# document

id: 6f1398c4fa9cfb4a6b4509b56a3e5bf9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
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"in developed countries, down from 9% in 1995, and 57% in least \r\ndeveloped countries, down from 71% in 1995 (World Bank 2021). \r\nEmployment in other (non-agriculture) food system sectors, such as \r\nthe food processing industry and service sectors, differs between food \r\nsystems. The share of total non-farm food system employment ranges \r\nfrom 10% in traditional food systems (e.g., sub-Saharan Africa), to over \r\n50% in food systems in transition (e.g., Brazil), to high shares (80%) \r\nin modern food systems (e.g., US) (Townsend et al. 2017). The share of \r\nthe food expenditures that farmers receive is decreasing; at the global \r\nlevel, this share has been estimated at 27% in 2015 (Yi et al. 2021)."


id: 3b6aa98da37df8d53fd09eb5388c3c5a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
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"bio-available nutrients, including almost 200 million suffering from \r\nstunting, wasting or overweight (UNICEF 2019)."


id: 32aa1863e4ca6db3acbd3600d18d7271
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
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"Energy: Emissions from energy use occur throughout the food \r\nsupply chain. In 2018, the main contributions came from energy \r\nindustries supplying electricity and heat (970 MtCO2-eq yr-1), \r\nmanufacturing and construction (920 MtCO2-eq yr-1, of which 29% \r\nwas attributable to the food, beverage, and tobacco industry), and \r\ntransport (760 MtCO2-eq yr-1). These emissions were almost entirely \r\nas CO2. Energy emissions from forestry and fisheries amounted \r\nto 480 MtCO2-eq yr-1, with 91% of emissions as CO2. Emissions \r\nfrom residential and commercial fuel combustion contributed \r\n250 MtCO2-eq yr-1 (79% of emissions as CO2, and with emissions of \r\n1.7 MtCH4 yr-1) and 130 MtCO2-eq yr-1 (with 98% of emissions as \r\nCO2), respectively."


id: 5b45e88dfa7bf9a7f4bee97e84083ad7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
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"Modern food systems are highly consolidated, through vertical and \r\nhorizontal integration (Swinnen and Maertens 2007; Folke et al. 2019). \r\nThis consolidation has led to uneven distribution of power across the \r\nfood value chain, with influence concentrated among a few actors in \r\nthe post-farmgate food supply chain (e.g., large food processors and \r\nretailers), and has contributed to a loss of indigenous agriculture and \r\nfood systems, for example on Pacific Islands (Vogliano et al. 2020). \r\nWhile agricultural producers contribute a higher proportion of GHG \r\nemissions compared with other actors in the supply chain, they have \r\nrelatively little power to change the system (Clapp 2019; Group of \r\nChief Scientific Advisors 2020; Leip et al. 2021)."


id: e2fb3a571d98159347e5c52984b3230d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
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"Refrigeration uses an estimated 43% of energy in the retail sector \r\n(Behfar et al. 2018) and significantly increases fuel consumption \r\nduring distribution. Besides being energy intensive, supermarket "


id: 315cb6e41c64b8979a1876a06c5df26f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
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"distances, the share of transport in total GHG emissions can be \r\nover 40% (e.g., bananas, with total global average GHG emissions \r\nof 0.7 kgCO2-eq kg-1) (Poore and Nemecek 2018), but transport is \r\na  minor source of GHG emissions for most food products (Poore \r\nand Nemecek 2018)."


id: ec7928db0ccedcd66025720a7ecaf4ef
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
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"Industry: Direct industrial emissions associated with food systems are \r\ngenerated by the refrigerants industry (580 MtCO2-eq yr-1 as F-gases) \r\nand the fertiliser industry for ammonia production (280 MtCO2-eq yr-1\r\nas CO2) and nitric acid (60 MtCO2-eq yr-1 as N2O). The industry \r\nsector data account for CO2 stored in urea (-50 MtCO2-eq yr-1). \r\nPackaging contributed about 6% of total food system emissions \r\n(0.98 GtCO2-eq yr-1, 91% as CO2, with CH4 emissions of 2.8 Mt CH4\r\nyr-1). Major emissions sources are pulp and paper (60 MtCO2-eq yr-1) \r\nand aluminium (30 MtCO2-eq yr-1), with ferrous metals, glass, and \r\nplastics making a smaller contribution. High shares of emissions from \r\npackaging are found for beverages and some fruit and vegetables \r\n(Poore and Nemecek 2018)."


id: 859540792a2c79c57da0d95af500b8c2
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"Transport has overall a  minor importance for food system GHG \r\nemissions, with a share of 5% to 6% (Poore and Nemecek 2018; Crippa \r\net al. 2021b). The largest contributor to food system transport GHG \r\nemissions was road transport (92%), followed by marine shipping \r\n(4%), rail (3%), and aviation (1%). Only looking at energy needs, air \r\nor road transport consumes one order of magnitude higher energy \r\n(road: 70-80 MJ t-1 km-1; aviation: 100-200 MJ t-1 km-1) than \r\nmarine shipping (10-20 MJ t-1 km-1) or rail (8-10 MJ t-1 km-1) \r\n(FAO  2011). For specific food products with high water content, \r\nrelatively low agricultural emissions and high average transport "


id: ca496e44d9c022b829978df7d369a1f7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
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"Waste: Management of waste generated in the food system \r\n(including  food waste, wastewater, packaging waste, etc.) leads \r\nto biogenic GHG  emissions, and contributed 1.7  GtCO2-eq yr-1 to \r\nfood systems' GHG emissions in 2018. Of these emissions, 55% \r\nwere from domestic and commercial wastewater (30 MtCH4 yr-1\r\nand 310 ktN2O yr-1), 36% from solid waste management (20 MtCH4 yr-1\r\nand 310 ktN2O yr-1), and 8% from industrial wastewater (4 MtCH4 yr-1\r\nand 80 ktN2O yr-1). Emissions from waste incineration and other \r\nwaste management systems contributed 1%."


id: 943b78f815a03e5cedbd1217bb567d8f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
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"Table 12.7 | GHG emissions from food systems by sector according to IPCC classification in Mt gas yr-1 and food systems' share of total anthropogenic \r\nGHG emissions in 1990 and 2015."


id: c49d6ade504a18a2bd708713260f7473
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
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"Notes: Agricultural emissions include the emissions from the whole sector; biomass production for non-food use currently not differentiated. Non-food system AFOLU emissions are \r\nnegative (that is, a net carbon sink), therefore the share of AFOLU food system emissions is >100. Source: EDGARv6 (Crippa et al. 2019; Crippa et al. 2021b), and FAOSTAT (FAO 2021). \r\nLULUCF: land use, land-use change and forestry."


id: 284d75cee54285905de7877d1690b278
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"meat, which brings GHG footprints of beef from dairy herds closer to \r\nthose of meat from monogastric animals, with emissions intensities \r\nof pork (4.4-13  kgCO2-eq per 100 g  protein) and poultry meat \r\n(2.3-11 kgCO2-eq per 100 g protein) (Poore and Nemecek 2018)."


id: 1dfe6f9d3bf108186cd58e91c17656cd
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"specific (Meijaard et al. 2020) and for plant-based proteins, GHG \r\nfootprints per serving remain lower than those of animal source \r\nproteins (Kim et al. 2019).\r\n12.4.2.3 Territorial National Per Capita GHG Emissions \r\nfrom Food Systems"


id: 7cb71d87bbf91e3ebfcef9eda6604acd
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"Food systems are connected to other societal systems, such as the \r\nenergy system, financial system, and transport system (Leip et al. \r\n2021). Also, food systems are dynamic and continuously changing \r\nand adapting to existing and anticipated future conditions. Food \r\nproduction systems are very diverse and vary by farm size, intensity \r\nlevel, farm specialisation, technological level, production methods \r\n(e.g., organic, conventional, etc.), with differing environmental and \r\nsocial consequences (Vaclavik et al. 2013; Fanzo 2017; Herrero et al. \r\n2017; Herrero et al. 2021)."


id: e99db95e040fb8b486180f4b71b90cb9
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"Various frameworks have been proposed to assess sustainability of \r\nfood systems, including metrics and indicators on environmental, \r\nhealth, economic and equity issues, pointing to the importance of \r\nrecognising the multi-dimensionality of food system outcomes \r\n(Gustafson et al. 2016; Chaudhary et al. 2018; Hallstrom et al. 2018; \r\nZurek et al. 2018; Eme et al. 2019; Bene et al. 2020; Hebinck et al. 2021). \r\nData platforms are being developed, but so far comprehensive data \r\nfor evidence-based food system policy are lacking (Fanzo et al. 2020)."


id: adcb9e69a85c06af50e79d9f44fc117c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
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"To visualise several food systems dimensions in a  GHG context, \r\nFigure 12.7 shows GHG emissions per capita and year for regional \r\ncountry aggregates (Crippa et al. 2021a; Crippa et al. 2021b), \r\nindicated by the size of the bubbles. The GHG emissions presented \r\nhere are based on territorial accounting similar to the UNFCCC GHG "


id: 83956ec35440ee79d17ec89f43cf95c7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
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"Figure 12.7 | Regional differences in health outcomes, territorial per capita GHG emissions from national food systems, and share of food system \r\nGHG emissions from energy use. GHG emissions are calculated according to the IPCC Tier 1 approach and are assigned to the country where they occur, not necessarily \r\nwhere the food is consumed. Health outcome is expressed as relative contribution of each of the following risk factors to their combined risk for deaths: child and maternal \r\nmalnutrition (red), dietary risks (yellow) or high body mass index (blue). Sources: wholesale cost of food per capita: Springmann et al. 2021); territorial food system GHG \r\nemissions: EDGAR v.6, Crippa et al. (2021a), recalculated according to Crippa et al. (2021b) using AR6 GWPs; deaths attributed to dietary factors: IHME (2018); GBD 2017 Diet \r\nCollaborators et al. (2019)."


id: 2108589ae1ce4013510b467b6e5c7a1b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
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"The share of GHG emissions from energy use is taken as a proxy for \r\nthe structure of food supply in a region (Section 12.4.1), and the cost \r\nfor food as a  proxy for the structure of the demand side and the \r\naccess to (healthy) food (Chen et al. 2016; Finaret and Masters 2019; \r\nHirvonen et al. 2019; HLPE 2020; Springmann et al. 2021), though \r\nacknowledging the limitations of such a simplification."


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"While total food system emissions in 2018 range between 0.9 and \r\n8.5 tCO2-eq per capita per year between regions, the share of energy \r\nemissions relative to energy and land-based (agriculture and food \r\nsystem land-use change) emissions ranges between 3% and 78%. \r\nRegional expenditures for food range from USD3.0-8.8 per capita \r\nper day (Figure 12.7), though there is high variability within countries "


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"and the costs of nutrient-adequate diets often exceeds those of diets \r\ndelivering adequate energy (Hirvonen et al. 2019; Bai et al. 2020; FAO \r\net al. 2020). Thus, low-income households in industrialised countries \r\ncan also be affected by food insecurity (Penne and Goedeme 2020)."


id: 2035aa921ec02a1944ee4d6ce64c6842
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
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"GHG emissions from food systems can be reduced by targeting direct \r\nor indirect GHG emissions in the supply chain including enhanced \r\ncarbon sequestration, by introducing sustainable production methods \r\nsuch as agroecological approaches which can reduce system-level \r\nGHG emissions of conventional food production and also enhance \r\nresilience (HLPE 2019), by substituting food products with high GHG \r\nintensities with others of lower GHG intensities, by reducing food \r\nover-consumption, and/or by reducing food loss and waste. The \r\nsubstitution of food products with others that are more sustainable \r\nand/or healthier is often called 'dietary shift'."


id: 1e70ff6e1fdecb251518e56768b235ba
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
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"Table  12.8 summarises the main characteristics of food system \r\nmitigation opportunities, their effect on GHG emissions, and \r\nassociated co-benefits and adverse effects."


id: fe2d49f5fda83511b9dff22e0c1bb743
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"Clark et al. (2020) showed that even if fossil fuel emissions were \r\neliminated immediately, food system emissions alone would \r\njeopardise the achievement of the 1.5oC target and threaten the \r\n2oC target. They concluded that both demand-side and supply-side \r\nstrategies are needed, including a  shift to a  diet with lower GHG \r\nintensity and rich in plant-based 'conventional' foods (e.g., pulses, \r\nnuts), or new food products that could support dietary shift. \r\nSuch dietary shift needs to overcome socio-cultural, knowledge, \r\nand economic barriers to significantly achieve GHG mitigation \r\n(Section 12.4.5)."


id: 8dda35ac8d2957c44ae46b51aa53fb32
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
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"Agricultural food production systems range from smallholder \r\nsubsistence farms to large animal production factories, in open \r\nspaces, greenhouses, rural areas or urban settings."


id: 8dea55d5c5ed89e50b73b734e2ec4a31
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"Dietary shift: Studies demonstrate that a  shift to diets rich in \r\nplant-based foods, particularly pulses, nuts, fruits and vegetables, \r\nsuch as vegetarian, pescatarian or vegan diets, could lead to \r\nsubstantial reduction of greenhouse gas emissions as compared to \r\ncurrent dietary patterns in most industrialised countries, while also \r\nproviding health benefits and reducing mortality from diet-related \r\nnon-communicable diseases (Springmann et al. 2018a; Chen et al. \r\n2019; Willett et al. 2019; Bodirsky et al. 2020; Costa Leite et al. 2020; \r\nErnstoff et al. 2020; Jarmul et al. 2020; Semba et al. 2020; Theurl et al. \r\n2020; Hamilton et al. 2021)."


id: feb4c2d012af8d566724881fcc7f0cf7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
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"Food losses occur at the farm, post-harvest and during the food \r\nprocessing/wholesale stages of a food supply chain, while in the final \r\nretail and consumption stages the term food waste is used (HLPE \r\n2014). Typically, food losses are linked to technical issues such as \r\nlack of infrastructure and storage, while food waste is often caused \r\nby socio-economic and behavioural factors. Mitigation opportunities \r\nthrough reducing food waste and loss exist in all food supply chain \r\nstages and are described in the sub-sections below."


id: 96069e11e672825fa9e74c8122c43d32
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
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content:
"Food system mitigation opportunities can be either incremental \r\nor transformative (Kugelberg et al. 2021). Incremental options are \r\nbased on mature technologies, for which processes and causalities \r\nare understood, and their implementation is generally accepted by \r\nsociety. They do not require a substantial change in the way food \r\nis produced, processed, or consumed and might lead to a  (slight) \r\nshift in production systems or preferences. Transformative mitigation \r\nopportunities have wider food system implications and usually "


id: a1496c90767c1b53aff19a353801085
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
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content:
"Technological innovations: have made food production more \r\nefficient since the onset of agriculture (Winiwarter et al. 2014; \r\nHerrero et al. 2020). Emerging technologies include digital agriculture "


id: 3c6987a4277156a75134ab92f7f68b5f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
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"n options\r\normative\r\nD: d\r\ndem\r\nDir\r\n of by-products, \r\nd waste logistics \r\nement\r\nM+ FL+ \r\nvation\r\nFW+ E0 \r\naging \r\nechnologies\r\nFW+ M0 E0 \r\niency E+ \r\ngistics\r\nD+ FL+ FW- \r\nasures to \r\n waste in retail \r\ntering\r\nFW+ E+ M+ \r\nfuels/\r\nodes D+ \r\niency E+ \r\nefrigerants D+ \r\n017); [2] Foyer et al. (2016)\r\ntorfer et al. (2021); [12] Fol\r\n] Gomez and Gennaro Izzo \r\n (2019); [29] Gentry et al. (\r\nisto and Teixeira de Mattos \r\n and Sanjuan (2019); [46] \r\n0); [54] Buisman et al. (20\r\nes."


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created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
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"Co-benefits of controlled-environment agriculture include minimising \r\nwater and nutrient losses as well as agro-chemical use (Al-Kodmany \r\n2018; Shamshiri et al. 2018; Armanda et al. 2019; Farfan et al. 2019; \r\nO'Sullivan et al. 2019; Rufi-Salis et al. 2020) (robust evidence, high \r\nagreement). Water is recycled in a  closed system and additionally \r\nsome plants generate fresh water by evaporation from grey or black \r\nwater, and high nutrient use efficiencies are possible. Food production \r\nfrom controlled-environment agriculture is independent of weather \r\nconditions and able to satisfy some consumer demand for locally\u0002produced fresh and diverse produce throughout the year (Benke and \r\nTomkins 2017; Al-Kodmany 2018; O'Sullivan et al. 2019)."


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"(using advanced sensors, big data), gene technology (crop bio\u0002fortification, genome editing, crop innovations), sustainable \r\nintensification (automation of processes, improved inputs, precision \r\nagriculture) (Herrero et al. 2020), or multi-trophic aquaculture \r\napproaches (Knowler et al. 2020; Sanz-Lazaro and Sanchez-Jerez \r\n2020), though literature on aquaculture and fisheries in the context of \r\nGHG mitigation is limited."


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"Such technologies may contribute to a reduction of GHG emissions \r\nat the food system level, enhanced provision of food, better \r\nconsideration of ecosystem services, and/or contribute to nutrition\u0002sensitive agriculture, for example, by increasing the nutritional quality \r\nof staple crops, increasing the palatability of leguminous crops such \r\nas lupines, or increasing the agronomic efficiency or resilience of \r\ncrops with good nutritional characteristics."


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"Controlled-environment agriculture is a very energy intensive technology \r\n(mainly for cooling) and its GHG intensity depends therefore crucially \r\non the source of the energy. Options for reducing GHG intensity include \r\nreducing energy use through improved lighting and cooling efficiency \r\nor by employing low-carbon energy sources, potentially integrated into \r\nthe building structure (Benke and Tomkins 2017)."


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"Comprehensive studies assessing the GHG balance of controlled\u0002environment agriculture are lacking. The overall GHG emissions \r\nfrom controlled-environment agriculture is therefore uncertain and \r\ndepends on the balance of reduced GHG emissions from production \r\nand distribution and reduced land requirements, versus increased \r\nexternal energy needs."


id: 1c98968f2c0ac90c425f055b171c6893
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"Controlled-environment agriculture is mainly based on hydroponic or \r\naquaponic cultivation systems that do not require soil. Aquaponics \r\ncombine hydroponics with a re-circulating aquaculture compartment \r\nfor integrated production of plants and fish (Junge et al. 2017; \r\nMaucieri et al. 2018), while aeroponics is a further development of \r\nhydroponics that replaces water as a growing medium with a mist of \r\nnutrient solution (Al-Kodmany 2018). Aquaponics could potentially \r\nproduce proteins in urban farms, but the technology is not yet mature \r\nand its economic and environmental performance is unclear (Love \r\net al. 2015; O'Sullivan et al. 2019)."


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"Controlled-environment agriculture is often undertaken in urban \r\nenvironments to take advantage of short supply chains (O'Sullivan \r\net al. 2019), and might use abandoned buildings or be integrated in \r\nsupermarkets, producing for example herbs 'on demand'."


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vector_id: 12485
content:
"Optimising growing conditions, hydroponic systems achieve higher \r\nyields than un-conditioned agriculture (O'Sullivan et al. 2019); \r\nand yields can be further enhanced in CO2-enriched atmospheres \r\n(Shamshiri et al. 2018; Armanda et al. 2019). By using existing \r\nspaces or modular systems that can be vertically stacked, this \r\ntechnology minimises land demand, however it is energy intensive \r\nand requires large financial investments. So far, only a few crops \r\nare commercially produced in vertical farms, including lettuce and \r\nother leafy greens, herbs and some vegetables, due to their short \r\ngrowth period and high value (Benke and Tomkins 2017; Armanda \r\net al. 2019; Beacham et al. 2019; O'Sullivan et al. 2019). Through \r\nbreeding, other crops could reach commercial feasibility, or crops \r\nwith improved taste or nutritional characteristics can be grown \r\n(O'Sullivan et al. 2019)."


id: 6722b58bb7db7acd7d864fb6c544df64
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15423
content:
"Meat analogues have attracted substantial venture capital, and \r\nproduction costs have dropped considerably in the last decade, with \r\nsome reaching market maturity (Mouat and Prince 2018; Santo et al. \r\n2020), but there is uncertainty whether they will 'disrupt' the food \r\nmarket or remain niche products. According to Kumar et al. (2017), the \r\ndemand for plant-based meat analogues is expected to increase as \r\ntheir production is relatively cheap and they satisfy consumer demands \r\nwith regard to health and environmental concerns as well as ethical \r\nand religious requirements. Consumer acceptance is still low for some \r\noptions, especially insects (Aiking and de Boer 2019) and cultured \r\nmeat (Chriki and Hocquette 2020; Siegrist and Hartmann 2020)."


id: 48f5ec6ecc4a5909be62172802736a2c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10055
content:
"In controlled-environment agriculture, photosynthesis is fuelled by \r\nartificial light through LEDs or a combination of natural light with \r\nLEDs. Control of the wave band and light cycle of the LEDs and micro\u0002climate can be used to optimise photosynthetic activity, yield and \r\ncrop quality (Gomez and Gennaro Izzo 2018; Shamshiri et al. 2018)."


id: c4002da781cab15eaa49f85efc49e996
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31766
content:
"Insects: Farmed edible insects have a higher feed conversion ratio \r\nthan other animals farmed for food, and have short reproduction \r\nperiods with high biomass production rates (Halloran et al. 2016). \r\nInsects have good nutritional qualities (Parodi et al. 2018). They \r\nare suited as a protein source for both humans and livestock, with \r\nhigh protein content and favourable fatty acid composition (Fasolin \r\net al. 2019; Raheem et al. 2019b). If used as feed, they can grow on \r\nfood waste and manure; if used as food, food safety concerns and \r\nregulations can restrict the use of manure (Raheem et al. 2019b) or \r\nfood waste (Varelas 2019) as growing substrates, and the dangers \r\nof pathogenic or toxigenic microorganisms and incidences of anti\u0002microbial resistance need to be managed (Garofalo et al. 2019)."


id: 36c8bf325fe0459f5d4527ede9d9ea0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6863
content:
"Algae and bivalves have a high protein content and a favourable \r\nnutrient profile and can play a  role in providing sustainable food. \r\nBivalves are high in omega-3 fatty acids and vitamin B12 and \r\ntherefore well suited as replacement of conventional meats, and have \r\na lower GHG footprint (Parodi et al. 2018; Willer and Aldridge 2020). \r\nMicro- and macro algae are rich in omega-3 and omega-6 fatty acids, \r\nanti-oxidants and vitamins (Parodi et al. 2018; Penalver et al. 2020; \r\nTorres-Tiji et al. 2020). Kim et al. (2019) show that diets with modest \r\namounts of animals low on the food chain such as forage fish, \r\nbivalves, or insects have similar GHG intensities to vegan diets. Algae \r\nand bi-valves can be used to filter nutrients from waters, though care \r\nis required to avoid accumulation of hazardous substances (Gentry \r\net al. 2020; Willer and Aldridge 2020)."


id: 3b4d87278309608c56f0d8f3e00104ab
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7619
content:
"A review of LCA studies on different plant-based, animal source and \r\nnine 'future food' protein sources (Parodi et al. 2018) concluded that \r\ninsects, macro-algae, mussels, mycoproteins and cultured meat show \r\nsimilar GHG intensities per unit of protein (mean values ranging \r\n0.3-3.1 kgCO2-eq per 100 g protein), comparable to milk, eggs, and \r\ntuna (mean values ranging 1.2-5.4  kgCO2-eq per 100 g  protein); \r\nwhile chlorella and spirulina consume more energy per unit of \r\nprotein and were associated with higher GHG emissions (mean \r\nvalues ranging 11-13  kgCO2-eq per 100 g  protein). As the main \r\nsource of GHG emissions from insects and cellular agriculture foods \r\nis energy consumption, their GHG intensity improves with increased \r\nuse of low-carbon energy (Smetana et al. 2015; Parodi et al. 2018; \r\nPikaar et al. 2018)."


id: e50c832c571de9bb00626a3deff837e0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37594
content:
"Future foods offer other benefits such as lower land requirements, \r\ncontrolled systems with reduced losses of water and nutrients, \r\nincreased resilience, and possibly reduced hazards from pesticide \r\nand antibiotics use and zoonotic diseases, although more research \r\nis needed including on allergenic and other safety aspects, and \r\npossibly reduced protein bioavailability (Alexander et al. 2017; \r\nParodi et al. 2018; Stephens et al. 2018; Fasolin et al. 2019; Chriki \r\nand Hocquette 2020; Santo et al. 2020; Hadi and Brightwell 2021; \r\nTzachor et al. 2021) (medium evidence, high agreement). Research \r\nis needed also on the effect of processing (Wickramasinghe et al. \r\n2021), though a randomised crossover trial comparing appetising \r\nplant foods with meat alternatives found several beneficial and no \r\nadverse effects from the consumption of the plant-based meats \r\n(Crimarco et al. 2020)."


id: d3bb717d5760fd2f47fb5e78ef0b93ac
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34594
content:
"Cellular agriculture: The use of fungi, algae and bacteria is an old \r\nprocess (beer, bread, yoghurt) and serves, among others, for the \r\npreservation of products. The concept of cellular agriculture (Mattick \r\n2018) covers bio-technological processes that use micro-organisms \r\nto produce acellular (fermentation-based cellular agriculture) or \r\ncellular products. Yeasts, fungi or bacteria can synthesise acellular \r\nproducts such as haem, milk and egg proteins, or protein-rich animal \r\nfeed, other food ingredients, and pharmaceutical and material \r\nproducts (Rischer et al. 2020; Mendly-Zambo et al. 2021). Cellular "


id: c05da31fce1b6e35274bbc56d3cd9828
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31144
content:
"Food processing includes preparation and preservation of fresh \r\ncommodities (fruit and vegetables, meat, seafood and dairy \r\nproducts), grain milling, production of baked goods, and manufacture \r\nof pre-prepared foods and meals. Food processors range from small \r\nlocal operations to large multinational food producers, producing "


id: b6df8685638e5730cf28baac836fc8db
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29373
content:
"The second component of mitigation in food processing relates to \r\nreduction in fossil energy use. Opportunities include energy efficiency \r\nin processes (also discussed in Section  11.3), the use of heat and \r\nelectricity from low-carbon energy sources in processing (Chapter 6), \r\nthrough off-grid thermal processing (sun drying, food smoking) \r\nand improving logistics efficiencies. Energy-intensive processes \r\nwith energy-saving potential include milling and refining (oil seeds, \r\ncorn, sugar), drying, and food safety practices such as sterilisation \r\nand pasteurisation (Niles et al. 2018). Packaging also plays a role: \r\nreduced transport energy can be achieved through reducing the mass \r\nof goods transported and improving packing densities in transport \r\nvehicles (Lindh et al. 2016; Molina-Besch et al. 2019; Wohner \r\net al. 2019). Choice of packaging also influences refrigeration energy \r\nrequirements during transport and storage."


id: 2ae297ed5a2240f0b8eadf220b006492
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4779
content:
"food for local to global markets. The importance of food processing \r\nand preservation is particularly evident in developing countries \r\nwhich lack cold chains for the preservation and distribution of fresh \r\nperishable products such as fresh fish (Adeyeye and Oyewole 2016; \r\nAdeyeye 2017)."


id: 988d4a2fea090f06209211772369e60f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24052
content:
"Mitigation in food processing largely focuses on reducing food waste \r\nand fossil energy usage during the processing itself, as well as in the \r\ntransport, packaging and storage of food products for distribution \r\nand sale (Silva and Sanjuan 2019). Reducing food waste provides \r\nemissions savings by reducing wastage of primary inputs required \r\nfor food production. Another mitigation route, contributing to the \r\ncircular bioeconomy (Section  12.6.1.2 and Cross-Working Group \r\nBox  3  in this chapter), is by valorisation of food processing by\u0002products through recovery of nutrients and/or energy. No global \r\nanalyses of the emissions savings potential from the processing step \r\nin the value chain could be found."


id: 503f57bb69f345682311959f51e3435d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11401
content:
"Transport mitigation options along the supply chain include \r\nimproved logistics, the use of alternative fuels and transport modes, \r\nand reduced transport distances. Logistics and alternative fuels and \r\ntransport modes are discussed in Chapter  10. Transport emissions \r\nmight increase with increasing demand for a diversity of foods as \r\ndeveloping countries become more affluent. New technologies that \r\nenable food on demand or online food shopping systems might further \r\nincrease emissions from food transport; however, the consequences \r\nare uncertain and might also entail a shift from individual traffic to \r\nbulk transport. The impact on food waste is also uncertain as more \r\ntargeted delivery options could reduce food waste, but easier access \r\nto a wider range of food could also foster over-supply and increase \r\nfood waste. Mitigation opportunities in food transport are inherently \r\nlinked to decarbonisation of the transport sector (Chapter 10)."


id: 22d57b084d00dd9d4038f67dfbd9fac6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3337
content:
"Reduced food waste during food processing can be achieved by \r\nseeking alternative processing routes (Atuonwu et al. 2018), improved \r\ncommunication along the food value chain (Gobel et al. 2015), \r\noptimisation of food processing facilities, reducing contamination, \r\nand limiting damages and spillage (HLPE 2014). Optimisation of food \r\npackaging also plays an important role in reducing food waste, in \r\nthat it can extend product shelf life; protect against damage during \r\ntransport and handling; prevent spoilage; facilitate easy opening and \r\nemptying; and communicate storage and preparation information to \r\nconsumers (Molina-Besch et al. 2019)."


id: 2e29194c25ca0d09b71ce2e632de4c4f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5396
content:
"Developments in smart packaging are increasingly contributing \r\nto reducing food waste along the food value chain. Strategies for \r\nreducing the environmental impact of packaging include using less, \r\nand more sustainable, materials and a shift to reusable packaging \r\n(Coelho et al. 2020). Active packaging increases shelf life through \r\nregulating the environment inside the packaging, including levels of \r\noxygen, moisture and chemicals released as the food ages (Emanuel \r\nand Sandhu 2019). Intelligent packaging communicates information \r\non the freshness of the food through indicator labels (Poyatos\u0002Racionero et al. 2018), and data carriers can store information on \r\nconditions such as temperature along the entire food chain (Muller \r\nand Schmid 2019)."


id: 77b6c49e919a32ce3234ee05ac1072d6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18270
content:
"Retail and the food service industry are the main factors shaping the \r\nexternal food environment or 'food entry points'; they are the 'physical \r\nspaces where food is obtained; the built environment that allows \r\nconsumers to access these spaces' (HLPE 2017). These industries \r\nhave significant influence on consumers' choices and can play a role \r\nin reducing GHG emissions from food systems. Opportunities are \r\navailable for optimisation of inventories in response to consumer \r\ndemands through advanced IT systems (Niles et al. 2018), and for \r\ndiscounting foods close to sell-by dates, which can serve to reduce \r\nboth food spoilage and wastage (Buisman et al. 2019)."


id: aec130e0d38eceb8f9c8ef81bac902c8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27982
content:
"LCA can be used to evaluate the benefits and trade-offs associated \r\nwith different processing or packaging types (Silva and Sanjuan \r\n2019). Some options, such as aluminium, steel and glass, require \r\nhigh energy investment in manufacture when produced from primary \r\nmaterials, with significant savings in energy through recycling \r\nbeing possible (Camaratta et al. 2020). However, these materials \r\nare inert in landfill. Other packaging options, such as paper and \r\nbiodegradable packaging, may require a  lower energy investment \r\nduring manufacture, but may require larger land area and can release \r\nmethane when consigned to anaerobic landfill where there is no \r\nmethane recovery. Nevertheless, packaging accounts for only 1-12% \r\n(typically around 5%) of the GHG emissions in the lifecycle of a food \r\nsystem (Wohner et al. 2019; Crippa et al. 2021b), suggesting that \r\nits benefits can often outweigh the emissions associated with the \r\npackaging itself."


id: e528324b9afb48eb23417fb06c323bf7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37617
content:
"As one of the highest contributors to energy demand at this stage \r\nin the food value chain, refrigeration has received a  strong focus \r\nin mitigation. Efficient refrigeration options include advanced \r\nrefrigeration temperature control systems, and installation of \r\nmore efficient refrigerators, air curtains and closed display fridges \r\n(Chaomuang et al. 2017). Also related to reducing emissions from \r\ncooling and refrigeration is the replacement of hydrofluorocarbons \r\nwhich have very high GWPs with lower GWP alternatives (Niles et al. \r\n2018). The use of propane, isobutane, ammonia, hydrofluoroolefins \r\nand CO2 (refrigerant R744) are among those that are being explored, \r\nwith varying success (McLinden et al. 2017). In recent years, due to \r\nrestrictions on high GWP-refrigerants, a considerable growth in the \r\nmarket availability of appliances and systems with non-fluorinated \r\nrefrigerants has been seen (Eckert et al. 2021)."


id: 46a1ec2341aa699fb8faef94128848db
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9633
content:
"Energy efficiency alternatives generic to buildings more broadly are \r\nalso relevant here, including efficient lighting, heating, ventilation, \r\nand air conditioning systems and building management, with \r\nventilation being a  particularly high energy user in retail, that \r\nwarrants attention (Kolokotroni et al. 2015)."


id: 5526a65c81cae27bafa9bf844b3ecce5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12255
content:
"Food system mitigation potentials in AFOLU are assessed in \r\nSection  7.4, and food system mitigation potentials linked to \r\ndemand-side measures are assessed in Chapter  5. Studies \r\nsuggest that implementing supply- and demand-side policies in \r\ncombination makes ambitious mitigation targets easier to achieve \r\n(Clark et al.  2020; Global Panel on Agriculture and Food Systems \r\nfor Nutrition 2020; Temme et al. 2020; Latka et al. 2021a) (high \r\nagreement, limited evidence)."


id: 33281ffd673d38121a917322278e7045
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6256
content:
"In developing countries particularly, better infrastructure for \r\ntransportation and expansion of processing and manufacturing \r\nindustries can significantly reduce food losses, particularly of highly \r\nperishable food (Niles et al. 2018; FAO 2019a)."


id: ed33fb58f26b811b670741ec38500810
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39111
content:
"Notes: #1 Minimum level to be effective 20% price increase; #2 Minimum level to be effective USD50-80 tCO2-eq. a\r\n In addition, all interventions are assumed to address health \r\nand climate change mitigation. b Requires coordination between policy areas, participation of stakeholders, transparent methods and indicators to manage trade-offs and \r\nprioritisation between possibly conflicting objectives; and suitable indicators for monitoring and evaluation against objectives."


id: 2f936810170181e7adf8f2355245ecb2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5633
content:
"Stoll-Kleemann and Schmidt 2017; El Bilali 2019; iPES Food 2019; \r\nMilford et al. 2019; Temme et al. 2020) (Section  12.4.1) (robust \r\nevidence, high agreement)."


id: c20001f94558610a134b39c40d97c658
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31429
content:
"The trends in the global and national food systems towards \r\na globalisation of food supply chains and increasing dominance of \r\nsupermarkets and large corporate food processors (Dries et al. 2004; \r\nNeven and Reardon 2004; Baker and Friel 2016; Andam et al. 2018; \r\nPopkin and Reardon 2018; Reardon et al. 2019; Pereira et al. 2020) \r\nhave led to environmental, food insecurity and malnutrition problems. \r\nStudies therefore call for a  transformation of current global and \r\nnational food systems to solve these problems (Schosler and Boer \r\n2018; McBey et al. 2019; Kugelberg et al. 2021). This has not yet \r\nbeen successful, including due to insufficient coordination between \r\nrelevant food system policies (Weber et al. 2020) (medium evidence, \r\nhigh agreement)."


id: d704e7ae1eddd68bae8e01fe5bbef4e2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35133
content:
"Table 12.9 summarises the implications of a range of policy instruments \r\ndiscussed in more detail in the following sub-sections and highlights \r\nthe benefits of integrated policy packages. Furthermore, Table 12.9 \r\nassesses transformative potential, environmental effectiveness, \r\nfeasibility, distributional effect, cost, and cost-benefits and trade\u0002offs of individual policy instruments, as well as their potential role as \r\npart of coherent policy packages. Table 12.9 shows that information \r\nand behavioural policy instruments can have significant but small \r\neffects in changing diets (robust evidence, medium agreement), but \r\nare mutually enforcing and might be essential to lower barriers and \r\nincrease acceptance of market-based and administrative instruments \r\n(medium evidence, high agreement)."


id: 89583337bb034378804e92bb561501ae
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21337
content:
"The policy instruments are assessed in relation to shifting food \r\nconsumption and production towards increased sustainability and \r\nhealth. This includes lowering GHG emissions, although not in all \r\ncases is this the primary focus of the instrument, and in some cases \r\nlowering GHG emissions may not even be explicitly mentioned."


id: 43eff1d5ea8d038c05209ec4ec8a944
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9186
content:
"Transformation of food systems may come from technological, social \r\nor institutional innovations that start as niches but can potentially \r\nlead to rapid changes, including changes in social conventions \r\n(Centola et al. 2018; Benton et al. 2019)."


id: 6f660eb0fe94e9d3d12e65cf9a4477bc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16862
content:
"Modelling results show only small consumption shifts with moderate \r\nmeat price increases; and high price increases are required to reach \r\nmitigation targets, even though model predictions become highly \r\nuncertain due to lack of observational data (Mazzocchi 2017; \r\nBonnet et al. 2018; Fellmann et al. 2018; Zech and Schneider 2019; \r\nLatka et al. 2021b). Taxes applied at the consumer level are found \r\nto be more effective than levying the taxes on the production side \r\n(Springmann et al. 2017)."


id: 3a7bbbc940ce3838886a6ad81f844b0b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7489
content:
"Unilateral taxes on food with high GHG intensities have been \r\nshown to induce increases in net export flows, which could reduce \r\nglobal prices and increase global demand. Indirect effects on GHG \r\nmitigation therefore could be reduced by up to 70-90% of national \r\nresults (Fellmann et al. 2018; Zech and Schneider 2019) (limited \r\nevidence, high agreement). The global mitigation potential for GHG "


id: 73b4ca0e27fbaaf6635b2e1d0f6e8933
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17605
content:
"business is scarcely researched, although they could play a major role \r\nin food system transitions."


id: 561eea1293ffc75c99be1276332de723
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12425
content:
"taxation of food products at USD52 kgCO2-eq-1 has been estimated \r\nat 1 GtCO2-eq yr-1 (Springmann et al. 2017)."


id: 42c082e97e5331fa11196945d1bb5653
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8939
content:
"The InterAcademy Partnership assessed how research can contribute \r\nto providing the required evidence and opportunities for food system \r\ntransitions, with a focus on climate change impacts and mitigation \r\n(IAP 2018). The project builds on four regional assessments of \r\nopportunities and challenges on food and nutrition security in \r\nAfrica (NASAC 2018), the Americas (IANAS 2018), Asia (AASSA \r\n2018), and Europe (EASAC 2017). The Partnership concludes with \r\na  set of research questions around food systems, that need to be \r\nbetter understood: (i) how are sustainable food systems constituted \r\nin different contexts and at different scales? (ii) how can transition \r\ntowards sustainable food systems be achieved? and (iii) how can \r\nsuccess and failure be measured along sustainability dimensions \r\nincluding climate mitigation?"


id: 4b39da1d7bf0e9fe8a1968f5fd6a714c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10483
content:
"Studies have shown that taxes can improve the nutritional quality of \r\ndiets and reduce GHG emissions from the food system, particularly if \r\naccompanied by other policies that increase acceptance and elasticity, \r\nand reduce regressive and distributional problems (Niebylski et al. 2015; \r\nHagenaars et al. 2017; Mazzocchi 2017; Springmann et al. 2017; Wright \r\net al. 2017; Henderson et al. 2018; Sall 2018; FAO et al. 2020; Penne \r\nand Goedeme 2020) (robust evidence, high agreement)."


