# document

id: a8561f6f1a21086c22928bccdca3eba4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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"[...] that the immediate economic, environmental, and social benefits \r of mitigation in line with developing countries' NDCs exceed those \r NDCs' costs, and ultimately align with the SDGs (Antwi-Agyei \r et al. 2018; Vandyck et al. 2018; Caetano et al. 2020) (Chapter 17). \r In relation to the promotion of co-benefits, the Paris Agreement has \r enhanced mechanisms for promoting co-benefits (e.g., in some cases \r for biodiversity conservation through the endorsement of REDD+ \r initiatives and activities) and linkages to sustainable development \r (e.g., through the Article 6.4 mechanism). Finally, in its preambular \r text the Paris Agreement endorses both a human rights perspective \r and the concept of just transitions, creating potential hooks for further \r elaboration and expansion of these principles in mitigation actions.\r On the criterion of economic performance, the Paris Agreement's \r performance is potentially enhanced by the capacity for Parties "


id: a94993e61af664d13ca689c055c88fe
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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"In relation to the criterion of transformative potential, there is, as \r yet, limited empirical data or theoretical analysis on which to assess \r the Paris Agreement's transformative potential. The IPCC Special \r Report on Global Warming of 1.5degC concluded that pathways \r limiting global warming to 1.5degC would require systems transitions \r that are 'unprecedented in terms of scale' (IPCC 2018b). There is \r limited evidence to suggest that this is underway, although there \r are arguments made that Paris has the right structure to achieve this. \r The linking of the UNFCCC financial apparatus, including the GCF, \r to the Paris Agreement, and the provisions on technology support \r and capacity building, provide potential avenues for promoting \r increased investment flows into low-carbon technologies and \r development pathways, as Labordena et al. (2017) show in the case \r of solar energy development in Africa. Similarly, Kern and Rogge \r [...]"


id: d9025a325451efd114d8e44de1eb595d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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"[...] (2016) argue that the Paris Agreement's global commitment towards \r complete decarbonisation may play a  critical role in accelerating \r underlying system transitions, by sending a strong signal as to the \r actions needed by national governments and other international "


id: 859012503499ae8d44e5d89687b25e9c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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"countries, potentially triggering institutional capacity-building at the \r national, sub-national and sectoral levels (Section 14.3.2.7).\r Ultimately, the overall effectiveness of the Paris Agreement depends \r on its ability to lead to ratcheting up of collective climate action \r to meet the long-term global temperature goal (Bang et al. 2016; \r Christoff 2016; Young 2016; Dimitrov et al. 2019; Gupta and van \r Asselt 2019). As noted above, there is some evidence that this is \r already occurring. The design of the Paris Agreement, with 'nationally \r determined' contributions at its centre, countenances an initial \r shortfall in collective ambition in relation to the long-term global \r temperature goal on the understanding and expectation that Parties \r will enhance the ambition of their NDCs over time (Article 4). This \r is essential given the current shortfall in ambition. The pathways \r reflecting current NDCs, according to various estimates, imply \r [...]"


id: 77bfbece0414f56fe6b32100ee7b0c9e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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"[...] global warming in the range of 3degC by 2100 (UNFCCC 2016b; UNEP \r 2018a) (Box  4.3). NDCs will need to be substantially scaled up if \r the temperature goal of the Paris Agreement is to be met (Rogelj \r et al. 2016; Rogelj et al. 2018; Hohne et al. 2017, 2018; UNEP 2020). \r The Paris Agreement's 'ambition cycle' is designed to trigger such \r enhanced ambition over time. Some studies find that like-minded \r climate mitigation clubs can deliver substantial emissions reductions \r (Hovi et al. 2017) and are reasonably stable despite the departure \r of a  major emitter such as the United States (Sprinz et al. 2018); \r other studies find that conditional commitments in the context \r of a  pledge and review mechanism are unlikely to substantially \r increase countries' contributions to emissions reductions (Helland \r et al. 2017), and hence need to be complemented by the adoption of \r instruments designed differently from the Paris Agreement (Barrett \r [...]"


id: 94998e438c41aa9826b1d5d4b1d9fc49
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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"[...] and Dannenberg 2016). In any case, high (but not perfect) levels of \r mean compliance rates with the Paris Agreement have to be assumed \r for reaching the 'well below 2degC' temperature goal (Saelen 2020; \r Saelen et al. 2020). This is by no means assured."


id: 5d0dcff148fafa2e3a1448bee95c6448
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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"In relation to the criterion of institutional strength, the Paris \r Agreement's signalling and guidance function is, however, \r arguably high. The Paris Agreement has the potential to interact \r with complementary approaches to climate governance emerging \r beyond it (Held and Roger 2018). It may also be used by public\u0002sector organisations -  organised and mobilised in many countries \r and transnationally - as a point of leverage in domestic politics to \r encourage countries to take costly mitigation actions (Keohane and \r Oppenheimer 2016). More broadly, the Paris Agreement's architecture \r provides flexibility for decentralised forms of governance (Jordan \r et al. 2015; Victor 2016) (Section 14.5). The Agreement has served \r a  catalytic and facilitative role in enabling and facilitating climate \r action from non-state and sub-state actors (Chan et al. 2015; Chan \r et al. 2016; Hale 2016; Backstrand et al. 2017; Kuyper et al. 2018b). \r [...]"


id: cf360af4535c28f87fe75e34f90fb88
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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"[...] Such action could potentially 'bridge' the ambition gap created by \r insufficient NDCs from Parties (Hsu et al. 2019b). The 2018 UNEP \r Emissions Gap Report estimates that if 'cooperative initiatives are \r scaled up to their fullest potential', the impact of non-state and sub\u0002national actors could be up to 1-23 GtCO2-eq yr-1 by 2030 compared \r to current policy, which could bridge the gap (Lui et al. 2021). \r However, at present such a contribution is limited (Michaelowa and \r Michaelowa 2017; UNEP 2018a). Non-state actors are also playing \r a role in enhancing the ambition of individual NDCs by challenging \r their adequacy in national courts (Chapter 13 and Section 14.5.3)."


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"The Paris Agreement's institutional strength in terms of 'rules and \r standards to facilitate collective action' is disputed given the current \r lack of comparable information in NDCs (Peters et al. 2017; Pauw et al. \r 2018; Mayer 2019; Zihua et al. 2019), and the extent to which its \r language, as well as that of the Rulebook, strikes a balance in favour \r of discretion over prescriptiveness (Rajamani and Bodansky 2019). \r Similarly, in terms of 'mechanisms to enhance  transparency and \r accountability', although detailed rules relating to transparency \r have been developed under the Paris Rulebook, these rules permit \r Parties considerable self-determination in the extent and manner \r of application (Rajamani and Bodansky 2019), and may not lead \r to further ambition (Weikmans et al. 2020). Further the Paris \r Agreement's compliance committee is facilitative and designed to \r ensure compliance with the procedural obligations in the Agreement \r [...]"


id: a9ac2c84b5217128a523ad40e801b19d
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"[...] rather than with the NDCs themselves, which are not subject \r to obligations of result. The Paris Agreement does, however, seek to \r support the building of transparency-related capacity of developing "


id: d1aaf2e03f4beaeebee7dff948801244
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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"These findings derived from the peer-reviewed literature are also consistent with two additional sets of analysis. The first set concerns \r trends in emissions, drawing directly from Chapters 2, 6 and 11, showing that global annual emission growth has slowed, as evidenced \r by annual emission increments of 0.55 GtCO2-eq yr-1 between 2011 and 2019 compared to 1.014 GtCO2-eq yr-1 in 2000 and 2008. \r This suggests avoided emissions of 4-5 GtCO2-eq yr-1 (see also Figure 1.1d). The second set concerns emissions reductions projected \r by Annex I governments for 2020 in their fourth biennial reports to the UNFCCC. It is important to note that these are mostly projected \r annual savings from implemented policies (not ex-post evaluations), and there are considerable differences in countries' estimation \r methodologies. Nevertheless, combining estimates from 38% of the total of 2,811 reported policies and measures yields an overall \r [...]"


id: f10cdd625deba03aaf85ea39ef736745
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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"2. Proximate emission drivers. With less overt focus on emissions, studies of trends in energy efficiency, carbon intensity, or \r deforestation often point to associated policies. The literature includes an increasing number of studies on demonstrable progress in \r developing countries. For example, South and South-East Asia have seen energy intensity in buildings improving at about 5-6% yr-1\r since 2010 (Figure 2.22). In India alone, innovative programmes in efficient air conditioning, LED lighting, and industrial efficiency are \r reported as saving around 25 Mtoe in 2019-2020, thus leading to avoided emissions of over 150 MtCO2 yr-1 (Malhotra et al. 2021) \r (Box 16.3). Likewise, reductions in deforestation rates in several South and Central American and Asian countries are at least partly \r attributable to ecosystem payments, land-use regulation, and internal efforts (Section 7.6.2). Finally, the policy-driven displacement of \r [...]"


id: b1a296bae8df842b5c5e2d6b05062ab4
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"[...] fossil fuel combustion by renewables in energy has led to reductions in carbon intensity in several world regions (Chapters 2 and 6). "


id: 9ff32a6e6bce5ad1e3fdb8016187fbde
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"3. Technologies. The literature indicates unambiguously that the rapid expansion of low-carbon energy technologies is substantially \r attributable to policy (Sections 6.7.5 and 16.5). Technology-specific adoption incentives have led to a greater use of less carbon\u0002intensive (e.g., renewable electricity) and less energy-intensive (especially in transport and buildings) technologies. As Chapters 2 and \r 6 of this report note that modern renewable energy sources currently satisfy over 9% of global electricity demand, and this is largely \r attributable to policy. There are no global-level studies estimating the avoided emissions due to renewable energy support policies, \r but there are methods that have been developed to link renewable energy penetration to avoided emissions, such as that of IRENA \r (2021). Using that method, and assuming that 70% of modern renewable energy expansion has been policy induced, yields an \r [...]"


id: c14ca200ea4f2d75faf0406d2a6427e4
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"[...] estimate of avoided emissions of 1.3 GtCO2-eq yr-1 in 2019. Furthermore, observed cost reductions are the result of policy-driven \r capacity expansion as well as publicly funded resarch and development, in individual countries and globally. These correspond with \r induced effects on number of patents, 'learning curve' correlations with deployed capacity, and cost component and related case study \r analyses (Kavlak et al. 2018; Nemet 2019; Popp 2019; Grubb et al. 2021). "


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"export credit agencies. Further, another USD34.1 billion of the climate \r finance provided through multilateral channels is attributable to the \r developed countries (OECD 2021). The OECD methodology has been \r critiqued as it uses Rio markers, the limitations of which could lead \r to erroneous reporting and assessment of finance provided as well \r as of the mitigation outcome (Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2011b; \r Weikmans and Roberts 2019). This issue is to be addressed through \r the modalities, procedures and guidance under the Enhanced \r Transparency Framework of the Paris Agreement (Section 14.3.2.4), \r through the mandate to the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and \r Technological Advice (SBSTA) to develop common tabular formats for \r the reporting of information on, inter alia, financial support provided, \r mobilised and received (UNFCCC 2019k). Until then, the Biennial \r Assessment Report prepared by the Standing Committee on Finance \r [...]"


id: 8fe0cdcbeff0c88d614465c3b6498918
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"of implementation. As mentioned in Section  14.3.2.8, in the Paris \r Agreement the binding obligation on developed country Parties to \r provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties \r applies to both mitigation and adaptation (UNFCCC 2015a, Art. \r 9.1). In 2019, climate finance provided and mobilised by developed \r countries was in the order of USD79.6 billion, coming from different \r channels including bilateral and multilateral channels, and also \r through mobilisation of the private sector attributable to these \r channels (OECD 2021). A majority (two-thirds) of these flows targeted \r mitigation action exclusively (Chapter 15). These estimates, however, \r have been criticised on various grounds, including that they are an \r overestimate and do not represent climate-specific net assistance \r only; that in grant equivalence terms the order of magnitude is \r lower; and the questionable extent of transparency of information \r [...]"


id: fbe3e252b595e3eb6a79074a11df8e86
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"[...] on mobilised private finance, as well as the direction of these flows \r (Carty et al. 2020). On balance, such assessments need to be viewed \r in the context of the original commitment, the source of the data \r and the evolving guidance, and modalities and procedures from the \r UNFCCC processes. As mentioned in Chapter 15, the measurement \r of climate finance flows continues to face definitional, coverage and \r reliability issues, despite progress made by various data providers \r and collators (Section 15.3.2)."


id: 8ed94f0894af2e7ffbb2915e890f9f47
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"Multilateral development banks (MDBs) comprise six global \r development banks: the European Investment Bank, International \r Fund for Agricultural Development, International Investment Bank, \r New Development Bank, OPEC Fund for International Development, \r and the World Bank Group; six regional development banks: \r the African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, Asian \r Infrastructure Investment Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction \r and Development, Inter-American Development Bank, and the Islamic \r Development Bank; and 13 sub-regional development banks: the Arab \r Bank for Economic Development in Africa, Arab Fund for Economic \r and Social Development, Black Sea Trade and Development Bank, \r Caribbean Development Bank, Central American Bank for Economic \r Integration, Development Bank of the Central African States, \r Development Bank of Latin America, East African Development \r Bank, Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development Bank, \r [...]"


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"[...] Economic Cooperation Organization Trade and Development Bank, \r Economic Community of West African States Bank for Investment \r and Development, Eurasian Development Bank, and the West African \r Development Bank. Together they play a  key role in international \r cooperation at the global, regional and sub-regional levels because \r of their growing mandates and proximity to policymakers (Engen and \r Prizzon 2018). For many, climate change is a growing priority and for \r some, because of the needs of the regions or sub-regions in which \r they operate, climate change is embedded in many of their operations. "


id: 7ca42e4e22bbd359abdd68767a6866f4
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"The multiplicity of actors providing financial support has resulted in \r a fragmented international climate finance architecture as indicated \r in Section 14.3.2.8. It is also seen as a system which allows for speed, \r flexibility and innovation (Pickering et al. 2017). However, the system \r is not yet delivering adequate flows given the needs of developing \r countries (Section 14.3.2.8). An early indication of these self-assessed \r needs is provided in the conditional NDCs. Of the 136 conditional \r NDCs submitted by June 2019, 110 have components or additional \r actions conditioned on financing support for mitigation and 79 \r have components or additional actions for support for adaptation \r (Pauw et al. 2020). While the Paris Agreement did not explicitly \r countenance conditionality for actions in developing countries, it is \r generally understood that the ambition and effectiveness of climate \r ambition in these countries is dependent on financial support (Voigt \r [...]"


id: aa85f707afb732cf85bf6ad5e57d183e
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"in 2012 at the UN Conference on Sustainable Development in Rio \r de Janeiro (Inter-American Development Bank 2012). This has \r engendered other forms of collaboration among the MDBs, including, \r commitments to: collectively total at least USD65 billion annually by \r 2025 in climate finance, with USD50 billion for low- and middle\u0002income economies; to mobilise a further USD40 billion annually by \r 2025 from private sector investors, including through the increased \r provision of technical assistance, use of guarantees, and other de\u0002risking instruments; to help clients deliver on the goals of the Paris \r Agreement; to build a  transparency framework on the impact of \r MDBs' activities; and to enable clients to move away from fossil \r fuels (Asian Development Bank 2019). While the share of MDBs in \r direct climate financing is small, their role in influencing national \r development banks and local financial institutions, and leveraging \r [...]"


id: 18167f824e7ae78b0634bab445313a1b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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"[...] and crowding in private investments in financing sustainable \r infrastructure, is widely recognised (NCE 2016). However, with this \r recognition there is also an exhortation to do more to align with the \r goals of the Paris Agreement, including a comprehensive examination \r of their portfolios beyond investments that directly support climate \r action to also enabling the long-term net zero GHG emissions \r trajectory (Larsen et al. 2018; Cochran and Pauthier 2019). Further, \r a recent assessment has shown that MDBs perform relatively better \r in mobilising other public finance than private co-financing (Thwaites \r 2020). In addition, the banks have launched or are members of \r significant initiatives such as the Climate and Clean Air Coalition to \r reduce emissions of shortlived climate pollutants, the Carbon Pricing \r Leadership Coalition, the Coalition for Climate Resilient Investment \r and the Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action. These help \r [...]"


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created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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"[...] to spur action at different levels, from economic analysis to carbon \r financing, and convenors of finance and development ministers for \r climate action, with leadership of many of these initiatives led by the \r World Bank."


id: f9813d483d445e4ed639d029ab3881eb
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"There is a growing recognition of the importance of mobilising private \r sector financing including for climate action (World Bank 2015b; \r Michaelowa et al. 2020b). An early example of the mobilisation of \r the private sector in a  cooperative mode for mitigation outcomes \r is evidenced from the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto \r Protocol and the linking with the European Union's Emissions \r Trading System, both triggered by relevant provisions in the Kyoto \r Protocol (Section 14.4.4) and lessons learned from this are relevant \r for development of market mechanisms in the post Paris Agreement \r period (Michaelowa et al. 2019b). In 2019 and 2020, on average for \r the two years, public and private climate financing was on the order \r of USD632 billion, of which USD310 billion originated from the private \r sector. However, as much as 76% of the (overall) finance stayed in \r the country of origin. This trends holds true also for private finance \r [...]"


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"[...] (CPI 2021). Figure 14.4 depicts the international climate finance flows \r totalling USD161 billion reported in 2020, about 19% of which were \r private flows. For (international) mitigation financing flows of USD116 \r billion, the share provided by private sources was 24%. "


id: 7376b8aae1c08c26043a604efa73647b
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"The multilateral climate funds also have a role in the international \r climate finance architecture. This includes, as mentioned in \r Section  14.3.2.8, those established under the UNFCCC's financial \r mechanism, its operating entities, the Global Environment Facility \r (GEF), which also manages two special funds, the Special Climate \r Change Fund and the Least Developed Countries Fund; and the \r Green Climate Fund (GCF), also an operating entity of the financial \r mechanism which in 2015, was given a  special role in supporting \r the Paris Agreement. The GCF aims to provide funding at scale, \r balanced between mitigation and adaptation, using various financial \r instruments including grants, loans, equity, guarantees or others \r to activities that are aligned with the priorities of the countries \r compatible with the principle of country ownership (GCF 2011). \r The GCF faces many challenges. While some see the GCF as an \r [...]"


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"[...] opportunity to transform and rationalise what is now a complex and \r fragmented climate finance architecture with insufficient resources \r and overlapping remits (Nakhooda et al. 2014), others see it as an \r opportunity to address the frequent tensions which arise between \r mitigation-focused transformation and national priorities of countries. \r This tension is at the heart of the principle of country ownership and \r the need for transformational change (Winkler and Dubash 2016). \r Leveraging private funds and investments by the public sector and \r taking risks to unlock climate action are also expressed strategic \r aims of the GCF. "


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"International cooperation in science and technology occurs across \r different levels, with a growing number of international cooperation \r initiatives aimed at research and collaborative action in technology \r development. Weart (2012) finds that such global efforts are effective \r in advancing climate change science due to the international nature of \r the challenge. Global research programmes and institutions have also \r provided the scientific basis for major international environmental \r treaties. For example, the Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution \r Convention and the Montreal Protocol were both informed by scientific \r assessments based on collaboration and cooperation of scientists \r across several geographies (Andresen et al. 2000). Furthermore, \r the Global Energy Assessment (GEA) provided the scientific basis \r and evidence for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, \r in particular SDG 7  to ensure access to affordable, reliable and \r [...]"


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"[...] sustainable modern energy for all (GEA 2012). The GEA drew on \r the expertise of scientists from over 60 countries and institutions. \r Several other platforms exist to provide scientists and policymakers \r an opportunity for joint research and knowledge sharing, such as The \r World in 2050, an initiative that brings together scientists from some \r 40 institutions from around the world to provide the science for SDG \r and Paris Agreement implementation (TWI2050 2018). "


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"The Technology Mechanism consists of the Technology Executive \r Committee (TEC) (replacing the EGTT), as its policy arm, and the Climate \r Technology Centre and Network (CTCN), as its implementation arm \r (UNFCCC 2015b). The TEC focuses on identifying and recommending \r policies that can support countries in enhancing and accelerating \r the development and transfer of climate technologies (UNFCCC \r 2020b). The CTCN facilitates the transfer of technologies through \r three core services: (i) providing technical assistance at the request \r of developing countries; (ii) creating access to information and \r knowledge on climate technologies; and (iii) fostering collaboration \r and capacity building (CTCN 2020a). The CTCN 'network' consists \r of a diverse set of climate technology stakeholders from academic, \r finance, non-government, private sector, public sector, and research \r entities, together with more than 150 National Designated Entities, \r [...]"


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"[...] which serve as CTCN national focal points. Through its network, the \r CTCN seeks to mobilise policy and technical expertise to deliver \r technology solutions, capacity-building and implementation advice \r to developing countries (CTCN 2020b). At the Katowice UNFCCC \r Conference of the Parties in 2018, the TEC and CTCN were requested \r to incorporate the technology framework developed pursuant to \r Article 10 of the Paris Agreement into their respective workplans and \r programmes of work (UNFCCC 2019f). "


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"A particular locus for international cooperation on technology \r development and innovation is found within institutions and \r mechanisms of the UN climate regime. The UNFCCC, in Article 4.1(c), \r calls on 'all Parties' to 'promote and cooperate in the development, \r application and diffusion, including transfer, of technologies, \r practices and processes that control, reduce or prevent anthropogenic \r emissions of greenhouse gases' and places responsibility on \r developed country Parties to 'take all practicable steps to promote, \r facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to \r environmentally sound technologies and know-how to other Parties, \r particularly developing country Parties, to enable them to implement \r the provisions of the Convention' (UNFCCC 1992, Art. 4.5). The issue \r of technology development and transfer has continued to receive \r much attention in the international climate policy domain since its \r [...]"


id: 1cb71a709e056aee7dae1e5e9a97d53c
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"[...] initial inclusion in the UNFCCC in 1992 - albeit often overshadowed \r by dominant discourses around market-based mechanisms - and its \r role in reducing GHG emissions and adapting to the consequences of \r climate change 'is seen as becoming ever more critical' (de Coninck \r and Sagar 2015a). Milestones in the development of international \r cooperation on climate technologies under the UNFCCC have \r included: (i) the development of a  technology transfer framework \r and establishment of the Expert Group on Technology Transfer (EGTT) \r under the SBSTA in 2001; (ii) recommendations for enhancing the "


id: 282e90d2c0250c6358ca904c760de15e
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"and institutional cooperation) and systemic (creating enabling \r environments through regulatory and economic policies (Khan et al. \r 2020; UNFCCC 2021b). In its annual synthesis report for 2018, the \r UNFCCC secretariat compiled information submitted by Parties on \r the implementation of capacity building in developing countries, \r highlighting cooperative and regional activities on NDCs, including \r projects to build capacity for implementation, workshops related to \r transparency under the Paris Agreement and collaboration to provide \r coaching and training (UNFCCC 2019h). A  number of developing \r country Parties also highlighted their contributions to South-South \r cooperation (discussed further in Section  14.5.1.4), and identified \r capacity-building projects undertaken with others (e.g.,  capacity\u0002building for risk management in Latin America and the Caribbean, \r improving capacity for measurement, reporting and verification \r [...]"


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"[...] through the Alliance of the Pacific and a  climate action package \r launched by Singapore). "


id: 34d8cb9cf95a7c6839be2e6b6264215e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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"The importance of 'financial support' for strengthening cooperative \r action on technology development and transfer was recognised in \r Article 10.6 of the Paris Agreement. The technology framework \r established by the Paris Rulebook specifies actions and activities \r relating to the thematic area of 'support' as including: (i) enhancing \r the collaboration of the Technology Mechanism with the Financial \r Mechanism; (ii) identifying and promoting innovative finance and \r investment at different stages of the technology cycle; (iii) providing \r enhanced technical support to developing country Parties, in \r a  country-driven manner, and facilitating their access to financing \r for innovation, enabling environments and capacity building, \r developing and implementing the results of TNAs, and engagement \r and collaboration with stakeholders, including organisational and \r institutional support; and (d) enhancing the mobilisation of various \r [...]"


id: 36ef67e55f6cf182b03de9a86f8e9544
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"[...] types of support, including pro bono and in-kind support, from various \r sources for the implementation of actions and activities under each \r key theme of the technology framework. "


id: 2fd1c09935349710260c56ce3c19a403
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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"Notwithstanding the technology framework's directive for enhanced \r collaboration of the Technology and Financial Mechanisms of \r the UNFCCC, linkages between them, and particularly to the GCF, \r continue to engender political contestation between developing and \r developed countries (Oh 2020b). Developing countries sought to \r address concerns over the unsustainable funding status of the CTCN \r by advocating linkage through a funding arrangement or financial \r linkage, whereas developed countries favour the design of an \r institutional linkage maintaining the different and separate mandates \r of the CTCN and the GCF (Oh 2020a,b). With no resolution reached, \r the UNFCCC COP requested the Subsidiary Body for Implementation, \r at its fifty-third session, to take stock of progress in strengthening \r the linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial \r Mechanism with a  view to recommending a  draft decision for \r [...]"


id: e30b8350c20ecb2cd2b88b6e96c28d90
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content:
"including the EU, Switzerland, China, South Korea, New Zealand, \r Kazakhstan and several US states and Canadian provinces (Wettestad \r and Gulbrandsen 2018). More systems are in the pipeline, including \r Mexico and Thailand (ICAP 2019). The link between the EU and \r Switzerland entered into force in January 2020 and other linkages \r are being negotiated. Scholars analyse the potential benefits of these \r multilateral linkages and demonstrate that these can be significant \r (Doda et al. 2019; Doda and Taschini 2017). Over time, the linkages \r of national emissions trading systems can be seen as building blocks \r to a  strategic enlargement of international cooperation (Caparros \r and Pereau 2017; Mehling 2019). The World Bank has emerged as an \r important lynchpin and facilitator of knowledge-building and sharing \r of lessons about the design and linking of carbon markets, through \r initiatives such as the Partnership for Market Readiness, Networked \r [...]"


id: 1d9c64a958b337f6a71463199ceeed32
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"capacity in developing countries (Robinson 2018). In an effort to \r improve capacity-building efforts within the UNFCCC, in 2015, \r the Paris Committee on Capacity-building (PCCB) was established \r by the COP decision accompanying the Paris Agreement as the \r primary body for enhancing capacity-building efforts, including by \r improving coherence and coordination in capacity-building activities \r (UNFCCC 2016a, para. 71). The activities of the Committee include \r the provision of guidance and technical support on climate change \r training and capacity building, raising awareness and sharing climate \r information and knowledge. During 2020, the PCCB was able, despite \r the COVID-19 situation, to hold its fourth meeting, implement and \r assess its 2017-2020 work plan, and develop and agree on its future \r roadmap (2021-2024) (UNFCCC Subsidiary Body for Implementation \r 2020). Non-governmental organisations such as the Coalition on \r [...]"


id: fcc92ccececc668fdb7f2ea655660b3a
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content:
"However, it is important to distinguish between theory and practice. \r The practice of ETS linking so far demonstrates a few attempts that \r did not result in linkages due to shifts of governments and political \r preferences (for instance the process between the EU and Australia, \r and Ontario withdrawing from the Western Climate Initiative) (Bailey \r and Inderberg 2018). It is worth noting that the linking of carbon \r markets raises problems of distribution of costs and loss of political \r control and hence does not offer a politically easy alternative route \r to a  truly international carbon market. Careful, piecemeal and \r incremental linking may be the most feasible approach forward \r (Green et al. 2014; Gulbrandsen et al. 2019). It is premature for any \r serious assessment of the practice of ETS linking to be conducted. \r Environmental effectiveness, transformative potential, economic \r performance, institutional strength and even distributional outcomes \r [...]"


id: e63c4984bf387696c406637389edba90
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content:
"[...] can potentially be significant and positive if linking is done carefully \r (Doda and Taschini 2017; Mehling et al. 2018; Doda et al. 2019), but \r are all marginal if one focuses on existing experiences (Spalding\u0002Fecher et al. 2012; Haites 2016; Schneider et al. 2017; La Hoz Theuer \r et al. 2019; Schneider et al. 2019)."


id: 79c710b5696f67e998d2d4026b6ef3da
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18632
content:
"While Solar Radiation Modification (SRM) and carbon dioxide \r removal (CDR) were often referred to as 'geoengineering' in earlier \r IPCC reports and in the literature, IPCC SR1.5 started to explore \r SRM and CDR more thoroughly and to highlight the differences \r between -  but also within -  both approaches more clearly. This \r section assesses international governance of both SRM and CDR, \r recognising that CDR, as a mitigation option, is covered elsewhere in \r this report, whereas SRM is not. Chapter 12 of this report covers the \r emerging national, sub-national and non-state governance of CDR, \r while Chapters 6, 7 and 12 also assess the mitigation potential, risks \r and co-benefits of some CDR options. Chapters 4 and 5 of AR6 WGI \r assess the physical climate system and biogeochemical responses \r to different SRM and CDR methods. Cross-Working Group Box 4 on \r SRM (AR6 WGII, Chapter  16; and Cross-Working Group Box  4  in \r [...]"


id: bc9f4900723c960e3ed6d9a4834c5e8a
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content:
"[...] this chapter) gives a brief overview of Solar Radiation Modification \r methods, risks, benefits, ethics and governance."


id: 5ce9ac69617ce06189209b6049bdd7e
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content:
"There is high agreement in the literature that for addressing climate change risks, SRM cannot be the main policy response to climate \r change and is, at best, a supplement to achieving sustained net zero or net negative CO2 emission levels globally (de Coninck et al. \r 2018; MacMartin et al. 2018; Buck et al. 2020; National Academies of Sciences Engineering and Medecine 2021). SRM contrasts with \r climate change mitigation activities, such as emissions reductions and CDR, as it introduces a 'mask' to the climate change problem \r by altering the Earth's radiation budget, rather than attempting to address the root cause of the problem, which is the increase in \r GHGs in the atmosphere. In addition, the effects of proposed SRM options would only last as long as a deployment is maintained - for \r example, requiring a yearly injection of aerosols in the case of SAI as the lifetime of aerosols in the stratosphere is one to three years \r [...]"


id: ac54625c459a643379317efecbad6f0
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content:
"[...] (Niemeier et al. 2011) or continuous spraying of sea salt in the case of MCB as the lifetime of sea salt aerosols in the atmosphere is \r only about 10 days - which contrasts with the long lifetime of CO2 and its climate effects, with global warming resulting from CO2\r emissions likely remaining at a similar level for a hundred years or more (MacDougall et al. 2020) and long-term climate effects of \r emitted CO2 remaining for several hundreds to thousands of years (Solomon et al. 2009)."


id: 88dccbd3535f9bfe78566f9fe9c6ee7e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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content:
"In the context of reaching the long-term global temperature goal of the Paris Agreement, there are different hypothetical scenarios \r of SRM deployment: early, substantial mitigation with no SRM, more limited or delayed mitigation with moderate SRM, unchecked \r emissions with total reliance on SRM, and regionally heterogeneous SRM. Each scenario presents different levels and distributions \r of SRM benefits, side effects, and risks. The more intense the SRM deployment, the larger is the likelihood for the risks of side effects \r and environmental risks (e.g., Heutel et al., 2018). Regional disparities in climate hazards may result from both regionally-deployed \r SRM options such as GBAM, and more globally uniform SRM such as SAI (Jones et al. 2018; Seneviratne et al. 2018). There is an \r emerging literature on smaller forcings of SAI to reduce global average warming, for instance, to hold global warming to 1.5degC or 2degC \r [...]"


id: fdaaf644ab40323f19af91a03d517bdb
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content:
"[...] alongside ambitious conventional mitigation (Jones et al. 2018; MacMartin et al. 2018), or bring down temperature after an overshoot "


id: 3496415375d7c7cc0498f52cb25c059d
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content:
"warming either locally or globally, it would not maintain the climate in a present-day state nor return the climate to a pre-industrial \r state (climate averaged over 1850-1900) (AR6 WGI, Box 1.2) in all regions and in all seasons even when used to fully offset the global \r mean warming (high confidence) (AR6 WGI Chapter 4). This is because the climate forcing and response to SRM options are different \r from the forcing and response to GHG increase. Because of these differences in climate forcing and response patterns, the regional \r and seasonal climates of a world with a global mean warming of 1.5degC or 2degC achieved via SRM would be different from a world with \r similar global mean warming but achieved through mitigation (MacMartin et al. 2018). At the regional scale and seasonal timescale \r there could be considerable residual climate change and/or overcompensating change (e.g., more cooling, wetting or drying than just \r [...]"


id: b7cc0a9ff00b1857fd4a35dd715878e0
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vector_id: 29555
content:
"[...] what's needed to offset warming, drying or wetting due to anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions), and there is low confidence in \r understanding of the climate response to SRM at the regional scale (AR6 WGI, Chapter 4)."


id: b35bbe799f5f576e2afa5d24601b1f2e
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content:
"There is low confidence and large uncertainty in projected impacts of SRM on crop yields due in part to a limited number of studies. \r Because SRM would result in only a slight reduction in CO2 concentrations relative to the emissions scenario without SRM (AR6 \r WGI, Chapter  5), the CO2 fertilisation effect on plant productivity is nearly the same in emissions scenarios with and without \r SRM. Nevertheless, changes in climate due to SRM are likely to have some impacts on crop yields. A single study indicates MCB may \r reduce crop failure rates compared to climate change from a doubling of CO2 pre-industrial concentrations (Parkes et al. 2015). Models \r suggest SAI cooling would reduce crop productivity at higher latitudes compared to a scenario without SRM by reducing the growing \r season length, but benefit crop productivity in lower latitudes by reducing heat stress (Pongratz et al. 2012; Xia et al. 2014; Zhan et al. \r [...]"


id: 117d0b6be56d9b013b3d1bd7625a45ed
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"[...] 2019). Crop productivity is also projected to be reduced where SAI reduces rainfall relative to the scenario without SRM, including \r a case where reduced Asian summer monsoon rainfall causes a reduction in groundnut yields (Xia et al. 2014; Yang et al. 2016). \r SAI will increase the fraction of diffuse sunlight, which is projected to increase photosynthesis in forested canopy, but will reduce \r the direct and total available sunlight, which tends to reduce photosynthesis. As total sunlight is reduced, there is a net reduction \r in crop photosynthesis with the result that any benefits to crops from avoided heat stress may be offset by reduced photosynthesis, \r as indicated by a single statistical modelling study (Proctor et al. 2018). SAI would reduce average surface ozone concentration (Xia \r et al. 2017) mainly as a result of aerosol-induced reduction in stratospheric ozone in polar regions, resulting in reduced downward \r [...]"


id: 21ca635fbe11de2e9b9362906d99f1b
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vector_id: 3159
content:
"[...] transport of ozone to the troposphere (Pitari et al. 2014; Tilmes et al. 2018). The reduction in stratospheric ozone also allows more UV \r radiation to reach the surface. The reduction in surface ozone, together with an increase in surface UV radiation, would have important \r implications for crop yields but there is low confidence in our understanding of the net impact."


id: e5fbbe950b6512ef512896dca9b7a38a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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content:
"Few studies have assessed potential SRM impacts on human health and well-being. SAI using sulfate aerosols is projected to deplete \r the ozone layer, increasing mortality from skin cancer, and SAI could increase particulate matter due to offsetting warming, reduced \r precipitation and deposition of SAI aerosols, which would increase mortality, but SAI also reduces surface-level ozone exposure, which \r would reduce mortality from air pollution, with net changes in mortality uncertain and depending on aerosol type and deployment \r scenario (Effiong and Neitzel 2016; Eastham et al. 2018; Dai et al. 2020). However, these effects may be small compared to changes \r in risk from infectious disease (e.g., mosquito-borne illnesses) or food security due to SRM influences on climate (Carlson et al. 2022). \r Using volcanic eruptions as a natural analogue, a sudden implementation of SAI that forced the El Nino-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) \r [...]"


id: 6f5d5f9eba7f4d570386896ea82ed4f2
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content:
"[...] system may increase risk of severe cholera outbreaks in Bengal (Trisos et al. 2018; Pinke et al. 2019). Considering only mean annual \r temperature and precipitation, SAI that stabilises global temperature at its present-day level is projected to reduce income inequality \r between countries compared to the highest warming pathway (RCP8.5) (Harding et al. 2020). Some integrated assessment model "


id: 292bf34fabfe7248bd4dbe00c00f9712
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content:
"There is large uncertainty in terrestrial ecosystem responses to SRM.  By decoupling increases in atmospheric greenhouse gas \r concentrations and temperature, SAI could generate substantial impacts on large-scale biogeochemical cycles, with feedbacks to \r regional and global climate variability and change (Zarnetske et al. 2021). Compared to a high CO2 world without SRM, global-scale \r SRM simulations indicate reducing heat stress in low latitudes would increase plant productivity, but cooling would also slow down \r the process of nitrogen mineralisation, which could decrease plant productivity (Glienke et al. 2015; Duan et al. 2020). In high latitude \r and polar regions SRM may limit vegetation growth compared to a high CO2 world without SRM, but net primary productivity may still \r be higher than pre-industrial climate (Glienke et al. 2015). Tropical forests cycle more carbon and water than other terrestrial biomes \r [...]"


