# document

id: 733afe9520407156a4c6f95622cabb0d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17524
content:
"[...] Research has noted conditions under which climate change can increase the risk of armed conflict, which includes ethnic exclusion, \r agricultural dependence, large populations, insufficient infrastructure, dysfunctional local institutions and low levels of development (von \r Uexkull et al., 2016; Ide et al., 2020)."


id: 57e583b8ca89da2a6a0cdd6c6efcb088
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12728
content:
"Since the AR5, there is robust evidence of the socially destabilising measures and high-risk income alternatives that the world's poorest \r commonly take to cope with the impacts of climate change on livelihoods (Blattman and Annan, 2016). To avoid impoverishment, \r households often pursue risky livelihood alternatives, with high potential for return on investment (Sovacool et al., 2018), but which in \r some cases undermine environmental quality (Bolognesi et al., 2015), violate laws (Ahmed et al., 2019), contradict social norms (Hagerman \r and Satterfield, 2014), erode institutions (Sovacool et al., 2018), or affect intra- and inter-community cooperation (Nadiruzzaman and \r Wrathall, 2015). At the same time, a narrowing of livelihood options carries a strong potential for participation and association with \r violent non-state organisations and movements, either criminal or ideological (Nett and Ruttinger, 2016). In order to reduce the risk of \r [...]"


id: 68d2c72651d032d0d27ce85bd1389957
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15703
content:
"[...] instability and violence associated with climate change, a broadening of livelihood options among the most vulnerable people appears \r to be an effective policy approach (Miguel et al., 2004)."


id: 25dcc2ca424dc4da787254aaa390d69a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3843
content:
"In this regard, specific attention ought to be paid to how responses to climate change exacerbate inequalities within societies and create \r tensions between different groups--typically between those who are able to protect themselves from climate change impacts and those \r who do not have sufficient resources or are not prioritised in the responses to climate change. Frequently the possibility of migration \r from climate change is conflated with conflict outcomes from climate change; however, there is limited evidence and low agreement\r that climate change and migration will result in increased conflict (Okpara et al., 2016b), while there is robust evidence and medium \r agreement that climate change can exacerbate existing tensions, which can in turn result in political violence and an increase in asylum\u0002seeking (Marchiori et al., 2012). In the future, conflict in the context of climate change impacts may increase the number of migrants \r [...]"


id: d7a06ded6ba221904fab85799dd5a08
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35242
content:
"[...] seeking asylum, although at present there is scant empirical evidence for this (Schutte et al., 2021). Recent evidence also provides \r support for social conflict around inequitable climate mitigation policy as well (e.g., fossil fuel subsidies and emissions reductions targets) \r (Rentschler, 2016)."


id: 72253320beac84cf350c463ffe3d82dd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17327
content:
"Links between climate change, structural racism and development \r are less well established as an element of disproportionate impacts \r of climate change (Sealey-Huggins, 2018). Discrimination is not \r restricted to structural racism and includes discrimination of all kinds, \r including that of gender and caste, because of which a considerable \r population is directly bound to suffer the harsh impacts of the \r climate change. The climate change and gender literature has come \r a long way in demonstrating concrete examples of how structural \r inequalities operate. The political and micro-political aspects and \r how they interact with structural inequalities are also important to \r understand vulnerability. Henrique and Tschakert (2020) shows how \r the many adaptation efforts benefit powerful actors, while further \r entrenching the poor and disadvantaged in cycles of dispossession. \r This critical analysis recommends acknowledging injustices, embracing \r [...]"


id: 49bcd74928f768d75aca13ec9d3725ca
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10204
content:
"[...] deliberation and nurturing responsibility for human and more-than\u0002human others. Garcia et al. (2020) describes the socio-political drivers \r of gendered inequalities that produce discriminatory opportunities for \r adaptation. They use an intersectional subjectivities lens to examine \r how entrenched power dynamics and social norms related to gender \r create barriers to adaptation, such as lack of resources and agency. \r The analysis shows a pronounced dichotomy as women experience the \r brunt of these barriers and a persistent power imbalance that positions \r them as 'less able' to adapt than men."


id: d57c0bcb308425cec3025d84307cf54b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34876
content:
"Historical marginality and exclusion are context-specific conditions that \r shape vulnerability (Leichenko and Silva, 2014). There is also robust \r evidence that gender inequalities contribute to climate vulnerability, \r and that consideration of gender is a key approach to climate justice \r (see Cross-Chapter Box  GENDER in Chapter 18). There is robust \r evidence for the differentiated impacts of climate change and climate\u0002orientated policies on women (McOmber, 2020). For example, Friedman \r et  al. (2019) show that, in Ghana, homogeneous representations of \r women farmers and a technical focus of climate-orientated policy \r interventions may threaten to further marginalise the most vulnerable \r and exacerbate existing inequalities. Climate change impacts can also \r heighten existing gender inequalities (Jost et  al., 2016; Glazebrook \r et al., 2020). On the one hand, climate change impacts can be gendered \r as a result of customary roles in society, such as triple workloads for \r [...]"


id: 98bff65a87abeaaefe56124104820bc1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24089
content:
"[...] women (i.e., economic labour, household and family labour, and duties \r of community participation), and occupational hazards from gendered \r work indoors and outdoors (Murray et al., 2016). On the other, climate \r change hazards interact with changing gender roles in society, such \r as urban migration of both men and women in ways that break with \r tradition (Bhatta et al., 2016)."


id: 14a409cbea4d26d2a55e732da8a69f7d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Many countries base their adaptation strategies on National Adaptation \r Programmes of Action (NAPAs), which often correlate different levels \r of decision making and governance (Golrokhian et al., 2016). Whereas \r the involvement of national governments is needed for designing \r appropriate responses to climate change, recent studies underscore \r the need to also consider IKLK within adaptation and risk reduction \r strategies, thus fostering stronger linkages with local communities, \r leading to improved vertical integration between different strategies, \r programmes and actors (Ford et al., 2016; Vij et al., 2017; Singh et al., \r 2020). The relevance of addressing the issue of vulnerability and poverty \r to reduce the climate change risks has been demonstrated within the \r assessed literature on the impact of climate change (Hallegatte et al., \r 2017). In this regard, it is noticeable that not many NAPAs explicitly aim \r [...]"


id: 1234f3a6c6206eeaa2dde73fdf4a27c1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
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vector_id: 396
content:
"[...] to reduce poverty, even though poverty reduction is associated with \r vulnerability reduction to climate change (Demski et al., 2017)."


id: dc27594623ff3bfe7ad3ad80cb60adbf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36007
content:
"Next to issues of observed impacts and responses to climate change, \r it is important to assess observed barriers in implementing climate \r change responses. The discussion of barriers is complemented later \r in the chapter with an assessment of the enabling environments for \r adaptation (see Section  8.5.1). Some of the most common barriers \r outlined in the scientific literature are summarised in Table 8.3.\r There are various characteristics of responses to climate change, \r which aim to protect livelihoods and prevent poverty expansion (i.e., \r an enlargement of the group of people already affected by poverty). \r Some of them are:\r * Timely: meaning that responses need to take place within a matter \r of weeks or months and not over years (Wise et al., 2014).\r * Targeted: with a focus on the affected communities and groups, \r to help alleviate the pressures they are under (e.g., Aleksandrova, \r 8.3 Human Vulnerability, Spatial Hotspots, \r Observed Loss and Damage, and \r [...]"


id: 75892735b800e0ac9c459bf6d8055730
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
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content:
"[...] Livelihood Challenges\r This section assesses the literature on vulnerability--the assessment \r of vulnerability at global and national scales--and explores economic \r and non-economic losses of people and livelihoods exposed to and \r impacted by climate change. The section examines how climate change \r threatens livelihoods and juxtaposes global and local level assessments \r of vulnerability based on empirical data at different scales. The analysis \r of recent literature underscores that climate change impacts and \r adaptation needs cannot be understood by looking at climate change \r only. Vulnerability and livelihood security are seen as an important \r component for understanding the human dimension of climate change \r (Rhiney et al., 2016; Cardona, 2017; Byers et al., 2018; Eriksen et al., \r 2020; Wisner, 2020; Birkmann et al., 2021a; Cole et al., 2021)."


id: aaceba75c5a87b0a4b068634017f15db
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27278
content:
"to assess the broader adaptation challenges and adaptive capacities \r at global scale independent of a specific climatic hazard. Examples \r include the percentage of population with access to improved water \r sources and improved sanitation, the number of physicians per 1000 \r people or the dependency ratio (UNEP, 2018). These indicators are also \r part of more comprehensive vulnerability assessments, such as those \r assessed within this section namely the vulnerability components of \r the INFORM risk index (e.g., INFORM, 2019) and of the WorldRiskIndex \r (e.g., Birkmann and Welle, 2016; Birkmann et  al., 2021a; Feldmeyer \r et al., 2021). Recent literature underscores that measuring vulnerability \r is key for assessing factors that significantly determine actual and \r future adverse consequences of climate change and complex risks \r (Cutter and Finch, 2008; Cardona et al., 2012; de Sherbinin et al., 2019; \r Peters et al., 2019; Jamshed et al., 2020c; Visser et al., 2020; Feldmeyer \r [...]"


id: c9dabe081e2415f16874713b70cc2667
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32841
content:
"[...] et al., 2021). However, there is also important critique on indicator\u0002based assessments of vulnerability (see de Sherbinin et al., 2019; Rufat \r et al., 2019; Visser et al., 2020), particularly with regard to issues of \r validation and its use in decision-making processes. Nevertheless, \r we observe an emerging agreement in the literature that resilience \r building and adaptation to climate change has to be informed by \r climate and multidimensional assessment of the vulnerability of \r people, different groups and coupled human-environmental systems, \r including both quantitative and qualitative assessment approaches \r (IPCC, 2014b; UNEP, 2018; Singleton et  al., 2021; Birkmann et  al., \r 2022). Since, interdependencies between regional (supranational/sub\u0002continental), national, community and individual vulnerability have \r often been overlooked, this chapter assesses both global and regional \r vulnerability, as well as local livelihood vulnerabilities."


id: 189ea8b11be0db3c1fb391fe050bc8e2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
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"assessments do not sufficiently account for how climate change \r impacts and imposes risks on poor people, nor do they capture issues \r of climate justice and more complex societal impacts and future \r risks. For example, various observed losses in the context of climate \r change cannot be sufficiently expressed in terms of an economic value \r (see Section 8.3.5), but these items or assets are highly relevant for \r various people with limited economic resources (Hallegatte et  al., \r 2017). Consequently, the assessment of risks from climate change \r facing particularly poor people requires comprehensive assessments \r of human vulnerability, resilience and the impacts of climate change \r on human well-being going beyond a simple temperature-societal\u0002impact understanding. Knowledge about methods and approaches to \r assess human or human-environmental vulnerability and livelihood \r security, including aspects of intersectionality, is important in order \r [...]"


id: 2ffa08eddff31d6ff7f6b1be0821e17
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5697
content:
"[...] to explore whether or not adaptation and development programmes \r are able to reduce vulnerability. The body of literature on these issues \r has grown significantly since the AR5 publication (IPCC, 2014a; Moser, \r 2014)."


id: 1b1d43c492d2cde789c410c13de11d5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1966
content:
"These quantitative global assessments that have emerged within \r the last decades have not been sufficiently assessed in former IPCC \r reports, for example, in terms of the agreement on spatial hotspots or \r in terms of regional clusters of vulnerability and the linkages between \r past societal impacts and levels of vulnerability. The assessed literature \r shows that conditions and phenomena that characterise systemic \r vulnerability (hazard independent vulnerability), such as high levels of \r poverty and gender inequality, limited access to basic infrastructure \r services or state fragility are highly relevant for understanding societal \r impacts of climatic hazards and future risks of climate change (e.g., \r Cutter et al., 2003; ADB, 2005; Cutter and Finch, 2008; World Bank, \r 2008; UNISDR, 2009; Crawford et al., 2015; Rufat et al., 2015; Carrao \r et  al., 2016; Gupta, 2016; Rahman, 2018; Andrijevic et  al., 2020; \r [...]"


id: 76bfecf300f52948d865b45ab86c70d0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18108
content:
"[...] Jamshed et  al., 2020a; Feldmeyer et  al., 2021; Garschagen et  al., \r 2021). These factors and context conditions also influence individual \r vulnerability at household or community level. Access to basic services, \r such as water and sanitation, are linked to human rights and if not \r granted increase the likelihood that people disproportionately suffer \r from climate-induced hazards, due to their pre-existing lack of access \r to such services. In addition, increasing climate hazards further \r constrain the access to such services (United Nations, 2018; Kohlitz \r et al., 2019; Gupta et al., 2020)."


id: b9b08b002ae948bb2c6090fcd4d9845d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29882
content:
"While past research regarding the nexus between climate change and \r poverty often focused on vulnerable groups in rural areas of low-income \r countries (de Sherbinin, 2014; IPCC, 2014a; Barbier and Hochard, 2018), \r new global mega-trends, such as urbanisation, underscore the need to \r assess both rural and urban communities and their vulnerability. In \r many rapidly growing cities in the Global South, access to land and \r to housing is a challenge, particularly for the poor and marginalised, \r contributing to a further increase in informal settlements that often \r emerge in highly hazard-exposed areas (Jeschonnek et al., 2014; Rana \r et al., 2021). In addition, migration from rural areas to urban centres, \r also due to increasing adverse impacts of climate change on rural \r livelihoods, can add another level of complexity (Flavell et al., 2020). \r Moreover, the context in which such urbanisation processes take place \r [...]"


id: c94135eac89059061317a4ad9228b69a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32737
content:
"[...] is key. For example, rapidly growing medium-sized cities, for example \r in West Africa, often do not have sufficient financial, technical and \r institutional resources to adapt urban structures to climate change \r (Birkmann and Welle, 2016; Birkmann et al., 2016; de Sherbinin et al., \r 2017). Hence, vulnerability in urban contexts is an emerging issue for \r international, national and local adaptation programmes. Rather than \r focusing on mega-cities and their exposure as primary hotspots, more \r attention has to be given to rapidly growing small- and medium-sized \r cities and their adaptation needs from the perspective of vulnerability \r reduction and poverty."


id: 7af9499ad5bb8dfb971ed065ed27ba37
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18834
content:
"While different assessments use different sets of indicators, most \r of the global assessments with national-scale resolution (Birkmann \r and Welle, 2016; Kreft et al., 2016; Feldmeyer et al., 2017; Hallegatte \r et  al., 2017; Eckstein et  al., 2019; INFORM, 2019; ND-GAIN, 2019; \r Garschagen et  al., 2021), contain indicators that cover different \r aspects of economic poverty, inequality, access to basic infrastructure \r services, education and human capital (e.g., adult literacy rate) and \r some also include issues of gender inequality, specific vulnerable \r groups or insurance against extreme events. The assessments also \r differ, for example, in terms of their consideration of aspects of \r governance, such as corruption and conflict, or the consideration \r of social safety nets, such as insurance coverage, or the number of \r people affected by hazards (Feldmeyer et al., 2017; INFORM, 2019), \r as well as in terms of the consideration of losses experienced in the \r [...]"


id: 551ee0cef696873dcf8d91efb37fe65f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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"[...] past or issues such as biodiversity as an aspect of adaptive capacity \r (Hallegatte et  al., 2017; Birkmann et  al., 2022). Moreover, the \r assessments differ in terms of the consideration of specific indicators \r and the inclusion or non-inclusion of specific hazard exposure (Welle \r and Birkmann, 2015; Hallegatte et al., 2017; INFORM, 2019; ND-GAIN, \r 2019; Birkmann et al., 2022)."


id: e182d8b7927ae852a333faae7b1784e5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36945
content:
"While quantitative measures of vulnerability are widely used at \r different scales (Cutter et  al., 2016; Garschagen et  al., 2021), there \r are also studies that caution the use of such indices in policy making \r or risk reduction efforts (Rufat et  al., 2019; Spielman et  al., 2020). \r Such assessments of vulnerability have to be internally and externally \r validated and handled with care when applied in decision-making \r processes in terms of their options and limits. At the same time, these \r assessments capture important conditions and structures that make \r people more susceptible to various climate hazards and climate change \r impacts. The relevance of these conditions is confirmed by quantitative \r impact assessments as well as many specific case study assessments \r (Welle and Birkmann, 2015; Feldmeyer et al., 2021; Birkmann et al., \r 2022). For example, the access to basic services (e.g., water and \r sanitation) (Bollin and Hidajat, 2013; Pandey et  al., 2017b; UNEP, \r [...]"


id: 5caa3ea3f91839035cf45fbc69d62b46
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13568
content:
"[...] 2018; United Nations, 2018; Gupta et al., 2020; Jamshed et al., 2020a) \r and broader modes of engagement in governance and governance \r fragility (Crawford et al., 2015; Rahman, 2018; Andrijevic et al., 2020) \r significantly influence how climatic hazards translate into severe or \r non-severe losses and harm (see Section 8.5.2)."


id: c0e11abd9cd2c23cb288910d6b087e61
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31231
content:
"Recent comparative studies of global assessments of vulnerability \r show high agreement on the spatial clusters that have very high \r or very low vulnerability to climate change, compared to larger \r differences in terms of exposure and risk (Birkmann and Welle, \r 2016; Hallegatte et al., 2017; INFORM, 2019; Feldmeyer et al., 2021; \r Garschagen et al., 2021; Schleussner et al., 2021). The comparison of \r the averaged ranking results at the scale of 'climate regions' using the \r vulnerability components of INFORM and the WorldRiskIndex--as two \r comprehensive global assessment approaches of systemic vulnerability \r (hazard independent vulnerability) (see Figures 8.5; 8.6)--also finds a \r high agreement in terms of most vulnerable regions and regions with \r low vulnerability (Figure 8.5; Feldmeyer et al., 2021). The assessment \r at this scale reveals that global hotspots of human vulnerability can be \r found in climate regions in East Africa, Central Africa and West Africa, \r [...]"


id: 8807ee1ee0f6604b91c70c439ea7490e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21081
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"[...] followed by high vulnerability in Central America, South Asia and \r Southeast Asia, for example. Garschagen et al. (2021) in a comparison \r of further risk indices also found that there is high agreement on global \r assessments of vulnerability compared to exposure or overall risk."


id: ebb592f5a46a3d7ea3c2064c66123744
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38830
content:
"The analysis of vulnerability assessment results of the INFORM Risk \r Index and WorldRiskIndex4\r  at the level of countries coupled with \r population data confirms a high agreement on most vulnerable \r countries. It also shows that global hotspots of human vulnerability \r are not just single countries, but often emerge within regional \r clusters, particularly in Africa, but also in Asia and Central America \r (see Figure  8.6 and Birkmann et  al., 2021a). These regional clusters \r (Figure 8.6) are characterised by high levels of vulnerability in terms \r of socioeconomic, demographic, environmental and governance \r conditions that make people more likely to face adverse consequences \r once a climate hazard occurs. The internal and external validation of \r these index systems shows its statistical validity and robustness (Welle \r and Birkmann, 2015; Marin-Ferrer et al., 2017; Birkmann et al., 2022). \r It also confirms a quantitative relationship between most vulnerable \r [...]"


id: 51b706bb22ed5b9f97e4b78bc91b5a8b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11662
content:
"[...] regions and fatalities and severely affected people due to climate\u0002influenced hazards (Birkmann et al., 2022). The vulnerability map in \r Figure 8.5 shows the vulnerability level (systemic societal vulnerability) \r linked to national scale and provides additional information about the \r population density within these countries. The background map does \r not show specific vulnerable populations within countries. Selected \r examples of sub-national human vulnerabilities have been added as \r additional information in terms of case studies based on information \r from other chapters within this report (see, for example, Box  8.7; \r Sections  5.12; 10.3.3; 10.5.1; 13.8.1; 14.4.7; 15.3.4; Cross-Chapter \r Paper 6.2.7)."


id: 87b7d8f2779ea322051a119375dfcec4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21036
content:
"also point towards major differences between countries with high and \r low vulnerability (Pelling et al., 2004; CRED and UNDRR, 2015; CRED \r and UNDRR, 2016; CRED and UNDRR, 2020b). Even if one takes solely \r 'highly vulnerable countries' such as India, Pakistan and the Philippines \r (and not 'very highly' vulnerable countries), mortality is still nine times \r higher compared to very low vulnerability countries. Similarly, studies \r further revealed that average number of adversely affected people per \r hazard event (e.g., loss of the house) is 11 times higher in regions and \r countries categorised as having very high vulnerability compared to \r very low vulnerability (Birkmann et  al., 2022). In addition to floods, \r droughts and storms, published EM-DAT data for wildfires and heat \r stress, confirmed higher suffering (higher average mortality) in more \r vulnerable regions compared to less vulnerable regions, particularly \r [...]"


id: 9d5450aa47f7b87b2da13691d4e94834
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24911
content:
"[...] when excluding extreme outliers (CRED, 2020). These findings point \r towards the fact that in regions identified as highly vulnerable in the \r assessments even moderate future climate change and future climate \r hazards are likely to push people further into poverty and lead to \r significant destabilisation processes in terms of livelihoods security \r (Wallemacq and House, 2018; Birkmann et al., 2022)."


id: 8961fe5f8e8daae2329f2302e5b06a3c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21346
content:
"The assessments of human vulnerability also point towards important \r adaptation options that are not visible if one focuses on climatic \r hazards or temperature changes alone (Figure  8.9; Duckers et  al., \r 2015; Cutter et  al., 2016; Birkmann et  al., 2021a). Fundamental for \r vulnerability reduction and adaptation are social insurances and \r infrastructure programmes, as well as legislation that improves the \r access of poor and marginalised groups to basic infrastructure services \r and security. For example, the 'free basic service programme' of the \r national government of South Africa (GovSA, 2021) is one example \r where a national government (Government of South Africa) has \r committed itself to providing a basic amount of free water, electricity \r and sanitation to low-income households, particularly indigent \r people, such as those living in informal settlements or remote rural \r areas. Coupled with incentives, for example in terms of a higher use \r [...]"


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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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"[...] of renewable energy (e.g., solar home systems in rural areas) (see \r GovSA, 2021), these investments can support vulnerability reduction \r and mitigation of GHG emissions. However, the programme design and \r implementation has also been criticised (see Nel and Rogerson, 2005; \r Muller, 2008), as is witnessed by ongoing service delivery protests \r (Mutyambizi et al., 2020). This example shows that current national \r programmes can--even if they are not classified as adaptation \r measures--provide important entry points to reduce human \r vulnerability to climate change."


id: e9b39e773f251e3ee4e7f8e270c8e6b9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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content:
"While increasing attention is given to issues of human vulnerability, \r less attention has been given to the historical conditions that foster \r systemic vulnerability of societies. It is important to acknowledge \r that drivers and root causes of systemic human vulnerabilities and \r development challenges are not always new, and sometimes--for \r example in various countries in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean--can \r be linked to histories of imperialism, colonial structures (Grasham \r et al., 2019), and subsequent development and governance contexts \r (Southard, 2017; Zhukova, 2020). Thus, root causes of present \r structures of human and human-environmental vulnerability often \r have historic dimensions, for example, chronic poverty and structural \r inequality in Africa (Grasham et al., 2019) or the Caribbean are still \r influenced by the colonial power relations outside of these countries \r making solutions for vulnerability reduction more difficult (see e.g., \r [...]"


id: 862b0eb4b473772e98ca81f15bb1ef4d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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"[...] Douglass and Cooper, 2020). In addition, national borders, such as \r in many regions in Africa, sometimes cut through ethnic groups and \r therewith ignore important interrelations between communities on \r both sides of the border."


id: b79c81e26f33a30834ce24c19647c6b1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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"Figure 8.6 |  Global map of vulnerability. This map shows the relative level of average national vulnerability as calculated by global indices (INFORM and WRI see details \r in 8.3.2). Areas shaded light yellow are on average the least vulnerable and those shaded darker red are the most vulnerable. The map combines information about the level of \r vulnerability (independent of the population size) with the population density (see legend) to show where both high vulnerability and high population density coincide. The map \r reveals that there are densely populated areas of the world that are highly vulnerable, but also highly vulnerable populations in more sparsely populated areas. There are also \r highly vulnerable communities and populations in countries with overall low vulnerability as shown with local case studies alongside the map. The pie charts show the number \r [...]"


id: bc1fdcd837fdb15607437fd0276277aa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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content:
"[...] of deaths (mortality) per hazard (storm, flood, drought, heatwaves and wildfires) event per continental region based on EM-DAT Data (CRED, 2020). The size of the pie chart \r represents the average mortality per hazard event while slices of each pie chart show the absolute number of deaths from each hazard. This reveals that over the past decade, there \r were significantly more fatalities per hazard in the more vulnerable regions, e.g., Africa and Asia. The analysis of the data shown in this map revealed that over 3.3 billion people \r are living in countries classified as very highly and highly vulnerable, while approximately 1.8 billion people live in countries with low and very low vulnerability (Birkmann et al., \r 2022). These vulnerability values are based on the average of the vulnerability components of the INFORM Index (INFORM, 2019) and WorldRiskIndex (Birkmann and Welle, 2016; \r [...]"


id: 968aec985e53044bad534cf476976ba6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"[...] Feldmeyer et al., 2017) with updated data from 2019 classified into five classes using the quantile method. Other studies applied more vulnerability classes within their assessment \r and therefore provide slightly different numbers (Birkmann et al., 2021a). However, despite different calculation methods, the conclusion remains that there are significantly more \r people residing in countries with very high and highly vulnerability compared to those living in countries classified as having low or very low vulnerability."


id: 1901d225767deecebee7be215b448f0e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Next to the identification of the level of agreement between different \r vulnerability assessments (Garschagen et  al., 2021) and the spatial \r hotspots, global assessments of vulnerability and adaptation readiness \r also point towards the need for a transboundary perspective and \r transboundary cooperation in terms of vulnerability reduction and \r adaptation (Tilleard and Ford, 2016; Birkmann et  al., 2021a). Newer \r research points towards the fact that various phenomena of vulnerability, \r particularly in highly vulnerable regions, spill over national borders and \r emerge in rather regional clusters, such as forced migration and poverty \r in West and Central Africa, as well as conflicts in the Near East and Asia \r (IDMC, 2020). This means that regional and transboundary challenges \r contribute to the formation of systemic human vulnerability, for \r example, forced migration that is occurring within countries, but also \r [...]"


id: 490ac27ba3e6ed81935b2b7105056d2b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10073
content:
"[...] across international borders that is also influenced by climate change \r (Kaczan and Orgill-Meyer, 2020). In summary, these findings point \r towards the need for more transboundary approaches in vulnerability \r and risk reduction, adaptation and development. Recent literature and \r data presented in Figure 8.6 and (Birkmann and Welle, 2016; Feldmeyer \r et  al., 2017; Hallegatte et  al., 2017; INFORM, 2019; Birkmann et  al., \r 2021a) demonstrate the need to strengthen approaches to monitor \r the regional dimensions of vulnerability and to develop strategies \r and programmes that consider transboundary vulnerability in risk \r reduction and cooperation at different scales. This includes, for example, \r cooperation between national-level institutions, but also transboundary \r networks of cities or communities (Tilleard and Ford, 2016; Benzie and \r Persson, 2019; Birkmann et  al., 2021a). The transnational nature of \r [...]"


id: 50ccc4d86c4e916e8673a9b2e9d29444
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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content:
"[...] climate change impacts means that addressing them requires concerted \r efforts among nations (IPCC, 2014b; Dzebo, 2019)."


id: dc2eb4ee471f7e3fa83cb70b235e4e2d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36010
content:
"Evidence exists that threats to land-based livelihoods and risks of \r undernutrition increase significantly with higher levels of global \r warming (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2019a). With global warming of 1.5degC \r or less, impacts of climate change on livelihoods are still significant, \r for example, for West Africa and the Sahel there will be an estimated \r reduction of the area suitable for maize production of about 40%. The \r consequences of global warming of up to 3degC would mean a high \r risk of undernutrition for entire regions (see Hoegh-Guldberg et  al., \r 2019a) that are already classified as most vulnerable (see Figure 8.6). \r That means the consequences of significant warming are a particular \r challenge for regional hotspots of vulnerability. Small changes in crop \r productivity, already observed due to increasing droughts, floods or \r changes in rainfall patterns, could lead to severe health risks and \r [...]"


id: ab538eafa0732c8f87c55cbe60d887d2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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vector_id: 27371
content:
"[...] undernutrition. This is because of existing precarious living conditions \r and the limited capacities that people and institutions have to build \r and enhance coping and adaptive capacities at the level of individual \r households, communities and state institutions (see UNEP, 2018; \r Birkmann et  al., 2021a). The risk of loss of life, displacement and \r adverse health consequences due to climate change in these most \r vulnerable regions (such as Micronesia, South Asia, West Africa--see \r Figures  8.5; 8.6) is higher compared to regions classified as having "


id: bd330173a47b4dc5f31caba71a35e5da
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30536
content:
"Moreover, the assessment reveals that in most vulnerable regions \r a double burden of existing destabilised livelihood conditions and \r additional climatic hazards is already visible and largely influences \r societal impacts of climate change. For example, flooding along the \r White Nile in Uganda and South Sudan hit vulnerable communities \r that were displaced due to conflicts and were thus uprooted again \r by flooding (IDMC, 2020). Societal impacts and future risks of climate \r change to societies need to incorporate information about vulnerability \r and exposure--including capacities of people to cope and adapt \r (Wisner, 2016; Cardona et al., 2020). There is increasing evidence that \r individual and societal capacities to cope and adapt also depend on \r how governmental and national institutions can support people at risk \r (see Section  8.6). For example, climate information services depend \r on a functioning weather service. Likewise, social safety nets as an \r [...]"


id: e6052e9f6028bc80338f2179efd95020
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"[...] adaptation strategy require financial resources, which are often absent \r for most people in highly vulnerable regions. In addition, examples of \r national programmes that target most vulnerable groups, such as the \r free basic service programme in South Africa, show that next to the \r adaptation to individual hazards, strategies exist that aim to reduce \r systemic human vulnerability (see GovSA, 2021)."


id: 11049542260a950cc0d7982590b23e1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 189
content:
"At the same time, there is scientific evidence that more intense and \r frequent climate-influenced hazards (e.g., storms, flooding, droughts, \r heat stress) can undermine decade-long poverty reduction efforts, \r particularly in most vulnerable regions (Mysiak et al., 2016; Formetta \r and Feyen, 2019; Laborde et  al., 2020b; Lakner et  al., 2020). There \r is high agreement that, with global warming of about 3degC, such \r undermining of poverty reduction efforts will intensify and more \r regions will face development setbacks due to the spatial and temporal \r expansion of climate hazards, including the further erosion of capital \r that enables people to develop adaptive capacities (high confidence) \r (see Section  8.5). Such trends can further exacerbate poverty traps \r (see Section 8.2.2). According to a World Bank report, between 32 and \r 132 million people could fall into extreme poverty by 2030 due to the \r impacts of climate change (Jafino et al., 2020). Models estimate that at \r [...]"


id: 448346145b01a327c8ac47221290db2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9285
content:
"[...] 3degC warming and under Shared Socioeconomic Pathway (SSP) 1, there \r would be an additional 245 million people exposed to poverty. Under \r SSP2 this number would increase to 904  million additional people \r exposed to poverty (SSP2) and under SSP3 (with significant challenges \r for equity) about 1918 million additional people could be exposed to \r poverty in the year 2050 (Byers et al., 2018)."


id: 3a60fa96880fa11e9fb4525d6da63888
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
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vector_id: 7475
content:
"Another important phenomenon that modifies trends in vulnerability to \r climate change and poverty is the COVID-19 pandemic (see Box 8.3). It \r is likely that the COVID-19 pandemic with its global repercussions will \r continue to modify and, in many cases, intensify poverty and human \r vulnerability (Laborde et al., 2020a; Sumner et al., 2020). Recent studies \r that estimate the impact of COVID-19 on global poverty agree that \r a significant increase of poverty due to COVID-19 and the respective \r lockdown of countries is already observed or expected in the near future \r (Laborde et al., 2020b; Sumner et al., 2020). These studies underscore \r that 80% of those newly living in extreme poverty (living on under 1.9 \r USD d-1) due to COVID-19 would be mainly located in two global regions: \r sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia (Sumner et al., 2020). Consequently, \r the COVID-19 pandemic is likely to further increase inequality at different \r [...]"


id: 3a2163e3a7cc43e90aea2f7ba26e4221
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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vector_id: 7436
content:
"[...] scales and increase the burden within regions already characterised by \r a significant adaptation gap in terms of high vulnerability (see also \r Figure 8.6). This implies that the capacity of people to prepare for present "


id: 6284059c86f94a3e4842f0b53125825b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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vector_id: 14621
content:
"A study of the World Bank (Hallegatte et  al., 2017) estimates that \r losses in terms of well-being are significantly higher than actual asset \r losses experienced (Hallegatte et al., 2017). A higher proportion of the \r global absolute economic losses occurred in high-income countries. \r About 56% of all disasters reported occurred in high-income countries, \r while the low-income countries account for 44% of the recorded \r disasters. However, low-income countries account for about 68% \r of the total deaths reported, high-income countries for about 32% \r (CRED and UNDRR, 2020b). In contrast, average absolute economic \r losses6\r  were significantly lower in most vulnerable countries compared \r to low vulnerable countries (Birkmann et  al., 2022). Economic loss \r trends from EM-DAT database (CRED, 2020) must be interpreted \r with caution. Economic loss data is often incomplete and needs to \r be improved. However, these differences in terms of economic losses \r [...]"


id: faa7f54eb66d75a2eac60bf903e6c24c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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vector_id: 41474
content:
"[...] can also be explained in part by the significant wealth differences and \r the monetary value of assets exposed. Consequently, there is a need \r to critically reflect on the measures used to assess L&D from climate \r change. Interestingly, the number of people affected by droughts, \r floods and storms as a percentage of the total population and per \r hazard event again points to the disproportionate suffering of most \r vulnerable countries (Birkmann et al., 2022)."


id: 5e365606437ab214728a2fc36aee5f05
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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content_type: text
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vector_id: 13865
content:
"Climate change impacts add to livelihood challenges and can further \r increase inequality and poverty (see Section 8.2.1), whose root causes \r are social, institutional and governance related. Various regional \r clusters of high vulnerability (see Figure  8.6) are also influenced by \r historical processes, such as colonialism and power relations that made \r people and countries vulnerable (Schell et al., 2020). Thus, vulnerability \r to climate change is not primarily linked to the degree of exposure \r to climate change impacts, but determined by societal structures and \r development processes that shape context and individual vulnerability \r (see Section 8.3.2), and values and lived experiences of climate hazards \r (Djoudi et al., 2016; Walker et al., 2021). Intersectionality approaches \r are central to grasping differential vulnerability (Thomas et  al., \r 2019) for past and present livelihood impacts of climate change (see \r [...]"


id: fe3e4c4d1520510eb2efd53fa74860e6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42100
content:
"[...] Figure 8.3; Section 8.2.2.2). Assessing observed local conditions and \r livelihood impacts and shifts requires us to consider reinforcing social \r phenomena such as age, gender, class, race and ethnicity, which shape \r social inequalities and experiences of the world and also intersect with \r climate hazards and vulnerability (Walker et al., 2021)."


id: f0ff189e0b113a1fc5eec46e089abdbe
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39768
content:
"Overall, there is robust evidence that at the global scale poor and most \r vulnerable people, particularly in regions classified as highly vulnerable, \r are disproportionately affected by well-being losses and loss of life in \r the context of climate change and climate-influenced natural hazards \r (CRED and UNDRR, 2015; Hallegatte et  al., 2017; Birkmann et  al., \r 2022) (high agreement). In this context, non-economic losses also \r need to receive more attention (see Section 8.3.3.2). While there is an \r emerging understanding that inequality and multidimensional poverty \r are important determinants of systemic vulnerability to climate change \r (Dennig et  al., 2015; Hallegatte and Rozenberg, 2017; Islam and \r Winkel, 2017) that affects more than 3 billion people today, only very \r few countries explicitly aim to reduce poverty and income inequality as \r an adaptation measure (see e.g., Brazil Ministry of Environment, 2016) \r [...]"


id: 25bc6743b4cbc01a17acdea4a1301c6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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content:
"[...] (high agreement). Reducing vulnerability is a prerequisite for climate \r justice and just transitions."


id: 51637c089690f719f6f00db4aad72ee6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11596
content:
"Since AR5 a new discourse on L&D has emerged with new typology \r and elaboration of a definition. L&D has a long and contentious \r history and is enshrined in the Paris Agreement (see Cross-Chapter \r Box LOSS in Chapter 17). Despite ambiguity about what constitutes \r L&D (Boyd et  al., 2017), it focuses on how to avert, minimise, and \r address the negative impacts of climate change, including those \r that cannot be avoided through adaptation. It can also be thought \r of as the observed residual risk (and potentially irreversible losses) \r from climate change when adaptation limits are encountered and \r mitigation has failed (Boda et al., 2020). L&D is considered a policy \r mechanism (see Cross-Chapter Box LOSS in Chapter 17). There is also \r a burgeoning science for L&D (Mechler et al., 2019b) which advances \r the breakdown on compounding vulnerabilities and highlights the \r disproportionate effects of climate change on the vulnerable and \r [...]"


