger is the epicentre of experimentation and scale up. This vast geographic extent generates significant mitigation potential despite \r\nthe relatively modest per unit area increase in carbon of about 0.4 MgC ha-1 a-1 (Luedeling and Neufeldt 2012). In addition to the \r\ncarbon benefits, these agroforestry systems decrease erosion, provide animal fodder, recharge groundwater, generate nutrition and \r\nincome benefits and act as safety nets for vulnerable rural households during climate and other shocks (Bayala et al. 2014, 2015; \r\nBinam et al. 2015; Sinare and Gordon 2015; Ilstedt et al. 2016)."


id: 6521f1b996ba08c0b5bcaddcb8bd967a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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content:
"A melange of factors contributed to regreening in the Sahel. Increased precipitation, migration, community development, economic \r\nvolatility and local policy reform have all likely played a role (Haglund et al. 2011; Sendzimir et al. 2011; Brandt et al. 2019a; Garrity and \r\nBayala 2019); the easing of forestry regulations has been particularly critical in giving farmers greater control over the management \r\nand use of trees on their land (Garrity et al. 2010). This policy shift was catalysed by greater regional autonomy resulting from \r\neconomic decline and coincided with successful pilots and NGO-led experimentation, cash-for-work, and training efforts to support \r\nchanges in land management (Sendzimir et al. 2011). Participation of farmers in planning and implementation helped align actions \r\nwith local knowledge and goals as well as market opportunities."


id: c6dcbe4baaedc5beef5b554d7008c4f4
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content:
"Regreening takes place when dormant seed or tree stumps sprout and are cultivated through the technique, called Farmer Managed \r\nNatural Regeneration (FMNR). Without planting new trees, FMNR is presumed to be cheaper than other approaches to restoration, \r\nthough comparative economic analysis has yet to be conducted (Chomba et al. 2020). Relatively lower investment costs are believed \r\nto have contributed to the replication across the landscape. These factors worked together to contribute to a groundswell of action \r\nthat affected rights, access, and use of local resources (Tougiani et al. 2009)."


id: 89c2da9193b0ad7008175b73b8b7879d
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content:
"Regreening in the Sahel and the consequent transformation of the landscape has resulted from the actions of hundreds of thousands \r\nof individuals responding to social and biophysical signals (Hanan 2018). This is an example for climate change mitigation, where \r\neliminating regulations - versus increasing them - has led to carbon dioxide removal."


id: 5df0b8201a3883d2d9c85b331563f285
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"Additionality, permanence and leakage have been widely discussed \r\nin the forestry and agricultural mitigation literature (Murray et al. \r\n2007), including in AR5 (Section 11.3.2 of the AR5WGIII report) and \r\nearlier assessment reports. Since the earlier assessment reports, \r\nnew studies have emerged to provide new insights on the effect of \r\nthese issues on the credibility of forest and agricultural mitigation. \r\nThis assessment also provides additional context not considered in \r\nearlier assessments."


id: 8582bdc8e6654fa81c6f48ab08286c7a
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"Typically, carbon registries will require that project developers \r\nshow additionality by illustrating that the project is not undertaken \r\nas a  result of a  legal requirement, and that the project achieves \r\ncarbon reductions above and beyond a  business as usual. The \r\nprotocols developed by the California Air Resources Board to ensure \r\npermanence and additionality are strong standards and may even \r\nlimit participation (e.g., Ruseva et al. 2017). The business as usual \r\nis defined as past management actions by the same entity that \r\ncan be verified. Additionality can thus be observed in the future as \r\na  difference from historical actions. This approach has been used \r\nby several countries in their UNFCCC Biennial Update reports to \r\nestablish reductions in carbon emissions from avoided deforestation \r\n(e.g., Brazil and Indonesia)."


id: 95fe9babca450e3cb4b91ebd9d328607
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"The same experimental methods have been applied to analyse \r\nadditionality of the adoption of soil conservation and nutrient \r\nmanagement practices in agriculture. Claassen et al. (2018) find that \r\nprogrammes to promote soil conservation are around 50% additional \r\nacross the USA (i.e., 50% of the land enrolled in soil conservation \r\nprogrammes would not have been enrolled if not for the programme), \r\nwhile Woodward et al. (2016) find that adoption of conservation "


id: 7f939819e2bd82f3a9980faadcab39d8
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content:
"tillage is rarely additional. Claassen et al. (2018) find that payments \r\nfor nutrient management plans are nearly 100% additional, although \r\nthere is little evidence that farmers reduce nutrient inputs when they \r\nadopt plans. It is not clear if the same policy approaches would lead \r\nto additionality in other regions."


id: 90f3735fe02f46ca58559e32e0663936
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"To date, there has been significantly less investment in agricultural \r\nprojects than forestry projects to reduce net carbon emissions \r\n(Table  7.4). For example, the economic potential (available up \r\nto USD100 tCO2\r\n-1) for soil carbon sequestration in croplands is \r\n1.9  (0.4-6.8) GtCO2 yr-1 (Section  7.4.3.1), however, less than 2% \r\nof the carbon in Table 7.4 is derived from soil carbon sequestration \r\nprojects. While reductions in CH4 emissions due to enteric fermentation \r\nconstitute a large share of potential agricultural mitigation reported \r\nin Section 7.4, agricultural CH4 emission reductions so far have been \r\nrelatively modest compared to forestry sequestration. The protocols \r\nto quantify emission reductions in the agricultural sector are available \r\nand have been tested, and the main limitation appears to be the \r\nlack of available financing or the unwillingness to re-direct current \r\nsubsidies (medium confidence)."


id: 182717e288a0317c7fbc984d838f0d2f
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content:
"Numerous developing countries have established policy efforts \r\nto abate agricultural emissions or increase carbon storage. Brazil, \r\nfor instance, developed a  subsidy programme in 2010 to promote \r\nsustainable development in agriculture, and practices that would \r\nreduce GHG emissions. Henderson et al. (2020) report that this \r\nprogramme reduced GHG emission in agricultural by up to "


id: 9fdc082b315efdfcba5ecb96a78ba2ac
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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content:
"170  MtCO2 between 2010 and 2018. However, the investments in \r\nlow-carbon agriculture in Brazil amounted only 2% of the total funds \r\nfor conventional agriculture in 2019. Programmes on deforestation \r\nin Brazil had successes and failures, as described in Box  7.9. \r\nIndonesia has engaged in a wide range of programmes in the REDD+ \r\nspace, including a  moratorium implemented in 2011 to prevent \r\nthe conversion of primary forests and peatlands to oil palm and \r\nlogging concessions (Wijaya et al. 2017; Tacconi and Muttaqin 2019; \r\nHenderson et al. 2020). Efforts to restore peatlands and forests have \r\nalso been undertaken. Indonesia reports that results-based REDD+ \r\nprogrammes have been successful and have led to lower rates of \r\ndeforestation (Table 7.4)."


id: e70de74be02d57a5183c67df36714d05
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content:
"(Box  7.10). Within several of the NDCs, countries have explicitly \r\nsuggested intensification as an approach to reduce emission in the \r\nlivestock sector. However, it is important to note caveats associated \r\nwith pursuing mitigation via intensification (Box 7.11)."


id: 46b1e5481e8392ef073c526c3dedbe05
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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content:
"Existing policies focused on GHG management in agriculture \r\nand forestry is less advanced in Africa than in Latin American and \r\nAsia, however, Henderson et al. (2020) report on 10 countries in \r\nsub-Saharan Africa that have included explicit policy proposals \r\nfor reducing AFOLU GHG emissions through their NDCs. These \r\ninclude efforts to reduce N2O emission, increase implementation \r\nof conservation agriculture, improve livestock management, and \r\nimplement forestry and grassland practices, including agroforestry "


id: 79676468c0b8181a289e726ee9a1e927
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18556
content:
"Sustainable intensification (SI) has received considerable attention as a suggested means of pursuing increased overall production, \r\nreducing associated environmental externalities, and potentially releasing agricultural land for alternative uses, such as forestry \r\nor rewilding (Godfray and Garnett 2014; Pretty 2018). The concept was explored within the SRCCL (SRCCL (Mbow et al. 2019), \r\nSection 5.6.4.4 and Cross-Chapter Box 6 in Chapter 5). SI is context specific and dynamic, with no universally prescribed methodology \r\n(HLPE 2019). Equal importance is given to enhancing sustainability as to achieving agricultural intensification. The former aspect is \r\noften challenging to realise, measure and maintain."


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vector_id: 12963
content:
"Preconditions to ensure sustainable intensification\r\nIncreasing the total amount of product produced by improving production efficiency (output per unit of input) does not \r\nguarantee SI. It will only be successful if increased production efficiency translates into reduced environmental and social impacts \r\nas well as increased production. For example, AR5 highlighted a growing emphasis on reducing GHG emissions per unit of product \r\nvia increasing production efficiency (Smith et al. 2014), but reductions in absolute GHG emissions will only occur when production \r\nefficiency increases at a greater rate than the rate at which production increases (Clark et al. 2005)."


id: 4c91f875b2e51b8cf217900e8d84f12e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10734
content:
"Defined indicators are required. Measurement of SI requires multiple indicators and metrics. It can be assessed at farm, regional or \r\nglobal scales and temporal aspect must be considered. SI may warrant whole system redesign or land reallocation (Garnett et al. 2013; \r\nPretty et al. 2018). Accordingly, there is high agreement concerning the need to consider multiple environmental and social outcomes "


id: 7327ecd60552940982a9f89226db717a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17508
content:
"at wider spatial scales, such as catchments or regions (Weltin et al. 2018; Bengochea Paz et al. 2020; Cassman and Grassini 2020). \r\nImpacts may be considered in relative terms (per area or product unit), with relationships potentially antagonistic. Both area- and \r\nproduct unit-based metrics are valid, relevant under different contexts and useful in approaching SI, but do not capture overall impacts \r\nand trade-offs (Garnett 2014). To reduce the risk of unsustainable intensification, quantitative data and selection of appropriate \r\nmetrics to identify and guide strategies are paramount (Garnett et al. 2013; Gunton et al. 2016; Cassman and Grassini 2020)."


id: a2998583223dce6479c29957a75ab63a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25824
content:
"It is critical that intensification does not drive expansion of unsustainable practices. Increased productivity with associated economic \r\nreward could incentivise and reward agricultural land expansion, or environmentally and socially damaging practices on existing \r\nand former agricultural land (Ceddia et al. 2013; Phalan 2018). Accordingly, coordinated policies are crucial to ensuring desired \r\noutcomes (Godfray and Garnett 2014; Reddy et al. 2020; Kassam and Kassam 2020). Barretto et al. (2013) found that in agriculturally \r\nconsolidated areas, land-use intensification coincided with either a  contraction of both cropland and pasture areas, or cropland \r\nexpansion at the expense of pastures, both resulting in a stable farmed area. In contrast, in agricultural frontier areas, land-use \r\nintensification coincided with expansion of agricultural lands."


id: 7ada331d783ba3d42bceabc38a3fbf78
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18815
content:
"In conclusion, SI within agriculture is needed given the rising global population and the need to address multiple environmental \r\nand social externalities associated with agricultural activities. However, implementation requires strong stakeholder engagement, \r\nappropriate regulations, rigorous monitoring and verification and comprehensive outreach and knowledge exchange programmes."


id: 280da26346cc4805436b5137a1cef050
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4244
content:
"2020) combined with sustainable management and provision of \r\nagricultural and wood products are widely expected to increase the \r\nterrestrial pool of carbon (Cross-Working Group Box 3 in Chapter 12). \r\nCarbon sequestration policies, sustainable land management (forest \r\nand agriculture), and biomass energy policies can be complementary \r\n(Favero et al. 2017; Baker et al. 2019). However, if private markets \r\nemerge for biomass and BECCS on the scale suggested in the SR1.5, \r\npolicy efforts must ramp up to substantially value, encourage, and \r\nprotect terrestrial carbon stocks and ecosystems to avoid outcomes \r\ninconsistent with many SDGs (high confidence)."


id: 8d77fca5a15d5c86d2c4867f568257cb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22074
content:
"If biomass energy production expands and shifts to carbon \r\ncapture and storage (e.g.,  BECCS) during the century, there could \r\nbe a  significant increase in the area of crop and forestland used \r\nfor biomass energy production (Sections  7.4 and 7.5). BECCS is \r\nnot projected to be widely implemented for several decades, but \r\nin the meantime, policy efforts to advance land-based measures \r\nincluding reforestation and restoration activities (Strassburg et al. "


id: 7205b994104f72b843aaa3f81708227d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17309
content:
"by other objectives such as water quality and species protection. \r\nConsiderably less funding has been available for agricultural \r\nprojects aimed at reducing carbon emissions, and outside of \r\nvoluntary markets, there do not appear to be large sources \r\nof  funding emerging either through international organisations, \r\nor national programs. In the agricultural sector, funding for carbon \r\nmust be obtained by redirecting existing resources from non-GHG \r\nconservation to GHG measures, or by developing new funding \r\nstreams (Henderson et al. 2020)."


id: c6b7e787348179d2c9318b0838b73e34
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32260
content:
"Risk and uncertainty. Most approaches to reduce emissions, \r\nespecially in agriculture, require new or different technologies that \r\ninvolve significant time or financial investments by the implementing \r\nlandholders. Adoption rates are often slow due to risk aversion among \r\nagricultural operators. Many AFOLU measures require carbon to be \r\ncompensated to generate positive returns, reducing the likelihood of \r\nimplementation without clear financial incentives. Research to show \r\ncosts and benefits is lacking in most parts of the world."


id: 13939d9eb762807b8bca787c3c488cbf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 660
content:
"Poverty. Mitigation and adaptation can have important implications \r\nfor vulnerable people and communities, for example, mitigation \r\nactivities consistent with scenarios examined in the SR1.5 could raise \r\nfood and fiber prices globally (Section. 7.5). In the NDCs, 82 Parties \r\nincluded references to social issues (e.g., poverty, inequality, human \r\nwell-being, marginalisation), with poverty the most cited factor \r\n(70 Parties). The number of hungry and food insecure people in the \r\nworld is growing, reaching 821 million in 2017, or one in every nine \r\npeople (FAO 2018b), and two-thirds live in rural areas (Laborde \r\nDebucquet et al. 2020). Consideration of rural poverty and food \r\ninsecurity is central in AFOLU mitigation because there are a large \r\nnumber of farms in the world (about 570 million), and most are "


id: f38a9af3a28131b9f3a8728b48e1adf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40225
content:
"Scale and accessibility of financing. The largest share of funding \r\nto date has been for REDD+, and many of the commitments to \r\ndate suggest that there will be significant funding in this area \r\nfor the foreseeable future. Funding for conservation programmes \r\nin OECD countries and China affects carbon, but has been driven "


id: 5ea92f1f0bdf34a4e82424392318fd6c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13943
content:
"Achieving the large contribution to mitigation that the AFOLU sector can make requires public and private investment. Austin et al. \r\n(2020) estimate that in forestry, USD178 billion yr-1 is needed over the next decade to achieve 5 GtCO2 yr-1, and investments need \r\nto ramp up to USD400 billion yr-1 by 2050 to expand effort to 6 GtCO2 yr-1. Other land-based options, such as mangrove protection, \r\npeatland restoration, and agricultural options would increase this total cost estimate, but have smaller to negligible opportunity costs."


id: 5f9fa59e4270405e99642e5cc381b244
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14136
content:
"Opportunity costs are a direct financing costs for activities that require land uses to change. For instance a government can encourage \r\nplanting forests on agricultural land by (a) requiring it, (b) setting up a market or market-based incentives, or (c) buying the land and \r\ndoing it themselves. In each case, the required investment is the same - the planting cost plus the net foregone returns of agricultural \r\nrents - even though a different entity pays the cost. Private entities that pay for carbon credits will also bear the direct costs of \r\nplanting plus the opportunity costs. In the case of avoided deforestation, opportunity costs similarly must be paid to individual actors \r\nto avoid the deforestation."


id: 23dc70060d410780933a34e855f8c47d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3494
content:
"functions between state and non-state actors (Zelli et al. 2017; Phelps \r\net al. 2010). Overlap and duplication in Forest Law Enforcement, \r\nGovernance and Trade (FLEGT) and REDD+ also limits governance \r\neffectiveness (Gupta et al. 2016)."


id: 9ff6d79c60c3fa9ada276d718753452b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25357
content:
"smaller than 2 hectares. It is important to better understand how \r\ndifferent mitigation policies affect the poor."


id: f7ada5aa7b708d126c6d842267e530cc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40947
content:
"Clear land tenure and land-use rights. Unclear property rights \r\nand tenure insecurity undermine the incentives to improve forest and \r\nagricultural productivity, lead to food insecurity, undermine REDD+ \r\nobjectives, discourage adoption of farm conservation practices, \r\ndiscourage tree planting and forest management, and exacerbate \r\nconflict between different land users (Antwi-Agyei et al. 2015; Felker \r\net al. 2017; Sunderlin et al. 2018; Borras and Franco 2018; Riggs \r\net al. 2018; Kansanga and Luginaah 2019). Some positive signs \r\nexist as over 500 million hectares of forests have been converted \r\nto community management with clear property rights in the past \r\ntwo decades (Rights and Resources Initiative 2018), but adoption of \r\nforest and agricultural mitigation practices will be limited in large \r\nremaining areas with unclear property rights (Gupta et al. 2016)."


id: 8d731f8a73f1945c32a80888428aa6ac
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22070
content:
"Lack of institutional capacity. Institutional complexity, or lack \r\nthereof, represents a major challenge when implementing large and \r\ncomplex mitigation programmes (e.g., REDD+) in agriculture, forest \r\nand other land uses (Backstrand et al. 2017). Without sufficient \r\ncapacity, many synergies between agricultural and forest programs, \r\nor mitigation and adaptation opportunities, may be missed (Duguma \r\net al. 2014). Another aspect of institutional complexity is the \r\ndifferent biophysical and socio-economic circumstances as well as \r\nthe public and private financial means involved in the architecture \r\nand implementation of REDD+ and other initiatives (Zelli et al. 2017)."


id: d09c6b074dc45b9014bf73b830200bf4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34049
content:
"Opportunity for political participation of local stakeholders is barrier \r\nin most places where forest ownership rights are not sufficiently \r\ndocumented (Essl et al. 2018). Since incentives for self-enforcement \r\ncan have an important influence on deforestation rates (Fortmann \r\net al. 2017), weak governance and insecure property rights are \r\nsignificant barriers to introduction of forest carbon offset projects \r\nin developing countries, where many of the low-cost options for \r\nsuch projects exist (Gren and Zeleke 2016). Governance challenges \r\nexist at all levels of government, with poor coordination, insufficient \r\ninformation sharing, and concerns over accountability playing \r\na prominent role within REDD+ projects and programmes (Ravikumar \r\net al. 2015). In some cases, governments are increasingly centralising \r\nREDD+ governance and limiting the distribution of governance "


id: a5b3d1d455782fac0a95ee8ec2144325
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26381
content:
"Implementation of nature-based solution may have local or regionally \r\nimportant consequences for other ecosystem services, some of which \r\nmay be negative (high confidence). Land-use change has important \r\nimplications for the hydrological cycle, and the large land-use shifts \r\nsuggested for BECCS when not carried out in a  carefully planned \r\nmanner, are expected to increase water demands substantially across \r\nthe globe (Stenzel et al. 2019; Rosa et al. 2020). Afforestation can \r\nhave minor to severe consequences for surface water acidification, "


id: ac1e52825809d203d650c9887051ff9e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27523
content:
"depending on site-specific factors and exposure to air pollution \r\nand sea-salts (Futter et al. 2019). The potential effects of coastal \r\nafforestation on sea-salt related acidification could lead to re\u0002acidification and damage on aquatic biota."


id: 80270148db95181b0ff784493d070f0a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19675
content:
"forest mitigation measures, suggesting that climate change presents \r\na formidable challenge to implementation of nature-based solutions \r\nbeyond 2030 (high confidence)."


id: 4739504560fce0f7bdee337d2a77c525
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9732
content:
"In addition to climate change, Dooley and Kartha (2018) also note \r\nthat technological and social factors could ultimately limit the \r\nfeasibility of agricultural and forestry mitigation options, especially \r\nwhen deployed at large scale. Concern is greatest with widespread \r\nuse of bioenergy crops, which could lead to forest losses (Harper \r\net al. 2018). Deployment of BECCS and forest-based mitigation \r\ncan be complementary (Favero et al. 2017; Baker et al. 2019), but \r\ninefficient policy approaches could lead to net carbon emissions if \r\nBECCS replaces high-carbon content ecosystems with crops."


id: 27074807d57081786785139cabadbd2c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4035
content:
"Specific soil conditions, water availability, GHG emission\u0002reduction potential as well as natural variability and resilience.\r\nRecent analysis by (Cook-Patton et al. 2020) illustrates large \r\nvariability in potential rates of carbon accumulation for afforestation \r\nand reforestation options, both within biomes/ecozones and across \r\nthem. Their results suggest that while there is large potential for \r\nafforestation and reforestation, the carbon uptake potential in \r\nland-based climate change mitigation efforts is highly dependent \r\non the assumptions related to climate drivers, land use and land \r\nmanagement, and soil carbon responses to land-use change. Less \r\nanalysis has been conducted on bioenergy crop yields, however, \r\nbioenergy crop yields are also likely to be highly variable, suggesting \r\nthat bioenergy supply could exceed or fall short of expectations in \r\na given region, depending on site conditions."