id: 44fb8da5c7847ea8f39760d31872da4e
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"[...] but large areas of the tropics may tip between savanna and tropical forest depending on rainfall and fire (Beer et al. 2010; Staver et \r al. 2011). Thus, SAI-induced reductions in precipitation in Amazonia and central Africa are expected to change the biogeography of \r tropical ecosystems in ways different both from present-day climate and global warming without SAI (Simpson et al. 2019; Zarnetske \r et al. 2021). This would have potentially large consequences for ecosystem services (AR6 WGII, Chapters 2 and 9). When designing \r and evaluating SAI scenarios, biome-specific responses need to be considered if SAI approaches are to benefit rather than harm \r ecosystems. Regional precipitation change and sea salt deposition over land from MCB may increase or decrease primary productivity \r in tropical rainforests (Muri et al. 2015). SRM that fully offsets warming could reduce the dispersal velocity required for species to \r [...]"


id: e9019bb5c30a836509852f127adb7133
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content:
"[...] track shifting temperature niches whereas partially offsetting warming with SAI would not reduce this risk unless rates of warming \r were also reduced (Trisos et al. 2018; Dagon and Schrag 2019). SAI may reduce high fire-risk weather in Australia, Europe and parts \r of the Americas, compared to global warming without SAI (Burton et al. 2018). Yet SAI using sulphur injection could shift the spatial \r distribution of acid-induced aluminium soil toxicity into relatively undisturbed ecosystems in Europe and North America (Visioni et \r al. 2020). For the same amount of global mean cooling, SAI, MCB, and CCT would have different effects on gross and net primary \r productivity because of different spatial patterns of temperature, available sunlight, and hydrological cycle changes (Duan et al. \r 2020). Large-scale modification of land surfaces for GBAM may have strong trade-offs with biodiversity and other ecosystem services, \r [...]"


id: d1b6dbee49fd265d684747a035577dde
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content:
"[...] including food security (Seneviratne et al. 2018). Although existing studies indicate SRM will have widespread impacts on ecosystems, \r risks and potential for risk reduction for marine and terrestrial ecosystems and biodiversity remain largely unknown."


id: 45a447f8ade028f5483c384926901494
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9469
content:
"A sudden and sustained termination of SRM in a high CO2 emissions scenario would cause rapid climate change (high confidence) \r (AR6 WGI, Chapter 4). More scenario analysis is needed on the potential likelihood of sudden termination (Kosugi 2013; Irvine and \r Keith 2020). A gradual phase-out of SRM combined with emissions reduction and CDR could avoid these termination effects (medium \r confidence) (MacMartin et al. 2014; Keith and MacMartin 2015; Tilmes et al. 2016). Several studies find that large and extremely rapid \r warming and abrupt changes to the water cycle would occur within a decade if a sudden termination of SAI occurred (McCusker et \r al. 2014; Crook et al. 2015). The size of this 'termination shock' is proportional to the amount of radiative forcing being masked by \r SAI. A sudden termination of SAI could place many thousands of species at risk of extinction, because the resulting rapid warming \r [...]"


id: f0e81096f5cda5998d5ea825ebdb7708
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content:
"Studies on the public perception of SRM have used multiple methods: questionnaire surveys, workshops, and focus group interviews \r (Burns et al. 2016; Cummings et al. 2017). Most studies have been limited to Western societies with some exceptions. Studies have \r repeatedly found that respondents are largely unaware of SRM (Merk et al. 2015). In the context of this general lack of familiarity, \r the publics prefer carbon dioxide removal (CDR) to SRM (Pidgeon et al. 2012), are very cautious about SRM deployment because of \r potential environmental side effects and governance concerns, and mostly reject deployment for the foreseeable future. Studies also \r suggest conditional and reluctant support for research, including proposed field experiments, with conditions of proper governance \r (Sugiyama et al. 2020). Recent studies show that the perception varies with the intensity of deliberation (Merk et al. 2019), and that \r [...]"


id: dfb51c25e51f5cfbb23a6af25cc02d98
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content:
"[...] the public distinguishes different funding sources (Nelson et al. 2021). Limited studies for developing countries show a tendency for \r respondents to be more open to SRM (Visschers et al. 2017; Sugiyama et al. 2020), perhaps because they experience climate change \r more directly (Carr and Yung 2018). In some Anglophone countries, a small portion of the public believes in chemtrail conspiracy \r theories, which are easily found in social media (Tingley and Wagner 2017; Allgaier 2019). Since researchers rarely distinguish different \r SRM options in engagement studies, there remains uncertainty in public perception."


id: 45895cc56bed013f5096aee462b7e195
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content:
"There is broad literature on ethical considerations around SRM, mainly stemming from philosophy or political theory, and mainly \r focused on SAI (Flegal et al. 2019). There is concern that publicly debating, researching and potentially deploying SAI could involve \r a 'moral hazard', with potential to obstruct ongoing and future mitigation efforts (Morrow 2014; Baatz 2016; McLaren 2016), while \r empirical evidence is limited and mostly at the individual, not societal, level (Burns et al. 2016; Merk et al. 2016; Merk et al. 2019). \r There is low agreement whether research and outdoors experimentation will create a 'slippery slope' toward eventual deployment, \r leading to a lock-in to long-term SRM, or whether it can be effectively regulated at a later stage to avoid undesirable outcomes (Hulme \r 2014; Parker 2014; Callies 2019; McKinnon 2019). Regarding potential deployment of SRM, procedural, distributive and recognitional \r [...]"


id: 4d2c8b0b718a9ad3946e386a78f512e1
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content:
"[...] conceptions of justice are being explored (Svoboda and Irvine 2014; Svoboda 2017; Preston and Carr 2018; Hourdequin 2019). With \r the SRM research community's increasing focus on distributional impacts of SAI, researchers have started more explicitly considering \r inequality in participation and inclusion of vulnerable countries and marginalised social groups (Flegal and Gupta 2018; Whyte \r 2018; Taiwo and Talati 2021), including considering stopping research (Stephens and Surprise 2020; National Academies of Sciences \r Engineering and Medecine 2021). There is recognition that SRM research has been conducted predominantly by a relatively small \r number of experts in the Global North, and that more can be done to enable participation from diverse peoples and geographies in \r setting research agendas and research governance priorities, and undertaking research, with initial efforts to this effect (Rahman et al. \r [...]"


id: b9f2dd667112e44b562605abd01dbbc9
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"[...] 2018), noting that unequal power relations in participation could influence SRM research governance and have potential implications \r for policy (Winickoff et al. 2015; Frumhoff and Stephens 2018; Whyte 2018; Biermann and Moller 2019; McLaren and Corry 2021; \r National Academies of Sciences Engineering and Medecine 2021; Taiwo and Talati 2021)."


id: 7be3d09d17769f30c4b687c4b37b0ad7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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"Currently, there is no dedicated, formal international SRM governance for research, development, demonstration, or deployment (AR6 \r WGIII, Chapter 14). Some multilateral agreements - such as the UN Convention on Biological Diversity or the Vienna Convention on \r the Protection of the Ozone Layer - indirectly and partially cover SRM, but none is comprehensive and the lack of robust and formal \r SRM governance poses risks (Ricke et al. 2013; Talberg et al. 2018; Reynolds 2019a). While governance objectives range broadly, from \r prohibition to enabling research and potentially deployment (Sugiyama et al. 2018b; Gupta et al. 2020), there is agreement that SRM \r governance should cover all interacting stages of research through to any potential, eventual deployment with rules, institutions, \r and norms (Reynolds 2019b). Accordingly, governance arrangements are co-evolving with respective SRM technologies across the \r [...]"


id: 94e79cec2707f956599c608d21a5804b
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"[...] interacting stages of research, development, demonstration, and - potentially - deployment (Rayner et al. 2013; Parker 2014; Parson \r 2014). Stakeholders are developing governance already in outdoors research; for example, for MCB and OAC experiments on the "


id: 91451f10599688f70fc5d77b5c698f27
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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content:
"While there is room for national and even sub-national governance of \r SAI - for example on research (differentiating indoor from open-air) \r (Jinnah et al. 2018; Hubert 2020) and public engagement (Bellamy \r and Lezaun 2017; Flegal et al. 2019) - international governance of \r SAI faces the challenge that comprehensive institutional architectures \r designed too far in advance could prove either too restrictive or too \r permissive in light of subsequent political, institutional, geophysical \r and technological developments (Sugiyama et al. 2018a; Reynolds \r 2019a). Views on governance encompass a broad range, from aiming \r to restrict to wanting to enable research and potentially deployment; \r in between these poles, other authors stress the operationalisation \r of the precautionary approach: preventing deployment until specific \r criteria regarding scientific consensus, impact assessments and \r governance issues are met (Tedsen and Homann 2013; Wieding \r [...]"


id: afe5ef53fb7d088377b91dce5fcdf84b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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content:
"[...] et al. 2020). Many scholars suggest that governance arrangements \r ought to co-evolve with respective SRM technologies (Parker 2014), \r including that it stay at least one step ahead of research, development, \r demonstration, and - potentially - deployment (Rayner et al. 2013; \r Parson 2014). With the modelling community's increasing focus on \r showing that, and in what ways, SAI could help to minimise climate \r change impacts in the Global South, the SRM governance literature \r has come to include considerations of how SAI could contribute \r to global equity (Horton and Keith 2016; Flegal and Gupta 2018; \r Hourdequin 2018)."


id: 3115f5ea94e2abe282ec36b176984e90
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Solar radiation modification, in the literature also referred to as 'solar \r geoengineering', refers to the intentional modification of the Earth's \r shortwave radiative budget, such as by increasing the reflection of \r sunlight back to space, with the aim of reducing warming. Several \r SRM options have been proposed, including stratospheric aerosol \r injection (SAI), marine cloud brightening (MCB), ground-based \r albedo modifications (GBAM), and ocean albedo change (OAC). SRM \r has been discussed as a potential response option within a broader \r climate risk management strategy, as a  supplement to emissions \r reduction, carbon dioxide removal and adaptation (Crutzen 2006; \r Shepherd 2009; Caldeira and Bala 2017; Buck et al. 2020), for \r example as a temporary measure to slow the rate of warming (Keith \r and MacMartin 2015) or address temperature overshoot (MacMartin \r et al. 2018; Tilmes et al. 2020). SRM assessments of potential benefits \r [...]"


id: bec60a367e6695ba7adcf425cbf2b160
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content:
"[...] and risks still primarily rely on modelling efforts and their underlying \r scenario assumptions (Sugiyama et al. 2018a), for example in the \r context of the Geoengineering Model Intercomparison Project \r GeoMIP6 (Kravitz et al. 2015). Recently, small-scale MCB and \r OAC experiments started to take place on the Great Barrier Reef \r (McDonald et al. 2019)."


id: c740b741aab0734e97821b270130bd0d
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content:
"SAI -  the most researched SRM method -  poses significant \r international governance challenges since it could potentially \r be deployed uni- or minilaterally and alter the global mean \r temperature much faster than any other climate policy measure, \r at comparatively low direct costs (Parson 2014; Nicholson et al. \r 2018; Smith and Wagner 2018; Sugiyama et al. 2018b; Reynolds \r 2019a). While being dependent on the design of deployment \r systems, both geophysical benefits and adverse effects would \r potentially be unevenly distributed (AR6 WGI, Chapter  4). \r Perceived local harm could exacerbate geopolitical conflicts, not \r least depending on which countries are part of a  deployment \r coalition (Maas and Scheffran 2012; Zurn and Schafer 2013), but \r also because immediate attribution of climatic impacts to detected \r SAI deployment would not be possible. Uncoordinated or poorly \r researched deployment by a limited number of states, triggered by \r [...]"


id: ccb810d00d7bad8245d20aa485597db0
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content:
"[...] perceived climate emergencies, could create international tensions \r (Corry 2017; Lederer and Kreuter 2018). An additional risk is that \r of rapid temperature rise following an abrupt end of SAI activities \r (Parker and Irvine 2018; Rabitz 2019)."


id: d71ed2b713d078870c2b4a6c8d1e1e26
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content:
"Given that risks and potential benefits of SRM proposals differ \r substantially and their large-scale deployment is highly speculative, \r there is a wide array of concrete proposals for near-term anticipatory \r or adaptive governance. Numerous authors suggest a  wide range \r of governance principles Nicholson et al. (2018) encapsulate most \r of these in suggesting a  list of four: (i) Guard against potential \r risks and harm; (ii) Enable appropriate research and development \r of scientific knowledge; (iii) Legitimise any future research or \r policymaking through active and informed public and expert \r community engagement; (iv) Ensure that SRM is considered only \r as a  part of a  broader, mitigation-centred portfolio of responses \r to climate change. Regarding international institutionalisation, \r options range from formal integration into existing UN bodies like \r the UNFCCC (Nicholson et al. 2018) or the Convention on Biological \r [...]"


id: c495123c60d0c98d7207425edbdc4927
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content:
"[...] Diversity (CBD) (Bodle et al. 2014) to the creation of specific, but \r less formalised global fora (Parson and Ernst 2013) to forms of club \r governance (Bodansky 2013; Lloyd and Oppenheimer 2014). Recent \r years have also seen the emergence of transnational non-state actors "


id: a16c54ef7822de1766a810b49818e4e0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25615
content:
"Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) refers to a  cluster of technologies, \r practices, and approaches that remove and sequester carbon dioxide \r from the ocean and atmosphere and durably store it in geological, \r terrestrial, or ocean reservoirs, or in products (Table 12.6). In contrast \r to SRM, CDR does not necessarily impose transboundary risks, except \r insofar as misleading accounting of its use and deployment could give \r a false picture of countries' overall mitigation efforts. CDR is clearly \r a form of climate change mitigation, and as described in Chapter 12 \r is needed to counterbalance residual GHG emissions that may prove \r hard to abate (e.g., from industry, aviation or agriculture) in the context \r of reaching net zero emissions both globally - in the context of Article \r 4 of the Paris Agreement - and nationally. CDR could also later be used \r for reducing atmospheric CO2 concentrations by providing net negative \r [...]"


id: e95574cb1bc7fd0c9958455dc2faa927
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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content:
"[...] emissions at the global level (Fuglestvedt et al. 2018; Bellamy and \r Geden 2019). Despite the common feature of removing carbon dioxide, \r technologies like afforestation/reforestation, soil carbon sequestration, \r bioenergy with carbon capture and storage, direct air capture with \r carbon storage, enhanced weathering, ocean alkalinity enhancement \r or ocean fertilisation are very different, as are the governance \r challenges. Chapter 12 highlights the sustainable development risks \r associated with land and water use that are connected to the biological \r approaches to CDR. As a public good which largely lacks incentives \r to be pursued as a business case, most types of CDR require a suite \r of dedicated policy instruments that address both near-term needs as \r well as long-term continuity at scale (Honegger et al. 2021b)."


id: 79b79f50c548b2b797879a25d683cc4a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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vector_id: 18616
content:
"The Paris Agreement sets in place a new framework for international \r climate policy (Paroussos et al. 2019), which some cite as evidence \r of 'hybrid multilateralism' (Christoff 2016; Savaresi 2016; Backstrand \r et al. 2017). While a  trend of widening involvement of non-state \r actors was evident prior to conclusion of the Paris Agreement, \r particularly at UNFCCC COPs, the 'new landscape of international \r climate cooperation' features an 'intensified interplay between \r state and non-state actors', including civil society and social \r movements, business actors, and sub-national or substate actors, \r such as local governments and cities (Backstrand et al. 2017, p. 562). \r This involvement of other actors beyond states in international climate \r cooperation is facilitated by the Paris Agreement's 'hybrid \r climate policy architecture' (Bodansky et al. 2016) (Section 14.3.1.1), \r which acknowledges the primacy of domestic politics in climate change \r [...]"


id: f70f43f44e67d05861eae0b888600f8f
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content:
"[...] and invites the mobilisation of international and domestic pressure \r to make the Agreement effective (Falkner 2016b). In this landscape, \r there is greater flexibility for more decentralised 'polycentric' forms \r of climate governance and recognition of the benefits of working in \r diverse forms and groups to realise global climate mitigation goals \r (Jordan et al. 2015; Oberthur 2016) (Section 1.9). "


id: 21846ca0d891d8826362b6d27fe6ea1b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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vector_id: 3108
content:
"Increasing attention has focused on the role of multi-level, multi\u0002actor cooperation among actors, groupings and agreements beyond \r the UNFCCC climate regime as potential 'building blocks' towards \r enhanced international action on climate mitigation (Falkner \r 2016a; Caparros and Pereau 2017; Potoski 2017; Stewart et al. \r 2017). This can include agreements on emissions and technologies \r at the regional or sub-global level, what scholars often refer to as \r 'climate clubs' (Nordhaus 2015; Hovi et al. 2016; Green 2017; Sprinz \r et al. 2018). One forum through which such agreements are often \r discussed, in support of UNFCCC objectives, is high-level meetings \r of political leaders, such as the G7 and G20 states (Livingston 2016). \r It also includes cooperation on narrower sets of issues than are \r found within the Paris Agreement, for instance, other international \r environmental agreements dealing with a  particular subset of \r [...]"


id: 97815083f2f480fd2a5f533427713869
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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content:
"[...] GHGs; linkages with, or leveraging of, efforts or agreements in other \r spheres such as adaptation, human rights or trade; agreements \r within particular economic sectors; or transnational initiatives \r involving global cooperative efforts by different types of non-state \r actors. Cooperative efforts in each of these forums are reviewed \r in the following sections of the chapter. Section  14.5.1 discusses \r international cooperation at multiple governance levels (global, "


id: bb1786a298b0707a4e545d9f266cfffb
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vector_id: 30139
content:
"Full compliance with the Kigali Amendment is predicted to reduce \r HFC emissions by 61% of the global baseline by 2050 (Hoglund\u0002Isaksson et al. 2017), with avoided global warming in 2100 due to \r HFCs from a baseline of 0.3degC-0.5degC to less than 0.1degC (WMO 2018). \r Examining the interplay of the Kigali Amendment with the Paris \r Agreement, Hoch et al. (2019) show how the Article 6 mechanisms \r under the Paris Agreement could generate financial incentives for \r HFC mitigation and related energy efficiency improvements. Early \r action under Article 6  of the Paris Agreement could drive down \r baseline levels of HFCs for developing countries (calculated in \r light of future production and consumption in the early- and mid\u00022020s) thus generating long-term mitigation benefits under the \r Kigali Amendment (Hoch et al. 2019). However, achievement of the \r objectives of the Kigali Amendment is dependent on its ratification \r by key developed countries, such as the United States, and the \r [...]"


id: 30a77ee8063226f8e2515e2b99f0c60a
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content:
"[...] provision of funds by developed countries through the Protocol's \r Multilateral Fund to meet developing countries' agreed incremental \r costs of implementation (Roberts 2017). The Kigali Amendment came \r into force on 1 January 2019 and has been ratified by 118 of the 198 \r Parties to the Montreal Protocol. "


id: a71373d2a51827087e575bb1a1fe3db1
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content:
"The 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone \r Layer (the Montreal Protocol) is the leading example of a  non\u0002climate MEA with significant implications for mitigating climate \r change (Barrett 2008). The Montreal Protocol regulates a  number \r of substances that are both ozone-depleting substances (ODS) and \r GHGs with a significant global warming potential (GWP), including \r chlorofluorocarbons, halons and hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs). \r As a  result, implementation of phase-out requirements for these \r substances under the Montreal Protocol has made a  significant \r contribution to mitigating climate change (Molina et al. 2009) \r (Section 9.9.7.1). Velders et al. (2007) found that over the period from \r 1990 to 2010, the reduction in GWP100-weighted ODS emissions \r expected with compliance to the provisions of the Montreal Protocol \r was 8 GtCO2-eq yr-1, an amount substantially greater than the first \r [...]"


id: 17eaa69be9be7fa90635341508cf88fc
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content:
"[...] commitment period Kyoto reduction target. Young et al. (2021) \r suggest that the Montreal Protocol may also be helping to mitigate \r climate change through avoided decreases in the land carbon sink."


id: a032b8b3cff3c7af74b5c98768ed9c37
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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vector_id: 25400
content:
"MEAs dealing with transboundary air pollution, such as the \r Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP) \r and its implementing protocols, which regulate non-GHGs like \r particulates, nitrogen oxides and ground-level ozone, can also have \r potential benefits for climate change mitigation (Erickson 2017). \r Studies have indicated that rigorous air quality controls targeting \r short-lived climate forcers, like methane, ozone and black carbon, \r could slow global mean temperature rise by about 0.5degC by mid\u0002century (Schmale et al. 2014). Steps in this direction were taken with \r 2012 amendments to the CLRTAP Gothenburg Protocol (initially \r adopted in 1999) to include black carbon, which is an important \r driver of climate change in the Arctic region (Yamineva and Kulovesi \r 2018). The amended Protocol, which has 28 Parties including the US \r and EU, entered into force in October 2019. However, its limits on \r [...]"


id: 3583173377cc6e5c1b3359073e0beadc
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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content:
"[...] black carbon have been criticised as insufficiently ambitious in light of \r scientific assessments (Khan and Kulovesi 2018). There is still a non\u0002negligible uncertainty in the assessment of radiative forcing of each \r short-lived climate forcer (SLCF), and the results of AR6 WGI have \r been updated since AR5. For example, the assessment of Emission\u0002based Radiative Forcing from Black Carbon emissions was revised \r downward in AR6 (AR6 WGI Section  6.4.2). When discussing co\u0002benefits with MEAs related to transboundary air pollution, attention \r should be paid to the uncertainty in radiative forcing of SLCFs and \r the update of relevant scientific knowledge."


id: 1cfcc47ad7b68afa0b4f027355cb62b1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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vector_id: 2282
content:
"Another MEA that may play a  role in aiding climate change \r mitigation is the 2013 Minamata Convention on Mercury, which \r came into force on 16 August 2017. Coal burning for electricity \r generation represents the second largest source (behind artisanal \r and small-scale gold mining) of anthropogenic mercury emissions to \r air (UNEP 2013). Efforts to control and reduce atmospheric emissions \r of mercury from coal-fired power generation under the Minamata \r Convention may reduce GHG emissions from this source (Eriksen \r and Perrez 2014; Selin 2014). For instance, Giang et al. (2015) have \r modelled the implications of the Minamata Convention for mercury \r emissions from coal-fired power generation in India and China, \r concluding that reducing mercury emissions from present-day levels \r in these countries is likely to require 'avoiding coal consumption and \r transitioning toward less carbon-intensive energy sources' (Giang \r [...]"


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content:
"[...] et al. 2015). Parties to the Minamata Convention include five of the \r six top global CO2 emitters - China, the United States, the EU, India \r and Japan (Russia has not ratified the Convention). The Minamata \r Convention also establishes an Implementation and Compliance \r Committee to review compliance with its provisions on a 'facilitative' \r basis (Eriksen and Perrez 2014). "


id: 599209b16f689f0a20464c0e02dbee5b
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content:
"Adaptation involves actions to lessen the harm associated with \r climate change, or take advantage of potential gains (Smit and \r Wandel 2006). It can seek to reduce present and future exposure \r to specific climate risks (Adger et al. 2003), mainstream climate \r information into existing planning efforts (Gupta et al. 2010; van der \r Voorn et al. 2012; van der Voorn et al. 2017), and reduce vulnerability \r (or increase resilience) of people or communities to the effects of \r climate change (Kasperson and Kasperson 2001). There is a  body \r of literature highlighting potential synergies and conflicts between \r adaptation actions - in any of the three areas above - and mitigation \r actions -  and potential strategies for resolving them (Locatelli \r et al. 2011; Casado-Asensio and Steurer 2014; Duguma et al. 2014; \r Suckall et al. 2015; Watkiss et al. 2015; van der Voorn et al. 2020). \r In a strategic context, this issue has been analysed in Bayramoglu \r [...]"


id: fcadf8d76a89413a073677bc77d5b267
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"[...] et al. (2018), Eisenack and Kahler (2016) and Ingham et al. (2013), \r among others. Bayramoglu et al. (2018) analyse the strategic \r interaction between mitigation, as a  public good, and adaptation, \r essentially a  private good, showing that the fear that adaptation \r will reduce the incentives to mitigate carbon emissions may not be \r justified. On the contrary, adaptation can reduce free-rider incentives \r (lead to larger self-enforcing agreements), yielding higher global \r mitigation levels and welfare, if adaptation efforts cause mitigation \r levels between different countries to be complements instead of \r strategic substitutes (Ingham et al. 2013). "


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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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vector_id: 37873
content:
"MEAs that require state Parties to conserve habitat (such as the \r Convention on Biological Diversity) or to protect certain ecosystems like \r wetlands (such as the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International \r Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat) may also have co-benefits \r for climate change mitigation through the adoption of well-planned \r conservation policies (Phelps et al. 2012; Gilroy et al. 2014). At \r a theoretical level, REDD+ activities have been identified as a particular \r opportunity for achieving climate mitigation objectives while also \r conserving tropical forest biodiversity and ecosystem services. Elements \r of REDD+ that promise greatest effectiveness for climate change \r mitigation (e.g., greater finance combined with reference levels which \r reduce leakage by promoting broad participation across countries with \r both high and low historical deforestation rates) also offer the greatest \r [...]"


id: 759658610e67b79220ba2a783d9e1856
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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vector_id: 17919
content:
"[...] benefits for biodiversity conservation (Busch et al. 2011). However, \r actual biodiversity and ecosystem service co-benefits are dependent \r on the design and  implementation of REDD+ programmes (Ehara \r et al. 2014; Panfil and Harvey 2016), with limited empirical evidence \r to date of emissions reductions from these programmes (Newton et al. \r 2016; Johnson et al. 2019), and concerns about whether they meet \r equity and justice considerations (Schroeder and McDermott 2014) \r (Section 7.6.1). "


id: bd3920ada34c73ac55f0f84b70d35aa7
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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vector_id: 30541
content:
"International cooperation in mitigation and adaptation share many \r of the same challenges, including the need for effective institutions. \r The UNFCCC, for example, addresses international financial support \r for adaptation and for mitigation in the same general category, and \r subjects them to the same sets of institutional constraints (Peterson \r and Skovgaard 2019). Sovacool and Linner (2016) argue that the history \r of the UNFCCC and its sub-agreements has been shaped by an implicit \r bargain that developing countries participate in global mitigation policy \r in return for receiving financial and technical assistance for adaptation \r and development from industrialised countries and international \r green funds. Khan and Roberts (2013) contend that this played out \r poorly under the Kyoto framework: the Protocol's basic architecture, \r oriented around legally binding commitments, was not amenable to \r merging the issues of adaptation and mitigation. Kuyper et al. Kuyper \r [...]"


id: 1e38064183598a9e46d35c1098d1bed
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content:
"[...] et al. (2018a) argue that the movement from the Kyoto Protocol to the \r Paris Agreement represents a shift in this regard; the Paris Agreement \r was designed not primarily as a  mitigation policy instrument, but \r rather one encompassing mitigation, adaptation, and development \r concerns. While this argument suggests that the Paris architecture, \r involving voluntary mitigation actions and a greater attention to issues "


id: 42f9800fe8268e2ae758f6896c72bd16
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8983
content:
"There are recognised limits to adaptation (Dow et al. 2013), and \r exceeding these limits results in loss and damage, a  topic that \r is gathering salience in the policy discourse. Roberts et al. (2014) \r focused on 'loss and damage', essentially those climate change \r impacts which cannot be avoided through adaptation. The Paris \r Agreement contains a  free-standing article on loss and damage \r (UNFCCC 2015a), focused on cooperation and facilitation, under \r which Parties have established a clearing house on risk transfer, and \r a Task Force on Displacement (UNFCCC 2016a). The COP decision \r accompanying the Paris Agreement specifies that 'Article 8  does \r not involve or provide a  basis for any liability or compensation' \r (UNFCCC 2016a). There is range of views on the treatment of loss \r and damage in the Paris Agreement, how responsibility for loss and \r damage should be allocated (Lees 2017; McNamara and Jackson \r [...]"


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content:
"[...] 2019), and how it could be financed (Roberts et al. 2017; Gewirtzman \r et al. 2018). Some scholars argue that there are continuing options \r to pursue compensation and liability in the climate change regime \r (Mace and Verheyen 2016; Gsottbauer et al. 2018). There have also \r been efforts to establish accountability of companies - particularly \r 'carbon majors' - for climate damage in domestic courts (Ganguly \r et al. 2018; Benjamin 2021). For states that have suffered loss and \r damage there is also the option to pursue 'state responsibility' claims \r under customary international law and international human rights \r law (Wewerinke-Singh 2018; Wewerinke-Singh and Salili 2020)."


id: 6bfcd7472413fe2362dde48772b7e9ed
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16302
content:
"There are also direct links between mitigation and sustainable \r development. The international agendas for mitigation and \r sustainable development have shaped each other, around concepts \r such as 'common but differentiated responsibilities and respective \r capabilities', as well as the distinction - in the UNFCCC and later the \r Kyoto Protocol - between Annex I and non-Annex I countries (Victor \r 2011; Patt 2015). The same implicit bargain that developing countries \r would support mitigation efforts in return for assistance with respect \r to adaptation also applies to support for development (Sovacool \r and Linner 2016). That linkage between mitigation and sustainable \r development has become even more specific with the Paris Agreement \r and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, each of which \r explicitly pursues a set of goals that encompass both mitigation and \r development (Schmieg et al. 2017), reflecting the recognition that \r [...]"


id: ccc239e48c5ec0db4bce265b996dd25e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33354
content:
"[...] achieving sustainable development and climate mitigation goals are \r mutually dependent (Gomez-Echeverri 2018). It is well accepted that \r the long-term effects of climate mitigation will benefit sustainable \r development. A  more contested finding is whether the mitigation \r actions themselves promote or hinder short-term poverty alleviation. \r One study, analysing the economic effects of developing countries' \r NDCs, finds that mitigation actions slow down poverty reduction \r efforts (Campagnolo and Davide 2019). Other studies suggest \r possible synergies between low-carbon development and economic \r development (Hanger et al. 2016; Labordena et al. 2017; Dzebo \r et al. 2019). These studies typically converge on the fact that financial \r assistance flowing from developed to developing countries enhances \r any possible synergies or lessens the conflicts. However, mitigation \r measures can also have negative impacts on gender equality, and \r [...]"


id: 46ce7c58f40068b5f06bbeb3befbed06
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9662
content:
"[...] peace and justice (Dzebo et al. 2019). The International Monetary \r Fund (IMF) has also taken on board the climate challenge and is \r examining the role of fiscal and macroeconomic policies to address \r the climate challenge for supporting its members with appropriate \r policy responses."


id: c9ed33981795a9ed3c5cdd81e042f01
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32852
content:
"In  the Neubauer case in 2021, the German Federal Constitutional \r Court ordered the German legislature, in light of its obligations, \r including on rights protections, to set clear provisions for reduction \r targets from 2031 onward by the end of 2022 (German Constitutional \r Court 2021). There are cases in the Global South as well (Peel and Lin \r 2019; Setzer and Benjamin 2020), with the Supreme Court in Nepal \r in its 2018 decision in Shrestha ordering the government to amend \r its existing laws and introduce a new consolidated law to address \r climate mitigation and adaptation as this would protect the rights to \r life, food, and a clean environment, and give effect to the 2015 Paris \r Agreement (The Supreme Court of Nepal 2018). There are dozens of \r further cases in national and regional courts, increasingly based on \r human rights claims, and this trend is only likely to grow (Shi et al. \r 2017; Peel and Osofsky 2018; Beauregard et al. 2021). These cases \r [...]"


id: 2289f45866d2ade30b4bf36ecd7a6caf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3292
content:
"[...] face procedural hurdles, such as standing, as well as substantive \r difficulties, for instance, with regard to the primarily territorial \r scope of state obligations to protect human rights (Boyle 2018; \r Mayer 2021), however, there are increasing instances of successful \r outcomes across the world."


id: 2f1f3d600f8ccca75d15abc732c53171
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5560
content:
"The literature also identifies institutional synergies at the international \r level, related to the importance of addressing climate change and \r development in an integrated, coordinated and comprehensive \r manner across constituencies, sectors and administrative and \r geographical boundaries (Le Blanc 2015). The literature also stresses \r the important role that robust institutions have in making this \r happen, including in international cooperation in key sectors for \r climate action as well for development (Waage et al. 2015). Since \r the publication of AR5, which emphasised the need for a  type of \r development that combines both mitigation and adaptation as a way \r to strengthen resilience, much of the literature has focused on ways \r to address these linkages and the role institutions play in key sectors \r that are often the subject of international cooperation - for example, \r environmental and soil degradation, climate, energy, water resources, \r [...]"


id: bafbff7d1fe5e2c334495b7b4bf21682
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30113
content:
"[...] and forestry (Hogl et al. 2016). An assessment of thematic policy \r coherence between the voluntary domestic contributions regarding \r the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda should be integrated in \r national policy cycles for sustainable and climate policymaking to \r identify overlaps, gaps, mutual benefits and trade-offs in national \r policies (Janetschek et al. 2020). "


id: 1d87512b46034994c878e704adc380b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2374
content:
"It is only since 2008 that the relationship between climate change \r and human rights has become a  focus of international law and \r policymaking. It is not just climate impacts that threaten the \r enjoyment of human rights but also the mitigation responses to \r climate change that affect human rights (Shi et al. 2017). The issue of \r human rights-climate change linkages was first taken up by the UN \r Human Rights Council in 2008, but has since rapidly gained ground \r with UN human rights treaty bodies issuing comments (e.g., Human \r Rights Committee 2018), recommendations (e.g., Committee on the \r Elimination of Discrimination against Women 2018) and even a joint \r statement (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 2019) \r on the impacts of climate change on the enjoyment of human rights. \r Climate change effects and related disasters have the potential to \r affect human rights broadly, for instance, by giving rise to deaths, \r [...]"


id: bd5fff1a0c61d836800d7af7a7973767
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30565
content:
"[...] disease or malnutrition (right to life, right to health), threatening food \r security or livelihoods (right to food), impacting upon water supplies \r and compromising access to safe drinking water (right to  water), \r destroying coastal settlements through storm surge (right to adequate \r housing), and in some cases forcing relocation as traditional territories \r become uninhabitable (UNGA 2019). In addition, the right to a healthy \r environment, recognised in 2021 as an autonomous right at the \r international level by the Human Rights Council (UN Human Rights \r Council 2021), arguably extends to a right to a 'safe climate' shaped in \r part by the Paris Agreement (UNGA 2019)."


id: 975702aa25af37cc14f7b6fb8cb6c398
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23828
content:
"In their NDCs, Parties mention various trade-related mitigation \r measures, including import bans, standards and labelling schemes, \r border carbon adjustments (BCAs; see also Chapter 13), renewable \r energy support measures, fossil fuel subsidy reform, and the use \r of international market mechanisms (Brandi 2017). Some of these \r 'response measures' (Chan 2016b) may raise questions concerning \r their consistency with trade agreements of the World Trade \r Organization (WTO). Non-discrimination is one of the foundational \r rules of the WTO. This means, among others, that 'like' imported and \r domestic products are not treated differently ('national treatment') \r and that a  WTO member should not discriminate between other \r members ('most-favoured-nation treatment'). These principles are \r elaborated in a set of agreements on the trade in goods and services, \r including the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the \r [...]"


id: 944c89a25e648938f1dce84a70c520ef
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23299
content:
"[...] General Agreement on Trade in Services(GATS), the Agreement on \r Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), and the Agreement on Subsidies \r and Countervailing Measures (ASCM)."


id: c6521987981d609897975f7ab9997bf8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32204
content:
"Other regulatory measures may also target the GHG emissions \r associated with the production of goods (Dobson 2018). These \r measures include bans on carbon-intensive materials, emissions \r standards for the production process of imported goods, and \r carbon footprint labels (Kloeckner 2012; Holzer and Lim 2020; \r Gerres et al. 2021). The compatibility of such measures with trade \r agreements remains subject to debate. While non-discriminatory \r measures targeting the emissions from a  product itself (e.g.,  fuel \r efficiency standards for cars) are more likely to be allowed than \r measures targeting the production process of a good (Green 2005), \r some studies suggest that differentiation between products based \r on their production process may be compatible with WTO rules \r (Benoit 2011; McAusland and Najjar 2015). (Mayr et al. 2020) find \r that sustainability standards targeting the emissions from indirect \r land use change associated with the production of biofuels may be \r [...]"


