# document

id: bdd8cd43e9c6ee3b7333553f479eb77
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Synergies between mitigation and adaptation actions and sustainable development that can enhance the quality and pace of \r\ndevelopment in Africa exist at both sectoral and national levels. Available data on NDCs show the top mitigation priorities in African \r\ncountries include energy, forestry, transport and agriculture and waste, and adaptation priorities focus on agriculture, water, energy \r\nand forestry. The energy sector dominates in mitigation actions and the agricultural sector is the main focus of adaptation measures, \r\nwith the latter sector being a slightly larger source of greenhouse gases than the former (Mbeva et al. 2015; African Development \r\nBank 2019; Nyiwul 2019)."


id: 9a0078301a3b86db5b90db3f0876c3f7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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content:
"Renewable energy development can support synergies between mitigation and adaptation by stimulating local and national \r\neconomies through microenterprise development; providing off-grid affordable and accessible solutions; and contributing to poverty \r\nreduction through increased locally available resource use and employment and increased technical skills (Nyiwul 2019; Dal Maso \r\net al. 2020). The Paris Agreement's technology transfer and funding mechanisms could reduce renewable energy costs and providing \r\nscale economics to local economies. "


id: deaf4668b6c917af4cc79825037e51a9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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"Barriers to achieving these synergies include the absence of suitable macro-and micro- level policy environments for adaptation \r\nand mitigation actions; coherent climate change policy frameworks and governance structures to support adaptation; institutional \r\nand capacity deficiencies in climate and policy research such as on data integration and technical analysis; and the high financial \r\nneeds associated with the cost of mitigation and adaptation (African Development Bank 2019; Nyiwul 2019). Strengthening of \r\nnational institutions and policies can support maximising synergies and co-benefits between adaptation and mitigation to reduce silos \r\nand redundant overlaps, increase knowledge exchange at the country and regional levels, and support engagement with bilateral and \r\nmultilateral partners and mobilising finance through the mechanisms available (African Development Bank 2019)."


id: d7341c833d1802165cfebf7fe993f3a9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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content:
"Adaptation and mitigation are deeply linked in practice  - at the \r\nlocal level, for instance, asset managers address integrated low\u0002carbon resilience to climate change impacts and urban planners \r\ndo the same (Urge-Vorsatz et al. 2018; Grafakos et al. 2020) \r\n(Table 13.3). Similarly, ecosystem-based (or nature-based) solutions, \r\nmay generate co-benefits by simultaneously sinking carbon, cooling \r\nurban areas through shading, purifying water, improving biodiversity, \r\nand offering recreational opportunities that improve public health \r\n(Raymond et al. 2017). Accurately identifying and qualitatively or \r\nquantitatively assessing these co-benefits (Stadelmann et al. 2014; \r\nLeiter and Pringle 2018; Leiter et al. 2019) is central to an integrated \r\nadaptation and mitigation policy evaluation. "


id: f8e442223eb64a2a431de27b5998e1d5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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content:
"state level, since risks and opportunities vary by location and the \r\nspecific local development context (robust evidence, high agreement) \r\n(IPCC 2014b; Denton et al. 2015). "


id: da2e42a0c540940dfdb1c555118829b9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
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"Some studies press the need to consider the complex ways that power \r\nand interests influence how collective decisions are made, and who \r\nbenefits from and pays for these decisions, of climate policy and to be \r\naware of unintended consequences, especially for vulnerable people \r\nliving under poor conditions (Mayrhofer and Gupta 2016; De Oliveira \r\nSilva et al. 2018). The specific adaptation and mitigation linkages will \r\ndiffer by country and region, as illustrated by Box 13.15."


id: afa767a58671fa0e83ff34f8353a538d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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"The IPCC's Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) emphasised the \r\nimportance of climate-resilient pathways - development trajectories \r\nthat combine adaptation and mitigation through specific actions \r\nto achieve the sustainable development goals (Prasad et al. 2009; \r\nLewison et al. 2015; Fankhauser and McDermott 2016; Romero\u0002Lankao et al. 2016; Solecki et al. 2019) - from the household to the "


id: dcc2501472e1d38ecb945ca7a88636fc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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"To fully maximise their potential co-benefits and trade-offs of \r\nintegrating adaptation and mitigation, these should be explicitly \r\nsought, rather than accidentally discovered (Spencer et al. 2017; \r\nBerry et al. 2015), and policies designed to account for both (robust "


id: 7fb0d1b58eb326242531d3f69f5625d4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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"Conflicts have emerged over political views, government priorities of resources (oil, bioenergy, hydropower), and weak governance \r\namong national and local authorities, indigenous groups and other stakeholders such as NGOs which play a  critical role in the \r\ntechnological and financial support for the REDD+ initiative (Reed 2011; Kashwan 2015; Gebara et al. 2014; Locatelli et al. 2011, \r\n2017). a more holistic approach which recognises these social, environmental and political drivers would appear to have benefits but \r\nassessment is needed to allow evidence-based actionable policy statements. "


id: 8f5018354f35880c066a18c1e33bd6d7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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"to create accessible recreational areas that improve public health \r\nwhile improving biodiversity, sinking carbon and protecting \r\nneighbourhoods from extreme flooding events, may lead to more \r\nefficient and cost-effective policies (Klein et al. 2005; Locatelli et al. \r\n2011; Kongsager et al. 2016; Mills-Novoa and Liverman 2019). "


id: a118bb477351b145d38f1c8153e93874
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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"evidence, high agreement) (Caetano et al. 2020). For example, the \r\nREDD+ initiative focus on mitigation by carbon sequestration was \r\nset up to provide co-benefits such as: nature protection, political \r\ninclusion, monetary income, economic opportunities. However, \r\nsome unintended trade-offs may have occurred such as physical \r\ndisplacement, loss of livelihoods, increased human-wildlife conflicts, \r\nproperty claims, food security concerns, and an unequal distribution \r\nof benefits to local population groups (Bushley 2014; Duguma \r\net al. 2014a; Gebara et al. 2014; Kongsager and Corbera 2015; \r\nAnderson et al. 2016; Di Gregorio et al. 2016, 2017). Ultimately, \r\necosystem (or nature-based) strategies, such as the use of wetlands "


id: abc031880b1a52cef39b672b4f3465b0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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"The 'nexus' approach is another widely used framework that describes \r\nthe linkages between water, energy, food, health and other socio\u0002economic factors in some integrated assessment approaches (Rasul \r\nand Sharma 2016). The Food-Energy-Water (FEW)nexus, for example, \r\nconsiders how water is required for energy production and supply "


id: e2f39e489ec178e3641cf80da3453a49
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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content:
"(and thus tied to mitigation), how energy is needed to treat and \r\ntransport water, and how both are critical to adaptable and resilient \r\nfood production systems (Mohtar and Daher 2014; Biggs et al. 2015). \r\nClimate change impacts all these dimensions in the form of multi\u0002hazard risk (Froese and Schilling 2019). Although integrative, the FEW \r\nnexus faces many challenges including: limited knowledge integration; \r\ncoordination between different institutions and levels of government; \r\npolitics and power; cultural values; and ways of managing climate \r\nrisk (Leck and Roberts 2015; Romero-Lankao et al. 2017; Mercure \r\net al. 2019). More empirical assessment is needed to identify potential \r\noverlaps between sectoral portfolios, as this could help to delineate \r\nresources allocation for synergies and to avoid trade-offs. "


id: 4a891c5fe81f40bbdfe1300c9d6c6cfa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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"There are multiple ways that mitigation and adaptation may be \r\nintegrated. Table 13.3 sets out those relationships broken down into \r\nfour areas: adaptation that contributes to mitigation; mitigation that \r\ncontributes to adaptation; holistic, sustainability first strategies; and \r\ntrade-offs. The table shows that more holistic and sustainability\u0002oriented policies can open up the possibility for accelerated transitions \r\nacross multiple priority domains (robust evidence, high agreement). "


id: f9156db6bfc8de41535a740fb4b6fa36
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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"development and climate resilience across scales (from global, regional, \r\nto local government actions (robust evidence, high agreement) (Duguma \r\net al. 2014b; Heidrich et al. 2016; Di Gregorio et al. 2017; Locatelli et al. \r\n2017; Nachmany and Setzer 2018; Mills-Novoa and Liverman 2019). \r\nEven so, the specific ways that these linkages are governed vary widely \r\ndepending on institutional and jurisdictional scale, competing policy \r\npriorities, and available capacity (Landauer et al. 2019). "


id: 7008be5bb8f90aa306999f1087d090de
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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"13.8.3.1 Governing the Linkages Between Mitigation and \r\nAdaptation at the Local, Regional, and Global Scales "


id: dc59226537b98f1e2679cca166e66037
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"based differences in exposur to that risk, and the importance of local/\r\ntraditional and indigenous knowledge (Beg et al. 2002; Duguma \r\net al. 2014b). Despite the evidence that integrated mitigation and \r\nadaptation policies can be effective and efficient (Klein et al. 2005) \r\nand can potentially reduce trade-offs, there is still limited evidence \r\nof how such integrated policies would specifically contribute to \r\nprogress on the SDGs (robust evidence, high agreement) (Kongsager \r\net al.2016; Di Gregorio et al. 2017; Antwi-Agyei et al. 2018; De Coninck \r\net al. 2018; Campagnolo and Davide 2019)."


id: 4285bb80191dce517e25e1d8e10f9cbd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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"Where mainstreaming of environmental concerns has been \r\nattempted through national plans, they have had success in some \r\ncases when backed by strong political commitments that support \r\na vertical coordination structure rather than horizontal structures led \r\nby the focus ministry (Nunan et al. 2012). Such political commitments \r\nare therefore crucial to success but insufficient in and of themselves \r\n(Runhaar et al. 2018; Wamsler et al. 2020). Integration of the budget \r\nprocess is particularly important, as are aligned time frames across \r\ndifferent objectives (Saito 2013). Recognition of the functional \r\ninteractions across policy sectors is improved by a  translation of \r\nlong-term policy objectives into a plan that aligns with integration \r\ngoals (Corry 2012; Oels 2012; Dupont 2019)."


id: 60dc7f5e15b627cdf047d1094fac68e4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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"There are important links between inequality, justice and climate \r\nchange (Ikeme 2003; Bailey 2017). Many of these operate through \r\nthe benefits, costs and risks of climate action (distributive justice), \r\nwhile others focus on differential participation and recognition of \r\nsub-national actors and marginalised groups (procedural justice) \r\n(Bulkeley and Castan Broto 2013; Bulkeley et al. 2013; Hughes 2013; \r\nReckien et al. 2018; Romero-Lankao and Gnatz 2019). "


id: 3e8033cfc3ed540d299470aa29182440
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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"Climate policy integration carries implications for the pursuit of the \r\nSDGs, given that it is nearly impossible to achieve the desired socio\u0002economic gains if fundamental environmental issues, such as climate \r\nchange, are not addressed (Gomez-Echeverri 2018). Research on \r\nclimate resilient development pathways (Roy et al. 2018), for instance, \r\nargues for long-term policy planning that combines the governance \r\nof national climate and SD goals, builds institutional capacity across \r\nall sectors, jurisdictions, and actors, and enhances participation and \r\ntransparency (robust evidence, high agreement) (Chapter 4 and 17)."


id: 60bffde4fc11934d7852fb6a28d1f601
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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"In the Global South, climate change policies are often established in \r\nthe context of sustainable development and of other pressing local \r\npriorities (e.g.,  air pollution, health, and food security). National \r\nclimate policy in these countries tends to give prominence to \r\nadaptation based on country vulnerability, climatic risk, gender\u0002"


id: b7f9d15697e2fdc8b070c0455aab75e5
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"The potential for transformative climate change policy that delivers \r\nboth adaptation and mitigation is also shaped by a  number of \r\nenabling and disabling factors tied to governance processes (robust \r\nevidence, high agreement) (Burch et al. 2014) (Section 13.9). "


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"Box 13.17 | Enabling and Disabling Factors for Integrated Governance of Mitigation \r\nand Adaptation"


id: d5adbaa2f4d0f2b21b8ecb56729c5b29
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"Ensuring participatory governance and social inclusion. Interlinkages in the food-energy-water nexus highlight the importance \r\nof inclusive processes (Shaw et al. 2014; Nakano et al. 2017; Cook and Chu 2018; Romero-Lankao and Gnatz 2019). The cultivation of \r\nurban grassroots innovations and social innovation may accelerate progress (Wolfram and Frantzeskaki 2016), as may the development \r\nof carefully-designed climate and energy dialogues that enable learning among multiple stakeholders (Cashore et al. 2019)."


id: df9d0d544c48f8b287ae83d287664bed
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"Considering synergies and trade-offs with broader sustainable development priorities. The explicit consideration of synergies \r\nand trade-offs will enable more integrated policy making (Dang et al. 2003; von Stechow et al. 2015). Policy frameworks to do so \r\nare just emerging, such as analysis of trade-offs between energy and water policies and agriculture (Huggel et al. 2015; Antwi\u0002Agyei et al. 2018). "


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"Employing a diverse set of tools to reach targets. Building codes, land-use plans, public education initiatives, and nature-based \r\nsolutions such as green ways may impact adaptation and mitigation simultaneously (Burch et al. 2014). Ecological restoration provides \r\nanother suite of tools, for instance the Brazilian target of restoring and reforesting 0.12 million km2\r\n of forests by 2030, which can \r\nenhance biodiversity and ecosystem services while also sinking carbon (Bustamante et al. 2019). Mandatory retrofits to improve \r\nindoor air quality can also increase energy efficiency and resilience to climate change impacts (Friel et al. 2011; Houghton 2011)."


id: 3eb724a6834ab2c830293108c6e237b7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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"Monitoring and evaluating key indicators, beyond only greenhouse gas emissions, such as biodiversity, water quality, \r\nand affordability: An integrated approach requires robust process for collecting data on these indicators. Challenges are related to \r\nthe limited evidence-base on synergies, co-benefits, and trade-offs across sectors and jurisdictions (Di Gregorio et al. 2016; Kongsager \r\net al. 2016; Locatelli et al. 2017; Zen et al. 2019). Moreover, adaptation policies mostly lack measurable targets or expected outcomes \r\nincreasing the challenge of designing an integrated framework (OECD 2017)."


id: cd0cbcfaaaf6d3374efab1d96d8b0a17
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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"Iterative and adaptive management. Adaptive management helps to address the underlying uncertainty (Kundzewicz et al. 2018) \r\nthat characterises implementation of integrated approaches to adaptation and mitigation. Policy integration needs to be considered \r\niteratively along the process of development, implementation, and evaluation of climate policies. "


id: 7c339193810ad151bd9f8dd18c960ad4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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"Strategic partnerships that coordinate efforts. Strategic partnerships among diverse actors, therefore, bring diverse technical \r\nskills and capacities to the endeavour (Burch et al. 2016; Islam and Khan 2017). However, realising strategic approaches for joint \r\nadaptation and mitigation require adequate financial, technical and human resources. "


id: e7f08add256fcbd6a9ffdab95f211334
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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"Participatory and collaborative planning approaches can help overcome injustices and address power differentials.\r\nParticipatory and collaborative planning approaches can provide multiple spaces of deliberation where marginalised voices can be \r\nheard (Blue and Medlock 2014; UN Habitat 2016; Castan Broto and Westman 2017; Waisman et al. 2019). These tools organise climate \r\nand sustainability action by addressing its democratic deficit and facilitating the recognition of multiple perspectives in environmental \r\nplanning alongside material limits of development (Agyeman 2013)."


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"This section follows on from Section 13.6 (single policy instruments) \r\nand 13.7 (policy packages). Section  13.9 literature follows closely \r\non from Section 13.7 literature on policy packages, which discusses \r\nchange within one system, although there remains an overlap."


id: 65d687c5042c08a2a56e019ecff43743
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"Section 13.9.2 provides a brief introduction to policy and institutions \r\nas two of the six dimensions of enabling conditions, and the \r\nimportance of enabling conditions to systemic change and climate \r\nmitigation. Section 13.9.3 briefly introduces actions for transformative \r\njustice, which seek to restructure the underlying system framework \r\nthat produces mitigation inequalities. Section  13.9.4 provides \r\na  brief overview of net zero policies and targets (often no more \r\nthan aspirational), which imply economy-wide measures and \r\nsystem change. Section  13.9.5 assesses the literature arguing for \r\na  system restructuring approach to climate mitigation, based on "


id: cbebacb0a841514227d9e20bd1e8de2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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"Section  13.9 assesses literature related to economy wide and \r\ncross  - sector systemic change as an approach to accelerate \r\nclimate mitigation. "


id: 326b39bbc3af34cadd37023c38fbff72
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"It focuses specifically on policy and institutions, as two of the six \r\nenabling conditions for economy-wide system change and thus \r\nprovides a third dimension of the role of policy and institutions to \r\nclimate mitigation. Enabling conditions in general are discussed in \r\nChapter 4 of the SR1.5 (IPCC 2018), as well as Chapter 4 of this report. "


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"systemic restructuring. Section  13.9.6 assesses the literature on \r\nstimulus packages and green new deals which aim for systemic \r\nchange, sometimes with value for climate mitigation. And finally, \r\nSection 13.9.7 assesses emerging literatures which argues that there \r\nare existing challenges to accelerating climate mitigation that may \r\nbe overcome by systemic change and targeted actions."


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"This sub-section introduces the concept of transformative justice \r\nas part of measures intending to accelerate mitigation. Fair and \r\neffective climate policymaking requires institutional practices to: \r\nconsider the distributional impacts of climate policy in the design \r\nand implementation of every policy (Agyeman 2013; Castan Broto \r\nand Westman 2017); align mitigation with other objectives such as \r\ninclusion and poverty reduction (Hughes and Hoffmann 2020; Rice \r\net al. 2020; Hess and McKane 2021); represent a variety of voices, \r\nespecially those of the most vulnerable (Bullard et al. 2008; Temper \r\net al. 2018); and rely on open processes of participation (robust \r\nevidence, high agreement) (Anguelovski et al. 2016; Bouzarovski \r\net al. 2018; Rice et al. 2020)."


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"Distributive approaches to climate justice address injustices related \r\nto access to resources and protection from impacts. There is an \r\nimportant difference between affirmative and transformative justice \r\naction (Fraser 1995; Agyeman et al. 2016; Castan Broto and Westman \r\n2019): Affirmative action includes policies and strategies that seek \r\nto correct inequitable outcomes without disturbing the underlying \r\npolitical framework while transformative action seeks to correct \r\ninequitable outcomes by restructuring the underlying framework that \r\nproduces inequalities. "


id: 56f92839c101ffec6bfa5b8a006b0a76
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"Transformative action that responds to distributive justice concerns \r\ninclude economy-wide actions via stimulus packages (such as \r\nthe European Green Deal and the New Green Deal in the USA) \r\n(Section  13.9.5). Other examples are the increasing number of \r\nclimate litigation suits that are transforming the way distributive \r\ndimensions of climate justice are understood (Section 13.4.2). "


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"The last few years have seen a  proliferation of net zero emission \r\ntargets set by national and regional governments, cities as well as \r\ncompanies and institutions (NewClimate Institute and Data Driven \r\nEnviroLab 2020; Black et al. 2021; Rogelj et al. 2021) (see also Cross\u0002Chapter Box 3 in Chapter 3). Meeting these targets implies economy\u0002wide systemic change (medium evidence, high agreement)."


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"The Energy & Climate Intelligence Unit (ECIU) Net Zero Tracker divides \r\ncountries into those which have net zero emissions achieved, have it \r\nin law, have proposed legislation, have it in policy documents or have \r\nemission reduction targets under discussion in some form. a recent \r\nstudy estimated that 131 countries have either adopted, announced \r\nor are discussing net zero GHG emissions targets, covering 72% of \r\nglobal emissions (Hohne et al. 2021). Out of those, as of 1 October \r\n2021, the ECIU Net Zero Tracker states that Germany, Sweden, the \r\nEuropean Union, Japan, United Kingdom, France, Canada, South \r\nKorea, Spain, Denmark, New Zealand, Hungary and Luxembourg \r\nhave net zero targets set in law (ECIU 2021)."


id: c83cd2112090b81ed768d100f8aa7b7a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32540
content:
"Chapter 4 is the lead chapter of this report for justice and climate \r\nmitigation issues, and includes an overview of institutions which \r\nhave been set up to ensure a Just climate transition (Section 4.5). \r\nChapter  13 has sought to integrate justice issues in Section  13.2 \r\nin reference to procedural justice and the impact of inequalities \r\non sub-national institutions, Section 13.6 in regard to distribution, \r\nand Section  13.8 in relation to integrating mitigation and \r\nadaptation policies."


id: a668c184e9d5f4c427b384bf773b7c5f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26496
content:
"Some have argued that the expansion of these emission reduction \r\ntargets marks an important increase in climate mitigation momentum \r\nsince the Paris Agreement of 2015 and the 2018 IPCC Special Report \r\non Global Warming of 1.5degC (Black et al. 2021; Hohne et al. 2021). On \r\nthe other hand net zero emission targets in their current state vary "


id: 9cc60d7a6d06b9e914062d29cf8642a5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24818
content:
"Others focus more on single system reconfigurations, such as the \r\nenergy system (Matthes 2017; Tozer 2020); urban systems (Holtz et al. \r\n2018); or the political system (Somerville 2020; Newell and Simms \r\n2020). Becken (2019) argues that only systemic changes at a large \r\nscale will be sufficient to break or disrupt existing arrangements and \r\nroutines in the tourism industry."


id: c66ea051cf8fe7e0c3bcbac87a9ccdaa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32221
content:
"enormously in scope, quality and transparency - with many countries \r\nat the discussion stage - and this makes scrutiny and comparison \r\ndifficult (NewClimate Institute and Data Driven EnviroLab 2020; \r\nBlack et al. 2021; Rogelj et al. 2021)."


id: 4655ec31ebf2f264f494385db9397a30
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9596
content:
"In order to realise the mitigation potential of net zero emission \r\ntargets some areas within the targets might need to be changed. For \r\nexample, this includes clearer definitions; well defined time frames \r\nand scopes; focusing on direct emission reductions within their own \r\nterritory; minimal reliance on offsets; scrutiny of use and risks of CO2\r\nremoval; attention to equity, near-term action coupled with long\u0002term intent setting; and ongoing monitoring and review (medium \r\nevidence, high agreement) (Levin et al. 2020; NewClimate Institute \r\nand Data Driven EnviroLab 2020; Black et al. 2021; Hohne et al. 2021; \r\nRogelj et al. 2021; World Bank 2021b)."


id: ef64f22ce10849ced8bc9b93f394532
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39486
content:
"There is now a significant body of work which explicitly states, or \r\nimplicitly accepts, that systemic change may be necessary to deliver \r\nsuccessful climate mitigation, including net zero targets. Newell \r\nphrases this as the difference between 'plug and play' mitigation \r\napplications where one aspect of a  system is changed while \r\neverything in the system remains the same compared to systemic \r\nchange, with change affecting all the system (Newell 2021a,b). This \r\nsection highlights an emergent, multidisciplinary literature since \r\nIPCC AR5, which suggests that acceleration to decarbonised systems \r\nvia a sustainable development pathway may be better achieved by \r\nmoving from a single policy instrument or mix of policies approach to \r\na systemic economy-wide approach (Figure 13.6). "


id: 81a0dc6a80639558812592e9061343dc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19937
content:
"Economy-wide stimulus packages which have occurred post \r\nCOVID-19, and in some cases in response to environmental concerns, \r\nhave the ability to undermine or aid climate mitigation (medium \r\nevidence, high agreement). Attention in the early efforts of their \r\ndevelopment and design can contribute to shifting sustainable \r\ndevelopment pathways and net zero outcomes, while meeting short\u0002term economic goals (medium evidence, high agreement) (Hepburn \r\net al. 2020; Hanna et al. 2020)."


id: 6618af1d2ea03adba5fa0534ef87fc65
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15226
content:
"The complexity and multi-facetted challenges of rapidly decarbonising \r\nour current interconnected systems (such as energy, food, health) \r\nin a  just way has led Michaelowa et al. (2018) to conclude that \r\nimplementation of strong mitigation policy packages that are needed \r\nrequires a systemic change in policymaking."


id: e5b28d7ed5921f5daaff207a90c2d687
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37712
content:
"Multiple modelling assessments of different development and \r\nmitigation pathways are available. Most of these analyses which lead \r\nto significant climate mitigation assume significant systemic change \r\nacross social, technological, and economic aspects of a country for \r\nexample, India (Gupta et al. 2020); Japan (Sugiyama et al. 2021) and \r\nthe globe (Rogelj et al. 2015; Dejuan et al. 2020)."


id: 3e2a802a40daba57e189e67360cd2e46
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8113
content:
"Economy-wide packages, as a  way to stimulate and/or restructure \r\ndomestic economies to deliver particular, desired outcomes is \r\na widely accepted tool of government (for example the Roosevelt's \r\nNew Deal packages in the USA between 1933 and 1939). a number \r\nof country-level stimulus package were put in place after the 2008 \r\nGlobal Recession, and there was support for a Global Green New Deal \r\nfrom UNEP (Steiner 2009; Barbier 2010). Cross-economy structural \r\nchange packages may provide opportunities for another approach to \r\naccelerate climate mitigation. "


id: a02985d44c702e2937e8b981e517fc13
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25390
content:
"UNEP (2020) argued that major, long-term sectoral transformation \r\nacross multiple systems is needed to reach net zero GHG emissions. \r\nBernstein and Hoffmann (2019) and Rockstrom et al. (2017) \r\nargue that the presence of multi-level, multi-sectoral lock-ins of \r\noverlapping and interdependent political, economic, technological \r\nand cultural forces mean that a new approach of coordinated, cross\u0002economy, systemic climate mitigation is necessary. Creutzig et al. \r\n(2018) propose a resetting of the approach to consumption and use \r\nof resources to that of demand side solutions, which would have \r\nongoing economy-wide systemic implications."


id: 745dfd440039cca320f77cf4ebbab13f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"This approach has already been taken up to some degree by \r\na  number of countries/blocs. For example, California as well as \r\nGermany, through the German Energiewende, are early examples of \r\na USA state and a country which have tried to link their economies to \r\na sustainable future through energy-wide efforts of structural change \r\n(Morris and Jungjohann 2016; Burger et al. 2020a). "


id: 90b8f53445f4ee8ae97a4be9fbfcb81
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"boosting economic activity, supporting the recovery from the \r\nCOVID-19 pandemic (Jaumotte et al. 2020)."


id: 7b671d76d53221e2b3c974d9280b7529
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18911
content:
"In addition to these economy-wide measures, there have since been \r\ncross-economy Green New Deals implemented such as the European \r\nGreen Deal (Elkerbout et al. 2020; Hainsch et al. 2020; UNEP 2020a) \r\n(Box 13.1) with calls for other New Deals, for example a Blue New \r\nDeal (Dundas et al. 2020), or deals to bring together climate and \r\njustice goals (Hathaway 2020; MacArthur et al. 2020). "


id: 3bf9ec91435ef6b48b1ff516b6ed6cf9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Conversely, other short-term fiscal or recovery measures in stimulus \r\npackages may perpetuate high carbon and environmental damaging \r\nsystems. These include fossil fuel based infrastructure investment; \r\nfiscal incentives for high carbon technologies or projects; waivers \r\nor roll-backs of environmental regulation; bailouts of fossil fuel \r\nintensive companies without conditions for low-carbon transitions \r\nor environmental sustainability (UNEP 2020a; O'Callaghan and \r\nMurdock 2021; Vivid Economics 2021)."


id: b0628d50cba34614d1bed622b33be4ba
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28267
content:
"The COVID-19 Pandemic has resulted in global economic recession, \r\nwhich many Governments have responded to with economic \r\nstimulus programmes. See also Cross-Chapter Box 1 in Chapter 1 on \r\nCOVID-19. It has also led to more analysis of the potential of cross\u0002economy stimulus packages to benefit climate goals, including what \r\nlessons can be learned from the stimulus packages put in place as \r\na result of the 2008-2009 Global Recession. "


id: 5bc7062f0d7d619da3fd744d00029bd7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13407
content:
"The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) reviewed the \r\ngreen stimulus plans of the G20 following the 2008-2009 recession \r\nto examine what worked; what did not; and the lessons which could \r\nbe learnt (Barbier 2010). This work was updated (Barbier 2020) \r\nand concluded that the constituents of successful green stimulus \r\nframeworks were long-term commitments in public spending; pricing \r\nreform; ensuring concerns about affordability were overcome; and \r\nminimising unwanted distributional impacts. Others argue that \r\npost-2008 recession stimulus package outcomes benefited both \r\nenvironmental and industrial objectives and that a long-term policy \r\ncommitment to the transition to a sustainable, low-carbon economy \r\nmakes sense from both an environmental and industrial strategy \r\npoint of view (Fankhauser et al. 2013). "


id: e37f01cf71375d289b9ea1447a842efc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37319
content:
"The multidisciplinary literature exploring how to accelerate \r\nclimate mitigation and transition to low GHG economies and \r\nsystems has grown rapidly over the last few years. Acceleration \r\nis also confirmed as an important sub-theme of the more specific \r\ntransition literature (Kohler et al. 2019). While literature focusing \r\non how to accelerate the impact of climate mitigation is derived \r\nfrom empirical evidence, there is very little ex post evidence of \r\ndirected acceleration approaches."


id: 570d12908b6bf416153dfd451556c329
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12571
content:
"The overlapping discussions of how to accelerate climate mitigation; \r\ntransition to low-carbon economies; and shift development pathways \r\ndepends heavily on country-specific dynamics in political coalitions, \r\nmaterial endowments, industry strategy, cultural discourses, and civil \r\nsociety pressures (Sections 13.2, 13.3, 13.4, 13.7, and 13.8). Ambition \r\nfor acceleration at different scales and stringency (whether for cities, \r\ncountry climate policies, country industrial strategies, or national \r\neconomic restructuring) increase governance challenges, including \r\ncoordination across stakeholders, institutions, and scales. 'There is \r\ntherefore no \"one-size-fits-all\" blueprint for accelerating low-carbon \r\ntransitions' (medium evidence, high agreement) (Geels et al. 2017a; \r\nRoberts et al. 2018)."


id: 9931cec425523393bbbde62e3286bf2e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24167
content:
"Others provide a framework which allows a systematic evaluation \r\nof options, given objectives and indicators, for COVID-19 stimulus \r\npackages (e.g. Dupont et al. 2020; Jotzo et al. 2020; OECD 2021c). \r\nJotzo et al. (2020) conclude that the programmes that most closely \r\nmatch green stimulus are afforestation and ecosystem restoration \r\nprogrammes, energy efficiency upgrades and RE projects. These type \r\nof policies provide short-term goals of COVID-19 while also making \r\nprogress on longer terms objectives (Jotzo et al. 2020). The IMF \r\nconcluded that a comprehensive mitigation policy package combining \r\ncarbon pricing and government green infrastructure spending (that \r\nis partly debt financed) can reduce emissions substantially while "


id: af4b10229b33bce68ca29bed6b984f79
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28073
content:
"Markard et al. (2020) describe the key challenges to accelerating \r\nclimate mitigation and sustainability transitions as: "


id: 9ff64469a5086da5815d6f758b11798b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25356
content:
"transformative change. They argue that 'deep leverage points' - the \r\ngoals of a system, its intent, and rules - need to be addressed more \r\ndirectly, and they provide analysis of the food and energy systems. "


id: bda97547ab972a98a52ab10e1e4d1e91
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30627
content:
"The strategic choosing of policies and points of intervention is \r\nlinked to the importance of choosing self-reinforcing actions for \r\nacceleration (Rosenbloom et al. 2018; Butler-Sloss et al. 2021; Sharpe \r\nand Lenton 2021; Jordan and Moore 2020; Bang 2021). Butler-Sloss \r\net al. (2021) explains the types of self-reinforcing actions (or feedback \r\nloops) which can encourage or undermine rapid transformation of \r\nenergy systems. "


id: d5805eb3c04d41a34e8aa5fb8a0ffcd6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34879
content:
"An example of this first overarching action, the strategic targeting of \r\nthe challenges to acceleration, is the focus on undermining carbon\u0002intensive systems, thereby reducing opposition to more generalised \r\nacceleration policies, including the encouragement of low-carbon \r\nsystems (robust evidence, high agreement) (Hvelplund and Djorup \r\n2017; Rosenbloom 2018; Roberts and Geels 2019; Victor et al. \r\n2019; Rosenbloom et al. 2020; Rosenbloom and Rinscheid 2020). \r\nUndermining high carbon systems includes deliberately phasing out \r\nunsustainable technologies and systems (Kivimaa and Kern 2016; \r\nDavid 2017; European Environment Agency 2019; Johnsson et al. \r\n2019; UNEP 2019b; Carter and McKenzie 2020; Newell and Simms \r\n2020); confronting the issues of incumbent resistance (Roberts et al. \r\n2018); and avoiding future emissions and energy excess by reducing \r\ndemand (Rogelj et al. 2015; UNEP 2019b; Victor et al. 2019)."


id: 620668b6bb6acccaac75461b7d603b8c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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content:
"Other strategic goals include tackling the equity and justice issues of \r\n'stranded regions' (Spencer et al. 2018); paying greater attention to \r\nsystem architecture to enable increased acceleration to low-carbon \r\nelectricity supply, in this case in the wind industry (McMeekin et al. \r\n2019); and the importance of maintaining global ecosystem of low\u0002carbon supply chains (Goldthau and Hughes 2020). "


id: e303b03770f8a188108ac2291badd80e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37235
content:
"Other strategic goals combine national and global action. For \r\nexample, global NGO coalitions have formed around strategic policy \r\noutcomes such as the 'Keep it in the Ground' movement (Carter \r\nand McKenzie 2020), and are supported via coordinated networks, \r\nsuch as the Powering Past Coal Alliance (Jewell et al. 2019), and \r\nwith knowledge dissemination, for example, the 'Fossil Fuel Cuts \r\nDatabase' (Gaulin and Le Billon 2020). "


id: 5b63d96d6628e42cbe46e941bc65f28
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13322
content:
"The acceleration literature links two over-arching actions: first, \r\na  strategic targeting approach to overcoming the challenges to \r\nacceleration by a parallel focus on undermining high carbon systems \r\nwhile simultaneously encouraging low-carbon systems; and second, \r\nfocusing on a coordinated, cross-economy systemic response, including \r\nharnessing enabling conditions (robust evidence, high agreement) \r\n(Rogelj et al. 2015; Geels et al. 2017b; Hvelplund and Djorup 2017; \r\nGomez Echeverri 2018; Markard 2018; Tvinnereim and Mehling 2018; \r\nO'Brien 2018; Roberts et al. 2018; Hess 2019; Kotilainen et al. 2019; \r\nVictor et al. 2019; European Environment Agency 2019; Rosenbloom \r\nand Rinscheid 2020; Newell and Simms 2020; Otto et al. 2020; Strauch \r\n2020; Burger et al. 2020a; Hsu et al. 2020b; Rosenbloom et al. 2020). "


id: c18488be5c978d271c287b67261f772e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31352
content:
"The second overarching point highlighted by the literature is the \r\nbenefits of focusing on a  coordinated, cross-economy systemic \r\nresponse. Coordination is central to this. For example, coordination \r\nof actions and coherent narratives across sectors and cross \r\neconomy, including within and between all governance levels and \r\nscales of actions, is beneficial for acceleration (robust evidence,\r\nhigh agreement) (Zurn and Faude 2013; Hawkey and Webb 2014; \r\nHuttunen et al. 2014; Magro et al. 2014; Warren et al. 2016; Kohler \r\net al. 2019; Kotilainen et al. 2019; McMeekin et al. 2019; Victor et al. \r\n2019; Hsu et al. 2020b). Victor et al. (2019) provide a framework of \r\nhow to prioritise the most urgent actions for climate mitigation and \r\nthey give practical case studies of how to improve coordination to \r\naccelerate reconfiguration of systems for economy-wide climate \r\nmitigation in sectors such as power; cars; shipping; aviation; \r\nbuildings; cement; and plastics. "


id: 8be60944b57fd2b93a3b067a497938bd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21780
content:
"Strategic targeting, or the identifying of specific intervention points \r\n(Kanger et al. 2020), points of leverage (Abson et al. 2017), or upward \r\ncascading tipping points (Sharpe and Lenton 2021), broadly means \r\nchoosing particular actions which will lead to a greater acceleration \r\nof climate mitigation across systems. For example, Dorninger \r\net al.(2020) provide a  quantitative systematic review of empirical \r\nresearch addressing sustainability interventions. They take 'leverage \r\npoints' - places in complex systems where relatively small changes \r\ncan lead to potentially transformative systemic changes - to classify \r\ndifferent interventions according to their potential for system-wide "


id: 64a39950201ef063ba8474b6c775ecb6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14989
content:
"However, coordination is a  necessary but insufficient condition of \r\nacceleration. All enabling conditions are required to deliver systemic \r\ntransformation (Section 13.9.2)."


id: 38c2f5b52231c000b7ca2fc399ab9261
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7189
content:
"Research has expanded in a  number of areas relevant to climate \r\nmitigation, yet there is considerable scope to add to knowledge. \r\nKey areas for research exist in climate institutions and governance, \r\npolitics, policies and acceleration of action. In each area there is an \r\noverarching need for more ex post analysis of impact, more cases \r\nfrom the developing world, and understanding how institutions and \r\npolicies work in combination with each other."


id: 9705c8b8099dd5a0e314d8d965d7af02
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23761
content:
"Institutions and governance underpin mitigation. Climate laws provide the legal basis for action, organisations through which policies \r\nare developed and implemented, and frameworks through which diverse actors interact. Specific organisations, such as expert \r\ncommittees, can inform emission reduction targets, inform the creation of policies and packages, and strengthen accountability. \r\nInstitutions enable strategic thinking, building consensus among stakeholders and enhanced coordination. "


id: 780d42493ef687c75a46e2735d60620a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18331
content:
"Climate governance is constrained and enabled by countries' political systems, material endowments and their ideas, values and \r\nbelief systems, which leads to a variety of country-specific approaches to climate mitigation. "


id: 39445f8bae90573e7b3244d7aadf4007
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7288
content:
"Countries follow diverse approaches. Some countries focus on greenhouse gases emissions by adopting comprehensive climate laws \r\nand creating dedicated ministries and institutions focused on climate change. Others consider climate change among broader scope \r\nof policy objectives, such as poverty alleviation, energy security, economic development and co-benefits of climate actions, with the \r\ninvolvement of existing agencies and ministries. See also FAQ 13.3 on sub-national climate mitigation."