id: d34d180bf89f1bfc73d873e597678a40
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34519
content:
"Adaptation benefits and biodiversity conservation. Biodiversity \r\nmay improve resilience to climate change impacts as more-diverse \r\nsystems could be more resilient to climate change impacts, thereby \r\nmaintaining ecosystem function and preserving biodiversity (Hisano \r\net al. 2018). However, losses in ecosystem functions due species \r\nshifts or reductions in diversity may impair the positive effects of \r\nbiodiversity on ecosystems. Forest management strategies based on \r\nbiodiversity and ecosystems functioning interactions can augment \r\nthe effectiveness of forests in reducing climate change impacts \r\non ecosystem functioning (high confidence). In spite of the many \r\nsynergies between climate policy instruments and biodiversity \r\nconservation, however, current policies often fall short of realising \r\nthis potential (Essl et al. 2018)."


id: db6b9b45e40e7ce5174335965fc179b0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35879
content:
"The effects of climate change on ecosystems, including changes in \r\ncrop yields, shifts in terrestrial ecosystem productivity, vegetation \r\nmigration, wildfires, and other disturbances also will affect the \r\npotential for AFOLU mitigation. Climate is expected to reduce crop \r\nyields, increase crop and livestock prices, and increase pressure on \r\nundisturbed forest land for food production creating new barriers and \r\nincreasing costs for implementation of many nature-based mitigation \r\ntechniques (medium confidence) (IPCC AR6 WGII Chapter 5)."


id: c1b2097372e0429e498b91123f684f62
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31380
content:
"The observed increase in the terrestrial sink over the past half century \r\ncan be linked to changes in the global environment, such as increased \r\natmospheric CO2 concentrations, N deposition, or changes in climate \r\n(Ballantyne et al. 2012), though not always proven from ground-based \r\ninformation (Vandersleen et al. 2015). While the terrestrial sink relies \r\non regrowth in secondary forests (Houghton and Nassikas 2017), \r\nthere is emerging evidence that the sink will slow in the Northern \r\nHemisphere as forests age (Nabuurs et al. 2013), although saturation \r\nmay take decades (Zhu et al. 2018). Forest management through \r\nreplanting, variety selection, fertilisation, and other management \r\ntechniques, has increased the terrestrial carbon sink over the last \r\ncentury (Mendelsohn and Sohngen 2019). Saturation of the sink in \r\nsitu may not occur when, for example, substitution effects of timber \r\nusage are also considered."


id: 64dff3b8fd65035e44bb0b6b3eeab194
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15020
content:
"Monitoring, reporting, and verification. Development of satellite \r\ntechnologies to assess potential deforestation has grown in recent \r\nyears with the release of 30 m data by Hansen et al. (2013), however, \r\nthis data only captures tree cover loss, and increasing accuracy over \r\ntime may limit its use for trend analysis (Ceccherini et al. 2020; Palahi \r\net al. 2021). Datasets on forest losses are less well developed for \r\nreforestation and afforestation. As Mitchell et al. (2017) point out, \r\nthere has been significant improvement in the ability to measure \r\nchanges in tree and carbon density on sites using satellite data, but \r\nthese techniques are still evolving and improving and they are not yet \r\navailable for widespread use."


id: 4977a615c2d619eccce9635613093940
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10150
content:
"Ground-based forest inventory measurements have been developed \r\nin many countries, most prominently in the Northern Hemisphere, \r\nbut more and more countries are starting to develop and collect \r\nnational forest inventories. Training and capacity building is going on \r\nin many developing countries under UNREDD and FAO programmes. \r\nAdditional efforts to harmonise data collection methods and to make \r\nforest inventory data available to the scientific community would \r\nimprove confidence in forest statistics, and changes in forest statistics \r\nover time. To some extent the Global Forest Biodiversity Initiative fills \r\nin this data gap (https://gfbi.udl.cat/)."


id: 96532ce98aa99af1cb0a25922cd8be70
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23644
content:
"Increasing concentrations of CO2 are expected to increase carbon \r\nstocks globally, with the strongest effects in the tropics (Schimel et al. \r\n2015; Kim et al. 2017a) (IPCC AR6 WGII Chapter 5) and economic \r\nmodels suggest that future sink potential may be robust to the \r\nimpacts of climate change (Tian et al. 2018). However, it is uncertain \r\nif this large terrestrial carbon sink will continue in the future (Aragao \r\net al. 2018), as it is increasingly recognised that gains due to CO2\r\nfertilisation are constrained by climate and increasing disturbances \r\n(Schurgers et al. 2018; Duffy et al. 2021) (IPCC AR6 WGII Chapter 5). \r\nFurther, negative synergies between local impacts like deforestation \r\nand forest fires may interact with global drivers like climate change \r\nand lead to tipping points (Lovejoy and Nobre 2018). Factors that \r\nreduce permanence or slow forest growth will drive up costs of "


id: a87077fb3140eb7e644071bcfd11ccab
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26842
content:
"impacts on biodiversity, air and water quality, water distribution, \r\nand on human health (Section 7.3). Freshwater ecosystems equally \r\nface a series of combined threats including from land-use change, \r\nwater extraction, exploitation, pollution, climate change and invasive \r\nspecies (IPBES 2019a)."


id: 18c0b037f6df694fc66adbb75125a7b6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1574
content:
"The increasing trend in aquaculture production especially in South \r\nand South-East Asia through intensive methods affects existing food \r\nproduction and ecosystems by diverting rice fields or mangroves \r\n(Bhattacharya and Ninan 2011). Although extensive traditional \r\nfish farming of carp in central Europe can contribute to landscape \r\nmanagement, enhance biodiversity and provide ecosystem services, \r\nthere are several barriers to scale up production due to strict \r\nEU environmental regulations, vulnerability to extreme weather \r\nevents, and to avian predators that are protected by EU laws, and \r\ndisadvantages faced by small-scale enterprises that dominate the \r\nsector (European-Commission 2021). Bioenergy production may have \r\nhigh opportunity costs in land-scarce areas and compete with land \r\nused for food production which threatens food security and affects \r\nthe poor and vulnerable. But these impacts will differ across scale, \r\ncontexts and other factors."


id: 69400277a571d032f5cb1d534f4f0278
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15782
content:
"Currently, land degradation is estimated to have reduced productivity \r\nin 23% of the global terrestrial area, and between USD235 billion \r\nand USD577 billion in annual global crop output is at risk because \r\nof pollinator loss (IPBES 2019a). The global trends reviewed above \r\nare based on data from 2000 studies. It is not clear whether the \r\nassessment included a quality control check of the studies evaluated \r\nand suffer from aggregation bias. For instance, a  recent meta\u0002analysis of global forest valuation studies noted that many studies \r\nreviewed had shortcomings such as failing to clearly mention the \r\nmethodology and prices used to value the forest ecosystem services, \r\ndouble counting, data errors, and so on (Ninan and Inoue 2013). \r\nFurthermore, the criticisms against the paper by (Costanza et al. "


id: 1ba1b30d1540cb6325764e1895a656cb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2047
content:
"Although numerous studies have estimated the value of ecosystem \r\nservices for different sites, ecosystems, and regions, these studies \r\nmostly evaluate ecosystem services at a  single point in time \r\n(Costanza et al. 1997; Xue and Tisdell 2001; Nahuelhual et al. 2007; "


id: 90f18efb8c0813118b64d9fac1f1cc04
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22707
content:
"The role assigned to local government mechanisms such as Ghana's Community Resource Management Area Mechanisms (CREMAs) \r\nwas expected to give a  voice to smallholders who are an important stakeholder in Ghana's cocoa sector. CREMAs are inclusive \r\nbecause authority and ownership of natural resources are devolved to local communities who can thus have a voice in influencing CSC \r\npolicy thereby ensuring equity and adapting CSC to local contexts. However, ensuring the long-term sustainability of CREMAs will help \r\nto make them a reliable mechanism for farmers to voice their concerns and aspirations, and ensure their independence as a legitimate \r\ngovernance structure in the long run. The private sector was assigned an important role to popularise climate-smart cocoa production \r\nin Ghana. However, whether this will work to the advantage of smallholder cocoa producers needs to be seen."


id: 4aea3668d2135e4f7db97f2e768b5f74
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10419
content:
"Current negative trends in biodiversity and ecosystem services will \r\nundermine progress towards achieving 80% (35 out of 44) of the \r\nassessed targets of SDGs related to poverty, hunger, health, water, \r\ncities, climate, oceans and land (IPBES 2019a). However, Reyers and \r\nSelig (2020) note that the assessment by (IPBES 2019a) could only \r\nassess the consequences of trends in biodiversity and ecosystem \r\nservices for 35 out of the 169 SDG targets due to data and knowledge \r\ngaps, and lack of clarity about the relationship between biodiversity, \r\necosystem services and SDGs."


id: b2f6c5e96b458e06ab310713b8963ca3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28727
content:
"mechanisms is critical to better understand the permanence of \r\nmitigation measures in land sector."


id: 8366f83afe7729d564a509f18fb6c850
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20250
content:
"Closing knowledge gaps and narrowing uncertainties are crucial to \r\nadvance AFOLU mitigation. Knowledge gaps exist across a  range \r\nof areas, from emissions accounting and mitigation measure \r\ndevelopment to integration of scientific and traditional knowledge \r\nand development and sustainable implementation strategies. The \r\nfollowing are identified as priorities:"


id: 3dda9c5948b96b29f099a177dcd0d91d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8048
content:
"In contrast to other sectors, AFOLU can facilitate mitigation in several different ways. Specifically, AFOLU can (i) reduce emissions as \r\na sector in its own right, (ii) remove meaningful quantities of carbon from the atmosphere and relatively cheaply, and (iii) provide \r\nraw materials to enable mitigation within other sectors, such as energy, industry or the built environment."


id: b230f556fb19b9db5152f6ec2b7fcbe
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28579
content:
"The emissions profile of AFOLU differs from other sectors, with a greater proportion of non-CO2 gases (N2O and CH4). The impacts of \r\nmitigation efforts within AFOLU can vary according to which gases are targeted, as a result of the differing atmospheric lifetime of \r\nthe gases and differing global temperature responses to the accumulation of the specific gases in the atmosphere."


id: 6037c0badb146b0ec467421ce819f4d3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14232
content:
"In addition to tackling climate change, AFOLU mitigation measures have capacity, where appropriately implemented, to help address \r\nsome critical, wider challenges, as well as contributing to climate change adaptation. AFOLU is inextricably linked with some of \r\nthe most serious challenges that are suggested to have ever faced humanity, such as large-scale biodiversity loss, environmental \r\ndegradation and the associated consequences. As AFOLU concerns land management and utilises a considerable portion of the \r\nEarth's terrestrial area, the sector greatly influences soil, water and air quality, biological and social diversity, the provision of natural \r\nhabitats, and ecosystem functioning, consequently impacting many SDGs."


id: 47206c86c171a34031310f9fcc6f6ea7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9716
content:
"Coordinating Lead Authors: \r\nShuaib Lwasa (Uganda), Karen C. Seto (the United States of America)"


id: 3cb6ff464d5096c1e4d4b2136eb2d4f3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7864
content:
"Xuemei Bai (Australia), Hilda Blanco (the United States of America), Kevin R. Gurney (the United \r\nStates of America), Siir Kilkis (Turkey), Oswaldo Lucon (Brazil), Jin Murakami (Japan), Jiahua Pan \r\n(China), Ayyoob Sharifi (Japan/Iran), Yoshiki Yamagata (Japan)"


id: 7a64f250905dd43db468d4b5cdb75770
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18728
content:
"Lwasa, S., K.C. Seto, X. Bai, H. Blanco, K.R. Gurney, S. Kilkis, O. Lucon, J. Murakami, J. Pan, A. Sharifi, Y. Yamagata, 2022: \r\nUrban systems and other settlements. In IPCC, 2022: Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution \r\nof Working Group III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [P.R. Shukla, \r\nJ. Skea, R. Slade, A. Al Khourdajie, R. van Diemen, D. McCollum, M. Pathak, S. Some, P. Vyas, R. Fradera, M. Belkacemi, \r\nA. Hasija, G. Lisboa, S. Luz, J. Malley, (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA. \r\ndoi: 10.1017/9781009157926.010"


id: 49858dcb2dbfac57e88aadfeba483bb9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10162
content:
"5.1 tCO2-eq per person (71.7%); Eastern Europe and West-Central Asia \r\nincreased from 6.9 to 9.8 tCO2-eq per person (40.9%); Latin America \r\nand Caribbean increased from 2.7 to 3.7 tCO2-eq per person (40.4%); \r\nand Middle East increased from 7.4 to 9.6 tCO2-eq per person (30.1%). \r\nAlbeit starting from the highest level, Developed Countries had \r\na decline of 11.4 to 10.7 tCO2-eq per person (-6.5%). {8.3.3}"


id: c40d450a722ddad6486c6ebd03c9a330
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31773
content:
"Although urbanisation is a global trend often associated with \r\nincreased incomes and higher consumption, the growing \r\nconcentration of people and activities is an opportunity to \r\nincrease resource efficiency and decarbonise at scale (very \r\nhigh confidence). The same urbanisation level can have large \r\nvariations in per capita urban carbon emissions. For most regions, per \r\ncapita urban emissions are lower than per capita national emissions. \r\n{8.1.4, 8.3.3, 8.4, Box 8.1}"


id: 611ace3d9c06800e748a126701ff8510
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14376
content:
"Most future urban population growth will occur in developing \r\ncountries, where per capita emissions are currently low but \r\nexpected to increase with the construction and use of new \r\ninfrastructure and the built environment, and changes in \r\nincomes and lifestyles (very high confidence).  The drivers of \r\nurban greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are complex and include \r\nan interplay of population size, income, state of urbanisation, and \r\nhow cities are laid out (i.e. urban form). How new cities and towns \r\nare designed, constructed, managed, and powered will lock-in \r\nbehaviour, lifestyles, and future urban GHG emissions. Low-emission \r\nurbanisation can improve well-being while minimising impact \r\non GHG emissions, but there is risk that urbanisation can lead to \r\nincreased global GHG emissions through increased emissions outside \r\nthe city's boundaries. {8.1.4, 8.3, Box 8.1, 8.4, 8.6}"


id: e00afdb0b32d359e9430813a9f19dc94
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36661
content:
"The urban share of global GHG emissions (including carbon \r\ndioxide (CO2) and methane (CH4)) is substantive and continues \r\nto increase (high confidence). In 2015, urban emissions were \r\nestimated to be 25 GtCO2-eq (about 62% of the global share) and \r\nin 2020, 29 GtCO2-eq (67-72% of the global share).1\r\n About 100 of \r\nthe highest emitting urban areas account for approximately 18% of \r\nthe global carbon footprint. {8.1.6, 8.3.3}"


id: 68eaa89fefd8bde4a2661b12a549ac3f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15729
content:
"The urban share of regional GHG emissions increased between \r\n2000 and 2015, with much inter-region variation in the \r\nmagnitude of the increase (high confidence). Globally, the urban \r\nshare of national emissions increased 6 percentage points, from 56% \r\nin 2000 to 62% in 2015. For 2000 to 2015, the urban emissions share \r\nacross AR6 WGIII regions increased from 28% to 38% in Africa, from \r\n46% to 54% in Asia and Pacific, from 62% to 72% in Developed \r\nCountries, from 57% to 62% in Eastern Europe and West-Central \r\nAsia, from 55% to 66% in Latin America and Caribbean, and from \r\n68% to 69% in the Middle East. {8.1.6, 8.3.3}"


id: bbc85ff027d81c36ac9e504567c4b9e4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30267
content:
"Per capita urban GHG emissions increased between 2000 \r\nand 2015, with cities in the Developed Countries region \r\nproducing nearly seven times more per capita than the lowest \r\nemitting region (medium confidence). From 2000 to 2015, global \r\nurban GHG emissions per capita increased from 5.5 to 6.2 tCO2-eq \r\nper person (an  increase of 11.8%); Africa increased from 1.3 to \r\n1.5 tCO2-eq per person (22.6%); Asia and Pacific increased from 3.0 to "


id: 3e080a33cf879a2127133f857d3adbda
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8081
content:
"The construction of new, and upgrading of, existing urban \r\ninfrastructure through 2030 will result in significant emissions \r\n(very high confidence). The construction of new and upgrading "


id: d6ed5cc8a9ee3e1c4523a19580630ddc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35120
content:
"These examples are considered to be a subset of nature-based solutions or ecosystem-based approaches."


id: fba3014055f6d5eaa121535b7f3a8f99
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41642
content:
"of existing urban infrastructure using conventional practices and \r\ntechnologies can result in significant committed CO2 emissions, \r\nranging from 8.5 GtCO2 to 14 GtCO2 annually up to 2030 and more \r\nthan double annual resource requirements for raw materials to about \r\n90 billion tonnes per year by 2050, up from 40 billion tonnes in 2010\r\n(medium evidence, high agreement). {8.4.1, 8.6}"


id: 654096ea216d6b6d252f50aa70f45852
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15090
content:
"vehicles towards walking, cycling, and low-emissions shared and \r\npublic transportation, passive energy comfort in buildings, and urban \r\ngreen infrastructure can deliver significant public health benefits and \r\nhave lower GHG emissions. {8.2, 8.3.4, 8.4, 8.6}"


id: dbb53d35ff3618555aa0e46521823348
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35946
content:
"Given the dual challenges of rising urban GHG emissions and \r\nfuture projections of more frequent extreme climate events, \r\nthere is an urgent need to integrate urban mitigation and \r\nadaptation strategies for cities to address climate change \r\nand withstand its effects (very high confidence). Mitigation \r\nstrategies can enhance resilience against climate change impacts \r\nwhile contributing to social equity, public health, and human well\u0002being. Urban mitigation actions that facilitate economic decoupling \r\ncan have positive impacts on employment and local economic \r\ncompetitiveness. {8.2, Cross-Working Group Box 2, 8.4}"


id: 4d9c11abbff025fc8a760934bd120949
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10931
content:
"Cities can only achieve net-zero GHG emissions through deep \r\ndecarbonisation and systemic transformation (very high \r\nconfidence). Three broad mitigation strategies have been found to \r\nbe effective in reducing emissions when implemented concurrently: \r\n(i) reducing or changing urban energy and material use towards \r\nmore sustainable production and consumption across all sectors, \r\nincluding through compact and efficient urban forms and supporting \r\ninfrastructure; (ii) electrification and switching to net-zero-emissions \r\nresources; and (iii) enhancing carbon uptake and storage in the urban \r\nenvironment (high evidence, high agreement). Given the regional \r\nand global reach of urban supply chains, cities can achieve net-zero \r\nemissions only if emissions are reduced within and outside of their \r\nadministrative boundaries. {8.1.6, 8.3.4, 8.4, 8.6}"


id: 28e12c2b52a811330991afec7227de4f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4409
content:
"Packages of mitigation policies that implement multiple urban\u0002scale interventions can have cascading effects across sectors, \r\nreduce GHG emissions outside of a  city's administrative \r\nboundaries, and reduce more emissions than the net sum \r\nof individual interventions, particularly if multiple scales of \r\ngovernance are included (high confidence). Cities have the \r\nability to implement policy packages across sectors using an urban \r\nsystems approach, especially those that affect key infrastructure \r\nbased on spatial planning, electrification of the urban energy system, \r\nand urban green and blue infrastructure. The institutional capacity \r\nof cities to develop, coordinate, and integrate sectoral mitigation \r\nstrategies within their jurisdiction varies by context, particularly \r\nthose related to governance, the regulatory system, and budgetary \r\ncontrol. {8.4, 8.5, 8.6}"


id: ea0d9cfcb01e8e04fceb23937cae28fc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38526
content:
"With over 880 million people living in informal settlements, \r\nthere are opportunities to harness and enable informal \r\npractices and institutions in cities related to housing, waste, \r\nenergy, water, and sanitation to reduce resource use and \r\nmitigate climate change (low evidence, medium agreement).\r\nThe upgrading of informal settlements and inadequate housing to \r\nimprove resilience and well-being offers a chance to create a low\u0002carbon transition. However, there is limited quantifiable data on "


id: e553518f8c6474e7db7cdace123c7a06
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37647
content:
"Integrated spatial planning to achieve compact and resource\u0002efficient urban growth through co-location of higher residential \r\nand job densities, mixed land use, and transit-oriented \r\ndevelopment (TOD) could reduce GHG emissions between 23% \r\nand 26% by 2050 compared to the business-as-usual scenario\r\n(robust evidence, high agreement, very high confidence).\r\nCompact cities with shortened distances between housing and jobs, \r\nand interventions that support a modal shift away from private motor "


id: 5a629a9b33521aeba4973a9430211866
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13157
content:
"these practices and their cumulative impacts on GHG emissions. \r\n{8.1.4, 8.2.2, Cross-Working Group Box 2, 8.3.2, 8.4, 8.6, 8.7}"


id: f21d5d9b18afdf190423b39496630153
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39986
content:
"Achieving transformational changes in cities for climate \r\nchange mitigation and adaptation will require engaging \r\nmultiple scales of governance, including governments and \r\nnon-state actors, and in connection with substantive financing \r\nbeyond sectoral approaches (very high confidence). Large \r\nand complex infrastructure projects for urban mitigation are often \r\nbeyond the capacity of local municipality budgets, jurisdictions, and \r\ninstitutions. Partnerships between cities and international institutions, \r\nnational and regional governments, transnational networks, and \r\nlocal stakeholders play a  pivotal role in mobilising global climate \r\nfinance resources for a  range of infrastructure projects with low\u0002carbon emissions and related spatial planning programmes across \r\nkey sectors. {8.4, 8.5}"


id: e75aa60e425fb9d39f9a392fcbd76215
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37999
content:
"of SDG 11 on Sustainable Cities and Communities for 'inclusive, \r\nsafe, resilient and sustainable' cities and human settlements \r\n(United  Nations 2015; Queiroz et al. 2017; United Nations 2019). \r\nAdditionally, UN-Habitat's New Urban Agenda (NUA) calls for \r\nvarious measures, including integrated spatial planning at the \r\ncity-regional scale, to address the systemic challenges included in \r\ngreening cities, among which is emissions reduction and avoidance \r\n(United Nations 2017)."