id: 4cf2f4e16a1a71cc22cb98c1615881b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10809
content:
"Marketing regulations: Currently, 16 countries regulate marketing \r\nof unhealthy food to children, mainly on television and in schools \r\n(Taillie et al. 2019), and many other efforts are ongoing across the \r\nglobe (European Commission 2019). The aim to counter the increase \r\nin obesity in children and target products high in saturated fats, \r\ntrans-fatty acids, free sugars and/or salt (WHO 2010) was endorsed \r\nby 192 countries (Kovic et al. 2018). Nutrition and health claims for \r\nproducts are used by industry to increase sales, for example in the \r\nsport sector or for breakfast cereals. They can be informative, but can \r\nalso be misleading if misused for promoting unhealthy food (Whalen \r\net al. 2018; Ghosh and Sen 2019; Sussman et al. 2019)."


id: c514718466a2ce55ad5e2b82eb9aedac
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31985
content:
"Strong statutory marketing regulations can significantly reduce the \r\nexposure of children to, and sales of, unhealthy food compared \r\nwith voluntary restrictions (Kovic et al. 2018; Temme et al. 2020). \r\nData on effectiveness of marketing regulations with a broader food \r\nsustainability scope are not available. On the other hand, regulations \r\nthat mobilise private investment into emerging food production \r\ntechnologies can be instrumental in curbing the cost and making \r\nthem competitive (Bianchi et al. 2018a)."


id: a43d6d2866f5448fe6d92237e41804f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26087
content:
"Investment into research and innovation: El Bilali (2019) assessed \r\nresearch gaps in the food system transition literature and found \r\na need to develop comparative studies that enable the assessment \r\nof spatial variability and scalability of food system transitions. The \r\nauthor found also that the role of private industry and corporate "


id: ffbe191ad8b80314debeb99c34635311
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42384
content:
"habitat degradation in Southeast Asia and concluded that production \r\nof certified palm oil continued to lead to deforestation."


id: 8786e3a08d56d1511274ba32781d12f8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21000
content:
"using their potential for guiding food system policies in other sectors \r\n(Wijesinha-Bettoni et al. 2021)."


id: a953c86ff8a5edf36f658d3310cd3920
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27011
content:
"Organisational procurement: Green public procurement is a policy \r\nthat aims to create additional demand for sustainable products \r\n(Bergmann Madsen 2018; Mazzocchi and Marino 2019) or decrease \r\ndemand for less sustainable products (e.g.,  the introduction of \r\n'Meatless Monday' by the Norwegian Armed Forces) (Cheng et al. \r\n2018; Gava et al. 2018; Milford and Kildal 2019; Wilts et al. 2019). \r\nTo improve dietary choices, organisations can increase the price of \r\nunsustainable options while decreasing the price of sustainable ones, \r\nor employ information or choice architecture measures (Goggins and \r\nRau 2016; Goggins 2018). Procurement guidelines exist at global, \r\nnational, organisational or local levels (Noonan et al. 2013; Neto and \r\nGama Caldas 2018). Procurement rules in schools or public canteens \r\nincrease the accessibility of healthy food and can improve dietary \r\nbehaviour and decrease purchases of unhealthy food (Cheng et al. \r\n2018; Temme et al. 2020)."


id: 764cec52d1b57000204a32553126ced2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18033
content:
"Food regulations: Novel foods based on insects, microbial proteins \r\nor cellular agriculture must go through authorisation processes to \r\nensure compliance with food safety standards before they can be \r\nsold to consumers. Several countries have 'novel food' regulations \r\ngoverning the approval of foods for human consumption. For \r\nexample, the European Commission, in its update of the Novel Food \r\nRegulation in 2015, expanded its definition of novel food to include \r\nfood from cell cultures, or that produced from animals by non\u0002traditional breeding techniques (EU 2015)."


id: 99c65b1adc8b0579809630c3e721d97e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24282
content:
"For animal product analogues, regulatory pathways and procedures \r\n(Stephens et al. 2018) and terminology issues (defining equivalence \r\nquestions) (Carreno and Dolle 2018; Pisanello and Ferraris 2018) \r\nneed clarification, as does their relation to religious rules (Chriki and \r\nHocquette 2020)."


id: ea548f1e6a5033166cf26b796f7abe6e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38584
content:
"Examples of legislation targeting food waste include the French \r\nban on wasting food approaching best-before dates, requiring \r\nits donation to charity organisations (Global Alliance for the \r\nFuture of Food 2020). In Japan, the Food Waste Recycling Law set \r\ntargets for food waste recycling for industries in the food sector \r\nfor 2020, ranging between 50% for restaurants and 95% for food \r\nmanufacturers (Liu et al. 2016)."


id: ecfbde9295be95655dd32ebb8a6241fd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39063
content:
"Food labels: Instruments to improve transparency and information \r\non food sustainability aspects are based on the assumption of the \r\n'rational' consumer. Information gives the necessary freedom of \r\nchoice, but also the responsibility to make the 'right choice' (Kersh \r\n2015; Bucher et al. 2016). Studies find a lack of consumer awareness \r\nabout the link between own food choices and environmental effect \r\n(Grebitus et al. 2016; Leach et al. 2016; Hartmann and Siegrist 2017; \r\nde Boer et al. 2018) and so effective messaging is required to raise \r\nawareness and acceptance of potentially stricter food system policies."


id: 5ba45acc1b1b75556b6950b8eed962e9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13377
content:
"Sustainable food-based dietary guidelines: National food-based \r\ndietary guidelines (FBDGs) provide science-based recommendations \r\non food group consumption quantities. They are available for 94, mostly \r\nupper- and middle-income, countries globally (Wijesinha-Bettoni et al. \r\n2021), are adapted to national cultural and socio-economic context, \r\nand can be used as a benchmark for food formulation standards for \r\npublic and private food procurement, or to inform citizens (Bechthold \r\net al. 2018; Temme et al. 2020). Most FBDGs are based on health \r\nconsiderations and only a few mention environmental sustainability \r\naspects (Bechthold et al. 2018; Ritchie et al. 2018; Ahmed et al. 2019; \r\nSpringmann et al. 2020). Implementation of FBDGs so far focuses \r\nlargely in the education and health sectors, with few countries also "


id: 64984c2ee676535ecd5a34946aa82168
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14973
content:
"Back-of-package labels usually provide detailed nutritional \r\ninformation (Temple 2019). Front-of-package labels simplify and \r\ninterpret the information: for example, the traffic light system or \r\nthe Nutri-Score label used in France (Kanter et al. 2018b) and the \r\nhealth star rating used in Australia and New Zealand (Shahid et al. \r\n2020) provide an aggregate rating based on product attributes such "


id: 7d7987f3007072b8d82d4469b3a30fb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19245
content:
"and fast food companies, that enhance visibility of new products \r\nand ease integration into daily life for consumers, particularly if \r\nsustainable products are similar to the products they substitute \r\n(Slade 2018). This effect can be further increased by media and role \r\nmodels (Elgaaied-Gambier et al. 2018)."


id: 6d1e1c6e225b52eb0155f56825c76237
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16475
content:
"Choice architecture: Information is more effective if accompanied \r\nby reinforcement through structural changes or by changing the food \r\nenvironment, such as through product placement in supermarkets, \r\nto overcome the intention-behaviour gap (Bucher et al. 2016; \r\nBroers et al. 2017; Torris and Mobekk 2019). Behavioural change \r\nstrategies have also been shown to improve efficiencies of school \r\nfood programmes (Marcano-Olivier et al. 2020)."


id: 5067ea72a89c655e6f010263e31c8b65
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11423
content:
"Research on food system governance is mostly non-empirical or case \r\nstudy based, which means that there is limited understanding of \r\nwhich governance arrangements work in specific social and ecological \r\ncontexts to produce particular food system outcomes (Delaney et al. \r\n2018). Research has identified a  number of desirable attributes in \r\nfood systems governance, including adaptive governance (Termeer \r\net al. 2018), a systems perspective (Whitfield et al. 2018), governance \r\nthat considers food system resilience (Ericksen 2008; Moragues\u0002Faus et al. 2017; Meyer 2020), transparency, participation of civil \r\nsociety (Candel 2014; Duncan 2015;), and cross-scale governance \r\n(Moragues-Faus et al. 2017)."


id: c065a33219e142e924bc7b90088d4d4a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31147
content:
"and membership structures may hinder their ability to confront \r\nfundamental structural issues like unsustainable diets or inequities in \r\nfood access (Santo and Moragues-Faus 2019)."


id: f96e3fd79455bb817582a54f8a534e58
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41247
content:
"to develop effective nexus governance (Cairns and Krzywoszynska \r\n2016; Weitz et al. 2017; Pahl-Wostl et al. 2018). Other policy \r\nparadigms and theoretical frameworks that aim to integrate \r\nfood systems governance include system transition, agroecology, \r\nmultifunctionality in agriculture (Andree et al. 2018), climate-smart \r\nagriculture (Taylor 2018) and the circular economy (Box 12.4). Cross\u0002sectoral coordination on food systems and climate governance \r\ncould be aided by internal recognition and ownership by agencies, \r\ndedicated budgets for cross-sectoral projects, and consistency in \r\nbudgets (Pardoe et al. 2018) (Boxes 12.1 and 12.2)."


id: 26d4c42e5fdc902ec7b95918f6da53a4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3990
content:
"Food systems governance is still fragmented at national levels, \r\nwhich means that there may be a proliferation of efforts that cannot \r\nbe scaled and are ineffective (Candel 2014). National policies can be \r\ncomplemented or possibly pioneered by initiatives at the local level \r\n(de Boer et al. 2018; Rose 2018). The city-region has been proposed \r\nas a useful focus for food system governance (Vermeulen et al. 2020); \r\nfor example, the Milan Urban Food Policy Pact involves 180 global \r\ncities committed to integrative food system strategies (Candel 2019; \r\nMoragues-Faus 2021). Local food policy groups and councils that \r\nassemble stakeholders from government, civil society, and the private \r\nsector have formed trans-local networks of place-based local food \r\npolicy groups, with over two hundred food policy councils worldwide \r\n(Andree et al. 2018). However, the fluidity and lack of clear agendas "


id: 4f932b0aff873eab0234fc3ce69341b4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11286
content:
"Until 2016, the strategic goals of Finnish food policy were split between different programmes and ministries, resulting in fragmented \r\nnational oversight of the Finnish food system. To enable policy coordination, a national food strategy was adopted in 2017 called \r\nFood2030 (Government of Finland 2017). Food2030 embodies a holistic food system approach and addresses multiple outcomes of \r\nthe food system, including the competitiveness of the food supply chain and the development of local, organic and climate-friendly \r\nfood production, as well as responsible and sustainable consumption."


id: c763b74228af6fd1b7bd4b5e2199bb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32397
content:
"mitigation measures that occupy land while not being considered \r\nland-based measures, we discuss ways to minimise potential \r\nadverse effects, and we consider the potential for synergies through \r\nintegrating mitigation measures with other land uses, by applying \r\na systems perspective that seeks to meet multiple objectives from \r\nmulti-functional landscapes. Mitigation measures with zero land \r\noccupation, e.g., offshore wind and kelp farming, are not considered."


id: 87186b7ef8a4a92013f1ffad344a60e9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20930
content:
"This section provides a cross-sectoral perspective on land occupation \r\nand related impacts, risks and opportunities associated with land\u0002based mitigation options, as well as mitigation options that are not \r\ndesignated land-based, yet occupy land. It builds on Chapter 7, which \r\ncovers mitigation in agriculture, forestry and other land use (AFOLU, \r\nincluding future availability of biomass resources for mitigation in \r\nother sectors. It complements Section 12.4, which covers mitigation \r\ninherent in the food system, as well as Chapters  6, 9, 10 and 11, \r\nwhich cover mitigation in the energy, transport, building and industry \r\nsectors, and Chapters 3 and 4 which cover land and biomass use, \r\nprimarily in energy applications, in mitigation and development \r\npathways in the near- to mid-term (Chapter  4) and in pathways \r\ncompatible with long-term goals (Chapter 3)."


id: f72ff89a9d3a0b47fc15bd7269fc4ac2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40863
content:
"The deployment of climate change mitigation options often affects \r\nland and water conditions, and ecosystem capacity to support \r\nbiodiversity and a range of ecosystem services (IPCC 2019a; IPBES \r\n2019) (robust evidence, high agreement). It can increase or decrease \r\nterrestrial carbon stocks and sink strength, hence impacting the \r\nmitigation effect positively or negatively. As for any other land uses, \r\nimpacts, risks and opportunities associated with mitigation options \r\nthat occupy land depend on deployment strategy and on contextual \r\nfactors that vary geographically and over time (Doelman et al. 2018; \r\nHurlbert et al. 2019; Smith et al. 2019a; Wu et al. 2020) (robust \r\nevidence, high agreement)."


id: ca7e8fe4410d3d1d6e9697cf59eee78d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32966
content:
"Depending on emissions-reduction targets, the portfolio of mitigation \r\noptions chosen, and the policies developed to support their \r\nimplementation, different land-use pathways can arise with large \r\ndifferences in resulting agricultural and forest area. Some response \r\noptions can be more effective when applied together (Smith et al. \r\n2019b); for example, dietary change, efficiency increases, and reduced \r\nwastage can reduce emissions as well as the pressure on land resources, \r\npotentially enabling additional land-based mitigation such as A/R and \r\ncultivation of biomass crops for biochar, bioenergy and other bio-based \r\nproducts. The SRCCL (Smith et al. 2019b) report that dietary change \r\ncombined with reduction in food loss and waste can reduce the land "


id: 119b86e3a29d89d26804f85f21bb120
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 290
content:
"The IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5degC (SR1.5) found \r\nthat large areas may be utilised for A/R and energy crops in modelled \r\npathways limiting warming to 1.5degC (Rogelj et al. 2018). The SRCCL \r\ninvestigated the implications of land-based mitigation measures for \r\nland degradation, food security and climate change adaptation. It \r\nfocused on identification of synergies and trade-offs associated with \r\nindividual land-based mitigation measures (Smith et al. 2019b). \r\nIn this section we expand beyond the scope of the Special Report \r\non Climate Change and Land (SRCCL) assessment to include also "


id: a624b6e1304ab5f043233ec6bec3daad
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26453
content:
"requirement for food production by up to 5.8 Mkm2 (0.8-2.4 Mkm2\r\nfor dietary change; about 2 Mkm2\r\n for reduced post-harvest losses, and \r\n1.4 Mkm2\r\n for reduced food waste) (Parodi et al. 2018; Springmann et al. \r\n2018; Clark et al. 2020; Rosenzweig et al. 2020b) (Sections 7.4 and \r\n12.4). Stronger mitigation action in the near term targeting non-CO2\r\nemissions reduction and deployment of other CDR options (DACCS, \r\nenhanced weathering, ocean-based approaches; see Section 12.3) can \r\nreduce the land requirement for land-based mitigation (Obersteiner \r\net al. 2018; van Vuuren et al. 2018)."


id: 89622c0f3c651d403b25f729ecd3f849
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21347
content:
"Capellan-Perez et al. (2017) and Dupont et al. (2020) report 2-3% \r\navailability of urbanised surface area, when considering factors \r\nsuch as roof slopes and shadows between buildings, and threshold \r\nrelating to energy return on investment. Land occupation of solar \r\ntechnologies is considered to be underestimated in studies assuming \r\nideal conditions, with real occupation being five to ten times higher \r\n(De Castro et al. 2013; MacKay 2013; Ong et al. 2013; Smil 2015; \r\nCapellan-Perez et al. 2017)."


id: 15efb3f68c232e291f2b3d2bbba4204f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1077
content:
"Production of hydrogen and synthetic hydrocarbon fuels via \r\nelectrolysis and hydrocarbon synthesis is subject to conversion losses \r\nthat vary depending on technology, system integration and source \r\nof carbon (Wulf et al. 2020; Ince et al. 2021) (Sections 6.4.4.1 and \r\n6.4.5.1). Indicative electricity-to-hydrocarbon fuel efficiency loss is \r\nestimated at about 60% (Ueckerdt et al. 2021). The advantage of \r\nsmaller land occupation for solar, wind, hydro and nuclear, compared \r\nwith biomass-based options, is therefore smaller for hydrocarbon \r\nfuels than for electricity. Furthermore, biofuels are often co-produced \r\nwith other bio-based products, which further reduces their land \r\noccupation, although comparisons are complicated by inconsistent \r\napproaches to allocating land occupation between co-products \r\n(Ahlgren et al. 2015; Czyrnek-Deletre et al. 2017)."


id: c44cc0dc2ce398dcbaeaa40612c4639e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31825
content:
"Note that comparisons on a  per-MWh basis do not reflect \r\nthe GHG emissions associated with the power options, or that the \r\ndifferent options serve different functions in power systems. \r\nReservoir hydropower and biomass-based dispatchable power can \r\ncomplement other balancing options (e.g.,  battery storage, grid \r\nextensions and demand-side management (Goransson and Johnsson \r\n2018) (Chapter 6) to provide power stability and quality needed in \r\npower systems with large amounts of variable electricity generation \r\nfrom wind and solar power plants. Furthermore, the requirements of \r\ntransport in grids, pipelines and so on differ. For example, electricity \r\nfrom buildings-integrated PV can be used in the same location as \r\nit is generated."


id: 91ba023f6076e6198516dede150f7f29
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22863
content:
"The land occupation of PV depends on the share of ground-mounted \r\nversus buildings-integrated PV, the latter assumed to reach 75% \r\nshare by 2050 (Luderer et al. 2019). van de Ven et al. (2021) assumed \r\na  3% share of urbanised land in 2050 available for rooftop PV; "


id: 56ff66e147fc3540c0b871bfeb47fb27
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12554
content:
"biomass may also be a  co-product. We then discuss impacts and \r\nopportunities common to both systems, before considering impacts \r\nand opportunities associated with non-land-based mitigation options \r\nthat nevertheless occupy land."


id: dce6ae29be0925046b56ee6d07559d3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36127
content:
"forest ownership and the character and product portfolio of the \r\nassociated forest industry (Lauri et al. 2019; Favero et al. 2020). \r\nHow forest carbon stocks, biodiversity, hydrology, and so on are \r\naffected by changes in forest management and harvesting in turn \r\ndepends on both management practices and the characteristics of \r\nthe forest ecosystems (Eales et al. 2018; Griscom et al. 2018; Kondo \r\net al. 2018; Nieminen et al. 2018; Thom et al. 2018; Runting et al. \r\n2019; Tharammal et al. 2019) (robust evidence, medium agreement). \r\nAs described above, the GHG savings achieved from producing and \r\nusing bio-based products will in addition depend on the character \r\nof existing societal systems, including technical infrastructure and \r\nmarkets, as this determines the product substitution patterns."


id: 1b2c3005c1d263cf9243a70b83f2611c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1971
content:
"Environmental and socio-economic co-benefits are enhanced when \r\necological restoration principles are applied (Gann et al. 2019) along \r\nwith effective planning at landscape level and strong governance \r\n(Morgan et al., 2020). For example, restoration of natural vegetation \r\nand establishing plantations on degraded land enable organic \r\nmatter to accumulate in the soil and have potential to deliver \r\nsignificant co-benefits for biodiversity, land resource condition \r\nand livelihoods (Box  12.3 and Cross-Working Group Box  3  in this \r\nchapter). Tree planting and agroforestry on cleared land can deliver \r\nbiodiversity benefits (Seddon et al. 2009; Kavanagh and Stanton \r\n2012; Law et al. 2014), with biodiversity outcomes influenced by \r\nblock size, configuration and species mix (Cunningham et al. 2015; \r\nPaul et al. 2016) (robust evidence, high agreement)."


id: 98d2b9c3fdfb658517393c6906a57542
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24102
content:
"When A/R activities comprise the establishment of natural forests, \r\nthe risk to land is primarily associated with potential displacement \r\nof previous land use to new locations, which could indirectly \r\ncause land-use change including deforestation (Sections 7.4.2 and \r\n7.6.2.4). A/R (including agroforestry) aimed at providing timber, fibre, \r\nbiomass, non-timber resources and other ecosystem services can \r\nprovide renewable resources to society and long-term livelihoods \r\nfor communities. Forest management and harvesting regimes \r\naround the world will adjust in different ways as society seeks to \r\nmeet climate goals. The outcome depends on forest type, climate, "


id: c56e354f0832698b2944724697328cc7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32044
content:
"Biomass-based systems and A/R can contribute to addressing \r\nland degradation through land rehabilitation or restoration \r\n(Box  12.3). Land-based mitigation options that produce biomass \r\nfor bioenergy/BECCS or biochar through land rehabilitation rather \r\nthan land restoration imply a trade-off between production / carbon \r\nsequestration and biodiversity outcomes (Hua et al. 2016; Cowie "


id: 76f334476120fa9e036ec87106d25d7d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18135
content:
"Another example of beneficial effects includes perennial grasses \r\nand woody crops planted to intercept runoff and subsurface lateral \r\nflow, reducing nitrate entering groundwater and surface waterbodies \r\n(Femeena et al. 2018; Woodbury et al. 2018; Griffiths et al. 2019). In \r\nIndia, Garg et al. (2011) found desirable effects as a result of planting \r\nJatropha on wastelands previously used for grazing (which could \r\ncontinue in the Jatropha plantations): soil evaporation was reduced, \r\nas a larger share of the rainfall was channelled to plant transpiration \r\nand groundwater recharge, and less runoff resulted in reduced soil \r\nerosion and improved downstream water conditions. Thus, adverse \r\neffects can be reduced and synergies achieved when plantings are \r\nsited carefully, with consideration of potential hydrological impacts \r\n(Davis et al. 2013)."


id: 9fe1c5be43afb49432e3490901aed4d2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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content:
"Several biomass conversion technologies can generate co-benefits \r\nfor land and water. Anaerobic digestion of organic wastes (e.g., food "


id: 6633473cfef16bb7b43394a163d5a02b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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content:
"Both A/R and dedicated biomass production could have adverse \r\nimpacts on food security and cause indirect land-use change if \r\ndeployed in locations used for food production (IPCC 2019a). But \r\nthe degree of impact associated with a  certain mitigation option \r\nalso depends on how deployment takes place and the rate and total \r\nscale of deployment. The highest increases in food insecurity due to \r\ndeployment of land-based mitigation are expected to occur in sub\u0002Saharan Africa and Asia (Hasegawa et al. 2018). The land area that \r\ncould be used for bioenergy or other land-based mitigation options \r\nwith low to moderate risks to food security depends on patterns \r\nof socio-economic development, reaching limits between 1  and \r\n4 million km2\r\n (Hurlbert et al. 2019; IPCC 2019a; Smith et al. 2019c)."


id: a2e4286efd784650d18001ecd082e68b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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vector_id: 25874
content:
"The land requirement and impacts (including visual and noise impacts) \r\nof onshore wind turbines depend on the size and type of installation, \r\nand location (Ioannidis and Koutsoyiannis 2020). Wind power and \r\nagriculture can coexist in beneficial ways and wind power production \r\non agriculture land is well established (Fritsche et al. 2017; Miller and \r\nKeith 2018a). Spatial planning and local stakeholder engagement can \r\nreduce opposition due to visual landscape impacts and noise (Frolova \r\net al. 2019; Hevia-Koch and Ladenburg 2019). Repowering, that is, \r\nreplacing with higher capacity wind turbines, can mitigate additional \r\nland requirement associated with deployment towards higher share \r\nof wind in power systems (Pryor et al. 2020)."


id: 4adebff18721fce1070d31ee3e006f19
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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content:
"The use of less productive, degraded/marginal lands has received \r\nattention as an option for biomass production and other land-based \r\nmitigation that can improve the productive and adaptive capacity \r\nof the lands (Liu et al. 2017; Qin et al. 2018; Dias et al. 2021; Kreig \r\net al. 2021) (Section 7.4.4 and Cross-Working Group Box 3 in this \r\nchapter). The potential is however uncertain as biomass growth rates \r\nmay be low, a  variety of assessment approaches have been used, \r\nand the identification of degraded/marginal land as 'available' has \r\nbeen contested, as much low productivity land is used informally \r\nby impoverished communities, particularly for grazing, or may \r\nbe economically infeasible or environmentally undesirable for \r\ndevelopment of energy crops (medium evidence, low agreement) \r\n(Baka 2013; Fritz et al. 2013; Haberl et al. 2013; Baka 2014)."


id: aed5dd01d071ed820b9a6f8e47aff9e0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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content:
"As many of the SDGs are closely linked to land use, the identification \r\nand promotion of mitigation options that rely on land uses described \r\nabove can support a  growing use of bio-based products while \r\nadvancing several SDGs, such as SDG 2 (zero hunger), SDG 6 (clean \r\nwater and sanitation), SDG  7  (affordable and clean energy) and \r\nSDG 15 (life on land) (Fritsche et al. 2017; IRP 2019; Blair et al. 2021). \r\nPolicies supporting the target of Land Degradation Neutrality (LDN) \r\n(SDG  15.3) encourage planning of measures to counteract loss of \r\nproductive land due to unsustainable agricultural practices and land \r\nconversion, through sustainable land management and strategic \r\nrestoration and rehabilitation of degraded land (Cowie et al. 2018). \r\nLDN can thus be an incentive for land-based mitigation measures "


id: a8bddbd7001c8a79d0a3e756a888a628
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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content:
"As for wind power, land impacts of solar power depend on the \r\nlocation, size and type of installation (Ioannidis and Koutsoyiannis \r\n2020). Establishment of large-scale solar farms could have positive \r\nor negative environmental effects at the site of deployment, \r\ndepending on the location. Solar PV and CSP power installations \r\ncan lock away land areas, displacing other uses (Mohan 2017). Solar "


id: 437648115326cdea8dc87b75080e6ee0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9092
content:
"reserve has been established around Chernobyl to conserve, enhance \r\nand manage carbon stocks and biodiversity (Deryabina et al. 2015; \r\nEwing et al. 2016), although invertebrate and plant populations are \r\naffected (Mousseau and Moller 2014; Mousseau and Moller 2020)."


id: bf43219e0171c81db94dcc5cc999a2cf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30919
content:
"The land sector (Chapter 7) contributes to mitigation via emissions \r\nreduction and enhancement of land carbon sinks, and by providing \r\nbiomass for mitigation in other sectors. Key challenges for governance "


id: 37ef2f8214070c638eaeb920bf1ce1ff
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7050
content:
"of land-based mitigation include social and environmental safeguards \r\n(Duchelle et al. 2017; Sills et al. 2017; Larson et al. 2018); insufficient \r\nfinancing (Turnhout et al. 2017); capturing co-benefits; ensuring \r\nadditionality; addressing non-permanence of carbon sequestration; \r\nmonitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) of emissions reduction \r\nand carbon dioxide removals; and avoiding leakage or spillover \r\neffects. Governance approaches to addressing these challenges are \r\ndiscussed in Section  7.6, and include MRV systems and integrity \r\ncriteria for project-level emissions trading; payments for ecosystem \r\nservices; land-use planning and land zoning; certification schemes, \r\nstandards and codes of practice."


id: e2aa5a66cf6c56cb8f9202b9f8a5bdea
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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vector_id: 37179
content:
"Box 12.3 | Land Degradation Neutrality as a Framework to Manage Trade-offs \r\nin Land-based Mitigation"


id: 9d960437b21ab0d32dc720242748f910
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24962
content:
"The United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) introduced the concept of Land Degradation Neutrality (LDN), \r\ndefined as 'a state whereby the amount and quality of land resources necessary to support ecosystem functions and services and \r\nenhance food security remain stable or increase within specified temporal and spatial scales and ecosystems' (UNCCD 2015), and it \r\nhas been adopted as a target of SDG 15 (life on land). At December 2020, 124 (mostly developing) countries had committed to pursue \r\nvoluntary LDN targets."


id: 2f18383c3d5471ec23a2dea1d8784217
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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content:
"The goal of LDN is to maintain or enhance land-based natural capital, and its associated ecosystem services, such as provision \r\nof food and regulation of water and climate, while enhancing the resilience of the communities that depend on the land. LDN \r\nencourages a dual-pronged approach promoting sustainable land management (SLM) to avoid or reduce land degradation, combined \r\nwith strategic effort in land restoration and rehabilitation to reverse degradation on degraded lands and thereby deliver the target of \r\n'no net loss' of productive land (Orr et al. 2017)."


id: 4f628cffbb271070246411bac3f6e64a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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content:
"In the context of LDN, land restoration refers to actions undertaken with the aim of reinstating ecosystem functionality, whereas land \r\nrehabilitation refers to actions undertaken with a goal of provision of goods and services (Cowie et al. 2018). Restoration interventions \r\ncan include destocking to encourage regeneration of native vegetation; shelter belts of local species established from seed or \r\nseedlings, strategically located to provide wildlife corridors and link habitat; and rewetting drained peatland. 'Farmer-managed natural \r\nregeneration' is a low-cost restoration approach in which regeneration of tree stumps and roots is encouraged, stabilising soil and "


id: 73f51bd9190cb4bb2fd3e6293bc3a0ae
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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vector_id: 17645
content:
"enhancing soil nutrients and organic matter levels (Chomba et al. 2020; Lohbeck et al. 2020). Rehabilitation actions include \r\nestablishment of energy crops, or afforestation with fast-growing exotic trees to sequester carbon or produce timber. Application of \r\nbiochar can facilitate rehabilitation by enhancing nutrient retention and water-holding capacity, and stimulating microbial activity \r\n(Cowie 2020a)."


id: fc623b0ffa1ab167918e12140be84423
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41768
content:
"SLM, rehabilitation and restoration activities undertaken towards national LDN targets have potential to deliver substantial CDR \r\nthrough carbon sequestration in vegetation and soil. In addition, biomass production, for bioenergy or biochar, could be an economically \r\nviable land use option for reversing degradation, through rehabilitation. Alternatively, a focus on ecological restoration (Gann et al. \r\n2019) as the strategy for reversing degradation will deliver greater biodiversity benefits."


id: 9cbc866ecae448ef20342b3ff368cf3e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24812
content:
"Achieving neutrality requires estimating the likely impacts of land-use and land-management decisions, to determine the area of land, \r\nof each land type, that is likely to be degraded (Orr et al. 2017). This information is used to plan interventions to reverse degradation on \r\nan equal area of the same land type. Therefore, pursuit of LDN requires concerted and coordinated efforts to integrate LDN objectives \r\ninto land-use planning and land management, underpinned by sound understanding of the human-environment system and effective \r\ngovernance mechanisms."


id: a9a86206721117f663ec48a44eac61f8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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content:
"Countries are advised to apply a landscape-scale approach for planning LDN interventions, in which land uses are matched to land \r\npotential, and resilience of current and proposed land uses is considered, to ensure that improvement in land condition is likely to \r\nbe maintained (Cowie 2020a). A  participatory approach that enables effective representation of all stakeholders is encouraged, \r\nto facilitate equitable outcomes from planning decisions, recognising that decisions on LDN interventions are likely to involve trade\u0002offs between various environmental and socio-economic objectives (Schulze et al. 2021)."


id: 1d87d3bb157f9b8fab851fd6ea1ca2dd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Planning and implementation of LDN programmes provides a framework in which locally-adapted land-based mitigation options \r\ncan be integrated with use of land for production, conservation and settlements, in multifunctional landscapes where trade-offs \r\nare recognised and managed, and synergistic opportunities are sought. LDN is thus a vehicle to focus collaboration in pursuit of the \r\nmultiple land-based objectives of the multilateral environmental agreements and the SDGs."


id: 2d60970fc1332d4b56c6a9e0404d8f97
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5267
content:
"Table 12.10 collates risks, impacts and opportunities associated with \r\ndifferent mitigation options that occupy land."


id: 5b9b1b1eed37feebbfb9c790f620cffb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13366
content:
"Table 12.10 | Summary of impacts, risks and co-benefits associated with land occupation by mitigation options considered in Section 12.5."


id: 65e0e121095046920770185bae70a851
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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vector_id: 15184
content:
"3 For lack of space, the focus is on land only, although the bioeconomy also includes sea-related bioresources."


id: 77c82a2e5f37c393980c281e2e604d28
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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content:
"Authors: Henry Neufeldt (Denmark/Germany), Goran Berndes (Sweden), Almut Arneth (Germany), Rachel Bezner Kerr (the United \r\nStates of America/Canada), Luisa F Cabeza (Spain), Donovan Campbell (Jamaica), Jofre Carnicer Cols (Spain), Annette Cowie (Australia), \r\nVassilis Daioglou (Greece), Joanna House (United Kingdom), Adrian Leip (Italy/Germany), Francisco Meza (Chile), Michael Morecroft \r\n(United Kingdom), Gert-Jan Nabuurs (Netherlands), Camille Parmesan (United Kingdom/the United States of America), Julio C. Postigo \r\n(the United States of America/Peru), Marta G. Rivera-Ferre (Spain), Raphael Slade (United Kingdom), Maria Cristina Tirado von der \r\nPahlen (the United States of America/Spain), Pramod K. Singh (India), Pete Smith (United Kingdom)"


id: b067a1223bda7383589b11f15319af1b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28272
content:
"The growing demand for biomass offers both opportunities and challenges to mitigate and adapt to climate change and natural \r\nresource constraints (high confidence). Increased technology innovation, stakeholder integration and transparent governance \r\nstructures and procedures at local to global scales are key to successful bioeconomy deployment maximising benefits and managing \r\ntrade-offs (high confidence)."


id: fdf9f9d289a9ecb3158460874ba8453d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42050
content:
"Limited global land and biomass resources accompanied by growing demands for food, feed, fibre, and fuels, together with prospects \r\nfor a paradigm shift towards phasing out fossil fuels, set the frame for potentially fierce competition for land3\r\n and biomass to meet \r\nburgeoning demands, even as climate change increasingly limits natural resource potentials (high confidence)."


id: 69190320904a253cc89418dfb787fd60
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15758
content:
"Sustainable agriculture and forestry, technology innovation in bio-based production within a circular economy, and international \r\ncooperation and governance of global trade in products to reflect and disincentivise their environmental and social externalities, can \r\nprovide mitigation and adaptation via bioeconomy development that responds to the needs and perspectives of multiple stakeholders \r\nto achieve outcomes that maximise synergies while limiting trade-offs (high confidence)."


id: c960b2da9fd42fd366ce646a6d78c44c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32754
content:
"There is high confidence that climate change, population growth and changes in per capita consumption will increase pressures \r\non managed as well as natural and semi-natural ecosystems, exacerbating existing risks to livelihoods, biodiversity, human and \r\necosystem health, infrastructure, and food systems (Conijn et al. 2018; IPCC 2018; IPCC 2019a; Lade et al. 2020). At the same time, \r\nmany global mitigation scenarios presented in IPCC assessment reports rely on large GHG emissions reduction in the AFOLU sector \r\nand concurrent deployment of reforestation/afforestation and biomass use in a multitude of applications (Rogelj et al. 2018; Hanssen \r\net al. 2020) (AR6 WGI Chapters 4 and 5, AR6 WGIII Chapters 3 and 7)."


id: 3ea15bd14f351383abd1d2e0008dd70f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8204
content:
"Given the finite availability of natural resources, there are invariably trade-offs that complicate land-based mitigation unless land \r\nproductivity can be enhanced without undermining ecosystem services (Obersteiner et al. 2016; Campbell et al. 2017; Caron et al. \r\n2018; Conijn et al. 2018; Heck et al. 2018; Searchinger 2018a; Smith et al. 2019). Management intensities can often be adapted to local \r\nconditions with consideration of other functions and ecosystem services, but at a global scale the challenge remains to avoid further \r\ndeforestation and degradation of intact ecosystems, in particular biodiversity-rich systems (AR6 WGII Cross-Chapter Box NATURAL), \r\nwhile meeting the growing demands. Further, increased land-use competition can affect food prices and impact food security and \r\nlivelihoods (To and Grafton 2015; Chakravorty et al. 2017), with possible knock-on effects related to civil unrest (Abbott et al. 2017; \r\nD'Odorico et al. 2018)."


id: 37b83edf2b5625de4783766775662a2c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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content:
"Changes on the demand side as well as improvements in resource-use efficiencies within the global food and other bio-based systems \r\ncan also reduce pressures on the remaining land resources. For example, dietary changes toward more plant-based food (where \r\nappropriate) and reduced food waste can provide climate change mitigation along with health benefits (Willett et al. 2019) (AR6 WGIII \r\nSections 7.4 and 12.4) and other co-benefits with regard to food security, adaptation and land use (Mbow et al. 2019; Smith et al. \r\n2019a) (AR6 WGII Chapter 5). Advancements in the provision of novel food and feed sources (e.g., cultured meat, insects, grass-based \r\nprotein feed and cellular agriculture) can also limit the pressures on finite natural resources (Parodi et al. 2018; Zabaniotou 2018) \r\n(AR6 WGIII Section 12.4)."


id: 875f0387d771cab9da46627de8240a28
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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content:
"Scarcity is an argument for adopting circular economy principles for the management of biomass, as for non-renewable resources. \r\nWaste avoidance, product reuse and material recycling keep down resource use while maintaining product and material value. However, \r\nreuse and recycling are not always feasible, for example when biofuels are used for transport and bio-based biodegradable chemicals \r\nare used to reduce ecological impacts, where losses to the environment are unavoidable. A balanced approach to management of \r\nbiomass resources could start from the perspective of value preservation within the carbon cycle, with possible routes for biomass use \r\nbased on the carbon budget defined by the Paris Agreement, principles for sustainable land use and natural ecosystem protection."


id: 8995ed5a82dd8d2678bb3beb806cce61
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21381
content:
"Analyses of synergies and trade-offs between adaptation and mitigation in the agriculture and forestry sectors show that outcomes \r\ndepend on context, design and implementation, so actions have to be tailored to the specific conditions to minimise adverse effects \r\n(Kongsager 2018). This is supported in literature analysing the nexus between land, water, energy and food in the context of climate \r\nchange, which consistently concludes that addressing these different domains together rather than in isolation would enhance \r\nsynergies and reduce trade-offs (Obersteiner et al. 2016; D'Odorico et al. 2018; Soto Golcher and Visseren-Hamakers 2018; Froese \r\net al. 2019; Momblanch et al. 2019)."


id: 708cc27c38f9d25b87ff2fbc172658d7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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vector_id: 17059
content:
"Nature-based solutions addressing climate change can provide opportunities for sustainable livelihoods as well as multiple ecosystem \r\nservices, such as flood risk management through floodplain restoration, saltmarshes, mangroves or peat renaturation (UNEP 2021; \r\nAR6 WGII Cross-Chapter Box NATURAL). Climate-smart agriculture can increase productivity while enhancing resilience and reducing \r\nGHG emissions inherent to production (Lipper et al. 2014; Bell et al. 2018; FAO 2019b; Singh and Chudasama 2021). Similarly, climate\u0002smart forestry considers the whole value chain and integrates climate objectives into forest sector management through multiple \r\nmeasures (from strict reserves to more intensively managed forests) providing mitigation and adaptation benefits (Nabuurs et al. \r\n2018; Verkerk et al. 2020) (AR6 WGIII Section 7.3)."


id: c208b089463d607f121ed3f62c69d4a7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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vector_id: 31435
content:
"Cross-Working Group Box 3, Figure 1 | Left: High-input intensive agriculture, aiming for high yields of a few crop species, with large fields and no semi-natural \r\nhabitats. Right: Agroecological agriculture, supplying a range of ecosystem services, relying on biodiversity and crop and animal diversity instead of external inputs, \r\nand integrating plant and animal production, with smaller fields and presence of semi-natural habitats. Source: Reprinted by permission from Springer Nature \r\nCustomer Service Centre GmbH: Springer Nature, Nature Sustainability, Towards better representation of organic agriculture in life cycle assessment, Hayo M. G. van \r\nder Werf et al. (c) 2020."


id: 147b4ef3363929d775af4db56de7f91
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 829
content:
"Decisions on land uses between biomass production for food, feed, fibre or fuel, as well as nature conservation or restoration and \r\nother uses (e.g., mining, urban infrastructure), depend on differences in perspectives and values. Because the availability of land for \r\ndiverse biomass uses is invariably limited, setting priorities for land-use allocations therefore first depends on making the perspectives \r\nunderlying what is considered as 'high-value' explicit (Fischer et al. 2007; Garnett et al. 2015; De Boer and Van Ittersum 2018; "


id: 4883d90819a8babcdc7eb79c779d8a04
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9972
content:
"Muscat et al. 2020). Decisions can then be made transparently based on societal norms, needs and the available resource base. \r\nPrioritisation of land use for the common good therefore requires societal consensus building embedded in the socio-economic and \r\ncultural fabric of regions, societies and communities. Integration of local decision-making with national planning ensures local actions \r\ncomplement national development objectives."


id: 116901b6c4322ab960c956392b70ed1d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 259
content:
"In summary, there is significant scope for optimising use of land resources to produce more biomass while reducing adverse effects \r\n(high confidence). Context-specific prioritisation, technology innovation in bio-based production, integrative policies, coordinated \r\ninstitutions and improved governance mechanisms to enhance synergies and minimise trade-offs can mitigate the pressure on \r\nmanaged as well as natural and semi-natural ecosystems (medium confidence). Yet, energy conservation and efficiency measures, and \r\ndeployment of technologies and systems that do not rely on carbon-based energy and materials, are essential for mitigating biomass \r\ndemand growth as countries pursue ambitious climate goals (high confidence)."


id: 2c0516b5fb4d707df8d7885c7cd071a2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4997
content:
"the focus turns from sector-specific mitigation measures to mitigation \r\nmeasures which have cross-sectoral implications, including measures \r\nthat have application in more than one sector and measures where \r\nimplementation in one sector impacts on implementation in another. \r\nFinally, Section  12.6.1.3 notes the cross-sectoral relevance of \r\na selection of general-purpose technologies, a topic that is covered \r\nfurther in Chapter 16."