id: 81f7db73ec70d0aff0f6863855089888
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19988
content:
"Institutions can enable creation of mitigation and sectoral policy instruments; policy packages for low-carbon system transition, \r\nand economy-wide measures for systemic restructuring. Policy instruments to reduce greenhouses gas emissions include economic \r\ninstruments, regulatory instruments and other approaches. "


id: e9b19f679843c5de627e5f976e508ad0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38467
content:
"Economic policy instruments directly influence prices to achieve emission reductions through taxes, permit trading, offset systems, \r\nsubsidies, and border tax adjustments, and are effective in promoting implementation of low-cost emissions reductions. Regulatory \r\ninstruments help achieve specific mitigation outcomes particularly in sectoral applications, by establishing technology or performance \r\nrequirements. Other instruments include information programmes, government provision of goods, services and infrastructure, \r\ndivestment strategies, and voluntary agreements between governments and private firms."


id: 17bb7283648e4b44f17a7a17359c75e9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1382
content:
"Climate policy instruments can be sector-specific or economy-wide and could be applied at national, regional, or local levels. \r\nPolicymakers may directly target GHG emission reduction or seek to achieve multiple objectives, such as urbanisation or energy \r\nsecurity, with the effect of reducing emissions. In practice, climate mitigation policy instruments operate in combination with other \r\npolicy tools, and require attention to the interaction effects between instruments. At all levels of governance, coverage, stringency \r\nand design of climate policies define their efficiency in reducing greenhouse gases emissions."


id: 70411c947a50aca51c0b8cab52ed127e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17007
content:
"Policy packages, when designed with attention to interactive effects, local governance context, and harnessed to a clear vision for \r\nchange, are better able to support socio-technical transitions and shifts in development pathways toward low-carbon futures than \r\nindividual policies. See also Chapter 14 on international climate governance. "


id: b30e96cc008f80fcfe025850dcdb7485
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28744
content:
"Sub-national actors (for example individuals, organisations, jurisdictions and networks at regional, local and city levels) often \r\nhave a remit over areas salient to climate mitigation, such as land-use planning, waste management, infrastructure, housing, and \r\ncommunity development. Despite constraints on legal authority and dependence on national policy priorities in many countries, sub\u0002national climate change policies exist in more than 120 countries. However, they often lack national support, funding, and capacity, \r\nand adequate coordination with other scales. Sub-national climate action in support of specific goals is more likely to succeed when \r\nlinked to local issues such as travel congestion alleviation, air pollution control."


id: 24278c8fdd28cded54f2f106db996135
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3543
content:
"The main drivers of climate actions at sub-national levels include high levels of citizen concern, jurisdictional authority and funding, \r\ninstitutional capacity, national level support and effective linkage to development objectives. Sub-national governments often \r\ninitiate and implement policy experiments that could be scaled to other levels of governance."


id: eb8321222bbd7be485a71fd3c7f2c809
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Preety Bhandari (India), Antonina Ivanova Boncheva (Mexico), Alejandro Caparros (Spain), \r\nKamal Djemouai (Algeria), Izumi Kubota (Japan), Jacqueline Peel (Australia), Agus Pratama Sari \r\n(Indonesia), Detlef F. Sprinz (Germany), Jorgen Wettestad (Norway)"


id: 502c3cb91c40e301768721777279bb66
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11392
content:
"Mustafa Babiker (Sudan/Saudi Arabia), Govindasamy Bala (India), Christopher Bataille (Canada), \r\nPaolo Bertoldi (Italy), Felix Creutzig (Germany), Heleen de Coninck (the Netherlands), Navroz \r\nK.  Dubash (India), Rachael Garrett (Switzerland/the United States of America), Oliver  Geden \r\n(Germany), Veronika Ginzburg (the Russian Federation), Michael Grubb (United Kingdom), Erik Haites \r\n(Canada), Benjamin Hinder (United Kingdom), Janna Hoppe (Germany), Yong-Gun Kim (Republic of \r\nKorea), Katharine J. Mach (the United States of America), Gregory F. Nemet (the United States of \r\nAmerica/Canada), Kilian Raiser (Germany), Yamina Saheb (France/Algeria), Sonia I.  Seneviratne \r\n(Switzerland), Raphael Slade (United Kingdom), Masahiro Sugiyama (Japan), Christopher H. Trisos \r\n(South Africa), Maarten van Aalst (the Netherlands), Harro van Asselt (the Netherlands)"


id: f70ad7a5212873391d52421b12c05fb6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40834
content:
"Patt, A., L. Rajamani, P. Bhandari, A. Ivanova Boncheva, A. Caparros, K. Djemouai, I. Kubota, J. Peel, A.P. Sari, D.F. Sprinz, \r\nJ. Wettestad, 2022: International cooperation. In IPCC, 2022: Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change. \r\nContribution of Working Group III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change \r\n[P.R. Shukla, J. Skea, R. Slade, A. Al Khourdajie, R. van Diemen, D. McCollum, M. Pathak, S. Some, P. Vyas, R. Fradera, \r\nM. Belkacemi, A. Hasija, G. Lisboa, S. Luz, J. Malley, (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, \r\nNY, USA. doi: 10.1017/9781009157926.016"


id: 201868d887ee792551e888fdcb42505
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2865
content:
"equity remain of central importance in the UN climate regime, \r\nnotwithstanding shifts in the operationalisation of 'common but \r\ndifferentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities' from Kyoto \r\nto Paris (high confidence). {14.3} "


id: 5a9276fdeeb6a87bc883a1277527064f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13191
content:
"International cooperation is having positive and measurable \r\nresults (high confidence). The Kyoto Protocol led to measurable \r\nand substantial avoided emissions, including in 20 countries with \r\nKyoto first commitment period targets that have experienced \r\na  decade of declining absolute emissions. It also built national \r\ncapacity for greenhouse gas (GHG) accounting, catalysed the \r\ncreation of GHG markets, and increased investments in low-carbon \r\ntechnologies (medium confidence). Other international agreements \r\nand institutions have led to avoided carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions \r\nfrom land use practices, as well as avoided emissions of some non\u0002CO2 greenhouse gases (medium confidence). {14.3, 14.5, 14.6}"


id: 9767a34946c1fa2c82cf076531c06c4e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23848
content:
"International cooperation under the United Nations (UN) \r\nclimate regime has taken an important new direction with \r\nthe entry into force of the 2015 Paris Agreement, which \r\nstrengthened the objective of the UN climate regime, \r\nincluding its long-term temperature goal, while adopting \r\na  different architecture from that of the Kyoto Protocol to \r\nachieve it (high confidence). The core national commitments \r\nunder the Kyoto Protocol have been legally binding quantified \r\nemission targets for developed countries tied to well-defined \r\nmechanisms for monitoring and enforcement. By contrast, the \r\ncommitments under the Paris Agreement are primarily procedural, \r\nextend to all Parties, and are designed to trigger domestic policies \r\nand measures, enhance transparency, stimulate climate investments, \r\nparticularly in developing countries, and to lead iteratively to rising \r\nlevels of ambition across all countries (high confidence). Issues of "


id: 213e7076b787c6e688dc1a8d3890ad5e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3067
content:
"This chapter assesses the role and effectiveness of international \r\ncooperation in mitigating climate change. Such cooperation includes \r\nmultilateral global cooperative agreements among nation states such \r\nas the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change \r\n(UNFCCC), and its related legal instruments, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol \r\nand the 2015 Paris Agreement, but also plurilateral agreements \r\ninvolving fewer states, as well as those focused on particular economic \r\nand policy sectors, such as components of the energy system. \r\nMoreover, this chapter assesses the role of transnational agreements \r\nand cooperative arrangements between non-state and sub-national \r\nactors, including municipal governments, private sector firms and \r\nindustry consortia, and civil society organisations. This chapter does \r\nnot assess international cooperation within the European Union, as \r\nthis is covered in Chapter 13 of this report."


id: 3ea2d73330e6fc9ab2003b94a951eb2a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8207
content:
"Past IPCC assessment reports have discussed the theoretical literature, \r\nproviding insights into the rationale for international cooperation, as \r\nwell as guidance as to its structure and implementation. This chapter \r\nlimits such theoretical discussion primarily to the new developments \r\nsince the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5). Important developments in \r\nthis respect include attention to climate clubs (groups of countries and \r\npotentially non-state actors that can work together to achieve particular \r\nobjectives), and the effects of framing the global climate change \r\nmitigation challenge as one of accelerating a socio-technical transition \r\nor transformation, shifting development pathways accordingly, in \r\naddition to (or rather than) solving a global commons problem. This \r\nchapter draws from theory to identify a set of criteria by which to assess \r\nthe effectiveness of existing forms of international cooperation."


id: e9312ea390a5ccc2db524e2f29a98adc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38381
content:
"The key development since AR5 has been the negotiation and \r\nadoption of the Paris Agreement, which, building on the UNFCCC, \r\nintroduces a new approach to global climate governance. This new \r\napproach, as discussed below (Section  14.3.1.1), is driven by the \r\nneed to engage developing countries in emissions reductions beyond \r\nthose they had taken on voluntarily under the Cancun Agreements, \r\nextend mitigation commitments to those developed countries that \r\nhad rejected or withdrawn from the Kyoto Protocol, and to respond to \r\nthe rapidly changing geopolitical context (Section 14.3.1.2). "


id: 99fcf850ff11e862d7e79bbae1674cb8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24325
content:
"This section describes recent insights from social science theory that \r\ncan shed light on the need for and ideal structure of international \r\ncooperation. This section starts by describing developments in \r\nframing the underlying problem, moves towards a  body of theory \r\ndescribing the benefits of multilateral sub-global action, and ends \r\nwith a theory-based articulation of criteria to assess the effectiveness \r\nof international cooperation."


id: eeae2a41b2e75861ce092442d6b376a2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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vector_id: 39371
content:
"Previous IPCC reports have framed international climate cooperation, \r\nand indeed climate mitigation more generally, primarily as addressing \r\na global commons problem (Stavins et al. 2014). In this report, by \r\ncontrast, multiple framings are considered. Chapter  1  introduces \r\nfour analytic frameworks: aggregated economic approaches such as \r\ncost-benefit analysis, which maps onto the global commons framing; \r\nethical approaches; analysis of transitions and transformations; and \r\npsychology and politics of changing course. Here, we highlight some \r\nof the findings that are of relevance to international cooperation."


id: 5f7ee8cda79640df2aaad2957ba58e30
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14109
content:
"When applied to the international context, the public good (or global \r\ncommons) framing stresses that the incentives for mitigation at \r\nthe global level are greater than they are for any single country, since \r\nthe latter does not enjoy the benefits of its own mitigation efforts \r\nthat accrue outside its own borders (Stavins et al. 2014; Patt 2017). \r\nThis framing does not preclude countries engaging in mitigation, \r\neven ambitious mitigation, but it suggests that these countries' level \r\nof ambition and speed of abatement would be greater if they were \r\npart of a cooperative agreement. "


id: fdfdab989ec9f447d80f689988dccf1e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42053
content:
"extent, the dichotomy of views aligns with the two framings: analysis \r\nimplicitly aligned with the global commons framing is negative about \r\nthe Paris architecture, whereas that aligned with the transitions \r\nframing is more positive (Kern and Rogge 2016; Patt 2017; Roberts \r\net al. 2018)."


id: e9e127e8788e827c2b0076f56f9ad449
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38498
content:
"the agreement, as countries can credibly threaten potential free\u0002riders with a  short-term agreement where green investments will \r\nbe insufficient due to the hold-up problem (Battaglini and Harstad \r\n2016). Finally, thresholds and potential climate catastrophes have \r\nalso been shown, theoretically and numerically, to reduce free-riding \r\nincentives, especially for countries that may become pivotal in failing \r\nto avoid the threshold (Barrett 2013; Emmerling et al. 2020)."


id: b77292aa17c1465ba05d0856f3e2220e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29488
content:
"The analytic approach focusing on transitions and transformation \r\nfocuses on path-dependent processes as an impediment to the shift \r\nto low-carbon technologies and systems. Cross-Chapter Box 12 on \r\nTransition Dynamics (Chapter  16) summarises the key points of \r\nthis literature. This chapter describes how the two framings focus \r\non different indicators of progress, and potentially different types \r\nof cooperative action within the international context. This chapter \r\nhighlights in later sections conflicting views on whether the Paris \r\nAgreement is likely to prove effective (Section  14.3.3.2). To some "


id: f7200ec9b935f6d7dea77a7a5ee48eda
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40847
content:
"Just as the transition framing highlights indicators of progress other \r\nthan global emissions, it de-emphasises the importance of achieving \r\ncost-effectiveness with respect to global emissions. Hence, this strand \r\nof the literature does not generally support the use of international "


id: ea94de753de00534abdb42e8b58e867e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38631
content:
"and an open membership policy can lead to a large stable climate \r\nagreement, including full participation. Table 14.1 presents a number \r\nof key results related to climate clubs from a static context."


id: 381e42370c63763d37636a1c43de8c78
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7075
content:
"This section identifies a set of criteria for assessing the effectiveness \r\nof international cooperation, which is applied later in the chapter. \r\nLessons from the implementation of other multilateral environmental \r\nagreements (MEAs) can provide some guidance. There is considerable \r\nliterature on this topic, most of which predates AR5, and which will \r\ntherefore not be covered in detail. Issues include ways to enhance \r\ncompliance, and the fact that a  low level of compliance with an \r\nMEA does not necessarily mean that the MEA has no effect (Downs \r\net al. 1996; Victor et al. 1998; Weiss and Jacobson 1998). Recent \r\nresearch examines effectiveness from the viewpoint of the extent to \r\nwhich an MEA influences domestic action, including the adoption of \r\nimplementing legislation and policies (Brandi et al. 2019). "


id: e78c98afd29c1f5d4351a2083e284eeb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38047
content:
"Results based on an agent-based model suggest that climate clubs \r\nresult in major emissions reductions if there is a  sufficiently high \r\nprovision of the club good and if initial membership by several states \r\nwith sufficient emissions weight materialises. Such configurations \r\nallow the club to grow over time to enable effective global action \r\n(Hovi et al. 2017). The departure of a  major emitter (specifically \r\nthe United States) triggered a scientific discussion on the stability of \r\nthe Paris Agreement. Sprinz et al. (2018) explore whether climate clubs "


id: ef6a644c6fbd0d960c0a422961051747
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39494
content:
"While environmental outcomes and economic performance have \r\nbeen long-standing criteria for assessment of effectiveness, \r\nthe other elements deserve some note. It is the case that the \r\nachievement of climate objectives, such as limiting global average \r\nwarming to 1.5degC-2degC, will require the transition from high- to \r\nlow-carbon technologies and the transformation of the sectors "


id: a8cf86d6884bf1608812acb29f23e2fe
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"and social environments within which those technologies operate. \r\nSuch transformations are not linear processes, and hence many of \r\nthe early steps taken -  such as supporting early diffusion of new \r\nrenewable energy technologies - will have little immediate effect on \r\nGHG emissions (Patt 2015; Geels et al. 2017). Hence, activities that \r\ncontribute to transformative potential include technology transfer \r\nand financial support for low-carbon infrastructure, especially where \r\nthe latter is not tied to immediate emissions reductions. Assessing \r\nthe transformative potential of international cooperation takes these \r\nfactors into account. Equity and distributive outcomes are of central \r\nimportance to the climate change debate, and hence for evaluating \r\nthe effects of policies. Equity encompasses the notion of distributive \r\njustice which refers to the distribution of goods, burdens, costs and \r\nbenefits, as well as procedural-related issues (Kverndokk 2018). "


id: 24dc815e2439bc99b3371619ef8105fd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"The Kyoto Protocol specifies GHG emissions reduction targets for \r\nthe 2008-2012 commitment period for countries listed in its Annex \r\nB (which broadly corresponds to Annex I to the UNFCCC) (UNFCCC \r\n1997, Art. 3  and Annex B). The Kyoto Protocol entered into force \r\nin 2005. Shortly thereafter, states began negotiating a  second \r\ncommitment period under the Protocol for Annex B Parties, as well \r\nas initiating a  process under the UNFCCC to consider long-term \r\ncooperation among all Parties."


id: 5ed72d84d9de3a7bb6bcdabbc65d0183
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"At the 13th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP13) in \r\nBali in 2007, Parties adopted the Bali Action Plan which launched \r\nnegotiations aimed at an agreed outcome enhancing the UNFCCC's \r\n'full, effective and sustained implementation'. The agreed outcome \r\nwas to be adopted at COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009, but negotiations \r\nfailed to deliver a consensus document. The result instead was the \r\nCopenhagen Accord, which was taken note of by the COP. While \r\nit was a political agreement with no formal legal status under the \r\nUNFCCC, it reflected significant progress on several fronts and set \r\nin place the building blocks for the Paris Agreement, namely: setting "


id: 2238750064c47e6ff80219e94575696e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3241
content:
"In addition to building on the social science theory just described, \r\nwe recognise that it is also important to strike a  balance \r\nbetween applying the same standards developed and applied to \r\ninternational cooperation in AR5 and maintaining consistency with \r\nother chapters of this report (primarily Chapters 1, 4, 13 and 15). \r\nTable 14.2 presents a set of criteria that do this, and which are then \r\napplied later in the chapter."


id: c1a5dd24049c62aabeb278f896e0f288
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31371
content:
"a goal of limiting global temperature increase to below 2degC; calling \r\non all countries to put forward mitigation pledges; establishing \r\nbroad new terms for the reporting and verification of countries' \r\nactions; setting a goal of mobilising USD100 billion a year by 2020 \r\nfrom a  wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and \r\nmultilateral, including alternative sources of finance; and, calling \r\nfor the establishment of a new Green Climate Fund and Technology \r\nMechanism (Rajamani 2010; Rogelj et al. 2010; UNFCCC 2010a). One \r\nhundred and forty states endorsed the Copenhagen Accord, with 85 \r\ncountries entering pledges to reduce their emissions or constrain \r\ntheir growth by 2020 (Christensen and Olhoff 2019). "


id: 830c44a434179a79d74ada1f7478d9da
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20183
content:
"At COP16 in Cancun in 2010, Parties adopted a set of decisions termed \r\nthe Cancun Agreements that effectively formalised the core elements \r\nof the Copenhagen Accord, and the pledges states made, under the \r\nUNFCCC.  The Cancun Agreements were regarded as an interim \r\narrangement through to 2020, and Parties left the door open to further \r\nnegotiations, in line with negotiations launched in 2005, toward \r\na legally-binding successor to the Kyoto Protocol (Freestone 2010; Liu \r\n2011a). Collectively the G20 states are on track to meeting the mid \r\nlevel of their Cancun pledges, although there is uncertainty about some \r\nindividual pledges. However, there is significant gap between annual "


id: ffad075fca154a8490189811ed71c393
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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vector_id: 42376
content:
"(La  Hoz  Theuer et al. 2019). Article 5  also provides explicit \r\nendorsement of reducing emissions from deforestation and forest \r\ndegradation and fostering conservation (REDD+). The Kyoto Protocol \r\ncontains an extensive reporting and review process, backed by \r\na compliance mechanism. This mechanism includes an enforcement \r\nbranch, to ensure compliance, and sanction non-compliance (through \r\nthe withdrawal of benefits such as participation in market-based \r\nmechanisms), with its national system requirements, and GHG \r\ntargets. By contrast, the Paris Agreement relies on informational \r\nrequirements and flows to enhance the clarity of NDCs, and to track \r\nprogress in the implementation and achievement of NDCs."


id: 3689541c6d6300a71bdb50cb26cb4457
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6828
content:
"emissions expected under full implementation of pledges and the level \r\nconsistent with the 2degC goal (Christensen and Olhoff 2019)."


id: 106f5f888105305ae9c369596de8bf7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"At the 2011 Durban climate conference, Parties launched negotiations \r\nfor 'a Protocol, another legal instrument or agreed outcome with legal \r\nforce' with a scheduled end to the negotiations in 2015 (UNFCCC \r\n2012, Dec. 1, para. 2). At the 2012 Doha climate conference, Parties \r\nadopted a  second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol, \r\nrunning from 2013-2020. The Doha Amendment entered into force \r\non 31 December 2020. Given the subsequent adoption of the Paris \r\nAgreement, the Kyoto Protocol is unlikely to continue beyond 2020 \r\n(Bodansky et al. 2017a). At the end of the compliance assessment \r\nperiod under the Kyoto Protocol, Annex B  Parties were in full \r\ncompliance with their targets for the first commitment period; in \r\nsome cases through the use of the Protocol's flexibility mechanisms \r\n(Shishlov et al. 2016). "


id: 7a20757b1a3d31c3919b107ad21d5d04
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18686
content:
"Beyond these countries, in the decade leading up to the Paris climate \r\nnegotiations, increasing differences within the group of developing \r\ncountries divided the 134-strong developing country alliance of the \r\nG77/China into several interest-based coalitions (Vihma et al. 2011; \r\nBodansky et al. 2017b). A division emerged between the vulnerable \r\nleast developed and small island states on the one side and rapidly \r\ndeveloping economies, the BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and \r\nChina) on the other, as the latter are 'decidedly not developed but "


id: d9a4132e745894fa7cf170b23926a0a0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35587
content:
"EU, and China being perceived as leaders at different points in time \r\nand to varying degrees (Karlsson et al. 2012; Parker et al. 2014). Small \r\nisland states are also credited with demonstrating 'moral leadership' \r\n(Agueda Corneloup and Mol 2014), and non-state and sub-national \r\nactors are beginning to be recognised as pioneers and leaders (Wurzel \r\net al. 2019). There is also a burgeoning literature on the emergence of \r\ndiffused leadership and the salience of followers (Parker et al. 2014; \r\nBusby and Urpelainen 2020)."


id: 314bd9b6f3d60bf8db78d1996584c668
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5923
content:
"It is in the context of this complex, multipolar and highly differentiated \r\nworld - with a heterogeneity of interests, constraints and capacities, \r\nincreased contestations over shares of the carbon and development \r\nspace, as well as diffused leadership - that the Paris Agreement was \r\nnegotiated. This context fundamentally influenced the shape of the \r\nParis Agreement, in particular on issues relating to its architecture, \r\n'legalisation' (Karlas 2017) and differentiation (Bodansky et al. \r\n2017b; Kinley et al. 2020), all of which are discussed below."


id: eb7592a3929b05e0fdcff8823f42173e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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"The 2015 Paris Agreement to the UNFCCC, which entered into force \r\non 4 November 2016, and has 193 Parties as of March 2022, is at \r\nthe centre of international cooperative efforts for climate change \r\nmitigation and adaptation in the post-2020 period. Although its legal \r\nform was heavily disputed, especially in the initial part of its four-year "


id: 107a48605d6b2d46dd6e35be84bfc3f7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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content:
"Leadership is essential to reaching international agreements and \r\novercoming collective action problems (Parker et al. 2015). The Paris \r\nnegotiations were faced, as a reflection of the multipolarity that had \r\nemerged, with a 'fragmented leadership landscape' with the USA, "


id: a8f0d92cfa478e56465cffedd82b51c4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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"Figure 14.1 | Key features of the Paris Agreement. Arrows illustrate the interrelationship between the different features of the Paris Agreement, in particular between \r\nthe Agreement's goals, required actions through NDCs, support (finance, technology and capacity building), transparency framework and global stocktake process. The figure \r\nalso represents points of interconnection with domestic mitigation measures, whether taken by state Parties or by non-state actors (NSAs). This figure is illustrative rather than \r\nexhaustive of the features and interconnections."


id: b4a0baab27df847651f1ee22cc3b2e01
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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content:
"Some authors interpret the Paris Agreement's temperature goal as \r\na single goal with two inseparable elements, the well below 2degC goal \r\npressing towards 1.5degC (Rajamani and Werksman 2018), but others \r\ninterpret the goal as a unitary one of 1.5degC with minimal overshoot \r\n(Mace 2016). Yet others interpret 1.5degC as the limit within the long\u0002term temperature goal, and that it 'signals an increase in both the \r\nmargin and likelihood by which warming is to be kept below 2degC' \r\n(Schleussner et al. 2016). Although having a long-term goal has clear \r\nadvantages, the literature highlights the issue of credibility, given \r\nthe lengthy timeframe involved (Urpelainen 2011), and stresses \r\nthat future regulators may have incentives to relax current climate \r\nplans, which could have a  significant effect on the achieved GHG \r\nstabilisation level (Gerlagh and Michielsen 2015)."


id: fec5ca8c327a9c3d0cf70fd226a94bd3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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content:
"The preamble of the Paris Agreement lists several factors that provide \r\nthe interpretative context for the Agreement (Bodansky et al. 2017b; \r\nCarazo 2017), including a  reference to human rights. The human \r\nrights implications of climate impacts garnered particular attention \r\nin the lead up to Paris (Duyck 2015; Mayer 2016b). In particular, the \r\nHuman Rights Council, its special procedures mechanisms, and the \r\nOffice of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, through a series \r\nof resolutions, reports, and activities, advocated a  rights-based \r\napproach to climate impacts, and sought to integrate this approach in \r\nthe climate change regime. The Paris Agreement's preambular recital \r\non human rights recommends that Parties, 'when taking action to \r\naddress human rights', take into account 'their respective obligations "


id: 3cb77a6375fc20c22ad6f2d2629186d3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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"At last count 131 countries had adopted or had net zero targets \r\n(whether of carbon or GHG) in the pipeline, covering 72% of global \r\nemissions. If these targets are fully implemented some estimate \r\nthat this could bring temperature increase down to 2degC-2.4degC by \r\n2100 as compared to current policies which are estimated to lead \r\nto a  temperature increase of 2.9-3.2degC, and NDCs submitted to \r\nthe Paris Agreement which are estimated to lead to a temperature \r\nincrease of 2.4degC-2.9degC (Hohne et al. 2021). "


id: b58af3bd9fe6131e4a5af59cdab0e771
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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"Although NDCs are developed by individual state Parties, the Paris \r\nAgreement requires that these are undertaken by Parties 'with \r\na  view' to achieving the Agreement's purpose and collectively \r\n'represent a progression over time' (UNFCCC 2015a, Art. 3). The Paris \r\nAgreement also encourages Parties to align the ambition of their \r\nNDCs with the temperature goal through the Agreement's 'ambition \r\ncycle', thus imparting operational relevance to the temperature goal \r\n(Rajamani and Werksman 2018). "


id: 29f3166c06afae0b69a6bb969b02df22
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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content:
"Article 4.1 contains a  further non-binding requirement that Parties \r\n'aim' to reach global peaking of GHG 'as soon as possible' and \r\nto undertake rapid reductions thereafter to achieve net zero GHG \r\nemissions 'in the second half of the century'. Some argue this implies \r\na need to reach net zero GHG emissions in the third quarter of the \r\n21st century (Rogelj et al. 2015; IPCC 2018b) (Chapter 2, Table 2.4 and \r\nCross-Chapter Box 3 in Chapter 3). To reach net zero CO2 around 2050, \r\nin the short-term global net human-caused CO2 emissions would need \r\nto fall by about 45% to 60% from 2010 levels by 2030 (IPCC 2018b). \r\nAchieving the Paris Agreement's Article 4.1 aim potentially implies that \r\nglobal warming will peak and then follow a gradually declining path, \r\npotentially to below 1.5degC warming (Rogelj et al. 2021). "


id: 1d289f14d7fd921d4ed367e37d871ce9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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content:
"have noted that given the key role of CDR in net zero targets and \r\n1.5degC compatible pathways, and the fact that it presents 'significant \r\ncosts to current and future generations', it is important to consider \r\nwhat an equitable distribution of CDR might look like (UNFCCC \r\n2019c; Day et al. 2020; Lee et al. 2021b)."


id: 9cf22c13a2008eae21fe27506377f957
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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content:
"Each Party to the Paris Agreement has a  procedural obligation to \r\n'prepare, communicate and maintain' successive NDCs 'that it intends \r\nto achieve'. Parties have a further procedural obligation to 'pursue \r\ndomestic mitigation measures' (UNFCCC 2015a, Art.  4.2). These \r\nprocedural obligations are coupled with an obligation of conduct to \r\nmake best efforts to achieve the objectives of NDCs (Rajamani 2016a; \r\nMayer 2018b). Many states have adopted climate policies and laws, \r\ndiscussed in Chapter 13, and captured in databases (LSE 2020)."


id: aa985dac822dbfa288fd18108e58fb6d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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content:
"The framing and content of NDCs is thus largely left up to Parties, \r\nalthough certain normative expectations apply. These include \r\ndeveloped country leadership through these Parties undertaking \r\neconomy-wide absolute emissions reduction targets (UNFCCC 2015a, \r\nArt. 4.4), as well as 'progression' and 'highest possible ambition' \r\nreflecting 'common but differentiated responsibilities and respective \r\ncapabilities in light of different national circumstances' (Art. 4.3). \r\nThere is 'a firm expectation' that for every five-year cycle a  Party \r\nputs forward a new or updated NDC that is 'more ambitious than \r\ntheir last' (Rajamani 2016a). While what represents a Party's highest \r\npossible ambition and progression is not prescribed by the Agreement \r\nor elaborated in the Paris Rulebook (Rajamani and Bodansky 2019), \r\nthese obligations could be read to imply a due diligence standard \r\n(Voigt and Ferreira 2016b)."


id: 172d20a7993a223a5a8aa625b0e51be0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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content:
"There are several approaches to evaluating NDCs, incorporating \r\nindicators such as CO2 emissions, GDP, energy intensity of GDP, \r\nCO2 per energy unit, CO2 intensity of fossil fuels, and share of fossil \r\nfuels in total energy use (Peters et al. 2017). However, some favour \r\napproaches that use metrics beyond emissions such as infrastructure \r\ninvestment, energy demand, or installed power capacity (Iyer et al. \r\n2017; Jeffery et al. 2018). One approach is to combine the comparison \r\nof aggregate NDC emissions using Integrated Assessment Model \r\nscenarios with modelling of NDC scenarios directly, and carbon \r\nbudget analyses (Jeffery et al. 2018). Another approach is to engage \r\nin a  comprehensive assessment of multiple indicators that reflect \r\nthe different viewpoints of the Parties to the UNFCCC (Aldy et al. \r\n2017; Hohne et al. 2018). These different approaches are described in \r\ngreater depth in Section 4.2.2."


id: e1966e9d29a4fc17bb6fb02d6f7a0291
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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content:
"Parties' first NDCs submitted to the provisional registry maintained by \r\nthe UNFCCC Secretariat vary in terms of target type, reference year \r\nor points, timeframes, and scope and coverage of GHGs. A significant "


id: a29e2165ae59b4d6e805765fd5a6a907
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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content:
"2019). According to the estimates in Table  4.3, communicated \r\nunconditional commitments imply about a  7% reduction of world \r\nemissions by 2030, in terms of Kyoto GHGs, compared to a scenario \r\nwhere only current policies are in place. If conditional commitments \r\nare also included, the reduction in world emissions by 2030 would \r\nbe about 12%. "


id: 62e62b2d0182b9906de5b4ae18ab5477
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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content:
"(including their conditional elements), implies possibility of global \r\nemissions peaking before 2030'. However, such total global GHG \r\nemission level in 2030 is still expected to be 15.9% above the 2010 \r\nlevel. This 'implies an urgent need for either a significant increase in \r\nthe level of ambition of NDCs between now and 2030 or a significant \r\noverachievement of the latest NDCs, or a  combination of both.' \r\n(UNFCCC 2021a). "


id: 98d9cd65f2cbbbaa90fb426e6a96010e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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content:
"The Paris Agreement encourages Parties, while submitting their NDCs, \r\nto explain how these are 'fair and ambitious' (UNFCCC 2015a, Art. 4.8 \r\nread with UNFCCC 2016a, para. 27). The Rulebook obliges Parties to \r\nprovide information on 'fairness considerations, including reflecting \r\non equity' as applicable to their NDC (Rajamani and Bodansky 2019; \r\nUNFCCC 2019b paras. 7a and 9, Annex, paras. 6(a) and (b)). Although \r\nequity within nations and between communities is also important, \r\nmuch of the literature on fairness and equity in the context of NDCs \r\nfocuses on equity between nations."


id: c11ad57437dbac162d694bc09a2897b4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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content:
"It is challenging, however, to determine 'fair shares', and address \r\nfairness and equity in a  world of voluntary climate contributions \r\n(Chan 2016a), in particular, since these contributions are insufficient \r\n(Section  14.3.2.2.). Self-differentiation in contributions has also \r\nled to fairness and equity being discussed in terms of individual \r\nNationally Determined Contributions rather than between categories \r\nof countries (Chan 2016a). In the climate change regime, one option \r\nis for Parties to provide more rigorous information under the Paris \r\nAgreement to assess fair shares (Winkler et al. 2018), and another \r\nis for Parties to articulate what equity principles they have adopted \r\nin determining their NDCs and how they have operationalised \r\nthese principles, and to explain their mitigation targets in terms of \r\nthe portion of the appropriated global carbon budget (Hales and \r\nMackey 2018). "


id: a92092f1e297b76bab1c38d935a55798
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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content:
"Equity is critical to addressing climate change, including through the \r\nParis Agreement (Klinsky et al. 2017), however, since the political \r\nfeasibility of developing equity principles within the climate change \r\nregime is low, the onus is on mechanisms and actors outside the \r\nregime to develop these (Lawrence and Reder 2019). Equity and \r\nfairness concerns are being raised in national and regional courts \r\nthat are increasingly being asked to determine if the climate actions \r\npledged by states are adequate in relation to their fair share \r\n(The Supreme Court of the Netherlands 2019; European Court of \r\nHuman Rights 2020; German Constitutional Court 2021), as it is \r\nonly in relation to such a 'fair share' that the adequacy of a state's \r\ncontribution can be assessed in the context of a  global collective \r\naction problem (Section 13.5.5). Some domestic courts have stressed \r\nthat as climate change is a  global problem of cumulative impact, "


id: 40331f69680a83ef77f8cb1061ff4251
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content:
"Although NDCs reflect a  'bottom-up', self-differentiated approach \r\nto climate mitigation actions, the Paris Agreement couples this to \r\nan international transparency framework designed, among other \r\nthings, to track progress in implementing and achieving mitigation \r\ncontributions (UNFCCC 2015a, Art. 13). This transparency framework \r\nbuilds on the processes that already exist under the UNFCCC. The "


id: 4b75e4c49f3e84f1489937f2b8e9d357
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content:
"transparency framework under the Paris Agreement is applicable \r\nto all Parties, although with flexibilities for developing country \r\nParties that need it in light of their capacities (Mayer 2019). Each \r\nParty is required to submit a  national inventory report, as well as \r\n'the information necessary to track progress in implementing and \r\nachieving' its NDC (UNFCCC 2015a, Art. 13.7) biennially (UNFCCC \r\n2016a, para. 90). The Paris Rulebook requires all Parties to submit \r\ntheir national inventory reports using the 2006 IPCC Guidelines \r\n(UNFCCC 2019b, Annex, para. 20). "


id: 9e4949dd107fad938c8e1747f2f45e65
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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content:
"The Paris Agreement's transparency framework is complemented by \r\nthe global stocktake, which will take place every five years (starting \r\nin 2023) and assess the collective progress towards achieving the \r\nAgreement's purpose and long-term goals (UNFCCC 2015a, Art. 14). \r\nThe scope of the global stocktake is comprehensive  - covering \r\nmitigation, adaptation and means of implementation and support - \r\nand the process is to be facilitative and consultative. The Paris \r\nRulebook outlines the scope of the global stocktake to include social \r\nand economic consequences and impacts of response measures, \r\nand loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate \r\nchange (UNFCCC 2019f, paras. 8-10)."


id: 6339d441d96b3290df50e49f80fe8fb2
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"In relation to the provision of information necessary to track progress \r\ntowards implementation and achievement of NDCs, the Paris Rulebook \r\nallows each Party to choose its own qualitative or quantitative \r\nindicators (UNFCCC 2019k, Annex, para. 65), a significant concession \r\nto national sovereignty (Rajamani and Bodansky 2019). The Rulebook \r\nphases in common reporting requirements for developed and \r\ndeveloping countries (except LDCs and SIDS) at the latest by 2024 \r\n(UNFCCC 2019k, para. 3), but offers flexibilities in 'scope, frequency, \r\nand level of detail of reporting, and in the scope of the review' for \r\nthose developing countries that need it in light of their capacities \r\n(UNFCCC 2019k, Annex, para. 5). Some differentiation also remains \r\nfor information on support provided to developing countries (Winkler \r\net al. 2017), with developed country Parties required to report such \r\ninformation biennially, while others are only 'encouraged' to do so \r\n(UNFCCC 2015a, Art. 9.7). "


id: 94207566138b81b943759730dff9a23f
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"The global stocktake is to occur 'in the light of equity and the \r\nbest available science'. While the focus of the global stocktake is \r\non collective and not individual progress towards the goals of the \r\nAgreement, the inclusion of equity in the global stocktake enables \r\na discussion on equitable burden sharing (Rajamani 2016a; Winkler \r\n2020), and for equity metrics to be factored in (Robiou du Pont and \r\nMeinshausen 2018). The Paris Rulebook includes consideration of the \r\nmodalities and sources of inputs for the global stocktake (UNFCCC \r\n2019f, paras. 1, 2, 13, 27, 31, 36h and 37g), which arguably will result \r\nin equity being factored into the outcome of the stocktake (Winkler \r\n2020). The Rulebook does not, however, some argue, resolve the \r\ntension between the collective nature of the assessment that is \r\nauthorised by the stocktake and the individual assessments required \r\nto determine relative 'fair share' (Rajamani and Bodansky 2019; \r\nZahar 2019). "


id: fce3c32d38d5328338a1ca7ba8806d8
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"The global stocktake is seen as crucial to encouraging Parties to \r\nincrease the ambition of their NDCs (Huang 2018; Hermwille et al. \r\n2019; Milkoreit and Haapala 2019) as its outcome 'shall inform Parties \r\nin updating and enhancing, in a nationally determined manner, their \r\nactions and support' (Art. 14.3) (Rajamani 2016a; Friedrich 2017; \r\nZahar 2019). The Rulebook provides for the stocktake to draw on \r\na wide variety of inputs sourced from a full range of actors, including \r\n'non-Party stakeholders' (UNFCCC 2019f, para. 37). However, the \r\nRulebook specifies that the global stocktake will be 'a Party-driven \r\nprocess' (UNFCCC 2019f, para. 10), will not have an 'individual Party \r\nfocus', and will include only 'non-policy prescriptive consideration of \r\ncollective progress' (UNFCCC 2019f, para. 14)."


id: ed58b44fbd22ee58ce218d8947e9e970
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"Article 5  of the Paris Agreement calls for Parties to take action to \r\nconserve and enhance sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases, \r\nincluding biomass in terrestrial, coastal, and marine ecosystems, \r\nand encourages countries to take action to support the REDD+ \r\nframework under the Convention. The explicit inclusion of land use \r\nsector activities, including forest conservation, is potentially, while \r\ncautiously, a 'game changer' as it encourages countries to safeguard \r\necosystems for climate mitigation purposes (Grassi et al. 2017). \r\nAnalyses of Parties' NDCs shows pledged mitigation from land \r\nuse, and forests in particular, provides a  quarter of the emissions \r\nreductions planned by Parties and, if fully implemented, would result "


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content:
"have been at best mixed. However, Article 6 goes beyond the project\u0002based approach followed by the CDM, as hinted by the emerging \r\nlandscape of activities based on Article 6 (Greiner et al. 2020), such \r\nas the bilateral treaty signed under the framework of Article 6  in \r\nOctober 2020 by Switzerland and Peru (Section 14.4.4)."


id: af4eb59919a72ca6b915a4b98edfbd6f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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"A key action endorsed by Article 5  is REDD+, which refers to \r\ninitiatives established under the UNFCCC for reducing emissions from \r\ndeforestation and forest degradation and the role of conservation, \r\nsustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest \r\ncarbon stocks in developing countries. It remains an evolving concept \r\nand some identified weaknesses are being addressed, including \r\nthe issues of scale (project-based vs sub-national jurisdictional \r\napproach), problems with leakage, reversal, and benefit sharing, as \r\nwell as safeguards against potential impacts on local and indigenous \r\ncommunities. Nevertheless, REDD+ shows several innovations \r\nunder the climate regime with regard to international cooperation. \r\nThe legal system for REDD+ manages to reconcile flexibility \r\n(creating consensus) and legal security. It shows a high standard of \r\neffectiveness (Dellaux 2017)."


id: acd0fea832e5d1e94558debfe5bc9e36
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"This experience from the CDM is relevant to the implementation \r\nof Article 6  (4) of the Paris Agreement. It addresses a  number of \r\nspecific types of cooperative approaches, including those involving \r\nthe use of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes (ITMOs) \r\ntowards NDCs, a  'mechanism to contribute to mitigation and \r\nsupport sustainable development', and a framework for non-market \r\napproaches such as many aspects of REDD+. "


id: 92f4318d20584a3518dad29a29c353c1
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content:
"Article 6 of the Paris Agreement provides for voluntary cooperative \r\napproaches. Its potential importance in terms of project-based \r\ncooperation should be viewed against the background of key lessons \r\nfrom the market-based mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol, \r\nparticularly the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The CDM has \r\nbeen used for implementing bilateral strategies and unilateral (non\u0002market) actions for instance in India (Phillips and Newell 2013), hence \r\narguably covering all the mechanisms now included in Article 6 of the \r\nParis Agreement. As we describe in Section 14.3.3.1, below, ex post\r\nevaluation of the Kyoto market mechanisms, in particular the CDM, "


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content:
"Article 6.4 concerns the mitigation mechanism, with some similarities \r\nto the Kyoto Protocol's CDM. Unlike the CDM, there is no restriction \r\non which Parties can host mitigation projects and which Parties can \r\nuse the resulting emissions reductions towards their NDCs (Marcu \r\n2016). This central mechanism will operate under the authority and \r\nguidance of the CMA, and is to be supervised by a body designated \r\nby the CMA (Marcu 2016)."