id: 2b1dba4925355ca948b0d3cce797c5f2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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content:
"[...] marginal (see Box 8.5 for illustration of distributional effect of both \r the drought and responses in the Cape region in South Africa). New \r evidence provides additional insight into L&D from slow-onset events \r related to climate change (sea level rise, drought) (see Anjum and \r Fraser, 2021; Lund, 2021) For example, (Singh et  al., 2021) found \r growing evidence of urban droughts leading to economic losses (e.g., \r groundwater overextraction, financial impacts) and non-economic \r losses (e.g., conflict, increased drudgery)."


id: 4b6b923ae8da91d8408245dbaaba399b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10520
content:
"food supplies, and loss of livestock and livelihoods. Cross-sectoral \r economic effects were estimated to reduce gross domestic product \r (GDP) by 2.8% yr-1 (King-Okumu et  al., 2021). Past studies have \r similarly shown that in the context of extreme events, such as floods \r or droughts, the most commonly sold assets are livestock and land. The \r sale of property particularly reduces the asset base, creates long-term \r vulnerabilities to future events and can trigger chronic poverty (high \r confidence). People may face food shortages in the future from lack of \r crop production (Opondo, 2013).The sale of cattle affects the household \r asset base, as well as important access to animal traction power for \r farming.\r In South Asia, there is robust evidence of economic impacts of climate \r change (Cao et al., 2021), for example in the Sundarbans (a transboundary \r ecosystem with components in both India and Bangladesh, with the \r [...]"


id: 4a6c27e658fed4c21e55fc027b72146b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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content:
"[...] problem of unproductive livelihoods being common across residents \r of both countries) observations show local livelihoods are rapidly \r becoming unproductive (loss of fish, and increasing salination making \r agriculture increasingly difficult) (Ghosh, 2018); conditions that are \r exacerbated by climate change impacts (high confidence). Cyclone \r and storm surges induced by climate change force saline water into \r agricultural lands along the coast, which damages crops not only in \r the year the cyclone hits, but for several years afterwards (Rabbani \r et al., 2013). They showed in Shyamnagar Upazilla in Satkhira district \r the proportion of salinity-free farmland has gone down over the past \r 20 years, from more than 60% to nil (Rabbani et al., 2013). Vietnam \r has also experienced effects of flooding and salinisation in the Mekong \r delta, coupled with rapid social development. Intensified floods and \r droughts have dramatically resulted in loss of livelihoods in agriculture \r [...]"


id: 812bf65bd18842eeb94da6f3dfaaea1a
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19858
content:
"[...] and fisheries in some areas of the basin (Evers and Pathirana, 2018). In \r Vietnam, the expected salinisation increases livelihood shifts into areas \r that are riskier, such as shrimp farming. Furthermore, the Vietnamese \r Mekong Delta is characterised by strong migration processes towards \r cities, particularly Ho Chi Min, meaning that abrupt livelihood shifts \r are already happening. There are emerging examples of Indigenous \r Peoples affected by climate change in indigenous farming mountain \r communities of the Nepal Himalaya. (Sujakhu et  al., 2019). The \r Philippines has experienced extreme events, such as Typhoon Haiyan \r in 2013, which left more than 7353 people reported dead or missing, \r damaged or swept away more than 1.1 million houses and injured more \r than 27,000 people (McPherson et al., 2015). More than 4 million were \r displaced. The cost of damages has been estimated at USD 864 million \r with USD  435  million for infrastructure and USD  440  million for \r [...]"


id: ecb7632b54d466861a9b1847e40010ee
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39006
content:
"Extreme climate events are disproportionately impacting economies of \r the most vulnerable everywhere (medium evidence, high agreement). \r In the Caribbean, Central America and USA, Hurricanes Katrina, Harvey, \r Irma, Maria and Michael are examples of extreme climate events that \r have displaced households, destroyed homes, and led to loss of income \r among the poor and marginalised (Klinenberg et al., 2020). Puerto Rico \r was devastated by Hurricane Maria but received less support from the \r Federal Emergency Management Agency (Garcia, 2021). Evidence is \r emerging on unequal governance responses in the USA versus Puerto \r Rico (Joseph et al., 2020). Floods, storms and heatwaves have impacted \r poorer communities and wildfires in California have impacted many \r wealthy groups, and also infrastructure used by all, for example, with \r lengthy electrical power blackouts. However, they have particularly \r impacted those vulnerable to disasters, such as undocumented Latino/a \r [...]"


id: 41adc14e43482f1e654dc33ca19a7d03
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8743
content:
"[...] and Indigenous immigrants in the case of the Thomas Fire in California's \r Ventura and Santa Barbara counties (Mendez et  al., 2020). In 2017, \r Hurricane Irma hit Ragged Island in the Bahamas as a category 5 storm, \r leaving the island in ruins and deemed 'unliveable' by its authorities, \r with most infrastructure left as rubble, no essential utilities remained, \r schools and health clinics were in ruins and the stench of dead animals \r was overwhelming. This storm resulted in significant economic L&D \r by the community through loss of their homes, churches, schools, \r agricultural land and infrastructure (Thomas and Benjamin, 2020)."


id: 9a226bd6d9441cdd87f72ef651cf8895
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24353
content:
"Box  8.6). Urban communities, in particular those living in informal \r settlements, are exposed to heatwaves. In Peru, analysis of water risks \r posed by climate change in the Vilcanota-Urubamba basin, Southern \r Peru, revealed seasonal water scarcity and glacial lake outburst floods \r (GLOFs), pose a serious threat for highly exposed and vulnerable \r people. It showed that very high-risk potentials of 134 current and \r another 6 out of 20 future glacier lakes as potentially highly susceptible \r to outburst floods. A total of eight existing and one possible future \r lakes indicate future river discharge could be reduced by some 2-11% \r (7-14%) until 2050 (2100). Farmers, in particular smallholders, in \r some regions face losses to irrigated agriculture and hydropower \r capacity with effects on water scarcity and food security (Drenkhan \r et al., 2019). However, other assessments also point towards positive \r effects of water reservoirs and hydropower in terms of water storage, \r [...]"


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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13121
content:
"[...] flood management and irrigation (Ahmad et al., 2014; Liu et al., 2015; \r Kuraku et al., 2019)"


id: a10fdfad96f23c5c404ef5c48bcf2ae3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25558
content:
"In the context of the Pacific Islands, NELDs are thought of as \r interconnected and span human mobility and territory, cultural heritage \r and Indigenous knowledge, life and health, biodiversity and ecosystem \r services, and sense of place and social cohesion (Carmona et al., 2017; \r Ojwang et al., 2017; McNamara et al., 2021b). There are gaps in our \r understanding of NELD, much of the evidence is from the Global \r South and at smaller scales (high agreement), NELD is not explicitly \r linked to attribution science yet and evidence often lacks coverage on \r certain groups (Boyd et al., 2017; Carmona et al., 2017; Ojwang et al., \r 2017). Non-economic losses are often associated with displacements \r and migration in terms of climate change and human vulnerability \r (Section 8.2.1.4), studies show that the impacts of extreme flooding, \r droughts and/or hurricanes and cyclones that can lead to a sense of \r lost identity and place, and emotional distress, that are hardly assessed \r [...]"


id: 7f141b5f20075b58296be9c7a0a8ca16
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"[...] dimensions of impacts and risks (Adger et al., 2014; Barnett et al., 2016; \r Tschakert et al., 2017; Serdeczny et al., 2018). Non-economic losses are \r particularly relevant for understanding adverse consequences of climate \r change on the poor and most vulnerable population groups (high \r confidence). These NELD categories are still overlooked in vulnerability \r assessments and adaptation planning. A novel way to consider NELD \r in assessments is to interconnect with a sustainable development \r perspective (Boyd et al., 2017; Boda et al., 2020)."


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"There are additional dimensions of economic losses that are of a \r more diffuse nature. In particular, climate change is also expected to \r negatively affect labour supply, particularly in temperature exposed \r industries (agriculture, mining, manufacturing, construction), due to \r increases in the number of extreme hot days (Graff Zivin and Neidell, \r 2014; Garg et  al., 2020). Low-income countries have on average a \r large share of workers in such industries and will thus be especially \r hard hit. Aside from labour supply, a number of studies also document \r negative impacts to manufacturing productivity (Acharya et al., 2018; \r Pogacar et al., 2018; Somanathan et al., 2021). These findings provide \r a channel to explain macroeconomic consequences of climate change \r (Burke et  al., 2015). However, there are also non-economic costs in \r that extreme heat will cause increased discomfort to workers, such \r as psychological stress, disease and in extreme cases, death among \r [...]"


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"[...] the workforce in developing economies, as well as tropical and sub\u0002tropical countries (Ansah et al., 2021)."


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"In order to categorise the different types of NELD that exist, (Serdeczny \r et  al., 2016), reviewed the literature and came up with a set of \r systematic categories that capture what is usually thought about as \r having intrinsic value and according this framing of NELD this includes: \r human life, sense of place and mobility, cultural artefacts, biodiversity \r and ecosystems, communal and production sites and agency and \r identity (Serdeczny et al., 2016; Serdeczny, 2019). For example, there \r is emerging evidence on linkages between slow-onset events and \r mobility decisions, trajectories and outcomes (Zickgraf, 2021). In \r addition, categories include psychosocial and emotional distress (van \r Der Geest and Schindler, 2016). For example, research shows potential \r increased risk of intimate partner violence following disasters, noting \r that societies that are vulnerable to climate change may need to \r prepare for the social disasters that can accompany disasters revealed \r [...]"


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"is evidence of loss of cultural heritage sites due to sea level rise and \r coastal erosion as well as other climate variability (Brooks et al., 2020). \r Haile et al. (2013) show flood casualties in Ethiopia include children \r drowned while playing outside during the 2007 flood period although \r official data is hard to come by (p. 489). Moreover, loss of place was \r experienced in Itang, where many of the local houses are built from \r wood, grasses and mud walls, which are easy to reconstruct, but are \r not strong enough to withstand an extreme flood. Here, 38% of the \r surveyed houses were severely damaged by the 2007 flood. These \r houses were constructed as an adaptation strategy but could not \r withstand the floods. In Kenya, Opondo (2013) shows loss of human \r life was the most severe impact of floods. For example, in the focus \r group discussion with men, 'it was reported that a boat capsized on \r River Nzoia at Siginga and ten people died' (p. 457). In Mozambique, \r [...]"


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"[...] Brida et al. (2013) show loss of sense of place occurred after flooding \r in the central districts of Caia and Mopeia, which had a devastating \r impact on homes and livestock (Brida et  al., 2013). Health impacts \r of the forest fires in Amazon basin countries have disproportionately \r affected vulnerable people and social groups (see Box 8.6)."


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"In the literature on NELD, there are many examples of loss of life (high \r agreement). In Nepal, one of the deadliest landslides in Nepal history \r resulted in the death of 156 people (van der Geest, 2018). Evidence \r from Landslide Jure and consecutive rainfall in Sindhupalchok in Nepal \r showed the experience led to mental stress, such as fear of new landslides, \r in about 68.4% of people interviewed (van Der Geest and Schindler, \r 2016). One study in Nepal showed that almost a quarter (23%) of the \r households interviewed had sold property, including homes, livestock \r and heirlooms in response to flooding (Bauer, 2013). Human deaths are \r increasingly associated with L&Ds from tropical cyclones and typhoons, \r such as in the southern coastal districts of Bangladesh, in particular \r Khulna and Satkhira (Chiba et al., 2017). A case study from Mindanao, \r Philippines, by Chandra et al. (2017) also reported physical injuries and \r [...]"


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"[...] loss of life from the most powerful typhoon for over a century in 2012, \r affecting more than 6 million people and killing at least 1000 people \r (Eugenio et al., 2016). Beckman and Nguyen (2016) reported that in \r Vietnam floods in 2004 washed away 24 houses in the commune, with \r the loss of families when their houses were washed away."


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"This section examines the intersections between L&Ds and livelihood \r shifts. This requires an examination of the differentiated aspects \r of livelihoods. Understanding economic (e.g., loss of food crops, \r infrastructure, assets etc.) and non-economic losses (e.g., health, well\u0002being, loss of place, agency) and their consequences for livelihoods is \r important that the intangible aspects become clearly visible and receive \r greater attention in loss assessments and in designing adaptation \r strategies and programmes. Figure  8.10 provides a summary of \r examples of observed impacts of climate hazards on economic and \r non-economic capital and the section assesses livelihood implications \r across regions. It shows examples of climate hazards attributed to \r climate change in studies since AR5, across a range of geographical \r sites for heatwaves, drought, hurricanes, and floods and non-economic \r L&Ds. Figure 8.10 reveals examples of climate hazards attributed to \r [...]"


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"[...] climate change in studies since AR5 across a range of geographical \r sites for extreme and slow-onset events, such as heatwaves, drought, \r hurricanes and sea level rise. These are associated with non-economic \r L&Ds. The figure underscores that non-economic L&Ds lead to \r significant livelihood threats and livelihood changes. In addition, the \r limits of adaptation become evident (Chapter 16)."


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"An illustrative example is climate-induced loss of well-being and (im)\r mobility in Bhola Slum, an informal settlement in Dhaka, Bangladesh. \r Research revealed that IDPs from the southern coast experienced \r loss of belonging, identity, quality of life and social value produced \r in people a nostalgia and desire to return home (Ayeb-Karlsson \r et  al., 2020). Another example is of urban climate change justice \r experienced by migrants in the Indian cities of Bengaluru and Surat, \r where environmental marginalisation can be attributed to a lack of \r recognition of citizenship rights and informal livelihood strategies \r driven by broken social networks and a lack of political voice, as \r well as heightened exposure to emerging climate risks and economic \r precariousness. In this case, migrants experience extreme forms of \r climate injustice in their invisibility to formal government and are even \r actively erased from cities through force or discriminatory development \r [...]"


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"of place (Tucker et  al., 2015). Acosta et  al. (2016) identified loss to \r productive sites in the Philippines with landslides destroying agriculture, \r leaving many farmers without livelihoods. Similarly, Beckman and \r Nguyen (2016) in Vietnam identified an example where communal \r dams had been destroyed in floods leading to lack of irrigation for \r communal sites and local loss of farmland for farming communities. \r Chandra et  al. (2017) identified the vicious cycle between declining \r agricultural production and conditions of soil erosion due to floods and \r droughts resulting in decreased crop fertility to productive sites with \r implications for decline in crop yields, loss of crops and of livelihood \r assets. Climate change-related extreme weather events, such as \r typhoons, floods, and droughts, can have detrimental impacts on crop \r production (high confidence) and in the Philippines and Pakistan have \r [...]"


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"[...] significantly affected the livelihoods of cash crop-focused rural villages \r (Escarcha et al., 2020; Jamshed et al., 2020b). There is an emerging shift \r from crop to livestock production as a buffer activity to recover from \r crop losses (Section 5.10.4; Jamshed et al., 2017; Escarcha et al., 2020). \r As with many examples of livelihood shifts, the viability of the shifts in \r the long term under climate change have yet to be assessed."


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"Extreme climatic events pose serious disruptions to local livelihoods \r and asset bases, requiring people to reconstruct, transform and \r diversify livelihoods (Uddin et al., 2021). Examples of livelihood shifts \r across Asia and Southeast Asia (e.g., Bangladesh, India, Philippines, \r Vietnam) include rural communities in coastal areas, urban settlements \r that are experiencing economic losses (high confidence) from, for \r example, crop failure and reduced access to fish, which contribute to \r non-economic losses associated with involuntary migration (Ghosh, \r 2018) and the malnutrition of children (Siddiqi et  al., 2011). For \r Bangladesh, Chiba et al. (2017) show a connection between mental \r stress and impacts to the fundamental capacity to sustain livelihoods, \r such as food and a place to live, due to severe damage to houses, \r homesteads, properties, livestock and crops, loss of family members \r and relatives, and anxiousness about securing employment and \r [...]"


id: 783873e21d8ee769a5c62cd496ae11e0
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"[...] income in the future. In Bangladesh coastal communities experienced \r losses in livelihood assets due to Cyclones Sidr and Aila (Uddin et al., \r 2021) and a significant number of cyclone victims were displaced \r from their homes by severe cyclones. People have had to change their \r occupations--both intra- and intersectorally--and are confronted \r by increased consumption and social costs. The study uncovered \r differences in impacts between occupations, such as farming and \r fishing; fishers changed their occupation post-disaster. The study also \r showed evidence that local people are learning to live with change and \r uncertainty by nurturing and combining various types of knowledge \r and social memory, generating diversified livelihood options and \r self-organising to enhance their resilience to future extreme weather \r events. In Bangladesh, Ahmed et al. (2019) found cyclones, riverbank \r erosion, salinity intrusion and floods negatively impacted people's \r [...]"


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"[...] lives by reducing their livelihood options. Their study found that when \r there are limited adaptation strategies, many people turn to 'illegal \r livelihoods' included using fine mesh nets to collect shrimp fry in the \r rivers, as well as logging in the Sundarbans. These people include the \r poorest and vulnerable, and law enforcement only exacerbates their \r vulnerability. Escarcha et  al. (2020), studied impacts of typhoons, \r floods and droughts on crop production and effects on livelihoods of \r cash crop focused on rural villages in the Philippines. Their preliminary \r observations show a shift from crop to livestock production as a buffer \r activity to recover from crop losses. Farmers changed their farming \r activities as a multi-adaptive response driven by past experiences of \r climatic changes, farmers' social relations, household capacity and \r resources available.\r In Central Asia, the Sahel and South Asia, three global poverty hotspots, \r [...]"


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"[...] change impacts were shown to undermine traditional knowledge about \r livelihoods in ways that jeopardise future culture cohesion and sense "


id: 71d483bdbe0dd891f7cee19937ff0531
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"In Africa, many communities already experience drought- and flood\u0002related disasters (high confidence) such as those that negatively \r impact livelihoods and assets in the Muzarabani district of Zimbabwe \r (Mavhura, 2017). In Muzarabani community has revived and \r developed new livelihood strategies to manage risks, including local \r informal safety nets, local farming practices and the traditional flood\u0002proofing structures. Food security and agriculture productivity are \r examples of livelihood resources most at risk to climate hazards (see \r Figure  8.2) (high confidence). An illustration of such risks to cocoa \r farmers in Ghana includes increased incidences of crop pests and \r diseases, wilting of cocoa leaves, high mortality of cocoa seedlings \r which affected expansion and farm rehabilitation, and wilting of \r cherelles resulting in losses of crop yield. An illustration of livelihood \r shifts resulting from losses is of farmers shifting to cereals due to the \r [...]"


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"[...] unpredictable climatic patterns and the shortened duration of rainfall. \r Yet, insecurity with storage, supply chains and low returns from cereal \r production, coupled with land scarcity in the Western region, have \r resulted in a return to cocoa production (Asante et al., 2017)."


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"Research from Australia shows complex linkages between the impacts \r of drought on livelihood income, health and cultural heritage, increasing \r risk of heat stroke, and possibly a link to suicide among male farmers \r (Alston, 2012; Hanigan et  al., 2012; Marshall et  al., 2019). The link \r between agricultural losses and suicides has also been noted in South \r Asia, including India (Carleton, 2017). Livelihoods are shifting with \r impacts to well-being, as noted by (Evans et al., 2016), who showed \r connections between loss of fishery productivity and impact on tourism \r sector livelihoods in the Great Barrier Reef region. In Europe, losses \r to Indigenous Peoples are associated with loss of well-being of Sami \r communities and has forced livelihood shifts from reindeer herding \r due to loss of ecosystems to support the animals (Persson et al., 2017; \r Jaakkola et al., 2018). Traditional pastoralist systems are also greatly \r [...]"


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"[...] impacted by cumulative dual challenges of encroachment of other \r land users and by climate change. Traditional Sami reindeer herding \r strategies are still practiced, but the rapidly changing environmental \r circumstances are forcing herders into uncharted territories where \r traditional strategies and the transmission of knowledge between "


id: d3b871cdc081c9bdd74e8d83e66cf73e
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"In summary, across regions there is an increasing number of examples \r of observed economic and NELD from climate change. Adaptation \r measures need to better incorporate actions to tackle the burgeoning \r negative social, psychological and well-being impacts of climate \r change (Barnett et al., 2016; Box 8.5). At present, losses from climate \r change are potentially growing faster than adaptation measures \r across the globe. It is still uncertain how economic and non-economic \r losses trigger successful or viable new climate-related livelihood \r transitions for the poor and people or groups in vulnerable situations \r in the future (see Sections  8.4.4; 8.4.5). In all likelihoods, economic \r losses from climate hazards (e.g., drought) will be compounded by \r many factors including COVID-19 and other vulnerability drivers. For \r instance, globally, small-scale coffee producers have been destabilised \r by COVID-19, but also because of a history of recurrent (climate) shocks \r [...]"


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"[...] and structural inequalities, and may have to shift into alternative \r livelihoods (Guido et al., 2020). Coastal communities in Vanuatu have \r been impacted in the immediate period after COVID-19 showing \r changes in village populations, loss of cash income and difficulties in \r accessing food, and have experienced shifting pressures on particular \r resources and habitats (Steenbergen et al., 2020). This trend poses real \r challenges to equity and sustainability."


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"Linkages between losses, coping strategies and livelihood shifts in \r small islands (e.g., in the Pacific region, Kiribati and Tuvalu, and in \r the Caribbean, the Bahamas) shed light on impacted low-income \r households. For example, farmers have experienced extensive damage \r to homes and loss of infrastructure, and experience lack of migration \r opportunities (Curtain and Dornan, 2019). Evidence is growing that \r there is also significant loss of cultural heritage in resettlement \r (Barnett and O'neill, 2012), evidence from small islands' displaced \r communities suggests that resettlement can have impacts on sense of \r place, identity and social fabric, a theme highly relevant to loss, coping \r and adapting livelihoods, and not only restricted to small islands \r (McNamara et al., 2021b). Roberts (2015) identified loss of communal \r sites in Kiribati. It is predicted that, by 2050, up to 80% of the land \r on the island of Buariki and 50% of the land on Bikenibeu may be \r [...]"


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"[...] completely inundated and these effects will result in significant loss \r of livelihoods and displacement. Throughout the Caribbean, evidence \r indicates that there will be an overall reduction in the area of land \r suitable for crop cultivation, as the region's climate gets progressively \r warmer and as rainfall becomes more variable (Rhiney et al., 2016)."


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"The multiple shocks of extreme events reduce crop yields, destroy homes, \r and lead to loss of infrastructure and displacement (high confidence). \r These are experienced in South and North America. For example, in Peru, \r glacial outbursts have led to loss of livelihoods (Drenkhan et al., 2019). \r People use a range of coping and adaptation strategies to deal with \r hazards where they live, such as shifting livelihood activities, inputs or \r production areas. However, traditional techniques are increasingly failing \r due to changing weather patterns. Across Peru, findings demonstrate \r that people use temporary and permanent migration among their many \r coping and adaptation strategies. Hazards related to water excess have \r been the key force in destroying homes and driving displacement in \r Peru. In contrast, studies demonstrate that water scarcity also threatens \r [...]"


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"[...] livelihoods and thereby influences migration in Peru. While non\u0002climatic reasons for moving dominate migrants' motivations in many \r areas of Peru, water-related climatic drivers of migration are becoming \r increasingly relevant (Wrathall et al., 2014). Peru's smallholder farmers \r and urban poor are not responsible for the climate crisis, yet their lives \r and cultural heritage are being increasingly jeopardised by its effects, \r making improvements in governance an imperative for Peru (Bergmann \r et  al., 2021). Another area of significance is coffee production in \r Brazil, where the majority of Brazilian coffee farms are operated by \r smallholders, producers with relatively small properties, who are \r mostly reliant on family labour (Koh et al., 2020). In the USA (e.g., New \r Orleans and Puerto Rico), people have lost livelihoods due to displaced \r households and destroyed homes, leading to loss of income, as well \r [...]"


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"[...] as loss of social networks and family networks and loss of cultural \r heritage. For example, impacts of Hurricane Katrina have led to people \r being displaced from their employment, many evacuees had to relocate \r to new areas, which disrupted their social networks and placed them "


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"In summary, this section has moved beyond the IPCC WGII AR5 in \r laying out structural elements of vulnerability and climate-related \r vulnerability hotspots globally, such as poverty, lack of access to basic \r services, gender inequality and undernourishment. The assessment \r provides new quantitative evidence about the global spatial \r distribution of systemic human vulnerability and therewith underscores \r that various hotspots of countries classified as having very high or \r high vulnerability emerge in regional clusters. In addition, the number \r of people living in very highly and highly vulnerable country contexts \r is significantly higher in some assessments, with even twice as many \r as the number of people living in countries classified as having low \r and very low vulnerability. The evidence suggests that statistically \r relevant differences in fatalities per hazard event are not just a \r product of the hazard event, but also strongly linked with the level \r [...]"


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"[...] of vulnerability of the region or community exposed. The assessment \r of non-economic losses has also received little attention in past IPCC \r Assessment Reports, therefore this section has provided new insights \r on how (next to measurable economic losses) non-economic losses \r and intangible losses emerge. These non-economic losses represent \r an important dimension of societal impacts of climate change that \r has not sufficiently captured so far within standard damage or post\u0002disaster assessments. Finally, the section provides evidence about the \r existing adaptation gap in terms of differential vulnerabilities and \r various non-economic losses already experienced."


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"Between 2015 and 2017, the Western Cape region experienced an unprecedented three consecutive years of below average rainfall, \r leading to acute water shortages, most prominently in the city of Cape Town (Sousa et al., 2018). Anthropogenic climate change made \r the drought five to six times more likely (Pascale et al., 2020; see also AR6 WGI Chapter 10, Section 10.6.2). The severity of the drought \r presented new challenges to the existing management and governance capacity to ensure equitable and sustainable water service \r delivery. The city's water supply infrastructure and demand management practice were unprepared for the 'rare and severe' event of three \r consecutive years of below average rainfall (Wolski, 2018; Muller, 2019). Despite a potential total storage volume of about 900,000 Ml \r of water (enough water for around a year and a half of normal usage, after taking evaporation into account), Cape Town's reservoirs fell \r [...]"


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"[...] from 97% full in 2014 to less than 20% in May 2018 (Ouweneel et al., 2020; Cole et al., 2021). The drought saw residents queue for water \r as restrictions were imposed together with threats of closure of water provision to households (Sorensen, 2017; Scheba and Millington, \r 2018). Poor communication in the early stages of the drought (Hellberg, 2020) and a lack of trust in the administration contributed to \r a near-panic situation at the threat of 'Day Zero' as dams almost ran dry in the first half of 2018 (Enqvist and Ziervogel, 2019; Simpson \r et al., 2020c). 'Day Zero' was avoided largely through public response, water demand management and the 2018 winter rains (Sorensen, \r 2017; Booysen et al., 2019a; Muller, 2019; Rodina, 2019b; Matikinca et al., 2020). At a household level, responses to the drought showed \r everyday residents can display unprecedented degrees of resilience (Sorensen, 2017), including behavioural and attitudinal shifts and \r [...]"


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"[...] technological innovation across the full socioeconomic spectrum (Ouweneel et  al., 2020). But the private nature of some of these \r responses extended existing inequality in water access through privileged forms of 'gated adaptation' by elites which conventional water \r governance arrangements were unprepared for (Simpson et al., 2019b; Simpson et al., 2020a)."


id: d2f9b0e848cb5c51b37641ca2c860f9d
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"These 'climate gating' actions, such as drilling boreholes, secured water access for high-income households and companies, but excluded \r a large proportion of Cape Town's population who could not afford such private technologies (Simpson et al., 2019a; Simpson et al., \r 2020b). These responses were unanticipated by the city administration and compounded fiscal challenges faced by the municipality \r which could no longer use revenues from high-consumption households to cross-subsidise water for low-income households (Simpson \r et al., 2020a). This shift threatened to undermine the sustainability of the municipal fiscus and general water access ( Box 9.8; Simpson \r et al., 2019a; Simpson et al., 2020a). In order to recover losses, municipal water tariffs for consumers were raised by 26% in 2018 (Muller, \r 2018; Simpson et al., 2019a). In addition to a decline in tourism, median estimations of the overall economic impact of the drought \r [...]"


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"[...] indicate loss of 27.6 billion South African Rand (USD 1.7 billion) translating into 64,810 job losses in the Western Cape, with Cape Town \r accounting for approximately half of those job losses (DEDAT, 2018). This had a disproportionate impact on unskilled and semi-skilled \r workers, particularly for those from low- and middle-income households (DEDAT, 2018). The drought also exacerbated the potential for \r sanitation health risks of the urban poor where tens of thousands of people lack access to safely managed sanitation facilities (Enqvist \r and Ziervogel, 2019)."


id: abe674a93c52c1653db8ef8a978fbdf9
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"The Day Zero Disaster Plan included prioritising and protecting the poor and most vulnerable communities where critical infrastructure \r and facilities and vulnerable and informal residential areas would remain connected while higher-income residential areas would be \r cut off (Cole et  al., 2021). Yet it is important to recognise that pre-existing deficiencies in service delivery meant water access for \r the urban poor did not change as significantly during the drought, particularly those in informal settlements who collect water from \r standpipes (Enqvist and Ziervogel, 2019; Matikinca et al., 2020). For these communities, the negative economic impact of the drought was \r compounded by the unintended consequences of demand management regulation emanating from the drought response. South Africa \r ostensibly ensures a constitutional right to water, regardless of ability to pay (Rodina, 2016), 58). Since 2018, however, as a consequence \r [...]"


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"[...] of new water tariffs instituted during the drought, Cape Town residents now have had to 'prove their poverty' in order to register as \r indigent households and access their water right (Scheba and Millington, 2018). Further, since 2007 and with increasing effect during the \r drought, the municipality has installed approximately 250,000 water management devices as a credit control and, during the drought, \r also a consumption control measure. As these have been largely installed in low-income homes, this control measure disproportionately \r affected poor households (Scheba and Millington, 2018; Enqvist and Ziervogel, 2019)."


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"The Cape Town case highlights how disaster planning for slow-onset city-wide shocks will be become increasingly important to safeguard \r equity and sustainability across African cities (Cole et al., 2021). It demonstrates the importance of integrating state and non-state \r responses to climate change in municipal adaptation and disaster planning (Booysen et al., 2019a; Booysen et al., 2019b; Simpson et al., \r 2020a), particularly for responses with unintended consequences. Further, water tariff models need to be flexible enough and have built\u0002in redundancies in order to prioritise the needs of the urban poor and ensure climate responses do not disproportionately affect low\u0002income groups and deepen existing inequalities (Scheba and Millington, 2018; Enqvist and Ziervogel, 2019; Simpson et al., 2019b). \r Systems and relationships of mutual accountability can also build more effective water management between spheres of government and \r [...]"


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"[...] enhance horizontal collaboration between municipal departments and non-state entities (Ziervogel, 2019b; Ziervogel, 2019a)."


id: 6fc285456459ce81dea9424d8a583519
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"Future climate vulnerability and risks to livelihood security are \r significantly influenced by present and past development trends, equity \r and sustainability. Consequently, observed impacts covered in previous \r sections provide essential insight for enhancing future adaptation and \r risk reduction. Since the AR5, new research approaches incorporate \r past lessons to project and assess climate change vulnerability and \r socioeconomic conditions into the future. Scenario tools and methods \r are a powerful approach for integrated assessments of emissions \r pathways, associated warming and development contexts, helpful in \r guiding analysis of adaptation policy and planning (Berkhout et al., \r 2014; Birkmann et  al., 2021a). Both quantitative and qualitative \r scenario approaches that assess future vulnerability and risks, as well \r as livelihood challenges at global, national and local scales, allow \r experts, planners, decision makers and affected people to articulate \r [...]"


id: c3722250e3d6f349ec46452cf336a077
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"[...] and visualise development futures. These approaches can complement \r emissions pathway scenarios."


id: b9c0aea1bba8c68e1a91fa2b17d3a4
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"Contrasting with 'top-down' SSP scenarios, (Berkhout et  al., 2014) \r outline how mesoscale and 'bottom-up' scenarios have been developed \r to inform spatial planning, for example, in the Netherlands. Increasing \r computational power has opened possibilities for large-scale 'bottom\u0002up' simulations of people's livelihoods in the context of evolving \r climate change impacts, such as the migration decisions of farmers \r facing drought in Mexico over the coming century (Bell et al., 2019) and \r livelihood decisions of people facing coastal flooding in Bangladesh \r to the year 2100 (Bell et al., 2021). Such 'bottom-up' scenarios can \r generate projections about future outcomes, inform mapping and \r assess future vulnerability, with special emphasis on livelihoods of the \r poor. Researchers conclude that results of respective scenarios that \r aim to inform adaptation and risk reduction policies in the context of \r climate change have to match the frames of the stakeholder (Berkhout \r [...]"


id: 2400d593f43ae1dd7e811022d7835391
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"[...] et  al., 2014; Conway et  al., 2019). Scenarios that assess potential \r future vulnerabilities and future capacities for adaptation require \r more attention, since many approaches for projecting future climate \r risk still largely overlook non-climatic drivers that determine future \r vulnerability and exposure (Windfeld et al., 2019)."


id: 56dcf4aff711253a8ed8fa07fbc01c37
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"In addition, Smirnov et al. (2016) conclude that worldwide the number \r of people exposed to extreme droughts will increase under both the \r RCP4.5 and the RCP8.5 particularly at the end of the century. The authors \r assess that under RCP4.5 the average monthly global population \r exposed to drought will increase between the periods 2008-2017 \r and 2081-2100 from a mean of 80 million to 212 million, and under \r RCP8.5 from about 90  million to approximately 472  million people. \r The research findings underscore that there is a high probability that \r exposure to extreme droughts will increase, particularly in regions and \r countries already classified as highly vulnerable (e.g., Nigeria, Sudan, \r etc.) (Smirnov et al., 2016). Extreme droughts are expected to further \r erode coping and adaptive capacities of those already characterised \r by high levels of vulnerability (see Section  8.3.1). Building adaptive \r capacities for the most vulnerable groups in the future in these areas \r [...]"


id: eaf1ec44d9a957fde41695f8b4da851a
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"[...] will be a challenge, since high levels of livelihood insecurity are coupled \r with high levels of structural vulnerability at national and regional \r scale (poverty, state fragility, etc.) making planned adaptation support \r very complex and difficult. Therefore, increasing adaptation gaps at \r different scales are anticipated in the future."


id: a7f2bdf8826aa6980686b70b559841fd
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"Increasing population exposure (e.g., due to urbanisation of coastal \r zones, etc.), coupled with higher frequencies and intensities of specific \r climate hazards are likely in connection with the existing adaptation \r gap (e.g., high levels of vulnerability) to compromise development \r and human security. Recent studies, such as that by Harrington \r (2018), conclude that the actual exposure and the physical individual \r recognition of some climate hazards, will be higher in low-income \r countries. The study of Harrington (2018) underscores that changes \r in extreme heat, for example, will be felt by the average citizen of \r a low-income country after 1.5degC of global warming and will not \r be felt by about 40% of people living in high-income nations until \r well after double the amount of global warming is reached (3degC \r increase). In this context, even if a city or place is exposed to heat \r stress, people experience it quite differently due to different levels of \r [...]"


id: 7f3f098ff51c3e08890d5d45e95750ae
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"et al., 2019). The concept of tipping points is usually associated with \r large-scale components of the climate system that could be pushed \r past an irretrievable threshold as a result of human-induced climate \r change (Lenton et  al., 2008), such as the deterioration of Antarctic \r ice sheets (Pattyn and Morlighem, 2020). Social tipping points refer \r to similar mechanisms of destabilisation resulting from impacts of \r climate change on human societies at multiple scales and the societal \r context conditions in which these impacts occur. They are reached \r when climate change impacts force destabilising social transformations \r from one state to another (Lenton et al., 2019): from sporadic losses \r due to climate change to chronic losses and impoverishment, from \r peace to violence, from a democracy to an authoritarian regime, from \r adequate food provisioning to famine, or into forced migration. For \r example, small variations in the rainfall or temperature can jeopardise \r [...]"


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"[...] livelihoods that are dependent upon subsistence agriculture, which can \r lead to migration or tensions around resources (see Figure 8.11). Social \r tipping points can also occur when intangible elements that ensure the \r survival of individuals and communities are eroded or removed. This \r is the case, for example, when the social fabric of a community falls \r apart. The Millennium drought in Australia led to higher rates of male \r suicide, especially among farmers, and droughts in Ghana led to similar \r outcome when people were forced to drink from the same water source \r as their animals, which they perceived as robbing them off their human \r dignity (Bryant and Garnham, 2015; Tschakert et al., 2019)."


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"Responses to climate change can have dual effects on development \r pathways. On the one hand, mitigation and adaptation processes \r can create significant development opportunities. The potential of \r mitigation policies for job creation, in particular, has been highlighted \r (Healy and Barry, 2017). However, responses to climate change can also \r have detrimental effects on future development: mitigation policies, \r such as the building of hydro-electrical dams or the culture of biofuels \r can lead to communities' dislocation and populations' resettlement, \r particularly of disadvantaged groups within a society (de Sherbinin \r et al., 2011; Eriksen et al., 2021). Adaptation policies can also hinder \r some development processes: for example, the promotion of migration \r as an adaptation strategy can lead to communities being deprived of \r their workforce and resenting the departure of some of their members \r (Gemenne and Blocher, 2017), even though this may offer new \r [...]"