id: f5f110cee52628994668a7ba3e825da1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40623
content:
"The Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) of the Intergovernmental Panel on \r\nClimate Change (IPCC) was the first IPCC report that had a standalone \r\nchapter on urban mitigation of climate change. The starting point for \r\nthat chapter was how the spatial organisation of urban settlements \r\naffects greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and how urban form and \r\ninfrastructure could facilitate mitigation of climate change. A main \r\nfinding in AR5 was that urban form shapes urban energy consumption \r\nand GHG emissions."


id: 7eba6408796a59f96046808ba8c1aaae
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19450
content:
"Since AR5, there has also been an increase in scientific literature \r\non urban mitigation of climate change, including more diversity of \r\nmitigation strategies than were covered during AR5 (Lamb et al. \r\n2018), as well as a growing focus on how strategies at the urban \r\nscale can have compounding or additive effects beyond urban areas \r\n(e.g., in rural areas, land-use planning, and the energy sector)."


id: d3c5ab1e6297c1195921ea32ec219783
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34604
content:
"There is more literature on using a systems approach to understand \r\nthe interlinkages between mitigation and adaptation, and situating \r\nGHG emissions reduction targets within broader social, economic, \r\nand human well-being contexts and goals (Bai  et al. 2018; Urge\u0002Vorsatz et al. 2018; Lin et al. 2021). In particular, the nexus approach, \r\nsuch as the water and energy nexus and the water-energy-food \r\nnexus, is increasingly being used to understand potential emissions \r\nand energy savings from cross-sectoral linkages that occur in cities \r\n(Wang and Chen 2016; Engstrom et al. 2017; Valek et al. 2017). There \r\nis also a growing literature that aims to quantify transboundary urban \r\nGHG emissions and carbon footprint beyond urban and national \r\nadministrative boundaries (Chen et al. 2016; Hu et al. 2016). Such \r\na scope provides a more complete understanding of how local urban \r\nemissions or local mitigation strategies can have effects on regions' \r\ncarbon footprint or GHG emissions."


id: 61fc56d740f3e225e8ae080a980fe6b9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14510
content:
"Cities are also gaining traction within the work of the IPCC. The \r\nIPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5degC (SR1.5 Chapter 4) \r\nidentified four systems that urgently need to change in fundamental \r\nand transformative ways: urban infrastructure, land use and \r\necosystems, industry, and energy. Urban infrastructure was singled \r\nout but urban systems form a pivotal part of the other three systems \r\nrequiring change (IPCC 2018a) (see 'infrastructure' in Glossary). The \r\nIPCC Special Report on Climate Change and Land (SRCCL) identified \r\ncities not only as spatial units for land-based mitigation options but \r\nalso places for managing demand for natural resources including \r\nfood, fibre, and water (IPCC 2019)."


id: 975b794c3a05f0a816ddb1e3fc2d2eba
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23832
content:
"Moreover, cities around the world are putting increasing focus on \r\ntackling climate change. Since AR5:"


id: f377ca4b337f5dc851d54b11865b204b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40210
content:
"Other international frameworks are highlighting the importance of \r\ncities. For example, the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform \r\non Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) report on nature's \r\ncontribution to people is clear: cities straddle the biodiversity sphere in \r\nthe sense that they present spatial units of ecosystem fragmentation \r\nand degradation while at the same time contain spatial units where \r\nthe concentration of biodiversity compares favourably with some \r\nlandscapes (IPBES 2019a). Cities are also featured as a key element in \r\nthe transformational governance to tackle both climate change and \r\nbiodiversity and ecosystem challenges in the first-ever IPCC-IPBES \r\nco-sponsored workshop report (Portner et al. 2021) (Section 8.5 and \r\nsee 'governance' in Glossary)."


id: 670bc33ed8ee3577b2d061b5142a8797
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15396
content:
"facilitate reaching those targets, underscore the growing support for \r\nclimate action by city and other subnational leaders.\r\n8.1"


id: 5256dae8c931d89f2cb16681648242ac
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11763
content:
"This chapter takes an urban systems approach and covers the full \r\nrange of urban settlements, including towns, cities, and metropolitan \r\nareas. By 'urban system' (Figure  8.15), this chapter refers to two \r\nrelated concepts. First, an urban systems approach recognises \r\nthat cities do not function in isolation. Rather, cities exhibit strong \r\ninterdependencies across scales, whether it is within a  region, \r\na country, a continent, or worldwide. Cities are embedded in broader \r\necological, economic, technical, institutional, legal, and governance \r\nstructures that often constrain their systemic function, which cannot \r\nbe separated from wider power relations (Bai et al. 2016)."


id: 596d977e0dc83a5107f826336bfd0305
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12969
content:
"One major innovation in this Assessment Report is the inclusion of \r\nhistorical and future urban GHG emissions. Urban emissions based \r\non consumption-based accounting by regions has been put forth for \r\nthe time frame 1990-2100 using multiple datasets with projections \r\ngiven in the framework of the Shared Socio-economic Pathway \r\n(SSP)-Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP) scenarios. \r\nThis advance has provided a  time dimension to urban footprints \r\nconsidering different climate scenarios with implications for urban \r\nmitigation, allowing a comparison of the way urban emissions and \r\ntheir reduction can evolve given different scenario contexts (see \r\nGlossary for definitions of various 'pathways' and 'scenarios' in the \r\ncontext of climate change mitigation, including 'SSPs' and 'RCPs')."


id: 26dfaa5bb1f1d2e3de828dfc1f5a7092
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4000
content:
"The notion of a system of cities has been around for nearly 100 years \r\nand recognises that cities are interdependent, in that significant \r\nchanges in one city, such as economic activities, income, or population, \r\nwill affect other cities in the system (Christaller 1933; Berry 1964; \r\nMarshall 1989). This perspective of an urban system emphasises the \r\nconnections between a city and other cities, as well as between a city \r\nand its hinterlands (Hall and Hay 1980; Ramaswami et al. 2017b; \r\nXu et al. 2018c). An important point is that growth in one city affects \r\ngrowth in other cities in the global, national or regional system of \r\ncities (Gabaix 1999; Scholvin et al. 2019; Knoll 2021)."


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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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vector_id: 2016
content:
"Special emphasis is placed on the co-benefits of urban mitigation \r\noptions, including an evaluation of linkages with the SDGs based \r\non synergies and/or trade-offs. Urban mitigation options are further \r\nevaluated based on multiple dimensions according to the feasibility \r\nassessment (see Section  8.5.5 and Figure  8.19, and Section  8.\r\nSM.2) indicating the enablers and barriers of implementation. These \r\nadvances provide additional guidance for urban mitigation.  "


id: 7668c034a882eb7045819707808a22b2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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content:
"Moreover, there is a hierarchy of cities (Taylor 1997; Liu et al. 2014), \r\nwith very large cities at the top of the hierarchy concentrating political \r\npower and financial resources, but of which there are very few. Rather, \r\nthe urban system is dominated by small and medium-sized cities \r\nand towns. With globalisation and increased interconnectedness of \r\nfinancial flows, labour, and supply chains, cities across the world \r\ntoday have long-distance relationships on multiple dimensions but \r\nare also connected to their hinterlands for resources."


id: 926386e1902452cce49b7eb7381c3dcd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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content:
"At the 43rd Session of the IPCC in 2016, the IPCC approved a Special \r\nReport on Climate Change and Cities during the Seventh Assessment \r\nCycle of the IPCC (AR7). To stimulate scientific research knowledge \r\nexchange, the IPCC and nine global partners co-sponsored the IPCC \r\nCities and Climate Change Science Conference, which brought \r\ntogether over 700 researchers, policymakers, and practitioners \r\nfrom 80 countries."


id: 54dadd5f85f077573e49fb745bcc720e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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content:
"The second key component of the urban systems lens identifies the \r\nactivities and sectors within a city as being inter-connected - that \r\ncities are ecosystems (Rees 1997; Grimm et al. 2000; Newman and \r\nJennings 2008; Acuto et al. 2019; Abdullah and Garcia-Chueca 2020; \r\nAcuto and Leffel 2021). This urban systems perspective emphasises \r\nlinkages and interrelations within cities. The most evident example of \r\nthis is urban form and infrastructure, which refer to the patterns and \r\nspatial arrangements of land use, transportation systems, and urban \r\ndesign. Changes in urban form and infrastructure can simultaneously \r\naffect multiple sectors, such as buildings, energy, and transport."


id: cacf3cb04ee8530facccf835b34ceb5a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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content:
"The conference identified key research priorities including the \r\nneed for an overarching systems approach to understanding how \r\nsectors interact in cities as drivers for GHG emissions and the \r\nrelationship between climate and other urban processes, as well as \r\nachieving transformation towards low-carbon and resilient futures \r\n(Bai  et al. 2018). The subsequent report on the global research \r\nand action agenda identifies scale, informality, green and blue \r\ninfrastructure, governance and transformation, as well as financing \r\nclimate action, as areas for scientific research during the AR6 cycle \r\nand beyond (WCRP 2019)."


id: 1441eeaef7011b8e3e78b2682773e834
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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content:
"This chapter assesses urban systems beyond simply jurisdictional \r\nboundaries. Using an urban systems lens has the potential to accelerate \r\nmitigation beyond a single sector or purely jurisdictional approach \r\n(Section 8.4). An urban systems perspective presents both challenges \r\nand opportunities for urban mitigation strategies. It  shows that any \r\nmitigation option potentially has positive or negative consequences \r\nin other sectors, other settlements, cities, or other parts of the world, \r\nand requires more careful and comprehensive considerations on the \r\nbroader impacts, including equity and social justice (see Glossary for \r\na comprehensive definition of 'equity' in the context of mitigation and \r\nadaptation). This chapter focuses on cities, city regions, metropolitan \r\nregions, megalopolitans, mega-urban regions, towns, and other types "


id: d0d67185c0508dbeb42d28e8464759a4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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vector_id: 34090
content:
"of urban configurations because they are the primary sources of \r\nurban GHG emissions and tend to be where mitigation action can \r\nbe most impactful."


id: 2a2d6297e1cd6852988bbf4bf6283316
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
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vector_id: 4632
content:
"The 21st century will be the urban century, defined by a  massive \r\nincrease in global urban populations and a significant building up of \r\nnew urban infrastructure stock to accommodate the growing urban \r\npopulation. Six trends in urbanisation are especially important in the \r\ncontext of climate change mitigation."


id: daba389f7c82953fd18c8ef144e32ad1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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content:
"There is no internationally agreed upon definition of 'urban', 'urban \r\npopulation', or 'urban area'. Countries develop their own definitions \r\nof urban, often based on a combination of population size or density, \r\nand other criteria including the percentage of population not \r\nemployed in agriculture, the availability of electricity, piped water, \r\nor other infrastructures, and characteristics of the built environment, \r\nsuch as dwellings and built structures. This chapter assesses \r\nurban systems, which includes cities and towns. It uses a  similar \r\nframework to Chapter 6 of AR6 WGII, referring to cities and urban \r\nsettlements as 'concentrated human habitation centres that exist \r\nalong a continuum' (Dodman et al. 2022) (for further definitions of \r\n'urban', 'cities', 'settlements' and related terms, see Glossary, and \r\nWGII Chapter 6)."


id: 21ecc83999bac5644f9c498467f47461
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content:
"First, the size and relative proportion of the urban population is \r\nunprecedented and continues to increase. As of 2018, approximately \r\n55% of the global population lives in urban areas (about 4.3 billion \r\npeople) (UN DESA 2019). It is predicted that 68% of the world \r\npopulation will live in urban areas by 2050. This will mean adding \r\n2.5 billion people to urban areas between 2018 and 2050, with 90% \r\nof this increase taking place in Africa and Asia. There is a  strong \r\ncorrelation between the level of urbanisation and the level of \r\nnational income, with considerable variation and complexity in the \r\nrelationship between the two (UN DESA 2019). In general, countries \r\nwith levels of urbanisation of 75% or greater all have high national \r\nincomes, whereas countries with low levels of urbanisation under \r\n35% have low national incomes (UN DESA 2019). In general, there \r\nis a clear positive correlation between the level of urbanisation and \r\nincome levels (Figure 8.1 and Box 8.1)."


id: de4dba98dc5a13d21708c1b0f39a7041
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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content:
"Figure 8.14: Relationship between urbanisation level and gross national income (GNI). There is a positive and strong correlation between the urbanisation level \r\nand gross national income. High-income countries have high levels of urbanisation, on average 80%. Low-income countries have low levels of urbanisation, on average 30%. \r\nSource: UN DESA 2019, p. 42."


id: aebcf5b9f200b8f57759289414699227
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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vector_id: 27981
content:
"climate change mitigation strategies include solutions appropriate \r\nfor cities of varying sizes and typologies (Section 8.6 and Figure 8.21)."


id: 21e23c37607aa793bbdd17285fdee523
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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content:
"Second, the geographic concentration of the world's current urban \r\npopulation is in emerging economies, and the majority of future \r\nurban population growth will take place in developing countries and \r\nleast-developed countries (LDCs). About half of the world's urban \r\npopulation in 2018 lived in just seven countries, and about half of \r\nthe increase in urban population through 2050 is projected to be \r\nconcentrated in eight countries (UN DESA 2019) (Figure 8.2). Of these \r\neight, seven are emerging economies where there will be a need for \r\nsignificant financing to construct housing, roads, and other urban \r\ninfrastructure to accommodate the growth of the urban population. \r\nHow these new cities of tomorrow will be designed and constructed \r\nwill lock-in patterns of urban energy behaviour for decades if not \r\ngenerations (Sections 8.3.4 and 8.4). Thus, it is essential that urban "


id: f1141efd31ff2cbd660296422cb1d49e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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content:
"Third, small and medium-sized cities and towns are a dominant type \r\nof urban settlement. In 2018, more than half (58%) of the urban \r\npopulation lived in cities and towns with fewer than 1  million \r\ninhabitants and almost half of the world's urban population (48%) \r\nlived in settlements with fewer than 500,000 inhabitants (Figure 8.3). \r\nAlthough megacities receive a lot of attention, only about 13% of the \r\nurban population worldwide lived in a megacity - an urban area with \r\nat least 10 million inhabitants (UN DESA 2019). Thus, there is a need \r\nfor a wide range of strategies for urban mitigation of climate change \r\nthat are appropriate for cities of varying levels of development "


id: 4021fccef8bd3645b0ea6656b6fa2b38
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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vector_id: 8471
content:
"Figure 8.2: Urban population size in 2018 and increase in the projected urban population. In 2018, about half of the world's urban population lived in seven \r\ncountries, and about half of the increase in urban population through 2050 is forecasted to concentrate in eight countries. Source: UN DESA 2019, p. 44."


id: d13459984f9d1d4d23ef383169b033dc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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content:
"et al. 2021), but the challenges for these cities differ in scope and \r\nmagnitude from rapidly expanding cities."


id: c5c9fc15737b8d8ab883f83aa705f98f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32106
content:
"and size, especially smaller cities which often have lower levels of \r\nfinancial capacities than large cities."


id: dc7b09303163bc81817e383dc9730c60
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36057
content:
"Fourth, another trend is the rise of megacities and extended \r\nmetropolitan regions. The largest cities around the world are \r\nbecoming even larger, and there is a growing divergence in economic \r\npower between megacities and other large cities (Kourtit et al. 2015; \r\nHoornweg and Pope 2017; Zhao et al. 2017b). Moreover, there is \r\nevidence that the largest city in each country has an increasing share \r\nof the national population and economy."


id: eae61fb64dd0b801ab20477835134aa1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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vector_id: 38690
content:
"Fifth, population declines have been observed for cities and towns \r\nacross the world, including in Poland, Republic of Korea, Japan, \r\nUnited States, Germany, and Ukraine. The majority of cities that \r\nhave experienced population declines are concentrated in Europe. \r\nMultiple factors contribute to the decline in cities, including declining \r\nindustries and the economy, declining fertility, and outmigration \r\nto larger cities. Shrinking urban populations could offer retrofitting \r\nopportunities (UNEP 2019) and increasing greenspaces (Jarzebski "


id: c24005d55e77e8c13fab535b209d4591
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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vector_id: 31463
content:
"Urban areas concentrate GHG fluxes because of the size of the urban \r\npopulation, the size and nature of the urban economy, the energy \r\nand GHGs embodied in the infrastructure (see 'embodied emissions' \r\nin Glossary), and the goods and services imported and exported to \r\nand from cities (USGCRP 2018)."


id: 3c8dbe364ee190508a04ac148fdf6593
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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content:
"Urbanisation in the 21st century will be dominated by population \r\nand infrastructure growth in developing countries, and as such it is \r\nimportant to highlight three aspects that are unique and especially \r\nrelevant for climate change mitigation. First, urbanisation will \r\nincrease in speed and magnitude. Given their significant impact on \r\nemissions, mitigation action in Asian cities, especially the large and \r\nrapidly growing cities, will have significant implications on global \r\nambitions (Section 8.3.4)."


id: 7f3b51dd83204220c6628934ed4f5dab
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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vector_id: 19539
content:
"Second, a number of cities in developing countries lack institutional, \r\nfinancial and technical capacities to enable local climate change \r\naction (Sharifi et al. 2017; Fuhr et al. 2018). While these capacities \r\ndiffer across contexts (Hickmann et al. 2017), several governance \r\nchallenges are similar across cities (Gouldson et al. 2015). These \r\nfactors also influence the ability of cities to innovate and effectively \r\nimplement mitigation action (Nagendra et al. 2018) (Chapter 17)."


id: 21dbad843026713d99e4f8e106fb96e0
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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vector_id: 3181
content:
"Third, there are sizable economic benefits in developing country cities \r\nthat can provide an opportunity to enhance political momentum and \r\ninstitutions (Colenbrander et al. 2016). The co-benefits approach \r\n(Section  8.2), which frames climate objectives alongside other \r\ndevelopment benefits, is increasingly seen as an important concept \r\njustifying and driving climate change action in developing countries \r\n(Sethi and Puppim de Oliveira 2018)."


id: 8a1204ec91533b39257e2864d651875
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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content:
"Large-scale system transformations are also deeply influenced by \r\nfactors outside governance and institutions, such as private interests \r\nand power dynamics (Jaglin 2014; Tyfield 2014). In some cases, these \r\nprivate interests are tied up with international flows of capital. In \r\nIndia, adaptation plans involving networks of private actors and \r\nrelated mitigation actions have resulted in the dominance of private \r\ninterests. This has led to trade-offs and adverse impacts on the poor \r\n(Chu 2016; Mehta et al. 2019)."


id: 3ba510cd4e18221e5fa0d9a0eec5b358
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7679
content:
"Urban GHG emissions accounting can determine critical conceptual \r\nand quantitative aspects of urban GHG emissions. The accounting \r\nframework chosen can therefore predetermine the emissions \r\nresponsibility, the mitigation options available, and the level of effort \r\nrequired to correctly account for emissions (Afionis et al. 2017)."


id: 499abcd4abcb6100ff96e4b8f6338ae3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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vector_id: 10177
content:
"Two main urban carbon accounting advances have occurred since \r\nAR5. The first includes efforts to better understand and clarify how the \r\ndifferent urban GHG accounting frameworks that have emerged over "


id: 33d746b95cd0f436972558eb293132ff
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6362
content:
"the past 15 years are interrelated, require different methodological \r\ntools, and reflect differing perspectives on emissions responsibility \r\nand quantification effort. The second main advance lies in a series \r\nof methodological innovations facilitating practical implementation, \r\nemissions verification, and scaling-up of the different GHG \r\naccounting approaches. This section provides an overview of the \r\nmost used GHG urban accounting frameworks followed by a review \r\nof the advances since AR5."