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content:
"of the international climate change regime, such as the Climate \r\nInvestment Funds administered through multilateral development \r\nbanks (the role of these banks in climate finance is discussed \r\nfurther in Section 14.4.1 below). "


id: 3bff8bae92a33b94f993d1b38f37eaab
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content:
"The Article 6.4 central mechanism is intended to promote mitigation \r\nwhile fostering sustainable development. The decision adopting the \r\nParis Agreement specifies experience with Kyoto market mechanisms \r\nas a  basis for the new mitigation mechanism (UNFCCC 2016a, \r\npara. 37(f)). Compared with the CDM under the Kyoto Protocol, the \r\ncentral mechanism has a more balanced focus on both climate and \r\ndevelopment objectives, and a stronger political mandate to measure \r\nsustainable development impact and to verify that the impacts are \r\n'real, measurable, and long-term' (Olsen et al. 2018). There are also \r\nopportunities to integrate human rights into the central mechanism \r\n(Obergassel et al. 2017b; Calzadilla 2018). It is further subject to \r\nthe requirement that it must deliver 'an overall mitigation in global \r\nemissions', which is framed by the general objectives of Article 6 for \r\ncooperation to enhance ambition (Kreibich 2018)."


id: b21105743344f2920d49efc28aeb5933
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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"Pursuant to decisions adopted at the Paris and Katowice conferences, \r\nParties agreed that the operating entities of the financial \r\nmechanism - GEF and GCF - as well as the Special Climate Change \r\nFund, the Least Developed Countries Fund, the Adaptation Fund and the \r\nStanding Committee on Finance, all serve the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC \r\n2016a, paras. 58 and 63, 2019e,g). The GCF, which became operational \r\nin 2015, is the largest dedicated international climate change fund \r\nand plays a key role in channelling financial resources to developing \r\ncountries (Antimiani et al. 2017; Brechin and Espinoza 2017). "


id: b6e445e93b1fcf8072e04473ad6fc6f7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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"Negotiations over rules to operationalise Article 6  have thus far \r\nproven intractable, failing to deliver both at COP24 in Katowice in \r\n2018, where the rest of the Paris Rulebook was agreed, and in COP25 \r\nin Madrid in 2019. Ongoing points of negotiation have included: \r\nwhether to permit the carryover and use of Kyoto CDM credits and \r\nassigned amount units into the Article 6.4 mechanism, whether to \r\nimpose a  mandatory share of proceeds on Article 6.2 mechanism \r\nto fund adaptation, like for Article 6.4; and whether and how credits \r\ngenerated under Article 6.4 should be subject to accounting rules \r\nunder Article 6.2 (Michaelowa et al. 2020a). "


id: 2931d81cbfdf1fd23dee308098bccd37
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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"Finance is the first of three means of support specified under the \r\nParis Agreement to accomplish its objectives relating to mitigation \r\n(and adaptation) (UNFCCC 2015a, Art. 14.1). This sub-section \r\ndiscusses the provision made in the Paris Agreement for international \r\ncooperation on finance. Section  14.4.1 below considers broader \r\ncooperative efforts on public and private finance flows for climate \r\nmitigation, including by multilateral development banks and through \r\ninstruments such as green bonds."


id: c36344edfbcfd6e1f9e9702f4a3db8b4
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"As highlighted above, the objective of the Paris Agreement includes \r\nthe goal of '[m]aking finance flows consistent with a pathway towards \r\nlow greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development' \r\n(UNFCCC 2015a, Art. 2.1(c)). Alignment of financial flows, and in \r\nsome cases provision of finance, will be critical to the achievement of \r\nmany Parties' NDCs, particularly those that are framed in conditional \r\nterms (Zhang and Pan 2016; Kissinger et al. 2019) (Chapter 15). "


id: eb7bd4a29faef556b5e353ae638b2643
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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content:
"International cooperation on climate finance represents 'a complex \r\nand fragmented landscape' with a range of different mechanisms \r\nand forums involved (Pickering et al. 2017; Roberts and Weikmans \r\n2017). These include entities set up under the international climate \r\nchange regime, such as the UNFCCC financial mechanism, with the \r\nGlobal Environment Facility (GEF) and Green Climate Fund (GCF) \r\nas operating entities; special funds, such as the Special Climate \r\nChange Fund, the Least Developed Countries Fund (both managed \r\nby the GEF), and the Adaptation Fund established under the Kyoto \r\nProtocol; the Standing Committee on Finance, a constituted body \r\nwhich assists the COP in exercising its functions with respect \r\nto the UNFCCC financial mechanism; and other bodies outside "


id: 41490133653fd0d8be49fffe53e208f6
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"It is widely recognised that the USD100 billion yr-1 figure is a fraction \r\nof the broader finance and investment needs of mitigation and \r\nadaptation embodied in the Paris Agreement (Peake and Ekins \r\n2017). One estimate, based on a review of 160 Intended Nationally \r\nDetermined Contributions ((I)NDCs), suggests the financial demand \r\nfor both mitigation and adaptation needs of developing countries \r\ncould reach USD474 billion yr-1 by 2030 (Zhang and Pan 2016). The \r\nOrganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) \r\nreports that climate finance provided and mobilised by developed \r\ncountries was USD79.6 billion in 2019. This finance included "


id: d6b86d250988c7f1494252670e8344c1
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content:
"four components: bilateral public, multilateral public (attributed \r\nto developed countries), officially supported export credits and \r\nmobilised private finance (OECD 2021) (Section 15.3.2 and Box 15.4). "


id: 4491dcaca07234c9e7648c137ac18419
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"development and transfer, with 70 Parties requesting technological \r\nsupport for both mitigation and adaptation, and 37 Parties for \r\nmitigation only (Pauw et al. 2020). Thirty-eight LDCs (79%) and \r\n29 SIDS made their NDCs conditional on technology transfer, as did \r\n50 middle-income countries (Pauw et al. 2020). "


id: f721eeffd6d6b35e5e1f096aeb8d0b21
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"While technology is seen as a  key means of implementation and \r\nsupport for Paris Agreement commitments, the issue of technology \r\ndevelopment and the transfer of environmentally sound technologies \r\nfor climate mitigation was heavily contested between developed and \r\ndeveloping countries in the Paris negotiations, and these differences \r\nare likely to persist as the Paris Agreement is implemented (Oh 2019). \r\nContestations continued in negotiations for the Paris Rulebook, \r\nparticularly regarding the meaning of technological innovation, \r\nwhich actors should be supported, and how support should be \r\nprovided by the UNFCCC (Oh 2020a). "


id: 11af5a8ae53cd85ef77a1c7f7b799968
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"The Paris Agreement emphasises that efforts to accelerate, encourage \r\nand enable innovation are 'critical for an effective long-term global \r\nresponse to climate change and promoting economic growth and \r\nsustainable development' and urges that they be supported, as \r\nappropriate, by the Technology Mechanism and Financial Mechanism \r\nof the UNFCCC (UNFCCC 2015, Art. 10.5). This support should be \r\ndirected to developing country Parties 'for collaborative approaches \r\nto research and development, and facilitating access to technology, \r\nin particular for early stages of the technology cycle' (UNFCCC \r\n2015, Art. 10.5). Inadequate support for research and development, \r\nparticularly in developing countries, has been identified in previous \r\nstudies of technology interventions by international institutions as \r\na  key technology innovation gap that might be addressed by the \r\nTechnology Mechanism (de Coninck and Puig 2015)."


id: 8ec872c9c2feab00187277e1b793bdc3
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"Technology development and transfer is the second of three 'means \r\nof implementation and support' specified under the Paris Agreement \r\nto accomplish its objectives relating to mitigation (and adaptation) \r\n(UNFCCC 2015a, Art. 14.1). This sub-section discusses the provision \r\nmade in the Paris Agreement for international cooperation on \r\ntechnology development and transfer. Section 14.4.2 below considers \r\nbroader cooperative efforts on technology development and transfer \r\nunder the UNFCCC.  Both sections complement the discussion in \r\nSection  16.6 on the role of international cooperation in fostering \r\ntransformative change."


id: fbea3c6639228794293f7ab85d01bb9c
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"To support Parties' cooperative action, the Technology Mechanism, \r\nestablished in 2010 under the UNFCCC (Section 14.4.2), will serve the \r\nParis Agreement, subject to guidance of a new 'technology framework' \r\n(UNFCCC 2015, Art. 10.4). The latter was strongly advocated by \r\nthe African group in the negotiations for the Paris Agreement (Oh \r\n2020a), and was adopted in 2018 as part of the Paris Rulebook, with \r\nimplementation entrusted to the component bodies of the Technology \r\nMechanism. The guiding principles of the framework are coherence, "


id: 700c4b2df108f659bab26667bc0f49dc
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"The importance of technology as a  means of implementation for \r\nclimate mitigation obligations under the Paris Agreement is evident \r\nfrom Parties' NDCs. Of the 168 NDCs submitted as of June 2019, \r\n109 were expressed as conditional upon support for technology "


id: 33f86c7fcd64400f9c86cebb762e2345
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"Together with finance, and technology development and transfer, \r\ncapacity building is the third of 'the means of implementation and \r\nsupport' specified under the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC 2015a, \r\nArt. 14.1). Capacity building has primarily been implemented through \r\npartnerships, collaboration and different cooperative activities, inside \r\nand outside the UNFCCC. This sub-section discusses the provision \r\nmade in the Paris Agreement for international cooperation on capacity \r\nbuilding. Section 14.4.3 below considers broader cooperative efforts \r\non capacity building within the UNFCCC. "


id: c459d3fd5a59cd64fc36b7b322eae80a
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"under the Paris Agreement. For example, Umemiya et al. (2020) \r\nsuggest the need for a  common monitoring system at the global \r\nlevel, and evaluation research at the project level, to achieve more \r\neffective capacity-building support. Khan et al. (2020) articulate \r\n'four key pillars' of a  sustainable capacity-building system for \r\nimplementation of NDCs in developing countries: universities \r\nin developing countries as institutional hubs; strengthened civil \r\nsociety networks and partnerships; long-term programmatic finance \r\nsupport; and consideration of a capacity-building mechanism under \r\nthe UNFCCC - paralleling the Technology Mechanism - to marshal, \r\ncoordinate and monitor capacity-building activities and resources."


id: c3d6d7ad6032cbbaed7a2cf3cd62ea93
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"The Paris Agreement establishes a  mechanism to facilitate \r\nimplementation and promote compliance under Article 15. "


id: 6a60fa91291c3c633428d71acbca7b66
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"The Paris Agreement's overall aim is to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change, in the context of sustainable \r\ndevelopment and efforts to eradicate poverty. This aim is explicitly linked to enhancing implementation of the UNFCCC, including its \r\nobjective in Article 2 of stabilising greenhouse gas concentrations at a level that would 'prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference \r\nwith the climate system'. The Agreement sets three goals:"


id: 57bd32f19cc13c532f115caeb1dd8412
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"In order to achieve the long-term temperature goal, Parties aim to reach global peaking of emissions as soon as possible, recognising \r\nthat peaking will take longer for developing countries, and then to undertake rapid reductions in accordance with the best available \r\nscience. This is designed to reach global net zero GHG emissions in the second half of the century, with the emissions reductions effort \r\nto be determined on the basis of equity and in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty. In addition, \r\nimplementation of the Agreement as a whole is expected to reflect equity and Parties' 'common but differentiated responsibilities and \r\nrespective capabilities', in light of different national circumstances."


id: e50a7d9bacb9ac98b1b208836c2aa57e
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"The core mitigation commitments of Parties under the Paris Agreement centre on preparing, communicating and maintaining \r\nsuccessive 'Nationally Determined Contributions' (NDCs), the contents of which countries determine for themselves. All Parties must \r\nhave NDCs and pursue domestic mitigation measures with the aim of achieving the objectives of their NDCs, but Parties' NDCs are \r\nneither subject to a review of adequacy (at an individual level) nor to legally binding obligations of result. The compliance mechanism \r\nis correspondingly facilitative."


id: 27127c3b9379951cf16b60e8c30d25eb
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"The Paris Agreement establishes a global goal on adaptation, and recognises the importance of averting, minimising and addressing \r\nloss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change. "


id: c79ba88f70ed20b208eafb16a1a37dd0
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"These international processes establish an iterative ambition cycle for the preparation, communication, implementation and review \r\nof NDCs."


id: e20732a457ca1d45522056d93122b06c
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"For developing countries, the Paris Agreement recognises that increasing mitigation ambition and realising long-term low-emissions \r\ndevelopment pathways can be bolstered by the provision of financial resources, capacity building, and technology development and \r\ntransfer. In continuation of existing obligations under the Convention, developed countries are obliged to provide financial assistance \r\nto developing countries with respect to mitigation and adaptation. The Paris Agreement also recognises that Parties may choose to \r\nvoluntarily cooperate in the implementation of their NDCs to allow for higher ambition in their mitigation and adaptation actions and \r\nto promote sustainable development and environmental integrity."


id: 4e3c54e279ce320ed78131e15e884e78
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"In terms of transformative potential, the Kyoto Protocol has been found \r\nto increase international patent applications for renewable energy \r\ntechnologies, especially in the case of solar energy technologies \r\nand especially in countries with more stringent emissions reduction \r\ntargets, and has even led to an increase in patent applications in \r\ndeveloping countries not obliged to reduce emissions under Kyoto \r\n(Miyamoto and Takeuchi 2019). Kyoto also had a  positive and \r\nstatistically significant impact on the cost-effectiveness of renewable \r\nenergy projects, as well as renewable energy capacity development, \r\nas it stimulated the introduction of domestic renewable energy \r\npolicies (Liu et al. 2019)."


id: ab3327788dab76597edd792fc9b83f71
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"The issue of institutional strength of Kyoto has been analysed by many \r\nauthors, and much of this has been assessed in previous assessment \r\nreports. Since AR5, several papers question the environmental efficacy \r\nof the Kyoto Protocol based on its institutional design (Rosen 2015; \r\nKuriyama and Abe 2018). Particular attention has focused on Kyoto's \r\nmarket mechanisms (Erickson et al. 2014; Kollmuss et al. 2015)."


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"As described in previous IPCC reports and above, the 1997 Kyoto \r\nProtocol included three international market-based mechanisms. \r\nThese operated among Annex I Parties (i.e., International Emissions \r\nTrading and Joint Implementation) and between Annex I Parties and \r\nnon-Annex I countries (i.e., the CDM) (Grubb et al. 2014; World Bank \r\n2018). Joint Implementation led to limited volumes of emissions \r\ncredit transactions, mostly from economies in transition but also \r\nsome Western European countries; International Emissions Trading \r\nalso led only to limited transaction volumes (Shishlov et al. 2016)."


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"Of the Kyoto Protocol's mechanisms, the CDM market has led to \r\na greater amount of activity, with a 'gold rush' period between 2005 \r\nand 2012. The main buyers of CDM credits were private companies \r\nsurrendering them within the European Union (EU) Emissions Trading \r\nSystem (ETS). Once the EU tightened its rules and restricted the use "


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"of CDM credits in 2011, there was a sharp drop in the price of CDM \r\ncredits in 2012. This price never recovered, as the demand for \r\nCDM was very weak after 2012, in part because of the difficulties \r\nencountered in securing the entry into force of the Doha Amendment \r\n(Michaelowa et al. 2019b). "


id: 3a8cadda0eb2472a26aee8a1a89f7deb
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"Given the comparatively recent conclusion of the Paris Agreement, \r\nevidence is still being gathered to assess its effectiveness in practice, \r\nin particular, since its long-term effectiveness hinges on states \r\ncommunicating more ambitious NDCs in successive cycles over \r\ntime. Assessments of the Paris Agreement on paper are necessarily \r\nspeculative and limited by the lack of credible counterfactuals. \r\nDespite these limitations, numerous assessments exist of the "


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"support. Victor et al. (2019) argue that international cooperation that \r\nenhances transformative potential needs to operate at the sectoral \r\nlevel, as the barriers to transformation are highly specific to each \r\nsector; the Paris Agreement's broad consensus around a clear level of \r\nambition sends a strong signal on what is needed in each sector, but \r\non its own will do little unless bolstered with sector-specific action \r\n(Geels et al. 2019). On the less optimistic side, it is noted that the \r\nextent of the 'investment signal' sent by the Agreement to business \r\nis unclear (Kemp 2018), and it is also unclear to what extent the Paris \r\nAgreement is fostering investment in break-through technologies. \r\nUnited States non-cooperation from 2017 to 2020 posed a significant \r\nthreat to adequate investment flows through the GCF (Chai et al. \r\n2017; Urpelainen and Van de Graaf 2018). "


id: 3d8989c653687140372993ec002d739a
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"agricultural sector in their NDCs, and many others include agriculture \r\nin their economy-wide targets (Richards et al. 2018). Some studies \r\nfind that agricultural development pathways with mitigation co\u0002benefits can deliver 21-40% of needed mitigation for the 'well below \r\n2degC' limit, thus necessitating 'transformative technical and policy \r\noptions' (Wollenberg et al. 2016). Other studies indicate that broader \r\n'natural climate solutions, including forests, can provide 37% of the \r\ncost-effective CO2 mitigation needed through 2030 for a more than \r\n66% chance of holding warming to below 2degC' (Griscom et al. 2017). "


id: 5ca2e690a6b77bfae9e459277a2828ac
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"to link mitigation policies, therefore improving aggregate cost\u0002effectiveness. Voluntary cooperation under Article 6  of the Paris \r\nAgreement could facilitate such linkage of mitigation policies (Chan \r\net al. 2018). A  combination of common accounting rules and the \r\nabsence of restrictive criteria and conditions on the use of ITMOs \r\ncould accelerate linkage and increase the latitude of Parties to scale \r\nup the ambition of their NDCs. However, significant question marks \r\nremain over how the environmental integrity of traded emissions \r\nreductions can be ensured (Mehling 2019). The ability of Article 6 to \r\ncontribute to the goal of the Paris Agreement will depend on the \r\nextent to which the rules ensure environmental integrity and avoid \r\ndouble counting, while utilising the full potential of cooperative \r\nefforts (Michaelowa et al. 2019a; Schneider et al. 2019). "


id: 1dd9c8edcd52ac64585897026d6275a5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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"In conclusion, it remains to be seen whether the Paris Agreement will \r\ndeliver the collective ambition necessary to meet the temperature \r\ngoal. While the Paris Agreement does not contain strong and stringent \r\nobligations of result for major emitters, backed by a  demanding \r\ncompliance system, it establishes binding procedural obligations, lays \r\nout a range of normative expectations, and creates mechanisms for \r\nregular review, stock taking, and revision of NDCs. In combination \r\nwith complementary approaches to climate governance, engagement \r\nof a wide range of non-state and sub-national actors, and domestic \r\nenforcement mechanisms, these have the potential to deliver the \r\nnecessary collective ambition and implementation. Whether it will do \r\nso, remains to be seen."


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"Authors: Mustafa Babiker (Sudan/Saudi Arabia), Paolo Bertoldi (Italy), Christopher Bataille (Canada), Felix Creutzig (Germany), \r\nNavroz  K.  Dubash (India), Michael Grubb (United Kingdom), Erik Haites (Canada), Ben Hinder (United Kingdom), Janna Hoppe \r\n(Switzerland), Yong-Gun Kim (Republic of Korea), Gregory F. Nemet (the United States of America/Canada), Anthony Patt (Switzerland), \r\nYamina Saheb (France), Raphael Slade (United Kingdom)"


id: a043e37987f0ea5417d2f80ab8b0c550
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"This report notes both a growing prevalence of mitigation policies over the past quarter century (Chapter 13), and 'signs of progress' \r\nincluding various quantified indices of GHG mitigation (Table 2.4). Even though policies implemented and planned to date are clearly \r\ninsufficient for meeting the Paris long-term temperature goals, a natural question is to what extent the observed macro-level changes \r\n(global, national, sectoral, technological) can be attributed to policy developments. This Assessment Report is the first to address that \r\nquestion. This box describes the methods for conducting such 'attribution analysis' as well as its key results, focusing on the extent to \r\nwhich polices have affected three main types of 'outcome indices': "


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"Policy attribution examines the extent to which emission-relevant outcomes on these indices - charted for countries, sectors and \r\ntechnologies, particularly in Chapter 2 and the sectoral chapters - may be reasonably attributed to policies implemented prior to the \r\nobserved changes. Such policies include regulatory instruments such as energy efficiency programmes or technical standards and \r\ncodes, carbon pricing, financial support for low-carbon energy technologies and efficiency, voluntary agreements, and regulation \r\nof land-use practices. The sectoral chapters give more detail along with some accounts of policy, while trends in mitigation policy \r\nadoption are summarised in Chapter 13."


id: 8826595e89374497a4fd1aedd27ba6b3
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"In reviewing hundreds of scientific studies cited in this report, the impacts of adopted policies on observed outcomes were assessed. \r\nThe vast majority of these studies examine particular instruments in particular contexts, as covered in the sectoral chapters and \r\nChapter 13; only a few have appraised global impacts of policies, directly or plausibly inferred (the most significant are cited in \r\nFigure 1 in this Cross-Chapter Box). Typically, studies consider 'mitigation policies' to be those adopted with either a primary objective \r\nof reducing GHG emissions or emissions reductions as one among multiple objectives. "


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"Policies differ in design, scope, and stringency, may change over time as they require amendments or new laws, and often partially \r\noverlap with other instruments. Overall, the literature indicates that policy mixes are, theoretically and empirically, more effective in \r\nreducing emissions, stimulating innovation, and inducing behavioural change than stand-alone policy instruments (Sections 5.6 and \r\n13.7) (Rosenow et al. 2017; Best and Burke 2018; Sethi et al. 2020). Nevertheless, these factors complicate analysis, because they give \r\nrise to the potential for double counting emissions reductions that have been observed, and which separate studies can attribute to \r\ndifferent policy instruments. "


id: dfc9e0a172912b88e60a5bbf5e0f1c26
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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content:
"Efforts to attribute observed outcomes to a policy or policy mix is also greatly complicated by the influence of many exogenous factors, \r\nincluding fossil fuel prices and socio-economic conditions. Likewise, technological progress can result from both exogenous causes, such \r\nas 'spillover' from other sectors, and policy pressure. Further, other policies, such as fossil fuel subsidies as well as trade-related policies, \r\ncan partially counteract the effect of mitigation policies by increasing the demand for energy or carbon-intensive goods and services. \r\nIn some cases, policies aimed at development, energy security, or air quality have climate co-benefits, while others increase emissions."


id: e90bf9d1bdb619e1a7e555d09e13610f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38358
content:
"Studies have applied a number of methods to identify the actual effects of mitigation policies in the presence of such confounding \r\nfactors. These include statistical attribution methodologies, including experimental and quasi-experimental design, instrumental \r\nvariable approaches, and simple correlational methods. Typically, the relevant mitigation metric is the outcome variable, while \r\nmeasures of policies and other factors act as explanatory variables. Other methodologies include aggregations and extrapolations"


id: 3cb8edd9bf0847438bd74810c0b7b736
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7867
content:
"from micro-level data evaluation, and inference from combining multiple lines of analysis, including expert opinion. Additionally, the \r\nliterature contains reviews, many of them systematic in nature, that assess and aggregate multiple empirical studies. "


id: 28611facd80092615bf7006b78fe9224
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4310
content:
"With these considerations in mind, multiple lines of evidence, based upon the literature, support a  set of high-level findings, as \r\nillustrated in Figure 1 in this Cross-Chapter Box, as follows. "


id: e842d4223d615e9473c4466a67d92d7f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38197
content:
"1. GHG Emissions. There is robust evidence with a high level of agreement that mitigation policies have had a discernible impact on \r\nemissions. Several lines of evidence indicate that mitigation policies have led to avoided global emissions to date of several billion \r\ntonnes CO2-eq annually. The figure in this box shows a selection of results giving rise to this estimate. "


id: d2676496a127c653f9a919d0f2f17f97
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34373
content:
"As a starting point, one methodologically sophisticated econometric study links global mitigation policies (defined as climate laws \r\nand executive orders) to emission outcomes; it estimates emission savings of 5.9 GtCO2 yr-1 in 2016 compared to a no-policy world \r\n(Eskander and Fankhauser 2020) (Section 13.6.2)."


id: de5873a67f5cebed19bb3fabab247261
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36378
content:
"A second line of evidence derives from analyses of the Kyoto Protocol. Countries which took on Kyoto Protocol targets accounted \r\nfor about 24% of global emissions during the first commitment period (2008-12). The most recent robust econometric assessment \r\n(Maamoun 2019) estimates that these countries cut GHG emissions by about 7% on average over 2005-2012, rising over the period to \r\naround 12% (1.3 GtCO2-eq yr-1) relative to a no-Kyoto scenario. This isconsistent with estimates of Grunewald and Martinez (2016) of \r\nabout 800 MtCO2-eq yr-1 averaged to 2009. Developing countries' emissions reduction projects through the CDM (defined in Article 12 \r\nof the Kyoto Protocol) were certified as growing to over 240 MtCO2-eq yr-1 by 2012 (UNFCC 2021c). With debates about the full "


id: 1ea01520ac23cedfcf7b870cf96c9ead
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2592
content:
"Cross-Chapter Box 10, Figure 1 | Policy impacts on key outcome indices. The figure shows the impacts of policies on three indices: proximate \r\nemission drivers, technologies and GHG emissions, including several lines of evidence on GHG abatement attributable to policies."


id: a6ca701d2e4bd1ff951bf42bf10dc262
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26559
content:
"extent of 'additionality', academic assessments of savings from the CDM have been slightly lower, with particular concerns around \r\nsome non-energy projects (Section 14.3.3.1)."


id: c94d2cfeab24bda78038a0f4b74a88f4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32743
content:
"A third line of evidence derives from studies that identify policy-related, absolute reductions from historical levels in particular \r\ncountries and sectors through decomposition analyses (Le Quere et al. 2019; Lamb et al. 2021), or evaluate the impact of particular \r\npolicies, such as carbon pricing systems. From a wide range of estimates in the literature (Sections 2.8.2.2 and 13.6), many evaluations \r\nof the EU ETS suggest that it has reduced emissions by around 3% to 9% relative to unregulated firms and/or sectors (Schafer 2019; \r\nColmer et al. 2020), while other factors, both policy (energy efficiency and renewable support) and exogenous trends, played a larger \r\nrole in the overall reductions seen (Haites 2018). "


id: 67f0a4b532cd41c8cbb9198e5aa80a49
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15555
content:
"Victor 2016). The next two sections address this complementarity \r\nbetween the Paris Agreement and other agreements and institutions."


id: adf904b6a631aba61143939720d119c8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27850
content:
"As discussed above, the Paris Agreement sets in place a  new \r\nframework for international climate policy albeit one that is \r\nembedded in the wider climate regime complex (Coen et al. 2020). \r\nWhereas international governance had earlier assumed centre stage, \r\nthe Paris Agreement recognises the salience of domestic politics \r\nin the governance of climate change (Kinley et al. 2020). The new \r\narchitecture also provides more flexibility for recognising the \r\nbenefits of working in diverse forms and groups and allows for more \r\ndecentralised 'polycentric' forms of governance (Jordan et al. 2015; "


id: 3c0378486360db602cc1544ae5f238a9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7751
content:
"The Paris Agreement identifies a  number of pathways, or means \r\nof implementation, towards accomplishing rapid mitigation and \r\nthe achieving of its temperature goal: finance; capacity building; \r\ntechnology and innovation; and cooperative approaches and markets \r\n(Sections 14.3.2.7-14.3.2.10 above). In this section, we examine \r\neach of these means and mechanisms of implementation, and the \r\nagreements and institutions lying outside of the Paris Agreement \r\nthat contribute to each. In the following section, 14.5, we examine \r\nthe agreements and institutions playing other governance roles: "


id: c3e1c49823760047945fec55c363952d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31742
content:
"Figure 14.3 | Climate governance beyond the UNFCCC. The figure shows those relationships, marked in blue, between international governance activities, described in \r\nthe text, that relate to activities of the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement."


id: c8fa775634c7c320c9730578e38779e4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32679
content:
"regulating activities in particular sectors; linking climate mitigation \r\nwith other activities such as adaptation; and stimulating and \r\ncoordinating the actions of non-state actors at a global scale. "


id: 9231a44639d9f12829861a57105ba0f7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22939
content:
"International cooperation on climate finance is underpinned by \r\nvarious articles of the UNFCCC including Articles 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.7 \r\nand 11.5 (UNFCCC 1992). This was further amplified through the \r\ncommitment by developed countries in the Copenhagen Accord \r\nand the Cancun Agreements to mobilise jointly through various \r\nsources USD100 billion yr-1 by 2020 to meet the needs of the \r\ndeveloping countries (UNFCCC 2010b). This commitment was made \r\nin the context of meaningful mitigation action and transparency "


id: 8eae9f0be0a0a517098a36db2d0036b2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22289
content:
"Figure  14.3 maps out the interlinkages described in the text of \r\nSections 14.4 and 14.5. It is an incomplete list, but illustrates \r\nclearly that across multiple types of governance, there are multiple \r\ninstruments or organisations with activities connected to the \r\ndifferent governance roles associated with the Paris Agreement and \r\nthe UNFCCC more generally."


id: 100836ce79de20fca90e89d4a6540e2e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5
content:
"The Paris Agreement and the imperative for sustainable development \r\nreinforce the need to forge strong linkages between climate and \r\ndevelopment (Fay et al. 2015). This in turn has highlighted the urgent \r\nneed for greater attention to the relationship between development \r\nassistance and finance, and climate change (Steele 2015). "


id: de0d94e24f1e4f31aa01bce11023caf8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36330
content:
"In 2015, 20 representative MDBs and members of the International \r\nDevelopment Finance Club unveiled five voluntary principles to \r\nmainstream climate action in their investments: commitment \r\nto  climate strategies, managing climate risks, promoting climate \r\nsmart objectives, improving climate performance and accounting \r\nfor their own actions (World Bank 2015a; Institute for Climate \r\nEconomics 2017). The members subscribing to these principles had \r\ngrown to 44 as of January 2020. Arguably, it is only through closer \r\nlinkages between climate and development that significant inroads \r\ncan be made in addressing climate change. MDBs can play a major \r\nrole through the totality of their portfolios (Larsen et al. 2018). "


id: 56d98aa3be65d3bb52c1248ded870e3a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12527
content:
"The UNFCCC website cites some 20 bilateral development agencies \r\nproviding support to climate change programmes in developing \r\ncountries (UNFCCC 2020a). These agencies provide a  mix of \r\ndevelopment cooperation, policy advice and support and financing \r\nfor climate change projects. Since the year 2000, the OECD \r\nDevelopment Assistance Committee has been tracking trends in \r\nclimate-related development finance and assistance. The amount of \r\nbilateral development finance with climate relevance has increased \r\nsubstantially since 2000 (OECD 2019a). For 2019, it was reported \r\nto be USD28.8 billion in direct finance and USD2.6 billion through "


id: 27c883d3ace4e441c127960b62934a47
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4189
content:
"The UN system is also supporting climate action through much\u0002needed technical assistance and capacity building, which is \r\ncomplementary to the financial flows insofar as it enables countries \r\nwith relevant tools and methodologies to assess their needs, \r\ndevelop national climate finance roadmaps, establish relevant \r\ninstitutional mechanisms to receive support and track it, enhance \r\nreadiness to access financing, and include climate action across \r\nrelevant national financial planning and budgeting processes (UN \r\n2017a). The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is the \r\nlargest implementer of climate action among the UN Agencies, with \r\nothers, such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), United \r\nNations Environment Programme (UNEP), United Nations Industrial \r\nDevelopment Organisation (UNIDO), and United Nations Office for \r\nSouth-South Cooperation (UNOSSC), providing relevant support."


id: d680ae1223e4f23fa76d8674c86fda2e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35045
content:
"The current architecture of climate finance is one that is primarily \r\nbased on north-south, developed-developing country dichotomies. \r\nThe Paris Agreement, however, has clearly recognised the role of \r\nclimate finance flows across developing countries, thereby enhancing \r\nthe scope of international cooperation (Voigt and Ferreira 2016b). \r\nEstimates of such flows, though, are not readily available. According \r\nto one estimate in 2020 the flows among non-OECD countries were \r\nof the order of USD29 billion (CPI 2021)."


id: 6f275659c4d4294126ce774f6322cbc2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16824
content:
"Foreign direct investments and their greening are seen as a channel \r\nfor increasing cooperation. An assessment of the greenfield foreign \r\ndirect investment in different sectors shows the growing share of \r\nrenewable energy at USD92.2 billion (12% of the volume and 38% \r\nof the number of projects) (FDI Intelligence 2020). Coal, oil and gas \r\nsectors maintain the top spot for capital investments globally. Over \r\nthe last decade there is growing issuance of green bonds with non\u0002financial private sector issuance gaining ground (Almeida 2020). \r\nWhile it is questionable if green bonds have a significant impact on \r\nshifting capital from non-sustainable to sustainable investments, \r\nthey do incentivise the issuing organisations to enhance their green \r\nambition and have led to an appreciation within capital markets of "


id: cee5d19eab4d5e1daba63bcbd3490fd8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33742
content:
"Figure 14.4 | International finance flows. Total international climate financial flows for 2020 were USD161 billion. By comparison, public sector bilateral and multilateral \r\nfinance in 2017 for fossil fuel development, including gas pipelines, was roughly USD4 billion. Part (a) disaggregates total financial flows according to public and private sources, \r\nand indicates the breakdown between mitigation on the one hand, and adaptation and multiple objectives on the other, within each source. Part (b) disaggregates total financial \r\nflows according to intended purpose, namely mitigation or adaptation and multiple objectives, and disaggregates each type according to source. Part (c) provides additional \r\ndetail on the relative contributions of different public and private sources. Sources: data from CPI 2021; OECD 2021."


id: 4b3c6e33dea7f4d1404a8ecd08f3e1de
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10485
content:
"green frameworks and guidelines and signalled new expectations \r\n(Maltais and Nykvist 2020). In parallel, institutional investors \r\nincluding pension funds are seeking investments that align with the \r\nParis Agreement (IIGCC 2020). However, the readiness of institutional \r\ninvestors to make this transition is arguable (OECD 2019b; Ameli et al. \r\n2020). This evidence suggests that international private financing \r\ncould play an important role but this potential is yet to be realised \r\n(Chapter 15)."


