# document

id: 338b963c83616da198ed9a386a92db06
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6317
content:
"This chapter builds on this, examining equitable development, robust \r\ninstitutions and poverty reduction as essential inputs to societies' \r\ncapacity for adaptation (i.e., closes the adaptation gap) in order to avoid \r\nlosses and damages (L&Ds) from climate change. It assesses quantitative \r\nspatio-temporal information on human vulnerability at a global scale \r\nand for specific sub-regions, livelihood groups and communities at \r\nthe local level. The chapter assesses the newest literature on how \r\nmultidimensional poverty and human vulnerability to climate change is \r\nmeasured and also examined the agreement of different index systems \r\nin terms of global hotspots of human vulnerability."


id: dd0bb194a3fd3bbe00a22ca57eb2024d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36154
content:
"The chapter assesses newer literature about the synergies and trade\u0002offs for the poorest and most vulnerable people and groups between \r\nadaptation-mitigation and sustainable development strategies, which \r\nsocieties must negotiate in order to pursue climate resilient develop\u0002ment. It explores synergies and mismatches in key development sectors \r\nthat the poorest rely on, including agriculture, forestry and energy. It \r\nidentifies the development strategies, elements of institutional design \r\nand financial mechanisms that could support risk reduction and adap\u0002tation. Our assessment reveals that successful adaptation is not solely \r\na question of levels of funding, but depends on broader institutional \r\ndesign that determine societal development and enabling conditions \r\nfor adaptation to and mitigation of climate change. An assessment "


id: a50a32be33b2af25b79ce5c16a3d5cc8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26257
content:
"In addition, the chapter explores how climate change affects different \r\nlivelihoods and livelihood assets and also examines factors that \r\ncharacterise vulnerability to climate change, focusing on different \r\ndimensions of human vulnerability and its subsystems (e.g., access \r\nto infrastructure services). In this context the chapter also assesses \r\nquantitative data to map human vulnerability as well as economic \r\nand non-economic losses that are highly relevant for understanding \r\nadverse impacts of climate change."


id: a57cd4625cc6323307147062d19c60
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26345
content:
"Overall, the chapter is key in terms of understanding societal impacts \r\nof climate change and factors that determine the various differential \r\nadverse consequences of climate change on societies. The information \r\npresented and assessed is fundamental for informing adaptation and \r\nrisk reduction strategies, since climatic information alone cannot \r\nexplain sufficiently why some regions, societies or groups are \r\nsuffering significantly more under climate change compared to others. \r\nConcepts such as vulnerability, intersectionality and climate justice \r\nprovide important insights on how societal impacts of climate change \r\nare influenced and determined by broader societal development \r\ncontexts."


id: 18ac84113ab64dcfe14b5451e4a4daf5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1555
content:
"of enabling conditions for adaptation supports the finding that more \r\nconvergent, integrated and comprehensive approaches to adaptation \r\nare needed. The chapter concludes that climate justice requires con\u0002sideration of the legal, institutional and governance frameworks that \r\nsignificantly determine whether adaptation is successful in addressing \r\nthe needs of the poor."


id: 6163698c48632e2bb0936640f12f70f4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14433
content:
"Thus, intersections between climate hazards and socioeconomic \r\ndevelopment are assessed from the point of view of vulnerability, \r\npoverty, livelihoods and inequality (see Figure 8.1). Chapter 8 adopts \r\nthis wider perspective to examine the differential nature of observed \r\nand future disproportionate vulnerabilities (i.e., who is most susceptible \r\nto climate hazards and events, where, at the core to understanding of \r\nwhat scale and why?), as well as the inequalities inherent in adaptation \r\nand mitigation solutions as part of a wider climate justice perspective \r\nadopted in Chapter 8, and challenges for climate resilient development."


id: 89cb624a9fb1ad7df09aa1791ca51d54
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21410
content:
"Finally, our assessment points towards the fact that human vulnerability \r\nto climate change is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that is \r\noften influenced by historic development processes, such as structures \r\nthat originated with colonisation. Also, recent global shocks not \r\ndirectly related to climate change, such as the COVID-19 pandemic \r\nand its socioeconomic consequences, impact climate vulnerability and \r\ninequitable impacts occurring between countries and within countries. \r\nRecent studies show that COVID-19, and other social, economic and \r\npolitical crises, have worsened the circumstances of the poor and \r\nfurther marginalised them."


id: e6d253713b8aadda86335ad2b564a9aa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37901
content:
"This section reports on new evidence on the observed impacts \r\nof climate change to livelihoods and the poor since the previous \r\nassessment (IPCC, 2014a). New evidence provides additional insight \r\ninto the interlinkages between climate change, poverty and livelihoods. \r\nNew evidence has been evaluated according to climate change hazard \r\ncategories developed for the AR6 (IPCC, 2021), and summarised in \r\nFigure 8.2."


id: 203e539fceef2427e77c65c1f9f0dd72
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2890
content:
"Reliable and precise estimates of the impacts of climate change on \r\npersistent poverty are difficult to generate, for example, due to data \r\nscarcity and data gaps (Hallegatte et  al., 2015; Hallegatte et  al., \r\n2018; Kugler et al., 2019). However, progress has been made towards \r\ndetection and attribution of climate change impacts on the poorest \r\nby linking standard climate observations in low-income countries with \r\nnew non-traditional forms of data (including Indigenous knowledge, \r\nhistorical archival data, satellite imagery, and data from digital \r\ndevices) (Kuffer et al., 2016; Lu et al., 2016; Bennett and Smith, 2017; \r\nSteele et al., 2017)."


id: f1db987092bf8e43449ef7bad82c1af5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39937
content:
"Overall, our assessment shows (see Figure 8.2) high confidence that \r\ntwo categories of climate hazards pose high risk to a broad range of \r\nlivelihood resources that the poor rely on: warming trends and droughts \r\n(Figure  8.2b). Two key livelihood resource categories--life, bodily \r\nhealth and food security, and crop yield (representing agricultural \r\nproductivity) are most at risk to a broad range of climate hazards (high \r\nconfidence, Figure  8.2b). In addition to warming and drought, both \r\npluvial and fluvial flooding, severe storms and sea level rise represent \r\na high-risk cluster for livelihood impacts (high confidence, Figure 8.2b)."


id: e1efe05917eff61ab8c6bb7ac700868e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37033
content:
"Figure 8.2 reflects the fundamental threat that climate hazards pose \r\nto the survival of plants, livestock and fish, as well as the people on \r\nwhich livelihoods depend (high confidence) (see Horton et al., 2021). \r\nThe dependence of livelihoods on biological, ecological and human \r\nsurvival depicted in Figure 8.2 is also treated in Chapter 5. Likewise, \r\nimpacts to livelihood resources can be compared to impacts to other \r\nkey assets (see Working Group I (WGI) Section 12.3; WGI Table 12.2, \r\nRanasinghe et al., 2021)."


id: 896947c49e40901b94cdfbca675f58db
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21354
content:
"It is revealed that warming trends and droughts pose greatest risks to \r\nthe widest array of livelihood resources, and are particularly detrimental \r\nto crops and human health, a long-term requirement for livelihoods \r\nand well-being (high confidence) (see Figure  8.2B; Section  8.4.5.3; \r\nSection  16.5.2.3.4; Campbell et  al., 2018). A wide range of hazards \r\nalso threaten the survival of fish and livestock that livelihoods depend "


id: 6b5e3223bfa9b35af9d95f5090d37de7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16190
content:
"Figure 8.2 |  Summary of confidence on the observed impacts of 23 climate hazards on nine key livelihood resources on which the poor depend most.\r\n(a) A total of 207 confidence statements on the total set of livelihood impacts. Based on a standardised assessment of available literature since the AR5 (IPCC, 2014a), each impact \r\ncategory was assigned a confidence statement based on weight of evidence; high confidence is represented with HC, medium confidence with MC and low confidence with LC. An \r\naverage numerical confidence score is assigned for impacts from each climate hazard, and for each livelihood resource category, representing total risk."


id: 7fa2663a817fadadd4fa10e23f02e6de
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19592
content:
"(b) The 'high-risk' cluster of livelihood impacts, where confidence is highest. (c) The spatial distribution of relative confidence. Hotspots represent highest confidence of observed \r\nlivelihood impacts; however, the absence of spatial information reflects not an absence of observed livelihood risk, but the relative weight of evidence sampled in this assessment \r\nexercise."


id: 40ffabe15000641c743be1009a7eb8d8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8621
content:
"on (high confidence, Figure 8.2b), as well as other sources of income \r\nfor the poor. Salinity is a secondary hazard related to droughts, coastal \r\nflooding and sea level rise, and poses a fundamental risk to agriculture \r\n(high confidence). There is also robust evidence for rainfall variability \r\ndriving short-term impacts to agricultural productivity as well as \r\npermanent loss of agriculture (high confidence)."


id: 2445febb8aacdda6dc99826f8f1c25ff
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3574
content:
"rainfall and wind storms grows and becomes more robust (Otto et al., \r\n2016; Stott et al., 2016; Otto et al., 2018; Otto, 2020; Clarke et al., 2021; \r\nvan Oldenborgh et al., 2021a; van Oldenborgh et al., 2021b; Verschuur \r\net al., 2021)."


id: db709d19ff1914e650315c6fbecc326a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35883
content:
"While severe storms, pluvial and riverine floods, and coastal floods \r\nprimarily impact private livelihood resources, such as homes and \r\nincome (high confidence, Figure  8.2b), warming and droughts also \r\naffect common pool resources, such as rangeland, fisheries and forests \r\n(high confidence, Figure 8.2b). Multiple hazards undermine ecosystems \r\nthat Indigenous Peoples and poor communities depend on for food \r\nsecurity and income and have sustainably managed over the long \r\nterm, such as forests, grazing land and marine fisheries (Barange et al., \r\n2014; Leichenko and Silva, 2014; Bene et al., 2016; Jantarasami et al., \r\n2018)."


id: d4f85184b77b91d2b6499fc23661adfe
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34792
content:
"Climate justice questions arise about the observed differential L&Ds \r\ndue to climatic hazards to affected populations in close connection with \r\ntheir vulnerability (Wrathall et al., 2015). Individual extreme weather \r\nevents attributable to climate change result in L&Ds in communities \r\nand societies, which allow a quantification of the differential impacts \r\nof such events on different groups (Hoegh-Guldberg et  al., 2019a). \r\nConsidering the disproportionately adverse impacts of climatic hazard \r\non most vulnerable groups and regions and their relatively minor \r\ncontribution to anthropogenic climate change (Mora et  al., 2018; \r\nRobinson and Shine, 2018), it is evident that vulnerability reduction \r\nand adaptation to climate change have also to be seen as an issue of \r\nclimate justice and climate just development (Byers et al., 2018)."


id: 83517748c1f99632378681fed5a844fa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20234
content:
"Probabilistic attribution allows an assessment of people's future \r\nclimate risks and estimates about the costs of successfully adapting \r\nto them (James et al., 2014; James et al., 2019). To answer questions \r\nabout impacts on people, the vulnerable and poor in particular, \r\nrequires attribution, vulnerability and adaptation science need to move \r\nfar beyond understanding physical events and incorporate information \r\n(including Indigenous knowledge and local knowledge (IKLK)) \r\non people's vulnerability and capacities, and exposure and losses \r\nresulting from discrete events (Bellprat et al., 2019). Attribution science \r\nis therefore highly compatible with risk management tools (i.e., risk \r\nreduction, risk transfer, insurance, risk pooling, recovery, rehabilitation \r\nand compensation) suggested in policy (James et al., 2019)."


id: e562e661811f7606f21044d682b50367
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37658
content:
"A focus in the chapter is on the intersections between climate \r\nhazards and differential vulnerability resulting in actual and potential \r\neconomic and non-economic losses (Section  8.3, 8.4; Thomas et  al., \r\n2019). Increasingly, intersections of age, gender, socioeconomic class, \r\nethnicity and race are recognised as important to the climate risks and \r\ndifferential impacts and losses experienced by vulnerable, marginal and \r\npoor in societies (high confidence).(Section  8.2,2.3; CCB GENDER in \r\nChapter 18; Nyantakyi-Frimpong and Bezner-Kerr, 2015). For example, \r\nlinkages between wildfires and gendered norms and values are real-"


id: 2898147299c5e92148b1724aa88bc696
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4355
content:
"In parallel to evidence on L&D, the science of climate event attribution \r\nhas evolved from a theoretical possibility into a subfield of climate \r\nscience. As attribution science strengthens, with it the evidence base \r\nlinking greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to extreme heat events, heavy "


id: 2051222c76d88ed15ad180194cb67ed2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2903
content:
"Figure 8.3 |  Illustration of the relationship between climate hazards, their impacts (including economic and non-economic losses and damages) and human \r\nsystems leading to systemic vulnerability. We need to understand who is vulnerable, where, at what scale and why. We cannot just look at the climate hazard (e.g., wild \r\nfires, floods, droughts, sea level rise, etc.) but must also look at who is being affected by these hazards and factors that make people and groups vulnerable (e.g., poverty, uneven \r\npower structures, disadvantage and discrimination due to, for example, social location and the intersectionality or the overlapping and compounding risks from ethnicity or racial \r\ndiscrimination, gender, age, or disability, etc.) (see also Cross-Chapter Box GENDER in Chapter 18; Section 5.12)."


id: a91aca4405641b98c6357b34e53e3920
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26966
content:
"Sweden and Maasai in Africa are examples of Indigenous People who \r\nalso face climate risks and have limited resources, capacity or power to \r\nrespond (Leal Filho et al., 2017; Persson et al., 2017)."


id: e8495f3f38ca56db53f84053cc41100c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38202
content:
"world examples (Walker et al., 2021). A broader climate agenda which \r\nconsiders social structures and power relations intersecting with climate \r\nchange extremes is important (Versey, 2021), in order to understand \r\ndisproportionate impacts of climate hazards, observed and future losses \r\nand vulnerability (see Figure 8.3)."


id: aa357b8923c4a566e6368884f09508c8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27174
content:
"Agricultural livelihoods of the rural poor, especially in Africa, Asia \r\nand Latin America, are already in transition due to the forces of \r\nindustrialisation, urbanisation and economic globalisation (De Brauw \r\net al., 2014; Tacoli et al., 2015). Scientific evidence shows that climate \r\nchange is accelerating livelihood transitions from rural agricultural \r\nproduction to urban wages (Cai et al., 2016; Cattaneo and Peri, 2016; \r\nKaczan and Orgill-Meyer, 2020)."


id: 91fdf47aade2cc3d9e9ad2cc3805b6e2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22903
content:
"The 2018 US National Climate Assessment has identified that \r\nsoutheastern USA is already experiencing more frequent and longer \r\nsummer heatwaves and, by 2050, rising global temperatures are expected \r\nto mean that cities in southeastern USA may experience extreme \r\nheat (USGCRP, 2018). This includes disadvantaged African American \r\ncommunities, who are more exposed and hence disproportionately \r\nexperience the impacts of climate change (Shepherd and KC, 2015; \r\nMarsha et  al., 2018). The historically discriminated Sami in northern "


id: fddbbcf625ee2e04077ca2a943af1019
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42026
content:
"On the other hand, climate change impacts widen the range of \r\nhouseholds willing or needing to engage in migration to include those \r\nless able to bear the costs of urban migration (Afifi et al., 2016; Hunter \r\nand Simon, 2017). The effect is also greater urban poverty, and a "


id: 9949c34409f95799fad1466155e420c6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24188
content:
"et al., 2018). In other words, when people cannot farm due to rising \r\ntemperatures (and related stressors), they migrate. In this context, \r\nmigration as a livelihood diversification strategy may evolve and \r\ntake multiple forms over time (Bell et al., 2019), such as temporary \r\nmigration (Mueller et al., 2020), seasonal migration (Gautam, 2017) or \r\npermanent migration (Nawrotzki et al., 2017), but generally conforms \r\nto existing patterns of migration (Curtis et al., 2015)."


id: d6ca86a773b5f4c055872d831d2c54ca
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35098
content:
"higher social burden of migrants seeking urban wages (Singh, 2019). \r\nEvidence suggests that poor households often move in desperation \r\nto make ends meet. In the context of climate hazards, such as coastal \r\ninundation and salinity, economic necessity often drives working-age \r\nadults in poor households to seek outside earnings (Dasgupta et al., \r\n2016). Labour migration in the context of climate change is also \r\ngendered, and as more men seek employment opportunities away \r\nfrom home, women are required to acquire new capacities to manage \r\nnew challenges, including increasing vulnerability to climate change \r\n(Banerjee et al., 2019b)."


id: 7dbd56cc662288a5485cef79e4c378c3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19298
content:
"A key concern for the poor is climate change impacts that undermine \r\nlivelihood diversification and resilience, narrowing the set of available \r\nlivelihood alternatives (Tanner et  al., 2015; Bailey and Buck, 2016; \r\nPerfecto et al., 2019)."


id: 6649cd934c7c722cac515487835f87f3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15260
content:
"Migration and displacement are directly induced by the impacts of \r\nclimate change (high confidence) (Cross-Chapter Box  MIGRATE in \r\nChapter 7), however, migration responses to climate change are \r\ndifferentiated across the spectrum of households' wealth. In well\u0002off households, migration can be used as a way to support income \r\ndiversification through remittances (Gemenne and Blocher, 2017). High \r\nlevels of poverty mean that a large part of the African population does \r\nnot have sufficient resources to be mobile (Borderon et al., 2019; Leal \r\nFilho et al., 2020c). The poorest households, conversely, will typically \r\nlack the resources that would allow them to migrate in ways that \r\nmaintain an acceptable standard of living, and may find themselves \r\nunable or unwilling to move in the face of climate change impacts \r\n(Sam et al., 2021)."


id: 946f1011af3f78098137004dc775ab76
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23322
content:
"Climate change may be accelerating livelihood transitions and \r\nmigration in ways that accelerate urbanisation (Adger et  al., 2020). \r\nAlthough a range of climate hazards are noted for accelerating rural\u0002to-urban livelihood transitions (see Cross-Chapter Box  MIGRATE in \r\nChapter 7), a key theme to emerge across many case studies is the \r\nimpact of rising temperatures on agricultural productivity (Mueller \r\net  al., 2014; Cattaneo and Peri, 2016; Call et  al., 2017; Wrathall "


id: 2bff47b47f8b1f5a3b04b6d16bb86b54
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4993
content:
"well as the political benefits of collective action (Pelling et al., 2018). \r\nIn contrast, wealthier tiers of society facing climate change impacts \r\nare more able to liquidate assets to avoid losses from climate change, \r\nto be formally compensated for losses (Fang et al., 2019) and employ \r\nsocial positions to leverage gains from adaptation (Nadiruzzaman and \r\nWrathall, 2015)."


id: 9ee15324d844dab4c8e83f63bf485ea3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25177
content:
"New evidence provides little expectation of net positive impacts of \r\nclimate change for the poor (Hallegatte et  al., 2015). Nevertheless, \r\nsome benefits of climate change adaptation include improved disaster \r\npreparedness, the accumulation of social assets, economic benefits of \r\nagricultural diversification and benefits associated with migration, as "


id: 192b72775fdcf41683d3ba4b9690540
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1644
content:
"Figure Box 8.1.1 |  The global distribution of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) refugee and internally displaced people \r\n(IDP) settlements (as of 2018) overlaid on a gridded map of the days predicted to exceed safe temperature thresholds for human health in the \r\ncoming decades (2041-2060 under SSP2 8.5). Semi-circles indicate the presence of refugee and IDP camps in grid cells, with darker semi-circles depicting increasingly \r\ndense concentrations of settlements. Darker background colors indicate increasingly unsafe conditions. Regions of concern include the southern edge of the Sahel, and the \r\nnorthern edge of the Levant"


id: 9472d2e36c984a56062060e70ee8ade4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23324
content:
"the future of unique and threatened socio-ecological systems, and the \r\necosystem services they provide. The Amazonian indigenous territories \r\nand protected areas can deliver protection of biodiversity and important \r\necosystem services if appropriate governance mechanisms are in place \r\nand their land tenure rights and livelihoods are secured (Steege et al., \r\n2015). The role of enabling environments is discussed in Section 8.5."