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vector_id: 25541
content:
"This section presents further cross-sectoral considerations related \r\nto GHG mitigation. Firstly, various cross-sectoral perspectives on \r\nmitigation actions are presented. Then, sectoral policy interactions \r\nare presented. Finally, implications in terms of international trade \r\nspillover effects and competitiveness, and finance flows and related \r\nspillover effects at the sectoral level, are addressed."


id: 42503ebecb0975643e223f01e787485c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8864
content:
"A body of literature has been developed which addresses the \r\nco-benefits of climate mitigation action (Karlsson et al. 2020). Adverse \r\nside effects of mitigation are also well documented. Co-benefits \r\nand adverse side effects in individual sectors and associated with \r\nindividual mitigation measures are discussed in the individual sector \r\nchapters (Sections 5.2, 6.7.7, 7.4, 7.6, 8.2, 8.4, 9.8, 10.1.1 and 11.5.3), \r\nas well as in previous IPCC General and Special Assessment reports. \r\nThe term 'co-impacts' has been proposed to capture both the co\u0002benefits and adverse side effects of mitigation. An alternative framing \r\nis one of multiple objectives, where climate change mitigation is \r\nplaced alongside other objectives when assessing policy decisions "


id: ab60a719ffab401e519dd95c8fca69e1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27386
content:
"Chapters 5 to 11 present mitigation measures applicable in individual \r\nsectors, and potential co-benefits and adverse side effects4\r\n of these \r\nindividual measures. This section builds on the sectoral analysis \r\nof mitigation action from a  cross-sectoral perspective. Firstly, \r\nSection 12.6.1.1 brings together some of the observations presented \r\nin the sectoral chapters to show how different mitigation actions in \r\ndifferent sectors can contribute to the same co-benefits and result \r\nin the same adverse side effects, thereby demonstrating the potential \r\nsynergistic effects. The links between these co-benefits and adverse \r\nside effects and the SDGs is also demonstrated. In Section 12.6.1.2, "


id: b472faee04af9f154c2a18a671f0dec9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28987
content:
"for energy storage has the potential to contribute to protecting water \r\nresources and reducing wastes associated with coal-fired power in \r\nmany parts of the world, but mining of lithium has the potential \r\nfor creating water and waste challenges if not managed properly \r\n(Agusdinata et al. 2018; Kaunda 2020)."


id: c5dc0c3064fc7e8210de3de5b151859
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32115
content:
"(Urge-Vorsatz et al. 2014; Mayrhofer and Gupta 2016; Cohen et al. \r\n2017; Bhardwaj et al. 2019)."


id: 63ba978d9135674564df1c9510bd0e95
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14833
content:
"The identification and assessment of co-benefits has been argued to \r\nserve a  number of functions (Section  1.4) including using them as \r\nleverage for securing financial support for implementation, providing \r\njustification of actions which provide a balance of both short- and long\u0002term benefits and obtaining stakeholder buy-in (robust evidence, low \r\nagreement) (Karlsson et al. 2020). Assessment of adverse side effects \r\nhas been suggested to be useful in avoiding unforeseen negative \r\nimpacts of mitigation and providing policy- and decision-makers with \r\nthe information required to make informed trade-offs between climate \r\nand other benefits of actions (Urge-Vorsatz et al. 2014; Bhardwaj et al. \r\n2019; Cohen et al. 2019) (high evidence, low agreement)."


id: ddf2b02c3d622965dfc865857ba0a367
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36309
content:
"While earlier literature has suggested that co-impacts assessments \r\ncan support adoption of climate mitigation action, a  more recent \r\nbody of literature has suggested limitations in such framing (Ryan \r\n2015; Bernauer and McGrath 2016; Walker et al. 2018). Presenting \r\ngeneral information on co-impacts as a component of a mitigation \r\nanalysis does not always lead to increased support for climate \r\nmitigation action. Rather, the most effective framing is determined \r\nby factors relating to local context, type of mitigation action under \r\nconsideration and target stakeholder group. More work has been \r\nidentified to be required to bring context into planning co-impacts \r\nassessments and communication thereof (Ryan 2015; Bernauer and \r\nMcGrath 2016; Walker et al. 2018) (low evidence, low agreement)."


id: d1d0ba810051dc619503482ff42fd37
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34266
content:
"Various approaches to identifying and organising co-impacts in \r\nspecific contexts and across sectors have been proposed towards \r\nproviding more comparable and standardised analyses. However, \r\nconsistent quantification of co-impacts, including cost-benefit \r\nanalysis, and the utilisation of the resulting information, remain \r\na challenge (Urge-Vorsatz et al. 2014; Floater et al. 2016; Mayrhofer \r\nand Gupta 2016; Cohen et al. 2019; Karlsson et al. 2020). This \r\nchallenge is further exacerbated when considering that co-impacts of \r\na mitigation measure in one sector can either enhance or reduce the \r\nco-impacts associated with mitigation in another, or the achievement \r\nof co-benefits in one geographic location can lead to adverse side \r\neffects in another. For example, the production of lithium for batteries "


id: 5116cb725871a101a84a79b0e7721de7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"An area where the strong link between the cross-sectoral co-impacts \r\nof mitigation action and global government policies is being clearly \r\nconsidered is in the achievement of the SDGs (Obergassel et al. 2017; \r\nDoukas et al. 2018; Markkanen and Anger-Kraavi 2019; Smith et al. \r\n2019; van Soest et al. 2019) (Chapters 1 and 17, individual sectoral \r\nchapters). Figure 12.9 demonstrates these relationships from a cross\u0002sectoral perspective. It shows the links between sectors which give \r\nrise to emissions, the mitigation measures that can find application "


id: a1d84ea7efe57089706f3d3b9eb22db4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25695
content:
"in the sector, and co-benefits and adverse side effects of mitigation \r\nmeasures and the SDGs (noting that the figure is not intended to be \r\ncomprehensive). Such a framing of co-impacts from a cross-sectoral \r\nperspective in the context of the SDGs could help to further support \r\nclimate mitigation action, particularly within the context of the Paris \r\nAgreement (Gomez-Echeverri 2018) (medium evidence, medium \r\nagreement). Literature sources utilised in the compilation of this \r\ndiagram are presented in Supplementary Material 12.SM.3."


id: 9fcb1496d356c1711f7cae52be33cfad
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25320
content:
"hydrogen (Breyer et al. 2015; Anwar et al. 2020). Certain emissions \r\nreductions in the AFOLU sector are contingent on energy sector \r\ndecarbonisation. Trees and green roofs planted to counter urban \r\nheat islands reduce the demand for energy for air conditioning and \r\nsimultaneously sequester carbon (Kim and Coseo 2018; Kuronuma \r\net al. 2018). Recycling of organic waste avoids methane generation if \r\nthe waste would have been disposed of in landfill sites, can generate \r\nrenewable energy if treated through anaerobic digestion, and can \r\nreduce requirements for synthetic fertiliser production if the nutrient \r\nvalue is recovered (Creutzig et al. 2015). Liquid transport biofuels link \r\nto the land, energy and transport sectors (Section 12.5.2.2)."


id: 8099e36fd5f470f55a9e13379a3b9b8d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19753
content:
"Three aspects of mitigation from a  cross-sectoral perspective are \r\nconsidered, following Barker et al. (2007):"


id: f7f9aea0695f5eaf1e42043eda28e13d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41000
content:
"Demand-side mitigation measures, discussed in Chapter 5, also have \r\ncross-sectoral implications which need to be taken into account when \r\ncalculating mitigation potentials. Residential electrification has the \r\npotential to reduce emissions associated with lighting and heating, \r\nparticularly in developing countries where these are currently met \r\nby fossil fuels and using inefficient technologies, but will increase \r\ndemand for electricity (Chapters 5 and 8 and Sections 6.6.2.3 and \r\n8.4.3.1). Many industrial processes can also be electrified in the move \r\naway from fossil reductants and direct energy carriers (Chapter 11). \r\nThe impact of electrification on electricity sector emissions will \r\ndepend on whether electricity generation is based on fossil fuels in \r\nthe absence of CCS or low-carbon energy sources (Chapter 5)."


id: 7959c1a411d1ecac43806afb1e30f43a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18543
content:
"At this stage, however, there is no single global agreement on how circular economy principles are best implemented, and differential \r\ngovernment support for circular economy interventions is observed in different jurisdictions."


id: b1fe4a8edfff81d0572d4281ef786764
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28540
content:
"Box 12.5 provides further details on hydrogen in the context of cross\u0002sectoral mitigation specifically, while further details on the role of \r\nhydrogen in individual sectors are provided in Chapters 6, 8. 9, 10 and \r\n11. In contrast, the benefits of digitalisation, which could potentially \r\ngive rise to substantial energy savings across multiple sectors, need \r\nto be traded off against demand for electricity to operate consumer \r\ndevices, data centres, and data networks. Measures are required \r\nto increase energy efficiency of these technologies (IEA 2017). \r\nSection 5.3.4.1 of this report provides further information on energy \r\nand emissions benefits and costs of digitalisation."


id: 5ddc6ce5b32efec4d46be83a0a9ac71c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13815
content:
"General-purpose technologies (GPTs) include, but are not limited \r\nto, additive manufacturing, artificial intelligence, biotechnology, \r\nhydrogen, digitalisation, electrification, nanotechnology and robots \r\n(de Coninck et al. 2018). Many of the individual sectoral chapters have \r\nidentified the roles that such technologies can have in supporting \r\nmitigation of GHG emissions. Section 16.2.2.3 presents an overview \r\nof the individual technologies and specific applications thereof."


id: 94d760f9b78a8945559f87bfe7b41457
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23390
content:
"With respect to co-impacts of GPTs, the other focus of this chapter, \r\nit is highlighted that assessment of the environmental, social \r\nand economic implications of such technologies is challenging and \r\ncontext specific, with multiple potential cross-sectoral linkages \r\n(de  Coninck et al. 2018). Each GPT would need to be explored in \r\ncontext of what it is being used for, and potentially in the geographical \r\ncontext, in order to understand the co-impacts of its use."


id: 10ce15f742041c64999ad332fd047dc3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 142
content:
"In this chapter, which focuses on cross-sectoral implications of \r\nmitigation, it is highlighted that certain of these GPTs will find \r\napplication across the sectors, and there will be synergies and trade\u0002offs when utilising these technologies in more than sector. One \r\nexample here is the use of hydrogen as an energy carrier, which, \r\nwhen coupled with low-carbon energy, has potential for driving \r\nmitigation in energy, industry, transport, and buildings. The increased \r\nuptake of hydrogen across the economy requires establishment of \r\nhydrogen production, transport and storage infrastructure which \r\ncould simultaneously support multiple sectors, although there is the \r\npotential to utilise existing infrastructure in some parts of the world \r\n(Alanne and Cao 2017)."


id: 3970345f938378c541d3080716727052
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7318
content:
"When it comes to the production of low-carbon hydrogen, the focus of the attention is on production using electricity from renewable \r\nsources via electrolysis, so-called 'green hydrogen'. However, 'blue hydrogen', produced out of natural gas with CCS, is also often \r\nconsidered. Since a significantly increasing role for hydrogen would require considerable infrastructure investments and would affect \r\nexisting trade flows in raw materials, governments have started to set up national hydrogen strategies, both potential exporting \r\n(e.g., Australia) and importing (e.g., Japan) countries (METI 2017; COAG Energy Council 2019)."


id: e4ed0e5660e7fe46cc913dd0abca3bc6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37566
content:
"The IAM scenarios imply a modest role played by hydrogen, with some scenarios featuring higher levels of penetration. The consumption \r\nof hydrogen is projected to increase by 2050 and onwards in scenarios likely limiting global warming to 2degC or below, and the median \r\nshare of hydrogen in total final energy consumption is 2.1% in 2050 and 5.1% in 2100 (Box 12.4, Figure 1) (Numbers are based on \r\nthe AR6 scenarios database). There is large variety in hydrogen shares, but the values of 10% and more of final energy use that occur \r\nin many roadmaps are only rarely reached in the scenarios. Hydrogen is predominantly used in the industry and transportation sectors. \r\nIn the scenarios, hydrogen is produced mostly by electrolysis and by biomass energy conversion with CCS (Box 12.5, Figure 1). Natural \r\ngas with CCS is expected to play only a modest role; here a distinct difference between the roadmaps quoted before and the IAM \r\nresults is observed."


id: 14acfabb288c5bc29ea42c15ec8c8aa5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 864
content:
"It is concluded that there is increasing confidence that hydrogen can play a significant role, especially in the transport sector and the \r\nindustrial sector. However, there is much less agreement on timing and volumes, and there is also a range of perspectives on the role \r\nof the various production methods of hydrogen."


id: c198f4ac9951be0985a69df83b08c71d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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vector_id: 31363
content:
"measures. This has important implications for understanding the \r\ndifferences in magnitude and distribution of mitigation costs and \r\npotentials of Section 12.2 (Karplus et al. 2013; Rausch and Karplus \r\n2014). There is a comprehensive literature on the efficiency of uniform \r\ncarbon pricing compared to sector-specific mitigation approaches, \r\nbut relatively less literature on the distributional impacts of carbon \r\ntaxes and measures to mitigate potential adverse distributional \r\nimpacts (Rausch and Karplus 2014; Rausch and Reilly 2015; Wang \r\net al. 2016b; Ahman et al. 2017; Mu et al. 2018). For example, in terms \r\nof cross-sectoral distributional implications, studies  find negative \r\ncompetitiveness impacts for the energy-intensive industries (robust \r\nevidence, medium agreement) (Rausch and Karplus 2014; Wang et al. \r\n2016b; Ahman et al. 2017). "


id: 5695cd0a15b216eb7b07870cd455e999
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12487
content:
"A taxonomy of policy types and attributes is provided by Section 13.6. \r\nIn addition, the sectoral chapters provide an in-depth discussion of \r\nimportant mitigation policy issues such as policy overlaps, policy \r\nmixes, and policy interaction as well as policy design considerations \r\nand governance. The point of departure for the assessment in this \r\nchapter is a focus on cross-sectoral perspectives aiming at maximising \r\npolicy synergies and minimising policy trade-offs."


id: ca24967995e5ad801723b5c149bcc8c3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32902
content:
"Synergies and trade-offs resulting from mitigation policies are \r\nnot clearly discernible from either sector-level studies or global \r\nand regional top-down studies. Rather, they would require \r\na cross-sectoral integrated policy framework (von Stechow et al. \r\n2015; Monier et al. 2018; Pardoe et al. 2018; Singh et al. 2019) or \r\nmultiple-objective-multiple-impact policy assessment framework \r\nidentifying key co-impacts and avoiding trade-offs (robust evidence, \r\nhigh agreement) (Urge-Vorsatz et al. 2014)."


id: 1b64cca95228a33d34addad9fa1fe337
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1998
content:
"Strong interdependencies and cross-sectoral linkages create both \r\nopportunities for synergies and the need to address trade-offs. This \r\ncalls for coordinated sectoral approaches to climate change mitigation \r\npolicies that mainstream these interactions  (Pardoe et al. 2018). \r\nSuch an approach is also called for in the context of cross-sectoral \r\ninteractions of adaptation and mitigation measures, examples are in \r\nthe agriculture, biodiversity, forests, urban, and water sectors (Arent \r\net al. 2014; Berry et al. 2015; Di Gregorio et al. 2017).  Integrated "


id: 5e397ab5d47bec5c303e6e7b3d944c9b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13867
content:
"approaches and multi-target back-casting approaches that take into \r\naccount unanticipated outcomes and indirect consequences would \r\nbe needed (robust evidence, high agreement) (Klausbruckner et al. \r\n2016; Hoff et al. 2019; van der Voorn et al. 2020) (Box 12.6)."


id: e7dda43db6fd2a8dd0884c09387ce220
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38106
content:
"planning and cross-sectoral alignment of climate change policies are \r\nparticularly evident in developing countries' NDCs pledged under \r\nthe Paris Agreement, where key priority sectors such as agriculture \r\nand energy are closely aligned between the proposed mitigation \r\nand adaptation actions in the context of sustainable development \r\nand the SDGs. An example is the integration between climate-smart \r\nagriculture and low-carbon energy (robust evidence, high agreement) \r\n(Antwi-Agyei et al. 2018; England et al. 2018). Yet, there appear to be \r\nsignificant challenges relating to institutional capacity and resources \r\nto coordinate and implement such cross-sectoral policy alignment, \r\nparticularly in developing country contexts (Antwi-Agyei et al. 2018)."


id: 772a387106402091e8ba24db2379953e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18168
content:
"Another dimension of climate change policy  interactions  in the \r\nliterature is related to trade-offs and synergies between climate \r\nchange mitigation and other societal objectives. For example, in \r\nmitigation policies related to energy, trade-offs and synergies \r\nbetween universal electricity access and climate change mitigation \r\nwould call for complementary policies such as pro-poor tariffs, fuel \r\nsubsidies, and broadly integrated policy packages  (Dagnachew \r\net al. 2018). In agriculture and forestry, research suggests that \r\nintegrated policy programmes enhance mitigation potentials across \r\nthe land-use-agriculture-forestry nexus and lead to synergies and \r\npositive  spillovers  (Galik et al. 2019). To maximise synergies and \r\ndeal with trade-offs in such a  cross-sectoral context, evidence\u0002based/informed and holistic policy analysis approaches like nexus "


id: 827f10d126556cdedd3c8acf69f12517
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20083
content:
"Finally, there are knowledge gaps in the literature particularly in \r\nrelation to policy scalability and the extent and magnitude of policy \r\ninteractions when scaling the policy to a  level consistent with \r\nlow GHG emissions pathways such as 2degC and 1.5degC. "


id: 52f6c135c6d70376c4098920833d19ec
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11855
content:
"Shifting to renewable (in particular solar) energy reduces dependency on fossil fuel imports and greenhouse gas emissions, which is \r\ncrucial for mitigating climate change. Employing renewable energy for desalination of seawater and for cooling of greenhouses in \r\nintegrated production systems can enhance water availability, increase crop productivity and generate co-products and co-benefits \r\n(e.g., algae, fish, dryland restoration, greening of the desert)."


id: c575fec740da834c397d4b2afd2c141b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32049
content:
"The Sahara Forest project integrated production system uses amply available natural resources, namely solar energy and seawater, \r\nfor improving water availability and agricultural/biomass production, while simultaneously providing new employment opportunities. \r\nUsing hydroponic systems and humidity in the air, water needs for food production are 50% lower compared to other greenhouses."


id: 85651595d16e8b26bc2b9eba41e43ebd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20607
content:
"Technical and economic nexus solutions\r\nSeveral major technologies are combined in the Sahara Forest Project, namely electricity production through the use of solar power \r\n(PV or CSP), freshwater production through seawater desalination using renewable energy, seawater-cooled greenhouses for food \r\nproduction, and outdoor revegetation using run-off from the greenhouses."


id: 82f03e26cbdf1ca67a06cee53b928cc1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20164
content:
"The key stakeholders which benefit from such an integrated production system are from the water sector, which urgently requires an \r\naugmentation of irrigation (and other) water, and the agricultural sector, which relies on the additional desalinated water to maintain \r\nand increase agricultural production. The project also involves public and private sector partners from Jordan and abroad, with little \r\nengagement of civil society so far."


id: 39cabd35890baacf92ffd12d25ec5b6f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7383
content:
"The Sahara Forest Project has been implemented at pilot scale so far, including the first pilot with one hectare and one greenhouse \r\npilot in Qatar and a larger 'launch station' with three hectares and two greenhouses in Jordan. These pilots have been funded by \r\ninternational organisations such as the Norwegian Ministry of Climate and Environment, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the \r\nEuropean Union. Alignment with national policies, institutions and funding, as well as upscaling of the project, is underway or planned."


id: 3de0a6ef7eac816abd461591511b3f5d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8051
content:
"The multi-sectoral planning and investments that are needed to upscale the project require cooperation among the water, agriculture, \r\nand energy sectors and an active involvement of local actors, private companies, and investors. These cooperation and involvement \r\nmechanisms are currently being established in Jordan. Given the emphasis on the economic value of the project, public-private \r\npartnerships are considered as the appropriate business and governance model, when the project is upscaled. Scenarios for upscaling \r\n(seawater use primarily in low-lying areas close to the sea, to avoid energy-intensive pumping) include 50 MW of CSP, 50 hectares of \r\ngreenhouses, which would produce 34,000 tonnes of vegetables annually, provide employment for over 800 people, and sequester \r\nmore than 8000 tonnes of CO2-eq annually."


id: a32f680d5019bc923420d8b058297080
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25921
content:
"final goods but also across those producing raw materials and \r\nintermediary goods all over the world."


id: fcfcd5b3cc971a2c2284d85fff0e14f7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
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vector_id: 41868
content:
"International spillovers of mitigation policies are effects that \r\ncarbon-abatement measures implemented in one country have on \r\nsectors in other countries. These effects include (i) carbon leakage \r\nin manufacture; (ii) the effects on energy trade flows and incomes \r\nrelated to fossil fuel exports from major exporters; (iii) technology \r\nand knowledge spillovers; and (iv) transfer of norms and preferences \r\nvia various approaches to establish sustainability requirements on \r\ntraded goods, such as EU-RED and environmental labelling systems \r\nto guide consumer choices (robust evidence, medium agreement).\r\nThis section focuses on cross-sectoral aspects of international \r\nspillovers related to the first two effects."


id: 2206e50711aa03003140cb9b64fde895
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3211
content:
"This type of leakage is especially important because the countries \r\nthat provide basic materials are usually emerging or developing \r\neconomies, many of which have no or limited regulation of GHG \r\nemissions. For this reason, foreign direct investment in developing \r\neconomies usually leads to an increase in emissions (Kivyiro and \r\nArminen 2014; Shahbaz et al. 2015; Bakhsh et al. 2017): in the case \r\nof basic materials the effect of expansion of economic activity on \r\nemissions exceeds the effect of technological spillovers, while for \r\ndeveloped countries the effect is opposite (Shahbaz et al. 2015; \r\nPazienza 2019). Meng et al. (2018) calculated that environmental \r\ncost for generating one unit of GDP through international trade was \r\n1.4 times higher than that through domestic production in 1995. By \r\n2009, this difference increased to 1.8 times. Carbon leakage due \r\nto the differences in environmental regulation was the main driver \r\nof this increase."


id: 1433d21e39293844df72158e9671c7b8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 773
content:
"Carbon leakage occurs when mitigation measures implemented in \r\none country or sector lead to a  rise in emissions in other countries \r\nor sectors. Three types of spillovers are possible: (i) domestic cross\u0002sectoral spillovers when mitigation policy in one sector leads to the \r\nre-allocation of labour and capital towards the other sectors of the \r\nsame country; (ii) international spillovers within a single sector when \r\nmitigation policy leads to substitution of domestic production of carbon\u0002intensive goods with their imports from abroad; and (iii) international \r\ncross-sectoral spillovers when mitigation policy in one sector in one \r\ncountry leads to the rise in emissions in other sectors in other countries. \r\nWhile the first two are described in Section 13.6, this section focuses \r\non the third. Though some papers address this type of leakage, there is \r\nstill a significant lack of knowledge on this topic."


id: 5d266a0b687c0b4a32bc85dba3cd38d8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13663
content:
"In order to address emissions leakage through global value chains, \r\nLiu and Fan (2017) propose the value-added-based emissions \r\naccounting principle, which makes it possible to account for GHG \r\nemissions within the context of the economic benefit principle. \r\nDavis et al. (2011) notice that the analysis of value chains gives \r\nan opportunity to find the point where regulation would be the \r\nmost efficient and the least vulnerable to leakage. For instance, \r\ntransaction costs of global climate policy and the risks of leakage \r\nmay be reduced if emissions are regulated at the extraction stage as \r\nthere are far fewer agents involved in this process than in burning of \r\nfossil fuels or consumption of energy-intensive goods. Li et al. (2020) \r\ncalls for coordinated efforts to reduce emissions embodied in trade \r\nflows in pairs of the economies with the highest leakage, such as \r\nChina and the United States, China and Germany, China and Japan, \r\nRussia and Germany."


id: 7a525d83ae632cbd94dadf55643006bc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18720
content:
"One possible channel of cross-sectoral international carbon leakage \r\nis through global value chains. Mitigation policy in one country not \r\nonly leads to shifts in competitiveness across industries producing "


id: 1a432ce6b85988f66bcb3fc9eabdfc00
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1817
content:
"make each country build more complete industrial systems to satisfy \r\ntheir final demand, although they have comparative disadvantages \r\nin some production stages. As a  result, emissions would increase. \r\nAccording to Zhang et al. (2020), for China, the decrease of the \r\ndegree of global value chain participation (which ranges from 0 to 1) \r\nby 0.1 would lead to an increase in gross carbon intensity of China's \r\nexports of 11.7%. On distributional implications, Parrado and De Cian \r\n(2014) report that trade-driven spillover effects transmitted through \r\nimports of materials and equipment result in significant inter-sectoral \r\ndistributional effects, with some sectors witnessing substantial \r\nexpansion in activity and emissions and others witnessing a decline \r\nin activities and emissions."


id: 40bf2b9e49a377f6f4cec1882cae189d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8578
content:
"Unfortunately, these proposals either face difficulties in collection \r\nand verification of data on emissions along value chains or require \r\na high level of international cooperation, which is hardly achievable \r\nat the moment. Neuhoff et al. (2016) and Pollitt et al. (2020) focus \r\non the regulation of emissions embodied in global value chains \r\nthrough national policy instruments. They propose implementation \r\nof a  charge on consumption of imported basic materials into the \r\nEuropean emissions trading system. Such a  charge, equivalent to \r\naround EUR80 tCO2\r\n-1, could reduce the EU's total CO2 emissions by \r\nup to 10% by 2050 (Pollitt et al. 2020) without significant effects \r\non competitiveness. This proposal is very close to the carbon border \r\nadjustment introduced in the EU and described in more detail in \r\nSections 13.2 and 13.6."


id: 265e8ea538726bbdf0e085e66623f4ba
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3920
content:
"It should also be mentioned that international trade leads to important \r\nknowledge and technology spillovers (Sections 16.3 and 16.5) and \r\nis critically important for achieving other Sustainable Development \r\nGoals (Section  12.6.1). Any policies imposing additional barriers \r\nto international trade should therefore be implemented with great \r\ncaution and require comprehensive evaluation of various economic, \r\nsocial and environmental effects."


id: d6743f212f3e34ecddbc872e02534a41
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35033
content:
"Cross-sectoral trade-related spillovers of mitigation policies include \r\ntheir effect on energy prices. Other things being equal, regulation \r\nof emissions of industrial producers decreases the demand for fossil \r\nfuels that would reduce prices and encourage the rise of fossil fuel \r\nconsumption in regions with no or weaker climate policies (robust \r\nevidence, medium agreement)."


id: 35f300050564a61f36d8c3c94320c0a9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6739
content:
"Arroyo-Curras et al. (2015) studied the energy channel of carbon \r\nleakage with the REMIND IAM of the global economy. They came to \r\nthe conclusion that the leakage rate through the energy channel is \r\nless than 16% of the emissions reductions of regions who introduce \r\nclimate policies first. This result did not differ much for different sizes \r\nand compositions of the early mover coalition."


id: 20487ed2de789904c2923dc560fb5b0a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2896
content:
"Another important cross-sectoral aspect of carbon leakage concerns \r\nthe transport sector. If mitigation policy leads to the substitution of \r\ndomestic carbon-intensive production with imports, one of the side \r\neffects of this substitution is the rise of emissions from transportation \r\nof imported goods. International transport is responsible for about \r\na  third of worldwide trade-related emissions, and over 75%  of \r\nemissions for major manufacturing categories (Cristea et al. \r\n2013). Carbon leakage would potentially increase the emissions \r\nfrom transportation significantly as the trade of major consuming \r\neconomies of the EU and US would shift towards distant trading \r\npartners in East and South Asia. Meng et al. (2018) consider more \r\ndistant transportation as one of the major contributors to the rise in \r\nemissions embodied in international trade from 1995 to 2009."


id: 5c950a3e2cb245d10be369a877107add
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13550
content:
"Bauer et al. (2015) built a  multi-model scenario ensemble for the \r\nanalysis of energy-related spillovers of mitigation policies and \r\nrevealed huge uncertainty: energy-related carbon leakage rates \r\nvaried from negative values to 50%, primarily depending on the \r\ntrends in inter-fuel substitution."


id: 765a4dabd89ebda3da9b5760e41145df
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18045
content:
"Another kind of spillover in the energy sector concerns the 'green \r\nparadox': announcement of future climate policies causes an \r\nincrease in production and trade in fossil fuels in the short term \r\n(Jensen et al. 2015; Kotlikoff et al. 2016). The delayed carbon tax \r\nshould therefore be higher than an immediately implemented carbon \r\ntax in order to achieve the same temperature target (van der Ploeg \r\n2016). Studies also make a distinction between a 'weak' and 'strong' \r\ngreen paradox (Gerlagh 2011). The former refers to a short-term rise \r\nin emissions in response to climate policy, while the latter refers to \r\nrising cumulative damage."


id: 4054ebdc62ed921ab3feddb9a1620860
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8514
content:
"Emissions leakage due to international trade, investment and value \r\nchains is a  significant obstacle to more ambitious climate policies \r\nin many regions. However, it does not mean that disruption of \r\ntrade would reduce global emissions. Zhang et al. (2020) show that \r\ndeglobalisation and the drop in international trade may result in \r\nemissions reductions in the short term, but in the longer term it will "


id: d4295c3a4584160838064e41243995fb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34658
content:
"The green paradox may work in different ways for different kinds \r\nof fossil fuels. For instance, Coulomb and Henriet (2018) show that \r\nclimate policies in the transport and power-generation sectors "


id: 5c5e7bed5428ccc336c1e75567899ede
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13505
content:
"increase the discounted profits of the owners of conventional oil and \r\ngas, compared to the no-regulation baseline, but will decrease these \r\nprofits for coal and unconventional oil and gas producers."


id: 653e606e451bd3cf8711c85adede82e7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15087
content:
"Many studies also distinguish different policy measures by the scale \r\nof green paradox they provide. The immediate carbon tax is the first\u0002best instrument from the perspective of global welfare. Delayed \r\ncarbon tax leads to some green paradox but less than in the case of \r\nsupport for renewables (Michielsen 2014; van der Ploeg and Rezai \r\n2019). With respect to the latter, support for renewable electricity \r\nhas a  lower green paradox than support for biofuels (Michielsen \r\n2014; Gronwald et al. 2017). The existence of the green paradox is \r\nan additional argument in favour of more decisive climate policy \r\nnow: any postponements will lead to additional consumption of \r\nfossil fuels and consequently the need for more ambitious and costly \r\nefforts in future."


id: ba13b7ce404c1ffc899f91ef9ce2a0e1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29960
content:
"The effect of fossil fuel production expansion as a result of anticipated \r\nclimate policy may be compensated by the effect of  divestment. \r\nDelayed climate policy creates incentives for investors to divest \r\nfrom fossil fuels. Bauer et al. (2018) show that this divestment effect \r\nis stronger and thus announcing of climate policies leads to the \r\nreduction of energy-related emissions."


id: 1bde9c2c15697c961000ed37a14b6229
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2090
content:
"The implication of the effects of mitigation policies through the \r\nenergy-related spillovers channel is of particular significance to \r\noil-exporting countries (medium evidence, medium agreement). \r\nEmissions-reduction measures lead to decreasing demand for fossil \r\nfuels and consequently to the decrease in exports from major oil\u0002and gas-exporting countries. The case of Russia is one of the most \r\nillustrative. Makarov et al. (2020) show that the fulfilment by Paris \r\nAgreement Parties of their NDCs would lead to 25% reduction of \r\nRussia's energy exports by 2030 with significant reduction of its \r\neconomic growth rates. At the same time, the domestic consumption \r\nof fossil fuels is anticipated to increase in response to the drop in \r\nexternal demand that would provoke carbon leakage (Orlov and \r\nAaheim 2017). Such spillovers demonstrate the need for dialogue \r\nbetween exporters and importers of fossil fuels while implementing \r\nthe mitigation policies."


id: bc7bab246888b1944a9453474e60fb09
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30405
content:
"Finance is a  principal enabler of GHG mitigation and an essential \r\ncomponent of countries' NDC packages submitted under the \r\nParis Agreement (UNFCCC 2016). The assessment of investment \r\nrequirements for mitigation along with their financing at sectoral \r\nlevels are addressed in detail by sectoral chapters while the \r\nassessment of financial sources, instruments, and the overall \r\nmitigation financing gap is addressed by Chapter 15 (Sections 15.3, \r\n15.4, and 15.5). The focus in this chapter with respect to finance is on \r\nthe scope and potential for financing integrated solutions that create \r\nsynergies between and among sectors. "


id: d9f8e18a9ed81ffc3d959eee6acbca8c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35647
content:
"in petroleum  imports  and GHG emissions while enhancing energy \r\nsecurity. Yet,  under a  water-constrained scenario as a  result of \r\nclimate change, the need for additional energy to expand irrigation \r\nto previously rain-fed sugar plantations and to power desalination \r\nplants yields the opposite result in terms of GHG emissions and \r\nenergy costs, making biofuels a sub-optimal option, and negatively \r\naffects their economics and the prospects for financing. "


id: 5eb71b200515cba54300787e0a037d8e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13950
content:
"Finally, the literature review and analysis in Chapter 12 has taken \r\naccount of the post-AR5 literature available and accessible to the \r\nchapter authors. Nonetheless, the assessment of the chapter is \r\nincomplete without mentioning knowledge gaps encountered during \r\nthe assessment. These knowledge gaps include:"


id: 7c2bfaf3bb856eea804f3e3c5e8e27d0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19059
content:
"At the local level, integrated planning and financing are needed to \r\nachieve more sustainable outcomes.  For example, at a  city level, \r\nintegration is needed across sectors such as transport, energy systems, \r\nbuildings, sewage and solid waste to optimise emissions footprints. \r\nHow a  city is designed will  affect transportation demands, which \r\nmakes it either more or less difficult to implement efficient public \r\ntransportation, leading in turn to more or fewer emissions.  Under \r\nsuch cases, solutions in terms of public and private investment paths \r\nand financing policies based on purely internal sector considerations \r\nare bound to cause adverse impacts on other sectors and poor overall \r\noutcomes (Gouldson et al. 2016)."


id: b60925f1e731febc1cf643171c4a440
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29248
content:
"Limiting the increase in warming to well below 2degC, and achieving net zero CO2 or GHG emissions, will require anthropogenic CO2 \r\nremoval from the atmosphere."


id: 25dcbf9f0c65a66e077f85ecb2febc2a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3842
content:
"The carbon dioxide removal (CDR) methods studied so far have different removal potentials, costs, co-benefits and side effects. \r\nSome biological methods for achieving CDR, like afforestation/reforestation or wetland restoration, have long been practised. \r\nIf implemented well, these practices can provide a  range of co-benefits, but they can also have adverse side effects such as \r\nbiodiversity loss or food price increases. Other chemical and geochemical approaches to CDR include direct air carbon capture \r\nand storage (DACCS), enhanced weathering or ocean alkalinity enhancement. They are generally less vulnerable to reversal than \r\nbiological methods."


id: cc6575fcd9ef67da03d0ea6e2d4b9a42
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33276
content:
"DACCS uses chemicals that bind to CO2 directly from the air; the CO2 is then removed from the sorbent and stored underground or \r\nmineralised. Enhanced weathering involves the mining of rocks containing minerals that naturally absorb CO2 from the atmosphere \r\nover geological timescales, which are crushed to increase the surface area and spread on soils (or elsewhere) where they absorb \r\natmospheric CO2. Ocean alkalinity enhancement involves the extraction, processing, and dissolution of minerals and addition to the \r\nocean where they enhance sequestration of CO2 as bicarbonate and carbonate ions in the ocean."


id: 190f5dff5b115137d71296b5e454589f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1625
content:
"Mitigation measures do not only reduce GHGs, but have wider impacts. They can result in decreases or increases in GHG emissions \r\nin another sector or part of the value chain from where they are applied. They can have wider environmental (e.g., air and water \r\npollution, biodiversity), social (e.g., employment creation, health) and economic (e.g., growth, investment) co-benefits or adverse \r\nside effects. Mitigation and adaptation can also be linked. Taking these considerations into account can help to enhance the benefits \r\nof mitigation action, and avoid unintended consequences, as well as provide a stronger case for achieving political and societal \r\nsupport and raising the finances required for implementation."


id: f9af34dcaf3cd6dd27d75fb479b1a71d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41289
content:
"Activities associated with the food system caused about one-third of total anthropogenic GHG emissions in 2015, distributed across \r\nall sectors. Agriculture and fisheries produce crops and animal-source food, which are partly processed in the food industry, packed, \r\ndistributed, retailed, cooked, and finally eaten. Each step is associated with resource use, waste generation, and GHG emissions."