id: cecba483d65d2bd05daee283b61a97e0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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content:
"CBCF considers not only the supply-chain-related GHG emissions of \r\nkey infrastructure, but also emissions associated with all goods and \r\nservices across a city, often removing emissions associated with goods \r\nand services exported from a city (Wiedmann et al. 2016, 2021). The \r\ndistinction between the PCF and ACF variants of the CBCF is primarily \r\nassociated with whether the agents responsible for the final demand \r\nare confined to only city residents (PCF) or all consumers in a city \r\n(ACF), which can include government consumers, capital formation, \r\nand other final demand categories (Heinonen et al. 2020)."


id: bc686563e008d2f47c847eabb5fe898c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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content:
"A recent synthesis of these frameworks in the context of a net-zero \r\nGHG emissions target suggests that the four frameworks contribute \r\nto different aspects of decarbonisation policy and can work together \r\nto inform the overall process of decarbonisation (Ramaswami \r\net al. 2021). Furthermore, the relative magnitude of GHG emissions \r\nfor a  given city resulting from the different frameworks is often \r\na  reflection of the city's economic structure as a  'consumer' or \r\n'producer' city (Chavez and Ramaswami 2013; Sudmant et al. 2018)."


id: feecf63f2e0f17dc454abf82eb0c1f1e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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content:
"The TA framework is unique in that it can be independently verified \r\nthrough direct measurement of GHGs in the atmosphere, offering \r\na check on the integrity of emission estimates (Lauvaux et al. 2020; \r\nMueller et al. 2021). It is traditionally simpler to estimate by urban \r\npractitioners given the lower data requirements, and it can be \r\nrelevant to policies aimed specifically at energy consumption and \r\nmobility activities within city boundaries. However, it will not reflect \r\nelectricity imported for use in cities or lifecycle emissions associated \r\nwith in-city consumption of goods and services."


id: dd452ffb6691fc11df3280875bc0698a
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content:
"The CIF framework adds to the TA framework by including GHG \r\nemissions associated with electricity imports and the lifecycle \r\nGHG  emissions associated with key infrastructure provisioning \r\nactivities in cities, serving all homes, businesses, and industries. This \r\nwidens both the number of emitting categories and the responsibility \r\nfor those emissions by including infrastructure-related supply chain \r\nemissions. The CIF framework enables individual cities to connect \r\ncommunity-wide demand for infrastructure and food with their \r\ntransboundary production, strategically aligning their net-zero \r\nemissions plans with larger-scale net-zero efforts (Ramaswami and \r\nChavez 2013; Ramaswami et al. 2021; Seto et al. 2021)."


id: b213ecf01cf6809a664cff912539b6f6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"All these approaches are foundationally rooted in the concept of \r\nurban metabolism, that is, the tracking of material and energy flows \r\ninto, within, and out of cities (Wolman 1965). These frameworks \r\nall aim to quantify urban GHG emissions but reflect different \r\nperspectives on where the emission responsibility is allocated in \r\naddition to how much and which components of the GHG emissions \r\nassociated with the import and export of goods and services to and \r\nfrom a  city ('transboundary embedded/embodied GHG emissions') \r\nare included in a given urban emissions account. The four frameworks \r\nshare some common, overlapping GHG emission quantities and their \r\ninterrelationships have been defined mathematically (Chavez and \r\nRamaswami 2013)."


id: aaec7ba7b58c0941015d666f39d61e4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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content:
"The PCF version of the CBCF shifts the focus of the consumption and \r\nassociated supply chain emissions to only household consumption of \r\ngoods and services (Jones and Kammen 2014). This both reduces the \r\nTA emissions considered and the supply chain emissions, excluding \r\nall emissions associated with government, capital formation, and \r\nexports. The ACF, by contrast, widens the perspective considerably, \r\nincluding the TA and supply chain emissions of all consumers in \r\na city, but often removing emissions associated with exports."


id: 94249342d49a310c16857eef27d9d305
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content:
"A key advance since AR5 lies in understanding the different GHG \r\naccounting frameworks in terms of what they imply for responsibility - \r\nshared or otherwise - and what they imply for the depth and breadth \r\nof GHG emission reductions. TA focuses on in-city direct emission \r\nof GHGs to the atmosphere (e.g.,  combustion, net ecosystem \r\nexchange, methane (CH4) leakage) within a  chosen geographic \r\narea (Sovacool and Brown 2010; Gurney et al. 2019). CIF connects \r\nessential infrastructure use and demand activities in cities with their \r\nproduction, by combining TA emissions with the transboundary \r\nsupply chain emissions associated with imported electricity, fuels, \r\nfood, water, building materials, and waste management services \r\nused in cities (Ramaswami et al. 2008; Kennedy et al. 2009; Chavez \r\nand Ramaswami 2013)."


id: 4d741a628924bad3446ab9ebfae7245f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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"An additional distinction is the ability to sum up accounts from \r\nindividual cities in a  region or country, for example, directly to \r\narrive at a regional or national total. This can only be done for the \r\nTA and PCF frameworks. The ACF and CIF frameworks would require \r\nadjustment to avoid double-counting emissions (Chen et al. 2020a)."


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"(United Nations 2015). The SDGs and related indicators can be an \r\nopportunity to improve cities by using science-based decision-making \r\nand engaging a diverse set of stakeholders (Simon et al. 2016; Klopp \r\nand Petretta 2017; Kutty et al. 2020)."


id: 6078034d5c97b47ab0468d80110a53b9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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content:
"There are multiple ways that development pathways can be shifted \r\ntowards sustainability (Section  4.3.3, Cross-Chapter Box  5  in \r\nChapter  4, Chapter  17 and Figure  17.1). Urban areas can work \r\nto redirect development pathways towards sustainability while \r\nincreasing co-benefits for urban inhabitants. Figure 8.4 indicates that \r\nmitigation options for urban systems can provide synergistic linkages \r\nacross a wide range of SDGs, and some cases where linkages can \r\nproduce both synergies and trade-offs. While linkages are based \r\non context and the scale of implementation, synergies can be most \r\nsignificant when urban areas pursue integrated approaches where \r\none mitigation option supports the other (Sections 8.4 and 8.6)."


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vector_id: 4418
content:
"Co-benefits are 'the positive effects that a policy or measure aimed \r\nat one objective might have on other objectives, thereby increasing \r\nthe total benefits to the society or environment' (IPCC 2018b). AR5 \r\nWGIII Chapter  12 reported a  range of co-benefits associated with \r\nurban climate change mitigation strategies, including public savings, \r\nair quality and associated health benefits, and productivity increases \r\nin urban centres (Seto et al. 2014). Since AR5, evidence continues to \r\nmount on the co-benefits of urban mitigation. Highlighting co-benefits \r\ncould make a strong case for driving impactful mitigation action (Bain \r\net al. 2016), especially in developing countries, where development \r\nbenefits can be the argument for faster implementation (Sethi and \r\nPuppim de Oliveira 2018). Through co-benefits, urban areas can \r\ncouple mitigation, adaptation, and sustainable development while \r\nclosing infrastructure gaps (Thacker et al. 2019; Kamiya et al. 2020)."


id: 4f5d6e03b580e33140714cd2ceb9f1ca
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11249
content:
"The urgency of coupling mitigation and adaptation is emphasised \r\nthrough a special Cross-Working Group Box on 'Cities and Climate \r\nChange' (Section  8.2.3 and Cross-Working Group Box  2  in this \r\nchapter). This section further addresses synergies and trade-offs for \r\nsustainable development with a focus on linkages with the SDGs and \r\nperspectives for economic development, competitiveness, and equity. "


id: 93d77024cc331fa8aff5189313600203
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23220
content:
"Sustainable development is a  broad concept, encompassing socio\u0002economic and environmental dimensions, envisaging long-term \r\npermanence and improvement. While long-term effects are more \r\nrelated to resilience  - and hence carry co-benefits and synergies \r\nwith the mitigation of GHG emissions - some short-term milestones \r\nwere defined by the post-2015 UN Sustainable Development Agenda \r\nSDGs, including a specific goal on climate change (SDG 13) and one \r\non making cities inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable (SDG 11) "


id: 97a1e6a30a39bdfabe91a471fcfac192
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23897
content:
"There is increasing evidence that climate mitigation measures can \r\nlower health risks that are related to energy poverty, especially among \r\nvulnerable groups such as the elderly and in informal settlements \r\n(Monforti-Ferrario et al. 2018). Measures such as renewable energy\u0002based electrification of the energy system not only reduce outdoor air "


id: d488a96981ce42e1ebf9e1c0b8d1e4a7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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vector_id: 34715
content:
"(Cole et al. 2018; Petit-Boix and Apul 2018; De la Sota et al. 2019) \r\n(Section 8.4.4, Figure 8.18 and Box 8.2)."


id: cf4c608e53fe733b0a43513a430ab787
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33821
content:
"pollution, but also enhance indoor air quality by promoting smoke\u0002free heating and cooking in buildings (Kjellstrom and McMichael \r\n2013). The environmental and ecological benefits of electrification \r\nof the urban energy system include improved air quality based \r\non a  shift to non-polluting energy sources (Jacobson et al. 2018; \r\nAjanovic and Haas 2019; Bagheri et al. 2019; Gai et al. 2020). Across \r\n74 metropolitan areas around the world, an estimated 408,270 lives \r\nper year are saved due to air quality improvements that stem from \r\na  move to 100% renewable energy (Jacobson et al. 2020). Other \r\nstudies indicate that there is potential to reduce premature mortality \r\nby up to 7000 people in 53 towns and cities, to create 93,000 new \r\njobs, and to lower global climate costs and personal energy costs, \r\nthrough renewable energy transformations (Jacobson et al. 2018)."


id: 305d0d9806ec848cd3b6cedb220d20ac
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5762
content:
"Sustainable management of urban ecosystems entails addressing \r\neconomic growth, equity, and good governance. In total, 102 SDG \r\ntargets (99 synergies and 51 trade-offs) are identified with published \r\nevidence of relationships with urban ecosystems - out of the 169 \r\nin the 2030 Agenda (Maes et al. 2019). The targets require action \r\nin relation to urban ecosystem management, environmental \r\nimprovements, equality related to basic services, long-term economic \r\ngrowth, economic savings, stronger governance, and policy \r\ndevelopment at multiple scales."


id: e4365d38c0d54692bf89ea75b2ba9f2d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37455
content:
"Across 146 signatories of a city climate network, local energy-saving \r\nmeasures led to 6596 avoided premature deaths and 68,476 years of \r\nlife saved due to improved air quality (Monforti-Ferrario et al. 2018). \r\nBetter air quality further reinforces the health co-benefits of climate \r\nmitigation measures based on walking and bicycling since evidence \r\nsuggests that increased physical activity in urban outdoor settings \r\nwith low levels of black carbon improves lung function (Laeremans \r\net al. 2018). Physical activity can also be fostered through urban \r\ndesign measures and policies that promote the development of ample \r\nand well-connected parks and open spaces, and can lead to physical \r\nand mental health benefits (Kabisch et al. 2016) (Section  8.4.4 \r\nand Figure 8.18)."


id: be46fb36888092ac3cc1198401ae55bf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30742
content:
"Mitigation measures related to different sectors can provide \r\nco-benefits and reduce social inequities. Transport-related measures, \r\nsuch as transportation demand management, transit-oriented \r\ndevelopment (TOD), and promotion of active transport modes provide \r\neconomic co-benefits through, for example, reducing health care \r\ncosts linked with pollution and cardiovascular diseases, improving \r\nlabour productivity, and decreasing congestion costs (including \r\nwaste of time and money) (Sharifi et al. 2021). As a case-in-point, \r\ndata from cities such as Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta, Manila, \r\nBeijing, Mexico City, Dakar, and Buenos Aires indicate that economic \r\ncosts of congestion account for a considerable share of their gross \r\ndomestic product (GDP), ranging from 0.7% to 15.0% (Dulal 2017) \r\n(Section 8.4.2)."


id: a2a237c0b1023586332c5798db8f7632
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25830
content:
"Cities in India, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Thailand show that reducing \r\nemissions from major sources (e.g.,  transport, residential burning, \r\nbiomass open burning, and industry) could bring substantial \r\nco-benefits of avoided deaths from reduced PM2.5 (fine inhalable \r\nparticulates) emissions and radiative forcing from black carbon \r\n(Pathak and Shukla 2016; Dhar et al. 2017; Permadi et al. 2017; Karlsson \r\net al. 2020), reduced noise, and reduced traffic injuries (Kwan and \r\nHashim 2016). Compact city policies and interventions that support \r\na  modal shift away from private motor vehicles towards walking, \r\ncycling, and low-emission public transport delivers significant public \r\nhealth benefits (Creutzig 2016; Urge-Vorsatz et al. 2018). Trade-offs \r\nassociated with compact development include the marginal health \r\ncosts of transport air pollution (Lohrey and Creutzig 2016) and stress \r\nfrom traffic noise (Gruebner et al. 2017) (Section 8.4.2.3)."


id: cf30cbe8dc12747fe087ce585ff301fb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33798
content:
"Since policy interventions can result in negative impacts or trade-offs \r\nwith other objectives, fostering accessibility, equity, and inclusivity \r\nfor disadvantaged groups is essential (Viguie and Hallegatte 2012; \r\nSharifi 2020; Portner et al. 2021). Anti-sprawl policies that aim to \r\nincrease density, or the introduction of large green areas in cities \r\ncould increase property prices, resulting in trade-offs with affordable \r\nhousing and pushing urban poor further away from cities (Reckien \r\net al. 2017; Alves et al. 2019). Deliberate strategies can improve \r\naccess of low-income populations to jobs, and gender-responsive \r\ntransport systems that can enhance women's mobility and financial \r\nindependence (Viguie and Hallegatte 2012; Lecompte and Juan Pablo \r\n2017; Reckien et al. 2017; Priya Uteng and Turner 2019)."


id: 8ed5b3336ef2a40c019c382fbe416c33
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22314
content:
"Urban green and blue infrastructure  - a subset of nature-based \r\nsolutions (NBS)  - acts as both climate mitigation and adaptation \r\nmeasures by reducing heat stress (Kim and Coseo 2018; Privitera and \r\nLa Rosa 2018; Herath et al. 2021), improving air quality, reducing \r\nnoise (Scholz et al. 2018; De la Sota et al. 2019), improving urban \r\nbiodiversity (Hall et al. 2017b), and enhancing well-being, including \r\ncontributions to local development (Lwasa et al. 2015). Health \r\nbenefits from urban forestry and green infrastructure include \r\nreduced cardiovascular morbidity, improved mental health (van den \r\nBosch and Ode Sang 2017; Vujcic et al. 2017; Al-Kindi et al. 2020; \r\nSharifi et al. 2021), raised birth weight (Dzhambov et al. 2014), and \r\nincreased life expectancy (Jonker et al. 2014). Urban agriculture, \r\nincluding urban orchards, rooftop gardens, and vertical farming \r\ncontribute to enhancing food security and fostering healthier diets "


id: 8ea94ffe14a88745d8f61712dfe45dde
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22284
content:
"Low-carbon urban development that triggers economic decoupling \r\nand involves capacity-building measures could have a  positive \r\nimpact on employment and local competitiveness (Dodman 2009; \r\nKalmykova et al. 2015; Chen et al. 2018b; Garcia-Gusano et al. \r\n2018; Hu et al. 2018; Shen et al. 2018). Sustainable and low-carbon \r\nurban development that integrates issues of equity, inclusivity, and \r\naffordability while safeguarding urban livelihoods, providing access \r\nto basic services, lowering energy bills, addressing energy poverty, \r\nand improving public health, can also improve the distributional \r\neffects of existing and future urbanisation (Friend et al. 2016; \r\nClaude et al.  2017; Colenbrander et al. 2017; Ma et al. 2018; \r\nMrowczynska et al. 2018; Puksec et al. 2018; Wiktorowicz et al. 2018; \r\nRamaswami 2020)."


id: 5622f846e170ed749bfc54169d12c807
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12428
content:
"Depending on the context, green and blue infrastructure can also \r\noffer considerable economic co-benefits. For example, green roofs and \r\nfacades and other urban greening efforts such as urban agriculture \r\nand greening streets can improve microclimatic conditions and \r\nenhance thermal comfort, thereby reducing utility and health care \r\ncosts. The presence of green and blue infrastructure may also increase \r\nthe economic values of nearby properties (Votsis 2017; Alves et al. \r\n2019) (Section 8.4.4 and Figure 8.18)."


id: 32255f9fb7a83d1a71442b2b4fc4c196
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6079
content:
"Studies in the UK show that beneficiaries are willing to pay (WTP) \r\nan additional fee (up to 2% more in monthly rent) for proximity to \r\ngreen and blue infrastructure, with the WTP varying depending on \r\nthe size and nature of the green space (Mell et al. 2013, 2016). Urban \r\nagriculture can not only reduce household food expenditure, but \r\nalso provide additional sources of revenue for the city (Ayerakwa \r\n2017; Alves et al. 2019). Based on the assessed literature, there is \r\nhigh agreement on the economic co-benefits of green and blue \r\ninfrastructure, but supporting evidence is still limited (Section 8.7)."


id: 62ce0f4835dc49c2012723a1c98abc9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14680
content:
"As for trade-offs, some mitigation efforts may increase exposure to \r\nstressors such as flooding and the urban heat island (UHI) effect \r\n(see  Glossary), thereby reducing the adaptive capacity of citizens. \r\nFor instance, in some contexts, high-density areas that lack adequate \r\nprovision of green and open spaces may intensify the UHI effect \r\n(Pierer and Creutzig 2019; Xu et al. 2019). There are also concerns \r\nthat some mitigation efforts may diminish adaptive capacity of urban \r\npoor and marginalised groups through increasing costs of \r\nurban  services and/or eroding livelihood options. Environmental \r\npolicies designed to meet mitigation targets through phasing out old \r\nvehicles may erode livelihood options of poor households, thereby \r\ndecreasing their adaptive capacity (Colenbrander et al. 2017). \r\nAmbitious mitigation and adaptation plans could benefit private \r\ncorporate interests resulting in adverse effects on the urban poor \r\n(Chu et al. 2018; Mehta et al. 2019)."


id: f89977be76a6478da7cf0609439fec3e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41101
content:
"Urban green and blue infrastructure such as urban trees, greenspaces, \r\nand urban waterways can sequester carbon and reduce energy \r\ndemand, and provide adaptation co-benefits by mitigating the UHI \r\neffect (Berry et al. 2015; Wamsler and Pauleit 2016; WCRP 2019) \r\n(Section 8.4.4, Figure 8.18 and Box 8.2)."


id: ccde2923cfadb5dea82dc6995453788
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33378
content:
"Authors: Xuemei Bai (Australia), Vanesa Castan Broto (Spain/United Kingdom), Winston Chow (Singapore), Felix Creutzig (Germany), \r\nDavid Dodman (Jamaica/United Kingdom), Rafiq Hamdi (Belgium), Bronwyn Hayward (New Zealand), Siir Kilkis (Turkey), Shuaib Lwasa \r\n(Uganda), Timon McPhearson (the United States of America), Minal Pathak (India), Mark Pelling (United Kingdom), Diana Reckien \r\n(Germany), Karen C. Seto (the United States of America), Ayyoob Sharifi (Iran/Japan), Diana Urge-Vorsatz (Hungary)"


id: 974048325fac8127dda70364d341c28e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23803
content:
"This Cross-Working Group Box on Cities and Climate Change responds to the critical role of urbanisation as a megatrend impacting \r\nclimate adaptation and mitigation. Issues associated with cities and urbanisation are covered in substantial depth within all three \r\nWorking Groups (including WGI Box TS.14, WGII Chapter 6 'Cities, Settlements and Key Infrastructure', WGII regional chapters, WGII \r\nCross-Chapter Paper 'Cities and Settlements by the Sea', and WGIII Chapter 8 'Urban Systems and Other Settlements'). This Box \r\nhighlights key findings from WGII and III and substantial gaps in literature where more research is urgently needed relating to \r\npolicy action in cities. It describes methods of addressing mitigation and adaptation in an integrated way across sectors and cities \r\nto advance sustainable development and equity outcomes and assesses the governance and finance solutions required to support \r\nclimate-resilient responses."


id: e9ce2bfd353dcf9707f85124b51ed0d0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38481
content:
"Urban settlements contribute to climate change, generating about 70% of global CO2-eq emissions (high confidence) (see \r\nWGI Box TS.14, WGII Sections 6.1 and 6.2, and WGIII Section 8.3). This global impact feeds back to cities through the exposure of \r\ninfrastructure, people, and business to the impacts of climate-related hazards. Particularly in larger cities, this climate feedback is \r\nexacerbated by local choices in urban design, land use, building design, and human behaviour (Viguie et al. 2020) that shape local \r\nenvironmental conditions. Both the local and global combine to increase hazardousness. Certain configurations of urban form and \r\ntheir elements can add up to 2degC to warming; concretisation of open space can increase run-off, and building height and orientation \r\ninfluences wind direction and strength (see WGII Section 6.3 and WGIII Section 8.4.2)."