id: 935c831f3db1fbe3336ffe28b2076ff9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23132
content:
"At the same time, there is increasing evidence that successful adapta\u0002tion depends on equitable development and climate justice; for exam\u0002ple, gender inequality (SDG 5) and discrimination (SDG 16) are among \r\nthe barriers to effective adaptation (high confidence) (Bryan et  al., "


id: fde7f0d119302cccf16fce65684a2778
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42036
content:
"On Yap Island in the Federated States of Micronesia, displaced atoll communities have been under considerable pressure due to climate \r\nchange. This is because of the island's vulnerability, as a result of its weak economic status, and the little access it has to technologies that \r\nmay support adaptation efforts. This trend is seen in many SIDS (see also Chapter 15). On small islands and remote atolls where resources \r\nare often limited, recognising the starting point for action is critical to maximising benefits from adaptation. They do not have uniform \r\nclimate risk profiles, and not all adaptations are equally appropriate in all contexts (Nurse et al., 2014) (high confidence)."


id: b9a9e63b3595f7bea0054704821c7f04
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29877
content:
"The recurrences of natural hazards (e.g., El Nino-driven tropical storms, associated coastal erosion and saltwater or seasonal droughts \r\nleading to water scarcity) and crises threaten food and nutrition security through impacts on traditional agriculture, leading to income \r\nlosses and causing the forced migration of coastal communities to highlands in search of better living conditions. As many of the \r\nprojected climate change impacts are unavoidable, implementing some degree of adaptation becomes crucial for enhancing food and \r\nnutrition security, strengthening livelihoods, preventing poverty traps and increasing the resilience of coastal communities to future \r\nclimate risks (Krishnapillai, 2018)."


id: 43aa4bf842f72c19c0b4d5d73cc5db79
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9129
content:
"With support from the US Department of Agriculture and the US agency for International Development, the Cooperative Research \r\nand Extension wing of the College of Micronesia- Federated States of Micronesia Yap Campus has been providing outreach, technical \r\nassistance and extension education to regain food and nutrition security and stability. They have done this by improving the soil and \r\ncultivating community vegetable gardens, as well as indigenous trees and traditional crops. This programme implemented a three\u0002pronged adaptation model to boost household and community resilience under harsh conditions on a degraded landscape, hence \r\naddressing poverty risks and promoting more sustainable livelihoods (Meyer and Jose, 2017)."


id: 678415f3fc6133afafaad616dd272a7f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15482
content:
"The following three strategies: (a) gender-focused capacity development on soil health management, (b) good practices in sustainable \r\nland management (SLM) and (c) income-generation activities were employed to mitigate crop production losses and increase resilience \r\nto climate-influenced hazard events within the 258 ha of degraded lands in Gargey Village."


id: e83235bf00012dc353df4aae2af2dd8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38180
content:
"The project first focused on increasing the capacity development for 1100 residents of Gargey Village, including women and youth, in order \r\nto create a base of community knowledge for soil health management. Training on soil health management including the following: use of \r\ncover crops and improved fallow, legumes, composting and agroforestry systems, mulching, minimum tillage and contour farming, as well as \r\naltering production practices (planting time, spacing, pest and disease treatment, harvesting time), alternative crop production methods \r\n(container gardening, raised-bed gardening, small-plot intensive farming), hands-on training on compost preparation and seed germination."


id: 4741cdeeeca7de34abca8323bdce8e70
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9740
content:
"Dissemination and use of good practices in sustainable land management\r\nFollowing capacity building, the project trained villagers in the use of SLM practices to further soil resilience during ongoing and acute \r\nprecipitation events. The SLM practices focused on volcanic soil management and compost preparation and use, along with the planting \r\nof native trees and crops. The protective soil cover was improved through cover crops, crop residues or mulch, and crop diversification \r\nthrough rotations. Local salt-tolerant crop varieties were introduced. Seed packets and seedlings were distributed to ensure a continuous \r\nsupply of resilient traditional plants and to provide for sustainable post-disaster recovery."


id: e05039ec5ced2b41fd4ac2378c72b05b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36716
content:
"The project also included training to increase the incomes of households by training household members in the cultivation of vegetables \r\nusing various alternative crop production methods. Households were then able to sell their vegetables in the local markets."


id: 1807d5c9411605fe370b253904776521
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1435
content:
"Less hunger and more cash from leafy vegetables is a concept adopted at the household level to not only reduce poverty, but also to \r\nempower displaced communities to address the issue of malnutrition. Practices include growing a variety of nutritious vegetables as part \r\nof a large crop portfolio and using alternative crop production methods, such as small-plot intensive farming using container gardening or \r\nraised-bed gardening (Krishnapillai and Gavenda, 2014). In addition, focusing efforts on increasing the sustainable production of staple \r\ncrops confers significant nutritional benefits."


id: a92ab29f724b109cf09e6046330f5ed8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26988
content:
"More households in the settlements are consuming vegetables since home gardeners started harvesting regularly and sharing their\r\nproduce with extended families or selling them to generate income. The location-specific, community-based adaptation model improved \r\nfood and nutrition security and livelihoods (Krishnapillai, 2017). People can access more nutritious and reliable food sources, and they are \r\ngrowing their own food and selling their surplus, creating new optimism about their future."


id: 2adbd4f6f94bb000f143d74fa97f8f90
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4773
content:
"The climate-smart agriculture (CSA) package increased land cover by more than 50% within Gargey Village. This includes the planting of \r\n42 varieties of native trees and crops. Current major crops that are being successfully grown at this location include coconut, breadfruit, \r\nmango, noni, chestnut, pineapple, sugarcane, land taro, tapioca and sweet potato. There have been additional benefits in terms of \r\nimprovement in water availability. These activities have directly benefited the resilience and food security of more than 1000 residents \r\nin Gargey Village, and lessons learnt from this project have helped to scale up similar projects at three locations in Yap that have \r\nexperienced equivalent climate-damaging processes."


id: a0198278e9556c6bcd2c425fedc49507
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25379
content:
"2018; Onwutuebe, 2019; Garcia et al., 2020). Likewise, both climatic \r\nand non-climatic threats to development, such as conflict (SDG 16), \r\nmay seriously undermine capacity to formulate and implement adap\u0002tation policies, and design planning pathways (Hinkel et  al., 2018). \r\nThe risk of conflict associated with climate change has great potential \r\nto undermine other development goals (Box 8.4). Where sustainable \r\ndevelopment lags and human vulnerability is high, there is also often \r\nalso a severe adaptation gap (Figure 8.12; Birkmann et al., 2021a). The \r\nSDGs may provide important cues on how to close the adaptation gap: \r\nclimate action needs to be prioritised where past and future climate \r\nchange impacts threaten SDGs, and where investment in SDGs im\u0002prove capacity for adaptation (see Section 8.6)."


id: bc2a1a5502405283359e328339d30bff
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30345
content:
"Responses to observed impacts such as glacier melt, sea level rise \r\nand increases in the frequency of extreme weather events such as \r\ndroughts, hurricanes and floods need to take into account how they \r\ninfluence other policy issues and sectors, including poverty alleviation, \r\nhuman health and well-being (Orimoloye et al., 2019), water/energy \r\nand the built environment (Andric et  al., 2018), transportation and \r\nmobility (Markolf et  al., 2019), agriculture (Hertel and Lobell, 2014) \r\nand biodiversity/ecosystems (Nogues-Bravo et  al., 2019), only to \r\nmention a few. Recent literature provides evidence that impacts of \r\nclimate change together with non-climatic drivers can create poverty-\r\nenvironment traps that may increase the probability of long-term and \r\nchronic poverty (Figure  8.4; Hallegatte et  al., 2015; Djalante et  al., \r\n2020; Malhi et al., 2020; McCloskey et al., 2020) (high confidence)."


id: e84e05e1c0fafc8b49dd5b507b532b83
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38207
content:
"Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic is not only influencing climate change research (Leal Filho et al., 2021b) but is also influencing the \r\ncapacities of governmental institutions and nations to support planned adaptation and poverty reduction favouring the most vulnerable \r\ngroups, since the crisis also means among other issues a significant reductions in tax revenues (Clemens and Veuger, 2020). COVID-19 \r\nmay also force people to seek alternative sources of income that can lead to the further erosion of long-term adaptive capacities. In many \r\nsettings, the pandemic has had significant impact on businesses and SMEs (Schmid et al., 2021). The important role of governmental \r\nsupport for buffering crises and periods of income loss of individual households (e.g., unemployment) and private businesses (e.g., \r\nSMEs) has also been demonstrated during the COVID-19 pandemic in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) \r\ncountries (OECD, 2020b)."


id: 9623899d127f5f991959b2ecd7cc4c0c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23608
content:
"Livelihood disruptions and an increasing probability of higher levels of poverty and of structural vulnerability in various countries have \r\nalready been observed (Laborde et al., 2020b). These vulnerabilities and the new layers created by the pandemic must be seen with an \r\nintersectional lens (Raju, 2019; Sultana, 2021)."


id: b6f5538f122b2df6d508d27eed035f97
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29398
content:
"In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic has also revealed the unequal access to vaccine and the importance of national state institutions to \r\nbuffer negative impacts, for example, of the lock downs or in terms of unemployment. The COVID-19 pandemic recovery also sets some \r\nbasis for a stronger narrative towards a green recovery approach (Djalante et al., 2020; Forster et al., 2020)."


id: 6af76253ec61744f268f80a7f721cbf8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16107
content:
"in physical conditions and create new dependencies that can increase \r\nvulnerability in the long run (Zimmermann et al., 2018)."


id: ed2d4cfe961a8851f91797eb90a20e0c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39104
content:
"In the AR5, the maladaptation outcomes emerge when climate change \r\nimpacts and risks are disproportionately born by the poorest populations \r\n(Olsson et al., 2014). Since then, most maladaptation evidence emerges \r\nas a consequence of failure to address root causes of vulnerabilities \r\nthat emerge under high and multiple forms of inequalities. In fact, \r\nthe literature shows that adaptation practices can indeed redistribute \r\nvulnerabilities and increase risks to already poor and marginalised \r\npeople with risk to maladaptation outcomes mainly in the Global South \r\ncountries (Atteridge and Remling, 2018)."


id: bce1fe2d9e60b963548c6f62d9b1d706
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30471
content:
"Also the influence of new global phenomena, such as urbanisation, \r\nissues of urban health (Schmid and Raju, 2020) and the consequences \r\nof the COVID-19 pandemic need to be considered when assessing \r\nactual and potential consequences of different responses to climate \r\nchange. For example, inequalities, vulnerabilities and poverty pockets \r\nare expected to change and increase, particularly in urban areas in \r\ncountries with rapid urbanisation processes and high levels of poverty \r\n(Djalante et al., 2020), hence urban and urbanisation trends need more \r\nattention. Urbanisation processes add another level of complexity (Raju "


id: 2a7d7dd86a926f3fb847c070c3373322
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4703
content:
"The determinants of violence in the context of climate shocks are primarily poor institutional planning and response to impacts, such as \r\nthe capacity of a government to respond to and manage environmental risk (Selby et al., 2017). In Latin America, for example, evidence on \r\nsocial conflicts related to disputes over access to water in the context of drought and decreasing water availability point to institutional \r\nfailures, such as poor, inequitable or corrupt water governance (Poupeau et al., 2017). Such observations are not confined to low-income \r\ncountries. In industrialised countries, failure of governments to address climate change is likely to fuel discontent, a condition in which \r\nviolent outcomes are possible (Ide et al., 2020)."


id: 42f6580222ce14f33b1d3a32e1392c5b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8978
content:
"In recent years, research on the climate-security nexus has developed considerably, and has highlighted risks pertaining to conflicts, \r\ngeo-political rivalries, critical infrastructure, terrorism or human security (Gemenne et al., 2014). While different studies have identified \r\nstrong past correlations between climatic variations (of temperature and rainfall in particular) and the occurrence of violent conflicts \r\n(Hsiang et al., 2013), others have stressed the need for stronger explanatory models or the risk of a selection bias (Benjaminsen et al., \r\n2012; Solow, 2013; Buhaug et al., 2014)."


id: 4820c980e20a6584f8458c88d7afa4df
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9906
content:
"While climate change may increase armed conflict risks in certain contexts (Mach et al., 2019), responses to climate change will be crucial \r\nto mitigate these risks. Poor institutional responses can directly drive violence, and there is robust evidence that inequitable responses \r\nfurther exacerbate marginalisation, exclusion or disenfranchisement of some populations, which are commonly recognised drivers of \r\nviolent conflict."


id: 84b96d9cf84b08b3dbe1a8da3ba69487
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20495
content:
"Robust evidence suggests environmental problems (related to climate change) can be dealt with cooperatively, hence leading to more \r\npositive and peaceful relations between groups (Wolf et al., 2003; Ide, 2019). To avert violent outcomes induced by climate change, \r\nstronger local and national climate adaptation institutions within vulnerable societies, and stronger cooperative resource governance \r\nmechanisms between vulnerable countries (such as transboundary water governance agreements) are needed."


id: 78b960dd579f52e30c95dccb56e08095
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18431
content:
"Table 8.1 |  Selected observed climate change adaptation responses in urban and rural areas commonly associated with positive implications for poverty, livelihoods and sustainable \r\ndevelopment."


id: afc0f573ebd2432ce3acc32d6e9791dd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28156
content:
"interlinked with broader development issues (industrial production, \r\nland use planning, education, etc.) at different scales."


id: 9c23de51cf297a20c752798d4606bad1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24728
content:
"et al., 2021). This is particularly the case in rapidly growing medium\u0002sized cities in Africa that at present do not have sufficient resources to \r\ncope and adapt, and to implement climate-sensitive land use planning \r\n(Birkmann et al., 2016)."


id: 234c68ee1a513ce21c1a12f3e9fc02f6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3413
content:
"8.2.2.2 Observed Impacts and Implications for Structural \r\nInequalities, Gender and Access to Resources"


id: e08e7e0920a9623f03c08417e2e7a8a6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36758
content:
"Tables 8.1 and 8.2 present a summary of a set of common climate change \r\nresponses observed, classified according to their main approach. All \r\nthese responses demand a certain level of commitment, the support of \r\nadequate policies and enough budget for their implementation (Archie \r\net  al., 2018). The observed climate change adaptation responses--\r\ndifferentiated along urban and rural settings--underscore the very \r\ndifferent nature of various responses and the need for cross-sectoral \r\napproaches."


id: 413ae465f5c4be147eceb285f5f4aa9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8656
content:
"This section examines the mutual reinforcement of climate change \r\nimpacts and structural inequalities. There is robust evidence that \r\nnegative impacts and harm posed by climate change are also a result \r\nof social and political processes and existing structural inequalities \r\n(Sealey-Huggins, 2018). Climate change encompasses unevenly \r\ndistributed impacts on women, youth, elderly, Indigenous Peoples, \r\ncommunities of colour, urban poor and socially excluded groups, \r\nexacerbated by unequal distribution of resources and poor access \r\nfor some (Rufat et al., 2015; McNeeley, 2017; Sealey-Huggins, 2018). \r\nStructurally disadvantaged people, who are subject to social, economic \r\nand political inequalities resulting historically from discrimination, \r\nmarginality or disenfranchisement because of gender, age, ethnicity, \r\nclass, language, ability and/or sexual orientation, are disproportionately \r\nvulnerable to the negative impacts of climate change hazards (Kaijser "


id: 62251315606d9ecb072d7ed465fd4d8b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14541
content:
"While Table 8.1 shows selected adaptation responses, Table 8.2 shows \r\nselected mitigation responses that highlight that some mitigation \r\nresponses (e.g., increasing energy efficiency) also have a potential \r\nbenefit for the poor or more vulnerable groups, for example, through \r\nthe reduction of costs for electricity. Both tables underscore that \r\nclimate change mitigation and adaptation responses are strongly "


id: 4a974509cc70c659fdb5458bfd1ded4f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10361
content:
"seek employment opportunities away from home, women are required \r\nto acquire new capacities to manage new challenges, including risks \r\nfrom climate change. Banerjee et  al. (2019b) finds that capacity\u0002building interventions for women staying behind, which aimed to \r\nstrengthen autonomous adaptation measures (e.g. precautionary \r\nsavings and flood preparedness), also positively influenced women \r\nto approach formal institutions. Besides, the intervention households \r\nwere more likely to invest a part of the precautionary savings in flood \r\npreparedness measures than control households."


id: c5b5b8280f51e259524bab59a6b08867
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32092
content:
"and Kronsell, 2014; Otto et al., 2016). High levels of vulnerability at \r\nnational scale (see Section 8.3) are often linked to complex histories, \r\nincluding long-term economic dependencies established and reinforced \r\nin the context of colonisation."


id: 8c1224384c673f96fde2d9b8517a658a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21811
content:
"Next to the direct differential impacts of climate change on different \r\nsocial groups, the impacts of climate change can also exacerbate \r\ninequality due to the lower access and limited ability to benefit from \r\nservices provided by ecosystems. Marginalised poor people often \r\nsignificantly depend on the access to surrounding environments, \r\nnatural resources and ecosystem services for their livelihoods, for \r\nleisure or cultural practices. Thus shifts in such resources, for example, \r\ndue to the bleaching of coral reefs or shifts in fish stock, also cause \r\nsevere challenges and risks to these communities (Leal Filho, 2018; Le, \r\n2019; UNTTSDCC, 2014)."


id: 34436bc0aad0cbec8303a2bd3e91ffe9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6432
content:
"Overall, the assessed literature highlights that climate change \r\nimpacts are not emerging in isolation from development context and \r\ndevelopment pathways. Economic and social ramifications mean that \r\nthey may exacerbate poverty and marginalisation (Finkbeiner et  al., \r\n2018; Dogru et al., 2019). Choudhary et al. (2019) and Orimoloye et al. \r\n(2019) highlight how the effects of climate change can be even more \r\nprejudicial to poor countries, which, in most cases, already suffer from \r\nweak governance, high prevalence of informal settlements and lack \r\nof resources. Health, livelihood assets and economy are examples of \r\naspects that will worsen as a result of the negative impacts of climate \r\nchange and failure to provide opportunities for sustainable adaptation \r\n(United Nations, 2015). These facts highlight the importance of \r\nmitigation and adaptation measures especially in these regions \r\ncharacterised by high levels of vulnerability (see also Section 8.3)."


id: 8c8fc705956429f096268dc99125b960
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21913
content:
"Gender influences the way that people also experience loss and \r\nprocess psychological and emotional distress of losses, such as \r\nmortality of children and other relatives in climate-related disasters \r\n(Chandra et al., 2017).Women's capacities are often constrained due \r\nto their roles in their household and society, institutional barriers \r\nand social norms. These constraints result in low adaptive capacity of \r\nwomen, which make them more vulnerable to hazards. As more men "


id: 2b24e31b20e05d5138ba107f39d3fba2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4836
content:
"Table 8.3 |  Some common barriers in implementing climate change responses and their implications."


id: e8e5b984ff53548ea1a1d821f1e8a74b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38326
content:
"There are various characteristics of responses to climate change, \r\nwhich aim to protect livelihoods and prevent poverty expansion (i.e., \r\nan enlargement of the group of people already affected by poverty). \r\nSome of them are:"


id: a50bcd7770ecb5e117765b237a33aa5a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26259
content:
"Linkages between global and individual vulnerability and livelihood \r\nsecurity, including aspects of intersectionality are also assessed. \r\nOverall, this Section 8.3 reveals that different countries, societies and \r\nspecific groups within a society have very different starting points on \r\ntheir move towards climate resilience."