id: d53c76525c1bcab5507c20597636e16c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34838
content:
"A food systems approach helps identify critical areas as well as novel and alternative approaches to mitigation on both the supply \r\nside and the demand side of the food system. But complex co-impacts need to be considered and mitigation measures tailored to \r\nthe specific context. International cooperation and governance of global food trade can support both mitigation and adaptation."


id: 35033561192b66bcf24820675179772e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6572
content:
"There is large scope for emissions reduction in both cropland and grazing production, and also in food processing, storage and \r\ndistribution. Emerging options such as plant-based alternatives to animal food products and food from cellular agriculture are \r\nreceiving increasing attention, but their mitigation potential is still uncertain and depends on the GHG intensity of associated energy \r\nsystems due to relatively high energy needs. Diet changes can reduce GHG emissions and also improve health in groups with excess \r\nconsumption of calories and animal food products, which is mainly prevalent in developed countries. Reductions in food loss and \r\nwaste can help reduce GHG emissions further."


id: 1871d3b27b18ca33476743fad11978aa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1512
content:
"Recommendations to buy local food and avoid packaging can contribute to reducing GHG emissions but should not be generalised, \r\nas trade-offs exist with food waste, GHG footprint at farm gate, and accessibility to diverse healthy diets."


id: 1bf5775c987af0daa251b7764b316e61
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2101
content:
"Babiker, M., G. Berndes, K. Blok, B. Cohen, A. Cowie, O. Geden, V. Ginzburg, A. Leip, P. Smith, M. Sugiyama, F. Yamba, 2022: \r\nCross-sectoral perspectives Supplementary Material. In IPCC, 2022: Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change. \r\nContribution of Working Group III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change\r\n[P.R. Shukla, J. Skea, R. Slade, A. Al Khourdajie, R. van Diemen, D. McCollum, M. Pathak, S. Some, P. Vyas, R. Fradera, \r\nM. Belkacemi, A. Hasija, G. Lisboa, S. Luz, J. Malley, (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA.\r\nAvailable from https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg3/."


id: 7cf203b8ff4c8969b385b8c7714cbfd3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19175
content:
"full-load equivalent hours of wind turbines (3200 hours yr-1 versus \r\n2600 hours yr-1), this leads to a higher production and associated \r\navoided emissions compared to UNEP (2017). Combined with \r\nthe  higher reference levels for solar and wind energy, this brings \r\nthe achievable mitigation potential range for 2030 for solar energy \r\nto 2 to 7 GtCO2 (from 3 to 6 GtCO2) and for wind energy to 2.1 to \r\n5.6 GtCO2-eq (from 2.6 to 4.1 GtCO2)."


id: 3547d220ec89f6dcc01dc6f81b8982b3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6620
content:
"In this Supplementary Material, background information is \r\nprovided on the way the data on costs and potentials has been \r\nsynthesised. Section  12.SM.1.2 provides information on how the \r\nextended Table  12.4 on costs and potentials of mitigation options \r\nwas constructed using the input of the sectoral chapters and \r\nother information. Section  12.SM.1.3 provides information on the \r\nconstruction of Figure SPM.7 in the Summary for Policymakers."


id: 91aa9afd2d682bb63c6b16b6837b270c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22858
content:
"Regarding nuclear energy, IEA (2019a) explores the role of lifetime \r\nextensions of nuclear power plants. The report shows that an extra \r\n80 GW can stay online by 2030, which would be equivalent to about \r\n0.4 GtCO2 of avoided emissions. This is well below the potential \r\nestimate in UNEP (2017) and could be part of the realisation of that \r\npotential, compensating for the fact that the potential for new-built \r\npower plants in the timeframe until 2030 will gradually decrease \r\ngiven the long lead times required to get nuclear power plants online \r\n(IEA 2019b). Based on these considerations, the potential for nuclear \r\nenergy is not updated from the figures presented in UNEP (2017)."


id: e533b06d4fd52b712d84fa984b3c7851
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37626
content:
"For the energy sector, the starting point for determining the mitigation \r\npotential was UNEP (2017), which was also published as Blok et al. \r\n(2020). This assessment was checked for key updates that substantially \r\ninfluence the ranges as reported in these literature sources."


id: bd91acfadca64832cc1415e148ec4a13
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30610
content:
"For other low-carbon electricity sources, no studies were found that \r\nled to a downward or upward revision of the potentials identified \r\nin UNEP (2017)."


id: c0b5326db06d1a317d8c6274db793c26
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31201
content:
"The mitigation cost data per electricity generation technology were \r\nprovided in Chapter 6. The starting point was electricity production cost \r\ndata for 2019 and 2030 provided by the International Energy Agency \r\n(IEA) for four marker regions: Asia (China), Asia (India), Europe, and \r\nNorth America. For these regions, mitigation costs were calculated \r\nfor two scenarios, the first in which coal-fired power  plants are \r\nreplaced,  and the second in which natural-gas fired power plants \r\nare replaced, leading to a total of eight cases. Although these cases \r\ncannot be used to determine an accurate global distribution of \r\nmitigation costs, they are considered sufficiently representative for \r\nthe range of mitigation costs for each technology."


id: a1ff99c064d5794c2ca9b36c1932ef64
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25737
content:
"The reference emissions scenario in the World Energy Outlook 2016 \r\nreport (IEA 2016) was compared to the preferred reference scenario \r\nfor this assessment, World Energy Outlook 2019 (IEA 2019b). There is \r\nlimited change in the overall parameters between the World Energy \r\nOutlooks of 2019 and 2016. Total electricity production in 2030 was \r\nmarginally higher (0.6%) and the average fossil fuel emissions factor \r\n2.4% lower in WEO2019 as compared to WEO2016. A substantially \r\nhigher contribution of wind and solar energy was seen in the reference \r\nscenario (Current Policies), leading to a reduction of the remaining \r\npotential by 0.50 and 0.95 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide (GtCO2) for \r\nwind and solar respectively. In contrast, the contribution of nuclear \r\nenergy in the reference scenario has become smaller. For all other \r\nlow-carbon sources the differences are small."


id: 180aac20ce274168a8138f4a9b7583c0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1439
content:
"Estimating the potential deployment of low-carbon electricity \r\nsources by 2030 is difficult. The technical potentials are significant, \r\nand for all technologies are higher or much higher than the potentials \r\nidentified by UNEP (2017). In many cases, the technical potential of \r\nelectricity-generating technologies is even much higher than the \r\nanticipated electricity demand projected for 2030, see for example \r\nrecent assessments for solar energy (Creutzig et  al. 2017; Dupont \r\net al. 2020), onshore wind energy (Bosch et al. 2017), offshore wind \r\nenergy (Bosch et al. 2018) and hydropower (Hoes et al. 2017)."


id: ce9c234f1146a39fa42d787479b94380
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33690
content:
"There are few studies that explicitly explore the limits of deployment \r\nof technologies by 2030. For solar energy a group of solar energy \r\nexperts (Haegel et  al. 2019) showed the feasibility of achieving \r\n10 terawatt (TW) of installed photovoltaic energy capacity in 2030, \r\nwhich is higher than the highest end of the 8.2 TW estimate in the \r\nUNEP (2017) report. Bogdanov et  al. (2019) provide a somewhat \r\nlower contribution of solar energy in 2030 (installed power 7 TW), \r\nbut a somewhat higher contribution from wind energy than \r\nassumed before, at 3.3 TW. Combined with a substantially higher "


id: 59f9e9fc4bdc9bddd3cfa7fa501417b9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13076
content:
"local and regional conditions (see also Section 6.4.7), but the cost \r\nranges presented here are considered to represent how the various \r\ntechnologies compare in mitigation costs, along with the variability \r\nper technology."


id: c486d8689eaa00171852ae4cc43f7c7d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31884
content:
"potentials were provided. The relative emissions reductions were \r\napplied to the Shared Socio-economic Pathway 2 (SSP2) baseline \r\nprovided with the PBL dataset and subsequently organised in cost bins."


id: 20893656eb87c7ca4a79a9615522461f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2946
content:
"The analysis by the United States Environmental Protection Agency is \r\nreported in US EPA (2019). Data were downloaded via the Non-CO2\r\nGreenhouse Gas Data Tool (US EPA 2021), which provides cumulative \r\ncost data, and organised in cost bins. The mitigation potentials were \r\ncorrected for the GWPs used in AR6. However, as EPA originally uses \r\na GWP of 25, there may still be a small mismatch over the cost bins."


id: 916e3e44fa3b05279766b625d2d8ba70
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22798
content:
"Data for methane (CH4) emissions reductions from coal, oil and \r\nnatural gas operations, solid waste and wastewater were provided \r\nby three organisations: the International Institute for Applied \r\nSystems Analysis (IIASA), the Netherlands Environmental Assessment \r\nAgency PBL and the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). For \r\noil and gas, data from the IEA were also used. In this analysis, as \r\nfar as possible global warming potentials (GWPs) as established in \r\nthe Sixth Assessment Report are used: 27 for biogenic methane and \r\n28.9 for fossil methane (Cross-Chapter Box 2 in Chapter 2)."


id: e00b5f931c22255c28f7642714c34433
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36662
content:
"Data from the IEA for oil and gas were downloaded from the \r\nMethane Tracker Database (IEA 2021). Costs are given in USD per \r\nBritish thermal unit (BTU), these were converted using a conversion \r\nfactor of 21.5 kg methane per million BTU."


id: ac6b00e05f476e1280432fc84d624449
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27571
content:
"The results are shown in Table  12.SM.1.1. There are notable \r\ndifferences between the sources in mitigation potentials. There is \r\nhowever a fair agreement between the data sources as to whether \r\nmitigation potentials typically appear in lower or higher cost ranges. \r\nIn the table, a 'best estimate' per cost bin is also presented, based \r\non an average of the estimates. For coal, oil and gas, PBL and IIASA \r\nare each allocated half of the weight of the other sources, based on \r\nthe observation that PBL relies heavily on IIASA for these sources. \r\nFor the 'less than zero' cost bin, data from PBL were not taken into \r\naccount as these potentials are already included in the baseline. "


id: 1a0943ff449abed91e8db8cac41d3944
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1780
content:
"The analysis by IIASA is reported in Hoglund-Isaksson et al. (2020). \r\nData were provided by Mrs Lena Hoglund-Isaksson (most recent \r\nversion on 27 October 2021). The data were reported in EUR tCO2\r\n-1\r\nand allocated to USD tCO2\r\n-1 cost bins using a USD to EUR ratio of 0.86."


id: 17de011624c32bc6269fda6db0b46e78
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1402
content:
"The analysis by the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency \r\nPBL is reported in Harmsen et  al. (2019a). Data were provided by \r\nMr  Mathijs Harmsen in Excel format (1 February 2021), see also \r\nHarmsen et  al. (2019b). Cumulative relative emissions reduction "


id: 8c05cc2ea9704fd71036ce15526927a8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21804
content:
"a\r\n This number is the summation over the cost bins and can be higher than all the values per institute because PBL is not taken into account for the negative bin."


id: 6e4f2af7129611640555a67baaa2fe9c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16674
content:
"The uncertainty ranges are determined by the lowest and highest \r\nvalue per cost bin. Cumulative uncertainty ranges are based on \r\ncumulative values and are in relative terms substantially smaller."


id: 729a5a943398a699d24521c3df304d84
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17405
content:
"For shipping, in Chapter  10 an emissions reduction potential of \r\n39% (range 30 to 56%) compared to business as usual is quoted \r\n(Section  10.6.4), which translates to 0.7 GtCO2, using an average \r\nbusiness-as-usual emissions of approximately 1.8 GtCO2 (Bouman \r\net  al. 2017). It is assumed that one-third of the potential is for \r\nbiofuels, which are excluded here, as this is a separate category in \r\nthis overview. The review study by Bouman et al. (2017) quotes earlier \r\nstudies which found that 'it is possible to improve energy efficiency \r\nand reduce emissions in a cost effective manner, either with zero \r\ncosts or with net cost savings', and so it is assumed that the potential \r\nwill mostly be in the below-zero cost bin."


id: 87611be367b8da13f3454bdf150d6daa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20977
content:
"The data for agriculture, forestry and land-use change were obtained \r\nfrom Chapter  7 (Table  7.3), where potentials below a certain cost \r\nlevel are provided. These values were converted into cost bins in \r\nTable 12.4 by calculating the additional potential when going from \r\none cost level to the next. The uncertainty ranges of the cost bin were \r\nscaled down proportionally from the cumulative values."


id: 1bf60164ae873c63ebc200366375441
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2103
content:
"IRENA (2016) estimates that 10% of the fuels for the transport sector \r\ncan be in the form of biofuels in 2030. For the calculation of avoided \r\nCO2 emissions, the approach in UNEP (2017) is used. Mitigation costs \r\nfor transportation biofuels are uncertain. Transportation biofuels are \r\ncurrently mostly more expensive than regular fuels, but they could \r\nmove closer to parity with regular fuels, especially if next generation \r\nbiofuels are applied (Junqueira et  al. 2017; IEA Bioenergy 2020). \r\nGiven this uncertainty, it can be expected that costs will end up in \r\nthe range of 0 to 100 USD tCO2-eq-1, although the distribution over \r\nthe cost bins is uncertain."


id: 7c6da3f2a45f04d84514d9ce1b329c47
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19092
content:
"The data for buildings were obtained from Chapter 9. A more extended \r\noverview than in Table 12.4, with a breakdown for developing and \r\ndeveloped countries, can be found in Tables 9.SM.2 and 9.SM.3."


id: df88ec81ac2681feee688945a2ec525c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36574
content:
"For the transport sector, the following assessment was made, partly \r\nbased on information from Chapter 10."


id: 3a0f497bb28fea31b18ff4b6c53ae57a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7428
content:
"The data for industry were obtained from Chapter 11 (Sections 11.4.1 \r\nand 11.4.2, and Figure 11.13). The reference shows an increase in \r\nCO2 emissions from 2017 to 2030 of 28%. For comparison, industrial \r\nfinal energy use increases by 24% in the Current Policies scenario \r\nof the World Energy Outlook 2019 (IEA 2019b) (no data on CO2\r\nemissions are available for the World Energy Outlook scenario). This \r\nsuggests that the Chapter 11 reference emissions are slightly higher \r\nthan in the World Energy Outlook (assuming no major fuel shifts in \r\nthe Current Policies scenario)."


id: e872271ee090744414b19b6abbd870a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38233
content:
"Data for fluorinated gas emissions reductions were taken from \r\nthree sources. Data from IIASA are taken directly from Purohit \r\nand Hoglund-Isaksson (2017). The analysis by the United States \r\nEnvironmental Protection Agency is reported in US EPA (2019). \r\nData were downloaded via the Non-CO2 Greenhouse Gas Data \r\nTool (US EPA 2021), which provides cumulative cost data, and were \r\nsubsequently organised in cost bins. The analysis by the Netherlands \r\nEnvironmental Assessment Agency PBL is reported in Harmsen et al. \r\n(2019a), Data were provided by Mr Mathijs Harmsen in Excel format \r\n(1 February 2021), see also Harmsen et  al. (2019b). Cumulative \r\nrelative emissions reductions were provided. The emissions reduction \r\npotentials for the various gases were summed together and \r\nsubsequently organised in cost bins."


id: 5f30fc1e747bc7ed3146a7ce24ea5d6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14057
content:
"Data for the impact of modal shifts in passenger transport are taken \r\nfrom ITDP and UC Davis2\r\n (2015). They calculate that costs, both for \r\nthe shift to public transport and the shift to cycling, are lower than \r\nfor transport by passenger cars."


id: 67886984a3eace02afdf11b311f6cae4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15483
content:
"For aviation, limited estimates are available. Emissions reduction \r\npotentials (excluding biofuels) in the range of 0.12 to 0.32 GtCO2\r\nare reported (ICAO 2019; ICCT 2020; IEA 2020), but underlying \r\nassumptions are not very well documented."


id: de6560561bc834e2be5b5ae3769a276b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36392
content:
"The results are presented in Table  12.SM.1.2. There are notable \r\ndifferences between the sources in mitigation potentials. There is, \r\nhowever, a fair agreement that most of the potential appears in "


id: 82b64186ffaf20d5fd12867a407910f8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20130
content:
"Table 12.SM.1.2 | Methane mitigation potentials for fluorinated gases for 2030 from three different sources. For comparison, the reference emissions are also \r\ngiven. A 'best estimate' per source is given in italics. Sources: see text."


id: 1677dba0c4df6145a908d5acecfa3a00
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1169
content:
"the lower cost ranges. In the table, a 'best estimate' per cost bin \r\nis also presented, using an average value per cost bin. For the 'less \r\nthan zero' cost bin, data from PBL were not taken into account as \r\nthese potentials are already included in the baseline. The uncertainty \r\nranges are determined by the lowest and highest value per cost bin. \r\nCumulative uncertainty ranges are based on cumulative values and \r\nare, in relative terms, substantially smaller."


id: 153eedbd096ba20cd9c6ca9103a2f4a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 951
content:
"fluorinated gases, the lowest and highest potential cumulative \r\npotential found for the various estimates were used as the lowest \r\nand highest bound of the error bars presented."


id: 74107dc755177fb467bf1102a084f269
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17661
content:
"The information for direct air carbon capture and storage and \r\nenhanced weathering is that reported in Section 12.3."


id: b45a2976cf83f0532cb400c17ad61ab9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28968
content:
"Table 12.SM.2.1 | Line of sight and role of context for indicators in the geophysical feasibility dimension for the assessment of direct air carbon capture \r\nand storage (DACCS), enhanced weathering (EW), ocean fertilisation and 'blue carbon'."


id: ffbdff0844597443d55ae5c262ab0012
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42383
content:
" Table 12.SM.2.3 | Line of sight and role of context for indicators in the technological feasibility dimension for the assessment of direct air carbon \r\ncapture and storage (DACCS), enhanced weathering (EW), ocean fertilisation and 'blue carbon'."


id: d5d369fb64b15212b8e19932cf30800
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34929
content:
"Table 12.SM.2.4 | Line of sight and role of context for indicators in the economic feasibility dimension for the assessment of direct air carbon capture \r\nand storage (DACCS), enhanced weathering (EW), ocean fertilisation and 'blue carbon'."


id: aaeac6ac25723381aaae3b440deab2a2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27292
content:
"Table 12.SM.2.5 | Line of sight and role of context for indicators in the socio-cultural feasibility dimension for the assessment of direct air carbon capture \r\nand storage (DACCS), enhanced weathering (EW), ocean fertilisation and 'blue carbon'."


id: 9212cf21f400dadc440740cb2fd281e3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22916
content:
"Table 12.SM.2.6 | Line of sight and role of context for indicators in the institutional feasibility dimension for the assessment of direct air carbon capture \r\nand storage (DACCS), enhanced weathering (EW), ocean fertilisation and 'blue carbon'."


id: 55c094945b7a6a2c4f653a5d77b0f697
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12358
content:
"The following tables (Tables  12.SM.3.1 and 12.SM.3.2) present \r\nexamples of the information used in the construction of Figure 12.9. \r\nTable 12.SM.3.1 provides examples of mitigation actions that fall into \r\nthe groups of actions shown in Figure 12.9 in the different sectors. \r\nNote that the mapping is intended to be illustrative and is not \r\nintended to be exhaustive."


id: 4b78e796eeb9b8c9e9899b108c2aaee0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10531
content:
"Table 12.SM.3.2 | Examples of co-benefits and adverse side effects, linked to different mitigation actions. The letters A to G link to the groups of mitigation \r\nactions shown in Table 12.SM.3.1."


id: f6f971481e0718ba8960df1066550edd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40821
content:
"Sources include: Urge-Vorsatz et al. (2014); Buonocore et al. (2016); Ahman et al. (2017); Kerr et al. (2017); Cohen et al. (2019); Forouli et al. (2019); Smith et al. (2019); \r\nVan de Ven et al. (2019); Karlsson et al. (2020)."


id: f4406b06109f8d3515b3b2539cf8c560
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40342
content:
"Elin Lerum Boasson (Norway), Mercy J.  Borbor-Cordova (Ecuador), Solomone Fifita (Tonga), \r\nErik  Haites (Canada), Mark Jaccard (Canada), Frank Jotzo (Australia), Sasha Naidoo (South \r\nAfrica), Patricia Romero-Lankao (Mexico/the United States of America), Wei Shen (China/United \r\nKingdom), Mykola Shlapak (Ukraine), Libo Wu (China)"


id: f3d313658cb794de1aaecc077d13b88e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40275
content:
"Dubash, N.K., C.  Mitchell, E.L.  Boasson, M.J.  Borbor-Cordova, S.  Fifita, E.  Haites, M.  Jaccard, F.  Jotzo, S.  Naidoo, \r\nP.  Romero-Lankao, M.  Shlapak, W.  Shen, L. Wu, 2022: National and sub-national policies and institutions. In IPCC, \r\n2022: Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Sixth Assessment \r\nReport of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [P.R. Shukla, J. Skea, R. Slade, A. Al Khourdajie, R. van Diemen, \r\nD.  McCollum, M.  Pathak, S.  Some, P. Vyas, R.  Fradera, M.  Belkacemi, A.  Hasija, G.  Lisboa, S.  Luz, J.  Malley, (eds.)]. \r\nCambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA. doi: 10.1017/9781009157926.015"


id: 334912e31dc2183be135ce5009988693
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6275
content:
"Sub-national actors are important for mitigation because \r\nmunicipalities and regional governments have jurisdiction \r\nover climate-relevant sectors such as land-use, waste and \r\nurban policy; are able to experiment with climate solutions; \r\nand can forge partnerships with the private sector and \r\ninternationally to leverage enhanced climate action (robust \r\nevidence, high agreement). More than 10,500 cities and nearly \r\n250 regions representing more than 2 billion people have pledged \r\nlargely voluntary action to reduce emissions. Indirect gains include \r\ninnovation, establishing norms and developing capacity. However, \r\nsub-national actors often lack national support, funding, and \r\ncapacity to mobilise finance and human resources, and create new \r\ninstitutional competences. {13.5}"


id: b0074f8c553e29281a4042cdbae627e9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28212
content:
"Long-term deep emission reductions, including the reduction \r\nof emissions to net zero, is best achieved through institutions \r\nand governance that nurture new mitigation policies, \r\nwhile at the same time reconsidering existing policies that \r\nsupport continued Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions (robust \r\nevidence, high agreement). To do so effectively, the scope of \r\nclimate governance should include both direct efforts to target GHG \r\nemissions and indirect opportunities to tackle GHG emissions that \r\nresult from efforts directed towards other policy objectives. {13.2, \r\n13.5, 13.6, 13.7, 13.9} "


id: 2896f8ea9dc5fb313b9bc1140f1189b0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4353
content:
"Climate governance is constrained and enabled by domestic \r\nstructural factors, but it is still possible for actors to make \r\nsubstantial changes (medium evidence, high agreement).\r\nKey structural factors are domestic material endowments (such as \r\nfossil fuels and land-based resources); domestic political systems; \r\nand prevalent ideas, values and belief systems. Developing countries \r\nface additional material constraints in climate governance due to \r\ndevelopment challenges and scarce economic or natural resources. \r\na broad group of actors influence how climate governance develop \r\nover time, including a  range of civic organisations, encompassing \r\nboth pro-and anti-climate action groups. {13.3, 13.4}"


id: 9c45d4a44cfe1262b0b22fac161e4adc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24748
content:
"Policies have had a  discernible impact on mitigation for \r\nspecific countries, sectors, and technologies (robust evidence,\r\nhigh agreement), avoiding emissions of several GtCO2-eq yr-1 \r\n(medium evidence, medium agreement). Both market-based and \r\nregulatory policies have distinct, but complementary roles. The share \r\nof global GHG emissions subject to mitigation policy has increased \r\nrapidly in recent years, but big gaps remain in policy coverage, and the \r\nstringency of many policies falls short of what is needed to achieve \r\nstrong mitigation outcomes (robust evidence, high agreement). {13.6, \r\nCross-Chapter Box 10 in Chapter 14}"


id: 42f8e1c70cdacdf51e5ea92f3f0044
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8982
content:
"Mitigation strategies, instruments and policies that fit with \r\ndominant ideas, values and belief systems within a  country \r\nor within a sector are more easily adopted and implemented \r\n(medium evidence, medium agreement). Ideas, values and beliefs \r\nmay change over time. Policies that bring perceived direct benefits, \r\nsuch as subsidies, usually receive greater support. The awareness of \r\nco-benefits for the public increases support of climate policies (robust \r\nevidence, high agreement). {13.2, 13.3, 13.4}"


id: 5eb1949715aacbbe88c65327b344b96
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13947
content:
"Climate laws enable mitigation action by signalling the \r\ndirection of travel, setting targets, mainstreaming mitigation \r\ninto sector policies, enhancing regulatory certainty, creating \r\nlaw-backed agencies, creating focal points for social \r\nmobilisation, and attracting international finance (medium \r\nevidence, high agreement). By 2020, 'direct' climate laws primarily \r\nfocused on GHG reductions were present in 56 countries covering \r\n53% of global emissions, while more than 690 laws, including \r\n'indirect' laws, may also have an effect on mitigation. Among direct \r\nlaws, 'framework' laws set an overarching legal basis for mitigation \r\neither by pursuing a  target and implementation approach, or by \r\nseeking to mainstream climate objectives through sectoral plans and \r\nintegrative institutions. {13.2}"


id: 6037d2b7444243aaaf9efc33afa27782
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14233
content:
"Climate litigation is growing and can affect the outcome \r\nand ambition of climate governance (medium evidence, high \r\nagreement). Since 2015, at least 37 systemic cases have been \r\ninitiated against states that challenge the overall effort of a  state \r\nto mitigate or adapt to climate change. If successful, such cases \r\ncan lead to an increase in a  country's overall ambition to tackle \r\nclimate change. Climate litigation has also successfully challenged \r\ngovernments' authorisations of high-emitting projects setting \r\nprecedents in favour of climate action. Climate litigation against \r\nprivate sector and financial institutions is also on the rise. {13.4}"


id: 6893de59c830cc1b740d245dcc5bc669
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15667
content:
"The media shapes the public discourse about climate \r\nmitigation.  This can usefully build public support to \r\naccelerate mitigation action, but may also be used to impede \r\ndecarbonisation (medium evidence, high agreement). Global \r\nmedia coverage (across a study of 59 countries) has been growing, \r\nfrom about 47,000  stories in 2016-2017 to about 87,000 in \r\n2020-2021. Generally, the media representation of climate science \r\nhas increased and become more accurate over time. On occasion, \r\nthe propagation of scientifically misleading information by organised \r\ncounter-movements has fuelled polarisation, with negative \r\nimplications for climate policy. {13.4}"


id: ffa6f6e9a4d1832903e52e4ffc649fa9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42373
content:
"Institutions can enable improved governance by coordinating \r\nacross sectors, scales and actors, building consensus for \r\naction, and setting strategies (medium evidence, high \r\nagreement). Institutions are more stable and effective when they \r\nare congruous with national context, leading to mitigation-focused \r\ninstitutions in some countries and the pursuit of multiple objectives \r\nin others. Sub-national institutions play a  complementary role to \r\nnational institutions by developing locally-relevant visions and plans, \r\naddressing policy gaps or limits in national institutions, building \r\nlocal administrative structures and convening actors for place-based \r\ndecarbonisation. {13.2}"


id: 90c56620f86fe66cd5841c0d7b5ac786
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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vector_id: 22680
content:
"(medium evidence, high agreement). Creation of markets for emission \r\nreduction credits tends to benefit countries able to supply credits. \r\nPolicies to support technology development and diffusion tend to \r\nhave positive spillover effects (medium evidence, high agreement).\r\nThere is no consistent evidence of significant emissions leakage or \r\ncompetitiveness effects between countries, including for emissions\u0002intensive trade-exposed industries covered by emission trading \r\nsystems (medium evidence, medium agreement). {13.6}"


id: 1da7b300c65e557d96146c0db1b87535
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2402
content:
"Explicit attention to equity and justice is salient to both social \r\nacceptance and fair and effective policymaking for mitigation \r\n(robust evidence, high agreement). Distributional implications of \r\nalternative climate policy choices can be usefully evaluated at city, \r\nlocal and national scales as an input to policymaking. Institutions \r\nand governance frameworks that enable consideration of justice \r\nand just transitions are likely to build broader support for climate \r\npolicymaking. {13.2, 13.6, 13.8, 13.9}"


id: 384044dd72994a6eb04f617ff5afab2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Policy packages are better able to support socio-technical \r\ntransitions and shifts in development pathways toward low\u0002carbon futures than are individual policies (robust evidence,\r\nhigh agreement). For best effect, they need to be harnessed to \r\na  clear vision for change and designed with attention to local \r\ngovernance context. Comprehensiveness in coverage, coherence \r\nto ensure complementarity, and consistency of policies with the \r\noverarching vision and its objectives are important design criteria. \r\nIntegration across objectives occurs when a  policy package is \r\ninformed by a  clear problem framing and identification of the full \r\nrange relevant policy sub-systems. {13.7}"


id: fd7ce88c6495730acd3378c8165cfe22
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41954
content:
"The co-benefits and trade-offs of integrating adaptation and \r\nmitigation are most usefully identified and assessed prior \r\nto policy making rather than being accidentally discovered \r\n(robust evidence, high agreement). This requires strengthening \r\nrelevant national institutions to reduce silos and overlaps, increasing \r\nknowledge exchange at the country and regional levels, and \r\nsupporting engagement with bilateral and multilateral funding \r\npartners. Local governments are well placed to develop policies that \r\ngenerate social and environmental co-benefits but to do so require \r\nlegal backing and adequate capacity and resources. {13.8}"


id: fec58efc69963694a7ec6f39a12f761a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42211
content:
"Climate change mitigation is accelerated when attention \r\nis given to integrated policy and economy-wide approaches, and \r\nwhen enabling conditions (governance, institutions, behaviour, \r\ninnovation, policy, and finance), are present (robust evidence,\r\nmedium agreement). Accelerating climate mitigation includes \r\nsimultaneously weakening high carbon systems and encouraging \r\nlow-carbon systems; ensuring interaction between adjacent systems \r\n(e.g. energy and agriculture); overcoming resistance to policies \r\n(e.g., from incumbents in high carbon emitting industries), including \r\nby providing transitional support to the vulnerable and negatively \r\naffected by distributional impacts; inducing changes in consumer \r\npractices and routines; providing transition support; and addressing \r\ncoordination challenges in policy and governance. {13.7, 13.9}"


id: fd152a9a562f810ba54d3d3f4634ec14
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41880
content:
"Removing fossil fuel subsidies would reduce emissions, improve \r\npublic revenue and macroeconomic performance, and yield \r\nother environmental and sustainable development benefits; \r\nsubsidy removal may have adverse distributional impacts especially on \r\nthe most economically vulnerable groups which, in some cases can \r\nbe mitigated by measures such as redistributing revenue saved, all \r\nof which depend on national circumstances (high confidence); fossil \r\nfuel subsidy removal is projected by various studies (using alternative \r\nmethodologies) to reduce global CO2 emissions by 1-4%, and GHG \r\nemissions by up to 10% by 2030, varying across regions (medium \r\nconfidence). {6.3, 13.6}"


id: 22996841685ba1aa8ea7b9dce8e82865
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3303
content:
"Economy-wide packages, including economic stimulus \r\npackages, can contribute to shifting sustainable development \r\npathways and achieving net zero outcomes while meeting \r\nshort term economic goals (medium evidence, high \r\nagreement). The 2008-2009 Global Recession showed that \r\npolicies for sustained economic recovery go beyond short-term fiscal \r\nstimulus to include long-term commitments of public spending on \r\nthe low-carbon economy; pricing reform; addressing affordability; \r\nand minimising distributional impacts. COVID-19 spurred stimulus \r\npackages and multi-objective recovery policies that may have the \r\npotential to meet short-term economic goals while enabling longer\u0002term sustainability goals. {13.9}"


id: f0def2c0852a6edeedae8e52174a50af
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39745
content:
"National mitigation policies interact internationally with \r\neffects that both support and hinder mitigation action \r\n(medium evidence, high agreement). Reductions in demand for \r\nfossil fuels tend to negatively affect fossil fuel exporting countries "


id: e111bda88d9094d63a6a4510da90e330
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36861
content:
"attention to the opportunities for economy-wide system change \r\npresented by consideration of post-COVID recovery packages, and \r\nwider efforts at sustainable economic restructuring (Section  13.9). \r\nConsistent with the discussion in Chapter 4, these larger approaches \r\noffer opportunities to undertake systemic restructuring and shift \r\ndevelopment pathways."


id: e4840f1969376b86fe0d5e086933c9af
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37489
content:
"Finally, the chapter addresses core themes from earlier assessment \r\nreports, but seeks to do so in an enhanced manner. The discussion of \r\nclimate institutions assesses a growing literature on climate law, as \r\nwell as both purpose-built climate organisations and the layering of \r\nclimate responsibilities on existing organisations at national and sub\u0002national scales (Section 13.2). The discussion of policies focuses on \r\nan ex post assessment of policies, as well as the interaction among \r\nthem, and learnings on how they can be combined in packages \r\n(Sections  13.6 and 13.7). It also lays out a  framework for their \r\nassessment that encompasses environmental effectiveness, economic \r\neffectiveness, distributional outcomes, co-benefits, institutional \r\nrequirements, as well as a new criterion of transformational potential \r\n(Section 13.6). "


id: 20ed941394a2ebc89c5022f06e2a3b05
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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vector_id: 3014
content:
"The aim of this chapter is to assess the full range of the multi-stranded \r\nand diverse literature on climate institutions and policy, reflecting the \r\nrichness of real-world climate governance."


id: fa6424b766fb0831e67514aad2b00e74
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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vector_id: 41419
content:
"This encompassing approach to climate governance is also built on \r\na  recognition that climate policymaking is routinely formulated in \r\nthe context of multiple policy objectives such as energy security, \r\nenergy access, urban development, and mitigation-adaptation \r\nlinkages. This informs policymaking based on an understanding that \r\nto fully maximise direct and indirect climate mitigation potential, \r\nmaximising co-benefits and minimising trade-offs should be explicitly \r\nsought rather than accidentally discovered and policies designed \r\naccordingly. This understanding also informs the design of institutions \r\n(Section 13.2) and policies (Sections 13.6 and 13.7) as well as the \r\nlinkage between mitigation and adaptation (Section 13.8)."


id: 92c1b3e7c82744a351e6c31f8de8eaaf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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content:
"Institutions and governance arrangements can help address 'policy \r\ngaps' and 'implementation gaps' (Cross-Chapter Box 4 in Chapter 4) \r\nthat hinder climate mitigation. While the need for institutions and \r\ngovernance is universal, individual country approaches vary, based on \r\nnational approaches and circumstances, as discussed in this section. "


id: b6269ab0dfb5fef273d1f52763fb8ae4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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content:
"The chapter also engages with several new developments and an \r\nexpansion of the literature since AR5. "


id: babf457233be07f7e57fffd679bae893
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30071
content:
"Since AR5, the understanding of climate governance has become \r\nmore encompassing and complex, involving multiple actors, decision\u0002making arenas, levels of decision-making and a variety of political \r\ngoals. Climate governance sometime directly targets GHG emissions; \r\nat other times mitigation results from measures that primarily aim \r\nto solve other issues, for instance relating to food production, forest \r\nmanagement, energy markets, air pollution, transport systems or \r\ntechnology development, but with mitigation or adaptation effects \r\n(Karlsson et al. 2020). "


id: 3f188832b6bef05d2405ac0c8dc33b93
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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content:
"A growing literature assesses how national policymaking on climate \r\nmitigation is dependent on national politics around, and building \r\nconsensus on, climate action. This, in turn, is shaped by both \r\nnationally specific structural features (Section 13.3) and the role of \r\ndifferent actors in the policymaking process (Section 13.4). Important \r\nnew avenues through which climate policy making is shaped, such \r\nas climate litigation (Section 13.4.2), and channels for public opinion \r\nformation, such as the media (Section 13.4.3) are also assessed. The \r\nchapter weaves discussions of the role of justice, understood through \r\na discussion of procedural justice (Section 13.2), distributional justice \r\n(Section 13.6) and vulnerability (Section 13.8), and its role in creating \r\npublic support for climate action (Section 13.9)."


id: e9e5535962eb7942d2d8062dd7ffa612
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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content:
"Consistent with usage in this assessment, institutions are rules, norms \r\nand conventions that guide, constrain or enable behaviours and \r\npractices, including the organisations through which they operate, \r\nwhile governance is the structure, processes and actions that public \r\nand private actors use to address societal goals (See Glossary for \r\ncomplete definitions). Multiple terms are used in the literature to \r\ndiscuss climate governance, often varying across countries. Climate \r\nlaws, or legislation, is passed by legislatures, and often sets the \r\noverarching governance context, but the term is also used to refer \r\nto legislation that is salient to climate outcomes even if not centrally \r\nfocused on climate change. National strategies, often referred to as \r\nplans, most often operate through executive action by government, "


id: fc255fd1f512b341bdbf7fdb7aadf6d0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"A significant new theme is the focus on the dynamic elements of policy \r\nmaking, that is, how policy can be designed to accelerate mitigation. \r\nThis includes through technological transitions, socio-technical \r\ntransitions, shifts in development pathways and economy-wide \r\nmeasures. This literature emphasises the importance of examining \r\nnot just individual policies, but packages of policies (Section 13.7) \r\nand how these are enabled by the alignment of policy, institutions, \r\nfinance, behaviour and innovation (Section  13.9). Also new is "


id: 9553d110deea9c6fedfc5e51d1f5b99c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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content:
"1 Data from climate-laws.org, search for mitigation focused legislation for different time frames. Accessed Oct. 31, 2021."


id: ea5deab3737c8d411afb84abddd529f0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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content:
"set guidance for action and often are not legally binding, although \r\nstrategies may also be enshrined in law. Both laws and strategies \r\nmay elaborate targets, or goals, for emissions outcomes, although \r\nthese are not necessary components of laws and strategies. While \r\nlaws typically operate at the national level (states may also make \r\nlaws in federal nations), strategies, plans and targets may also \r\noperate at the sub-national level."