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"[...] livelihood opportunities. However, the migration consequences in the \r context of climate change are often more nuanced and different trade\u0002offs and benefits occur (see Porst and Sakdapolrak, 2020). For example, \r remittances support family members but, at the same time, can also \r create imbalances in local markets (Melde et  al., 2017). Evidence \r exists that some climate responses, such as small-scale agricultural \r livelihood adaptation strategies, have improved the ability of people \r to sustain their livelihood and to reduce poverty (Osbahr et al., 2010)."


id: 2557fde168322a3fd317bd120902a2a7
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"Empirical evidence shows that social tipping points can be triggered \r long before climate tipping points are reached. For example, recent \r research in West Africa shows that migration decisions are often based \r on the perceptions of environmental changes by local populations \r rather than on the actual observed changes (De Longueville et  al., \r 2020). The migration of some members of a community can also \r trigger the migration of the whole group, as the migration of some \r members can have a strong impact on the community (Gemenne and \r Blocher, 2017). In other contexts, the expectation of a climate impact \r can trigger social or political shifts: for example, the expectation of \r lower snow cover levers can reduce or stop investments in ski resorts. \r Some planned relocations of populations are already underway in \r anticipation of future climate impacts (de Sherbinin et al., 2011), while \r the government of Indonesia decided in 2019 to move its capital city, \r [...]"


id: b66d52cf068d73ba0b8f03b11c647d97
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"Livelihood shifts may also take place proactively as new opportunities \r emerge and reduce climate impacts by providing buffers of financial \r capital. For example, Hirons (2014) assesses artisanal and small-scale \r mining as an emerging livelihood opportunity in Ghana. Evidence \r challenges the popular assertion around the idea of wealth seeking for \r short-term profit and reveals an alternative scenario whereby artisanal \r and small-scale mining can be a poverty-driven activity, particularly in \r areas in which agricultural employment has not delivered sufficient \r income or where crops are highly exposed and sensitive to climate \r change impacts. Income from new livelihood activities can support \r recovery following specific events (major flooding or drought) linked \r to climate hazards and climate change. Livelihood shifts therefore \r take place in a highly dynamic and heterogeneous context. Another \r example comes from the Small Lake Chad, Republic of Chad studied by \r [...]"


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"[...] (Okpara et al., 2016a). Fluctuating water levels linked to seasonal flood \r pulses and droughts were shown to link closely to livelihood dynamics. "


id: 9a5dc3913b5d5c61699669a4818291a9
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"Lake drying led to new adaptive behaviours based on seasonality (e.g., \r migration of herders to different areas of the lake shore to access \r water resources, in line with more predictable seasonal changes), as \r well as linking to opportunism supported by climate change impacts. \r For example, during times of lake flooding, new opportunities for \r fishing opened for people that were otherwise operating primarily as \r pastoral or agricultural households. However, these kinds of livelihood \r shifts remain largely reactive and can bring negative as well as positive \r impacts. In the Lake Chad case, it resulted in social clashes between \r different groups, while in other examples from Tanzania, livelihood \r shifts towards extensification of farming led to deforestation (Suckall \r et  al., 2014), which could constitute a maladaptive shift. Such \r findings have important implications for the types of government and \r [...]"


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"[...] institutional support that can enable livelihood shifts and highlight the \r need to consider trade-offs for climate change mitigation, as well as \r with other adaptation options (see Section 8.6)."


id: 328f84ef8ca69941243cbbfa8f09b000
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"Key risks due to future climate change, exposure and vulnerability \r are difficult to assess and are based on evidence from the past and \r likely future vulnerabilities and livelihood challenges. The assessment \r of Representative Key Risks (see Section 16.5.2.3.4) underscores that \r risks to living standards are potentially severe as measured by the \r magnitude of impacts in comparison to historical events or as inferred \r from the number of people currently vulnerable (see in detail Chapter \r 16). Table 8.4 provides an overview of what is known in the literature \r assessed about future risks, inequalities and particularly future \r vulnerabilities, including potential challenges for climate justice and \r adaptation barriers. For example, barriers for gender, ethnicity and class \r have been addressed for a long time yet need substantive intervention. \r Gender, along with many other structural inequalities (Table  8.4) \r [...]"


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"[...] that are deeply rooted, pose future threats to people and groups in \r vulnerable situations from, for example, the loss of land or assets, \r exposure to extreme events and so on. These people will also likely be \r highly exposed to future climate risks unless there are significant and \r new avenues for action on climate change now. For example, recent \r studies suggest that the total population of all countries classified "


id: 1b42a4b6da632c07eac4ea6b0e3fe360
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"The climate change risks in this section are addressed through the lens \r of livelihoods, human, food, water and ecosystem security, building \r on key impacts and risks since AR5 (Oppenheimer et al., 2014) and \r key findings from SR1.5degC (Hoegh-Guldberg et  al., 2018; Roy et  al., \r 2018), SROCC (IPCC, 2019b), and SRCCL (IPCC, 2019a). The AR5 \r WGII risk tables (IPCC, 2014b), updated in SR1.5degC (Roy et al., 2018) \r offer an interesting entry point as they show high confidence on key \r observed impacts and limits to the adaptation of natural and social \r systems that are compounded by the effects of poverty and inequality \r on water scarcity, ecosystem alteration and degradation, coastal \r cities in relation to sea level rise, cyclones and coastal erosion, food \r systems and human health (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018; Roy et al., \r 2018). As a consequence, climate change risks pose substantially \r negative impacts on climate-sensitive livelihoods of smallholder \r [...]"


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"[...] farmers, fisheries communities, urban poor, Indigenous Peoples and \r informal settlements, with limits to adaptation evidenced by the loss \r of income, ecosystems and health, and increasing migration (Roy \r et al., 2018). The compounded effects of socioeconomic development \r patterns and climate change impacts are worst in climate-sensitive \r ecosystems in the Arctic and SIDS (Roy et al., 2018). The future risks \r to these climate-sensitive ecosystems and livelihoods are potentially \r severe given their current high exposure to climate hazards, and high \r number of vulnerable of people exposed for example in the SIDS (see \r also Chapter 16; Ahmadalipour et  al., 2019; Liu and Chen, 2021). \r Residual losses then may be unavoidable for some ecosystems and \r livelihoods affecting the vulnerable groups of people and countries as \r consequences of structural poverty, socioeconomic, gender and ethnic \r inequalities, that marginalise and exclude and limit the development \r [...]"


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"The incidence of floods also increases the occurrence of diseases (e.g., \r diarrhoea and respiratory infections) and undernutrition in children \r living in informal settlements and slums in Asia (Ghosh, 2018) and \r Africa (Clark et al., 2020). Women and children are currently bearing \r the worst impacts of climate hazards, and are unable to move due \r to assigned gender roles to avoid flooding risks in highly vulnerable \r slums in Bangladesh. This results in poor living conditions and causes \r the women emotional distress (Ayeb-Karlsson et al., 2020). This region \r experienced severe floods associated with death, injury, infectious \r disease, mental and emotional stress and cultural disruptions--\r dimensions of non-economic losses that are often not accounted for in \r disaster relief policies (Chiba et al., 2017) and these greatly influence \r the ability to build adaptive capacities for future hazards (Roy et al., \r 2018). In the same way, risks to female-headed households that have \r [...]"


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"[...] insecure tenure rights are greater. This group was the most affected \r by flooding in 2018 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, costing 3-4% of the \r country's GDP and affecting 4.5 million people (Erman et al., 2019)."


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"Likewise, in the Amazon basin, climate change hazards of severe \r droughts and floods (high confidence) (Cox et  al., 2004; IPCC, \r 2019a) are revealing limits to adaptation among the majority \r of riverine communities and smallholder farmers with residual \r impacts associated with losses of income, fisheries and agricultural \r productivity, as well as affecting non-economic livelihood dimensions, \r such as the ability to attend school and losses of place and identity \r through forced migration (Maru et al., 2014; Pinho et al., 2015; Lapola \r et  al., 2018). Furthermore, the expansion of the agricultural frontier \r and construction of large dams to supply energy needs in the Amazon \r basin are amplifying the vulnerabilities and reducing future adaptive \r capacities of smallholders and the fisheries communities to climate \r risk (Bro et al., 2018; Castro-Diaz et al., 2018). It is expected that a \r global temperature warming level of 2degC by 2050 in the Amazon will \r [...]"


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"[...] lead to a significant reduction of water flow in major rivers leading to \r further food and water insecurity (Betts et al., 2018). This is affecting \r forest- and river-dependent livelihoods in the region (Box 8.6; Lapola \r et al., 2018)."


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"In the Himalayas (part of the Hindu Kush Himalaya, HKH) temperature \r warming is expected to increase up to 2degC by 2050 (high confidence), \r increasing flooding and bringing larger risks to food and water security \r for mountain communities that are already highly vulnerable given \r limited livelihood options and supporting infrastructure in these regions \r (Mishra et al., 2017). In Nepal, agriculture-orientated livelihoods are \r reported to be negatively affected by an increase in landslide frequency \r (92.6%) and intensity (97.3%) over a 20  years period (1996-2016) \r (van Der Geest and Schindler, 2016). The catastrophic landslide in 2014 \r caused material losses associated with loss of crops and land to poor \r households that were 14 times greater than their annual gains. The \r NELD losses were emotional distress and fear of new event occurrence, \r showing that poorest households may not fully recover following \r an extreme event. This example is indicative of the representative \r [...]"


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"[...] future climate risks to these populations. Livelihood diversification is \r commonly adopted by poor households and smallholders in Nepal to \r reduce the impacts of extreme rainfall and landslides. However, there \r are limits to these strategies given poor household infrastructure that \r challenge risk reduction, as a result, it is expected that migration to \r neighbouring countries as Bhutan or India will increase (van Der Geest \r and Schindler, 2016)."


id: 8dc23e09012159e5146298a60179215c
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"The glacier retreat associated with the increase in global warming \r temperature has also shown losses that are permanent and related \r to a sense of belonging and cultural heritage for glacier countries. The \r most negative livelihood impacts are experienced by poor households \r in the Peruvian Andes and Himalayas (Jurt et al., 2015). The risks for \r smallholder livelihoods in glaciated regions are expected to increase \r as the shrinking glaciers result in increased water competition, crop \r failure and extreme flooding (Kraaijenbrink et al., 2017). For example, \r in Bhutan adaptive measures such as changing crops, developing \r irrigation channels and sharing water among community members \r are still insufficient to avoid L&D associated with the dramatically \r reduced water availability (Kusters and Wangdi, 2013; Warner and \r Van der Geest, 2013). In high-mountain regions, the intersections of \r agro-pastoralist marginalisation, difficulty of access and ecological \r [...]"


id: 863a334a8222a7fb3012434b71632baa
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"[...] sensitivity contribute to residual impacts associated with extreme \r climate hazards, which can lead to irreversible losses and challenge \r poverty reduction efforts (Mishra et al., 2019)."


id: 9325a5aac401c0877aaf1e52b91becb6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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content:
"There is increasing evidence that maladaptation can lead to future \r risks to socio-ecological security. Adaptation measures focusing \r on short-term action can lead to adverse longer-term impacts to \r livelihoods and failures to address transboundary scales to avoid \r negative consequences for social and ecological systems (Warner \r and Van der Geest, 2013; Roy et al., 2018; Mechler et al., 2019a; see \r also Section  5.13.3). Hence, maladaptation can intensify and even \r accelerate future risks as a result of climate change mitigation and \r adaptation policies when responses to climate change hazards are \r embedded within business-as-usual development approaches (Work \r et al., 2019). For instance, in Cambodia, the conventional development \r strategies intertwined with climate change mitigation and adaptation \r initiatives are increasing the probability of maladaptive outcomes in \r the context of high informality, and conflicts among poor farmers \r [...]"


id: 62d8d63d88dcc3e6b57cab7c1a6ff933
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"[...] exposed and vulnerable to flooding (Work et al., 2019). The potential \r for maladaptation emerges from the vulnerability of precarious living \r conditions of informal poor farmers, not accounted for in climate \r mitigation and adaptation strategies for irrigation, protected areas "


id: 2a79f1a9528e41d7b32676bf5276c536
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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content:
"The Amazon ecosystem, together with the Arctic, is listed as the first of five IPCC Reasons for Concern due to climate change, given \r the high confidence level that different temperature warming and GHG emissions will pose significant risks that threaten these unique \r ecosystems (O'Neill et  al., 2017b; Roy et  al., 2018). In addition to the scientific evidence, a resurgence of cross-national collective \r expressions about the fate of the Amazon forest, Indigenous Peoples and traditional communities, in the context of an unprecedented \r climate crisis and sustainable future, have gained pronounced importance. On 19 August 2019, the skies of Sao Paulo State were dark \r by 3 pm due to the formation of a 'smoke corridor' associated with the extensive burning of the Amazon forest (Seymour and Harris, \r 2019). The fire outbreaks were a consequence of multiple factors related to political, social, economic and environmental scenarios \r [...]"


id: be4100cf61590255eb215aa3a6c78bfe
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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"[...] concomitant with the weakening of environmental governance, such as control and monitoring of deforestation and fire incidences \r programmes (Escobar, 2019; Seymour and Harris, 2019). The deforestation rate and incidences of fire are both increasing in the Amazon \r of Brazil, Colombia and Peru (Seymour and Harris, 2019). Accordingly, 2019 registered an increase of 60% in the cumulative fire count \r in Brazil, Bolivia and Peru in comparison with the same period in 2018, and a 12% increase in comparison with the same period in an \r extremely dry year in 2016 (GFED, 2019). In this context, looking at this case study through the lenses of poverty, inequality and the SDGs, \r it addresses the compound effect of climate and land use change in the Amazon forest fires and its cascading impacts and risks on the \r social domain in the region. There is evidence that both climate and land use change impacts and risks are disproportionately borne by \r [...]"


id: 488e4da094e5b28a40bae8a4e6103767
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"[...] poor and vulnerable ethnic groups, remote rural communities and poor urban households in the Amazon (Pinho et al., 2015; Brondizio \r et al., 2016; Mansur et al., 2016; Pinho, 2016)."


id: 471dcefab6125d665f149e3dd3368bdf
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"Fires are not a natural phenomenon in the Amazon region (Bush et al., 2004; McMichael et al., 2012); they are used for food security, \r hunting and religious rituals by Indigenous Peoples and traditional communities (Hecht, 2006; Carmenta et al., 2019; da Cunha, 2020), \r and also as a widespread technique for land clearing for small- and large-scale farms for agriculture (Morello et al., 2019). The dramatically \r increased forest burning observed in the Amazon recently are the result of illegal land grabbing, the small-a and large-scale cattle \r ranching sector and agribusiness practices coupled with loosening of land tenure policies and decision makers' neglect of deforestation \r and burning monitoring data (Nobre et  al., 2016; Lovejoy and Nobre, 2018; Leal Filho et  al., 2020a). The fire outbreaks intensified \r substantially to the point that, in August 2019, there were approximately 3500 fires in 148 Indigenous territories (DETER and INPE, 2019; \r [...]"


id: 8045c28c6fbb9e27e9a3c70f63ea61ea
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"[...] ISA, 2019). Although most of the burning in the Legal Amazon in Brazil occurred on private land of medium and larger sizes (about 67%), "


id: d59d19a699b567a2e8ff1739be072b44
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content:
"around 33% was observed within Indigenous territories and protected areas called conservation units (UCs) (DETER and INPE, 2019; ISA, \r 2019). In 2019, 40% of the deforestation occurred in public forests, which encompasses undesignated forest lands, Indigenous territories \r and UCs. This deforestation came accompanied by fires: 18% of the 2019 fires occurred on undesignated lands, 7% on Indigenous \r territories and 6% on UCs, where many traditional populations live (Alencar et al., 2020). During 2019, 46% of the deforestation and \r 52% of the fires occurred on private rural properties and settlements, respectively, where legal accountability for these crimes is possible. \r The 2020 deforestation rate increased by 47% and 9.5% compared to 2018 and 2019, respectively, and was the highest in the decade \r (Silveira et al., 2020). The clear-cut inside indigenous territories more than doubled from 2018 to 2019 (Brasilis, 2021) and, despite it \r [...]"


id: b1856820523ff2a206cf239c5b18dc4a
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"[...] decreasing from the 2019 rate, during 2020 it was the highest since 2008. On average, at least 50% of yearly active fires were within 5 km \r of deforested areas in the same year, reaching 74% during 2019 (Silveira et al., 2020). This means, that fires and deforestation have an \r increased threat to Indigenous populations (Oliveira et al., 2020), particularly during the year 2020 and currently in 2021, since COVID-19 \r and air pollution from agricultural burning greatly impacts respiratory health in the Amazon (Morello, 2021)."


id: 55ae834bdab914752f9df646134695be
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content:
"In Acre State, the fire incidence coupled with extreme droughts in 2005 and 2010 led to an increase--from 1.2% to 27%--in \r hospitalisations of children (under 5 years) due to respiratory diseases (Smith et al., 2015). The same evidence was found among the \r rapidly deforested areas known as the 'Arc of Deforestation', with a dramatically higher number of respiratory diseases recorded, mainly \r in children under 5 years (do Carmo et al., 2013). There is also evidence for interlinked dynamics between deforestation, urbanisation and \r incidence of fire episodes providing an appropriate environment for Anopheles darlingi vector propagation and the increased incidence \r of malaria in the region (Hahn et al., 2014). In the 2005 drought, burning in Acre alone recorded 400,000 people affected and the loss of \r 300,000 ha of forest with direct costs of USD 50 million (Brown et al., 2006). In 2010, the fires during the drought were approximately \r [...]"


id: 66a39b3d9d17ad92ebc16256611038f6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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content:
"[...] 16 times larger than those in the meteorologically normal years (Campanharo et al., 2019). The estimated total economic loss in 2010 \r was about USD 243.36 +- 85.05 million, representing 9.07 +- 2.46% of Acre's GDP (Campanharo et al., 2019). The economic and non\u0002economic losses associated with the impacts of climate change and future risks of fire outbreaks on native food crops (acai, guarana), \r livelihoods, tourism, medicinal and spiritual sites, culture, migration patterns, place-based attachments, emotional and mental distress \r among the most affected and vulnerable population as Indigenous Peoples and traditional communities are still to be fully estimated \r for the region (Pinho et al., 2015; Brondizio et al., 2016). Also relevant is a trend of Amazonian forest fires spreading from the southern \r Brazilian Amazon to Bolivia and Peru, indicating that transboundary burning increases are systemic and will lead to extensive economic \r [...]"


id: 2f87020ba09077d03ea8cc1277c6365d
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content:
"[...] losses of wild crops, infrastructure and livelihoods, requiring a landscape level approach for deforestation and fire management and \r control (Kalamandeen et al., 2018)."


id: 7bc04e41ac72ef112c37c5dba45d9128
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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content:
"In terms of adaptation and risk reduction, priority should be given to strengthening multi-scale governance and partnerships among \r different private and public actors. Policies at national and sub-national levels are needed, such as control strategies to reduce deforestation \r and fire incidence, demarcating new Indigenous territories, payment for ecosystem services (REDD+) and investment in traceability for \r commodity production chains are needed (Morello et al., 2017; Scarano, 2017; Carmenta et al., 2019; Seymour and Harris, 2019). The \r increase in global temperature level up to 2degC will exacerbate food and water insecurity in the Amazon (Betts et al., 2018; Hoegh\u0002Guldberg et al., 2018) (medium confidence). Thus, curbing fire incidence and deforestation rate will make it easier for Indigenous Peoples, \r traditional and vulnerable populations to reach the SDGs, especially in terms of reducing poverty (SDG1), improving food security (SDG2), \r [...]"


id: da3910a77112605aa35ec6b71391995f
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content:
"[...] improving well-being and health (SDG3) and protecting terrestrial ecosystem (SDG15) (Roy et al., 2018)."


id: 5398e655d583cde35a894798f469117a
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content:
"The maladaptation outcome also emerges as a failure of adaptation. In \r Ghana, poor farmers, facing crop yield failure during severe droughts \r further exacerbated by water use for irrigation have diversified their \r livelihoods (e.g., selling firewood for charcoal production).This is a \r form of maladaptation that can further increase their vulnerability to \r climate risks, compromising food production, income generation and \r sustainability (Antwi-Agyei et al., 2018b). In Cambodia, governmental \r adaptation strategies focusing on reforestation and conservation \r measures are eroding local biodiversity, and crop irrigation strategies \r are compromising scarce water resources and also excluding poor \r farmers, who are susceptible to flooding, from decision making and \r benefits (Work et al., 2019). Likewise, in Ethiopia, efforts of adaptation \r programmes to address droughts contribute to current unsustainable \r development trajectories among pastoralist communities, resulting in \r [...]"


id: 9ef4eea3c85f44443b5253134fac6930
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"[...] charcoal production, overgrazing, migration, conflict with other groups \r and marginalisation of livelihoods (Magnan et al., 2016). In the Sudan, \r maladaptation outcomes for the poor population are linked to a \r dependency on a war economy and post-conflict power dynamics that \r are and will continue to affect sustainability and equity in the context \r of drought incidence (Young and Ismail, 2019)."


id: 9ada68bd04d7a401c4f6f6fd89757421
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content:
"Table  8.6, built from SR1.5degC (Roy et  al., 2018), illustrates how \r ecological thresholds and socioeconomic determinants are linked to \r soft and hard adaptation limits and what the potential and magnitude \r of livelihoods risks will be in the future. For instance, in the SR1.5degC \r (IPCC, 2018b) and Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a \r Changing Climate (SROCC) (IPCC, 2019b), hard limits are expected with \r global warming beyond 1.5degC associated with the loss of coral reefs, \r that will lead to substantial loss of income and livelihoods for coastal \r communities (Roy et  al., 2018; Mechler et  al., 2019b; Oppenheimer \r et  al., 2019). The loss of coral reefs around the remote islands of \r Boigu in Australia is affecting low-lying communities facing financial, \r institutional (Evans et al., 2016) and cultural place-based attachment \r adaptation limits (McNamara et  al., 2017). Another hard limit to \r [...]"


id: 444af1b45706d122c88a2f558eb6f364
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"[...] adaptation with implications for income, and culture- and place-based \r livelihoods is related to the sensitivity of fish to global temperature \r increase, with losses in fish reproduction expected to be 10% (SSP1-\r 1.9) to about 60% (SSP5-8.5), potentially cascading into severe risks \r for fisheries livelihoods (Dahlke et al., 2020). In West African fisheries, \r the loss of coastal ecosystems and productivity are estimated to require \r 5-10% of countries' GDP in adaptation costs (Zougmore et al., 2016), \r incurring financial limits in poor countries to avoid socioeconomic risks. \r The SROCC (IPCC, 2019b) showed that scientific knowledge limitations \r can constrain management of coastlines, mainly in the context of lack \r of data, affecting most of the vulnerable and poor communities in the \r Global South (Perkins et al., 2015; Sutton-Grier et al., 2015; Wigand \r et al., 2017; Romanach et al., 2018). Hard and soft adaptation limits are \r [...]"


id: 294364aa7724f6c371b8f6f57b3dedbd
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"[...] challenging to define, given the rate and intensity of climate change \r hazards and the mitigation and adaptation options available, but also \r the level and rate of non-climatic stresses increasing vulnerabilities \r and undermining adaptive capacity of poorest members of society and \r sensitive ecosystems (medium evidence, high agreement) (Klein et al., \r 2014; Roy et al., 2018)."


id: 84e33ed059957825eb4eed145d272789
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"The multi-intersectionality of inequalities (socioeconomic, caste, \r ethnicity, among others) and marginalisation, result in differential \r capacity to avoid risks, which is particularly limited amongst the most \r vulnerable communities who are in, or at the brick of falling into, \r poverty traps, which then also affects future generations (Hallegatte \r and Rozenberg, 2017; Roy et  al., 2018; Tschakert et  al., 2019). For \r instance, the poorest communities in the Global South, who are \r dependent upon thriving ecosystems for health, food, water and \r energy, are disproportionately more exposed to temperature extremes \r and droughts, compromising food and water security (Byers et  al., \r 2018). There are also inequalities associated with opportunities to \r adapt to risks that are unevenly distributed among global regions, with \r richer and more equal societies in the Global North presenting superior \r capacities than Global South communities, sectors, ecological systems \r [...]"


id: b3bbf4580fb31dfbc446c5d3f96ff22c
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content:
"[...] and species, where the most detrimental climate change impacts \r are experienced (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018; Roy et al., 2018). The \r climate-sensitive livelihoods of poor and vulnerable communities in the \r Global South, and the unprecedented ecosystems losses are examples \r of multiple limits of adaptation that emerge simultaneously and are \r also linked to the differential access to assets and resources, such as \r physical (propriety, income), social (health, age, education) cultural \r (shared community values and norms, ethnicity), ecological (linked to \r land use change and productivity) and institutional (market, policies \r and governance) (Roy et  al., 2018; Hoegh-Guldberg et  al., 2019a; \r Olsson et al., 2019). The adaptation limits emerge mostly in countries \r in Global South, and disproportionately affect specific groups, with \r high poverty incidence, that are constrained by inadequate financial \r [...]"


id: 774d746b91a359106d549fc970130488
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content:
"[...] resources and institutional instruments (Tian and Lemos, 2018; Volpato \r and King, 2019), including lack of understanding and preparedness \r of the risks posed by climate change (Ayeb-Karlsson et  al., 2016; \r Maharjan et al., 2020)."


id: efc232f3cdcae959d5edc3c43335a587
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"The recent evidence shows that adaptation limits can also be \r associated with financial and institutional mechanisms, and related \r to structural poverty and inequalities among rural farmers in India \r (Singh et  al., 2019a) and among low-income countries (Tenzing, \r 2020), agro-pastoralist communities (Volpato and King, 2019), women \r (Balehey et  al., 2018), informal slum settlements in Latin America \r (Nunez Collado and Wang, 2020) and informal workers in Southeast \r Asia (Balehey et al., 2018). For SIDS, multiple adaptation limits also \r emerge as a combination of political-institutional and cultural aspects \r (Robinson and Wren, 2020), such as preserving national identity \r and sovereignty in the context of migration in the Marshall Islands \r (Bordnera et al., 2020). A widespread narrative is that an increase in \r migration in SIDS, given sea level rise and global temperature increase \r by 2050, is inevitable, desirable and economically necessary. Many \r [...]"


id: 1ef551f507a248e27a281a79a6711a77
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"[...] more people will be exposed to migration and affected by multiple \r forms of physiological and emotional stress (Bordnera et  al., 2020). \r In the same way, the Mohawk community of Kanesatake, Canada, is \r faced with institutional and socio-political adaptation limits such as \r lack of land ownership rights, insurance and social institutions (Fayazi \r et al., 2020)."


id: 96b879d5a5ea43aac4975055a5501805
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"In other situations, adaptation limits to household livelihoods emerge \r from ecological thresholds associated with global warming temper\u0002atures, such as deterioration of land and water resources, extinction of \r species and biodiversity that can lead to systemic crop failures, declin\u0002ing fisheries productivity and water availability and substantial risks to \r households' livelihoods (Roy et al., 2018). However, it is also important \r to note that limits are associated with development, technology and \r cultural norms and values that can change over time to enhance or \r reduce the capacity of systems to avoid limits (Adger et al., 2014; Roy \r et al., 2018). It could also include aspects of maintaining security of \r air or water quality, as well as equity, cultural cohesion and preser\u0002vation of livelihoods (Adger et al., 2014; Tschakert et al., 2019). For \r soft limits, however, adaptation options could become available in the \r [...]"


id: 5736e851b12cf8765dfaa7105c58054d
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12596
content:
"[...] future through changing attitudes or values or as a result of innovation \r or other resources becoming available to most vulnerable and poor \r actors, households and countries. However, when compounded with "


id: 871da018b2451c38509c2c2e743fbf19
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20935
content:
"Table 8.6 represents different types of adaptation limits (soft or hard) \r that emerge over time, sometimes concomitantly, that are leading to \r severe risks to livelihoods in a high poverty, unequal and hotter future, \r especially among poor and vulnerable populations, and within those \r Indigenous People, women and children (see Section 16.5.2.3.4). The \r confidence statements are assessed through the evidence on papers \r as high (>=10 papers), medium (5-9 papers) and low (<= 4 papers) to \r ensure traceability on the nature of livelihoods barriers and ecological \r thresholds associated with 'soft' or 'hard' limits to adaptation under \r a warming global world. The determinants of livelihood barriers are \r linked to gender-based inequality or discrimination, poverty and \r inequality, indigeneity and cultural place attachment, artic hunting \r and fishing, and urban slum and informal settlements incurring soft \r and hard limits to adaptation. The ecological thresholds assessed are \r [...]"


id: 8f76aa204584f0b4648fcd6ec0e59974
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content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22450
content:
"[...] associated with glacier retreat, loss of coral reefs, biodiversity loss, \r ocean acidification and warming, sea level rise and heat stress incurring \r hard limits to adaptation and severe risks to people's livelihoods. The \r severity of risks to livelihoods is assessed using a magnitude indicator "


id: 76d1e99037070b06977ea3fddac32476
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18119
content:
"In Latin America, compounding effects of climate change impacts \r (disasters) and armed conflict has contributed to forced migration \r to the point that in 2018 alone, 1.7 million people migrated due to \r extreme events, four times as many as the number of people leaving \r their homeland due to armed conflict (Serraglio and Schraven, 2019). \r In South America, migration within and between countries can stem \r from climate extremes, primarily felt by the poorest and marginalised \r (by gender, age, ethnicity) populations that might not be able to adapt \r to the fast pace and scale of changes at the local level (Maru et al., \r 2014; Pinho et al., 2015; Serraglio and Schraven, 2019). In mountain \r regions, intersections of people's marginalisation, difficulty in access \r and environmental sensitivity in the context of incidence of climate \r extremes have combined to reduce the ability of mountain agro\u0002pastoralists to cope with climate extremes (Mishra et  al., 2019). \r [...]"


id: da33c2669951dd65d89bd76fde01c2a7
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35685
content:
"[...] Mountain ecosystems are also highly susceptible to disasters and \r disturbances, which can lead to irreversible loss and challenge poverty \r reduction efforts (Mishra et al., 2019) Some risks associated with the \r degradation and loss of habitats and ecosystem services associated \r with land use changes and commodities in many countries have \r compounding impacts on equity and sustainability, associated with \r permanent losses to the livelihoods of poor and marginalised groups, \r such as Indigenous Peoples and traditional communities around the \r world (Roy et  al., 2018). For instance, high deforestation rates and \r increased forest burning in many Amazonian countries are further \r exposing vulnerable Indigenous Peoples and traditional populations \r to health problems, crop failures and shortages of freshwater supply, \r especially in the context of extreme droughts and non-supportive \r governance (Leal Filho et al., 2020a; Walker et al., 2020)."


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"In the context of urbanisation, in fast growing cities in Asia, Africa and \r Latin America that are highly socially and economically unequal, the \r climate change impacts from events such as flooding and droughts, \r are amplified as water crises, mostly among the poor and marginalised \r population, challenging governance for risk reduction (Gore, 2015; \r Dodman et al., 2017; Jiang and O'Neill, 2017; Pelling et al., 2018; Solecki \r et al., 2018). In the Global South, over 880 million people are living \r in precarious and informal conditions without access to water and \r sanitation, mostly in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia (see Chapter \r 6; Rosenzweig et al., 2018; Satterthwaite et al., 2018; Tusting et al., \r 2019). In rapidly urbanising sub-Saharan African countries, around 53 \r (50-57) million urban inhabitants (50% of urban population ) and 595 \r (585-607) million rural inhabitants (82% of the rural population) were \r [...]"


id: cb76429f2327dbb9194451aa7f6ca5e2
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"In past decades, a number of categories of adaptation options have \r been identified and are discussed in Section 8.5. Adaptation options \r are categorised in various ways, such as in terms of grey and green \r adaptation or hard and soft measures (Depietri et al., 2013; Chambwera \r et  al., 2014; Grimm et  al., 2015). Grey measures refer, for example, \r to technological and engineering solutions to improve adaptation \r of infrastructures or to protect a specific land use or city from \r adverse consequences of climate hazards (OECD, 2018). Accordingly, \r ecosystem-based approaches, including natural infrastructure, can \r provide an effective complement or substitute for traditional built \r (or 'grey') infrastructure. For example, watershed restoration can \r protect sources of drinking water and reduce the need for subsequent \r treatment. Green measures often encompass ecosystem-based (or \r nature-based) approaches. These make use of the multiple services \r [...]"


id: 9beb1ec8ef6bbb9a57fa16ededcca475
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"[...] provided by ecosystems to improve resilience and adaptive capacity \r or to reduce risk. Soft adaptation measures include policy, legal, social, \r management and financial measures that can alter human behaviour \r and support adaptive governance, contributing to improved adaptation \r capacity, increased awareness, and change in values and actions on \r climate change issues."


id: ef80f3c1b831546470b582b40ced03f6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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content:
"Adaptation actions frequently include deliberate, coordinated, proactive \r policy decisions based on the awareness that conditions have changed \r or will change and that action is required to avert impacts or return to, \r maintain or achieve a desired state (Carter et al., 1994). Governance \r provides an important contextual framing, particularly in contexts \r where it is weak or contested (e.g., some of the Sahel zone). In these \r cases, it can mean that adaptation options stem largely from the local \r level. Adaptation processes can be categorised as individual, collective, \r proactive, reactive, autonomous, coordinated or natural (Chambwera \r et al., 2014). Apart from governments, other actors, organisations and \r institutions (including non-state agencies and private industry actors) \r also play an important part in adaptation processes, and consequently \r the discussion of enabling environments for sustainable or successful \r [...]"


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"[...] adaptation has to consider these different scales and actors. For \r example, while autonomous adaptations are mainly undertaken by \r private actors, triggered by climate change-induced market or welfare \r changes, planned adaptations can be carried out by both private and \r public actors. Natural adaptations appear within ecosystems as a \r reaction to climate change, as well as other factors, and incorporate \r innumerable possible actions that are context specific, ranging from \r managerial approaches to technological innovations and ecosystem\u0002based approaches (Huq et  al., 2004). Sanchez et  al. (2017) draws \r attention to preconceived ideas about some adaptation measures \r that are either considered good or bad without proper evaluation. It is \r argued that the association 'hard-bad' and 'soft-good' is not necessarily \r true; the impacts of adaptation can only be established through \r a case-by-case assessment. The decision to select a more or less "


id: 753af0e059669914a8fd94f64628ca6a
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content:
"In light of the severe adverse consequences of climate change for the \r poorest populations, whose livelihoods are frequently dependent on \r vulnerable ecosystems, it is essential to enhance knowledge about \r sustainable and appropriate adaptation strategies and measures, as \r well as recognise and respond to limits to adaptation as reported in \r AR5 (Somorin, 2010; Noble et  al., 2014; Connolly-Boutin and Smit, \r 2016). There is increasing evidence on the adaptation options that \r enhance the ability of different socio-ecological systems to become \r resilient in the long term in ways that do not exacerbate poverty and \r inequality, and on which adaptations may have little or no impact, or \r even adverse effects (maladaptation). Analysis of climate hazards can \r provide an indication of required adaptation strategies, however, most \r important is the focus on exposure and vulnerability. The novelty of \r the AR6 is the assessment of existing response capacities to cope and \r [...]"


id: 59d1d5104adb415f006c8455f942047c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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content:
"[...] adapt to climate changes and associated hazards. There is increasing \r knowledge about the differential adaptation options within and across \r social groups and the influence of (enabling) conditions that enhance \r or limit these options."


id: 94ae13bd5dad03e856029ae87728021b
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content:
"intensive adaptation measure should integrate all approaches, social, \r environmental, technical and economic, in a multi-criteria analysis. This \r analysis should value, inter alia, social and environmental sensitivity, \r benefits and drawbacks or trade-offs with climate, including all the \r adaptation options, among them the 'no action' alternative.\r Adaptation frequently responds to an observed or anticipated 'trigger' \r for response, such as the looming loss of land to sea level rise (Barnett \r et al., 2014). Identifying adaptation needs stemming from climate risks \r and vulnerabilities provides a foundation for selecting a sequence of \r adaptation options that connect through time, a long-term adaptation \r pathway (Wise et al., 2014; Turnheim et al., 2015). National, sectoral \r or local adaptation plans are likely to include a number of measures \r that are implemented jointly from across various categories, including \r [...]"


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"[...] structural, institutional and social options. While structural or \r physical adaptation encompasses measures for the engineered built \r environment it also can encompass nature-based solutions, which \r include ecosystem-based protection measures, for example to buffer \r risks and hazard exposure to extreme weather events. The category of \r 'soft' adaptation measures--changes in societal values or practices--\r is often linked to issues of education, information and behavioural \r changes to support communities within specific adaptation processes \r to climate change and climate hazards. Institutional adaptation deals \r with adaptation actions and measures introduced through new legal \r frameworks, laws and regulations for new institutions or policies for \r risk reduction and adaptation. This category can also encompass the \r development of new organisations that have a mandate to support \r adaptation (Noble et al., 2014). The appropriateness and accessibility \r [...]"