id: a1de2a197472f62bc056d334fbb8be1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25705
content:
"Science, technology and innovation are essential for the design of \r\neffective measures to address climate change and, more generally, for \r\neconomic and social development (de Coninck and Sagar 2015a). The \r\nOECD finds that single countries alone often cannot provide effective \r\nsolutions to today's global challenges, as these cross national borders \r\nand affect different actors (OECD 2012). Madani (2020) shows how \r\nconflict, including international sanctions, can reduce science and \r\ninnovation capacity, which is not evenly distributed, particularly \r\nacross the developed and the developing world. For this reason, \r\nmany countries have introduced strategies and policies to enhance \r\ninternational cooperation in science and technology (Chen et al. \r\n2019). Partnerships and international cooperation can play a role in \r\nestablishing domestic innovation systems, which enable more effective \r\nscience and technology innovation (de Coninck and Sagar 2015b,a). "


id: de2a478e23fc30584992f8bd43e82bbe
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36349
content:
"Non-state actors are also increasingly collaborating internationally. \r\nSuch collaborations, referred to as international cooperative \r\ninitiatives (ICIs), bring together multi-stakeholder groups across \r\nindustry, communities, and regions, and operate both within "


id: c61790214deef058d1ac2a98cafa0e19
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32163
content:
"technology transfer framework put forward at the Bali COP in 2007 \r\nand creation of the Poznan strategic programme on technology \r\ntransfer under the GEF; and (iii) the establishment of the Technology \r\nMechanism by the COP in 2010 as part of the Cancun Agreements \r\n(UNFCCC 2010b). The Technology Mechanism is presently the \r\nprincipal avenue within the UNFCCC for facilitating cooperation on \r\nthe development and transfer of climate technologies to developing \r\ncountries (UNFCCC 2015b). As discussed in Section 14.3.2.9 above, \r\nthe Paris Agreement tasks the Technology Mechanism also to serve \r\nthe Paris Agreement (UNFCCC 2015b, Art. 10.3). "


id: 4ecaddeae7c23d4b3a7af6d29e4accb3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11141
content:
"and outside the UNFCCC process. Lui et al. (2021) find that such \r\ninitiatives could make a  major contribution to global emissions \r\nreduction, Bakhtiari (2018) finds that the impact on greenhouse gas \r\nreduction of these initiatives is hindered due to a lack of coordination \r\nbetween ICIs, overlap with other activities conducted by the UNFCCC \r\nand governments, and a  lack of monitoring systems to measure \r\nimpact. Increasing the exchange of information between ICIs, \r\nenhancing monitoring systems, and increasing collaborative research \r\nin science and technology would help address these issues (Boekholt \r\net al. 2009; Bakhtiari 2018)."


id: 873935a5571c04c148c6ebf8054dd36c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20953
content:
"At the level of research institutes, there has been a major shift to \r\na more structured and global type of cooperation in research; Wagner \r\net al. (2017) found significant increases in both the proportion of \r\npapers written by author teams from multiple countries and in \r\nthe number of countries participating in such collaboration, over the \r\ntime period 1990-2013. Although only a portion of these scientific \r\npapers address the issue of climate change specifically, this growth \r\nof scientific collaboration across borders provides a comprehensive \r\nview of the conducive environment in which climate science \r\ncollaboration has grown. "


id: cf0b62b56eaca7b0b8d6c9e6c033dad8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33771
content:
"However, there are areas in which international cooperation can \r\nbe strengthened. Both the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda \r\nfor Sustainable Development call for more creative forms of \r\ninternational cooperation in science that help bridge the science \r\nand policy interface, and provide learning processes and places to \r\ndeliberate on possible policy pathways across disciplines on a more \r\nsustainable and long-lasting basis. Scientific assessments, such as the \r\nIPCC and Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity \r\nand Ecosystem Services (IPBES) offer this possibility, but processes \r\nneed to be enriched for this to happen more effectively (Kowarsch \r\net al. 2016). "


id: 6a5dd70968adb2d17b4b27986f48cf02
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15993
content:
"The Joint Annual Report of the TEC and CTCN for 2019 indicated that, \r\nas of July 2019, the CTCN had engaged with 93 developing country \r\nParties regarding a  total of 273 requests for technical assistance, \r\nincluding 11 multi-country requests. Nearly three-quarters (72.9%) of \r\nrequests received by the CTCN had a mitigation component, with two\u0002thirds of those mitigation requests related to either renewable energy \r\nor energy efficiency. Requests for decision-making or information tools \r\nare received most frequently (28% of requests), followed by requests \r\nfor technology feasibility studies (20%) and technology identification \r\nand prioritisation (18%) (TEC and CTCN 2019). "


id: 2a948dbcfad6fcb86c508796334537c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4721
content:
"The CTCN is presently funded from 'various sources, ranging from the \r\n[UNFCCC] Financial Mechanism to philanthropic and private sector \r\nsources, as well as by financial and in-kind contributions from the \r\nco-hosts of the CTCN and from participants in the Network' (TEC and \r\nCTCN 2019, para. 97). Oh (2020b) describes the institution as 'mainly \r\nfinancially dependent on bilateral donations from developed countries \r\nand multilateral support'. Nevertheless, inadequate funding of the \r\nCTCN poses a problem for its effectiveness and capacity to contribute \r\nto implementation of the Paris Agreement. A  2017 independent \r\nreview of the CTCN identified 'limited availability of funding' as a key \r\nconstraint on its ability to deliver services at the expected level and \r\nrecommended that '[b]etter predictability and security over financial "


id: f5f7c078b985017c84720e9c569de715
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40630
content:
"resources will ensure that the CTCN can continue to successfully \r\nrespond to its COP mandate and the needs and expectations of \r\ndeveloping countries' (Ernst & Young 2017, para. 84). The 2019 Joint \r\nReport of the TEC and CTCN indicates that resource mobilisation for \r\nthe Network remains a challenge (TEC and CTCN 2019, pp. 23-24)."


id: 7ff5a49b1df9a91df31d5e7681eb5b02
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19649
content:
"Beyond the UNFCCC, other climate cooperation and partnership \r\nactivities on capacity building include climate-related bilateral \r\ncooperation and those organised by the OECD, IFDD (Francophonie \r\nInstitute for Sustainable Development), UNDP National \r\nCommunications Support Programme, UNEP and the World Bank. "


id: 799e6f82b55655afbc4fe9787e5982cd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18601
content:
"Climate-related bilateral cooperation provides important human \r\nand institutional capacity building support for climate change \r\nactions and activities in developing countries, particularly through \r\ndeveloped countries' bilateral cooperation structures, such as the \r\nFrench Development Agency (AFD), the German Development Agency \r\n(The Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Internationale Zusammenarbeit - GIZ), \r\nthe Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and others."


id: ccb56889f274eadcd5a43e5956e5add3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33342
content:
"There are also a  number of regional cooperative structures with \r\ncapacity-building components, including ClimaSouth, Euroclima+, \r\nthe UN-REDD Programme, the Caribbean Regional Strategic \r\nProgramme for Resilience, the Caribbean Climate Online Risk and \r\nAdaptation Tool, a project on accelerating low carbon and resilient \r\nsociety realisation in the Southeast Asian region, the World Health \r\nOrganisation's Global Salm-Surv network, the Red Iberoamericana \r\nde Oficinas de Cambio Climatico network and the Africa Adaptation \r\nInitiative. Many climate-related capacity-building initiatives, \r\nincluding those coordinated or funded by international or regional \r\ninstitutions, are implemented at the national and sub-national levels, \r\noften with the involvement of universities, consultancy groups and \r\ncivil society actors. "


id: ba39bcbb38576a0ef5307bf4c2084064
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29984
content:
"International climate cooperation has long focused on supporting \r\ndeveloping countries in building capacity to implement climate \r\nmitigation actions. While there is no universally agreed definition of \r\ncapacity building and the UNFCCC does not define the term (Khan \r\net al. 2020), elements of capacity building can be discerned from \r\nthe Convention's provisions on education and training programmes \r\n(UNFCCC 1992, Art. 6), as well as the reference in Article 9(2)(d) to \r\nthe SBSTA providing support for 'endogenous capacity-building in \r\ndeveloping countries'. "


id: a22133c194bc93a6f68f3aabc965658d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25759
content:
"It is also noted that comprehensive support is provided by the GCF \r\nto developing countries (GCF, 2020). This support is made available \r\nand accessible for all developing countries through three different \r\nGCF tools: the Readiness Programme, the Project Preparation \r\nFacility, and the funding of transformative projects and programmes. \r\nThe goal of the Readiness Programme is to strengthen institutional \r\ncapacities, governance mechanisms, and planning and programming \r\ncompetencies in support of developing countries' transformational \r\nlong-term climate policies (GCF, 2020). Despite a  decades-long \r\nprocess of capacity-building efforts under many development and \r\nenvironmental regimes, including the UNFCCC, progress has been \r\nuneven and largely unsuccessful in establishing institution-based "


id: ef8646bde6af87e04db1aea8e6ae6e7f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39516
content:
"Quantifying the contribution of capacity-building efforts to climate \r\nmitigation is acknowledged to be 'difficult, if not impossible' (Hsu \r\net al. 2019a). Nonetheless, such activities 'may play a valuable role in \r\nbuilding a foundation for future reductions' by providing 'necessary \r\ncatalytic linkages between actors' (Hsu et al. 2019a)."


id: fc35954bf1964f6f7b06de1193430a99
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41739
content:
"In theory, trading carbon assets can reduce the costs of global climate \r\nmitigation, by helping facilitate abatement of greenhouse gases \r\nat least-cost locations. This could help countries ratchet up their \r\nambitions more than in a situation without such mechanisms (Mehling \r\net al. 2018), particularly if mechanisms are scaled up from projects and \r\nprogrammes (Michaelowa et al. 2019b). Progress as to developing \r\nsuch mechanisms has however so far been moderate and uneven. "


id: 5a4e397cd828546256c531fb4d1374ca
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13137
content:
"Of the three international market-based mechanisms under the 1997 \r\nKyoto Protocol discussed in Section 14.3.2.7, and in previous IPCC \r\nreports, only the CDM or a similar mechanism may have a role to \r\nplay under the Paris Agreement, although the precise terms are yet \r\nto be decided. "


id: 1d8d0341a5ffc028860a59525a2ca716
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2381
content:
"Article 6, also discussed in Section 14.3.2.7, is the main framework \r\nto foster enhanced cooperation within the Paris Agreement. \r\nAlthough there is an emerging global landscape of activities based \r\non Article 6 (Greiner et al. 2020), such as the bilateral treaty signed \r\nunder the framework of Article 6 in October 2020 by Switzerland \r\nand Peru, the possibilities of bilateral cooperation are yet to be fully \r\nexploited. As discussed above, adequate accounting rules are key to \r\nthe success of Article 6. Sectoral agreements are also a promising \r\ncooperative mechanism, as discussed in Section  14.5.2. In fact, \r\nboth bilateral and sectoral agreements have the potential to \r\nenhance the ambition of the Parties involved and can eventually \r\nserve as building blocks towards more comprehensive agreements \r\n(Section 14.2.2). "


id: b18840536181721300f4603bc7ab0b66
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28460
content:
"A relevant and promising new development is the international \r\nlinkage of existing regional or national emissions trading systems \r\n(ETS). Several ETS are now operational in different jurisdictions, "


id: a1e68e2e494c90e7ebbce637b8c4dbf0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25713
content:
"Authors: Govindasamy Bala (India), Heleen de Coninck (the Netherlands), Oliver Geden (Germany), Veronika Ginzburg (the Russian \r\nFederation), Katharine J. Mach (the United States of America), Anthony Patt (Switzerland), Sonia I. Seneviratne (Switzerland), Masahiro \r\nSugiyama (Japan), Christopher H. Trisos (South Africa), Maarten van Aalst (the Netherlands)"


id: bd511f108fd7003c13dd7af880455f62
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30554
content:
"Proposed Solar Radiation Modification schemes \r\nThis cross-working group box assesses Solar Radiation Modification (SRM) proposals, their potential contribution to reducing or \r\nincreasing climate risk, as well as other risks they may pose (categorised as risks from responses to climate change in the IPCC AR6 \r\nrisk definition in 1.2.1.1), and related perception, ethics and governance questions."


id: 167fabc1dd978dd1fd652c6883ab8ddd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1173
content:
"SRM refers to proposals to increase the reflection of shortwave radiation (sunlight) back to space to counteract anthropogenic warming \r\nand some of its harmful impacts (de Coninck et al. 2018) (AR6 WGI Chapters 4 and 5). A number of SRM options have been proposed, \r\nincluding: stratospheric aerosol interventions (SAI), marine cloud brightening (MCB), ground-based albedo modifications (GBAM), and \r\nocean albedo change (OAC). Although not strictly a form of SRM, cirrus cloud thinning (CCT) has been proposed to cool the planet \r\nby increasing the escape of longwave thermal radiation to space and is included here for consistency with previous assessments \r\n(de Coninck et al. 2018). SAI is the most-researched proposal. Modelling studies show SRM could reduce surface temperatures and \r\npotentially ameliorate some climate change risks (with more confidence for SAI than other options), but SRM could also introduce \r\na range of new risks."


id: ce46bed28c595c31795660c800f2ed87
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33623
content:
"The choice of SRM deployment scenarios and reference scenarios is crucial in assessment of SRM risks and its effectiveness in \r\nattenuating climate change risks (Keith and MacMartin 2015; Honegger et al. 2021a). Most climate model simulations have used \r\nscenarios with highly stylised large SRM forcing to fully counteract large amounts of warming in order to enhance the signal-to-noise \r\nratio of climate responses to SRM (Kravitz et al. 2015; Sugiyama et al. 2018a; Krishnamohan et al. 2019)."


id: 4c69f1411fb22557ea1ec0ff2381291e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10704
content:
"The effects of SRM fundamentally depend on a variety of choices about deployment (Sugiyama et al. 2018b), including: its position \r\nin the portfolio of human responses to climate change (e.g., the magnitude of SRM used against the background radiative forcing), \r\ngovernance of research and potential deployment strategies, and technical details (latitude, materials, and season, among others, \r\nsee AR6 WGI Chapter 4.6.3.3). The plausibility of many SRM scenarios is highly contested and not all scenarios are equally plausible \r\nbecause of socio-political considerations (Talberg et al. 2018), as with, for example, CDR (Fuss et al. 2014, 2018). Development \r\nof scenarios and their selection in assessments should reflect a diverse set of societal values with public and stakeholder inputs \r\n(Sugiyama et al. 2018a; Low and Honegger 2020), as depending on the focus of a limited climate model simulation, SRM could look \r\ngrossly risky or highly beneficial (Pereira et al. 2021)."


id: e686d20d83cf0f9f666e97ee3a9e2a3b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37855
content:
"(Tilmes et al. 2020). If emissions reductions and CDR are deemed insufficient, SRM may be seen by some as the only option left to \r\nensure the achievement of the Paris Agreement's temperature goal by 2100."


id: 31b6a9a523e968637b7d914af9bb39f2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5990
content:
"SRM risks to human and natural systems and potential for risk reduction\r\nSince AR5, hundreds of climate modelling studies have simulated effects of SRM on climate hazards (Kravitz et al. 2015; Tilmes et al. \r\n2018). Modelling studies have shown SRM has the potential to offset some effects of increasing GHGs on the global and regional \r\nclimate, including the increase in frequency and intensity of extremes of temperature and precipitation, melting of Arctic sea ice and \r\nmountain glaciers, weakening of Atlantic meridional overturning circulation, changes in frequency and intensity of tropical cyclones, \r\nand decrease in soil moisture (AR6 WGI, Chapter  4). However, while SRM may be effective in alleviating anthropogenic climate "


id: bbb8f1e71e02c8795175c454fed80e69
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30255
content:
"Cross-Working Group Box 4, Table 1 | SRM options and their potential climate and non-climate impacts. Description, potential climate impacts, \r\npotential impacts on human and natural systems, and termination effects of a number of SRM options: stratospheric aerosol interventions \r\n(SAI), marine cloud brightening (MCB), ocean albedo change (OAC), ground-based albedo modifications (GBAM), and cirrus cloud thinning (CCT)."


id: c22024894b0dcf008a3138ebfcb11cc8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31451
content:
"SAI implemented to partially offset warming (e.g., offsetting half of global warming) may have potential to ameliorate hazards in \r\nmultiple regions and reduce negative residual change, such as drying compared to present-day climate, that are associated with fully \r\noffsetting global mean warming (Irvine and Keith 2020), but may also increase flood and drought risk in Europe compared to unmitigated \r\nwarming (Jones et al. 2021). Recent modelling studies suggest it is conceptually possible to meet multiple climate objectives through \r\noptimally designed SRM strategies (WGI, Chapter 4). Nevertheless, large uncertainties still exist for climate processes associated with \r\nSRM options (e.g., aerosol-cloud-radiation interaction) (AR6 WGI, Chapter 4) (Kravitz and MacMartin 2020)."


id: cf21d24e16d682b213fd9dd4fa5ce450
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33787
content:
"Compared with climate hazards, many fewer studies have examined SRM risks - the potential adverse consequences to people and \r\necosystems from the combination of climate hazards, exposure and vulnerability - or the potential for SRM to reduce risk (Curry et al. \r\n2014; Irvine et al. 2017). Risk analyses have often used inputs from climate models forced with stylised representations of SRM, such \r\nas dimming the sun. Fewer have used inputs from climate models that explicitly simulated injection of gases or aerosols into the \r\natmosphere, which include more complex cloud-radiative feedbacks. Most studies have used scenarios where SAI is deployed to hold \r\naverage global temperature constant despite high emissions."


id: 131832e7d5e6f00adcc1f1cb514b0482
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 571
content:
"scenarios have included SAI (Arino et al. 2016; Emmerling and Tavoni 2018; Heutel et al. 2018; Helwegen et al. 2019; Rickels et al. \r\n2020) showing the indirect costs and benefits to welfare dominate, since the direct economic cost of SAI itself is expected to be \r\nrelatively low (Moriyama et al. 2017; Smith and Wagner 2018). There is a general lack of research on the wide scope of potential risk \r\nor risk reduction to human health, well-being and sustainable development from SRM and on their distribution across countries and \r\nvulnerable groups (Honegger et al. 2021a; Carlson et al. 2022)."


id: f6246718fa132f1fefb45389811105cc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40664
content:
"SRM may also introduce novel risks for international collaboration and peace. Conflicting temperature preferences between countries \r\nmay lead to counter-geoengineering measures such as deliberate release of warming agents or destruction of deployment equipment \r\n(Parker et al. 2018). Game-theoretic models and laboratory experiments indicate a powerful actor or group with a higher preference \r\nfor SRM may use SAI to cool the planet beyond what is socially optimal, imposing welfare losses on others although this cooling does \r\nnot necessarily imply excluded countries would be worse off relative to a world of unmitigated warming (Ricke et al. 2013; Weitzman \r\n2015; Abatayo et al. 2020). In this context, counter-geoengineering may promote international cooperation or lead to large welfare \r\nlosses (Helwegen et al. 2019; Abatayo et al. 2020)."


id: 969010acb7ff9856f5d9f1087a4d7f6a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23692
content:
"Cooling caused by SRM would increase the global land and ocean CO2 sinks (medium confidence), but this would not stop CO2 from \r\nincreasing in the atmosphere or affect the resulting ocean acidification under continued anthropogenic emissions (high confidence) \r\n(AR6 WGI, Chapter 5). "


id: 4b249e338f40982130f5a43cd5a35d44
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10464
content:
"Few studies have assessed potential SRM impacts on ecosystems. SAI and MCB may reduce risk of coral reef bleaching compared \r\nto global warming with no SAI (Latham et al. 2013; Kwiatkowski et al. 2015), but risks to marine life from ocean acidification would \r\nremain, because SRM proposals do not reduce elevated anthropogenic atmospheric CO2 concentrations. MCB could cause changes in \r\nmarine net primary productivity by reducing light availability in deployment regions, with important fishing regions off the west coast \r\nof South America showing both large increases and decreases in productivity (Partanen et al. 2016; Keller 2018)."


id: 437075d956e4da0a420a5f55e75a791e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9088
content:
"Great Barrier Reef (McDonald et al. 2019). Co-evolution of governance and SRM research provides a chance for responsibly developing \r\nSRM technologies with broader public participation and political legitimacy, guarding against potential risks and harms relevant \r\nacross a full range of scenarios, and ensuring that SRM is considered only as a part of a broader portfolio of responses to climate \r\nchange (Stilgoe 2015; Nicholson et al. 2018). For SAI, large-scale outdoor experiments even with low radiative forcing could be \r\ntransboundary and those with deployment-scale radiative forcing may not be distinguished from deployment, such that MacMartin \r\nand Kravitz (2019) argue for continued reliance on modelling until a decision on whether and how to deploy is made, with modelling \r\nhelping governance development. "


id: af6d0ce2232df2b03d4b644f4ff055d5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28093
content:
"to only those of a  research character, and in 2012 the CBD made \r\na  non-legally-binding decision to do the same, further requiring \r\nsuch research activities to be limited scale, and carried out under \r\ncontrolled conditions, until more knowledge is gained to be able to \r\nassess the risks (GESAMP 2019; Burns and Corbett 2020). In doing \r\nso they have taken a  precautionary approach (Sands and  Peel, \r\n2018). The London Convention and Protocol has also developed \r\nan Assessment Framework for Scientific Research Involving Ocean \r\nFertilisation (London Convention/Protocol 2010) and in 2013 adopted \r\namendments (which are not yet in force) to regulate marine carbon \r\ndioxide removal activities, including ocean fertilisation. "


id: 9494d2be92a19d92157a0100fd6f517
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23346
content:
"Currently, there is no targeted international law relating to SRM, \r\nalthough some multilateral agreements -  such as the Convention \r\non Biological Diversity, the UN Convention on the Law of the \r\nSea, the Environmental Modification Convention, and the Vienna \r\nConvention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer and its Montreal \r\nProtocol  -  contain provisions applicable to SRM (Bodansky 2013; \r\nJinnah and Nicholson 2019; Reynolds 2019a)."


id: 691a4d4dcd609661d3b6745be76a411a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15760
content:
"CDR methods other than afforestation/reforestation and soil carbon \r\nsequestration have only played a minor role in UNFCCC negotiations \r\nso far (Fridahl 2017; Rumpel et al. 2020). To accelerate, and indeed \r\nbetter manage CDR globally, stringent rules and practices regarding \r\nemissions accounting, measuring, reporting and verifying and \r\nproject-based market mechanisms have been proposed (Honegger \r\nand Reiner 2018; Mace et al. 2018). Given their historic responsibility, \r\nit can be expected that developed countries would carry the main \r\nburden of researching, developing, demonstrating and deploying \r\nCDR, or finance such projects in other countries (Fyson et al. 2020; \r\nPozo et al. 2020). McLaren et al. (2019) suggest that there is \r\na  rationale for separating the international commitments for net \r\nnegative emissions from those for emissions reductions."


id: 5bcee4ab7aa6c967ec7ed49b183448fe
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13411
content:
"Specific regulations on CDR options have been limited to those \r\nposing transboundary risks, namely the use of ocean fertilisation. \r\nIn a series of separate decisions from 2008 to 2013, Parties to the \r\nLondon Convention and Protocol limited ocean fertilisation activities "


id: 6281d4dfbdb4a115f99226b2fcad52f4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14618
content:
"developed country Parties to phase down HFCs by 85% from 2011 \r\nto 2013 levels by 2036. Developing country Parties are permitted \r\nlonger phase-down periods (out to 2045 and 2047), but must freeze \r\nproduction and consumption between 2024 and 2028 (Ripley and \r\nVerkuijl 2016; UN 2016). A ban on trade in HFCs with non-Parties \r\nwill come into effect from 1  January 2033. For HFC-23, which is \r\na  by-product of HCFC production rather than an ODS, Parties are \r\nrequired to report production and consumption data, and to destroy \r\nall emissions of HFC-23 occurring as part of HCFCs or HFCs to the \r\nextent practicable from 2020 onwards using approved technologies \r\n(Ripley and Verkuijl 2016). "


id: c41f4ece1d1799da67b22b0f82321f2e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31790
content:
"sub-global and regional); Section 14.5.2 discusses cooperation with \r\ninternational sectoral agreements and institutions such as in the \r\nforestry, energy and transportation sectors; and Sections 14.5.3-\r\n14.5.5 discuss transnational cooperation across civil society and \r\nsocial movements, business partnerships and investor coalitions, and \r\nbetween sub-national entities and cities, respectively. "


id: bdeefb36386acbf428648d2d5ba2207a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30679
content:
"A key idea underpinning this analysis is that decomposition of \r\nthe larger challenge of climate mitigation into 'smaller units' may \r\nfacilitate more effective cooperation (Sabel and Victor 2017) and \r\ncomplement cooperation in the UN climate regime (Stewart et al. \r\n2017). However, it is recognised that significant uncertainty remains \r\nover the feasibility and costs of these efforts (Sabel and Victor 2017), \r\nas well as whether they ultimately strengthen progress on climate \r\nmitigation in the multilateral climate arena (Falkner 2016a)."


id: e23187cafc69c8acfe1d71e83870bf70
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37075
content:
"International cooperation on climate change mitigation takes place \r\nat multiple governance levels, including under a range of multilateral \r\nenvironmental agreements (MEAs) beyond those of the international \r\nclimate regime. "


id: 3e1dbee6cbb5f5233031f942c4f25363
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8099
content:
"The 2016 Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol applies to the \r\nproduction and consumption of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs). HFCs, \r\nwhich are widely used as refrigerants (Abas et al. 2018), have a high \r\nGWP100 of 14,600 for HFC-23, and are not ODS (Section 9.9.7.1). \r\nThe Kigali Amendment addresses the risk that the phase-out of \r\nHCFCs under the Montreal Protocol and their replacement with \r\nHFCs could exacerbate global warming (Akanle 2010; Hurwitz \r\net al. 2016), especially with the predicted growth in HFC usage for \r\napplications like air conditioners (Velders et al. 2015). In this way it \r\ncreates a cooperative rather than a conflictual relationship between \r\naddressing ozone depletion and the climate protection goals of the \r\nUNFCCC regime (Hoch et al. 2019). The Kigali Amendment requires "


id: 7b9273f39c5e913b94a2568bf9962900
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18948
content:
"intervention may facilitate adjustment to expected climate and its \r\neffects' (Annex I: Glossary)."


id: 1e8c34f98d22176e17a36d55ed52c858
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2579
content:
"Distinct from project or programmatic level activities, however, \r\ninternational cooperation for adaptation operates to provide finance \r\nand technical assistance (Bouwer and Aerts 2006). In most cases it \r\ninvolves transboundary actions, such as in the case of transboundary \r\nwatershed management (Wilder et al. 2010; Milman et al. 2013; \r\nvan der Voorn et al. 2017). In others it involves the mainstreaming \r\nof climate change projections into existing treaties, such as for the \r\nprotection of migratory species (Trouwborst et al. 2012). "


id: b809caf012ead2150d901f578acc67ee
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29595
content:
"As discussed in Chapter  1, the emerging framing for the issue of \r\nclimate mitigation is that it is no longer to be considered in isolation \r\nbut rather in the context of its linkages with other areas. Adaptation, \r\nloss and damage, human rights and sustainable development are \r\nall areas where there are clear or potential overlaps, synergies, and \r\nconflicts with the cooperation underway in relation to mitigation."


id: 4075355c7be0f8a7d1c5f558b70a0d9a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8532
content:
"The IPCC defines adaptation as: 'in human systems, the process of \r\nadjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects, in order to \r\nmoderate harm or exploit beneficial opportunities. In natural systems, \r\nthe process of adjustment to actual climate and its effect; human "


id: 712d102a79e6477b718084d9465bd1b6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17170
content:
"related losses of items both material and non-material that are not \r\ncommonly traded in the market, but whose loss is still experienced \r\nas such by those affected. Examples of NELD include loss of cultural \r\nidentity, sacred places, human health and lives (Serdeczny 2019). The \r\nSantiago Network is part of the Warsaw International Mechanism, to \r\ncatalyse the technical assistance of relevant organisations, bodies, \r\nnetworks and experts, for the implementation of relevant approaches \r\nto avert, minimise and address loss and damage at the local, national \r\nand regional levels, in developing countries that are particularly \r\nvulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change (UNFCCC 2020c). "


id: 436a0d45e8c80d6b23366206171ff75
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9078
content:
"of financial support and transparency, functions better to leverage \r\nadaptation support into meaningful mitigation actions, there are \r\nonly few papers that examine this issue. Stua (2017a,b) explores the \r\nrelevance of the so-called 'share of proceeds' included in Article 6 of \r\nthe Paris Agreement as a key tool for leveraging adaptation though \r\nmitigation actions."


id: 55fb37415656fe46c68f082785acfcb6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12402
content:
"There are direct links between climate mitigation efforts, adaptation \r\nand loss and damage -  the higher the collective mitigation \r\nambition and the likelihood of achieving it, the lower the scale of \r\nadaptation ultimately needed and the lower the scale of loss and \r\ndamage anticipated. The liability of states, either individually or \r\ncollectively, for loss and damage is contested, and no litigation has \r\nyet been successfully launched to pursue such claims. The science \r\nof attribution, however, is developing (Otto et al. 2017; Skeie et al. \r\n2017; Marjanac and Patton 2018; Patton 2021) and while it has \r\nthe potential to address the thorny issue of causation, and thus \r\ncompensation (Stuart-Smith et al. 2021), it could also be used to \r\ndevelop strategies for climate resilience (James et al. 2014). "


id: cb2fcdfd57424975553fec1c5ad68505
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33085
content:
"One scholar argues that climate impacts are 'incremental violence \r\nstructurally over-determined by international relations of power and \r\ncontrol' that affect most those who have contributed the least to \r\nGHG emissions (Dehm 2020). Calls for compensation or reparation \r\nfor loss and damage are therefore a  demand for climate justice \r\n(Dehm 2020). Many small island states entered declarations on \r\nacceptance of the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement that they continue \r\nto have rights under international law regarding state responsibility \r\nfor the adverse effects of climate change, and that no provision in \r\nthese treaties can be interpreted as derogating from any claims or \r\nrights concerning compensation and liability due to the adverse \r\neffects of climate change."


id: beda4751788db2e8e850489401efbb25
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30845
content:
"The adoption in 2013 of the Warsaw International Mechanism on \r\nLoss and Damage as part of the UNFCCC occurred despite the historic \r\nopposition of the United States to this policy. Vanhala and Hestbaek \r\n(2016) examine the roles of 'frame contestation' (contestations \r\nover different framings of loss and damage, whether as 'liability \r\nand compensation' or 'risk management and insurance' or other) and \r\nambiguity in accounting for the evolution and institutionalisation \r\nof the loss and damage norm within the UNFCCC. However, there \r\nis little international agreement on the scope of loss and damage \r\nprogrammes, and especially how they would be funded and by \r\nwhom (Gewirtzman et al. 2018). Moreover, non-economic loss and \r\ndamage (NELD) forms a  distinct theme that refers to the climate\u0002"


id: 77be0f9ec6b87e5c585b8a8db5d9d8e2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18274
content:
"As discussed in AR5, policies to open up trade can have a range of \r\neffects on GHG emissions, just as mitigation policies can influence \r\ntrade flows among countries. Trade rules may impede mitigation \r\naction by limiting countries' discretion in adopting trade-related \r\nclimate policies, but they also have the potential to stimulate the \r\ninternational adoption and diffusion of mitigation technologies and \r\npolicies (Droege et al. 2017)."


id: 8e22f8644a0070c6301566888c40f0c3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22205
content:
"The mitigation impacts of trade agreements are difficult to ascertain, \r\nand the limited evidence is mixed. Examining the effects of three \r\nfree trade agreements (FTAs) - Mercosur, the North American Free \r\nTrade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Australia-United States Free Trade \r\nAgreement - on GHG emissions, Nemati et al. (2019) find that these \r\neffects depend on the relative income levels of the countries involved, \r\nand that FTAs between developed and developing countries may \r\nincrease emissions in the long run. However, studies also suggest \r\nthat FTAs incorporating specific environmental or climate-related \r\nprovisions can help reduce GHG emissions (Baghdadi et al. 2013; \r\nSorgho and Tharakan 2020)."


id: d034aa5f665409518f3fad2f2dbaa850
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33994
content:
"Investment agreements, which are often integrated in FTAs, seek \r\nto encourage the flow of foreign investment through investment \r\nprotection. While international investment agreements hold potential \r\nto increase low-carbon investment in host countries (PAGE 2018), \r\nthese agreements have tended to protect investor rights, constraining \r\nthe latitude of host countries in adopting environmental policies \r\n(Miles 2019). Moreover, international investment agreements may \r\nlead to 'regulatory chill', which may lead to countries refraining \r\nfrom or delaying the adoption of mitigation policies, such as phasing \r\nout fossil fuels (Tienhaara 2018). More contemporary investment \r\nagreements seek to better balance the rights and obligations of \r\ninvestors and host countries, and in theory offer greater regulatory \r\nspace to host countries (UNCTAD 2019), although it is unclear to \r\nwhat extent this will hold true in practice."


id: afcff000673184ab531cca62df457357
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28168
content:
"As the intersections between climate impacts and human rights have \r\nbecome increasingly clear, litigants have begun to use human rights \r\narguments, with a growing receptivity among courts towards such \r\narguments in climate change cases (Peel and Osofsky 2018; Savaresi \r\nand Auz 2019; Macchi and van Zeben 2021). In the landmark \r\nUrgenda climate case in 2019, the Dutch Supreme Court interpreted \r\nthe European Convention on Human Rights in light of customary \r\ninternational law and the UN climate change regime and ordered \r\nthe state to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 25% by 2020 \r\ncompared to 1990 (The Supreme Court of the Netherlands 2019). "


id: 5e9fe893d935bd1366a4fa90fed76a17
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13937
content:
"Several measures that can be adopted as part of carbon pricing \r\ninstruments to address carbon leakage concerns have been examined \r\nin the light of WTO rules. For instance, depending on the specific \r\ndesign, the free allocation of emissions allowances under an ETS could \r\nbe considered a subsidy inconsistent with the ASCM (Rubini and Jegou \r\n2012; Ismer et al. 2021). The WTO compatibility of another measure \r\nto counter carbon leakage, BCAs, has also been widely discussed \r\n(Box  14.2). Alternatives to BCAs, such as consumption charges on \r\ncarbon-intensive materials (Pollitt et al. 2020), can be consistent with \r\nWTO law, as they do not involve discrimination between domestic \r\nand  foreign products based on their carbon intensity (Ismer and \r\nNeuhoff 2007; Tamiotti 2011; Pauwelyn 2013; Holzer 2014; Ismer \r\nand Haussner 2016; Cosbey et al. 2019; European Commission 2019; \r\nMehling et al. 2019; Porterfield 2019; Ismer et al. 2020)."


id: c5a49b05de71ec097448d3768510d0a7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32078
content:
"Analyses of the WTO compatibility of BCAs (Ismer and Neuhoff 2007; Tamiotti 2011; Hillman 2013; Pauwelyn 2013; Holzer 2014; \r\nTrachtman 2017; Cosbey et al. 2019; Mehling et al. 2019; Porterfield 2019) gained new currency following the legislative proposal to \r\nintroduce a 'carbon border adjustment mechanism' in the EU (European Commission 2021). BCAs can in principle be designed and \r\nimplemented in accordance with international trade law, but the details matter (Tamiotti et al. 2009). To increase the likelihood that \r\na BCA will be compatible with international trade law, studies suggest that it would need to: have a clear environmental rationale \r\n(i.e., reduce carbon leakage); apply to imports and exclude exports; consider the actual carbon intensity of foreign producers; account \r\nfor the mitigation efforts by other countries; and provide for fairness and due process in its design and implementation (Pauwelyn \r\n2013; Trachtman 2017; Cosbey et al. 2019; Mehling et al. 2019)."


id: 2ba3547a0fdd8303ad7c449fa18a0320
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4932
content:
"BCAs may also raise concerns regarding their consistency with international climate change agreements (Hertel 2011; Davidson Ladly \r\n2012; Ravikumar 2020). To mitigate these concerns, BCAs could include special provisions (e.g., exemptions) for LDCs, or channel \r\nrevenues from the BCA to developing countries to support low-carbon and climate-resilient development (Grubb 2011; Springmann \r\n2013; Mehling et al. 2019). Moreover, international dialogue on principles and best practices guiding BCAs could help to ensure that \r\nsuch measures do not hinder international cooperation on climate change and trade (Bernasconi-Osterwalder and Cosbey 2021). "


id: 5f0c35209eab55cce48cbfddb41ddccc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14022
content:
"Renewable energy support measures may be at odds with the ASCM, \r\nthe GATT, and the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Investment \r\nMeasures. In WTO disputes, measures adopted in Canada, India, and \r\nthe United States to support clean energy generation were found to \r\nbe inconsistent with WTO law due to the use of discriminatory local \r\ncontent requirements, such as the requirement to use domestically \r\nproduced goods in the production of renewable energy (Cosbey and \r\nMavroidis 2014; Kulovesi 2014; Lewis 2014; Wu and Salzman 2014; \r\nCharnovitz and Fischer 2015; Shadikhodjaev 2015; Espa and Marin \r\nDuran 2018)."


id: 9cf4ac49def1287d5edaf7b72463b775
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24852
content:
"Some measures may both lower trade barriers and potentially bring \r\nabout GHG emissions reductions. An example is the liberalisation of \r\ntrade in environmental goods (Hu et al. 2020). In 2012, the Asia\u0002Pacific Economic Cooperation economies agreed to reduce tariffs for \r\na list of 54 environmental goods (including, for example, solar cells; \r\nbut excluding, for example, biofuels or batteries for electric vehicles). \r\nHowever, negotiations on an Environmental Goods Agreement under "


id: fc3ef1f7ea0c4b3501e91d45cf6c724
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41745
content:
"such as reinstating an exception for environmentally-motivated \r\nsubsidies under the ASCM (Horlick and Clarke 2017)."


id: 6eb31f9597c29b5de5a2e9e4ae04d4e3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16742
content:
"the WTO stalled in 2016 due in part to disagreement over which \r\ngoods to include (de Melo and Solleder 2020). Another example is \r\nfossil fuel subsidy reform, which may reduce GHG emissions (Jewell \r\net al. 2018; Chepeliev and van der Mensbrugghe 2020; Erickson et al. \r\n2020) and lower trade distortions (Burniaux et al. 2011; Moerenhout \r\nand Irschlinger 2020). However, fossil fuel subsidies have largely \r\nremained unchallenged before the WTO due to legal and political \r\nhurdles (Asmelash 2015; De Bievre et al. 2017; Meyer 2017; Steenblik \r\net al. 2018; Verkuijl et al. 2019)."


id: 1fe2eed01c4e66633d94c8d4245f4e0d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2817
content:
"A trend in international economic governance has been the adoption \r\nof 'mega-regional' trade agreements involving nations responsible \r\nfor a substantial share of world trade, such as the Comprehensive \r\nand Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the \r\nEU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), \r\nand the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in \r\nEast Asia. Given the size of the markets covered by these agreements, \r\nthey hold potential to diffuse climate mitigation standards (Meltzer \r\n2013; Holzer and Cottier 2015). While CETA includes climate\u0002related provisions and Parties have made a  broad commitment to \r\nimplement the Paris Agreement (Laurens et al. 2019), and the CPTPP \r\nincludes provisions promoting cooperation on clean energy and low\u0002emissions technologies, the RCEP does not include specific provisions \r\non climate change."