id: 158027ff69f9baddef3e6d13fd2e8f3e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"This section begins with a  discussion of national laws for climate \r\naction (Section  13.2.1), followed by a  discussion of national \r\nstrategies (Section  13.2.2). The third section examines institutions \r\n(Section13.2.3), including organisations that are established to \r\ngovern climate actions, and the final section explores sub-national \r\ninstitutions and their challenges in influencing climate mitigation \r\n(Section 13.2.4). "


id: ff5b42a7cd3bee6635f135440c051604
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42331
content:
"There are both narrow and broad definitions of what counts as \r\n'climate laws'. The literature distinguishes direct climate laws that \r\nexplicitly considers climate change causes or impacts - for example \r\nthrough mention of greenhouse gas reductions in its objectives \r\nor title (Dubash et al. 2013)  - from indirect laws that have 'the \r\ncapacity to affect mitigation or adaptation' through the subjects they \r\nregulate, for example, through promotion of co-benefits, or creation \r\nof reporting protocols (Scotford and Minas 2019). Closely related is \r\na 'sectoral approach' based on the layering of climate considerations \r\ninto existing laws in the absence of an overarching framework \r\nlaw (Rumble 2019). Many countries also adopt executive climate \r\nstrategies (discussed in Section  13.2), which may either coexist \r\nwith or substitute for climate laws, and that may also be related to \r\na country's NDC process under the Paris Agreement. "


id: afb660b8ccab0922dbcd848f696fb98
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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"However, country examples also suggest other, different approaches \r\nto framework laws. Korea's Framework Act on Low Carbon, \r\nGreen Growth seeks to shift business and society toward green \r\ngrowth through a  process of strategy setting and action plans \r\n(Jang et al. 2010). Kenya's framework Climate Change Act creates \r\nan institutional structure to mainstream climate considerations into \r\nsectoral decisions, one of several examples across Africa of efforts \r\nto create framework legislation to promote mainstreaming (Rumble \r\n2019). Mexico's General Law on Climate Change includes sectoral \r\nemission targets, along with the creation of coordinating institutions \r\nacross ministries and sub-national authorities (Averchenkova and \r\nGuzman Luna 2018). Consequently, different countries have placed \r\nemphasis on different aspects of framework laws, although the most \r\nwidely prevalent approach is that exemplified by the UK. "


id: a7b5ce2afca2521b17cfa5cd6fbdc9b9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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content:
"The prevalence of both direct and indirect climate laws has increased \r\nconsiderably since 2007, although definitional differences across \r\nstudies complicate a  clear assessment of their relative importance \r\n(medium evidence, high agreement) (Iacobuta et al. 2018; Nachmany "


id: c0cbe6ef92236283863e82d725442fcc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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"Figure 13.1 | Prevalence of legislation by emissions and number of countries across regions. Top: Shares of global GHG emissions under national climate change \r\nlegislations - in 2010, 2015 and 2020. Emissions data used are for 2019, since emissions shares across regions deviated from past patterns in 2020 due to COVID. Bottom: \r\nNumber of countries with national climate legislation - in 2010, 2015, and 2020. Climate legislation is defined as an act passed by a parliament that includes in its title or \r\nobjectives reductions in GHGs. AR6 regions: DEV = Developed countries; APC = Asia and Pacific; EEA = Eastern Europe and West-Central Asia; AFR = Africa; LAM = Latin \r\nAmerica and the Caribbean; MDE = Middle East. Source: updated and adapted with permission from Iacobuta et al. (2018) to reflect AR6 regional aggregation and recent data."


id: 6b9aaf5a077f2ade7698d31fac4e8787
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) prepared under the \r\nParis Agreement may be informed by national strategies (Rocha \r\nand Falduto 2019). But the process of preparing NDCs can itself \r\nraise political awareness, encourage institutional innovation \r\nand coordination, and engage stakeholders (Roser et al. 2020). \r\nNationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) illustrate a diversity of \r\napproaches: direct mitigation targets, strategies, plans and actions \r\nfor low-GHG emission development, or the pursuit of mitigation \r\nco-benefits resulting from economic diversification plans and/\r\nor adaptation actions (UNFCCC Secretariat 2021). Figure  13.2 \r\nshows that the prevalence of emission targets increased across all \r\nregions between 2010 and 2020, the period during which the Paris \r\nAgreement was reached. "


id: 9bc08e70e9247e0f83f07ba5f90aaabd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24660
content:
"The performance of framework laws suggests a mixed picture. While \r\nthe structure of the UK Act successfully sets a  direction of travel \r\nand has resulted in a  credible independent body, it performs less \r\nwell in fostering integration across sectoral areas and providing an \r\nenforcement mechanism (Averchenkova et al. 2021). a  review of \r\nseven European climate change acts concludes that overall targets \r\nmay not be entirely aligned with planning, reporting and evaluation \r\nmechanisms, and that sanction mechanisms are lacking across the \r\nboard (Nash and Steurer 2019), which limit the scope for legislation \r\nto perform its integrative task. These observations suggest the need \r\nfor careful attention to the design of framework laws."


id: 38e66074d4e409959acc475254798f58
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7213
content:
"There is extremely limited evidence on the aggregate effects of \r\nclimate laws on climate outcomes, although there is a  broader \r\nliterature assessing climate policies (Section  13.6 in this chapter \r\nand Cross-Chapter Box  10 in Chapter  14). a  single assessment of \r\ndirect and indirect climate laws as well as relevant executive action \r\nacross a  global database finds a  measurable and positive effect: \r\nglobal annual emissions have reduced by about 5.9 CO2 compared \r\nto an estimation of what they otherwise would have been (Eskander \r\nand Fankhauser 2020). Climate laws require further research, \r\nincluding on the quantification of impact, framework versus sectoral \r\napproaches, and the various mechanisms through which laws act - \r\ntarget setting, creating institutional structures, mainstreaming and \r\nensuring compliance. "


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"Almost all Parties outlined domestic mitigation measures as key \r\ninstruments for achieving mitigation targets in specific priority areas \r\nsuch as energy supply (89%), transport (80%), buildings (72%), \r\nindustry (39%), agriculture (67%), LULUCF (75%) and waste (68%). \r\nRenewable energy generation was the most frequently indicated \r\nmitigation option (84%), followed by improving energy efficiency \r\nof buildings (63%) and multi-sector energy efficiency improvement \r\n(48%); afforestation, reforestation and revegetation  (48%); "


id: 16467acbdaf814c82ffce25b75c929cc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"National climate strategies, which are often formulated through \r\nexecutive action, contribute to climate governance in several ways. \r\nStrategies enable discussion of low-emissions pathways while \r\naccounting for uncertainty, national circumstances and socio\u0002economic objectives (Falduto and Rocha 2020). "


id: d6a1f649682f5f91d99cfe9175144ecf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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content:
"1 The European Union is an international organisation that is discussed here because it plays a large role in shaping climate obligations and policies of its Member States."


id: 4b59a31c53b5f4a3d504d3514557bfec
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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"and improving energy efficiency of transport (45%) (UNFCCC \r\nSecretariat 2021). Parties often communicated mitigation options \r\nrelated to the circular economy, including reducing waste (29%) \r\nand recycling waste (30%) and promoting circular economy (25%). \r\nMany Parties highlighted policy coherence and synergies between \r\ntheir mitigation measures and development priorities, which \r\nincluded long-term low-emission development strategy(LT-LEDS), \r\nthe sustainable development goals (SDGs) and, for some, green \r\nrecovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. "


id: da61b5e45fe29624235a383fa5e6a23a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Universal 'best-practice' formulations of organisations may not be \r\napplicable across country contexts, but institutions that are suited \r\nto national context can be ratcheted up over time in their scope \r\nand effectiveness (medium evidence, medium agreement). National \r\nclimate institutions take diverse forms because they emerge out of \r\ncountry-specific interactions between national climate politics and \r\nexisting institutional structures. Certain institutional forms tend to be \r\ncommon across countries, such as expert climate change commissions; \r\na review finds eleven such institutions in existence as of mid-2020. \r\nAlthough this institutional form may be common, these commissions \r\nvary in terms of expertise, independence and focus (Abraham-Dukuma \r\net al. 2020), reinforcing the important shaping role of national context. "


id: 1aedacf0533d73b466a328c9fe64bcc6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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content:
"Some countries approach NDCs as an opportunity to integrate \r\nmitigation objectives and broader economic shifts or sectoral \r\ntransformations (medium evidence, medium agreement). For \r\nexample, Brazil's 2016 NDC focussed on emissions from land-use \r\nchange, including agricultural intensification, to align mitigation \r\nwith a  national development strategy of halting deforestation \r\nin the Amazon, and increasing livestock production (De Oliveira \r\nSilva et al. 2018). While the forest sector accounts for the bulk of \r\nMadagascar's mitigation potential, its NDC promotes GHG mitigation \r\nin both AFOLU and energy sectors to maximise co-benefits, and \r\nachieve a higher number of sustainable development goals (SDGs) \r\n(Nogueira et al. 2020). "


id: 8c76ed517630501effafcdcb863e860f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21899
content:
"The central institutional arrangements of climate governance in the UK were established by the 2008 Climate Change Act (CCA): \r\nstatutory five-year carbon budgets; an independent advisory body, the Committee on Climate Change (CCC); mandatory progress \r\nmonitoring and reporting to Parliament; and continuous adaptive planning following a five-yearly cycle. The CCC is noteworthy as an \r\ninnovative institution that has also been emulated by other countries."


id: 1254c221aa8c1c20f2bc2e77961c1be2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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content:
"The design of the CCC was influenced by the concept of independent central banking (Helm et al. 2003). It has established a reputation \r\nfor independent high quality analysis and information dissemination, is frequently referred to in Parliament and widely used by other \r\nactors in policy debates, all of which suggest a high degree of legitimacy (Averchenkova et al. 2018). However, since the CCC only \r\nrecommends rather than sets budgets (McGregor et al. 2012), accountability for meeting the carbon budgets works primarily through \r\nreputational and political effects rather than legal enforcement. "


id: 7b683c412c7515a384674f2643fad83b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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content:
"created for other purposes that nonetheless have implications for \r\nmitigation outcomes (Dubash 2021). In relatively few countries do \r\nnew, purpose-built, legally-mandated bodies created specifically for \r\nclimate mitigation exist although this number is growing; examples \r\ninclude the UK (Averchenkova et al. 2018), China (Teng and Wang \r\n2021), Australia (Keenan et al. 2012) and New Zealand (Timperley \r\n2020). These cases indicate that dedicated and lasting institutions \r\nwith a  strategic long-term focus on mitigation emerge only under \r\nconditions of broad national political agreement around climate \r\nmitigation as a national priority (Dubash 2021). However, the specific \r\nforms of those institutions differ, as illustrated by the case of the UK's \r\nClimate Change Committee established as an independent agency \r\n(Box  13.2) and China, which is built around a  top-down planning \r\nstructure (Box 13.3)."


id: 93f8d33143de922303b79c731be9d74f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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content:
"Where economy-wide institutions do not exist, new institutions may \r\nstill address sub-sets of the challenge. In Australia, while political \r\nconditions resulted in the repeal of an overarching Clean Energy \r\nAct in 2014, although a Climate Change Authority continued, other \r\ninstitutions primarily focused on the energy sector such as the Clean \r\nEnergy Regulator, the Clean Energy Finance Corporation, and the \r\nAustralia Renewable Agency continued to shape energy outcomes \r\n(MacNeil 2021). "


id: 567083d2a6aedf62942720b8e27f0f07
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"New rules and organisations are not only created, they are also \r\ndismantled or allowed to wither away. Cases of institutional \r\ndismantling or neglect include the Australian Clean Energy Act \r\n(Crowley 2017; MacNeil 2021), the Indian Prime Minister's Council \r\non Climate Change, which, while formally functional, effectively does "


id: df8fca5b82909e3f11278f172ab42c5c
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"Skovgaard (2012) suggests that there is an important distinction \r\nbetween finance ministries that bring a  limiting 'budget frame' \r\nto climate action, versus a 'market failure frame' that encourages \r\nbroader engagement by relevant ministries."


id: 8afcd7fe2eb5a6dff14da8a8672b51a5
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"not meet (Pillai and Dubash 2021), and the weakening of climate \r\nunits inside sectoral ministries in Brazil (Hochstetler 2021). While \r\nthere is limited literature on the robustness of climate institutions, \r\ncase studies suggest institutions are more likely to emerge, persist \r\nand be effective when institutions map to a  framing of climate \r\nchange that has broad political support (medium evidence, medium \r\nagreement). Thus while mitigation focused framings and institutions \r\nmay win political support in some countries, in other cases sectorally \r\nfocused or multiple objectives oriented institutions may be most \r\nuseful and resilient (Dubash 2021). "


id: 6d24f2f68e5230172f97be9bf2f6ecaf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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content:
"Coordination within federal systems poses additional complexities, \r\nsuch as overlapping authority across jurisdictions, multiple norms in \r\nplace, and approaches to coordination across scales (Brown 2012). \r\nMulti-level governance systems such as the EU can influence the \r\ndesign and functioning of climate policies and institutions in member \r\nstates, such as Germany (Skjaerseth 2017; Janicke and Wurzel 2019; \r\nFlachsland and Levi 2021) and the UK (Lockwood 2021a). In some \r\ncases, this can result in distinct European modes of governance as has \r\nbeen suggested occurred in the case of wind energy (Fitch-Roy 2016)."


id: e24841d9c0e77d0df3983636d3427441
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Climate governance challenges include ensuring coordination, \r\nbuilding consensus by mediating conflict, and setting strategy \r\n(medium evidence, high agreement). Coordination is important \r\nbecause climate change is an all-of-economy and society problem \r\nthat requires cross-sectoral and cross-scale action; building \r\nconsensus is needed because large-scale transformations can \r\nunsettle established interests; and strategy setting is required due \r\nto the transformative and time-bound nature of climate mitigation \r\n(Dubash et al. 2021). Yet, climate institutions have a mixed record in \r\naddressing these challenges. "


id: 70cbda4f363593d1c9698e0a151e2bbd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Within countries, institutional platforms allow federal and sub\u0002national governments to negotiate and agree on policy trajectories \r\n(Gordon 2015). In Germany, cooperation is channelled through \r\nperiodic meetings of environment ministers and centre-state working \r\ngroups (Weidner and Mez 2008; Brown 2012), and in Canada \r\nthrough bilateral negotiations and side-payments between scales of \r\ngovernment (Rabe 2007; Gordon 2015). Federal systems might allow \r\nfor sub-national climate action despite constraints at the federal \r\nlevel, as has occurred in Australia (Gordon 2015; MacNeil 2021) and \r\nthe United States (Rabe 2011; Jordaan et al. 2019; Bromley-Trujillo \r\nand Holman 2020; Thompson et al. 2020). Where agenda-setting \r\nrests with the central government, coordination may operate through \r\ntargets, as with China (Qi and Wu 2013), or frameworks for policy \r\naction, as in India (Vihma 2011; Jogesh and Dubash 2015)."


id: 82cbe295dee19c276b90b91608d4d8ae
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content:
"Institutions that provide coordination, integration across policy areas \r\nand mainstreaming are particularly important given the scope and \r\nscale of climate change (Candel and Biesbroek 2016; Tosun and Lang \r\n2017) (Section 13.7). Ministries of environment are often appointed \r\nas de facto agents of coordination, but have been hampered by \r\ntheir limited regulative authority and ability to engage in intra\u0002governmental bargaining with ministries with larger budgets and \r\npolitical heft (Aamodt 2018). "


id: ead34c60bb3f81f9b3a9a60fe91863ac
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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content:
"Institutions can also create spaces to accommodate concerns of \r\nother actors (Upadhyaya et al. 2021). Deliberative bodies, such as \r\nGermany's Enquete Commission (Weidner and Mez 2008; Flachsland \r\nand Levi 2021) or the Brazilian Forum on Climate Change (Tyler and \r\nHochstetler 2021) provide a space for reconciling competing visions \r\nand approaches to climate change. Many countries are creating \r\ndeliberative bodies to forge 'Just Transition' strategies (Section 13.9). "


id: 25b33be7ee733cc640c5356ed8564c69
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content:
"Without explicit coordination with finance ministries, there is a risk \r\nof parallel and non-complementary approaches. For example, the \r\nSouth African Treasury pursued a carbon tax without clear indication \r\nof how it interfaced with a  quantitative sectoral budget approach \r\nespoused by the environment ministry (Tyler and Hochstetler 2021). "


id: bbedaec2f2273e78f41e0120cac1a6ab
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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"Spatially localised alternative discourses of justice are often more recognised socially than national and universal framings of climate \r\njustice (Bailey 2017). Participatory forms of governance such as climate assemblies and citizen juries (Ney and Verweij 2015) can help \r\nenhance the legitimacy of institutional decisions, even while empirical assessments suggest that these approaches continue to face \r\npractical challenges (Devaney et al. 2020; Sandover et al. 2021; Creasy et al. 2021). "


id: 4c3f523da2e1e83273bc0ab39c7b0fc6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10677
content:
"South Africa's national monitoring and evaluation system provides high-level guidance on information requirements and assessment \r\nmethodologies (DEA 2015). The country is developing a comprehensive, integrated National Climate Change Information System, \r\nto enable tracking, analysis and enhancement of South Africa's progress towards the country's transition to a low-carbon economy \r\nand climate-resilient society (DFFE Republic of South Africa 2021). It includes information on GHG emission reductions achieved, \r\nobserved and projected climate change, impacts and vulnerabilities, the impact of adaptation and mitigation actions, financial flows \r\nand technology transfer activities. South Africa's approach is premised upon continuous learning and improvement through a phased \r\nimplementation approach (DEA 2019). "


id: a292c140f74d2dbec099b540da35ac47
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"a recent innovation is the creation of Citizens' Assemblies that bring \r\ntogether representative samples of citizens to deliberate on policy \r\nquestions with the intent of informing them (Devaney et al. 2020; \r\nSandover et al. 2021). The ability of institutions to forge agreement \r\nalso rests on attention to procedural justice (Box 13.4)."


id: d85aa833717ca728432fa26cd9324763
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35365
content:
"Since addressing climate change requires transformative intent and \r\nshifting development pathways (Sections 1.6, 3.6, 4.3, 4.4, 13.9, 17.3.2, \r\nand Cross-Chapter Box  5 in Chapter  4), institutions that can devise \r\nstrategies and set trajectories are useful enablers of transformation. \r\nStrategy setting often requires an overarching framework such as \r\nthrough framework laws that set targets (Averchenkova et al. 2017), \r\nor identify key sectors and opportunities for low-carbon transition \r\n(Hochstetler and Kostka 2015) and innovation (UNEP 2018). Few \r\ncountries have built deliberate and lasting institutions that provide \r\nstrategic intent, and those that have, have pursued different \r\napproaches. The UK's approach rests on five-yearly targets (Box 13.2); \r\nGermany requires sectoral budgets enforced through the Bundestag \r\n(Flachsland and Levi 2021); and China uses an apex decision-body to \r\nset targets (Teng and Wang 2021) (Box 13.3). "


id: 660f53c2734859789ff00f32eb015c6b
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content:
"The perceived need for attention to institutional capacity is \r\nhighlighted by the fact that the NDCs of 113 developing countries \r\nout of 169 countries studied list capacity building as a condition of \r\nNDC implementation (Pauw et al. 2020). While international support \r\nfor capacity is widely articulated as essential for many countries \r\n(Khan et al. 2020), ensuring the form of capacity is appropriate, \r\neffective and led domestically remains a challenge (Nago and Krott \r\n2020; Sokona 2021). "


id: 16e4393934b13dd1b1dae54b8f3c58d3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Addressing all of these governance concerns  - coordination, \r\nmediating interests, and strategy setting  - require attention to \r\ninstitutional capacity. These include the capacity to address 'upstream' \r\npolicy issues of agenda setting, framing, analysis and policy design; \r\npursue goals even while mediating interests (Upadhyaya et al. 2021); "


id: dfa6a3ab9b71d3362dc6a89391f0c715
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36596
content:
"Transnational networks have limited influence on climate policies \r\nwhere national governments exert top-down control (e.g., in the city \r\nof Rizhao, China) (Westman et al. 2019); where sub-national actors \r\nface political fragmentation, lack regulations, and financial and \r\nhuman resources; or where vertically-integrated governance exists, \r\nas in State of Sao Paulo, Santiago de Chile, and Mexico City (Romero\u0002Lankao et al. 2015; Setzer 2017)."


id: 5dd63c91a2d49bc909fa4dd539f4cda4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13808
content:
"Jurisdiction over significant mitigation-related arenas like planning, \r\nhousing and community development reside at the sub-national \r\nlevel. To address linkages between mitigation and local concerns, \r\nsub-national actors engage in institution building within a broader \r\nsocio-economic and political context, with actors and institutions at \r\na multitude of scales shaping the effectiveness of sub-national-scale \r\ninterventions (Romero-Lankao et al. 2018a). Mitigation policies may \r\ndemand coordination between sectoral and jurisdictional units that \r\nhistorically have not collaborated; they may require sub-national \r\nactors to confront politically sensitive issues such as carbon taxes \r\nor increases in utility rates; and they may demand a redistribution \r\nof resources to protect endangered ecosystems or vulnerable \r\npopulations (Hughes and Romero-Lankao 2014). "


id: 3fe8f7aabb7110e4dd54c16558bb9389
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Public support for sub-national climate institutions increases when \r\nclimate policies are linked to local issues such as travel congestion \r\nalleviation or air pollution control (Puppim de Oliveira 2013; Romero\u0002Lankao et al. 2013; Simon Rosenthal et al. 2015; Romero-Lankao \r\net al. 2015; Ryan 2015), or when embedded in development priorities \r\nthat receive support from the national government or citizens \r\n(Jorgensen et al. 2015b; Floater et al. 2016; Dubash et al. 2018). \r\nFor example, Indian cities have engaged in international climate \r\ncooperation seeking innovative solutions to address energy, water \r\nand infrastructure problems (Beermann et al. 2016). "


id: 3e1ae21f8ead2d432bc05eab2e07eb98
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"Sub-national actors have built climate institutions by creating new \r\nvisions and narratives, by setting new entities or committing existing \r\noffices, providing them with funds, staff and legal authority, or by \r\nexperimenting with innovative solutions that could be transferred \r\nto other local governments or scaled nationally (Hoffmann 2011; \r\nHoornweg et al. 2011; Aylett 2015; Hughes and Romero-Lankao 2014; \r\nRomero-Lankao et al. 2015; Hughes 2019b). These actors have also \r\ncreated task forces, referendums, coordination of financial and human \r\nresources, technical assistance, awareness campaigns and funding \r\n(Castan Broto 2017; Romero-Lankao et al. 2018a; Hughes 2019b). \r\nNational governments can play a key role supporting planning for \r\nclimate change at the regional and national level, for example, \r\nthrough the articulation of climate change action in national urban \r\npolitics (Van Den Berg et al. 2018; Cobbinah et al. 2019). "


id: a49155a02fa515cc265f49a39f732de1
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Availability of federal funding is a fundamental pillar of city actors' \r\ncapacity to develop mitigation policies. Administrative structures, \r\nsuch as the presence of a  professional city manager and staff \r\nassigned specifically to climate efforts (Simon Rosenthal et al. 2015). \r\nCooperation between administrative departments, and the creation \r\nof knowledge and data on energy use and emissions are also \r\nessential for mitigation planning (Hughes and Romero-Lankao 2014; \r\nRyan 2015). For example, the high technical competency of Tokyo's \r\nbureaucracy combined with availability of historical and current data \r\nenabled the city's unique cap-and-trade system on large building \r\nfacilities (Roppongi et al. 2017)."


id: 54fc9f541b96b844fcba6bb0aeee9db9
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"Multi-jurisdictional and multi-sectoral sub-national networks in \r\ndozens of countries globally have helped build climate institutions. \r\nThey have also facilitated social and institutional learning, and \r\naddressed gaps in national policy (Holden and Larsen 2015; Jordan \r\net al. 2015; Setzer 2015; Haarstad 2016; Hermwille 2018; Kammerer \r\nand Namhata 2018; Rashidi and Patt 2018; Westman and Castan \r\nBroto 2018; Lee and Jung 2018; Lee 2019; Schwartz 2019). "


id: ace81746de978f9e7df9ea7355352f9b
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Visions and narratives about the future benefits or risks of climate \r\nchange are often effectively advanced at the sub-national level, \r\ndrawing on local governmental abilities to bring together actors \r\ninvolved in place-based decarbonisation across sectors (Hodson \r\nand Marvin 2009; Bush et al. 2016; Huang et al. 2018; Prendeville \r\net al. 2018; Levenda et al. 2019). For example, in the plans of \r\n43 C40 Cities, climate action is framed as part of a vision for vibrant, \r\neconomically prosperous, and socially just cities, that are habitable, \r\nsecure, resource-efficient, socially and economically inclusive, and \r\ncompetitive internationally (Romero-Lankao and Gnatz 2019). "


id: 68ad47246195f3fbc644bb4eb701e2fc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15685
content:
"Transnational networks have opened opportunities for sub-national \r\nactors to play a crucial mitigation role in political stalemates (Jones \r\n2014; Schwartz 2019). The C40, the Global Covenant of Mayors for \r\nClimate and Energy, and ICLEI have disseminated information on best \r\npractices and promoted knowledge sharing between sub-national \r\ngovernments (Lee 2013; Hakelberg 2014; Heidrich et al. 2016; Kona \r\net al. 2016; Di Gregorio et al. 2020) (Section 14.5.5). Organisations \r\nsuch as the US Carbon Cycle Working Group of the United States \r\nGlobal Change Research Program, the Australian Climate Action \r\nNetwork, and the Mexican Metropolitan Environmental Commission \r\nhave helped facilitate coordination and learning across multiple \r\njurisdictions and sectors, and connected ambiguous spaces between \r\npublic, private and civil society actors (Romero-Lankao et al. 2015; \r\nHorne and Moloney 2019; Hughes 2019b). "


id: 2015efb15fe0f9d4c2009e1056ee2d58
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content:
"However, institution building is often constrained by a lack of national \r\nsupport, funding, human resources, coalitions, coordination across \r\nold and new organisations, and the ability to create new institutional \r\ncompetences (Valenzuela 2014; Jorgensen et al. 2015a; Ryan 2015; \r\nDubash et al. 2018; Romero-Lankao et al. 2018a; Anderton and Setzer \r\n2018; Cointe 2019; Di Gregorio et al. 2019; Jaccard et al. 2019; Hughes \r\n2019b). Climate mitigation can also be limited by cultural norms and \r\nvalues of policy actors with varying levels of power, and shifting \r\nalliances (Lachapelle et al. 2012; Damso et al. 2016; Giampieri et al. \r\n2019; Romero-Lankao et al. 2018a). "


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content:
"Durban has effectively linked climate change agendas with ongoing sustainability actions and goals. To do so, adaptation has \r\nbeen broadened to include a just transition to a low-carbon future to address development, energy security and GHG reduction \r\n(Roberts et al. 2016). "


id: 1e5e68b9f53285d76341f711e4ba9a6a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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"Durban has mainstreamed climate and justice concerns within local government through strong local leadership by key individuals and \r\ndepartments; included climate concerns within various municipal short-term and long-term planning processes; mobilised civil society; \r\nenhanced local and international networking; explored funding opportunities; and restructured institutions (Roberts et al. 2016). "


id: 9ff3e0440d9e327e185f55865a9394b1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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content:
"Durban shows that embedding responses to climate change within local government activities requires that climate change is made\r\nrelevant locally and framed within a broader environmental justice framework (Roberts 2010). Civil society has been key in balancing \r\nthe influence of the private sector on Durban's dynamic political process (Aylett 2013). "


id: a9be29ecfb8789bc12d2e6b5f37a66b9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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"Institution building is constrained by inequities; resources, legal remit, \r\nknowledge, and political clout vary widely within and among sub\u0002national governments globally (Jorgensen et al. 2015b; Genus and \r\nTheobald 2016; Joffe and Smith 2016; Klinsky 2018; Reckien et al. \r\n2018; Markkanen and Anger-Kraavi 2019). Dominant discourses tend \r\nto prioritise scientific and technical expertise and, thus, they focus on \r\ninfrastructural and economic concerns over the concerns and needs \r\nof disadvantaged populations (Heikkinen et al. 2019; Romero-Lankao \r\nand Gnatz 2019)."


id: 97d76869a624f9bf813dc6f12f171fb4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23926
content:
"Moreover, deep mitigation requires moving beyond existing \r\ntechnological responses (Mulugetta and Castan Broto 2018) to \r\npolicies that correspond to the realities of developing countries \r\n(Bouteligier 2013). However, best practice approaches tend to \r\nbe fragmented due to the requirements of different contexts, and \r\noften executed as pilot projects that rarely lead to structural change \r\n(Nagorny-Koring 2019). Instead, context-specific approaches that \r\ninclude consideration of values, cultures and governance better \r\nenable successful translation of best practices (Affolderbach and \r\nSchulz 2016; Urpelainen 2018)."


id: 5e3b7e5e3780c2e3bba2d94801a2eac3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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content:
"A growing literature suggests that ambitious climate policy emerges \r\nout of strong domestic political support (medium evidence, medium \r\nagreement) (Aklin and Mildenberger 2020; Lamb and Minx 2020; \r\nColgan et al. 2021). Such support is the outcome of political interest \r\nconstellations and struggles that vary from country to country. \r\nStructural factors (such as economic wealth and natural resources, \r\nthe character of the national political system, and the dominant ideas, \r\nvalues and beliefs) shape how climate change is governed (medium \r\nevidence, high agreement) (Boasson 2015; Hochstetler 2020). This \r\nsection assesses the ways these structural factors affect political \r\ndynamics and decision-making, and ultimately constrain, sustain or \r\nenable development of domestic climate governance."


id: 849831a1236661fb6d3ece28c8e71774
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
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content:
"To address this situation requires procedural justice that involves \r\nall communities, particularly disadvantaged, in climate mitigation \r\ndecisions and policies (Box 13.4). Also essential is recognition justice, \r\nthat addresses past inequities through tools such as subsidies, \r\ntariffs, rebates, and other policies (Agyeman 2013; Rydin 2013; UN \r\nHabitat 2016). Both tenets are key to ensure the fair distribution of \r\nbenefits or negative impacts from mitigation policies (distributional \r\njustice) (McCauley and Heffron 2018; Lewis et al. 2020). However, \r\nthe benefits of inclusive approaches are often overlooked in favour \r\nof growth oriented mitigation and planning (Rydin 2013; Altenburg \r\n2011; Smith 2019; Lennon 2020). Box  13.6 discusses how the "


id: 5147b44c94c920c4c9453c5c1df2d37b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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"While these structural factors are crucial, they do not determine the \r\noutlook of given countries' climate governance, as civic, corporate \r\nand/or political groups or individuals can be mobilised and seek \r\nto counteract these structural effects, as indicated in the following \r\nSection 13.4 that examines the role of various actors and agencies \r\nin shaping governance processes. Taken together, Sections 13.3 and \r\n13.4 show that domestic climate governance is not fully constrained \r\nby structural factors, but rather that diverse actors can and do achieve \r\nsubstantial changes."


id: b9e4c63f908035df8c95a8d3e3a28e1b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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content:
"potential trade-offs and challenges (Dagnachew et al. 2018; Ellis \r\nand Tschakert 2019; Penasco et al. 2021) (Section  13.7.2 for \r\nwider discussion)."


id: 6f12e3e31a5e728a3dab87553da501d1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Material endowments are natural and economic resources, such as \r\nfossil fuels and renewable energy, forests and land, and economic or \r\nfinancial resources, which tend to shape developments of domestic \r\nclimate governance (medium evidence, high agreement) (Friedrichs \r\nand Inderwildi 2013; Lachapelle and Paterson 2013; Bang et al. 2015; \r\nLamb and Minx 2020). Most countries' social and economic systems \r\nare largely developed on the basis of their material endowment, and \r\nthus they contribute to shape the distribution of political power in \r\nthat country (Hall and Soskice 2001). Material endowments are by \r\nno means the only influencing factor, and actors may succeed to \r\neither circumvent or exploit material endowments to impact climate \r\ngovernance (limited evidence, medium agreement) (Boasson 2015; \r\nGreen and Hale 2017; Aklin and Mildenberger 2020). "


id: 2bb88d049e467ee589aad72e24885a4c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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content:
"The effectiveness of domestic climate governance will significantly \r\nrely on how well it fits with the features of the countries' specific \r\npolitical systems (limited evidence, high agreement) (Schmitz \r\n2017; Lamb and Minx 2020). Political systems have developed \r\nover generations and constitute a set of formal institutions, such as \r\nlaws and regulations, bureaucratic structures, political executives, \r\nlegislative assemblies and political parties (Egeberg 1999; Pierson \r\n2004). Different political systems create differing conditions for \r\nclimate governance to emerge and evolve, but because political \r\nsystems are so politically and historically entrenched they are not \r\nlikely to change quickly even though this could facilitate domestic \r\nclimate mitigation efforts (medium evidence, high agreement) \r\n(Duit and Galaz 2008; Boasson et al. 2021). In addition, variations \r\nin governance capacities also affect climate policy making and \r\nimplementation (Meckling and Nahm 2018). "


id: a0e1fa9d98e9496b08758d117f29c252
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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content:
"Broader public participation and more open contestation spaces tend \r\nto nurture more encompassing climate policies, facilitate stronger \r\ncommitments to international agreements (Battig and Bernauer 2009; \r\nBohmelt et al. 2016), achieve more success in decoupling economic \r\ngrowth from CO2 emissions (Laegreid and Povitkina 2018), reduce \r\nmore CO2 emissions (Clulow 2019; von Stein 2020), and maintain \r\nlower deforestation rates (medium evidence, medium agreement) \r\n(Buitenzorgy and Mol 2011). States with less public participation \r\nand contestation space can also develop ambitious climate emission \r\nreduction targets and institutions (Zimmer et al. 2015; Eckersley \r\n2016; Han 2017; Engels 2018), but the drivers and effects of climate \r\npolicies within less open and liberal political contexts has not yet \r\nbeen sufficiently investigated. "


id: ed71f367974ac003b1fdb60da976bd82
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Rich carbon-intensive resources and well developed infrastructure \r\ncan make low-carbon activities relatively less economically profitable, \r\nand negatively influence some perceptions of climate mitigation \r\npotential (Bertram et al. 2015a; Erickson et al. 2015). If effective \r\nclimate policies are introduced despite this, they can alter the \r\nimportance of country's material endowments in a way that underpin \r\nmore forceful climate governance over time. For instance, policy \r\ninterventions to limit fossil fuel exploitation or support renewable \r\nenergy deployment may change the value of these energy resources \r\nover time (Schmitz et al. 2015; Urge-Vorsatz et al. 2018; Chailleux \r\n2020; Colgan et al. 2021). "


id: f3a9c4b5b41a317e67a13a8f44e401ae
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40242
content:
"Developing countries face additional material constraints in climate \r\ngovernance due to challenges associated with underdevelopment \r\nand scarce economic or natural resources (medium evidence, high \r\nagreement). Hence, many developing countries design domestic \r\nclimate mitigation policies in combination with policy goals that \r\naddress various developmental challenges (von Stechow et al. \r\n2016; Deng et al. 2017; Thornton and Comberti 2017; Campagnolo \r\nand Davide 2019), such as air quality, urban transportation, energy \r\naccess, and poverty alleviation (Klausbruckner et al. 2016; Li \r\net al. 2016; Melamed et al. 2016; Slovic et al. 2016; Khreis et al. \r\n2017; Geall et al. 2018; Xie et al. 2018). Combining climate and \r\ndevelopmental policies for beneficial synergies should not overlook "


id: b81abc8179d4d4535cf40ac0587c33f2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29606
content:
"However, new norms sometimes only influence political discussion \r\nand not actual governance. For instance, more ambitious climate \r\nemission reduction targets may not lead to more effective mitigation \r\nactions or policy instruments. Put another way, words do not replace \r\nactions (Geden 2016). "


id: 6ad62dce63ef27f9fcb7d2db45967318
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16079
content:
"Significant variation in ideas, values and beliefs related to climate \r\ngovernance are detected across and within regions, countries, \r\nsocieties, organisations, and individuals (medium evidence, medium \r\nagreement) (Shwom et al. 2015; Boasson et al. 2021; Knox-Hayes \r\n2016; Wettestad and Gulbrandsen 2018). These factors provide the \r\ncontext for climate policymaking and include differences in countries' \r\nhistories (Aamodt 2018; Aamodt and Boasson 2020); the political \r\nculture and regulatory traditions in governing environmental and \r\nenergy issues (Tosun 2018; Aamodt 2018; Boasson et al. 2021); \r\nand even bureaucrats' educational background (Rickards et al. \r\n2014). Structural factors in a  country, such as deeply held value \r\nsystems, are not changed rapidly, just as political systems or natural \r\nendowments, are not changed rapidly. Consequently, climate policy \r\nand governance is more effective if it takes into account these deep\u0002rooted values and beliefs."


id: 93cd2dcc4bf22444936e7bdcf2064597
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Differences in dominant individual preferences may also be important. \r\nThe factors that shape individual ideas, values and beliefs about \r\nclimate governance include trust in politicians, the state and other \r\npeople in general (Drews and van den Bergh 2016; Harring et al. 2019; \r\nHuber et al. 2020), fairness beliefs, variation in political orientation \r\n(left leaning more concerned), and class (medium evidence, medium \r\nagreement) (Schmitz et al. 2018; Inglehart and Norris 2017). "


id: 948747dee6f83fba4e16e17cec48c3e2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Levels of climate change concern on the individual level have \r\nincreased in most countries (Shwom et al. 2015), and vary with \r\ngender (females are more concerned), and place of residence (urban \r\nresidents are more concerned) (Shwom et al. 2015; McCright et al. \r\n2016a; Ziegler 2017). The higher educated in developing countries \r\ntend to be more concerned (Lee et al. 2015) while individuals working \r\nin polluting industries tend to oppose forceful climate governance \r\n(Bechtel et al. 2019; Mildenberger 2020). "


id: 28068bd27ccaf422c24bf4980af195b5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Ideas, values and beliefs affect climate governance by shaping \r\npeople's perceptions, attitude, and preferences on specific policy and \r\ngovernance issues (medium evidence, high agreement) (Boasson \r\n2015; McCright et al. 2016b; Schifeling and Hoffman 2019; Leipold \r\net al. 2019; Boasson et al. 2021). While these are often entrenched, \r\nthey can also change, for instance when facing growing exposures \r\nto climate risks, stronger scientific evidence, and dominant public or \r\npolitical discourse (Mayer et al. 2017; Diehl et al. 2021). While change \r\ntend to be incremental, the pace of change may vary substantially \r\nacross countries and specific climate issue areas."


id: 8b65996674a32daf18cb99366843e6c3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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content:
"medium agreement) (Schleich et al. 2018; Mildenberger and Tingley \r\n2019). For example, emission trading schemes are welcomed as a new \r\nregulatory instrument in China in the context of its market-oriented \r\nreforms and ideological shift in the past decades (Lo 2013). Based \r\non the study of 167 nation-states and 95 sub-national jurisdictions \r\nwith carbon pricing, researchers find that that high public belief in \r\nclimate science underpin adoption of systems that produce a rather \r\nhigh carbon price (Levi et al. 2020). These public opinions need to \r\nbe identified and leveraged in supporting specific policy choices \r\nor changes (Mildenberger and Tingley 2019). Policy support tends \r\nto be greater if people believe effective measures are being taken \r\nby other actors, including other households (Bostrom et al. 2018; \r\nMarlon et al. 2019), and other countries and at the international level \r\n(Schleich et al. 2018). "


id: d3256163fc50bc326344d1bbb2ef1e1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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content:
"A broad array of actors are engaged in shaping mitigation policy \r\nprocesses, including politicians and political parties, corporate actors, \r\ncitizen groups, indigenous peoples organisations, labour unions and \r\ninternational organisations. Actors aiming to influence the climate\u0002related policymaking process are studied together to understand \r\nclimate policy dynamics and outcomes (Bulkeley 2000; Fisher 2004; \r\nJost and Jacob 2004; Jasny et al. 2015; Fisher and Leifeld 2019; Jasny \r\nand Fisher 2019) and collaboration and influence within climate \r\npolicy networks (Ingold and Fischer 2014; McAllister et al. 2014; \r\nWagner and Yla-Anttila 2018; Kammerer et al. 2021). Most research, \r\nhowever, focuses on one particular type of actor. "


id: 2e6f0cac6d69289f809a61cc4c1f5ccb
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"On the other hand, anti-climate ideas or beliefs may arise due to \r\nthe introduction of more constraining or ambitious climate policies, \r\nfor example protests in reaction to toll roads in Norway, which \r\nincrease the cost of driving, or protests in France against increasing \r\ncarbon taxes (Grossman 2019; Wanvik and Haarstad 2021). The \r\npolicy implication is that vulnerable or effected groups should be \r\nconsidered when introducing policy change, and that participation, \r\ntransparency, and good communication all helps to reduce climate\u0002related discontent. "


id: 65423b046e8e395b7a0d417ddb245f5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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content:
"Political actors are decision-makers, and also influence whether \r\nclimate governance is perceived as urgent and appropriate (Okereke \r\net al. 2019; Ferrante and Fearnside 2019; Boasson et al. 2021). They \r\ninclude political parties, legislative assemblies and committees, \r\ngovernmental executives and the political leaders of governmental \r\nministries (Boasson 2015). They are more likely to pay attention to \r\nclimate issues when polling indicates high political salience with the \r\npublic (Carter 2006, 2014), or when it becomes a  contested issue \r\namong differing political parties (Boasson et al. 2021). Fluctuations \r\nin the public's interest and attention may underpin a  disjointed \r\napproach in politicians' engagement (Willis 2017, 2018). Policy \r\nimplementation can be hampered if political actors propose frequent \r\npolicy changes (Boasson et al. 2021). "


id: 33183a38e1a96a8e0c1bc46dade2cb4d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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"Survey-based studies of public perceptions on hypothetical policy \r\ninstruments or activities, such as carbon taxes or energy infrastructure, \r\nsuggest that linking climate policy to other economic and social \r\nreforms can increase public support for climate governance (Carattini \r\net al. 2019; Bergquist et al. 2020). People and politicians tend to \r\nunderestimate other peoples' and politicians' willingness to support \r\nmitigation policies (Hurlstone et al. 2014; Mildenberger and Tingley \r\n2019), but if actors are informed about other actors actual perceptions \r\nand behaviours this may reduce the tendency to underestimate \r\nclimate governance support (Mildenberger and Tingley 2019)."