id: d7346dbc2d4b3f91283681ab10998009
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35171
content:
"Conventional assessments of risks and the benefits of adaptation and \r\nrisk reduction measures in the context of climate change primarily \r\nfocus on the financial value of the avoided losses (in USD) and the \r\nassets that are going to be protected from adverse consequences \r\nof climate change or extreme events due to specific measures (e.g., \r\ndyke construction). Even though these assessments fall short of \r\nmeasuring the real costs of addressing climate change impacts (see \r\nDeFries et  al., 2019), they often support the definition of priorities \r\nin terms of protecting economic values and assets. However, these "


id: 460f83c28c06ba0ea60345cb794bbf96
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9541
content:
"Finally, responses such as those outlined in Table 8.1 and Table 8.2, \r\nneed to ensure the active participation of local stakeholders considering \r\ntheir diverse interests, so that they are grounded in reality. In addition, \r\nresponses need to be complemented with operational procedures \r\nand time frames so that they can be more systematically pursued and \r\nimplemented (Alves et al., 2020)."


id: 4b0ed0955c115a6de1ec2c7ec6bcc969
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10448
content:
"This literature underscores that approaches to assess resilience, \r\nvulnerability and human well-being include global assessments that \r\ncan inform strategies and priority settings for adaptation and risk \r\nreduction in the context of climate change (high confidence) (WHO, \r\n2014b; Young et al., 2015; Feldmeyer et al., 2017; GIZ and BMZ, 2017; \r\nHallegatte et al., 2017; Birkmann et al., 2021a; Garschagen et al., 2021; \r\nToolkit, 2021)."


id: b73e424ff35753750bbb6a060aee8e77
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29450
content:
"There is an increasing evidence base that successful adaptation and risk \r\nreduction strategies need to acknowledge not only climate change and/\r\nor specific climate hazards (sea level rise, flooding, droughts, etc.), but \r\nalso human vulnerability and existing adaptation gaps and thereby the \r\ndifferent starting points that societies or different groups have towards \r\nclimate resilience (see UNEP, 2016; Birkmann et  al., 2021a). Recent \r\nreports underscore that development and capacity indicators are useful "


id: 37551d0b84d968dc8b4a882ebe0b149
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6951
content:
"the vulnerability of a society, a specific community or an individual \r\nhousehold that determine adverse societal consequences of climatic \r\nhazards. International vulnerability and resilience assessments show \r\nthat vulnerability varies across countries of similar wealth or income \r\nbecause multidimensional vulnerability, well-being and resilience \r\ndepend on a larger set of factors (Birkmann and Welle, 2016; Hallegatte \r\net al., 2017; INFORM, 2019). In this regard, vulnerability assessment is \r\nsignificantly different from climate exposure mapping."


id: f681d8708eb2867baa25339bb48e184d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40742
content:
"The assessment of literature published since the AR5 suggests that \r\nalongside already deteriorated specific conditions that determine \r\nindividual vulnerability and livelihood security to climate change (see \r\nSection  8.2), high levels of poverty, lack of access to basic services \r\n(human rights to water and sanitation), poor governance and conflicts \r\nare important factors that characterise vulnerability and systemic \r\nhuman vulnerability in particular (EC-DRMKC, 2020; Wisner, 2020; \r\nFeldmeyer et  al., 2021; Garschagen et  al., 2021; GIZ, 2021). These \r\ncontext conditions within a country or region limit the access to \r\neffective adaptation options particularly for the poor and marginalised \r\ngroups."


id: b2af0ec00d4572882c807a3d3ced0e49
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28676
content:
"The findings of these global assessments suggest, among other \r\nissues, that options to reduce vulnerability and enhance resilience \r\ndo exist in various countries at different levels, in part irrespective \r\nof their income level (Feldmeyer et al., 2017; Hallegatte et al., 2017). \r\nVulnerabilities at national and regional-level influence community and \r\nindividual vulnerability, particularly through structures that determine \r\nentitlements, the access to resources and processes of marginalisation \r\n(Watts and Bohle, 1993; Thomas and Warner, 2019)."


id: 281d1ef5a8c868df81e00a877a2e14f5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4253
content:
"Recent studies underscore that human vulnerability--thus the \r\npredisposition to be adversely affected--is largely determined by past \r\nand present development processes, rather than by the occurrence of \r\nindividual events (Wisner, 2016; Cutter, 2018; Birkmann et al., 2020). \r\nAlso the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic will create newly \r\npoor, particularly in countries that are already characterised by high \r\nlevels of vulnerability (see Box 8.3; Laborde et al., 2020b; Lakner et al., \r\n2020)."


id: f9b02cdc400e419fb63081b3ac07ac9a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41290
content:
"Quantitative studies and assessments published since AR5 provide \r\nadditional insights about human vulnerability to climate change and \r\nresilience of societies at different scales using different indicator sets and \r\napproaches (Feldmeyer et al., 2017; Hallegatte et al., 2017; EC-DRMKC, \r\n2020; Birkmann et al., 2021a; Feldmeyer et al., 2021; Garschagen et al., \r\n2021)."


id: 6872989e6724ce7502d22d20534a8147
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15644
content:
"Figure  8.7 provides an aggregated regional overview of selected \r\nindicators used within the vulnerability index mapped in Figure 8.6. \r\nThe overview shows that the many compounded challenges faced by \r\nAfrican countries are starkly pronounced, but also in other regions, \r\nespecially Asia, Central and South America, and among SIDS, there \r\nare several challenges such as inequality, governance issues and \r\ndisplacement, which all increase the vulnerability and constrain \r\nadaptive capacities of these regions to climate change."


id: 5d1e59f79d35cd2b580f53f8ffc08c35
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13655
content:
"However, it is also important to note that vulnerability assessments \r\ndo have their limitations (Heesen et  al., 2014; Rufat et  al., 2019). \r\nFor example, in high-income countries, specific groups can be highly \r\nvulnerable to climate change due to marginalisation and discrimination \r\ndue to ethnicity or gender. Gender inequality, for example, is also high \r\nin some countries classified in the literature as having low vulnerability \r\n(see Birkmann et al., 2021a; Birkmann et al., 2022). Nevertheless, these \r\ncountries have, in theory, sufficient financial resources and governance \r\ncapacities to deal with these challenges, while this is different for \r\nmany country clusters classified as highly vulnerable."


id: dedc2d8c6f264852f6bb21bcc482fbfc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36472
content:
"Countries and regional clusters with low vulnerability (see Figures 8.5; \r\nFigure 8.6), such as Australia and New Zealand or Iceland and North \r\nEurope, encompass population groups that are exposed and vulnerable \r\nto climate hazards, such as sea level rise or droughts but, within these \r\nregions' context, conditions exist that allow the negative impacts "


id: 97513c51b36036f4f590c93083e74ae5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23821
content:
"5 Measured as death per hazard event and calculated by averaging the country values of mortality per event falling in different vulnerability categories."


id: b5316dffb9288ecce0de445b5012a314
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29116
content:
"and losses to be buffered (also for most vulnerable groups). These \r\nregions have higher financial and institutional capacities to support \r\npeople at risk and planned adaptation at a different magnitude \r\nwithin their region, for example, as seen in compensation payments \r\nfor drought exposed farmers (Hochrainer-Stigler and Hanger-Kopp, \r\n2017; Australian-Government, 2021) or flood affected households in \r\nGermany in 2021. Also, the percentage of households insured against \r\nclimate-influenced hazards, such as floods or storms, is significantly \r\nhigher in these regions (North America, Western Europe) compared to \r\nregions such as Western Africa or Micronesia (Welle and Birkmann, \r\n2015; Feldmeyer et al., 2021; Birkmann et al., 2022)."


id: 2c8d80348994fbafa501c1542bcf90da
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5106
content:
"While climate change differentially impacts people in vulnerable \r\nsituations within countries, including the poor, children, women, \r\nmarginalised Indigenous or other ethnic minority people (Rhiney et al., \r\n2016; Mendez et al., 2020), the global assessment results underscore \r\nthat, in most vulnerable regions and countries, very limited resources \r\nand structures exist to support these groups when droughts, floods or \r\nstorms occur and place an additional burden on these groups."


id: b8eb3905e79245ce9b4f00e9cc634c28
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29740
content:
"The relevance of human vulnerability has also been confirmed by \r\nrecent assessments. The assessment of vulnerability studies and \r\nmortality data found that the average mortality5\r\n from floods, storms \r\nand droughts is 15  times higher in regions and countries ranked \r\nas very highly vulnerable (e.g., Afghanistan, Haiti, Mozambique, \r\nNigeria, Somalia) compared to regions and countries with very low \r\nvulnerability (e.g., Canada, Italy, Sweden, UK) (Birkmann et al., 2022). \r\nThese patterns are confirmed by other studies (e.g., CRED and UNDRR, \r\n2015; CRED and UNDRR, 2016; CRED and UNDRR, 2020b) that \r\nexamined disaster mortality per hazard event in low and lower middle \r\nincome countries compared to high income countries and therewith "


id: 6411992ded12da87bb965cdc9be9d14a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14891
content:
"While global assessments often allow for country rankings, it is \r\nsimilarly important to better understand how many people are living \r\nin these different levels of vulnerability. The quantitative assessments \r\nunderscore that a significantly higher number of people live in countries \r\nwith very high and high vulnerability compared to the population \r\nliving in countries classified as having low and very low vulnerability. \r\nAn analysis that measured the vulnerability of countries according \r\nto the INFORM Risk Index and the WorldRiskIndex vulnerability \r\nindex components, differentiating vulnerability values into seven \r\nvulnerability classes found that nearly twice as many people are living "


id: ed0465a6940af7419b565bd857de4771
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39069
content:
"in most vulnerable countries compared to the number living in less \r\nvulnerable countries (Birkmann et al., 2021a). Another study that uses \r\nthe same data and differentiates vulnerability into five classes (also \r\nconsidering the lack of coping capacity within the INFORM index, see \r\n(Marin-Ferrer et al., 2017)) concludes that about 3.3 billion people are \r\nliving in countries classified as highly vulnerable, while approximately \r\n1.8 billion people live in countries with low vulnerability (Birkmann \r\net  al., 2022). Additional assessments based on the classification of "


id: 18dcdc28304af444ec36b529c605a6c1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1589
content:
"income groups of countries reveal that approximately 3.6  billion \r\npeople live in low and lower middle-income countries, which are most \r\nvulnerable and disproportionally bear the human costs of disasters due \r\nto extreme weather events and hazards (World Bank, 2019b; CRED \r\nand UNDRR, 2020b; EC-DRMKC, 2020; UN-DESA, 2020a; UN-DESA, \r\n2021; Birkmann et al., 2022). While these numbers are different, both \r\nresults underscore that the absolute and relative number of people \r\nliving in most vulnerable contexts is significantly higher compared to "


id: 920caa8daeab2fadd945e0eb3bc6f906
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22911
content:
"those that live in a country with a low vulnerability status (Birkmann \r\net al., 2021a; Birkmann et al., 2022). These differences have also been \r\nobserved in former years (Welle and Birkmann, 2015; Feldmeyer et al., \r\n2017)."


id: b416088d8e1b34cbf8f83c2da9926267
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28926
content:
"flooding can also significantly influence neighbouring countries and \r\ncan affect exposure and vulnerability of the respective country (Nadin \r\nand Roberts, 2018; Booth et al., 2020). Likewise, climate change may \r\naffect transboundary resources (e.g., underground water reserves) and \r\ntransboundary ecosystems (e.g., in terms of the migration of species) \r\n(Vij et al., 2017) and thereby further reduce the capacity of vulnerable \r\ngroups to cope and adapt. In addition, recent research indicates \r\nthat social inequities are also coupled with access to and quality of \r\nenvironmental resources in urban environments--meaning social and \r\nenvironmental justices are interconnected (see Schell et al., 2020)."


id: 3bd864b7486956983b869e9b03fa81ed
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7718
content:
"That means, even moderate changes in the global mean temperature, \r\nas identified in the recent IPCC report SR1.5degC (IPCC, 2018c) and \r\nin scientific literature (Hoegh-Guldberg et  al., 2019a), can mean \r\nsubstantial increases in risks for more than 3 billion people due to high \r\nlevels of vulnerability."


id: 356c1c31cedd05edb5981b2153e5ccf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6645
content:
"Overall, there is robust evidence and high agreement in the recent \r\nliterature that countries and regions classified as highly vulnerable \r\nface multiple development challenges at once, in which high levels of \r\npoverty interact with limited access to water and sanitation or with \r\nhigh levels of forced migration and, in some cases, with state fragility \r\nmaking solutions difficult (Hallegatte et al., 2017; Marin-Ferrer et al., \r\n2017; Feldmeyer et al., 2021; Garschagen et al., 2021; Birkmann et al., \r\n2022). High levels of vulnerability within these regional clusters are \r\nthe product of current development challenges, but are often caused \r\nby long and complex histories, including issues of colonisation and \r\nmarginalisation, for example, in hotspots in Africa (Birkmann et  al., \r\n2021a)."


id: 67308edb8e4348f5b50b639d1d653138
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15429
content:
"Individual adaptation projects to specific climate hazards in regions \r\nclassified as highly vulnerable are needed. However, recent studies \r\nunderscore that deeper development challenges need to be addressed \r\nin order to make progress towards adaptation and vulnerability \r\nreduction and to avoid maladaptation (Eriksen et al., 2021). Adaptation \r\nand development projects, such as the construction of a dam as a \r\nresponse to water shortages in one country can significantly influence \r\nthe exposure to water shortages and the response capacities of \r\nanother country downstream. Often, transboundary challenges are a \r\nresult of policy and resource management choices or uncertainty, and \r\naddressing them requires a greater engagement between governing \r\nbodies, which may also guide more suitable responses in the context \r\nof climate change adaptation and vulnerability reduction (Earle et al., \r\n2015; Tilleard and Ford, 2016; McLeman, 2018; Birkmann et al., 2021a)."


id: ec18f5c7c62064bd25fc1bcd8f862f1e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38903
content:
"Most of those countries and regional clusters identified as highly \r\nvulnerable have contributed little to the overall amount of GHG \r\nemissions and therefore support for (transboundary) adaptation from \r\nthe international community is required in these places and for those \r\nliving under these conditions in order to support and achieve climate \r\njustice."


id: ba511ed65b34af9d6bc420bc29acb208
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29998
content:
"8.3.2.3 The Effect of Higher Levels of Global Warming for Most \r\nVulnerable Regions and Specific Livelihoods"


id: b95aeb0f65ee94d042b121b6d7cc7197
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29824
content:
"improve the access of people to basic services need to become a \r\nhigher priority in adaptation and development planning in order to \r\navoid more than 3 billion people currently and even more in the future \r\nbeing exposed to severe adverse consequences of climate change. \r\nReducing vulnerability to climate change is therefore indispensable for \r\nclimate justice and just transitions (high confidence)."


id: eff57f81f697d1b830853ba040c73a30
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39599
content:
"medium or low vulnerability (Birkmann et  al., 2022). Nevertheless, \r\nother regions and countries classified as less vulnerable, for example \r\nin Asia, are experiencing disasters and have a relative high share of \r\nthe observed global fatalities or losses, when considering non-climatic \r\nnatural hazards (CRED and UNDRR, 2020a; see also Section 8.3.2.1). In \r\naddition, changing climatic hazard and exposure patterns have to be \r\nconsidered. However, the agreement of major global index systems on \r\nexposure is significantly lower compared to vulnerability (Garschagen \r\net al., 2021)."


id: 231ee6624b1b2a7e0c9939dd920f154
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3374
content:
"Literature in the area of climate change risk management and \r\nadaptation highlights the importance of overall governance systems \r\nand their functioning and inclusiveness in terms of vulnerability and \r\nrisk reduction (Burch et  al., 2019). Empirical evidence and scientific \r\nstudies show linkages between issues of governance, conflicts and \r\nhigh levels of state fragility and systemic human vulnerability (see \r\nFigure 8.8; Section 8.5.2; Eklow and Krampe, 2019; Peters et al., 2019; \r\nMawejje and Finn, 2020)"


id: ec2d048232c048ebfb875abdb3b9a74a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38923
content:
"The comparison of state fragility and vulnerability at the level of \r\nregions (United Nations Statistics Division regions) based on the \r\nvulnerability information of the INFORM and WorldRiskIndex systems \r\nand information from the Failed State Index indicates clear linkages \r\n(see Figure 8.8), meaning that societal development and governance \r\nchallenges often interact and, in many cases, are influenced by complex \r\nhistories (see FFP, 2020; Birkmann et al., 2021a; Feldmeyer et al., 2021). \r\nStrategies to reduce systemic vulnerability and multidimensional \r\npoverty have to account for these broader governance challenges that \r\nhamper resilience building and the development of adaptive capacities \r\nto climate change at various levels."


id: f4a8687d430fcd8bf90f42297d75e095
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40417
content:
"Strategies to strengthen adaptation to climate change have therefore \r\nto acknowledge these interdependencies between climate change, \r\nvulnerability, development and governance (see Section  8.6.5). The \r\nresults of different global vulnerability assessments and the role of \r\ngovernance conditions underscore that next to individual adaptation \r\nprojects in specific sectors, integrated strategies and programmes \r\nare needed that reduce systemic vulnerability and support \r\nenabling conditions for adaptation for most vulnerable groups (see \r\nSection 8.6.5)."


id: 1b11a0f3fd23855e352139df03a2d250
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1961
content:
"Literature that assesses trends of poverty and vulnerability, as well as \r\nexposure to climate change, reveals that geographic patterns of poverty \r\nand vulnerability are uneven and changing over time (Feldmeyer et al., \r\n2017). However, a robust finding of different studies is that population \r\ngrowth in most vulnerable country groups and regions 'is' and 'will be' \r\nsignificantly higher in the future compared to population growth in \r\ncountries classified as having low vulnerability (see Section 8.4.5.2). \r\nIn summary, a significant increase of population is expected in \r\nhighly vulnerable countries in the future. In addition, global studies \r\npredict that, by 2030, almost 50% of the world's poor will be living \r\nin countries affected by state fragility, conflict and violence (UNISDR, \r\n2009; Hallegatte et al., 2017)."


id: 324a8079ce721d31cc440a893ffe42f5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6103
content:
"Overall, the assessments above underscore that adaptation and \r\nrisk reduction require not only information about changing climatic \r\nconditions, but also assessments that capture the development \r\ncontexts and structural inequality that determine and influence human \r\nvulnerability. Strategies that reduce poverty and inequality and that "


id: e8d28d8ead3bdd4a7e7887ba841aecc3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38311
content:
"Recent scientific studies in the context of climate-influenced hazards \r\nand disasters also underscore that various regions and countries \r\nclassified as highly vulnerable are characterised by a high persistence \r\nof human vulnerability and chronic poverty (Feldmeyer et al., 2017; UN\u0002DESA, 2020b; World Bank, 2020). For example, various highly vulnerable \r\nregions in Central, West and East Africa, countries such as Afghanistan, \r\nDemocratic Republic of Congo and Haiti, and also SIDS in Melanesia \r\nand Micronesia have been characterised by high levels of poverty for \r\ndecades (World Bank, 2020). Several of these highly vulnerable regions \r\nare also likely to experience a further increase in climate hazards such \r\nas sea level rise in Melanesia and Micronesia and in coastal zones of \r\nWest Africa and more severe droughts in Africa (IPCC, 2021)."


id: 7fd1e9cefbee9cdcedb6cd5aefcdf17
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19628
content:
"Map with observed changes in agricultural and ecological droughts (IPCC, 2021) overlaid over human vulnerability (see Figure 8.6) provide\r\nhensive overview for defining adaptation priorities."