id: 694be88b80f2d2ddfdaa1ffef7c73dca
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15791
content:
"[...] inconsistent with the TBT Agreement. Importantly, trade rules express \r a strong preference for the international harmonisation of standards \r over unilateral measures (Delimatsis 2016)."


id: 10ceb070a6f79729bc13b4e728463d96
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 144
content:
"Options can also be pursued at the plurilateral and regional levels. \r Several studies suggest that climate clubs (Section  14.2.2) could \r employ trade measures, such as lower tariffs for climate-related \r goods and services, or BCAs, to attract club members (Nordhaus \r 2015; Brewer et al. 2016; Keohane et al. 2017; Stua 2017a; Banks \r and Fitzgerald 2020). Another option is to negotiate a  new \r agreement addressing both climate change and trade. Negotiations \r between six countries (Costa Rica, Fiji, Iceland, New Zealand, \r Norway, Switzerland) were launched in 2019 on a new Agreement \r on Climate Change, Trade and Sustainability (ACCTS), which, if \r successfully concluded, would liberalise trade in environmental \r goods and services, create new rules to remove fossil fuel subsidies, \r and develop guidelines for voluntary eco-labels (Steenblik and \r Droege 2019). At the regional level, countries could further opt for \r [...]"


id: 5bfd74ec466d0bbd4d3c86e233840861
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13444
content:
"[...] the inclusion of climate provisions in the (re)negotiation of FTAs \r (Morin and Jinnah 2018; Yamaguchi 2020). Moreover, the conduct \r of climate impact assessments of FTAs could help identify options \r to achieve both climate and trade objectives (Porterfield et al. 2017). \r In their assessment of the feasibility of various options for reform, \r Das et al. (2019) find that the near-term feasibility of options that \r require consensus at the multilateral level (notably amendments of \r WTO agreements) is low. By contrast, options involving a  smaller \r number of Parties, as well as options that can be implemented by \r WTO members on a voluntary basis, face fewer constraints."


id: a57904d1fe3345887c51770817243432
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26341
content:
"With limited progress in the multilateral trading system, some studies \r suggest that regional FTAs hold potential for strengthening climate \r governance. In some cases, climate-related provisions in such FTAs \r can go beyond provisions in the Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement, \r addressing for instance cooperation on carbon markets or electric \r vehicles (Gehring et al. 2013; van Asselt 2017; Morin and Jinnah 2018; \r Gehring and Morison 2020). However, Morin and Jinnah (2018) find \r that these provisions are at times vaguely formulated, not subject \r to third-party dispute settlement, and without sanctions or remedy \r in case of violations. Moreover, such provisions are not widely used \r in FTAs, and they are not adopted by the largest GHG emitters. \r For instance, the 2019 United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, \r NAFTA's successor, does not include any specific provisions on climate \r change, although it could implement cooperative mitigation actions \r [...]"


id: 20f8ccc32f93bd741b00ddfed470903
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3021
content:
"Studies have discussed various options to minimise conflicts, and \r strengthen the role of trade agreements in climate action, although \r the mitigation benefits and distributional effects of these options \r have yet to be assessed. Some options require multilateral action, \r including: (i) the amendment of WTO agreements to accommodate \r climate action; (ii) the adoption of a 'climate waiver' that temporarily \r relieves WTO members from their obligations; (iii) a 'peace clause' \r through which members commit to refraining from challenging \r each other's measures; (iv) an 'authoritative interpretation' by WTO \r members of ambiguous WTO provisions; (v) improved transparency \r of the climate impacts of trade measures; (vi) the inclusion of \r climate expertise in WTO disputes; and (vii) intensified institutional \r coordination between the WTO and UNFCCC (Hufbauer et al. 2009; \r Epps and Green 2010; Bacchus 2016; Droege et al. 2017; Das et al. \r [...]"


id: 4c89315638478f62163f395c497bc49e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10726
content:
"2012; Shimoda and Nakazawa 2012; UN 2018). An important new \r development in SSC is that in relation to some technologies the \r cooperation is increasingly led by Southern countries (for instance, \r wind energy between Europe, India and China), challenging the \r classical North-South technology cooperation paradigm. More \r broadly, Parties should ensure the sustainability of cooperation, \r rather than focusing on short-term goals (Eyben 2013). The Belt and \r Road Initiative (BRI) is a classic example of a recent SSC initiative \r led by China. According to a joint study by Tsinghua University and \r Vivid Economics, the 126 countries in the BRI region, excluding \r China, currently account for about 28% of global GHG emissions, but \r this proportion may increase to around 66% by 2050 if the carbon \r intensity of these economies only decreases slowly (according to \r historical patterns shown by developing countries). In this context \r [...]"


id: c88e58557bd29546054af0e2e2f9baec
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32593
content:
"[...] it is important to highlight that China has already outlined a vision \r for a  green BRI, and recently increased its commitment through \r the Green Investment Principles initiative, announcing a  new \r international coalition to improve sustainability and promote green \r infrastructure (Jun and Zadek 2019)."


id: 16e9cb0b22bd3aa0f524eb839a1cf6f6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1252
content:
"Janus et al. (2014) explore evolving development cooperation and \r its future governance architecture based on The Global Partnership \r for Effective Development Cooperation and The United Nations \r Development Cooperation Forum. Drawing on evidence from the \r hydropower, solar and wind energy industry in China, Urban (2018) \r introduces the concept of 'geographies of technology transfer and \r cooperation' and challenges the North-South technology transfer \r and cooperation paradigm for low-carbon innovation and climate \r change mitigation. While North-South technology transfer and \r cooperation (NSTT) for low-carbon energy technology has been \r implemented for decades, South-South technology transfer and \r cooperation (SSTT) and South-North technology transfer and \r cooperation (SNTT) have only recently emerged. Kirchherr and Urban \r (2018) provide a meta-synthesis of the scholarly writings on NSTT, \r SSTT and SNTT from the past 30 years. The discussion focuses on \r [...]"


id: 4d90b9c4179c149ca4040abf1ef5e08d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10923
content:
"[...] core drivers and inhibitors of technology transfer and cooperation, \r outcomes as well as outcome determinants. A case study of transfer \r of low-carbon energy innovation and its opportunities and barriers, \r based on the first large Chinese-funded and Chinese-built dam in \r Cambodia is presented by Hensengerth (2017). "


id: 8b63147e6a2ee7258867f6a96ea3f75f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21683
content:
"Information on triangular cooperation is more readily available than \r on South-South cooperation though some UN organisations such \r as UNDP and FAO have established platforms for the latter which \r also include climate projects. Further, although there are many \r South-South cooperation initiatives involving the development \r and transfer of climate technologies, the understanding of the \r motivations, approaches and designs is limited and not easily \r accessible. There is no dedicated platform for South-South and \r triangular cooperation on climate technologies. Hence, it is still too \r early to fully assess the achievements in the field of climate action \r (UNFCCC and UNOSSC 2018). In order to maximise its unique \r contribution to Agenda 2030, Southern providers recognise the \r benefits of measuring and monitoring South-South cooperation, \r and there is a  clear demand for better information from partner \r countries. Di Ciommo (2017) argues that 'better data could support \r [...]"


id: 7e15036698c5fa4f260d216cb7c0f7ee
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19354
content:
"[...] monitoring and evaluation, improve effectiveness, explore synergies \r with other resources, and ensure accountability' to a  diverse set \r of stakeholders. Besharati et al. (2017) present a  framework of \r 20 indicators, organised in five dimensions, that researchers and \r policymakers can use to access the quality and effectiveness of SSC \r and its contribution to sustainable development."


id: 258017012412cdb544ef5f365633f98f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3782
content:
"incentive structure has changed the way REDD+ was developed and \r implemented (Brockhaus et al. 2017). Large-scale market resources \r have not fully materialised as a global carbon market system that \r explicitly integrates REDD+ remains under development (Angelsen \r 2017). Public funding for REDD+ is also limited (Climate Focus 2017). \r Leading up to the adoption of the Paris Agreement, the governments \r of Germany, Norway, and the United Kingdom formed a partnership \r in 2014 called 'GNU' to support results-based financing for REDD+, \r with Norway emerging as one of, if not the single largest, major \r donor for REDD+ through its pledge in 2007 of approximately USD3 \r billion annually. Norway pledged USD1 billion for Brazil in 2008 and \r the same for Indonesia in 2010 (Schroeder et al. 2020). Meanwhile, \r REDD+ Early Movers was established with support from Germany, \r and the Central African Forest Initiative, a collaborative partnership \r [...]"


id: c2ad6f6656d1431b18d870184d95cb45
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31534
content:
"[...] between the European Union, Germany, Norway, France, and the \r United Kingdom was also set up. It supports six central African \r countries in fighting deforestation."


id: 6807ce417f1f9aacd5765648d662636a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15570
content:
"More recently, the Lowering Emissions by Accelerating Forest Finance \r (LEAF) Coalition was established, consisting of the governments of \r Norway, the UK, and the USA and initially nine companies, to accelerate \r REDD+ with a jurisdictional approach. LEAF uses the Architecture for \r REDD+ Transactions (ART)'s The REDD+ Environmental Excellence \r Standard (TREES), coordinated by Emergent, a non-profit intermediary \r between tropical countries and the private sector. Three jurisdictions \r in Brazil and two countries have already submitted concept notes \r to ART to receive results-based payments. REDD+ initiatives with \r a jurisdictional approach have also been adopted in various markets, \r such as the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International \r Aviation (CORSIA) (Maguire 2021). In addition to Brazil, Indonesia has \r attracted significant interest as a host country for REDD+. Indonesia \r [...]"


id: cfe8790cf2c3b4ecafb2fd8b48698c21
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33932
content:
"[...] ranks second, after Brazil, as the largest producer of deforestation\u0002related GHG emissions (Zarin et al. 2016), but it has committed \r to a  large reduction of deforestation in its NDC (Government of \r Indonesia 2016). Australia has collaborated on scientific research \r and emissions reduction monitoring (Tacconi 2017). It took a while, \r however, before emissions reductions were witnessed (Meehan et al. \r 2019). The expansion of commodity plantations, however, conflict \r with reduction ambitions (Anderson et al. 2016; Irawan et al. 2019) In \r addition to implementation at the site and jurisdictional levels, legal \r enforcement (Tacconi et al. 2019) as well as policy and regulatory \r reforms (Ekawati et al. 2019) appear to be needed."


id: 3ccdd995fc674deefed022ba62dd9771
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7881
content:
"After the UN-sponsored Tropical Forestry Action Plan (Winterbottom \r 1990; Seymour and Busch 2016), among the longest standing \r programmes in the forestry sector are the World Bank-sponsored \r Forest Carbon Partnership Facility in 2007, which helps facilitate \r funding for REDD+ readiness and specific projects, in addition to \r preparing countries for results-based payments and future carbon \r markets while securing local communities' benefits managed sub\u0002nationally, and the UN REDD+ Programme initiated in 2008, which \r aims to reduce forest emissions and enhance carbon stocks in \r forests while contributing to national sustainable development in \r developing countries, after the 2007 COP13 in Bali formally adopted \r REDD+ in the UNFCCC decisions and incorporated it in the Bali \r Plan of Action. As discussed above, Article 5 of the Paris Agreement \r encourages Parties to take action to implement and support REDD+. \r These efforts tend to focus on reducing emissions through the \r [...]"


id: e64a688b83482f2dde316320a8c23a6c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37818
content:
"[...] creation of protected areas, payments for ecosystem services, and/\r or land tenure reform (Pirard et al. 2019). The UNREDD+ programme \r supports national REDD+ efforts, inclusion of stakeholders in \r relevant dialogues, and capacity building toward REDD+ readiness \r in partner countries. To date the conservation and emissions \r impacts of REDD+ remain misunderstood (Pirard et al. 2019), but \r while existing evidence suggests that reductions in deforestation \r from sub-national REDD+ initiatives have been limited (Bos et al. \r 2017) it shows an increasing prominence (Maguire et al. 2021). \r Additionally, the Green Climate Fund has carried out results-based \r payments within REDD+. Eight countries have so far received \r significant funding (GCF 2021). The shift in the REDD+ focus from \r ecosystem service payment to domestic policy realignments and "


id: f2adc72ca61e057c153e4f5297f95c04
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40097
content:
"Recent efforts towards the enhancement of sinks from the forestry \r sector have the overarching goal of reaching zero gross deforestation \r globally, that is, eliminating the clearing of all natural forests. The \r New York Declaration on Forests (NYDF) was the first international \r pledge to call for a halving of natural forest loss by 2020 and the \r complete elimination of natural forest loss by 2030 (Climate Focus \r 2016). It was endorsed at the United Nations Climate Summit in \r September 2014.  By September 2019  the list of NYDF supporters \r included over 200  actors: national  governments, sub-national \r governments, multi-national companies, groups representing \r indigenous communities, and non-government organisations. These \r endorsers committed to doing their part to achieve the NYDF's ten \r goals, which included ending deforestation for agricultural expansion \r by 2020, reducing deforestation from other sectors, restoring forests, \r [...]"


id: f60682f74d84813dfe1ad62f54220589
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40641
content:
"[...] and providing financing for forest action (Forest Declaration 2019). \r These goals are assessed and tracked through the NYDF Progress \r Assessment, which includes NYDF Assessment Partners that collect \r data, generate analysis, and release the finding based on the NYDF \r framework and goals. "


id: 2e86591ef75859001eff3688a35244ac
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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"Recent efforts toward negative emissions through restoration \r include the Bonn Challenge, the African Forest Landscape \r Restoration Initiative (AFR100) and Initiative 20x20. The Bonn \r Challenge, initiated in 2011 by the Government of Germany and \r the International Union for Conservation of Nature, is intended to \r catalyse the existing international AFOLU commitments. It aimed \r to bring 150 million hectares (Mha) of the world's deforested and \r degraded land into restoration by 2020, and 350 Mha by 2030. AFR \r has the goal of restoring 100 Mha specifically in Africa (AUDA-NEPAD \r 2019), while 20x20 aims to restore 20 Mha in Latin America and the \r Caribbean (Anderson and Peimbert 2019). Increasing commitments \r for restoration have created momentum for restoration interventions \r (Chazdon et al. 2017; Mansourian et al. 2017; Djenontin et al. 2018). \r To date 97 Mha has been pledged in NDCs. Yet only a small part of this \r [...]"


id: 4964db35a3ff05edad3ff8ba8f7c9b4
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"[...] goal has been achieved. The Bonn Challenge Barometer - a progress\u0002tracking framework and tool to support pledgers -  indicates that \r 27 Mha (InfoFLR 2018) are currently being restored, equivalent to \r 1.379 GtCO2-eq sequestered (Dave et al. 2019). A key challenge in \r scaling up restoration has been to mobilise sufficient financing (Liagre \r et al. 2015; Djenontin et al. 2018). This underscores the importance \r of building international financing for restoration (equivalent to the \r Forest Carbon Partnership Facility focused on avoided deforestation \r and degradation)."


id: 7894dd2e0940c18ca9fb550445e9981e
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"The effectiveness of these agreements, which lack binding rules, can \r only be judged by the supplementary actions they have catalysed. \r The NYDF contributed to the development of several other zero\u0002deforestation pledges, including the Amsterdam Declarations by seven \r European nations to achieve fully sustainable and deforestation-free \r agro-commodity supply chains in Europe by 2020 and over 150 \r individual company commitments to not source products associated \r with deforestation (Donofrio et al. 2017; Lambin et al. 2018). Recent \r studies indicate that these efforts currently lack the potential to \r achieve wide-scale reductions in clearing and associated emissions \r due to weak implementation (Garrett et al. 2019), although in some \r cases in Indonesia and elsewhere the commodity supply chain \r sustainability drive appears to contribute to lowering deforestation \r (Wijaya et al. 2019; Chain Reaction Research 2020; Schulte et al. \r [...]"


id: b9efa3d14e1eb9898b06e11d72f6ad87
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"[...] 2020). The NYDF may have triggered small additional reductions \r in deforestation in some areas, particularly for soy, and to a lesser \r extent cattle, in the Brazilian Amazon (Lambin et al. 2018), but these \r effects were temporary, as efforts are being actively reversed and \r deforestation has increased again significantly. Deforestation rates \r have escalated in Brazil, with the rate in June 2019 (the first dry\u0002season month in the new administration) up 88% over the 2018 rate \r in the same month (INPE 2019). Curtis et al. (2018) find global targets \r are clearly not being met. More recent increase in the deforestation \r rate remains to be assessed. NYDF confirms that the initiative did not \r reach its zero-deforestation goal (NYDF Assessment Partners 2020)."


id: e296ae2cab13f053140a70288c4ea295
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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content:
"Sub-global agreements have also started to emerge, examples of \r issue-specific climate clubs. In 2015, 70 solar-rich countries signed \r a framework agreement dedicated towards promoting solar energy \r development (ISA 2015). In 2017 the Powering Past Coal Alliance was \r formed, uniting a  set of states, businesses, and non-governmental \r organisations around the goal of eliminating coal-fired power \r generation by 2050 (Jewell et al. 2019; Blondeel et al. 2020). Scholars \r have argued that greater attention to supply-side agreements such \r as this - focusing on reducing and ultimately eliminating the supply \r of carbon-intensive energy sources - would strengthen the UNFCCC \r and Paris Agreement (Collier and Venables 2014; Piggot et al. 2018; \r Asheim et al. 2019; Newell and Simms 2020). Chapter 6 of this report, \r on energy systems, notes the importance of regional cooperation on \r electric grid development, seen as necessary to enable higher shares \r [...]"


id: 5d70e678868b8e1c899473fbe07a5596
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"[...] of solar and wind power penetration (RGI 2011). Finally, a number \r of transnational organisations and activities have emerged, such as \r REN21, a  global community of renewable energy experts (REN21 \r 2019), and RE100, an NGO-led initiative to enlist multilateral \r companies to shift towards 100% renewable energy in their value \r chains (RE100 2019)."


id: 739ab25f1812d3aa5567aadd59c38a5d
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"As Goldthau and Witte (2010) document, the majority of governance \r efforts, outside of oil and gas producing states, was oriented towards \r ensuring reliable and affordable access for oil and gas imports. For \r example, the original rationale for the creation of the International \r Energy Agency (IEA), during the oil crisis of 1973-74, was to manage \r a  mechanism to ensure importing countries' access to oil (van de \r Graaf and Lesage 2009). On the other side of the aisle, oil exporting \r countries created the international institution OPEC to enable them \r to influence oil output, thereby stabilising prices and revenues for \r exporting countries (Fattouh and Mahadeva 2013). For years, energy \r governance was seen as a  zero-sum game between these poles \r (Goldthau and Witte 2010). The only international governance agency \r focusing on low-carbon energy sources was the International Atomic \r Energy Agency, with a dual mission of promoting nuclear energy and \r [...]"


id: ee1aeaf1d63b5d915872176c12a67d8a
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"More recently, however, new institutions have emerged, and existing \r institutions have realigned their missions, in order to promote capacity \r building and global investment in low-carbon energy technologies. \r Collectively, these developments may support the emergence of \r a  nascent field of global sustainable energy governance, in which \r a  broad range of global, regional, national, sub-national and non\u0002state actors, in aggregate, shape, direct and implement the low \r carbon transition through climate change mitigation activities, which \r produce concomitant societal benefits (Bruce 2018). Beginning in the \r 1990s, for example, the IEA began to broaden its mission from one \r concerned primarily with security of oil supplies, which encompassed \r conservation of energy resources, to one also concerned with the \r sustainability of energy use, including work programmes on energy \r efficiency and clean energy technologies and scenarios (van de Graaf \r [...]"


id: 5120ac27b9b7bf035bad93137168c9bc
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"[...] and Lesage 2009). Scholars have suggested that it was the widespread \r perception that the IEA was primarily interested in promoting the \r continued use of fossil fuels, and underplaying the potential role of \r renewable technologies, that led a  number of IEA member states \r to successfully push for the creation of a parallel organisation, the \r International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), which was then \r established in 2009 (van de Graaf 2013). An assessment of IRENA's \r activities in 2015 suggested that the agency has a  positive effect \r related to three core activities: offering advisory services to member \r states regarding renewable energy technologies and systems; serving \r as a  focal point for data and analysis for renewable energy; and, \r mobilising other international institutions, such as multilateral \r development banks, promoting renewable energy (Urpelainen and "


id: a0e651f20c619e5b4c7fd4fbe71cf691
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"Whether a  result of the above activities or not, multilateral \r development banks' lending practices have shifted in the direction \r of renewable energy (Delina 2017), a point also raised in Chapter 15 \r of this report. Activities include new sources of project finance, \r concessional loans, as well as loan guarantees, the latter through the \r Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (Multilateral Investment \r Guarantee Agency 2019). This appears to matter. For example, Frisari \r and Stadelmann (2015) find concessional lending by multilateral \r development banks to solar energy projects in Morocco and India to \r have reduced overall project costs, due to more attractive financing \r conditions from additional lenders, as well as reducing the costs \r to local governments. Labordena et al. (2017) projected these \r results into the future, and found that with the drop in financing \r costs, renewable energy projects serving all major demand centres \r [...]"


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"[...] in sub-Saharan Africa could reach cost parity with fossil fuels by \r 2025, whereas without the drop in financing costs associated with \r concessional lending, this would not be the case. Similarly, Creutzig \r et al. (2017) suggest that greater international attention to finance \r could be instrumental in the full development of solar energy."


id: 710dac5f83c71ff0b526724fd230b54d
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content:
"Given the complexity of global energy governance, it is impossible \r to make a  definitive statement about its overall contribution to \r mitigation efforts. Three statements, do however, appear to be \r robust. First, prior to the emergence of climate change on the global \r political agenda, international cooperation in the area of energy \r was primarily aimed at expanding and protecting the use of fossil \r energy, and these goals were entrenched in a number of multilateral \r organisations. Second, since the 1990s, international cooperation \r has gradually taken climate mitigation on board as one of its goals, \r seeing a realignment of many pre-existing organisations priorities, \r and the formation of a number of new international arrangements \r oriented towards the development of renewable energy resources. \r Third, the realignment is far from complete, and there are still \r examples of international cooperation having a  chilling effect on \r [...]"


id: 6473570d466a5b2a90cea9e3875f7595
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"[...] climate mitigation, particularly through financing and investment \r practices, including legal norms designed to protect the interests of \r owners of fossil assets. "


id: b522fa880da1f8d5058588ad1eaeb5cd
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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"The Paris Agreement neither explicitly addresses emissions from \r international aviation and shipping, nor repeats the Kyoto Protocol's \r provision requiring Parties to work through ICAO/IMO to address \r these emissions (Hoch et al. 2019). This leaves unclear the status of \r the Kyoto Protocol's Article 2.2 directive after 2020 (Martinez Romera \r 2016; Dobson 2020), potentially opening up scope for more attention \r to aviation and shipping emissions under the Paris Agreement \r (Doelle and Chircop 2019). Some commentators have suggested that \r emissions from international aviation and shipping should be part of \r the Paris Agreement (Gencsu and Hino 2015; Traut et al. 2018), and \r shipping and aviation industries themselves may prefer emissions to \r be treated under an international regime rather than a nationally\u0002oriented one (Gilbert and Bows 2012). In the case of shipping \r emissions, there is nothing in the Paris Agreement to prevent a Party \r [...]"


id: 5bb0b0d37572ed223b06fbfb52d94923
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content:
"[...] from including international shipping in some form in its NDC (Doelle \r and Chircop 2019) Under the Paris Rulebook, Parties 'should report \r international aviation and marine bunker fuel emissions as two \r separate entries and should not include such emissions in national \r totals but report them distinctly, if disaggregated data are available' \r (UNFCCC 2019d). "


id: 261c2de6412062450e3192a1dfbf06a8
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"ICAO has an overarching climate goal to 'limit or reduce the impact \r of aviation greenhouse gas emissions on the global climate' with \r respect to international aviation. In order to achieve this, ICAO has \r two global aspirational goals for the international aviation sector, of \r 2% annual fuel efficiency improvement through 2050 and carbon \r neutral growth from 2020 onwards (ICAO 2016). In order to achieve \r these global aspirational goals, ICAO is pursuing a  'basket' of \r mitigation measures for the aviation sector consisting of technical \r and operational measures, such as a  CO2 emissions standard for \r new aircraft adopted in 2016, measures on sustainable alternative \r fuels and a market-based measure, known as the Carbon Offset and \r Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA), which the \r triennial ICAO Assembly of 193 Member States resolved to establish \r in 2016 (ICAO 2016). In line with the 2016 ICAO Assembly Resolution \r [...]"


id: e1a5bd2a9fc14bd92e9173fe4ca3a26d
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"[...] that established CORSIA, in mid-2018, the ICAO's 36-member state \r governing Council adopted a series of Standards and Recommended "


id: b3fe6ac9bc530db090c4b832dbfba027
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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content:
"Practices (SARPs), now contained in Annex 16, Volume IV of the \r Chicago Convention (1944), as a  common basis for CORSIA's \r implementation and enforcement by each state and its aeroplane \r operators. From 1  January 2019, the CORSIA SARPs require states \r and their operators to undertake an annual process of monitoring, \r verification, and reporting of emissions from all international flights, \r including to establish CORSIA's emissions baseline (ICAO 2019). \r Based on this emissions data, CORSIA's carbon offsetting obligations \r commenced in 2021, with three-year compliance cycles, including \r a pilot phase in 2021-2023. States have the option to participate \r in the pilot phase and the subsequent voluntary three-year cycle in \r 2024-2026. CORSIA becomes mandatory from 2027 onwards for \r states whose share in the total international revenue tonnes per \r kilometre is above a  certain threshold (Hoch et al. 2019). Under \r [...]"


id: f88198c322633b20c56a74f9608d8743
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"[...] CORSIA, aviation CO2 emissions are not capped, but rather emissions \r that exceed the CORSIA baseline are compensated through use of \r 'offset units' from emissions reduction projects in other industries \r (Erling 2018). However, it is unclear whether the goal of carbon \r neutral growth and further CO2 emissions reduction in the sector \r will be sufficiently incentivised solely through the use of such offsets \r in combination with ICAO's manufacturing standards, programmes, \r and state action plans, without additional measures being taken, \r for example, constraints on demand (Lyle 2018). If countries such \r as China, Brazil, India and Russia do not participate in CORSIA's \r voluntary offsetting requirements this could significantly undermine \r its capacity to deliver fully on the sectoral goal by limiting coverage \r of the scheme to less than 50% of international aviation CO2\r emissions in the period 2021-2026 (Hoch et al. 2019; Climate Action \r [...]"


id: b9e8e27505c111807b72ad74aa772f3
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"[...] Tracker 2020b). In addition, a  wide range of offsets are approved \r as 'eligible emissions units' in CORSIA, including several certified \r under voluntary carbon offset schemes, which may go beyond those \r eventually agreed under the Paris Agreement Article 6  mechanism \r (Hoch et al. 2019). It is noted, however, that ICAO applies a set of \r 'Emissions Unit Eligibility Criteria', agreed in March 2019, which \r specify required design elements for eligible programmes. In June \r 2020, the ICAO Council decided to define 2019 emissions levels, \r rather than an average of 2019 and 2020 emissions, as the baseline \r year for at least the first three years of CORSIA, although there were \r significant reductions (45-60%) in aviation CO2 emissions in 2020 \r compared with 2019 as a result of reductions in air travel associated \r with the COVID-19 pandemic (Climate Action Tracker 2020b)."


id: b7c1897fee6ea5788bf8fd7224962245
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"However, it is unlikely that the EEDI and other IMO technical and \r operational measures will be sufficient to produce 'the necessary \r emissions reduction because of the future growth in international \r seaborne trade and world population' (Shi and Gullett 2018). \r Consequently, in 2018, the IMO adopted an initial strategy on \r reduction of GHG emissions from ships (IMO 2018). This includes \r a goal for declining carbon intensity of the sector by reducing CO2\r emissions per transport work, as an average across international \r shipping, by at least 40% by 2030, and pursuing efforts towards \r 70% by 2050, compared to 2008 levels (IMO 2018, Para. 3.1). The \r strategy also aims for peaking of total annual GHG emissions from \r international shipping as soon as possible and a  reduction by at \r least 50% by 2050 compared to 2008 levels, while pursuing efforts \r towards phasing them out 'as soon as possible in this century' as \r [...]"


id: e597c54be04d8f4dda2d47b9fb68d92b
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content:
"[...] a point 'on a pathway of CO2 emissions reduction consistent with \r the Paris Agreement temperature goals' (IMO 2018, Para. 2, 3.1). The \r shipping industry is on track to overachieve the 2030 carbon intensity \r target but not its 2050 target (Climate Action Tracker 2020c). The \r initial IMO strategy is to be kept under review by the MEPC with \r a view to adoption of a revised strategy in 2023. "


id: aa9bf5b70ddcf44320d8e2fc60e1f415
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content:
"The IMO's initial strategy identifies a series of candidate short-term \r (2018-2023), medium-term (2023-2030) and long-term (beyond \r 2030) measures for achieving its emissions reduction goals, including \r possible market-based measures in the medium-to-long term (IMO \r 2018, paras. 4.7-4.9). Further progress on market-based measures \r faces difficulty in light of conflicts between the CBDRRC principle of \r the climate regime and the traditional non-discrimination approach \r and principle of no more favourable treatment enshrined in MARPOL \r and other IMO conventions (Zhang 2016). Both the CBDRRC and non\u0002discrimination principles are designated as 'principles guiding the \r initial strategy' (IMO 2018, Para. 3.2). The challenges encountered \r in introducing global market-based measures for shipping emissions \r under the IMO have prompted regional initiatives such as the \r proposed extension of the EU ETS to emissions from maritime \r [...]"


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"[...] activities (Christodoulou et al. 2021), which was announced on \r 14 July 2021 by the EU Commission as part of its 'Fit for 55' legislative \r package (European Commission 2021)."


id: 3360ca720cc5099167d765968950e0bf
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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content:
"Prominent examples of new climate social movements that operate \r transnationally are Extinction Rebellion and Fridays for Future, \r which collectively held hundreds of coordinated protests across the \r globe in 2019-2021, marking out 'the transnational climate justice \r movement as one of the most extensive social movements on the \r planet' (Almeida 2019). Fridays for Future is a children's and youth \r movement that began in August 2018, inspired by the actions of \r then 15-year old Greta Thunberg who pledged to strike in front of the \r Swedish parliament every Friday to protest against a lack of action \r on climate change in line with the Paris Agreement targets (Fridays \r for Future 2019). Fridays for Future events worldwide encompass \r more than 200 countries and millions of strikers. The movement is \r unusual for its focus on children and the rights of future generations, \r with children's resistance having received little previous attention \r [...]"


id: a429d72695cb9c01d334ef36ac6d3b6f
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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content:
"[...] in the literature. Fridays for Future is regarded as a  progressive \r resistance movement that has quickly achieved global prominence \r (for example, Thunberg was invited to address governments at the \r UN Climate Summit in New York in September 2019) and is credited \r with helping to support the discourse about the responsibility of \r humanity as a  whole for climate change (Holmberg and Alvinius \r 2019). Whereas Fridays for Future has focused on periodic protest \r action, Extinction Rebellion has pursued a  campaign based on \r sustained non-violent direct citizen action that is focused on three \r key demands: declaration of a 'climate emergency', acting now to halt \r biodiversity loss and reduce greenhouse gas emissions to net zero by \r 2025, and creation of a citizen's assembly on climate and ecological \r justice (Booth 2019; Extinction Rebellion 2019). The movement first \r arose in the United Kingdom- where it claimed credit for adoption \r [...]"


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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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content:
"[...] of a climate emergency declaration by the UK government - but now \r has a presence in 45 countries with some 650 groups having formed \r globally (Gunningham 2019)."


id: 2f0af97b837154569b5ad8ccb66ade9d
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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vector_id: 5547
content:
"Transnationally organised civil society actors have had long-standing \r involvement in international climate policy, with a particular focus \r on consulting or knowledge-sharing where they are present in \r transnational climate governance initiatives (Michaelowa and \r Michaelowa 2017). The term 'civil society' generally denotes 'the \r voluntary association of individuals in the public sphere beyond the \r realms of the state, the market and the family' (de Bakker et al. 2013, \r p. 575). Whereas civil society organisations are usually involved in \r lobbying or advocacy activities in a public arena, social movements \r focus on mobilisation and action for social change (Daniel and \r Neubert 2019). Examples of civil society groups involved in \r international climate policy include non-governmental organisations \r (NGOs) such as Greenpeace International, the World Wide Fund \r for Nature, the Environmental Defense Fund, the World Resources \r [...]"


id: 1ffac31e0132c6396c469e1ee491acd9
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content:
"[...] Institute, Friends of the Earth and Earthjustice among many others, \r as well as NGO networks such as the Climate Action Network, which \r has over 1300 NGO members in more than 130 countries, working \r to promote government and individual action to limit human\u0002induced climate change to ecologically sustainable levels (Climate \r Action Network International 2020). The influence of civil society \r engagement in global climate governance is well acknowledged, \r with these organisations' globally dispersed constituencies and non\u0002state status offering perspectives that differ in significant ways from \r those of many negotiating states (Derman 2014). "


id: a1eeca57d1909148cd683e38a0bdf610
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25723
content:
"opinion from the ICJ. The aim of climate litigation more generally is \r to supplement other regulatory efforts by filling gaps and ensuring \r that interpretations of laws and policies are aligned with climate \r mitigation goals (Osofsky 2010).\r The overall impact of transnationally-organised civil society action \r and social movements for international cooperation on climate \r change mitigation has not been comprehensively evaluated in \r the literature. This may reflect the polycentric organisation of the \r movement, which poses challenges for coordinating between groups \r operating in different contexts, acting with different strategies and \r around multiple issues, and lobbying multiple decision-making \r bodies at various levels of government in a sustainable way (Tormos\u0002Aponte and Garcia-Lopez 2018). There is some literature emerging \r on environmental defenders and their need for protection against \r violence and repression, particularly in the case of indigenous \r [...]"


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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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content:
"[...] environmental defenders who face significantly higher rates of violence \r (Scheidel et al. 2020). Scheidel et al. (2020) also find that combining \r strategies of preventive mobilisation, protest diversification and \r litigation can enhance rates of success for environmental defenders \r in halting environmentally destructive projects. In the area of climate \r litigation, commentators have noted the potential for activists and \r even researchers to suffer retaliation through the courts as a result of \r 'strategic lawsuits against public participation' and lawsuits against \r researchers brought by fossil fuel interests (Setzer and Byrnes 2019; \r Setzer and Benjamin 2020). Influence of social movements may be \r enhanced through taking advantage of 'movement spillover' (the \r involvement of activists in more than one movement) (Hadden 2014) \r and coordination of activities with a range of 'non-state governors', \r including cities, sub-national governments, and investor groups \r [...]"