id: 669da29e827c3ae264ed714238463c7f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15312
content:
"The benefits of actions taken to reduce GHG emissions and climate stressors diminish with delayed action, indicating the necessity \r\nfor rapid responses. Delaying the same actions for increasing the resilience of infrastructure from 2020 to 2030 is estimated to have \r\na median cost of at least USD1 trillion (Hallegatte et al. 2019) while also missing the carbon emissions reductions required in the \r\nnarrowing window of opportunity to limit global warming to 1.5degC (WGI). In contrast, taking integrated actions towards mitigation, \r\nadaptation, and sustainable development will provide multiple benefits for the health and well-being of urban inhabitants and avoid \r\nstranded assets (see WGII Section 6.3, WGII Chapter 17, Cross-Chapter Box on 'Feasibility' in WGII Chapter 18, WGIII Chapter 5, and \r\nWGIII Section 8.2)."


id: 6a1199b3e966d73453ebbd629aafb41e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15934
content:
"While more cities have developed plans for climate adaptation and mitigation since AR5, many remain to be implemented (limited \r\nevidence, high agreement) (Araos et al. 2017; Aguiar et al. 2018; Olazabal and Ruiz De Gopegui 2021). A review of local climate \r\nmitigation and adaptation plans across 885 urban areas of the European Union suggests mitigation plans are more common than \r\nadaptation plans - and that city size, national legislation, and international networks can influence the development of local climate \r\nand adaptation plans with an estimated 80% of those cities with above 500,000 inhabitants having a mitigation and/or an adaptation \r\nplan (Reckien et al. 2018)."


id: 7bd624b094fc5e50a64c0f84d4c25e5d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18999
content:
"Effective climate strategies combine mitigation and adaptation responses, including through linking adaptive urban land use with \r\nGHG emission reductions (medium evidence, high agreement) (Xu et al. 2019; Patterson 2021). For example, urban green and blue \r\ninfrastructure can provide co-benefits for mitigation and adaptation (Urge-Vorsatz et al. 2018) and is an important entry point for \r\nintegrating adaptation and mitigation at the urban level (Frantzeskaki et al. 2019) (see WGIII Section 8.4.4 and WGIII Figure 8.18). \r\nGrey and physical infrastructure, such as sea defences, can immediately reduce risk, but also transfer risk and limit future options. \r\nSocial policy interventions including social safety nets provide financial security for the most at-risk and can manage vulnerability \r\ndetermined by specific hazards or independently."


id: 343d4590a711e609dc507a0ce6b51dc7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6426
content:
"Hazard-independent mechanisms for vulnerability reduction - such as population-wide social security - provide resilience in the face \r\nof unanticipated cascading impacts or surprise and novel climate-related hazard exposure. Social interventions can also support or \r\nbe led by ambitions to reach the SDGs (Archer 2016). Climate-resilient development invites planners to develop interventions and \r\nmonitor the effectiveness of outcomes beyond individual projects and across wider remits that consider sustainable development. \r\nCurbing the emission impacts of urban activities to reach net-zero emissions in the next decades, while improving the resilience of \r\nurban areas, necessitates an integrated response now."


id: d9769af6110e3b74a564070539542771
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35557
content:
"Key gaps in knowledge include: urban-enabling environments; the role of smaller settlements, low-income communities, and informal \r\nsettlements, as well as those in rental housing spread across the city; and the ways in which actions to reduce supply chain risk can \r\nbe supported to accelerate equitable and sustainable adaptation in the face of financial and governance constraints (Birkmann et al. \r\n2016; Shi et al. 2016; Rosenzweig et al. 2018; Dulal 2019)."


id: d4fe0993bace86d123d94f932a49a1aa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34798
content:
"Increasing the pace of investments will put pressure on governance capability, transparency, and accountability of decision-making \r\n(medium confidence) (see WGII Section 6.4.5). Urban climate action that actively includes local actors is more likely to avoid unintended, \r\nnegative maladaptive impacts and mobilise a wide range of local capacities. In the long run, this is also more likely to carry public \r\nsupport, even if some experiments and investments do not deliver the intended social benefits. Legislation, technical capacity, and \r\ngovernance capability are required to be able to absorb additional finance."


id: 6cec6ac5e101f51053d22eeab1dd2fe4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16439
content:
"In recent years, about USD384 billion of climate finance has been invested in urban areas per year. This remains at about 10% of the \r\nannual climate finance that would be necessary for low-carbon and resilient urban development at a global scale (Negreiros et al. \r\n2021). Rapid deployment of funds to stimulate economies in the recovery from COVID-19 has highlighted the pitfalls of funding \r\nexpansion ahead of policy innovation and capacity building. The result can be an intensification of existing carbon-intensive urban \r\nforms - exactly the kinds of 'carbon lock-in' (see WGIII Glossary and WGIII Section 8.4.1) that have contributed to risk creation and its \r\nconcentration amongst those with little public voice or economic power."


id: 9e4eb03dbd13fb9888cf608ff0f79aee
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25083
content:
"The diversity of cities' experiences of climate mitigation and adaptation strategies brings an advantage for those city governments and \r\nother actors willing to 'learn together' (limited evidence, high confidence) (Bellinson and Chu 2019; Haupt and Coppola 2019). While \r\ncontexts are varied, policy options are often similar enough for the sharing of experiments and policy champions. Sharing expertise \r\ncan build on existing regional and global networks, many of which have already placed knowledge, learning, and capacity building \r\nat the centre of their agendas. Learning from innovative forms of governance and financial investment, as well as strengthening \r\nco-production of policy through inclusive access to knowledge and resources, can help address mismatches in local capacities and \r\nstrengthen wider SDGs and COVID-19 recovery agendas (limited evidence, medium agreement). Perceptions of risk can greatly "


id: 10485768170d7f6834d4c95b49a2e70c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 52
content:
"influence the reallocation of capital and shift financial resources (Battiston et al. 2021). Coupling mitigation and adaptation in an \r\nintegrated approach offers opportunities to enhance efficiency, increases the coherence of urban climate action, generates cost \r\nsavings, and provides opportunities to reinvest the savings into new climate action projects to make all urban areas and regions \r\nmore resilient."


id: 5452edfacc6ac45c0488e86f51e681f5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12115
content:
"Urban land use is one of the most intensive human impacts on \r\nthe planet (Pouyat et al. 2007; Grimm et al. 2008). Urban land \r\nexpansion to accommodate a growing urban population has resulted \r\nin the conversion of agricultural land (Pandey et al. 2018; Liu et al. \r\n2019), deforestation (van Vliet 2019), habitat fragmentation (Liu \r\net al. 2016b), biodiversity loss (McDonald et al. 2018, 2020), and \r\nthe modification of urban temperatures and regional precipitation \r\npatterns (Li et al. 2017; Krayenhoff et al. 2018; Liu and Niyogi 2019; \r\nZhang et al. 2019)."


id: e346ee786a65bd37240bc7225a06ae2a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37284
content:
"et al. 2014; Salat et al. 2014; Ramaswami et al. 2016; Seto et al. 2016; \r\nd'Amour et al. 2017). Thus, understanding trends in urban land use is \r\nessential for assessing energy behaviour in cities as well as long-term \r\nmitigation potential (Sections 8.4 and 8.6, and Figure 8.21)."


id: 4a3271afe856ccee35e986ab5f5663b5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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vector_id: 10297
content:
"Urban land use and the associated built environment and \r\ninfrastructure shape urban GHG emissions through the demand \r\nfor materials and the ensuing energy-consuming behaviours. In \r\nparticular, the structure of the built environment (i.e.,  its density, \r\nform, and extent) have long-lasting influence on urban GHG \r\nemissions, especially those from transport and building energy use, \r\nas well as the embodied emissions of the urban infrastructure (Butler "


id: 26683636ef15a019290aea08f90f1bc5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3927
content:
"This section draws on the literature to discuss three key trends in \r\nurban land expansion, and how those relate to GHG emissions."


id: a9582b90517a631f56b0d0ef60d008d2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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vector_id: 27017
content:
"Figure  8.6:  (a) Distribution of growth typologies across 10 cities, and (b) sample of 64 cities by region with different patterns of urban growth.\r\nThe empirical data is based on the Global Human Settlement Layer and backscatter power ratio for different patterns of urban growth across the sample of cities. In (b), the \r\nblue arrows indicate outward urban growth. Other urban patterns indicate stabilised (orange), mature upward (light blue), budding outward (green), and upward and outward \r\n(red). Note that with few exceptions, each city is comprised of multiple typologies of urban growth. Source: Mahtta et al. (2019)."


id: 3909e8191682df7c55aef61e92cdbf4a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7242
content:
"First, urban land areas are growing rapidly all around the world. From \r\n1975 to 2015, urban settlements expanded in size approximately \r\n2.5 times, accounting for 7.6% of the global land area (Pesaresi \r\net al. 2016). Nearly 70% of the total urban expansion between 1992 \r\nand 2015 occurred in Asia and North America (Liu et al. 2020a). By \r\n2015, the extent of urban and built-up lands was between 0.5% and \r\n0.6% of the total 130 Mkm2\r\n global ice-free land use, taking up other \r\nuses such as fertile cropland and natural ecosystems."


id: 487ddbe7b9bb253742fa13740dde291d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9966
content:
"appears to be relatively stable for all city sizes. While the larger cities \r\nin Africa and South-East Asia and Pacific exhibit slightly stable urban \r\npopulation densities, the small and medium-sized cities in those \r\nregions trend toward lower urban population densities. In large \r\nurban centres of Eastern Asia and North America, rapid decreases \r\nin earlier decades seem to have tapered. Compared to larger cities, \r\nsmall-medium urban areas with populations of less than 2 million \r\nhave more declines in urban population densities and higher rates of \r\nurban land expansion (Guneralp et al. 2020)."


id: f9b895721cf6ccf074497b1c58e2d41d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41298
content:
"Second, as Figure  8.5 shows, urban population densities are \r\ndeclining, with significant implications for GHG emissions. From \r\n1970 to 2010, while the global urban settlement extent doubled \r\nin size (Pesaresi et al. 2016), most regions (grouped by the AR6 \r\nWGIII 10-region aggregation) exhibited a trend of decreasing urban \r\npopulation densities, suggesting expansive urban growth patterns. \r\nUrban population densities have consistently declined in Australia, \r\nJapan and New Zealand, and Europe, North America, and Southern \r\nAsia regions, across all city sizes. North America consistently had \r\nthe lowest urban population densities. Notably, the Middle East \r\nregion appears to be the only region exhibiting an overall increasing \r\ntrend across all city-size groups, while Latin America and Caribbean "


id: fe0d6c0ec941804e2cb72653d0fb453
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42063
content:
"This decline in urban densities is paralleled by an increase in 'sprawl', \r\nor 'outward' urban development. Urban expansion occurs in either \r\none of three dimensions: (i) outward in a  horizontal manner; (ii) \r\nupward, by way of vertical growth; or (iii) infill development, \r\nwhere unused, abandoned, or underutilised lands within existing \r\nurban areas are developed or rehabilitated (Figure  8.20). Outward \r\nexpansion results in more urban land area and occurs at the expense \r\nof other land uses (i.e., the conversion and loss of cropland or forests). \r\nVertical expansion results in more multi-storey buildings and taller \r\nbuildings, more floor space per area, and an increase in urban built\u0002up density. Every city has some combination of outward and upward "


id: 9bf33e40a28de56c0c66f413a7e32831
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24688
content:
"Figure 8.7: Percent of total urban land expansion from other land covers, sorted by the AR6 WGIII 10-region aggregation (1970-2010). As urban land \r\nhas expanded outward, other forms of land cover, including agriculture, 'nature' (e.g., forest, grassland, shrubland, water, and bare soil, all of which are disaggregated to the \r\nbottom half of the plot), and other land covers, have been displaced. Globally, agriculture comprises the majority (about 60%) of the land displaced by urban expansion since \r\n1970. Forests and shrubland vegetation - important carbon stocks - also make up a significant proportion of displacement. The loss of carbon-sequestering land like forests \r\nand shrubland independently impacts climate change by reducing global carbon stocks. Eurasia is omitted because there are no case studies from that region that report land \r\nconversion data. Source: adapted from Guneralp et al. (2020)."


id: 1cb11fe7b4af75061ceb5c4ccc374c54
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2225
content:
"growth in varying degrees (Mahtta et al. 2019) (Figure 8.6). That each \r\ncity is comprised of different and multiple urban growth typologies \r\nsuggests the need for differentiated mitigation strategies for different \r\nparts of a single city (Section 8.6 and Figure 8.21). Recent research \r\nshows that the relative combination of outward versus upward growth \r\nis a reflection of its economic and urban development (Lall et al. 2021). \r\nThat is, how a city grows - whether upward or outward - is a function \r\nof its economic development level. Upward growth, or more tall \r\nbuildings, is a reflection of higher land prices (Ahlfeldt and McMillen \r\n2018; Ahlfeldt and Barr 2020)."


id: 11c558f063f9f44d3e17c40a2229204b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 314
content:
"accelerate transitions to low-carbon urban development. There are \r\nseveral key reasons for their potential to mitigate GHG emissions. First, \r\ninformal urban areas may not require large investments in retrofitting \r\nas they have developed with minimal investment in large-scale \r\ninfrastructure. Second, these areas exhibit flexibility of development \r\nand can potentially be transformed into an urban form that supports \r\nlow- or carbon-neutral infrastructure for transportation, energy use \r\nin residential buildings, and other sectors (Baurzhan and Jenkins \r\n2016; Henneman et al. 2016; Byrne et al. 2017; Oyewo et al. 2019)."


id: f6e0fd75f359f9418eb57e09d66890eb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40804
content:
"An analysis of 478 cities with populations of more than 1  million \r\npeople found that the predominant urban growth pattern worldwide \r\nis outward expansion, suggesting that cities are becoming more \r\nexpansive than dense (Mahtta et al. 2019) (Figure 8.6). The study also \r\nfound that cities within a geographic region exhibit remarkably similar \r\npatterns of urban growth. Some studies have found a mix of urban \r\nforms emerging around the world; an analysis of 194 cities identified \r\nan overall trend (from 1990 to 2015) toward urban forms that are \r\na mixture of fragmented and compact (Lemoine-Rodriguez et al. 2020). \r\nThe exception to this trend is a group of large cities in Australia, New \r\nZealand, and the United States that are still predominantly fragmented. \r\nThe same study also identified small to medium-sized cities as the most \r\ndynamic in terms of their expansion and change in their forms."


id: d049092096b7a14780dcd2c5568f3fb7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34004
content:
"Non-networked and non-centralised urban services and infrastructure in \r\ninformal settlements, including sanitation, waste, water, and electricity, \r\nserve over 60% of the urban population in developing country cities \r\n(Lawhon et al. 2018). The alternatives of disruptive, hybrid, largely \r\nnon-networked multiplicity of technologies applicable at micro to \r\nmeso scales have potential for low-emissions development in urban \r\nareas of developing countries (Narayana 2009; Davila and Daste 2012; \r\nRadomes Jr and Arango 2015; Potdar et al. 2016; Grove et al. 2018). \r\nThese technologies can be applied in the short term as responses with \r\nlong-term influence on emissions reduction. The cumulative impact of \r\nthe disruptive technologies can reduce emissions by 15-25% through \r\nenhanced emissions sinks in small and medium-sized cities (Tongwane \r\net al. 2015; du Toit et al. 2018; Nero et al. 2018, 2019; Frantzeskaki et al. \r\n2019; Mantey and Sakyi 2019; Singh and G. 2019)."


id: ee4f5e9c3edbaa4288606924b6803655
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39297
content:
"One major innovation presented in AR6 - particularly in this chapter - \r\nis the inclusion of trend data on urban GHG emissions. Using \r\nmultiple datasets in conjunction with the SSP and RCP scenarios, \r\nthis chapter provides an estimate of urban GHG emissions from \r\n1990 through 2100, based on a consumption-based approach. This \r\ninnovation provides, for the first time, a temporal dimension to urban \r\nfootprints considering different climate scenarios with implications \r\nfor urban mitigation. The new analysis presents a  comparison of \r\nways urban emissions can evolve given different scenario contexts \r\n(Section 8.3.4.2). Additionally, new research has quantified trends in "


id: ac4ad630f9c18cb8b291af1c20eae9e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27557
content:
"About 880 million people currently live in informal settlements  - \r\ndefined as unplanned areas operating outside of legal and regulatory \r\nsystems, where residents have no legal claim over their property and \r\nhave inadequate basic services and infrastructure (United Nations \r\n2018). Furthermore, upgrading informal settlements and inadequate \r\nhousing is essential for improving resilience to climate change and \r\nwell-being. Given the ubiquity of informal settlements in developing \r\ncountries and LDCs, there is potential to harness informality to "


id: 8f45a771aa432df13a91c3771a10eb66
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22415
content:
"Between 2000 and 2015, urban population, urban CO2-eq emissions, \r\nand national CO2-eq emissions increased as a share of the global total \r\nin the Asia and Pacific region while the share declined for Developed \r\nCountries. The urban share of total regional CO2-eq emissions decreased \r\nin Developed Countries from 58.2% (2000) to 40.0% (2015). Urban \r\nper capita CO2-eq and national per capita CO2-eq also increased in all \r\nregions except for the urban per capita CO2-eq value in the Developed \r\nCountries region, which declined slightly."


id: e40d953b3752cdf0b2a3397b27c13806
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37424
content:
"urban CO2 emissions and their key drivers across 91 global cities from \r\n2000 to 2018 (Luqman et al. 2021)."


id: b210101432fca6f0d95acdbaffd344d4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28548
content:
"Figures 8.8 and 8.9 present key urban emission metrics and trends for \r\nsix regions (based on the AR6 WGIII regional breakdown) - the first \r\nfor the year 2015, and the latter for both 2000 and 2015."


id: 9a7111852633e72c7c983c196149ddd9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24417
content:
"The key trends are as follows. First, the urban share of global GHG \r\nemissions (including CO2 and CH4) is substantive and continues \r\nto increase (Figure  8.9). Total urban CO2-eq emissions based on \r\nconsumption-based accounting were estimated to be 25 GtCO2-eq, \r\nor 62% of the global total in 2015, and increased to an estimated \r\n29 GtCO2-eq in 2020, representing about 67-72% of global emissions. \r\nThis estimate includes all CO2 and CH4 emissions except aviation, \r\nshipping, and biogenic sources (i.e., land-use change, forestry, and \r\nagriculture). About 100 of the highest-emitting urban areas account \r\nfor approximately 18% of the global carbon footprint (Moran \r\net al. 2018). Globally, the urban share of national CO2-eq emissions \r\nincreased 6 percentage points, from 56% in 2000 to 62% in 2015."


id: 1fe44dd9654e81b97f527bc6f3b18b45
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2821
content:
"Fourth, the global average per capita urban GHG emissions increased \r\nbetween 2000 and 2015, with cities in the Developed Countries \r\nregion producing nearly seven times more per capita than the \r\nlowest emitting region (medium confidence). From 2000 to 2015, \r\nthe global urban GHG emissions per capita increased from 5.5 to \r\n6.2 tCO2-eq per person (an increase of 11.8%), with increases across \r\nfive of the six regions: Africa increased from 1.3 to 1.5 tCO2-eq per \r\nperson (22.6%); Asia and Pacific increased from 3.0 to 5.1 tCO2-eq \r\nper person (71.7%); Eastern Europe and West-Central Asia increased \r\nfrom 6.9 to 9.8 tCO2-eq per person (40.9%); Latin America and \r\nCaribbean increased from 2.7 to 3.7 tCO2-eq per person (40.4%); \r\nand the Middle East increased from 7.4 to 9.6 tCO2-eq per person \r\n(30.1%). Albeit starting from the highest level, Developed Countries \r\nhad a decline of 11.4 to 10.7 tCO2-eq per person (-6.5%)."


id: fa9e7d25fc52da255a0e11695da8de8d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41464
content:
"Second, while urban CO2 emissions were increasing in all urban \r\nareas, the dominant drivers were dependent upon development level. \r\nEmissions growth in urban areas other than in Developed Countries \r\nwas driven by increases in area and per capita emissions. Across \r\nall cities, higher population densities are correlated with lower per \r\ncapita GHG emissions (Luqman et al. 2021)."


id: ed1004a404f624b9d981661ba07111c4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39078
content:
"In 2015, regional urban per capita consumption-based CO2-eq \r\nemissions were lower than regional consumption-based national per \r\ncapita CO2-eq emissions in five of the six regions. These regions in \r\norder of the difference are: Developed Countries (lower by 1.0 tCO2-eq \r\nper capita); Latin America and Caribbean (lower by 0.8 tCO2-eq \r\nper  capita); Eastern Europe and West-Central Asia (lower by \r\n0.7 tCO2-eq per capita); Middle East (lower by 0.4 tCO2-eq per capita); \r\nand Africa (lower by 0.2 tCO2-eq per capita); while higher only in the \r\nAsia and Pacific region (higher by 0.9 tCO2-eq per capita). All regions \r\nshow convergence of the urban and national per capita CO2-eq, as \r\nthe urban share of national emissions increases and dominates the \r\nregional total."