id: 3d408b3a7b49d15c880da7c631aee9d2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7955
content:
"There is robust evidence that in many world regions the exposure to \r\nclimatic hazards is increasing with additional global warming (Chin\u0002Yee, 2019; Hoegh-Guldberg et  al., 2019a; IPCC, 2021). In addition, \r\ndevelopment patterns and practices such as urbanisation and migration \r\nto exposed areas, for example, to coastal zones in West Africa or South \r\nAsia is increasing exposure. While the spatial and temporal exposure \r\nto impacts from climate change and extreme events increases with \r\nhigher levels of global warming (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2019a), in all \r\nglobal regions and various climate zones (IPCC, 2021), the burden is \r\ngreater for the most vulnerable regions where people have limited \r\nsupport and capacities to build adaptive capacities for future impacts \r\nof climate change."


id: 679c01a756f2469a82d34d59724ab865
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15493
content:
"on the type of changes observed in droughts is low for North and \r\nsoutheast Africa, it is the high vulnerability in this region that requires \r\nurgent attention (see Figure 8.9)."


id: 3e5521e7f29782b2283963929d9d0b76
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8142
content:
"Recent reports on extreme poverty and human rights (Alston, 2019) \r\nshow that millions already face malnutrition due to devastating \r\ndrought. In addition, the linkages between ecosystem vulnerability \r\nand human vulnerability and human well-being are important aspects \r\nthat need more attention, since, for example, the degradation of \r\nmarine ecosystems that support food systems for hundreds of millions \r\nof people will threaten food security (see for details Cross-Chapter \r\nBox MOVING PLATE in Chapter 5)."


id: c336beb465f74c7c8122c108720f9f07
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31617
content:
"While the findings of the Alston report underscore the urgency to act \r\nin order to protect people's livelihoods, particularly in low-income \r\ncountries, it also shows that extreme poverty (Alston, 2019) and \r\ndifferent dimensions of poverty are found in middle- and high-income \r\ncountries."


id: 21a37e31ea057a28b241673b56706735
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3125
content:
"In this regard, vulnerability assessment results provide an important \r\nadditional layer of information for decision making in terms of \r\ndefining adaptation and risk reduction needs and priorities, as shown \r\nin Figure  8.9. The figure shows the published climatic information \r\nregarding observed changes in agricultural and ecological droughts \r\n(IPCC, 2021) combined with a background map of vulnerability. For \r\nexample, the combined information reveals that even if the agreement "


id: 2d697581d306bce003865451f6d95a55
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5275
content:
"8.3.3.1 The Implications of Vulnerability for Past and Present \r\nLivelihood Impacts of Climate Change"


id: 1a351c19f97681570e0fdc05491d71e7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1806
content:
"This understanding helps to clarify how social structures, institutions \r\nand governance mechanisms matter to address social causes in \r\naddition to climate magnifiers while holding them accountable (see \r\nSection  8.5). For example, low-elevation coastal zones concentrate \r\nhigh levels of poverty in some specific areas: 90% of the world's \r\nrural poor are concentrated in the low-elevation coastal zones of just \r\n15 countries, and this population keeps growing (Barbier, 2015). Yet \r\nstudies on the economic impacts of climate change and also integrated \r\nassessment models typically overlook the distributional effects of \r\nthese impacts according to vulnerability and exposure and do not \r\nsufficiently account for agent and societal heterogeneity (Balint et al., \r\n2017; Sovacool et al., 2021)."


id: 235d5b617b4c9dabc704d673bcd3a6f6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3419
content:
"Since the AR5, high confidence is attributed to the fact that the, mostly \r\ndetrimental, climate change impacts and risks are experienced mainly \r\nby the poorest people around the world (Olsson et al., 2014; Roy et al., \r\n2018). There is high confidence that climate change impacts will put a \r\ndisproportionate burden on low-income households and thus increase \r\npoverty levels (IPCC, 2014a; Hallegatte and Rozenberg, 2017)."


id: b1a1e5d6f7eaaf2492f7beeabb8db457
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28473
content:
"There is robust evidence that economic development based on \r\nthe exploitation of natural resources can significantly increase the \r\nvulnerability of communities at the local level. For example, there is \r\na correlation between political arrangements and environmental \r\ndegradation that brings about both disasters and an increase in disaster \r\nrisk (Cannon and Muller-Mahn, 2010; Pereira et  al., 2020), while \r\ndevelopment is recognised by some as a key element for adaptation \r\n(Cannon and Muller-Mahn, 2010)."


id: 725c0f7c7913757a16d74cd9f202600
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17363
content:
"This section complements the global and regional assessment of \r\nvulnerability in the previous section with a more precise assessment of \r\nobserved local conditions and livelihood impacts and shifts. First, the \r\nsection reviews linkages between vulnerability and livelihood impacts \r\nof climate change broadly. Second, it examines the range of observed \r\ndisproportionate impacts according to economic (e.g., income) and \r\nnon-economic (e.g., cultural) impacts of climate change. Third, it \r\nexamines current risks of adaptation limits and compounding effects \r\nacross social groups and associated livelihood shifts."


id: bdc914b13518339edaaf0f5fb689a4bd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30651
content:
"Maladaptation is an important thread given its relevance to assess \r\nways that well-intentioned development can exacerbate past and \r\nexisting vulnerabilities and undermine livelihoods (see Section 8.2.2.1).\r\nEvidence shows that some local development projects can undermine "


id: f97e5c20e8c41ebe8f2e99766c75ff1a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41261
content:
"and non-economic losses, the impacts of climate change are very real \r\nand profound (Tschakert et  al., 2017; Roy et  al., 2018) Particularly \r\nin low-income and most vulnerable regions, it is not the absolute \r\neconomic loss, but the combination of economic and especially non\u0002economic losses that need to receive higher attention and need to \r\ninform adaptation strategies."


id: a4ef85f7b2e96c89ade4fa65eab0745
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26239
content:
"resilience and increase the vulnerability of neighbouring communities, \r\nleading to maladaptation (Magnan et al., 2016; Schipper, 2020; Eriksen \r\net  al., 2021). Development projects can also negatively affect the \r\nvulnerability and create new ones of the very community where they are \r\nimplemented (Burby, 2006; Magnan et al., 2016; Atteridge and Remling, \r\n2018; Thomas and Warner, 2019; Work et  al., 2019). Maladaptation\r\nhas also received growing attention since AR5 as a projected future \r\nclimate risk for vulnerable social groups (see Section 8.4.5.5) and in \r\nthe context of adaptation constraints and trade-offs in climate resilient \r\ndevelopment (see Sections 8.5.1; 8.6.1), Despite maladaptation, there \r\nis however robust evidence that inclusive and sustainable development \r\nat the local level, can reduce vulnerability (Cannon and Muller-Mahn, \r\n2010; Patnaik et al., 2019)."


id: 751a36634926fab2dfbc9b74e8512dde
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17840
content:
"Economic losses include income and physical assets and non-economic \r\nlosses include mortality, mobility and mental well-being losses from \r\nclimate change (see Section 8.3.4). The IPCC WGII AR5 (IPCC, 2014a) \r\nprimarily associated L&Ds with extreme weather events and economic \r\nimpacts, and treated it primarily as a future risk. New evidence \r\nprovides insights into present-day L&Ds from slow-onset impacts (e.g., \r\nsea level rise) (Adamo et  al., 2021) and non-economic losses (e.g., \r\ncultural impacts, emotional and psychological distress) (McNamara \r\net al., 2021b) which previously received much less attention. AR5 had \r\nmore focus on L&Ds in high-income regions than in regions most at \r\nrisk, such as SIDS and least developed countries (LDCs) (van der Geest \r\nand Warner, 2020)."


id: 1cf390738b2c643e96653f194949337d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2273
content:
"Impacts of climate change are affecting the economic and non\u0002economic dimensions of people's lives, including subsistence practices \r\nof communities that are experiencing decreases in agriculture \r\nproductivity and quality, water stress, increases in pests and diseases, \r\ndisruption to culture, and emotional and psychological distress, to cite \r\njust a few (Savo et al., 2016). For example, the cumulative effects of \r\nslow-onset events threaten food security especially among the poor \r\nin Latin America and the Caribbean--regions which face the largest \r\ngender gap in terms of food security globally (Zuniga et al., 2021). In \r\ngeneral for Global South countries, the global average temperature \r\nwarming (including the Paris target of 1.5degC) means substantially \r\nhigher warming and including higher frequency and magnitude \r\nof extreme events, that will result in significant impacts on societal \r\nvulnerability (Aitsi-Selmi and Murray, 2016; Djalante, 2019)."


id: aabd9e16fc78e471de783fe6bfde5e4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27264
content:
"The literature is assessed according to this new L&D typology, which \r\nincludes both extreme and slow-onset events and has a strong emphasis \r\non climate justice and disproportionate impacts of climate hazards (see \r\nFigure 8.3), with a new focus non-economic L&D."


id: f37093064a33ca50a6231156f32b12aa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40205
content:
"While extreme events are not new, the intensity and frequency of \r\nextreme events are stacking, leading to additional increase in poverty \r\nor vulnerability in some regions, exacerbated by COVID-19, and up \r\nagainst existing development pathways leading to significant impact \r\non economic losses globally (high confidence). There is robust evidence\r\nthat many African countries experience climate-related losses in terms of \r\nloss of crop yields, destroyed homes, food insecurity through increased \r\nfood prices, and displacement (Box 8.5; Olsson et al., 2014). Attention \r\nhas been focused on low-income groups, women and children, poor \r\nrural communities, and Indigenous Peoples such as the example of the \r\nDupong, an Indigenous Peoples in Ghana using Indigenous strategies \r\nto limit adverse impacts of climate change-induced water shortages \r\n(Opare, 2018). In Kenya, economic L&D during droughts between 2009 \r\nand 2011 incurred costs that included trucking emergency water and "


id: 3291ddff309cc1f9e3db7664fb6c0a92
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6155
content:
"Measuring losses from climate change impacts in terms of poverty and \r\ninequality can be difficult, and part of the lack of assessments of non\u0002economic L&D can be attributed to the limited observational climate \r\ndata on poor countries and population impacted, which are mostly \r\nconcentrated in the Southern Hemisphere (Roy et al., 2018).This is also \r\ndue to the challenges posed by the limited data available for assessing \r\nattribution (Cramer et al., 2014; Harrington and Otto, 2020; Otto et al., \r\n2020a) and lack of a comprehensive set of adaptation metrics (Otto \r\net al., 2020b). Economic L&Ds from climate change are often assessed \r\nand reported after disasters or within crises, however, non-economic \r\nlosses from climate change are often overlooked as is their relevance \r\nfor poverty and livelihoods. For those who experience both economic "


id: 11b7104dac0ad8748fb6eb91bc9a0785
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 306
content:
"A pertinent example of economic losses is the example of the Torres \r\nStrait in Australia. This example shows evidence of communities living \r\non remote islands. Boigu is a low-lying mud island inundated by the \r\nsea during high tides and storm surges. Those most exposed and \r\nvulnerable to climate change have limited livelihood assets and face \r\nchallenges to secure external support with government and others. \r\nPlace-based values evoke a reluctance to relocate or retreat with \r\neconomic losses such as community infrastructure, housing and cultural \r\nsites (McNamara et al., 2017). In the Great Barrier Reef, Australia sea \r\nlevel rise and sea level global temperature warming affects fisheries' \r\nproductivity and tourism (Evans et al., 2016). Unprecedented burn area \r\nof wild forest fires in Australia between September 2019 and January \r\n2020 (Boer et  al., 2020) extended over almost 19  million hectares, \r\ndestroyed over 3000 houses and killed 33 people (Filkov et al., 2020)."


id: 8b72fad010c733fd403ba985fbc3b96c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21695
content:
"The 2018 European heatwave in Northern and Eastern Europe caused \r\nmultiple and simultaneous crop failures--among the highest observed \r\nin recent decades (high agreement). These yield losses were associated \r\nwith extremely low rainfall in combination with high temperatures \r\nbetween March and August 2018 (Beillouin et al., 2020). Across Europe, \r\nin 2018, people experienced one of the worst harvests in a generation. \r\nNorthern and Eastern Europe experienced multiple and simultaneous \r\ncrop failures--among the highest observed in recent decades. These \r\nyield losses were associated with extremely low rainfalls in combination \r\nwith high temperatures between March and August 2018. This \r\ncompounding of extreme conditions in 2018 led to one of the highest \r\nnegative relative yield anomalies at the scale of Eastern and Northern \r\nEurope, across a large array of crop species (Beillouin et al., 2020)."


id: aa9846e772c4c70385a2892948104b3a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27233
content:
"Sea level rise, coastal flooding and surge inundation are increasingly \r\npressing problems across the urban Pacific, including the urban and \r\ncoastal population of Vanuatu (McDonnell, 2021). Pacific region islands, \r\nsuch as Vanuatu (Handmer and Nalau, 2019), are particularly vulnerable \r\nto climate change. Kiribati and Tuvalu are impacted by exceptionally \r\nhigh tides that affect the urban atolls of South Tarawa and Funafuti, and \r\ncyclonic activity causing extensive economic damage in Tuvalu (Curtain \r\nand Dornan, 2019). Limited migration opportunities for low-income \r\nhouseholds can result in forced immobility, and high tides, sea level rise \r\nand cyclonic damages could result in relocation of significant groups of \r\nthe population."


id: ae928dd929b19dcfde4b4671f48c2dda
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27946
content:
"difficult to measure, there are a growing number of cases of NELD \r\nglobally (medium evidence, high agreement). Illustrative examples \r\nof NELD from climate change include the Pacific (McNamara et  al., \r\n2021b) and SIDS in the Caribbean. (Martyr-Koller et  al., 2021). For \r\nexample, the hurricane season in 2017 was particularly extreme \r\nresulting in climate-induced displacement with direct implications for \r\nNELD, including threats to health and well-being and loss of culture \r\nand agency (Thomas and Benjamin, 2020)."


id: 87387119cf726e90a5f2921b5b4b08ab
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20952
content:
"Climate change L&D presents an existential threat to some (Boyd et al., \r\n2017). For example, Pacific Island countries have contributed least to \r\ntotal GHG emissions, but the nations of the South Pacific are highly \r\nvulnerable to rising sea levels, tropical cyclones and other climate\u0002related risks (Nand and Bardsley, 2020). For example, across Oceania \r\nthere is significant risk that sea level rise will lead to forced relocation. \r\nPacific leaders underscore the importance of losses, including deep \r\nconnections between their world views and their land, and that \r\nleaving their islands can only be considered an option of 'last resort' \r\n(McDonnell, 2021)."


id: a29e595b7a1bf704ba0a1fabd0936cdf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25829
content:
"Geographical focus on non-economic losses in the literature is largely on \r\nthe Global South with studies mainly smaller in scale (high agreement). \r\nMany events studied include severe storms, floods and landslides. Key \r\ngroups affected include low-income groups, agro-pastoralists, women \r\nand girls, children and youth, Indigenous Peoples, ethnic and religious \r\nminorities. In Europe, the Samis face significant challenges to health as \r\necosystems deteriorate (Jaakkola et al., 2018). In Zimbabwe, Storm Idai \r\naffected 270,000 people and subsequent flooding and landslides left \r\n340 people dead and many others missing (Chanza et al., 2020). There "


id: 9ffb2d14086e5c4c3d1dd1cb1a49a809
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25364
content:
"Non-economic loss and damage (NELD) is values based (subjective \r\nand intangible) and relates to norms, social values and highlights \r\nintersectional experiences and perspectives on climate risk. The \r\ndiscourse on L&D includes a framing of NELD as loss of human and \r\nnon-human life, and mental and physical health that is experienced \r\nwidely across the world in vastly different ways associated with social \r\nvalues (Tschakert et al., 2019). There are respectable arguments for the \r\ncase that all life has intrinsic value (Vetlesen, 2019). The NELD framing \r\nof climate impacts highlights that not all risks are measurable. While "


id: 67b3de726d2a3a536737228a6f6bf29
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15514
content:
"following disasters or challenges posed by adverse climate change \r\nimpacts. For example, many households in villages affected by Cyclone \r\nAila in Dacope and Koyra upazilas of Khulna district in Bangladesh \r\nmigrated to other places permanently after the cyclone, as these \r\naffected villages were subject to long-term flooding (e.g., 2-3 years) \r\nfollowing the cyclone. They migrated as they were unable to restore \r\ntheir livelihoods and, thus, were unable to secure necessary income for \r\nsurvival (Saha, 2017)."


id: 57d9d3f4631004c9fc93d531cc7b2d35
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12721
content:
"The examples show the multifaceted nature of intangible and non\u0002economic losses that people experience in the context of climate \r\nchange and the daily risks they are exposed to. Conventional \r\nvulnerability assessments cover some aspects that are linked to the \r\nlikelihood of experiencing non-economic losses, such as aspects of \r\nhealth, governance, education and in some cases also forced migration \r\nand the role of social networks. Overall, the elements of this assessment \r\nhere underscore that it is not just the climatic stressor, but rather the \r\nunderlying context conditions that decide whether an extreme event \r\ntranslates into a disaster."


id: 6465c35b83ab22222ddb832eaafce06d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14941
content:
"While there are limited studies that view economic and NELD from \r\nclimate change at a global scale of livelihood transformations there is \r\nrobust evidence on the granular linkages, at community, national and \r\nregional levels, between losses, coping strategies and livelihood shifts. \r\nAcross Africa, climate change is impacting crop yields and destroying \r\nhomes, resulting in loss of infrastructure and leading to non-economic \r\nlosses associated with involuntary migration and displacement (Olsson \r\net al., 2014), and loss of livestock and assets (see IPCC SR 1.5degC, Chapter "


id: 1180134e635fbb779cc42d383be28b4b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 281
content:
"NELD also includes the loss of social networks. This has lasting \r\nimplications for psychological health as well as for coping with crises "


id: 7ddd9a508feeed73df2211ee7ca56ced
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19322
content:
"3, (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018), resulting in long-term reduction in the \r\ncapacity for agriculture and land management. For example, in March \r\n2019 Tropical Cyclone Idai in Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Malawi \r\nled to substantial losses of agriculture, infrastructure, and access to \r\naid and support, all of which contributed to significant displacement \r\nin each country (Fischel de Andrade and de Lima Madureira, 2021). \r\nExamples of livelihood impacts include livelihood shifts among Kenyan \r\npastoralists to camel husbandry, resulting from household inequalities \r\nin assets and changes in relation to weakening of social norms of \r\nreciprocity and social cohesion (Volpato and King, 2019)."


id: bf373c8fafdcdea0043b7452c335ed02
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30912
content:
"Pascale et al., 2020; see also AR6 WGI Chapter 10, \r\nSection 10.6.2; M. Fanadzo,2021\r\nFunk, C. et al. 2018: Haile et al., 2020"


id: d09cf1dda88c97ec61acd045f9375bce
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34051
content:
"Seager et al.2015; Murray et al. 2021;.Greene 2021, \r\nGreene, 2018; Barreau et al., 2017. Hung et al, \r\n2021; Garwood, et al. (n.d.)"


id: 3125c4617208418f3e0ca54ba5f2455e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5900
content:
"van Oldenborgh et al. 2020; Celermajer et al., 2021; \r\nNguyen et al., 2021; Godfree et al., 2021"


id: dd54bbaf35ff57442fffa231b6226420
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36205
content:
"Figure 8.10 |  Examples of non-economic loss and damage associated with climate hazards attributed to climate change against a background of global \r\nvulnerability. Symbols with corresponding detail in the table show examples where non-economic losses have been documented. The figure is not exhaustive in terms of examples \r\nof extreme or slow-onset events or losses. It does not capture undocumented cases. It is an illustration of the relationship between unequivocal human-induced climate change and \r\nintangible losses (Adapted from Boyd et al., 2021)."