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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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content:
"[...] (Gunningham 2019). Studies of general societal change suggest that \r once 3.5% of the population are mobilised on an issue, far-reaching \r change becomes possible (Gladwell 2002; Chenoweth and Belgioioso \r 2019) - a tipping point that may be approaching in the case of climate \r change (Gunningham 2019). As noted in Chapter 5, in the particular \r case of low-carbon technologies, 'if 10-30% of the population were \r to demonstrate commitment to low-carbon technologies, behaviours, \r and lifestyles, new social norms would be established'. "


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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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"Transnational civil society organisations advocating for climate \r justice in global governance have articulated policy positions around \r rights protections, responsibility-based approaches to climate \r finance, and the need for transparency and accountability (Derman \r 2014). Another recent area of activity, which overlaps with that of \r emerging investor alliances (Section 14.5.4), is the sustainability of \r capital investment in fossil fuel assets. Efforts to shift away from \r fossil fuels led by civil society include the Beyond Coal Campaign \r (in the USA and Europe) and the organisation for a Fossil Fuel Non\u0002proliferation Treaty. 350.org has supported mobilisation of youth \r and university students around a campaign of divestment that has \r grown into a  global movement (Gunningham 2019). As Mormann \r (2020) notes, as of November 2020 'more than 1,200 institutional \r investors managing over USD14 trillion of assets around the world \r [...]"


id: fa82b3901725c7ed80192c9a6c71582
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"[...] have committed to divest some or all of their fossil fuel holdings'. \r Studies suggest that the direct impacts of the divestment movement \r have so far been small, given a  failure to differentiate between \r different types of fossil fuel companies, a lack of engagement with \r retail investors, and a lack of guidance for investors on clean energy \r re-investment (Osofsky et al. 2019; Mormann 2020). The movement \r has had a more significant impact on public discourse by raising the \r profile of climate change as a financial risk for investors (Bergman \r 2018). Blondeel et al. (2019) also find that broader appeal of the \r divestment norm was achieved when moral arguments were linked \r to financial ones, through the advocacy of economic actors, such as \r the Bank of England's governor."


id: 77719d325f478ee917ed201b3b9929bf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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"Climate justice campaigns by transnational civil society organisations \r increasingly embrace action through the courts. Chapter 13 discusses \r the growth and policy impact of such 'climate litigation' brought by \r civil society actors in domestic courts, which is attracting increasing \r attention in the literature (Setzer and Vanhala 2019; Peel and Osofsky \r 2020). Transnational and international court actions focused on \r climate change, by contrast, have been relatively few in number (Peel \r and Lin 2019). This reflects - at least in part - the procedural hurdles \r to bringing such claims, as in many international courts and tribunals \r (outside of the area of human rights or investor-state arbitration) \r litigation can only be brought by states (Bruce 2017). However, there \r have been active discussions about seeking an advisory opinion \r from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on states' international \r obligations regarding the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions \r [...]"


id: 8f58bb549cf98d2dc3b9a74dc2187195
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"[...] (Sands 2016; Wewerinke-Singh and Salili 2020), or bringing a case to \r the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea on marine pollution \r harms caused by climate change (Boyle 2019). In September 2021 the \r Government of Vanuatu announced a campaign to seek an advisory "


id: dfffc05d8a2865beb630d6ae6a4222ec
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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"as the World Bank, in initiating public-private partnerships (PPPs). \r Andonova (2017) calls this 'governance entrepreneurship'. Such \r partnerships can be defined as 'voluntary agreements between \r public actors (international organisations, states, or sub-state public \r authorities) and non-state actors (non-governmental organisations \r (NGOs), companies, foundations, etc.) on a  set of governance \r objectives and norms, rules, practices, and/or implementation \r procedures and their attainment across multiple jurisdictions and \r levels of governance' (Andonova 2017). Partnerships may carry \r out different main functions: first, policy development, establishing \r new agreements on norms, rules, or standards among a broader set \r of governmental and non-governmental actors; second, enabling \r implementation and delivery of services, by combining resources from \r governmental and non-governmental actors; and, third, knowledge \r [...]"


id: f6f38f1d5da2084d02d052edb705b0fd
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"[...] production and dissemination, to for example, the evolution of \r relevant public policies. "


id: ab205a607605a0e94f38b87a67fe12cb
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"An example of a  prominent PPP in the area of climate mitigation \r is the Renewable Energy Network (REN21 2019), which is a global \r multi-stakeholder network focused on promoting renewable energy \r policies in support of the transition to renewable energy through \r knowledge, established in 2004. It includes members from industry, \r NGOs, intergovernmental organisations, and science and academia. \r Another example is the Green Economy Coalition founded in 2009 \r to bring to bear the perspectives of workers, business, poor people, \r the environment community, and academics in the transition to \r a greener and more sustainable economy. Another example is that in \r 2015, Peru, in collaboration with France and the UNFCCC Secretariat, \r launched the Non-state Actor Zone for Climate Action, an online \r platform to showcase commitments to climate action by companies, \r cities, regions and investors (Chan et al. 2016; Bertoldi et al. 2018). \r [...]"


id: c9d1c0136700a84c435ad5db0468b5b6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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"[...] More recently, the UNFCCC Race to Zero initiative led by High-level \r Climate Champions Nigel Topping and Gonzalo Munoz seeks to \r mobilise actors beyond national governments to join the Climate \r Ambition Alliance and pursue net zero CO2 targets. Its membership \r includes 454 cities, 23 regions, 1391 businesses, 74 of the biggest \r investors, and 569 universities."


id: 38aade5d3c59c181d4f3a30ad492da
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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"PPPs for cooperation on climate mitigation goals have emerged \r at multiple levels of governance beyond the realm of international \r organisations. For example, PPP funding for cities expanded rapidly \r in the 1990s and outpaced official external assistance almost \r tenfold. Most of the PPP infrastructure investment has been aimed \r at telecommunications, followed by energy. However, with the \r exception of the telecommunications sector, PPP investments have \r generally bypassed low-income countries (Ivanova 2017). It is \r therefore not surprising that PPPs have added relatively little to the \r financing of urban capital in developing countries over the past two \r decades (Bahl and Linn 2014). Liu and Waibel (2010) argue that the \r inherent risk of urban investment is the main obstacle to increasing \r the flow of private capital. Nevertheless, there have been cases where \r PPP investments have exceeded official external aid flows even for \r [...]"


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content:
"[...] water and sanitation, and highly visible projects have been funded \r with PPPs in selected metropolitan areas of developing countries, \r including urban rail projects in Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, and Manila \r (Liu and Waibel 2010). "


id: dcb50f74a045433665dcb9d8775fd085
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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content:
"Community climate action plans consider all GHGs emitted within \r the local geographic boundaries, including from industry, home \r heating, burning fuel in vehicles, and so on. It is these community \r plans that require large multi-stakeholder partnerships to be \r successful. Partners in these partnerships generally include the local \r government departments, other government departments, utilities, \r large businesses, Chambers of Commerce, some small and medium\u0002sized enterprises, universities, schools, and local civil society groups \r (Clarke and MacDonald 2016). Research shows that the partnership's \r structural features enable the achievement of plan outcomes, such as \r reducing GHG emissions, while also generating value for the partners \r (Austin and Seitanidi 2012; Clarke and MacDonald 2016; Clarke \r and Ordonez-Ponce 2017). Stua (2017b) explores the Mitigation \r Alliances (MAs) on the national level. The internal governance model \r [...]"


id: 777625cd4f28b4806a2d2ac9c89d5fa1
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"[...] of MAs consists of overarching authorities mandated to harmonise \r the overall organisational structure. These authorities guarantee an \r effective, equitable and transparent functioning of the MA's pillars \r (the demand, supply, and exchange of mitigation outcomes), in line \r with the principles and criteria of the Paris Agreement. This hybrid \r governance model relies upon its unique links with international \r climate institutions (Stua 2017a)."


id: 8eb9126f7dee47b8fdb9366450d0b60
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22299
content:
"Transnational cooperative action by investors on climate mitigation \r has been facilitated by international standard-setting on issues \r of climate risk and disclosure. For example, in 2017 the Financial \r Stability Board's Taskforce on Climate-related Financial Disclosures \r (TCFD) adopted international recommendations for climate risk \r disclosure (TCFD 2017). These recommendations, which apply to all \r financial-sector organisations, including banks, insurance companies, \r asset managers, and asset owners, have received strong support \r from investor coalitions globally, including Climate Action 100+ \r (with 300 investors with more than USD33 trillion in assets under \r management), the Global Investor Coalition on Climate Change \r (a coalition of regional investor groups across Asia, Australia, Europe \r and North America) and the Institutional Investors Group on Climate \r Change (IIGCC). One of the key recommendations of the TCFD calls \r [...]"


id: c8da1d8aecadc7dc299cd9cd1c73268c
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"[...] for stress-testing of investment portfolios taking into consideration \r different climate-related scenarios, including a 2degC or lower scenario. \r Broad adoption of the TCFD recommendations could provide a basis \r for decisions by investors to shift assets away from climate-risk \r exposed assets such as fossil fuel extraction projects (Osofsky et al. \r 2019). There is strong evidence showing the urgent need for scaling\u0002up climate finance to mitigate greenhouse gases in line with pursuit \r of limiting the temperature increase to 1.5degC above pre-industrial \r levels, and to support adaptation to safeguard the international \r community from the consequences of a  changing climate. While \r public actors have a responsibility to deploy climate finance, it is clear "


id: 34eff36c1dc22a41bf25787770ac6d52
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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"A leading example is the World Business Council on Sustainable \r Development (WBCSD), a global, CEO-led organisation of over 200 \r leading businesses working together to accelerate the transition \r to a sustainable world. Member companies come from all business \r sectors and all major economies, representing a combined revenue of \r more than USD8.5 trillion and with 19 million employees. The WBCSD \r aims to enhance 'the business case for sustainability through tools, \r services, models and experiences'. It includes a Global Network of \r almost 70 national business councils across the globe. The overall \r vision is to create a world where more than 9 billion people are all \r living well and within the boundaries of our planet, by 2050. Vision \r 2050,  released in 2010, explored what a  sustainable world would \r look like in 2050, how such a world could be realised, and the role \r that business can play in making that vision a reality. A few years \r [...]"


id: bbb700383581bee64997ca0799499beb
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"[...] later, Action2020 took that Vision and translated it into a roadmap \r of necessary business actions and solutions (WBCSD 2019). WBCSD \r focuses on those areas where business operates and can make an \r impact. They identify six transformation systems that are critical \r in this regard: Circular Economy, Climate and Energy, Cities and \r Mobility, Food and Nature, People and Redefining Value. All have an "


id: a648e8bb4ccca4a87a57a4efa9af88ae
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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content:
"As most of these partnerships are of recent vintage an assessment of \r their effectiveness is premature. Instead, partnerships can be assessed \r on the basis of the three main functions introduced earlier. Starting \r with policy development, that is, establishing new agreements on \r norms, rules, or standards among a  broader set of governmental \r and non-governmental actors, this is not the most prominent aspect \r of partnerships so far, although both the cities' networks and risk \r disclosure recommendations include some elements of this. The \r second element, enabling implementation and delivery of services, \r by combining resources from governmental and non-governmental \r actors, seems to be a  more prominent part of the partnerships \r (Ivanova et al. 2020). Both UNEP financing, the WBCSD, the REDD+ \r and TEEB mechanisms, and PPP funding for cities are examples here. \r Finally, the third element, knowledge production and dissemination, \r [...]"


id: 2fee31abda09e14c0633e43df925db1d
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"[...] for example, contributing to the evolution of relevant public policies, \r is the most prominent part of these partnerships, with the majority \r including such activities. "


id: a2a89b01731148e48673bebd757ef34a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25835
content:
"y \r Local and regional governments have an important role to play in \r global climate action, something recognised by the Paris Agreement, \r and also assessed in Sections 13.3.2 and 13.3.4 of this report. There \r are several ways they can be useful. First, sub-national governments \r can contribute insights and experience that provide valuable lessons \r to national governments, as well as offering needed implementation \r capacity (GIZ 2017; Leffel 2018). A great deal of policymaking has \r occurred at the level of city governments in particular. Cities have \r been responsible for more than 70% of global greenhouse gas \r emissions and generate over 80% of global income (World Bank \r 2010), and many of them have started to take their own initiative \r in enacting and developing mitigation policies (CDP 2015). Most of \r these activities aim at the reduction of GHG emissions in the sectors \r of energy, transportation, urban land use and waste (Bulkeley 2010; \r [...]"


id: 8ebbeae82382a0d3f8616a0ba0a33e41
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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content:
"[...] Xuemei 2007), and are motivated by concerns not only over climate, \r but also a  consideration of local co-benefits (Rashidi et al. 2017, \r 2019). Second, sub-national governments can fill the void in policy \r leadership in cases where national governments are ineffectual, even \r to the point of claiming leadership and authority with respect to \r foreign affairs (Leffel 2018). International cooperation plays a role in \r such action. Several international networks, such as C40, ICLEI, Mayors \r for Climate Protection, and the Covenant of Mayors have played an \r important role in defining and developing climate-policy initiatives \r at the city level (Funfgeld 2015). While the networks differ from each \r other, they generally are voluntary and non-hierarchical, intended to \r support the horizontal diffusion of innovative climate policies through \r information-sharing platforms linked to specific goals that member \r cities make (Kern and Bulkeley 2009). The literature has addressed \r [...]"


id: 397c4ac81b65d78397157f46835fae4f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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content:
"[...] the questions of why cities join the networks (Betsill and Bulkeley \r 2004; Pitt 2010), what recognition benefits cities can expect (Buis \r 2009; Kern and Bulkeley 2009), and how memberships can provide \r visibility to leverage international funding (Betsill and Bulkeley 2004; \r Heinrichs et al. 2013). Membership in the networks has been found \r to be a significant predictor of cities' adoption of mitigation policies, \r even when controlling for national-level policies that may be in place \r (Rashidi and Patt 2018). Kona et al. (2018) find that cities belonging \r to the Covenant of Mayors are engaging in emissions reductions at \r a  rate consistent with achieving a  2degC global temperature target. \r Kona et al. (2021) document this trend continuing.\r With respect to their role in formal international cooperation, however, \r it is unclear what authority, as a non-state actor, they actually have. \r Cities, for example, are members of transnational initiatives aimed at "


id: ad371b1d7c7d60dae4dd8c23e9d42905
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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content:
"What is less common, but gradually growing, is an important and \r more relevant literature on criteria to assess sustainability and impact \r on climate and development goals. Michaelowa and Michaelowa \r (2017) assess 109 transnational partnerships and alliances based \r on four design criteria: existence of mitigation targets; incentives for \r mitigation; definition of a baseline; and existence of a monitoring, \r reporting, and verification procedure . About half of the initiatives \r do not meet any of these criteria, and not even 15% satisfy three \r or more. A recent study using a systematic review of business and \r public administration literature on PPPs concludes that research in \r the past rarely incorporated sustainability concepts. The authors \r propose a research agenda and a series of success factors that, if \r appropriately managed, can contribute to sustainable development, \r and in so doing contribute to a more solid scientific evaluation of \r [...]"


id: da34224a6dfda1a569b97feebb517524
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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content:
"[...] PPPs (Pinz et al. 2018). There is evidence that with the adoption \r of the Sustainable Development Goals, many of which are directly \r linked to climate goals, PPPs will become even more prominent as \r they will be called upon to provide resources, knowledge, expertise, \r and implementation support in a  very ambitious agenda. PPPs in \r the developing world need to take into account different cultural \r and social decision-making processes, language differences, \r and unfamiliar bureaucracy (Gardiner et al. 2016). Having more \r evidence on what norms and standards in relation to sustainability \r are used and their governance is essential (Axel 2019). The issue \r of double counting should be revised. GHGs are accounted both \r at the national and sub-national level or company level (Schneider "


id: 1838a896871e2a49e5cd8fc8cea53a61
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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vector_id: 1462
content:
"non-state actors, such as Global Climate Action, originally the Non\u0002state Actor Zone for Climate Action, under the UNFCCC. While there is \r reason to believe that such membership can add value to mitigation \r efforts, one study suggests that the environmental effects have yet \r to be reliably quantified (Hsu et al. 2019a). By contrast, Kuramochi \r et al. (2020) provide evidence that non-state actors are leading \r to significant emissions reductions beyond what countries would \r otherwise be achieving. In terms of institutional strength, Michaelowa \r and Michaelowa (2017) suggest that few such networks fulfil \r governance criteria, and hence challenge their effectiveness. Several \r researchers suggest that their role is important in informal ways, given \r issues about the legitimacy of non-state actors (Chan et al. 2016; \r Nasiritousi et al. 2016). Backstrand et al. (2017) advance the concept \r of 'hybrid multilateralism' as a heuristic to capture this intensified \r [...]"


id: be6f857e598356aed0ffccdfa3cf93e9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30767
content:
"[...] interplay between state and non-state actors in the new landscape of \r international climate cooperation. The effectiveness of such non-state \r government actors should be measured not only by their contribution \r to mitigation, but also by their success to enhance the accountability, \r transparency and deliberative quality of the UNFCCC and the Paris \r Agreement (Chan et al. 2015; Busby 2016; Hale et al. 2016). In the \r post-Paris era, effectiveness also revolves around how to align non\u0002state and intergovernmental action in a comprehensive framework \r that can help achieve low carbon futures (Chan et al. 2016). Stua \r (2017b) suggests that networks involving non-state actors can play \r an important role in enhancing transparency. Such effectiveness has \r to be complemented also by normative questions, applying a  set \r of democratic values: participation, deliberation, accountability, \r and transparency (Backstrand and Kuyper 2017). Such concepts of \r [...]"


id: 9450362b23ae91d9d43da9cfe7097ae6
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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vector_id: 23303
content:
"[...] polycentric governance offer new opportunities for climate action, \r but it has been argued that it is too early to judge their importance \r and effects (Jordan et al. 2015)."


id: 95be11a950db712659cf66091ca02a91
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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vector_id: 23536
content:
"to add up to the level of aggregate emissions reductions necessary to \r achieve the objectives of holding global average warming well below \r 2degC, much less 1.5degC (Section  14.3.3 Figure  14.2), and that there \r is no legally binding obligation to achieve the NDCs. Arguments in \r support of Paris are that it puts in place the processes, and generates \r normative expectations, that nudge NDCs to become progressively \r more ambitious over time, including in developing countries. The \r growing number of countries with mid-century net-zero GHG or CO2\r targets, consistent with Article 4 of the Paris Agreement, lends support \r to this proposition, although there is as yet no empirical literature \r drawing an unambiguous connection. The collective quantified goal \r from a  floor of USD100 billion a  year in transfers to developing \r countries, the Green Climate Fund and other provisions on finance in \r the Paris Agreement have also been recognised as key to cooperation \r [...]"


id: af059bec2c3384f1eba5a892221985dd
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content:
"[...] (Sections 14.3.2.8 and 14.4.1). But then these arguments are met \r with counter arguments, that even with Paris processes in place, \r given the logic of iterative, rising levels of ambition over time, this \r is unlikely to happen within the narrow window of opportunity that \r exists to avert dangerous levels of global warming (Section 14.3.3). \r The degree to which countries are willing to increase the ambition \r and secure the achievement of their NDCs over time will be an \r important indicator of the success of the Paris Agreement; evidence \r of this was expected by the end of 2020, but the COVID-19 pandemic \r has delayed the process of updating NDCs. "


id: b80a54c30c37858f8f4f115bcb6da2e4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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vector_id: 29597
content:
"An increasing role is also played by other cooperative agreements, in \r particular (potentially) under Article 6 (Sections 14.3.2.10 and 14.4.4), \r transnational partnerships, and the institutions that support them. This \r fits both a transitions narrative that cooperation at the sub-global and \r sectoral levels is necessary to enable specific system transformations, \r and a recent emphasis in the public goods literature on club goods and \r a gradual approach to cooperation, also referred to as building blocks \r or incremental approach (Sections 14.2 and 14.5.1.4). There has been \r little analysis of whether these other agreements are of sufficient scale \r and scope to ensure that transformations happen quickly enough. This \r chapter, appraising them together, concludes that they are not. First, \r many agreements, such as those related to trade, may stand in the \r way of bottom-up mitigation efforts (Section 14.5.1.3). Second, many \r [...]"


id: 69db8caf71aff5e22fa49a3bdeee16b
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"[...] sectoral agreements aimed at decarbonisation - such as within the \r air travel sector - have not yet adopted targets comparable in scale, \r scope or legal character to those adopted under the Paris Agreement \r (Section 14.5.2.3). Third, there are many sectors for which there are \r no agreements in place. At the same time, there are some important \r bright spots, many in the area of transnational partnerships. A growing \r number of cities have committed themselves to adopting urban policies \r that will place them on a path to rapid decarbonisation, while learning \r from each other how to implement successful policies to realise climate \r goals (Section 14.5.5). An increasing number of large corporations have \r committed to decarbonising their industrial processes and supply chains \r (Section 14.5.4). And an ever-increasing number of non-state actors \r are adopting goals and initiating mitigation actions (Section 14.5.3). \r [...]"


id: bb10d57ea81276bd3b62fe09fc1e4541
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30134
content:
"[...] These goals and actions, some argue, could bridge the mitigation gap \r created by inadequate NDCs, although the empirical literature to date \r challenges this, suggesting that there is less transparency and limited \r accountability for such actions, and mitigation targets and incentives \r are also not clear (Sections 14.3.3 and 14.5). "


id: bd96db00cc5cbba8bea7945b1f3e1b3a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30617
content:
"The main development since AR5 in terms of international climate \r cooperation has been the shift from the Kyoto Protocol to the Paris \r Agreement as the primary multilateral driver of climate mitigation \r policy worldwide (Section  14.3). Most ex-post assessments of the \r Kyoto Protocol suggest that it did lead to emissions reductions in \r countries with binding targets, in addition to changing investment \r patterns in low-carbon technologies. As noted earlier, the Paris \r Agreement is tailored to the evolving understanding of the climate \r mitigation challenge as well as shifting political imperatives and \r constraints. Whether the Paris Agreement will in fact be effective \r in supporting global action sufficient to achieve its objectives is \r contested, with competing arguments in the scientific literature \r supporting different views. To some extent these views align with the \r different analytic frameworks (Section 14.2.1): the Paris Agreement \r [...]"


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"[...] does not address the free-riding issue seen as important within the \r global commons framing, but may provide the necessary incentives \r and support mechanisms viewed as important under the political and \r transitions framings, respectively. The strongest critique of the Paris \r Agreement is that current NDCs themselves fail by a wide margin "


id: a648f7dbc84d7000777f175e7ee9b01b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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"This section provides an overall assessment of international \r cooperation, taking into account the combined effects of cooperation \r within the UNFCCC process, other global agreements, as well as \r regional, sectoral, and transnational processes. Recent literature \r consistent with the transitions framing highlights that cooperation \r can be particularly effective when it addresses issues on a  sector\u0002by-sector basis (Geels et al. 2019). Table 14.4 below summarises the \r effects of international cooperation on mitigation efforts in each of \r the sectoral areas covered in Chapters 5 to 12 of this report. As it \r indicates, there are some strong areas of sector-specific cooperation, \r but also some important weaknesses. Formal agreements and \r programmes, both multilateral and bilateral, are advancing mitigation \r efforts in energy, AFOLU, and transportation, while transnational \r networks and partnerships are addressing issues in urban systems, \r [...]"


id: e40eb00983f93be3d0a3a6b04f6d7689
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:20
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content:
"[...] industry, and buildings. Although many of the concerns relevant for \r buildings may be embedded in the energy sector with respect to their \r operation, and the industrial sector with respect to their materials, \r reinforcing the networks with more formal agreements could be \r vital to putting these sectors on a pathway to net zero GHG or CO2\r emissions. Several of the sectors have very little formal cooperation \r at the international level, and a common theme across many of them \r is a need for increased financial flows to achieve particular objectives."


id: 66fc5e55fe9f64a5196236b9bf24ca4c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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content:
"Many of the international agreements and institutions discussed in \r this chapter, in particular the Paris Agreement, are new. The logic and \r architecture of the Paris Agreement, in particular, breaks new ground, \r and there is limited evaluation of prior experience in the form of \r analogous treaties to draw on. Such instruments have evolved in \r response to geopolitical and other drivers that are changing rapidly, \r and will continue to shape the nature of international cooperation \r under it and triggered by it. The Paris Agreement is also, in common \r with other multilateral agreements, a  'living instrument' evolving \r through interpretative and operationalising rules, and forms of \r implementation, that Parties continue to negotiate at conferences \r year on year. It is a constant 'work in progress' and thus challenging \r to assess at any given point in time. The Paris Agreement also engages \r a larger set of variables - given its privileging of national autonomy \r [...]"


id: 4f2c5da197081015e992bb0e127c8cb9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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content:
"[...] and politics, integration with the sustainable development agenda, \r and its engagement with actions and actors at multiple levels - than \r earlier international agreements, which further complicates the task \r of tracing causality between observed effects and international \r cooperation through the Paris Agreement."


id: 554d058393b0f85ce3013a64d87834e9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12288
content:
"Yes, to an extent. Countries' emissions were in line with their internationally agreed targets: the collective greenhouse gas (GHG) \r mitigation target for Annex I countries in the UNFCCC to return to their 1990 emissions levels by 2000, and their individual targets \r in the Kyoto Protocol for 2008-12. Numerous studies suggest that participation in the Kyoto Protocol led to substantial reductions in \r national GHG emissions, as well increased levels of innovation and investment in low-carbon technologies. In this latter respect, the \r Kyoto Protocol set in motion some of the transformational changes that will be required to meet the temperature goal of the Paris \r Agreement. It is too soon to tell whether the processes and commitments embodied in the Paris Agreement will be effective in achieving \r its stated goals with respect to limiting temperature rise, adaptation, and financial flows. There is, however, evidence that its entry into \r [...]"


id: 160bd3c39cb39e73a361da3e75fa7b0b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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content:
"[...] force has been a contributing factor to many countries' adopting mid-century targets of net-zero GHG or CO2 emissions. "


id: 43eb21bc80a8b82969891a7542201636
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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content:
"Continued international cooperation remains critically important both to stimulate countries' enhanced levels of mitigation ambition, \r and through various means of support to increase the likelihood that they achieve these objectives. The latter is particularly the \r case in developing countries, where mitigation efforts often rely on bilateral and multilateral cooperation on low-carbon finance, \r technology support, capacity building, and enhanced South-South cooperation. The Paris Agreement is structured around Nationally \r Determined Contributions that are subject to an international oversight system, and bolstered through international support. \r The international oversight system is designed to generate transparency and accountability for individual emissions reduction \r contributions, and regular moments for stock-taking of these efforts towards global goals. Such enhanced transparency may instil \r [...]"


id: d78339f821f4d78a4b51588b6e32eb0d
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35221
content:
"[...] confidence and trust, and foster solidarity among nations, with theory-based arguments that this will lead to greater levels of \r ambition. Together with other cooperative agreements at the sub-global and sectoral levels, as well as a  growing number of \r transnational networks and initiatives, the implementation of all of these mechanisms is likely to play an important role in making \r political, economic, and social conditions more favourable to ambitious mitigation efforts in the context of sustainable development \r and efforts to eradicate poverty. "


id: 5f6e2fedbdd5b31393e2c567d2d8d745
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"While international cooperation is contributing to global mitigation efforts, its effects are far from uniform. Cooperation has \r contributed to setting a global direction of travel, and to falling greenhouse gas emissions in many countries and avoided emissions \r in others. It remains to be seen whether it can achieve the kind of transformational changes needed to achieve the Paris Agreement's \r long-term global goals. There appears to be a large potential role for international cooperation to better address sector-specific \r technical and infrastructure challenges that are associated with such transformational changes. Finalising the rules to pursue \r voluntary cooperation, such as through international carbon market mechanisms and public climate finance in the implementation \r of NDCs, without compromising environmental integrity, may play an important role in accelerating mitigation efforts in developing \r [...]"


id: 1ac6b89370a1fe987ee809000ebc668b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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content:
"[...] countries. Finally, there is room for international cooperation to more explicitly address transboundary issues associated with carbon \r dioxide removal and solar radiation management. "


id: 2b031be10056bf7511fb56a1dff41f08
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4802
content:
"Finance to reduce net greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and \r enhance resilience to climate impacts represents a  critical \r enabling factor for the low carbon transition. Fundamental \r inequities in access to finance as well as its terms and \r conditions, and countries' exposure to physical impacts of \r climate change overall result in a  worsening outlook for \r a  global just transition (high confidence). Decarbonising the \r economy requires global action to address fundamental economic \r inequities and overcome the climate investment trap that exists for \r many developing countries. For these countries the costs and risks \r of financing often represent a significant challenge for stakeholders \r at all levels. This challenge is exacerbated by these countries' \r general economic vulnerability and indebtedness. The rising public \r fiscal costs of mitigation, and of adapting to climate shocks, are \r affecting many countries and worsening public indebtedness and \r [...]"


id: 66ba387a628bfff4323317835a597650
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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content:
"[...] country credit ratings at a time when there were already significant \r stresses on public finances. The COVID-19 pandemic has made these \r stresses worse and tightened public finances still further. Other major \r challenges for commercial climate finance include: the mismatch \r between capital and investment needs,1\r  home bias2 considerations, \r differences in risk perceptions for regions, as well as limited \r institutional capacity to ensure safeguards represent. {15.2, 15.6.3}"


id: 3d3cc49074b577ff89acd909132789a0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7950
content:
"Investors, central banks, and financial regulators are driving \r increased awareness of climate risk. This increased awareness \r can support climate policy development and implementation \r (high confidence). Climate-related financial risks arise from physical \r impacts of climate change (already relevant in the short term), and \r from a  disorderly transition to a  low-carbon economy. Awareness \r of these risks is increasing leading also to concerns about financial \r stability. Financial regulators and institutions have responded with \r multiple regulatory and voluntary initiatives by to assess and address \r these risks. Yet despite these initiatives, climate-related financial risks \r remain greatly underestimated by financial institutions and markets \r limiting the capital reallocation needed for the low-carbon transition. \r Moreover, risks relating to national and international inequity  - \r which act as a barrier to the transformation - are not yet reflected in \r [...]"


id: b2e6c42c43241a931182450af66cb423
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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vector_id: 28710
content:
"[...] decisions by the financial community. Stronger steering by regulators \r and policy makers has the potential to close this gap. Despite the \r increasing attention of investors to climate change, there is limited \r evidence that this attention has directly impacted emission reductions. \r This leaves high uncertainty, both near-term (2021-30) and longer\u0002term (2021-50), on the feasibility of an alignment of financial flows \r with the Paris Agreement (high confidence). {15.2, 15.6}"


id: 2be9d30e87650582376e9954f20e2c22
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4976
content:
"Innovative financing approaches could help reduce the systemic \r underpricing of climate risk in markets and foster demand for \r Paris-aligned investment opportunities. Approaches include \r de-risking investments, robust 'green' labelling and disclosure \r schemes, in addition to a  regulatory focus on transparency \r and reforming international monetary system financial sector \r regulations (medium confidence). Markets for green bonds, ESG \r (environmental, social, and governance), and sustainable finance \r products have grown significantly since the Fifth Assessment Report \r of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC AR5) and \r the landscape continues to evolve. Underpinning this evolution \r is investors' preference for scalable and identifiable low-carbon \r investment opportunities. These relatively new labelled financial \r products will help by allowing a  smooth integration into existing \r asset allocation models (high confidence). Markets for green bonds, \r [...]"


id: 89a1b15a88d1d314926623fb5312caf9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21389
content:
"[...] ESG (environmental, social, and governance), and sustainable \r finance products have also increased significantly since AR5, but \r challenges nevertheless remain, in particular there are concerns \r about 'greenwashing' and the limited application of these markets \r to developing countries. New business models (e.g., pay-as-you-go) \r can facilitate the aggregation of small-scale financing needs and \r provide scalable investment opportunities with more attractive risk\u0002return profiles. Support and guidance for enhancing transparency \r can promote capital markets' climate financing by providing quality \r information to price climate risks and opportunities. Examples \r include Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) and environmental, \r social and governance (ESG) disclosure, scenario analysis and \r climate risk assessments, including the Task Force on Climate-Related \r Financial Disclosures (TCFD). The outcome of these market-correcting \r [...]"


id: 52656e9b77b613fd08a74b56a86942fd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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vector_id: 11775
content:
"[...] approaches on capital flows cannot be taken for granted, however, \r without appropriate fiscal, monetary and financial policies. Mitigation \r policies will be required to enhance the risk-weighted return of low\u0002emission and climate-resilient options, and - supported by progress in \r transparent and scientifically based projects' assessment methods - \r to accelerate the emergence and support for financial products \r based on real projects, such as green bonds, and phase out fossil fuel \r subsidies. Greater public-private cooperation can also encourage the \r private sector to increase and broaden investments, within a context \r of safeguards and standards, and this can be integrated into national \r climate change policies and plans. {15.1, 15.2.4, 15.3.1, 15.3.2, \r 15.3.3, 15.5.2, 15.6.1, 15.6.2, 15.6.6, 15.6.7, 15.6.8}."


id: e7def128d3003956f80ccb5aa39e89fc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38108
content:
"Ambitious global climate policy coordination and stepped-up \r (public) climate financing over the next decade (2021-2030) \r can help address macroeconomic uncertainty and alleviate \r developing countries' debt burden post-COVID-19. It can \r also help redirect capital markets and overcome challenges \r relating to the need for parallel investments in mitigation and \r the up-front risks that deter economically sound low carbon \r projects. (high confidence). Providing strong climate policy signals \r helps guide investment decisions. Credible and clear signalling by \r governments and the international community reduce uncertainty \r for financial decision-makers and help reduce transition risk. In \r addition to indirect and direct subsidies, the public sector's role in \r addressing market failures, barriers, provision of information, and risk \r sharing (equity, various forms of public guarantees) can encourage \r the efficient mobilisation of private sector finance (high confidence). \r [...]"


id: ec233b6f850dc68ca9fb46db0dec2557
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38913
content:
"The following policy options can have important long-term \r catalytic benefits (high confidence). (i) Stepped-up both the \r quantum and composition of financial, technical support and \r partnership in low-income and vulnerable countries alongside low\u0002carbon energy access in low-income countries, such as in sub-Saharan \r Africa, which currently receives less than 5% of global climate \r financing flows; (ii) continued strong role of international and national \r financial institutions, including multilateral, especially location-based \r regional, and national development banks; (iii)  de-risking cross\u0002border investments in low-carbon infrastructure, development of \r local green bond markets, and the alignment of climate and non\u0002climate policies, including direct and indirect supports on fossil \r fuels, consistent with the climate goals; (iv) lowering financing costs \r including transaction costs and addressing risks through funds and \r [...]"


id: 6f6583892261e300819bf5df38fc77f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16861
content:
"gas emissions and climate-resilient development', positions finance \r as one of the Agreement's three overarching goals (UNFCCC 2015). \r This formulation is a recognition that the mitigation and resilience \r goals cannot be achieved without finance, both in the real economy \r and in the financial system, being made consistent with these goals \r (Zamarioli et al. 2021). It has in turn contributed to the development \r of the concept of alignment (with the Paris Agreement) used in \r the financial sector (banks, institutional investors), businesses, and \r public institutions (development banks, public budgets). As a result, \r since AR5, in addition to measuring and analysing climate finance, \r an increasing focus has been placed on assessing the consistency or \r alignment, as well as respectively the inconsistency or misalignment, \r of finance with climate policy objectives, as for instance illustrated \r by the multilateral development banks' joint framework for aligning \r [...]"


id: cfa3f555bcfccb215b677b6624e40897
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
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vector_id: 33890
content:
"In many cases, the scope of what may be considered as 'climate \r finance' will also depend on the context of implementation such as \r priorities and activities listed in countries' Nationally Determined \r Contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC 2019a) \r as well as national development plans more broadly targeting the \r achievement of SDGs. Hence, rather than opposing the different \r options listed above, the choice of one or the other depends on the \r desired scope of measurement, which in turn depends on the policy \r objective being pursued. The increasingly diverse initiatives and body \r of grey literature address a range of different information needs. They \r provide analyses at the levels of domestic finance flows (e.g., UNDP \r 2015; Hainaut and Cochran 2018), international flows (e.g. OECD \r 2016; AfDB et al. 2018), global flows (UNFCCC 2018a; Buchner et al. \r 2019), the financial system (e.g.,  UNEP Inquiry 2016a) or specific \r [...]"


id: 642c717753bc870d7ae577a012bcb45c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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vector_id: 14910
content:
"[...] financial instruments such as bonds (e.g.,  CBI 2018). Common \r frameworks, reporting transparency are, however, necessary in order \r to identify overlaps, commonalities and differences between these \r different measurements in terms of scope and underlying definitions. \r In that regard, the developments of national and international \r taxonomies, definitions and standards can help, as further discussed \r in Section 15.6, and Chapter 17 in AR6 WGII report."


id: a2978ea43ec6a3a6ea6bbe3c2f052b55
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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vector_id: 25822
content:
"The multiplication of sources and channels of international climate finance can help address growing climate-related needs, and \r partly results from increased decentralisation as well financial innovation, which in turn can increase the effectiveness of finance \r provided. There is, however, also evidence that increased complexity implies transaction costs (Brunner and Enting 2014), in part due \r to bureaucracy and intra-governmental factors (Peterson and Skovgaard 2019), which constitutes a barrier to low-carbon projects \r and are often not accounted for in assessments of international climate finance. On the ground, activities by international providers \r operating in the same countries may overlap, with sub-optimal coordination and hence duplication of efforts, both on the bilateral and \r multilateral sides (Ahluwalia et al. 2016; Gallagher et al. 2018; Humphrey and Michaelowa 2019), as well as risks of fragmentation of \r [...]"


id: 2003b4df85978085672fe90623971b69
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2846
content:
"[...] efforts (Watson and Schalatek 2020) which slows down coordination with international providers, national development banks and \r other domestic institutions."


id: 8d80134537265c685fbfddac703215f3
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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content:
"The AR5 concluded that published assessments of financial flows \r whose expected effect was to reduce net greenhouse gas (GHG) \r emissions and/or to enhance resilience to climate change aggregated \r USD343-385 billion4\r  yr-1 globally between 2010 and 2012 (medium \r confidence). Most (95% of total) went towards mitigation, which \r was nevertheless underfinanced and adaptation even more so. \r Measurement of progress towards the commitment by developed \r countries to provide USD100 billion yr-1 by 2020 to developing \r countries, for both mitigation and adaptation (Bhattacharya et  al. \r 2020)  - a narrower goal than overall levels of climate finance  - \r continued to be a  challenge, given the lack of clear definition \r of such finance, although there remain divergent perspectives \r (Section  15.2.4). As against these flows, annual need for global \r aggregate mitigation finance between 2020 and 2030 was cited \r briefly in the AR5 to be about USD635 billion (mean annual), both \r [...]"


id: d3c20fe88a2c4299021a899ac8ac35d
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34599
content:
"[...] public and private, implying that the reported 'gap' in mitigation \r financing of estimated flows during 2010 to 2012 was slightly under \r one-half of that required (IPCC 2014)."


id: 868d7cd481e71756615cbcf783c3b0a8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20840
content:
"Key findings from AR5 and other IPCC publications. For the \r first time the IPCC in AR5 (Clarke et al. 2014) elaborated on the role \r of finance in a  dedicated chapter. In the following year, the Paris \r Agreement (UNFCCC 2015) recognised the transformative role of \r finance, as a  means to achieving climate outcomes, and the need \r to align financial flows with the long-term global goals even as \r implementation issues were left unresolved (Bodle and Noens 2018). \r AR5 noted the absence of a  clear definition and measurement of \r climate finance flows, a  difficulty that continues (Weikmans and \r Roberts 2019) (Sections 15.2 and 15.3). The approach taken in AR5 \r was to report ranges of available information on climate finance flows \r from diverse sources, using a broad definition of climate finance, as in \r the Biennial Assessments in 2014 and again in 2018 (UNFCCC 2014a, \r 2018a) of the Standing Committee under the UNFCCC: Climate \r [...]"


id: bffcf3613135fc3129de0cf61eedb1e7
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content:
"[...] finance is taken to refer to local, national or transnational financing - \r drawn from public, private and alternative sources of financing - that \r seeks to support mitigation and adaptation actions that address \r climate change (UNFCCC 2014b). For this chapter, while the focus is \r primarily on mitigation, adaptation, resilience and loss and damage "


id: 2bf812942b68649efe8344b36599cca7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4987
content:
"Mitigation finance deals with investments that aim to reduce global carbon emissions, while adaptation finance deals with the \r consequences of climate change (Lindenberg and Pauw 2013). Mitigation affects the scale of adaptation needs and adaptation \r may have strong synergies and co-benefits as well as trade-offs with mitigation (Grafakos et al. 2019). If mitigation investments \r are inadequate to reducing global warming (as in the last decade) with asymmetric adverse impacts in lower latitudes and low\u0002lying geographies, the scale of adaptation investments has to rise and the benefits of stronger adaptation responses may be high \r (Markandya and Gonzalez-Eguino 2019). If adaptation investments build greater resilience, they might even moderate mitigation \r financing costs. Similar policy coherence considerations apply to disaster risk reduction financing, the scale of which depends on \r [...]"


id: c5fadc8966b0f4133c1eff759e0e079d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32141
content:
"[...] success with both adaptation and mitigation (Mysiak et al. 2018). The same financial actors, especially governments and the private \r sector, decide at any given time on their relative allocations of available financing for mitigation, adaptation and disaster-risk reduction \r from a constrained common pool of resources. The trade-offs and substitutability between closely-linked alternative uses of funds, \r therefore, make it essential for a simultaneous assessment of needs - as in parts of this chapter. Climate finance versus the financing \r of other Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) faces a similar issue. A key agreement was that climate financing should be 'new \r and additional' and not at the cost of SDGs. Resources prioritising climate at the cost of non-climate development finance increase \r the vulnerability of a population for any given level of climate shocks, and additionality of climate financing is thus essential (Brown \r [...]"


id: f54b28c0ff24b66480a9bd5d0109df41
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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vector_id: 40525
content:
"[...] et al. 2010). Policy coherence is also the reason why mitigation finance cannot be separated from consideration of spending and \r subsidies on fossil fuels. Climate change may additionally cause the breaching of physical and social adaptation limits, resulting in \r climate-related residual risks (i.e., potential impacts after all feasible mitigation, adaptation, and disaster risk reduction measures have \r been implemented) (Mechler et al. 2020). Because these residual losses and damages from climate-related risks are related to overall \r mitigation and adaptation efforts, the magnitude of potential impacts is related to the overall quantum of mitigation, adaptation, and \r disaster risk reduction finance available (Frame et al. 2020). All categories of climate finance thus need to be considered together in \r discussions around climate finance."


id: 436a0d591fc736cdf71e61fba9fe05a7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9079
content:
"This is the first IPCC Assessment Report chapter on investment \r and finance since the 2015 Paris Agreement, which represented \r a landmark event for climate finance because for the first time the \r key role of aligning financial flows to climate goals was spelled out. \r Since then, the financial sector has recognised the opportunity and \r has stepped up to centre-stage in the global policy conversation on \r climate change. While before the Paris Agreement, only few financial \r professionals and regulators were acquainted with climate change, \r today climate change is acknowledged as a strategic priority in most \r financial institutions. This is a major change in the policy landscape \r from AR5. However, this does not mean that finance necessarily plays \r an adequate enabling role for climate investments. On the contrary, \r the literature shows that without appropriate conditions, finance can \r represent a barrier to filling the climate investment gap (Hafner et al. \r [...]"