id: 2fbe59eff6fe1cad7f0220f0b795d3cb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5655
content:
"For international investment agreements, various other suggestions \r\nhave been put forward to accommodate climate change concerns. \r\nThese include incorporating climate change through ongoing reform \r\nprocesses, such as reform of investor-state dispute settlement under \r\nthe UN Commission on International Trade Law; modernisation \r\nof the Energy Charter Treaty; the (re)negotiation of international \r\ninvestment agreements; and the adoption of a  specific treaty to \r\npromote investment in climate action (Brauch et al. 2019; Tienhaara \r\nand Cotula 2020; Yamaguchi 2020; Cima 2021)."


id: c1587988be9ea16363e2beba03af04cd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31317
content:
"South-South cooperation (SSC) and triangular cooperation (TrC) are \r\nbold, innovative, and rapidly developing means of strengthening \r\ncooperation for the achievement of the SDGs (FAO 2018). SSC is \r\ngaining momentum in achieving sustainable development and \r\nclimate actions in developing countries (UN 2017b). Through SSC, \r\ncountries are able to map their capacity needs and knowledge gaps \r\nand find sustainable, cost-effective, long-lasting and economically \r\nviable solutions (FAO 2019). In the UN Climate Change Engagement \r\nStrategy 2017 (UNOSSC 2017), South-South Cooperation Action Plan \r\nis identified as a substantive pillar to support."


id: 3add9bc3d35d4873b784bddb59853358
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7554
content:
"In 2019, the role of South-South and triangular cooperation was \r\nfurther highlighted with the BAPA+40 Outcome document (UN \r\n2019), noting outstanding contributions to alleviating global \r\ninequality, promoting sustainable development and climate actions, \r\npromoting gender equality and enriching multilateral mechanisms. \r\nFurthermore, the role of triangular cooperation was explicitly "


id: d45cb595978fff320eaf36a8b17edb3c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34683
content:
"recognised in the document reflecting its increasingly relevant role in \r\nthe implementation of the SDGs (UN 2019)."


id: 7d5b5ba6a5a617c30ddda85f04b20012
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19228
content:
"There has been a recent resurgence of South-South cooperation (Gray \r\nand Gills 2016). The South-South Cooperation Action Plan was adopted \r\nby the UN as a substantive pillar to support the implementation of \r\nthe UN Climate Change Engagement Strategy 2017 (UNOSSC 2017). \r\nLiu et al. (2017a) explored prospects for South-South cooperation for \r\nlarge-scale ecological restoration, which is an important solution to \r\nmitigate climate change. Emphasis is given to experience and expertise \r\nsharing, co-financing, and co-development of new knowledge and \r\nknow-how for more effective policy and practice worldwide, especially \r\nin developing and newly industrialised countries."


id: f88e53bf98750e53f4fef78aa1cf5225
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41092
content:
"Hensengerth (2017) explores the role that technology transfer/\r\ncooperation from Europe played in shaping firm-level wind energy \r\ntechnologies in China and India and discusses the recent technology \r\ncooperation between the Chinese, Indian, and European wind firms. \r\nThe research finds that firm-level technology transfer/cooperation \r\nshaped the leading wind energy technologies in China and to a lesser \r\nextent in India. Thus, the technology cooperation between China, India, \r\nand Europe has become multi-faceted and increasingly Southern-led."


id: b094db64a7822859014272d2ae0b5c0b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28297
content:
"The global landscape of development cooperation has changed \r\ndramatically in recent years, with countries of the South engaging \r\nin collaborative learning models to share innovative, adaptable and \r\ncost-efficient solutions to their development and socio-economic\u0002environmental challenges, ranging from poverty and education \r\nto climate change. The proliferation of new actors and cross\u0002regional modalities has enriched the understanding and practice of \r\ndevelopment cooperation and generated important changes in the \r\nglobal development architecture towards a more inclusive, effective, \r\nand horizontal development agenda. South-South cooperation \r\nwill grow in the future, while it is complimentary to North-South \r\ncooperation. However, there are knowledge gaps in relation to the \r\nprecise volume, impact, effectiveness and quality of development \r\ncooperation from emerging development partners. This gap needs to \r\nbe plugged, and evidence on such cooperation strengthened."


id: 16c9aa3c2492ec427dfb2e58b6eb08c0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1222
content:
"Rampa et al. (2012) focus on the manner in which African states \r\nunderstand and approach new opportunities for cooperation with \r\nemerging powers, especially China, India and Brazil, including the \r\ncrucial issue of whether they seek joint development initiatives with \r\nboth traditional partners and emerging powers. UN (2018) presents \r\nand analyses case studies of SSTT in Asia and Pacific and Latin \r\nAmerica and Caribbean regions. Illustrative case studies on TrC can \r\nbe consulted in Shimoda and Nakazawa (2012), and specific cases on \r\nbiofuel SSC and TrC in UNCTAD (2012)."


id: 598f9ffb1e4f7749c5da57dc96a289ab
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12992
content:
"The central argument in the majority of these case studies is that \r\nSouth-South cooperation, which is value-neutral, is contributing \r\nto sustainable development and capacity building (Rampa et al. "


id: bc6c3ba88ba102153ec1261e6b789a91
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30392
content:
"Sectors refer to distinct areas of economic activity, often subject to \r\ntheir own governance regimes; examples include energy production, \r\nmobility, and manufacturing. A  sectoral agreement could include \r\nvirtually any type of commitment with implications for mitigation. \r\nIt could establish sectoral emission targets, on either an absolute or \r\nan indexed basis. It could also require states (or particular groups \r\nof states, if commitments are differentiated) to adopt uniform or \r\nharmonised policies and measures for a sector, such as technology\u0002based standards, taxes, or best-practice standards, as well as \r\nproviding for cooperation on technology research or deployment."


id: 1067f0a0864e011fb114b108735375ff
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 74
content:
"Since 2008, several, often overlapping, voluntary and non-binding \r\ninternational efforts and agreements have been adopted to reduce \r\nnet emissions from the forestry sector. These initiatives have varying \r\nlevels of private sector involvement and different objectives, \r\ntargets, and timelines. Some efforts focus on reducing emissions \r\nfrom deforestation and degradation, while other focus on the \r\nenhancement of sinks through restoration of cleared or degraded \r\nlandscapes. These initiatives do not elaborate specific policies, \r\nprocedures, or implementation mechanisms. They set targets, \r\nframeworks, and milestones, aiming to catalyse further action, \r\ninvestment, and transparency in conservation and consolidate \r\nindividual country efforts."


id: e7d8384d37b586a9ec784d48ae955495
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38098
content:
"Another relevant initiative is one under the 2015 United Nations \r\nConvention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), which targets land \r\ndegradation neutrality, that is, 'a state whereby the amount and \r\nquality of land resources, necessary to support ecosystem functions \r\nand services and enhance food security, remains stable or increases \r\nwithin specified temporal and spatial scales and ecosystems' (Orr \r\net al. 2017). This overarching goal was recognised as also being \r\ncritical to reaching the more specific avoided deforestation and \r\ndegradation and restoration goals of the UNFCCC and UNCBD. The \r\nLand Degradation Neutrality (LDN) initiative from UNCCD includes \r\ntarget-setting programmes that assist countries by providing \r\npractical tools and guidance for the establishment of the voluntary \r\ntargets and to formulate associated measures to achieve LDN \r\nand accelerate implementation of projects (Chasek et al. 2019). "


id: b5d6f5942a6bd70a6f28169bae9c5943
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29214
content:
"resilience and the contribution of biodiversity to carbon stocks \r\nthough conservation and restoration, including 'restoration of at least \r\n15% of degraded ecosystems' (UNCBD 2010). The plan elaborates \r\nmilestones, including the development of national plans for potential \r\nrestoration levels and contributions to biodiversity protection, carbon \r\nsequestration, and climate adaptation to be integrated into other \r\nnational strategies, including REDD+. In 2020, however, the CBD \r\nfound that while progress was evident for the majority of the Aichi \r\nBiodiversity Targets, it was not sufficient for the achievement of the \r\ntargets by 2020 (CBD 2020)."


id: 32e799fb642dbfaae590e22495d70ae3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6221
content:
"Today, 124 countries have committed to their LDN national targets \r\n(UNCCD 2015). The LDN Fund is an investment vehicle launched in \r\nUNCCD COP 13 in 2017, which exists to provide long-term financing \r\nfor private projects and programmes for countries to achieve their \r\nLDN targets. According to the UNCCD, most of the funds will be \r\ninvested in developing countries. "


id: 62f26aeebe31bc382cc71ddfad795933
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14707
content:
"In sum, existing international agreements have had a small impact \r\non reducing emissions from the AFOLU sector and some success in \r\nachieving the enhancement of sinks through restoration. However, \r\nthese outcomes are nowhere near levels required to meet the Paris \r\nAgreement temperature goal -  which would require turning land \r\nuse and forests globally from a  net anthropogenic source during \r\n1990-2010 to a net sink of carbon by 2030, and providing a quarter \r\nof emissions reductions planned by countries (Grassi et al. 2017). The \r\nAFOLU sector has so far contributed only modestly to net mitigation \r\n(Chapter 7)."


id: d60ebaf4c1a9c3d8fc881c6852b558e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34975
content:
"International cooperation on issues of energy supply and security has \r\na long and complicated history. There exists a plethora of institutions, \r\norganisations, and agreements concerned with managing the sector. \r\nThere have been efforts to map the relevant actors, with authors \r\nin one case identifying six primary organisations (Kerebel and \r\nKeppler 2009), in another 16 (Lesage et al. 2010), and in a  third \r\n50 (Sovacool and Florini 2012). At the same time, very little of that \r\nhistory has had climate mitigation as its core focus. Global energy \r\ngovernance has encompassed five broad goals - security of energy "


id: d7f289a1d1df7e298a64ec07bad82fe
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35299
content:
"In 2010, the Parties to the CBD adopted the Strategic Plan for \r\nBiodiversity 2011-2020 which included 20 targets known as the \r\nAichi Biodiversity targets (Marques et al. 2014). Of relevance to the \r\nforestry sector, Aichi Target 15 sets the goal of enhancing ecosystem "


id: 27624652e4a0ac608d2818c318ee57c8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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"Van de Graaf 2015). The United Nations, including its various agencies \r\nsuch as the Committee on Sustainable Energy within the United \r\nNations Economic Commission for Europe, has also played a  role \r\nin the realignment of global energy governance towards mitigation \r\nefforts. As a precursor to SDG 7, the United Nations initiated in 2011 \r\nthe Sustainable Energy for All initiative, which in addition to aiming \r\nfor universal access to modern energy services, included the goals of \r\ndoubling the rate of improvement in energy efficiency, and doubling \r\nby 2030 the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix \r\n(Bruce 2018)."


id: c3da712eac661ff3b870301299dcaa04
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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vector_id: 31735
content:
"supply and demand, economic development, international security, \r\nenvironmental sustainability, and domestic good governance - and \r\nas only one of these provides an entry point for climate mitigation, \r\neffort in this direction has often been lost (van de Graaf and \r\nColgan 2016). To take one example, during the 1980s and 1990s \r\na  combination of bilateral development support and lending \r\npractices from multilateral development banks pushed developing \r\ncountries to adopt power market reforms consistent with the \r\nWashington Consensus: towards liberalised power markets and away \r\nfrom state-owned monopolies. The goals of these reforms did not \r\ninclude an environmental component, and among the results was \r\nnew investment in fossil-fired thermal power generation (Foster and \r\nRana 2020)."


id: ac1eab38b2aa34d999b528c0c80aca92
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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content:
"Despite improvements in the international governance of energy, it \r\nstill appears that a great deal of this is still concerned with promoting \r\nfurther development of fossil fuels. One aspect of this is the \r\ndevelopment of international legal norms. A large number of bilateral \r\nand multilateral agreements, including the 1994 Energy Charter "


id: dbd1f8a08cb27cbee975e8bd0418bf3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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content:
"Treaty, include provisions for using a system of investor-state dispute \r\nsettlement (ISDS) designed to protect the interests of investors in \r\nenergy projects from national policies that could lead their assets to \r\nbe stranded. Numerous scholars have pointed to ISDS being able to \r\nbe used by fossil-fuel companies to block national legislation aimed \r\nat phasing out the use of their assets (Tienhaara 2018; Bos and Gupta \r\n2019). Another aspect is finance; Gallagher et al. (2018) examine the \r\nrole of national development finance systems. While there has been \r\na great deal of finance devoted to renewable energy, they find the \r\nmajority of finance devoted to projects associated either with fossil \r\nfuel extraction or with fossil fuel-fired power generation. "


id: c70bd6b998afbaa39dbb7393448cf22c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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content:
"with international shipping contributing 1.2% of global GHG\r\nemissions. These international transport emissions are projected \r\nto be between approximately 60% and 220% of global emissions \r\nof CO2 in 2050, as represented by the four main illustrative model \r\npathways in SR1.5 (Rogelj et al. 2018; UNEP 2020) Notably, however, \r\nthe climate impact of aviation emissions is estimated to be two to \r\nfour times higher due to non-CO2 effects (Terrenoire et al. 2019; Lee \r\net al. 2021a). Increases in trans-Arctic shipping and tourism activities \r\nwith sea ice loss are also forecast to have strong regional effects due \r\nto ships' gas and particulate emissions (Stephenson et al. 2018). "


id: 6c7215d4978886dfd4974272032591d9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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content:
"The Kyoto Protocol required Annex I  Parties to pursue emissions \r\nreductions from aviation and marine bunker fuels by working through \r\nIMO and ICAO (UNFCCC 1997, Art. 2.2). Limited progress was made \r\nby these organisations on emissions controls in the ensuing decades \r\n(Liu 2011b), but greater action was prompted by conclusion of the \r\nSDGs and Paris Agreement (Martinez Romera 2016), together with \r\nunilateral action, such as the EU's inclusion of aviation emissions in \r\nits Emissions Trading System (Dobson 2020). "


id: 78d0584dae64554fd18e317e4b2aa58
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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vector_id: 18444
content:
"The transportation sector has been a particular focus of cooperative \r\nefforts on climate mitigation that extend beyond the sphere of the \r\nUNFCCC climate regime. A  number of these cooperative efforts \r\ninvolve transnational public-private partnerships, such as the \r\nEuropean-based Transport Decarbonisation Alliance, which brings \r\ntogether countries, regions, cities and companies working towards \r\nthe goal of a 'net-zero emission mobility system before 2050' (TDA \r\n2019). Other efforts are centred in specialised UN agencies, such \r\nas the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the \r\nInternational Maritime Organization (IMO). "


id: 417ac0382f9de30216daa0e15ed05226
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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content:
"Measures introduced by the ICAO and IMO have addressed CO2\r\nemissions from international shipping and aviation. Emissions from \r\nthese parts of the transportation sector are generally excluded \r\nfrom national emissions reduction policies and NDCs because the \r\n'international' location of emissions release makes allocation to \r\nindividual nations difficult (Bows-Larkin 2015; Lyle 2018; Hoch et al. \r\n2019). The measures adopted by ICAO take the form of standards and \r\nrecommended practices that are adopted in national legislation. IMO \r\npublishes 'regulations' but does not have a power of enforcement, \r\nwith non-compliance a responsibility of flag states that issue a ship's \r\n'MARPOL' certificate."


id: e8cf26e9e1463fb3bb117f877d12237f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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content_type: text
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vector_id: 38307
content:
"As discussed in Chapter 2 and Figure SPM.4, international aviation \r\ncurrently accounts for approximately 1% of global GHG emissions, "


id: f05ec5e96f0ceea5b47e4f714b521c83
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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content:
"and, as a  matter of urgency, aims to phase them out as soon as \r\npossible in this century. IMO has considered a range of measures to \r\nmonitor and reduce shipping emissions. In 2016, the IMO's Marine \r\nEnvironment Protection Committee (MEPC) approved an amendment \r\nto the MARPOL Convention Annex VI for the introduction of \r\na mandatory global data collection scheme for fuel oil consumption \r\nof ships (Dobson 2020). Other IMO measures have focused on \r\nenergy efficiency (Martinez Romera 2016). The IMO's Energy \r\nEfficiency Design Index (EEDI), which is mandatory for new ships, \r\nis intended, over a ten-year period, to improve energy efficiency by \r\nup to 30% in several categories of ships propelled by diesel engines \r\n(Smith and Ahmad 2018). In May 2019, the MEPC approved draft \r\namendments to the MARPOL Convention Annex VI, which if adopted, \r\nwill bring forward the entry into force of the third phase of the EEDI \r\nrequirements to 2022 instead of 2025 (IMO 2019; Joung et al. 2020). "


id: cab43bc5b3b13cbf73eafecbb397ac3f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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content:
"Other measures adopted by ICAO include an aircraft CO2 emissions \r\nstandard that applies to new aircraft type designs from 2020, and \r\nto aircraft type designs already in production as of 2023 (Smith \r\nand Ahmad 2018). Overall, CORSIA and regional measures, such \r\nas the EU ETS, are estimated to reduce aviation carbon emissions \r\nby only 0.8% per year from 2017-2030 (noting, however, that 'if \r\nnon-CO2 emissions are included in the analysis, then emissions will \r\nincrease') (Larsson et al. 2019). Accordingly, pathways consistent \r\nwith the temperature goal of the Paris Agreement are likely to \r\nrequire more stringent international measures for the aviation sector \r\n(Larsson et al. 2019). "


id: c1095105e7c1c070142f1998b9ea0995
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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content:
"movements from the Global North and South, as well as from distinct \r\nindigenous rights and peasant rights movements, and are organised \r\nas a  decentralised network of semiautonomous, coordinated units \r\n(Claeys and Delgado Pugley 2017; Tormos-Aponte and Garcia-Lopez \r\n2018). The climate justice movement held global days of protest \r\nin most of the world's countries in 2014 and 2015, and mobilised \r\nanother large campaign in 2018 (Almeida 2019). The polycentric \r\narrangement of the global climate movement allows simultaneous \r\ninfluence on multiple sites of climate governance, from the local to \r\nthe global levels (Tormos-Aponte and Garcia-Lopez 2018). "


id: 43c56e84a4fdee98e2fbe8d186796de4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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vector_id: 9147
content:
"with the temperature goals of the Paris Agreement requires concrete \r\nimplementation measures and strengthened targets in the next \r\niteration in 2023 (Doelle and Chircop 2019; Climate Action Tracker \r\n2020c). As a step towards this, in 2020, the IMO's MEPC put forward \r\ndraft amendments to the MARPOL Convention that would require \r\nships to combine a technical and an operational approach to reduce \r\ntheir carbon intensity. These amendments were formally adopted by \r\nthe Committee at its session in June 2021."


id: d697eda1d7d7bad41a6d1ef72e33f4c8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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vector_id: 35058
content:
"Historically, the issue of climate change did not give rise to intense, \r\norganised transnational protest characteristic of social movements \r\n(McAdam 2017). During the 1990s and early 2000s, the activities \r\nof the global climate movement were concentrated in developed \r\ncountries and largely sought to exercise influence through \r\nparticipation in UNFCCC COPs and side events (Almeida 2019). The \r\nmid-2000s onwards, however, saw the beginnings of use of more \r\nnon-institutionalised tactics, such as simultaneous demonstrations \r\nacross several countries, focusing on a  grassroots call for climate \r\njustice that grew out of previous environmental justice movements \r\n(Almeida 2019). Groups representing indigenous peoples, youth, \r\nwomen, and labour rights brought to the fore new tools of contention \r\nand new issues in the UNFCCC, such as questions of a just transition \r\nand gender equity (Allan 2020). "


id: 8f1f6b673ca5eda4279caab33c117063
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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content:
"The Paris Agreement's preamble explicitly recognises the importance \r\nof engaging 'various actors' in addressing climate change, and \r\nthe decision adopting the Agreement created the Non-state Actor \r\nZone for Climate Action platform to aid in scaling up these efforts. \r\nSpecific initiatives have also been taken to facilitate participation \r\nof particular groups, such as the UNFCCC's Local Communities and \r\nIndigenous Peoples Platform, which commenced work in Katowice \r\nin 2019. Climate movements based in the Global South, as well \r\nas in indigenous territories, are playing an increasingly important \r\nrole in transnational negotiations through networks such as the \r\nIndigenous Peoples Platform. These groups highlight the voices \r\nand perspectives of communities and peoples particularly affected \r\nby climate change. For instance, the Pacific Climate Warriors is \r\na grassroots network of young people from various countries in the "


id: b652bb11eb27b305582b97a605a0cf50
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:23
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vector_id: 29294
content:
"Climate justice has been variously defined, but centres on addressing \r\nthe disproportionate impacts of climate change on the most vulnerable \r\npopulations and calls for community sovereignty and functioning \r\n(Schlosberg and Collins 2014; Tramel 2016). Contemporary climate \r\njustice groups mobilise multiple strands of environmental justice "


id: 4a71e8bdade87b0ce42489d4f63b9ff3
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content:
"Pacific Islands region whose activities focus on resisting narratives \r\nof future inevitability of their Pacific homelands disappearing, and \r\nre-envisioning islanders as warriors defending rights to homeland \r\nand culture (McNamara and Farbotko 2017). Youth global climate \r\nactivism, particularly involving young indigenous climate activists, is \r\nanother notable recent development. Although there remains little \r\npublished literature on indigenous youth climate activism (MacKay \r\net al. 2020), analysis of online sources indicates the emergence of \r\nseveral such groups, including the Pacific Climate Warriors and Te Ara \r\nWhatu from Aotearoa New Zealand (Ritchie 2021), as well as Seed \r\nMob in Australia. "


id: f251b5c6a94d607211cfcfce402accd7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"Combined national climate commitments fall far short of the Paris \r\nAgreement's long-term temperature goals. Similar political ambition \r\ngaps persist across various areas of sustainable development. Many \r\ntherefore argue that actions by non-state actors, such as businesses \r\nand investors, cities and regions, and NGOs, are crucial. However, non\u0002state climate and sustainability actions may not be self-reinforcing \r\nbut may heavily depend on supporting mechanisms. Governance \r\nrisk-reduction strategies can be combined to maximize non-state \r\npotential in sustainable and climate-resilient transformations (Chan \r\net al. 2019). "


id: eb2e502488bb7078f23b20822de94f48
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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vector_id: 38730
content:
"mitigating climate, protecting biodiversity and conserving indigenous \r\nculture by institutionalising payments on carbon sequestration and \r\nbiodiversity conservation values of ecosystems services from global \r\nto local communities. These mechanisms include public-private \r\npartnership, and NGO participation. REDD+ and TEEB allocation \r\npolicies will be interventions in a  highly complex system, and will \r\ninevitably involve trade-offs; therefore, it is important to question \r\nthe 'win-win-win' discourse (Zia and Kauffman 2018; Goulder et al. \r\n2019). The initial investment and the longer periods of recovery of \r\ninvestment are sometimes barriers to private investment. In this \r\nsense, it is important to have government incentives and encourage \r\npublic-private investment (Ivanova and Lopez 2013)."


id: efba567d2c7c4463de5e169134755453
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"The World Bank has also established several partnerships since 2010, \r\nmainly in the field of carbon pricing. Prominent examples are the \r\nNetworked Carbon Markets initiative (established 2013' spanning \r\nboth governmental actors and experts' now entering a  phase II) \r\nand the Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition, established in 2015 \r\nand spanning a wide range of governmental and non-governmental \r\nactors, not least within business (World Bank 2018; World Bank 2019; \r\nWettestad et al. 2021). These partnerships deal with knowledge \r\nproduction and dissemination and seek to enable implementation \r\nof carbon pricing policies. The leadership role of the international \r\n'heavyweight' World Bank gives these partnerships additional \r\ncomparative political weight, meaning also a  potentially greater \r\ninvolvement of powerful finance ministries/ministers generally \r\ninvolved in Bank matters and meetings. "


id: 2944aabf3008bd886052730f6587f44a
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content:
"PPPs may also be developed to assist with implementation and \r\nsupport of states' climate mitigation commitments. For instance, \r\nUNEP has initiated a  number of PPPs for climate change finance. \r\nThese are designed to increase financing for the purposes of \r\ndisseminating low-carbon technologies to tackle climate change and \r\npromote clean energy in many parts of developing countries (UNEP \r\n2018b; Charlery and Traerup 2019). "


id: 4e38a144a2ccbdde22d5d2845e447dd7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11031
content:
"In the same vein, in 2010 FAO delivered the Framework for Assessing \r\nand Monitoring Forest Governance. The Framework draws on several \r\napproaches currently in use or under development in major forest \r\ngovernance-related processes and initiatives, including the World \r\nBank's Framework for Forest Governance Reform. The Framework \r\nbuilds on the understanding that governance is both the context \r\nand the product of the interaction of a  range of actors and \r\nstakeholders with diverse interests (FAO 2010). For example, UNFCCC \r\nand the UN-REDD programme focus on REDD+ and UNEP focuses on \r\nThe Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB), institutional \r\nmechanisms that have been conceptualised as a 'win-win-win' for "


id: 6357a904a3fd74ead1b9c7ffb117e46b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"Local governments are also creating cross-sector social partnerships \r\n(CSSPs) at the sub-national level, entities created for addressing social, \r\neconomic, and/or environmental issues with partner organisations \r\nfrom the public, private and civil society sectors (Crane and Seitanidi \r\n2014). In particular, with support from international networks such \r\nas ICLEI Local Governments for Sustainability, C40, Global Covenant \r\nof Mayors, and Global 100% Renewable Energy, local governments \r\naround the world are committing to aggressive carbon reduction \r\ntargets for their cities (Ivanova et al. 2015; Clarke and Ordonez-Ponce \r\n2017; Kona et al. 2018). Research on CSSPs implementing community "


id: f3814c86b9b3c5dad1498ef974a2901d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40218
content:
"impact on climate. An important initiative launched in September \r\n2008 -Natural Climate Solutions - has the objective of leveraging \r\nbusiness investment to capture carbon out of the atmosphere. This \r\ninitiative has built strong cross-sectoral partnerships and is intended \r\nto tap into this immense emissions reduction solution potential \r\nthrough natural methods with the help of private investment."


id: 7dd4e664eff1bfd70ed9c4d5048a5f57
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19312
content:
"sustainability plans shows that climate change is one of the four \r\nmost common issues, after waste, energy and water (which are also \r\nhighly relevant to climate mitigation) (MacDonald et al. 2017). "


id: 7f5c5361ed568ff9b9ebe5ac6d351a7d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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vector_id: 19562
content:
"The Global Methane Initiative (GMI) is a  multilateral partnership \r\nlaunched in 2004 by the United States Environmental Protection \r\nAgency along with 36 other countries to generate a voluntary, non\u0002binding agenda for global collaboration to decrease anthropogenic \r\nmethane releases. The GMI builds on the Methane to Markets \r\n(M2M) Partnership, an international partnership launched in 2004. In \r\naddition to the GMI's own financial assistance, the initiative receives \r\nfinancial backing from the Global Methane Fund (GMF) for methane \r\nreduction projects. The GMF is a fund created by governments and \r\nprivate donors (Leonard 2014)."


id: 57fd758b9cad0ab9da982103b2b0e231
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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vector_id: 12744
content:
"Another potentially influential type of transnational business \r\npartnership is investor coalitions or alliances formed for the purpose \r\nof pushing investee companies to adopt stronger measures for \r\nstranded asset management and climate change mitigation. MacLeod \r\n& Park (2011, p. 55) argue that these transnational groups 'attempt \r\nto re-orient and \"regulate\" the behaviour of business by holding \r\ncorporations accountable via mechanisms of information sharing, \r\nmonitoring of environmental impacts, and disclosure of activities \r\nrelated to the corporate climate footprint'. This favours a theory of \r\nactive ownership (investor engagement with corporate boards) over \r\ncapital divestment as the optimal pathway to shape the behaviour \r\nof corporate actors on climate risk (Kruitwagen et al. 2017; Krueger \r\net al. 2020)."


id: d6289180a003ae8508ed6af505a39bb7
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content:
"Transnational business partnerships are a  growing feature of the \r\nlandscape of multi-level, multi-actor governance of climate change. \r\nMany business leaders embraced the ethos of 'business cannot \r\nsucceed in societies that fail'. Examples of this line of reasoning \r\nare: poverty limits consumer spending, political instability disrupts \r\nbusiness activity, and climate change threatens the production \r\nand distribution of goods and services. Such situations endanger \r\nmultinational enterprise investments, global asset management \r\nfunds, and the core business of international insurance companies \r\nand pension funds (van Tulder et al. 2021)."


id: 7facba7d992dbc70946fc7658355c4d4
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"et al. 2014). Some recent studies aim to provide systems to assess \r\nthe impact of PPPs beyond the much-used notion of value for \r\nmoney. One of these recent studies proposes a conceptual model \r\nthat addresses six dimensions relevant to economic, social and \r\nenvironmental progress. These include resilience and environment, \r\naccess of services to the population, scalability and replicability, \r\neconomic impact, inclusiveness, and finally, degree of engagement \r\nof stakeholders (Berrone et al. 2019). These systems will most likely \r\ncontinue to evolve."


id: 9bd560c38e80ff7e61b2ba2925471b2
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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vector_id: 24670
content:
"that the contribution from the private sector needs to be significant \r\n(Gardiner et al. 2016). "


id: 3c95a595f7288d08f1302783e675b954
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
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vector_id: 7850
content:
"There is a relatively large volume of literature that assesses PPPs in \r\ngeneral. Much of this applies to partnerships which, either by design \r\nor not, advance climate goals. This literature provides a good starting \r\npoint for assessing these partnerships as they become operational. \r\nThese can help assess whether such partnerships are worth the effort \r\nin terms of their performance and effectiveness (Liu et al. 2017b), their \r\neconomic and social value added (Quelin et al. 2017), their efficiency \r\n(Estache and Saussier 2014) and the possible risks associated with \r\nthem (Grimsey and Mervyn 2002). "


id: d1004b48a37c0f3d6bff589ed16034a9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34118
content:
"climate regime's transformative potential. Second, the international \r\nmarket mechanisms under Article 6  - should an agreement on \r\nimplementation deals be reached - allow a shift from projects and \r\nprogrammes to policy-based and sectoral generation of emissions \r\ncredits. Moreover, the sectoral agreement CORSIA also makes use \r\nof such credits. Third, there is a lack of attention to both distributive \r\noutcomes and institutional support within sectoral agreements, \r\nrepresenting a serious gap in efforts to harmonise mitigation with \r\nequity and sustainable development. Fourth, there are transnational \r\npartnerships and initiatives, representing the actions of non-state \r\nactors, addressing each of the assessment criteria, with the exception \r\nof economic effectiveness."


id: 8aad18f7e3479ca2b9edd7bfba8cfc35
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21572
content:
"Table  14.5 provides examples of mechanisms addressing each \r\nof the assessment criteria identified in Section 14.2.3. The effects of \r\ndifferent forms of international cooperation are separated out, \r\nincluding not only UNFCCC and other multilateral processes, but also \r\nsub-global and sectoral agreements. Several points stand out. First, \r\nthe Paris Agreement has the potential to significantly advance the UN "


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vector_id: 20747
content:
"the effectiveness of policies. The latter framing is particularly under\u0002developed. Greater development of theories resting in social science \r\ndisciplines such as economic geography, sociology, and psychology \r\ncould potentially provide a more complete picture of the nature and \r\neffectiveness of international cooperation."


id: 6514d875a2597b80ef50a1f70a6e3205
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15050
content:
"Any assessment of the effectiveness of international cooperation \r\nis limited by the methodological challenge of observing sufficient \r\nvariance in cooperation in order to support inference on effects. \r\nThere is little in the way of cross-sectional variance, given that \r\nmost of the governance mechanisms assessed here are global in \r\ntheir geographical coverage. One exception is with respect to the \r\neffects of the Kyoto Protocol, which we have reported. Time series \r\nanalysis is also challenging, given that other determinants of climate \r\nmitigation, including technology costs and the effects of national and \r\nsub-national level policies, are rapidly evolving. Thus, this chapter \r\nprimarily reviews scholarship that compares observations with \r\ntheory-based counterfactual scenarios."


id: bb60044bf0413f5d8776bf7c388da594
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30181
content:
"Understanding of the effectiveness of international agreements and \r\ninstitutions is driven entirely by theory-driven prediction of how \r\nthe world will evolve, both with these agreements in place and \r\nwithout them. The predictions in particular are problematic, because \r\ngovernance regimes are complex adaptive systems, making it \r\nimpossible to predict how they will evolve over time, and hence what \r\ntheir effects will be. Time will cure this in part, as it will generate \r\nobservations of the world with the new regime in place, which we can \r\ncompare to the counterfactual situation of the new regime's being \r\nabsent, which may be a simpler situation to model. But even here our \r\nmodelling capacity is limited: it may simply never be possible to know \r\nwith a high degree of confidence whether international cooperation, \r\nsuch as that embodied in the Paris Agreement, is having a significant \r\neffect, no matter how much data are accumulated. "


id: 928660025696dbc6b4ccf94c4d54eade
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23000
content:
"Given the importance of theory for guiding assessments of the past \r\nand likely future impacts of policies, it is important to note that \r\namong the alternative theoretical frameworks for analysis, some have \r\nbeen much more extensively developed in the literature than others. \r\nThis chapter has noted in particular the partial dichotomy between \r\na  global commons framing of climate change and a  transitions \r\nframing, which include different indicators to be used to evaluate "


id: 50d65ca3cb154391c3c006b164a75e19
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11500
content:
"UNFCCC, 2015a: Paris Agreement. 25 pp. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/\r\nenglish_paris_agreement.pdf (Accessed October 31, 2021)."


id: cee1657b0d664ad804c90feee11cd81
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33740
content:
"15 December 2018, 53-58 https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/\r\ncma2018_3_add2_new_advance.pdf (Accessed October 31, 2021)."


id: f4e75f3dfe999b6b4bf39d2dee4a6216
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40451
content:
"42 pp. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2021_08_adv_1.pdf\r\n(Accessed October 31, 2021)."


id: 8b80f0b4c211dc97dcee18cf0adbab29
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21709
content:
"Kreibiehl, S., T. Yong Jung, S. Battiston, P. E. Carvajal, C. Clapp, D. Dasgupta, N. Dube, R. Jachnik, K. Morita, N. Samargandi, \r\nM. Williams, 2022: Investment and finance. In IPCC, 2022: Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change. \r\nContribution of Working Group III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate \r\nChange  [P.R.  Shukla, J. Skea, R. Slade, A. Al Khourdajie, R. van Diemen, D. McCollum, M. Pathak, S. Some, P. Vyas, \r\nR. Fradera, M. Belkacemi, A. Hasija, G. Lisboa, S. Luz, J. Malley, (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and \r\nNew York, NY, USA. doi: 10.1017/9781009157926.017"


id: fa6471027c79345a7c56e941ccb69e4b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41420
content:
"fossil-fuel related financing continue to be of major concern despite \r\nrecent commitments. This reflects policy misalignment, the current \r\nperceived risk-return profile of fossil fuel-related investments, and \r\npolitical economy constraints (high confidence). {15.3}"


id: a05a8370c733b2bb9091318d3924fef1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25421
content:
"Estimates of climate finance flows - which refers to local, national, \r\nor transnational financing from public, private, multilateral, bilateral \r\nand alternative sources, to support mitigation and adaptation actions \r\naddressing climate change - exhibit highly divergent patterns across \r\nregions and sectors and a slowing growth. {15.3}"


id: bd10141be1b619b27160c24b4080de0c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30510
content:
"When the perceived risks are too high the misallocation of abundant \r\nsavings persists. Investors refrain from investing in infrastructure \r\nand industry in search of safer financial assets, even earning low or \r\nnegative real returns. {15.2, 15.3}"


id: 814cd05689b33c228f235b96669ec6d0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19881
content:
"Global climate finance is heavily focused on mitigation (more than \r\n90% on average between 2017-2020). This is despite the significant \r\neconomic effects of climate change's expected physical impacts, \r\nand the increasing awareness of these effects on financial stability. \r\nTo meet the needs for rapid deployment of mitigation options, \r\nglobal mitigation investments are expected to need to increase by \r\nthe factor of 3 to 6 (medium confidence). The gaps are wide for all \r\nsectors and represent a major challenge for developing countries,3\r\nespecially Least-Developed Countries (LDCs), where flows have to \r\nincrease by factor 4 to 7, for specific sectors like agriculture, forestry \r\nand other land use (AFOLU) in relative terms, and for specific groups \r\nwith limited access to, and high costs of, climate finance (high \r\nconfidence). {15.4, 15.5}"


id: b8dcfc9633dd60d7ebf424c318043844
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29728
content:
"The actual size of sectoral and regional climate financing gaps \r\nis only one component driving the magnitude of the challenge, \r\nwith financial and economic viability, access to capital markets, \r\ninvestment requirements for adaptation, reduction of losses \r\nand damages, climate-responsive social protection, appropriate \r\nregulatory frameworks and institutional capacity to attract and \r\nfacilitate investments and ensure safeguards being decisive to scale\u0002up financing. Financing needs for the creation and strengthening \r\nof regulatory environment and institutional capacity, upstream \r\nfinancing needs as well as R&D and venture capital for development \r\nof new technologies and business models are often overlooked \r\ndespite their critical role to facilitate the deployment of scaled-up \r\nclimate finance (high confidence). {15.4.1, 15.5.2}"


id: 2adac3d0aff0aa546ebe3a2c7b713141
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4770
content:
"The relatively slow implementation of commitments by \r\ncountries and stakeholders in the financial system to  scale \r\nup  climate finance reflects neither the urgent need for \r\nambitious  climate action, nor the economic rationale \r\nfor ambitious climate action (high confidence). Delayed climate \r\ninvestments and financing  - and limited alignment of investment \r\nactivity with the Paris Agreement - will result in significant carbon "


id: 8292afa44d336c2a8ba94e4e4cddca48
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20098
content:
"Progress on the alignment of financial flows with low GHG \r\nemissions pathways remains slow. There is a climate financing \r\ngap which reflects a persistent misallocation of global capital \r\n(high confidence). Persistently high levels of both public and private "


id: bd8648d79111845fe8efcb5c34cfb286
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30602
content:
"lock-ins, stranded assets, and other additional costs. This will \r\nparticularly impact urban infrastructure and the energy and transport \r\nsectors (high confidence). A  common understanding of debt \r\nsustainability and debt transparency, including negative implications \r\nof deferred climate investments on future GDP, and how stranded \r\nassets and resources may be compensated, has not yet been \r\ndeveloped (medium confidence). {15.6}"


id: 844633663a3c1ede5e1b328eff7478cb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20425
content:
"The greater the urgency of action to remain on a  1.5degC pathway \r\nthe greater need for parallel investment decisions in upstream and \r\ndownstream parts of the value chain. Greater urgency also reduces \r\nthe lead times to build trust in regulatory frameworks. Consequently, \r\nmany investment decisions will need to be made based on the long\u0002term global goals. This highlights the importance of trust in political \r\nleadership which, in turn, affects risk perception and ultimately \r\nfinancing costs (high confidence). {15.6.1, 15.6.2}"


id: 45d212f854e3ba998e2b66fe5e8d349f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9504
content:
"There is a  mismatch between capital availability in the developed \r\nworld and the future emissions expected in developing countries. \r\nThis emphasises the need to recognise the explicit and positive social \r\nvalue of global cross-border mitigation financing. A significant push \r\nfor international climate finance access for vulnerable and poor \r\ncountries is particularly important given these countries' high costs \r\nof financing, debt stress and the impacts of ongoing climate change \r\n(high confidence). {15.2, 15.3.2.3, 15.5.2, 15.6.1, 15.6.7}"


id: 9048ac9f02c7ff05bb4d4f4fd800a061
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22586
content:
"The mutual benefits of coordinated support for climate mitigation \r\nand adaptation in the next decade for both developed and developing \r\nregions could potentially be very high in the post-COVID-19 era. \r\nClimate compatible stimulus packages could significantly reduce the \r\nmacro-financial uncertainty generated by the pandemic and increase \r\nthe sustainability of the world economic recovery. {15.2, 15.3.2.3, \r\n15.5.2, 15.6.1, 15.6.7}"


id: f7db0064e3413e74e5ffd2787d0fb774
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40980
content:
"Political leadership and intervention remain central to addressing \r\nuncertainty as a  fundamental barrier for a  redirection of financial \r\nflows. Existing policy misalignments  - for example in fossil fuel \r\nsubsidies - undermine the credibility of public commitments, reduce \r\nperceived transition risks and limit financial sector action (high \r\nconfidence). {15.2, 15.3.3, 15.6.1, 15.6.2, 15.6.3}"


id: 6432d4b48a8e9a071b301ccd9393f964
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14915
content:
"finance for nature-based solutions, including mitigation in the \r\nforest sector (REDD+), and climate-responsive social protection; \r\n(vi) improved financing instruments for loss and damage events, \r\nincluding risk-pooling-transfer-sharing for climate risk insurance; \r\n(vii)  economic instruments, such as phasing in carbon pricing and \r\nphasing out fossil fuel subsidies in a  way that addresses equity \r\nand access; and (viii) gender-responsive and women-empowered \r\nprogrammes. {15.2.3, 15.2.4, 15.3.1, 15.3.2.2, 15.3.3, 15.4.1, 15.4.2, \r\n15.4.3, 15.5.2, 15.6, 15.6.2, 15.6.4, 15.6.5, 15.6.6, 15.6.7, 15.6.8.2}"


id: 85bfa0efce0fdb230ae53350bd15a1d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20673
content:
"significant room for interpretation and context-specific considerations \r\nremains. Further, such definition needs to be put in perspective with the \r\nexpectations of investors and financiers (see Box 15.2)."