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content:
"[...] of adaptation options under these categories for supporting the poor \r and most vulnerable groups differs. In many cases large-scale structural \r measures are not affordable for many poor communities. Despite this \r important potential of Indigenous knowledge for disaster risk reduction \r of communities, it is often shunned by practitioners (Dube and Munsaka, \r 2018). It is further argued by practitioners that Indigenous knowledge \r lacks documentation, it is not found in all generational classes, it is \r contextualised to particular communities and the knowledge cannot be \r scientifically validated. However, there is also evidence that both local \r communities and disaster risk reduction practitioners can benefit from \r the Indigenous knowledge of communities (Dube and Munsaka, 2018)."


id: 3c89a60f4147ae735508b51d205b71d0
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content:
"In this context, there are many potential adaptation options available \r for a marginal change of existing agricultural and other livelihood \r systems, often variations of existing climate risk management. \r According to Howden et al. (2007), implementation of these options \r is likely to have substantial benefits under moderate climate change \r for some existing cropping systems. Apparently, there are limits to \r their effectiveness under more severe climate changes. Hence, more \r systemic changes in resource allocation need to be considered, such as \r targeted diversification of production systems and livelihoods. Howden \r et al. (2007) further argue that achieving increased adaptation action \r will necessitate integration of climate change-related issues with \r other risk factors, which implies integrating non-climatic factors, such \r as climate variability and market risk, and with other policy domains, \r such as sustainable development. An increasing number of research \r [...]"


id: 80139ee935b669345d35ef8c0c056148
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content:
"[...] programmes seek to support adaptation to climate change through \r the engagement of large-scale transdisciplinary networks that span \r countries and continents (Cundill et al., 2019)."


id: d1fc2d392da59f0b08f5a28d11902349
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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content:
"Based on analysis of different adaptation options, there is high \r agreement that the many barriers to effective adaptation will require \r a comprehensive and dynamic policy approach covering a range of \r geographical scales and multiple actors across scales, taking into \r consideration both climatic and non-climatic stress factors (Eriksen \r et al., 2015). For instance, from the agricultural perspective, this could \r imply the understanding by farmers of change in risk profiles to the \r establishment of efficient markets that facilitate response strategies. \r It is also important to note that science, too, has to adapt employing a \r range of approaches, based on the fact that multidisciplinary problems \r require multidisciplinary solutions. Towards enhancing resilience, a \r focus on integrated rather than disciplinary science alone could be of \r utmost importance as well as strengthening of the interface with key \r [...]"


id: 2562a688e0cb589e96d3d4645b18eb63
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content:
"Common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC) is a key principle within the United Nations Framework \r Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and attempts to acknowledge countries' diverse development situations. The Convention and \r its Kyoto Protocol operationalised the principle by committing developed (Annex I) countries to absolute emission reduction or limitation \r targets and exempting developing countries from any binding reductions in emissions (Huggins and Karim, 2016; Pauw et al., 2019). In \r contrast, the Paris Agreement distinguishes between 'developed' and 'developing' countries instead of Annex I and non-Annex I countries \r and acknowledges significant asymmetries and inequalities, not only between developed and developing countries, but also between \r developed and developing countries themselves, both in terms of vulnerability to climate change impacts and capacity to mitigate the \r [...]"


id: 541e76fa4f69dbed2e72562311ceb7b7
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content:
"[...] problems. The literature contains extensive analyses of CBDR-RC in relation to equity in mitigation efforts in the post-2020 regime (e.g., \r Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2015; du Pont et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2017; Holz et al., 2018; Saelen et al., 2019), but little in relation to \r adaptation, particularly relating to how it plays out in the Paris Agreement."


id: 5135253768b52cde48006a04cc5d9f7b
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"The literature offers two main perspectives when evaluating the effectiveness of these provisions on adaptation in the context of the \r post-Paris climate change regime. One argument follows that the Paris Agreement gives priority attention to the most vulnerable parties \r and, unlike previous international agreements in the climate change regime, places adaptation on equal footing to mitigation (Magnan \r and Ribera, 2016; Perez and Kallhauge, 2017; Morgan, 2018). Article 7 is interpreted here as a breakthrough, containing unprecedented \r provisions that give adaptation prominence and which elevate the importance of undertaking adequate action to cope with current and \r future climate change impacts. A second view argues that the Article 7 marks little departure from previous efforts to support adaptation \r efforts in developing countries (Doelle, 2016) or that it could have included stronger provisions, such as a quantitative goal with respect \r [...]"


id: 42b13325217cb32b559486c2c1d229df
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content:
"The literature nevertheless shows high agreement that other parts of the Paris Agreement do contain consequential provisions on \r adaptation and the operationalisation of the CBDR-RC principle. Those provisions covering financial support are arguably the most \r pertinent, as they replace the dichotomy between developing countries and developed countries with a trichotomy which also includes \r 'other Parties' (Maljean-Dubois, 2016). While provision of support from developed parties continues to be mandatory, these 'other parties', \r apparently developing country parties, are 'encouraged to provide or continue to provide such support voluntarily' (Article 9.2). Parties \r themselves determine whether they belong to this category. So far, several developing countries have made contributions to the Green \r Climate Fund, ranging from Indonesia and Mexico to Mongolia and Panama (Green Climate Fund, 2017). Expanding the donor base to \r [...]"


id: deb8d75f8dc2180abd9ffd3e5af43734
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content:
"[...] these 'other parties' and breaking down the wall between donor and recipient countries marks a departure from previous practice, under \r which developing countries had no formal role in climate finance and support (Bodansky, 2016; Voigt and Ferreira, 2016)."


id: b9fc9ec7c2a76c7f39edc5ccfc4446f6
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"The scale of analysis, baseline conditions prior to adaptation and scale \r of action matter too when assessing the key components of an enabling \r environment for adaptation. At a national scale, it is well established \r that low-income countries are less well positioned to manage climate \r change impacts, being variously attributed to a lack of institutional, \r economic or financial capacity to adapt effectively (Tol and Yohe, 2007; \r Barr et al., 2010). It can be particularly difficult to adapt to drought, \r for example, when it occurs in the pre-conditions of poor water \r supplies and sanitation (see Box 8.5; Section 8.3.2), and in a context of \r corruption, governance failure and a lack of accountability. Adaptation \r productivity in higher-income countries is further supported by better \r infrastructure and stronger institutions--low adaptation efficiency is \r linked to lower government spending, higher inequalities in income \r [...]"


id: b0bae092bdcfd26808698593132bb80f
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"[...] distribution and poor governance (Fankhauser and McDermott, 2014). \r At smaller scales, even within a single socioeconomic setting, different \r groups require different kinds of adaptation support and exhibit \r different vulnerabilities to climate change impacts. Huynh and Stringer \r (2018) found that households vulnerable to climate change impacts \r linked to sea level rise and flooding in Da Nang City and Ngu Hanh \r Son district, Vietnam, had limited access to human, natural, physical, \r financial and social assets, and lacked a diversified livelihood portfolio. \r An enabling environment for household-level adaptation would need \r to address these factors in this context. However, the same authors \r found that at district scale, different challenges persisted, including \r obstacles to multidirectional flows of climate information, poor \r vertical interplay both upward and downward, and a lack of citizen \r participation in the governance of climate change."


id: 1cafa613f701d77633510b092f8b32c3
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content:
"The specific political economy of each country and its underpinning \r philosophies shape the national political context in which public policy \r supporting adaptation is developed and implemented. It further shapes \r the context for private adaptation. Public policy targeting climate \r change seeks to address market failures, amend policy distortions \r and offer incentives for private adaptation, as well as provide climate\u0002resilient public goods, climate services and safety nets for the poor and \r vulnerable (Fankhauser, 2017). In some countries that have a more \r stable institutional context, such policies are more straightforward to \r develop and implement; while in countries with weaker institutions \r (e.g., those emerging from conflict), a larger role may be needed for \r regional economic commissions and transnational networks to support \r the governance of 'borderless climate risks' (Benzie and Persson, 2019), \r [...]"


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content:
"There are nevertheless concerns regarding institutional fit: that \r foreign funding regimes may not map onto more recently developed \r administrative traditions, leading to dominance of governance models \r emanating from donors (Vink and Schouten, 2018). Research has \r found multilateral donors do not prioritise vulnerable developing \r countries at the project selection stage and they have received smaller \r allocations of adaptation finance from bilateral donors than less \r vulnerable countries (Saunders, 2019), leaving the poor vulnerable \r to climate impacts. The lack of climate finance flowing to LDCs and \r SIDs (currently 14% and 2% of the total, respectively) is compounded \r by access issues due to the inability of domestic institutions to meet \r specific fiduciary standards and other access requirements, insufficient \r human resource support and the inflexibility of current approaches, \r which are biased in favour of governments and against non-traditional \r [...]"


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content:
"[...] actors, such as local enterprise and grassroots organisations (Shakya \r et  al., 2021). Further, vulnerable developing countries shoulder \r additional financial burden, embodied in higher interest payments to \r service public and private debt, due to the increased cost of capital "


id: 5186d602d6307c0e23ce42fe3d6986f3
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vector_id: 11619
content:
"Among the many institutions, actors and roles associated with \r successful adaptation, two play an increasingly important role: local \r governments and the private sector (Noble et al., 2014). These groups \r often define the flows of information and finance from the top down, \r as well as supporting the scaling up of community and household \r adaptation. In some countries, for example, in South America \r (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay) vocational agricultural schools, often in \r remote rural locations, play a key part in knowledge-sharing activities \r that support adaptation. Similar valuable contributions are made \r by universities through their outreach activities, particularly those \r offering programmes in environmental and agricultural fields. Many \r actors face a lack of resources and capacity, particularly at the local \r level. Local institutions, including local governments, NGOs and civil \r society organisations, are hampered by ongoing challenges in gaining \r [...]"


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content:
"[...] support from higher governance levels--from national government or \r the international community--particularly in developing countries. At \r the same time, private sector actors, from individual farmers and small/\r medium enterprises (SMEs) as well as large multinational businesses, \r will seek to protect and enhance their production systems, supply \r chains and markets by pursuing adaptation-related opportunities. Yet, \r while these goals will help expand adaptation activities, they may \r not align with government or community objectives and priorities \r without coordination and incentives, and in the process, can reinforce \r existing capacities, inequalities and power relations (Sovacool et al., \r 2015). Similarly, an enabling environment for businesses' adaptation \r is highly differentiated and often requires structural deficits (such as \r limited market access, finance and transport and communications \r infrastructure) to be tackled (Gannon et al., 2020)."


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content:
"Policies and investments that are adopted are embedded within \r the relevant legal and regulatory frameworks, which extend beyond \r national jurisdictions upward to the regional scale (such as the \r Southern Africa Development Community's Southern Africa Regional \r Framework of Climate Change Programmes, 2010) and international \r scale, for example, UNFCCC, the 2015 Paris Agreement, the Sendai \r Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, the New Urban Agenda and the \r SDGs. Legal and regulatory concerns also extend downward to shape \r local- and city-scale adaptation efforts (e.g., Sao Paulo's municipal \r policy and new master plan). Nevertheless, only a minority of countries \r have dedicated legal frameworks supporting adaptation (Lesnikowski \r et al., 2017) and these often lack in both precision and obligation--\r largely because adaptation is a contested global public good but \r also because adaptation is commonly bundled in with mitigation \r [...]"


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vector_id: 37335
content:
"[...] commitments (Hall and Persson, 2018). Coherence, horizontally and \r vertically in both policy and law is often lacking. At the same time, \r bottom-up, private, autonomous adaptation efforts are being better \r tracked, with different actors motivated by growing experiences of \r local climate change impacts (Berrang-Ford et  al., 2014). While the \r emergent polycentricity of adaptation governance is beginning to \r take shape, wherein both state and non-state actors share a common \r adaptation goal and interact coherently, yet often independently, to \r advance progress towards it (Morrison et al., 2019), understandings \r of how various centres of decision making with different degrees of \r autonomy support an enabling environment for adaptation, remain \r at a nascent stage. Multiple scales and forms of adaptation occur, \r with attributes such as self-organisation, appreciation of site-specific \r conditions, and the need for learning and experimentation, alongside "


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vector_id: 33527
content:
"The challenges of climate change have driven governments around the \r world to emphasise climate services as a route to enhance decision \r making and reduce climate-related risks, as well as inform adaptation, \r supporting calls for the right to information (Tall and Njinga, 2013). \r While there have been some efforts to evaluate the economic impact of \r climate services alongside other impacts (e.g, Tall et al., 2018), little is \r known about the institutional contexts in which investments in climate \r services have taken place, nor those groups that are most vulnerable or \r marginalised in relation to specific climate risks. Vincent et al. (2017) \r offer preliminary insights from Malawi, identifying that barriers to \r improved integration of climate services in national policy planning \r include factors relating to spatial and temporal scale, accessibility \r and timing of information provision, credibility and mismatches in \r [...]"


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vector_id: 30844
content:
"[...] time frames between planning cycles and climate projections. An \r understanding of the factors that enable climate service investment is "


id: d455f96d3a007f0b920d9d3fa5a9ab5b
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34680
content:
"In a market economy, human activities tend to exacerbate degradation \r of natural capital, despite its role in buffering climate change impacts, \r supporting mitigation and providing adaptation options. Economic \r agents base their decisions on market prices, even though market prices \r do not incorporate the costs of deteriorating natural capital because \r of externalities and other market failures, that is environmental \r degradation is not internalised (Bowen et al., 2012). At the same time, \r expanding populations, capitalism and consumption choices affect the \r condition of natural capital, alongside short-termism stemming from \r poverty, linked to the need for survival. All these factors therefore \r interact, with the aggregate effect of worsening the impacts of climate \r change, while also undermining future adaptation options, particularly \r for the poor. Adaptation policies should, but do not always, compensate \r [...]"


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vector_id: 33863
content:
"[...] for the prevalent market failures. For example, in Melanesia, sea \r walls have been built out of coral by local people in an attempt to \r reduce the impacts of rising sea levels, leading to outright destruction \r of some of the world's most productive and biodiverse coral reefs \r (Martin and Watson, 2016). Similarly, in the Congo Basin, farmers are \r adapting to increasingly variable rainfall by expanding their cropping \r activities into forested areas, releasing carbon into the atmosphere \r through forest clearance activities and threatening biodiversity. \r Agricultural land is also being degraded globally (see IPCC, 2019a), \r and this too closes down adaptation and livelihood options for the \r poorest, natural resource-dependent populations, while jeopardising \r food security, biodiversity and human health at wider scales. An \r enabling environment for adaptation therefore demands investment in \r sustaining natural capital at multiple scales, internalising the costs of \r [...]"


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content:
"[...] degradation, as well as establishing the necessary legal and regulatory \r frameworks (and associated enforcement) to reduce its degradation \r (IPBES, 2018)."


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"Overall, adaptation entails financial (and non-financial) costs not just \r in implementing adaptation actions, but also in designing, facilitating \r and preparing for actions--costs to create and maintain an enabling \r environment (see also Section  8.2.2.3; Cross-Chapter Box  LOSS in \r Chapter 17). Financial and economic investments target the whole \r range of other types of asset (natural capital, physical capital, human \r capital, social capital). AR5 reports that aggregate economic losses \r accelerate with increasing temperatures (IPCC, 2014a). Costs may \r be borne when gaining information (e.g., investments in climate \r services), while adjustment costs are incurred as adaptations take \r place. Nevertheless, to enable adaptation, investment is needed \r in various natural, human, physical and social assets, as considered \r below. The importance of investment in each of these different types \r of asset varies according to the scale and livelihood system in need of \r [...]"


id: bdb27bc59d6a925e506284938ff93467
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"[...] adaptation and the ways in which livelihood resilience is framed and \r power is distributed, within each specific setting (Carr, 2020)."


id: dc6add2eb7ca31ed19fa14f41b6e1b42
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36045
content:
"It is well established that climate change compounds the impacts of \r pressures that humans place on the environment (high confidence) \r and that environmental degradation can undermine options for \r adaptation and an enabling environment, with poor and natural \r resource-dependent groups most acutely affected (see e.g., Cross\u0002Chapter Paper 3 for insights from deserts and semiarid areas). \r Sustainable management of natural capital contributes to building \r resilience and the natural ability of ecosystems to adapt to climate \r change (IPCC, 2014a; see also IPCC SROCC, Section  5.3.2, Bindoff \r et al., 2019). Some systems like mangroves (found in 123 countries, \r many of which are in the Developing World) offer a broad range of \r vital ecosystem services (Hamza et  al., 2020). Mangroves provide \r regulating services by acting as a natural defence against sea level rise \r and storm surges; and by sequestering carbon in both the trees and \r [...]"


id: d8a649cdb26f8059db7ed64ad56ca7d1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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content:
"[...] sediments they capture. Provisioning services (e.g., fish, crabs, timber \r and fuelwood) from mangroves support livelihoods and livelihood \r adaptation options, especially for those with few other livelihood \r opportunities, while these systems also provide important habitat \r (breeding, spawning and nursery grounds for fish) and biodiversity, \r and offer cultural services in the forms of education, recreation and \r spiritual benefits (Quinn et al., 2017). As the frequency of events such \r as hurricanes, storms and typhoons rises with climate change, natural \r capital assets like mangroves become increasingly important in \r protecting coastlines and supporting adaptation. While not reducing \r the hazard itself, the mangroves reduce exposure and, in some cases, \r also vulnerability. The literature shows with high confidence that \r environmental assets support both climate change mitigation (at a \r large scale) and adaptation (at a smaller scale), particularly for the \r [...]"


id: c6cbf7c9e2037121bac62d8d0b549094
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32280
content:
"[...] poorest groups in society, who directly depend upon natural capital \r for their subsistence (e.g., Angelsen et al., 2014). In turn, the legal and \r regulatory context and institutional set up determines who has access \r rights to different aspects of the natural resource base. This shows \r how different aspects of the enabling environment work in tandem to \r constitute one another."


id: 1b680ee55d42e089717b24df24bbb016
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2000
content:
"The literature increasingly shows that approaches such as nature\u0002based solutions (NBS) and ecosystem-based adaptation (see Chapters \r 2; 6) can offer value for money in tackling climate change from both a \r mitigation and adaptation standpoint (Seddon et al., 2020). According \r to the Global Commission on Adaptation, a global investment of \r USD 1.8 trillion between 2020 and 2030 into adaptation measures such \r as early warning systems, climate-resilient infrastructure, improved \r dryland agriculture, mangrove protection, and resilient water resources \r can yield USD 7.1 trillion in total net benefits (Global Commission on \r Adaptation, 2019). NBS operate by harnessing natural processes, \r sometimes in combination with technological or engineered solutions. \r Examples encompass green public spaces and parks (Sahakian and \r Anantharaman, 2020), green infrastructure, such as urban forests and \r street trees (Richards and Edwards, 2017), which create shade and \r [...]"


id: fa933b476f7ae0ff9dd897a6c9791ca0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41458
content:
"[...] reduce urban heat island effects whereby urban areas are warmer than \r their surroundings (Depietri et al., 2013), and support human health \r and well-being by keeping people in cities more closely linked with \r nature (Gulsrud et al., 2018). NBS also encompasses blue infrastructure \r including constructed wetlands, bioswales, rain gardens and so forth, \r which can reduce flood risks (Haase, 2015). While the literature is \r generally positive about the ability of NBS to support climate risk \r reduction and deliver multiple other benefits (Connop et al., 2016), such \r as green job opportunities, improved provision of recreational space, \r cleaner air, habitat provision and increased property values (Emmanuel \r and Loconsole, 2015), more research is required to specifically assess \r and evaluate the conditions and contexts in which these kinds of "


id: b6ff87081030014fa87accaa63f1c657
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29408
content:
"Adaptations that support human health and well-being require \r investments in physical assets and infrastructure linked to water and \r sanitation (see Chapter 4), particularly in rapidly urbanising areas in \r the Global South, alongside specific pro-poor investment strategies \r given disproportionate climate change impacts on women (see Cross\u0002Chapter Box GENDER in Chapter 18), other marginalised groups and \r low-income households who lack access to healthcare. Climate change \r facilitates the spread of vector-borne diseases such as malaria, as well \r as illnesses such as meningitis (Rocklov and Dubrow, 2020). Impacts \r on health are also experienced, through food insecurity resulting \r from climate change, including malnutrition, as well as through loss \r of livelihoods, making it more difficult to afford and to access health \r services. Health aspects are considered in-depth in Chapter 7, but we \r underscore the importance of a rights-based approach to adaptation \r [...]"


id: 1d36b6a8055ea5c983cb30c0702daf25
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2316
content:
"Analyses of educational attainment distributions with datasets reaching \r back as far as 1970 show that improving educational attainment in \r people of working age has been the most consistent and significant \r driver of economic growth globally (Lutz et  al., 2008), showing the \r importance of the right to education. Education has further supported \r sustainable development by fostering empowerment, yielding access \r to information (including on climate change) and has clear links to \r other aspects of human capital, including health and mortality (Samir \r and Lutz, 2017). There is medium evidence and high agreement that \r education reduces vulnerability and enhances adaptive capacity \r (Frankenberg et al., 2013; Sharma et al., 2013), with high agreement \r that climate change impacts can have negative effects on existing \r levels of human capital, with some development pathways affected \r more than others (Samir and Lutz, 2017). Education can help to \r [...]"


id: f1bc6cc5e460b7186d6416bcff59c801
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39916
content:
"[...] shape people's risk perception and assessment, as well as affecting \r knowledge sharing and the development of problem-solving abilities \r (Striessnig et al., 2013)."


id: efb58ab483a0b79849ecaa4d2d97e8ca
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
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vector_id: 39553
content:
"A key dimension of human capital is local understanding of climate risk, \r which includes knowledge systems outside Western scientific approach\u0002es. For millennia, local communities have relied heavily upon culturally \r accumulated Indigenous knowledge, participating in landscapes as \r stewards of their environment, engaged in profoundly detailed liveli\u0002hood strategies that deal with natural hazards (Ajayi and Mafongoya, \r 2017). Indigenous knowledge systems are embedded in culture, and are \r passed from generation to generation in various ways: livelihoods, tradi\u0002tions, spiritual practices and oral tradition, cultural identity and historical \r memory. Indigenous knowledge is known or learnt from experience, or \r acquired through observation and practice, and handed down from gen\u0002eration to generation. It is acknowledged that Indigenous communities, \r [...]"


id: bc5546fb81be9c94690fed9163a4c6a4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30381
content:
"[...] particularly those in hazard-prone areas, have developed a profound un\u0002derstanding and knowledge of disaster prevention and mitigation, early \r warning, preparedness and response, and post-disaster recovery. Indige\u0002nous knowledge systems, themselves, are an indispensable dimension \r of capacity for adaptation, and where threatened represent a major risk \r to Indigenous communities. While still robust among Indigenous Peoples \r in many parts of Africa, Asia and Latin America, Indigenous knowledge \r is not well reflected or incorporated in assessments such as this, and \r stands in danger of being lost as its custodians are passing away."


id: e98fe66e307fa64ca7ae264bd7842cd5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38445
content:
"as well as foresight in planning and design and climate risk screening, \r successful adaptation relating to physical capital also demands legal \r and institutional enablers (e.g., development and enforcement of \r building codes and regulations; roll out of insurance options; planning \r restrictions to reduce construction in locations that are highly exposed \r to climate hazards, etc). In some situations, these are lacking. For \r example, low-lying LDCs, such as Bangladesh, as well as SIDS, regularly \r suffer from climate events such as floods, typhoons, cyclones, hurricanes \r and saline intrusion (see Chapter 15 on small islands). Hazards such as \r typhoons cause substantial damage and destruction, impede mobility, \r reduce connectivity, disrupt communications, food, water and energy \r supplies, and render people homeless and without the assets they rely \r on to make a living. In the absence of adequate legal and institutional \r [...]"


id: ff7bfb1b4ad70d9d57042d4676a55e57
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42354
content:
"[...] enablers, as well as livelihood assets, the maintenance of physical \r capital is far more challenging, as the case of Cyclone Aila in Box 8.8 \r demonstrates."


id: 4141fff20eaf5358a62deef1eaa88ddd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8665
content:
"locally effective adaptive responses. However, it is important that IKLK \r is situated within knowledge from other scales in order to assess its \r broader relevance and applicability (Ahlborg and Nightingale, 2012). \r Some authors suggest including Indigenous knowledge in the IPCC \r assessment process should be of high priority, as it is becoming \r increasingly relevant for climate services (high confidence) (Strauss and \r Orlove, 2003; Crate and Nuttall, 2009; Crate, 2011). Their knowledge \r can draw attention to climate baselines and change, and identify \r adaptation priorities, such as plant and animal species that should \r be protected given local contextual environmental considerations. \r For example, using Indigenous knowledge in weather and climate \r prediction, local communities in different parts of Tanzania have been \r coping with, and adapting to, increased climate variability normally \r manifested in the form of increased frequency and magnitude of \r [...]"


id: 27cafcb0331fa4d9a4505d5c526f5fcd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4191
content:
"[...] various exigencies, including droughts and floods, and outbreak of \r pests and diseases (Kijazi et al., 2013). Prediction of impending hazards \r has been an integral part of Indigenous Peoples' adaptation strategies. \r Various environmental and astronomical indicators are used to predict \r rainfall, including plant phenology, behaviour and movement of birds, \r animal and insects, in many parts of Tanzania (Kijazi et al., 2013)."


id: bc886501350ea3f9c00794a0d03f2aab
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30416
content:
"Physical capital in the form of technology is increasingly supporting \r climate change adaptation, despite that innovations can be rolled \r out under high uncertainty, opening up new risks (e.g., hacking). \r Moreover, deployment of technology is closely tied to other forms \r of capital, especially human capital, and innovations cannot just be \r rolled out in the absence of suitable institutional and technical support \r and training. Similarly, access to finance is vital. Some technological \r adaptations require a pre-existing level of infrastructure and literacy, \r raising important questions about inequality (Taylor, 2018). Rotz et al. \r (2019) warn of automation impacts on rural labour, especially in \r places with high youth unemployment, while Taylor (2018) notes that \r social classes and gender are impacted differently by technological \r change, and failure to address underlying inequalities will shape who \r becomes vulnerable. Adequate testing of technologies in terms of their \r [...]"


id: 3a3e9648de7d8d7b9674ccf638f8052b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7453
content:
"[...] applicability to different contexts is also required, ensuring they do not \r become maladaptive when applied at scale."


id: 866b84a15ce8fb80273d101c42c265d0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20814
content:
"Ensuring sufficient investment in physical capital is vital to support \r development pathways at the national level, but for the poorest and \r most marginalised in society, physical capital represents an invaluable \r source of adaptation options (Hallegatte et al., 2019). Physical capital \r constitutes assets such as land, roads and other infrastructure (e.g., \r water supplies, electricity, mobile phone connectivity), housing and \r other buildings, as well as the materials and tools needed to make \r a living (e.g., farming, forestry and fishing equipment, transportation \r vehicles, technology). It can also help to foster a sense of place, and \r can support well-being. Climate change impacts on physical capital \r are often widespread, as well as economically and emotionally costly, \r particularly when communities are afflicted by hardship (inadequate \r levels of sustainable human development through access to essential \r [...]"


id: c1b44f66ad53d12091aa5fb63b50da85
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31381
content:
"[...] public goods and services and access to income opportunities) (Abbott \r and Pollard, 2004)."


id: 3087dae20068863323d7f730679cfd31
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5794
content:
"Similarly, technology must always be grounded in an appreciation \r of the cultural context. Research in the European Arctic with the \r Indigenous Sami Peoples found that use of GPS technology on reindeer, \r together with supplementary feeding, offered useful adaptations for \r some herders. However, there are fears such technologies may, over \r time, reduce the skills, cultural knowledge and Indigenous adaptations \r of the Sami (Andersson and Keskitalo, 2017), as, for example, reindeer \r become tamer through supplementary feeding, affecting their range \r selection. Overall, technology and other adaptations should seek not \r to erode Sami culture's adaptive capacity (Vuojala-Magga et al., 2011; \r Risvoll and Hovelsrud, 2016), particularly because reindeer grazing \r as a land management practice can play a useful climate change \r mitigation role too. Reindeer grazing protects tundra from tree line and \r bush encroachment, while summer grazing increases surface albedo \r [...]"


id: 88c365de2226527e56fe35189274c4d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21227
content:
"Aila greatly damaged the region's physical capital, including 6000 km of roads and 17,000 km of embankments. The cyclone polluted \r and damaged sources of drinking water and destroyed 243,000 houses and thousands of schools (Mallick et  al., 2017; Paul and \r Chatterjee, 2019). In Satkhira and Khulna districts alone, 165,000 houses were destroyed and households were forced to live on damaged \r embankments in makeshift shanties (UNDP, 2015). Many people had to live in these temporary shelters for years (Saha, 2017). Aila \r occurred during a high tide and the surge of saline water inundated not only the roads, embankments and houses but also vast areas \r of agricultural field and shrimp farms (Paul and Chatterjee, 2019) leaving many areas waterlogged for months (Abdullah et al., 2016; \r Mallick et al., 2017). The effect of saline water logging inside embankments caused further harm to houses, roads and culverts, adding \r [...]"


id: 9cbe0924f1e2f687c2904145b5de787f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24813
content:
"[...] more barriers to the post-disaster reconstruction activities (Roy, 2020). In the same area, tube-wells were damaged. Women had to travel \r up to 2 km every day to collect safe water, spending 30-90 minutes on this activity daily (Alam and Rahman, 2019). The distribution \r of costs across different socioeconomic groups was not always as expected. A study in Aila-affected Koyra sub-district of Khulna found \r that households with higher incomes were more vulnerable to Aila in both relative and absolute terms compared to middle- and low\u0002income groups mainly due to damage to shrimp farming, which underpinned their livelihoods (Abdullah et al., 2016). This highlights how \r specialised livelihoods can leave people more vulnerable as they have fewer options. However, the same study found that the damage \r to physical capital such as fishing nets and boats was statistically significantly greater for middle- and low-income groups. Damage to \r [...]"


id: 3e572f1573e4029aef97b6fe0ec5352d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8144
content:
"[...] houses was statistically significantly more among poorer households followed by middle- and higher-income groups."


id: 1def989929cdf3ea92098cb394d2b747
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2457
content:
"As of 2017, many of the affected areas had not yet been able to recover from the effects of Aila (Paul and Chatterjee, 2019). A transformative \r approach needs to be taken not only to help them recover in livelihood terms, but also to support people's well-being. Suggestions of \r physical interventions that are needed include higher and stronger dykes, cyclone-resistant housing, active maintenance and strict \r policing of embankment use and good governance (Abdullah et  al., 2016). Enabling formal institutions could help, for instance, by \r improving the climate resilience of physical capital (e.g., by developing and enforcing building codes for houses). Other institutional \r mechanisms could help to improve access to low interest credit, prevent maladaptation, improve enforcement of laws, and provide \r insurance. However, such institutional reforms need to be co-developed with local people and incorporate local cultural mechanisms \r [...]"


id: 8c9c1d93ceacd3419b8de32dbd3e1d1c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21926
content:
"[...] (Islam and Nursey-Bray, 2017). Future adaptation strategies also need to consider the limits to autonomous adaptation (i.e. that without \r external intervention) and differential level of impacts and adaptive capacities among different groups of households in the Aila-affected \r areas. This example illustrates the importance of a more comprehensive approach to resilience building, and the need to better understand \r the interlinkages between the core components of an enabling environment for adaptation (see Figure 8.12)."


id: 1afff4b746b3ab5b40d76f2dedb84ecd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1947
content:
"ties (e.g., one-way information transfer) can lead to the establishment \r of mutual collaboration relations that can be more easily drawn on in \r times of climate change-related shocks and stresses (Ingold, 2017), \r while collective shared disaster experiences can cause new social groups \r to emerge and spur action, linked to a perceived common fate (Ntontis \r et al., 2020). However, this can exacerbate inequalities and create new \r ones, with those who are more connected having enhanced access to, \r for example, shelters following storm evacuations or earthquakes (Rahill \r et al., 2014). In adapting to more incremental changes, social capital has \r been shown to increase shared local knowledge and awareness, support \r participatory processes and strengthen ties to corporate and political \r institutions, increasing their responsiveness to local concerns, as shown \r by examples from Aldrich et al. (2016). They describe how in Houma, \r [...]"


id: 917d53521221e204bf9b6daa7e06fe8f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22805
content:
"[...] Louisiana, located west of New Orleans, rising sea levels and hurricane \r risks have drawn on and built social capital at the community level. Having \r what was perceived locally as insufficient federal government support, \r residents, church groups and town council members collaborated to spur \r adaptation. Community mobilisation led to construction of self-funded \r levees and water projects to protect 200,000 residents from storm surges. \r Projects include marshland restoration, the elevation of existing housing, \r improved pumping systems and canal drainage, as well as buyouts \r and relocations of businesses and housing that has been repetitively \r damaged. Funds were raised from households through donations via \r a self-imposed sales tax. While this example paints a positive picture of \r the role of social capital and collective action in adaptation activities, it \r also raises questions about the coherence of actions across levels, again, \r [...]"


id: 7865ba53dd1209513c57fe1abc1851b7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18386
content:
"[...] highlighting a role for polycentric governance if risks of maladaptation \r are to be reduced. The danger in the example presented here is that \r should federal plans conflict with the community level work in the future, \r local efforts may have been in vain if installations have to be removed. \r This highlights the importance of careful evaluation of all adaptation \r options on an ongoing basis."


id: 789de0dcd9dae64662bf8800ad5f7a66
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18415
content:
"both the need to adapt and the way it is presented and communicated, \r although evidence is somewhat mixed in terms of how experiences \r of weather affect opinions and perceptions of climate change (Howe \r et  al., 2019). Research also highlights the importance of context in \r understanding relations between perceptions of risks and behaviour, \r arguing that power relations and other obstacles and opportunities \r play a vital role in shaping actions (Rufat et  al., 2020). In general, \r nonetheless, adaptation is spurred when people perceive that there is \r an action they can take to make a difference (Kuruppu and Liverman, \r 2011; Mayer and Smith, 2019), although it cannot be assumed that \r action will be taken if the socio-cultural setting is not amenable and it \r contravenes the values underlying people's perceptions (Kwon et al., \r 2019). Research testing for the effect of beliefs on behavioural change \r from 48 countries highlighted the need for policy leaders to present \r [...]"


id: 5d54a52c62f053dddd9fb1a79f9c9c50
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13709
content:
"[...] climate change as solvable yet challenging, if fatalistic beliefs that act \r as barriers to adaptation were to be reduced (Mayer and Smith, 2019). \r This demonstrates how beliefs do not always reinforce actions, even \r when risks are perceived. Similarly, research from Burkina Faso working \r with the Fulbe ethnic group found that cultural norms restricted \r engagement in four of the most successful livelihood strategies that \r support adaptation to climate change (labour migration, working for \r development projects, gardening and female engagement in economic \r activities) (Nielsen and Reenberg, 2010). Cultural factors therefore \r play an important but under-researched role in adaptation."


id: 75897218e2ccdc7f2d274cd51f9fbfaa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17908
content:
"CRD relies on identifying synergies between different strategies and \r actions in the field of climate change, primarily between mitigation \r actions with adaptation benefits (Locatelli et  al., 2015), adaptation \r actions with mitigation benefits (Denton et  al., 2014; Sanchez and \r Izzo, 2017), processes that promote both mitigation and adaptation \r measures, and policies and strategies that promote integrated \r mitigation and adaptation measures (Zhao et al., 2018). At the same \r time, adaptation and mitigation actions can be evaluated in terms of \r their co-benefits, the social, economic or other benefits of actions in \r addition to avoiding climate change impacts (Karlsson et al., 2020). \r The clearest co-benefits of mitigation are associated with economic \r development through low-carbon industrialisation (IPCC, 2014c; Jakob \r et al., 2014; Lu, 2017). Co-benefits can include contributing to economic \r growth, reducing competition for resources, improved integration \r [...]"


id: f59a7744327ae0398806114a8bd5350d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40577
content:
"[...] of scientific input to policy development and implementation, or \r improving political participation and social licensing in large-scale "


id: 77547386fc57ca7dd28d3c0c44cb5352
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18202
content:
"security and nutrition, and help to end hunger. There are five land \r challenges identified including climate change mitigation, adaptation, \r desertification, land degradation and food security. This report identified \r three major categories of climate response options that show promise \r for achieving mitigation and increasing capacity for adaptation while \r addressing poverty: SLM options, value chain management and \r risk management options (IPCC, 2019a). For example, programmes \r supporting no-till agriculture and residue retention allow small-scale \r farmers to participate in mitigation and adaptation activities, with \r long-term benefits to soil health and food, energy and water security \r (Wright et al., 2014). Likewise, the installation of a solar powered drip \r irrigation system simultaneously reduces emission, improves water \r security and increases farmers' income (Locatelli et al., 2015). Response \r options in terms of SLM options, and value chain and risk management \r [...]"


id: 3062af7cd38d5508f48678750a8cc590
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"[...] involve interlinkages between land-based climate strategies, synergies \r and trade-offs (see Chapter 6). On the other hand, a key trade-off is \r the potential for maladaptation, where one adaptation intervention at \r one time, location or sector could increase the vulnerability at another \r time, location or sector, or increase the vulnerability of the target group \r to future climate change (medium evidence, high agreement) (Eriksen \r et al., 2011). A cause of increasing concern to adaptation planners is \r the understanding of maladaptation has changed subtly to recognise \r that it arises inadvertently, from poorly planned adaptation actions, but \r also from carefully deliberated decisions where wider considerations \r place greater emphasis on singular or short-term outcomes ahead of \r broader, longer-term threats, or discount, or fail to consider, the full \r range of interactions arising from the planned actions across scales \r [...]"