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created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31160
content:
"[...] 2020). Indeed, despite the enormous acceleration in policy initiatives \r (e.g., NGFS 2020) and coalitions of the willing in the private sectors, \r the effect in terms of closing the investment gap identified already in \r AR5 has been limited (Section 15.5.2)."


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"The institutions under climate finance in this chapter refer to the \r set of financial actors, instruments and markets that are recognised \r to play a key role in financing decisions on climate mitigation and \r adaptation. For a definition of climate financial stock and flows see \r further Section 15.3 and the Glossary. The issue of climate finance is \r closely related to the conversation on international cooperation and \r the question of how cross-border investments can support climate \r mitigation and adaptation in developing countries. However, the issue \r is also related to more general questions of how financial institutions, \r both public and private, can assess climate risks and opportunities \r from all investments, and what roles states, policymakers, regulators \r and markets can play in making them more sustainable. In particular, \r the question of the respective roles of the public and private \r financial actors has become important in deliberations on climate \r [...]"


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"[...] finance in recent years. The broader macroeconomic context is an \r important starting point. Four major events and macro trends mark \r the developments in climate finance in the previous five years and \r likely developments in the near term."


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"types of financial flows such as equity, bond and banking credit \r markets, which in turn are likely to impact climate finance flows to \r all sub-sectors and geographies (with greater expected volatility in \r more risky and more leveraged regions). This is in contrast to longer\u0002term trend considerations (2020-2050) that typically focus the \r attention on drivers of disaggregated flows of climate finance and \r policies. The upward trends of the cycles tend to favour speculative \r bubbles like real estates at the expense of investment in production \r and infrastructures whereas the asymmetric downsides raise \r uncertainty and risks for longer-term investments on newer climate \r technologies, and favour a flight to near-term safety (e.g., lowest risk \r non-climate short-term treasury investments, highest creditworthy \r countries, and away from cross-border investments (Section 15.5) - \r making the challenge of longer-term low-carbon transition more \r [...]"


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"[...] difficult. In this respect, the impact of financial regulation is unclear. \r On the one hand, it could be argued that the tighter bank regulations \r under Basel III, combined with an economic environment with higher \r uncertainty and flatter yield curve, can push banks to retrench \r from climate finance projects (Blended Finance Taskforce, 2018a), \r since banks tend to limit loan maturity to five or eight years, while \r infrastructure projects typically require the amortisation of debt over \r 15 to 20 years (Arezki et al. 2016). On the other hand, other studies \r report that stricter capital requirements are not a driving factor for \r moving away from sustainability projects (CISL and UNEP FI 2014)."


id: d16ef4805ace0f7ad6e7e74a70ac95b6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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"Four key aspects of the global macroeconomy, each slightly different, \r pointed in a cascading fashion towards a deteriorating environment \r for stepped-up climate financing over the next crucial decade \r (2020-2030), even before COVID-19. The argument is often made \r that there is enough climate financing available if the right projects \r and enabling policy actions ('bankable projects') present themselves \r (Cuntz et  al. 2017; Meltzer 2018). The attention to 'bankability' \r does not however address access and equity issues (Bayliss and \r Van Waeyenberge 2018). Some significant gains in climate financing \r at the sectoral and microeconomic levels were nevertheless \r happening in specific segments, such as solar energy financing and \r labelled green bonds (although how much of such labelled financing \r is incremental to unlabelled financing that might have happened \r anyway remains uncertain) (Tolliver et al. 2019). Issues of 'labelling' \r [...]"


id: ef3d25fe428e8dd29f8d48e19ff95a66
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"[...] (Cornell 2020) apply even more to ESG (environmental, social and \r governance) investments, which started to grow rapidly after 2016 \r (Section  15.6.5). Overall, these increments for climate finance \r remained, however, small in aggregate relative to the size of the shifts \r in climate financing required in the coming decade. Annual energy \r investments in developing regions (other than China) which account \r for two-thirds of the world population, with least costs of mitigation \r per tonne of emissions (one-half that in developed regions), and \r for the bulk of future expected global GHG emissions, saw a 20% \r decline since 2016, and only a one-fifth share of global clean energy \r investment, reflecting persistent financing problems and costs of \r mobilising finance towards clean energy transition, even prior to the \r pandemic (IEA 2021a). In the words of a macroeconomic institution, \r 'tangible policy responses to reduce greenhouse gas emissions have \r [...]"


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"[...] been grossly insufficient to date' (IMF 2020a). The reason is in part \r global macroeconomic headwinds, which show a relative stagnation \r since 2016 and limited cross-border flows in particular (Yeo 2019)."


id: 67c2bebb449c526d1ee24d2ae636901d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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"Slowing and more unstable GDP growth. The first headwind \r was more unstable and slowing GDP growth at individual country \r levels and in aggregate because of worsening climate change impact \r events (Donadelli et al. 2019; Kahn et al. 2019). As each warmer year \r keeps producing more negative impacts - arising from greater and \r rising variability and intensity of rainfall, floods, droughts, forest fires \r and storms - the negative consequences have become more macro\u0002economically significant, and worst for the most climate-vulnerable \r developing countries (high confidence). Paradoxically, while these \r effects should have raised the social returns and incentives to invest \r more in future climate mitigation, a standard public policy argument, \r these macroeconomic shocks may work in the opposite direction \r for private decisions by raising the financing costs now (Cherif and \r Hasanov 2018). With some climate tipping points, potentially in \r [...]"


id: 311d2ed3b7fb366d7d692b0f0bf90e42
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"[...] the near-term reach (see AR6 WGI Chapter 4) the uncertainty with \r regard to the economic viability and growth prospects of selected \r macroeconomically critical sectors increases significantly (AR6 WGII \r Chapters 8 and 17). Taking account of other behavioural failures, this \r was creating a barrier for proactive and accelerated mitigation and \r adaptation action."


id: 9c135cad485082fd3d2cb9a030a3cdca
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"The macroeconomic headwinds have worsened dramatically with the \r onset of COVID-19. Almost two years after the pandemic started, it \r is still too uncertain and early to conclude impacts of the pandemic \r until 2025-2030, especially as they affect climate finance. Multiple \r waves of the pandemic, new virus mutations, accumulating human \r toll, and growing vaccine coverage but vastly differing access across \r developed versus developing regions, are evident. They are causing \r divergent impacts across sectors and countries, which combined with \r the divergent ability of countries and regions to mount sufficient \r fiscal and monetary policy actions imply continued high uncertainty \r on the economic recovery paths from the crisis. The situation remains \r more precarious in middle- and low-income developing countries \r (IMF 2021a). While recovery is happening, the job losses have been \r large, poverty rates have climbed, public health systems are suffering \r [...]"


id: 1e744d3dcdeb63cb797bb043492dcc46
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"[...] long-term consequences, education gains have been set back, public \r debt levels are higher (5-10% of GDP higher), financial institutions \r have come under longer-term stress, a larger number of developing \r countries are facing debt distress, and many key high-contact sectors, \r such as tourism and trade, will take time to recover (Eichengreen et al. \r 2021). The implication is negative headwinds for climate finance with \r public attention focused on pandemic relief and recovery and limited \r (and divergent) fiscal headroom for a  low-carbon transition, with \r considerable uncertainties ahead (Hepburn et al. 2020b; Maffettone \r and Oldani 2020; Steffen et al. 2020)."


id: c992cb9eac3bceda231f083ce87adc93
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content:
"Public finances. The second headwind was rising public fiscal costs \r of mitigation and adapting to rising climate shocks affecting many \r countries, which were negatively impacting public indebtedness and \r country credit ratings (Cevik and Jalles 2020; Klusak et al. 2021) at \r a time of growing stresses on public finances and debt (Benali et al. \r 2018; Kling et  al. 2018; Kose et  al. 2020) (high confidence). Every \r climate shock and slowing growth puts greater pressures on public \r finances to offset these impacts. Crucially, the negative consequences \r were typically greater at the lower end of income distributions \r everywhere (Acevedo et al. 2018; Aggarwal 2019). As a result, the \r standard prescription of raising distributionally adverse carbon taxes \r and reducing fossil fuel subsidies to raise resources faced political \r pushback in several countries (Copland 2020; Green 2021), and low \r rates elsewhere. Reduced taxes on capital, by contrast, was viewed \r [...]"


id: d1329718610669644ba67d06c02767fd
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"[...] as a way to improve growth (Bhattarai et al. 2018; Font et al. 2018), \r and working against broader fiscal action. Progress with carbon \r pricing remained modest across 44 OECD and G20 countries, with \r 55-70% of all carbon emissions from energy use entirely unpriced \r as of 2018 (OECD 2021a). Climate-vulnerable countries meanwhile \r faced sharply rising cost of sovereign debt. Buhr et al. (2018) calculate \r the additional financing costs of Climate Vulnerable Forum countries \r of USD40 billion5\r  on government debt over the past 10 years and \r USD62 billion for the next 10 years. Including private financing cost, \r the amount increases to USD146-168 billion over the next decade."


id: 7c8a6c4878ac631d72f48597ba9bf85c
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"An important immediate finding from the COVID-19 crisis was that the \r slowdown in economic activity is illustrating some of these choices: \r immediately after the onset, more costly and carbon-intensive coal \r use for energy use tumbled in major countries such as China and \r the USA, while the forced 'stay-at-home' policies adopted around the \r major economies of the world led to a -30-35% decline in individual \r country GDP, and was in turn associated with a  decrease in daily \r global CO2 emissions by -26% at their peak in individual countries, \r and -17% globally (-11 to -25% for +-1s) by early April 2020 \r compared with the mean 2019 levels, with just under half coming \r from changes in surface transport, city congestion and country \r mobility (Le Quere et al. 2020). Along with the carbon emissions drop \r was a dramatic improvement in other parameters such as clean air \r quality. Moreover, longer-term behavioural impacts are also possible: \r [...]"


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"[...] a dramatic acceleration of digital technologies in communications, \r travel, retail trade and transport. The question however is whether \r the world might revert to the earlier carbon-intensive path of \r recovery, or to a different future, and the choice of policies in shaping \r this future. Studies generally suggest that the gains from long-term \r impacts of the pandemic on future global warming will be limited \r and depend more on the nature of public policy actions and long\u0002term commitments by countries to raise their ambitions, not just \r on climate but on sustainable development broadly (Barbier 2020; \r Barbier and Burgess 2020; Forster et al. 2020; Gillingham et al. 2020; \r Reilly et al. 2021). The positive lesson is clear: opportunities exist for \r accelerating structural change, and for a re-orientation of economic \r activity modes to a low-carbon use strategy in areas such as coal use \r in energy consumption and surface transport, city congestion and \r [...]"


id: 261ab65feebb98ba0b0679f72f761d32
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"[...] in-country mobility, for which lower-cost alternatives exist and offer \r potentially dramatic gains (Hepburn et al. 2020b)."


id: 208944f5b9c8d8c2c7e150024da2e06e
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content:
"Bank 2020). Evidence from 133 countries between 2001-2018 \r suggests that such shocks can cause social unrest, and migration \r pressures, especially when starting inequality is high and social \r transfers are low (Saadi Sedik and Xu 2020). Additionally, climate \r policies are more politically difficult to implement when the setting \r is one of high inequality but much less politically costly where \r incomes are more evenly distributed with stronger social safety nets \r (Furceri et al. 2021). A redrawn social compact incorporating climate \r (Beck et al. 2021) that would adopt redistributive taxes and lower \r carbon consumption, and strengthen state capacity to deliver safety \r nets, health and education with accelerated climate and environmental \r sustainability within and across countries, is increasingly recognised \r as important. Countries, regions and coordination bodies of the larger \r countries (G7, G20) have already begun such a shift to financing of \r [...]"


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"[...] a Just Transition, but primarily focused on the developed countries, \r although gaps remain (Krawchenko and Gordon 2021)."


id: 88df7581b3464a97ea538a28d095a382
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"Climate finance in support of a Just Transition is likely to be a key \r to a  successful low-carbon transition globally (high confidence). \r Ambitious global climate agreements are likely to work far better \r by maximising cooperative arrangements (IPCC 2018; Gazzotti et al. \r 2021) with greater financing support from developed to developing \r regions in recognition of 'common but differentiated responsibilities \r and respective capabilities' and a  greater ethical sense of climate \r justice (Khan et al. 2020; Sardo 2020; Warner 2020; Pearson et al. \r 2021). While Just Transition issues apply within developed countries \r as well (see later discussion), these are of relatively second-order \r significance to addressing climate justice issues between richer and \r poorer countries - given the scale of financing and existing social \r safety nets in the former and their absence in the latter. For example, \r over the past three decades drought in Africa has caused more \r [...]"


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"[...] climate-related mortality than all climate-related events combined \r from the rest of the world (Warner 2020). These issues can however \r serve both as a  bridge and a  barrier to greater cooperation on \r climate change. The key is to build greater mutual trust with clearer \r commitments and well-structured key decisions and instruments \r (Sardo 2020; Pearson et al. 2021)."


id: 6f37a8f54fb45b52c47bdc0b6ca715dc
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"The Just Transition discussion has picked up steam. It was explicitly \r recognised in the Paris Agreement and the 2018 Just Transition \r Declaration signed by 53 countries at COP24, which 'recognised the \r need to factor in the needs of workers and communities to build \r public support for a rapid shift to a zero-carbon economy.' Originally \r proposed by global trade unions in the 1980s, the recent discourse \r has become broader. It has coalesced into a more inclusive process \r to reduce inequality across all three areas of energy, environment \r and climate (McCauley and Heffron 2018; Bainton et  al. 2021). It \r seeks accelerated public policy support to ensure environmental \r sustainability, decent work, social inclusion and poverty eradiation \r (Burrow 2017), widely shared benefits, and protection of indigenous \r rights, and livelihoods of communities and workers who stand to \r lose (including workers in fossil fuel sectors such as coal and oil \r [...]"


id: 9eea73a2e59fde8978a6452fef630ff8
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content:
"[...] and gas) (UNFCCC 2018b; EBRD 2020; Jenkins et al. 2020). Because \r the process involves 'climate justice' and equity within and across \r generations, it involves difficult political trade-offs (Newell and \r Mulvaney 2013). The implications for a  Just Transition in climate \r finance are clear: expanding equitable and greater access to climate \r finance for vulnerable countries, communities and sectors, not just \r for the most profitable private investment opportunities, and a larger \r role for public finance in fulfilling existing finance commitments \r (Bracking and Leffel 2021; Kuhl 2021; Long 2021; Roberts et al. 2021). "


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"equivalency measure can easily and more accurately measure the \r value and benefit of blended public and private finance by comparing \r the effective interest cost (and volume) gain with such financing, \r against the benchmark costs without such blending. Here again, \r a pressing challenge is to improve the operational definitions of what \r counts as ODA within blended finance. Blended finance remains very \r poorly defined and accounted (Pereira 2017; Andersen et al. 2019; \r Attridge and Engen 2019; Basile and Dutra 2019). Guarantees are \r expressly not included in the definition of ODA (Garbacz et al. 2021). \r As a result, bilateral and multilateral agencies have no incentive or \r limited authority and basis to use such instruments, while multilateral \r development banks continue to approach guarantees with great \r caution because of the limits of their original charters (World Bank \r 2009) and require counter-indemnities by recipient countries, internal \r [...]"


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"[...] and historic agency inertia, perceived loss of control over the use \r of funds (compared to their preferred direct project-based lending) \r and employ restrictive accounting rules for capital provisioning of \r guarantees at 100% of their face value to maintain AAA ratings \r with credit rating agencies (Humphrey 2017; Pereira dos Santos \r and Kearney 2018; Bandura and Ramanujam 2019; Hourcade et al. \r 2021a). Largely because of such official uncertainty the actual flows \r of blended finance and guarantees continue to remain a very small \r share (typically, less than 5%) of official and multilateral finance \r flows to lower project risks and costs, and hence the potential for \r large-scale accelerated low-carbon private investments in developing \r countries. Public guarantees can offer a fifteen times multiplier effect \r on the scale of low-carbon investments generated with such support, \r compared to a 1:1 ratio in direct financing (Hourcade et al. 2021a)."


id: 5d8ad8e19aa2276af0c22bac01f6b84
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"A second priority is to accelerate the implementation of the \r USD100  billion a  year (and likely more, given growing financing \r gaps) in climate finance commitments expressed in the Copenhagen \r Agreement Accord (and reiterated since) from developed to \r developing countries, and to build greater confidence by agreeing \r rapidly on key definitions. Shifting to a grant equivalent net flows \r definition of climate finance, which is now universally accepted for \r all other aid flows by all parties since 2014 and which took effect \r since 2019 on every other public international good finance provision \r (under the SDGs), with the sole exception of climate finance, would \r resolve many uncertainties: the disbursement of climate finance flows \r on a  grant equivalent basis that is comparable across institutions, \r instruments and countries, and measurement with greater accuracy \r about the effective transfer of resources. The journey to get to a clear \r [...]"


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"[...] and precise definition of net official overseas development assistance \r (ODA) took time. The original proposal was first initiated in the 1960s \r (Pincus 1963) but it was not till multilateral development banks \r (MDBs) and others laid out the compelling reasons why (Chang et al. \r 1998) that this was accomplished: especially to resolve decades of \r confusion and inconsistency between different types of financial \r flows and hence the perennial measurement problems and 'the \r compromise between political expediency and statistical reality' \r (Bulow and Rogoff 2005; Hynes and Scott 2013; Scott 2015, 2017)."


id: cb19b3a87febc626a5f1500496cc8452
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"A fourth priority is expanding jobs and dealing with job losses in the \r global low-carbon transition (Carley and Konisky 2020; Crowe and Li \r 2020; Pai et al. 2020; Cunningham and Schmillen 2021; Hanto et al. \r 2021), especially in coal and other sectors, as well as land and other \r effects for indigenous communities (Zografos and Robbins 2020). \r Many countries, especially low-income countries, remain dependent \r on fossil fuels for their energy and exports and jobs, and support \r for their transition to a low-carbon future will be essential. Global \r recovery from the pandemic will take longer than initially envisaged \r (IMF 2021c; OECD 2021b) and an accelerated climate action for \r a Build Back Better global infrastructure plan with better and more \r resilient jobs might play a  key role as part of the Just Transitions. \r Already, there is substantial evidence (Sulich et al. 2020; Dell'Anna \r 2021; Dordmond et al. 2021) that a more sustainable climate path \r [...]"


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content:
"employment multipliers and mutual gains from given spending) than \r would any other large-scale alternative. But this would nevertheless \r require a carefully managed transition globally, including access to \r much larger volumes of climate financing in developing economies \r (Muttitt and Kartha 2020). The multilateral finance institutions have \r generally played a  supportive role, expanding their financing to \r developing countries during the pandemic (even as bilateral aid flows \r have fallen sharply), but have been hampered by the constraints on \r their mandates and instruments (as noted earlier). Political leadership \r and direction will be again crucial to enhance their roles. The recent \r expansion of SDR quotas at the IMF similarly might help, but the \r current distributions of quota benefits flow primarily to the developed \r countries and do little to expand investment flows on a longer-term \r basis for a global expansion in growth and job opportunities in the \r [...]"


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"These five options identified above on near-term actions and \r priorities will however, require greater collective political leadership. \r A review of past crisis episodes suggests that collective actions to \r avoid large global or multi-country risks work well primarily when \r the problems are well defined, a small number of actors are involved, \r solutions are relatively well established scientifically, and public \r costs to address them are relatively small (Sandler 1998, 2015) (for \r example, dealing with early pandemic outbreaks such as Ebola, \r TB, and cholera; extending global vaccination programmes such as \r smallpox, measles and polio; early warning systems and actions for \r natural disasters such as tsunamis, hurricanes/cyclones and volcanic \r disasters; the Montreal Protocol for ozone-depleting refrigerants, \r and renewables wind and solar energy development). They do not \r appear to work as well for more complex global collective action \r [...]"


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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10328
content:
"[...] problems which concern a  number of economic actors, sectors, \r without inexpensive and mature technological options, and where \r political and institutional governance is fragmented. Greater \r political coordination is needed because the impacts are often not \r near term or imminent, but diffuse, slow moving and long term, \r and where preventive disaster avoidance is costly even when these \r costs are  low compared to the longer-term damages  - till tipping \r points are reached of the need for reduced 'stressors' and increasing \r 'facilitators' (Jagers et al. 2020). But by then, it may be too late."


id: 5966f1b339f636dd936e48fbca164b5f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12964
content:
"As a  fifth priority, transformative climate financing options based \r on equity and global sustainability objectives may also need to \r consider a greater mix of public pricing and taxation options on the \r consumption side (Arrow et al. 2004; Folke et al. 2021). Two-thirds of \r global GHG emissions directly or indirectly are linked to household \r consumption, with average per capita carbon footprint of North \r America and Europe of 13.4 and 7.5 tCO2-eq per capita, respectively, \r compared to 1.7 in Africa and Middle East (Gough 2020) and as \r high as 200 tCO2-eq per capita among the top 1% in some high\u0002income geographies versus 0.1 tCO2-eq at the other end of the \r income distribution in some least-developed countries (Chancel \r and Piketty 2015). Globally, the highest-expenditure households \r account for eleven times the per capita emissions of lowest\u0002expenditure households, with rising carbon income elasticities that \r [...]"


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"[...] suggest 'redistribution of carbon shares from global elites to global \r poor' as welfare efficient (Chancel and Piketty 2015; Hubacek et al. \r 2017). Within countries and regions, and within sectors, similar \r patterns hold. The top 10% of the population with the highest \r per capita footprints account for 27% of the EU carbon footprint, \r and the top 1% have a carbon footprint of 55 tCO2-eq per capita, \r with air transport the most elastic, unequal and carbon-intensive \r consumption (Ivanova and Wood 2020). Similarly, within sectors, \r there are large differences in carbon-intensity in the building sector \r in North America (Goldstein et  al. 2020) and across cities where \r consumption-based GHG emissions vary widely across the world \r (ranging from 1.8 to 25.9 tCO2-eq per capita)."


id: a9d012392651c975eba1784c3bb27d47
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"The second level of attention needed on Just Transitions has to \r do with inequities within a  large country setting, developed or \r developing. The Just Transition issue exists within developed \r countries as well. As the ongoing pandemic illustrates, the first \r climate burden hit is often felt most acutely at the level of states \r and cities, with many smaller ones without enough fiscal capacity \r or ability to mount an adequate discretionary counter policy. Only \r national governments have the ability to borrow more in their fiscal \r accounts to address large collective problems, whether pandemics \r or climate change. Therefore, it is important that national policies \r and funds be available for programmes to address the Just Transition \r issues for larger subnational states, cities and regions. This would be \r helped by countries including Just Transition initiatives in their NDCs \r for financing (as South Africa has recently done), and attention by \r [...]"


id: 1557f73f3f1be44b2f9e0d0371d05fd9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Measures of financial flows and stocks provide complementary \r and interrelated insights into trends over time: the accumulation \r of flows, measured per unit of time, results in stocks, observed at \r a given point in time (IMF 2009; UN and ECB 2015). On the flows \r side, GDP, a System of National Accounts (SNA) statistical standard \r that measures the monetary value of final goods and services \r produced in a country in a given period of time. In 2020, global GDP \r represented above USD2015 70 trillion6\r  (down from around 80 trillion \r USD2015 in 2019), out of which developed countries represented \r approximately 60% (Figure 15.1); a slowly decreasing share over \r the last years. The GDP metric is useful here as an indicator of the \r level of activity of an economy but gives no indication relating to \r human well-being or SDG achievements (Giannetti et al. 2015) as it \r counts positively activities that negatively impact the environment, \r [...]"


id: 3f44b600d13bd3261babcfaa25b52bc3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8322
content:
"On the stock side, an increasingly significant portion of the growing \r value of financial capital (stocks in particular) may be disconnected \r from the value of underlying productive capital in the real economy \r (Igan et  al. 2020). This trend, however, remains uneven between \r developed countries, most of which have relatively deep capital \r markets, and developing countries at different stages of development \r (Section  15.6.7). Bonds, a  form of debt financing, represent \r a significant share of total financial assets. As of August 2020, the \r overall size of the global bond markets (amount outstanding) was \r estimated at approximately USD128.3 trillion, out of which over two \r thirds was from 'supranational, sovereign, and agencies', and just \r under a third from corporations (ICMA 2020b). As discussed later in \r the chapter, since AR5, an increasing number and volume of bonds \r have been earmarked for climate action but these still only represent \r [...]"


id: b740513f5ef9b7fff60cb64069d48fd2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"[...] less than 1% of the total bond market. As of end-2020, climate\u0002aligned bonds outstanding were estimated at USD0.9 trillion (Giorgi \r and Michetti 2021), though already raising concerns in terms of both \r underlying definitions (Section 15.6.6) and risks of increased climate\u0002related indebtedness (Section 15.6.1, 15.6.3)."


id: a601f0dbe9797f9e67a19f7add7538ee
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26428
content:
"There remain well documented interpretations and debates on how to account for progress (Clapp et al. 2012; Stadelmann et al. \r 2013; Jachnik et al. 2015; Weikmans and Roberts 2019). Different interpretations relate mainly to the type and proportion of activities \r that may qualify as 'climate' on the one hand, and to how to account for different types of finance (and financial instruments) on \r the other hand. As an example, there are different points at which financing can be measured, for example, pledges, commitments, \r disbursements. There can be significant lags between these different points in time, for example disbursements may spread over \r time. Further, the choice of point of measurement can have an impact on both the volumes and on the characteristics (geographical \r origin, labelling as public or private) of the finance tracked. The enhanced transparency framework under the Paris Agreement may \r [...]"


id: de8359fd6a8dfd6ee0e0c789d13eeff7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36415
content:
"[...] lead to improvements and more consensus in the way climate finance is accounted for and reported under the UNFCCC. Available \r analyses specifically aimed at assessing progress towards the USD100 billion goal remain rare, for example the UNFCCC SCF Biennial \r Assessments do not directly address this point (UNFCCC 2018a). Dedicated OECD reports provide figures based on accounting for \r gross flows of climate finance based on analysing activity-level data recorded by the UNFCCC (bilateral public climate finance) and \r the OECD (multilateral public climate finance, mobilised private climate finance and climate-related export credits) (OECD 2015a; \r OECD 2019a; OECD 2020b). For 2018, the OECD analysis resulted in a total of USD78.9 billion, out of which USD62.2 billion of public \r finance, USD2.1 billion of export credits and USD14.5 billion of private finance was mobilised. Mitigation represented 73% of the total, \r adaptation 19% and cross-cutting activities 8%."


id: e0c1934308aa3447b766cd2e61c15b70
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36801
content:
"As called for by Article 2.1c of the Paris Agreement and introduced \r in Section  15.3.1, achieving the goal of the Paris Agreement of \r holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below \r 2degC above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the \r temperature increase to 1.5degC above pre-industrial levels requires \r making all finance consistent with this goal. Data on investments \r and financing to high GHG activities remain very partial and \r difficult to access, as relevant actors currently have little incentive \r or obligations to disclose such information compared to reporting \r on and communicating about their activities contributing to climate \r action. Further, the development of methodologies to assess \r finance for activities misaligned with climate mitigation goals, for \r hard- and costly-to-abate sectors such as heavy industries, as well \r as for activities that eventually need to be phased out but can play \r [...]"


id: b5a3716541516c9fda0bfa13a45a3b02
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29182
content:
"[...] a  transition role for a  given period, remain work in progress. This \r results in limited empirical evidence to date."


id: 7d908b7274648a76961aec75430838d1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"The IEA provides comprehensive analyses of global energy \r investments, estimated at about USD1.8 trillion a year over 2017-\r 2019 (IEA 2019a, 2020a), and expected to reach that level again in \r 2021 after a drop to about 1.6 trillion in 2020 (IEA 2021c). Energy \r investments represent about 8% of global GFCF (Section 15.3.2.1). \r In the power sector, fossil fuel-related investments reached an \r estimated USD120 billion yr-1 on average over 2019-2020, which \r remains well above the level that underpin the IEA's own Paris\u0002compatible Sustainable Development Scenario (SDS) and Net Zero \r Emission (NZE) scenarios. The IEA observes a similar inconsistency \r for supply-side new investments: in 2019-2020 on average yr-1, an \r estimated USD650 billion were invested in oil supply and close to \r USD100 billion in coal supply. These estimates also result in fossil \r fuel investments remaining larger in aggregate than the total \r tracked climate finance worldwide (Section  15.3.2.2). For oil and \r [...]"


id: 50588554be5921a8328a8295c88fd44
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"[...] gas companies, which are amongst the world's largest corporations \r and sometimes government owned or backed, low-carbon solutions \r are estimated to represent less than 1% of capital expenditure \r (IEA 2020b). As discussed in the remainder of this chapter, shifting \r investments towards low-GHG solutions requires a combination of "


id: e023029130ae7e43415a5c552e71f55d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36682
content:
"In terms of financing provided to fossil fuel investments, available \r analyses point out a still significant role played by commercial banks \r and export credit agencies. Commercial banks provide both direct \r lending as well as underwriting services, the latter facilitating capital \r raising from investors in the form of bond or share issuance. Available \r estimates indicate that lending and underwriting extended over \r 2016- 2019 by 35 of the world's largest banks to 2100 companies \r active across the fossil fuel lifecycle reached USD687 billion yr-1 on \r average (Rainforest Action Network et al. 2020). Official export credit \r agencies, which are owned or backed by their government, de-risk \r exports by providing guarantees and insurances or, less often, loans. \r In 2016-2018, available estimates indicate the provision of about \r USD31 billion yr-1 worth of fossil fuel-related official export credits, \r out of which close to 80% was for oil and gas, and over 20% for coal \r [...]"


id: 1471d72be6aa3a4c613e117dab63e308
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 818
content:
"Finance for new fossil fuel-related assets lock in future GHG \r emissions that may be inconsistent with remaining carbon budgets \r and, as discussed above, with emission pathways to reach the Paris \r Agreement goals. This inconsistency exposes investors and asset \r owners to the risk of stranded assets, which results from potential \r sharp strengthening climate public policies, that is, transition risk. As \r a result, a growing number of investors and financiers are assessing \r climate-related risks with the aim to disclose information about their \r current level of exposure (to both transition and physical climate\u0002related risks), as well as to inform their future decisions (TCFD 2017). \r Reporting to date is, however, inconsistent across geographies and \r jurisdictions (CDSB and CDP 2018; Perera et  al. 2019), with also \r a wide variety of metrics, methodologies, and approaches developed \r by commercial providers that contribute to disparate outcomes \r [...]"


id: e064915fca24723960f9dc58a7787b7b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36732
content:
"[...] (Kotsantonis and Serafeim 2019; Boffo and Patalano 2020). Further, \r as developed in Section 15.6.1, there is currently not enough evidence \r in order to conclude whether climate-related risk assessments result \r in increased climate action and alignment with the goals of the Paris \r Agreement (The 2deg Investing Initiative and Wuest Partner 2020)."


id: de021ab6310add0038ad77f01fb685e1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36323
content:
"Financing needs7 are discussed in various contexts, only one being \r international climate politics and finance. Also, financing needs are \r used as an indicator for required system changes (when compared \r to current flows and asset bases) and an indicator for near- to long\u0002term investment opportunities from the perspective of investors \r and corporates. Investment needs are widely used as an indicator \r focusing on initial investments required to realise new infrastructure. \r It compares relatively well with private sector flows dominated \r by return-generating investments but lacks comparability and \r explanatory power regarding the needs in the context of international \r climate cooperation, where considerations on economic costs play \r a more substantial role. Chapter 12 elaborates on global economic \r cost estimates for various technologies. This indicator includes both \r costs and benefits of options, of which investment-related costs \r [...]"


id: 6cd64b7d95a01ee9ae9eecf99611c7c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16428
content:
"[...] make up only one component. Both analyses offer complementary \r insights. There are financing needs not directly related to the \r realisation of physical infrastructure and which are not covered \r in both investment and cost estimates. For instance, the needs for \r building institutional capacity to achieve social and economic goals \r and to strengthen knowledge, skills, national and international \r cooperation might not be significant, but an enabling environment \r for future investments would not be established without satisfying it. \r Moreover, comprehending financial needs for addressing economic \r losses due to climate change can hardly be measured in terms of the \r indicators introduced before."