id: 4460ff169af843637df789fac0f5582b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9266
content:
"in unfamiliar labour markets, resulting in mental health challenges \r\n(Palinkas, 2020). There has also been a 'climate gentrification' in parts \r\nof New Orleans (Aune et al., 2020). Many of those who returned to their \r\npre-Katrina areas had to deal with extensive damage to their homes \r\nand to public infrastructure."


id: 2f51b2b9f677bab90560e5f9c7716241
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5590
content:
"generations may be of limited use. For example, rotational grazing \r\nis no longer possible as all pastures are being used, and changes in \r\nclimate result in unpredictable weather patterns unknown to earlier \r\ngenerations (Axelsson-Linkowski et al., 2020). These examples show \r\nthat there are complex factors underpinning the linking L&D and \r\nshifting livelihoods. Moreover, there are significant challenges to \r\nundertaking a shift to secure alternative livelihoods."


id: 843c709f0231ac958d69ac8d19ef0924
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20421
content:
"The effect of communication at different stages in the drought highlights how critical information needs to be provided in a format \r\nand language that empowers people to act appropriately and collaboratively (Muller, 2019; Rodina, 2019b; Rodina, 2019a). Getting \r\npolitical decisions made in a timely fashion and with public support is a long-standing challenge for managers of urban water supplies \r\n(Muller, 2017; Muller, 2019). In Cape Town this was further challenged by dependence on a malfunctioning national department for \r\nwater supply planning, poor coordination between the spheres of government--city, provincial and national governments--and poor \r\ncollaboration between political representatives, technical experts and strategic managers (Madonsela et al., 2019; Nhamo and Agyepong, \r\n2019; Rodina, 2019a; Ziervogel, 2019b). This highlights the need to strengthen partnerships and collaboration across sectors and scales "


id: b9d173f55d06e14de0b1b064cf0ae631
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29906
content:
"of governance (Ziervogel, 2019a), including the adoption of a 'whole-of-society' approach that recognises the contributions of non-state \r\nactors as adopted in the Cape Town Resilience Strategy (CoCT, 2019; Simpson et al., 2020a). Experienced yet inflexible water management \r\ninitially operated at a distance from politicians and their citizens. There was limited knowledge and capacity in how various municipal \r\ndepartments thought about risk, exposure and vulnerability of Cape Town's highly differentiated population (Mukheibir and Ziervogel, \r\n2007; Pasquini et al., 2015; Madonsela et al., 2019). In the later stages of the drought, Cape Town's water management department was \r\nable to work collaboratively across different departments and with politicians to implement responses."


id: a58d4c45865e6d79e188f9484ad8ddd7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26364
content:
"et al., 2014). Scenarios are limited by stakeholders' imaginations and, \r\nas such, new emergent challenges, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, \r\nare difficult to anticipate in scenario planning. Nevertheless, recent \r\nstudies and forecasts of the impact of COVID-19 on poverty conclude \r\nthat in the near- and medium-term future major portions of the newly \r\npoor will emerge in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia (Laborde \r\net al., 2020b; Sumner et al., 2020). Since these countries are already \r\ncharacterised by high levels of absolute poverty and vulnerability to \r\nclimate change, it is likely that these regions will face more severe \r\nchallenges in overcoming vulnerability and will be confronted with a \r\ngrowing adaptation gap. Thus, the implication for scenario planning is \r\nthat single crises or events, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, might not \r\nsignificantly alter existing vulnerabilities, but rather reinforce them."


id: 77af7494e9a23d01997f48f8e1af74c5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18264
content:
"8.4.1.1 Exposure and Vulnerability under Different Scenarios \r\nand Alternative Development Pathways"


id: e6231713370c576e0efda370616446c4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37789
content:
"At the international and national level, the SSPs (O'Neill et al., 2017a) \r\nhave been developed to outline various development pathways, \r\nassociated emissions and levels of warming, but also different possible \r\ndevelopment profiles (i.e., levels of economic growth, poverty, inequality, \r\ndemographic change, etc.) that are highly relevant for adaptation."


id: 9716be78b68f572f9c492dc091e5eaea
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23777
content:
"Studies using the SSPs to understand multidimensional poverty are \r\nfew but growing, and underscore that the impacts of climate change \r\non poverty are extremely sensitive to different levels of warming (Byers \r\net al., 2018). Multi-sector risks approximately double between 1.5degC \r\nand 2degC global mean temperature (GMT) change, and double again \r\nin a +3degC world. Comparing a +1.5degC world pursuing sustainable \r\ndevelopment (SSP1) to a high-poverty and high-inequality +3degC world \r\n(SSP3), Byers et al. (2018) project substantial increases in populations \r\nexposed to drought, water stress, heat stress and habitat degradation \r\n(see in detail Byers et  al., 2018). While in a +1.5degC world exposed \r\npopulations increase by 7-17%, the increase within a +3degC plus \r\nworld is 27-51% (Byers et al., 2018; Frame et al., 2018). Populations \r\nin Asia and Africa account for more than 80% of the global population "


id: da430eb3b51a75b2948f63bbb7d273cf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35702
content:
"The SSPs scenarios orient climate models around possible development \r\npathways that produce future exposure patterns, risk probabilities and \r\nvulnerability for future populations (O'Neill et al., 2014; O'Neill et al., \r\n2017a). While the likelihood of any given scenario actually occurring is \r\nhighly uncertain, they have the advantage of pairing with computational \r\nmodels to generate robust projections about risk profiles in possible \r\nfutures, and therefore assess the relative influence of different drivers \r\nof change. In this way, scenario tools generate pictures of future \r\nvulnerability and adaptation pathways, and often have both an analytic \r\nand normative function. The decision-making context will determine \r\nwhich specific scenario approach is most appropriate (Rozenberg "


id: 2db4e9ce3d20ab7d4e73bcfffa7310ac
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5334
content:
"exposed to these phenomena, and within South Asia and the Sahel, \r\nup to 90% of populations are exposed. Scenario tools help us to \r\nunderstand the burden of increasing multidimensional poverty, and \r\npotential for poverty traps, if mitigation and adaptation measures are \r\nnot taken rapidly and effectively implemented."


id: 1701395c18c1e6da68c9d994c5f210e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1267
content:
"et al., 2016). In addition, a World Bank study concludes that losses of \r\nhuman well-being are higher than the overserved economic losses from \r\nnatural hazards (Hallegatte et al., 2017). In this regard, it is likely that \r\nfuture impacts of climate change, particularly under increasing levels \r\nof global warming (above 1.5degC) will also increase non-economic \r\nlosses (see Section 8.3.2.3) and losses of human well-being that are \r\nparticularly relevant to most vulnerable groups and the poor."


id: 49beb181c49b0e16e4f0dac923d17fa1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10207
content:
"At the national and sub-national levels, studies on development and \r\nrisk scenarios capture specific challenges, for example, urban growth, \r\ndemographic change, human health and ageing (e.g., Dong et  al., \r\n2015; Chapman et al., 2019). In this regard, local scenarios of human \r\nvulnerability can inform future strategies for adapting to hazards such \r\nas heatwaves in cities under different socioeconomic development \r\nstrategies. These scenario approaches allow us to focus on changes \r\nin climatic and societal conditions as well as urban transformations. \r\nThis provides a more comprehensive basis for defining adaptation \r\ngoals (see Fekete, 2019; Birkmann et al., 2021b). Costs and benefits of \r\ndifferent adaptation measures can be assessed against different future \r\nscenarios of climatic and societal change."


id: 9062d2ea5424f8da913030326c9785b9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22604
content:
"Furthermore, the expected future increase in the number of people \r\nexposed to climate hazards, such as sea level rise and coastal flooding, \r\nis not only determined by changing hazard patterns, but also by regional \r\nprocesses of migration and urbanisation for example in Asia and Africa, \r\nincluding an increasing number of urban poor living in low-elevation \r\ncoastal zones (United Nations, 2018). This can increase again the \r\nprobability that more people require assistance and support for buffering \r\nthese effects of climate-related hazards, for example, in coastal zones. \r\nHistorical urbanisation processes, in coastal cities in Asia (e.g., in China, \r\nVietnam, etc.) and Africa (e.g., in Nigeria) have increased the exposure \r\nof people to climate hazards, such as sea level rise, which by 2100 \r\nunder Relative Concentration Pathway (RCP) 8.5 will globally threaten \r\n630 million people, largely in coastal cities (Kulp and Strauss, 2019)."


id: 20f3085cbcc8126d37a4ad268a73eaa6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3017
content:
"The influence of climate change also impacts the future response \r\ncapacities of people and nations to deal with future climate change \r\nand climate hazards. Recent studies (e.g., Mysiak et al., 2016) conclude \r\nthat climate change can increase the severity and intensity of crises or \r\neven trigger disasters, particularly floods, storms, forest and wildfires, \r\nand droughts. These have undermined decade-long poverty reduction \r\nefforts, particularly in low-income and at-risk countries (Djalante, \r\n2019). Climate-influenced (disaster) risks are getting more complex \r\nand systemic (UNDRR, 2019). The magnitude of global annual average \r\neconomic losses from natural and climate-induced hazards to the built \r\nenvironment alone are estimated in the United Nations Office for \r\nDisaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) Global Assessment Report (2015) as \r\nbeing comparable with the GDP of the 36th largest economy in the \r\nworld at that time--the Philippines (in 2015) (UNISDR, 2015; Mysiak "


id: d62d326ffa3eb0c286bf619afa358f6a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34998
content:
"conditioning (Barreca et  al., 2016). That means well-off populations \r\nare better insulated from effects of global warming than poorer or \r\nmore vulnerable groups, even if they are geographically living in the \r\nsame exposure zone. These findings underscore that issues of climate \r\njustice need to be considered within the problem definition when \r\ndesigning adaptation strategies, and not solely at the end. Impacts \r\nof future climate hazards (heat stress, flooding, etc.) differ not only \r\ndue to changes in frequency and intensity of the hazard itself, but \r\nalso significantly in terms of the opportunities people have to respond \r\nand prepare for these hazards and climatic changes at present and in \r\nthe future. However, extreme heat stress has also caused significant \r\nfatalities in countries classified as having low vulnerability, such as \r\nseen within the heat wave in Europe in 2003."


id: ace1eb9c9f1f05338952aaf196d15070
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27656
content:
"In socio-ecological systems, tipping points occur when a (small \r\nquantitative) change inevitably triggers a nonlinear change in the \r\ncorresponding social component of the socio-ecological systems, driven \r\nby a self-reinforcing positive feedback mechanism, that inevitably and \r\noften irreversibly leads to a qualitatively different state of the social \r\nsystem (Milkoreit et al., 2018)."


id: ab41814b443eeb5978ef0de5dfcd0fab
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27357
content:
"In recent years, significant research efforts have been made to identify \r\nearly warning signals for social tipping points (Barrett and Dannenberg, \r\n2014; Bentley et al., 2014; Lenton et al., 2019). While some identify \r\nearly warning signals through time series (Scheffer et al., 2012), others \r\nsee them in interaction networks and individual thresholds (Barrett and \r\nDannenberg, 2014; McLeman, 2018). Empirical research conducted \r\nin a transboundary contentious region--the Jordan river valley--\r\nshowed that there were significant local and regional differences in \r\nthe identification of social tipping points (Rodriguez Lopez et al., 2019)."


id: e2b8b87bbe8c0e76b46eb7d4797652ee
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37191
content:
"Climate change has the potential to trigger major, sudden social \r\ntransformations, yet there are no clear linear relationships between \r\nthe magnitude of climate change impacts and the social changes they \r\ninduce (Steffen et al., 2018). Evidence shows that major destabilising \r\nsocial transformations (e.g., forced migration) can occur in response \r\nto limited climate change impacts, even while major climate change \r\nimpacts can be mitigated through the resilience of social, political and \r\neconomic systems, and thus yield only minor social impacts."


id: 990580cb7464380a2d087e6cabec6fd6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24139
content:
"In the context of climate change, 'tipping points' have been identified \r\nas critical thresholds at which a tiny perturbation can qualitatively \r\nalter the state or development of a system (Lenton et al., 2008; Lenton "


id: 7ec228ddc72f9d97372892bfd2e18722
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19455
content:
"Figure 8.11 |  A social tipping point is reached when climate impacts push a society towards a state of instability. Those climate impacts are typically aggravated by \r\neconomic, social and political stressors that reduce adaptive capacity and overwhelm its resilience. Once a social tipping point is reached, a society may experience mutually reinforcing \r\nstates of economic, social and political instability, leading to cascading disruptions such as livelihood insecurity, migration and displacement, food insecurity, impoverishment, civil \r\nand political conflict, and change of political regimes."


id: 15adc15e01e9ebdecf61a602abc0da55
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1029
content:
"Shifting livelihoods is a typical adaptation strategy but can also \r\nreflect a social tipping point if this shift affects the community as a \r\nwhole. Therefore, social tipping points should not be confused with \r\nthe carrying capacity of a community. While the carrying capacity \r\nof a community is a fixed, predetermined limit, social tipping points \r\nare dynamic and constantly evolving under the influence of different \r\nsocial and political factors, such as solidarity networks or governance \r\nmechanisms. The carrying capacity of a community can evolve over time, \r\nbut remains a static concept, unlike social tipping points. Social tipping \r\npoints have also been applied to adaptation, through the concept of \r\nadaptation tipping points, which indicate how much pressure a socio\u0002environmental system is able to absorb (Ahmed et al., 2018). Beyond \r\nthe adaptation tipping point, the efficiency of adaptation responses \r\nwill be limited, and can even transform into maladaptive options."


id: 442fffd4e6799c8a88be170b0271d94b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9233
content:
"shocks and climate hazards (e.g., droughts, floods), shifting livelihoods \r\nis a common response and, in many cases, can be unavoidable due \r\nto the negative consequences of these climate hazards on specific \r\nlivelihood capitals (see Section 8.5). Such shifts can involve a change \r\nin livelihood activities (e.g., continuing in agriculture but growing \r\ndifferent kinds of crops), or a change to broader livelihood strategies \r\n(e.g., diversifying into handicrafts or paid employment, specialising \r\nin one particular activity, or migrating, seasonally or permanently, in \r\nsearch of other livelihood opportunities) or even an entire change of \r\nthe livelihood activity, for example, abandoning agriculture altogether \r\n(McLeman and Smit, 2006; Black et al., 2011). Shifting livelihoods can \r\ntherefore involve mobility or take place in situ. Some of these shifts \r\nalso lead to social tipping points."


id: f65c0b878e508ce4c592f8d0665fef44
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40710
content:
"8.4.5.1.1 Proactive and reactive livelihood shifts and their relevance \r\nfor future risks due to climate change"


id: 6aff5157a734713ecc91918712705c1b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16120
content:
"There is robust evidence with high agreement that future climate \r\nchange impacts will have severe consequences for poor households, \r\nparticularly those situated in areas highly exposed to actual or future \r\nclimate hazards, such as low-lying coastal communities (see also \r\nCross-Chapter Paper 1), drylands (see also Cross-Chapter Paper 3) or \r\nremote mountain (see also Cross-Chapter Paper 5) settlements with \r\nlow levels of connectivity to markets, poor infrastructure and high \r\ndependence upon poor quality natural capital (Barbier and Hochard, \r\n2018; Gioli et al., 2019). While livelihoods operate in a dynamic context \r\ncharacterised by multiple interacting structures and processes, climate \r\nchange can act as a risk multiplier. When current livelihood activities \r\nbecome untenable as a result of both long trends and short-term "


id: 2c0ca5b893dfa397a31833f60de5b4d7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5007
content:
"et al., 2018). In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic and consequences \r\nlinked to measures to reduce the spreading of the virus are likely to \r\nincrease poverty, particularly in regions already facing high levels of \r\nvulnerability and poverty (Laborde et al., 2020b; Sumner et al., 2020)."


id: bfdcf02db1cc1fdc3850a2b7c18bcfd9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31044
content:
"Overall, there is high agreement that future climate change impacts \r\nare going to worsen poverty and exacerbate inequalities within and \r\nbetween nations, with projections that by 2030 these will increase \r\nsignificantly (Olsson et al., 2014; Hallegatte and Rozenberg, 2017; Roy "


id: 745b3ffd13450bd23ee0e165375a2f62
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17706
content:
"Table 8.4 |  Summary of interlocking categories differentiation future risks, vulnerabilities, inequality and adaptation"


id: 80baaa65938242dc616783411a7f86e9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19781
content:
"practices (Wangui and Smucker, 2018). This study found that most \r\nfemale-headed and poorest households could not access the land, \r\nwater for irrigation and financial assets required to access adaptive \r\npractices that are available in the wider community. Consequently, \r\nfuture impacts of climate change are likely to increase rather than \r\ndecrease inequality based on already observed impacts on adaptive \r\ncapacities that constrain future adaptation options, particularly for the \r\npoor (Roy et al., 2018)."


id: 6adce9423435c0b94a7dd6abe879059f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16085
content:
"as most highly vulnerable is projected to grow significantly. A study \r\nusing five vulnerability categories globally concludes that the total \r\npopulation of all countries with very high vulnerability (see Figure 8.6) \r\nis projected to increase from 2019 numbers approximately by 102% \r\nby 2050 (i.e., roughly double) and 257% by 2100, while the population \r\nof all countries with very low vulnerability is projected to decrease by \r\n9% by 2050 and 17% by 2100 (based on UN medium probabilistic \r\nprojections). Another study estimates that the total population of \r\nall countries classified at most vulnerable (top two categories; using \r\nseven vulnerability categories globally) is predicted to increase by 82% \r\nby 2050 and 192% by 2100. In contrast the population of all countries \r\nclassified as least vulnerable (bottom two categories) is projected to \r\nonly increase by 9% by 2050 and 1% by 2100 (see in detail UN-DESA, \r\n2019; Birkmann et al., 2021a; Birkmann et al., 2022)."


id: 838623c31f897762578810a922932790
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20280
content:
"That means that, based on current population growth estimates and if \r\nvulnerability levels are not reduced significantly, more people will be \r\nliving in more vulnerable context conditions in the future compared \r\nto those living in less vulnerable contexts. This is independent of the \r\ndevelopment of climatic hazard exposure. If significant reductions \r\nof vulnerability are achieved, this projection will change. However, \r\nthe vulnerability and poverty of some regions and countries, such \r\nas Afghanistan or Haiti, has proved over decades to be persistent. \r\nConsequently, the estimated future population growth is another \r\nfactor that points towards the urgent need to reduce vulnerability and \r\nto narrow the adaptation gap."


id: abab89a95c0baa85fb121bf3d1d6250e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27442
content:
"While future adaptation options can also encompass measures or tools \r\nthat emerge in future, most of the future adaptation options and their \r\nrelevance for reducing vulnerability, poverty and inequality are known. \r\nEvidence exists that the importance of social networks that organise \r\nsocial protection and leverage resources in terms of reducing risks to \r\nclimate change is increasing, particularly for most vulnerable people or \r\ngroups in countries that have limited social security measures in place."


id: ba9150dc8670e0fc1d0a2870186ab850
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30037
content:
"Local perceptions of losses from adverse effects of climate variability \r\nand change can help to assess the magnitude of impacts that \r\nindividuals and communities have not been able to cope with or adapt \r\nto (James et al., 2014; Barnett et al., 2016; McNamara and Jackson, \r\n2019 McNamara et al. 2021, Mecheler et al. 2020)."