id: 69ca3b17d70a6d0f5a6f6c4d0244a51c
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"[...] (Eriksen et  al., 2021). Research identifies the challenge of avoiding \r maladaptation as one of reducing long-term structural vulnerability. \r Accordingly, one can consider CCD and maladaptation as two sides \r of the same coin. Scholars of 'sustainable adaptation' define it as \r adaptation that contributes to socially and environmentally sustainable \r development pathways, which takes into account both social justice \r and environmental integrity (Eriksen et  al., 2011). The parallels in \r maladaptation include the underlying drivers of vulnerability, namely \r socio-environmental processes such as conflict, marginalisation, \r economic restructuring, exploitation, institutional fragility and so forth \r (Antwi-Agyei et al., 2018b; Neef et al., 2018)."


id: da4b88cbdf727318ec58627b1ea4900
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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"The key challenge for CRD is addressing climate change from the \r perspective of development: addressing the fundamental development \r obstacles that limit capacity for adaptation. Where development is \r not sustainable, especially if it is not equitable, capacity for adapting \r is greatly reduced--a phenomenon known as the adaptation gap \r (Figure 8.14; Birkmann et al., 2021a; UNEP, 2021). Figure 8.14 depicts \r the effect of development trajectories (as described in the SSPs \r framework) on capacity for adaptation, a key determinant of eventual \r outcomes. Achieving CRD through coupling adaptation with equitable \r sustainable development under and low emissions profiles that limit \r warming to 1.5degC (i.e., sustainability scenario) is necessary to close the \r adaptation gap. Even if emissions are kept low and 1.5degC emissions \r targets are achieved, if poverty and inequality remain high, then \r impacts are expected to remain high and may overwhelm capacity \r [...]"


id: 3542bd2c2a75f8e72eb85160ed866d4b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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"[...] for adaptation. High poverty and high inequality in a society (i.e., \r inequality scenario) reduce the likelihood that countries are able to \r manage risk and avoid residual impacts, such as also documented \r in the assessment above (see Sections  8.2; 8.3; 8.4). Unsustainable \r development trajectories reduce capacity for adaptation and may \r result in highly unequally distributed residual impacts from climate \r change. Even despite rapid, equitable development and modest \r emissions reductions efforts necessary to limit warming to 2degC (i.e., the \r middle of the road scenario), there is still risk of unequal distribution of \r impacts. Under all high emissions scenarios (>3degC warming), universal \r residual impacts are unavoidable."


id: 366809a236a62633d8a5c6c2ce37847a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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content:
"Harnessing opportunities for mitigation, adaptation and development \r in an effective manner may lead to 'triple wins' under CRD, though \r empirical evidence is extremely rare for such triple win strategies that \r address mitigation, adaptation and development in an effective manner \r (Tompkins et  al., 2013). Integration of mitigation, adaptation and \r development is being initiated and operationalised through projects \r by several developing countries to achieve main national development \r priorities, such as poverty reduction, increased employment \r opportunities, energy security and transportation (Denton et al., 2014; \r Stringer et al., 2014). Important follow-on questions are pressing social \r questions about how trade-offs are deliberated, who wins and loses and \r who decides (see Section 8.4 and Ellis and Tschakert, 2019). Likewise, \r the efficiency, effectiveness and feasibility trade-offs of climate policies \r [...]"


id: a06f8987bad5f42f9fc88241054da3e
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"[...] must be considered (i.e., can programmes in developing countries be \r economically efficient and provide opportunities to achieve sustainable \r development targets for developing countries?) (Dang et  al., 2003). \r Moreover, questions about co-benefits must consider the benefit-\r cost ratio of mitigative versus adaptive action for assets saved from "


id: 6b4797cc74f4e5dd98212710ab167f1f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Integrated climate change actions or responses can be inefficient \r and infeasible in the absence of enabling conditions, including the \r policy conditions that reinforce unified climate action, and sustainable \r financial mechanisms for implementation of the programmes and \r policies (Duguma et al., 2014b). In the absence of strong coordination, \r integrating mitigation and adaptation may undermine the overall or \r individual objectives of either climate response (Kongsager, 2018). A \r lack of coordination in mitigation and adaptation may also exacerbate \r the threats of climate change to sustainable development (Ayers and \r Huq, 2009; Kongsager, 2018). Therefore, for successful integration of \r CRD, it is necessary to move beyond considering either adaptation \r or mitigation towards better understanding the linkages between \r adaptation and mitigation projects and policies at multiple levels of \r governance to identify potential trade-offs in projects and policies \r [...]"


id: 3f4269a2bfd68f91db60b8855e2d07f0
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content:
"[...] (Suckall et  al., 2015) and to identify the enabling conditions for \r designing and implementing action leading to synergies (Denton et al., \r 2014; Kongsager, 2018)."


id: 137a9ff9cf8ef6a1894665a1fded59de
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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content:
"Despite the potential effectiveness and efficiency of integrating \r mitigation and adaptation under a common CRD framework, gaps \r persist in our knowledge about the enabling conditions for synergies, \r due to the limited number of examples and even fewer evaluations. \r Potential benefits may be achieved by pursuing multi-level governance \r approaches, that means integrating decision making at the local level \r with coordination at other levels, by actors and agencies simultaneously \r pursuing multiple other priorities (see Section 8.5.2 Shaw et al., 2014). \r For example, pursuing climate-resilient land use pathways integrating \r climate policy within the land use sector requires a governance policy \r environment that combines multiple policy aims, including urban \r growth, soil conservation and water management alongside mitigation \r and adaptation. Facilitating climate-resilient land use pathways \r combining the aims of climate change adaptation, mitigation and \r [...]"


id: e0b34f5a491d3908e76f1d85cb8a825f
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content:
"[...] sustainable development requires a governance environment with: (a) \r internal climate policy coherence between mitigation and adaptation \r objectives and policies, (b) external climate policy coherence between \r climate change and development objectives; (c) vertical policy \r integration that mainstreams climate change into sectoral policies and \r (d) overarching governance structures that facilitate horizontal policy \r integration for cross-sectoral coordination (Di Gregorio et  al., 2017) \r as well as sector policies integrating climate change adaptation and \r mitigation (England et al., 2018)."


id: bf8287ee3de56f344a67904a5ffbab07
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Some sectors--such as agriculture, forestry, energy--are found to \r have more potential for CRD synergies than others, although trade\u0002offs are also identified. CSA, carbon-forestry programmes and the \r water-energy-climate nexus show trade-offs across levels and sectors \r with identified winners and losers (high confidence) (IPCC, 2018a). \r Mitigation can be designed to provide opportunities for enhanced \r adaptation with comparable co-benefits, even while adaptation \r portfolios can maximise co-benefits around sustainable resource \r management that reduce emissions (Dovie, 2019). Climate policy \r integration can be considered as the integration of multiple policy \r objectives, governance arrangements and policy processes of climate \r change mitigation and adaptation along with other policy domains \r (Di Gregorio et al., 2017), as well as sector policies integrating climate \r change adaptation and mitigation (England et al., 2018). Integrating \r [...]"


id: 920be2b4f78fa922b1f9d0074113f914
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content:
"[...] climate policies may require balancing multiple sectoral goals, such \r as REDD+ projects, CSA, water sector strategies, national policies \r on climate change and national conservation plans (Duguma et  al., \r 2014a). Within the scientific discourse, increasing attention is given to \r the question of the synergies and mismatches between mitigation and \r adaptation policies."


id: 9a3f253658b552f7ddced2b9e29ba470
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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vector_id: 24376
content:
"CRD may require multi-sectoral coordination, including public-private \r partnerships (Campbell et al., 2018). In the food system, for example, \r under a CRD framework transformative actions may require (a) \r incentives for expanded private sector activities and/or public-private \r partnerships, (b) publicly backed credit and/or insurance, (c) public \r institutional support for strong local organisations and networking, (d) \r climate-informed weather advisories and early warning systems, (e) \r digital investments in technological transformation for agriculture (e.g., \r 'digital agriculture' and virtual markets), (f) investments in climate\u0002resilient and low-emission practices and technologies (Duguma et al., \r 2014b), (g) prioritisation and pathways of change, (h) capacity and \r enabling policy and institutions are crucial with careful consideration of \r trade-offs between adaptation and mitigation, and amongst other SDGs \r [...]"


id: 5caf68c171b61da646ec6fa1f4e77f89
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content:
"[...] for achieving SDG13 'urgent action to combat climate change and its \r impacts' (Campbell et al., 2018). Moreover, the risks of transformative \r actions to the farmers is addressed by strong good governance at \r multiple levels, combining top-down and bottom-up processes along \r with by a mix of levers that combine policy, technology, education and \r awareness raising, dietary shifts and financial/economic mechanisms, \r attending to multiple time dimensions (Stringer et al., 2020)."


id: 2643f76d88a8423d91ed8e6ced54a29a
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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content:
"Integrated CRD approaches in agriculture, such as CSA, can reduce trade\u0002offs and exploit synergies with biodiversity and food security to reduce \r the risk of climate change (Di Gregorio et al., 2017; Loboguerrero et al., \r 2019). There are many technologies and approaches in agriculture that \r leverage synergies relevant for CRD, including agroecology (Pandey \r et al., 2017a; Saj et al., 2017), CSA, climate-smart landscapes, organic \r agriculture mitigating climate change, conservation agriculture, \r ecological intensification and sustainable intensifications, which in \r many cases aim to address both adaptation and mitigation to climate \r change simultaneously (Kongsager, 2018). From these approaches, \r a number of scalable agriculture technologies have emerged that \r simultaneously achieve mitigation and adaptation goals, such as \r reducing water consumption while maintaining grain yield, including \r alternate wetting and drying irrigation technology (Liang et al., 2016) \r [...]"


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content:
"[...] and aerobic rice production (Wichelns, 2016). Likewise, a number \r of these approaches have been supported within international and \r national institutional frameworks (e.g., through incentives) to harness \r synergies (Kongsager et al., 2016)."


id: 96ccd3f7b53280cf400c2ec870dd6c87
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content:
"Locally appropriate agro-ecological practices have clear potential \r to increase the resilience of livelihoods and enhance adaptation \r to climate change at field and farm levels across a wide range of \r contexts, often with significant mitigation co-benefits (Sinclair et al., \r 2019). Relatedly, agroforestry systems are the intentional integration \r of trees and shrubs into crop and animal production systems to solve \r societal challenges including climate change (Raymond et al., 2017). \r For example, in the tropics, such systems offer viable opportunities to \r mitigate and adapt to climate change for farmers by transitioning to \r resilient farming systems and improving farm economy while securing \r environmental benefits for local and global communities (Swamy and \r Tewari, 2017). In Western Africa, the high plant functional diversity of \r agroforestry systems with a mix of trees and crops having different \r roles, such as shade provision, soil fertilization, fruit production or \r [...]"


id: 21251233d53edee7b043ee86e7d44978
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content:
"(Rivera-Ferre et al., 2016) and strengthen institutions such as agricultural \r support programmes, markets and intra- and inter-regional trade (Zhang \r et  al., 2017). For example, sustainable pastoralism can contribute to \r mitigation both by increasing carbon sequestration through improved \r soil management and by reducing methane emissions through changing \r the mix and distribution of the herd. Likewise sustainable pastoralism \r can also contribute to adaptation by changing grazing management, \r introducing alternative livestock breeds, improving pest management \r and modifying production structures (Joyce et  al., 2013). Another \r example of rangeland adaptation is diversifying the use of rangelands, \r such as supplementing with payments for ecosystem services, carbon \r sequestration, tourism or supplementary assistance for all land-based \r [...]"


id: b52fc98e121baf344cceb319a882b1c6
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content:
"[...] activities (Gharibvand et  al., 2015). However, challenges for climate\u0002smart livestock production systems remain due to a lack of information, \r limited access to technology and insufficient capital (FAO, 2017). \r Smallholders in cropping and livestock systems in sub-Saharan Africa \r and South Asia, for example, face obstacles obtaining climate change \r mitigation and adaptation synergies due to poor access to markets \r and relevant knowledge, land tenure insecurity and the common \r property status of most grazing resources (Descheemaeker et al., 2016). \r Consequently, the appropriateness of these strategies and measures \r needs to be further evaluated, particularly in terms of their usefulness \r for the poor and most vulnerable."


id: dbd6e817825ca0125ae51612599a5482
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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content:
"The enabling conditions for the expansion of agroforestry include \r training and expert support programmes for managers and sharing \r of best practices (Ashraf et al., 2015; Hernandez-Morcillo et al., 2018; \r Tschora and Cherubini, 2020). Other scalable frameworks integrating \r food and agriculture within CRD include sustainable intensification \r (SI), which emphasises sustainable practices to safeguard sustainable \r use of natural resources and meet the growing demand for agricultural \r production, while building resilience (Thierfelder et al., 2018). Integrated \r agricultural systems aim to increase farm diversity and lower reliance \r on external inputs, enhancing nutrient cycling and increasing natural \r resource use efficiency (Smith et al., 2017), and may have the potential \r to enhance resilience against climate change impacts and risks (Gil \r et  al., 2017). Policy frameworks that aim to integrate any of these \r [...]"


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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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content:
"[...] approaches for climate action must account for the costs associated \r throughout the uptake and adoption process (Gil et al., 2017)."


id: 594345e577eac4b52742fa7ff7c02b7
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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vector_id: 12946
content:
"As the consumption of animal protein and products rises along \r with global standards of living, CRD will require transformations in \r livestock-centred livelihoods. Livestock are a key contributor to global \r food security, especially in marginal lands where animal products are \r a unique source of energy, protein and micronutrients (FAO, 2017; \r IPCC, 2019a). However, they also contribute disproportionately to total \r annual anthropogenic GHG emissions globally and influence climate \r through land use change, processing and transport through emitting \r CO2, animal production by increasing methane emissions, and feed \r and manure production by emitting CO2, nitrous oxide, and methane, \r (Rojas-Downing et  al., 2017). Mitigation of livestock emissions can \r be achieved by implementation of various technologies and practices \r such as improving diets to reduce enteric fermentation, improving \r manure management and improving animal nutrition and genetics \r [...]"


id: ae79c5e28b825280a8af47c83a0ebd0d
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content:
"[...] (Rojas-Downing et al., 2017); altering land use for grazing and feed \r production, altering feeding practices, improving manure treatment \r and reducing herd size (Zhang et  al., 2017). Adaptation strategies \r in the livestock sector include changes in animal feeding, genetic \r manipulation, alterations in species and/or breeds (Zhang et  al., \r 2017), shifting to mixed crop-livestock systems (Rojas-Downing et al., \r 2017), production and management system modifications, breeding \r strategies, institutional and policy changes, science and technology \r advances, and changing farmers' perceptions and adaptive capacity \r (USDA, 2013)."


id: 4e400f01ac1725c85c3ada480ff01852
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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content:
"However, while studies of existing REDD+ programmes noted \r the moderately encouraging impacts for mitigation and small or \r insignificant impacts for adaptation options (especially well-being), \r they underscored the potentially damaging impacts to local livelihoods \r (Milne et  al., 2019; Skutsch and Turnhout, 2020). They suggested \r improved engagement with local communities, increased funding \r to strengthen the interventions on the ground, and more attention \r to both mitigation and adaptation outcomes in implementation for \r achieving the benefits of REDD+ programme (Duchelle et al., 2018). \r Moreover, to effectively counter local threats to forests and biodiversity \r and attain positive biodiversity and development outcomes, REDD+ \r programmes must be focused on better institutional support for \r governance, coordinating interventions and monitoring of plans, \r as well as making explicit linkages between REDD+ activities and \r [...]"


id: f7cb38b79a0d13897733a33085464f80
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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content:
"[...] national biodiversity conservation efforts (Panfil and Harvey, 2016) \r and assuring a fair distribution of benefits to local communities (Myers \r et  al., 2018). An analysis of country-specific REDD+ programmes in \r Cameroon looking at synergies of REDD+ with other national goals, \r such as poverty reduction, identified two principal modes of strategic \r interaction management among actors. The first priority relates to \r specific structures for designing REDD+ giving high priority to social \r safeguards. The second relates to programming that builds trust, \r communication and confidence of participants creating an environment \r for enabling management through commitment and behavioural \r interaction by creating an overarching institutional framework and \r unilateral management (Somorin et al., 2016)."


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"About 1 billion people globally (12.5% of the world's population) do \r not have access to electricity (World Bank, 2021), and yet access to \r electricity is required for basic adaptation strategies, such as the use \r of air conditioning and fans in homes and working spaces to mitigate \r heat stress and enable healthier lives, daytime activities and night\u0002time sleep quality. Electrification enables farmers to mechanically \r pump water from the underground to boost agricultural productivity, \r stabilise yields and make food security less reliant on erratic rainfall \r patterns and less vulnerable to dry spells. Access to electricity enables \r the spread of valuable information through television, radio, computers \r and smartphones, including weather forecasts and disaster prevention \r and response (Dagnachew et  al., 2018). The increasing access to \r electricity facilitates SDG 7 coupled with other SDGs and societal \r goals, including mitigation of climate change (van Vuuren et  al., \r [...]"


id: a955df4228942ce4f3a2a8b8157bb910
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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vector_id: 27015
content:
"[...] 2018) through reducing energy consumption by the use of efficient \r technology and appliances. Electricity access can be an important \r enabler of adaptation action for different purposes in different sectors \r (Mastrucci et al., 2019)."


id: b7ae5c961e8ed1f9daa11c8b859f2384
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content:
"Low-carbon development strategies can also be compatible with \r ecological sustainability, as proponents of bioenergy have claimed. \r Bioenergy can contribute to reducing emissions and energy inefficiencies \r in agricultural food and bioenergy sectors, while safeguarding food \r and energy security. However, recent literature also points towards \r significant tensions and mismatches between increasing bioenergy on \r agricultural land and local livelihoods and food security (Yildiz, 2019). \r A growing list of studies have documented the detrimental trade-offs \r between smallholder food systems and large-scale biofuel production, \r which include dispossession and impoverishment of smallholder farmers, \r food insecurity, food shortages and social instability (Hunsberger et al., \r 2017). Nevertheless, synergies between bioenergy and food security can \r be promoted by integrated resource management designed to improve \r both food and water security and access to bioenergy; investments in \r [...]"


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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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content:
"Trade-offs of bioenergy can be minimised by replacing land-intensive \r first-generation biofuels (e.g., oil palm) with second and subsequent \r generations (e.g., microalgae). However, there are costs of relying on \r 'sustainable biofuels' as most of the agricultural and non-agricultural \r land would be needed for cultivation of biofuels along with reduction \r in patterns of energy consumption a significant reduction in population \r (Gomiero, 2015). Contrasting impacts on environmental, economic and \r social sustainability are reported for production and use of biofuels \r (Azapagic and Perdan, 2011), ranging from positive impacts, such as \r reduction in GHG emissions, energy security and rural development, \r to negative impacts, such as risks of increasing food prices, increasing \r GHG emissions through direct and indirect land use change from \r production of biofuel feedstocks, and degradation of land, forests, \r water resources and ecosystems (UNEP, 2009). Biofuel production \r [...]"


id: 8fe2eadd1b7c3e1e3f817db70b461fc4
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content:
"[...] may cause loss of biodiversity (Jeswani et  al., 2020) and may also \r impact various ecosystem services, such as land, water and food, and \r may pollute air, water and soil (Scovronick and Wilkinson, 2014). The \r collective benefits of biofuels could be realised by developing future \r policies based on integrated systems with a clear understanding about \r the interactions across sectors and land uses gained by analysing \r complete value chains (Jeswani et al., 2020)."


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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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content:
"A range of different traditional economic decision support tools can \r be used to help guide resource allocation in relation to climate change \r adaptation (e.g., cost-benefit analysis, cost-effectiveness analysis, \r multi-criteria analysis) (Watkiss et al., 2016), with a strong focus on \r monetary values and the present and near-term. There are also tools \r to assess uncertainty (e.g., iterative risk management) and to guide \r decision making under uncertainty over longer time frames (through, \r e.g., real options analysis, robust decision making involving substantial \r numbers of scenarios, portfolio analysis and rule-based decision \r support for uncertainty where maximum regrets are minimised). Use \r of these tools nevertheless requires human capital and skills, and more \r commonly they are applied to public rather than private (individual/ \r household) adaptation decision processes. Tools grounded in \r economics can lack sufficient consideration of which groups in society \r [...]"


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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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vector_id: 16795
content:
"[...] might gain and lose out from particular options (Sovacool et al., 2015; \r Stringer et al., 2019), neglecting to appreciate non-monetary factors \r (like well-being) which are non-economic, less tangible and harder to \r put a value on (see Section 8.3)."


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"Clean sources of energy, such as solar and wind, can facilitate both \r mitigation and adaptation. For example, in South Africa, clean sources \r of energy provide energy security with huge water savings along with \r creation of employment, proximity to point of use and, in many cases, \r less reliance on concentrated sources of energy (Mpandeli et al., 2018). \r Overall, the increased use of thermal solar panels contributes to reducing \r GHG emissions and improves air quality, as well as providing benefits \r to the community and the environment. The differential adoption of \r solar panels can be managed by simultaneous investment in other \r technologies that utilise renewable energy along with investment in \r solar panels (Kaya et al., 2019). Development of a smart electricity grid \r connected to a renewable energy source reduces GHG emissions and \r decreases vulnerability to climate change by enhancing the response \r to changing conditions and providing a more reliable service to the \r [...]"


id: 5359f56b9bb36fdb06630e17f0c61ae3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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"[...] population (Hennessey et al., 2017). Moreover, development of policies \r for a low-carbon and climate-resilient power system, a local nexus \r between mitigation and adaptation could be explored (Handayani \r et al., 2020). For example, use of efficient fuel in urban areas facilitates \r air pollution reduction and also provides health benefits for urban \r populations (Ramaswami et al., 2017). Green buildings substantially \r reduce energy consumption and also improve indoor environmental \r quality and thus contribute to mitigation and provide societal value in \r terms of health (MacNaughton et al., 2018). In addition, green-roofed \r buildings contribute to keeping local temperatures cooler during hot \r days and thereby reducing energy use for air conditioning and thus \r contributing to both mitigation and adaptation (Sharma et al., 2016)."


id: c837385d50d615a29a2cb17d76706300
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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"Mainstreaming and policy coherence is one of the most proposed \r strategies for dealing with adaptation and mitigation as a coherent \r approach, in the context of good governance. Politics, power and \r interests influence the prospects of achieving integrated climate policy \r and development goals in practice (Naess et al., 2015). Institutional \r incoherence has led to inefficiency and ineffectiveness (Di Gregorio \r et  al., 2017). To achieve more coherent institutions and synergies, \r four major enabling conditions have been identified: (a) planned and/\r or existing national laws, policies and strategies, (b) existing and \r planned financial means and measures, (c) institutional arrangements \r in the country with specific reference to climate change issues and \r (d) planned and/or existing programmes and initiatives in the country \r (Kabisch et al., 2016). Another strategy offered is to develop a 'dual \r track approach' at local/municipality/city level by having a local \r [...]"


id: 71e6a480ace6912fa62379698163776b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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content:
"[...] climate plan and/or mainstreaming plan (Duguma et al., 2014b). This \r can lead to effective implementation of climate actions and diffusion of \r climate issues into local sector policies (Reckien et al., 2019). Effective \r climate policy integration (CPI) calls for four levels of coherence (Di \r Gregorio et al., 2017), namely between internal coherence (mitigation "


id: 5f59b2f839fa85a3685f6a537ffdfa18
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"is used to examine synergies and trade-offs between adaptation and \r mitigation (Howells and Rogner, 2014). As reviewed by Wiegleb and \r Bruns (2018), early use of the concept was by the World Economic \r Forum in 2008 where it was emphasised that issues of economic \r growth need to be considered within water, energy and food resource \r systems. This was later published as Water Security: The Water-Food-\r Energy-Climate Nexus. Another key activity was the Bonn2011 Nexus \r conference. Then, in 2015, The Nexus Dialogue Programme was \r held by the UN and EU Commissions as an approach to implement \r the SDGs. UN Water underscores the water-energy-food nexus as \r central to development (Newell et al., 2019). It notes that demand for \r water, food and energy are rising due to a growing population, rapid \r urbanisation, changing diets and economic growth, and in most cases, \r the lack of knowledge on the water-energy-food nexus has often led \r [...]"


id: 4054420172b12f126c7494c0a9bb4802
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"[...] to mismatches in prioritisation and decision making which hinders \r sustainable development (Mitra et al., 2020). However, the benefits of \r nexus approach are not always easily quantified and often accrue to \r local communities over time (Amjath-Babu et al., 2019)."


id: fef734e998cc4f8d8c37fd045f132ae8
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content:
"A well-coordinated and integrated nexus approach offers opportunities \r to build resilient systems while harmonising interventions, mitigating \r trade-offs and hence improving sustainability (Biggs et  al., 2015). \r This can be achieved through greater resource mobilisation and \r coordination, policy convergence across sectors and targeting nexus \r points in the broader landscape (Mpandeli et  al., 2018). Studies \r utilising the nexus approach to climate change in different places \r show considerably different results. In the southern African region, \r climate change is already affecting water-energy-food resources and \r exerting further pressure on already scarce resources. It is proposed \r that adaptation can be achieved through cross-sectoral management \r of resources, by adopting water management practices, aiming to \r produce more food and energy with less water resources and adopting \r cleaner and renewable sources of energy. This will result in saving \r [...]"


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"[...] water and ensuring energy security in a region that depends on \r hydro and coal energy sources (Mpandeli et al., 2018). Applying the \r nexus approach to the Hindu Kush Himalayan region identified three \r challenges: increasing population and declining agricultural land, \r stagnating or declining food production and increasingly water- and \r energy-intensive food production despite water and energy scarcity \r (Rasul and Sharma, 2016). Nexus smart adaptation policies need to \r be complemented with system-wide adaptation, policy coherence and \r sectoral coordination that targets poverty and vulnerability linkages \r (Rasul and Sharma, 2016)."


id: a8c7ac86b8e14151f0362a8f4920a836
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"Different governance approaches, such as polycentric governance, \r adaptive governance, multi-level governance, collaborative governance \r or network governance, are increasingly utilised to understand the \r processes of transitioning towards CRD. The potential of polycentric \r governance approaches for promoting both climate mitigation and \r adaptation is well established (Cole, 2015; Abbott, 2017; Morrison \r et al., 2017a; Warner et al., 2018). Polycentric governance deals with \r active steering of local, regional, national and international actors, and \r instigates learning from experience across multiple actors, levels of \r decision making and temporal scales (Ostrom, 2010). It is the source of \r power to achieve collective goals. Polycentric actors have the framing \r power, power by design and pragmatic power (Morrison et al., 2017b). \r Polycentric governance offers new opportunities for climate action \r through more opportunities for communication, trust-building, policy \r [...]"


id: 624024111ffbe4117a2b7c5aa1570846
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"[...] experimentation and learning (Cole, 2015). Adaptive governance \r is understood as various interactions between actors, networks, \r organisations and institutions towards achieving a desired state of \r social-ecological systems (Chaffin et al., 2014). It requires a structure of \r nested institutions, diversity at different levels, connected by formal and \r informal social networks (Dietz et al., 2003). As Brunner and Lynch (2010) \r observe, the emergence of community-based initiatives in addressing \r climate change marks the emergence of adaptive governance."


id: 62b002a2d70360e3fa97478cf4fb8242
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"and Nicholls, 2017; Brugnach et  al., 2017). Detailed knowledge of \r local socio-ecological contexts may offer transformational processes \r to harness synergies (Thornton and Comberti, 2017). A study in the \r Ukraine on cooperatives shows that it offers a well-established \r livelihood strategy and means to support agriculture smallholders. \r Moreover, social capital fulfils key roles in the process of capacity \r building and implementation of sustainable measures (Kopytko, 2018). \r In Indonesia, a well-known programme focusing on community\u0002led adaptation and mitigation activities is Proklim. It empowers \r communities to learn about climate change impacts, record data \r and plan actions for climate change (Muttaqin and Yulianti, 2019). \r Multi-stakeholder, participatory planning processes are beneficial \r to help farmers to screen and prioritise rural livelihood strategies in \r Indonesia. The necessity of CRD is reflected in standard development \r [...]"


id: 31fc948bb10517fdda63852f368383b6
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"[...] interventions: water management, intensification and diversification \r of agriculture and aquaculture, education, health, food security and \r skill building for farmers (Wise et al., 2016)."


id: a4114d7c595fb7ed8c2ba41fc3c157ac
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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"Globally, the main sectors benefiting from adaptation finance to date \r include water and waste water management; agriculture, forestry, land \r use and natural resource management; disaster risk management; and \r infrastructure, energy, and other built environment (Oliver et al., 2018). \r In recent years, this finance has moved away from concentrating on \r water and wastewater management to spread out more evenly across \r the sectors. Between 2015/16 and 2017/18, investment in water and \r wastewater management dropped from USD 11 billion to USD 9 billion, \r while investment in agriculture, forestry, land use and natural resource \r management grew from USD 5 billion to USD 7 billion, and investment \r in disaster risk management more than doubled from USD 3 billion \r to USD 7 billion (CPI, 2019). In addition, while mitigation actions are \r more easily delineated, for example wind farms in the energy sector, \r adaptation measures often need to be mainstreamed across a number \r [...]"


id: be71a5632799cf9e34e5b38698f86feb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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"There is still some debate on what qualifies as adaptation finance and \r how such finance should be measured (UNFCCC, 2016). According to \r the Climate Policy Initiative, adaptation finance is 'finance with the \r aim of improving preparation and reducing climate-related risk and \r damage, for both human and natural systems, as short-term climate \r impacts will continue to exact economic, social, and environmental \r costs even if appropriate mitigation actions are taken' (CPI, 2019). \r According to UNEP, the annual costs of adaptation in developing \r countries could range from USD  140  billion to USD  300  billion by \r 2030. Globally, adaptation costs are estimated to be even greater, \r with up to USD 500 billion yr-1 by 2050 under a Business-As-Usual \r scenario (UNEP, 2021). While global climate finance flows reached \r USD 579 billion on average over the 2017/18 period, there has been \r a continued heavy imbalance in favour of mitigation finance, with \r [...]"


id: cddc0cbcc39b3ed6ee27138a255d6282
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"[...] adaptation finance totalling around USD  30  billion (compared to \r USD 532 billion for mitigation), or 5% of tracked climate finance. The \r World Bank has, however, committed to increase direct adaptation \r finance to USD 50 billion over the 2020-25 period, putting the Bank's \r adaptation finance in developing countries on par with its mitigation \r investments (World Bank, 2019a). Adaptation finance is also growing \r alongside finance for actions with both mitigation and adaptation \r benefits, for example in forestry or agriculture, which rose to just over \r USD 12 billion (CPI, 2019), as well as increasing focus on adaptation \r and cross-sectoral projects. Looking only at climate finance flows \r from developed to developing countries, the OECD estimates a total \r of USD 78.9 billion mobilised in 2018, with mitigation accounting for \r 70% (USD 55 billion) of the total, adaptation 21% (USD 16.8 billion) \r and cross-cutting finance making up the remainder (OECD, 2020a)."


id: b89b9303e199f01a25d9b600d5357496
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content:
"at the individual or household scale, without coordination at larger \r institutional scales (Section  8.3, 8.4; Barrett, 2014). Discussions of \r adaptation finance often occur in the context of dwindling resources \r and trade-offs: triage decisions about other investments that societies \r can tolerate suspending (Warner and Van der Geest, 2013; Tanner \r et al., 2015). In many poor, vulnerable countries, complex governance \r challenges, such as budget austerity or corruption, hamper the provision \r of such support. In the absence of adaptation funding for the poor, \r coordinated at higher scales, the costs of adaptation are borne by the \r poor at community, kin-group and household scales. Bearing the cost \r of adaptation, thus, can become, in the short term, an erosive process \r of coping that ultimately increases the likelihood that communities and \r households will remain trapped in poverty (Antwi-Agyei et al., 2018b). \r [...]"


id: 94f556f5a6c71d2db38a1e98792abde9
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content:
"[...] In the long term, measures financing adaptation may be maladaptive, \r meaning they ultimately leave the poor at greater risk of experiencing \r climate change impacts (Section 8.4.5; Rahman and Hickey, 2019). Such \r circumstances highlight the governance gap that drives the poorest to \r rely on extreme measures to finance adaptation."


id: 84c8d7e986270af9994bbf038ba8a49b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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content:
"New financial instruments can help to support investment in, for \r example, ecosystem-based adaptation. For example, green bonds \r can raise significant amounts of capital in support of projects with \r environmental/climate benefits. The green bond market has quickly \r developed since the European Investment Bank launched the first \r green bond in 2007, with issuance growing to USD 257.7 billion in \r 2019, up more than 50% on the previous year (CPI, 2019). Most green \r bonds focus on energy, buildings and transport infrastructure but \r green bond issuance to support sustainable agriculture and forestry \r has grown from USD 208 million in 2013 to USD 7.4 billion in 2018 \r (Wilkins, 2019). The Seychelles issued the world's first 'blue' bond in \r 2018 with the support of the World Bank. Similar to green bonds, blue \r bonds earmark the use of bond proceeds for specific purposes, here the \r sustainable use of marine resources (World Bank, 2018). In 2019, the \r [...]"


id: 35ede9a9db5ddc9d907831dba77616bd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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"[...] European Bank for Reconstruction and Development issued the world's \r first ever dedicated climate resilience bond, raising USD 700 million. \r The 5-year bond will be used to finance the Bank's projects in climate\u0002resilient infrastructure (e.g., water, energy and transport), climate\u0002resilient business, commercial operations, climate-resilient agriculture \r and ecological systems (Bennett, 2019). While these issuances are still \r small compared to the overall green bond market, their rapid growth \r points to enormous opportunities for ecosystem-based adaptation."


id: 2def149e2600bcb4f0ebd6f11b405b1d
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"Enabling conditions for formal adaptation finance for the poorest are \r needed to reduce reliance on high-risk, extra-legal sources of income (see \r Section 8.5.2). In general, the antidote to this emerging problem is access \r to living wages that the poor can rely on to finance adaptation. There are \r few examples of pro-poor mechanisms, programmes or institutions that \r prioritise coordinated, access to credit for proactively adapting livelihoods \r of the poor (Agrawal and Perrin, 2009). Institutions can reduce incentives \r for vulnerable people to engage in high-risk activities by including them \r in the process of adaptation governance, which aims not only to support \r sustainable livelihood practices (such as farming, fishing and forestry), \r but also to guarantee land tenure (Wrathall et al., 2019). Also critical \r for risk reduction to the poor is the ability of authorities across multiple \r spatial and temporal scales to maintain social protection to reduce \r [...]"


id: aa8af75c99de04ffa5ba31cae13d31bc
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"[...] the dependency of illegal sources of income and facilitate adaptation \r (Tenzing, 2020). A range of tools exists for opening access to credit to \r poor and marginalised people whose livelihoods are most vulnerable \r (Ribot, 2013): climate insurance tools that are designed and targeted \r at the poorest and which have been properly assessed to ensure that "


id: bdb48f1d61fd487b575d062bd7c30597
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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"in regional clusters. It reports that significantly more people are living \r in highly vulnerable context conditions compared to those living in \r low vulnerability contexts. The assessment revealed that more than \r 3 million people are living in countries classified as very highly or highly \r vulnerable (depending on the assessment method and the number \r of classes used, and countries included). In contrast, approximately \r 1.8 billion people reside in low or very low vulnerable country contexts. \r Studies estimate the population in the most vulnerable regions to \r almost double by the year 2100 (Section  8.4.5.2). When near-term \r estimates are used, the population growth in highly vulnerable \r countries is still significantly higher compared to less vulnerable \r countries. Consequently, this assessment points towards the fact \r that even if we do not know how societal or community vulnerability \r will develop in specific areas, it is very likely that in the future, \r [...]"


id: 3957446a984d7f679e88244fd51f989b
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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content:
"[...] more people will live in destabilised and highly vulnerable country \r contexts compared to the population today. However, it is important \r to note that the scientific literature also underscores that trends in \r vulnerability differ significantly between different world regions and \r within countries."


id: 25d1aceaaa5a14cbc37829dace96d24d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"The chapter provides additional evidence on livelihood resources at \r local levels that have been impacted by different climate hazards and, \r globally, that specific hazards (namely, drought and rising temperatures) \r are more threatening and destabilising to livelihoods than others. \r There is robust evidence that coping and adaptive capacities erode \r with increasing GMT--substantial differences are expected between \r a GMT increase of less than 1.5degC compared to an increase of more \r than 3degC--and the frequencies of climate hazards, such as heat waves, \r droughts or floods is likely to increase substantially. Nevertheless, this \r assessment also revealed that the adverse impacts of climate change \r for livelihoods and multidimensional poverty differ substantially \r between different population groups exposed to climate hazards, \r based on the socioeconomic and governance context. Consequently, \r societal impacts of climate change need to be understood in the \r [...]"


id: efcd33651152c64e8c8ca43310e53c28
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content:
"[...] broader context of development and the development challenges that \r influence exposure, vulnerability and adaptation."


id: b184b9c1c21c865a4f6ff82ba2c42af8
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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content:
"There is robust evidence of the impacts of all climate hazards on \r the key livelihood resources that the poor depend on. There is high \r confidence that two climate hazards pose high risk to a broad range \r of livelihood resources: warming trends and droughts. Meanwhile, \r the livelihood resources that are globally at greatest risk include \r people's bodily health, food security and agricultural productivity (high \r confidence). Evidence suggests that the fundamental challenge of \r climate change to livelihoods is that rising temperatures, drought and \r other hazards endanger human life, and the lives of plants and animals \r that humans rely on to survive (high confidence). There is now robust \r evidence that the impacts of climate change on livelihoods are driving \r people to migrate in search of alternative incomes, and this tendency \r will increase with rising temperatures. Of greatest concern are people \r whose development context is compromised by war, conflict and \r [...]"


id: cb04dcfb85bfa482813e00fe7522d063
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"This chapter builds on AR5 and the IPCC SR 1.5degC on key limits to the \r adaptation of natural and social systems that are compounded by the \r effects of poverty and inequality, such as on water scarcity, ecosystems \r alteration and degradation, coastal cities in relation to sea level rise, \r cyclones and coastal erosion, food systems and human health (high \r confidence). Climate change risks could have substantial negative \r impacts on climate-sensitive livelihoods of smallholder farmers, \r fisheries communities, Indigenous People, urban poor and informal \r settlements, with limits to adaptation evidenced in the loss income, \r ecosystems, health and increasing migration (high confidence). The \r chapter also addresses how ecological thresholds and socioeconomic \r determinants of vulnerabilities are linked to soft and hard adaptation \r limits, including the potential and magnitude of livelihood risks in the \r future. For instance, a hard limit associated with losses of coral reefs \r [...]"


id: 1c71b0517207e79d0ed99ab381cb6e92
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"[...] in a 1.5degC warmer world will lead to substantial loss of income and \r livelihoods for coastal communities (high confidence), including loss \r of culture- and place-based attachment (medium confidence). Hard \r adaptation limits are expected for the Arctic ecosystem. Their threshold \r will affect residents of Arctic regions dependent on hunting and \r fishing livelihoods (high confidence). New emerging considerations \r to ecological limits to adaptation, such as severe glacier retreat \r and Amazon forest dieback, is expected to affect the livelihoods of \r smallholder farmers and Indigenous People through crop yield failures, \r biodiversity loss, reduced hydropower capacity and health (medium \r evidence). While a knowledge gap remains on the projected risks \r of increasing global temperature to climate-sensitive livelihoods \r among Global South countries and specific groups of people, current \r observations show negative impacts to livelihoods for tens to hundreds \r [...]"


id: bcb79a0a8efc891ddb754c4840a6a856
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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content:
"[...] of millions of people. Thus, without sustainable, equitable and urgent \r adaptation measures, maladaptation risks are likely to further increase \r vulnerability, marginalisation and ecological tipping points among the \r poor within countries (medium confidence)."


id: 486f313a0aa347231936b158413010a7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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vector_id: 9954
content:
"Climate change and related hazards (e.g., droughts, floods, heat stress, etc.) affect many aspects of people's lives--\r such as their health, access to food and housing, or their source of income such as crops or fish stocks--and many \r will have to adapt their way of life in order to deal with these impacts. People who are poor and have few resources \r with which to adapt are thus much more seriously negatively affected by climate-related hazards. 'Vulnerability' \r is when a person or community is not able to cope and adapt to climate-related hazards. For example, if someone \r who is very rich has their house washed away in a flood, this is terrible, but they often have more resources to \r rebuild, have insurances that support recovery and maybe even build a house that is not in a flood-prone area. \r Whereas for someone who is very poor and who does not live in a state that provides support, the loss of their \r [...]"