id: 267432feca7f96174b158e76a10db74f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3934
content:
"assessment of the needs. For finance to become an enabler of the \r transition, domestic and international public interventions can be \r needed to ensure enough supply of finance across sectors, regions \r and stakeholders. The location of financing needs and vicinity to \r capital matter given home bias (Fuchs et  al. 2017; OECD 2017a; \r Ito and McCauley 2019) (prioritising own country or regions), \r transaction costs and risk considerations (Section 15.2). Most of the \r finance is mobilised domestically but the depth of capital markets is \r substantially greater in developed countries, increasing the challenges \r to mobilise substantial volumes of additional financing for many \r developing countries. The same applies to various stakeholders with \r limited connections into the financial sector. In addition, governments \r enabling financial market frameworks, guidelines and supportive \r infrastructure is crucial for inclusive finance for the bottom of the \r [...]"


id: 698376112aff1ac76c0d0bb9d4eb7bd8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15832
content:
"For example, the recent Chinese policy direction towards tougher \r access to and a  substantial cut in feed-in-tariffs in 2018 led to \r a significant drop in renewable investment and new capacity addition \r in China (FS-UNEP Centre and BNEF 2019; Hove 2020). However, the \r significant bouncing back of newly installed capacity (72 GW wind \r power and 47 GW solar power in 2020) shows the strong development \r of zero-carbon power generation driven by lower cost and policies to \r support them by energy revolution strategies in China. Investors had \r proven to be willing to work with transparent support mechanisms, \r such as with the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which \r stimulated emission reductions and allowed industrialised countries \r to implement emission-reduction projects in developing countries to \r meet their emission targets (Michaelowa et al. 2019). However, the \r collapse of carbon markets and prices, especially of the EU Emissions \r [...]"


id: bd93dd8e038684b510c302dac09792fb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30615
content:
"[...] Trading System, led to the continuous decline of Certified Emission \r Reductions issuances from CDM in the past years (World Bank Group \r 2020). Also, the dependency on regulatory intervention to ensure fair \r market access only has proven to burden investor appetite."


id: f4aabb29b9e60f21476f09ecb07265c8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40422
content:
"The attractiveness of a sector and region for capital markets depends \r on several factors. Some essential elements are the duration of loan \r and profile as long-term loans and heavily heterogeneous returns \r represent challenges in financing mitigation technologies and \r policies. After the financial crisis and restricted access to long-term \r debt, capital intensity of technologies and resulting long payback \r periods of investment opportunities for mitigation technologies have \r been a crucial challenge (Bertoldi et al. 2021). Also, implicit discount \r rates applied during the investment decision process vary depending \r on the payback profile, with research mainly covering the difference \r between the financing of assets generating revenues versus costs \r (Jaffe et al. 2004; Schleich et al. 2016). In addition, a low correlation \r between the climate projects and dominating asset classes might \r provide an opportunity in climate action by satisfying the appetite \r [...]"


id: c5434854b7c4af8631c3e3096933227f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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vector_id: 32011
content:
"[...] of institutional investors, which tend to manage portfolios with \r consideration of the Markowitz modern portfolio theory (optimising \r return and risk of a portfolio through diversification) (Marinoni et al. \r 2011). Transaction cost is a significant barrier to the diffusion and \r commercialisation of low-carbon technologies and business models \r and adaptation action. High transaction costs, attributed to various \r factors, such as complexity and limited standardisation of investments, \r limited pipelines, complex institutional and administrative procedures, \r create significant opportunity costs of green investments comparing \r with other standard investments (IRENA 2016; Nelson et al. 2016; \r Feldman et al. 2018). For example, transaction costs are commonly \r observed in small-scale, dispersed independent renewable energy \r systems, especially in rural areas, and energy efficiency projects \r (Hunecke et al. 2019). A more robust standardisation and alignment of \r [...]"


id: e61199f6d81477eefcd6d3c3a7880ea3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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vector_id: 37772
content:
"[...] Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) terms with best practices globally \r has led to a  substantially increased interest in capital markets in \r developing countries (WBCSD 2016; Schmidt et al. 2019; World Bank \r 2021). Notably, PPA significantly increases the probability of more \r balanced investment and development outcomes and ultimately \r more sustainable independent power projects in developing \r countries. Therefore, lowering transaction costs would be essential \r for creating investor appetite. The role of intermediaries bundling \r demand for financing has been demonstrated to reduce transaction \r costs and to reach investors' critical size. In addition, new innovative \r approaches, such as fintech and blockchain (Section  15.6.8), have \r been discussed for providing new opportunities in the energy sector"


id: e009435ba00cdeacedb64998bb1c6777
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36658
content:
"rather representing an add-on component and consequently \r requiring the support of decision-makers used to business-as-usual \r projects. Despite the benefits that improvement of energy efficiency \r has in contributing to curbing energy consumption, mitigating \r greenhouse gas emissions, and providing multiple co-benefits (IEA \r 2014a), investment in energy efficiency is a low priority for firms, and \r the financial environment is not favourable due to lack of awareness \r of energy efficiency by financial institutions, existing administrative \r barriers, lack of expertise to develop projects, asymmetric information, \r and split incentives (UNEP DTU 2017; Cattaneo 2019). While Energy \r Service Companies' (ESCO) business models are expected to facilitate \r the investment in energy efficiency by sharing a portion of financial \r risk and providing expertise, there has been limited progress made \r with ESCO business models, and only slightly over 20% of projects \r [...]"


id: 87c6bb2ef5d22e41f5f8f704eb365571
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21046
content:
"The investment needs and existing challenges differ by sector. Each \r sector has different characteristics along the arguments listed above \r making the supply of finance by commercial investors an enabling \r factor or barrier. In the transport sector, transformation towards green \r mobility would provide significant co-benefits for human health by \r reducing transport-related air pollution, so the transport sector cannot \r achieve such transformation in isolation from other sectors. However, \r a considerable involvement of the public sector in many transportation \r infrastructure projects is given, and the absence of a standard solution \r increases transaction costs (including bidding package, estimating, \r drawing up a contract, administering the contract, corruption, and \r so on). Financial constraints, including access to adequate finance, \r pose a significant challenge in the agriculture sector, especially for \r SMEs and smallholder farmers. The distortion created by government \r [...]"


id: 7dd8613f09778ce3f092143b1da7aac1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19315
content:
"[...] failure and a lack of effective policies create barriers to financing for \r agriculture. The inability to manage the impact of the agriculture\u0002related risks, such as seasonality, increases uncertainty in financial \r management. Moreover, inadequate infrastructure, such as electricity \r and telecommunication, makes it difficult for financial institutions to \r reach agricultural SMEs and farmers and increases transaction costs \r (World Bank 2016). Low economies of scale, low bargaining power, \r poor connectivity to markets, and information asymmetry also lead \r to higher transaction costs (Pingali et  al. 2019). In the industrial \r manufacturing and residential sector, gaining energy efficiency \r remains one of the critical challenges. Investment in achieving energy \r efficiency encounters some challenges when it may not necessarily \r generate direct or indirect benefits, such as increase in production \r capacity or productivity and improvement in product quality. Also, \r [...]"


id: 3c37fca9c46663cc014b78f5b790d23a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7787
content:
"[...] early-stage, high upfront cost and future, stable revenue stream \r structure suggest the needs for a better enabling environment, such \r as a robust financial market, awareness of financial institutions, and \r regulatory frameworks (e.g., stringent building codes, incentives for \r ESCOs) (IEA 2014a; Barnsley et al. 2015)."


id: 97d0b50f9453c36c87c05824e39a51cc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23923
content:
"One source of uncertainty about the investment estimates for the \r power sector is the evolution of the levelised cost of technical \r options in the future, for example the continuation of the observed \r declining costs trends of renewable energy (IRENA 2020b) which has \r been underestimated in many modelling exercises. The learning by \r doing processes and economies of scale might be at least partially \r outweighed, in all countries and more specifically in Small Island \r Developing States (SIDS) and other developing countries because of \r different risk factors, scales of installations, accessibility, and others \r (Lucas et  al. 2015; van der Zwaan et  al. 2018). These parameters, \r together with transaction costs/soft costs (Section  15.5), financing \r costs and the level of technical competences need to be better \r represented in the future to represent the 'climate investment trap' \r in many developing countries (Garcia de Fonseca et al. 2019). This \r [...]"


id: 6a5b88390e83a8e5537aef7432fbd4c8
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15992
content:
"[...] 'climate investment trap', as flagged by Ameli et al. (2021a), is created \r by existing and expected physical effects of climate change, higher \r financing costs and resulting lower investment levels in developing \r countries. Applying significantly standardised assumptions can \r consequently not provide robust insights for specific country groups. \r This will require progress in the spatiotemporal granularity of the \r models (Collins et al. 2016)."


id: 452820f8feda93f8226647b7540afc8f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9393
content:
"about the structural functioning of the energy-economy-land\u0002use system (see Annex III: 'Scenarios and modelling methods' for \r details). Tables 15.2 and 15.3 focus on the near-term (2023-2032) \r investment requirements in the energy sector and how these differ \r depending on temperature category. Figures 3.36 and 3.37 present \r the data for the medium term (2023-2052). The results highlight \r both requirements for increased investments and a shift from fossil \r towards renewable technologies and efficiency for more ambitious \r temperature categories. The substantial ranges within each category \r reflect multiple pathways, differentiated by socio-economic \r assumptions, technology, and so on. It is necessary to open up these \r extra dimensions and contrast them with national and sub-regional \r analysis to understand how investment requirements depend \r on particular circumstances and assumptions within a  country \r for a  specific technology. Limiting peak temperature to levels of \r [...]"


id: dea169eff8a4ffc4d69dfd756229d47b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36430
content:
"[...] 1.5degC-2degC requires rapid decarbonisation of the global energy \r systems, with the fastest relative emission reductions occurring in the \r power generation sector (Hirth and Steckel 2016; Luderer et al. 2018)."


id: 6632760b7a935dfdf8291e9e53a0de7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15246
content:
"This requires fast shifts of investment as infrastructures in the power \r sector generally have long lifetimes of a  few decades. in global \r modelled pathways that limit warming to 1.5degC (>50%) with no \r or limited overshoot, investments into non-biomass renewables \r (especially solar and wind, but also including hydro, geothermal, and \r others not shown in Table 15.2) increase to over USD1 trillion yr-1 \r in 2030, increasing by more than factor 3 over the values of around \r USD250-300 billion yr-1 that have been relatively stable over the \r last decade (IEA 2019a). Overall, electricity generation investments \r increase considerably, reflecting the higher relevance of capital \r expenditures in decarbonised electricity systems. While decreasing \r technology costs have substantially reduced the challenge of high \r capital intensity, still remaining relative disadvantages in terms of \r capital intensity of low-carbon power technologies can especially \r [...]"


id: 9948f9df939220ac19ecfbb9e16ea6ea
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24187
content:
"[...] create obstacles for fast decarbonisation in countries with high \r interest rates, which decrease the competitiveness of those \r technologies (Iyer et al. 2015; Hirth and Steckel 2016; Steckel and \r Jakob 2018; Schmidt et  al. 2019). CCS as well as nuclear will not \r drive investment needs until 2030, given considerably longer lead\u0002times for these technologies, and the lack of a  significant project \r pipeline currently."


id: 22d8f9d77f77beb596861ba8aab8da8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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"Using global scenarios assessed in Chapter  3  for assessing \r investment requirements. Tables  15.2 and 15.3 present the \r analysis of investment requirements in global modelled mitigation \r pathways assessed in Chapter 3 for key energy sub-sectors within \r modelled global pathways that limit warming to 2degC (>67%) or \r lower. These pathways explore the energy, land-use, and climate \r system interactions and thus help identify required energy sector \r transformations to reach specific long-term climate targets. However, \r reporting of investment needs outside the energy sector was scarce, \r reducing the explanatory power of the shown total investment need \r in the context of overall investment needs (Ekholm et  al. 2013; \r IPCC 2018, Box 4.8; McCollum et al. 2018; Bertram et al. 2021). The \r modelling of these scenarios is done with a  variation of scenario \r [...]"


id: a442b34ccc869835fcac3a59fc322d8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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content:
"[...] assumptions along different dimensions (inter alia policy, socio\u0002economic development and technology availability), as well as with \r different modelling tools which represent different assumptions "


id: ff83b3d9a7cb2e5164b98fa8153857dc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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content:
"It is worth highlighting that driven by technology cost assumptions, \r IRENA forecasts falling average annual investments needs for energy, \r but also energy efficiency, for the period 2030-2050 compared to \r 2020-2030. In the 1.5degC scenario (1.5-S) the total annual investment \r needs excluding fossils and nuclear decrease from 5.0 trillion USD2015\r until 2030 yr-1 to 3.8 trillion USD2015 yr-1 for 2030-2050 (IRENA \r 2021). In IAM scenarios of Category C1, electricity supply investments \r (including generation, transmission and distribution, and storage) \r remain flat at 2.2 trillion USD2015 yr-1 through the coming three \r decades in absolute terms. Given rising GDP, the complementary \r methods and sources thus consistently point to a peak in electricity \r supply investments as a percentage of GDP in mitigation scenarios \r in the coming decade. This reflects the fact that the coming decade \r requires low-carbon power generation investments to both cover \r [...]"


id: 1c2b16812ecd31b78a61cf437ebba82
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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vector_id: 2142
content:
"[...] the demand increase and (partly premature) replacement of fossil \r generation capacities, both concentrated in emerging and developing \r countries. Relative investment numbers for electricity measured \r against GDP then decrease towards 2050, as they only need to \r cover natural replacement and increasing demands (which due \r to electrification will also pick up in developed countries), and due to \r further declining technology costs. Investments for low-carbon fuel "


id: 73b3d6da573f07ea522d90d830f8b0ec
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"However, given the strong interlinkage of the presented transitions \r and accumulated effects, climate change related investments \r can hardly be separated (The Food and Land Use Coalition 2019). \r Shakhovskoy et  al. (2019) present an overview of financing needs \r of small-scale farmers globally, however, without focusing on the \r required climate-related investments. According to their assessment, \r 270 million smallholder farmers in South and South-East Asia, sub\u0002Saharan Africa and Latin America face approximately USD240 billion \r of financing needs, thereof USD100 billion short-term agricultural \r needs, USD88 billion long-term agricultural needs and USD50 billion \r non-agricultural needs (Shakhovskoy et  al. 2019). These numbers \r can only provide 'an indication of the magnitude of the climate \r investments required in small-scale agriculture' (CPI 2020). \r Table 15.4 summarises the studies used as well as adjustments made \r [...]"


id: d84d3bdb4ec45d7e6b436ddc2b9a4d01
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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"A few exercises tried assess the consequences of the perpetuation of \r these drivers on the magnitude of the financing gap. They suggest, \r comparing the evolution of the infrastructure investment trends \r (beyond energy) by comparison with what they should be in an optimal \r scenario, a cumulative deficit between 19% (Oxford Economics 2017) \r and 32% (Arezki et al. 2016). The volume of this gap is of the same order \r of magnitude as the incremental infrastructure investments (energy and \r beyond) for meeting a 1.5degC target (2.4% of the world GDP on average) \r (Box 4.8 of SR1.5 (IPCC 2018)) calculated by exercises assuming no \r pre-existing investment gap. This figure is consistent with the 1.5% \r to 1.8% assessed by the European Commission (2020) for Europe and \r the 2% of the IMF (2021d) for the G20, which do not encompass many \r developing countries for which economic take-off is today fossil fuels \r dependent. For low- and middle-income economies, Rozenberg and \r [...]"


id: b026157b1ff1c7bfb1771538a0146852
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"[...] Fay's (2019) results suggest to increase the infrastructure investments \r by 2.5 to 6 percentage points of GDP to cover both the reduction of the \r structural investment gap and the specific additional costs for bridging \r it with low-carbon and climate-resilient options. These assessments \r indicate the challenge at stake but do not exist at very disaggregated \r sectoral and regional levels for sectors other than energy."


id: 85a34a5802d9e2d12ad74449f71ebce1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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"Most studies choose to assess public sector projects, ignoring \r household-level investments as well as private sector adaptation \r (UNEP 2018; Buchner et al. 2019). UNEP's 2020 Adaptation Gap Report \r estimates adaptation costs amounting to 140-300 billion  USD  yr-1\r in 2030 and USD280-500 billion yr-1 in 2050 (UNEP 2021). Over \r 100 countries included adaptation components in their intended \r NDCs (INDCs) and approximately 25% of these referenced national \r adaptation plans (NAPs) (GIZ 2017a) but estimates of the financing \r required for NAP processes is not available. These NAPs, as formally \r agreed under the UNFCCC in 2010, are iterative, continuous processes \r that have multiple stages with a developmental phase that requires \r country-specific financing of primarily which comprises grants, bond \r issuance or debt conversion (NDC Partnership 2020, NAP Global \r Network 2017). At the same time, multilateral climate funds such as the \r [...]"


id: 5455df84915b4c463fd2f3c76e89c17e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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"[...] Green Climate Fund and the GEF/Least Developed Countries Fund offer \r 'readiness and preparatory support' and implementation for the NAPs \r and adaptation planning process (GCF 2020a; GEF 2021a,b). There has \r been no significant updating of adaptation cost estimates since UNEP's \r (UNEP 2016, 2018). The Global Commission on Adaptation makes the \r case that investing USD1.8 trillion in early warning system, climate\u0002resilient infrastructure, global mangrove and resilient water resources \r would generate about USD1.7 trillion in benefits due to avoided cost \r and non-monetary and social resources (Verkooijen 2019; UNEP 2021)."


id: 77a9be692a7988aa91c2d3eb4b6f5aca
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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"The below quantitative analysis does not differentiate between \r financing gaps driven by barriers within or outside the financial sector \r given that the IAM models as well as most other studies used do \r not incorporate actual risk ranges depending on policy strength and \r coherence and institutional capacity, low-carbon policy risks, lack of \r long-term capital, cross-border currency fluctuation, and pre-investment \r costs and barriers within the financial sector that discourage private \r sector financing. They comprise short-termism (UNEP Inquiry 2016b), \r high perceived risks for mitigation-relevant technologies and/or \r regions (information gap through incomplete/asymmetric information, \r (Kempa and Moslener 2017; Clark et  al. 2018)), lack of carbon \r pricing effects (Best and Burke 2018), home bias (results in limited \r balancing for regional mismatches between current capital and needs \r distribution, (Boissinot et al. 2016)), and perceived high opportunity \r [...]"


id: 563dd1b9e09d4598c95245a335a0d8b8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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"[...] and transaction costs (results from limited visibility of future pipelines \r and policy interventions; SME financing tickets and the missing middle, \r (Grubler et al. 2016)). In addition, barriers outside the financial sector \r will have to be addressed to close future financing gaps. The mix and \r dominance of individual barriers might vary significantly across sectors \r and regions and is analysed below."


id: 2f96d94655726ec63781a260867886aa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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"Figure 15.4 | Breakdown of recent average (downstream) mitigation investments and model-based investment requirements for 2020-2030 (USD billion) \r in scenarios that likely limit warming to 2degC or lower. Mitigation investment flows and model-based investment requirements by sector / segment (energy efficiency in \r buildings and industry, transport including efficiency, electricity generation, transmission and distribution including electrification, and agriculture, forestry and other land use), by \r type of economy, and by region (see Annex II Part I Section 1: By region is based on intermediate level (R10) classification scheme. By type of economy is based on intermediate \r level (R10) classification scheme, which considers 'North America', 'Europe', and 'Australia, Japan and New Zealand' as developed countries, and the other seven regions as \r [...]"


id: add3ede789dfe21e7fcd3743d90412fa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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vector_id: 27826
content:
"[...] developing countries). Breakdown by sector / segment may differ slightly from sectoral analysis in other contexts due to the availability of investment needs data. The granularity \r of the models assessed in Chapter 3, and other studies, do not allow for a robust assessment of the specific investment needs of LDCs or SIDSs. Investment requirements in \r developing countries might be underestimated due to missing data points as well as underestimated technology costs. In modelled pathways, regional investments are projected \r to occur when and where they are cost cost-effective to limit global warming. The model quantifications help to identify high-priority areas for cost-effective investments, but do \r not provide any indication on who would finance the regional investments. Investment requirements and flows covering downstream / mitigation technology deployment only. \r [...]"


id: 3366fa3d5a5dec00e93a5a8eba968a5e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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"[...] Data includes investments with a direct mitigation effect, and in the case of electricity, additional transmission and distribution investments. See section 15.4.2 Quantitative \r assessment of financing needs for detailed data on investment requirements. Data on mitigation investment flows are based on a single series of reports (Climate Policy \r Initiative, CPI) which assembles data from multiple sources. Investment flows for energy efficiency are adjusted based on data from the International Energy Agency (IEA). \r Data on mitigation investments do not include technical assistance (i.e., policy and national budget support or capacity building), other non-technology deployment financing. \r Adaptation only flows are also excluded. Data on mitigation investment requirements for electricity are based on emission pathways C1, C2 and C3 (Table SPM.1). For electricity \r [...]"


id: e5edf32b9cbfc9258cd4abd1a353dd59
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content:
"[...] investment requirements, the upper end refers to the mean of C1 pathways and the lower end to the mean of C3 pathways. Data points for energy efficiency, transport and \r AFOLU cannot always be linked to C1-C3 scenarios. Data do not include needs for adaptation or general infrastructure investment or investment related to meeting the SDGs \r other than mitigation, which may be at least partially required to facilitate mitigation. The multiplication factors show the ratio of average annual model-based mitigation \r investment requirements (2020-2030) and most recent annual mitigation investments (averaged for 2017-2020). The lower and upper multiplication factors refer to the lower \r and upper ends of the range of investment needs."


id: c5cc5aca098d55a817d89863f2a00f52
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"are crucial options here, as in other low-income countries and \r regional settings. Notably, climate finance flows to African countries \r might have even decreased for mitigation technology deployment \r (stagnated for adaptation between 2017 and 2020), widening the \r finance gap in African countries in the recent years (high confidence).\r Over 80% of climate finance is reported to originate and stay within \r borders, and even higher for private climate flows (over 90%) \r (Boissinot et  al. 2016). There are multiple reasons for such 'home \r bias' in finance - national policy support, differences in regulatory \r standards, exchange rate, political and governance risks, as well \r as information market failures. The extensive home bias means \r that even if national actions are announced and intended to be \r implemented unilaterally and voluntarily, the ability to implement \r them requires access to climate finance which is constrained by the \r [...]"


id: 1b098034c5823f3019df89da2a1d679
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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"[...] relative ability of financial and capital markets at home to provide \r such financing, and access to global capital markets that requires \r supporting institutional policies in source countries. 'Enabling' public \r policies and actions locally (cities, states, countries and regions), to \r reduce investment risks and boost domestic climate capital markets \r financing, and to enlarge the pool of external climate financing \r sources with policy support from source capital countries thus matters \r at a general level. The biggest challenge in climate finance is likely to \r be in developing countries, even in the presence of enabling policies \r and quite apart from any other considerations such as equity and \r climate justice (Klinsky et al. 2017) or questions about the equitable \r allocations of future 'climate budgets' (Gignac and Matthews 2015). \r The differentiation between developed and developing countries \r matters most on financing. Most developed countries have already \r [...]"


id: 9a6d1a124c89399eb05866a807badda9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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"[...] achieved very high levels of incomes, have the largest pool of capital \r stock and financial capital (which can be more easily redeployed \r within these countries given the home bias of financial markets), the \r most well-developed financial markets and the highest sovereign \r credit ratings, in addition to starting with very high levels of per \r capita carbon consumption - factors that should allow the fastest \r adjustment to low-carbon investments and transition in these \r countries from domestic policies alone. The financial and economic \r circumstances are more challenging in many developing countries, \r even within a heterogeneity of circumstances across countries. The \r dilemma, however, is that the fastest rates of the expected increase \r in future carbon emissions are in developing countries. The biggest \r challenge of climate finance globally is thus likely to be  the \r constraints to climate financing because of the opportunity costs \r [...]"


id: 436d1227a0555d209d079df398ef437
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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"[...] and relative under-development of capital markets and financing \r constraints (and costs) at home in developing countries, and the \r relative availability or absence of adequate financing policy support \r internationally from developed countries. The Paris Agreement and \r commitment by developed countries to support the climate financing \r needs of developing countries thus continue to matter a great deal.\r Soft costs/institutional capacity (Osama et  al. 2021). Most \r funding needs assessments focus on technology costs and ignore \r the cascade of financing needs as outlined above. International \r grant funding or national budget allocations for soft costs like \r the creation of a  regulatory environment can be a  prerequisite \r for the supply of commercial financing for the deployment of \r technologies. Such critical funding needs might represent a small "


id: 21d00b10933a66096bd9160e77ea6af3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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"Agricultural support is an important source of distortions to \r agricultural incentives in both rich and poor countries (Mamun et al. \r 2019) ranging from the largest component of the support, market \r price supports, increased gross revenue to farmers as a  result of \r higher prices due to market barriers created by government policies, \r to production payments and other support including input subsidy \r (e.g., fertiliser subsidy)  (Searchinger et al. 2020). USD600 billion of \r annual governmental support for agriculture in the OECD database \r contributes only modestly to the related objectives of boosting crop \r yields and just transition (Searchinger et al. 2020). A review of NDCs \r of 40 developing countries which submitted a NDC to the UNFCCC \r Interim NDC Registry by April 2017, and include within their NDC \r efforts to REDD+ via support from the UN-REDD Programme and/or \r World Bank Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, indicates that none \r [...]"


id: a3e5f2dd949ab723394485f4c966041c
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vector_id: 26027
content:
"[...] of the countries reviewed mention fiscal policy reform of existing \r finance flows to agricultural commodity production or other publicly \r supported programmes that affect the direct and underlying drivers \r of land use conversion (Kissinger et al. 2019)."


id: dd791bf0550ff3f8956c2936e80d35dc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36230
content:
"Analysis by region and type of economy. The analysis of \r gaps by type of economy illustrates the challenge for developing \r countries. Estimated mitigation financing needs as a  percentage \r of mean 2017-2020 GDP in USD2015 comes in at around 2-4% for \r developed countries, and around 4-9% for developing countries (high \r confidence) (Figure 15.4). Climate finance flows have to increase by \r a factor of four to seven in developing countries and three to five \r in developed countries. This disparity is further exacerbated when \r considering adaptation, infrastructure and SDG-related investment \r needs (high confidence) (Hourcade et al. 2021a). However, differences \r across developing countries are significant. Flows to Eastern Asia, \r with its annual average flows (2017-2020) of 252 billion USD2015\r being dominated by China (more than 95% of total mitigation \r flows to Eastern Asia), would have to increase by a  factor of two \r [...]"


id: 6ac92e0f855b4e86ab59c56e54475998
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"[...] to four, a  comparable level to developed countries. Section  15.6.2 \r elaborates on outlooks with regard to fiscal space and ability to tap \r capital markets, in particular for developing countries. In particular, \r attention must accelerate on low-income Africa. This large continent \r currently contributes very little to global emissions, but its rapidly \r rising energy demands and renewable energy potential versus its \r growing reliance on fossil fuels and 'cheap' biomass (especially \r fuelwood for cooking and charcoal, with impacts on deforestation) \r amid fast-rising urbanisation makes it imperative that institutional \r investors and policymakers recognise the very large 'leap-frog' \r potential for the renewable energy transition as well as risks of lock\u0002in effects in infrastructure more generally in Africa that is critical to \r hold the global temperatures rise to well below 2degC in the longer \r term (2020-2050). Overlooking this transition opportunity, rivalling \r [...]"


id: c0dac9c2e00023b61fb196b82fc229f9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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"[...] China, India, USA and Europe, would be costly. Policies centred \r around the accelerated development of local capital markets for \r energy transitions  - with support from external grants, supra\u0002national guarantees and recognition of carbon remediation assets - "


id: cec694ec31f62555bf5e80105f3c570f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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content:
"share of overall investment needs but current (relatively small) \r gaps in funding of policy reforms can hinder or delay deployment \r of large volumes of funding in later years. The role, as well as the \r approximate volumes of such required timely international grant \r funding or national budget allocations, appear underestimated in \r research. The numbers available for the creation of an enabling \r environment for medium-sized renewable energy (RE) projects in \r Uganda (GET FiT Uganda 2018) are illustrative only and cannot be \r transferred as assumptions to other countries without taking into \r account potentially varying starting points in terms of institutional \r readiness, pipelines, as well as the general business environment. \r GET FiT Uganda supported 170 MWp of medium-scale RE capacity \r triggering investments of USD453 million (GET FiT Uganda 2018), \r international results-based incremental cost support amounted to \r [...]"


id: e759080d8bb497002e23985bcb2a3169
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content:
"[...] USD92 million and project preparation, technical assistance, and \r implementation support, required USD8 million, excluding support \r from national agencies."


id: efbf5412be9ac809451bb90525cd9642
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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vector_id: 39563
content:
"Early stage/venture capital financing/pilot project financing. \r Early-stage companies in impact investment sectors with business \r solutions can contribute positively to climate impact. Figure SPM.8 \r highlights the need for new business models facilitating parts of the \r behavioural change. Also, SE4All has underpinned the need for an \r expansion of available business models to achieve universal access \r (SEforALL and CPI 2020). Further research and development needs range \r from resource efficiency of proven technologies and next generation \r technologies but also new technologies (Chapter 16). Access to early \r stage financing remains critical with performance in recent years being \r weak (Gaddy et al. 2016). This historically weak performance of clean \r tech start-ups burdens the interest of investors in the sector on the \r one hand and discourages experienced executive talent (Wang and \r Yee 2020). Besides that, the concentration of venture capital markets \r [...]"


id: f735c577e13eb546bb385c719eb9655e
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content:
"[...] in the USA, Europe and India represents a major challenge (FS-UNEP \r Centre and BNEF 2019; Statistica 2021). With regard to commercial\u0002scale demonstration projects, IEA estimates a need of USD90 billion of \r public sector finance before 2030 having around USD25 billion already \r planned by governments to 2030 (IEA 2021c)."


id: a6fc16b0a4d402dbe68cb7e9f5ee1dd7
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vector_id: 26585
content:
"There is strong evidence of the correlation between institutional \r capacity of countries and international climate finance flows towards \r those economies (Adenle et al. 2017; Stender et al. 2019) and a strong \r need for robust institutional capacity to manage the transformation \r in a sustainable and human rights based way (Duyck et al. 2018). \r One example to consider unaddressed social concerns is the ongoing \r call for feedback by the European Commission and its platform on \r sustainable finance. It argues for a social taxonomy, that can support \r the identification of financing opportunities for economic activities \r contributing to social objectives (European Commission 2021b). \r SEforAll has highlighted the issue of investments not going to the \r countries with the greatest need, also partly driven by institutional \r capacity levels (SEforALL and CPI 2020). Also, most of the developing \r countries' NDCs are conditional upon international support for \r [...]"


id: a530670382f4079ae4ba23211381dbda
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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vector_id: 26290
content:
"[...] capacity building (Pauw et al. 2020). The Climate Technology Centre \r and Network (CTCN) was created as an operational arm of the UNFCCC \r Technology Mechanism with the mandate to respond to requests from \r developing countries. Initial evaluations of the mechanism underpin \r its importance and value for developing countries but stress long \r lead times and predictability of future international public finance \r to maintain operations as key challenges (UNFCCC 2017; DANIDA \r 2018). While limited pipelines, limited absorptive capacities as well \r as restricted institutional capacity of countries are often stated as \r challenges for an accelerated deployment of finance (Adenle et al. \r 2017), the question remains on the role of international public climate \r finance to address this gap and whether a concrete current financing \r gap exists for patient institutional capacity building. While current \r short-term, mostly project-related, capacity building often fails to \r [...]"


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content:
"[...] meet needs but alternative, well-structured patient interventions and \r finance could play an important role (Saldanha 2006; Hope 2011) \r accepting other barriers than financing playing a role as well. One \r reason why international public climate finance is not sufficiently \r directed to such needs might be the complexity in measuring \r intangible, direct outcomes like improved institutional capacity (Clark \r et al. 2018)."


id: 5a96d7547433c90971743bdda6923210
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13196
content:
"Need for parallel rather than sequential investment decisions.\r The needs and gaps assessment does not include upstream \r investment needs required to facilitate the technology deployment \r as foreseen in the scenarios presented above. For example, for their \r transforming energy scenario IRENA estimates the number of EVs \r to increase from around 8 million units in 2019 to 269 million units \r in 2030 (IRENA 2020c). This would require investments in battery \r factories amounting to approximately USD207 billion with further \r investment requirements in the value chain (IRENA 2020d). This \r illustrates the extent of parallel investments based on goals rather \r than concrete regulatory interventions and/or demand and poses \r a problem of upfront investment risks for each industry in the chain \r in the absence of certainty of the presence of parallel decisions in the \r upstream and downstream links in the chain. This is a typical element \r [...]"