id: f8cfbf3e000259be45efadd54781b5ef
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41137
content:
"The IPCC Special Report on a 1.5degC warming world shows with high \r\nconfidence that for the Arctic systems, if average temperature increase \r\nexceeds 1.5degC by the end of the century limits to adaptation and \r\nresidual impacts will be exceeded, compromising people's livelihoods \r\n(Ford et  al., 2015; O'Neill et  al., 2017b; Roy et  al., 2018; Hoegh\u0002Guldberg et  al., 2019a). The loss and degradation of the Amazon \r\nforest with global warming temperatures beyond 1.5degC is another \r\nclear example of irreversible loss, with significant impact to people's \r\nlivelihoods today and in the future (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018; Roy \r\net al., 2018). Moreover, the L&D from climate change impacts are also \r\nfelt heavily by women, children and elderly given the intersectionality \r\nwith socioeconomic and gender inequalities (Li et al., 2016; Roy et al., \r\n2018). For instance, gender and wealth inequality offers challenges \r\nto scale up the Maasai pastoralist community autonomous adaptive "


id: 139bba6644d2bb7077cc0dc29ea5d743
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 665
content:
"In SIDS, key risks are represented by losses of livelihoods of coastal \r\nsettlements, ecosystem services, infrastructure and economic stability, \r\nexhibiting limits to adaptation in the face of local people's coping \r\nstrategies capacity (Hoegh-Guldberg et  al., 2019a). There is high \r\nconfidence that sea level rise in SIDS combined with extreme flooding \r\nevents will threaten the future livelihoods of coastal communities \r\n(Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018; Roy et al., 2018)."


id: cecc3abc72a688a20156c004c45c6085
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33722
content:
"In the Global South, the increasing heat associated with warming \r\nglobal temperature represents an important risk due to losses in \r\nlabour productivity, crop failures and livelihood security. These involve \r\neconomic losses and health effects, as well as increasing deaths \r\nthat are anticipated to have significant implications for poverty, \r\ninequality and equity (Carleton, 2017; Roy et al., 2018). The increasing "


id: ebc4048ca7da86cd27d63af0ab74fcf0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38845
content:
"the government (Warner and Van der Geest, 2013). Among Indigenous \r\nPeoples in the Global South, for example in the Brazilian Amazon, \r\nAustralia and Botswana, locally autonomous adaptive measures were \r\nnot sufficient to avoid significant losses (some irreversible in case of \r\nlost habitats). The barriers and insufficient adaptive capacities are also \r\nintrinsically linked to historical marginalisation and vulnerability of the \r\npopulation in these countries (Maru et al., 2014)."


id: d179c9e38abd665350ff985e73a437db
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34206
content:
"temperature, droughts and excessive rain lead to successive crop \r\nfailures and reduced productivity that are affecting children's growth \r\nand health in developing countries (Hanna and Oliva, 2016). Likewise, \r\nthe expected global temperature increase by the end of the century \r\nwill have devastating health consequences for children, associated \r\nwith sea level rise, heatwaves, affecting the incidence of malaria and \r\ndengue, and malnutrition, especially in Asian (Ghosh et al., 2018) and \r\nAfrican countries, such as Chad, Mali, Niger and Somalia (Hanna and \r\nOliva, 2016; Ghosh et al., 2018; Clark et al., 2020)."


id: 9430e22017df6222210689ff25d79aaa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23280
content:
"In the Arctic, warming temperature and sea level rise constitute key \r\nrisks to the loss of identity and culture of Indigenous People. This is \r\nassociated with migration and relocation due to livelihood deterioration \r\nresulting from coastal erosion, permafrost thaw and reduced fisheries \r\nproductivity (Roberts and Andrei, 2015; Roy et al., 2018). These risks \r\nand losses often encompass various non-economic losses, such as the \r\nloss of identity, that cannot be replaced or economically compensated \r\n(see also Section 8.3.5)."


id: cb0dcc87f1a666a85e536b68e64d9485
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33066
content:
"Expected future risks to vulnerable communities and Indigenous \r\nPeoples include losses across a range of impacts. A larger household \r\ncomparative analysis across mountain regions in Africa, Asia and \r\nSoutheast Asia shows that more than 60% of the population reported \r\nlosses from residual impacts concerning droughts, floods, cyclones, \r\nsea level rise, glacier retreat and desertification, despite autonomous \r\nadaptation involving changing food consumption and formal aid from "


id: ca0d02d2c831174e1209b423b5aaf742
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32873
content:
"In semiarid West Africa, longer-term local adaptation is in place to help \r\npoor households deal with severe droughts. This involves reducing \r\nhousehold and cattle water consumption, planting drought-tolerant "


id: e7591e8474b5a74cfca18d4a81a42b06
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37995
content:
"The next section discusses how risks emerge as a result of the failure in \r\nadaptation or failure to implement it, with particular attention to risks \r\nthat are impossible to adapt to and lead to inevitable L&D among poor \r\nhouseholds, livelihoods and countries."


id: 253c7ecdb716a70defe278513a210cb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3742
content:
"crops and adopting integrated crop-livestock production for efficiency, \r\nwith migration being either seasonal and or permanent. These measures \r\nare mostly effective (van der Geest et al., 2019). Likewise, in Ethiopia, \r\nNorthern Kenya and Senegal, adaptation has advanced with external \r\ngovernment and non-government organisation (NGO) support (Schafer \r\net al., 2019). This includes technological innovations and insurance for \r\nhouseholds (Schafer et al., 2019), but is not enough to prevent losses in \r\nalready impoverished households (Schafer et al., 2019)."


id: fcfef88d208e010983a822ea06582664
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41872
content:
"There is robust evidence that future risks to climate-sensitive livelihoods, \r\nsuch as agriculture, livestock and fisheries are amplified by gender, age, \r\nwealth inequalities (Wangui and Smucker, 2018), ethical background \r\nand geography (Piggott-McKellar et al., 2020; Thomas and Benjamin, \r\n2020), as well as by ecological thresholds that challenge autonomous \r\nadaptation among vulnerable disadvantaged communities mostly in \r\nthe Global South (Roy et al., 2018; Mechler et al., 2020)."


id: a31bd4a253784987d5423735a400c6d9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25901
content:
"The assessment also points towards the fact that there are strong linkages \r\nbetween national-level vulnerability (e.g., Figure  8.6) and individual \r\nvulnerability at household or livelihood scale. Various disadvantaged and \r\nmarginalised groups or communities within a society are significantly \r\nconstrained in terms of the ability to build adaptive capacities for future \r\nclimate change threats due to limited access to resources or government \r\nsupport for planned adaptation. Consequently, these linkages between \r\nregional, national and local vulnerability need more attention in research \r\nand practical adaptation strategies (vertical integration)."


id: c947961feb717479e601b5725b97778a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32741
content:
"The health impacts and economic losses estimates are not homogeneously gathered for the entire Amazon basin countries, but some \r\nrecent evidence associated with this knowledge gap shows the magnitude of the forest fire impacts, as well as where they spatially occur \r\nand who are the most affected by it. Fires associated with deforestation in the Amazon have been related to 1065-4714 deaths annually \r\nin South America (Reddington et al., 2015). The recent fires in the Amazon basin are directly affecting 24 million Amazonians with the \r\nworst impacts felt by children and the elderly (Machado-Silva et al., 2020), Indigenous Peoples and traditional communities (Fellows \r\net al., 2020). Children under 5 years old and the elderly in rural areas are respectively 11 and 22 times more affected by the smoke from \r\nfire outbreaks and temperature increase in the Amazon (Machado-Silva et al., 2020)."


id: d670313ead7074b26399dacfbed4670e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35030
content:
"gp\r\nIt is expected that by 2030 the incidence of extreme droughts in the Amazon will increase the costs of the health sector associated with \r\ntreatment costs of respiratory diseases (20-50%) and malaria incidence (5-10%). This will also incur a high social cost as people will less \r\nable to carry out their livelihoods (Lapola et al., 2018). It is also expected that the droughts will accelerate and intensify rural (traditional \r\ncommunities and Indigenous Peoples) migration to urban centres where migrants living standards are expected to decrease once they \r\nwill occupy marginal areas within larger urban centres (Lapola et al., 2018)."


id: 3b083c66f1370d3482f00114986d8fba
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7576
content:
"Table 8.5 |  Categories of maladaptation as future risk and examples of outcomes and world regions based on literature assessment evidence."


id: 8842d014d636396a7dd3577528613c67
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21129
content:
"associated with monsoons. However, these measures led to disruptions \r\nin social cohesion as conflicts over water sharing escalated (Mathew \r\nand Akter, 2015). In the same region, local governments prioritise the \r\nglacier retreat as a perceived risk to flooding from dams, but overlook \r\nthe slow and gradual impact of the deficit in precipitation that is \r\nnegatively affecting rice productivity (Mathew and Akter, 2015). In \r\nBurkina Faso, a region highly impacted by severe droughts, local \r\ncommunities have become less able to cope with droughts given a \r\ndecline in cultural pastoralism and increased dependence on crops (van \r\nder Geest et al., 2019)."


id: 57d677519b4ad7170e4380bfe9b4141f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12718
content:
"management and reforestation projects funded by multilateral donors \r\n(Work et al., 2019). As a consequence, losses emerge despite actions \r\nto prevent adverse impacts, and maladaptation instead becomes a \r\nvector of increased vulnerability for poor and vulnerable communities \r\n(Mechler et al., 2019a)."


id: 2d1e0695a69bc82d7bc401909b968f28
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5218
content:
"As seen, maladaptive responses to droughts, sea level rise and \r\nflooding are negatively affecting poor farmers, pastoralists, and rural \r\nand urban informal workers, increasing loss of crops, infrastructure, \r\nincome, conflict and migration. Given the high risks of maladaptation \r\nto poor people this agenda should be given priority by development \r\nand planning sectors (Magnan et al., 2016). The categories in Table 8.5 \r\nalso represent important future compounding and complex risks that \r\ncan emerge due to maladaptation (high confidence)."


id: cfe5b2655f737110e2198921f7a61124
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33931
content:
"Communities and livelihoods with higher exposure to the risks posed \r\nby climate change and with lower adaptive capacity will experience a \r\nhigher burden of L&D in comparison to others (Tschakert et al., 2017). \r\nIn Asia (Indonesia) and the Arctic region, a decline in marine fisheries \r\nby approximately 3 million tonnes per degree of warming is expected \r\nto have severe negative regional impacts, especially on Indigenous \r\nPeople (Cheung et al., 2016)."


id: 9e41457d5ac2bbeb4b501ef9d292e24
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25071
content:
"In Bangladesh, an expensive coastal climate-resilient infrastructure \r\nproject could potentially increase the vulnerability of urban poor as \r\nthey will remain in areas that are highly susceptible to flooding brought \r\nby sea level rise (Magnan et  al., 2016). In Central America, the lack \r\nof assessments of future climate variability on crop yield scenarios, \r\ncoupled with lack of policymakers to incorporate autonomous local \r\nadaptation practices, could lead to an unsustainable trajectory for local \r\ncommunities and risk of maladaptation (Beveridge et  al., 2018). In \r\nBhutan, small-scale rice farmers have adopted water-sharing measures \r\nto avoid the impacts of reduced and uncertain precipitation levels "


id: 4f80a152b7de6016c40d0c87aafa7604
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11274
content:
"It is projected that climate change impacts on the incidence of disasters \r\nwill push 122  million additional people into extreme poverty with \r\nglobal temperature increase by 2030 (Hallegatte and Rozenberg, 2017; \r\nHoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018; Jafino et al., 2020). It is also expected \r\nthat around 330-396 million people will experience lower agricultural "


id: 1252c203c39371932e2dcd545e175eb8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 428
content:
"lack of finance, and high costs associated with disasters, poverty and \r\nenvironmental degradation, soft limits could become hard ones in the \r\nfuture (see Figure 8.5; Gracia et al., 2018)."


id: 8172ec932b472a0c3f2bf9f21dc15a8a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19903
content:
"yields at warming beyond 1.5degC (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018), most \r\nof them in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa (Chapter 16; Roy et al., \r\n2018; World Bank, 2019a). There is also medium evidence that tens \r\nto hundreds of millions of people that are dependent upon climate\u0002sensitive livelihoods could out-migrate as a consequence of global \r\ntemperature increasing, mostly in Africa, Asia and Latin America--\r\nposing additional risks to unsustainable urbanisation and group \r\nconflict (Chapter 16; Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018; Roy et al., 2018)."


id: 28c289b3768be33a38443e06584e1965
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4387
content:
"Table 8.6 |  Synthesis of hard and soft limits to adaptation and risks to livelihoods, equity and sustainability adapted from Chapter 5 of SR1.5degC (Roy et al., 2018)."


id: 29f56ca72f928a07e542865101a905a4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4604
content:
"of the current number of people exposed and vulnerable to climate\u0002sensitive livelihoods. The supporting literature is listed in Table SM8.1."


id: 2210e53de5839a20b3afa12e2f2bdf03
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3220
content:
"New emerging considerations to ecological limits to adaptation \r\nassociated with severe glacier retreat in the Peruvian Andes, is expected \r\nto reduce lake discharge by 2-11% (7-14%) by 2050 (2100). This will \r\naffect smallholders farmers, through crop yield failures and severely \r\nreduced hydropower capacity (Drenkhan et al., 2019). In addition, the \r\nstudy showed a very high risk of glacier lakes being affected by GLOFs \r\nunder RCP8.5, posing serious threat to rural people's livelihoods \r\n(Drenkhan et al., 2019)."


id: f0182a19734f5e7dc5d52f0123efc46a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39624
content:
"The compounding future effects on equity and sustainability emerge \r\nwhen multiple stressors linked to environmental and/or climate \r\nchange, together with underlying structural poverty, exclusion, \r\nmarginalisation, and conflicts creating risks that need to be addressed \r\nsimultaneously. Compounding risks of climate change received \r\nattention in AR5 (Oppenheimer et  al., 2014). This included risks \r\nassociated with compound hazards (O'Neill et  al., 2017b) and their \r\nimplications for future risk when repeated impacts erode human and \r\necosystem capacity, including through transboundary effects. In SRCCL \r\n(IPCC, 2019a), land degradation and climate change compounded \r\nto highly expose the livelihoods of the poor to climate hazards and \r\ncaused food insecurity (high confidence), migration, conflict and loss \r\nof cultural heritage (low confidence) (Olsson et al., 2019)."


id: 9a3aba9c0bc749736aaccde1fd6ac641
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24370
content:
"The evidence of compounded risks emerges from specific climate and \r\nenvironmental hazards, as in relation to heatwaves, droughts, altered \r\nprecipitation regimes and increasing aridity, cyclones, floods, hurricanes \r\nand wildfires (Table  8.7). Other evidence shows that the structural \r\npoverty and socioeconomic inequalities (Lusseau and Mancini, 2019), \r\ndisability (Sun et al., 2017), corruption (Markkanen, 2019) and isolation \r\n(Reyer et  al., 2017) (Table  8.7) compound to amplify climate risks \r\namong rural and urban poor, smallholder farms, coastal settlements, "


id: df271567a5bd05b39b7c2952c088bfc8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36514
content:
"Table 8.7 |  Effects of compounded risks on the poor. Climate hazards: flooding, hurricanes, drought and heatwaves."


id: c3a7ff6455f000dc9002e85e72db5ad2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31698
content:
"to fully recover post-disaster, especially in the context of increasing \r\nglobal temperature increase (van der Geest, 2018). Another example of \r\ncompounding effects of climate change to equity and sustainability is \r\nmigration, which is underpinned by the underlying socioeconomic and \r\npolitical context of vulnerability (see Section 8.2)."


id: b8535cccb24e01f3cc2369cb7179c26b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29643
content:
"with health impacts on children's development (Perera, 2017) and \r\nurban elderly (Sun et  al., 2017). In Tanzania, a greater exposure of \r\nhouseholds to climate change impacts and risks is associated with \r\nincreasing land value and variable tenure, compounded by declining \r\nfarm yields, accelerating the negative effects among the population \r\n(Roschel et  al., 2018). In India, extreme droughts and heatwaves \r\ncompound extreme poverty and high dependence on agriculture for \r\nincome and food production will affect crop productivity, income \r\nand food prices among smallholder farms (Singh and Leua, 2017). In \r\nMozambique, soil degradation and fertility, compounded by incidence \r\nof droughts, increase the vulnerability of already poor smallholders \r\nwho lack access to technological advances for crop yield management \r\nand drought-resistant crops (Kidane et al., 2019)."


id: 5306e92c8353b9b71eaceda67f2b3410
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11866
content:
"L&D from climate extremes, such as fatalities or economic losses \r\ndue to droughts or floods (see also Figure 8.6) also matter for future \r\nvulnerability and risk, since the poorest segments of society take \r\nlonger to recover after shocks (Gupta and Sharma, 2006; van der \r\nGeest, 2018). In some cases, poor households might never be able "


id: 8a642ee952f350098a64edbe67751db5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21519
content:
"of the value of ecosystem-based, institutional and social measures, \r\nincluding the provision of climate-linked safety nets for those who \r\nare most vulnerable (IPCC, 2014a). Climate adaptation measures are \r\nincreasingly integrated within wider policy, development strategies \r\nand spatial planning frameworks. Such integration streamlines the \r\nadaptation planning and decision-making process and embeds climate\u0002sensitive thinking in existing and new institutions and organisations \r\nacross scales and levels."


id: 6ab81f048768073e4037e7318f073ac0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16058
content:
"Overall, there is increasing evidence that the compounding effects of \r\nclimate hazards intertwined with dimensions of poverty, environmental \r\ndegradation and inequalities, represent a key risk to equity and \r\nsustainability among poor and vulnerable populations (medium evidence \r\nand high agreement). Compounding risks--compared to compounding \r\nhazards--can also be significantly influenced by societal tipping points \r\nand by different factors of human vulnerability that determine underlying \r\ndestabilisation processes of societies and communities exposed to \r\nclimate change, including issues of governance."


id: dea88bf9cb62f84533f5bd3d594fc77e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36435
content:
"This section focuses on adaptation at household and community scales, \r\nincluding options, capacity and enabling environment, which include \r\nactions required towards building resilience. The emphasis is on the \r\ndecision-making space and governance including the role of the state, \r\nprivate sector and other actors. Successful adaptation requires not only \r\nidentifying adaptation options and assessing their costs and benefits, \r\nbut also exploiting available mechanisms for expanding the adaptive \r\ncapacity of human and natural systems (Klein et  al., 2014). At the \r\nsame time, developing suitable responses to hazards for communities \r\nand users of climate services is important in ensuring the success of \r\nadaptation measures. But despite this, knowledge about adaptation \r\noptions, including possible actions that can be implemented to improve \r\nadaptation and reduce the impacts of climate change hazards, is still \r\nlimited."


id: 1540648cb274d10779b57167ab8135e1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 955
content:
"From the analysis in the IPCC  AR5, there is high agreement that \r\nengineered and technological adaptation options are still the most \r\ncommon adaptation responses. However, there is increased recognition "


id: ef87faa6a058dbefe6e9517561e3e8ca
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39518
content:
"and transformative changes in our perception and paradigms about the \r\nnature of climate change, adaptation and their relationship to other \r\nnatural and human systems."


id: ad8bd9ef77edf7081157a56340bf26cb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27775
content:
"In practice, adaptation refers to initiatives such as a policy, plan, project \r\nor decision that are designed to change and/or respond to something in \r\nthe context of existing risks and hazards. For example, a farmer might \r\nadapt to drought by deciding to harvest their crop earlier; a municipality \r\ncan decide to build a sea wall to adapt to increased flood risk."


id: 74ddd7298ccf4328959f0dc5f054f2d9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17797
content:
"This section assesses the literature on components of the enabling \r\nenvironment for adaptation. The point of departure considers findings \r\nin both the SR1.5degC report, which notes that adaptation becomes \r\nincreasingly difficult (and expensive) at temperatures that are more than \r\n1.5degC warmer (IPCC, 2018a). In addition, (IPCC, 2014a) underscores \r\nthat there is no one-size-fits-all approach to adaptation for all contexts, \r\nand that mitigation and adaptation must be pursued in tandem."