id: fa9f971877d9afc4db2fab3549fed676
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41466
content:
"Finance for climate action (or climate finance), environmental finance \r\n(which also covers other environmental priorities such as water, air \r\npollution and biodiversity), and sustainable finance (which encompasses \r\nissues relating to socio-economic impacts, poverty alleviation and \r\nempowerment) are interrelated rather than mutually exclusive concepts \r\n(UNEP Inquiry 2016a; ICMA 2020a). Their combination is needed to \r\nalign mitigation investments with multiple SDGs, and at a minimum, \r\nminimise the conflicts between climate targets and SDGs not being \r\ntargeted. From a climate policy perspective, climate finance refers to \r\nfinance 'whose expected effect is to reduce net GHG emissions and/or \r\nenhance resilience to the impacts of climate variability and projected \r\nclimate change' (UNFCCC 2018a). However, as pinpointed in the AR5, "


id: 1cfd161ed25dccc8b15d22b5afb9f07a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2283
content:
"Specifying the scope of climate finance requires defining two terms: \r\nwhat qualifies as 'finance' and as 'climate' respectively. In terms \r\nof what type of finance to consider, options include considering \r\ninvestments or total costs (Box 15.1), stocks or flows, gross or net \r\n(the latter taking into account reflows and/or depreciation), and \r\ndomestic or cross-border, public or private (Box  15.2). In terms of \r\nwhat may be considered as 'climate', a  key difference relates to \r\nmeasuring climate-specific finance (only accounts for the portion \r\nof finance resulting in climate benefits) or climate-related finance \r\n(captures total project costs and aims to measure the mainstreaming \r\nof climate considerations). One should even consider the investments "


id: d026873782f7398beced88a83370e732
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33979
content:
"This box defines some core terms used in this chapter as well as in other chapters addressing finance issues: cost, investment, \r\nfinancing, public and private. The chapter makes broad use of the term finance to refer to all types of transactions involving monetary \r\namounts. It avoids the use of the terms funds and funding to the extent possible, which should otherwise be understood as synonyms \r\nfor money and money provided."


id: 6882b8403b783e1fd235501f7195c798
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15654
content:
"Cost, investment and financing: different but intertwined concepts. Cost encompasses capital expenditures (CAPEX or upfront \r\ninvestment value leveraged over the lifetime of a project) operating and maintenance expenditures (OPEX), as well as financing costs. \r\nNote that some projects e.g., related to technical assistance may only involve OPEX (e.g., staff costs) but no CAPEX, or may not incur \r\ndirect financing costs (e.g., if fully financed via own funds and grants)."


id: 2d03d0a446c65c38849877b5fe2a1129
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5189
content:
"Investment, in an economic sense, is the purchase of (or CAPEX for) a physical asset (notably infrastructure or equipment) or intangible \r\nasset (e.g., patents, IT solutions) not consumed immediately but used over time. For financial investors, physical and intangible assets \r\ntake the form of financial assets such as bonds or stocks which are expected to provide income or be sold at a higher price later. In \r\npractice, investment decisions are motivated by a calculation of risk-weighted expected returns that takes into account all expected \r\ncosts, as well as the different types of risks, discussed in Section 15.6.1, that may impact the returns of the investment and even turn \r\nthem into losses."


id: 65e0e4412534ed462812cfc8b34f50db
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15185
content:
"Incremental cost (or investment) accounts for the difference between the cost (or investment value) of a climate project compared to \r\nthe cost (or investment value) of a counterfactual reference project (or investment). In cases where climate projects and investments \r\nare more cost effective than the counterfactual, the incremental cost will be negative."


id: beeaef0dd144a21915abfa17e91ce76b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30851
content:
"Financing refers to the process of securing the money needed to cover an investment or project cost. Financing can rely on debt \r\n(e.g., through bond issuance or loan subscription), equity issuances (listed or unlisted shares), own funds (typically savings or auto\u0002financing through retained earnings), as well as on grants and subsidies"


id: 76575506ab296b36d16094656c697aae
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18042
content:
"Public and private: statistical standard and grey zones. International statistics classify economic actors as pertaining to the \r\npublic or private sectors. Households always qualify as private and governmental bodies and agencies as public. Criteria are needed \r\nfor other types of actors such as enterprises and financial institutions. Most statistics rely on the majority ownership and control \r\nprinciple. This is the case for the Balance of Payment, which records transactions between residents of a country and the rest of the \r\nworld (IMF 2009)."


id: c49223a895a6e5bccdfc2849e2442905
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31894
content:
"Such a strict boundary between public and private sectors may not always be suitable for mapping and assessing investment and \r\nfinancing activities. On the one hand, some publicly owned entities may have a mandate to operate on a fully- or semi-commercial \r\nbasis, for example state-owned enterprises, commercial banks, and pension funds, as well as sovereign wealth funds. On the other \r\nhand, some privately owned or controlled entities can pursue not-for-profit objectives, e.g., philanthropies and charities. The present \r\nchapter considers these nuances to the extent made possible by available data and information."


id: e627fca36626f7753ceb68b6e817ca62
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37792
content:
"decided for reasons unrelated with climate objectives but which \r\ncontribute to these objectives (hydroelectricity, rail transportation)."


id: 2e0f9a95dc64cd7e4b833d4a10db4a6d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5377
content:
"Assessing climate consistency or alignment implies looking at all \r\ninvestment and financing activities, whether they target, contribute \r\nto, undermine or have no particular impact on climate objectives. This \r\nall-encompassing scope notably includes remaining investments and \r\nfinancing for high-GHG emission activities that may be incompatible \r\nwith remaining carbon budgets, but also activities that may play \r\na  transition role in climate mitigation pathways and scenarios \r\n(Section 15.3.2.3). As a result, any meaningful assessment of progress \r\nrequires the use of different shades to assess activities based on \r\ntheir negative, neutral ('do no harm') or positive contributions, \r\n(e.g.,  CICERO 2015; Cochran and Pauthier 2019; Natixis 2019). \r\nDoing so in practice requires the development of robust definitions, \r\nassessment methods and metrics, an area of work and research \r\nthat remained under development at the time of writing. A  range "


id: 42c5b98c3ebdcfa52df172e28ecdfe65
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8944
content:
"Beyond the need to scale up levels of climate finance, the Paris \r\nAgreement provides a  broad policy environment and momentum \r\nfor a more systemic and transformational change in investment and \r\nfinancing strategies and patterns. Article 2.1c, which calls for 'making \r\nfinance flows consistent with a  pathway towards low greenhouse "


id: 108b458937705b425f57b1c7924cc8dd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 97
content:
"International climate finance can flow through different bilateral, multilateral, and other channels, involving a range of different types \r\nof institutions both public (official) and private (commercial) with different mandates and focuses. In practice, the architecture of \r\ninternational public climate finance is rapidly evolving, with the creation by traditional donors of new public sources and channels \r\nover the years (Watson and Schalatek 2019), as well as emergence of new providers of development co-operation, both bilateral \r\n(Benn and Luijkx 2017) and multilateral (e.g., Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank), as well as of non-governmental actors such as \r\nphilanthropies (OECD 2018a)."


id: aed59505946a7f21a4f161241756c81f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28005
content:
"The operationalisation of the Green Climate Fund (GCF), which channels the majority of its funds via accredited entities, has notably \r\nattracted particular attention since AR5. Section 14.3.2 (in Chapter 14) provides a further assessment of progress and challenges of \r\nfinancial mechanisms under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), such as the GCF, the Global \r\nEnvironment Facility (GEF) and the Adaptation Fund (AF)."


id: 2f153bb04200322ba56b66d7dbd8ec36
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5554
content:
"financing needs cannot be entirely separated because of structural \r\nrelationships, synergies, trade-offs and policy coherence requirements \r\nbetween these sub-categories of climate finance (Box 15.1)."


id: 454716f49b33bc45388a03d3d75c56
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9413
content:
"of financial sector coalitions and civil society organisations as well \r\nas commercial services providers to the financial industry have \r\ndeveloped frameworks, approaches and metrics, mainly focusing \r\non investment portfolios (Institut Louis Bachelier et al.. 2020; IIGCC \r\n2021; TCFD Portfolio Alignment Team 2021; UN-Convened Net-Zero \r\nAsset Owner Alliance 2021), and, to a lesser extent for real economy \r\ninvestments (Micale et al. 2020; Jachnik and Dobrinevski 2021)."


id: a310303bb85ef4318ad581b809c1aa82
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25896
content:
"More recent published data from the Biennial Assessments \r\n(UNFCCC 2018a) and the Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5degC \r\n(IPCC 2018) have revised upwards the needs of financing between \r\n2020 and 2030 to 2035 to contain global temperature rise to below "


id: 9bd05d85653a09ed0afc8a84b0ee51b4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24667
content:
"Adaptation financing needs, meanwhile, were rising rapidly. \r\nThe Adaption Gap Report 2020 (UNEP 2021) reported that the \r\ncurrent efforts are insufficient to narrow the adaptation finance \r\ngap, and additional adaptation finance is necessary, particularly \r\nin developing countries. The gap is expected to be aggravated by \r\nCOVID-19 (high confidence). It reaffirmed earlier assessments that \r\nby 2030 (2050) the estimated costs of adaptation ranges between \r\nUSD140 and 300 billion yr-1 (USD280 and 500 billion yr-1). Against \r\nthis, the reported actual global public finance flows for adaptation \r\nin 2019/2020 were estimated at 46 billion (Naran et al. 2021). The \r\ncosts of climate disasters meanwhile continued to rise, affecting low\u0002income developing countries the most. Climate natural disasters - \r\nnot all necessarily attributable to climate change  - caused some \r\nUSD300 billion yr-1 economic losses and well-being losses of about \r\nUSD520 billion yr-1 (Hallegatte et al. 2017)."


id: e715bb804db7771187bfbf1491e5262e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
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content:
"Financial investors have started to account for climate risk in some \r\ncontexts but they do so only to a limited extent (Monasterolo and \r\nde Angelis 2020; Alessi et  al. 2021; Bolton and Kacperczyk 2021) \r\nand the reasons for these remain unclear. Two aspects are relevant \r\nhere. The first is the endogenous nature of climate financial risk \r\nand opportunities (with the term 'risk' meaning here the potential \r\nfor adverse financial impact, whether or not the distribution of \r\nlosses is known). Academics and practitioners in finance are aware \r\nthat financial risk can in certain contexts be endogenous, that is, "


id: c2bcd4568f4d3037983cf2a03121e39a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"the materialisation of losses is affected by the action of financial \r\nplayers themselves. However, the standard treatment of risk both in \r\nfinancial valuation models and in asset pricing assumes that risk is \r\nexogenous. In contrast, endogeneity is a  key feature of climate risk \r\nbecause today's perception of climate risk affects climate investment, \r\nwhich in turn affects directly the future risk. This endogeneity leads \r\nto the fact that multiple and rather different mitigation scenarios are \r\npossible (Chapter 3). Moreover, the likelihood of occurrence of each \r\nalternative scenario is very hard to estimate. Further, the assessment of \r\nclimate-related financial risk requires to combine information related \r\nto mitigation scenarios as well as climate impact scenarios, leaving \r\nopen an important knowledge gap for the next years (Section 15.6.1)."


id: d914fcd2fb90bc68132e82b39d7559b8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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"The second aspect is that the multiplicity of equilibria results in \r\na  coordination problem whereby the majority of investors wait to \r\nmove and reallocate their investments until they can follow a clear \r\nsignal. Despite the initial momentum of the Paris Agreement, for \r\nmany investors, both public and private, the policy signal seems not \r\nstrong enough to induce them to align their investment portfolios to \r\nclimate goals."


id: 2ad121ebb94c3b355027443590026503
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Analyses of the dynamics of the low-carbon transition suggest that \r\nit does not occur by itself and that it requires a policy signal credible \r\nenough in the perception of market players and investors (Battiston \r\net al. 2021b). Credibility could require a policy commitment device \r\n(Brunner et al. 2012). The commitment would also need to be large \r\nenough (analogous to the 'whatever it takes' statement by the \r\nEuropean Central Bank during the 2011-2012 European sovereign \r\ncrisis (Kalinowski and Chenet 2020)). In principle, public investments \r\nin low-carbon infrastructures (or private-public partnerships) as well \r\nas regulation could provide credible signals if their magnitude and \r\ntime horizon are appropriate (past experiences with feed-in-tariffs \r\n(FiTs) models across countries provide useful lessons)."


id: f8002b09ac97cdec788f5758f1f6bfb7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"Entering 2020, the world already faced large macroeconomic \r\nheadwinds to meeting the climate finance gap in the near term - \r\nbarring some globally coordinated action. While an understanding of \r\nthe disaggregated country-by-country, sector-by-sector, project-by\u0002project, and instrument-by-instrument approach to raising climate \r\nfinances analysed in the later parts of this chapter remains important, \r\nmacroeconomic drivers of finance remain crucial in the near term."


id: eccb85ff46c9168edaffcbdd0c162cc0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"Near-term finance financial flows in aggregate often show strong \r\nempirically observed cycles over time, especially in terms of \r\nmacroeconomic and financial cycles. By near-term, we mean here the \r\nlikely cycle over the next five to ten years (2020-2025 and 2020-2030), \r\nas influenced by global macroeconomic real business cycles (output, \r\ninvestment and consumption), with periodic asymmetric downside \r\nimpacts and crises (Gertler and Kiyotaki 2010; Borio 2014; Jorda \r\net al. 2017; Borio et al. 2018). Financial cycles typically have strong \r\nco-movements (asset prices, credit growth, interest rates, leverage, \r\nrisk factors, market fear, macro-prudential and central bank policies) \r\n(Coeurdacier and Rey 2013), they have large consequences for all "


id: cc8ddaea48ce1054274ac871bc3cbfb5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"future, the large-scale financing of new fossil fuel projects by large \r\nglobal financial institutions rose significantly since 2016, because \r\nof perceived lower private risks and higher private returns in these \r\ninvestments and other factors than in alternative but perceived more \r\nrisky low-carbon investments."


id: 162e880d8b65f6536b11f28da2091062
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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"Global growth. The fourth headwind entering 2020 was the sharply \r\nslowing global macroeconomic growth, and prospects for near\u0002term recession (which occurred in the pandemic). During global real \r\nand financial cycle downturns (Jorda et  al. 2019), the perception \r\nof general financial risk rises, causing financial institutions and \r\nsavers to reallocate their financing to risk-free global assets (high \r\nconfidence). This 'flight to safety' was evident even before the recent \r\npandemic, marked by an extraordinary tripling of financial assets to \r\nabout USD16.5 trillion in negative-interest earning 'safer' assets in \r\n2019 in world debt markets - enough to have nearly closed the total \r\nfinancing gap in climate finance over a decade."


id: b653ac7b9fdc06d5181d2c91b9c3226e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"The larger and still open public policy choice question that COVID-19 \r\nnow raises is whether there is room for public policy globally and \r\nin respect of their individual economies to integrate climate more \r\ncentrally to their growth, jobs and sustainable development strategies \r\nworldwide for ecological and economic survival. The outcomes will \r\ndepend on the robustness of recovery from the pandemic, and the \r\nstill evolving public policy responses to the climate agenda in the \r\nrecovery process. Private equity and asset markets have recovered "


id: c4b0da9d625ba7eff8ae298fe9f32bce
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Credit risks. The third headwind is rising financial and insurance \r\nsector risks and stresses (distinct from real 'physical' climate \r\nrisks above) arising from the impacts of climate change, and \r\nsystematically affecting both national and international financial \r\ninstitutions and raising their credit risks (high confidence) (Dafermos \r\net al. 2018; Rudebusch 2019; Battiston et al. 2021a). Central banks \r\nare beginning to take notice (Carney 2019; NGFS 2019). It is also \r\nthe case that, even if at greater risk from stranded assets in the "


id: bb6e40593c6f61a1417108bf1cbd691c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30195
content:
"policy (Mercure et  al. 2019). The argument for a  green recovery \r\nalso draws on the experience from the post-global financial crisis \r\nin 2008-2009 recovery, in which large economies such as China, \r\nSouth Korea, the USA and the EU observed that green investments \r\npropelled the development of new industrial sectors. Noticeably, \r\nthis had a  positive net effect on job creation when compared to \r\nthe investment in traditional infrastructure (UKERC 2014; Vona \r\net al. 2018; Jaeger et al. 2020). For a more in-depth discussion on \r\nmacroeconomic-finance possible response see Section  15.6.3. \r\nHere, we conclude with the options for reviving a  better globally \r\ncoordinated macroeconomic climate action. The options are some \r\ncombinations of five possible elements:"


id: cd3358c2ed49934ffc16278c46413c79
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"surprisingly rapidly during the pandemic (in response to the massive \r\nfiscal and central bank actions generating large excess savings \r\nwith very low or negative yields boosting stock markets). On public \r\nspending, some early studies suggest that the immediate economic \r\nrecovery packages were falling well short of being sufficiently \r\nclimate sustainable (Gosens and Jotzo 2020; Kuzemko et al. 2020; \r\nO'Callaghan 2021) but several governments have also announced \r\nintentions to spend more on a green recovery, 'build back better' and \r\nJust Transition efforts (Section  15.2.4), although outcomes remain \r\nhighly uncertain (Lehmann et al. 2021; Markandya et al. 2021)."


id: aea7a982ccd1761695073730a5d73eaf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"A new consensus and compact towards such a structural change and \r\neconomic stimulus instruments may therefore need to be redrawn \r\nworldwide, where an accelerated low-carbon transition is a priority; \r\nand accelerated climate finance to spur these investments may gain \r\nby becoming fully and rapidly integrated with near-term economic \r\nstimulus, growth and macroeconomic strategies for governments, \r\ncentral banks, and private financial systems alike. If that were \r\nto happen, COVID-19 may well be a  turning point for sustainable \r\nclimate policy and financing. Absent that, a return to 'business-as\u0002usual' modes will mean a likely down-cycle in climate financing and \r\ninvestments in the near term."


id: 463ba8dfc5858384bca146a25ca90c3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"Such a redrawing of a social compact has happened significantly in \r\nthe past, for example, after the 1860s 'gilded age of capital' with \r\nthe enlargement of the franchise in democratisation waves in Europe \r\nand the Americas (Dasgupta and Ziblatt 2015, 2016). Not only was \r\nsocial conflict avoided but growth outcomes became more equitable \r\nand faster. Similarly, comprehensive modern social safety nets and \r\nprogressive taxation, which started in the Great Depression and was \r\nextended in the post-war period, had both a positive pro-growth and \r\nlower inequality effects (Brida et al. 2020)."


id: 16b8e56972152bf5569cb15cbbc7565b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"There are three levels at which policy attention on climate financing \r\nnow may need to be focused. The first is the need to address the \r\nglobal equity issues in climate finance in a more carefully constructed \r\nglobally cooperative public policy approach. The second is to address \r\nissues appropriately with enhanced support, at the national level. \r\nThe third is to work it down further, to addressing needs at local \r\ncommunity levels. Because private investors and financing mostly \r\ndeal with allocation to climate finance at a  global portfolio level, \r\nthen to allocation by countries, and finally to individual projects, the \r\nchallenge for them is to refocus attention to Just Transition issues at \r\nthe country level, but also globally as well as locally (in other words, \r\nat all three levels)."


id: 2b2ed5ba48aa038abd33cf3be5558c3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"Climate finance will likely face greater challenges in the post\u0002pandemic context (Hanna et al. 2020; Henry et al. 2020). Evidence \r\nfrom the COVID-19 pandemic suggests that those in greatest \r\nvulnerability often had the least access to human, physical, and \r\nfinancial resources (Ruger and Horton 2020). It has also left in in \r\nits wake divergent prospects for economic recovery, with rising \r\nconstraints on credit ratings and costly debt burden in many \r\ndeveloping countries contrasted with the exceptionally low interest \r\nrate settings in developed economies driving the limited fiscal space \r\nin the former groups (Benmelech and Tzur-Ilan 2020). Similarly, \r\nmonetary policies are likely to be much tighter in developing countries \r\nin part structurally because of the absence of 'exceptional privilege' \r\nof global reserve currencies in developed economies."


id: bf0a6b0dc5994e633f1a0aeacbd44da3
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content:
"countries (IMF 2020b). In these circumstances, a  coordinated and \r\ncooperative approach, instead of unilateralism, might work better \r\n(McKibbin and Vines 2020). In the case of climate, simulations clearly \r\nsuggest the need and advantages of better coordinated climate action \r\nwith stepped-up Paris Agreement envisaged transfers (IMF 2020b). \r\nSeveral options in international climate finance arrangements to \r\nsupport a Just Transition are both available and urgent."


id: 7f35a8e068109ce2ddfc4fd896bd1312
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19535
content:
"As a  first priority, measures might need to accelerate a  mix of \r\nequitable financial grants, low-interest loans, guarantees and \r\nworkable business models access across countries and borders, \r\nfrom developed countries to low-income countries. A  big push on \r\nlow-carbon energy access globally, especially in large low-income \r\nregions such as Africa, with accelerated financial transfers, makes \r\nsense (Boamah 2020). For about one billion people globally at the \r\nbase of the pyramid without access to modern low-carbon energy \r\naccess, such an action, with enormous immediate leap-frogging \r\npotential, would be a key pathway to achieve the SDGs, ensure that \r\nhigh-carbon energy use is avoided, such as the burning of biomass \r\nand forests for charcoal, and improve air quality and public health, \r\nespecially women's health (van der Zwaan et al. 2018; Nathwani and \r\nKammen 2019; Dalla Longa and van der Zwaan 2021; Michaelowa \r\net al. 2021; Osabuohien et al. 2021)."


id: 22b6660b0a0a05dade4f0122c7b5d59f
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content:
"It makes sense to expedite these operational procedures (Khan et al. \r\n2020) which cannot be otherwise explained except in terms of avoiding \r\nresponsibilities, even where the benefits would be high (Klock et al. \r\n2018). It also causes (unnecessary) fragmentation and complexity \r\nand often 'strategic' ambiguity by many actors (Pickering et al. 2017), \r\nwhich worsens the possibilities for international cooperation, a critical \r\nrequirement to achieve the Paris goals (IPCC 2018). The world would \r\ngain collectively if these issues were to be decided soon. The absence \r\nof such a collective decision continues to be exceptionally costly for \r\nthe implementation of the Paris Agreement because of the fractious \r\nand seemingly insoluble negotiating climate and a breakdown of trust \r\nthat this has created (Roberts and Weikmans 2017)."


id: fd5fdba7f74250ce9d6a5554c3ef863
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"A third related and increasingly crucial priority is to expedite the \r\noperational definition of blended finance and promote the use of \r\npublic guarantee instruments. Private flows to accelerate the low\u0002carbon transition in developing countries would benefit enormously, \r\nby gaining clearer access to public international funds and support \r\ndefined on a grant equivalent basis, provided development and climate \r\nfinance operational definitions and procedures were improved on an \r\nurgent basis (Blended Finance Taskforce 2018a; OECD-DAC 2021). \r\nWhen blended and supported by public finance and policy, the grant "


id: a840ee1fd5e0eb67bbbea9dbe3127b24
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"the richest households, which have been sharply falling (Scheuer and \r\nSlemrod 2021) even as global income and wealth have risen, with \r\nregressive and falling overall taxes (Alvaredo et al. 2020; Saez and \r\nZucman 2020), could effectively generate significant revenues (over \r\n1% of GDP yr-1), about the same size as the proposed global USD50 \r\npertonne carbon price proposed and estimated by the IMF/OECD \r\n2021 report to the G20 (IMF and OECD 2021) to cover expected net \r\ninterest costs on overall decarbonisation initiatives and financing of \r\ngreen new deals (Schroeder 2021)."


id: 3f53dc5981bd91ff869696b363a5d49
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"Private institutional investors equally might equally wish to pay \r\ngreater attention to the Just Transition finance issues. It would be \r\nuseful for investors to identify ways to support to such initiatives, \r\nand more clearly identify the benefits of such transition measures \r\nenvisaged by both countries and investment financing proposals, \r\nincluding incorporating Just Transition consideration in their support \r\nto broader ESG and green financing initiatives."


id: 335cd1d09b6445a83932f0395d016e22
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Numerous options exist (Broeks et al. 2020; Nyfors et al. 2020) for such \r\ncarbon consumption reduction measures, while potentially improving \r\nsocietal well-being, for example: (i) inner-city zoning restrictions \r\non private cars and promoting walking/bicycle use and improved \r\nshared low-carbon transport infrastructure; (ii) advertising regulation \r\nand carbon taxes and fees on high-carbon luxury status goods and \r\nservices; (iii) subsidies and exemptions for low-carbon options, higher \r\nvalue-added taxes on specific high-carbon products and services, \r\nsubsidies for public low-carbon options such as commuter transport, \r\nand other behavioural nudges (Reisch et al. 2021); and (iv) framing \r\noptions (emphasising total cost of car over lifetimes), mandatory \r\nsmart metering, collective goods and services (leasing, renting, \r\nsharing options) and others. Finally, reducing subsidies on fossil fuels, \r\nraising the progressivity of taxes and raising overall wealth taxes on "


id: 3a2d888fcf9983e0d433946584b3e112
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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vector_id: 7442
content:
"in their climate policies and investments. For example, the EU Green \r\nDeal plans (Nae and Panie 2021) include several initiatives (focusing \r\non industries, regions and workers adversely affected, with explicit \r\nprogrammes to address them)."


id: 348e43d06a8e3d5ceac9d160863be199
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content:
"financing (Sections  15.3.2.3 and 15.3.2.4 respectively), as well \r\nas estimates of investment and financing needed to meet climate \r\nobjectives (Section 15.4)."


id: 1af4929f7fa3a22088ee0297019c7445
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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"The third level of argument is for a shift in focus from an exclusive \r\nattention to financing of mitigation and low-carbon new \r\ninvestments projects to also better understanding and addressing \r\nthe local adverse impacts of climate change on communities and \r\npeople, who are vulnerable and increasingly dispossessed due to \r\nlosses and damages from climate change or even those who are \r\nimpacted by decarbonisation measures in the fossil fuel sectors and \r\ntransportation, as well as those who are harmed by polluting sectors: \r\nindigenous men and women, minorities and generally the poor. It is \r\nevident that very few resources are available to countries, investors, \r\ncivil society, and smaller development institutions seeking to achieve \r\na just transition (Robins and Rydge 2020)."


id: d5590028fe988ae8022444cd61977514
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content:
"Finally, greater support is warranted for smaller towns and cities, local \r\nnetworks, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), communities, \r\nlocal authorities and universities for projects, research ideas and \r\nproposals (Lubell and Morrison 2021; Moftakhari et al. 2021; Stehle \r\n2021; Vedeld et al. 2021)."


id: e33d021d5d6ee7509a40be365490cb1a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37276
content:
"Gross-fixed capital formation (GFCF), another SNA standard that \r\ncovers tangible assets (notably infrastructure and equipment) and \r\nintangible assets, is a good proxy for investment flows in the real \r\neconomy. In 2019, global GFCF reached around 20 trillion USD2015\r\ncompared to around 14 trillion USD2015 in 2010, a more than 40% \r\nincrease (Figure  15.2). Global GFCF represents about a  quarter of \r\nglobal GDP, a relatively stable ratio since 2008. This share is, however, \r\nmuch higher for emerging economies, notably in Asia, which are \r\nbuilding new infrastructure at scale. As analysed in  Sections  15.4 \r\nand 15.5, infrastructure investment needs and gaps in developing \r\ncountries are significant. How these are met over the next \r\ndecade will critically influence the likelihood of reaching the Paris \r\nAgreement goals."


id: d2e6cfede4f98ee1c78605d64350f6ab
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content:
"Assessments of finance for climate action need to be placed within \r\nthe broader perspective of all investments and financing flows and \r\nstocks. This section provides aggregate level reference points of \r\nrelevance to the remainder of this chapter, notably when assessing \r\ncurrent levels of climate and fossil fuel-related investments and "


id: 74bcd3df921d04d822ef74c8f1d12d48
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"Figure 15.1 | Financial flows - GDP (trillion USD2015) by type of economy (left) and region (right). Note: Regional breakdown based on official UN country \r\nclassification. GDP in trillion USD2015. Source: World Bank Data (2020a). Numbers represent aggregated country data. Last updated data on 15 September 2021. CC BY-4.0."


id: efc25856ac9ba846be95fde8dd14f880
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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"From the perspective of climate change action, these orders of \r\nmagnitude make it possible to highlight the relatively small size \r\nof current climate finance flows and relatively larger size of remaining \r\nfossil fuel-related finance flows (discussed in the following two sub\u0002sections), as well as, more generally, the significant overall scale \r\nof financial flows and stocks that have to be made consistent with \r\nclimate goals. These orders of magnitude further make it possible to \r\nput in perspective climate-related investment needs (Section 15.4) \r\nand gaps (Section 15.5)."


id: 2b7dd64332cc01312b02245204402b43
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4906
content:
"The measurement of climate finance flows continues to face similar \r\ndefinitional, coverage and reliability issues as at the time of AR5 and \r\nthe Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5degC, despite progress \r\nmade (more sources, greater frequency, and some definitional \r\nimprovements) by a  range of data providers and collators. Based \r\non available estimates (Table 15.1 and Figure 15.3), flows of annual "


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content:
"Note: CPI: Climate Policy Initiative; SCF: Standing Committee on Finance. Numbers in current billion USD. Deflated to USD2015 in italic. Given the variations in numbers reported \r\nby different entities, changes in data, definitions and methodologies over time, there is low confidence attached to the aggregate numbers presented here. The higher bound \r\nreported in the SCF's Biennial Assessment reports includes estimates from the International Energy Agency on energy efficiency investments, which are excludes from the lower \r\nbound and CPI's estimates. Sources: UNFCCC (2018a); Buchner et al. (2019); Naran et al. (2021)."


id: 13d806b10643608162cea6bf7ca11f15
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"However, private investments in climate projects and activities often \r\nbenefit from public support in the form of co-financing, guarantees \r\nor fiscal measures. In terms of financial instruments and mechanisms, \r\ndebt as well as balance sheet financing (which can rely on both \r\nown resources and further debt) and project financing (combining \r\na large debt portion and smaller equity portion) represent the lion's \r\nshare. In this context, the rapid rise of climate-related bond issuances \r\nsince AR5 (Giorgi and Michetti 2021) represents an opportunity \r\nfor scaling up climate finance but also poses underlying issues of \r\nintegrity (Nicol et al. 2018a; Shishlov et al. 2018) and additionality \r\n(Schneeweiss 2019), as further discussed in Section  15.6.5, and \r\nneeds to be considered in the context of overall indebtedness and \r\ndebt sustainability (Sections 15.6.1 and 15.6.3)."


id: 1b693894cd8d7dbc09025b204f90f716
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"global climate finance are on an upward trend since AR5, reaching \r\na high-bound estimate of USD681 billion in 2016 (UNFCCC 2018a), \r\nrepresenting USD674 billion 2015. Latest available estimates indicate \r\na  drop in 2018 (Buchner et  al. 2019) and a  rebound in 2019 and \r\n2020 (medium confidence) (Naran et al. 2021). Although not directly \r\ncomparable in terms of scope, current climate finance flows remain \r\nsmall (approx. 3%) compared to the GFCF reference point introduced \r\nin Section 15.3.1, and need to be put in perspective with remaining \r\nfossil fuel financing (medium confidence) (Section 15.3.2.3)."


id: da662abc3e60a779bbf173712348e25e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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"At an aggregate level, in both developed and developing countries, \r\nthe vast majority of tracked climate finance is sourced from domestic \r\nor national markets rather than cross-border financing (Buchner et al. \r\n2019). This reinforces the point that national policies and settings \r\nremain crucial (Section 15.6.2), along with the development of local \r\ncapital markets (Section 15.6.7)."


id: e7b56b482c8c5353023ea46243ff6c2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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"Mitigation continues to represent the lion's share of global climate \r\nfinance (consistently above 90% between 2017 and 2020), and in \r\nparticular renewable energy, followed by energy efficiency and \r\ntransport (high confidence) (UNFCCC 2018a; Buchner et  al. 2019). \r\nWhile capacity additions on the ground kept rising, falling technology \r\ncosts in certain sectors (e.g., solar energy) has had a negative impact \r\non the year-on-year trend that can be observed in terms of volumes \r\nof climate finance (BNEF 2019; IRENA 2019a). However, such cost \r\nreduction could free up investment and financing capacities for \r\npotential use in other climate-related activities."


id: d462f800c92cd62075d7dbe7f275df36
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Climate finance in developing countries remains heavily concentrated \r\nin a few large economies (high confidence), with Brazil, India, China \r\nand South Africa accounting for around one-quarter to more than \r\na third depending on the year, a share similar to that represented \r\nby developed countries. Least-developed countries (LDCs), on \r\nthe other hand, continue to represent less than 5% year-on-year \r\n(medium confidence) (BNEF 2019; Buchner et al. 2019). Further, the \r\nrelatively modest growth of climate finance in developed countries is \r\na matter of concern given that economic circumstances are, in most \r\ncases, relatively more amenable to greater financing, savings and \r\naffordability than in developing countries."


id: 4df875ad0a856fef6e074a8942290974
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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"Tracking adaptation finance continues to pose significant challenges \r\nin terms of data and methods. Notably, the mainstreaming of \r\nresilience into investments and business decisions makes it difficult \r\nto identify relevant activities within financial datasets (Agrawala \r\net  al. 2011; Brown et  al. 2015; Averchenkova et  al. 2016). Despite \r\nthese limitations, evidence shows that finance for adaptation \r\nremains fragmented and significantly below rapidly rising needs \r\n(Section  15.4 and Cross-Chapter Box FINANCE: Finance for \r\nAdaptation and Resilience in Chapter  17 of AR6 WGII report). "


id: 4a9dd941fabae2d27c77388899faf3af
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"At a global level, the majority of tracked climate finance is assessed \r\nas coming from private actors (Buchner et al. 2019), although, the \r\nboundaries between private and public finance include significant \r\ngrey zones (Box 15.2), which implies that different definitions could \r\nlead to different conclusions (Yeo 2019; Weikmans and Roberts 2019). "


id: 172ea74451609970acbd0c5955a749e2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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"In 2009, at COP15, Parties to the UNFCCC agreed the following: 'In the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency \r\non implementation, developed countries commit to a goal of mobilising jointly USD100 billion a year by 2020 to address the needs \r\nof developing countries. This funding will come from a wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including \r\nalternative sources of finance' (UNFCCC 2009)."


id: 70cd9888567bbf7a231ad145ef88b707
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"This goal is further embedded as a target under SDG 13 Climate Action. While the parameters for what and how to count were not \r\ndefined when the goal was set, progress in this area has been achieved under the UNFCCC (UNFCCC 2019b) and via a UN-driven \r\nindependent expert review (Bhattacharya et al. 2020)."


id: b02664e1856e826458c1dfe0b9a3e22
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"Reports by Oxfam provide a complementary view on public climate finance, building on OECD figures and underlying data sources \r\nto translate gross flows of bilateral and multilateral public climate finance in grant equivalent terms, while also, for some activities, \r\napplying discounts to the proportion considered as climate finance (Carty et al. 2016; Carty and Le Comte 2018; Carty et al 2020). \r\nThe resulting annual averages for 2015-2016 and 2017-2018 range between 32% (low bound) and 44% (high bound) of gross \r\npublic climate finance. The difference with OECD figures stems from the high share represented by loans, both concessional and non\u0002concessional, in public climate finance, that is, 74% in 2018 (OECD 2020b)."