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"[...] of the 'valley of the death' of innovation (Scherer et al. 2000; Ahman \r et al. 2017). It discourages risk-taking and slows down the learning\u0002by-doing processes, economies of scale and increasing returns to \r adoption needed for lowering the costs of systemic technical change \r (Kahouli-Brahmi 2009; Weiss et  al. 2010). Implications for risk \r perception, financing costs as well as investment decision-making \r processes and ultimately for feasibility are rarely considered."


id: 912de354959898fd2f06ef5b54208da7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22751
content:
"protection with financial instruments in a consistent policy package, \r which includes financial instruments to deliver adequate liquidity \r and contingency plans for the disbursement of funds post disaster. \r Challenges related to financing residual climate-related losses and \r damages are particularly high for developing countries. Financing \r losses and damages from extreme events requires rapid pay-outs; the \r cost of financing for many developing countries is already quite high; \r and the expense of risk financing is expected to increase as disasters \r become more frequent, intense and more costly, not only due to \r climate change but also due to higher levels of exposure. Addressing \r both extreme and slow onset climate impacts requires designing \r adequate financial protection systems for reaching the most \r vulnerable. Moreover, some fraction of losses and damages, both \r material and non-material, are not commonly valued in monetary \r [...]"


id: 7caaba12f56f3fe264e6e11f58886cb6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19131
content:
"[...] terms (non-economic loss) and hence financing requirements are \r hard to estimate. These non-market-based residual impacts include \r loss of cultural identity, sacred places, human health and lives (Ameli \r et al. 2021a; Paul 2019; Serdeczny 2019)."


id: cf160009e046385f5e7db6a48df0af0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33781
content:
"which will include sectoral approaches such as water, energy, \r infrastructures, and food production. According to the UNFCCC, 'in \r 2015-2016, 3% of international public adaptation finance flows \r was supplied by multilateral climate funds, while 84% came from \r development finance institutions and 13% from other government \r sources' (UNFCCC 2019c). Comprehensive reporting on adaptation \r finance by Murphy and Parry (2020) and Buchner et al. (2019) argues \r that flows of finance for adaptation action in developing countries \r in 2017 and 2018 were estimated to be approximately USD30 \r billion; this plus an additional estimated flow of USD12 billion for \r dual adaptation and mitigation actions totalled USD42 billion, \r accounting for 7.25% of the total estimated international public and \r private flows of climate finance (Buchner et al. 2019). They are far \r below the financing needs given in Section 15.4. To date, the private \r [...]"


id: 882d14ed8646eed74eb6043afc741f29
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21111
content:
"[...] sector has limited involvement in NAPs and adaptation projects and \r planning but can be involved through public-private partnership \r (Section  15.6.2.1) and other incentives provided by governments \r (Schmidt-Traub and Sachs 2015; Druce et al. 2016; Koh et al. 2016; \r UNEP 2016; NAP Global Network 2017; Murphy and Parry 2020) \r and innovative private financing mechanisms such as green and \r blue bonds. However, adaptation financing is only about 2% of the \r share of green bond financing raised up to June 2019 (UNFCCC \r 2019c),11 whereas it is about 10% of sovereign green bonds raised \r (UNFCCC 2019d). (Tuhkanen 2020), in a  detailed review of green \r bond issuance in the Environmental Finance Data base 2019, found \r that between March 2010 to April 2019, '5% of all green bonds \r issued were categorised as adaptation and that 'the private sector \r accounts for a  significant proportion of adaptation-related green \r [...]"


id: 5bbc7be7865dafd2e0400fcc2bc5948d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13397
content:
"[...] bond issuances' (Tuhkanen 2020). However, GIZ (2017b), Nicol et al. \r (2017, 2018a), and Tuhkanen (2020) highlight that there is scepticism \r about this stream of finance for adaptation due to the factors that \r have thus far limited the private sector's involvement in adaptation: \r lack of resilience-related revenue streams, the small scale of some \r adaptation projects and the overall 'intangibility' of financing \r adaptation projects (Larsen et al. 2019)."


id: f29d4f8ed29556edb5145a44161acbd3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40090
content:
"Addressing knowledge gaps with regard to climate risk analysis and \r transparency will be one key driver for more appropriate climate \r risk assessment and efficient capital allocation (Section  15.6.1), \r efficient enabling environments to support the reduction of financing \r costs and reduce dependency on public financing (Section 15.6.2), \r a  revised common understanding of debt sustainability, including \r that negative implications of deferred climate investments on future \r GDP, particularly stranded assets and resources to be compensated, \r can facilitate the stronger access to public climate finance, \r domestically and internationally (Section 15.6.3), climate risk pooling \r and insurance approaches are a key element of financing of a just \r transition (Section 15.6.4), the supply of finance to a widened focus \r on relevant actors can ensure transformational climate action at all \r levels (Section 15.6.5), new green asset classes and financial products \r [...]"


id: 3ddf87a11bb602c285d9857a8c1e12fe
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8050
content:
"[...] can attract the attention of capital markets and support the scale \r up of financing by providing standardised investment opportunities \r which can be well integrated in existing investment processes \r (Section 15.6.6), a stronger focus on the development of local capital \r markets can help mobilise new investor groups and to some extent \r mitigate home bias effects (Section  15.6.7), new business models "


id: 2c7b70c872822757e2a36283ca59f156
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5093
content:
"regarded in the finance community only as an ethical issue. The \r reasons why climate change implies financial risk are not new and \r are discussed more in detail below. What is new is that climate \r enters now as a factor in the assessment of financial institutions' risk \r (e.g., the European Central Bank or the European Banking Authority) \r and credit rating (Section  15.6.3), and, going forward, into stress\u0002test exercises. This implies changes in incentives of the supervised \r financial actors, both public and private, and thus changes in the \r landscape of mitigation action by generating a  new potential for \r climate finance flows. However, critical knowledge gaps remain. \r In particular, the underestimation of climate-related financial risk \r by public and private financial actors can explain that the current \r allocation of capital among financial institutions is often inconsistent \r with the mitigation objectives (Rempel et al. 2020). Moreover, even \r [...]"


id: f9f73f322d6a5a983ad1b9437079c1bd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41342
content:
"[...] a  correct assessment of risk, which could provide incentives for \r divesting from carbon-intensive activities, does not necessarily lead \r to investing in the technical options needed for deep decarbonisation. \r Therefore, understanding the dynamics of the low-carbon transition \r require to fill in at the same time gaps about risk and gaps about \r investments in enabling activities in a broader sense."


id: b520e0018f77635ff629558f083e6290
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29103
content:
"remain uncertain until it suddenly unravels. Note also that, in order \r to be relevant for financial risk, the disorderly transition does not \r need to be a catastrophic scenario in terms of the fabric of markets. It \r also does not automatically entail systemic risk, as discussed below. \r Knowledge gaps in this area are related to emerging questions, \r including: What are, in detail, the transmission channels of physical \r and transition risk? How to assess the magnitude of the exposure \r to these risks for financial institutions and ultimately for people's \r savings? How do transition risk and opportunities depend on the \r future scenarios of climate change and climate policies? How to deal \r with the intrinsic uncertainty around the scenarios? To what extent \r could an underestimation of climate-related financial risk feed back \r on the alignment of climate finance flows and hamper the low\u0002carbon transition? Should climate risk be explicitly accounted for in \r [...]"


id: 1cdd04ab04da1381bd122cef1fa94b91
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2259
content:
"[...] regulatory frameworks for financial institutions, such as Basel III for \r banks and national frameworks for insurance? What lessons from \r the 2008 financial crisis are relevant here, regarding moral hazard \r and the trustworthiness of credit risk ratings? The attention of both \r practitioners and the scientific community to these questions has \r grown since the Paris Agreement. In the following we review some \r of the findings from the literature, but the field is relatively young \r and many of the questions are still open.12 Damages from climate \r change are expected to escalate dramatically in Europe (Forzieri \r et al. 2018) and in some EU countries there is already some evidence \r that banks, anticipating possible losses on the their loan books, lend \r proportionally less as a consequence."


id: 604186918b79effb0746071fecc001b2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14237
content:
"The concepts of carbon stranded assets (see e.g., Leaton and Sussams \r 2011), and orderly vs disorderly transition (Sussams et al. 2015) which \r emerged in the NGO community, have provided powerful metaphors \r to conceptualise transition risks and have evolved into concepts \r used also by financial supervisors (NGFS 2019)and academics. The \r term carbon stranded assets refers to fossil fuel-related assets (fuel \r or equipment) that become unproductive. An orderly transition \r is defined here as a situation in which market players are able to \r fully anticipate the price adjustments that could arise from the \r transition. In this case, there would still be losses associated with \r stranded assets, but it would be possible for market players to spread \r losses over time and plan ahead. In contrast, a disorderly transition \r is defined here as a situation in which a transition to a low-carbon \r economy on a  2degC path is achieved (i.e.,  by about 2040), but the \r [...]"


id: 9d888b75af3b74ca5ae427e14867f91b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24954
content:
"[...] impact of climate policies in terms of reallocation of capital into \r low-carbon activities and the corresponding adjustment in prices of \r financial assets (e.g., bonds and equity shares) is large, sudden and \r not fully anticipated by market players and investors. Note the impact \r could be unanticipated even if the date of the introduction is known \r in advance by the market players. There are several reasons why such \r adjustments could occur. One simple argument is that the political \r economy of the transition is characterised by forces pulling in \r different directions, including opposing interests within the industry, \r and mounting pressure from social awareness of unmitigated climate \r risks. Politics will have to find a  synthesis and the outcome could "


id: bdae2808f308955767a2ca7d75a4cd10
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30633
content:
"Assessment of physical risk. There is a literature on estimates of \r economic losses on physical assets (see Cross-Working Group Box \r ECONOMIC in chapter 16 of AR6 WGII). Here we discuss some figures \r and mechanisms that are relevant for the financial system. Significant \r cost increases have been observed related to increases in frequency \r and magnitude of extreme events (high confidence) (Section 15.4.2). \r At the global level, the expected 'climate value at risk' (climate \r VaR) of financial assets has been estimated to be 1.8% along \r a business-as-usual emissions path (Dietz et al. 2016), with however, \r a concentration of risk in the tail (e.g., 99th VaR equals to 16.9%, or \r USD24.213 trillion, in 2016). Climate-related impacts are estimated \r to increase the frequency of banking crises (up over 200% across \r scenarios) while rescuing insolvent banks could increase the ratio of \r public debt to gross domestic product by a factor of two (Lamperti \r [...]"


id: ee7e5042532a498558ae141fc05394e3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39334
content:
"[...] et al. 2019). Further assessments of physical risk for financial assets \r (Mandel 2020), accounting in particular for the propagation of losses \r through financial networks, estimate global yearly GDP losses at \r 7.1% (1.13%) in 2080, without adaptation (with adaptation), the \r former corresponding to a 10-fold increase with respect to the current \r yearly losses (0.76% of global GDP). Finally, climate physical risk can \r impact on the value of sovereign bonds (one of the top asset classes \r by size), in particular for vulnerable countries (Volz et al. 2020)."


id: 71b08ebc1746905a69b60fb8d9958e9e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17246
content:
"that could be affected (Monasterolo 2020). This, in turn depends \r on their direct or indirect role in the GHG value chain, their level of \r substitutability with respect to fossil fuel and their role in the policy \r landscape. Moreover, such a classification needs to be replicable and \r comparable across portfolios and jurisdictions. One classification that \r meets these criteria is the Climate Policy Relevant Sectors (CPRS) \r (Battiston et  al. 2017) which has been used in several studies by \r financial supervisors (EIOPA 2018; ECB 2019; EBA 2020; ESMA 2020). \r The CPRS classification builds on the international classification of \r economic activities (ISIC) to map the most granular level (4 digits) \r into a  small set of categories characterised by differing types of \r risk: fossil fuel (i.e., all activities whose revenues depend mostly and \r directly on fossil fuel, including concession of reserves and operating \r [...]"


id: 2ae99054b59170a2095e2838be996580
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4785
content:
"[...] industrial plants for extraction and refinement); electricity (affected in \r terms of input but that can in principle diversify their energy sources); \r energy intensive (e.g., steel or cement production plants, automotive \r manufacturing plants), which are affected in terms of energy cost \r but not in terms of the main input); and transport and buildings \r (affected in terms of both energy sources and specific policies). All \r financial assets (e.g., bonds, equity shares, loans) having as issuers \r or counterparties firms whose revenues depend significantly on the \r above activities are thus potentially exposed to transition risks and \r opportunities. Further, investors' portfolios have to be part of the \r analysis since changes in financial assets values affect the stability \r of financial institutions and can thus feed back into the transition \r dynamics itself (e.g., through cost of debt for firms and through costs \r [...]"


id: cd33516a8906f6deee52267f50136004
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33438
content:
"[...] for assisting the financial sector). One outstanding challenge for the \r analysis of investors' exposure to climate risks is the difficulty of \r gathering granular and standardised information on the breakdown \r of non-financial firms' revenues and CAPEX in terms of low-/high\u0002carbon activities (high confidence)."


id: 3285d72e98c2e4a6d7b3d98fdfa48de1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6144
content:
"major catastrophes (such as in 2018 with hurricanes Harvey, Irma, \r and Maria). This trend is expected to continue. The indirect costs of \r a climate-related flooding event can be up to 50% of the total costs, \r the majority of which is not covered by insurance (Alnes et al. 2018) \r (Section15.6.4). The gap between total damage losses and insurance \r pay-outs has increased over the past 10 years (Swiss Re Institute \r 2019). Indeed, the probability of 'extreme but plausible' scenarios \r will be progressively revised upwards in the 'value at risk'. As a result \r it becomes more difficult to find financial actors willing to provide \r insurance, as was observed for real estate in relation to flood and \r wildfires in California (Ouazad and Kahn 2019). This progressive \r adjustment would keep the financial system safe (Climate-Related \r Market Risk Subcommittee 2020; Keenan and Bradt 2020), but \r transfer to taxpayers the onus of damage compensation and the \r [...]"


id: ab1f0be9dc738f642c6521805255b368
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27331
content:
"Assessment of transition risk. Carbon stranded assets. Fossil \r fuel reserve and resource estimates exceed in equivalent quantity \r of CO2 with virtual certainty the carbon budget available to reach \r the 1.5degC and 2degC targets (high confidence) (Meinshausen et  al. \r 2009; McGlade and Ekins 2015; Millar et  al. 2017). In relative \r terms, stranded assets of fossil fuel companies amount to 82% \r of global coal reserves, 49%  of global gas reserves and 33% of \r global oil reserves (McGlade and Ekins 2015). This suggests that \r only less than the whole quantity of fossil fuels currently valued \r (either currently extracted, waiting for extraction as reserves or \r assets on company balance sheets) can yield economic return if \r the carbon budget is respected. The devaluation of fossil fuel assets \r implies financial losses for both the public sector (Section 15.6.8) \r and the private sector (Coffin and Grant 2019). Global estimates \r [...]"


id: 2e328dd93e5cd7c91e0b25f56ee6f408
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5402
content:
"[...] of potential stranded fossil fuel assets amount to at least 1 trillion, \r based on ongoing low-carbon technology trends and in the \r absence of climate policies (cumulated to 2035 with 10% discount \r rate applied; USD8  trillion without discounting (Mercure et  al. \r 2018a)). With worldwide climate policies to achieve the 2degC target \r with 75% likelihood, this could increase to over USD4 trillion (until \r 2035, 10% discount rate; USD12 trillion without discounting). \r Other estimates indicate USD8-15 trillion (until 2050, 5% discount \r rate, (Bauer et al. 2015)) and USD185 trillion (cumulated to year \r 2115 using combined social and private discount rate (Linquiti and \r Cogswell 2016)). However the geographical distribution of potential \r stranded fossil fuel assets (also called 'unburnable carbon') is \r not even across the world due to differences in production costs \r (McGlade and Ekins 2015). In this context, a delayed deployment of \r [...]"


id: 9e0576026d3eac39c061575f5c429a2f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25039
content:
"[...] climate finance and consequently limited alignment of investment \r activity with the Paris Agreement tend to strengthen carbon and \r thus to increase the magnitude of stranded assets."


id: e296b69cbb77ddb70d49df74774ea18e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37171
content:
"Several financial supervisors have conducted assessments of \r transition risk for the financial system at the regional level. For \r instance, the European Central Bank (ECB) reported preliminary \r estimates of aggregate exposures of financial institutions to CPRS \r relative to their total debt securities holdings as ranging between \r 1% for banks to about 9% for investment funds (ECB 2019). The \r European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) \r reported aggregate exposures to CPRS of EU insurance companies \r at about 13% of their total securities holdings (EIOPA 2018). \r Further analyses on the EU securities holdings indicate that among \r financial investments in bonds issued by non-financial corporations, \r EU institutions hold exposures to CPRS ranging between 36.8% for \r investment funds to 47.7% for insurance corporations; analogous \r figures for equity holdings range from 36.4% for banks to 43.1% for \r [...]"


id: 928b4c38c9e97a9cecc03152a9432e5c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23007
content:
"[...] pension funds (Alessi et al. 2019). Another study indicates that losses \r on EU insurance portfolios of sovereign bonds could reach up to 1%, \r in conservative scenarios (Battiston et al. 2019)."


id: 7e85a252f7a8b3983cf94d9e7f7b4bad
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19412
content:
"Some financial authorities recognise that climate change represents \r a major source of systemic risk, particularly for banks with portfolios \r concentrated in certain economic sectors or geographical areas \r (de Guindos 2021). Specifically, the concern that central banks would \r have to act as 'climate rescuers of last resort' in a systemic financial \r crisis stemming from some combination of physical and transition \r risk has been raised in the financial supervisor community (Bolton \r et al. 2020). The systemic nature of climate risk is reinforced by the \r possible presence of moral hazard. Indeed, if a  sufficient number \r of financial actors have an incentive to downplay climate-related \r financial risk, then systemic risk builds up in the financial system, \r eventually materialising for taxpayers (Climate-Related Market Risk \r Subcommittee 2020). While such type of risk may go undetected to \r standard market indicators for a while, it can materialise with a time \r [...]"


id: 677443508062c386ad5fb84a79996c4d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15466
content:
"[...] delay, similarly to the developments observed in the run up to the \r 2008 financial crisis."


id: e902650b861da84c0932b3aa0d6718b0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38347
content:
"Challenges for climate transition scenarios. The endogeneity of \r risk and its associated deep uncertainty implies that the standard \r approach to financial risk, consisting of computing expected \r values and risk based on historical values of market prices, is not \r adequate for climate risk (high confidence) (Bolton et  al. 2020). \r To address this challenge, a  recent stream of work has developed \r an approach to make use of climate policy scenarios to derive risk \r measures (e.g., expected shortfall) for financial assets and portfolios, \r conditioned to scenarios of disorderly transition (Battiston et al. 2017; \r Monasterolo and Battiston 2020; Roncoroni et al. 2020). In particular, \r climate policy shocks on the output of low-/high-carbon economic \r activities are calculated based on trajectories of energy technologies \r as provided by large-scale Integrated Assessment Models (Kriegler \r et al. 2015; McCollum et al. 2018) conditioned to the introduction of \r [...]"


id: 9510ac92e9ac3ad997345f5e7c392c92
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23431
content:
"[...] specific climate policies over time. This approach allows to conduct \r climate stress-tests both at the level of financial institutions and at \r the level of the financial system of a given jurisdiction."


id: 7db9abfac6db9f27b16cb3ce5e4691cf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19294
content:
"In a  similar spirit, recently, the community of financial supervisors \r in collaboration with the community of climate economics has \r identified a set of climate policy scenarios, based on large-scale IAM, \r as candidate scenarios for assessing transition risk (Monasterolo \r and Battiston 2020). These scenarios have been used, for instance, \r in an assessment of transition risk conducted at a national central \r bank (Allen et al. 2020). This development is key to mainstreaming \r the assessment of transition risk among financial institutions, but the \r following challenges emerge (high confidence). First, a  consensus \r among financial supervisors and actors on scenarios of transition \r risk that are too mild could lead to a  systematic underestimation \r of risk. The reason is that the default probability of leveraged \r financial institutions is sensitive to errors in the estimation of the \r loss distribution and hence sensitive on the choice of transition \r [...]"


id: 10c6e871fdca3b72c49ae9ecbdec6ad9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 135
content:
"[...] scenarios (Battiston and Monasterolo 2020). This in turn could \r lead to an allocation of capital across low-/high-carbon activities \r that is insufficient to cater for the investment needs of the low\u0002carbon transition."


id: d1fcf912d458f61d186a68e8ce6f6b69
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34294
content:
"Endogeneity of risk and multiplicity of scenarios. One \r fundamental challenge is that climate-related financial risk is \r endogenous (high confidence). This means that the perception of \r the risk changes the risk itself, unlike most contexts of financial \r risk. Indeed, transition risk depends on whether governments and \r firms continue on a business-as-usual pathway (i.e., misaligned with \r the Paris Agreement targets) or engage on a  climate mitigation \r pathway. But the realisation of the transition pathway depends \r itself on how, collectively, society, including financial investors and \r supervisors, perceive the risk of taking or not taking the transition \r scenario. The circularity between perception of risk and realisation \r of the scenario implies that multiple scenarios are possible, and that \r which scenario is ultimately realised can depend on policy action. The \r coordination problem associated also with low-carbon investments \r [...]"


id: b1d92ad6097acba826a68ffd6042c2b9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28514
content:
"[...] opportunities increases the uncertainty. Further, not all low-carbon \r activities are directly functional to the transition (e.g., investments in \r pharmaceutical, IT companies, or financial intermediaries), thus not \r all reallocations of capital lead to the same path."


id: fb475c35c4f42451c7640a10bdfb5c78
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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vector_id: 41581
content:
"Macroeconomic implications of the technological transition. \r Global macroeconomic changes that may affect asset prices are \r expected to take place as a result of a possible reduction in growth \r or contraction of fossil fuel demand, in scenarios in which climate \r targets are met according to carbon budgets, but also following \r ongoing energy efficiency changes (high confidence) (Clarke et  al. \r 2014; Mercure et al. 2018a). A review of the economic mechanisms \r involved in the accumulation of systemic risk associated with \r declining industries, with focus on fossil fuels, is given by Semieniuk \r et al. (2021). An example is the transport sector, which uses around \r 50% of oil extracted (IEA 2018; Thoma 2018). A rapid diffusion of \r EV (and other alternative vehicle types) poses an important risk as \r it could lead to oil demand peaking far before mid-century (Mercure \r et al. 2018b; 2021). New technologies and fuel switching in aviation, \r [...]"


id: b9c18f45f073f8a592c4e95463d9a6c4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"[...] heavy industry and shipping could further displace liquid fossil fuel \r demand (IEA 2017). A  rapid diffusion of solar photovoltaic could \r displace electricity generation based predominantly on coal and \r gas (Sussams and Leaton 2017). A  rapid diffusion of household \r and  commercial indoor heating and cooling based on electricity \r could further reduce the demand for oil, coal and gas (Knobloch et al. \r 2019). Parallels can be made with earlier literature on great waves of \r innovation, eras of clustered technological innovation and diffusion \r between which periods of economic, financial and social instability \r have emerged (Freeman and Louca 2001; Perez 2009)."


id: 3f9d5fdf0c19613567f1a51efd90fd27
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8387
content:
"Due to the predominantly international nature of fossil fuel markets, \r assets may be at risk from regulatory and technological changes both \r domestically and in foreign countries (medium confidence). Fossil fuel \r exporting nations with lower competitiveness could lose substantial \r amounts of industrial activity and employment in scenarios of peaking \r or declining demand for fossil fuels. In scenarios of peaking oil demand, \r production is likely to concentrate towards the Middle East and OPEC \r countries (IEA 2017). Since state-owned fossil fuel companies tend to \r enjoy lower production costs, privately-owned fossil fuel companies \r are more at risk (Thoma 2018). Losses of employment may be directly \r linked to losses of fossil fuel-related industrial activity or indirectly \r linked through losses of large institutions, notably of government \r income from extraction royalties and export duties. A  multiplier \r [...]"


id: f21ef1cce68cd7224f5e196859f6eb0e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39989
content:
"[...] effect may take place making losses of employment spill out of fossil \r fuel extraction, transformation and transportation sectors into other \r supplying sectors (Mercure et al. 2018a)."


id: e0db7aa792e6ec8c11334d05ca71d9a7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36826
content:
"Illustrative Mitigation Pathways include two groups of scenarios \r consistent with modelled global pathways that limit warming to 2degC \r (>67%) or lower, respectively. The two groups are representative \r for the IMPs defined in Chapter  3. In these scenarios, warming is \r stabilised before 2100. The warming levels along these paths imply \r 'Moderate' physical risk until 2050 and 'High' risk in 2050-2100 \r (with low levels of adaptation). Transition risk can arise along these \r trajectories from changes in expectations of economic actors about \r which of the scenarios is about to materialise. These changes imply, in \r turn, possible large variations in the financial valuation of securities \r and contracts, with losses on the portfolio of institutional investors \r and households. High policy credibility is key to avoiding transition \r risk, by making expectations consistent early on with the scenario. \r Low credibility can delay the adjustment of expectations by several \r [...]"


id: 195c58be48a62f66310b7844cd6e0ff
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1679
content:
"[...] years, leading either to a  late and sudden adjustment. However, \r if the policy never becomes credible, this changes the scenario since \r the initial target is not met."


id: c839663a3ba06d9e715f65ddc1ee8579
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32536
content:
"The Paris Agreement recognised for the first time the key role of \r aligning financial flows to climate goals. It further emphasises \r the importance of making financial flows consistent with climate \r actions and SDGs (Zamarioli et  al. 2021).This alignment has now \r to be operated in a  specific environment where the scaling-up of \r climate policies is conditional upon their contribution to post\u0002COVID-19 recovery packages (Sections  15.2.2 and 15.2.3 and \r Box  15.6). The enabling environments that are to be established \r account for the structural parameters of the underinvestment in \r long-term assets. The persistent gap between the 'propensity to save' \r and 'propensity to invest' (Summers 2016) obstructs the scaling \r up of climate investments, and it results from a short-term bias of \r economic and financial decision-making (Miles 1993; Bushee 2001; \r Black and Fraser 2002) that returns weighted on short-term risk \r [...]"


id: fec01635ab1c4294b5cd9a40a45ec6d6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42209
content:
"[...] dominate the investment horizon of financial actors. Overcoming this \r bias is the objective of an enabling environment apt to launch of \r a self-reinforcing circle of trust between project initiators, industry, \r institutional investors, the banking system, and governments."


id: 285a205260b18b9d54a8025b91423628
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4298
content:
"Green quantitative easing (QE) is now being examined as a tool for \r enabling climate investments (Dafermos et al. 2018) in which central \r banks could explicitly conduct a  programme of purchases of low\u0002carbon assets (Aglietta et al. 2015). A green QE programme 'would \r have the benefit of providing large amounts of additional liquidity \r to companies interested' in green projects (medium confidence) \r (Campiglio et  al. 2018). Green QE would have positive effects \r for stimulating a  low-carbon transition, such as accelerating the \r development of green bond markets (Hilmi et al. 2021), encouraging \r investments and banking reserves, and reducing risks of stranded \r assets, while it might increase income inequality and financial \r instability (Monasterolo and Raberto 2017). While the short-term \r effectiveness would not be substantial, the central bank's purchase \r of green bonds could have a positive effect on green investment in \r [...]"


id: 1c2c7c467dbc50f0abc7cb7fc360d448
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2144
content:
"[...] the long run (Dafermos et al. 2018). However, the use of green QE \r needs to be cautious on potential issues, such as undermining the \r central bank's independence, affecting the central bank's portfolio \r by including green assets with poor financial risk standards, and \r potential regulatory capture and rent-seeking behaviours (Krogstrup \r and Oman 2019)."


id: 548a1ed221dd3a85f97a27b088378c24
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12151
content:
"The role of government is crucial for creating an enabling \r environment for climate (Clark 2018), and governments are critical \r in the launching and maintenance of this circle of trust by lowering \r the political, regulatory, macroeconomic and business risks (high \r confidence). The issue is not just to progressively enlarge the space \r of low-carbon investments but to replace one system (fossil fuels \r energy system) rapidly with another (low-carbon energy system). \r This is a wave of 'creative destruction' with the public support for \r developing new markets and new entrepreneurship and finance for \r green products and technologies in a context which requires strong \r complementarities between Schumpeterian (technological) and \r Keynesian (demand-related) policies (Dosi et al. 2017). However, it \r is challenging to overcome the constraint of public budget under the \r pressure of competing demands and of creditworthy constraints for \r [...]"


id: 3d6c675fc68cdab6269376f1723868f8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7979
content:
"[...] countries that do not have an easy access to reserve currencies. It is \r needed to maximise, both at the national and international levels, the \r leverage ratio of public funds engaged in blended finance for climate \r change which is currently very low, especially in developing countries \r (Attridge and Engen 2019)."


id: c34cd4531273c3a2aa935e909037c5a9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31629
content:
"scientific evidence of climate impacts is being accompanied by \r rising levels of climate finance. Banks and institutional investors \r are also progressively rebalancing their investment portfolios away \r from fossil fuels and towards low-carbon investments (IEA 2019b; \r Monasterolo and de Angelis 2020). In the meantime, the world runs \r the risk of sharp adjustments, crises and irreversible 'tipping points' \r (Lontzek et al. 2015) sufficiently destabilising climate outcomes. This \r leads to the policy prescription towards financial regulatory agencies \r requiring greater and swifter disclosure of information about rising \r climate risks faced by financial institutions in projects and portfolios \r and central bank attention to systemic climate risk problems as \r one possible route of policy action (Carney 2015; Dietz et al. 2016; \r Zenghelis and Stern 2016; Campiglio et al. 2018). However, disclosure \r requirements of risks and information in private settings remain \r [...]"


id: cc9163391197a8090fd5058da88bbedb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33313
content:
"[...] mostly voluntary and difficult to implement (Battiston et  al. 2017; \r Monasterolo et al. 2017)."


id: b7318d07c0d852b4e16735dd1f55e7e6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29442
content:
"Nevertheless, financial markets are innovating in search of solutions \r (Section  15.6.6). Recognising and dealing with stranded fossil \r fuel assets is also a  key area of growing concern that financial \r institutions are beginning to grapple with. Larger institutions with \r more patient capital (pensions, insurance) are also increasingly \r beginning to enter the financing of projects and green bond markets. \r The case for efficient financial markets in developing countries is \r worse (Abbasi and Riaz 2016; Hong et al. 2019) because of weaker \r financial institutions (Hamid et al. 2017), heightened credit rationing \r behaviour (Bond et al. 2015), and high risk aversion as most markets \r are rated as junk, or below/barely investment grade (Hanusch \r et  al. 2016). Other constraints such as limited long-term financial \r instruments and underdeveloped domestic capital markets, absence \r of significant domestic bond markets for investments other than \r [...]"


id: 8392565b9517fdb2159b35b04e0e9e8c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20289
content:
"[...] sovereign borrowing, and inadequate term and tenor of financing, \r make the efficient markets thesis practically inapplicable for most \r developing countries."


id: 954453444e76ff85ca2eb31833ff5f57
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23461
content:
"Markets, finance and creative destruction. Branches of macro\u0002innovation theory could be grouped into two principal classes \r (Mercure et  al. 2016): 'equilibrium  - optimisation' theories that \r treat innovators as rational perfectly informed agents and reaching \r equilibrium under market price signals; and 'non-equilibrium' theory \r where market choices are shaped by history and institutional forces \r and the role of public policy is to intervene in processes, given \r a historical context, to promote a better outcome or new economic \r trajectory. The latter suggests that new technologies might not \r find their way to the market without price or regulatory policies to \r reduce uncertainty on expected economic returns. A key issue is the \r perception of risk by investors and financial institutions. The financial \r system is part of complex policy packages involving multiple \r instruments (cutting subsidies to fossil fuels, supporting clean \r [...]"


id: 923df1ca957621cee97cc8e36c5e785
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22952
content:
"[...] energy innovation and diffusion, levelling the institutional playing \r field and making risks transparent) (Polzin 2017) and the needed big \r systemic push (Kern and Rogge 2016) requires it takes on the role of \r 'institutional innovation intermediaries' (Polzin et al. 2016)."


id: cd48edb57f189fe6ab1ced9051773c5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33455
content:
"to efficiently allocate the public financing, and State Investment \r Banks (SIBs) can take up key roles (i) to provide capital to assist with \r overcoming financial barriers, (ii) to signal and direct investments \r towards green projects, and (iii) to attract private investors by taking \r up a de-risking role. Also, they can become a first mover by investing \r in new and innovative technologies or business models (Geddes \r et al. 2018). State-owned enterprises (SOEs) can also have an overall \r positive effect on renewables investments, outweighing any effect of \r crowding out private competitors (Prag et al. 2018). Green investment \r banks can assist in the green transition by developing valuable \r expertise in implementing effective public interventions to overcome \r investment barriers and mobilise private investment in infrastructure \r (OECD 2015c). De-risking measures may reduce investment risks, \r but lacking research and data availability hinders designing such \r [...]"


id: 1ef564579625ff5401c99b8edc08f0a5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2649
content:
"[...] measures (Dietz et al. 2016). Local governments' efforts to de-risk by \r securitisation might have negative effects by narrowing the scope for \r a green developmental state and encouraging privatisation of public \r services (Gabor 2019)."


id: 13f519aba0158ee580371e6c0fb3f8b1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 727
content:
"policy characteristics. Carbon tax can be a simpler and easier way to \r implement carbon pricing, especially in developing countries, because \r countries can utilise the existing fiscal tools and do not need concrete \r enabling conditions as market-based frameworks (high confidence). \r The reallocation of revenues from carbon taxes can be used for \r low-carbon investments, supporting poorer sections of society and \r fostering technological change (High-Level Commission on Carbon \r Prices 2017). In combination with other policies, such as subsidies \r and public R&D on resource-saving technologies, properly designed \r carbon taxes can facilitate the shift towards low-carbon, resource\u0002efficient investments (Bovari et  al. 2018; Naqvi and Stockhammer \r 2018; Dunz et al. 2021) (Section 9.9.3). The effectiveness of carbon \r pricing has been supported by various evidence. EU ETS has \r cut emissions by 42.8% in the main sectors covered (European \r [...]"


id: d7a8eeaa414ccd421e77498762ea957f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35253
content:
"[...] Commission 2021a), and China had achieved emissions reductions \r and energy conservation through its pilot ETS between 2013 and \r 2015 (Zhang et  al. 2019; Hu et  al. 2020). Institutional learning, \r administrative prudence, appropriate carbon revenue management \r and stakeholder engagement are key ingredients for successful ETS \r regimes (Narassimhan et al. 2018)."


id: b95320b8653a7f66acc920273acadbd1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29817
content:
"The potential role of coordinated multilateral initiatives.\r There is a growing awareness of the low leverage ratio of public to \r private capital in climate blended finance (Blended Finance Taskforce \r 2018b) and of a 'glass ceiling', caused by a mix of agencies' inertia \r and perceived loss of control over the use of funds, on the use of \r public guarantees by MDBs to increase it (high confidence) (Gropp \r et al. 2014; Schiff and Dithrich 2017; Lee et al. 2018). Many proposals \r have emerged for multilateral guarantee funds: Green Infrastructure \r Funds (de Gouvello and Zelenko 2010; Studart and Gallagher 2015), \r Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (Enhanced Green MIGA) \r (Deau and Touati 2018), guarantee funds to bridge the infrastructure \r investment gap (Arezki et al. 2016), and multi-sovereign guarantee \r mechanisms (Dasgupta et  al. 2019). The obstacle of limited fiscal \r space for economic recovery and climate actions in low-income and \r [...]"


id: 81e47993fc8aa863b95c336c7891dc8e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19977
content:
"[...] some emerging economies can be overcome only in a multilateral \r setting. Several multilateral actions are being envisaged: G20's \r suspension of official bilateral debt payments, IMF's adoption of new \r SDRs allocation (IMF 2021b). However, any form of unconventional \r debt relief will generate development and climate benefits only if \r they credibly target bridging the countries' infrastructure gap with \r low-carbon climate-resilient options."


id: 5cced9dde30bbae0ee06b06cafa82151
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13593
content:
"The presence of carbon prices can promote low-carbon technologies \r and investments (Best and Burke 2018), and price signals, including \r carbon taxation, provide powerful and efficient incentives for \r households and firms to reduce CO2 emissions (IMF 2019). The \r expansion of carbon prices is dependent on country-specific fiscal \r and social policies to hedge against regressive impacts on welfare, \r competitiveness, and employment (Michaelowa et  al. 2018). Such \r impacts need to be offset using the proceeds of carbon taxes \r or auctioned emission allowances to reduce distortive taxation \r (Bovenberg and de Mooij 1994; Goulder 1995; de Mooij 2000; \r Chiroleu-Assouline and Fodha 2014) and fund compensating \r measures for the population sections that are most adversely \r impacted (Combet et al. 2010; Jaccard 2012; Klenert et al. 2018). This \r is more difficult for developing countries with a large share of energy\u0002intensive activities, fossil fuel exporting countries and countries \r [...]"


id: f9a0c7a0b824138576322e1d75618a80
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41284
content:
"[...] which have lower potential to mitigate impacts due to lower wages \r or existing taxes (Lefevre et al. 2018)."


id: 733c6394bd9bbab60119031835985d02
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17526
content:
"Of interest in multilateral settings is a  credibility-enhancing effect \r provided by reciprocal gains for both the donor and the host \r country. Guarantor countries can compensate the public cost of their \r commitments with the fiscal revenues of induced exports. As to the \r host countries, they would benefit from new capital inflows and the \r grant equivalents of reduced debt service which might potentially \r go far beyond USD100 billion yr-1 (Hourcade et al. 2021a). A second \r interest would be to support a learning process about agreed-upon \r assessment and monitoring methods using clear metrics. Developing \r standardised and science-based assessment methods at low \r transaction costs is essential to strengthen the credibility of green \r investments and the emergence of a pipeline of high-quality bankable \r projects which can be capitalised in the form of credible assets and \r [...]"


id: 74f7c54fc93ee27abe71631a0451ac07
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17814
content:
"[...] supported with transparent and credible domestic spending. Multi\u0002sovereign guarantees would provide a quality backing to developing "


id: 1112d327f63aaaa993815249a2bffd3d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 197
content:
"A widely used indicator for the relative attractiveness of renewable energy but also development of price levels is the levelised cost of \r energy (LCOE). It is applied by a wide range of public and private stakeholders when tracking progress with regard to cost degression \r (Aldersey-Williams and Rubert 2019). LCOE calculation methodologies vary but in principle consider project-level costs only (NEA \r 1989). Besides other weaknesses, the LCOE concept usually does not consider societal costs resulting from de-risking instruments \r and/or other public interventions/support and therefore caution has to be applied when using the LCOE as the sole indicator of the \r success of enabling environments. The yearly IRENA mapping on renewable energy auction results demonstrates the extremely broad \r ranges of LCOEs (equal to the agreed tariffs) for renewable energy which can be observed (IRENA 2019a). For example, in 2018, \r [...]"


id: b28cecc3e22ee02391c040ba0563c29a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28652
content:
"[...] solar PV LCOEs for utility-scale projects came in between USD0.04 kWh-1 and USD0.35 kWh-1 with a global weighted average of \r USD0.085 kWh-1. However, comparative analysis taking into account societal costs is hardly available driven by challenges in the \r context of the quantification of public support."


id: d5499fb929c3ee802ce535723d6c193
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34847
content:
"by development finance institutions and/or international financial \r institutions (DFIs/IFIs). With an increasing number of sectors \r becoming viable and increasing complaints of private sector players \r with regard to crowding out (Bahal et al. 2018), a stronger separation \r and crowding in of commercial financing at the project/asset level \r is targeted. MDBs and IFIs were crucial for opening and growth in \r the early years of the green bonds, which represent a  substantial \r share of issuances (CBI 2019a). Drivers of an efficient private sector \r involvement are stronger incentives to have projects delivered on \r time and in budget as well as market competition (Hodge et  al. \r 2018). It remains key that the private sector mobilisation goes hand \r in hand with institutional capacity building as well as strong sectoral \r development in the host country, as a strong, knowledgeable public \r partner with the ability to manage the private sector is a dominating \r [...]"


id: 80b68a05d99caca2d72f4acda929da38
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19778
content:
"[...] success factor for public-private cooperation (WEF 2013; Yescombe \r 2017; Hodge et al. 2018)."