id: 92970775cbb5cd5b4b9a00d2d9b85e5b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23012
content:
"The increasing complexity of adaptation practice means that institutional \r\nlearning is an important component of effective adaptation (Noble et al., \r\n2014). It is paramount that approaches to selecting adaptation options \r\ncontinue to emphasise incremental change to reduce impacts while \r\nachieving co-benefits. There is increasing evidence that transformative \r\nchanges may be necessary in order to prepare for climate change impacts \r\nand adaptation options in the context of climate hazards (Noble et al., \r\n2014). Transformation for some actors at some levels may equate with \r\nincremental change and transitions for other actors and scales. While \r\nattention to flexibility and safety margins is becoming more common \r\nin selecting adaptation options, many see the need for more urgent "


id: 98f250cc4aa68b6456f7890cd58bcbfe
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24123
content:
"Climate change affects people inequitably, and everyone does not \r\ncontribute equally to climate change. A range of economic and non\u0002economic impacts can be experienced. This has led some researchers to \r\ncall for a more central role for rights-based approaches to adaptation "


id: c7ad32e9740af68d0432e0195af13926
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32438
content:
"United Nations treaty bodies in the reporting period. More broadly, \r\nrights-based approaches rely on the normative framework of human \r\nrights, requiring adaptation to be non-discriminatory, participatory, \r\ntransparent and accountable in both formal (e.g., legal and regulatory) \r\nand informal (e.g., social or cultural norms) settings and at international, \r\nnational and sub-national scales (Ensor et  al., 2015; Arts, 2017). \r\nSovacool et al. (2015) note that unless critical competing interests are "


id: 5b77e8586debc806827214d11b289f37
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13333
content:
"to help secure space for those marginalised from adaptation decision \r\nmaking and to prioritise access to resources and information for those \r\nmost vulnerable to, or affected by, the social, cultural or economic \r\nconsequences of climate change (Bee et  al., 2013; Da Costa, 2014; \r\nToussaint and Martinez Blanco, 2020; Box 8.7; Section 5.12). In terms \r\nof international law, the human rights obligations of states have been \r\nsubject to multiple recommendations relating to climate change by "


id: bb45232ce72f5386089675f407addef7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30166
content:
"Box 8.7 | Addressing inequalities in national capabilities: common but differentiated \r\nresponsibilities and respective capabilities relating to adaptation and the Paris Agreement"


id: 8c9154cded03ce40d2f7ace71104b683
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21915
content:
"The somewhat static interpretation of CBDR-RC prior to the Paris Conference of the Parties was overcome through the introduction \r\nof a qualification to the CBDR-RC principle: the phrase 'in the light of different national circumstances'. Without changing the original \r\nprinciple, the qualifier adds a dynamic element (Rajamani, 2016). Common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities \r\nof parties are therefore recognised not to be 'tied to the annexes', but instead evolve alongside national circumstances (Maljean-Dubois, \r\n2016; Voigt and Ferreira, 2016 p.301). The Paris Agreement also recognises context, considering differentiation in relation to each of the \r\nDurban pillars: mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology, capacity building and transparency (Rajamani and Guerin, 2017)."


id: 151aff098f8da6863d91bb0d7af51cdd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 926
content:
"Article 7 of the Paris Agreement acknowledges adaptation as a 'global challenge faced by all', recognising, for the first time, a global \r\naspiration of 'enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change'. It calls for a balance \r\nbetween mitigation and adaptation funding and emphasises the need to provide developing country parties, especially the most \r\nvulnerable, with '[c]ontinuous and enhanced international support' for adaptation. The basis for differentiation under Article 7 therefore \r\nrelies mostly on diverse national circumstances, capabilities and vulnerabilities. LDCs, as well as SIDS, are assumed by the literature, to be \r\npart of this category (Maljean-Dubois, 2016)."


id: 9923dc38fe27e665e08def3bfd9a0d99
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24154
content:
"change (see also Figure 8.6). To support enabling conditions in highly \r\nvulnerable countries that are also characterised by state fragility (see \r\nFigure 8.8), funding and projects designed to support adaptation may \r\nneed to be modified to effectively promote regional cooperation and \r\ntransboundary adaptation. Nevertheless, such interventions can also \r\nreinforce particularly powerful agendas and fail to assist and empower \r\nthose with the greatest need to adapt (Biermann et al., 2010; Burch \r\net al., 2019) neglecting community voices and sovereignty (Schlosberg \r\nand Collins, 2014). It is therefore important that the relevance of people \r\nand community empowerment to effectively achieve vulnerability \r\nreduction and climate change adaptation is recognised."


id: b7c888076b6b24198560a89652670ed0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29550
content:
"addressed during planning, adaptations may fail to achieve the desired \r\noutcomes. This is increasingly seen at a political level within efforts to \r\nimplement the Paris Agreement, in relation to the principle of 'common \r\nbut differentiated responsibilities and respective capacities' (CBDR-RC) \r\n(Box 8.7)."


id: 584615a7b0a747d876e65086a617ee8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12787
content:
"It is also insufficient to consider countries as stand-alone entities, due \r\nto links such as those provided by international trade. Taking Europe as \r\nan example, the continent has strong links to major trade partners such \r\nas India, Indonesia, Nigeria and Vietnam, so failure to assist adaptation \r\nin other locations opens up important vulnerabilities through supply \r\nchains (Lung et al., 2017). Policies seeking to protect national interests \r\nalone (e.g., in terms of food security) are seen as causes of negative \r\nimpacts at a global scale (Puma et al., 2015; Challinor et al., 2017), \r\nwith those nations and individuals least able to adapt to evolving \r\nclimate changes experiencing exacerbation of existing imbalances \r\n(Elbehri et al., 2015). LDCs are projected to suffer greater import losses \r\nin more connected networks (Puma et al., 2015). In the food sector, \r\npoorer net food buyers are anticipated to experience the worst impacts \r\nof climate change (Gitz et al., 2015)."


id: fea64aa1fd2ed4803899dac706f27a8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42186
content:
"Behind each policy are decisions about the magnitude of financial \r\nresource investments in specific adaptation actions, and their \r\nallocation between different sectors and groups in society, both \r\nspatially and temporally. The IPCC has estimated that limiting the \r\nrise in global average surface temperatures to 1.5degC would require \r\nbetween USD 1.6 trillion to USD 3.8 trillion of annual investment in \r\nsupply-side energy systems (those that generate energy) between \r\n2016 and 2050 (IPCC, 2018b). Resource allocations, however, are \r\nshaped by perceptions of the risks of climate change and the urgency \r\nof actions, as well as other motivational factors such as descriptive \r\nnorms and perceived self-efficacy (van Valkengoed and Steg, 2019) \r\nand the underlying approaches taken to valuing human well-being \r\n(e.g., see work from Bhutan on Gross National Happiness and climate \r\nchange actions (Kamei et al., 2021))."


id: b62b85e0f258232b5112fb01542200f2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29273
content:
"Acknowledging that context and scale matter, it is nevertheless possible \r\nto set out the core components of a generic enabling environment \r\n(Figure  8.12), linking them to the literature on climate change and \r\nrecognising how they can support adaptation in different socioeconomic \r\nand environmental settings in which different emphases are required. \r\nThis broad set of enablers requires different emphases according to the \r\nspecific context, yet the interdependence between them is universally \r\napplicable."


id: 6f2591bf4c67480c5ddc742a5b006ac6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16823
content:
"An increase in finance mobilised, however, does not automatically \r\nequate to adaptation interventions on the ground, nor does it \r\nguarantee the effectiveness of those adaptations deployed (Berrang\u0002Ford et al., 2021). Unintended negative consequences may arise due \r\nto lack of understanding of the drivers of vulnerability (such as gender \r\ninequality or inequitable access to natural resources), non-involvement \r\nof marginalised local groups, retrofitting adaptation into existing \r\ndevelopment agendas, and insufficiently defining adaptation success \r\n(Eriksen et al., 2021). A 2017 study estimated that less than 10% of \r\nclimate finance committed from international, regional and national \r\nclimate funds to developing countries between 2003 and 2016 went to \r\nlocally focused projects, suggesting a need to rethink approaches if the \r\nmost affected groups are to build sufficient resilience to the impacts of \r\nclimate change (Soanes et al., 2017)."


id: 7118c76716fb0c19d3856d2181754574
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17156
content:
"The literature shows with high confidence that the poorest groups in \r\nsociety often lose out, and require greater planned adaptation support, \r\nhaving less capacity to adapt than better off groups with easy access \r\nto assets (Barbier and Hochard, 2018; Ziervogel, 2019b; Box  8.5). \r\nDeveloping countries such as Burkina Faso, Mali and Zambia are not \r\nonly among the most vulnerable to climate change, they are also the \r\nleast able to mobilise the finance needed to adapt to its impacts (ND\u0002GAIN, 2019). Women and girls are often most heavily burdened. When \r\nbuilding adaptive capacity, these groups can require different support \r\nsuch that their knowledge, capacities and skills can be harnessed, \r\nin such a way that does not feminise responsibility and add to their \r\nburdens (Clissold et al., 2020; McNamara et al., 2021a)."


id: 35836a24c7b3286cb0bf0b9ff331aceb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6666
content:
"There is broad support for the notion, enshrined in the Paris Agreement, \r\nthat adaptation finance flowing to developing countries of the Global \r\nSouth should primarily benefit the most climate-vulnerable among them \r\ndue to their limited technical capacity and financial capabilities, yet \r\nsuch countries are often insufficiently considered in funding decisions. "


id: 821c8e5fcd8e4736b2fe1751ecd040ce
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20011
content:
"building of trust, increasingly shown to be vital (Dorsch and Flachsland, \r\n2017). Literature indicates that professional and learning networks are \r\nimportant groups supporting adaptation in cities and can help harness \r\nresources (Woodruff, 2018); while the research of (Hauge et al., 2019) \r\nin Norway underscores the importance of working across multiple \r\ndisciplines and the inclusion of actors from different levels of authority \r\nin multi-level municipal networks. They found that these factors can \r\nhelp to identify specific adaptation actions as well support knowledge \r\nsharing within participating organisations, which in turn helps garner \r\ncommitment to adaptation and its implementation. They also found \r\nthat it is important to involve local leaders in polycentric adaptation \r\nnetworks."


id: c81e0cf366e5cbd3f8396cccb50607dd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32522
content:
"brought about by greater exposure to climate risks (Buhr et al., 2018). \r\nThis has been further exacerbated by the recession and debt distress \r\naccompanying the COVID-19 pandemic (Kose et  al., 2021). A range \r\nof reforms, including comprehensive debt relief by public creditors, \r\ngreen recovery bonds, debt-for-climate swaps and new SDG-aligned \r\ndebt instruments may address unsustainable debt burdens, freeing up \r\ninvestment in climate adaptation and a green economic recovery (Volz \r\net al., 2020; see Section 8.6.3.1)."


id: 4d0c6bdcff9977c17ac3b0325051d9d9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10827
content:
"Greater investment is also needed in the developed countries of \r\nthe Global North. For example, the 2018 forest fires in Sweden, the \r\n2019-2020 Australian bushfire season and the 2020 forest fire season \r\nalong the US West Coast were unusually long and severe, resulting in \r\nunprecedented damage to natural habitats and human livelihoods and, \r\nrelatedly, significant economic cost, particularly given interlinkages \r\nwith other stressors such as COVID-19. While a range of drivers \r\nunderpin annual fire seasons, including greater water withdrawal and \r\nyears of fire suppression, early research indicates that climate change \r\nincreases their likelihood due to long-term warming trends (van \r\nOldenborgh et al., 2021a)."


id: 71e7329b45783536f0387b54b7247c68
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17287
content:
"However, investing in poverty reduction does not necessarily lead \r\nto climate change adaptation and where adaptation does result, it \r\ndoes not always reduce vulnerability of the most marginalised, as \r\ndocumented in case studies from northeast Brazil (Nelson et al., 2016). \r\nPoverty also affects private adaptation options. For example, research \r\nfrom Portugal highlights the importance of private financial assets in \r\nhelping older adults to adapt to extreme temperatures (Nunes, 2018)."


id: 56ddab3b45a6cd02bd21bc658e60901d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12533
content:
"important for the development of climate services at local, national and \r\ninternational levels (Vaughan et al., 2017) but this area of literature is \r\nnot yet well developed."


id: f1d038a1cfeb841f40fac5d368d2660a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39930
content:
"potential benefits are realised and how they can be mainstreamed into \r\npolicy (Frantzeskaki et al., 2019). Similarly, there is limited evidence \r\non unintended consequences (e.g., methane production, creation of \r\nhabitat for disease vectors, increased human-wildlife conflict) and \r\nhow these can be avoided (Wolch et al., 2014)."


id: 8ac297a66982af1f1cf5a8d3e13aa328
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21587
content:
"in adaptation decision making, considering the role of power dynamics \r\ntherein (Collins and Ison, 2009; Ensor and Harvey, 2015; Phuong et al., \r\n2017; Apgar et al., 2018; Brymer et al., 2018; Fisher and Dodman, 2019). \r\nA growing body of evidence also links to organisational learning and \r\nadaptation. Organisations' adaptive behaviours, like those of house\u0002holds and individuals, do not operate in a vacuum, with organisations' \r\nbehaviours shaped by policy and market conditions amongst other \r\nfactors. Mudombi et al. (2017) highlight further barriers in their study \r\nin South Africa, linked to inadequate resourcing, political interference, \r\ngovernance shortcomings and knowledge/expertise gaps within or\u0002ganisations, alongside short time frames for implementing projects."


id: e7cc60845ac1d8cd1be0ac85a3ec6ebc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38087
content:
"Successful adaptation requires support to be directed towards human \r\ncapital and socioeconomic capabilities and competences, in terms of \r\neducation, knowledge, experience, health and well-being, and migration, \r\nenabling people to contribute meaningfully towards development \r\n(Bowen et  al., 2012). At the same time, strong human capital and \r\ninvestment in actions that build human capacities to deal with climate \r\nchange, can further enhance adaptation activities linked to other capitals, \r\nand contribute positively to overall disaster risk reduction."


id: b3a2f713065467ff9d3f6ee4a76a43ba
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28846
content:
"At the same time, IKLK can inform adaptation actions (Apgar et al., \r\n2018), but is poorly integrated into formal educational systems and, in \r\nsome cases, is insufficient to adapt to new hazards that are emerging \r\nas a consequence of climate change. Education further feeds into \r\nlivelihood options, with close relationships between people's earning \r\ncapacities, the livelihood choices they can make and their levels of \r\nfinancial capital. It also supports food security (Lutz et  al., 2004). \r\nThere is medium evidence that climate change can undermine human \r\ncapital and education. For example, studies have shown that higher \r\ntemperatures reduce exam educational performance (Park, 2020), \r\nwhile extreme weather events such as snowstorms disrupt learning, \r\nyielding long-lasting and multidimensional effects (Maccini and Yang, \r\n2009; Cho, 2017; Graff Zivin et al., 2018)."


id: ea3623080d9ec155d32b4a6b465664d5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38558
content:
"As well as studies examining formal education, a large body of re\u0002search has focused on social learning and its role in building adaptive \r\ncapacity through joint knowledge production and reflexivity. Fore\u0002grounding the need for continuous changes in response to emerging \r\nconditions, this literature identifies the potential of shared learning for \r\nco-constructing policy and practice responses to complex, multi-stake\u0002holder environmental problems, and highlights both the necessity and \r\nchallenge of including non-dominant values, knowledge and expertise "


id: 6bedc1e4d3ac17d810c789d4d0eb30f7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16288
content:
"Indigenous knowledge about natural hazards enables communities \r\nat risk to take steps to reduce climate risk. Indigenous knowledge \r\nsystems are locally indispensable resources for adaptation to climate \r\nchange, yet are often misunderstood and undervalued. Generally, \r\nIndigenous Peoples and other local groups hold relevant local\u0002scale knowledge about environmental change, the impacts of those \r\nchanges on ecosystems and livelihoods at local scales, and possible "


id: 77a9976489b67369c90a4d50c64812e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18257
content:
"There are efforts in developing adaptation plans that utilise local \r\nknowledge. Local knowledge-based adaptation is focused primarily on \r\nthe use of traditional knowledge to increase adaptive capacity at the \r\ncommunity level and less on integration (Mimura et al., 2014). Hence, \r\nthere is need to increase effectiveness of policy processes that work \r\ntowards integration of local and scientific knowledge (Nakashima \r\net al., 2013; IPCC, 2014a)."


id: c9fb87c10a095ccd2bf3537cb878f978
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32864
content:
"Given the massive scale of investments required to build and sustain \r\nphysical capital at the state level, it is imperative to ensure physical \r\ncapital decisions consider climate resilience; not least because \r\nretrofitting and replacing are both highly costly. The World Bank \r\nestimates that adapting over the period 2010-2050 to a world that \r\nis 2degC warmer by 2050 will cost USD  70  billion to USD  100  billion \r\nper annum, with the infrastructure sector accounting for the largest \r\nshare of costs (World Bank, 2010). At the same time, every USD  1 \r\ninvested in preventive measures can save USD  5 of repairs (PRIF, \r\n2013). While adequate financing and technical expertise are required, "


id: 33df39045f0fed96d270dc93357a00b3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6366
content:
"Social and cultural factors are closely linked to values, beliefs and \r\nidentities (Heimann and Mallick, 2016) and mediate the ways in which \r\npeople respond to climate variability and change (Adger et al., 2013). \r\nThere is limited evidence but medium agreement about the importance \r\nand role of social and cultural factors in shaping adaptation, in terms of "


id: a7be49211535e7a03917846a655264e1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26728
content:
"Historically, southern coastal Bangladesh, where the 1970 Bhola Cyclone killed 500,000 people, has been considered among the most \r\nclimate-vulnerable environments on Earth. However, in recent decades, extreme weather events, like Cyclone Aila, though still destructive \r\nand destabilising, have resulted in lower death tolls thanks to a concerted investment in flood mitigation infrastructure, a dense network \r\nof cyclone shelters and a robust early warning system (Chowdhury et al., 1993; Paul, 2009). Cyclone Aila struck the southwest coast of \r\nBangladesh on 25 May 2009 with a wind speed of 120 km hour-1 (Islam and Hasan, 2016). With tidal surges of up to 6.5 m, occurring \r\nover dry pre-monsoon soils, 11 coastal districts and more than 3.9 million people were affected (United Nations, 2010), 190 people died \r\nand 7100 people suffered injuries (Saha, 2017)."


id: b1c746965f092c8d4e037b5de72ce0f0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28494
content:
"A range of coping and adaptation actions were enacted in response to losses of and damage to physical capital (Table Box 8.8.1). Actions \r\nvaried across the different affected areas and were taken by the households themselves, by the government and by NGOs."


id: 2684415af9976e261fbbe04cca4ee000
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3940
content:
"Table Box 8.8.1 |  Coping and adaptation actions enacted in the Cyclone Aila-affected area in response to losses of and damage to physical capital."


id: cd48ff53d6c8049d9c40be7695e2fb5e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33457
content:
"The impacts of some of these adaptations, particularly engagement in new livelihood activities after Aila, were varied, with income of \r\nthe affected households increasing in some cases and decreasing in others. In Koyra, the income of the poorest and middle-income \r\nhouseholds increased by 16% and 4%, respectively, while the income of richer households (many of whom lost physical capital assets \r\nthat they used to pursue their livelihoods) decreased by 50% (Abdullah et al., 2016)."