id: 6a51bc8e1fd1864c51211ce08373bdd9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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"Corporate actors often influence policies and their adoption (Pulver \r\nand Benney 2013; Mildenberger 2020; Goldberg et al. 2020). \r\nCorporate actors acting individually or through industry associations, \r\nhave worked to sway climate policy in different countries (Falkner \r\n2008; Bernhagen 2008; Newell and Paterson 2010; Meckling 2011; \r\nMildenberger 2020). Their ability varies by country and issue (medium \r\nevidence, medium agreement) (Skjaerseth and Skodvin 2010; \r\nBoasson and Wettestad 2013; Boasson 2015; Boasson et al. 2021) \r\nand depends on material endowments (Moe Singh 2012), access \r\nto the political system (Dillon et al. 2018; Mildenberger 2020), and \r\nthe ability to shape ideas, values and belief systems (Boasson 2015). \r\nCorporate actors tend to change their climate policy preferences over \r\ntime, as indicated by longitudinal studies of some European countries \r\n(Boasson and Wettestad 2013; Boasson 2015; Boasson et al. 2021)."


id: a519559acc5dac726273f08093a9ca07
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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content:
"While Section 13.3 shows that structural factors condition climate \r\ngovernance, their ultimate importance also depends on whether and \r\nhow various actors are mobilised (Hochstetler 2020; Boasson 2015).\r\na  wide range of regional and local governments as well as non\u0002governmental actors have become increasingly engaged in climate \r\ngovernance, for instance through public-private partnerships and \r\ntransnational networks (Jordan et al. 2015; Dorsch and Flachsland \r\n2017; Jordan et al. 2018) and through the media and litigation, as \r\ndiscussed here. "


id: 8f2216963528afc50fb3c9d358a28cfa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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"Corporate actors are crucial to policy implementation because they \r\nare prominent emitters of the greenhouse gases and owners of \r\ncarbon-intensive technologies and potential providers of solutions \r\nas developers, owners and adopters of low emission practices and \r\ntechnologies (Falkner 2008; Perrow and Pulver 2015). Many climate \r\npolicies and measures rely on businesses' willingness to exploit \r\nnewly created economic opportunities, such as support schemes \r\nfor renewable energy and energy efficiency sector or carbon pricing \r\n(Olsen 2007; Newell and Paterson 2010; Shen 2015; World Bank \r\n2019). Some corporate actors provide climate solutions, such as "


id: 3732bf0d44807174b1b61f64a64a2b6d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Climate governance processes result from both slow-moving \r\nincremental changes to policy and more rapid bursts of change \r\ndue to, for example, responses to dramatic weather events, general \r\nelections or global climate summits (medium evidence, high \r\nagreement) (Aamodt and Stensdal 2017; Jordan and Moore 2020; \r\nBoasson et al. 2021). While Section 13.3 assessed how entrenched \r\nstructural factors conditions climate governance developments, this \r\nsection examines how actors are able to alter climate governance "


id: 3be2f678e513b63566865bdb3bb69c42
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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content:
"and the Council of the European Union 2018). To date, there are only \r\na limited number of case studies that measure the direct effect of \r\nparticipation in these types of movements as it relates to climate \r\noutcomes (Saunders et al. 2014; Vestergren et al. 2018, 2019). "


id: 5b07746952da49d52ea9f715f872e3e
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"renewable energy deployment, and have successfully influenced \r\nclimate policy development related to feed-in tariffs, taxations, \r\nquotas, or emission trading schemes, in the EU (Boasson 2019), \r\nGermany (Leiren and Reimer 2018), the USA (Stokes and Breetz \r\n2018), the Nordic countries (Kooij et al. 2018), China (Shen 2017) \r\nand Japan (Li et al. 2019)."


id: e2da34eb744ded04edcdda3df5fb930a
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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"Citizens with less access to resources and power also participate \r\nby challenging nodes of power  - policymakers, regulators, and \r\nbusinesses  - to change their behaviours and/or accelerate their \r\nefforts. Tactics include lobbying, legal challenges, shareholder \r\nactivism, coop board stewardship, and voting (Gillan and Starks \r\n2007; Schlozman et al. 2012; Viardot 2013; Bratton and McCahery \r\n2015; Yildiz et al. 2015; Olzak et al. 2016). Citizens provide the labour \r\nand political will needed to pressure political and economic actors \r\nto enact emission-reducing policies, as well as providing resistance \r\nto them (Fox and Brown 1998; Boli and Thomas 1999; Oreskes and \r\nConway 2012; McAdam 2017). "


id: 9f082496052195d3ec77426aead525fb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Fossil fuel industries have been important agenda-setters in many \r\ncountries, including the USA (Dunlap and McCright 2015; Supran and \r\nOreskes 2017; Downie 2018), the EU (Skjaerseth and Skodvin 2010; \r\nBoasson and Wettestad 2013), Australia (Ayling 2017), China (Shen \r\nand Xie 2018; Tan et al. 2021), India (Schmitz 2017; Blondeel and Van \r\nde Graaf 2018), and Mexico (Pulver 2007), with differing positions \r\nand impacts across countries (Kim et al. 2016; Nasiritousi 2017). \r\nIn the US, the oil industry has underpinned emergence of climate \r\nscepticism (Dunlap and McCright 2015; Farrell 2016a; Supran and \r\nOreskes 2017), and its spread abroad (Dunlap and Jacques 2013; \r\nEngels et al. 2013; Painter and Gavin 2016). Corporate opposition \r\nto climate policies is often facilitated by a broad coalition of firms \r\n(Cory et al. 2021). "


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vector_id: 6110
content:
"Other citizen engagement involves a range of more confrontational \r\ntactics, such as boycotting, striking, protesting, and direct action \r\ntargeting politicians, policymakers, and businesses (Fisher et al. 2005; \r\nTarrow 2005; Fisher 2010; Saunders et al. 2012; Walgrave et al. 2012; \r\nWahlstrom et al. 2013; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Bondaroff 2014; \r\nHadden 2014, 2015; O'Brien et al. 2018; Chamorel 2019; Cock 2019; \r\n2019b; Hadden and Jasny 2019; Swim et al. 2019). Climate strikes and \r\nother more confrontational forms of climate activism have become \r\nincreasingly common (O'Brien et al. 2018; Evensen 2019; D.A. Fisher \r\n2019; Boulianne et al. 2020; Martiskainen et al. 2020; de Moor et al. \r\n2021; Fisher and Nasrin 2021a). Very few studies look specifically at \r\nthe effect of these tactics on actual climate-related outcomes and \r\nmore research is needed to understand the climate effects of citizen \r\nengagement and activism (Fisher and Nasrin 2021b)."


id: 1454c1f7ee674555c6c81bce0facbc27
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Conservative foundations, sometimes financed by business revenues, \r\nhave funded a  diversity of types of groups, including think-tanks, \r\nphilanthropic foundations, or activist networks to oppose climate \r\npolicy (Brulle 2014, 2019). However, there is limited knowledge \r\nabout the conditions under which actors opposed to climate action \r\nsucceed in shaping climate governance (Kinniburgh 2019; Martin \r\nand Islar 2021)."


id: ed8bd58040732649dfb3b5c370694dd7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39151
content:
"Some labour unions have developed positions and programmes on \r\nclimate change (Snell and Fairbrother 2010; Stevins 2013; Rathzel \r\net al. 2018), formed alliances with other actors in the field of climate \r\npolicy (Stevis 2018) and participated in domestic policy networks on \r\nclimate change (Jost and Jacob 2004), but we know little about their \r\nrelative importance or success. In countries with significant fossil fuel \r\nresources such as Australia, Norway, and the United States, labour \r\nunions, particularly industrial unions, tend to contribute to reducing \r\nthe ambition of domestic climate policies mainly due to the concern \r\nof job losses (Mildenberger 2020). Other studies find that the role of \r\nlabour unions varies across countries (Glynn et al. 2017)."


id: 63c7e0406a09662b2a5da9c0b9928017
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14846
content:
"On Friday 20 August 2018, Greta Thunberg participated in the first climate school strike. Since then, Fridays for Future - the name of \r\nthe group coordinating this tactic of skipping school on Fridays to protest inaction on climate change - has spread around the world."


id: 9b99930ef5924c4b4f531fdca2043d16
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24630
content:
"Although digital activism makes it easier to connect globally, it is unclear how digital technology will affect the youth climate \r\nmovement, and its effects on carbon emissions. Research suggests that online activism is likely to involve a more limited range of \r\nparticipants and perspectives (Bennett 2013; Elliott and Earl 2018). Digital tactics could also mean that groups are less embedded \r\nin communities and less successful at creating durable social ties, factors that have been found to lead to longer term engagement \r\n(Tufekci 2017; Rohlinger and Bunnage 2018; Shirky 2010). "


id: 5115b9eec0c7bb6bdcf0fa137afb36cb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11544
content:
"with enforcing environmental laws that aimed to maintain clean air \r\nand water in countries around the world (medium evidence, high \r\nagreement) (McCloskey 1991; Schreurs 1997; Rucht 1999; Brulle \r\n2000; Steinhardt and Wu 2016; Longhofer et al. 2016; Wong 2018). \r\nSeveral studies find environmental NGOs have a positive effect on \r\nreductions in carbon emissions, whether through effects that operate \r\nacross countries or (Frank et al. 2000; Schofer and Hironaka 2005; \r\nJorgenson et al. 2011; Baxter et al. 2013; Longhofer and Jorgenson \r\n2017; Grant et al. 2018) through impact of NGOs within nations \r\n(Shwom 2011; Dietz et al. 2015; Grant and Vasi 2017). "


id: 9b4f41ebe19e72b0ab7f177b839ac3a1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24572
content:
"At the same time, other research has documented various forms of \r\nbacklash against climate policies, both in terms of voting behaviour, \r\nas well as other collective efforts (Hill et al. 2010; Williamson et al. \r\n2011; McAdam and Boudet 2012; Wright and Boudet 2012; Walker \r\net al. 2014; Boudet et al. 2016; Fast et al. 2016; Krause et al. 2016; \r\nLyon 2016; Mayer 2016; Stokes 2016; Stokes and Warshaw 2017; \r\nMuradian and Pascual 2020; Stokes 2020). In a systematic analysis \r\nthat includes movements against fossil fuel investments along \r\nwith those against low-carbon emitting projects around the world, \r\nresearch finds that a quarter of all projects (no matter their targets) \r\nwere cancelled after facing resistance (Temper et al. 2020)."


id: be9d6d00b7264a129a2a3f4399cbbac2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30794
content:
"A range of international organisations can be important, particularly \r\nin developing countries, for instance by assisting in framing of national \r\nclimate governance and supporting the design of climate policies \r\nthrough technical assistance projects (Talaei et al. 2014; Ortega Diaz \r\nand Gutierrez 2018; Kukkonen et al. 2018; Bhamidipati et al. 2019; \r\nCharlery and Traerup 2019). Yet for these climate aid initiatives to \r\nwork effectively requires improved institutional architecture, better \r\nappreciation of local contexts, and more inclusive and transparent \r\ngovernance, based on evidence from many multilateral mechanisms \r\nlike REDD+, CDM, GEF and GCF (Gomez 2013; Arndt and Tarp 2017), \r\nand bilateral programmes on energy, agriculture and land-use "


id: 43b46fc7ac527017f91465f093a31151
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9140
content:
"This sub-section focuses on relevant climate litigation for policies and \r\ninstitutions. Climate litigation is further discussed in Sections 14.5.1.2 \r\n(linkages between mitigation and human rights) and Section 14.5.3 \r\n(cross-country implications and international courts/tribunals). "


id: 4137a5e79f4dab6242485eebec8c0d7d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8652
content:
"The vast majority of climate cases have emerged in United States, \r\nAustralia and Europe, and more recently in developing countries \r\n(Humby 2018; Kotze and du Plessis 2019; Peel and Lin 2019; Setzer \r\nand Benjamin 2019; Zhao et al. 2019; Rodriguez-Garavito 2020). "


id: feb4b0b8dde50ab388568237549b4845
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Mayer 2019; Paiement 2020; Barritt 2020; Sindico et al. 2021). \r\nBetween 2015 and 2021, individuals and communities initiated at \r\nleast 37 cases (including Urgenda and Leghari) against states (Setzer \r\nand Higham 2021), challenging the effectiveness of legislation and \r\npolicy goals (Jackson 2020; Setzer and Higham 2021). Some cases \r\nalso seek to shape new legal concepts such as 'rights of nature' \r\nrecognised in the Future Generations case in Colombia (Savaresi and \r\nAuz 2019; Rodriguez-Garavito 2020) and 'ecological damage' in the \r\ncase of Notre Affaire a Tous and others vs France (Torre-Schaub 2021)."


id: b998774215128f91e9d4684a7ebd6168
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29859
content:
"As  of 31 May 2021, 1841 cases of climate change litigation from \r\naround the world had been identified. Of these, 1387 were filed \r\nbefore courts in the United States, while the remaining 454 were \r\nfiled in 39 other countries and 13 international or regional courts \r\nand tribunals (including the courts of the European Union). Outside \r\nthe US, Australia (115), the UK (73) and the EU (58) remain the \r\njurisdictions with the highest volume of cases. The majority of cases, \r\n1006, have been filed since 2015 (Setzer and Higham 2021). The \r\nnumber of climate litigation cases in developing countries is also \r\ngrowing. There are at least 58 cases in 18 Global South jurisdictions \r\n(robust evidence, high agreement) (Humby 2018; Kotze and du Plessis \r\n2019; Peel and Lin 2019; Setzer and Benjamin 2019; Zhao et al. 2019; \r\nRodriguez-Garavito 2020; Setzer and Higham 2021)."


id: 1adcd927cdac51b12f35783fabdf00c0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1923
content:
"Moreover, there are a  number of regulatory challenges to state \r\nauthorisation of high-emitting projects, which differs from systemic \r\ncases against states (Bouwer 2018; Hughes 2019a). For instance, the \r\nHigh Court in Pretoria, South Africa, concluded that climate change \r\nis a  relevant consideration for approving coal-fired power plants \r\n(Humby 2018). Similarly, the Federal Court of Australia concluded \r\nthat the Minister for the Environment owed a  duty of care to \r\nAustralian children in respect to climate impacts when exercising \r\na statutory power to decide whether to authorise a major extension \r\nto an existing coal mine (Peel and Markey-Towler 2021)."


id: 730149fe544f8667128cdd0f9d284a0b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17485
content:
"Overall, courts have also played a  more active role for climate \r\ngovernance in democratic political systems (Peel and Osofsky 2015; \r\nEskander et al. 2021). Whether and to what extent differing law \r\ntraditions and political systems influence the role and importance \r\nof climate litigation has, however, not been examined enough \r\nscientifically (Setzer and Vanhala 2019; Peel and Osofsky 2020). "


id: 8e9498c45fe4a0a0159c2be36f49ac7d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22267
content:
"The majority of climate change litigation cases are brought against \r\ngovernments, by civic and non-governmental organisations and \r\ncorporations (Eisenstat 2011; Markell and Ruhl 2012; Wilensky 2015; \r\nFisher et al. 2017; Setzer and Higham 2021). Many, although not all \r\nof these cases, seek to ensure that governmental action on climate \r\nchange is more ambitious, and better aligned with the need to avert or \r\nrespond to climate impacts identified and predicted by the scientific \r\ncommunity (Markell and Ruhl 2012; Setzer and Higham 2021). \r\nClimate aligned cases against governments can be divided into two \r\ndistinct categories: claims challenging the overall effort of a  State \r\nor its organs to mitigate or adapt to climate change (sometimes \r\nreferred to as 'systemic climate litigation') (Jackson 2020) and claims \r\nregarding authorisation of third-party activity (Bouwer 2018; Gerrard \r\n2021; Ghaleigh 2021). "


id: 135ffef6fe6c47143a77c908108e0eb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 618
content:
"Systemic climate litigation that seeks an increase in a  country's \r\nambition to tackle climate change has been a growing trend since \r\nthe first court victories in the Urgenda case in the Netherlands (see \r\nBox  13.8 below) and the Leghari case in Pakistan in 2015. These \r\ncases motivated a wave of similar climate change litigation across \r\nthe world (Roy and Woerdman 2016; Ferreira 2016; Peeters 2016; "


id: 9b5f2bfa74cd4294e2caa60f1226eb56
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24587
content:
"countries and with unique cultural and political traditions also affect \r\nhow climate change is communicated (Eskjaer 2013)."


id: 3e9750e080a5cb3964e387f40ad51148
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8198
content:
"fuel industry (Franta 2017; Colombo 2021). In May 2021, the Hague \r\nDistrict Court of the Netherlands issued a ground-breaking judgment \r\nholding energy company Royal Dutch Shell (RDS) legally responsible \r\nfor greenhouse gas emissions from its entire value chain (Macchi and \r\nZeben 2021). Claims have also been brought against banks, pension \r\nfunds and investment funds for failing to incorporate climate risk \r\ninto their decision-making, and to disclose climate risk to their \r\nbeneficiaries (Wasim 2019; Solana 2020; Bowman and Wiseman \r\n2020). These litigation cases also impact on the financial market \r\nwithout directly involving specific financial institutions into the case \r\n(Solana 2020) but somehow aim to change their risk perceptions and \r\nattitude on high carbon activities (Griffin 2020). "


id: 92047c0dbec22f60d684727374d10ea
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22906
content:
"A broad variety of media platforms cover climate change issues, \r\nincluding traditional news media, such as newspapers and \r\nbroadcasting, digital social media (Walter et al. 2018), creative \r\nnarratives such as climate fiction and films (Svoboda 2016); humour \r\nand entertainment media (Brewer and McKnight 2015; Skurka \r\net al. 2018; Boykoff and Osnes 2019); and strategic communications \r\ncampaigns (Hansen and Machin 2008; Hoewe and Ahern 2017). Media \r\ncoverage can have far-reaching consequences on policy processes, \r\nbut we know less about its relative importance compared to other \r\npolicy shaping factors (medium evidence, medium agreement) (Liu \r\net al. 2011; Boykoff 2011; Hmielowski et al. 2014). "


id: a50d36e1e124effc54b5786d987f77e7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26262
content:
"Popular culture images, science fictions and films of ecological \r\ncatastrophe can dramatically and emotively convey the dangers \r\nof climate change (Bulfin 2017). The overall accuracy of the media \r\ncoverage on climate change has improved from 2005 to 2019 in \r\nthe United Kingdom (UK), Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the \r\nUSA (McAllister et al. 2021). Moreover, coverage of climate science \r\nis increasing. One study (MeCCO) has tracked media coverage of \r\nclimate change from over 127 sources from 59 countries in North and \r\nLatin America, Europe, Middle East, Africa, Asia and Oceania (Boykoff \r\net al. 2021). It shows the number of media science stories in those \r\nsources grew steadily from 47,376 per annum to 86,587 per annum \r\nbetween 2017 and 2021 across print, broadcast, digital media and \r\nentertainment (Boykoff et al. 2021). "


id: 47eca6cd7560e0275624a9a489a64cda
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9865
content:
"However, increasing media coverage does not always lead to more \r\naccurate coverage of climate change mitigation, as it can also spur \r\ndiffusion of misinformation (Boykoff and Yulsman 2013; van der \r\nLinden et al. 2015; Whitmarsh and Corner 2017; Fahy 2018; Painter \r\n2019). In addition, media professionals have at times drawn on the \r\nnorm of representing both sides of a controversy, bearing the risk of \r\nthe disproportionate representation of scepticism of anthropogenic \r\nclimate change despite the convergent agreement in climate science \r\nthat humans contribute to climate change, (robust evidence, high \r\nagreement) (Freudenburg and Muselli 2010; Boykoff 2013; Painter \r\nand Gavin 2016; Tindall et al. 2018; McAllister et al. 2021). This \r\noccurs despite increasing consensus among journalists regarding the \r\nbasic scientific understanding of climate change (Bruggemann and \r\nEngesser 2017). "


id: d931bf12d77c3effa696fc113942b2bf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35508
content:
"Accurate transference of the climate science has been undermined \r\nsignificantly by climate change counter-movements, particularly in the \r\nUSA (McCright and Dunlap 2000, 2003; Jacques et al. 2008; Brulle et al. \r\n2012; Boussalis and Coan 2016; Farrell 2016a; Carmichael et al. 2017; \r\nCarmichael and Brulle 2018; Boykoff and Farrell 2019; Almiron and \r\nXifra 2019) in both legacy and new/social media environments through \r\nmisinformation (robust evidence, high agreement) (van der Linden et al. \r\n2017), including about the causes and consequences of climate change \r\n(Brulle 2014; Farrell 2016a; Farrell 2016b; Supran and Oreskes 2017). \r\nMisinformation can rapidly spread through social media (Walter et al. \r\n2018). Together with the proliferation of suspicions of 'fake news' and \r\n'post-truth', some traditional and social media contents have fuelled \r\npolarisation and partisan divides on climate change in many countries "


id: 8377206ea9ab097d300132dfe2bd0bcf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20267
content:
"Media is another platform for various actors to present, interpret and \r\nshape debates around climate change and its governance (Tindall \r\net al. 2018). The media coverage of climate change has grown steadily \r\nsince 1980s (O'Neill et al. 2015; Boykoff et al. 2019), but the level \r\nand type of coverage differs over time and from country to country \r\n(robust evidence, high agreement) (Boykoff 2011; Schmidt et al. \r\n2013; Schafer and Schlichting 2014). Media can be a useful conduit \r\nto build public support to accelerate mitigation action, but may also \r\nbe utilised to impede decarbonisation endeavours (Boykoff 2011; \r\nO'Neill et al. 2015; Farrell 2016b; Carmichael et al. 2017; Carmichael \r\nand Brulle 2018). Different media systems in different regions and "


id: e9de768eb078e28503f663073117e594
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38491
content:
"(Feldman et al. 2017; Hornsey et al. 2018), which can further deter \r\ndevelopment of new and ambitious climate policy (Tindall et al. 2018). \r\nFurther, the ideological stance of media also influences the intensity \r\nand content of media coverage, in developed and developing countries \r\nalike (Dotson et al. 2012; Stoddart and Tindall 2015). "


id: 8b03b0e932d66c2e719db38b1722c622
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21625
content:
"These are either formal or informal, profit or non-profit and \r\npublic  or  private  (Avelino and  Wittmayer 2016). For example, \r\ncorporations are formal, private, and for-profit, the state and labour \r\norganisations are  formal, public, and non-profit, and communities \r\nare private, informal, and non-profit. An intermediary sector, crossing \r\nthe boundaries between private and public, for profit and non-profit, \r\nincludes energy cooperatives, not-for-profit energy enterprises, and \r\nthe scientific community (Avelino and Wittmayer 2016). "


id: 37255e66b67c604641ab5723b6b7b328
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6918
content:
"To address the challenge of climate mitigation, a  range of actors \r\nacross sectors and jurisdictions have created coalitions for climate \r\ngovernance, operating as actor-networks. For example, mitigation \r\npolicies are particularly effective when they are integrated with \r\nco-benefits such as health, biodiversity, and poverty reduction \r\n(Romero-Lankao et al. 2018a). Transnational business and public\u0002private partnerships and initiatives, as well as international cooperation \r\nat the sub-national and city levels are discussed in Chapter 14."


id: 3c6e7690945a5da5542306b3fceefca3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7826
content:
"The decision adopting the Paris Agreement welcomed contributions \r\nof sub-national actors to mobilising and scaling up ambitious \r\nclimate action (see also Chapter 14). They engage in climate relevant \r\nmechanisms, such as the Sustainable Development Goals and the \r\nNew Urban Agenda. Sub-national actors fill a gap in national policies, \r\nparticipate in transnational and sub-national climate governance \r\nnetworks and facilitate learning and exchange among governmental, \r\ncommunity, and private organisations at multiple levels, gathering \r\nknowledge and best practices such as emission inventories and risk \r\nmanagement tools that can be applied in multiple contexts (Kona \r\net al. 2016; Sharifi and Yamagata 2016; Michaelowa and Michaelowa \r\n2017; Warbroek and Hoppe 2017; Bai et al. 2018; Busch et al. 2018; \r\nHsu et al. 2018; Lee and Jung 2018; Marvin et al. 2018; Romero\u0002Lankao et al. 2018b; Urge-Vorsatz and Seto 2018; Amundsen et al. \r\n2018; Heikkinen et al. 2019; Hultman et al. 2020). "


id: 1ea13ee112f040e566f704a65a1b6a72
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2594
content:
"Common challenges in reporting climate change exist around the \r\nworld (Schmidt et al. 2013; Schafer and Painter 2021), but particularly \r\nso in the developing countries, due to lower capacities, lack of \r\njournalists' training in complex climate subjects, and lack of access \r\nto clear, timely and understandable climate-related resources and \r\nimages in newsrooms (robust evidence, high agreement) (Harbinson \r\n2006; Shanahan 2009; Broadbent et al. 2016; Luck et al. 2018). \r\nUgandan journalist Patrick Luganda has said, 'Those most at risk from \r\nthe impacts of climate change typically have had access to the least \r\ninformation about it through mass media.' (Boykoff, 2011), indicating \r\nthat information availability and capacity is a manifestation of global \r\nclimate (in)justice."


id: 7def8211cd730b1c619b90f15a671c2d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19337
content:
"Sub-national climate change policies exist in more than 142 countries \r\nand exemplify the increasing significance of mitigation policy \r\nat  the  sub-national level (Hsu et al. 2018). However, estimations \r\nof the number of sub-national actors pledging voluntary climate \r\naction are challenging and underreporting is a concern (Hsu et al. \r\n2018; Chan and Morrow 2019). As can be seen in Figure 13.3 more \r\nthan 10,500 cities and nearly 250 regions representing more than \r\n2 billion people, factoring for overlaps in population between these \r\njurisdictions, have pledged climate action as of December 2020 (Hsu \r\net al. 2020a). More jurisdictions in Europe and North America have \r\npledged action, but in terms of population almost all regions are \r\nsubstantially engaged in sub-national action."


id: 22b743d771c375d5686a95d66fb38e52
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3321
content:
"In many countries, sub-national actors and networks are a  crucial \r\ncomponent of climate mitigation as they have remit over land\u0002use planning, waste management, infrastructure, housing and \r\ncommunity development, and their jurisdictions are often where the \r\nimpacts of climate change are felt (robust evidence, high agreement). \r\nDepending on the legal framework and other institutional constraints, \r\nsub-national actors play crucial roles in developing, delivering \r\nand contesting decarbonisation visions and pathways (Schroeder \r\net al. 2013; Ryan 2015; Abbott et al. 2016; Backstrand et al. 2017; \r\nAmundsen et al. 2018; Fuhr et al. 2018) (Section 13.3.3). "


id: 26a37d50bb109b873a7809b33765b222
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3958
content:
"Many of these efforts are organised around transnational or regional \r\nnetworks. For example, a  coalition of 130 sub-national (in other \r\nwords, state, and regional) governments, representing 21% of the \r\nglobal economy and 672 million people, has pledged about 9% \r\nemissions reduction compared to a  base year (CDP 2020). More \r\nthan 10,000 cities, representing more than 10% of the global \r\npopulation, participate in the Global Covenant of Mayors, C40 Cities "


id: 2d09db073ab1c254fd16934cee5edcb5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5196
content:
"Sub-national actors include organisations, jurisdictions, and \r\nnetworks (e.g.,  a coalition of cities or state authorities). "


id: 4ff6133102a673f06d5e7173c2a2a26
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11359
content:
"Figure 13.3 | Sub-national GHG mitigation commitments: Total population by IPCC region. Population of sub-national actors (cities and regions) recording climate \r\naction commitments as captured in the ClimActor dataset. Population calculation considers overlap between City and Regions by only accounting for population once for Cities \r\nand Regions that are nested jurisdictions. Source: adapted with permission from Hsu et al. (2020a) to reflect IPCC AR6 aggregation. Compiled in 2020 from multiple sources \r\nbased on most recent year of data available."


id: 1b794a108d0388dcb2829df56ecde4a9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2017
content:
"Sub-national mitigation policies are highlighted below, based on the \r\ntaxonomy of policies in Section 13.6.1: "


id: d5ad5ee39a6e11bdbb90b62e8abd53d7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34905
content:
"European Network of Living Labs  - with a  global outreach  - has \r\nestablished a model of open and citizen-centric innovation for policy \r\nmaking. The proliferation of Climate Assemblies at the national and \r\nsub-national level further emphasises the increasing role that citizens \r\ncan play in both innovating and planning for carbon mitigation \r\n(Sandover et al. 2021)."


id: 2484835fb2ef52ed428206a477b8ffe6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3613
content:
"growing smaller cities in Latin America, Asia and Africa lack \r\ncapacity for urban planning and enforcement (Romero-Lankao \r\net al. 2015; Creutzig 2016)."


id: 8410814378dfb07bae2bbb64d7dc0aef
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20391
content:
"State and local authorities are often central to initiating and \r\nimplementing experiments and use an incremental, 'learning by \r\ndoing' governing approach (Bai et al. 2010; Nevens et al. 2013; \r\nCastan Broto and Bulkeley 2013; Mcguirk et al. 2015; Nagorny\u0002Koring and Nochta 2018; Hodson et al. 2018; Peng and Bai 2018; \r\nSmeds and Acuto 2018; Culwick et al. 2019; Sengers et al. 2019). \r\nExperiments relate to technological learning and changes in policies, \r\npractices, services, user behaviour, business models, institutions, and \r\ngovernance (Castan Broto and Bulkeley 2013; Wieczorek et al. 2015; \r\nKivimaa et al. 2017a; Laurent and Pontille 2018; Torrens et al. 2019). "


id: a915b94507bce751066a0a73dcd85214
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26959
content:
"Experimentation has contributed to learning, changes in outcomes \r\nwhen implemented, and shifts in the political landscape (Turnheim \r\net al. 2018). Experiments, however, are often isolated and do \r\nnot always result in longer-term, more widespread changes. The \r\ntransformative potential (understood as changes in the fundamental \r\nattributes of natural and human systems, see Annex I: Glossary) of \r\nexperiments is constrained by uncertainty about locally relevant \r\nclimate change solutions and effects; a lack of comprehensive, and \r\nsectorally inclusive national policy frameworks for decarbonisation; \r\nbudgetary and staffing limitations; and a  lack of institutional and \r\npolitical capacity to deliver integrated and planned approaches \r\n(Evans and Karvonen 2014; Mcguirk et al. 2015; Bulkeley et al. \r\n2016; Voytenko et al. 2016; Wittmayer et al. 2016; Webb et al. 2017; \r\nGrandin et al. 2018; Holscher et al. 2018; Nagorny-Koring 2019; \r\nSengers et al. 2019)."


id: c33fa38d58cdaf89314e30c4ad14c666
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31625
content:
"Partnerships, such as those among private and public, or \r\ntransnational and sub-national entities, have been found to enable \r\nbetter mitigation results in areas outside direct government control \r\nsuch as residential energy use, emissions from local businesses, or \r\nprivate vehicles (Fenwick et al. 2012; Castan Broto and Bulkeley \r\n2013; Aylett 2014; Hamilton et al. 2014; Bulkeley et al. 2016; \r\nWakabayashi and Arimura 2016; Grandin et al. 2018). Partnerships \r\ntake advantage of investments that match available grants or enable \r\na local energy project, or enhance the scope or impact of mitigation \r\n(Burch et al. 2013). "


id: d646fdecb05fea666f949829bde9e9f2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35012
content:
"limited, there are concerns that implementation challenges persist \r\nwith city level plans, particularly tied to management of initiatives \r\nand engagement of the population (Messori et al. 2020)."


id: 66ab35419dcc7df14ff1917acb40a970
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15320
content:
"Institutions and governance processes described in previous section \r\nresult in specific policies, that governments then implement and \r\nthat shape actions of many stakeholders. This section assesses \r\nthe empirical experience with the range of policy instruments \r\navailable to governments with which to shape mitigation outcomes. \r\nSection  13.7 that follows deals with how these instruments are \r\ncombined into packages, and Section 13.9 addresses economy-wide \r\nmeasures and issues."


id: b4cbf43774a76ef3b45bd7d90aa3ddf2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29059
content:
"Whether participation in transnational climate initiatives impacts \r\nsub-national governments' achievement on climate mitigation goals \r\nis uncertain. Some find that higher ambition in climate mitigation \r\ncommitments did not translate into greater mitigation (Kona \r\net al. 2016; Hsu et al. 2019). Other studies associate participation in \r\nnetworks with increased solar photovoltaic systems (PV) investment \r\n(Khan and Sovacool 2016; Steffen et al. 2019), and with potential to \r\nachieve carbon emissions reductions per capita in line with a global \r\n2degC scenario (Kona et al. 2016)."


id: 99a7a5f7eb39551ef1c3ea7a3ec681aa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24265
content:
" Many different policy instruments for GHG reduction are in use. \r\nThey fall into a few major categories that share key characteristics. \r\nThis section provides one possible taxonomy of these major types of \r\npolicy instruments, presents a set of criteria for policy evaluation, and \r\nsynthesises the literature on the most common mitigation policies. \r\nThe emphasis is on recent empirical evidence on the performance \r\nof different policy instruments and lessons that can be drawn from \r\nthese experiences. This builds on and enhances the AR5 Chapter 15, \r\nwhich provided a more theoretical treatment of policy instruments \r\nfor mitigation."


id: b05f73bfc5598f465615f977c298b583
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28265
content:
"Reporting networks may attract high-performing actors, suggesting \r\nan artificially high level of cities interested in taking climate \r\naction or piloting solutions (self-selection bias) that may not be \r\neffective elsewhere (van der Heijden 2018). Many studies present \r\na  conservative view of potential mitigation impact because they \r\ndraw upon publicly reported mitigation actions and exclude sub\u0002national actions that are not reported (Kuramochi et al. 2020)."


id: efd9be1b850216df3fda910a041a57fc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39585
content:
"In addition to direct mitigation contributions, climate action \r\npartnerships may deliver indirect effects that, while difficult \r\nto quantify, ensure long-term change (Chan et al. 2015). \r\nExperimentation and policy innovation helps to establish best \r\npractices (Hoffmann 2011); set new norms for ambitious climate \r\naction that help build coalitions (Chan et al. 2015; Bernstein and \r\nHoffmann 2018); and translate into knowledge sharing or capacity \r\nbuilding (Lee  and Koski 2012; Hakelberg 2014; Purdon 2015; \r\nAcuto and Rayner 2016). Emergent research explores whether, in \r\naddition to realising outcomes, mitigation initiatives also provide \r\nthe resources, skills and networks that governments and other \r\nstakeholders currently use to target other development goals (Shaw \r\net al. 2014; Wolfram 2016; Wiedenhofer et al. 2018; Amundsen et al. \r\n2018; Heikkinen et al. 2019)."


id: 928d997d0f6912371694affe92471877
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"A large number of policies and policy instruments can affect GHG \r\nemissions and/or sequestration, whether their primary purpose is \r\nclimate change mitigation or not. Consequently, consistent with the \r\napproach in this chapter, this section adopts a broad interpretation to \r\nwhat is considered mitigation policy. Also, the section recognises the \r\nmultiplicity of policies that overlap and interact. "


id: 92752d84edb152e7d45db02b3b79f9f6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22986
content:
"Environmental policy instruments, including for climate change \r\nmitigation, have long been grouped into three main categories  - \r\n(i) economic instruments, (ii) regulatory instruments, and (iii) other \r\ninstruments  - although the specific terms differ across disciplines \r\nand additional categories are common (Kneese and Schultze 1975; \r\nJaffe and Stavins 1995; Nordhaus 2013; Wurzel et al. 2013). Examples \r\nof common policies in each category are shown in Table 13.1, but this \r\nis not a comprehensive list. Principles of and empirical experience \r\nwith the various instruments are synthesised in Sections 13.6.3 to \r\n13.6.5, international interactions are covered in Section 13.6.6. "


id: 8eb1006a898cfa1c2fb4ab38045ce91
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22293
content:
"combustion. Fossil fuel use is subject to energy taxes in the majority \r\nbut not all jurisdictions, and in some instances, it is subsidised. "


id: f1b7e440d73b3cb344aeb880c7501da7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39910
content:
"An increasing share of global emissions sources is subject to \r\nmitigation policies, though coverage is still incomplete (Eskander and \r\nFankhauser 2020; Nascimento et al. 2021). "


id: f20c49205f0f67a4a2ab9377be11e751
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39978
content:
"The main gaps in current mitigation policy coverage are non-CO2\r\nemissions and CO2 emissions associated with production of industrial \r\nmaterials and chemical feedstocks, which are connected to broader \r\nquestions of shifting to cleaner production systems (Bataille et al. \r\n2018a; Davis et al. 2018). Sequestration policies focus mainly on \r\nforestry and carbon capture and storage (CCS) with limited support \r\nfor other carbon dioxide removal and use options (Geden et al. 2019; \r\nVonhedemann et al. 2020). "


id: 867b39098b166f617fcfd0c87d1a3666
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"While consistent information on global prevalence of policies is not \r\navailable, in G20 countries the use of various policy instruments \r\nhas increased steadily over the past two decades (Nascimento et al. \r\n2021). The share of countries that had mitigation policy instruments \r\nin place rose across all sectoral categories, albeit to different extents \r\nin different sectors and for different policy instruments (Figure 13.4). \r\nAmong G20 countries the electricity and heat generation has the \r\ngreatest number of policies in place, and the agriculture and forestry \r\nsector the fewest (Nascimento et al. 2021). "


id: 23dadfe87cd61526ef502920c63477d9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3492
content:
"The stringency of mitigation policies varies greatly by country, sector \r\nand policy (Box 13.9). Stringency can be increased through sequential \r\nchanges to policies (Pahle et al. 2018). "


id: ebcddcfc225415e9d44648715c496a68
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38855
content:
"The mix of policies has shifted towards more regulatory instruments \r\nand carbon pricing relative to information policies and voluntary \r\naction (Schmidt and Fleig 2018; Eskander and Fankhauser 2020). "


id: 471fc821151d26c43ab9002654111bf0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9714
content:
"Estimates of the effective carbon price (as an estimate of overall \r\nstringency across policy instruments) differ greatly between countries \r\nand sectors (World Bank 2021a). Countries with higher overall \r\neffective carbon prices tend to have lower carbon intensity of energy \r\nsupply and lower emissions intensity of the economy, as shown in \r\nan analysis of 42 G20 and OECD countries (OECD 2018). The carbon \r\nprice that prevails under a carbon tax or ETS is not directly a measure \r\nof policy stringency across an economy, as the carbon prices typically \r\nonly cover a share of total emissions, and rebates or free allowance \r\nallocations can limit effectiveness (OECD 2018). At low emissions \r\nprices, mitigation incentives are small; as of April 2021, seventeen "


id: 44f3b3d45be5a27180aa416aa25f5e4c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9361
content:
"The IEA database, which tracks renewable energy and energy \r\nefficiency policies at the national and sub-national levels for about \r\n160 countries, indicates an average of about 225 new renewable \r\nenergy and energy efficiency policies annually from 2010 through \r\n2019 with a peak in the number of new renewable energy policies in \r\n2011 (IEA 2021). "


id: 44588b567b2d05275d3e601225243cf2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9262
content:
"Comparing the stringency of policies over time or across jurisdictions is very challenging and there is no single widely accepted metric \r\nor methodology (Compston and Bailey 2016; Burck et al. 2019; Tosun and Schnepf 2020; Fekete et al. 2021). Policies are also assessed \r\nfor their estimated effect on emissions, however, this requires estimation of a counterfactual baseline and isolation of other effects \r\n(Cross-Chapter Box 10 in Chapter 14). Economic instruments can be compared on the basis of their price or cost per tCO2-eq. Even \r\nthat is fraught with complexity in the context of different definitions and estimations for fossil fuel taxes and subsidies. For non-price \r\npolicies an implicit or equivalent carbon price can be estimated. Factors such as the tax treatment of compliance costs can increase \r\ncomplexity. Accounting for the combined effect of overlapping policies presents additional challenges and such estimates are subject \r\nto numerous limitations."