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vector_id: 15580
content:
"[...] house in a flood could mean homelessness. This example shows that the same climate hazard (flood) can have a very \r different impact on people depending on their vulnerability (their capacity to cope and adapt to hazards)."


id: 1107a880f581bd8c508a7ba4706a8b9c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 191
content:
"A range of local, regional and global economic and political processes already underway have put the livelihoods of the poor at risk. These \r processes include urbanisation, industrialisation, technological transformation, monetisation of rural economies, increasing reliance on wages, \r and inequality at national and international levels. Climate change intersects with these processes.\r The world's poorest already struggle to provide for themselves and their families in their pursuit of livelihoods. \r Despite hard work there are many factors beyond an individual's control that can make earning a living very \r difficult. Climate change is one problem among many that puts stress on livelihoods. Poor and marginal groups \r disproportionately bear impacts of climate change, in ways that accelerate transitions from traditional livelihoods, \r such as rural farming, to wage jobs in urban areas. Where adaptation measures are insufficient and where the poor \r [...]"


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content:
"[...] are excluded from decision making, these livelihood transitions can be severely destabilising."


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"Adaptation can help to reduce risks for the poor and requires both public and private investment in various natural \r assets (e.g., mangroves, farmland, wetlands), human assets (e.g., health, skills, Indigenous knowledge), physical \r assets (e.g., mobile phone connectivity, housing, electricity, technology), financial assets (e.g., savings, credit) and \r social assets (e.g., social networks, membership of organisations such as farmer cooperatives). Often, the poor have \r the least to invest, so poverty can reduce adaptation options. Sometimes people migrate as a reaction to floods or \r droughts, though the poorest groups often lack the resources to move. Exactly what needs investing in to reduce \r risks varies according to the scale and livelihood system in need of adaptation. In general, risks can be reduced \r through a range of different technological and engineering approaches (for example, building sea defences to \r [...]"


id: de22dd47c3b38cecec05b5f315f54ac2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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content:
"[...] reduce storm surge impacts), as well as ecosystem-based approaches (such as replanting mangroves, altering the \r types of crops grown, changing the timing of farming activities, or using climate-smart agriculture or agroforestry \r approaches)."


id: cf35feaa5eaa0537c12e65ea09c08cb3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Contributing Authors: Philip Antwi-Agyei (Ghana), Aaron Atteridge (Sweden/Australia), Rachel \r Bezner-Kerr (Canada/USA), Timothy Breitbarth (USA/South Korea), Max Callaghan (UK/Germany), \r Tamma Carleton (USA), Colin Carlson (USA), Hayley Clements (South Africa), Declan Conway \r (UK), Sean Cooke (South Africa), Matthew Chersich (South Africa), David Chiawo (Kenya), Romy \r Chevalier (South Africa), Joanne Clarke (Australian/UK), Marlies Craig (South Africa), Olivier Crespo \r (South Africa), James Cullis (South Africa), Jampel Dell'Angelo (Italy/USA), Luleka Dlamini (South \r Africa) Hussen Seid Endris (Kenya), Christien Engelbreht (South Africa), Aidan Farrell (Trinidad \r and Tobago/Ireland), James Franke (USA), Thian Yew Gan (Malaysia/Canada), Christopher Golden \r (USA), Kerry Grey (South Africa), Toshihiro Hasegawa (Japan), Ryan Hogarth (Canada/UK), Hassan \r O. Kaya (South Africa), Nadia Khalaf (UK), Mercy Kinyua (Kenya), Scott Kulp (USA), William F. \r [...]"


id: e4e904d5b35dde32a2ec799e0348a9b0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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"[...] Lamb (UK/Germany), Charne Lavery (South Africa), Johan Maritz (South Africa), Guy Midgley \r (South Africa), Danielle Millar (South Africa), Jan Minx (Germany), Glenn Moncrieff (South \r Africa), Rachid Moussadek (Morocco), Mzime Ndebele-Murisa (Zimbabwe), Emily Nicklin (South \r Africa), Michelle North (South Africa), Mary Nyasimi (Kenya), Elizabeth Nyboer (Canada), Romaric \r Odoulami (Benin/South Africa), Andrew Okem (South Africa/Nigeria), Gladys Okemwa (Kenya), \r Kulthoum Omari (Botswana/South Africa), Esther Onyango (Kenya/Australia), Birgitt Ouweneel \r (the Netherlands/South Africa), Indra Overland (Norway), Lorena, Pasquini (South Africa), Laura \r Pereira (South Africa), Belynda Petrie (South Africa), Alex Pigot (UK), Wilfried Pokam (Cameroon), \r Bronwen Powell (Canada/USA), Jeff Price (UK), Heather Randell (USA), Maren Radeny (Kenya), \r Jonathan Rawlins (South Africa), Kanta Kumari Rigaud (Malaysia/USA), Carla Roncoli (USA), \r [...]"


id: c25f9fffa46ba2d43d8c01d22fedd03b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"[...] Olivia Rumble (South Africa), Elisa Sainz de Murieta (Spain), Georgia Savvidou (Sweden/Cyprus), \r Lucia Schlemmer (South Africa), Laura Schmitt Olabisi (USA), Chandni Singh (India), Thomas \r Smucker (USA), Nicola Stevens (South Africa), Anna Steynor (South Africa), Bamba Sylla (Rwanda/\r Senegal), Arame Tall (Senegal/USA), Richard Taylor (Canada/UK), Meryem Tenarhte (Morocco/"


id: bf0f5c23bcb43e65398b12daee95c072
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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"Mortality and morbidity will escalate with further global \r warming, placing additional strain on health and economic \r systems (high confidence). Above 2degC of global warming, distribution \r and seasonal transmission of vector-borne diseases is expected to \r increase, exposing tens of millions more people, mostly in west, east \r and southern Africa (high confidence). Above 1.5degC risk of heat-related \r deaths rises sharply (medium confidence), with at least 15 additional \r deaths per 100,000 annually across large parts of Africa, reaching \r 50-180 additional deaths per 100,000 people annually in regions \r of North, West, and East Africa for 2.5degC, and increasing to 200-600 \r per 100,000 people annually for 4.4degC. Above 2degC global warming, \r thousands to tens of thousands of additional cases of diarrhoeal \r disease are projected, mainly in west, central and east Africa (medium \r confidence). These changes risk undermining improvements in health \r [...]"


id: 2335242e55a4c5cba95c6a7078cd9e65
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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content:
"[...] from future socioeconomic development (high agreement, medium \r evidence). {9.10.2, Fig. 9.35}"


id: 658fb7681e17179ada38e78c29d454c6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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content:
"Africa's rapidly growing cities will be hotspots of risks from \r climate change and climate-induced in-migration, which could \r amplify pre-existing stresses related to poverty, informality, \r social and economic exclusion, and governance (high confidence). \r Urban population exposure to extreme heat is projected to increase from \r 2 billion person-days per year in 1985-2005 to 45 billion person-days \r by the 2060s (1.7degC global warming with low population growth) and \r to 95  billion person-days (2.8degC global warming with medium-high \r population growth), with greatest exposure in west Africa. Under relatively \r low population growth scenarios, the sensitive populations (people under \r 5 or over 64 years old) in African cities exposed to heat waves of at least \r 15 days above 42degC in African cities is projected to increase from around \r 27  million in 2010 to 360  million by 2100 for 1.8degC global warming \r (Shared Socioeconomic Pathway 1 (SSP1)) and 440  million (SSP5) for \r [...]"


id: 9947acbc1a53769275771237ff58b79b
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"[...] >4degC global warming. Compared to 2000, urbanisation is projected to \r increase urban land extent exposed to arid conditions by around 700% \r and exposure to high-frequency flooding by 2600% across west, central \r and east Africa by 2030. {9.9.1, 9.9.2, 9.9.4, Box 9.8}"


id: ab0d78d3b765b649a9e9dd923b56cdb4
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"Figure 9.1 |  The five regions of Africa used in this chapter, also showing \r estimated population density in 2019. The population of Africa was estimated \r at 1.312 billion for 2020, which is about 17% of the world's population but this is \r projected to grow to around 40% of the world's population by 2100 (UNDESA, 2019a). \r Although 57% of the African population currently live in rural areas (43% urban), Africa \r is the most rapidly urbanising region globally and is projected to transition to a majority \r urban population in the 2030s, with a 60% urban population by 2050 (UNDESA, \r 2019b). The 2019 gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in constant 2010 USD \r averaged USD  2250 across the 43  countries reporting data, ranging from USD  202 \r (Burundi) to USD 8840 (Gabon), with 40% of the population of sub-Saharan Africa \r living below the international poverty line of USD 1.90 per day in 2018 (World Bank, \r [...]"


id: 45ed48d05e2430d14f2fe4992396f856
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content:
"[...] 2019). The highest life expectancy at birth is 67 (Botswana and Senegal) and the lowest \r is 52 (Central African Republic) World Bank (2019). Grid-cell population density data for \r mapping are from Tatem (2017); WorldPop (2021)."


id: 6b19e612d52607865c15dab2a99873cf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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vector_id: 16137
content:
"In many parts of southern, east and west Africa, temperature or \r precipitation trends since the 1950s are attributable to human\u0002caused climate change and several studies document the impacts of \r these climate trends on human and natural systems (high confidence) \r (Figure  9.5; Sections  9.5.6; 9.5.7). Nevertheless, research into \r attribution of trends to human-caused climate change or climate \r impacts remains scarce for multiple regions, especially in north and \r central Africa. This illustrates an 'attribution gap' where robust evidence \r for attributable impacts is twice as prevalent in high- compared to \r low-income countries globally (Callaghan et al., 2021). Most studies \r on climate impacts in Africa have focused on terrestrial ecosystems or \r water, with fewer on marine ecosystems, agriculture, migration, and \r health and well-being (Callaghan et al., 2021). Specific factors driving \r these knowledge gaps include limited data collection, data access and \r [...]"


id: 51da84966a180139c3451bfb489c68f0
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content:
"Since AR5, there have been rapid advances in climate impact research \r due to increased computing power, data access and new developments \r in statistical analysis (Carleton and Hsiang, 2016). However, sparse and \r intermittent weather station data limit attribution of climate trends to \r human-caused climate change for large areas of Africa, especially for \r precipitation and extreme events, and hinder more accurate climate \r change projections (Section 9.5.2; Figure 9.5; Otto et al., 2020). Outside \r of South Africa and Kenya, digitally accessible data on biodiversity is \r limited (Meyer et al., 2015). Lack of comprehensive socioeconomic data \r also limits researchers' ability to predict climate change impacts. Ideally, \r multiple surveys over time are needed to identify effects of a location's \r changing climate on changing socioeconomic conditions. Twenty-five \r African countries conducted only one nationally representative survey \r [...]"


id: 57b44c2353a25500d88712c6a14a9720
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"[...] that could be used to construct measures of poverty during 2000-2010 \r and 14 conducted none over this period (Jean et al., 2016). Because \r of these challenges, much of what is known about climate impacts \r and risks in Africa relies on evidence from global studies that use \r data largely from outside Africa (e.g., Zhao et al., 2021). These studies \r generate estimates of average impacts across the globe, but may not \r have the statistical power to distinguish whether African nations display \r differential vulnerability, exposure or adaptive capacity. In sections \r of this chapter, we have relied, when necessary, on such studies, as \r they often provide best available evidence for Africa. Increasing data \r coverage and availability would increase the ability to discern important \r differences in risk both among and within African countries."


id: 355ea1a0fb5833f9bf583d9e7dcfbb0b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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content:
"Figure  9.5 |   Observed climate change impacts on human and natural \r systems are widespread across Africa, as are climate trends attributable \r to human-induced climate change. This machine-learning-assisted evidence map \r shows the presence of historical trends in temperature and precipitation attributable to \r human-induced climate change (pinks compared to greys) and the amount of evidence \r (shown by intensity of colours) documenting the impacts of these climate trends on \r human and natural systems (e.g., ecosystems, agriculture, health) across Africa. 'Robust' \r indicates more than five studies documented impacts per grid cell. A 'High' amount of \r evidence indicates more than 20 studies documented impacts for a grid cell. Climate \r impact studies from the literature were identified and categorised using machine \r learning. A language representation model was trained on a set of 2373 climate impact \r [...]"


id: 19ad3ed66cda2b61a464f5644395c921
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"[...] studies coded by hand. This supervised machine learning model identified 102,160 \r published studies predicted to be relevant for climate impacts globally; references to \r places in Africa were found in 5081 studies (5% of global studies). Temperature trends \r were calculated from 1951-2018 and precipitation from 1951-2016. Attribution of \r climate trends to human induced climate change is limited in some regions of Africa \r due to insufficient data (see Section 9.5.1, Figure 9.15). Hatching shows regions where \r trends in both temperature and precipitation are attributable to human-induced climate \r change. Data from Callaghan et al. (2021)."


id: 804199f48a0d73335099cc73b32ca0d0
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content:
"These unequal funding relations influence inequalities in climate-related \r research design, participation and dissemination between African \r researchers and researchers from high-income countries outside Africa, in \r ways that can reduce adaptive capacity in Africa (very high confidence). \r Those empowered to shape research agendas can shape research \r answers: climate research agendas, skills gaps and eligible researchers \r are frequently defined by funding agencies, often from a global north \r perspective (Vincent et  al., 2020a). Larger funding allocations for \r research focused on Ghana, South Africa, Kenya, Tanzania and Ethiopia \r are reflected in higher concentrations of empirical research on impacts \r and adaptation options in these countries, and there is a general lack \r of adaptation research for multiple of the most vulnerable countries in \r Africa (Figure 9.4) (Callaghan et al., 2021; Overland et al., 2021; Sietsma \r [...]"


id: 5beef48091ecc91d9b813dd843de71e9
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content:
"[...] et al., 2021; Vincent and Cundill, 2021). The combination of northern-led \r identification of both knowledge and skills gaps can result in projects \r where African partners are positioned primarily as recipients engaged \r to support research and/or have their 'capacity built' rather than also \r leading research projects on an equal basis (Vincent et al., 2020a; Trisos \r et al., 2021). Analysis of >15,000 climate change publications found for \r over 75% of African countries 60-100% of climate change publications \r on these countries did not include a single local author, with authorship \r dominated by researchers from richer countries outside Africa (Pasgaard \r et al., 2015). This can reduce adaptive capacity in Africa as researchers \r at global north institutions may shape research questions and outputs \r for a northern audience rather than providing actionable insights on \r priority issues for African partners (Pasgaard et  al., 2015; Nago and \r [...]"


id: c295de1b18cab2f3d46f29f698303233
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content:
"[...] Krott, 2020). Moreover, in order to access research publications in a \r timely manner, many researchers in Africa are forced to use shadow \r websites bypassing journal paywalls (Bohannon, 2016). Ways to \r enhance research partnerships to produce actionable insights on climate \r impacts and solutions in Africa include: increased funding from African \r and non-African sources, increasing direct control of resources for \r African partners, having African research and user priorities set research \r questions, identify skills gaps, and lead research, and having open access \r policies for research outputs (ESPA Directorate, 2018; Vogel et al., 2019; \r Vincent et al., 2020a; IDRC, 2021; Trisos et al., 2021)."


id: 9fcddfb6b134c734eee6081022ec0519
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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content:
"The transition from high to very high risk--that is severe and \r widespread impacts with limited ability to adapt--begins either at or \r just below 2degC for all three risks (Figure 9.6). The assessed temperature \r range for the transition to very high risk is wider for food production \r than for biodiversity and health. Projected impacts for food include: \r 10-30% decline in marine fisheries catch potential for the Horn of \r Africa region and southern Africa and more than 30% decline for west \r Africa at 2degC global warming, with greater declines at higher levels \r of warming (Section  9.8.2). Beyond 2degC global warming, over 50% \r of commercially important freshwater fish species across Africa are \r projected to be vulnerable to extinction (Figure  9.26). Between 2degC \r and 4degC, wheat, maize and rice yields are projected, on average, to be \r lower than 2005 yields across all regions of Africa. From 2degC global \r [...]"


id: 6fdbf4084567457b3b6b6e1aea9ca762
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content:
"[...] warming, over 40% losses in rangeland productivity are projected for \r western Africa. By 3.75degC, severe heat stress may be near year-round \r for cattle across tropical Africa (Figure 9.24). Multiple countries in west, \r central and east Africa are projected to be at risk from simultaneous \r negative impacts on crops, fisheries and livestock (Sections  9.8.2; \r 9.8.5; Thiault et al., 2019)."


id: b6253044a7c9bd96e0abb09d434bb843
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content:
"At the current global warming level, 83% of adaptation response \r categories assessed showed medium potential for risk reduction \r (that is, mixed evidence of effectiveness). Bulk water infrastructure \r (including managed aquifer recharge, dams, pipelines, pump stations, \r water treatment plants and distribution networks), human migration, \r financial investment for sustainable agriculture, and social infrastructure \r (including decentralised management, strong community structures \r and informal support networks) show high potential for risk reduction \r (high evidence of option's effectiveness)  (Sections  9.6.4; 9.7.3; Boxes \r 9.8; 9.9; 9.10; 9.11). However, there was limited evidence to assess \r the continued effectiveness of these options at higher global warming \r levels (Williams et  al., 2021) with some options, such as bulk water \r infrastructure (particularly large dams), expected to face increasing risk \r with continued warming with damages cascading to other sectors (see \r [...]"


id: 79936aad897d2a4da226a6915824a0ad
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content:
"[...] Box 9.5), while others, such as crop irrigation and adjusting planting \r times, may increasingly reach adaptation limits above 1.5degC and 2degC \r global warming (Sections 9.8.3; 9.8.4)."


id: 1bafa3a4157ce7e22120afa1bc38677
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"The best estimate for the onset of very high risk for biodiversity and \r health is at 2.1degC. Projected impacts considered very high risk for \r biodiversity include potential destabilisation of the African tropical \r forest carbon sink, risk of local extinction of more than 50% of plants, \r vertebrate and insect species across one-fifth of Africa, 7-18% of \r African species at risk of total extinction including, a third of freshwater \r fish, and more than 90% warm-water coral reefs lost (Section 9.6.2). \r For health, projected impacts considered high risk include potentially \r lethal heat exposure for more than 100 days per year in west, central \r and east Africa, with more than 50 additional heat-related deaths per \r 100,000 annually across large parts of Africa, and hundreds of millions \r more people exposed to extreme heat in cities (Section  9.5; 9.10.2; \r 9.9.4.1; Figure  9.35), tens to hundreds of thousands of additional \r [...]"


id: 2932bdd05edfdae268a236d2c862744d
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content:
"[...] cases of diarrhoeal disease in east, central and west Africa, and tens \r of millions more people exposed to mosquito-borne arboviruses like \r dengue or zika in north, east and southern Africa (Section 9.10.2)."


id: 8ec6845884b8cb7b40cfc8a4c5129b4b
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22305
content:
"In contrast, adaptation actions may induce trade-offs with mitigation \r objectives, as well as other adaptation and developmental outcomes, \r delivering negative impacts and compromising the attainment of \r the SDGs. For example, increased deployment of renewable energy \r technologies can drive future land use changes (Frank et al., 2021) and \r threaten important biodiversity areas if poorly deployed (Rehbein et al., \r 2020). The use of early maturing or drought-tolerant crop varieties may \r increase resilience (SDGs 1, 2), but adoption by smallholder farmers \r can also be hindered by affordability of seed. Cultivation of biodiesel \r crops also can hinder food security (SDG 2) at local and national \r levels (Tankari, 2017; Brinkman et  al., 2020). Additionally, the use \r of fertilizers in intense systems can result in increased environmental \r degradation (Akinyi et  al., 2021). When farmers migrate, it puts \r pressure on inadequate social services provision and facilities at \r [...]"


id: 48105ce7f280e91d0c37fe7be3fd1581
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content:
"[...] their destination (SDG 8) and leads to reduced farm labour and a \r deterioration of the workforce and assets (SDG 2) (Gemenne and \r Blocher, 2017a), which negatively affects farm operations and non\u0002migrants, particularly women, elderly and children, at the point of \r origin (Nyantakyi-Frimpong and Bezner-Kerr, 2015; Ahmed et al., 2016; \r Otto et al., 2017; Eastin, 2018). Farmers may also miss critical periods \r during the farming season that eventually makes them food insecure \r (SDG 2) and vulnerable to climate change (SDG 13) (Antwi-Agyei et al., \r 2018). Migrants should be supported to reduce their overall shocks \r to climate vulnerability at the points of origin and destination. Small\u0002scale irrigation infrastructure if not managed properly, may lead to \r negative environmental effects and compromise the integrity of \r riparian ecosystems (SDG 15) (Loucks and van Beek, 2017) and serve \r as breeding grounds for malaria-causing mosquitoes (SDG 3) (Attu and \r Adjei, 2018)."


id: 31e6c556a9f83869b7c0e7f500253da3
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content:
"specific contexts, adaptation generally is cost-effective (high confidence). \r The Global Commission on Adaptation estimated the benefits and costs \r of five illustrative investments and found benefit-cost ratios ranging \r from 2:1 to 10:1. However, it also noted that 'actual returns depend on \r many factors, such as economic growth and demand, policy context, \r institutional capacities and condition of assets' (The Global Commission \r on Adaptation, 2019). A review of ex-ante cost-benefit analyses for 19 \r adaptation-focused projects in Africa financed by the Green Climate \r Fund (GCF) shows benefit-cost ratios in a similar range. Using a \r 10% discount rate, as used by many of GCF's accredited entities, the \r benefit-cost ratio for individual projects ranges from 0.9:1 to 7.3:1, the \r median benefit-cost ratio is 1.8:1 and total ratio across all 19 projects is \r 2.6:1. When using lower discount rates, as some entities do for climate \r [...]"


id: 9160d513fd0e4505b8f9d4dcba6cd4d1
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content:
"[...] projects, the benefit-cost ratio is even higher, reflecting the front-loaded \r costs and back-loaded benefits of many adaptation investments. Using \r a 5% discount rate, the overall benefit-cost ratio of the GCF projects \r is 3.5:1, with a range from 1:1 to 11.5:1 and a median ratio of 2.4:1 \r (Breitbarth, 2020). In addition, many proposals have activities for which \r further benefits were not estimated due to the difficulty of attributing \r benefits directly to the intervention. The benefits of adaptation measures \r for infrastructure and others with clear market impacts are often easier \r to estimate than for policy interventions and where markets may not \r exist, such as ecosystem services (Li et al., 2014)."


id: ab23761f9d2fe8861f99e5972a423620
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27338
content:
"Adaptation costs in Africa are expected to rise rapidly as global \r warming increases (high confidence). A meta-analysis of adaptation \r costs identified in 44 NDCs and National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) \r from developing countries estimated a median adaptation cost around \r USD 17 per capita per year for 2020-2030 (Chapagain et  al., 2020). \r Adaptation cost estimates for Africa increase from USD 20-50 billion \r per year for Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP) 2.6 in 2050 \r (around 1.5degC of warming), to USD 18-60 billion per year for just over \r 2degC, to USD 100-437 billion per year for 4degC of global warming above \r pre-industrial levels (Schaeffer et al., 2013; UNEP, 2015; Chapagain et al., \r 2020). Focusing on individual sectors, the average country-level cost is \r projected to be USD 0.8 billion per year for adapting to temperature\u0002related mortality under 4degC global warming (Carleton et al., 2018), with \r [...]"


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"[...] cumulative energy costs for cooling demand projected to reach USD \r 51 billion by 2degC and USD 486 billion by 4degC global warming (Parkes \r et  al., 2019). Transport infrastructure repair costs are also projected \r to be substantial (Section  9.8.2) More precise estimates are limited \r by methodological difficulties and data gaps for costing adaptation, \r uncertainties about future levels of global warming and associated \r climate hazards, and ethical choices such as the desired level of \r protection achieved (Fankhauser, 2010; Hallegatte et al., 2018; UNFCCC, \r 2018) (Cross-Chapter Box  FINANCE in Chapter 17). As such, existing \r estimates are expected to substantially underestimate eventual costs \r with adaptation costs possibly 2-3  times higher than current global \r estimates by 2030, and 4-5 times higher by 2050 (UNEP, 2016a)."


id: 86583d46a72bb48d93c7d8fc335c888e
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"The amounts of finance being mobilised internationally to support \r adaptation in African countries are billions of US dollars less than \r adaptation cost estimates, and finance has targeted mitigation more \r than adaptation (high confidence). The Organisation for Economic Co\u0002operation and Development (OECD (2020) estimates an average of \r USD  17.3  billion per year in public finance targeting mitigation and \r adaptation from developed countries to Africa in 2016-2018, with \r adaptation expected to be a small share of this amount. Of the global \r total, only 21% in 2018 targeted adaptation (there is no breakdown \r provided for Africa). Analysis of OECD data that is reported by the \r funders, covering bilateral and multilateral funding sources, estimated \r international public finance (grants and concessional lending) committed \r to Africa for climate change for 2014-2018 at USD 49.9 billion: 61% \r (30.6 billion) for mitigation, 33% (16.5 billion) for adaptation and 5% \r [...]"


id: 6b8fd816a285f3dc3d2492d3d4d7caeb
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"[...] (2.7 billion) for both objectives simultaneously (Figure 9.8a; Savvidou \r et al., 2021). This equates to an average of USD 3.8 billion per year \r targeting adaptation (Savvidou et al., 2021). In per capita terms, only \r two countries (Djibouti and Gabon) were supported with more than \r USD 15 per person per year, most were supported with less than USD 5 \r per person per year (Savvidou et al., 2021)."


id: 847301026443bc26f5f5c915781be599
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"Even when accredited, some countries experience significant institutional \r and financial challenges in programming and implementing activities to \r support concrete adaptation measures (Omari-Motsumi et al., 2019). Low \r disbursement ratios suggest inadequate capacity to implement projects \r once they are approved (Savvidou et al., 2021). Systemic barriers have \r been highlighted in relation to the multilateral climate funds, including \r funds not providing full-cost adaptation funding, capacity barriers in \r the design and implementation of adaptation actions (including the \r development of fundable project proposals) and barriers in recognising \r and enabling the involvement of sub-national actors in the delivery and \r implementation of adaptation action (Omari-Motsumi et al., 2019). As \r of 2017, most GCF disbursements to Africa (61.9%) were directed to \r support national stakeholders' engagement with regards to readiness \r [...]"


id: 3381166962bdcae828e4c105a0dd099c
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"[...] activities, with only 11% directed to support DAEs in implementation \r of concrete projects/pipeline development (Fonta et  al., 2018). While \r supporting readiness activities is important for strengthening country \r ownership and institutional development, research suggests adaptation \r finance needs to shift towards implementation of concrete projects and \r more pipeline development if the goal of transformative and sustained \r adaptation in Africa is to be realised (Fonta et  al., 2018; Omari\u0002Motsumi et al., 2019). The source of these problems needs to be better \r understood so that the prospects for future climate-related investments \r can be improved and institutional strengthening and targeted project \r preparation can be supported (Omari-Motsumi et al., 2019; Doshi and \r Garschagen, 2020; Savvidou et al., 2021)."


id: 12bf501bdcc201c7c73b367b9a0b721a
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"However, to understand actual expenditure on adaptation, it is necessary \r to look at disbursements (that is, the amounts paid out compared to \r committed amounts). Low ratios of disbursements to commitments \r suggest difficulties in project implementation. Disbursement ratios for \r climate-related finance from all funders other than MDBs (for which \r data is not published) in Africa are very low (Figure 9.9b; Savvidou et al., \r 2021). Only 46% of 2014-2018 commitments targeting adaptation \r were dispersed (Savvidou et al., 2021). Regions faring worst are north \r Africa (15%), central Africa (33%) and west Africa (33%) (Figure 9.9c). \r These disbursement ratios for adaptation and mitigation finance in \r Africa are lower than the global average (Savvidou et al., 2021), which \r suggests greater capacity problems in implementing climate-related \r projects and, in turn, means lost opportunities to build resilience and \r adaptive capacity and a wider gap in adaptation finance for Africa \r [...]"


id: d66981991c61b7ac61a15ddb045a8af3
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"Some progress has been made in supporting developing countries \r to enhance their adaptation actions. The process to formulate and \r implement NAPs was established by parties under the UNFCCC to \r support developing countries in identifying their vulnerabilities, and \r determine their medium- and long-term adaptation needs (UNFCCC \r Paris Agreement, 2015). NAPs provide a means of developing and \r implementing strategies and programmes to address those needs. In \r 2016, the parties agreed the GCF would fund up to USD 3 million per \r country for adaptation planning instruments, including NAPs. However, \r accessing funding through the GCF for NAP formulation is challenging \r (Fonta et al., 2018) and, as of October 2020, 4 years after the decision \r to fund NAPs, only six African countries had completed their NAPs \r (UNFCCC NAP central). The next step is to convert adaptation planning \r documents into programming pipeline projects that are fundable \r [...]"


id: 8075a328c85b9c3edfe26f80614d92c8
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"[...] and implementable, which presents a significant barrier to enhanced \r adaptation action (Omari-Motsumi et al., 2019)."


id: f98056a8b0b42fb51a01e344c5db99a4
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"The present situation reflects not only an insufficient level of finance \r being mobilised to support African adaptation needs (Section 9.4.1) \r but also problems in accessing and using funding that is available. \r The direct-access modality introduced by the Adaptation Fund \r and GCF, whereby national and regional entities from developing \r countries can be accredited to access funds directly, is aimed at \r reducing transaction costs for recipient countries, increasing national \r ownership and agency for adaptation actions, and enhancing decision\u0002making responsibilities by national actors, thereby contributing to \r strengthening local capacity for sustained and transformational \r adaptation (CDKN, 2013; Masullo et al., 2015). Indeed, direct-access \r projects from the Adaptation Fund tend to be more community \r focused than indirect-access projects (Manuamorn and Biesbroek, \r 2020). Country institutions in Africa, however, are struggling to be \r [...]"


id: e2ba7537fa3893640a36e9a794451973
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"[...] accredited for direct access because of the complicated, lengthy \r and bureaucratic processes of accreditation, which requires, for \r example, strong institutional and fiduciary standards and capacity \r to be in place (Brown et al., 2013; Omari-Motsumi et al., 2019). As \r of December 2019, over 80% of all developing countries had no \r national direct access entities (DAEs) (Asfaw et al., 2019). Capacity \r to develop fundable projects in Africa is also inadequate. An analysis \r of proposals submitted to the GCF up to 2017 revealed that, while \r African countries were able to submit proposals to the GCF, they \r had the lowest percentage of approvals (39%) compared to all other "


id: a8d9e9822059175604086a8bcdc9aafc
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"Many adaptation interventions for most vulnerable countries and \r communities provide no adequate financial return on investments \r and can therefore only be funded with concessional public finance \r (Cross-Chapter Box FINANCE in Chapter 17). Yet, public funds alone \r are insufficient to meet rapidly growing adaptation needs. Public \r mechanisms can help leverage private sector finance for adaptation by \r reducing regulatory, cost and market barriers through blended finance \r approaches, public-private partnerships, or innovative financial \r instruments and structuring in support of private sector requirements \r for risk and investment returns, such as green bonds (Cross-Chapter \r Box FINANCE in Chapter 17). Sub-national actors can be core agents \r to conceptualise, drive and deliver adaptation responses, and unlock \r domestic resources in the implementation of adaptation action (CoM \r SSA, 2019; Omari-Motsumi et al., 2019), provided they are sufficiently \r [...]"


id: dd2ad4468016cea12a38d4d6266f86c0
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"Many African countries are at high risk of debt distress, especially due \r to the COVID-19 pandemic, and will need to decrease their debt levels \r to have the fiscal space to invest in climate resilience (Estevao, 2020; \r Dibley et al., 2021). As of mid-2021, the G20's Debt Service Suspension \r Initiative is providing temporary relief for repayment of bilateral credit, \r but this has largely not been taken up by private lenders (Dibley et al., \r 2021; World Bank, 2021). The total external debt-servicing payments \r combined for 44 African countries in 2019 were USD 75 billion (World \r Bank, 2019), far exceeding discussed levels of near-term climate \r finance. Aligning debt relief with Paris Agreement goals could provide \r an important channel for increased financing for climate action, for \r example, by allowing African countries to use their debt-servicing \r payments to finance climate change mitigation and adaptation (Fenton \r [...]"


id: dbaafbd08a25152dead026f74d5c19b8
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"[...] et al., 2014). Governments can disclose climate risks when taking on \r sovereign debt, and debt-for-climate resilience swaps could be used \r to reduce debt burdens for low-income countries while supporting \r adaptation and mitigation (Dibley et al., 2021)."


id: eb89ef2b8412eb8b701baef0071a2b02
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content:
"Overcoming governance barriers is a precondition to ensure successful \r adaptation and CRD (Pasquini et  al., 2015; Owen, 2020).  Despite \r the ambitious climate targets across African countries and renewed \r commitments in recent years (Zheng et al., 2019; Ozor and Nyambane, \r 2020), governance barriers include, among others, slow policy \r implementation progress (Shackleton et  al., 2015; Taylor, 2016), \r incoherent and fragmented approaches (Zinngrebe et  al., 2020; \r Nemakonde et al., 2021), inadequate governance systems to manage \r climate finance (Granoff et al., 2016; Banga, 2019), poor stakeholder \r participation (Sherman and Ford, 2014), gender inequalities (Andrijevic \r et  al., 2020), unaligned development and climate agendas (Musah\u0002Surugu et al., 2019; Robinson, 2020), elite capture of climate governance \r systems (Kita, 2019), hierarchical and complex state bureaucracy \r [...]"


id: 8d3b5b9cbf9d0d313f0d2683be3d3074
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"[...] (Meissner and Jacobs, 2016; Biesbroek et  al., 2018) and weak, non\u0002existent or fragmented sub-national institutions (Paterson et al., 2017; \r Musah-Surugu et  al., 2019). Further, adaptation planning involves \r cross-cutting themes, multiple actors and institutions with different \r objectives, jurisdictional authority and levels of power and resources, "


id: 7f4c93e10be717fd77d766b17b83ebff
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"Stakeholders across Africa are recognising the scale and severity of \r transboundary risks to water. Such risks are two-fold in nature, arising \r both from potential impacts due to climate change and from responses \r to climate change (Simpson et  al., 2021b). This awareness among \r stakeholders is leading to increasingly progressive approaches to natural \r resource development that can also reduce risk across boundaries \r within regions. For example, river basin organisations in Southern Africa \r such as the Orange-Senqu and the Okavango River Basin Commissions \r are revising treaties considered to pre-date the interrelated issues of \r climate change, growing populations and water scarcity (OKACOM, \r 2020). In parts of west Africa, where climate change is characterised by \r reduction of precipitation (Barry et al., 2018), regionally integrated and \r climate-resilient economic investments for water resource development \r [...]"


id: 97d95dd7c9a0f173419f2abcb27ec10a
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"[...] are enabled by the Senegal River Basin Organisation (OMVS) which \r emphasises programme and project development, financing and \r implementation in ensuing work plans (World Bank, 2020e), as does \r the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) in north and east Africa (Schmeier, 2017; \r Blumstein and Petersen-Perlman, 2021)."


id: f02a78d3fa1d70cd4d929473b2154a38
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"Soliev et al., 2015). Angola, for example, outlines regional adaptation \r as a priority and one of its unconditional adaptation strategies (which \r is already funded) is enhancing resilience in the Benguela fisheries \r system, a project shared with Namibia and South Africa (GEF and FAO, \r 2021). Another example is The Great Green Wall for the Sahara and \r Sahel Initiative, which was launched in 2007 with the aim of tackling \r land degradation in Africa (UNCCD, 2020). This transboundary project, \r led by the African Union Commission, is being implemented in more \r than 20  countries across Africa's Sahel region, in cooperation with \r international partners including UNCCD, GEF and the World Bank. \r Approximately USD 10 billion have been mobilised and/or promised \r for this initiative (UNCCD, 2020). Such statements demonstrate \r the increasing identification of transboundary risks and approaches \r to manage and adapt to them as areas of 'common concern' that \r [...]"


id: 1fe31d9ae96c8f79838d2c2dec790b24
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"[...] require cooperative adaptation actions. Accelerating strengthened \r transboundary water and climate governance needs to integrate these \r climate drivers of compromised water security. The role of institutions \r such as OMVS and the NBI have demonstrated they can influence \r economic behaviour among riparian countries of shared river basins \r highlighting that institutions are an integral part of climate governance \r in evolving economic systems (Hodgson, 2000)."