id: d9095e02bc31f91c8f1d60c481f9e0e5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35482
content:
"Third, the urban share of regional GHG emissions increased between \r\n2000 and 2015, with much inter-region variation in the magnitude \r\nof the increase (high confidence) (Figure  8.9). Between 2000 and \r\n2015, the urban emissions share across AR6 WGIII regions (6-region \r\naggregation) increased from 28% to 38% in Africa, from 46% to 54% \r\nin Asia and Pacific, from 62% to 72% in Developed Countries, from \r\n57% to 62% in Eastern Europe and West-Central Asia, from 55% \r\nto 66% in Latin America and Caribbean, and from 68% to 69% in \r\nthe Middle East."


id: 8495e5666671846ae2ceb7216f1d1e7a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20470
content:
"Figure 8.8: 2015 average urban greenhouse gas emissions per capita, considering carbon dioxide (CO2) and methane (CH4) emissions from a consumption\u0002based perspective, alongside urban population, for regions represented in the AR6 WGIII 6-region aggregation. The average urban per capita emissions are \r\ngiven by the height of the bars while the width represents the urban population for a given region, based on 2015 values for both axes. Provided within the bars are the \r\npercentage shares of the urban population by region as a share of the total urban population. Source: synthesised based on data from UN DESA (2019) and Gurney et al. (2022)."


id: 55eb3d4172e4d1e0fc1f3db1f9112e05
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12390
content:
"Urbanisation can drive emissions if the process is accompanied by an income increase and higher levels of consumption (Sudmant et al. \r\n2018). This is typically observed in countries with a large urban-rural disparity in income and basic services, and where urbanisation is \r\naccompanied by economic growth that is coupled to emissions. In addition, the outward expansion of urban land areas often results \r\nin the conversion and loss of agricultural land (Pandey et al. 2018; Liu et al. 2019), forests (Austin et al. 2019), and other vegetated \r\nareas, thereby reducing carbon uptake and storage (Quesada et al. 2018) (Section 8.3.1). Furthermore, the buildup and use of urban \r\ninfrastructure (e.g., buildings, power, sanitation) requires large amounts of embodied energy and carbon (Figures 8.17 and 8.22). \r\nBuilding new and upgrading existing urban infrastructure could produce cumulative emissions of 226 GtCO2 by 2050 (Bai et al. 2018)."


id: 57cbb34f8cd56fe2469d165433528e6d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12707
content:
"However, for the same level of consumption and basic services, an average urban dweller often requires less energy than their \r\nrural counterparts, due to higher population densities that enable sharing of infrastructure and services, and economies of scale. \r\nWhether and to what extent such emission reduction potentials can be realised depends on how cities are designed and laid out \r\n(i.e., urban form - see Section 8.4.2) as well as how urban infrastructure is built and powered, such as the energy intensity of the \r\ncity's transportation system, type and level of urban services, the share of renewable energy, as well as the broader national and \r\ninternational economic and energy structure that supports the function of the cities (Sections 8.4.3 and 8.6)."


id: 221c88565e852fc59dbbab959fe6b24f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3223
content:
"Although population-dense cities can be more efficient than rural areas in terms of per capita energy use, and cities contribute less \r\nGHG emissions per person than low-density suburbs (Jones and Kammen 2014), there is some, albeit limited, evidence that larger \r\ncities are not more efficient than smaller ones (Fragkias et al. 2013; Ribeiro et al. 2019). A number of studies comparing urban and rural \r\nresidents in the same country have shown that urban residents have higher per capita energy consumption and CO2 emissions (Chen \r\net al. 2019a; Hachaichi and Baouni 2021). There is some evidence that the benefits of higher urban densities on reducing per capita \r\nurban GHG emissions may be offset by higher incomes, smaller household sizes, and, most importantly, higher consumption levels, \r\nthus creating a counter-effect that could increase GHG emissions with urbanisation (Gill and Moeller 2018)."


id: e017fec8c870f20579ff4482e5195585
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36674
content:
"Many studies have shown that the relationship between urbanisation and GHG emissions is dependent on the level and stage of \r\nurban development, and follows an inverted U-shaped relationship of the environmental Kuznets curve (Wang et al. 2016, 2022; Zhang \r\net al. 2017; Xu et al. 2018a; Zhou et al. 2019) (Sections 8.3.1 and 8.6, and Figure 8.20). Considering existing trends, earlier phases of \r\nurbanisation accompanied by rapid industrialisation, development of secondary industries, and high levels of economic growth, are \r\ncorrelated with higher levels of energy consumption and GHG emissions. However, more mature phases of urbanisation, with higher \r\nlevels of economic development and establishment of the service sector, are correlated with lower levels of energy consumption and \r\nGHG emissions (Khan and Su 2021)."


id: ad8b22d5dfde4c6548024509541b265d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27773
content:
"the two not included here (van Vliet et al. 2017) also forecasts land \r\ndisplacement due to urban land expansion."


id: 81871d2d830d4381dc905ac01b2188f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19916
content:
"This section assesses scenarios of future urban land expansion and \r\nurban GHG emissions. These scenarios have implications for the \r\nurban climate change mitigation strategies discussed in Sections 8.4 \r\nand 8.6 - in particular, in the context of the potential mitigation and \r\ndevelopment pathways for urban areas under certain scenarios."


id: c641b0a4726504c7321643da7b6c6fc6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32191
content:
"The uncertainties across urban land expansion forecasts, and \r\nassociated SSPs, highlight an opportunity to pursue compact, \r\nlow or net-zero GHG emissions development that minimises \r\nland-use competition, avoids carbon lock-in, and preserves carbon\u0002sequestering areas like forests and grasslands (Sections  8.4. and \r\n8.6, and Figure 8.21). Among the forecasts available are six global\u0002scale spatially explicit studies of urban land expansion that have \r\nbeen published since AR5; four of the six, which present forecasts \r\nfor each of the five SSPs, are considered in Table 8.1 and Figure 8.10 \r\n(Huang et al. 2019; Li et al. 2019b; Chen et al. 2020a; Gao and O'Neill \r\n2020). All four have forecasts to 2050 but only three to 2100. One of "


id: 9adb9836598f0e86846838d4b0e30a13
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24489
content:
"1  million km2 (range of 0.9 to 2  million km2, a  49% increase) in \r\n2050. By 2100, the forecasted urban extents reach between 1.4 and \r\n3.6 million km2\r\n (median 2.5 million km2) under SSP5 and between \r\n1 and 1.5 million km2\r\n (median 1.3 million km2) under SSP3. Across \r\nthe studies, substantially larger amounts of urban land expansion are \r\nexpected after 2050 under SSP5 compared to other SSPs."


id: bd17c0a2689a8d23fc6cf7f11560757b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30517
content:
"Third, in spite of these general trends, there are differences in \r\nforecasted urban expansion in each region across the SSPs and \r\nstudies, with Huang et al. (2019) forecasting the most future \r\nurban land expansion between 2015 and 2050. The range across "


id: 4c46d9868d9267ae9ea177e2ea870b06
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10683
content:
"Table 8.1: Forecasts of total urban land per AR6 WGIII region (6-region aggregation) in 2050 for each SSP, with the median and range of estimates from \r\nfour studies: Huang et al. (2019), Li et al. (2019), Chen et al. (2020), and Gao and O'Neill (2020). Median estimates for the 2015 urban extent are based on the \r\nmean/median of estimates in Huang et al. (2019) and Chen et al. (2020). Median and range of estimates for each SSP in 2050 are based on values derived from the four studies: \r\nHuang et al. (2019), Li et al. (2019), Chen et al. (2020), and Gao and O'Neill (2020). While each study and SSP forecast increases in urban land in each region, the range and \r\nmagnitude vary. Source: data compiled from Huang et al. (2019), Li et al. (2019), Chen et al. (2020), and Gao and O'Neill (2020)."


id: 84118ecc17dc2d8c2c26d1ce954fd5a3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20394
content:
"Figure 8.10: Forecasts of urban land expansion in 2050 and 2100 according to each SSP and AR6 WGIII 6-region aggregation, by study, where A: Gao \r\nand O'Neill (2020), B: Chen et al. (2020a), C: Li et al. (2019), D: Huang et al. (2019), E: mean across studies, and F: median across all studies. Three studies \r\n(Li et al. 2019b; Chen et al. 2020a; Gao and O'Neill 2020) report forecasts of urban land expansion to both 2050 and 2100. One study (Huang et al. 2019) reports the forecast \r\nonly to 2050. Global current urban extents and the respective initial years vary slightly among the four studies. Years for values of current urban extent range from 2010 to \r\n2020. See Table 8.1 for the range of data across the four studies and across SSPs. Source: data compiled form Huang et al. (2019), Li et al. (2019), Chen et al. (2020), and Gao \r\nand O'Neill (2020)."


id: 976165d33789928aed2b9edcc0caa25f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23840
content:
"et al. 2019). Furthermore, this urban expansion-induced warming is \r\non average about half  - and in certain locations nearly twice  - as \r\nstrong as warming that will be caused by GHG emissions based on \r\nthe multi-model ensemble average forecasts in RCP4.5. In short, future \r\nurban expansion will amplify the background warming caused by GHG \r\nemissions, with extreme warming most pronounced during night-time \r\n(very high confidence) (Huang et al. 2019). These findings corroborate \r\nthose in the Technical Summary of AR6 WGI (Arias et al. 2021)."


id: 1f414333c61718dbf842f0009a5fac34
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2706
content:
"The forecasted amounts and patterns of urban expansion presented \r\nhere bear significant uncertainty due to underlying factors beyond mere \r\nmethodological differences between the studies. These factors include \r\npotential changes in the social, economic, and institutional dynamics \r\nthat drive urban land development across the world (Guneralp and \r\nSeto 2013). Some of these changes may come in the form of sudden \r\nshocks such as another global economic crisis or pandemic. The \r\nforecasts presented here do not take such factors into account."


id: e1344d2dc4b89bf13dadae322d7f4ce9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36889
content:
"Figure 8.11: Reference scenario and mitigation potential for global urban \r\nareas in the residential and commercial building, transport, waste, and \r\nmaterial production sectors. The top red line indicates the reference scenario \r\nwhere no further emissions reduction efforts are taken, while the bottom dark line \r\nindicates the combined potential of reducing emissions across the sectors displayed. \r\nWedges are provided for potential emissions savings associated with decarbonising \r\nresidential buildings, commercial buildings, transport, waste, and materials as \r\nindicated in the legend. The shaded areas that take place among the wedges with \r\nlines indicate contributions from decarbonisation of electricity supply. Source: Re-used \r\nwith permission from Coalition for Urban Transitions (2019)."


id: 1eb271e61b3d7f8140c6f8abcc94a724
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2603
content:
"There remains little globally comprehensive literature on projections \r\nof future baseline GHG emissions from urban areas or scenarios \r\ndeploying urban mitigation actions on the part of city or regional \r\ngovernments. This dearth of research rests on limited urban emissions \r\ndata that are consistent and comparable across the globe, making \r\nreview and synthesis challenging (Creutzig et al. 2016b). Some research \r\nhas presented urban emissions forecasts and related projections, \r\nincluding estimated urban energy use in 2050 (Creutzig et al. 2015), \r\nenergy savings for low-carbon development (Creutzig et al. 2016b), \r\nemission savings from existing and new infrastructure (Creutzig et al. \r\n2016a) (Figure 8.12), and urban emissions from buildings, transport, \r\nindustry, and agriculture (IEA 2016a)."


id: fea818b0f3115ce12fdc817d9afbf708
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42190
content:
"the urban portion of global GHG emissions, including the residential and \r\ncommercial building, transport, waste, and material production (focusing \r\non cement, aluminium, and steel) sectors, along with mitigation \r\nwedges aimed at staying below a 2degC level of atmospheric warming \r\n(Figure 8.11). Starting in 2015 with a global urban emissions total of \r\nalmost 14 GtCO2-eq, the study projects an increase to 17.3 GtCO2-eq \r\nby 2050 - but this reduces to 1.8 GtCO2-eq by 2050 with the inclusion \r\nof mitigation wedges: 58% from buildings, 21% from transport, 15% \r\nmaterials efficiency, and 5% waste, with decarbonisation of electricity \r\nsupply as a cross-cutting strategy across the wedges."


id: 75da98f411b56c8cb9c978364ea20a96
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17961
content:
"Figure 8.12: Urban infrastructure-based CO2-eq emission mitigation wedges. Urban infrastructure-based CO2-eq emission mitigation wedges across categories of \r\nexisting (yellow/green), new (blue), and construction (grey) of urban infrastructure. The wedges include low-carbon energy systems and infrastructure, modal shift, tolls/tax, or \r\nbehavioural change, and reductions from construction materials. Source: re-used with permission from Creutzig et al. (2016a)."


id: 1f37ffb62c09fa8c496aa559c611b60e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2702
content:
"os have been assessed b\r\n1.9 scenario is aligned \r\nd from Global Environm\r\nAfricaAsia and PacificDeveloped Countries\r\nastern Europe and We\r\natin America and Carib\r\nMiddle EastGlobal Total (GtCO2-eq)\r\nbon dioxide equivale\r\n aggregation. Global to\r\n-SPA1, (b) SSP1-RCP2.\r\ningent reduction pathw\r\nvels. SSP1 scenarios (a, \r\nj et al. 2018). The scena\r\nthe SSP-RCPs. Source: a"


id: 8f4f9721cb8ea68ca1c384d2e1bd3595
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22422
content:
"Table 8.2: Synthesis of the urbanisation and scenario contexts of the urban emissions scenarios. Descriptions for urbanisation are adapted based on Jiang and \r\nO'Neill (2017) while high, medium, low, or mixed levels in the scenario context are drawn from the marker model implementations of SSP1-SSP5 for IMAGE (van Vuuren et al. \r\n2017b; Rogelj et al. 2018), MESSAGE-GLOBIOM (Fricko et al. 2017), AIM/CGE (Fujimori et al. 2017), GCAM (Calvin et al. 2017), and REMIND-MAgPIE (Kriegler et al. 2017). \r\nThe letters in parentheses refer to the panels in Figure 8.13. Energy and material efficiency relate to energy efficiency improvement and decrease in the intermediate input of \r\nmaterials, including steel and cement. Dietary responses include less meat-intensive diets. Implications for urban areas relate to the mitigation options in Section 8.4. Source: \r\nadapted from Gurney et al. (2022)."


id: 6343a4d177a3dd024a0d0e8a67127926
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14757
content:
"9 Figure adapted from Global Environmental Change, Vol 73, Gurney et al., Greenhouse gas emissions from global cities under SSP/RCP scenarios, 1990 to 2100, (c)2022 \r\nwith permission from Elsevier."


id: a7531443ed6289719df5796b51d18877
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26660
content:
"The most comprehensive approach to-date for quantifying urban \r\nemissions within the global context (Gurney et al. 2021, 2022) \r\ncombines the per capita carbon footprint estimates for 13,000 cities \r\nfrom Moran et al. (2018) with projections of the share of urban \r\npopulation (Jiang and O'Neill 2017) within the IPCC's SSP-RCP \r\nframework (van Vuuren et al. 2014, 2017a; Riahi et al. 2017). Urban \r\nemissions in seven SSP-RCP scenarios are shown in Figure 8.13 along \r\nwith an estimate of the global total CO2-eq for context."


id: acadea17beda577960d7de611f2df54a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27624
content:
"When 2020 levels are compared to the values for the year 2030, urban \r\nareas that utilise multiple opportunities towards resource-efficient and \r\nwalkable urbanisation are estimated to represent a savings potential \r\nof 9.8 GtCO2-eq of urban emissions, under SSP1-RCP1.9 scenario \r\nconditions, on the path towards net-zero CO2 and CH4 emissions. In \r\ncontrast, urban emissions would increase by 3.4 GtCO2-eq from 2020 \r\nlevels in 2030 under SSP2-RCP4.5 scenario conditions with moderate \r\nchanges lacking ambitious mitigation action (Figure 8.14)."


id: 8ee8ab06f46c688762244ec868ed742c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22332
content:
"Table 8.3: Cross-cutting implications of the reference scenarios and Illustrative Mitigation Pathways (IMPs) for urban areas. The IMPs illustrate key themes of \r\nmitigation strategies throughout the WGIII report (Section 3.2.5). The implications of the key themes of the six IMPs (in addition to two pathways illustrative of higher emissions) \r\nfor mitigation in urban areas are represented based on the main storyline elements that involve energy, land use, food biodiversity and lifestyle, as well as policy and innovation. \r\nThe cross-cutting implications of these elements for urban areas, where multiple elements interact, are summarised for each reference scenario and the IMPs. IMP-Ren, IMP-LD \r\nand IMP-SP represent pathways in the C1 category that also includes SSP1-1.9. Source: adapted from the key themes of the IMPs for urban areas."


id: fb242acba9de68be47e8576b42cfb7f9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41558
content:
"Among the 500 urban areas with the highest consumption-based \r\nurban emissions footprint in 2015 (Moran et al. 2018), urban-level \r\nemission scenarios under SSP1 conditions are constructed for 420 \r\nurban areas located across all regions of the world (Kilkis 2021a). \r\nThese scenarios are based on urban-level population projections by \r\nSSP (Kii 2021), trends in relevant CMIP6 scenarios (Gidden \r\net al.  2019), and a  100% renewable energy scenario (Bogdanov \r\net al. 2021). In the year 2020, the 420 urban areas are responsible \r\nfor about 10.7 +- 0.32 GtCO2-eq, or 27% of the global total CO2 and \r\nCH4 emissions of about 40 GtCO2-eq, excluding aviation, shipping, \r\nand biogenic sources. Under three SSP1-based scenarios, the urban \r\nemissions of the 420 urban areas in 2030 is projected to be about \r\n7.0 GtCO2-eq in SSP1-RCP1.9, 10.5 GtCO2-eq in SSP1-RCP2.6, and \r\n5.2 GtCO2-eq in the SSP1 renewable energy scenario."


id: 4373083b37f0246321ef695a5e99654
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9091
content:
"Integrated action also has a key role in providing benefits for human \r\nwell-being. Urban mitigation options and strategies that are effective, \r\nefficient, and fair can also support broader sustainability goals \r\n(Guneralp et al. 2017; Kona et al. 2018; Pasimeni et al. 2019). Due \r\nto the complex and intensive interactions in urban systems and the \r\ninterlinked nature of the SDGs, cities can be important intervention \r\npoints to harness synergies and co-benefits for achieving emissions \r\nreductions along with other SDGs (Nilsson et al. 2016; Corbett and \r\nMellouli 2017) (Section 8.2 and Figure 8.4)."


id: 6965d01e8581fa54ce3830085cbddc84
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15811
content:
"Urban mitigation options can be categorised into three broad \r\nstrategies: (i) reducing or changing urban energy and material use \r\ntowards more sustainable production and consumption across \r\nall sectors, including through spatial planning and infrastructure; \r\n(ii) electrification and switching to net-zero-emissions resources; and \r\n(iii) enhancing carbon storage in the urban environment through \r\nurban green and blue infrastructure, which can also offer multiple \r\nco-benefits. A  fourth, socio-behavioural aspects, can shift energy \r\ndemand and emerge as the result of implementing the strategies. \r\nUrban mitigation options covered in this section are organised \r\naround these three strategies and can facilitate deep decarbonisation \r\nthrough systemic transformation (see Section  8.6 and Figure  8.21 \r\nfor prioritising mitigation options based on urban form and urban \r\ngrowth typologies)."


id: 83801b65e03f35a01c2b8b992c306e26
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20275
content:
"Urban infrastructures and the built environment are long-lived assets, \r\nembodying triple carbon lock-ins in terms of their construction, \r\noperations, and demolition (Creutzig et al. 2016b; Seto et al. 2016; \r\nUrge-Vorsatz et al. 2018). There is much focus in the climate change \r\nliterature on the operational lifetimes of the energy sector, especially \r\npower plants and the electricity grid, which are between 30 and \r\n60 years (Rode et al. 2017). Yet, in reality, the lifespans of urban "


id: c2e4f6a2798891a3e79ff877bfdefd8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31567
content:
"Avoiding carbon lock-in inherently involves decisions that extend \r\nbeyond the administrative boundaries of cities. This includes pricing \r\nof low-emissions technology or materials, such as electric battery \r\nor hydrogen vehicles and buses, although cities can support their \r\ndevelopment and deployment (Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 16 \r\non Transition Dynamics). In contrast, urban governments in most \r\nparts of the world do have powers to set building codes that regulate \r\nmaterials and construction standards for buildings, including heating \r\nand cooling technologies, and major appliances. Other examples \r\ninclude zoning that determines the location of buildings, land uses, \r\nstandards for densities, and the inclusion of energy planning in their \r\nbuilding standards and public works, including streets, parks, and \r\nopen spaces (Blanco et al. 2011; Raven et al. 2018)."