id: 4e51c1f46cac3e4c66642a9f716d4199
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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content:
"together several lines of evidence to indicate that mitigation policies \r\nhave had a discernible impact on mitigation for specific countries, \r\nsectors and technologies and led to avoided global emissions to \r\ndate by several billion tonnes CO2-eq annually (medium evidence,\r\nmedium agreement). "


id: c4d805c250597c5a2814eec78e366c35
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"jurisdictions with a carbon pricing policy had a tax rate or allowance \r\nprice less than USD5 per tCO2 (World Bank 2021a). "


id: c922d4ce6398b65c3254b3e9a6701600
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32712
content:
"Other policies, such as fossil fuel subsidies, may provide incentives to \r\nincrease emissions thus limiting the effectiveness of the mitigation \r\npolicy (Section 13.6.3.6). Those effects may be complex and difficult \r\nto identify. In most countries trade policy provides an implicit \r\nsubsidy to CO2 emissions (Shapiro 2020). The analysis of emissions \r\nfrom energy use in buildings in Chapter 9 illustrates the factors that \r\nsupport and counteract mitigation policies."


id: 2a5410544eeccfb5e41e5aeb4cc0ebe1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4671
content:
"Policy evaluation is a  'careful, retrospective assessment of merit, \r\nworth and value of the administration, output and outcomes of \r\ngovernment interventions' (Vedung 2005). The inherent complexity \r\nof climate mitigation policies calls for the application of multiple \r\ncriteria, and reflexiveness of analysis with regard to governments' \r\nand societies' objectives for policies (Huitema et al. 2011)."


id: a2f462ca4583441f7d795f26ce2a8bc7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25884
content:
"Furthermore, emissions pricing policies encourage reduction of \r\nemissions whose marginal abatement cost is lower than the tax/\r\nallowance price, so they have limited impact on emissions with \r\nhigher abatement costs such as industrial process emissions (Bataille \r\net al. 2018a; Davis et al. 2018). EU ETS emission reductions have \r\nbeen achieved mainly through implementation of low cost measures \r\nsuch as energy efficiency and fuel switching rather than more costly \r\nindustrial process emissions. "


id: 13722a8058131d535e6138af03ebd94d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 629
content:
"Evaluation of climate mitigation policy tends to focus on the \r\nenvironmental effectiveness and economic efficiency or cost\u0002effectiveness of GHG mitigation policies, with distributional \r\nequity sometimes as an additional criterion. In policy design and \r\nimplementation there is rising interest in co-benefits and side\u0002effects of climate policies, as well as institutional requirements for \r\nimplementation and the potential of policies to have transformative \r\neffect on systems. Table 13.2 elaborates. "


id: d1119b03934f13655fa63bd3c4ef2957
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34135
content:
"Estimating the overall effectiveness of mitigation policies is \r\ndifficult because of the need to identify which observed changes \r\nin emissions and their drivers are attributable to policy effort and \r\nwhich to other factors. Cross-Chapter Box 10 in Chapter 14 brings "


id: 4f566e84478200e06a8f3fc8ed0622d3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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content:
"2 The UK was a member of the EU ETS until December 31, 2020. A UK Emissions Trading Scheme (UK ETS) came into effect on 1 January 2021."


id: bd5299d1669012dfc7325d1efbe69b0c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Not all criteria are applicable to all instruments or in all circumstances \r\nand the relative importance of different criteria depend on the \r\nobjectives in the specific the context. a  given policy instrument \r\nmay score highly on only some assessment criteria. In practice, \r\nthe empirical evidence seldom exists for assessment of a  policy \r\ninstrument across all criteria. "


id: 2c41a764d90908ca8e15ee3682930d0d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5051
content:
"the addition or subtraction of other policies. In practice, numerous \r\njurisdictions have not increased their tax rates annually and some \r\nscheduled tax increases have not been implemented (Haites \r\net al. 2018). Predictability of future tax rates helps improve economic \r\nperformance (Bosetti and Victor 2011; Brunner et al. 2012). \r\nUncertainty about the future existence of a carbon price can hinder \r\ninvestment (Jotzo et al. 2012) and uncertainty about future price \r\nlevels can increase the resource costs of carbon pricing (Aldy and \r\nArmitage 2020)."


id: 9ed6581f289f1a64ffb2f2986461cce
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25167
content:
"Economic instruments, including carbon taxes, emissions trading \r\nsystems (ETS), purchases of emission reduction credits, subsidies for \r\nenergy efficiency, renewables and research and development and \r\nfossil fuel subsidy removal, provide a  financial incentive to reduce \r\nemissions. Pricing instruments, especially ETS and carbon taxes, \r\nhave become more prevalent in recent years (Section 13.6.1). They \r\nhave proven effective in promoting implementation of the low-cost \r\nemissions reductions, and practical experience has driven progress in \r\nmarket mechanism design (robust evidence, high agreement). "


id: 69cbaed7356b44fb0f7ee9c3bacca0f2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15883
content:
"The most common ETS design  - cap-and-trade  - sets a  limit on \r\naggregate GHG emissions by specified sources, distributes tradable \r\nallowances approximately equal to the limit, and requires regulated \r\nemitters to submit allowances equal to their verified emissions. The \r\nprice of allowances is determined by the market, except in cases \r\nwhere government determined price floors or ceilings apply. "


id: dcd883188993bf45beef2e7293839675
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36115
content:
"ETSs for GHGs were in place in 38 countries as of April 2021 \r\n(World Bank 2021a). The EU ETS, which covers 30 countries, was \r\nrecently displaced by China's national ETS as the largest. ETSs tend \r\nto cover emissions by large industrial and electricity generating \r\nfacilities.2\r\n Allowance prices as of April 1, 2021 ranged from just \r\nover USD1 to USD50, and coverage between 9% and 80% of the \r\njurisdiction's emissions. "


id: ce22c37cff54770f79fcfb23f3ba17c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33597
content:
"A carbon tax is a charge on carbon dioxide or other greenhouse gases \r\nimposed on specified emitters or products. In practice features such \r\nas exemptions and multiple rates can lead to debate as to whether \r\na specific tax is a carbon tax (Haites 2018). While other taxes can also \r\nreduce emissions by increasing the price of GHG emitting products, \r\nthe result may be inefficient unless the tax rate is proportional to the \r\nemissions intensity. a tax on value of fossil fuels, for example, could \r\nraise the price on natural gas more than the price of coal, and hence \r\nincrease emissions if the resulting substitution towards coal were to \r\noutweigh reductions in energy use. "


id: 705181e2949ff62736854a6a3f815d72
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17018
content:
"Multiple regional pilot ETSs with different designs have been \r\nimplemented in China since 2013 to provide input to the design of \r\na national system that is to become the world's largest ETS (Jotzo \r\net al. 2018; Qian et al. 2018; Stoerk et al. 2019). Assessments have \r\nidentified potential improvements to emissions reporting procedures \r\n(Zhang et al. 2019) and the pilot ETS designs (Deng et al. 2018). China's \r\nnational ETS covering over 2200 heat and power plants with annual \r\nemissions of about 4 GtCO2took effect in 2021 (World Bank 2021a). "


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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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vector_id: 14394
content:
"As of April 2021, 27 carbon taxes had been implemented by national \r\ngovernments, mostly in Europe (World Bank 2021a). Most of the \r\ntaxes apply to fossil fuels used for transportation and heating and \r\ncover between 3% and 79% of the jurisdiction's emissions. Several \r\ncountries also tax F-gases. Tax rates vary widely from less than USD1 \r\nto over USD137 per tCO2-eq. a  few jurisdictions lowered existing \r\nfuel taxes when they implemented the carbon tax, thus reducing the \r\neffective tax rate (OECD 2021a). How the tax revenue is used varies \r\nwidely by jurisdiction. "


id: 7d8aab8e5a063c34c4cf5ed01ebf9ae2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"All of the ETSs for which data are available have accumulated surplus \r\nallowances which reduces their effectiveness (Haites 2018). Surplus \r\nallowances indicate that the caps set earlier were not stringent \r\nrelative to emissions trends. Most of those ETSs have implemented \r\nmeasures to reduce the surplus including removal/cancellation of \r\nallowances and more rapid reduction of the cap. Several ETSs have \r\nadopted mechanisms to remove excess allowances from the market \r\nwhen supply is abundant and release additional allowances into the \r\nmarket when the supply is limited, such as the EU 'market stability \r\nreserve' (Hepburn et al. 2016; Bruninx et al. 2020). Initial indications \r\nare that this mechanism is at least partially successful in stabilising \r\nprices in response to short term disruptions such as the COVID-19 \r\neconomic shock (Gerlagh et al. 2020; Bocklet et al. 2019). "


id: f83fee457227ee277366a1eb0289f532
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41051
content:
"Carbon taxes tend to garner the least public support among possible \r\nmitigation policy options (Rhodes et al. 2017; Rabe 2018; Maestre\u0002Andres et al. 2019; Criqui et al. 2019) although some regulations also \r\nmeet with opposition (Attari et al. 2009). Policymakers sometimes \r\nuse the revenue to build support for the tax, allocating some to \r\naddress regressivity, to address competitiveness claims by industry, \r\nto reduce the economic cost by lowering existing taxes, and to fund \r\nenvironmental projects (Gavard et al. 2018; Klenert et al. 2018; \r\nLevi et al. 2020). "


id: 779b40aae217a651667d14c24db0a58e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18246
content:
"Some ETS also include provisions to limit the range of market prices, \r\nmaking them 'hybrids' (Pizer 2002). a price floor assures a minimum \r\nlevel of policy effect if demand for allowances is low relative to the \r\nETS emissions cap. It is usually implemented through a minimum price \r\nat auction, as for example in California's ETS (Borenstein et al. 2019). "


id: 7585b9abd14572ea5cda9fe1e797ee9e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17905
content:
"a  carbon tax generally is higher in countries where it constitutes \r\na large part of the fossil fuel price (Andersson 2019). "


id: ef94131a307bd155d73657f707c859e0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39532
content:
"a price ceiling allows the government to issue unlimited additional \r\nallowances at a pre-determined price to limit the maximum cost of \r\nmitigation. Price ceilings have not been activated to date. "


id: 8b16680bdfddf67d8ba5db12728c3eaa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21634
content:
"Few of the world's carbon prices are at a level consistent with various \r\nestimates of the carbon price needed to meet the Paris Agreement \r\ngoals. In modelling of mitigation pathways that limit warming to \r\n2degC (>50%)(Section  3.6.1) marginal abatement costs of carbon in \r\n2030 are about 60 to 120 USD2015 per tCO2, and about 170 to \r\n290  USD2015 per tCO2 in pathways that limit warming to 1.5degC \r\n(>50%) with no or limited overshoot (Section  3.6). One synthesis \r\nstudy estimates necessary prices at USD40-80 per tCO2 by 2020 \r\n(High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices 2017). Only a  small \r\nminority of carbon pricing schemes in 2021 had prices above USD40 \r\nper tCO2, and all of these were in European jurisdictions (World Bank \r\n2021a). Most carbon pricing systems apply only to some share of \r\nthe total emissions in a jurisdiction, so the headline carbon price is \r\nhigher than the average carbon price that applies across an economy \r\n(World Bank 2021a). "


id: 621adb7789e74f215f333fbb7855b945
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14532
content:
"A carbon tax or GHG ETS increases the prices of emissions intensive \r\ngoods thus creating incentives to reduce emissions (Stavins 2019) for \r\na comparison of a tax and ETS). The principal advantage of a pricing \r\npolicy is that it promotes implementation of low-cost reductions; for \r\na carbon tax, reductions whose cost per tCO2-eq reduced is lower \r\nthan the tax and for an ETS the lowest cost (per tCO2-eq) reductions \r\nsufficient to meet the cap. Both a tax and an ETS can be designed \r\nto limit adverse economic impacts on regulated sources and \r\nemissions leakage."


id: 5d60c0129fe0d3500afaf85fe06e425f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13717
content:
"The corresponding limitations of pricing policies are that they have \r\nlimited impact on adoption of mitigation measures when decisions \r\nare not sensitive to prices and do not encourage adoption of higher \r\ncost mitigation measures. Their effectiveness in influencing long-term \r\ninvestments depends on the expectation that the policy will continue \r\nand expectations related to future tax rates or allowance prices \r\n(Brunner et al. 2012). Other policies can be used in combination with \r\ncarbon pricing to address these limitations."


id: 475d890791908b7a2d140e827437ad4d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9764
content:
"The number of pricing policies has increased steadily and covered \r\n21.5% of global GHG emissions in 2020 (World Bank 2021a). Effective \r\ncoverage is lower because virtually all jurisdictions with a  pricing \r\npolicy have other policies that affect some of the same emissions. For \r\nexample, a few jurisdictions reduced existing fuel taxes when they \r\nintroduced their carbon tax thus reducing the effective tax rate, and \r\nmany jurisdictions have two or more pricing policies "


id: 9fcd208f63985453353f058cbd9ecc13
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25324
content:
"There is abundant evidence that carbon pricing policies reduce \r\nemissions. Statistical studies of emissions trends in jurisdictions with \r\nand without carbon pricing find a significant impact after controlling \r\nfor other policies and structural factors (Best et al. 2020; Rafaty et al. \r\n2020). Numerous assessments of specific policies, especially the EU \r\nETS and the British Columbia carbon tax, conclude that most have \r\nreduced emissions (robust evidence, high agreement) (Narassimhan \r\net al. 2018; Haites et al. 2018; Aydin and Esen 2018; Pretis 2019; \r\nAndersson 2019; FSR Climate 2019; Metcalf and Stock 2020; Rafaty \r\net al. 2020; Bayer and Aklin 2020; Diaz et al. 2020; Green 2021; \r\nArimura and Abe 2021). "


id: 4bd1d562987470d8994d758d89fa90a7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10600
content:
"Economic theory suggests that carbon pricing policies are on the \r\nwhole more cost effective than regulations or subsidies at reducing \r\nemissions (Gugler et al. 2021). Any mitigation policy imposes costs on \r\nthe regulated entities. In some cases entities may be able to recover \r\nsome or all of the costs through higher prices (Neuhoff and Ritz 2019; \r\nCludius et al. 2020). International competition from less stringently \r\nregulated firms limits the ability of emissions-intensive, trade\u0002exposed (EITE) firms to raise their prices. Thus, a unilateral mitigation \r\npolicy creates a risk of adverse economic impacts, including loss of \r\nsales, employment, profits, for such firms and associated emissions \r\nleakage (Section 13.6.6.1)."


id: e722bc87e09c37fcc9cb690d9856cb02
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37962
content:
"Estimating the emission reductions due to a specific policy is difficult \r\ndue to the effects of overlapping policies and exogenous factors such \r\nas fossil fuel price changes and economic conditions. Studies that \r\nattempt to attribute a  share of the reductions achieved to the EU \r\nETS place its contribution at 3-25% (FSR Climate 2019; Bayer and \r\nAklin 2020; Cheze et al. 2020). The relationship between a carbon tax \r\nand the resulting emission reductions is complex and is influenced \r\nby changes in fossil fuel prices, changes in fossil fuel taxes, and other \r\nmitigation policies (Aydin and Esen 2018). But the effectiveness of "


id: cf077cf7c40b45a17aa450c2693fa138
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33767
content:
"Pricing policies can be designed to minimise these risks; free \r\nallowances can be issued to EITE participants in an ETS and taxes \r\ncan provide exemptions or rebates. An extensive ex post literature \r\nfinds no statistically significant adverse impacts on competitiveness \r\nor leakage (13.6.6.1). "


id: 51ede65bdc01aa8afb46186ab6b6742d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11695
content:
"An ex post analysis of European carbon taxes finds no robust \r\nevidence of a negative effect on employment or GDP growth (Metcalf \r\nand Stock 2020). The British Columbia carbon tax led to a  small \r\nnet increase in employment (Yamazaki 2017) with no significant \r\nnegative impacts on GDP possibly due to full recycling of the tax \r\nrevenue (Bernard and Kichian 2021). Few carbon taxes apply to EITE \r\nsources (Timilsina 2018), so competitiveness impacts usually are not \r\na particular concern. "


id: 268ef781656f57a38f72ce3d24e39dda
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3947
content:
"Carbon pricing, especially an ETS that covers industrial sources, \r\nstimulates technological change by participants and others (Calel \r\nand Dechezlepretre 2016; FSR Climate 2019; van den Bergh and \r\nSavin 2021) (Section 13.6.6.3 and Chapter 16). The purpose of pricing \r\npolicies is to encourage implementation of the lowest cost mitigation \r\nmeasures. Pricing policies therefore are more likely to stimulate \r\nquick, low cost innovation such as fuel switching and energy \r\nefficiency, rather than long term, costly technology development \r\nsuch as renewable energy or industrial process technologies (Calel \r\n2020; Lilliestam et al. 2021). To encourage long-term technology \r\ndevelopment carbon pricing policies need to be complemented by \r\nother mitigation and research and development (R&D) policies. "


id: cfa58a0af0d02a3a41451372b36a300a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33892
content:
"Government revenue generated by carbon pricing policies globally \r\nwas approximately 53 billion USD in 2020 split almost evenly \r\nbetween carbon taxes and ETS allowance sales (World Bank 2021). \r\nRevenue raised though carbon pricing is generally considered \r\na relatively efficient form of taxation and a large share of revenue \r\nenters general government budgets (Postic and Fetet 2020). Some of \r\nthe revenue is returned to emitters or earmarked for environmental \r\npurposes. Allowance allocation and revenue spending measures have \r\nbeen used to create public support for many carbon pricing policies \r\nincluding at every major reform stage of the EU ETS (Klenert et al. \r\n2018; Dorsch et al. 2020) (Box 5.11)."


id: 5bbd3de27f8bdf110e50d8029c7e9a83
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13398
content:
"Offset credits are voluntary GHG emission reductions for which \r\ntradable credits are issued by a  supervisory body (Michaelowa \r\net al. 2019b). a buyer can use purchased credits to offset an equal \r\nquantity of its emissions. In a voluntary market governments, firms \r\nand individuals purchase credits to offset emissions generated by \r\ntheir actions, such as air travel. a compliance market al.ows specified \r\noffset credits to be used for compliance with mitigation policies, \r\nespecially ETSs, carbon taxes and low-carbon fuel standards. (Newell \r\net al. 2013; Bento et al. 2016; Michaelowa et al. 2019a)."


id: defa256f447de2bcd488e595803e2ef2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36486
content:
"When used for compliance, governments typically specify \r\na maximum quantity of offset credits that can be used, as well as \r\nthe types of emission reduction actions, the project start dates and \r\nthe geographic regions eligible credits. Initially, the EU ETS, Swiss \r\nETS and New Zealand ETS accepted credits issued under the Kyoto \r\nProtocol (Chapter 14), but they terminated or severely constrained \r\nthe quantity of international credits allowed for compliance use after \r\n2014 (Shishlov et al. 2016) (Section 13.6.6). "


id: 2850e87fce611b726b566e48dddb9cd3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4291
content:
"A key question for any offset credit is whether the emission \r\nreductions are 'additional': reductions that only happen because of \r\nthe offset credit payment (Greiner and Michaelowa 2003; Millard\u0002Ball and Ortolano 2010; van Benthem and Kerr 2013; Burke 2016; \r\nBento et al. 2016). To assess additionality and to determine the \r\nquantity of credits to be issued, regulators develop methodologies \r\nto estimate baseline (business-as-usual) emissions in the absence of \r\noffset payments (Newell et al. 2013; Bento et al. 2016). Credits are \r\nissued for the difference between the baseline and actual emissions \r\nwith adjustments for possible emissions increases outside the project \r\nboundary (Rosendahl and Strand 2011). Some research suggests that \r\nprocedural and measurement advances can significantly reduce the \r\nrisk of severe non-additionality (Mason and Plantinga 2013; Bento \r\net al. 2016; Michaelowa et al. 2019a). "


id: e523c6863276517c8244940ee13c157a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37612
content:
"Carbon taxes on fossil fuels have effects similar to the removal of \r\nfossil fuel subsidies (Ohlendorf et al. 2021) (Section 13.6.3.6). Even \r\nif a carbon tax is progressive it increases prices for fuels, electricity, \r\ntransport, food and other goods and services that adversely affect \r\nthe most economically vulnerable. Redistribution of tax revenue \r\nis critical to address the adverse impacts on low-income groups \r\n(Dorband et al. 2019) (Box 5.11). In countries with a limited capacity \r\nto collect taxes and distribute revenues to low-income households, \r\nsuch as some developing countries, carbon taxes may have greater \r\ndistributional consequences."


id: 1aad9e02c0d9f21f080284e134ec0c75
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1895
content:
"Distributional effects have generally not been a significant issue for \r\nETSs. Equity for industrial participants typically is addressed through \r\nfree allocation of allowances. Impacts on household incomes, \r\nwith the exception of electricity prices, are too small or indirect to \r\nbe a  concern. Some systems are designed to limit electricity price \r\nincreases (Petek 2020) or use some revenue for bill assistance to low\u0002income households (RGGI 2019). "


id: 60680729410df430903b7ea4e7bf63be
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14268
content:
"Subsidies for mitigation encourage individuals and firms to invest \r\nin assets that reduce emissions, changes in processes or innovation. \r\nSubsidies have been used to improve energy efficiency, encourage \r\nthe uptake of renewable energy and other sector-specific emissions "


id: ac1caa4f84aaca4ad038d7ab9b428669
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27521
content:
"much of it in the form of feed-in tariffs in Germany, enabled the \r\nscaling up of the global solar photovoltaic industry and attendant \r\nlarge reductions in production costs that by 2020 made solar power \r\ncost competitive with fossil fuels (Buchholz et al. 2019). There is also \r\nevidence for increased innovation activity as a result of solar feed-in \r\ntariffs (Bohringer et al. 2017b). "


id: 896357e982f1bd8567b457aef1af538d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
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vector_id: 21348
content:
"saving options (Chapters  6 to 11), and to promote innovation. \r\nTargeted subsidies can achieve specific mitigation goals yet have \r\nintrinsically narrower coverage than more broad-based pricing \r\ninstruments. Subsidies are often used not only to achieve emissions \r\nreductions but to address market imperfections or to achieve \r\ndistributional or strategic objectives. Subsidies are often used \r\nalongside or in combination with other policy instruments, and are \r\nprovided at widely differing cost per unit of emissions reduced. "


id: 231d3530e3f19270eb31a36f3e3b19f1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3370
content:
"Many governments have also provided subsidies for the purchase \r\nof electric vehicles, including with strong effect in China (Ma et al. \r\n2017), Norway (Baldursson et al. 2021) and other countries, and \r\nsometimes at relatively high rates (Kong and Hardman 2019)."


id: e87795751551168c6881451bd64df8d0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38236
content:
"Governments routinely provide direct funding for basic research, \r\nsubsidies for R&D to private companies, and co-funding of research and \r\ndeployment with industry (Dzonzi-Undi and Li 2016). Research \r\nsubsidies have been found to be positively correlated with green \r\nproduct innovation in a  study in Germany, Switzerland and Austria \r\n(Stucki et al. 2018). Government subsidies for R&D have been found to \r\ngreatly increase the green innovation performance of energy intensive \r\nfirms in China (Bai et al. 2019). For more detail see Chapter 16. "


id: 893f08476603525ca37cefc3ca2d3011
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21315
content:
"Many governments subsidise fossil fuel consumption and/or \r\nproduction through a variety of mechanisms (Burniaux and Chateau \r\n2014) (Figure  13.5). Different approaches exist to defining the \r\nscope and estimating the magnitude of fossil fuel subsidies (Koplow \r\n2018), and all involve estimates, so the magnitudes are uncertain. \r\nRationalising inefficient fossil fuel subsidies is one of the indicators to \r\nmeasure progress toward Sustainable Development Goal 12: Ensure \r\nsustainable consumption and production patterns (UNEP 2019a). "


id: c71374653f2d25a5f74e05647351c429
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32345
content:
"Subsidies of different forms are often provided for emissions savings \r\ninvestments to businesses and for the retrofit of buildings for energy \r\nefficiency. Emissions reductions from energy efficiencies can often \r\nbe achieved at low cost, but evidence for some schemes suggests \r\nlower effectiveness in emissions reductions than expected ex ante\r\n(Fowlie et al. 2018; Valentova et al. 2019). Tax credits can be used to \r\nencourage firms to produce or invest in low-carbon emission energy \r\nand low-emission equipment. Investment subsidies have been found \r\nto be more effective in reducing costs and uncertainties in solar \r\nenergy technologies than production subsidies (Flowers et al. 2016). "


id: 999476ea1991aae1a74b2c20d903ec6e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24250
content:
"Consumption subsidies represent approximately 70% of the total. \r\nMost of the subsidies go to petroleum, which accounts for roughly \r\n50% of the consumption subsidies and 75% of the production \r\nsubsidies (IEA 2020; OECD 2020). Much of the variation in the \r\nconsumption subsidies is due to fluctuations in the world price of oil \r\nwhich is used as the reference price. "


id: bb113a7417769f932958277c6283e7f3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30135
content:
"Subsidies have been provided extensively and in many countries for \r\nthe deployment of household rooftop solar systems, and increasingly \r\nalso for commercial scale renewable energy projects, typically using \r\n'feed-in tariffs' that provide a payment for electricity generated above \r\nthe market price (Pyrgou et al. 2016). Such schemes have  proven \r\neffective in deploying renewable energy, but lock-in subsidies for long \r\nperiods of time. In some cases they provide subsidies at higher levels \r\nthan would be required to motivate deployment (del Rio and Linares \r\n2014). High levels of net subsidies have been shown to diminish \r\nincentives for optimal siting of renewable energy installations \r\n(Penasco et al. 2019)."


id: 29d19d01e56b323583c04aa3c9668e52
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4584
content:
"A variant of subsidies for deployment of renewable energy are \r\nauctioned feed-in tariffs or auctioned contracts-for-difference, where \r\ncommercial providers bid in a competitive process. Auctions typically \r\nlead to lower price premiums (Eberhard and Kaberger 2016; Roberts \r\n2020) but efficient outcomes depend on auction design and market \r\nstructure (Grashof et al. 2020), although an emergent literature also \r\nquestions whether spread of auctions is due to performance or the \r\ndynamics of the policy formulation process (Fitch-Roy et al. 2019b; \r\nGrashof et al. 2020; Grashof 2021). The prequalification requirements \r\nor the assessment criteria in the auctions sometimes also include \r\nlocal co-benefits such as local economic diversification (Buckman \r\net al. 2019; White et al. 2021)."


id: a92528ab5849a07203fb66f4ff65aa72
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26979
content:
"The emissions reduction that could be achieved from fossil fuel subsidy \r\nremoval depends on the specific context such as magnitude and nature \r\nof subsidies, energy prices and demand elasticities, and how the fiscal \r\nsavings from reduced subsidies are used. Modelling studies of global \r\nfossil fuel subsidy removal result in projected emission reductions \r\nof between 1% and 10% by 2030 (Delpiazzo et al. 2015; IEA 2015; \r\nJewell et al. 2018; IISD 2019) and between 6.4% and 8.2% by 2050 \r\n(Schwanitz et al. 2014; Burniaux and Chateau 2014). "


id: a82fc0c7e8e886c65f5562311b6a1a2e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26807
content:
"Support for rollout clean technologies at high prices can be \r\neconomically beneficial in the long run if costs are reduced greatly \r\nas a function of deployment (Newbery 2018). Deployment support, "


id: 30b8b66150219dcd458dc82a4b6ebe3e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5827
content:
"An extensive literature documents the difficulties of phasing out \r\nfossil fuel subsidies (Schmidt et al. 2017; Gass and Echeverria 2017; \r\nSkovgaard and van Asselt 2018; Kyle 2018; Perry 2020; Gencsu et al. \r\n2020). Fossil fuel industries lobby to maintain producer subsidies and \r\nconsumers protest if they are adversely affected by subsidy reductions \r\n(Fouquet 2016; Coxhead and Grainger 2018). Yemen (2005 and 2014), \r\nCameroon (2008), Bolivia (2010), Nigeria (2012), Ecuador (2019) \r\nall abandoned subsidy reform attempts following public protests \r\n(Rentschler and Bazilian 2017; Mahdavi et al. 2020). Indonesia is an \r\nexample where fossil fuel subsidy removal was successful, helped by \r\nsocial assistance programmes and a communication effort about the \r\nbenefits of reform (Chelminski 2018; Burke and Kurniawati 2018). \r\nTo-date instances of fossil fuel subsidy reform or removal have \r\nbeen driven largely by national fiscal and economic considerations \r\n(Skovgaard and van Asselt 2019)."


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content:
"Performance standards grant regulated entities freedom to choose \r\nthe technologies and methods to reach a general objective, such as \r\na minimum market share of zero-emission vehicles or of renewable \r\nelectricity, or a maximum emissions intensity of electricity generated. \r\nTradable performance standards allow regulated entities to trade \r\ncompliance achievement credits; under-performers can buy surplus \r\ncredits from over-performers thereby reducing the aggregate cost of \r\ncompliance (Fischer 2008)."


id: 1c98a339471dad6959cd6c60006e2162
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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"Tradable performance standards have been applied to numerous \r\nsectors including electricity generation, personal vehicles, building \r\nenergy efficiency, appliances, and large industry. An important \r\napplication is Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) for electricity \r\nsupply, which require that a  minimum percentage of electricity is \r\ngenerated from specified renewable sources sometimes including \r\nnuclear and fossil fuels with CCS when referred to as a clean electricity \r\nstandard (Young and Bistline 2018) (Chapter 6). This creates a price \r\nincentive to invest in renewable generation capacity. Such incentives \r\ncan equivalently be created through feed-in tariffs, a form of subsidy \r\n(Section 13.6.3) and some jurisdictions have had both instruments \r\n(Matsumoto et al. 2017). RPS can differ in features and stringency, \r\nand are in operation in many countries and sub-national jurisdictions, \r\nincluding a majority of US states (Carley et al. 2018). "


id: abacc36a4e2abbead69c623cbd888861
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"Regulatory instruments are applied by governments to cause the \r\nadoption of desired processes, technologies, products (including \r\nenergy products) or outcomes (including emission levels). Failure to \r\ncomply incurs financial penalties and/or legal sanctions. Regulatory \r\ninstruments range from performance standards, which prescribe \r\ncompliance outcomes - and in some cases allow flexibility to achieve \r\ncompliance, including the trading of credits  - to more prescriptive \r\ntechnology-specific standards, also known as command-and-control \r\nregulation. Regulatory instruments play an important role to achieve \r\nspecific mitigation outcomes in sectoral applications (robust evidence,\r\nhigh agreement). Mitigation by regulation often enjoys greater political \r\nsupport but tends to be more economically costly than mitigation by \r\npricing instruments (robust evidence, medium agreement)."


id: f81af0d1433f5757a9811051e56d4fea
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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"Vehicle emissions standards are a  common form of performance \r\nstandard with flexibility (Chapter  9). a  corporate fuel efficiency \r\nstandard specifies an average energy use and/or GHG emissions \r\nper kilometre travelled for vehicles sold by a manufacturer. Another \r\nversion of this policy, the zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) standard, \r\nrequires vehicle sellers to achieve minimum requirements for sales "


id: 2c365c484d5239be03275cd79b70d6dc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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"(Raff and Walter 2020). Furthermore, standards may require high\u0002cost GHG reductions in one sector while missing low-cost options \r\nin another sector. Technology standards can also stifle innovation by \r\nblocking alternative technologies from entering the market (Sachs \r\n2012). Benefits of technology standards include their potential to \r\nachieve emission reductions in a  relatively short time frame and \r\nthat their effectiveness can be estimated with some confidence \r\n(Montgomery et al. 2019). "


id: 33c7e80973c6bf7612b319ed933c05c2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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"of zero-emission vehicles (Bhardwaj et al. 2020). Both instruments \r\nallow manufacturers to use tradable credits to achieve compliance. "


id: 42e83b5dbdaa25717dd8a16ceb2871d4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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"Low-carbon fuel standards (LCFS), which set an average life-cycle \r\ncarbon intensity for energy that declines over time, are another \r\nexample. LCFS are in place in many different jurisdictions (Chapter 9) \r\nand have been applied to petroleum products, natural gas, hydrogen \r\nand electricity (Yeh et al. 2016). An LCFS allows regulated entities \r\nto trade credits creating the potential for high carbon intensity fuel \r\nsuppliers to cross-subsidise low-carbon intensity transport energy \r\nproviders including low-carbon biofuels, hydrogen and electricity \r\n(Axsen et al. 2020). "


id: e9bb4d4e8ea335c6560d16a9b0f6e1ae
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content:
"Regulatory policy instruments tend to be more economically costly \r\nthan pricing instruments, as explained above. However, regulatory \r\npolicies may be preferred for other reasons."


id: c5b044fda4831c66722ef2222dcde9f4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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content:
"Trading and other flexibility mechanisms improve the economic \r\nefficiency of standards by harmonising the marginal abatement \r\ncosts among companies or installations subject to the standard. \r\nNevertheless tradable performance standards are less economically \r\nefficient in achieving emissions reductions than carbon pricing, \r\nsometimes by a significant amount (Giraudet and Quirion 2008; Chen \r\net al. 2014; Holland et al. 2015; Fox et al. 2017; Zhang et al. 2018)."


id: e703b4cd7eb0b97d3ba6fab97a13b647
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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"In some cases, regulatory policy can elicit greater political support \r\nthan pricing policy (Tobler et al. 2012; Lam 2015; Drews and van \r\nden Bergh 2016). For example, USA citizens have expressed more \r\nsupport for flexible regulation like the RPS than for carbon taxes \r\n(Rabe 2018). And a survey in British Columbia a few years after the \r\nsimultaneous implementation of a carbon tax and two regulations - \r\nthe LCFS and a clean electricity standard - found much less strong \r\nopposition to the regulations, even after being informed that they \r\nwere costlier to consumers (Rhodes et al. 2017). The degree of public \r\nsupport for regulations depends, however, on the type of regulation, \r\nas outright technology prohibitions can be unpopular (Attari et al. \r\n2009; Cherry et al. 2012)."


id: 703e6c82d49cd9a07361e660d1f36ec8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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"Technology standards take a more prescriptive approach by requiring \r\na  specific technology, process or product. They typically take one \r\nof three forms: requirements for specific pollution abatement \r\ntechnologies; requirements for specific production methods; or \r\nrequirements for specific goods such as energy efficient appliances. \r\nThey can also take the form of phase-out mandates, as applied for \r\nexample to planned bans of internal combustion engines for road \r\ntransport (Bhagavathy and McCulloch 2020), coal use; for example, \r\nGermany's decisions to phase out coal (Oei et al. 2020), and some \r\nindustry processes and products, for example, hydrofluorocarbons \r\n(HFCs) and use of sulphur hexafluoride (SF6) in some products (see \r\nBox 13.10 on non-CO2 gases). Technology standards are also referred \r\nto as command-and-control standards, prescriptive standards, or \r\ndesign standards. "


id: cc3cda8c1bfec4055ffcc59f5ab4410e
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"In comparison to economic instruments, regulatory policies tend to \r\ncause greater cost of living increases in percentage terms for lower \r\nincome consumers - called policy regressivity (Levinson 2019; Davis \r\nand Knittel 2019). And unlike carbon taxes, regulations do not generate \r\nrevenues that can be used to compensate lower income groups."


id: d4d0755b1c82f11060764e330c427c9b
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"A renewable energy procurement obligation in South Africa \r\nsuccessfully required local hiring with perceived positive results \r\n(Walwyn and Brent 2015; Pahle et al. 2016), a  clean energy \r\nregulation in Korea was perceived to provide greater employment \r\nopportunities (Lee 2017), and a UK obligation on energy companies \r\nto provide energy retrofits to low-income households improved \r\nenergy affordability according to participants (Elsharkawy and \r\nRutherford 2018). "


id: 99614c7186d4ab2064033ed9e59b9c1
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content:
"Technology standards are a common climate policy particularly at the \r\nsector level (Chapters 6-11). Technology standards tend to score lower \r\nin terms of economic efficiency than carbon pricing and performance \r\nstandards (Besanko 1987). But they may be the best instrument for \r\nsituations where decisions are not very responsive to price signals \r\nsuch as consumer choices related to energy efficiency and recycling \r\nand decisions relating to urban land use and infrastructure choices. "


id: 6175a7d82397f156b31119b58ab9790c
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content:
"From an energy system transformation perspective, technology \r\nstandards, including phase-out mandates, have particular promise \r\nto achieve profound change in specific sectors and technologies \r\n(Tvinnereim and Mehling 2018). As such policies change the \r\ntechnologies available in the market, then economic instruments can \r\nalso have a greater effect (Pahle et al. 2018). "


id: 9b558dcaf045b6090a1811c773b99819
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content:
"Non-CO2 gases weighted by their 100-year GWPs represent approximately 25% of global GHG emissions, of which methane (CH4) \r\naccounts for 18%, nitrous oxide (N2O) 4%, and fluorinated gases (HFCs, PFCs, SF6 and NF3) 2% (Minx et al. 2021). Only a small share \r\nof these emissions are subject to mitigation policies. "


id: 539cfe2d36c321f191ed46931293a1eb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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"Methane (CH4). Anthropogenic sources include agriculture, mainly livestock and rice paddies, fossil fuel extraction and processing, \r\nfuel combustion, some industrial processes, landfills, and wastewater treatment (EPA 2019). Atmospheric measurements indicate that \r\nmethane emissions from fossil fuel production are larger than shown in emissions inventories (Schwietzke et al. 2016). Only a small \r\nfraction of global CH4 emissions is regulated. Mitigation policies focus on landfills, coal mines, and oil and gas operations. "


id: 4653b2ad71402a90c5da966814fea451
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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"Regulations and incentives to capture and utilise methane from coal seams came into effect in China in 2010 (Tan 2018; Tao et al. \r\n2019). Inventory data suggest that emissions peaked and began a slow decline after 2010 (Gao et al. 2020) though satellite data \r\nindicate that China's methane emissions, largely attributable to coal mining, continued to rise in line with pre-2010 trends (Miller et al. \r\n2019). Methane emissions from sources including agriculture, waste and industry are included in some offset credit schemes, including \r\nthe CDM and at national level in Australia's Emissions Reductions Fund (Australian Climate Change Authority 2017) and the Chinese \r\nCertified Emission Reduction (CCER) scheme (Lo and Cong 2017). "


id: 73881cb1a6084b4ca9fd55f9b3849a06
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"Nitrous oxide (N2O). N2O emissions are produced by agricultural soil management, livestock waste management, fossil \r\nfuel combustion, and adipic acid and nitric acid production (EPA 2019). Most N2O emissions are not regulated and global emissions \r\nhave been increasing. N2O emissions by adipic and nitric acid plants in the EU are covered by the ETS (Winiwarter et al. 2018). \r\nN2O  emissions are included in some offset schemes. China, the United States, Singapore, Egypt, and Russia produce 86% of \r\nindustrial N2O emissions offering the potential for targeted mitigation action (EPA 2019)."