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"Figure 9.10 |  Progress in development of climate change framework law \r in Africa derived from an analysis of public databases of African laws, \r data drawn from Government of Niger (1998); Government of Liberia (2002); \r Government of Algeria (2004); Government of Tanzania (2004); Government of \r Central African Republic (2008); Government of Lesotho (2008); Government of Togo \r (2008); Government of Guinea Bissau (2011); Government of Ivory Coast (2012); \r Government of Rwanda (2012); Government of Sierra Leone (2012); Government of \r Cape Verde (2014); Government of Morocco (2014); Government of Mozambique \r (2014); Government of Madagascar (2015); Government of the Seychelles (2015); \r Government of Gabon (2016); Government of Kenya (2016); Government of Mali \r (2016); Government of Zambia (2016); Government of Malawi (2017); Government \r of Nigeria (2017); Government of Benin (2018); Government of Ghana (2018); \r [...]"


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"[...] Government of South Africa (2018); Government of Uganda (2018); Government of \r Zimbabwe (2019) sources quoted as of September 2019."


id: f93a09ea1f05f1313b4e164adba89376
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"In addition to the advancement of Indigenous knowledge in adaptive \r responses, it has been suggested that the protection of the rights of \r Indigenous Peoples can have adaptive benefits, in particular through \r the protection of land tenure rights (Ayanlade and Jegede, 2016). It \r has been argued that doing so will protect Indigenous Peoples' lands \r and resources from overconsumption, secure the recognition of their \r cultural stewardship over the environment, provide the financial \r incentive for land stewardship and promote the application of their \r unique knowledge on the sustainable development of that land \r and its preservation (Jaksa, 2006; Ayanlade and Jegede, 2016). Not \r only can a lack of protection of Indigenous legal tenure undermine \r these objectives, but a number of African laws may actively work \r against them. For example, a review of Tanzanian and Zambian laws \r highlighted existing provisions that empowered the state to terminate \r [...]"


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"[...] or criminalise the occupation of vacant, undeveloped or fallow lands, \r which undermined the occupation by Indigenous peoples of forests \r and other uncultivated lands (Ayanlade and Jegede, 2016)."


id: d5dec8bfc264aade01595638803c8ac8
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"The Paris Agreement acknowledges, in Article 7.5, that adaptation \r should be based on and guided by, among other things, 'traditional \r knowledge, knowledge of indigenous peoples and local knowledge \r systems'. The accumulated knowledge within Indigenous knowledge \r systems is particularly important as it can assist governments in \r determining how the climate is changing, how to characterise these \r impacts and provide lessons for adaptation (Salick and Ross, 2009). \r In this context, Indigenous knowledge systems can play an important \r role in the effective design of local laws (Mwanga, 2019), as well \r as national laws. Doing so can contribute to the success of climate \r change response strategies, including enhancing local participation \r and the implementation of community-based and ecosystem-based \r adaptations (Chanza and de Wit, 2016; Mwanga, 2019). For example, \r the Makorongo Village Forest Management By-Law in Tanzania codifies \r [...]"


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"[...] local customary practices relating to forest management and sustainable \r harvesting with associated dual adaptation and mitigation benefits and \r includes all villagers in the decision-making processes relating to forest \r management (Mwanga, 2019). The inclusion of beneficial Indigenous \r knowledge systems within local by-laws is contingent on the active \r involvement of members of the Indigenous community and awareness "


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content:
"(a) The importance of climate services and climate change literacy for more transformative responses to climate change in Africa adapted from Simpson et al. (2021a). Climate \r services promote climate resilient development by providing climate information for adaptation decision making (Street, 2016; Vaughan et al., 2018). Scalable uptake of climate \r services relies partly on climate risk perception of users, which is largely driven in Africa by experience and perception of local climate changes (Jacobs and Street, 2020; Steynor \r et al., 2020b; Steynor and Pasquini, 2020). Perception of climate change can occur without knowledge of its human-induced causes and its effects (Lee et al., 2015; Alemayehu \r and Bewket, 2017; Andrews and Smirnov, 2020). This can lead to coping responses to climate change which fall short of adaptation. Climate change literacy encompasses being \r [...]"


id: 312a09bf5ad62f6d6c24b463d4fcf12f
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"[...] aware of climate change and its anthropogenic causes and, together with climate services, can strengthen responses to climate change through better understanding of future risk \r (IPCC, 2019b; Simpson et al., 2021a)."


id: ea6e3e492a69c8b921872892b0edabd6
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"A recent Afrobarometer study covering 34 African countries found 67% \r of Africans perceive climate conditions for agricultural production to \r have worsened over time, and report drought as the main extreme \r weather event to have worsened in the past decade (Selormey et al., \r 2019). Of these participants, across all socioeconomic strata, 71% of \r those who were aware of the concept of climate change agreed that it \r needs to be stopped, but only 51% expressed confidence about their \r ability to make a difference. East Africans (63%) were almost twice as \r likely as north Africans (35%) to report that the weather for growing \r crops had worsened. Additionally, people engaged in occupations \r related to agriculture (farming, fishing or forestry) were more likely to \r report negative weather effects (59%) than those with other livelihoods \r (45%) (Selormey et al., 2019). Similar perceptions have been reported \r among a diversity of rural communities in many sub-Saharan African \r [...]"


id: ebe8b33fabd40714f4e71fa4820f2cd8
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"Vulnerability and exposure to the impacts of climate change are complex and affected by multiple, interacting non-climatic processes, \r which together influence risk, including socioeconomic processes (Lwasa et al., 2018; UNCTAD, 2020), resource access and livelihood \r changes (Jayne et al., 2019b) and intersectional vulnerability among social groups (Figure Box 9.1.1; Rao et al., 2020). Socioeconomic \r processes encompass broader social, economic and governance trends, such as expanded investment in large energy and transportation \r infrastructure projects (Adeniran and Daniell, 2020), rising external debt (Edo et al., 2020), changing role of the state in social development \r (Wunsch, 2014), environmental management (Ramutsindela and Buscher, 2019) and conflict, as well as those emanating from climate \r change mitigation and adaptation projects (Beymer-Farris and Bassett, 2012; van Baalen and Mobjork, 2018; Simpson et al., 2021b). \r [...]"


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"[...] These macro trends shape both urban and rural livelihoods, including the growing diversification of rural livelihoods through engagement \r in the informal sector and other non-farm activities, and are mediated by complex and intersecting factors like gender, ethnicity, class, \r age, disability and other dimensions of social status that influence access to resources (Luo et al., 2019). Research increasingly highlights \r the intersectionality of multiple dimensions of social identity and status that are associated with greater susceptibility to loss and damage \r (Caparoci Nogueira et al., 2018; Li et al., 2018)."


id: d103ea1e998995b910982e4315c3ac27
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"Arid and semi-arid countries in the Sahelian belt and the greater Horn of Africa are often identified as the most vulnerable regions on the \r continent (Closset et al., 2017; Serdeczny et al., 2017). Particularly vulnerable groups include pastoralists (Wangui, 2018; Ayanlade and \r Ojebisi, 2019), fishing communities (Belhabib et al., 2016; Muringai et al., 2019a), small-scale farmers (Ayanlade et al., 2017; Mogomotsi \r et al., 2020; see Section 9.8.1) and residents of formal and informal urban settlements (see Section 9.9). Research has identified key \r macro drivers, as well as multiple dimensions of social status that mediate differential vulnerability in different African contexts. For \r example, the contemporary vulnerability of small-scale rural producers in semi-arid northern Ghana has been shaped by colonial economic \r transformations (Ahmed et al., 2016), more recent neoliberal reforms reducing state support (Fieldman, 2011) and the disruption of local \r [...]"


id: 629951289629b9872b8bfdec6ad53094
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"[...] food systems due to increasing grain imports (Nyantakyi-Frimpong and Bezner-Kerr, 2015). Age interacts with other dimensions of social \r status, shaping differential vulnerability in several ways. Projected increases in mean temperatures and longer and more intense heat \r waves (Figure Box 9.1.1) may increase health risks for children and elderly populations by increasing risks associated with heat stress \r (Bangira et al., 2015; Cairncross et al., 2018). Temperature extremes are associated with increased risk of mortality in Ghana, Burkina \r Faso, Kenya and South Africa, with greatest increases among children and the elderly (Bangira et al., 2015; Amegah et al., 2016; Omonijo, \r 2017; Wiru et al., 2019; see Section 9.10.2.3.1)."


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"Rural African women are often disadvantaged by traditional, patriarchal decision-making processes and lack of access to land--issues \r compounded by kinship systems (that, is matrilineal or patrilineal), migrant status, age, type of household, livelihood orientation and \r disability in determining their adaptive options (Ahmed et  al., 2016; see Section  9.8.1; 9.11.1.2; Box  9.8). Differential agricultural \r productivity between men and women is about 20-30% or more in dryland regions of Ethiopia and Nigeria (Ghanem, 2011) and \r challenges women's ability to adapt to climate change. Limited access to agricultural resources and limited benefits from agricultural \r policies, compounded by other social and cultural factors, make women more vulnerable to climatic risks (Shukla et al., 2021). Kinship \r systems can contribute to their vulnerability and capacity to adapt. Women in matrilineal systems have greater bargaining power and \r [...]"


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"[...] have access to more resources than those in patrilineal systems (Chigbu, 2019; Robinson and Gottlieb, 2021; See section 9.8.1; 9.11.1.2)."


id: 411042cebf6a4308a74d9168fb014f41
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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content:
"Nielsen and Reenberg, 2010; Akresh et al., 2011; Eriksen et al., 2011; Beymer-Farris and Bassett, 2012; Davis et al., 2012; Adom, 2014; Akello, 2014; Headey and Jayne, \r 2014; Otzelberger, 2014; Wunsch, 2014; Conteh, 2015; Huntjens and Nachbar, 2015; Spencer, 2015; Adetula et al., 2016; Djoudi et al., 2016; Kuper et al., 2016; Stark \r and Landis, 2016; Allard, 2017; Anderson, 2017; Asfaw et al., 2017; Hufe and Heuermann, 2017; Hulme, 2017; Paul and wa Githinji, 2017; Rao et al., 2017; Serdeczny \r et al., 2017; Tesfamariam and Zinyengere, 2017; Tierney et al., 2017; Waha et al., 2017; Chihambakwe et al., 2018; Cholo et al., 2018; Jenkins et al., 2018; Keahey, 2018; \r Lwasa et al., 2018; Makara, 2018; Nyasimi et al., 2018; Petesch et al., 2018; Schuman et al., 2018; Theis et al., 2018; van Baalen and Mobjork, 2018; van der Zwaan et al., \r [...]"


id: 4809debc8f41b43dda08d255c652c571
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9894
content:
"[...] 2018; Adepoju, 2019; Adzawla et al., 2019b; Bryceson, 2019; Grasham et al., 2019; Jayne et al., 2019a; Lowe et al., 2019; Lunga et al., 2019; OGAR and Bassey, 2019; \r Onwutuebe, 2019; Ramutsindela and Buscher, 2019; Sulieman and Young, 2019; Torabi and Noori, 2019; Adeniran and Daniell, 2020; Alexander, 2020; Clay and Zimmerer, \r 2020; Devonald et al., 2020; Dolislager et al., 2020; Edo et al., 2020; Kaczan and Orgill-Meyer, 2020; Lammers et al., 2020; World Bank, 2020b; Asiama et al., 2021; Azong \r and Kelso, 2021; Birgen, 2021; Paalo and Issifu, 2021; Simpson et al., 2021b)."


id: 7a91faf811d83f2ffb3f5bfe7b789790
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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content:
"have lower internal climate variability (e.g. low seasonality), the low\u0002latitude African countries are projected to be exposed to large increases \r in frequency of daily temperature extremes (hotter than 99.9% of their \r historical records) earlier in the 21st century compared to generally \r wealthier nations at higher latitudes (Harrington et  al., 2016; Chen \r et al., 2021; Doblas-Reyes et al., 2021; Gutierrez et al., 2021). Although \r higher warming rates are projected over high latitudes during the first \r half of this century, societies and environments in low-latitude, low\u0002income countries are projected to become exposed to unprecedented \r climates before those in high latitude, developed countries (Frame \r et al., 2017; Harrington et al., 2017; Gutierrez et al., 2021). For example, \r beyond 2050, in central Africa and coastal west Africa, 10 months of \r every year will be hotter than any month in the period 1950-2000 \r [...]"


id: 36f8ec4b1a75b893473df19544dda074
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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"[...] under a high emissions scenario (RCP8.5) (Harrington et  al., 2017; \r Gutierrez et al., 2021). Ambitious, near-term mitigation will provide the \r largest reductions in exposure to unprecedented high temperatures \r for populations in low-latitude regions, such as across tropical Africa \r (Harrington et al., 2016; Frame et al., 2017)."


id: 79b9f5e72a82696f805ec895620baf23
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"However, production of salient climate information in Africa is \r hindered by limited availability of and access to weather and climate \r data, especially in central and north Africa (Figure  9.15; Coulibaly \r et  al., 2017; Hansen et  al., 2019a). Existing weather infrastructure \r remains suboptimal for development of reliable early warning \r systems (Africa Adaptation Initiative, 2018; Krell et  al., 2021). For \r example, it is estimated only 10% of the world's ground-based \r observation networks are in Africa, and that 54% of Africa's surface \r weather stations cannot capture data accurately (Africa Adaptation \r Initiative, 2018; World Bank, 2020d). Some programmes are trying to \r address this issue, including the trans-African hydro-meteorological \r observatory (van de Giesen et  al., 2014), the West African Science \r Service Centre on Climate Change and Adaptive Land Management \r (WASCAL) (Salack et al., 2019), the Southern African Science Service \r [...]"


id: d1d919fc1dfa08bcd62c0095cec28c76
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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"[...] Centre for Climate Change, Adaptive Land Management (SASSCAL) \r (Kaspar et  al., 2015) and the AMMA-CATCH National Observation \r Service and Critical Zone Exploration Network (Galle et  al., 2018). \r However, the sustainability of observation networks beyond the \r life of these programmes is uncertain as many African National \r Meteorological and Hydrology Services experience structural, financial \r and technical barriers to maintaining these systems (Section 9.4.5)."


id: 4f2cd5079764b030f963cf5be24b26e5
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"Figure 9.14 |  Summary of confidence in the direction of projected change in climate impact drivers (CIDs) in Africa. Projected changes represent the aggregate \r changes characteristic for mid-century for a range of scenarios, including: medium emission scenarios RCP4.5, SSP3-4.5, Scenario A1B from Special Report on Emissions Scenarios \r (SRES), or higher emissions scenarios (e.g., RCP8.5, SSP5-RCP8.5), within each AR6 WGI region (inset map) approximately corresponding to global warming levels between 2degC \r and 2.4degC (for CIDs that are independent of sea level rise). CIDs are drivers of impacts that are of climatic origin (that is, physical climate system conditions including means and \r extremes) that affect an element of society or ecosystems. The table also includes the assessment of observed or projected time-of-emergence of the CID change signal from the \r [...]"


id: f1e612e079b95e1fd25a4799619feb02
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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vector_id: 39945
content:
"[...] natural interannual variability if found with at least medium confidence (dots). Emergence of a climate change signal or trend refers to when a change in climate (the 'signal') \r becomes larger than the amplitude of natural or internal variations (the 'noise'). The figure is a modified version of Table 12.3 in Chapter 12 of WGI (Ranasinghe et al., 2021), please \r see this chapter for definitions of the various climate impact drivers and the basis for confidence levels of the assessment. Please note these WGI regions do not directly correspond \r to the regionalisation in this chapter nor do we assess climate risks for Madagascar."


id: 2398ad2eacb8566fd841b55a76e0888f
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content:
"At 1.5degC, 2degC and 3degC of global warming above pre-industrial levels, \r mean annual temperatures in north Africa are projected to be on \r average, 0.9degC, 1.5degC and 2.6degC warmer than the 1994-2005 average, \r respectively (Figure  9.16a). Warming is projected to be stronger in \r summer than winter (Lelieveld et al., 2016; Dosio, 2017). The number \r of hot days is likely to increase by up to 90% by the end of the century \r under RCP8.5 (global warming level [GWL] 4.4degC) (Gutierrez et  al., \r 2021; Ranasinghe et  al., 2021) and hot nights and the duration of \r warm spells to increase in the first half of the 21st century in both \r intermediate and high-emission scenarios (Patricola and Cook, 2010; \r Vizy and Cook, 2012; Lelieveld et al., 2016; Dosio, 2017; Filahi et al., \r 2017). Heatwaves are projected to become more frequent and intense \r even at 1.5degC of global warming (Gutierrez et al., 2021; Ranasinghe \r [...]"


id: 24a0f7e8069aeaa34b4faa3e9c8c086c
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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"[...] et  al., 2021). Children born in 2020, under a 1.5degC-compatible \r scenario will be exposed to 4-6  times more heatwaves in their \r lifetimes compared to people born in 1960; this exposure increases to \r 9-10 times more heatwaves for emission reduction pledges, limiting \r global warming to 2.4degC (Thiery et al., 2021)."


id: efc3fc33313b02d1f476230a47dccf8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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content:
"West African rainfall projections show a gradient of precipitation decrease \r in the west and increase in the east (medium confidence) (Figure 9.14; \r Dosio et al., 2021; Gutierrez et al., 2021; Ranasinghe et al., 2021). This \r pattern is evident at 1.5degC of global warming and the magnitude of \r change increases at higher warming levels (Figure  9.16c; Schleussner \r et al., 2016b; Kumi and Abiodun, 2018; Sylla et al., 2018). A reduction in \r length of the rainy season is projected over the western Sahel through \r delayed rainfall onset by 4-6 days at global warming levels of 1.5degC \r and 2degC (Kumi and Abiodun, 2018; Douville et al., 2021; Gutierrez et al., \r 2021). Although there are uncertainties in rainfall projections over the \r Sahel (Klutse et al., 2018; Gutierrez et al., 2021), CMIP6 models project \r monsoon rainfall amounts to increase by approximately 2.9% per \r degree of warming (Jin et al., 2020; Wang et al., 2020a), therefore, at \r [...]"


id: 1070986055cc470fabdda7ea3d8ffa5b
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content:
"[...] higher levels of warming and towards the end of the century, a wetter \r monsoon is projected in the eastern Sahel (medium confidence)."


id: 9de2d3e720118e9d01b6d2167f03c212
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content:
"At 1.5degC, 2degC and 3degC of global warming above pre-industrial levels, \r mean annual temperatures in central Africa are projected to be on \r average, 0.6degC, 1.1degC and 2.1degC warmer than the 1994-2005 average, \r respectively (Figure  9.16a). By the end of the century (2070-2099), \r warming of 2degC (RCP4.5 ) to 4degC (RCP8.5) is projected over the region \r (Aloysius et al., 2016; Fotso-Nguemo et al., 2017; Diedhiou et al., 2018; \r Mba et al., 2018; Tamoffo et al., 2019) and the number of days with \r maximum temperature exceeding 35degC is projected to increase by \r 150 days or more at GWL 4.4degC (Gutierrez et al., 2021; Ranasinghe \r et al., 2021). According to CMIP6 and CORDEX (Coordinated Regional \r Climate Downscaling Experiment) models, the annual average number \r of days with maximum temperature exceeding 35degC will increase \r between 14-27 days at GWL 2degC and 33-59 days at GWL 3degC above \r the 61-63  days for 1995-2014 (Gutierrez et  al., 2021; Ranasinghe \r [...]"


id: 58a009787b93c31f8fb147a8fc7ada34
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content:
"[...] et  al., 2021) (high confidence). The number of heatwave days is \r projected to increase and extreme heatwave events may last longer \r than 180 days at GWL 4.1degC (Dosio, 2017; Weber et al., 2018; Spinoni \r et al., 2019). Children born in 2020, under a 1.5degC-compatible scenario \r will be exposed to 6-8  times more heatwaves in their lifetimes \r compared to people born in 1960; this exposure increases to 7-9 times \r more heatwaves at GWL 2.4degC (Thiery et  al., 2021). The number of \r potentially lethal heat days per year is projected to increase from <50 \r during 1995-2005 to 50-75 at GWL 1.6degC, 100-150 at GWL 2.5degC \r and 200-350 at GWL 4.4degC (Mora et al., 2017)."


id: fd9d1048134460daa5a0258d7fb8840e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:57
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content:
"Mean annual rainfall increased over parts of Namibia, Botswana and \r southern Angola during 1980-2015 by between 128 and 256 mm \r (Figure 9.13b). Since the 1960s, decreasing precipitation trends have \r been detected over the South African winter rainfall region (high \r confidence) and the far eastern parts of South Africa (low confidence) \r (Engelbrecht et  al., 2009; Kruger and Nxumalo, 2017b; Burls et  al., \r 2019; Lakhraj-Govender and Grab, 2019; Gutierrez et  al., 2021; \r Ranasinghe et al., 2021). The frequency of dry spells and agricultural \r drought in the region has increased over the period 1961-2016 (Yuan \r et al., 2018; Seneviratne et al., 2021), the frequency of meteorological \r drought increased by between 2.5-3 events per decade since 1961 \r (Spinoni et al 2019) and the probability of the multi-year drought over \r the southwestern cape of South Africa increased by a factor of three \r (95% confidence interval 1.5-6) in response to global warming (Otto \r [...]"


id: cd3b0706f27891f6ca14127c396670f6
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"[...] et al., 2018). The number and intensity of extreme precipitation events \r have increased over the last century (Kruger and Nxumalo, 2017b; \r Ranasinghe et  al., 2021; Sun et  al., 2021), and in the Karoo region \r of southern South Africa, long-term station data show an increasing \r trend in annual rainfall of greater than 5 mm per decade over the \r period 1921-2015 (Kruger and Nxumalo, 2017b)."


id: d5f2017af0c96daff73b65223f3d0d18
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content:
"Sea surface temperatures around Africa are projected to increase by \r 0.5degC-1.3degC for 1.5degC global warming and increase by 1.3degC-2.0degC \r for 3degC global warming (Figure  9.16 f). Globally, 87% of observed \r marine heatwaves have been attributed to human-caused global \r warming, and at 2degC of global warming, nearly all marine heatwaves \r would be attributable to heating of the climate caused by human \r activities (Frolicher et al., 2018; Laufkotter et al., 2020). Increases in \r frequency, intensity, spatial extent and duration of marine heatwaves \r are projected for all coastal zones of Africa. At 1degC and 3.5degC of \r global warming, the probability of marine heatwave days is between \r 4-15  times and 30-60  times higher compared to the pre-industrial \r (1861-1880) 99th percentile probability, with highest increases over \r equatorial and sub-tropical coastal regions (Figure 9.16; Frolicher et al., \r 2018). These events are expected to overwhelm the ability of marine \r [...]"


id: fc41de5d1223018b0099b008bfd9f833
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content:
"[...] organisms and ecosystems to adapt to these changes (Section 9.6.1; \r Frolicher et  al., 2018). Reducing emissions and limiting warming to \r lower levels reduces risk to these systems (high confidence) (Hoegh\u0002Guldberg et al., 2018)."


id: 6616075401303a38eda1ed2e36a626bd
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content:
"Common indicators for the quality of the rain season for local communities in Africa include flower and fruit production of local trees \r (Nkomwa et al., 2014; Jiri et al., 2015; Kagunyu et al., 2016), insect, bird and animal behaviour and occurrence (Jiri et al., 2016; Mwaniki \r and Stevenson, 2017; Ebhuoma, 2020) and dry season temperatures (Kolawole et  al., 2016; Okonya et  al., 2017). Fulani herders in \r west Africa believe that when 'nests hang high on trees, then rains will be heavy; when nests hang low, rains will be scarce' (Roncoli \r et al., 2002). In South Africa, LK on weather forecasting is based on the hatching of insects, locust swarm movements and the arrival \r of migratory birds, which has enabled farmers to make adjustments to cropping practices (Muyambo et al., 2017; Tume et al., 2019). \r Most of these IK indicators apply to specific communities, and are used for short-term forecasting (e.g., event-specific predictions, such \r [...]"


id: 879255e785fd442dd10009444a6e664e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21008
content:
"[...] as a violent storm, and onset rain predictions) (Zuma-Netshiukhwi et al., 2013; Mutula et al., 2014). There is evidence of communities \r that rely heavily on IKLK indicators to forecast seasonal variability across the continent (Kagunyu et al., 2016; Mwaniki and Stevenson, \r 2017; Tume et al., 2019). However, their accuracy is debatable, due to age-old knowledge losing accuracy because of recent changes \r in weather conditions (Shaffer, 2014; Adjei and Kyerematen, 2018). There are also some limitations in the transferability of IK across \r geographical scales, as its understanding is framed by traditional beliefs and cultural practices, and historical and social conditions of \r each community, which vary significantly across communities. This has direct implications for the adoption of IKLK in national policy and \r planned adaptation by governments. However, in some parts of Africa, evidence of the integration of IKLK and scientific-based weather \r [...]"


id: 5269cdf5728ac1925d7781e99eac597
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
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vector_id: 11780
content:
"Studies on IKLK and climate change adaptation conducted in various African countries and across ecosystems indicate that Indigenous \r environmental knowledge is negatively affected by several factors. Local farmers who depend on this knowledge system for their \r livelihoods hold the view that African governments do not support and promote it in policy development. Most government agricultural \r extension workers still consider IK to be unscientific and unreliable (Seaman et al., 2014; Mafongoya et al., 2017). At the national level, \r there is a lack of recognition and inclusion of IKLK in adaptation planning by African governments, partly because most of the IK and LK \r in African local communities remains undocumented, but also because IKLK are inadequately captured in the literature (Ford et al., 2016; \r IPCC, 2019b). This knowledge is predominantly preserved in the memories of the elderly and is handed down orally or by demonstration \r [...]"


id: 6888caeb278e85af58414f91382f28d9
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content:
"[...] from generation to generation. It gradually disappears due to memory gaps, and when those holding the knowledge die or refuse to pass \r it to another generation, the knowledge becomes extinct (Rankoana, 2016a). The way in which IK is transmitted, accessed and shared in \r most African societies is not smooth (IIED, 2015). IK is also threatened by urbanisation, which attracts rural migrants to urban areas where \r IKLK use may be more limited (Fernandez-Llamazares et al., 2015). Further, most African societies that use IK were once colonised, \r whereby the African Indigenous ways of knowing were devalued and marginalised (Bolden et al., 2018). There are concerns about the \r effectiveness of both IK indicators and related adaptation responses by communities in predicting and adapting to weather events under \r future climate conditions (Speranza et al., 2009; Shaffer, 2014; Hooli, 2016)."


id: a489ac7b1f8a2b213dbff6c60556f5cd
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content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26159
content:
"Shifts in demography, geographic ranges, and abundance of plants \r and animals consistent with expected impacts of climate change are \r evident across Africa. These include uphill contractions of elevational \r range limits of birds (Neate-Clegg et  al., 2021), changes in species \r distributions previously reported in AR5 (Niang et al., 2014) and the \r death of many of the oldest and largest African baobabs (Patrut et al., \r 2018). An increase in frequency and intensity of hot, dry weather \r after wildfires has led to a long-term decline in plant biodiversity in \r Fynbos since the 1960s (Slingsby et al., 2017). Increasing temperatures \r may have contributed to the declining abundance and range size of \r South African birds (Milne et  al., 2015), including Cape Rockjumper \r (Chaetops frenatus) and protea canary (Serinus leucopterus), from \r increased risk of reproductive failure (Lee and Barnard, 2016; Oswald \r et al., 2020). For hot and dry regions (e.g., Kalahari), there is strong \r [...]"


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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18061
content:
"[...] evidence that increased temperatures are having chronic sublethal \r impacts, including reduced foraging efficiency and loss of body mass \r (du Plessis et al., 2012; Conradie et al., 2019), and are approaching \r species physiological limits, with heat extremes driving mass mortality \r events in birds and bats (McKechnie et al., 2021). Vegetation change \r linked to climate change and increasing atmospheric CO2 has had an \r indirect impact on animals. Increased woody cover has decreased the \r occurrence of bird, reptile and mammal species that require grassy \r habitats (Peron and Altwegg, 2015; McCleery et al., 2018). Decreased \r fruit production linked to rising temperatures has decreased the body \r condition of fruit-dependent forest elephants by 11% from 2008-2018 \r (Bush et al., 2020)."


id: 10d5b0581a23564c01b96f708cc184ce
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 149
content:
"The overall continental trend is woody plant expansion, particularly \r in grasslands and savannas, with woody plant cover increasing at \r a rate of 2.4% per decade (see Figure  9.17; Stevens et  al., 2017; \r Axelsson and Hanan, 2018). There is also increased grass cover in \r arid regions in southwestern Africa (Masubelele et al., 2014). There \r is high agreement that this is attributable to increased CO2, warmer \r and wetter climates, declines in burned area and release from \r herbivore browsing pressure, but the relative importance of these \r interacting drivers remains uncertain (O'Connor et al., 2014; Stevens \r et al., 2016; Garcia Criado et al., 2020). Woody encroachment is the \r dominant trend in the western and central Sahel, occurring over \r 24% of the region, driven primarily by shifts in rainfall timing and \r recovery from drought (Anchang et al., 2019; Brandt et al., 2019). \r Remote sensing studies demonstrate greening in southern Africa \r [...]"


id: 993c1caed7949d1e3f30c57f6a5bb17e
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vector_id: 24174
content:
"[...] and forest expansion into water-limited savannas in central and \r west Africa (Baccini et  al., 2017; Aleman et  al., 2018; Piao et  al., \r 2020), with increases in precipitation and atmospheric CO2 the \r probable determinants of change (Venter et al., 2018; Brandt et al., \r 2019; Zhang et al., 2019). These trends of greening and woody plant \r expansion stand in contrast to the desertification and contraction \r of vegetated areas highlighted in AR5 (Niang et al., 2014), but are \r based on multiple studies and longer time series of observations. \r Reported cases of desertification and vegetation loss, for example, "


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"Vegetation changes interacting with climate and land use change \r have impacted fire regimes across Africa. The frequency of weather \r conducive for fire has increased in southern and west Africa and is \r expected to continue increasing in the 21st century under both RCP2.6 \r and RCP8.5 (Betts et  al., 2015; Abatzoglou et  al., 2019). Increased \r grass cover in arid regions introduced fire into regions where fuel \r was previously insufficient to allow fire spread, such as the arid Karoo \r in South Africa (du Toit et  al., 2015; Strydom and Savage, 2016). In \r contrast, shrub encroachment, increased precipitation (Zubkova et al., \r 2019), vegetation fragmentation and cropland expansion have reduced \r fire activity in many African grasslands and savannas (Andela and van \r der Werf, 2014; Probert et  al., 2019). These drivers are expected to \r negate the effect of increasing fire weather and ultimately lead to a \r reduction in the total burned area under RCP4.5 and RCP8.5 (Knorr \r [...]"


id: 77ebf5da2062c913dd052f3f19325d75
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content:
"Anthropogenic climate change is already negatively impacting Africa's \r marine biodiversity, ecosystem functioning and services by changing \r physical and chemical properties of seawater (increased temperature, \r salinity and acidification, and changes in oxygen concentration, ocean \r currents and vertical stratification) (high confidence) (Hoegh-Guldberg \r et al., 2014; 2018). Coastal ecosystems in west Africa are among the \r most vulnerable because of extensive low-lying deltas exposed to sea \r level rise, erosion, saltwater intrusion and flooding (Belhabib et  al., \r 2016; UNEP, 2016b; Kifani et  al., 2018).  In southern Africa, shifting \r distributions of anchovy, sardine, hake, rock lobster and seabirds have \r been partly attributed to climate change (Crawford et al., 2015; van \r der Lingen and Hampton, 2018; Vizy et al., 2018), including southern \r shifts of 30 estuarine and marine fish species attributed to increased \r [...]"


id: a18720bef1eb07d86c45cd60afc1c83d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"[...] temperature and changes in water circulation from decreased river \r inflow (Augustyn et  al., 2018). Warming sea surface temperatures \r inhibiting nutrient mixing have reduced phytoplankton biomass in the \r western Indian Ocean by 20% since the 1960s, potentially reducing \r tuna catches (Roxy et al., 2016)."


id: 416458a5f65f20d3275f9a2ac9a316c2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"African ecosystems have a long evolutionary association with fire, \r large mammal herbivory and drought (Maurin et  al., 2014; Charles\u0002Dominique et  al., 2016). The maintenance of biodiversity depends \r on natural disturbance regimes. Natural regrowth of savanna plant \r biomass in southern Africa compensated for biomass removal through \r human activities (McNicol et al., 2018), and rapid recovery occurred \r after the 2014-2016 extreme drought (Abbas et  al., 2019). During \r the same drought event, browsing and mixed feeder herbivores \r were resilient, but grazers declined by approximately 60% and were \r highly dependent on drought refugia (Abraham et al., 2019). African \r tropical forests remained a carbon sink through the record drought \r and temperature experienced in the 2015-2016 El Nino, indicating \r resilience in the face of extreme environmental conditions (Bennett \r et  al., 2021). This is likely due to the presence of drought-tolerant \r [...]"


id: 232a67c9024e0355bd8a19712c0b3b2b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
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"[...] species and floristic and functional shifts in tree species assemblages \r (Fauset et  al., 2012; Aguirre-Gutierrez et  al., 2019). This resilience \r indicates that there is the capacity to recover from disturbances \r and short-term change. However, resilience has limits and beyond \r certain points, change can lead to irreversible shifts to different states \r (Figure 9.18)."


id: 7878075eb4b06cbebbef919a532dc6b0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Mangroves, seagrasses and coral reefs support nursery habitats for \r fish, sequester carbon, trap sediment and provide shoreline protection \r (Ghermandi et  al., 2019). Climate change is compromising these \r ecosystem services (medium confidence). Marine heatwaves associated \r with ENSO events have triggered mass coral bleaching and mortality \r over the past 20 years (Oliver et al., 2018). Mass coral bleaching in the \r western Indian Ocean occurred in 1998, 2005, 2010 and 2015/2016 \r with coral cover just 30-40% of 1998 levels by 2016 (Obura et al., \r 2017; Moustahfid et  al., 2018). The northern Mozambique Channel \r has served as a refuge from climate change and biological reservoir \r for the entire coastal east African region (McClanahan et  al., 2014; \r Hoegh-Guldberg et  al., 2018). A southern shift of mangrove species \r has been observed in south Africa (Peer et al., 2018) with loss in total \r suitable coastal habitats for mangroves and shifts in the distribution of \r [...]"


id: e67315de0f260af7def13f24819d6d51
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content:
"[...] some species of mangroves and a gain for others (Record et al., 2013). \r Mangrove cover was reduced 48% in Mozambique in 2000 from \r Tropical Cyclone Eline, with 100% mortality of seaward mangroves \r dominated by Rhizophora mucronata (Macamo et al., 2016). Recovery \r of mangrove species was observed 14 years later in sheltered sites. \r There is low confidence these cyclone-induced impacts are attributable \r to climate change owing, in part, to a lack of reliable long-term data \r sets (Macamo et  al., 2016). In west Africa, oil and gas extraction, \r deforestation, canalisation and de-silting of waterways have been the \r largest factors in mangrove destruction (Numbere, 2019)."