id: 36bede19c5a510b45dfe501fc66d0dee
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6858
content:
"infrastructures, especially the basic layout of roadways, are often much \r\nlonger (Reyna and Chester 2015). A number of detailed case studies \r\non the evolution of urban road networks for cities around the world \r\nreveal that the current layout of streets grew out of street networks \r\nthat were established hundreds of years ago (Strano et al. 2012; \r\nMasucci et al. 2013; Mohajeri and Gudmundsson 2014). Furthermore, \r\nthere is evidence that urban street layout, population growth, urban \r\ndevelopment, and automobile ownership co-evolve (Li et al. 2019a)."


id: e0595ce93c1e75906a2770c29296d0e7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36719
content:
"For cities to break out of mutually reinforcing carbon lock-in, it will \r\nrequire systematic transformation and systems-based planning that \r\nintegrates mitigation strategies across sectors and geopolitical scales. \r\nUrban energy demand patterns are locked-in whenever incremental \r\nurban design and planning decisions, coupled with investments in \r\nlong-lasting infrastructure, such as roads and buildings, take place \r\n(Seto et al. 2016). The fundamental building blocks of cities are based \r\non the layout of the street network, the size of city blocks, and the \r\ndensity of street intersections. If not significantly altered, these three \r\nfactors will continue to shape and lock-in energy demand for decades \r\nafter their initial construction, influencing the mitigation potential of \r\nurban areas (Section 8.4.2 and Figure 8.22)."


id: 2af5be3e60242424bb56bc18eeb51c75
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:18
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4793
content:
"spatial planning. There are important cascading effects not only for \r\ntransport but also other key sectors and consumption patterns, such \r\nas in buildings, households, and energy. However, these benefits \r\ncan be attained only when the existing spatial structure of an urban \r\narea does not limit locational and mobility options, thereby avoiding \r\ncarbon lock-in through the interaction of infrastructure and the \r\nresulting socio-behavioural aspects."


id: 87718df3b7208722bdd6077972a7c50f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20986
content:
"and towns (Lynch 1981; Handy 1996). Infrastructure describes the \r\nphysical structures, social and ecological systems, and corresponding \r\ninstitutional arrangements that provide services and enable urban \r\nactivity (Dawson et al. 2018; Chester 2019) and comprises services \r\nand built-up structures that support urban functioning, including \r\ntransportation infrastructure, water and wastewater systems, solid \r\nwaste systems, telecommunications, and power generation and \r\ndistribution (Seto et al. 2014)."


id: 4985947e628c4e664e5df956260c354b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10163
content:
"Modifying the layout of emerging urbanisation to be more compact, \r\nwalkable, and co-located can reduce future urban energy use by \r\n20-25% in 2050 while providing a corresponding mitigation potential \r\nof 23-26% (Creutzig et al. 2015, 2016b; Sethi et al. 2020), forming \r\nthe basis for other urban mitigation options. Cross-Chapter Box 7 in \r\nChapter 10 provides perspectives on simultaneously reducing urban \r\ntransport emissions, avoiding infrastructure lock-in, and providing \r\naccessible services. The systemic nature of compact urban form and \r\nintegrated spatial planning influences 'Avoid-Shift-Improve' (ASI, see \r\nGlossary) options across several sectors simultaneously, including for \r\nmobility and shelter (for an in-depth discussion on the integration of \r\nservice provision solutions within the ASI framework, see Section 5.3)."


id: 87ae70fd6d16126fcea556b66e3037e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21029
content:
"Integrated spatial planning, co-location of higher residential and \r\njob densities, and systemic approaches are widely identified with \r\ndevelopment that is characterised by the 5Ds of transit-oriented \r\ndevelopment (TOD) based on density, diversity (mixed land uses), \r\ndesign (street connectivity), destination accessibility, and distance to \r\ntransit. Spatial strategies that integrate the 5Ds are shown to reduce \r\nVMT/VKT, and thereby transport-related GHG emissions through \r\nenergy savings. The effect of urban form and built environment \r\nstrategies on VMT per capita varies by a number of factors (Ewing \r\nand Cervero 2010; Stevens 2017; Blanco and Wikstrom 2018). \r\nDensity and destination accessibility have the highest elasticities, \r\nfollowed by design (Stevens 2017). Population-weighted densities for "


id: e087b84d404bcf52e6c94ea478dee320
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36755
content:
"Since AR5, a  range of studies have been published on the \r\nrelationships between urban spatial structures, urban form, and GHG \r\nemissions. Multiple lines of evidence reaffirm the key findings from \r\nAR5, especially regarding the mitigation benefits associated with \r\nreducing vehicle miles or kilometres travelled (VMT/VKT) through "


id: 190d10dd9cf36302880fa4f9af809f28
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1623
content:
"121 metropolitan areas have further found that the concentration of \r\npopulation and jobs along mass transit corridors decreases VMT/VKT \r\nsignificantly when compared to more dispersed metropolitan areas. In \r\nthis sample, elasticity rates were twice as high for dense metropolitan \r\nareas located along mass transit lines (Lee and Lee 2020)."


id: c7618016bc2fa246c48056957e8e9b75
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32394
content:
"Spatial planning for compact urban form is a system-wide intervention \r\n(Sethi et al. 2020) and has potential to be combined with sustainable \r\ndevelopment objectives while pursuing climate mitigation for urban \r\nsystems (Grosse et al. 2016; Cheshmehzangi and Butters 2017; Facchini \r\net al. 2017; Lwasa 2017; Stokes and Seto 2019). Compact urban \r\nform can enable positive impacts on employment and green growth \r\ngiven that the local economy is decoupled from GHG emissions and \r\nrelated parameters while the concentration of people and activity \r\ncan increase productivity based on both proximity and efficiency (Lee \r\nand Erickson 2017; Salat et al. 2017; Gao and Newman 2018; Han \r\net al. 2018; Li and Liu 2018; Lall et al. 2021)."


id: 24a9af7edd38b85c255b1a0d80270810
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3644
content:
"Public acceptance can have a positive impact on integrated spatial \r\nplanning especially when there is a process of co-design (Grandin \r\net al. 2018; Webb et al. 2018). The quality of spatial planning can \r\nalso increase co-benefits for health and well-being, including \r\ndecisions to balance urban green areas with density (Li et al. \r\n2016; Sorkin 2018; Pierer and Creutzig 2019). The distributional \r\neffects of spatial planning can depend on the policy tools that \r\nshape the influence of urban densification on affordable housing \r\nwhile evidence for transit-induced gentrification is found to be \r\npartial and inconclusive (Chava and Newman 2016; Jagarnath and \r\nThambiran 2018; Padeiro et al. 2019; Debrunner and Hartmann \r\n2020) (Sections 8.2 and 8.4.4)."


id: d734b2324d26610b5791c1c7a07c6c3f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35172
content:
"Reducing GHG emissions across different urban growth typologies \r\n(Figure 8.20) depends in part on the ability to integrate opportunities \r\nfor climate mitigation with co-benefits for health and well-being \r\n(Grandin et al. 2018). At the same time, requirements for institutional \r\ncapacity and governance for cross-sector coordination for integrated \r\nurban planning is high given the complex relations between urban \r\nmobility, buildings, energy systems, water systems, ecosystem \r\nservices, other urban sectors, and climate adaptation (Grosse et al. \r\n2016; Castan Broto 2017a; Endo et al. 2017; Geneletti et al. 2017). \r\nThe capacity for implementing land-use zoning and regulations in \r\na way that is consistent with supporting spatial planning for compact \r\nurban form is not equal across urban areas and depends on different \r\ncontexts as well as institutional capacities (Bakir et al. 2018; Deng \r\net al. 2018; Shen et al. 2019)."


id: 16cfda6a54f7bf294385be6fa30947f5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1227
content:
"Currently, integrating spatial planning, urban form, and infrastructure \r\nin urban mitigation strategies remains limited in mainstream \r\npractices, including in urban areas targeting an emissions reduction \r\nof 36-80% in the next decades (Asarpota and Nadin 2020). Capacity \r\nbuilding for integrated spatial planning for urban mitigation includes \r\nincreasing collaboration among city departments and with civil \r\nsociety to develop robust mitigation strategies, bringing together \r\ncivil engineers, architects, urban designers, public policy and spatial \r\nplanners, and enhancing the education of urban professionals \r\n(Asarpota and Nadin 2020) (Section 8.5)."


id: c0410be9a2b526fd553ed6c568a86adc
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vector_id: 31126
content:
"Spatial planning for compact urban form is a  prerequisite for \r\nefficient urban infrastructure, including district heating and/or \r\ncooling networks (Swilling et al. 2018; Moller et al. 2019; Persson \r\net al. 2019; UNEP IRP 2020). District heating and cooling networks "


id: a4138178d56e8bd91b7a62f84c767aff
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26057
content:
"energy penetration, and demand flexibility (Kammen and Sunter \r\n2016) (see IMPs in Sections  3.2.5 and 8.3.4). The mitigation \r\npotential of electrification is ultimately dependent on the carbon \r\nintensity of the electricity grid (Kennedy 2015; Hofmann et al. 2016; \r\nPeng et al. 2018; Zhang and Fujimori 2020) and starts providing \r\nlifecycle emission savings for carbon intensities below a  threshold \r\nof 600 tCO2-eq GWh-1 (Kennedy et al. 2019). Integrated systems \r\nof roof-top photovoltaics (PVs) and all-electric vehicles (EVs) alone \r\ncould supply affordable carbon-free electricity to cities and reduce \r\nCO2 emissions by 54-95% (Brenna et al. 2014; Kobashi et al. 2021). \r\nFurthermore, electrification and decarbonisation of the urban energy \r\nsystem holds widespread importance for climate change mitigation \r\nacross different urban growth typologies and urban form (Section 8.6 \r\nand Figure 8.21) and leads to a multitude of public health co-benefits \r\n(see Section 8.2)."


id: 7d7e219a32e4c5166fb3ccfe9813adef
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19247
content:
"Strategies that can bring together electrification with reduced energy \r\ndemand based on walkable and compact urban form can accelerate \r\nand amplify decarbonisation. Taking these considerations  - across \r\nthe energy system, sectors, and land use - contributes to avoiding, \r\nor breaking out of, carbon lock-in and allows continued emission \r\nsavings as the energy supply is decarbonised (Kennedy et al. 2018; \r\nTeske et al. 2018; Seto et al. 2021). Indeed, electrification is already \r\ntransforming urban areas and settlements and has the potential to \r\ncontinue transforming urban areas into net-negative electric cities \r\nthat may sequester more carbon than emitted (Kennedy et al. 2018; \r\nSeto et al. 2021)."


id: bde04ff9abde141bee217f833c4fab78
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30663
content:
"In its simplest form, electrification involves the process of replacing \r\nfossil fuel-based technologies with electrified innovations such \r\nas electric vehicles, buses, streetcars, and trains (Sections  10.3 \r\nand 10.4), heat pumps, PVs (Section  6.4.2.1), electric cook-stoves \r\n(Section  9.8.2.1), and other technologies (Stewart et al. 2018). \r\nCost-effective decarbonisation of energy use can be supported by \r\nelectrification in urban areas if there is also demand-side flexibility \r\nfor power, heat, mobility, and water with sector coupling (Guelpa \r\net al. 2019; Pfeifer et al. 2021). Overall, demand-side flexibility \r\nacross sectors in urban areas is supported by smart charging, electric \r\nmobility, electrified urban rail, power-to-heat, demand side response, \r\nand water desalination (Lund et al. 2015; Calvillo et al. 2016; Salpakari \r\net al. 2016; Newman 2017; Meschede 2019)."


id: 565d2f12026fdd91383825922eeb578d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12462
content:
"Urban energy infrastructures often operate as part of larger energy \r\nsystems that can be electrified, decarbonised, and become enablers of \r\nurban system flexibility through demand-side options. With multiple \r\nend-use sectors (e.g., transport, buildings) and their interactions with \r\nland use drawing on the same urban energy system(s), increasing \r\nelectrification is essential for rapid decarbonisation, renewable "


id: 167323f9c9340e2142d365a03568dcb7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1168
content:
"Philippines) have been quantified based on reductions in GHG and \r\nPM2.5 emissions, avoided premature deaths, and increases in life \r\nexpectancies (IEA 2014; C40 Cities 2018, 2020b,c,d,e). In 22 Latin \r\nAmerican cities, converting 100% of buses and taxis in 2030 to \r\nelectric was estimated to result in a  reduction of 300 MtCO2-eq \r\ncompared to 2017 (ONU Medio Ambiente 2017). Yet the scaling \r\nup of electric vehicles in cities can be examined within a larger set \r\nof possible social objectives, such as reducing congestion and the \r\nprioritisation of other forms of mobility."


id: 1c667875b12bc4e8c23f58d33b3e8c1c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2187
content:
"cost options to energy storage for integrating the power sector with \r\nmultiple demands reduce investment needs in grid electricity storage \r\ncapacities (Mathiesen et al. 2015; Lund et al. 2018)."


id: 39a5886d5eb9e60344bf60c455f5769a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7352
content:
"Electrification at the urban scale encompasses strategies to \r\naggregate energy loads for demand response in the urban built \r\nenvironment to reduce the curtailment of variable renewable \r\nenergy and shifting time-of-use based on smart charging for \r\nredistributing energy demands (O'Dwyer et al. 2019). Peak shaving \r\nor shifting takes place among frequent interventions at the urban \r\nlevel (Sethi et al. 2020). Business models and utility participation, \r\nincluding municipal level demonstrations, can allow for upscaling \r\n(Gjorgievski et al. 2020; Meha et al. 2020). The urban system can \r\nsupport increasing demand-side flexibility in energy systems, \r\nincluding in contexts of 100% renewable energy systems (Drysdale \r\net al. 2019; Thellufsen et al. 2020)."


id: bb6f669ee80b822f33e684419cc5576e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30196
content:
"Electrification requires a  layering of policies at the national, state, \r\nand local levels. Cities have roles as policy architects, including transit \r\nplanning (e.g., EV targets and low-emission zones, restrictions on the \r\ntypes of energy use in new buildings), implementers (e.g., building \r\ncodes and compliance checking, financial incentives to encourage \r\nconsumer uptake of EVs and heat pumps), and complementary \r\npartners to national and state policymaking (e.g.,  permitting or \r\ninstallation of charging infrastructure) (Broekhoff et al. 2015). The \r\nnumber of cities that have instituted e-mobility targets that aim \r\nfor a  certain percentage of EVs sold, in circulation or registered, \r\nis increasing (REN21 2021). Realising the mitigation potential \r\nof electrification will require fiscal and regulatory policies and \r\npublic investment (Hall et al. 2017a; Deason and Borgeson 2019; \r\nWappelhorst et al. 2020) (Section 8.5)."


id: a651b1997dee52f9e6c6030e7f89ad22
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26480
content:
"EVs are most rapidly deployed when there has been a  suite of \r\npolicies, including deployment targets, regulations and use incentives \r\n(e.g., zero-emission zone mandates, fuel economy standards, building \r\ncodes), financial incentives (e.g.,  vehicles, chargers), industrial \r\npolicies (e.g.,  subsidies), and fleet procurement (IEA 2016b, 2017, \r\n2018, 2020a; Cazzola et al. 2019). The policy mix has included \r\nmandates for bus deployment, purchase subsidies, or split ownership \r\nof buses and chargers (IEA 2021b) (Chapter 10). Subsidies are often \r\ncritical to address the often-higher upfront costs of electric devices. In \r\nother instances, the uptake of electric induction stoves was increased \r\nthrough government credit and allotment of free electricity (Martinez \r\net al. 2017; Gould et al. 2018)."


id: 5fcc22889fcda016bbd1667516f1a363
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14158
content:
"Currently, despite power outages that are costly to local economies, \r\nthe adoption of smart electricity grids or smart energy systems has \r\nbeen slow in many developing regions, including in Sub-Saharan Africa \r\n(Westphal et al. 2017; Kennedy et al. 2019). This is due to a number of \r\ndifferent factors, such as unreliable existing infrastructure, fractured \r\nfiscal authority, lack of electricity access in urban areas, upfront cost, \r\nfinancial barriers, inefficient pricing of electricity, and low consumer \r\neducation and engagement (Venkatachary et al. 2018; Acakpovi et al. \r\n2019; Cirolia 2020)."


id: 8df6e2b23a9eb0e950117d5160d36c05
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22168
content:
"Bringing multiple stakeholders together in local decision-making \r\nfor smart energy systems requires effort beyond usual levels \r\nwhile multi-actor settings can be increased to enable institutional \r\nconditions (Lammers and Hoppe 2019). Public participation and \r\ncommunity involvement in the planning, design and operation \r\nof urban energy projects can be an enabler of decarbonising \r\nlocal energy demands (Corsini et al. 2019). Cooperation across \r\ninstitutions is important for municipalities that are engaged in \r\nstrategic energy planning and implementation for smart energy \r\nsystems (Krog 2019) (Section 8.5)."


id: 1b3ee11333cc922d0a9140bc34772376
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1979
content:
"Urbanisation and population density are one of the key drivers for \r\nenabling access to electricity across the world, with benefits \r\nfor sustainable development (Aklin et al. 2018). Grid-connected PV \r\nsystems for urban locations that currently lack electricity access can \r\nallow urban areas to leapfrog based on green electrification (Abid \r\net al. 2021). In the Global South, the conversion of public transport \r\nto electric transport, especially municipal buses (e.g.,  Bengaluru, \r\nIndia; Jakarta, Indonesia; Medellin, Colombia; Rio de Janeiro, \r\nBrazil; Quito, Ecuador) and micro-mobility (e.g.,  e-trikes in Manila, "


id: 88769666a2f7844e23e37b3f543e916b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21170
content:
"Electrification technologies can present potential trade-offs that can \r\nbe minimised through governance strategies, smart grid technologies, \r\ncircular economy practices, and international cooperation. One \r\nconsideration is the increase in electricity demand (Section 5.3.1.1). \r\nAcross 23 megacities in the world (population greater than 10 million \r\npeople), electrification of the entire gasoline vehicle fleet could increase \r\nelectricity demand on average by 18% (Kennedy et al. 2018). How grid \r\ncapacity will be impacted is dependent on the match between daily "


id: 62090cdf38b5e798fcfdf6ff3c14b0d3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14521
content:
"electricity loads and supply (Tarroja et al. 2018). Materials recycling \r\nof electrification technologies is also key to minimising potential \r\nenvironmental and social costs (Church and Crawford 2018; Gaustad \r\net al. 2018; Sovacool et al. 2020) and can ensure electrification reaches \r\nits complete mitigation potential. Circular economy strategies are \r\nparticularly valuable to this goal by creating closed-loop supply chains \r\nthrough recycling, material recovery, repair, and reuse. For instance, the \r\nPV CYCLE programme in Europe prevented more than 30,000 metric \r\ntonnes of renewable technology from reaching the waste stream \r\n(Sovacool et al. 2020) (Box 10.6 and 'circular economy' in Glossary)."


id: 5ca972a27bb6625c5791bb7bd20a4c9c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13565
content:
"For the carbon embodied in supply chains to become net-zero, all key \r\ninfrastructure and provisioning systems will need to be decarbonised, \r\nincluding electricity, mobility, food, water supply, and construction (Seto \r\net al. 2021). The growth of global urban populations that is anticipated \r\nover the next several decades will create significant demand for \r\nbuildings and infrastructure. As cities expand in size and density, there \r\nis an increase in the production of mineral-based structural materials "


id: bfaf877173909151d7a533556c3f025b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31007
content:
"and enclosure systems that are conventionally associated with mid\u0002and high-rise urban construction morphologies, including concrete, \r\nsteel, aluminium, and glass. This will create a significant spike in GHG \r\nemissions and discharge of CO2 at the beginning of each building \r\nlifecycle, necessitating alternatives (Churkina et al. 2020)."


id: eeaab12cc862ef5c4cb3e18a45f5abe3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39369
content:
"timbers. The parallel-to-grain strength of mass (engineered) timber is \r\nsimilar to that of reinforced concrete (Ramage et al. 2017). As much \r\nas half the weight of a given volume of wood is carbon, sequestered \r\nduring forest growth as a  by-product of photosynthesis (Martin \r\net al. 2018). Mass timber is inflammable, but in large sections forms \r\na self-protective charring layer when exposed to fire that will protect \r\nthe remaining 'cold wood' core. This property, formed as massive \r\nstructural sections, is recognised in the fire safety regulations of \r\nbuilding codes in several countries, which allow mid- and high-rise \r\nbuildings in timber. Ongoing studies have addressed associated \r\nconcerns about the vulnerability of wood to decay and the capacity \r\nof structural timber systems to withstand seismic and storm\u0002related stresses."


id: 5192bec4df917cc5b5dc962b7eb0fb9b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11632
content:
"Transitioning to biomass-based building materials, implemented \r\nthrough the adoption of engineered structural timber products and \r\nassemblies, will succeed as a  mitigation strategy only if working \r\nforests are managed and harvested sustainably (Churkina et al. 2020). \r\nSince future urban growth and the construction of timber cities may \r\nlead to increased timber demand in regions with low forest cover, it \r\nis necessary to systematically analyse timber demand, supply, trade, \r\nand potential competition for agricultural land in different regions \r\n(Pomponi et al. 2020). The widespread adoption of biomass-based \r\nurban construction materials and techniques will demand more \r\nrobust forest and urban land governance and management policies, \r\nas well as internationally standardised carbon accounting methods \r\nto properly value and incentivise forest restoration, afforestation, and \r\nsustainable silviculture."