id: 55fbf9965b435ab40088874f8e896f08
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"A point of method that attracts much attention relates to how to account for private finance mobilised. The OECD, through its \r\nDevelopment Assistance Committee, established an international standard to measure private finance mobilised by official \r\ndevelopment finance, which consists in methods tailored to different financial mechanisms. These methods take into account the role \r\nof, risk taken, and/or amount provided by all official actors involved in a given project, including recipient country institutions, thereby \r\nalso avoiding risks of double counting (OECD 2019b). MDBs apply a different method (World Bank 2018a) in their joint climate finance \r\nreporting (AfDB et al. 2020), which neither correspond to the geographical scope of the USD100 billion goal, nor address the issue of \r\nattribution to the extent required in that context."


id: 8aabc07e488f936be567e5246547ec98
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"Notwithstanding methodological discussions under the UNFCCC, there is still some distance from the USD100 billion a  year \r\ncommitment being achieved, including in terms of further prioritising adaptation. While the scope of the commitment corresponds to \r\nonly a fraction of the larger sums needed (Section 15.4), its fulfilment can both contribute to climate action in developing countries \r\nas well as to trust building in international climate negotiations. Combined with further clarity on geographical and sectoral gaps, \r\nthis can, in turn, facilitate the implementation of better coordinated and cooperative arrangements for mobilising funds (Peake and \r\nEkins 2017)."


id: 8b67246fdbc9c1b8f15e535e9bab4e3e
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content:
"may have more incentive to support mitigation over adaptation as \r\nmitigation benefits are global while the benefits of adaptation are \r\nlocal or regional (Abadie et al. 2013)."


id: ff1f9fcfa4d120a7fba91df028230d82
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"Further, there is increasing awareness about the need to better \r\nunderstand and address the interlinkages between climate change \r\nadaptation and disaster risk reduction (DRR) towards achieving \r\nresilience (OECD 2020a). Watson et  al. (2015) however, note that \r\nbetween 2003 and 2014, of the USD2 billion that flowed through \r\ndedicated climate change adaptation funds, only USD369 million \r\nexplicitly went to DRR activities (Climate Funds Update 2014; \r\nNakhooda et al. 2014a; Nakhooda et al. 2014b; Watson et al. 2015). \r\nFor the private sector, insurance and reinsurance remain the dominant \r\nway to transfer risk as discussed in Section 15.6.4)."


id: afbfa138aed515502a06c2da70a2e74d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"In modelled pathways that limit warming to 1.5degC (>50%) with no or \r\nlimited overshoot, however, make it clear that the share of fossil fuels \r\nin energy supply has to decrease (see Chapter 3). For instance, the \r\nInternational Energy Agency (IEA) Net Zero by 2050 scenario relies \r\non halting sales of new internal combustion engine passenger cars \r\nby 2035, rapid and steady decrease of the production of coal (minus \r\n90%), oil (minus 75%) and natural gas (minus 55%) by 2050, and \r\nphasing out all unabated coal and oil power plants by 2040 (IEA \r\n2021b). To avoid locking GHG emissions incompatible with remaining \r\ncarbon budgets, this implies a rapid scaling down of new fossil fuel\u0002related investments, combined with a scaling up of financing to allow \r\nenergy and infrastructure systems to transition (high confidence)."


id: 71cbbbeb0ddf184517a2cc995e6c824f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"Data on private and commercial finance remain very patchy, \r\nparticularly for corporate financing (including debt financing \r\nprovided by commercial banks), for which it is difficult to establish \r\na link with activities and projects on the ground (high confidence). \r\nFurther, as individual sources of aggregate reporting (UNFCCC \r\n2018a; Buchner et al. 2019; FS-UNEP Centre and BNEF 2020) tend to \r\nrely on the same main data sources (notably the BNEF commercial \r\ndatabase for renewable energy investments) as well as to cross\u0002check numbers against similar other sources, there is a potential for \r\n'group-think' and bias."


id: 8aebf176695cffd9043bc93e28384dc0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"Such data gaps as well as varying definitions of what qualifies as \r\n'climate' (or more broadly as 'green' and 'sustainable') not only pose \r\na  measurement challenge. They also result in a  lack of clarity for \r\ninvestors and financiers seeking climate-related opportunities. Such \r\nuncertainty can lead both to reduced climate finance as well as to \r\na lack of transparency in climate-related reporting (further discussed \r\nin Section 15.6.1), which in turn further hinders reliable measurement."


id: 7ac396dfa79f566c40a14fa4cdcdc3e2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"In terms of finance provided and mobilised by developed countries for \r\nclimate action in developing countries, while accounting scope and \r\nmethodologies continue to be debated (Box 15.4), progress has been \r\nachieved on these matters in the context of the UNFCCC (UNFCCC \r\n2019b). A consensus, however, exists, on a need to further scale up \r\npublic finance and improve its effectiveness in mobilising private \r\nfinance (OECD 2020b), as well as to further prioritise adaptation \r\nfinancing, in particular towards the most vulnerable countries (Carty \r\net al. 2020). The relatively low share of adaptation in international \r\nclimate finance to date may in part be due to a low level of obligation \r\nand precision in global adaptation rules and commitments (Hall and \r\nPersson 2018). Further, providers of international climate finance "


id: a4632278667464b20ae8ff8b04d7294e
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content:
"7 The term Investment 'Needs' used in the chapter means equal to the term Investment Requirement used in SPM."


id: 7119c2d0e5d3d709b832ae33e53c32e3
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content:
"conducive public policies, attractive investment opportunities, as well \r\nas the availability of financing to finance such a transition."


id: 6b5975ccd9b0ff149e785debca5df276
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16186
content:
"well as policy areas, for example, from a trade policy perspective, in \r\nmost countries, import tariffs and non-tariff barriers are substantially \r\nlower on relatively more CO2 intensive industries (Shapiro 2020). \r\nAvailable inventories of fossil fuel subsidies (in the form of direct \r\nbudgetary transfers, revenue forgone, risk transfers, or induced \r\ntransfers), covering 76 economies, indicate a rise to USD340 billion \r\nin 2017, a  5% increase compared to 2016. Such trend is due to \r\nslowed down progress in reducing support among OECD and G20 \r\neconomies in 2017 (OECD 2018b) and to a rise in fossil fuel subsidies \r\nfor consumption in several developing economies (Matsumura \r\nand Adam 2019), which, in turn, reduces the efficiency of public \r\ninstruments and incentives aimed at redirecting investments and \r\nfinancing towards low-GHG activities."


id: c5e2bd347a41ce887bf177a4d01ed0f3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"As a  result, the demand for fossil fuels, especially in the energy \r\nproduction, transport and buildings sectors, remain high, and the \r\nrisk-return profile of fossil fuel-related investments is still positive \r\nin many instance (Hanif et al. 2019). Political economy constraints of \r\nfossil fuel subsidy reform continue to be a major hurdle for climate \r\naction (Schwanitz et  al. 2014; Rottgers and Anderson 2018), as \r\nfurther discussed in Section 15.5.2. and Chapter 13."


id: 87b8d6cb89e6ab7df76819ff358310a1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21037
content:
"As developed in Section  15.6.3, the insufficient level of ambition \r\nand coherence of public policies at national and international \r\nlevels remains the root cause of the still significant misalignment \r\nof investment and financing compared to pathways compatible \r\nwith the Paris Agreement temperature goal (UNEP 2018). Such lack \r\nof coherence includes low pricing of carbon and of environmental \r\nexternalities more generally, as well as misaligned policies in non\u0002climate policy areas such as fiscal, trade, industrial and investment \r\npolicy, and financial regulation (OECD 2015b), as further specified in \r\nthe sectoral Chapters 6 to 12."


id: 9326af9fb1d94745185d614da95af8d9
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"The most documented policy misalignment relates to the remaining \r\nvery large scale of public direct and indirect financial support for \r\nfossil fuel-related production and consumption in many parts of \r\nthe world (Bast et al. 2015; Coady et al. 2017; Climate Transparency \r\n2020). Fossil fuel subsidies are embedded across economic sectors as "


id: 993ccb4a743cc2bae6d2c6cffa2bced2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Economic viability of investments - ideally not relying on the pricing \r\nof positive externalities  - has been a  critical driver of momentum \r\nin the past. The falling technology costs and the competitiveness \r\nof renewable technologies, especially solar PV and wind, have \r\naccelerated the deployment of renewable technologies over the past \r\nyears. Renewable energy technologies are now often competitive, \r\nand have even become the cheapest, in many countries, even without \r\nfinancial support (FS-UNEP Centre and BNEF 2015, 2016, 2017, \r\n2018, 2019; IEA 2020c; IRENA 2020a) and without pricing of the \r\navoided carbon emissions. In contrast, the dependency on regulatory \r\ninterventions and public financial support to create financial viability \r\nhas provided a source of volatile investor appetite. The annual volume \r\nof renewable investment by country is often volatile, reflecting ending \r\nand new regulations and policies (IEA 2019a)."


id: db5ae02e366a285e6a8a141b6ee1121e
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"A significant share of investment needs in heavily regulated sectors, \r\nsuch as electricity, public transport, and telecom, emphasises the \r\nimportance of regulatory intervention, such as ownership and market \r\naccess (OECD 2017b). For instance, energy-system developments \r\nrequire effective and credible commitments and action by \r\npolicymakers to ensure an efficient capital allocation aligned with \r\nclimate targets (Bertram et al. 2021)."


id: 3293a5e61f30567b861ed7956d3e302b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"There is a  lot of discussion about the regulated ownership of the \r\nprivate sector (European Commission 2017) and the restructuring of \r\nelectricity market contributed to low level of investment in baseline \r\nelectricity capacity and in investment research and innovation. These \r\nchanges create uncertainty of investment, and barriers to market \r\nentry and exit also potentially limit the competition in the market \r\nand restrict the entrance of new investment (Finon 2006; Joskow \r\n2007; Grubb and Newbery 2018). This is also the case in developing \r\ncountries (Foster and Rana 2020)."


id: 4eaa50c5016b97c5c86e9ac2b2a0b11f
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"The positive development in the energy sector has benefitted from \r\nthe evident stand-alone character of renewable energy generation \r\nprojects. First movers realised these projects with investors and \r\ndevelopers acting from conviction (Steffen et al. 2018). Such action is \r\nnot possible to this extent in energy efficiency with related investment "


id: 389fa40d6623455f80acec1087f3695a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7166
content:
"scenarios likely to limit warming to 2degC or lower. The differences \r\nrelate to the scope of the assessments regarding sectors, regions and \r\nperiods, top-down versus bottom-up approaches, and methodological \r\nissues around boundaries of climate-related investment needs, \r\nparticularly full vs incremental costs and the exclusion or inclusion \r\nof consumer-level investments. Information on investment needs \r\nand financing options in NDCs mirrors this challenge and is heavily \r\nheterogeneous (Zhang and Pan 2016)."


id: 2b481235c6d3661af738444083247aaa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4861
content:
"In particular, for global approaches, modelling assumptions are often \r\nheavily standardised, focusing on technology costs. Only limited \r\nglobal analysis is available on incremental costs and investments, \r\nreflecting the reality of developing countries, also considering the \r\ninterplay with significant infrastructure finance gaps, and can hardly \r\nserve as a robust basis for negotiations about international public \r\nclimate finance. The focus on investment irrespective of uncertainty \r\nas well as other qualitative aspects of needs does not allow for \r\na straightforward analysis of the need for public finance to leverage \r\nprivate sector financing and of the country heterogeneity in terms of \r\ninvestment risks and access to capital (Clark et al. 2018)."


id: d8019092aa123397bf408f71add37f87
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Another source of uncertainty about the financing needs is the \r\ninterplays between (i) the baseline economic growth rates, (ii) the link \r\nbetween economic growth and energy demand, including rebound \r\neffects of energy efficiency gains, (iii) the evolution of microeconomic \r\nparameters such as fossil fuel prices, interest rates, currency \r\nexchange rates (iv) the level of integration between climate policies \r\nand sectoral policies and their efficacy, and (v) the impact of climate \r\npolicies on growth and the capacity of fiscal and financial policies \r\nto offset their adverse effect (IPCC 2014; IPCC 2018). Integrated \r\nassessment models (IAMs) try to capture some of these interplays \r\neven though they typically do not capture the financial constraints \r\nand the structural causes of the infrastructure investment gap. Many \r\nof them rely on growth models with full exploitation of the means \r\nof production (labour and capital). They nevertheless provide useful "


id: fbe0f286d4bf4e08b1177ea31cc4d5d5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Multiple stakeholders prepare and present quantitative financing \r\nneeds assessments with methodologies applied to vary significantly \r\nrepresenting a major challenge for aggregation of needs (e.g., Osama \r\net  al. (2021) for African countries), most of them with a  focus on "


id: b1c4a114de36441131fcc29ff165bc96
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28488
content:
"indications of the orders of magnitude at play over the long run, and \r\nthe determinants of their uncertainty. Global yearly average low\u0002carbon investment needs until 2030 for electricity, transportation, \r\nAFOLU and energy efficiency measures including industry and \r\nbuildings are estimated between 3% and 6% of the world's GDP \r\naccording to the analysis in Section 15.5. The incremental costs of \r\nlow-carbon options are less than that and their funding could be \r\nachieved without reducing global consumption by reallocating \r\n1.4% to 3.9% of global savings. 2.4% on average (see Box 4.8 of \r\nSR1.5 (IPCC 2018)) currently flow towards real estate, land and liquid \r\nfinancial vehicles. For the short-term decisions, the major information \r\nthey give is the uncertainty range because this is an indicator of the \r\nrisks decision-makers need."


id: 8058858a69afdc09c464864955461b00
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19711
content:
"While the AR6 Scenarios Database provides good transparency with \r\nregard to technology costs for electricity generation, assumptions \r\ndriving in particular investments in energy efficiency are rarely made \r\navailable in both IAM-based assessments and also other studies. \r\nTaking into account the much broader range of tested and untested \r\ntechnologies the confidence levels, in particular for 2050 estimates, \r\nremain low but can provide an initial indication. Also, the ranges \r\nallow for a rough indication on possible 'green' investment volumes \r\nand respective asset allocation for financial sector stakeholders."


id: b933f55e6b64574f231d23b8ce85cac5
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content:
"Note: Global average yearly investments from 2023-2032 (in USD2015). Electricity subcomponents are not exhaustive. Hydro, geothermal, biomass and others are not shown, as these \r\nare shown to be of smaller magnitude (Chapter 3). Difference between non-biomass renewables and solar/wind represents hydro and in some scenarios geothermal, tidal, and ocean. \r\nScenarios are grouped into common AR6 categories (vertical axis, C1-C3). The numbers represent medians across all scenarios within one category, and rounded brackets indicate \r\ninter-quartile ranges, while the numbers in squared brackets indicate number of scenarios. C6, C7, and C8 are not shown in Table 15.2. Reference C5 category for Transmission and \r\nDistribution (T&D) is 364bn (294bn to 445bn) [111] used for calculation of incremental needs in Figure 15.4. Data source: AR6 Scenarios Database."


id: 3959cf3714950957178ac1aea55e6c95
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
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vector_id: 7303
content:
"Table 15.3 | Regional average yearly investments from 2023-2032 for electricity supply in billion USD2015."


id: a5a856213f1031162fe173dc08ff194e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
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content:
"Note: Average yearly investments from 2023-2032 for electricity generation capacity, by aggregate regions (in billion USD2015). Further notes see Table 15.2. Reference C5 \r\ncategory for Transmission and Distribution shown in Table 15.2 as it is used for calculation of incremental needs for Figure 15.4. Vertical axis, C4-C8 except Transmission and \r\nDistribution not shown. Data source: AR6 Scenarios Database."


id: d1f3f7d36e1d1735a0febc7fa16361d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34284
content:
"What is apparent is that the bulk of investment requirements \r\ncorresponds to medium- and low-income countries in Asia, Latin \r\nAmerica, the Middle East and Africa, as these still have growing \r\nenergy demand, and it is still considerably lower than the global \r\naverage. This illustrates a vital opportunity to ensure the build-up of \r\nsustainable energy infrastructures in these regions and constitutes \r\na  risk of additional carbon lock-in if investments into fossil "


id: 5cd403417b5e537f40d8ff7e0e71130d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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vector_id: 13596
content:
"infrastructures, especially coal-fired power plants, and uncontrolled \r\nurban expansion, continue."


id: 5b9ee9a79a35a3f17d658c44a7617303
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13373
content:
"Investment needs in electrification derived from IAMs do not \r\ninclude systematically investments in end-use equipment and \r\ndistribution (Box 4.8 in SR1.5 (IPCC 2018)). Model-based estimates \r\nof investment needs don't have the regional granularity to single out "


id: 1e34a2c8b799ac9fe82d268ef7678a7d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2513
content:
"supply like hydrogen and synthetic fuels, and for direct electrification \r\nequipment (heat pumps, electric vehicles (EV), etc.) scale up from \r\nmuch lower levels and will likely continue to grow as a share of GDP \r\nuntil mid-century, though uncertainties and accounting is still much \r\nmore uncertain. (Bertram et al. 2021)."


id: 774f666f2e41f51e9b5b0afe9c5adb1d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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vector_id: 18197
content:
"LDCs, as model regions typically are defined based on geographic \r\nproximity and therefore aggregate LDCs and other countries. With \r\nthe average electricity consumption per capita in Africa increasing \r\nto 0.68-0.87 (1.43-2.92) MWh in 2030 (2050) yr-1 and remaining \r\nat the very low end of the global range [0.46 in Africa compared \r\nto the upper end of 12.02 in North America, MWh per capita and \r\nyear in 2020], the targeted full electrification until 2030 appears \r\nunrealistic across all scenarios. SEforAll and IEA estimate assumed \r\ninvestment needs to decentralised end-user electrification to come \r\nin around USD40 billion on average until 2030 (SEforALL and CPI \r\n2020; IEA 2021d)."


id: 8d7a8430a10bc2c858047c9f45527a2a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22075
content:
"Quantitative analysis of investment needs in other sectors.\r\nAs described above, investment needs in non-energy sectors tend to \r\nbe ignored in many integrated assessment models with studies for \r\nindividual countries or regions providing a more fragmented picture \r\nonly. However, the quality of estimates is likely not to be less robust \r\ngiven the drawbacks of integrated assessment models."


id: cfd6d39b9600f77b66785f3ede9539a8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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vector_id: 33924
content:
"Chapter  7  stresses the importance of opportunity costs for AFOLU \r\nmitigation options, in particular for afforestation and avoided \r\ndeforestation projects, and derives net annual costs of around \r\nUSD278 billion yr-1 in the next several decades, mostly opportunity \r\ncosts. Net costs of delivering 5-6 Gt CO2 yr-1 of forest related carbon \r\nsequestration and emission reduction around 2050 as assessed with \r\nsectoral models are estimated to reach to ~ USD400 billion yr-1 by \r\n2050, excluding externality costs (Chapter 7.4)."


id: e45ab0fa880c97de6aa43b02e3373f2a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37471
content:
"Quantitative analysis of investment needs in energy \r\ngeneration based on IRENA and IEA data and comparison \r\nto AR6 scenario database output."


id: 1e7929739160e626a8608b16bb1c3aa1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2564
content:
"According to IRENA, the government plans in place today call \r\nfor investing at least USD95 trillion in energy systems over the \r\ncoming three decades (2016-2050) (IRENA 2020c). Redirecting and \r\nincreasing investments to ensure a climate-safe future (Transforming \r\nEnergy Scenario, TES) would require reaching on average around \r\n1 trillion USD2015 yr-1 (average until 2030) for electricity generation \r\nas well as grids and storage, increasing to above 2 trillion USD2015 yr-1\r\n(average until 2030) in the 1.5 scenario (IRENA 2021). IEA's respective \r\nSDS and NZE scenarios come in at average annual investments \r\nbetween USD1.0  trillion yr-1 and USD1.6 trillion yr-1 (average until \r\n2030) (IEA 2021b). These additional data points for the C1 and C3 \r\ncategory underpin the range presented in the AR6 Scenarios Database \r\nfor needs until 2032 despite the slightly varying periods."


id: fd85b2ff3a4b55223962713e5bd3199
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41959
content:
"Energy efficiency. Estimates on energy investment needs vary \r\nsignificantly with a low level of transparency with regard to underlying \r\ntechnology cost assumptions burdening the confidence levels."


id: 9e0754d5bf03847464603e94138b5c9b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"IRENA only selectively reports financing needs for energy \r\nefficiency in buildings and industry as separate categories. For the \r\n1.5-S average yr-1 needs until 2050 come in at 963 billion USD2015\r\nfor buildings, 102 billion USD2015 for heat pumps, and 354 billion \r\nUSD2015 for industry. Applying the relative share of these categories \r\non higher total needs until 2030, around 1.8 trillion USD2015  yr-1\r\nin buildings and industry are needed in the 1.5-S.  For the TES \r\ncumulative energy efficiency investment needs until 2030 are stated \r\nat 29 trillion USD2015 translating into an yearly average of around \r\n1.7  trillion USD2015 yr-1, excluding transportation. IEA estimates \r\ncome in at a much lower level at 0.6 and 0.8 billion USD2015 yr-1 on \r\naverage between 2026-2030 for their SDS and NZE scenarios."


id: d0672fae4a781455321c1f3a8de43774
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34018
content:
"In contrast to the IAMs, IRENA and IEA assessments do not allow \r\nfor an analysis of mitigation-driven investment needs in transmission \r\nand distribution, which likely results in an overestimation of the \r\nmitigation-driven investment needs in their analysis."


id: fb14c557a177f7ecdf114f4194cbe5cd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41549
content:
"Transportation. For the transportation sector, OECD has presented \r\nthe most comprehensive assessment of financing needs in the AR6 \r\ndatabase based on IEA data with the annual average coming in at \r\nUSD2.7 trillion between 2015 and 2035 i In modelled global pathways \r\nthat limit warming to 2degC (>67%). The assessment comprises road, \r\nrail and airports/ports infrastructure, with only rail infrastructure \r\nbeing considered in this analysis."


id: a3c7e740a75c05f54a96e35952e2f12b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26011
content:
"On a regional level, Oxford Economics (2017) shows that annual \r\ninfrastructure investments between 2016 and 2040 vary widely. \r\nFor all available countries (n=50) estimates count close to \r\n0.4 trillion USD2015 yr-1, including 0.217 trillion USD2015 yr-1 for China. \r\nBased on available data for nine African countries, investments in rail \r\ninfrastructure range from USD0.1 billion in Senegal to USD1.6 billion \r\nin Nigeria. Osama et al. (2021) highlight a USD4.7 billion financing gap \r\nfor African countries in the transport sector. In Latin America Oxford \r\nEconomics (2017) identifies Brazil as frontrunner of required rail \r\ninvestments with USD8.3 billion, followed by Peru with USD2.3 billion. "


id: 89e2c0dc4aa1c43ae7ceac3b60cd8bfd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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vector_id: 21428
content:
"Chapter  7  stresses the importance of opportunity costs for AFOLU \r\nmitigation options, in particular for afforestation projects, and derives \r\naverage yearly investment needs of around 278 billion USD2015 yr-1\r\nuntil 2030 rising to 431 billion USD2015 yr-1 over the next several \r\ndecades, including opportunity costs. The estimate is based on \r\nan assumption of emission reductions consistent with pathways \r\nC1-C4, leading to average abatement of 9.1 GtCO2 yr-1 (median \r\nrange 6.7-12.3 GtCO2 yr-1) from 2020-2050 and marginal costs \r\nof USD100 per tonne CO2, excluding investments in bioenergy with \r\ncarbon capture and storage and changes in food consumption and \r\nfood waste (Section  7.4). The largest investments are projected to \r\noccur in Latin America, South-East Asia, and Africa, constituting 61% \r\nof total expenditure. The implied change of land use might trigger \r\nnegative effects on other SDGs which need to be addressed to offer \r\nrobust safeguards and labelling for investors."


id: f0c828fd6489a250c80edcdca63003ee
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39726
content:
"In total, developed countries' financing needs mount up to almost \r\nUSD120 billion yr-1 (n=15, mean=7.97bn USD) for rail infrastructure. \r\nFinancing needs in developing countries (excluding LDCs and excluding \r\nChina) mount up to almost USD50 billion yr-1 (n=27, mean=1.78bn USD, \r\nexcluding China). Oxford Economics (2017) reports rail infrastructure \r\nfinancing needs for China of more than USD200 billion yr-1 between \r\n2016 and 2040."


id: eeb36b79c41caeee66bd90ad6b746f9d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39378
content:
"Fisch-Romito and Guivarch (2019) show, by endogenising the impact \r\nof urban infrastructure policies on mobility needs and modal choices \r\nthat transportation investment needs globally might be lower in low\u0002carbon pathways compared with baselines, with lower investments in \r\nroad and air infrastructure. This does mean that higher investments \r\nare not needed over the following two decades; this is confirmed by \r\nRozenberg and Fay (2019) that strong policy integration between urban, \r\ntransportation and energy policies reduce the total investment gap."


id: 33d816e47169efbd6539c41c5207f98f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6363
content:
"IRENA as well as IEA have presented estimates for energy efficiency \r\ninvestments in the transport sector. For the 1.5-S scenario, IRENA \r\nindicates average investment needs of USD2015 0.2 trillion yr-1 for EV \r\ninfrastructure, USD2015 0.2 trillion yr-1 for transport energy efficiency \r\nand USD2015 0.3 trillion yr-1 for EV batteries (average until 2030) (IRENA \r\n2020d). IEA indicates a total of around 0.6 and 0.7 trillion USD2015 yr-1\r\nfor transport energy efficiency in the SDS and IEA scenarios for the \r\n2026-2030 period (IEA 2021c). Many investment categories relating to \r\nmitigation options, in particular with regard to behavioural change and \r\ntransport mode changes (Chapter 10, Figure SPM.8), are neglected in \r\nthese analyses despite their significant mitigation potential."


id: 1dda852fe3fe8aea723366d538468d6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2440
content:
"AFOLU.  The Food and Land Use Coalition estimates additional \r\ninvestment needs for ten critical transitions for the global food and \r\nland use systems to achieve the long-term global goal (LTGG) \r\nand  SDGs. Additional annual investment needs until 2030 add up \r\nto USD300-350 billion. Considering the change in global diets \r\nas well as the land-based nature-based solutions only, annual \r\ninvestment needs would come in between USD110-135 billion. "


id: f25fb9915bb49bd30cf016b72b8a7a88
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40037
content:
"Adaptation financing needs. Financing needs for adaptation \r\nare even more difficult to define than those of mitigation because \r\nmobilising specific adaptation investments is only part of the challenge \r\nsince ultimately improving societies' adaptive capacities depends on "


id: ae6170652c705971d446e958ba72e12d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27909
content:
"the SDGs' fulfilment (Hallegatte et al. 2016). Bridging the investment \r\ngap on irrigation, water supply, health care, energy access, and quality \r\nbuildings is an essential enabling condition for adapting to climate \r\nchange. The scenario analysis conducted by Rozenberg and Fay (2019) \r\nshow that fulfilling the SDGs to improve the adaptive capacity of low\u0002and middle-income countries would require investments in water \r\nsupply, sanitation, irrigation and flood protection that would account \r\nfor about 0.5% of developing countries' GDP in a baseline scenario \r\nto 1.85% and 1% with a strong and anticipatory policy integration \r\n(USD664 billion and 351 billion on average by 2030)."


id: 60c2e0bf86699f6d378def6acb7b710d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14320
content:
"initiatives. These barriers are 'friction that prevents socially optimal \r\ninvestments from being commercially attractive' (Druce et al. 2016). \r\nThey are at the root of the 'microeconomic paradox' of a deficit of \r\ninfrastructure investments despite a  real return between 4% and \r\n8% (Bhattacharya et  al. 2016), of the low share of carbon-saving \r\npotentials tapped by dedicated policies such as energy renovation \r\nprogrammes (Urge-Vorsatz et  al. 2018), and, more generally of \r\na demand for climate finance lower than the volume of economically \r\nviable projects (de Gouvello and Zelenko 2010; Timilsina et al. 2010)."


id: 263b333e569cf761a0953a3982ca367c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3896
content:
"There is increasing recognition of rising adaptation challenges and \r\nassociated costs within and across developed countries. Undoubtedly \r\nmany developed countries are spending more on a  wide range of \r\nadaptation issues, both as preventive measures and building \r\nresilience (greening infrastructure, climate-proofing major projects \r\nand managing climate-related risks) against the impacts of climate \r\nchange extreme weather events (US GCRP 2018a). Developed \r\ncountries' climate change adaptation spending covers areas such as \r\nfederal insurance programmes, federal, state and local property and \r\ninfrastructure, supply chains, and water systems."


id: 8995d446856d6ea48c7b361baf31e40c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21380
content:
"The interpretation of the quantitative analysis thus needs to be \r\nperformed, taking into account the qualitative needs assessment in \r\nSection 15.4.1 and the evolution of parameters that determine the risk\u0002weighted relative attractiveness of low-carbon and climate-resilient \r\ninvestments compared to other investment opportunities. With some "


id: c268ca50ea36bb8fbe817bfc0d7f754d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31485
content:
"The analysis of financing gaps in climate action, which is used to \r\nmeasure implementation action and mitigation impact (FS-UNEP \r\nCentre and BNEF 2019) cannot be carried out as a  pure demand\u0002side challenge, in isolation from the analysis of barriers to deploy \r\nfunds (e.g.,  Ramlee and Berma 2013) and to take investment "


id: 47c9d24c7c1c2e90dd06f3f21097f26c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9844
content:
"institutions having announced climate finance commitments and/or \r\ntargets (see also Box 15.4), the actual asset allocation of commercial \r\nfinancial sector players including sectoral and regional focus will \r\nrespond to tangible and financially viable investment opportunities \r\navailable in the short term. Robust long-term pathways to create \r\nsuch conditions for a  significant private sector involvement rarely \r\nexist and expectations on private sector involvement in some critical \r\nsectors/regions might be too high (Clark et al. 2018)."


id: 4a37b09582d765c18c8e00486589727c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10299
content:
"The following section compares recent climate finance flows as \r\nreported by CPI and IEA to needs derived in Section 15.4, ignoring the \r\nslight mismatch in time horizons. The analysis ignores interlinked gaps, \r\nin particular infrastructure investment gaps and other SDG-related \r\ninvestment gaps, which need to be addressed in parallel to reach the \r\nLTGG but also at least partially to facilitate green investments."


id: f3ce6ae5b185d43e95c363ef90f32a6b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40270
content:
"Given the multiple sources and lack of harmonised methodologies, the data can only be indicative of the size and pattern of investment gaps. The gap between most recen\r\nflows and required investments is only a single indicator. A more comprehensive (and qualitative) assessment is required in order to understand the magnitude of the challenge \r\nof scaling up investment in sectors and regions. The analysis also does not consider the effects of misaligned flows. {15.3, 15.4, 15.5, Table 15.2, Table 15.3, Table 15.4}"


id: 822dd03b636f301b5eca6e3c4fb3e877
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20029
content:
"Total investments in mitigation need to increase by around three and \r\nsix times with significant gaps existing across sectors and regions8\r\n(high confidence). The findings on still significant gaps and limited \r\nprogress over the past few years to some extent seem to contradict \r\nthe massive increase in commitments by financial institutions. As \r\ndiscussed in Section 15.6, the investment gap is not due to global \r\nscarcity of funds."


id: b6debf786e1894ee2ecce6a2462024ac
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29372
content:
"energy sources. Reasonable auction results based on a substantial \r\nprivate-sector competition for investments have also been achieved \r\nin selected developing countries driven by rather standardised \r\ncontract structures and the increased availability of risk mitigation \r\ninstruments addressing political and regulatory risks and home \r\nbias constraints (FS-UNEP Centre and BNEF 2019; IRENA 2020a). \r\nDevelopment finance institution (DFI) climate portfolios tend to be \r\ndriven by concessional loans for renewable energy generation assets \r\nwith equity often being provided by (semi-) commercial investors \r\n(Section  15.3) which will have to change to accelerate renewable \r\nenergy investment activity."


id: 14d5a41990ddec9d1eedbae13abe1815
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 891
content:
"However, these investment gaps have little explanatory power \r\nin terms of the magnitude of the challenge to mobilise funding. \r\nIn addition to measurement challenges from different definitions \r\nand data gaps, sectors and regions offer highly divergent financial \r\nrisk-return profiles, in particular due to missing or weak regulatory \r\nenvironments consistent with ambitions levels, and economic costs \r\nas well as limited local capital markets, limited institutional capacity \r\nto ensure safeguard, standardisation, scalability and replicability of \r\ninvestment opportunities and financing models, and a pipeline ready \r\nfor commercial investments. Moreover, soft costs and institutional \r\ncapacity for enabling environment that can be prerequisite \r\nfor addressing financing gaps are ignored when focusing on \r\ninvestment cost needs."


id: 2659f247dbed994a7477c408e712597e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3917
content:
"Given the wide range of estimates on current investment flows into \r\nenergy efficiency, substantial uncertainty exists with regard to the \r\nmagnitude of the investment gaps. While CPI publishes investment \r\nlevels of 41 billion USD2015 in 2019 and 24 billion USD2015 in 2020 for \r\nenergy efficiency, counting majorly international flows, IEA results \r\ncome in at a much higher level of around 250 billion USD2015 annually \r\nbetween 2017 and 2020 (IEA 2021c) and IRENA (2020c) estimates \r\nenergy efficiency investments in buildings between 2017-2019 at an \r\naverage of USD139 billion yr-1."


id: 1e74691fc631a2ccd550c85b34cc268a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2560
content:
"Sectoral considerations. The renewable energy sector attracted the \r\nhighest level of financing in absolute and relative terms with business \r\nmodels in generation being proven and rapidly falling technology \r\ncosts driving the competitiveness of solar photovoltaic and onshore \r\nwind, even without taking account of the mitigation component \r\n(FS-UNEP Centre and BNEF 2019; IRENA 2020a). This investment \r\nactivity comes in line with the first generation of NDCs and their \r\nheavy focus on mitigation opportunities in the renewable energy \r\nsector (Pauw et al. 2016; Schletz et al. 2017). Still, the investment gap \r\ntends to remain stable with flows over the past years not showing \r\nan upward trend."


id: e4af48018dbb798f709f2a5e2bd4c3b4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37517
content:
"Public sector investments in the transport sector have increased \r\nsignificantly in the past years reflecting the increased interest \r\nof capital markets in renewable energy and the efficient and \r\ncorresponding reallocation of public funding. Provision of funding \r\nby capital markets for public transport infrastructure among others \r\nheavily depends on suitable financing vehicles and increased funding \r\nfor development of projects with a  low level of standardisation \r\n(OECD 2015a)."


id: 26926bdc62a6de5b79fe570f8bd36bc6
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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vector_id: 3952
content:
"Both IRENA and IEA include only incremental costs of EVs in their \r\nestimates on needs while CPI, when measuring actual flows, includes \r\nthose at full costs. Total private flows for EVs included in CPI numbers \r\namount to USD41 billion in 2018 (Buchner et al. 2019), representing \r\nmore than 80% of private sector finance into the transport sector, \r\naround one third of total public and private funding to the transport \r\nsector in 2018. This likely results in an underestimation of the \r\nfinancing gap - in addition to the fact that estimates for investment \r\nneeds for rail infrastructure are only available for selected countries."


id: f06e19d6671170d93fc08f9a16315cb9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39680
content:
"Comparing annual average total investments in global fuel supply \r\nand the power sector of approximately USD1.5 trillion9\r\n yr-1 in \r\n2019 (IEA 2020a) to the investment in the Stated Policies Scenario \r\n(approximately 1.7 trillion USD2015 yr-1) and the Sustainable \r\nDevelopment Scenario (approximately 1.8 trillion USD2015 yr-1) in \r\n2030 underlines the required shift of existing capital investment \r\nfrom fossil to renewables even more than the need to increase sector \r\nallocations (Granoff et al. 2016; McCollum et al. 2018)."


id: 533065f6a94221bb3736903627d61d5d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11904
content:
"Current financing of land-based mitigation options is less than \r\nUSD1 billion yr-1 representing only 2.5% of climate mitigation funding, \r\nsignificantly below the potential proportional contribution (Buchner \r\net  al. 2019). A  stronger focus on deforestation-free value chain, \r\nincluding a  stronger reflection in taxonomies and financial sector \r\ninvestment decision processes are necessary to ensure an alignment \r\nof financial flows with the LTGG. Taking into account the specifics of \r\nland-based mitigation (in particular long investment horizons, strong \r\ndependency on the monetisation of mitigation effects, strong public \r\nsector involvement) a significant scale-up of commercial financing to \r\nthe sector can hardly be expected in the absence of strong climate "


id: 6af34732de23f8d1094b14b801426257
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16105
content:
"Ensuring access to the heavily regulated electricity markets is a key \r\ndriver for an accelerated private sector engagement (IFC 2016; \r\nFS-UNEP Centre and BNEF 2018; REN21 2019), with phasing out of \r\nsupport schemes and regulatory uncertainty being a major driver for \r\nreduced investment volumes in various regional markets in the past \r\nyears (FS-UNEP Centre and BNEF 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2020). \r\nStrategic investors and corporate investments by utilities dominate \r\nthe investment activity in developed countries and countries in \r\ntransition (BNEF 2019) based on the competitiveness of renewable "


id: 69503cafad1286377afc490670cb230
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"policies (Clark et  al. 2018). Agriculture is likely to develop more \r\npotential to mobilise private finance than the forest sector given its \r\nstrong linkage to food security and hunger and shorter payback periods. \r\nThe significant gap in land-based mitigation finance also indicates the \r\ncrucial lack of finance to the bottom of the pyramid."


id: f281e118adf3bf836c9fc4397fdb956a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40059
content:
"10 Those under the UNFCCC, such as the GCF through its USD3 million per country readiness and preparatory support programme, the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) \r\nand the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF), the Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR) and the Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme (ASAP) are focused \r\non supporting the preparatory process of the NAPs. But the Adaptation Fund will support the implementation of concrete projects up to USD10 million per country."


id: cbb87637d0aaade217eb9ad65757d2e7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33165
content:
"Finance for adaptation and resilience. As explained early, the \r\nreduction of the infrastructure gap to increase societies' resilience \r\nand the implementation of the NAPs will require more and higher \r\nlevels of sustained financing. Activities mobilised for adaptation and \r\nresilience are often not marketable and their financing will continue \r\ncoming from the public sector (Murphy and Parry 2020) and, at the \r\ninternational level, from grants-based technical assistance or through \r\nbudgetary support or basket finance for large projects/programmes \r\nor sector-wide approaches or multilateral finance under (Non-)\r\nUNFCCC10 that also anticipate supporting NAP implementation  - \r\nparticularly those involving incremental costs and co-benefits, "


id: 3eab54fca4bc59efb29394c6cedb525e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8216
content:
"11 According to the climate bonds initiative, total green bond finance raised in 2018 was USD168.5 billion across 44 countries (UNFCCC 2019c)."