id: 2c1d5c4165e225814564577d1e28e923
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
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content:
"Figure 9.17 |  Widespread changes to African vegetation have been reported, especially increasing woody plant cover in many savannas and grasslands, \r with 37% of these changes proposed to be driven by human-caused climate change and increased CO2 (a). The warming of lakes and rivers has been detected across \r Africa and is attributed to climate change. Data on vegetation change was gathered from 156 studies published between 1989 and 2021(b). Climatic changes, mostly associated \r with changes in rainfall, are enhancing grass production in arid grasslands and savannas, and causing grass expansion into semi-desert regions with notable increases in the Sahel \r and southern Africa. Tropical forest expansion into mesic savannas is occurring on the fringes of the central African tropical forest. Interactions between land use, climate change \r [...]"


id: bc5f616cd6bd5b4bb0fd03ec84d302a7
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"[...] and increasing atmospheric CO2 concentrations are causing a widespread increase in woody plant cover encroachment in tropical savannas and grasslands. Some tree death and \r woody cover decline associated with climate and land use change have also been recorded across biomes. Of the reported changes to terrestrial vegetation, 24% were explicitly \r linked to climate change and a further 13% were proposed to be driven by climate change. In 48% of studies, no climate driver was mentioned and in 15% climate change was \r ruled out as the driver of change. Annual surface water temperatures in African lakes have warmed at a rate of 0.05degC-0.76degC per decade. Both satellite-based measures spanning \r 1985-2011 and in situ measurements spanning 1927-2014 agree on this warming trend. Other surface waters across Africa warmed from 1979-2018 at a rate of between \r [...]"


id: f58d87ad17b186033451707b6a7cad4a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
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content:
"[...] 0.05degC and 0.5degC per decade (Woolway and Maberly, 2020). Vegetation change data were taken from a larger, global literature survey of existing databases supplemented with \r newer studies documenting changes in tree, shrub and grass cover linked to climate and land use change in natural and semi-natural areas (for further details see Section 2.4.3.5; \r Table SM2.1; Table SM9.2 for Africa vegetation change data and Table SM9.3 for studies reporting lake warming data)."


id: 87aa1ec268518edbe92b931d8463b11d
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content:
"The geography of African biomes is projected to shift due to changes in \r atmospheric CO2 concentrations and aridity (Figure 9.18). Grassland \r expansion into the desert, woody expansion into grasslands and \r forest expansion into savannas are projected for areas of reduced \r aridity, caused by reduced moisture stress from CO2 fertilisation \r under medium (RCP4.5) and high (SRES A2) emissions scenarios \r (Heubes et  al., 2011; Moncrieff et  al., 2016). This greening trend \r may slow or reverse with continued temperature increase and/or in \r areas of increased aridity (Berdugo et al., 2020). The net impact of \r these effects on vegetation is highly uncertain (Trugman et al., 2018; \r Cook et  al., 2020a; Martens et  al., 2021). The maintenance or re\u0002establishment of natural fire and large mammal herbivory processes \r can mitigate projected CO2 and climate-driven changes (Scheiter and \r Savadogo, 2016; Stevens et al., 2016). Expansion of croplands and \r [...]"


id: 6c08d798f9ca2b8869fdbaa2aa3acf9a
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content:
"Figure 9.18 |  Increases in atmospheric CO2 and changes in aridity are projected to shift the geographic distribution of major biomes across Africa (high \r confidence). Arrows in the diagram indicate possible pathways of biome change from current conditions resulting from changes in CO2 and aridity. Changes need not be gradual \r or linear and may occur rapidly if tipping points are crossed. Currently, widespread greening observed in Africa has been at least partially attributed to increasing atmospheric CO2\r concentrations. Future projected increases in aridity are expected to cause desertification in many regions, but it is highly uncertain how this will interact with the greening effect \r of CO2. Inset maps show the projected geographical extent of changes in CO2 concentrations and aridity. CO2 is projected to increase globally under all future emission scenarios. \r [...]"


id: f6afec78b3ff2aece5ab4bbb3b48f8fd
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"[...] Aridity index maps show projected change in aridity (calculated as annual precipitation/annual potential evapotranspiration) at around 4degC global warming relative to 1850-1900 \r (RCP8.5 in 2070-2099) from 34 CMIP5 models (Scheff et al., 2017). Shaded areas indicate regions where >75% of models agree on the direction of change."


id: e02c1a0a95d0e27726ea0f651c9069bc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"With increasing warming, there is a lower likelihood species can \r migrate rapidly enough to track shifting climates, increasing global \r extinction risk and biodiversity loss across more of Africa (high \r confidence). Immigration of species from elsewhere may partly \r compensate for local extinctions and lead to local biodiversity gains \r in some regions (Newbold, 2018; Warren et al., 2018). However, more \r regions face net losses than net gains. At 1.5degC global warming, \r >46% of localities face net declines in vertebrate species richness \r of >10%, with net increases projected for less than 15% of localities \r (Barbet-Massin and Jetz, 2015; Newbold, 2018). At >2degC, 9% of \r species face complete range loss by 2100, regardless of their dispersal \r ability (Urban, 2015). With >4degC global warming, a net loss of >10% \r of vertebrate species richness is projected across 85% of Africa \r (Barbet-Massin and Jetz, 2015; Mokhatla et al., 2015; Newbold, 2018; \r [...]"


id: bea9ae50738af8b94a1e8e66d67deabe
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content:
"[...] Warren et al., 2018). Mountain top endemics and species in north and \r southern Africa are at risk due to disappearing cold climates (Milne \r et al., 2015; Garcia et al., 2016; Bentley et al., 2018; Soultan et al., \r 2019). For hot regions such as the Sahara, Congo Basin and Kalahari, \r no warmer-adapted species are available elsewhere to compensate \r for local extinctions, so the resilience of local biodiversity will depend \r entirely on the persistence of species (Burrows et  al., 2014; Garcia \r et  al., 2014). The capacity for species to avoid extinction through \r behavioural thermoregulation, plasticity or evolution is uncertain but \r will become increasingly unlikely under higher warming scenarios \r (Conradie et al., 2019)."


id: e07ec2fe68624c971cd3e4958a47cc7a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
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vector_id: 36751
content:
"Above 2degC global warming, the proportion of freshwater fish species \r vulnerable to climate change increases substantially (high confidence) \r (Figure 9.19). At 2degC, 36.4% of fish species are projected to be vulnerable \r to local or global extinction by 2100, increasing to 56.4% under 4degC \r warming (average of values from (Nyboer et  al., 2019; Barbarossa \r et al., 2021) (Figure 9.19). Global warming reduces available habitat for \r freshwater species due to reduced precipitation and increased drought \r leading to increasing water temperatures above optimal physiological \r limits in floodplains, estuaries, wetlands, ephemeral pools, rivers and \r lakes (Dalu et al., 2017; Kalacska et al., 2017; Nyboer and Chapman, \r 2018). Along the Zambezi River, projected flow reductions could cause \r a 22% reduction in annual spawning habitat and depletion of food \r resources for fry and juvenile fish that could impede fish migration \r [...]"


id: 2ef3896f37670ce1619969731ae20a40
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
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"[...] and reduce stocks (Kangalawe, 2017; Martinez-Capel et  al., 2017; \r Tamatamah and Mwedzi, 2020). More aquatic species will have the \r capacity to cope with 2degC compared to 4degC global warming, with more \r negative effects on physiological performance at 4degC (Dallas, 2016; \r Pinceel et  al., 2016; Zougmore et  al., 2016; Nyboer and Chapman, \r 2017; Ross-Gillespie et  al., 2018). Endemic, specialised fish species \r will have a lower capacity to adjust to elevated water temperatures \r compared to hardier generalist fishes (McDonnell and Chapman, 2015; \r Nyboer and Chapman, 2017; Lapointe et al., 2018; Reizenberg et al., \r 2019). More work is needed to understand the risk for invertebrates \r (Dallas and Rivers-Moore, 2014; Cohen et al., 2016), and to understand \r the potential effects of reduced mixing of water and other climate risks \r on freshwater biodiversity."


id: 5156153348ff793956c17ce46efe8a20
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
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content:
"(d-e) The mean projected increase in species of freshwater fish vulnerable to local extinction within 10 km grid cells for future global warming. Around a third of fish species are \r projected to be vulnerable to extinction by 2degC global warming. Pixel colour shows the projected percentage of species vulnerable to extinction and agreement between multiple \r vulnerability models. In (a), data were obtained from 22 peer-reviewed papers published since 2012 investigating the impacts of projected climate change on African biodiversity. \r When a paper provided impact projections for several time periods, climate change scenarios or for more than one species, each impact was recorded as an individual biodiversity \r impact projection, resulting in a database of 1165 biodiversity impact projections. Data were initially collected by Manes et al. (2021) as part of a larger literature review for \r [...]"


id: a41419fdc052e818b043920e3f2c4c5f
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"[...] Cross-Chapter Paper 1 on Biodiversity Hotspots and then expanded to include areas outside of African priority conservation areas (see Table SM 9.4). The literature review was \r limited to peer-reviewed publications that reported quantifiable risks to biodiversity, eliminating non-empirical studies. In (b-c), projections are based on intersecting current \r and future modelled species distributions at ~10 km spatial resolution from two recent global assessments of climate change impacts on terrestrial vertebrates (Newbold, 2018; \r Warren et al., 2018). In (d-e) projections are based on intersecting future species vulnerabilities from two recent assessments of climate change vulnerability of freshwater fish \r species (Nyboer et al., 2019; Barbarossa et al., 2021)."


id: a964c9c7985b2dc339de73552a3d4cf8
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content:
"et al., 2017). Climate change is projected to change patterns of invasive \r species spread (high confidence). The area of suitable climate for Lantana \r camara is projected to contract (Taylor et al., 2012) and to expand for \r Prosopis juliflora (Sintayehu et  al., 2020). Bioclimatic suitability for fall \r armyworm, a major threat to maize, is projected to decrease in central \r Africa but expand in southern and west Africa (Zacarias, 2020), and to \r expand for coffee berry borer (Hypothenemus hampei) in Uganda and \r around Mount Kenya (Jaramillo et  al., 2011). Climate suitability for \r tephritid fruit flies is projected to decrease in central Africa (Hill et  al., \r 2016). Increased water temperature is projected to favour invasive over \r local freshwater fish populations and shift the range of invasive aquatic \r plants in South Africa (Hoveka et al., 2016; Shelton et al., 2018). Alterations \r to lake and river connectivity are predicted to modify invasion pathways in \r [...]"


id: 435814ada8567928e777b966e81c935
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9063
content:
"[...] Lake Tanganyika and water hyacinth coverage may increase with warmer \r waters in Lake Victoria (Masters and Norgrove, 2010; Plisnier et al., 2018)."


id: a8b307a103b43e2f9a1f2ca73ef2a944
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content:
"With global warming >3degC, and with high population growth and \r agricultural expansion (SSP3, 2081-2100), 1.2  billion Africans are \r projected to be negatively affected by pollution of drinking water from \r reduced water quality regulation by ecosystems and 27 million people \r affected by reduced coastal protection by ecosystems (Chaplin-Kramer \r et al., 2019). The number of people affected reduces to 0.4 billion and \r 22  million, respectively, under a sustainable development scenario \r with global warming below 2degC (SSP1, 2081-2100). The African \r tropical forest carbon sink has been more resilient than Amazonia \r to recent warming but may already have peaked, and this service \r is predicted to decline with further warming, reducing 14% by the \r 2030s (Hubau et al., 2020; Sullivan et al., 2020). This declining carbon \r storage may be offset by CO2 fertilization (low confidence) (Martens \r et  al., 2021). Climate change is projected to shift the geographic \r [...]"


id: 7031bd93fb67ceb2f4f2bd8ccb50fde2
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content:
"[...] distribution of important human and livestock disease vectors (see \r Sections 9.8.2.4; 9.10.2). Changes in rainfall seasonality compounded \r with land privatisation and population growth may adversely impact \r nomadic and semi-nomadic pastoralists who follow shifting patterns \r of greening vegetation (Van Der Ree et al., 2015)."


id: 43facbd9fe9fe4ed8b923df5f401c658
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"Climate change is already negatively affecting tourism in Africa (high \r confidence). The 2015-2018 Cape Town drought caused severe water \r restrictions, reducing tourist arrivals and spending with associated job \r losses (Dube et al., 2020). Human-caused climate change increased the \r likelihood of the reduced rainfall that caused the drought by a factor \r of three (Otto et al., 2018)(Pascale et al., 2020). Extreme heat days \r have increased across South African national parks since the 1990s \r (van Wilgen et  al., 2016). This reduces animal mobility, decreasing \r animal viewing opportunities (Dube and Nhamo, 2020). Tourists and \r employees also fear heat stress (Dube and Nhamo, 2020). Visitors \r to South Africa's national parks preferred to visit in cool-to-mild \r temperatures (Coldrey and Turpie, 2020). Extreme weather conditions \r disrupted tourist activities and damaged infrastructure at Victoria \r Falls, Hwange National Park, Kruger National Park and the Okavango \r [...]"


id: d5e8d63766e1a6d291c7e381ff7e4694
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"[...] Delta (Dube et  al., 2018; Dube and Nhamo, 2018; Mushawemhuka \r et al., 2018; Dube and Nhamo, 2020). Rainfall variability and drought \r alter wildlife migrations, affecting tourist visits to the Serengeti \r (Kilungu et al., 2017). Reduced tourism decreases revenue for national \r park management (van Wilgen et al., 2016)."


id: 8d5cc0c168971ddd106c9b7b3510c3f6
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content:
"Kilimanjaro National Park (Kilungu et al., 2019). Woody plant expansion \r in savanna and grasslands reduce tourist's game viewing experience and \r negatively impact conservation revenues (Gray Emma and Bond William, \r 2013; Arbieu et  al., 2017). Visitation rates to South African national \r parks, based on mean monthly temperatures, are projected to decline \r 4% with 2degC global warming (Coldrey and Turpie, 2020). Sea level rise \r and increased intensity of storms is projected to reduce beach tourism \r due to beach erosion (Grant, 2015; Amusan and Olutola, 2017). Tourism \r in the Victoria Falls, Okavango and Chobe hydrological systems may be \r negatively affected by heat and increased variability of rainfall and river \r flow (Saarinen et al., 2012; Dube and Nhamo, 2019). Increased extreme \r heat will increase air turbulence and weight restrictions on aircraft, \r which could make air travel more uncomfortable and expensive to \r [...]"


id: feb65be87403a1035fbae5c415ba9f34
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content:
"and Bro-Jorgensen, 2016; Smith et  al., 2016; Phipps et  al., 2017). \r Species ability to disperse between areas to track shifting climates is \r increasingly impaired by land transformation and fencing, which also \r impact seasonal wildlife migrations (Lovschal et al., 2017; Sloan et al., \r 2017). On land, only 0.5% of the African protected area network is \r connected through low-impact landscapes (Ward et al., 2020). Linear \r transport infrastructure (e.g., roads, railways, pipelines) and fencing \r from proposed 'development corridors' are projected to bisect over 400 \r protected areas and degrade around 1800 more (Laurance et al., 2015). \r Climate change could increase human-wildlife conflict as resultant \r resource shortages cause communities to move into protected areas \r for harvesting or livestock grazing, or wildlife to move out of protected \r areas and into contact with people (Mukeka et al., 2018; Kupika et al., \r [...]"


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"[...] 2019; Hambira et al., 2020). See Section 9.6.4 for the role of land and \r ocean protected areas in climate change adaptation."


id: a3af78d98af534f4767aab10ca5627e6
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vector_id: 26001
content:
"Yet many areas targeted by AFR100 erroneously mark Africa's open ecosystems (grasslands, savannas, shrublands) as degraded and \r suitable for afforestation (Figure Box 9.3.1; (Veldman et al., 2015; Bond et al., 2019) (high confidence). These ecosystems are not degraded, \r they are ancient ecosystems that evolved in the presence of disturbances (fire/herbivory) (Maurin et al., 2014; Bond and Zaloumis, 2016; \r Charles-Dominique et al., 2016). Afforestation prioritises carbon sequestration at the cost of biodiversity and other ecosystem services \r (Veldman et al., 2015; Bond et al., 2019). Furthermore, it remains uncertain how much carbon can be sequestered as, compared to grassy \r ecosystems, afforestation can reduce belowground carbon stores and increase aboveground carbon loss to fire and drought (Yang et al., \r 2019; Wigley et al., 2020b; Nunez et al., 2021). Thus, afforested areas may store less carbon than ecosystems they replace (Dass et al., \r [...]"


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"[...] 2018; Heilmayr et al., 2020). Afforestation would reduce livestock forage, ecotourism potential and water availability (Gray Emma and \r Bond William, 2013; Anadon et al., 2014; Cao et al., 2016; Stafford et al., 2017; Du et al., 2021), and may reduce albedo thereby increasing \r warming (Bright et al., 2015; Baldocchi and Penuelas, 2019)."


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"Observed climate changes in Africa (see Section 9.5) have led to changes \r in river flow and runoff (Dallas and Rivers-Moore, 2014; Wolski et al., \r 2014) and high fluctuations in lake levels (high confidence) (Natugonza \r et al., 2016; Ogutu-Ohwayo et al., 2016; Gownaris et al., 2018). Shallow \r lakes respond dramatically to hydrological changes, for example, Lake \r Chilwa has dried up completely nine times in the last century (Wilson, \r 2014), while Lake Chad shrunk by 90% between 1963 and 2000 (Gao \r et al., 2011). However, recent analyses indicate that Lake Chad's water \r levels have been stable since 2000 due to infilling from groundwater \r resources (Buma et  al., 2018; Pham-Duc et  al., 2020). Other factors \r such as deforestation and increased water use in upstream tributaries \r also contribute to lake shrinking (Mvula et al., 2014). Water levels in \r Kenya's mostly shallow rift lakes have been rising since 2010, with some \r [...]"


id: e001c03a5ef0d8ada15abd8dd7885ad0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
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vector_id: 36653
content:
"[...] exceeding historical record high levels (Schagerl and Renaut, 2016; \r Olago et al., 2021). The recent 10-year rising trend is partly attributed to \r increased rainfall and changing land uses (Onywere et al., 2012; Olago \r et  al., 2021). Changes in water level fluctuations of 13 African lakes \r have been positively correlated with primary and overall production \r (Gownaris et  al., 2018), and will have important consequences for \r freshwater ecosystems and related ecosystem goods and services (see \r Sections  9.6.1.3; 9.8.5). Other effects of observed climate changes in \r Africa include higher episodic groundwater recharge, particularly in \r drylands, from heavy rainfall events that are in some cases related to \r ENSO and the IOD (Taylor et al., 2013; Fischer and Knutti, 2016; Cuthbert \r et  al., 2019; Kotchoni et  al., 2019; Myhre et  al., 2019), reduced soil \r moisture, more frequent and intense floods, more persistent and frequent \r [...]"


id: 9ad8c480637ee1ffba821572709ea6e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
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vector_id: 24487
content:
"[...] droughts (Douville et al., 2021) and the steady decline and projected \r disappearance by 2040 of African tropical glaciers (see Section9.5.9)."


id: 306d3e0d0dc574a9c39b29ac36e10b47
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
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vector_id: 5774
content:
"A substantial media campaign was launched to inform residents about the severity of the drought and urge water conservation (Booysen \r et al., 2019; Hellberg, 2019; Ouweneel et al., 2020). Together with stringent demand management through higher water tariffs, this \r communication campaign played an important role in reducing consumption from 540 to 280 litres per household per day (Booysen et al., \r 2019; Simpson et al., 2019a). Revenue from water sales contributes 14% of Cape Town's total revenue, making it the third-largest source \r of 'own' revenue for the city (Simpson et al., 2019b). However, with an unprecedented reduction in water use, the municipal budget was \r undermined (Simpson et al., 2020b). Collecting less revenue created a financial shock as the city struggled to recover operating finance, \r even while new capital requirements were needed for the development of expensive new water supply projects (Simpson et al., 2019b). \r [...]"


id: e6537e7e2b39dbf68230bbfee8eaf617
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37826
content:
"[...] This financial shock was compounded by the economic stress of poor agricultural and tourism performance brought about by the drought \r (Shepherd, 2019; Simpson et al., 2021b). As wealthy residents invested in private, off-grid water supplies, the risk of reduced municipal \r revenue collections from newly off-grid households aggregated with the risk of reduced tourism, increasing the risk to the reputation \r of the incumbent administration (Simpson et al., 2021b). This demonstrates how a population cohort with a high response capability to \r water scarcity can reduce risk while simultaneously increasing risks to the municipality and its capacity to provide water to vulnerable \r residents (Simpson et al., 2020b). Given that city populations in Africa pay 5-7 times more for water than the average price paid in the \r USA or Europe (Adamu and Ndi, 2017; Lwasa et al., 2018), municipal finance needs to delink operating revenue from potential climate \r shocks (see Box 8.6)."


id: a05c4647446d34bbb9371c342b0dd8b2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25422
content:
"Defining a sustainable pumping rate for the Makutapora wellfield is complicated by the variable and episodic nature of groundwater \r replenishment in this dryland environment. For example, groundwater recharge during the 1997/1998 El Nino event, the strongest El Nino \r event of the 20th century, accounted for nearly 20% of all of the recharge received from 1955-2010 (Taylor et al., 2013), highlighting the \r vital role interannual groundwater storage plays in enabling adaptation to climate variability and change in drylands. The disproportionate \r contribution of intense seasonal rainfalls to the replenishment of the Makutapora wellfield, consistent with observations from across \r sub-Saharan Africa (Cuthbert et al., 2019), suggests that groundwater in drylands are currently naturally resilient to climate change. \r However, it remains unclear whether climate change will strengthen or weaken the influence of ENSO and IOD on rainfall (Brown et al., \r [...]"


id: db2f691d33d9241665063d4fe8fe2aa8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35837
content:
"In west Africa, significant spatial variability in river flow is projected in \r the upper reaches of several rivers, with no clear pattern overall (Roudier \r et al., 2014) and large uncertainties in estimations of change in runoff \r (Roudier et al., 2014; Bodian et al., 2018). In some higher altitude regions, \r like the Niger Inland Delta in west Africa, river flows and water levels are \r expected to increase (medium confidence) (Aich et al., 2014; Thompson \r et al., 2017). In the Lower Niger Basin, combined average annual rainfall \r and erosivity for all the climatic models in all scenarios shows increasing \r rainfall amounts are projected to result in an increasing average change \r in rainfall-runoff erosivity of about 14%, 19% and 24% for the 2030s, \r 2050s and 2070s, with concomitant increase in soil loss of 12%, 19% \r and 21% (Amanambu et al., 2019). In the Volta River system, increasing \r wet season river flows (+36% by 2090s) and Volta lake outflow (+5% \r [...]"


id: 3415e99e206db2dd718f47aa749d1f72
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6406
content:
"[...] by 2090s) are anticipated under RCP8.5 (medium confidence) (Awotwi \r A et al., 2015; Jin et al., 2018). In the Volta River basin, compared to \r 1976-2005, drought events are projected to increase by 1.2 events per \r decade at around 2degC to 1.6 events per decade at around 2.5degC global \r warming, and drought area extent is projected to increase by 24% to \r 34% (Oguntunde et  al., 2017). In central Africa, runoff in the Congo \r river system may increase by up to 50% (RCP8.5), especially in the wet \r season, enhancing flood risks in the entire Congo Basin, particularly \r in the central and western parts (CSC, 2013). Average river flows are \r expected to increase in most parts of central Africa, with expected \r increases in total potential hydropower production (Ludwig et al., 2013), \r but see Box 9.5."


id: 1f2012c522980528abddea89b2b3c078
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2683
content:
"However, between 2010-2020 more people across Africa have been \r impacted by floods (e.g., related to Cyclone Idai in March 2019) \r compared to droughts (Lumbroso, 2020). Coastal cities are vulnerable \r to floods related to rainfall and sea level rise (Musa et al., 2014), as \r exemplified by the flood disasters experienced in the Niger delta in 2012 \r which displaced more than 3  million people and destroyed schools, \r clinics, markets and electricity installations (Amadi and Ogonor, 2015). \r From 2000-2015, the proportion of people exposed to floods grew by \r 20-24%, mostly in Africa and Asia, with Mozambique and multiple \r countries in West Africa estimated to have had the proportion of their \r populations exposed to flooding increase by more than 50% (Tellman \r et  al., 2021) and these numbers will increase under climate change. \r Sectoral impacts from flooding within Africa and globally are further \r elaborated on in Sections 9.8.2 and 9.8.5.1, Table 9.3 and Chapter 4 \r [...]"


id: 5a62319fc9995e0da7b2e3f84ac9652e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13155
content:
"Changes in the amplitude, timing and frequency of extreme events \r such as droughts and floods will continue to affect lake levels, rates of \r river discharge and runoff and groundwater recharge (high confidence) \r (Gownaris et al., 2016; Darko et al., 2019), but with disparate effects \r at regional, basin and sub-basin scales, and at seasonal, annual and \r longer timescales. The increased frequency of extreme rainfall events \r under climate change (Myhre et  al., 2019) is projected to amplify \r groundwater recharge in drylands (Jasechko and Taylor, 2015; Cuthbert \r et al., 2019). However, declining trends in rainfall and snowfall in some \r areas of north Africa (Donat et al., 2014b) are projected to continue \r in a warming world (Seif-Ennasr et al., 2016), restricting groundwater \r recharge from meltwater flows, exacerbating the salinisation and \r depletion of groundwater (Hamed et al., 2018) and increasing the risk \r [...]"


id: d52735f7f981c8b99676e7c91c6ef4b0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34824
content:
"[...] of reduced soil moisture (Petrova et  al., 2018) in this region where \r groundwater abstraction is greatest (Wada et al., 2014)."


id: a4e05707f8892e0fb44dbb7845332314
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26230
content:
"The water-energy-food (WEF) nexus explicitly recognises the strong \r interdependencies of these three sectors and their high levels of \r exposure to climate change (Zografos et al., 2014; Dottori et al., 2018; \r see Box 9.5). With increasing societal demands on more variable water \r resources under climate change, an intensification of WEF competition \r and trade-offs are projected (D'Odorico et  al., 2018; Dottori et  al., \r 2018). Other interacting factors, for example, the increasing number \r of transnational investments in land resources can lead to localised \r increased competition for water resources (Messerli et  al., 2014; \r Breu et  al., 2016; Chiarelli et  al., 2016). Understanding such nexus \r interlinkages can help characterise risks to water resource security, \r identify co-benefits and clarify the range of multi-sectoral actors \r involved in and affected by development decisions (Kyriakarakos et al., \r [...]"


id: 5269451b912e9a700c93c7a862cf5a0f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11778
content:
"[...] 2020). Major barriers and entry points for greater integration include \r coordination of horizontal policy and integration of climate change \r adaptation actions (England et al., 2018), capturing the scarcity values \r of water and energy embedded in food/energy products (Allan et al., \r 2015), and inclusion of community-based organisations such as \r water resource user associations (Villamayor-Tomas et al., 2015) and \r agricultural cooperatives (Kyriakarakos et al., 2020)."


id: 97d5316ef0e2338d3169fb158249214f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23924
content:
"The literature shows significant gender-differentiated vulnerability and \r intersectional vulnerability to climate change impacts on water in Africa \r (Fleifel et al., 2019; Grasham et al., 2019; Mackinnon et al., 2019; Dickin \r et al., 2020; Lund Schlamovitz and Becker, 2020), although studies are \r generally lacking in northern Africa (Daoud, 2021). Women and girls \r are, in most cases, more impacted than men and boys by customary \r water practices, as adult females are the primary water collectors \r (46% in Liberia to 90% in Cote d'Ivoire), while more female than male \r children are associated with water collection (62% compared with \r 38%, respectively) (Graham et al., 2016). Women and girls face barriers \r toward accessing basic sanitation and hygiene resources, and 71% of \r studies reported a negative health outcome, reflecting a water-gender-\r health nexus (Pouramin et al., 2020). These differential vulnerabilities are \r [...]"


id: 15289e57d2b63e6d510e2d30c58d16df
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 936
content:
"[...] crucial for informing adaptation, but are still relatively under-researched, \r more so for the urban poor than rural communities (Grasham et  al., \r 2019; Mackinnon et al., 2019; Lund Schlamovitz and Becker, 2020)."


id: 3f96f5c21f9d78bea97c1358eaea42d9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8379
content:
"While natural variability in the hydrological cycle has always been \r considered by water resources planners and engineers (Muller \r Schmied et al., 2016; Muller, 2018), many countries will have to take \r into consideration the range of historically unprecedented extremes \r expected in the future. Increasingly, the provision of urban water \r security is dependent on the functioning of complex bulk water \r infrastructure systems consisting of dams, inter-basin transfers, \r pipelines, pump stations, water treatment plants and distribution \r networks (McDonald et al., 2014). Risk-based studies on the potential \r climate change risks for water security show that there are benefits \r when risks are reduced at the tails of the distribution--floods and \r droughts--even if there is little benefit in terms of changes in the \r mean (Arndt et  al., 2019). When risk is taken into account in an \r integrated (national) bulk water infrastructure supply system, the \r [...]"


id: e0fa9b0b98e591e4a296c629a58756ba
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36848
content:
"[...] overall impact of climate change on the average availability of water to \r meet current and future demands is significantly reduced (Cullis et al., \r 2015). Further, stemming leakages and enhancing efficiency through \r technology and management improvements is important in building \r climate-resilient water conveyance systems (UN Environment, 2019). \r African cities could leap-frog through the development phases to "


id: 9d4a339441249db79685a0d485198c13
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24906
content:
"The interdependencies in the water-energy-food (WEF) nexus, coupled with its high exposure to climate change, amplify WEF risks. Risks \r can be transmitted from one WEF sector to the other two with cascading risks to human health, cities and infrastructure (Conway et al., \r 2015; Mpandeli et al., 2018; Nhamo et al., 2018; Yang and Wi, 2018; Ding et al., 2019; Simpson et al., 2021b). For example, increasing \r demand for water for agricultural and energy production is driving an increasing competition over water resources between food and \r energy industries which, among other effects, compromises the nutritional needs of local populations (Zografos et al., 2014; Dottori et al., \r 2018). Drought events, such as in southern Africa during the 2015/16 El Nino, have been associated with major multi-sector impacts on \r food security (over 40 million food-insecure people and extensive livestock deaths) and reduced energy security through disruption to \r [...]"


id: 2a36c290fb6ea92d08094024c16f23ce
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4638
content:
"[...] hydropower generation (associated in Zambia with the lowest rate of real economic growth in over 15 years) (Nhamo et al., 2018). The \r WEF nexus of the Nile and Zambezi river basins, which include many of Africa's largest existing hydropower dams, have received the \r most attention. In these two regions, where socioeconomic development is already driving up demand, projections indicate that water \r scarcity may be exacerbated by drying (Munday and Washington, 2019) and increased flow variability (Siam and Eltahir, 2017). However, \r for Africa more widely, very few studies fully integrate all three WEF nexus sectors and rarely include an explicit focus on climate change."


id: a6b7e8edf05283da654fa9caa85c9d0c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26549
content:
"Climate change risk to the productivity of this rapidly expanding hydropower and irrigation infrastructure compound the overall WEF \r nexus risk. Future levels of rainfall, evaporation and runoff will have a substantial impact on hydropower and irrigation production. \r Climate models disagree on whether climates will become wetter or dryer in each river basin. Cervigni et al. (2015) modelled revenues \r from the sale of hydroelectricity and irrigated crops in major African river basins under different climate scenarios between 2015 and \r 2050 (Figure Box 9.5.1). The study found that hydropower revenues in the driest climate scenarios could be 58% lower in the Zambezi \r River basin, 30% lower in the Orange basin and 7% lower in the Congo basin relative to a scenario with current climate conditions. \r Hydropower revenues in the wettest climate scenario could be more than 20% higher in the Zambezi river basin and 50% higher in the \r [...]"


id: 6c805041455ef9e640fc7341bb1c50a1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16381
content:
"[...] Orange basin. The biggest risk to the production of irrigated crops is in the eastern Nile where irrigation revenue could be 34% lower in \r the driest scenario and 11% higher in the wettest than in a scenario without climate change (Cervigni et al., 2015)."


id: ed0d89d57d226e0ad058b132a95ae0f1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39074
content:
"Studies have used the river basin as a unit of analysis and adopted sophisticated techniques to assess and present trade-offs between \r competing uses. For example, Yang and Wi (2018) consider the WEF nexus in the Great Ruaha tributary of the Rufiji River in Tanzania \r motivated by an observed decrease in streamflow during the dry season in the 1990s, but without an explicit focus on climate. Yang and \r Wi (2018) show sensitivity of water availability for irrigated crop production to warming, and sensitivity of hydropower generation and \r ecosystem health to changes in precipitation and dam development. Understanding of WEF nexus interlinkages can help characterise \r risks and identify entry points and the relevant institutional levels for cross-sectoral climate change adaptation actions (England et al., \r 2018). An integrated response can be enhanced through the inclusion of community-based organisations, such as water resource user \r [...]"


id: 1f9e9f7e3f35fcd106fc4597ea3d9206
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2774
content:
"[...] associations and the wide range of other multi-sectoral actors involved in and affected by development decisions. Capturing the scarcity \r values of water and energy embedded in food and other products can help identify the co-benefits and costs of integrated adaptation \r (Allan et al., 2015)."


id: da6f35859cc3c9a24e19cec4cfd810d0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35730
content:
"(d, f) The bar graphs show the forecast revenues for hydropower and irrigation infrastructure in each river basin under 121 different climate scenarios from 2015-2050, \r highlighting risk to revenues from high variability in river discharge due to climate change. In river basins with a wide range of potential river flow outcomes due to climate \r change, such as the eastern Nile and Zambezi, there is substantial uncertainty around revenue forecasts and potential for large reductions in future revenue. Hydropower \r revenues refer to net present value of hydroelectricity produced in each river basin over the period 2015-2050, and irrigation revenues refer to the crop revenues per \r hectare for each crop multiplied by the number of hectares of each crop across the basin. All figures are estimates of the net present value of revenues, using a discount \r [...]"


id: 530c39eb4237858901ec90dbd1895cd0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11874
content:
"[...] rate of 3%, and are in 2012 USD billions. The 121 potential climate futures were derived using different General Circulation Models (GCMs), Representative Concentration \r Pathways (RCPs), and downscaling methods. IPCC AR4 and AR5 provided data from 22 and 23 GCMs, respectively. These were evaluated across two or three emissions \r pathways, including RCP4.5 and RCP8.5. The Bias Corrected Spatial Disaggregation method of downscaling was then used to derive 99 potential climate futures. An \r additional 22 climate futures (11 GCMs driven by the RCP4.5 and RCP8.5 emissions pathways) were produced using the Empirical Statistical Downscaling Methods \r developed at the Climate Systems Analysis Group at the University of Cape Town. Data sourced from Cervigni et al. (2015)."


id: 6247dfd967b89f78f4d7259713fadc1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14568
content:
"about water resources, including location, quality and storage methods \r because they are primarily responsible for the management of water for \r household water supply, sanitation and health, and for productive uses \r in subsistence agriculture (UN-Water, 2006). As gender-differentiated \r relationships are complex, adaptation should take into account \r intersectional differences such as homeownership, employment and \r age (Harris et al., 2016), educational, infrastructural and programmatic \r interventions (Pouramin et al., 2020), aspects of protection and safety \r (Mackinnon et al., 2019), barriers to adaptation and gendered differences \r in the choice of adaptation measures (Mersha and Van Laerhoven, 2016), \r the complex power dynamics of existing social and political relations \r (Djoudi et al., 2016; Rao et al., 2017), and inclusion and empowerment \r of women in the management of environmental resources (Makina and \r [...]"


id: 760782ae7a919b1ea096763f6cf65d99
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17994
content:
"[...] Moyo, 2016). Incorporation of gender and water inequities into climate \r change adaptation would have a significant impact on achieving the \r SDGs (particularly 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6), while failure to incorporate gender \r will undermine adaptation efforts (Bunce and Ford, 2015; Fleifel et al., \r 2019; Pouramin et al., 2020)."


id: 99e69a87f076d204fc217f0895e6853d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:58
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24305
content:
"Climate change is projected to increase dependence upon groundwater \r withdrawals in most parts of Africa as an adaptive strategy to amplified \r variability in precipitation and surface water resources, highlighting \r the need for conjunctive surface-groundwater management and \r rainwater harvesting (Cobbing and Hiller, 2019; Taylor et  al., 2019). \r Alternative water supply options such as desalination, managed \r aquifer recharge, stormwater harvesting and re-use (direct and \r indirect, potable and non-potable), all require significant amounts of \r energy and are complex to operate and maintain. A failure to provide a \r source of reliable energy and the capacity to implement, maintain and \r operate these systems is a significant contributor to water scarcity risks \r in Africa (Muller and Wright, 2016). Soft adaptation options include \r increasing water use efficiency, changing agricultural practices, more \r appropriate water pricing (Olmstead, 2014) and enhancing capacity \r [...]"