id: eb625506fdebbc53fa8e5929b4a8319b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38767
content:
"Expansion of agroforestry practices may help to reduce land-use \r\nconflicts between forestry and agriculture. Harvesting pressures on \r\nforests can be reduced through the reuse and recycling of wooden \r\ncomponents from dismantled timber buildings. Potential synergies \r\nbetween the carbon sequestration capacity of forests and the \r\nassociated carbon storage capacity of dense mid-rise cities built from \r\nengineered timber offer the opportunity to construct carbon sinks \r\ndeployed at the scale of landscapes, sinks that are at least as durable \r\nas other buildings (Churkina et al. 2020). Policies and practices \r\npromoting design for disassembly and material reuse will increase \r\ntheir durability."


id: 9604051fa805f96d6c1165c5a8004a36
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23590
content:
"A broad-based substitution of monolithic engineered timber systems \r\nfor steel and concrete in mid-rise urban buildings offers the opportunity \r\nto transform cityscapes from their current status as net sources of \r\nGHG emissions into large-scale, human-made carbon sinks. The \r\nstorage of photosynthetic forest carbon through the substitution of \r\nbiomass-based structural materials for emissions-intensive steel and \r\nconcrete is an opportunity for urban infrastructure. The construction \r\nof timber buildings for 2.3 billion new urban dwellers from 2020 to \r\n2050 could store between 0.01 and 0.68 GtCO2 per year depending \r\non the scenario and the average floor area per capita. Over 30 years, \r\nwood-based construction can accumulate between 0.25 and \r\n20 GtCO2 and reduce cumulative emissions from 4 GtCO2 (range of \r\n7-20 GtCO2) to 2 GtCO2 (range of 0.3-10 GtCO2) (high confidence) \r\n(Churkina et al. 2020)."


id: d3a3fc7d89c53cabf0f392ddc01ea701
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34573
content:
"The findings of AR6 WGI and WGII have underscored the importance \r\nof urban green and blue infrastructure for reducing the total warming \r\nin urban areas due to its local cooling effect on temperature and \r\nits benefits for climate adaptation (IPCC 2021; Cross-Working Group \r\nBox  2  in this chapter). Urban green and blue infrastructure in the \r\ncontext of nature-based solutions (NBS) involves the protection, \r\nsustainable management, and restoration of natural or modified \r\necosystems while simultaneously providing benefits for human \r\nwell-being and biodiversity (IUCN 2021) (see Glossary for additional \r\ndefinitions). As an umbrella concept, urban NBS integrates established \r\necosystem-based approaches that provide multiple ecosystem \r\nservices and are important in the context of societal challenges \r\nrelated to urbanisation, climate change, and reducing GHG emissions "


id: a8ce686c7d4799fae772849b86e465f5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26908
content:
"Figure 8.17 indicates that new and emerging structural assemblies in \r\nengineered timber rival the structural capacity of steel and reinforced \r\nconcrete while offering the benefit of storing significant quantities \r\nof atmospheric carbon (see also Figure 8.22). 'Mass timber' refers to \r\nengineered wood products that are laminated from smaller boards \r\nor lamella into larger structural components such as glue-laminated \r\n(glulam) beams or cross-laminated timber (CLT) panels. Methods \r\nof mass-timber production that include finger-jointing, longitudinal \r\nand transverse lamination with both liquid adhesive and mechanical \r\nfasteners, have allowed for the reformulation of large structural "


id: bf3aff84a22fac121d008118ce388313
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30914
content:
"through the conservation and expansion of carbon sinks (Naumann \r\net al. 2014; Raymond et al. 2017) (Section 8.1.6.1)."


id: cf9e9843ec4dc604ad0710913b7c54f7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33885
content:
"spaces, greenways, and urban agriculture. Key mitigation benefits, \r\nadaptation co-benefits, and SDG linkages are represented by types of \r\ngreen and blue infrastructure. Local implementations of urban green \r\nand blue infrastructure can pursue these linkages while progressing \r\ntoward inclusive sustainable urban planning (SDG 11.3) and the \r\nprovision of safe, inclusive and accessible green and public spaces \r\nfor all (SDG 11.7) (Butcher-Gollach 2018; Pathak and Mahadevia \r\n2018; Rigolon et al. 2018; Anguelovski et al. 2019; Buyana et al. 2019; \r\nAzunre et al. 2021) (Section 8.2)."


id: 20a8fc40e1c32b387cc32548569021d9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2972
content:
"Urban green and blue infrastructure includes a  wide variety of \r\noptions, from street trees, parks, and sustainable urban drainage \r\nsystems (Davis and Naumann 2017), to building-related green roofs \r\nor green facades, including green walls and vertical forests (Enzi et al. \r\n2017). Figure 8.18 synthesises urban green and blue infrastructure \r\nbased on urban forests, street trees, green roofs, green walls, blue "


id: f7c4eefc6471647b09fc87e815ec25f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40965
content:
"Figure 8.18: Key mitigation benefits, adaptation co-benefits, and SDG linkages of urban green and blue infrastructure. Panel (a) illustrates the potential \r\nintegration of various green and blue infrastructure strategies within an urban system."


id: 8754e97ed45d301185524c83d82545b9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20971
content:
"times higher compared to boreal and temperate forests (Blais et al. \r\n2005). At the regional level, the estimated carbon storage density \r\nrates of tree cover include a  range of 3.14-14.1 kgC m-2 in the \r\nUnited States, 3.85-5.58 kgC m-2 in South Korea, 1.53-9.67 kgC m-2 \r\nin Barcelona, Spain, 28.1-28.9 kgC m-2 in Leicester, England, and \r\nan estimated 6.82 kgC m-2 in Leipzig, Germany and 4.28 kgC m-2\r\nin Hangzhou, China (Nowak et al. 2013). At the local scale, above\u0002and below-ground tree carbon densities can vary substantially, as \r\nwith carbon in soils and dead woody materials. The conservation \r\nof natural mangroves has been shown to provide urban mitigation \r\nbenefits through carbon sequestration, as demonstrated in the \r\nPhilippines (Abino et al. 2014). Research on urban carbon densities \r\nfrom the Southern Hemisphere will contribute to better estimates."


id: cb9abb28e8cb5720f7fd0e37e53e8404
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33148
content:
"Due to their potential to store relatively high amounts of carbon \r\ncompared to other types of urban vegetation, as well as their ability to \r\nprovide many climate mitigation co-benefits (high agreement, robust \r\nevidence), natural area protection and natural forest management \r\nin urban areas is an important priority for cities looking to mitigate \r\nclimate change. Globally, urban tree cover averages 26.5%, but \r\nvaries from an average of 12% in deserts to 30.4% in forested \r\nregions (Nowak and Greenfield 2020)."


id: ae79712bc380992e3abaa974add2736e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27929
content:
"On a per-tree basis, urban trees offer the most potential to mitigate \r\nclimate change through both carbon sequestration and GHG \r\nemissions reduction from reduced energy use in buildings (Nowak \r\net al. 2017). Maximum possible street tree planting among 245 world \r\ncities could reduce residential electricity use by about 0.9-4.8% \r\nannually (McDonald et al. 2016). Urban forests in the United States \r\nreduce building energy use by 7.2%, equating to an emissions \r\nreduction of 43.8 MtCO2 annually (Nowak et al. 2017)."


id: b65d490ab1a30b220b4c37363a49667e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29301
content:
"Urban trees can also mitigate some of the impacts of climate change \r\nby reducing the UHI effect and heat stress, reducing stormwater \r\nrunoff, improving air quality, and supporting health and well-being \r\nin areas where the majority of the world's population resides \r\n(Nowak and Dwyer 2007). Urban forest planning and management \r\ncan maximise these benefits for present and future generations by \r\nsustaining optimal tree cover and health (also see SDG linkages in \r\nFigure 8.4). Urban and peri-urban agriculture can also have economic \r\nbenefits from fruit, ornamental, and medicinal trees (Gopal and \r\nNagendra 2014; Lwasa 2017; Lwasa et al. 2018)."


id: 473bb6378e6b28c6dffd43c03419ba18
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9734
content:
"Urban tree carbon storage is highly dependent on biome. For example, \r\ncarbon sequestered by vegetation in Amazonian forests is two to five "


id: 9ffa43b54a8fd2696bcc13cb87ff2a20
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25361
content:
"The structure, composition, extent, and growing conditions of vegetation in cities has an influence on their potential for mitigating \r\nclimate change (Pregitzer et al. 2021). Urban natural areas, particularly forested natural areas, grow in patches and contain many of \r\nthe same components as non-urban forests, such as high tree density, down woody material, and regenerating trees (Box 8.2, Figure 1)."


id: d48651e1bde319dcbcf120c8d6719bf3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34713
content:
"Within urban natural areas, the amount of carbon stored varies widely based on vegetation type, tree density, and the species \r\ncomposition (Box 8.2, Figure 1). The oak-hardwood forest type is one of the most abundant in New York City's natural areas and is \r\ncharacterised by large and long-lived native hardwood tree species, with relatively dense wood. These forests store an estimated \r\n311.5 MgC ha-1. However, non-native exotic invasive species can be prevalent in the understory vegetation layer (<1m height), and \r\naccount for about 50% of cover in New York City (Pregitzer et al. 2019b)."


id: ceccc190e5cc4bbb8fbc6e78041ed90f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33723
content:
"This could lead to a trajectory where exotic understory species, \r\nwhich are often herbaceous, out-compete regenerating trees in \r\nthe understory layer, alter the soil (Ward et al. 2020), and alter the \r\nforest canopy (Matthews et al. 2016). A change in New York City's \r\nvegetation structure and composition to a more open vegetation \r\ntype could reduce the carbon storage by over half (open grassland \r\n120.1 MgC ha-1)."


id: 56eb7911d56812d30b79063b7e16a5e0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12541
content:
"When compared to estimates of carbon storage presented \r\nin other studies, the components (pools) of the natural area \r\nforests in New York City store carbon in similar proportions to \r\nother non-urban forests (see Table 1). This might suggest that in \r\nother geographies, similar adjacent non-urban forest types may \r\nstore similar carbon stocks per unit area (medium confidence). \r\nHowever, despite similarities to non-urban forests, the urban \r\ncontext can lead to altered forest function and carbon cycling \r\nthat should be considered. For example, trees growing in urban \r\nareas have been observed to grow at much higher rates due to \r\nhigher access to light, nutrients, and increased temperatures \r\n(Gregg et al. 2003; Reinmann et al. 2020)."


id: 964b725955577d4290d422d48d3b1717
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23637
content:
"Higher growth rates coupled with the UHI effect have also \r\nbeen suggested to yield greater evaporative cooling by urban \r\ncanopies relative to rural forests (Winbourne et al. 2020). Based \r\non estimates in New York City, it is likely that the majority of \r\ntree biomass, and carbon in trees in cities, could be found in \r\nurban natural area forest patches (medium agreement, limited \r\nevidence). More research is needed to map urban natural areas, \r\nassess vegetation, and differentiate tree canopy types (natural \r\nversus non-natural) at fine scales within many cities and \r\ngeographies. Accurate maps, as well as greater understanding of \r\ndefinitions of urban canopies and vegetation, could lead to better \r\naccounts for carbon stocks and the many other unique benefits \r\nthey provide (Raciti et al. 2012; Pregitzer et al. 2019a)."


id: 243057f310881ebcdae08c557655d350
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3551
content:
"Despite this potential, natural areas are inherently a minority land\u0002use type in cities and should be viewed along with other types \r\nof urban tree canopy that occur in more designed environments \r\nthat might out-perform natural areas in other ecosystem services. \r\nThe mosaic of vegetation characteristics and growing conditions \r\nwill yield different ecosystem services across cities (Pataki et al. \r\n2011) and should be an important consideration in planning, \r\nmanagement, and policy in the future."


id: 2fe2fd4870ea0166fd35d4138cc55764
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5679
content:
"Box 8.2, Table 1: A selection of benchmark reference estimates of different carbon pools sampled and the related urban considerations to \r\ncontextualise the results from New York City (NYC), United States (USA) natural area carbon stocks. The benchmark estimates are intended to provide \r\na point of reference to help contextualise the calculations for carbon pools in NYC's forests. Forest carbon is highly variable and dependent on microclimatic conditions \r\nsuch as moisture, microbial communities, and nutrient availability, all of which can be impacted by human activity in urban or altered environments. Standard errors \r\nand 95% confidence intervals can be found in Pregitzer et al. (2021). DBH: diameter at breast height; DWM: down woody material; CWM: coarse woody material and \r\nFWM: fine woody material. Source: Pregitzer et al. (2021)."


id: e57aec7e84f11145986180259c43b579
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37681
content:
"a  temperature difference between air temperature outside and \r\nbehind a green wall of up to 10degC, with an average difference of 5degC \r\nin Mediterranean contexts in Europe (Perini et al. 2017). The potential \r\nof saving energy for air conditioning by green facades can be around \r\n26% in summer months. Considerations of the spatial context are \r\nessential given their dependence on climatic conditions (Susca 2019). \r\nCities are diverse and emissions savings potentials depend on several \r\nfactors, while the implementation of green roofs or facades may be \r\nprevented in heritage structures."


id: 3f7cb2f912eabdf7225d4088f55ca272
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8359
content:
"Green roofs and green walls have potential to mitigate air and \r\nsurface temperature, improve thermal comfort, and mitigate UHI \r\neffects (Jamei et al. 2021; Wong et al. 2021), while lowering the \r\nenergy demand of buildings (Susca 2019) (Figure 8.18). Green roofs \r\nhave the highest median cooling effect in dry climates (3degC) and \r\nthe lowest cooling effect in hot, humid climates (1degC) (Jamei et al. \r\n2021). These mitigation potentials depend on numerous factors and \r\nthe scale of implementation. The temperature reduction potential \r\nfor green roofs when compared to conventional roofs can be about \r\n4degC in winter and about 12degC during summer conditions (Bevilacqua \r\net al. 2016). Green roofs can reduce building heating demands by \r\nabout 10-30% compared to conventional roofs (Besir and Cuce \r\n2018), 60-70% compared to black roofs, and 45-60% compared to \r\nwhite roofs (Silva et al. 2016). Green walls or facades can provide "


id: 24340158ecc3105219ee593740b9ef22
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3556
content:
"Green roofs have been shown to have beneficial effects in stormwater \r\nreduction (Andres-Domenech et al. 2018). A global meta-analysis of \r\n75 international studies on the potential of green roofs to mitigate \r\nrunoff indicate that the runoff retention rate was on average \r\n62% but with a wide range (0-100%) depending on a number of \r\ninterdependent factors (Zheng et al. 2021). These factors relate to the "


id: 5b53c6593dae6a223601aac14a29d9f7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13311
content:
"characteristics of the rainfall event (e.g., intensity) and characteristics \r\nof the green roof (e.g., substrate, vegetation type, and size), and of the \r\nclimate and season type. A hydrologic modelling approach applied \r\nto an Italian case demonstrated that implementing green roofs may \r\nreduce peak runoff rates and water volumes by up to 35% in a 100% \r\ngreen roof conversion scenario (Masseroni and Cislaghi 2016)."


id: 7e0416b4a38be54a7be288deafdc53c9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19348
content:
"Changes in behaviour across all areas (e.g., transport, buildings, food) \r\ncould reduce an individual's emissions by 5.6-16.2% relative to the \r\naccumulated GHG emissions from 2011 to 2050 in a baseline scenario \r\nmodelled with the Global Change Assessment Model (van  de Ven \r\net al. 2018). In other models, behaviour change in transport and \r\nresidential energy use could reduce emissions by 2 GtCO2-eq in 2030 \r\ncompared to 2019 (IEA 2020b) (Chapter  5). Voluntary behaviour \r\nchange can support emissions reduction, but behaviours that are \r\nnot convenient to change are unlikely to shift without changes to \r\npolicy (Skold et al. 2018). Cities can increase the capability of citizens \r\nto make sustainable choices by making these choices less onerous, \r\nthrough avenues such as changing urban form to increase locational \r\nand mobility options and providing feedback mechanisms to support \r\nsocio-behavioural change."


id: fd50cf727f9c4dbf5e04435c62572918
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41918
content:
"Transport emissions can be reduced by options including \r\ntelecommuting (0.3%), taking closer holidays (0.5%), avoiding \r\nshort flights (0.5%), using public transit (0.7%), cycling (0.6%), \r\ncar sharing (1.1%), and carpool commuting (1.2%); all reduction \r\nestimates reflect cumulative per capita emission savings relative to \r\nbaseline emissions for the period 2011-2050, and assume immediate \r\nadoption of behavioural changes (van de Ven et al. 2018). Cities can \r\nsupport voluntary shift to walking, cycling, and transit instead of car \r\nuse through changes to urban form, such as TOD (Kamruzzaman et al. \r\n2015), increased density of form with co-location of activities (Ma et al. \r\n2015; Ding et al. 2017; Duranton and Turner 2018; Masoumi 2019), \r\nand greater intersection density and street integration (Koohsari \r\net al. 2016). Mechanisms such as providing financial incentives or \r\ndisincentives for car use can also be effective in reducing emissions \r\n(Wynes et al. 2018) (Section 8.4.2)."


id: b23cb9a9692ea5e078ca4e1b3b9ee4af
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28587
content:
"Adopting energy efficient practices in buildings could decrease global \r\nbuilding energy demand in 2050 by 33-44% compared to a business\u0002as-usual scenario (Levesque et al. 2019). Reductions in home energy \r\nuse can be achieved by reducing floor area (0.5-3.0%), utilising more \r\nefficient appliances and lighting (2.7-5.0%), optimising thermostat \r\nsettings (8.3-11%), using efficient heating and cooling technologies \r\n(6.7-10%), improving building insulation (2.9-4.0%), optimising "


id: ff1eb995787390b79a0c8a1f603fd83
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42288
content:
"The waste sector is a significant source of GHG emissions, particularly \r\nCH4 (Gonzalez-Valencia et al. 2016; Nisbet et al. 2019). Currently, the \r\nsector remains the largest contributor to urban emissions after the \r\nenergy sector, even in low-carbon cities (Lu and Li 2019). Since waste \r\nmanagement systems are usually under the control of municipal \r\nauthorities, they are a prime target for city-level mitigation efforts \r\nwith co-benefits (EC 2015, 2020; Gharfalkar et al. 2015; Herrero and \r\nVilella 2018; Zaman and Ahsan 2019). Despite general agreement \r\non mitigation impacts, quantification remains challenging due to \r\ndiffering assumptions for system boundaries and challenges related \r\nto measuring avoided waste (Zaman and Lehmann 2013; Bernstad \r\nSaraiva Schott and Canovas 2015; Matsuda et al. 2018)."


id: 4d9a5a22a02384c58b344a60cd6d4288
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10928
content:
"Spatial planning, urban form, and infrastructure can be utilised to \r\ndeliberately increase both locational and mobility options for socio\u0002behavioural change in support of urban mitigation. The mitigation \r\nimpacts of active travel can include a reduction of mobility-related \r\nlifecycle CO2 emissions by about 0.5 tonnes over a  year when an \r\naverage person cycles one trip per day more, and drives one trip per \r\nday less, for 200 days a year (Brand et al. 2021). Urban areas that \r\ndevelop and implement effective 15/20-minute city programmes \r\nare very likely to reduce urban energy use and multiply emission \r\nreductions, representing an important cascading effect."


id: 882b8df658d64d1ce589a479a6a7bbb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21110
content:
"The generation and composition of waste varies considerably from \r\nregion to region and city to city. So do the levels of institutional \r\nmanagement, infrastructure, and (informal) work in waste disposal \r\nactivities. Depending on context, policy priorities are directed towards \r\nreducing waste generation and transforming waste to energy or \r\nother products in a circular economy (Diaz 2017; Ezeudu and Ezeudu \r\n2019; Joshi et al. 2019; Calderon Marquez and Rutkowski 2020; \r\nFatimah et al. 2020). Similarly, waste generation, waste collection \r\ncoverage, recycling, and composting rates, as well as the means of \r\nwaste disposal and treatment, differ widely, including the logistics of \r\nurban waste management systems. Multiple factors influence waste \r\ngeneration, and regions with similar urbanisation rates can generate \r\ndifferent levels of waste per capita (Kaza et al. 2018)."


id: 15904f8b38c2f2497c75d00c5f143b57
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1006
content:
"of waste-to-energy depends on the technological choices that are \r\nundertaken (e.g.,  anaerobic digestion of the organic fraction), the \r\nemissions factor of the energy mix that it replaces, and its broader \r\nrole within integrated municipal solid management practices \r\n(Eriksson et al. 2015; Potdar et al. 2016; Yu and Zhang 2016; Soares \r\nand Martins 2017; Alzate-Arias et al. 2018; Islam 2018). The climate \r\nmitigation potential of anaerobic digestion plants can increase when \r\npower, heat and/or cold is co-produced (Thanopoulos et al. 2020)."