id: 3fa45a19db3a0118fbcef51616a2523
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"Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs). Most HFCs are used as substitutes for ozone depleting substances. The Kigali Amendment (KA) to \r\nthe Montreal Protocol will reduce HFC use by 85% by 2047 (UN Environment 2018). To help meet their KA commitments developed \r\ncountry parties have been implementing regulations to limit imports, production and exports of HFCs and to limit specific uses of HFCs. "


id: 58232d0d64c5afb6e590e8f55971b752
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content:
"The EU, for example, issues tradable quota for imports, production and exports of HFCs. Prices of HFCs have increased as expected \r\n(Kleinschmidt 2020) which has led to smuggling of HFCs into the EU (European Commission 2019b). HFC use has been slightly (1-6%) \r\nbelow the limit each year from 2015 through 2018 (EEA 2019). China and India released national cooling action plans in 2019, laying \r\nout detailed, cross-sectoral plans to provide sustainable, climate friendly, safe and affordable cooling (Dean et al. 2020). "


id: 42a51c344c695f1e5ca8b16a67902a11
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content:
"Perfluorocarbons (PFCs), sulphur hexafluoride (SF6) and nitrogen trifluoride (NF3). With the exception of SF6, these gases are \r\nemitted by industrial activities located in the European Economic Area (EEA) and a limited number (fewer than 30) of other countries. \r\nRegulations in Europe, Japan and the USA focus on leak reduction as well as collection and reuse of SF6 from electrical equipment. \r\nOther uses of SF6 are banned in Europe (European Union 2014). "


id: 86ce5439b97d4d37bf385c6053db4901
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content:
"PFCs are generated during the aluminium smelting process if the alumina level in the electrolytic bath falls below critical levels (EPA \r\n2019). In Europe these emissions are covered by the EU ETS. The industry is eliminating the emissions through improved process \r\ncontrol and a shift to different production processes. "


id: 9027f8bfaa7107e7ba0df61a9cf8c55a
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content:
"The semiconductor industry uses HFCs, PFCs, SF6 and NF3 for etching and deposition chamber cleaning (EPA 2019) and has a voluntary \r\ntarget of reducing GHG emissions 30% from 2010 by 2020 (World Semiconductor Council 2017). Europe regulates production, import, \r\nexport, destruction and feedstock use of PFCs and SF6, but not NF3 (EEA 2019). In addition, fluorinated gases are taxed in Denmark, \r\nNorway, Slovenia and Spain."


id: 9521c85794f1a16757da5de6dcb12c93
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content:
"In some jurisdictions, public administrations are required to apply a shadow cost of carbon to regulatory analysis. "


id: b2ac1a9bf4b1b8321fb0f70c37264494
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"Traditionally, for example in widespread application in the United States, the shadow cost of carbon is calibrated to an estimate of the \r\nsocial cost of carbon as an approximation of expected future cumulative economic damage from a unit of greenhouse gas emissions \r\n(Metcalf and Stock 2017). Social cost of carbon is usually estimated using integrated assessment models and is subject to fundamental \r\nuncertainties (Pezzey 2019). An alternative approach, used for example in regulatory analysis in the United Kingdom since 2009, is \r\nto define a carbon price that is thought to be consistent with a particular targeted emissions outcome. This approach also requires \r\na number of assumptions, including about future marginal costs of mitigation (Aldy et al. 2021). "


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content:
"not (Stadelmann and Schubert 2018). Information policies can also \r\nsupport the changing of social norms about consumption choices, \r\nwhich have been shown to raise public support for pricing and \r\nregulatory policy instruments (Gossling et al. 2020)."


id: c38284625348e39d385af7a5b500b52b
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content:
"In some jurisdictions, the analysis of regulatory instruments is subject \r\nto an assessment on the basis of a shadow cost of carbon, which \r\ncan influence the choice and design of regulations that affect GHG \r\nemissions (Box 13.11). "


id: 2a18c6f1002dd2a6bfe3a09143ad2e0e
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content:
"Energy audits provide tailored information about potential energy \r\nsavings and benchmarking of best practices through a network of \r\npeers. Typical examples include the United States Better Buildings \r\nChallenge that has provided energy audits to support USA commercial \r\nand industrial building owners, energy savings have been estimated \r\nat 18% to 30% (Asensio and Delmas 2017); and Germany's energy \r\naudit scheme for SMEs achieving reductions in energy consumption \r\nof 5-70% (Kluczek and Olszewski 2017)."


id: f472b25583378c0290ed22acb1fe45de
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content:
"A range of other mitigation policy instruments are in use, often \r\nplaying a complementary role to pricing and standards."


id: e80ced235e5921fc224410d9fa486940
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"Effective climate change mitigation can cause economic and social \r\ndisruption where there is transformative change, such as changes \r\nin energy systems away from fossil fuels (Section 13.9). Transitional \r\nassistance policies can be aimed to ameliorate effects on consumers, \r\nworkers, communities, corporations or countries (Green and Gambhir \r\n2020) in order to create broad coalitions of supporters or to limit \r\nopposition (Vogt-Schilb and Hallegatte 2017). "


id: e577f504495fb79d385597a615e1a0eb
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"Consumption-oriented policy instruments seek to reduce GHG \r\nemissions by changing consumer behaviour directly, via retailers \r\nor via the supply chain. Aspects that hold promise are technology \r\nlists, supply chain procurement by leading retailers or business \r\nassociations, a  carbon-intensive materials charge and selected \r\ninfrastructure improvements (Grubb et al. 2020)."


id: 1ccdea5e6f7dd01d11a1b714c5bd7410
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"The information provided to consumers in labelling programmes is \r\noften not detailed enough to yield best possible results (Davis and \r\nMetcalf 2016). Providing information about running costs tends to be \r\nmore effective than providing data on energy use (Damigos et al. 2020). \r\nSound implementation of labelling programmes requires appropriate \r\ncalculation methodology and tools, training and public awareness \r\n(Liang Wong and Kruger 2017). In systems where manufacturers self\u0002report performance of their products, there tends to be misreporting \r\nand skewed energy efficiency labelling (Goeschl 2019)."


id: e6ae37cae6f639d4e0ff7e53764a17f
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content:
"Information programmes, including energy efficiency labels, energy \r\naudits, certification, carbon labelling and information disclosure, are \r\nin wide use in particular for energy consumption. They can reduce \r\nGHG emissions by promoting voluntary technology choices and \r\nbehavioural changes by firms and households. "


id: ce5e159e700b3b92b80bfc9c3aef7229
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"Energy efficiency labelling is in widespread use, including for \r\nbuildings, and for end users products including cars and appliances. \r\nCarbon labelling is used for example for food (Camilleri et al. 2019) \r\nand tourism (Gossling and Buckley 2016). Information measures also \r\ninclude specific information systems such as smart electricity meters \r\n(Zangheri et al. 2019). Chapters 5 and 9 provide detail."


id: 41125748136746e2b1caed73f136972f
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content:
"A new form of information programmes are financial accounting \r\nstandards as frameworks to encourage or require companies to \r\ndisclose how the transition risks from shifting to a  low-carbon \r\neconomy and physical climate change impacts may affect their \r\nbusiness or asset values (Chapter  15). The most prominent such \r\nstandard was issued in 2017 by the Financial Stability Board's Task \r\nForce on Climate-related Financial Disclosures. It has found rapid \r\nuptake among regulators and investors (O'Dwyer and Unerman 2020). "


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content:
"Information programmes can correct for a range of market failures \r\nrelated to imperfect information and consumer perceptions (Allcott \r\n2016). Alongside mandatory standards (13.6.4), information \r\nprogrammes can nudge firms and consumers to focus on often \r\noverlooked operating cost reductions (Carroll et al. 2022). For \r\nexample, consumers who are shown energy efficiency labels on \r\naverage buy more energy efficient appliances than those who are "


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content:
"Traditionally, corporate reporting has treated climate risks in a highly \r\nvaried and often minimal way (Foerster et al. 2017). Disclosure of \r\nclimate-related risks creates incentives for companies to improve "


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content:
"Government provision can also play an important role in economic \r\nstimulus programs, including as implemented in response to the \r\npandemic of 2020-2021. Such programmes can support low\u0002emissions infrastructure and equipment, and industrial or business \r\ndevelopment (Elkerbout et al. 2020; Hainsch et al. 2020; Barbier \r\n2020; Hepburn et al. 2020). "


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content:
"their carbon and climate change exposure, and ultimately regulatory \r\nstandards for climate risk (Eccles and Krzus 2018). Disclosure can \r\nalso reinforce calls for divestment in fossil fuel assets predominantly \r\npromoted by civil society organisations (Ayling and Gunningham \r\n2017), raising moral principles and arguments about the financial risks \r\ninherent in fossil fuel investments (Green 2018; Blondeel et al. 2019)."


id: 9c6e18b71b89ca988b3c0462b935f717
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24773
content:
"National, sub-national and local governments determine many \r\naspects of infrastructure planning, fund investment in areas such \r\nas energy, transport and the built environment, and purchase \r\ngoods and services, including for government administration and \r\nmilitary provisioning. "


id: 959aa27b978250b19c299ec63a40504b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23518
content:
"Voluntary Agreements result from negotiations between \r\ngovernments and industrial sectors that commit to achieve agreed \r\ngoals (Mundaca and Markandya 2016). When used as part of \r\na broader policy framework, they can enhance the cost effectiveness \r\nof individual firms in attaining emission reductions while pricing \r\nor regulations drive participation in the agreement (Dawson and \r\nSegerson 2008). "


id: 88357e4c6cad770f94d19c706591f7a6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21116
content:
"Public procurement rules usually mandate cost effectiveness but only \r\nin some cases allow or mandate climate change consideration in public \r\npurchasing, for example in EU public purchasing guidelines (Martinez \r\nRomera and Caranta 2017). Green procurement for buildings has \r\nbeen undertaken in Malaysia (Bohari et al. 2017). a  paper cites \r\nTaiwan (province of China) green public procurement law, which has \r\ncontributed to reduced emissions intensity (Tsai 2017). In practice, \r\nawareness and knowledge of 'green' public procurement techniques \r\nand procedures is decisive for climate-friendly procurement (Testa \r\net al. 2016). Experiences in low-carbon infrastructure procurement \r\npoint to procedures being tailored to concerns about competition, \r\ntransaction costs and innovation (Kadefors et al. 2020)."


id: 8d0262af3b27d8b3c1bf3232545c574c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21992
content:
"Public voluntary programmes, where a  government regulator \r\ndevelops programs to which industries and firms may choose to \r\nparticipate on a voluntary basis, have been implemented in numerous \r\ncountries. For example, the United States Environmental Protection \r\nAgency introduced numerous voluntary programmes with industry to \r\noffer technical support in promoting energy efficiency and emissions \r\nreductions, among other initiatives (EPA 2017). a European example \r\nis the EU Ecolabel Award programme (European Commission 2020b). \r\nAgreements for industrial energy efficiency in Europe (Cornelis 2019) \r\nand Japan (Wakabayashi and Arimura 2016) have been particularly \r\neffective in addressing information barriers and for smaller \r\ncompanies. The International Civil Aviation Organization's CORSIA \r\nscheme (Prussi et al. 2021) is an example of an international industry\u0002based public voluntary programme."


id: 9cf7339da0244fb1209d1c33d80c4a88
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24853
content:
"Infrastructure investment decisions lock-in high or low emissions \r\ntrajectories over long periods. Low-emissions infrastructure can \r\nenable or increase productivity of private low-carbon investments \r\n(Jaumotte et al. 2021) and is typically only a little more expensive \r\nover its lifetime, but faces additional barriers including higher upfront \r\ncosts, lack of pricing of externalities, or lack of information or aversion \r\nto novel products (Granoff et al. 2016). In low-income developing \r\ncountries, where infrastructure has historically lagged developed \r\ncountries, some of these hurdles can be exacerbated by overall more \r\ndifficult conditions for public investment (Gurara et al. 2018). "


id: 738573aab148dcda192be9fd8a959caa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17578
content:
"Voluntary agreements are often implemented in conjunction with \r\neconomic or regulatory instruments, and sometimes are used to \r\ngain insights ahead of implementation of regulatory standards, as \r\nin the case of energy efficiency PVPs in South Korea (Seok et al. \r\n2021). In some cases, industries use voluntary agreements as partial \r\nfulfilment of a  regulation (Rezessy and Bertoldi 2011; Langpap \r\n2015). For example, the Netherlands have permitted participating \r\nindustries to be exempt from certain energy taxes and emissions \r\nregulations (Veum 2018). "


id: abca4ff5e5b1ad3ea537a19fcec350f6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27465
content:
"Governments can also promote low-emissions investments \r\nthrough public-private partnerships and government owned 'green \r\nbanks' that provide loans on commercial or concessional basis for \r\nenvironmentally friendly private sector investments (David and \r\nVenkatachalam 2019; Ziolo et al. 2019). Public funding or financial \r\nguarantees such as contracts-for-difference can alleviate financial \r\nrisk in the early stages of technology deployment, creating pathways \r\nto commercial viability (Bataille 2020). "


id: ab90af518689b2f4e8ea8a70c4da7255
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27419
content:
"Private businesses tend to under-invest in research and development because of market failures (Geroski 1995), hence there is \r\na case for governments to support research and technology development. a range of different policy instruments are used, including \r\ngovernment funding, preferential tax treatment, intellectual property rules, and policies to support the deployment and diffusion of \r\nnew technologies. Chapter 16 treats innovation policy in-depth. "


id: 3e81ae764278df503f469fbdd2d2632c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8184
content:
"and Rivers 2017). However, the results are highly dependent on \r\nassumptions and typically do not reflect policy designs specifically \r\naimed at minimising or preventing leakage (Fowlie and Reguant 2018)."


id: 1d923f09e31f34fd5d10d7394397ae56
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2387
content:
"One country's mitigation policy can impact other countries in various \r\nways including changes in their GHG emissions (leakage), creation \r\nof markets for emission reduction credits, technology development \r\nand diffusion (spillovers), and reduction in the value of their fossil \r\nfuel resources. "


id: d54f40c1338a4eac123dbafbea294e3d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34852
content:
"Numerous ex post analyses, mainly for the EU ETS, find no evidence \r\nof any or significant adverse competitiveness impacts and conclude \r\nthat there was consequently no or insignificant leakage (medium \r\nevidence, medium agreement) (Branger et al. 2016; Haites et al. 2018; \r\nKoch and Basse Mama 2019; FSR Climate 2019; aus dem Moore et al. \r\n2019; Venmans et al. 2020; Kuusi et al. 2020; Verde 2020; Borghesi \r\net al. 2020). This is attributed to large allocations of free allowances \r\nto emissions-intensive, trade-exposed sources, relatively low \r\nallowance prices, the ability of firms in some sectors to pass costs on \r\nto consumers, energy's relatively low share of production costs, and \r\nsmall but statistically significant effects on innovation (Joltreau and \r\nSommerfeld 2019). Few carbon taxes apply to emissions-intensive, \r\ntrade-exposed sources (Timilsina 2018), so competitiveness impacts \r\nusually are not a particular concern. "


id: ad74064989790f7d8937fb786a0c90a8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27759
content:
"Compliance with a  mitigation policy can affect the emissions of \r\nforeign sources via several channels over different time scales (Zhang \r\nand Zhang 2017) (Box 13.13 ). The effects may interact and yield a net \r\nincrease or decrease in emissions. The leakage channel that is of most \r\nconcern to policymakers is adverse international competitiveness \r\nimpacts from domestic climate policies."


id: f2d4e19db5219b7103726b86d3dd4c0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40120
content:
"In principle, implementation of a  mitigation policy in one country \r\ncreates an incentive to shift production of tradable goods whose \r\ncosts are increased by the policy to other countries with less costly \r\nemissions limitation policies (Section  12.6.3). Such 'leakage' could \r\nto some extent negate emissions reductions in the first country, \r\ndepending on the relative emissions intensity of production in \r\nboth countries. "


id: 8b775ccc4692c70ea41b7112b6a23d23
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21701
content:
"Policies intended to address leakage include a  border \r\ncarbon  adjustment (Ward et al. 2019; Ismer et al. 2020). \r\na border carbon adjustment (BCA) imposes costs - a tax or allowance \r\npurchase obligation  - on imports of carbon-intensive goods \r\nequivalent to those borne by domestic products possibly mirrored \r\nby rebates for exports (Bohringer et al. 2012; Fischer and Fox 2012; \r\nZhang 2012; Bohringer et al. 2017c) (Chapter 14). A BCA faces the \r\npractical challenge of determining the carbon content of imports \r\n(Bohringer et al. 2017a) and the design needs to be consistent with \r\nWTO rules and other international agreements (Cosbey et al. 2019; "


id: 603732548562b15a321b072b04248462
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14231
content:
"Competitiveness: Mitigation policy raises the costs and product prices of regulated sources which causes production to shift to \r\nunregulated sources, increasing their emissions."


id: edfb1776fff289c6c43955eb484b0e97
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39241
content:
"Fossil fuel channel: Regulated sources reduce their fossil fuel use, which lowers fossil fuel prices and increases consumption and \r\nassociated emissions by unregulated sources."


id: c13c6f6da6a6fad489cf1b8c0bc76b34
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31293
content:
"Land-use channel: Mitigation policies that change land use lead to land use and emissions changes in other jurisdictions (Bastos \r\nLima et al. 2019)."


id: 856cab20b068591dd0c5eb471a859d78
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20613
content:
"Terms of trade effect: Price increases for the products of regulated sources shift consumption to other goods, which raises emissions \r\ndue to the higher output of those goods."


id: 6ae8de01e19480d3d482aaa7dade1d3e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16097
content:
"Technology channel: Mitigation policy induces low-carbon innovation, which reduces emissions by sources that adopt the innovations \r\nthat may include unregulated sources (Gerlagh and Kuik 2007)."


id: c3239c46e31c5a0c081c26565d7cdd10
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31605
content:
"Abatement resource effect: Regulated sources increase use of clean inputs, which reduces inputs available to unregulated sources \r\nand so limits their output and emissions (Baylis et al. 2014)."


id: a7106595f788703a104f921761de01ec
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26606
content:
"Scale channel: Changes to the output of regulated and unregulated sources affect their emissions intensities so emissions changes \r\nare not proportional to output changes (Antweiler et al. 2001)."


id: 4fb71b82b528381cc7a7a086a53dcd01
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11317
content:
"Intertemporal channel: Capital stocks of all sources are fixed initially but change over time affecting the costs, prices, output and \r\nemissions of regulated and unregulated products. "


id: b169b9aa6bbefe39ed9ded0378161ee1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28438
content:
"Mehling et al. 2019). Model estimates indicate that a BCA reduces \r\nbut does not eliminate leakage (Branger and Quirion 2014). No BCA \r\nhas yet been implemented for international trade although such \r\na measure is currently under consideration by some governments."


id: 1f9bc064480dc860380b071abf4a2596
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2771
content:
"technologies reduce the value of established resources. Mitigation \r\npolicies that reduce the use of fossil fuels also reduce the value of \r\nthese resources. A  single policy in one country is unlikely to have \r\na noticeable effect on the international price, but similar policies in \r\nmultiple countries could adversely affect the value of the resources. \r\nFor fossil fuel exporting countries, mitigation policies consistent with \r\nthe Paris Agreement goals could result in greater costs from changes \r\nin fossil fuel prices due to lower international demand than domestic \r\npolicy costs (medium evidence, high agreement) (Liu et al. 2020)."


id: ffcab40e88dda97812a282656be81212
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42393
content:
"A mitigation policy may allow the use of credits issued for emission \r\nreductions in other countries for compliance purposes (see also \r\nSection 13.6.3.4 on offset credits and Chapter 14 on international credit \r\nmechanisms). Creation of international markets for emission reduction \r\ncredits tends to benefit other countries through financial flows in \r\nreturn for emissions credit sales (medium evidence, high agreement). "


id: 2401a13bf605ddae68c24b8781827e4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3516
content:
"The impact on the value of established resources will be mitigated, to \r\nsome extent, by the reduced incentive to explore for and develop new \r\nfossil fuel supplies. Nevertheless, efforts to lower global emissions will \r\nmean substantially less demand for fossil fuels, with the majority of \r\ncurrent coal reserves and large shares of known gas and oil reserves \r\nneeding to remain unused, with great diversity in impacts between \r\ndifferent countries (McGlade and Ekins 2015) (Chapters 3, 6, 15). "


id: 275708b305f5573d4b3b8a4f5b384ac6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4097
content:
"The EU, New Zealand and Switzerland allowed participants in their \r\nemissions trading systems to use credits issued under the Kyoto \r\nProtocol mechanisms, including the Clean Development Mechanism \r\n(CDM), for compliance. From 2008 through 2014, participants used \r\n3.76 million imported credits for compliance of which 80% were \r\nCDM credits (Haites 2016).3\r\n Use of imported credits has fallen to \r\nvery low levels since 2014 (World Bank 2014; Shishlov et al. 2016).4"


id: 6230ca2f147d2be0d7adc99ff00aa1f5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14549
content:
"Estimates of the potential future loss in value differ greatly. There \r\nis uncertainty about remaining future fossil fuel use under different \r\nmitigation scenarios, as well as future fossil fuel prices depending \r\non extraction costs, market structures and policies. Estimates of total \r\ncumulative fossil fuel revenue lost range between 5-67 trillion USD \r\n(Bauer et al. 2015) with an estimate of the net present value of lost \r\nprofit of around 10 trillion USD (Bauer et al. 2016). Policies that \r\nconstrain supply of fossil fuels in the context of mitigation objectives \r\ncould limit financial losses to fossil fuel producers (Chapter 14). "


id: 417802b12b90a45fe20147d3f7180bd7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8711
content:
"The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is the world's largest \r\noffset programme (Chapter  14). From 2001 to 2019 over 7500 \r\nprojects with projected emission reductions in excess of 8000 MtCO2-\r\neq were implemented in 114 developing countries using some \r\n140  different emissions reduction methodologies (UNFCCC 2012; \r\nUNEP DTU Partnership 2020). Credits reflecting over 2000 MtCO2-eq \r\nof emission reductions by 3260 projects have been issued. To address \r\nadditionality and other concerns the CDM Executive Board frequently \r\nupdated its approved project methodologies."


id: 1efb224b8fe65db8914e4ad9e48da1c4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2653
content:
"Mitigation policies stimulate low-carbon R&D by entities subject \r\nto those policies and by other domestic and foreign entities (FSR \r\nClimate 2019). Policies to support technology development and \r\ndiffusion tend to have positive spillover effects between countries \r\n(medium evidence, high agreement) (Section 16.3)."


id: c6d674f05d709b056c9a07fe9bda35d2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32294
content:
"Innovation activity in response to a  mitigation policy varies by \r\npolicy type (Jaffe et al. 2002) and stringency (Johnstone et al. 2012). \r\nIn addition, many governments have policies to stimulate R&D, \r\nfurther increasing low-carbon R&D activity by domestic researchers. \r\nEmitters in other countries may adopt some of the new low-carbon \r\ntechnologies thus reducing emissions elsewhere. Technology \r\ndevelopment and diffusion is reviewed in Chapter 16."


id: 63bd5cd4d70c7202b561c79b49b9b258
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14836
content:
"Fossil fuel resources are a significant source of exports, employment \r\nand government revenues for many countries. The value of these \r\nresources depends on demand for the fuel and competing supplies in \r\nthe relevant international markets. Discoveries and new production "


id: 3865abca77d83897e6a2ce1aad6bbdec
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7132
content:
"Second, since AR5 there is growing attention to enabling transitions \r\nover time. Literature on socio-technical transitions, rooted in innovation \r\nstudies, highlights the need for different policy focus at different stages \r\nof a transition (Geels et al. 2017b,a; Kohler et al. 2019) (Section 1.7.3). \r\nOther literature examines how broad patterns of development drive \r\nboth social and mitigation outcomes through shifts in policies and \r\na  re-alignment of enabling conditions (Chapter  4). Explicit efforts \r\nto shift development pathways, for example by shifting patterns of \r\nenergy demand and urbanisation, therefore offer broader mitigation \r\nopportunities (Cross-Chapter Box 5 in Chapter 4). Common to both \r\napproaches is an emphasis beyond the short term, and attention to \r\nenabling longer-term structural shifts in economies and societies."


id: a5d000aff0aa2de614a041cc175912b2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26397
content:
"transitions, and is complemented by discussion in Section 13.8 on \r\nintegration between adaptation and mitigation, and Section  13.9 \r\non economy-wide measures and the broader enabling conditions \r\nnecessary to accelerate mitigation."


id: c3c0b558a06a0eee590d738cfbdde5b5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31713
content:
"Since AR5 an emergent multidisciplinary literature on policy \r\npackages, or policy mixes, has emerged that examine how policies \r\nmay be combined for sustainable low-carbon transitions (Rogge \r\nand Reichardt 2016; Kern et al. 2019). This literature covers various \r\nsectors including: energy (Rogge et al. 2017); transport (Givoni et al. \r\n2013); industry (Scordato et al. 2018); agri-food (Kalfagianni and Kuik \r\n2017); and forestry (Scullion et al. 2016). "


id: e6a57d5b437b6d9a9025d4d79fdf7f6f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37874
content:
"Taking these trends into account, Figure  13.6 outlines the climate \r\npolicy landscape, and how it maps to different parts of this Working \r\nGroup III report. One axis of variation captures alternative framings of \r\ndesired outcomes in national policymaking - mitigation versus multiple \r\nobjectives, while the second captures the shift in policymaking from \r\nan initial focus on shifting incentives through largely individual policy \r\ninstruments, to explicit consideration of how policies and economy\u0002wide measures, including those that shift incentives, can combine to \r\nenable transitions. As a result, Figure 13.6 represents interconnected \r\npolicy ideas, but backed by distinct strands of literature. Notably, each \r\nof these categories is salient to climate policymaking, although the \r\nbalance may differ depending on country context. "


id: c175202608edb337b805402d6e004161
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31342
content:
"A central theme in the literature is that transitions require policy \r\ninterventions to address system level changes, thereby going beyond \r\naddressing market failures in two ways. First, structural system \r\nchanges are needed for low-carbon transitions, including building \r\nlow-carbon infrastructure (or example aligning electricity grids and \r\nstorage with the requirements of new low-carbon technology), \r\nand  adjusting existing institutions to low-carbon solutions (for \r\nexample by reforming electricity market design) (Bak et al. 2017; \r\nPatt and Lilliestam 2018). Second, explicit transformational system \r\nchanges are necessary, including efforts at directing transformations, \r\nsuch as clear direction setting through the elaboration of shared \r\nvisions, and coordination across diverse actors across different policy \r\nfields, such as climate and industrial policy, and across governance \r\nlevels (Uyarra et al. 2016; Nemet et al. 2017). "


id: fea7b04273942b966f179e2729452e48
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42189
content:
"This section particularly focuses on climate policymaking for \r\ntransition - both socio-technical transitions and shifts in development \r\npathways, while direct climate policies and co-benefits are addressed \r\nin other parts of the report, as indicated in Figure 13.6. This section \r\nfocuses in particular on lessons for designing policy packages for "


id: 40b5b92867f2989598bda0510672d57b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8567
content:
"There are some specific suggestions for policy packages: Van den \r\nBergh et al. (2021) suggest that innovation support and information \r\nprovision combined with a carbon tax or market, or adoption subsidy \r\nleads to both effective and efficient outcomes. Others question \r\nthe viability of universally applicable policy packages, and suggest \r\npackages need to be tailored to local objectives (del Rio 2014) \r\nConsequently, much of the literature focuses on broad principles for \r\ndesign of policy packages and mixes, as discussed below."


id: ecbc948d96282c5f4bffa4377fb4d323
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39013
content:
"Comprehensiveness, balance and consistency are important criteria \r\nfor policy packages or mixes (robust evidence, high agreement) \r\n(Rogge and Reichardt 2016; Scobie 2016; Carter et al. 2018; Santos\u0002lacueva and Gonzalez 2018). Comprehensiveness assesses the \r\nextensiveness of policy packages, including the breadth of system \r\nand market failures it addresses (Rogge and Reichardt 2016). For \r\nexample, instrument mixes that include only moderate carbon \r\npricing, but are complemented by policies supporting new low\u0002"


id: e4f60f01452e909d98a4fdd89f223629
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37576
content:
"The economics literature provides insights on policy interactions among the multiple overlapping policies that directly or indirectly \r\naffect GHG emissions, including when different levels of government are involved. Multiple mitigation policies can be theoretically \r\njustified if there are multiple objectives or market failures or to achieve distributional objectives and increase policy effectiveness \r\n(Stiglitz 2019). Examples include the coexistence of the EU ETS with vehicle emission standards and energy efficiency standards (Rey \r\net al. 2013), and the fact that 85% of the emissions covered by California's ETS are also subject to other policies (Bang et al. 2017; \r\nMazmanian et al. 2020). Policy interactions are also widespread among energy efficiency policies (Wiese et al. 2018). "


id: f03b8bcc1e8b98dfa8c968c2e963cb5d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Interactive effects can influence the costs of policy outcomes. With multiple overlapping and possibly non-optimal policies, the effect \r\non total cost is not clear. A modelling study of USA mitigation policy finds the costs of using heterogeneous sub-national policies \r\nto achieve decarbonisation targets is 10% higher than national uniform policies (Peng et al. 2021). When multiple policy goals are \r\nsought, such as mitigation and R&D, a portfolio of optimal policies achieves the goals at significantly lower cost (Fischer and Newell \r\n2008). In some cases, overlapping mitigation policies can raise the cost of mitigation (Bohringer et al. 2016) while lowering the cost \r\nof achieving other goals, such as energy efficiency improvements and expansion of renewable energy (Rosenow et al. 2016; Lecuyer \r\nand Quirion 2019). It is possible that one or more of the policies is made redundant (Aune and Golombek 2021)."


id: 4bc4773dc91ae934c114613c63fcebdc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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content:
"While overlapping policies may raise the cost of mitigation, they increase the likelihood of achieving an emission reduction goal. Policy \r\noverlap will lead to different optimal carbon prices across jurisdictions (Bataille et al. 2018b). The existence of overlapping policies will \r\nusually increase administrative and compliance costs. However, ex post analysis shows that transaction costs of mitigation policies are \r\nlow and are not a decisive factor in policy choice (Joas and Flachsland 2016). "


id: 4135eb9d4717abf6fe32a0b20ac7d63f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8651
content:
"The effectiveness, as well as economic and distributional effects, of a given mitigation policy will depend on the interactions among all \r\nthe policies that affect the targeted emissions. Because a market instrument interacts with every other policy that affects the targeted \r\nemissions, interactions tend to be more complex for market instruments than for regulations that mandate specific emission reduction \r\nactions by targeted sources independent of other policies."


id: 242f74c7cd0996ff8018dc6ddd6c6cd6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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content:
"An ETS scheme implemented with existing mitigation policies may be subject to the 'waterbed effect' - emission reductions undertaken \r\nby some emitters may be offset by higher emissions by other ETS participants due to overlapping mitigation policies (Schatzki and \r\nStavins 2012). This reduces the impact of the ETS and lowers carbon trading prices (Perino 2018). However ex post assessments \r\nfind net emissions reductions. ETS design features such as a price floor and 'market stability reserve' can limit the waterbed effect \r\n(Edenhofer et al. 2017; Kollenberg and Taschini 2019; Narassimhan et al. 2018; FSR Climate 2019). "


id: eae26eac6e5fb027eb55f4318c817b39
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38688
content:
"A carbon tax, unlike the allowance price, does not change in response to the effect of overlapping policies but those policies may \r\nreduce emissions by sources subject to the tax and so lower the emission reductions achieved by the tax (Goulder and Stavins 2011). "


id: d3a335ad5c273b46470ba93b14f9068e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34570
content:
"Policy interactions often occur with the introduction of new mitigation policy instruments. For example, in China several sub-national \r\nETSs exist alongside policies to reduce emission intensity, increase energy efficiency and expand renewable energy supplies (Zhang \r\n2015). These quantity-based ETSs interact with many other policies (Duan et al. 2017), for example price-based provincial carbon \r\nintensity targets (Qian et al. 2017). They also interact with the level of market regulation; for example, full effectiveness of emissions \r\npricing would require electricity market reform in China (Teng et al. 2017). "


id: b834af1cbfa6f787f7479b6e52ebc102
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29624
content:
"of policies can build coalitions for climate policy, starting with green \r\nindustrial policy (e.g. supporting renewable energies through feed\u0002in tariffs) and introducing or making carbon pricing more stringent \r\nwhen supportive coalitions of stringent climate policy have been \r\nformed (Meckling et al. 2015). Similarly, investing in supportive \r\ninstitutions, with competencies compatible with low-carbon futures, \r\nare a necessary supportive element of transitions (Pahle et al. 2018; \r\nRosenbloom et al. 2019; Domorenok et al. 2021)."


id: 24c11f5bb9cc08253a546d85191b9269
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3662
content:
"This sub-section assesses policy integration and packages required \r\nto enable shifts in development pathways, with a  particular focus \r\non sectoral scale transitions. However, because shifting development \r\npathways requires broad transformative change, it complements \r\ndiscussion on broader shifts in policymaking such as fiscal, educational, \r\nand infrastructure policies (Cross-Chapter Box 5 in Chapter 4) and to \r\nthe alignment of a wide range of enabling conditions required for \r\nsystem transitions (Section 13.9). "


id: 243b7e1f778c251f2dd2f98d0abd4652
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3566
content:
"Another promising strategy is to design short-term policies which \r\nmight help to provide later entry points for more ambitious climate \r\npolicy (Kriegler et al. 2018) and supportive institutions. The sequencing "


id: 835ae421dd355e8f8490d2443b67c321
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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content:
"Third, achieving changes in development pathways requires engaging \r\nwith place-specific context. It requires attention to existing policies, \r\npolitical interests that may gain or lose from a transition, and locally \r\nspecific governance enablers and disablers. As a result, while there \r\nmay be approaches that carry over from one context to another, \r\nimplementation requires careful tailoring of transition approaches to \r\nspecific policy and governance contexts. Cross-Chapter Box 9 in this \r\nchapter summarises case studies of sectoral transitions from other \r\nchapters in this report (Chapters 5 to 12) to illustrate this complexity. \r\nBroader macroeconomic transformative shifts are discussed in more \r\ndetail in Section 13.9."


id: 2ef2a995b9113dd02e7829d004105673
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5532
content:
"Second policymaking for shifting development pathways has to \r\naccount for inherent uncertainties in future development paths \r\n(Moallemi and Malekpour 2018; Castrejon-Campos et al. 2020). \r\nThese uncertainties may be greater in developing countries that \r\nare growing rapidly and where structural features of the economy \r\nincluding infrastructure and urbanisation patterns are fluid. For \r\nexample, reviews of modelling studies of Chinese (Grubb et al. 2015) \r\nand Indian emissions futures (Spencer and Dubash 2021) find that \r\ndifferences in projections can substantially be accounted for by \r\nalternative assumptions about future economic structural shifts. \r\nConsequently, an important design consideration is that policy \r\npackages should be robust, that is, perform satisfactorily for all \r\nkey objectives under a  broad range of plausible futures (Kwakkel \r\net al. 2016; Maier et al. 2016; Castrejon-Campos et al. 2020). Such \r\nan approach to decision-making can be contrasted with one that "


id: 84fae3a724fb64c3b081247046d478e2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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vector_id: 20536
content:
"Authors: Parth Bhatia (India), Navroz K. Dubash (India), Igor Bashmakov (the Russian Federation), Paolo Bertoldi (Italy), Mercedes \r\nBustamante (Brazil), Michael Craig (the United States of America), Stephane de la Rue du Can (the United States of America), Manfred \r\nFischedick (Germany) Amit Garg (India), Oliver Geden (Germany), Robert Germeshausen (Germany), Siir Kilkis (Turkey), Susanna \r\nKugelberg (Denmark), Andreas Loeschel (Germany), Cheikh Mbow (Senegal), Yacob Mulugetta (Ethiopia), Gert-Jan Nabuurs (the \r\nNetherlands), Vinnet Ndlovu (Zimbabwe/Australia), Peter Newman (Australia), Lars Nilsson (Sweden), Karachepone Ninan (India) "


id: a33ac4e34cb7eafa01d6cdb36cc3cd3a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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vector_id: 25929
content:
"Real world sectoral transitions reinforce critical lessons on policy integration: a high-level strategic goal (Column a in Cross-Chapter \r\nBox  9, Table  1), the need for a  clear sector outcome framing (column B), a  carefully coordinated mix of policy instruments and \r\ngovernance actions (column C), and the importance of context-specific governance factors (column D). Illustrative examples, drawn \r\nfrom sectors, help elucidate the complexity of policymaking in driving sectoral transitions. "


id: e05e33bfb8f2a67b2d97d3bbef06b6ae
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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vector_id: 36727
content:
"mitigation relationships and linkages (Section 13.8.3); and enabling \r\nand disabling factors for governance of mitigation and adaption."


id: f5053da2aa65ff20aabd7de23b649124
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40471
content:
"Integrated climate-development actions require a  context-specific \r\nunderstanding of synergies and trade-offs with other policy \r\npriorities (Figure  13.6) with the aim of implementing mitigation/\r\nadaptation policies that reduce GHG emissions while simultaneously \r\nstrengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability (robust evidence,\r\nhigh agreement) (Klein et al. 2005; IPCC 2007; Zhao et al. 2018; Mills\u0002Novoa and Liverman 2019; Solecki et al. 2019). Efficient, equitable \r\nand inclusive policies which also acknowledge and contribute \r\ndirectly to other pressing priorities such reducing poverty, improving \r\nhealth, providing access to clean water, and fostering sustainable \r\nconsumption and production practices are helpful for mitigation/\r\nadaptation goals (robust evidence, high agreement) (Landauer et al. \r\n2019; Grafakos et al. 2020). "