id: 91863fd2c32c98eeee3428c2a19c0266
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22823
content:
"and green stimulus is argued to be the ideal response to tackle \r both the economic and the climate crises at once, disparities \r between regional strategies hinder the low-carbon transition (high \r confidence). Indeed, inconsistent policies within countries can also \r counterbalance emission reductions from green stimulus, as well as \r a lack of transparency and green spending pledged not materialising \r (Jaeger et al. 2020). Also, aggressive monetary policy as a response \r to the global financial crisis, including quantitative easing that did \r not target low-carbon sectors, has been heavily criticised (Jaeger \r et al. 2020). The COVID-19 crisis recovery, in contrast, benefits from \r developments which have taken place since, such as an emerging \r climate-risk awareness from the financial sector, reflected in the \r call from the Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action \r (Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action 2020), which unites \r [...]"


id: 471df461fde5fc5b75c4eb62a69a2fa3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9713
content:
"Public guarantees have been increasingly proposed to expand \r climate finance, especially from the private sector, with scarce public \r finance, by reducing the risk premium of the low-carbon investment \r opportunities (de Gouvello and Zelenko 2010; Emin et  al. 2014; \r Studart and Gallagher 2015; Schiff and Dithrich 2017; Lee et  al. \r 2018; Steckel and Jakob 2018). They have the advantage of a broad \r coverage including the 'macro' country risks and to tackle the up\u0002front risks during the preparation, bidding and development phases \r of the project lifecycle that deter project initiators, especially for \r capital-intensive and immature options. Insurances are also powerful \r de-risking instruments (Deau and Touati 2018) but they entitle the \r issuer to review claims concerning events and cannot cope with \r up-front costs. Contractual arrangements like power purchase \r agreements are powerful instruments to reduce market risks through \r [...]"


id: 1e5aba8c7f3ffe0343851e50e68b633f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2536
content:
"[...] a guaranteed price but they weigh on public budgets. Risk-sharing \r that brings together public agencies, firms, local authorities, private \r corporates, professional cooperatives, and institutional financiers can \r reduce costs (UNEP 2011), and support the deployment of innovative \r business models (Deau and Touati 2018). Combined with emission \r taxes they can contribute to reducing credit rationing of immature \r and risky low-carbon technologies (Haas and Kempa 2020)."


id: 8e9382f0d3ef3d45fa79882c7fca3efd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22265
content:
"Nevertheless, three uncertainties remain. First, only those countries \r and regions with highest credit-ratings (AAA or AA) with access to \r deep financial markets and excess savings will be able to mount \r such counter-cyclical climate investment paths, typically high-income \r developed economies (high confidence). In more debt constrained \r developing countries lower access to global savings pools  because \r of higher risk perceptions and lower credit ratings (BBB or less), \r exacerbated by COVID-19, are already leading to credit downgrades \r and defaults (Kose et al. 2020) and have long tended to be fiscally pro\u0002cyclical (McManus and Ozkan 2015). These include the general class \r of virtually all major emerging and especially low-income developing \r countries, to which such demand-stimulating counter-cyclical climate\u0002consistent borrowing path is likely. To access such funds, these \r countries would need globally coordinated fiscal policy and explicit \r [...]"


id: 47c70b6a674b6adf2a7e01d64a4bd004
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9842
content:
"[...] supporting cross-border instruments, such as sovereign guarantees, \r strengthening local capital markets and boosting the USD100 billion \r annual climate finance commitment (Dasgupta et al. 2019)."


id: 42866d99833aa4d9fcdc9432d5302fa4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8898
content:
"Higher public spending levels driven by the impacts of \r COVID-19 and related recovery packages. Higher levels of public \r funding represent a  massive chance but also a  substantial risk. \r A missing alignment of public funding and investment activity with \r the Paris Agreement (and Sustainable Development Goals) would \r result in significant carbon lock-ins, stranded assets and thus increase \r transition risks and ultimately economic costs of the transition (high \r confidence). Using IMF data for stimulus packages, Andrijevic et al. \r (2020) estimated that COVID-19-related fiscal expenditure had \r surpassed USD12 trillion by October 2020 (80% in OECD countries), \r a  third of which being spent in liquidity support and health care. \r Total stimulus pledged to date is ten times higher than low-Paris\u0002consistent carbon investment needs from 2020-2024 (Andrijevic \r et  al. 2020; Vivid Economics 2020). Overall, stimulus packages \r [...]"


id: 528bf159fee7037972633286d5919390
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11804
content:
"[...] launched include USD3.5 trillion to sectors directly affecting future \r emissions, with overall fossil fuel investment flows outweighing low\u0002carbon technology investment (Vivid Economics 2020)."


id: 550afd56e20309627deb5089497b1910
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12235
content:
"Financial history suggests that capital markets may be willing to accommodate extended public borrowing for transient spending \r spikes (Barro 1987) when macroeconomic conditions suggest excess savings relative to private investment opportunities (Summers \r 2015) and when public spending is seen as timely, effective and productive, with governments able to repay when conditions improve \r as economic crisis conditions abate (high confidence). A surge in global climate mitigation spending in the post-pandemic recovery \r may be an important opportunity, which global capital markets are signalling (Global Investor Statement 2019). The standard 'neo\u0002classical' macroeconomic model is often used in integrated energy-economy-climate assessments (Balint et al. 2016; Nordhaus 2018). \r This class of Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models, however, has a limited treatment of the financial sector and assumes \r [...]"


id: 10c125a1e410ec5c7e9b222ada02b1fb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 127
content:
"[...] that all resources and factors of production are fully employed, there is no idle capacity and no inter-temporal financial intermediation \r (Pollitt and Mercure 2018b). Investment cannot assume larger values than the sum of previously determined savings, as a fixed \r proportion of income. Such constraint, as stressed by Mercure et al. (2019), implies that investment in low-carbon infrastructure, under \r the equilibrium assumptions, necessarily creates a (neo-Ricardian) crowding-out effect that contracts the remaining sectors. Box 15.6, \r Figure 1 shows the implications (in the red-shaded part of Figure 1)."


id: 9d5f66bce2deefce941c9b26e46c8e61
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24920
content:
"Even if demand-led models work better in depressions, the question nevertheless is whether the additional public borrowing for such \r 'green stimulus' can be undertaken by market borrowings given already high public debt levels and recovered in the future from taxes \r as the economy revives. The results of recent macroeconomic modelling work (Liu et al. 2021) represented by 10 major countries/\r regions suggests answers. It uses a non-standard macroeconomic framework, with Keynesian features such as financial and labour \r market rigidities and fiscal and monetary rules (McKibbin and Wilcoxen 2013). First, a global 'green stimulus' of about an average of \r 0.8% of GDP annually in additional fiscal spending between 2020-30 would be required to accelerate the emissions reduction path \r required for a 1.5degC transition. Second, such a stimulus would also accelerate the global recovery by boosting GDP growth rates by \r [...]"


id: 12891405eabb7d654711cbb36c54e481
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 460
content:
"[...] about 0.6% annually during the critical post-COVID period. Third, the optimal tax policy would be to backload the carbon taxes to \r later in the macroeconomic cycle, both because this would avoid dampening near-term growth while pre-announced carbon tax plans \r would incentivise long-term private energy transition investment decisions today and provide neutral borrowing. This macroeconomic \r modelling path thus replicates the 'green stimulus' impacts expected in theory (Box 15.6, Figure 1). There are also some other additional \r features of the modelled proposal: (i) fiscal stimulus - needed in the aftermath of the pandemic - can be an opportunity to boost green \r and resilient public infrastructure; (ii) green research and development 'subsidies' are feasible to boost technological innovations; and \r (iii) income transfers to lower income groups are necessary to offset negative impacts of rising carbon taxes."


id: e50c1711bfa9c60fd7c592cd0868926e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37593
content:
"Substantial effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, which is relatively unique in its public health impacts when combined with the \r consequences of deep economy-wide shocks (economic downturn, public finances, and debt), are expected to last for decades \r even in the absence of no significant future recurrence. A scenario where the pandemic recurs mildly every year for the foreseeable \r future further hinders GDP and investment recovery, where growth is unlikely to rebound to previous trajectories, even within OECD \r economies (McKibbin and Vines 2020) and with worse effects in developing regions. History is strongly supportive: studies on the \r longevity of pandemics' impacts indicate significant macroeconomic effects persisting for decades, with depressed real rates of return, \r increased precautionary savings (Jorda et al. 2020), unemployment (Rodriguez-Caballero and Vera-Valdes 2020) and social unrest \r [...]"


id: 378818a5b041706a5f6a827356dff588
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6983
content:
"[...] (Barrett and Chen 2021). The direct effect on emissions is likely to be a small reduction from previous trajectories, but the longer\u0002lasting impacts are more on the macroeconomic-finance side. Pandemic responses have increased sovereign debt across countries \r in all income bands (IMF 2021e). However, its sharp increase in most developing economies and regions has caused debt distress \r (Bulow et al. 2021), widening the gap in developing countries' access to capital (Hourcade et al. 2021b). While strong coordinated \r international recovery strategies with climate-compatible economic stimulus is justified (Barbier 2020; Barbier and Burgess 2020; \r IMF 2020c; Le Quere et al. 2021; Pollitt et al. 2021), national recovery packages announced do not show substantial alignment with \r climate goals (D'Orazio 2021; Hourcade et al. 2021b; Rochedo et al. 2021; Shan et al. 2021). Contradictory post-COVID-19 investments \r [...]"


id: 9c5802f5e1d9c8f27d3afc3496ac6372
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24761
content:
"[...] in fossil fuel-based infrastructure may create new carbon lock-ins, which would either hinder climate targets or create stranded assets \r (Hepburn et al. 2020a; Le Quere et al. 2021; Shan et al. 2021), whilst deepening global inequalities (Hourcade et al. 2021b)."


id: 8e78128445c1d4c765e2148e22679951
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22254
content:
"Considerations on global debt levels and debt sustainability \r as well as implications for climate finance. The Paris Agreement \r marked the consensus of the international community that \r a temperature increase of well below 2degC needs to be achieved and \r the SR1.5 has demonstrated the economic viability of 1.5degC. However, \r in terms of increase of supply of, in particular, public finance, often the \r debate is still driven by the question on affordability, considerations \r around financial debt sustainability and budgetary constraints \r against the background of macroeconomic headwinds - even more \r in the (post-)COVID-19 world (high confidence). The level of climate \r alignment of debt is hardly considered in debt-related regulation and/\r or debt sustainability agreements like the Maastricht Treaty ceilings \r (3% of GDP government deficit and 60% of GDP (gross) government \r debt) not considering economic costs of deferred climate action as \r [...]"


id: 63ef9a271d15bb181a3b7eecc26f50ee
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14868
content:
"by shocks is more difficult to analyse and requires country-specific \r deep-dives. IPCC scenario data is often not sufficient to perform such \r analysis with additional assumptions being needed (Acevedo 2016). \r For debt sustainability analysis, these more short-term impacts are, \r however, a  crucial driver with transparency being limited to the \r significance of climate-related revision of estimates. The latter might \r result in a continued overestimation of future GDP as happened in \r the past, increasing the vulnerability of highly indebted countries \r (Guzman 2016; Mallucci 2020). While climate change considerations \r have already impacted country ratings and debt sustainability \r assessments (and financing costs), it is unclear whether current \r GDP forecasts are realistic. The review of the IMF debt sustainability \r framework leads to a  stronger focus on vulnerability rather than \r only income thresholds when deciding upon eligibility for debt relief \r [...]"


id: fff10b7f52692f87749ebf9f238b42e8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42422
content:
"[...] and/or concessional resources (Mitchell 2015), which could become \r a mitigation factor for the challenge described before."


id: 3b5a6f8c2dd42cdbf8f6e03459610f61
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7630
content:
"Stranded assets. The debate around stranded assets focuses strongly \r on the loss of value to financial assets for investors (Section 15.6.1), \r however, stranded assets and resources in the context of the \r transition towards a low-emission economy 'are expected to become \r a major economic burden for states and hence the tax payers' (high \r confidence) (EEAC 2016). Assets include not only financial assets \r but also infrastructure, equipment, contracts, know-how, jobs as \r well as stranded resources (Bos and Gupta 2019). Besides financial \r investors and fiscal budgets, consumers remain vulnerable to stranded \r investments. Against the background of the frequent simultaneousness \r of losses occurring for financial investors on the one hand and negative \r employment effects as well as regional development and fiscal effects \r on the other hand, negotiations about compensations and public \r support to compensate for negative effects of phasing out of polluting \r [...]"


id: 2bba0e82964380af1f9a9b473b5d95ee
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4954
content:
"[...] technologies often remain interlinked and compensation mechanisms \r and related redistribution effects untransparent."


id: 14a98a69f44f8d82d5a3a581ecfaf4dd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 860
content:
"Considering the need for responses to both short-term liquidity \r issues and long-term fiscal space, current G20/IMF/World Bank debt \r service suspension initiatives are focused on the liquidity issue rather \r than underlying problems of more structural nature of many low\u0002income countries (Fresnillo 2020a). In order to ensure fiscal space \r for climate action in the coming decade, a mix between debt relief, \r deferrals of liabilities, extended debt levels and sustainable lending \r practices including new solidarity structures need to be considered \r in addition to higher levels of bilateral and multilateral lending to \r reduce dependency on capital markets and to bridge the availability \r of sustainably structured loans for highly vulnerable and indebted \r countries. More standardised debt-for-climate swaps, a higher share \r of GDP-linked bonds or structures ensuring (partial) debt cancellation \r in case countries are hit by physical climate change impacts/shocks \r [...]"


id: 1536b49ca6781fb177578d240ae2848c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 949
content:
"[...] appear possible. The 'hurricane' clause introduced by Grenada, or \r wider natural disaster clauses provide issuers with an option to \r defer payments of interest and principal in the event of a qualifying \r natural disaster and can reduce short-term debt stress (UN Addis \r Ababa Action Agenda Art. 102) (UN 2015a). A mainstreaming of such \r clauses has been pushed by various international institutions. The \r collective action clause might be a good example of a loan/debt term \r which became market standard. Definition of triggers is likely the \r most complex challenge in this context."


id: 97da8da286996707c0c36ce4042c5a83
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23930
content:
"While there are questions about the sufficiency of insurance \r products to address the losses and damages of climate\u0002related disasters, insurance can help to cover immediate \r needs directly, provide rapid response and transfer financial \r risk in times of extreme crisis (high confidence) (GIZ 2015; \r Lucas 2015; Schoenmaker and Zachmann 2015; Hermann et al. \r 2016; Wolfrom and Yokoi-Arai 2016; Kreft and Schafer 2017; \r UNESCAP 2017; Matias et  al. 2018; UNECA 2018; Broberg \r and Hovani-Bue 2019; EEA 2019; Martinez-Diaz et  al. 2019). \r Commercial insurability is heavily driven by the predictability \r of losses and the resulting ability to calculate insurance \r premium levels properly. Climate change has become a major \r factor of increasing uncertainty. The previously strong reliance \r on historic data in calculation of premium levels may be but \r a starting point given the likely need for upward adjustment \r due to climate change and potential consequential economic \r [...]"


id: 87b4682165c92cf08488bbd7ef64231
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21034
content:
"[...] damage. Different risk perceptions between policyholders and \r insurers will create contrary assessments on premium levels \r and consequently underinsurance. McKinsey (2020b) also \r stresses the systemic effect of climate change on insurers' \r business models and resulting availability of appropriate \r insurance products."


id: dc91013999e9f63ff2081cf1ee174aae
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36068
content:
"Since 2000, the world has been experiencing significant increase in \r economic losses and damages from natural disasters and weather \r perils such as tropical cyclones, earthquakes, flooding and drought. \r Total global estimate of damage is about USD4210 billion, 2000-2018 \r (Aon Benfield UCL Hazard Research Centre 2019). The largest portion \r of this is attributed to tropical cyclones (USD1253 billion), followed \r by flooding (USD914 billion), earthquakes (USD757 billion) and \r drought (approximately USD372 billion, or about USD20 billion yr-1\r losses) (Aon Benfield UCL Hazard Research Centre 2019). In the \r period 2017-2018, natural catastrophe losses totalled approximately \r USD219 billion (Bevere 2019). According to the National Oceanic and \r Atmospheric Administration, 14 weather and climate disasters cost \r USD91 billion in 2018 (NOAA NCEI 2019). The European Environment \r Agency reports that 'disasters caused by weather and climate-related \r [...]"


id: 4ac67da5cb5251339315e9c5bd32b0ef
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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vector_id: 10399
content:
"[...] extremes accounted for some 83% of the monetary losses over the \r period 1980-2017' for EU Member States (EU-28) and that 'weather \r and climate-related losses amounted to EUR426 billion (at 2017 \r values)'. For the EEA member countries (EEA-33), the 'total reported \r economic losses caused by weather and climate-related extremes' \r over the same period amounted to approximately EUR453 billion \r (EEA 2019). Asia Pacific and Oceania has been particularly impacted \r by typhoon and flooding (China, India, the Philippines) resulting in \r economic losses of USD58 billion, 2000-2017, and a  combination \r of flooding, typhoon and drought totalling USD89 billion in 2018 \r (inclusive of loss by private insurers and government sponsored \r programmes (Aon Benfield UCL Hazard Research Centre 2019). Based \r on past historical analysis, a region such as the Caribbean, which has \r experienced climate-related losses equal to 1% of GDP each year \r [...]"


id: b75bfd6a4b4f8f5fee753ddc1da57d8b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29472
content:
"[...] since 1960, is expected to have significant increases in such losses \r in the future leading to possibly upwards of 8% of projected GDP \r in 2080 (Commonwealth Secretariat 2016). Similarly, Latin American \r countries, such as Argentina, El Salvador and Guatemala, experienced \r severe losses in agriculture totalling about USD6 billion due to \r drought in 2018 (Aon Benfield UCL Hazard Research Centre 2019). \r In the African region, where climate is projected to get significantly \r warmer, continuing severe drought in parts of East Africa, Tropical "


id: 93e6e9abc669be8006c9935d691962fa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23225
content:
"The conventional approach to such protective or hedging position \r has been indemnity and other classical insurance micro-, meso- and \r macro-level schemes (Hermann et  al. 2016). These include micro \r insurance schemes such as index insurance and weather derivative \r approaches that cover individuals' specific needs such as coverage \r for farm crops. Meso-level insurance schemes, which primarily benefit \r intermediary institutions, such as NGOs, credit unions, financial \r institutions and farmer credit entities, seek to reduce losses caused \r by credit default thereby 'enhancing investment potential', whereas \r macro-level insurance schemes 'allow both insured and uninsured \r individuals to be compensated for damages caused by extreme \r weather events' (Hermann et al. 2016). These macro-level insurance \r schemes include catastrophe bonds and weather derivatives and \r so on, that transfer risk to capital markets (Hermann et  al. 2016). \r [...]"


id: 53f5d7f5e1e8b06d24895c81c32654cc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12042
content:
"[...] Over the last decades, there has been a  trend towards weather\u0002index insurance and other parametric insurance products based on \r predefined pay-out risk pooling instruments. It has gained favour \r with governments in developing regions such as Africa, the Caribbean \r and the Pacific because it provides certainty and predictability about \r funding - financial preparedness - for emergency actions and initial \r reconstruction and reduces moral hazard. This 'financial resilience' is \r also increasingly appealing to the business sector, particularly micro, \r small and medium enterprises (MSMEs), in developing countries \r (MEFIN Network and GI RFPI Asia 2016; Woods 2016; Schaer \r and Kuruppu 2018)."


id: 392a11eced33ac18c23e7aac3cfdfff8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7267
content:
"the Pacific Islands (PCRAFI), the African Risk Capacity (ARC Agency \r and its financial affiliate), and the African Risk Capacity Limited (ARC \r Ltd/ the ARC Group) (ARC 2016) and in the Asian region, the South \r East Asian Disaster Risk Insurance Facility (SEADRIF) and the ASEAN \r Disaster Risk Financing and Insurance Program (ADRFI), (SEADRIF \r 2018; GIZ and World Bank 2019; Martinez-Diaz et  al. 2019; Vyas \r et al. 2019; World Bank 2019a). The group of 20 vulnerable countries \r (V20) has also developed a Sustainable Insurance Facility (SIF), billed \r as a  technical assistance facility for climate-smart14 insurance for \r MSMEs in 48 developing countries as well as potentially to de-risk \r renewable energy in these countries and regions (ACT Alliance 2020; \r V20 2020; V20 2021).\r However, as noted above, climate risk pooling is not a  panacea. \r There are very obvious and significant challenges. According to \r Kreft and Schafer (2017), limitations of insurance schemes include \r [...]"


id: 2222a851a58e381eb8e25e7328c570a9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3228
content:
"[...] coordination challenges, limited scope, destabilisation due to exit of \r one or more members as premiums rise and inadequate attention to \r permanence (Schaeffer et al. 2014). There are also challenges with \r risk diversification, replication, and scalability (high confidence). For \r example, CCRIF is extending both its membership and diversifying \r its geographic dimensions into Central America in seeking to lower \r covariate risk (similar shocks among cohorts such as droughts or \r floods). Under the SPC portfolio, CCRIF is able to segregate risk \r across the regions. Risk insurance does not obviate from the need to \r engage in capacity building to scale-up as well as having process for \r addressing systemic risk. Currently, risk pools have limited sectoral \r reach and may cover agriculture but not other important sectors \r such as fisheries and public utilities. Only recently (July 2019) has \r CCRIF initiated coverage of fisheries with the development of its \r [...]"


id: 31daf0c1d9d1ccb981cc6168284416eb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6021
content:
"[...] Caribbean Oceans and Aquaculture Sustainability Facility (COAST) \r instrument (CCRIF SPC 2019; ACT Alliance 2020). Historically, risk \r pool mechanisms, like CCRIF and ARC, only cover a small subset of \r perils, such as tropical cyclones, earthquakes and excess rainfall but \r do not include other perils such as drought. Since 2016, ARC has \r increased its scope to cover drought and in 2019 launched ARC \r Replica, which not only covers drought but offers premiums and \r coverage to NGOs and the World Food Programme through the \r START Network and a pastoral drought product for protecting small \r farmers and ensuring food security. In some regions and countries, \r there may also be limited access to reinsurance (Schaeffer et  al. \r 2014; Lucas 2015). An important down-side of climate risk pooling is \r that it does not cover the actual cost of damage and losses. Though \r on the positive side, pay-out may exceed costs, but it may also be \r [...]"


id: a1de08ef514643b1d3189cc665821c0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25704
content:
"[...] less than costs. Hence, the parametric approach is not a  panacea \r and does not preclude having recourse to conventional indemnity \r insurance, which will cover full damage costs after a climate change \r event as it involves full on-the-ground assessment of factors such as \r the necessity and costs of repair versus, say, replacement value of \r damaged infrastructure. This may be important for governmental and \r publicly provided services such as schools, hospitals, roads, airports, \r communications equipment and water supply facilities. Given \r the growing popularity of parametric insurance and climate risk "


id: 9ba65efb98396d5b87e7c13dc494a30f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24637
content:
"As noted also in IPCC AR5, risk sharing and risk transfer strategies \r provide 'pre-disaster financing arrangements that shift economic \r risk from one party to another' (IPCC 2012). Risk pooling among \r countries and regions is relatively advantageous when compared \r to conventional insurance because of the effective subsidising of \r 'affected regions' using revenues from unaffected regions which \r involve pooling among a large subset of countries (high confidence)\r (Lucas 2015). In general, the premiums are less costly than what an \r individual country or entity can achieve and disbursement is rapid \r and there are also fewer transaction costs (Lucas 2015; World Bank \r 2015). The World Bank argues that the experience with the Pacific \r Catastrophe Risk Insurance Pilot (PCRIP) and Africa Risk Capacity \r risk pooling (ARC) show savings of 50% in obtaining insurance cover \r for pooled risk compared with purchasing comparable coverage \r [...]"


id: 80f9892a17d54f470e489316ac0e0576
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19828
content:
"[...] individually (Lucas 2015; World Bank 2015; ARC 2016). However, \r it requires, as noted by UNESCAP, 'extensive coordination across \r participating countries, and entities' (Lucas 2015)."


id: 53f26822766da70dc6a2cee5a2e1bdbd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12040
content:
"At the same time, this approach has substantial basis risk (actual \r losses do not equal financial compensation) (high confidence) \r (Hermann et al. 2016). With parametric insurance, pay-outs are pre\u0002defined and based on risk modelling rather than on-the-ground \r damage assessment so may be less than, equal to, or greater than \r the actual damage. It does not cover actual losses and damage and \r therefore, may be insufficient to meet the cost of rehabilitation \r and  reconstruction. It may also be 'non-viable' or damaging to \r livelihoods in the long run (UNFCCC 2008; Hellmuth et  al. 2009; \r Hermann et al. 2016). Additionally, if the required threshold is not met, \r there may be no pay-out, though a country may have experienced \r substantial damages from a  climatic event. This occurred for the \r Solomon Islands in 2014 which discontinued its insurance with the \r Pacific Catastrophe Risk Insurance Pilot when neither its Santa Cruz \r [...]"


id: 8f01704e02f78e91714f16c333d09aa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22358
content:
"[...] earthquake nor the 2014 flash floods were eligible to receive a pay\u0002out under the terms of the insurance (Lucas 2015)."


id: 39b6aff60bed842d6b95a8f84ee7415d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7364
content:
"ARC and its impact on reducing vulnerability to disasters. It notes \r that there is scarce literature on disaster risk insurance mechanisms \r in terms of impacts. In its current sample of 20 countries as of \r November 2017, four are projected to experience food security crisis \r (IPC Level 3) but are not signatories to the ARC, which may signal \r that ARC is not attractive to all food insecure countries and that \r there is no overwhelming appetite for ARC among poorer countries. \r Additionally, Panda and Surminski (2020) research the importance \r of indicators and frameworks for monitoring the performance and \r impact of Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI) but \r make no final assessment of any of the regional climate risk pool. \r However, they propose mechanisms to improve the transparency and \r accountability of the system. Scherer (2017), Forest (2018) and Panda \r and Surminski (2020) seem to indicate that there is 'enthusiasm to \r [...]"


id: 17b514e7c2a3095ce1c2830d3409ce58
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1379
content:
"[...] support and scale-up regional climate risk insurance' (Scherer 2017, \r p. 4) Examples of this support include: the Germany Ministry for \r Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) has provided USD5.9 \r million for the World Food Programme (WFP) to protect 1.2 million \r vulnerable African farmers with climate risk insurance, through ARC \r Replica, and the G7 InsuResilience Vision 2025, which has committed \r to ensuring 400-500 million poor persons are covered against disaster \r shock by pre-arranged finance and insurance mechanism by 2025; \r some of this will be through ARC (WFP 2020). Of course, this does \r not mean that risk pools are without challenges or are not failing on \r specific sets of metrics. Forest (2018) flags three failing areas: policy \r holder and hazard coverage, the cost of premium and risk transfer \r parameters, and the use of pay-out, which in most cases are up to \r the government. Here, ARC is flagged among the three regional risk \r [...]"


id: c69c7a2d6c11ed2ee096400fc43297a8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32245
content:
"[...] pools, as the only one with contingency plan requirements that can \r support effective use of pay-outs. Other research exploring climate \r risk pooling and its impacts flag lack of transparency around pay-out, \r premium or risk transfer parameters. Ultimately, climate risk pools \r are not full insurance; they offer only limited coverage. Entities such \r as the U4 Anti-Corruption Help Desk are exploring how to mitigate \r potential corruption with regard to climate risk insurance."


id: 4275b56619ef5ea2af42510fa8f9b096
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8885
content:
"pooling, there are very ambitious attempts to expand this approach \r on several fronts (Scherer 2017). Schoenmaker and Zachmann \r (2015) have proposed a  global climate risk pool to help the most \r vulnerable countries. The pathway to this includes capacity building \r in underdeveloped financing sectors of developing countries. \r They argue that as climate extremes become more normalised, they \r will wipe out significant parts of the infrastructure and productive \r capacity of developing countries. This will have knock-on impact \r on fiscal capacity due to lowered tax revenue and high rebuilding \r costs. 'Developing countries', Schoenmaker and Zachmann (2015) \r argue, 'cannot insure against such events on a  market basis, nor \r would it be sensible to divert scarce fiscal resources away from \r infrastructure investment into accumulating a  financial buffer for \r such situations'. In that context, Schoenmaker and Zachmann (2015) \r [...]"


id: d43d16f75180647c89111f4735aea090
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34671
content:
"[...] call for international risk pooling as 'the only sensible strategy', \r especially if it addresses the major gaps in climate risk insurance for \r poor and vulnerable communities by enhancing demand through \r 'smart support instrument' for premium support such as full or \r partial premium subsidies and investment in providing risk reduction \r (Schafer et al. 2016; Le Quesne et al. 2017; MCII 2018; Vyas et al. \r 2019). This, it is argued, may help to smoothen out the limited uptake \r of regional institutions such as ARC and CCRIF SPC, which are only \r in three regions of the world (with missing mechanism in South \r America) (Kreft and Schafer 2017). Existing regional mechanisms, \r while they may perform very well, only cover a portion of climatic \r hazards and tend to have limited subscribers. For example, across the \r key four sovereign risk pools (ARC, CRIFSPC, PCRAFI and SEADRIF), \r though there are 68 countries only one-third or 32% have purchased \r [...]"


id: bc985ba33460ec2f40001be090cb9bc6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30429
content:
"[...] coverage in 2019 and 46% 'did not deploy disaster risk financing \r instruments' (ACT Alliance 2020)."


id: 194fcb70a0f35e26cd7c7a5e5bc8fcf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1668
content:
"Different finance challenges between rich and poor cities. \r Access to capital markets has been one of the major sources for \r subnational financing and is generally limited to rich cities, and much \r of this occurs through loans (high confidence). Different challenges \r to accessing capital markets associated with wealthy and poorer \r cities are compounded into three main issues: (i) scarcity and access \r of financial resources (Bahl and Linn 2014; Colenbrander et al. 2018b; \r Cook and Chu 2018; Gorelick 2018); (ii) the level of implication from \r the existing distributional uncertainties to the current financing of \r infrastructural decarbonisation across carbon markets (Silver 2015); \r and (iii) the policy and jurisdictional ambiguity in urban public \r finance institutions (Padigala and Kraleti 2014; Cook and Chu 2018). \r In poorer cities, these differing features continue to be inhibited by \r contextual characteristics of subnational finance, including gaps in \r [...]"


id: d57cd9f2d5820c6bb73dd57f14a9299b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34877
content:
"[...] domestic and foreign capital (Meltzer 2016), the mismatch between \r investment needs and available finance (Gorelick 2018), weak \r financial autonomy, insufficient financial maturity, investment-grade \r credit ratings in local debt markets (Bahl and Linn 2014), scarce \r diversified funding sources and stakeholders (Gorelick 2018; Zhan \r et al. 2018; Zhan and de Jong 2018) and weak enabling environments \r (Granoff et al. 2016)."


id: e2ff475b2032b294bd90a947055eb930
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37233
content:
"Climate investment and finance for communities. There is \r insufficient evidence about which financing schemes contribute \r to climate change mitigation and adaptations at community level \r (high confidence). There is growing interest in the linkages between \r microfinance and adaptation in the agriculture sector (Agrawala and \r Carraro 2010; Fenton et al. 2015; Chirambo 2016; CIF 2018; Dowla \r 2018), the finance for community-based adaptation actions (Fenton \r et al. 2014; Sharma et al. 2014), and the relations between remittances \r and adaptation (Le De et al. 2013). However, there is less discussion \r on community finance aside from the benefits of community finance \r and village funds in contributing to close investment gaps and \r community-based mitigation in the renewable energy and forest \r sectors (Ebers Broughel and Hampl 2018; Bauwens 2019; Watts et al. \r 2019) The full potential and barriers of the community finance model \r [...]"


id: 1b0c8ecf6c7cf09c2fb57baa5d1fc16a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1958
content:
"[...] are still unknown and research needs to expand understanding of \r favourable policy environments for community finance (Bauwens \r 2019; Watts et al. 2019)."


id: a2f47faa1e6794be9e773601bb8fa703
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25886
content:
"There are several initiatives aimed at protecting the integrity of \r the green label. Guidance on use and management of proceeds \r established by the International Capital Markets Association's \r Green Bond Principles (GBP) is followed on a voluntary basis, which \r notes eligible use of proceeds as primarily climate mitigation and \r adaptation projects. The GBP also recommend independent external \r reviews at the time of issuance, with 89% of green bond issuers in \r 2020 having external reviews at the time of issuance (CBI 2021a). \r In addition to best practice based on voluntary principles, a further \r check on greenwashing, although insufficient on its own, is the fear \r of reputation risk on behalf of investors, issuers and intermediaries in \r the age of social media (Hoepner et al. 2017; Deschryver and de Mariz \r 2020). A report on post-issuance green bond impact reporting notes \r that despite concerns (Shishlov et al. 2018), greenwashing incidence \r [...]"


id: 4ee3aed0a632f61ea1b4371d509c026c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11158
content:
"[...] is rare, with 77% of green bond issuers reporting on allocation and \r 59% reporting on impact, but with significant variance in quality and \r consistency of impact reporting (CBI 2021b)."


id: d2bec4239b9d05fb98194fa0c641dc21
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34426
content:
"Data challenges point to an inability to link emission reductions, \r including Scope 3 GHG emissions, at the organisation or firm level \r with green bond use-of-proceeds issuance (Ehlers et  al. 2020; \r Tuhkanen and Vulturius 2020). However one study found evidence \r of a  signalling effect of issuing green bonds resulting in emission \r reductions at the corporate level following issuance (Flammer 2020), \r and another study characterised the lifecycle emissions of renewable \r energy financed by green bonds, indicating potentially substantive \r avoided emissions but with variance up to a  factor of 12 across \r bonds depending on underlying assumptions (Gibon et  al. 2020). \r There is also a lack of impact reporting requirements and consistency \r in the green bond market. Impact reporting is not typically required \r for green bond listings on specific exchanges, nor are there any \r requirements for independent reviews of impact reporting, however \r [...]"


id: ae78d3dce355275dbdc7526bac458c9a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27928
content:
"While scaling up climate finance remains a challenge (Section 15.3.2), there is consensus that investments that are managed taking \r into account broader sustainability criteria have increased consistently and ESG integration into sustainable investment is increasingly \r being mainstreamed by the financial sector over recent years (Maiti 2021). The United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment \r (PRI) grew to over 3000 signatories in 2020, representing over USD100 trillion in assets under management (UN PRI 2020). And \r according to the 2018 biennial assessment by Global Sustainable Investment Alliance,15 sustainable investments in five major \r developed economies grew by 34% in the two-year period following the 2016 assessment. The primary ESG approaches leveraged \r were exclusion criteria and ESG integration, which together amounted to over USD37 trillion, accounting for two-thirds of the assessed \r [...]"


id: 7b33fa384c2c97f13189acdf5596fb0e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18873
content:
"[...] sustainable investments, with novel strategies such as best-in class screening and sustainability-themed investing showing significant \r growth, although together they accounted for around 6% of these investments (GSIA 2019). Shareholder activism or corporate \r engagement is the other key approach, which has been well established and continued to grow to nearly USD10 trillion (GSIA 2019)."


id: 6c95cee3a848cfe6de795d86afdaec16
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16394
content:
"However, research indicates that ESG strategies by themselves do not yield meaningful social or environmental outcomes (Kolbel et al. \r 2020). When it comes to the tangible impact of the financial sector on addressing climate change and sustainable development, there \r remains ambiguity. There is a growing need for more robust assessment of ESG scores, including establishing higher standardisation of \r scoring processes and a common understanding of the different ESG criteria and their tangible impact on addressing climate change. \r The issue was highlighted in an assessment of six of the leading ESG rating agencies' company ratings under the MIT Aggregate \r Confusion Project, which found the correlation among them to be 0.61, leading them to conclude that available ESG data was 'noisy \r and unreliable' (Berg et al. 2020). This need is reaffirmed by Drempetic et al. (2020), who claim that a thorough investigation of ESG \r [...]"


id: 9d27d2497c952ef86814178eabfb4b5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24889
content:
"[...] scores remains a relatively neglected topic, with extraneous factors, such as firm size, influencing the score (Drempetic et al. 2020)."


id: d47447ccf94d8b70ebdd01d07108fa50
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34700
content:
"There continues to be a research gap in assessing the direct impact of ESG and sustainable investments on climate change indicators, \r with most existing studies assessing the co-relation between either the factors driving the sustainable finance trends and the impact \r on sustainable investments, or sustainable investments and the impact on corporate financial performance. Nevertheless, since \r the post-SDG adoption period, there has been a notable uptake on research linking sustainable business practices and financial \r performance (Muhmad and Muhamad 2020). This research shows that there is a  growing business case for ESG investing, with \r evidence increasingly indicating a non-negative co-relation between ESG, SDG adoption and corporate financial performance (Friede \r et al. 2015; Muhmad and Muhamad 2020), and ESG performance having a positive relation with stock returns (Consolandi et al. \r [...]"