id: 634c102be6e86a4bedb2bc585ea296cd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14767
content:
"Near-term actions to shift the financial system over the next decade \r\nare critically important and possible with globally coordinated \r\nefforts. Taking into account the inertia of the financial system as \r\nwell as the magnitude of the challenge to align financial flows with \r\nthe long-term global goals, fast action is required to ensure the \r\nreadiness of the financial sector as an enabler of the transition (high \r\nconfidence). The following subsections elaborate on key areas which \r\ncan have a catalytic effect in terms of addressing existing barriers - \r\nbesides political leadership and interventions discussed in other \r\nChapters of AR6."


id: 24a515256f6664b063cf0a96fb90e716
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3637
content:
"Financing for resilience is limited, unpredictable, fragmented and \r\nfocused on few projects or sectors and short term as opposed to \r\nprogrammatic and long term (10-15 years) finacing to build resilience \r\n(ISDR 2009, 2011; Kellett and Peters 2014; Watson et al. 2015). Market\u0002based mechanisms are available but not equally accessible to all \r\ndeveloping countries, particularly SIDS and LDCs, and such mechanisms \r\ncan undermine debt sustainability (OECD and World Bank 2016). While \r\nresilience financing is mainly grant funding, concessional loans are \r\nincreasing substantially and are key sources of financing for disaster \r\nand resilience, particularly for upper-middle-income countries (OECD \r\nand World Bank 2016). The combination of these trends can contribute \r\nto greater levels of indebtedness among many developing countries, \r\nmany of which are already at or approaching debt distress."


id: 584ef62650991de701316ad1953f8a30
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12793
content:
"Social protection systems can be linked with a  number of the \r\ninstruments already considered: reserve funds, insurance and \r\ncatastrophe bonds, regional risk-sharing facilities, contingent credit, \r\nin addition to traditional international aid and disaster response. \r\nHallegatte et  al. (2017) recommend combining adaptive social "


id: f3ddac6a712965064a9f206f5844f8af
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40285
content:
"and financing approaches can help to overcome barriers related \r\nto transactions costs by aggregating and/or transferring financing \r\nneeds and establishing a supply of finance for needs of stakeholder \r\ngroups lacking financial inclusion (Section 15.6.8)."


id: c818f557223704967dc6ed579fd6baea
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32520
content:
"Achieving climate mitigation and adaptation objectives requires \r\nambitious climate finance flows in the near-term, that is, 5-10 years \r\nahead. However, knowledge gaps in the assessment of climate\u0002related financial risk are a  key barrier to such climate finance \r\nflows. Therefore, this section discusses the main knowledge gaps \r\nthat are currently being addressed in the literature and those that \r\nremain outstanding."


id: fa85a5d50c2b95c02f4f6fec902d8348
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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content:
"Climate-related financial risk is meant here as the potential adverse \r\nimpact of climate change on the value of financial assets. A recent \r\nbut remarkable development since AR5 is that climate change has \r\nbeen explicitly recognised by financial supervisors as a  source of \r\nfinancial risk that matters both for financial institutions and citizens' \r\nsavings (Bolton et al. 2020). Previously, climate change was mostly "


id: f4ac8b0aae30bc1d9f6699dc78af165c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40423
content:
"Physical risk. On the one hand, unmitigated climate change implies \r\nan increased potential for adverse socio-economic impacts especially \r\nin more exposed economic activities and areas (high confidence). \r\nAccordingly, physical risk refers to the component of financial risk "


id: 51a1c4c84cb432acb7c6e2f7bf481bd1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11640
content:
"associated with the adverse physical impact of hazards related to \r\nclimate change (e.g., extreme weather events or sea level rise) on the \r\nfinancial value of assets such as industrial plants or real estate. In turn, \r\nthese losses can translate into losses on the values of financial assets \r\nissued by exposed companies (e.g., equity/bonds) and or sovereign \r\nentities as well as losses for insurance companies. The assessment \r\nof climate financial physical risks poses challenges in terms of data, \r\nmethods and scenarios. It requires cross-match scenarios of climate\u0002related hazards at granular geographical scale, with the geolocation \r\nand financial value of physical assets. The relationship between \r\nthe value of physical assets (such as plants or real estate) and the \r\nfinancial value of securities issued by the owners of those assets \r\nis not straightforward. Further, the repercussion of climate-related \r\nhazards on sovereign risk should also be accounted for."


id: e14e84279736fd3f382d0c5e2089c526
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Transition risks and opportunities. On the other hand, the \r\nmitigation of climate change, by means of a  transition to a  low\u0002carbon economy, requires a  transformation of the energy and \r\nproduction system at a pace and scale that implies adverse impacts \r\non a range of economic activities, but also opportunities for some \r\nother activities (high confidence). If these impacts are factored in by \r\nfinancial markets, they are reflected in the value of financial assets. \r\nThus, transition risks and opportunities refers to the component of \r\nfinancial risk (opportunities) associated with negative (positive) \r\nadjustments in assets' values resulting directly or indirectly from the \r\nlow-carbon transition."


id: 583d5bf3e468078ef447975afcb53900
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12778
content:
"Assets directly and indirectly exposed to transition risk. \r\nIn terms of types of assets and economic activities, the focus \r\nof estimates of carbon stranded assets tends to be on physical \r\nreserves of fossil fuel (e.g.,  oil fields) and sometimes financial \r\nassets of fossil fuel companies (van der Ploeg and Rezai 2020). \r\nHowever, a precondition for a broader analysis of transition risks and \r\nopportunities is to go beyond the narrative of stranded assets and \r\nto consider a classification of sectors of all the economic activities "


id: 558d243c26371a153c5f2fd666fe7343
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12320
content:
"Given the magnitude of the assets that are potentially exposed, \r\nreported in the previously cited studies, a delayed or uncoordinated \r\ntransition risk can have implications for financial stability not only \r\nat the level of individual financial institutions, but also at the macro \r\nlevel. The possible systemic nature of climate financial risk has been \r\nhighlighted on the basis of general equilibrium economic analysis \r\n(Stern and Stiglitz 2021)."


id: 80b302c87071b39d9a167caa3e1b348c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19775
content:
"the possible reinforcing feedbacks and transmission channels to \r\nthe economy and to finance. Moreover, models need to account \r\nfor compound risk, that is, the interaction of climate physical and/\r\nor transition risk with other sources of risk such as pandemics, \r\nsuch as COVID-19."


id: 27a5031e526d43009b55cdadd08454b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4156
content:
"These considerations are part of an ongoing discussion on whether \r\nthe current financial frameworks, including Basel III, should \r\nincorporate explicitly climate risk as a  systemic risk. In particular, \r\nthe challenges in quantifying the extent of climate risk, reviewed in \r\nthis section, especially if risk is systemic, raise the question whether \r\na combination of quantitative and qualitative restrictions on banks' \r\nportfolios could be put in place to limit the build-up of climate risks \r\n(Baranovic et al. 2021)."


id: 7b3d3fd5914a84ee052b5b1daadc60e7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18883
content:
"Second, IAM do not contain a description of the financial system in \r\nterms of actors and instruments and make assumptions on agents' \r\nexpectations that could be inconsistent with the nature of a disorderly \r\ntransition (Espagne 2018; Pollitt and Mercure 2018a; Battiston \r\net al. 2020b). In particular, IAMs solve for least cost pathways to an \r\nemissions target in 2100 (AR4 WGIII SPM Box 3), while the financial \r\nsector's time horizon is much shorter and risk is an important factor \r\nin investment decisions."


id: 262fbe71ad31d1be4b90a1da5677e585
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3886
content:
"In this context, probabilities of occurrence of scenarios are difficult \r\nto assess and this is important because risks vary widely across \r\nthe different scenarios. In this context a major challenge is the fat\u0002tail nature of physical risk. One the one hand, forecasts of climate \r\nchange and its impact on humans and ecosystems imply tail events \r\n(Weitzman 2014) and tipping points which cannot be overcome by \r\nmodel consensus (Knutti 2010). On the other hand, everything else \r\nthe same, costs and benefits vary substantially with assumptions on \r\nagents' utility, productivity, and intertemporal discount rate, which \r\nultimately depend on philosophical and ethical considerations \r\n(Nordhaus 2007; Stern 2008; Pindyck 2013). Thus, more knowledge \r\nis needed on the interaction of climate physical and transition risks, "


id: f0009ef3000c1325d81215389f2098d0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39605
content:
"Third, the current modelling frameworks used to develop climate \r\nmitigation scenarios, which are based on large-scale IAM, assume that \r\nthe financial system acts always as an enabler and do not account for \r\nthe fact that, under some condition (i.e., if there is underestimation \r\nof climate transition risk) can also act as a barrier to the transition "


id: 183f2a5d780dd19e9e3dc01c5fbf95cd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1468
content:
"Although disclosure has increased since the TCFD recommendations \r\nwere published, the information is still insufficient for investors \r\nand more clarity is needed on potential financial impacts and \r\nhow resilient corporate strategies are under different scenarios \r\n(TCFD 2019). Several efforts to provide guidance and tools for the \r\napplication of the TCFD recommendations have been made (using \r\nSustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) Standards and the \r\nClimate Disclosure Standards Board (CDSB) Framework to Enhance \r\nClimate-Related Financial Disclosures in Mainstream Reporting TCFD \r\nImplementation Guide (UNEP FI 2018; CDSB and SASB 2019). Results \r\nof voluntary reporting have been mixed, with one study pointing \r\nto unreliable and incomparable results reported by the US utilities \r\nsector to the CDP (Stanny 2018)."


id: 7db8860785c76a86216b0985931b57b5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19292
content:
"(Battiston et al. 2020a) because it invests disproportionately more in \r\nhigh-carbon activities."


id: 260a6682f33a73413b27cd98e9b3a3b5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3867
content:
"There have been also similar initiatives at the national level (DNB \r\n2017; UK Government 2017; US GCRP 2018b). In particular, France \r\nwas the first country to mandate climate risk disclosure from financial \r\ninstitutions (via Article 173 of the law on energy transition). However, \r\ndisclosure responses have been so far mixed in scope and detail, with \r\nthe majority of insurance companies not reporting on physical risk \r\n(Evain et al. 2018). In the UK, mandatory GHG emissions reporting for \r\nUK-listed companies has not led to substantial emissions reductions \r\nto date but could be laying the foundation for future mitigation (Tang \r\nand Demeritt 2018)."


id: bcf960fe72dfee2537823fe49c0785ab
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"A key recent development is the EU Taxonomy for Sustainable Finance \r\n(TEG 2019), which provides a classification of economic activities that \r\n(among other dimensions) contribute to climate mitigation or can be \r\nenabling for the low-carbon transition. Indirectly, such classification \r\nprovides useful information on investors' exposure to transition risk \r\n(Alessi et  al. 2019; ESMA 2020). Finally, many consultancies have \r\nstepped forward offering services related to climate risk. However, \r\nthe methods are typically proprietary, non-transparent, or based \r\nprimarily on carbon footprinting, which is a necessary but insufficient \r\nmeasure of climate risk. Further, ESG (environmental, social and \r\ngovernance) metrics can be useful but are, alone, inadequate to \r\nassess climate risk."


id: cf7fe000216245c2d89a4c646fded8eb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33866
content:
"Decision-makers in financial risk management make increasing use \r\nof climate policy scenarios, in line with the TCFD guidelines and \r\nthe recommendations of the NGFS. In order to reduce the number \r\nof scenarios to consider, Illustrative Mitigation Pathways (IMPs, \r\nChapter  3), have been elaborated to illustrate key features that \r\ncharacterise the possible climate (policy) futures. The following \r\nconsiderations can be useful for scenario end-users who carry out \r\nrisk analyses on the basis of the scenarios described in Chapter 3. It is \r\npossible to associate climate policy scenarios with levels of physical \r\nand/or transition risk, but these are not provided with the scenario \r\ndata themselves."


id: 204c21da67c3a00f191ad2386c8f258d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2897
content:
"Main regulatory developments and voluntary responses to \r\nclimate risk. Framing climate risk as a  financial risk (not just as \r\nan ethical issue) is key for it to become an actionable criterion for \r\ninvestment decision among mainstream investors (high confidence)\r\n(TCFD 2019). Since 2015 financial supervisors and central banks \r\n(e.g.,  the Financial Stability Board, the G20 Green Finance Study \r\nGroup, and the Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS)) \r\nhave played a  central role in raising awareness and increasing \r\ntransparency of the potential material financial impacts of climate \r\nchange within the financial sector (Bank of England 2015, 2018; \r\nTCFD 2019). The NGFS initiative has engaged, in particular, in the \r\nelaboration of climate financial risk scenarios."


id: 4526aaace39fd3ce4a696ab364512954
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9391
content:
"On the one hand, each scenario is associated with a warming path, \r\nwhich in turn, on the basis of the results from WGII, implies certain \r\nlevels of physical risk (AR6 WGII Chapter 16). However, climate impacts \r\nare not accounted for in the scenarios. Moreover, levels of risk may vary "


id: 9d743a3f9c2856543bd1e6913cebcb62
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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vector_id: 24938
content:
"pathways with higher emissions. The warming levels reached along \r\nthese two scenarios imply physical risk levels that are 'Moderate' until \r\n2050 and 'Very High' in 2050-2100 (with low levels of adaptation). \r\nNoting, that 'Moderate' physical risk can mean for some countries \r\n(i.e.,  SIDS) significant and even hardly absorbable consequences \r\n(i.e., reaching hard adaptation limits). Transition risk is not relevant \r\nfor these scenarios, since a transition is not pursued."


id: 72d6a34870adb7cb06c93697e0f31c38
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17452
content:
"with the reason for concern and with the speed of the implementation \r\nof adaptation. On the other hand, while mitigation can come with \r\ntransition risk, in the case of lack of coordination among the actors, \r\nas discussed earlier in this section, this is not modelled explicitly in the \r\ntrajectories, since the financial sector is not represented in underlying \r\nmodels. The scientific state of the art in climate-related financial risk \r\noffers an analysis that is not yet comprehensive of both the physical \r\nand transition risk dimensions in the same quantitative framework. \r\nHowever, decision-makers can follow a mixed approach where they \r\ncan combine quantitative risk assessment for transition risk with more \r\nqualitative risk analysis related to physical risk."


id: ce5881830576b7bbe1d68c8e16a838b7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33644
content:
"Figure 15.6 represents sequences of events following along a scenario \r\nboth in terms of physical risk (left) and transition risk (right). Four \r\ngroups of IMPs (more are considered based on the warming level \r\nthey lead to in 2100. Current Policies (CurPol) considers climate \r\npolicies implemented in 2020 with only a  gradual strengthening \r\nafterwards, leading to above 4degC warming (with respect to pre\u0002industrial levels). Moderate Action (ModAct) explores the impact of \r\nimplementing the NDCs (pledged mitigation targets) as formulated \r\nin 2020 and some further strengthening afterwards, thereby limiting \r\nwarming to less than 4degC (>50%), but above 3degC (>50%). In these \r\ntwo scenarios, there is no stabilisation of temperature, meaning \r\nthat further warming occurs after 2100 (and higher risk) even if \r\nstabilisation could be eventually achieved. They are referred to as "


id: 91a38eed63c264ffcad6522fc5c90225
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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vector_id: 22849
content:
"Figure 15.6 | Schematic representation of climate scenarios in terms of both physical and transition risk. While the figure does not cover all possible events, \r\nit maps out how the combination of stated targets can lead to different paths in terms of risk, depending on implementation progress and policy credibility. IMP 1.5degC and \r\nIMP <2degC are representative for IMP-GS (Sens. Neg; Ren), IMP-Neg, IMP-LD; IMP-Ren; IMP-SP. Note that the figure defines 'High' progress as higher, but it is important that the \r\nphysical risk varies by region and country. This means, that 'Moderate' physical risk can be significant and even hardly absorbable for some countries."


id: 3bcf886e9a9edaec21b9d0de7d09f126
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7712
content:
"of fiscal operations, particularly in a  post-COVID-19 world (high \r\nconfidence). Instruments and institutional arrangements for better \r\ninternational monetary policy coordination will likely be necessary in \r\nthe context of growing external debt stress and negative credit rating \r\npressures facing both emerging and low-income countries. Central \r\nbankers have started examining the implications of disruptive risks \r\nof climate change, as part of their core mandate of managing the \r\nstability of the financial system (Chenet et al. 2021). Climate-related \r\nrisk assessments and disclosure, including central banks' stress \r\ntesting of climate change risks, can be considered as a  first step \r\n(Rudebusch 2019), although such risk assessments and disclosure \r\nmay not be enough by themselves to spur increased institutional \r\nlow-carbon climate finance (Ameli et al. 2020)."


id: 17d8490ef996972b66347ded6e94d7fe
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1399
content:
"Additional monetary policies and macroprudential financial \r\nregulation may facilitate the expected role of carbon pricing on \r\nboosting low-carbon investments (medium confidence) (D'Orazio \r\nand Popoyan 2019). Commercial banks may not respond to the price \r\nsignal and allocate credits to low-carbon investments due to the \r\nexistence of market failure (Campiglio 2016). This could support the \r\nproductivity of green capital goods and encourage green investments \r\nin the short term, but might cause financial instability by raising \r\nnon-performing loans ratio of dirty investments and creating green \r\nbubbles (Dunz et al. 2021). Financial supervisors needs to implement \r\nstricter guidelines to overcome the greenwashing challenges \r\n(Caldecott 2020)."


id: b30643008ec7ba123e6bfe5f90ef6b14
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28741
content:
"Transparency: Policy de-risking measures, such as robust policy \r\ndesign and better transparency, as well as financial de-risking \r\nmeasures, such as green bonds and guarantees, at both domestic \r\nand international levels, enhance the attractiveness of clean \r\nenergy investments (high confidence) (Steckel and Jakob 2018). \r\nOrganisations such as the Task Force on Climate-related Financial \r\nDisclosures (TCFD) can help increase capital markets' climate \r\nfinancing, including private sector, by providing financial markets \r\nwith information to price climate-related risks and opportunities \r\n(TCFD 2020). However, risk disclosures alone would likely be \r\ninsufficient as long as market failures that inhibit the emergence of \r\nlow-carbon investment initiatives with positive risk-weighted returns \r\n(high confidence) (Christophers 2017; Ameli et al. 2020)."


id: df216522a4d6aa02c308dfcc11b7e7d8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36509
content:
"Efficient financial markets and financial regulation. An \r\ninfluential efficient financial markets hypothesis (Fama 1970, 1991, \r\n1997) proceeds from the assumption that in well-developed financial \r\nmarkets, available information at any point of time is already well \r\ncaptured in capital markets with many participants. Despite increasing \r\nchallenges to the theory (Sewell 2011), especially by repeated \r\nepisodes of global financial crashes and crises, and other widely \r\nnoted anomalies, a weaker form of the efficient markets hypothesis \r\nmay still apply (medium confidence). It is arguable that accumulating "


id: 88f3b88a990a7dc2b570c76c53c5d5ac
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21258
content:
"Central banks and climate change. Central banks in all economies \r\nwill likely have to play a  critical role in supporting the financing "


id: c94c34c8921434277971caa0769011b4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32742
content:
"to trade was important, capacity expansion had positive effects on \r\nlearning-by-doing on innovation over time, and that feed-in-tariffs \r\n(FiTs), in particular, had positive impacts on technology diffusion \r\n(Grafstrom and Lindman 2017) (Box 16.4). The FiTs programme has \r\nbeen associated with rapid increase in early renewables capacity \r\nexpansion across the world by reducing market risks in financing and \r\nstability in project revenues (Menanteau et al. 2003; Jacobsson et al. \r\n2009) (Section 9.9.5). Competitive auctions where the bidder with \r\nthe lowest price or other criteria is selected for government's call for \r\ntender are increasingly being utilised as an alternative to FITs due to \r\ntheir strengths of flexibility, potential for real price discovery, ability \r\nto ensure greater certainty in price and quantity, and capability to \r\nguarantee commitments and transparency (IRENA and CEM 2015)."


id: 5b7ca9f805cdca1752089ed9ec231605
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13338
content:
"Outside of renewable energy, scattered but numerous examples are \r\navailable on the role of innovative public policy to spur and create \r\nnew markets and technologies (Arent et al. 2017): (i) proactive role \r\nof the state in energy transitions (e.g., the retirement of all coal-fired \r\npower plants in Ontario, Canada, between 2007 and 2014 (Kern \r\nand Rogge 2016; Sovacool 2016)); (ii) too early exit and design \r\nproblems not considering the market acceptability and financing \r\nissues (e.g., energy-efficient retrofitting in housing in UK (Rosenow \r\nand Eyre 2016), low or negative returns in reality versus engineering \r\nestimates in weatherisation programmes in US (Fowlie et al. 2018)); \r\nand (iii) energy performance contracting for sharing the business \r\nrisks and profits and improving energy efficiency (energy service \r\ncompanies (Bertoldi and Boza-Kiss 2017; Qin et al. 2017) and utility \r\nenergy service contracts in the USA (Clark 2018))."


id: 25840ce1c219e62f6052c04f0fd6a34f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3785
content:
"Crowding out. Literature has discussed the risks of low effectiveness \r\nof public interventions and of a  crowding out effect of climate\u0002targeted public support to other innovation sectors (Buchner et al. \r\n2013). However, much academic literature suggests no strong \r\nevidence of crowding out. (Deleidi et al. 2020). Examining the effect \r\nof public investment on private investment into renewables in \r\n17 countries over 2004-2014, showed that the concept of crowding \r\nout or in does not apply well to sectoral studies and found that public \r\ninvestments positively support private investments in general."


id: 4effdffea363f895b7d9a505ffcf3ad1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11186
content:
"Support climate action via carbon pricing, taxes, and emission \r\ntrading systems. Literature and evidence suggest that futures \r\nmarkets regarding climate are incomplete because they do not price \r\nin externalities (Scholtens 2017). As a result, low-carbon investments \r\ndo not take place to socially and economically optimal levels, and \r\nthe correct market signals would involve setting carbon prices \r\nhigh enough or equivalent trading in reduced carbon emissions \r\nby regulatory action to induce sufficient and faster shift towards \r\nlow-carbon investments (high confidence) (Aghion et  al. 2016). \r\nNonetheless, durable carbon pricing in economic and political \r\nsystems must be implemented and approached combining related \r\nelements to both price and quantity (Grubb 2014)."


id: 3879bae69a031cdcc3ba9ad444931890
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7150
content:
"Non-carbon price instruments, such as market-oriented regulation \r\nand public programmes involving low-carbon infrastructure, may \r\nbe preferable in developing countries where market and regulatory \r\nfailure and political economy constraints are more prevalent (Finon \r\n2019). While carbon pricing was suggested by many economists \r\nand researchers (Nordhaus 2015; Pahle et al. 2018), overcoming the \r\npolitical and regulatory barriers would be necessary for the further \r\nimplementation of an effective carbon pricing scheme nationally and \r\ninternationally. Without strong political support, the effectiveness \r\nof carbon pricing would be limited to least-cost movements \r\n(Meckling et al. 2015)."


id: 5bc5178a080becdcccfd0f370034bb85
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13405
content:
"Role of domestic financing sources. Efforts to address climate \r\nchange can be scaled up through the mobilisation of domestic \r\nfunds (Fonta et  al. 2018). Publicly organised and supported low\u0002carbon infrastructures through resurrected national development \r\nbanks may be justified (Mazzucato and Penna 2016). It is important "


id: d424b73b5ab84f2fa5e87d5322d7cfba
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34652
content:
"The GET FiT concept argued that the mitigation of political and regulatory risk by sovereign and international guarantees is cost\u0002efficient in developing countries, illustrating the estimated impact of such risk-mitigation instruments on equity and debt financing \r\ncosts, and consequently required feed-in tariff levels (Deutsche Bank Climate Change Advisors 2011). The impact of financing costs on \r\ncost of renewable energy generation is well researched with significant differences across countries and technologies being observed, \r\nwith major drivers being the regulatory framework as well as the availability and type of public support instruments (Geddes et al. \r\n2018; Steffen 2019). With a focus on developing countries and based on a case study in Thailand Huenteler et al. (2016) demonstrate \r\nthe significant effect of regulatory environments but also local learning and skilled workforce on cost of renewables. The effect of \r\nthose exceeds the one of global technology learning curves."


id: 73b0042481c5846546388326083ad148
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17601
content:
"Egli et al. (2018) identify macroeconomic conditions (general interest rate) and experience effects within the renewable energy finance \r\nindustry as key drivers in developed countries with a stable regulatory environment, contributing 5% (PV) and 24% (wind) to the \r\nobserved reductions in LCOEs in the German market with a relatively stable regulatory environment. They conclude that 'extant studies \r\nmay overestimate technological learning and that increases in the general interest rate may increase renewable energies' LCOEs, \r\ncasting doubt on the efficacy of plans to phase out policy support' (Egli et al. 2018). A rising general interest rate level could heavily \r\nimpact LCOEs - for Germany, a rise of interest rates to pre-financial crisis levels in five years could increase LCOEs of solar and wind \r\nby 11-25% respectively (Schmidt et al. 2019)."


id: adcde06fae758ef011bd1144a4fccd90
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27819
content:
"countries and allow for expanding developing countries' access to \r\ncapital markets at a lower cost and longer maturities, overcome the \r\nBasel III's liquidity impediment and the EU's Solvency II directive \r\non liquidity (Blended Finance Taskforce 2018b), and accelerate the \r\nrecognition of climate assets by investors seeking safe investment \r\nhavens (Hourcade et  al. 2021b). They would also strengthen the \r\nefficacy of climate disclosure through high grades climate assets \r\nand minimise the risks of 'greening' of the portfolios by investing \r\nin 'carbon neutral' activities and not in low-carbon infrastructures. \r\nFinally, they would free up grant capacities for SDGs and adaptation \r\nthat mostly involve non-marketable activities by crowding in private \r\ninvestments for marketable mitigation activities."


id: 3bd926d6261f48f04677ca5233680ee4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7720
content:
"Financing by development finance institutions and development \r\nbanks aims to address market failures and barriers related to limited \r\naccess to capital as well as provide direct and indirect subsidisation \r\nby accepting higher risk, longer loan tenors and/or lower pricing. \r\nMany development and climate projects in developing and emerging \r\ncountries have traditionally been supported with concessional loans "


id: a3cb7113c4a05cb201099b283e8e4932
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26014
content:
"Limited research is available on the efficiency of mobilisation of \r\nthe private sector at the various levels and/or the theory of change \r\nattached to the different approaches as applied in classical public\u0002private partnerships. Also, transparency on current flows and private \r\ninvolvement at the various levels is limited with no differentiation "


id: ced446a5deb656071c7e487186ea4c0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33730
content:
"being made in reporting (e.g., GCF co-financing reporting). Limited \r\nprioritisation and agreement on prioritisation of sectors and/or \r\nproject categories being ready and/or preferred for direct private \r\nsector involvement might become a challenge in the coming years \r\n(high confidence) (Sudmant et al. 2017a; Sudmant et al. 2017b)."


id: 49a4e421d8cbf1ec8b44688dbd5e5515
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10186
content:
"The steep decrease in renewable electricity costs since 2010 also \r\nrepresents a relevant driver for a low-carbon recovery (Jaeger et al. \r\n2020). Many more sectors are starting to show similar opportunities \r\nfor rapid growth with supportive public spending such as low-carbon \r\ntransport and buildings (IEA 2020d). Expectations that the package \r\nwill increase economic activity rely on the assumption that increased \r\ncredit will have a positive effect on demand, the so-called demand\u0002led policy (Mercure et al. 2019). Boosting investment should propel \r\njob creation, increasing household income and therefore demand \r\nacross economic sectors (high confidence). A similar plan has also \r\nbeen proposed by the US administration and the European Union \r\nthrough the Next Generation EU (European Council 2020)."


id: 91210ecb8bdcc937f974e7a4321642f5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22738
content:
"The gap analysis as well as other considerations presented in this \r\nchapter illustrate the critical role of increased volumes and efficient \r\nallocation of public finance to reach the long-term global goals, both \r\nnationally and internationally."


id: 71870649980dcfd1bbee148f088ae143
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17222
content:
"Second, a strong assumption is that voters will be politically supportive \r\nof extended and increased fiscal deficit spending on climate on \r\ntop of COVID-19-related emergency spending and governments \r\nwill overcome treasury biases towards fiscal conservatism (to \r\npreserve credit ratings). However, evidence strongly suggests that \r\nvoters (and credit rating agencies) tend to be fiscally conservative \r\n(Peltzman 1992; Lowry et al. 1998; Alesina et al. 2011; Borge and \r\nHopland 2020), especially where expenditures involve higher taxes \r\nin the future and do not identifiably flow back to their local bases \r\n(the 'public good' problem) (high confidence). Such mistrust has "


id: 5cbf5338d189614ac72ea64c4992341d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13578
content:
"been a reason for abortive return to fiscal austerity often in the past \r\n(most recently during global financial crisis) and may benefit for \r\npolitical support by consistently reframing the climate expenditures \r\nin terms of job creation benefits (Bougrine 2012), effectiveness of \r\nleast-cost fiscal spending on climate for reviving private activity, \r\nand the avoidance of catastrophic losses (Huebscher et, al. 2020) \r\nfrom higher carbon emissions.  A new understanding of debt \r\nsustainability including negative implications of deferred climate \r\ninvestments on future GDP has not yet been mainstreamed (see "


id: 9c6afa35602b220f8323e8c5d257c172
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24770
content:
"more on the debt sustainability discussion below (e.g., Buhr et al. \r\n2018; Fresnillo 2020a). In addition, implications on the availability \r\nof international public finance flows are not yet clear since current \r\nadditional funding prioritises urgent health care support rather than \r\nan increase in predictable mid-/long-term financial support. Heavy \r\ninvestment needs for recovery packages in developed countries on \r\nthe one hand and their international climate finance commitments \r\non the other might be perceived to compete for available 'perceived \r\nas appropriate' budgets."


id: db9519a8ed1fc8d9c384af43706bc813
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35918
content:
"Post-Keynesian demand-side macroeconomic models, with financial sectors and supply-side effects, in contrast, allow for the reality \r\nof non-equilibrium situations: persistent short- to medium-term underemployed economy-wide resources and excess savings over \r\ninvestment because of unexpected shocks, such as COVID-19. In these settings, economic stimulus packages allow a faster recovery "


id: 138bc1e64b25b6a2a4e8478ca5e95f4e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 650
content:
"with demand-led effects: 'Economic multipliers are near zero when the economy operates near capacity. In contrast, during crises such \r\nas the GFC, economic multipliers can be high' (Blanchard and Leigh 2013; Hepburn et al. 2020b). The expected results are opposite \r\nto the standard supply-led equilibrium models as a response to investment stimulus (the green-shaded part of Box 15.6, Figure 1), as \r\nintended by 'green-stimulus' packages such as proposed by the EU (Balint et al. 2016; Mercure et al. 2019)."


id: 5b4cbfa54f27b61b5065170abe799270
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13309
content:
"Robust studies on the economic costs and benefits in the \r\nshort- to long-term of reaching the LTGG exist for only few \r\ncountries and/or regions, primarily in the developed world (high \r\nconfidence) (e.g. BCG 2018; McKinsey 2020a). With many studies \r\nunderpinning the strong economic rationale for high investments \r\nin the short-term(e.g.,  McKinsey 2020a), regional differences are \r\nsignificant highlighting the need for extensive cooperation and \r\nsolidarity initiatives."


id: 9056b855ae53dc8b13f2db225defc4f8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22595
content:
"For many developing countries, the focus of debt sustainability \r\ndiscussions is on the negative effect of climate change on the future \r\nGDP and the uncertainty with regard to short-term effects of climate \r\nchange and their economic implications (high confidence). With long\u0002term economic impacts of climate change being in the focus of the \r\nmodelling community, the volatility of GDP in the short term driven "


id: b99fc3b00061680fb8e1b20eba6e2419
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29867
content:
"The use of debt-for-nature and debt-for-climate-swaps is still very \r\nlimited and not mainstreamed but offers significant potential if used \r\ncorrectly (high confidence)."


id: dea88b7cc016c748f27c312b3b9f6782
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36434
content:
"An increasing number of debt-for-climate/nature swaps have been \r\nseen in recent years applied primarily in international climate \r\ncooperation and in bilateral contexts, however, not (yet) to an extent \r\naddressing severe and acute debt crises (Essers et al. 2021; Volz et al. \r\n2021) offering significant potential if used correctly (Warland and \r\nMichaelowa 2015). Significant lead times, needs-based structuring, \r\ntransparency with regard to the additionality of financed climate \r\naction, uncertainty with regard to own resource constraints and ODA \r\naccountability remain as barriers for a massive scale-up needed to \r\nmake transactions relevant (Mitchell 2015; Fuller et al. 2018; Essers \r\net al. 2021). At the same time, the limitation of the use of debt-based \r\ninstruments as a response to climate-related disasters and counter\u0002cyclical loans might be necessary (Griffith-Jones and Tyson 2010)."


id: 63252cd72c5d8731454035aeae4497cc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14738
content:
"Debt levels globally but particularly in developing and vulnerable \r\ncountries have significantly increased over the past years with \r\ncurrent and expected climate change impacts further burdening \r\ndebt sustainability (high confidence). For low- and middle-income \r\ncountries, 2018 marked a  new peak of debt levels amounting to \r\n51% of GDP; between 2010 and 2018, external debt payments as \r\na percentage of government budget grew by 83% in low- and middle\u0002income countries, from an average of 6.71% in 2010 to an average \r\nof 12.56% in 2018 (Fresnillo 2020b). COVID-19 has further reduced \r\nthe fiscal space of many developing governments and/or increased \r\nthe likelihood of debt stress. With many vulnerable countries \r\nalready being burdened with higher financing costs, this limited \r\nfiscal space further shrinks their ability to actively steer the required \r\ntransformation (Buhr et al. 2018). Limited progress in increasing debt \r\ntransparency remains another burden (Section 15.6.7)."


id: 284655c7f4443ded9c35c8fcebb1fd4e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4283
content:
"Ensuring efficient debt restructuring and debt relief in events of \r\nextreme shocks and imminent over-indebtedness and sovereign \r\ndebt default are further crucial elements with a joint responsibility of \r\ndebtors and creditors (UN 2015a). In this context, the Commonwealth \r\nSecretariat flagged that the diversification of the lender portfolio \r\nmade debt restructuring more difficult with more and more \r\nheterogeneous stakeholders being involved (Mitchell 2015) and the \r\nUN AAAA raising concerns about non-cooperative creditors and \r\ndisruption of timely completion of debt restructuring (UN 2015a). \r\nThis is a side effect of a stronger use of capital markets, which needs \r\nto be carefully considered in the context of sovereign bond issuances \r\n(Section 15.6.7)."


id: cccfe0e133524e230d7509803cc8e7cc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33364
content:
"Recent phase-out deals tend to aim for (partial or full) compensation \r\nrather than no relief for losses. In contrast to the line of argument in \r\nthe tobacco industry, the backward-looking approach and a resulting \r\nobligation of compensation by investors in polluting assets can be \r\nobserved rarely with the forward-looking approach of compensations \r\nby future winners for current losers dominating - despite the high \r\nlevel of awareness about carbon externalities and resulting climate \r\nchange impacts among polluters for many years (van der Ploeg and "


id: 3ee4c1a7d0d3174b9939e8b80d7eb0eb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8251
content:
"Cyclone Idai, had devastating economic impacts for Mozambique, \r\nZimbabwe and Malawi (WMO 2019). According to Munich Re, loss \r\nfrom about 100 significant events in 2018 for Africa are estimated at \r\nUSD1.4 billion (Munich Re 2019)."


id: d98e80df21663371bcf05cd731126804
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35573
content:
"Rezai 2020). In particular, transactions in the energy sector show \r\na high level of investor protection also against much needed climate \r\naction which is also well illustrated by the share of claims settled \r\nin favour of foreign investors under the Energy Charter Treaty and \r\ninvestor-state dispute settlement (Bos and Gupta 2019)."


id: 21a7d0322572f17b57911bf5e78c1f89
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3130
content:
"Late government action can delay action and consequently strengthen \r\nthe magnitude of action needed at a  later point in time with \r\nimplications for employment and economic development in impacted \r\nregions requiring higher level of fiscal burden (high confidence). This \r\nhas also been considered in the context of global climate cooperation \r\nwith prolonged support for polluting infrastructure resulting in heavy \r\nlock-in effects and higher economic costs in the long run (Bos and \r\nGupta 2019). Despite a  significant share of fossil resources which \r\nneed to become stranded in developing countries to reach the \r\nLTGG, REDD+ remains a singular example for international financial \r\ncooperation in the context of compensation for stranded resources."


id: 8875db66f76e7e9725be1bc2373ee085
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21169
content:
"actors in the G20 countries. No G20 members are yet party to any \r\nclimate risk pooling initiative (Kreft and Schafer 2017). However, \r\ninternational bilateral donors such as the USAID and the UK \r\nForeign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO, formerly \r\nDFID), and the multilateral development banks are all, to different \r\nextent, supporters of the various climate risk pooling initiatives now \r\noperational in developing countries."


id: d10152f57cbec14d16c8a1b23b91fa13
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34119
content:
"Increasingly, climate risk insurance schemes are being blended \r\ninto disaster risk management as part of a  comprehensive risk \r\nmanagement approach (high confidence). The best-known example \r\nis the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF SPC \r\n2018), which involves cooperation among Caribbean states, Japan, \r\nCanada, UK and France and international organisations such as \r\nthe World Bank (UNESCAP 2017). But there are growing platforms \r\nof such an approach mainly under the umbrella of the G7's \r\nInsuResilience Initative (Deutsche Klimafinanzierung 2020), including, \r\nthe Pacific Catastrophe Risk Assessment and Financing Initiative for "


id: 75ab70f82b0cc1c285013e6875e654d0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17930
content:
"Other gaps and challenges flagged by Kreft and Schafer (2017) \r\ninclude limited coverage of the full spectrum of contingency risks \r\nexperienced by countries, inadequate role of risk management as \r\na standard for all regional pools, though there are some emerging \r\nbest practices in terms of data provision on weather-related risks, \r\nand incentivisation of risk reduction (high confidence). Here, they \r\nrecognise the work of Africa Risk Capacity for not only providing the \r\ninfrastructure to trigger disbursement but for also promoting national \r\nrisk analysis. Another important gap in the landscape of climate risk \r\npooling is lack of attention to financial institutions' lending portfolios \r\nthat are vulnerable to weather shocks. In this regard subsidies as part \r\nof innovative financing schemes facilitated by the donor community \r\ncan encourage the uptake of meso-level climate risk insurance \r\nsolutions (Kreft and Schafer 2017)."