id: ca1f04590ab37844a3dceac7b9127073
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32898
content:
"Research into adaptation projects led by various actors has shown that adaptations taken by the households and community themselves \r\nare effective only to address typical challenges (such as seasonal shifts in temperature or rainfall) but are less effective in addressing \r\nextreme events that have long-lasting impacts. This is mainly due to lack of adequate resources and institutional support (Alam et al., \r\n2015). At the same time, some coping mechanisms are harmful in the longer term, for example, harvesting Sundarbans forest wood after \r\nAila for reconstruction could have negative impacts on the forest."


id: 41facd2d9c8a2bf08d8a8941898bc9a3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8802
content:
"Social factors in the context of adaptation, by contrast, are more widely \r\nstudied. The literature on adaptation and the role of social capital as an \r\nenabler is diverse. There is high confidence that during disasters, social \r\ncapital plays an important role in linking those who are affected to \r\nexternal supports and resources. On small islands, social networks can be \r\ndense and support adaptation (Petzold and Ratter, 2015), with traditional \r\nknowledge and societal cohesion helping small island communities to \r\nhave self-belief and build resilience even in the absence of external \r\ninterventions (Nunn and Kumar, 2018). Even the development of weak "


id: 89fb8c38b7802a4c5a362c8b55158a73
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21445
content:
"for the poor. It examines whether climate change response options, \r\nmeaning mitigation and adaptation, in different development sectors, \r\ncreate development synergies or trade-offs for low-income households \r\nand people living in poverty."


id: 38d7636815efac4116a1e8ba13f77633
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7204
content:
"Further warnings about social capital as an adaptation enabler come \r\nfrom Acosta et al. (2016) who recognise that it may be detrimental to \r\nprivate adaptation in some cases. Their research in rural Ethiopia found \r\nthat qualitative measures of trust predict contributions to public goods, \r\nsupporting theories about collective action, but that the effects of social \r\ncapital are not homogenous: it can be helpful in some contexts, but \r\nunhelpful, or even detrimental in others. This led them to highlight the \r\nneed for policymakers to consider these potentially different outcomes. \r\nOther research, also from Ethiopia, suggested that households with \r\nmore social capital are more specialised in their livelihood strategies. \r\nThis could leave them more vulnerable to climate change impacts (as \r\nper the Cyclone Aila example where shrimp farmers were specialised \r\nand hit hardest by the cyclone's impacts), though social capital acts as \r\na kind of informal insurance (Wuepper et al., 2018)."


id: a5dbcef8e0e91625468c2d0467946f72
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26405
content:
"The link between development and climate change was not \r\nevaluated comprehensively until the first decades of the 21st century \r\n(Figure  8.13; Klein et  al., 2005; Tol, 2005). Until recently mitigation \r\nand adaptation, the two primary approaches to climate action, have \r\nbeen dealt with separately in climate change science and policy \r\n(Landauer et al., 2015). Nevertheless, synergistic 'co-benefits' between \r\nmitigation and adaptation may be enhanced, and trade-offs reduced, \r\nthrough the holistic empirical evaluation of actions for climate change \r\nresponse (Runhaar et al., 2018). The synergistic effect of mitigation and \r\nadaptation has been documented for a few interventions across the \r\nglobe, however, evidence-based quantification of the synergies and \r\ntrade-offs are rare."


id: 8c40c031873efbf32eebb58ad73b5fbf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21848
content:
"Where co-benefits have emphasised identifying mitigation-adaptation \r\nsynergies, a key turn has been evaluating climate compatible \r\ndevelopment (CCD), 'development that minimises the harm caused \r\nby climate change impacts, while maximising the many human \r\ndevelopment opportunities presented by a low emission, more resilient \r\nfuture' (Mitchell and Maxwell, 2010). CCD calls for triple wins, resulting "


id: acd2e65d9545a44473cf23c05bd3389e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27650
content:
"bottom-up processes, and making use of available levers of policy, \r\ntechnology, education and financial/economic systems (Stringer et al., \r\n2020)."


id: 1ee9c22e2502f4c375685aa045a725b0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2640
content:
"in synergies between mitigation-adaptation-development through \r\nsingle interventions (Figure  8.13; Ellis and Tschakert, 2019). CCD \r\noffers specific entry points for identifying ways on how to strengthen \r\nsynergies between mitigation and adaptation, particularly within the \r\ncontext of low-income countries. Effective integration of emission \r\nreductions and accommodation actions for mitigation and adaptation \r\ncan be win-win strategies, may be cost-efficient (Runhaar et al., 2018) \r\nand have the potential to create opportunities to foster sustainable \r\ndevelopment (Denton et al., 2014)."


id: 83ad60818798ea88dab24b0067bf5532
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20309
content:
"This assessment identifies and evaluates approaches to CRD 'that \r\ndeliberately adopt mitigation and adaptation measures to secure a safe \r\nclimate, meet basic needs, eliminate poverty and enable equitable, just \r\nand sustainable development'. The body of literature on the synergies \r\nand trade-offs between adaptation, mitigation, poverty, equity and \r\nsustainable development has grown steadily since the AR5 (IPCC, \r\n2014a). The IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of \r\n1.5degC (IPCC, 2018c), suggests that 'Limiting warming to 1.5degC can be \r\nachieved synergistically with poverty alleviation and improved energy \r\nsecurity and can provide large public health benefits through improved \r\nair quality, preventing millions of premature deaths.'"


id: e4b3838e343e7624ce5656bb8da1e97
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37521
content:
"Implementing the integrative concept of CRD is expected to produce \r\ntransformative benefits affecting the poorest populations primarily \r\n(Roy et al., 2018; Leal Filho et al., 2019). The risks of transformative \r\nactions to the poor are diminished when undertaken in the context \r\nof good governance at multiple levels, within existing top-down and "


id: eb106e9b7a9aedcfb33ebcc6cd0211b3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38710
content:
"projects (e.g., hydropower) (Hennessey et al., 2017). Adaptation can \r\nsupport mitigation and contribute to co-benefits in various ways: \r\nensuring development-based natural resource management (Denton \r\net al., 2014; Suckall et al., 2015; Reang et al., 2021), integrating water \r\nresources management (Liang et  al., 2016; Sharifi, 2021), practicing \r\nsustainable agriculture (Bustamante et al., 2014; Duguma et al., 2014a; \r\nDi Gregorio et al., 2017; Reang et al., 2021), ensuring the protection \r\nof ecosystem services (Pandey et  al., 2017a; Baumber et  al., 2019), \r\nconserving biodiversity (Di Gregorio et al., 2017; Loboguerrero et al., \r\n2019; Smith et  al., 2019) and managing bioenergy resource (Dovie, \r\n2019)."


id: 97f4d6cd3b1f753ec0da8615279a8376
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23949
content:
"Mitigation planning has not sufficiently considered poverty reduction \r\npolicies, the basis for narrowing the adaptation gap (see also \r\nFigure 8.14). Many synergies between climate change mitigation and \r\npoverty reduction have been identified, although sometimes with limited \r\nevidence. The mitigation measures that have been most evaluated \r\ninclude clean development mechanisms (CDM), programmes aimed \r\nat reduction of emissions from deforestation and forest degradation \r\n(REDD+), voluntary carbon offsets and biofuel production. However, \r\nwhile these mitigation programmes stimulate economic growth, \r\nthey may contribute to processes that trade-off against equitable \r\ndevelopment and threaten to further impoverish forest communities, \r\nsuch as large-scale land acquisitions (Carter et  al., 2017; Schaafsma \r\net al., 2021) and fortress conservation (see IPCC SR 1.5degC, Chapter 5 \r\n(Roy et al., 2018); and see also Chapter 6 of this report)."


id: ac2d3c6e5a251402f615ea90a5171db0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27539
content:
"amending or reducing the discursive rift between climate policy and \r\nsustainable development (Venema and Rehman, 2007)."


id: 9780a27287c0050b757f40150f42e32e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23866
content:
"destruction by climate impacts, for example (Stadelmann et al., 2014). \r\nImplementing a mitigation or adaptation option may positively or \r\nnegatively, directly or indirectly, affect the feasibility and effectiveness \r\nof other options, such as soil management leading to soil organic \r\ncarbon (Locatelli et al., 2015; de Coninck et al., 2018). Farmers and local \r\npeople are often also being encouraged to undertake mitigation and \r\nadaptation activities leading to long-term benefits, such as cultivation \r\nof no-till wheat with residue retention leading to low emissions along \r\nwith saving energy and water (Wright et al., 2014)."


id: 30313b882274b5182c09ca434edc29ff
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5736
content:
"Moreover, a regulatory structure for evaluation of mitigation and \r\nadaptation actions is required to understand the co-benefits of these \r\ntwo actions. For example, the choice of adaptation actions can be \r\nmade according to their effectiveness per unit of money invested such \r\nas economic assets saved from destruction of climate change impacts \r\nand benefits can be evaluated in terms of economies, people and the \r\nenvironment, such as human lives and health protected rather than the \r\nemission reduction by mitigation strategies (Stadelmann et al., 2014)."


id: 1519244ae88212aa629e0ec12cf73eb0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 924
content:
"The assessed literature underscores that for synergies to be realised, \r\nmitigation and adaptation policies must be institutionally supported \r\nwithin a multi-level governance architecture (national to sub-national \r\nto municipal levels) with other priorities, and sustainable financing \r\nmechanisms identified within the country or via the international \r\ncommunity (Dovie and Lwasa, 2017). Integrating and mainstreaming \r\nadaptation and mitigation across agencies within countries can bridge \r\nthe divide between climate policy and sustainable development \r\n(Venema and Rehman, 2007)."


id: 92f01a88bff48eb1ef99f99ef833fa93
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23064
content:
"Within sector policies and economic sectors (such as land use, \r\ntransportation and technology), mitigation and adaptation have many \r\npositive, negative, direct and indirect linkages within and beyond the \r\nsector (Locatelli et al., 2015). The land use sector, for example, includes \r\nagriculture and forestry, and encompasses the management of a mosaic \r\nof interacting urban environments and ecosystems with a diversity of \r\ncultural and institutional attributes (Locatelli et  al., 2015). The land \r\nuse sector is key to climate adaptation, where policy coordination can \r\nenhance food production, regulate urban microclimates, affect water \r\nsecurity and, in the case of mangroves, buffer the impacts of extreme \r\nclimate events in coastal areas (Locatelli et al., 2015). City-level actions, \r\nsuch as zoning and planning that promotes green development and "


id: f3154ec7797bf6551df5a0941b8588af
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40148
content:
"The Paris Agreement recognised that the agreement will reflect equity \r\nand CBDR-RC of national circumstances, (Voigt and Ferreira, 2016) and \r\nshould be broadened to include mitigation co-benefits (Dovie, 2019). \r\nIntegrating adaptation with mitigation may possibly contribute to "


id: a2af234da565e9188c1b681d53f0ec44
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25838
content:
"and incomes, adapt and build resilience to climate change, and reduce \r\nand/or remove GHG emissions (FAO, 2017). Various CSA technologies \r\nare capable of improving crop yields, increasing net income, increasing \r\ninput-use efficiencies and reducing emissions (Khatri-Chhetri et  al., \r\n2017). However, uptake and adoption of CSA by local farmers in poor \r\ndeveloping countries remains a challenge (Palanisami et al., 2015) due \r\nto the difficulty of identifying and prioritising of technologies suiting \r\nlocal climate risks and accommodating the farming practices of locals \r\n(Dougill et al., 2017; Khatri-Chhetri et al., 2017). An analysis of CSA \r\nimplementation in Mali, for example, identified major challenges to \r\npolicymakers' efforts to adopt CSA, including difficulties identifying \r\nCSA options and portfolios, valuing them and prioritising investments \r\n(Andrieu et al., 2017)."


id: d047f0b0519c7d31f8c9a762fd9a4ae
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34003
content:
"green and efficient energy use, can also be pivotal for reduction in \r\nemissions and improvement in resilience (UCLG, 2015). Urban planning \r\nand transport policies, such as means of transportation, are crucial to \r\nsupport a transition towards a low-carbon and resilient future (Ford \r\net al., 2018), as public and private transport facilities are crucial for \r\nemission reduction."


id: f68a3747fb813894c13d530a466cc36d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40745
content:
"Potential opportunities from CSA may also result from integration \r\nof 'technological packages' (Totin et  al., 2018), which include new \r\nmarket structures, knowledge infrastructure and agriculture extension \r\nservices, capacity-building programmes (Dougill et  al., 2017; Totin \r\net al., 2018) and institutional support for key enabling programmes, \r\nsuch as crop insurance, agro-advisories and rainwater harvesting \r\n(Khatri-Chhetri et  al., 2017). CSA is able--if carefully designed--to \r\nachieve transformative 'triple wins' for climate and development when \r\nit is accompanied by new governance architectures that are socially \r\ninclusive and respectful of traditions and livelihoods, and accommodate \r\ntraditional institutions that underpin the bargaining power of the \r\npoorest and most vulnerable groups (Karlsson et al., 2017)."


id: fa2bc134e3203b34ab2ae76361b8a1c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41382
content:
"Conservation agriculture (CA), another framework for achieving CRD, is \r\nbased on three synergistic principles: (a) soil management to reduce soil \r\nphysical disturbance and reduce its degradation, (b) crop management \r\nsuch as residue management to protect the soil top layers and (c) \r\ngenetic management to increase agricultural systems' biodiversity and \r\ntherefore their resilience (DeLonge and Basche, 2017). In the cereal \r\nsystems of the Indo-Gangetic Plains, India, CA has increased crop yields, \r\nreturns from crop cultivation and input-use efficiency, in spite of heat \r\nstress, while reducing GHGs emissions (Sapkota et al., 2015). However, \r\nchallenges with CA are also documented in the scientific literature. For \r\nexample, an evaluation of CA in Malawi noted that adoption of CA \r\nwas challenged by weak integration of CA in agricultural policies, lack \r\nof institutional arrangements of promoters and farmers' experiences \r\n(Chinseu et al., 2019)."


id: 9d7ac0c5310cfd8e9107b52bef64c2ab
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24944
content:
"CSA is discussed in the scientific literature as an approach that could \r\ntransform agricultural production systems and food value chains in \r\nline with sustainable development and food security under climate \r\nchange. However, concerns and criticisms have been raised, such as \r\nthe insufficient consideration of access to entitlements within CSA \r\nand the question who wins and loses when applying CSA in different \r\ncountry contexts (see Karlsson et al., 2017; Sain et al., 2017). CSA has \r\nthree main objectives: sustainably increase agricultural productivity "


id: 8912c50a4ced05b9cb7d775479467c07
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21282
content:
"strategies (Tschora and Cherubini, 2020). In spite of various benefits \r\nof agroforestry, the expansion of existing areas of agroforestry and \r\nthe establishment of new agroforestry systems has remained limited \r\n(Martineau et al., 2016), mainly due to a lack of institutional support, \r\na lack of expert support to ensure adequate management, weak \r\ncapacity for monitoring and regulation, and a lack of financial support \r\n(Hernandez-Morcillo et al., 2018)."


id: 3ffd35679a07e944afec1e144c85918a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8448
content:
"Overall, different farming and pastoral systems can achieve reductions \r\nin the emissions intensity of livestock products. Depending on the \r\nfarming and pastoral systems and level of development, reductions \r\nin the emissions intensity of livestock products may lead to absolute \r\nreductions in GHG emissions (IPCC, 2019a) (medium confidence). \r\nSignificant synergies exist between adaptation and mitigation, for \r\nexample, through SLM approaches (high confidence)."


id: 6b750954030347525c5f0c3c0218e496
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16206
content:
"Forests can support CRD in rural communities and households: they \r\nsupport consumption of energy, food and fibre, provide a safety net in \r\ncases of shocks, fill gaps during seasonal shortfalls and are a means \r\nto accumulate assets and provide support to emerge out of poverty \r\n(Angelsen et  al., 2014; Adams et  al., 2020). Forest ecosystems are \r\nan essential element of climate change mitigation and adaptation, \r\nwith the potential for synergy and conflict between the two climate \r\naction objectives (Morecroft et al., 2019). However, there are varied \r\nperspectives on the role of the forests, with some treating conservation \r\nand forest management practices as a barrier to livelihood resilience \r\n(Few et al., 2017) despite the broader role of forest management in \r\nclimate mitigation (Houghton, 2012)."


id: 9affc6b0ddf812ab639343cf050fa1f2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24518
content:
"Forestry mitigation projects such as forest conservation, reduced de\u0002forestation, protected area management and sustainable forest man\u0002agement, can promote adaptation and can also have consequences \r\nfor the development objectives of other sectors (e.g., expansion of \r\nfarmland) (Smith et al., 2014). REDD+ (reducing emissions from de\u0002forestation and forest degradation, fostering conservation and sus\u0002tainable management of forest and enhancement of carbon stocks) \r\nis a payment programme that may provide adaptation benefits by \r\nenhancing households' economic resilience (Sills et al., 2014; Duch\u0002elle et al., 2018) and also produce positive livelihood impacts through "


id: 6f47e7685af3dc3582f5a53ec5e0dbc5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16840
content:
"Policies supporting sustainable rangeland management and the \r\nlivelihood strategies of rangeland users have an outsized influence on \r\nboth development and climate action (Gharibvand et al., 2015). Climate \r\nchange adaptation, mitigation practices and livestock production can \r\nbe supported by policies that encourage diversification of livestock \r\nanimals (within species), support sustainable foraging and feed varieties "


id: b6f5854bdfc9086a5341c63ec088fc0b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29399
content:
"magnitude of climate change impacts (Bakkegaard et al., 2016), along \r\nwith facilitating participation of communities in the two activities and \r\ndefining forest policies (Ngum et  al., 2019). Moreover, international \r\ndonors and funds are also critical to guide countries to identify \r\nadaptation-mitigation synergies, through consultation processes, \r\ndialogue and awareness raising (Locatelli et al., 2016). Moreover, in \r\norder to be effective, nature-based climate solutions such as mixed \r\nspecies plantation, forest expansion and REDD+, must be people\u0002centric and respond to the needs of the rural and Indigenous Peoples \r\nwho manage ecosystems for their livelihoods, while at the same time \r\nsupporting the biodiversity of the ecosystems (Temperton et al., 2019; \r\nFleischman et al., 2020)."


id: 58ae461474a072d27244659cb70fe0d4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12844
content:
"the employment benefits of supporting conservation and sustainable \r\nmanagement of forests (Caplow et al., 2011). Furthermore, the man\u0002agement of ecosystem services may contribute to both mitigation and \r\nadaptation. For example, REDD+ projects, such as mangrove conser\u0002vation and restoration, simultaneously contribute to carbon storage \r\nand diversification of incomes and economic activities. At the same \r\ntime, mangroves protect coastal areas against flooding and hydrolog\u0002ical variations, improving capacity for adaptation in local livelihoods \r\n(Locatelli et al., 2016)."


id: ff77227abc22a4d1a23bf703ac73a2d1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42351
content:
"The continued dependence on fossil energy sources for economic \r\ndevelopment is the primary source of increasing GHGs (Hansen et al., \r\n2017). There is emerging agreement in terms of the importance of the \r\nbioenergy sector for climate change mitigation (Jackson et al., 2016; \r\nHansen et  al., 2017), however, the options and limitations in terms \r\nof transforming the energy systems to support both mitigation and \r\nadaptation are still contested."


id: ad25bd36031a18a04d61474eece13965
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27704
content:
"To achieve CRD, forestry conservation strategies need to be driven \r\nby climate action and forest management policies that benefit \r\nboth ecological and human systems, and, above all, involve forest \r\ncommunities in programme and project implementation (Cordeiro\u0002Beduschi, 2020). Synergies between mitigation and adaptation of the \r\nforestry sector can be enhanced by considering on-the-ground contexts \r\nof constraints and social trade-offs that may undermine implemented \r\nactions (Few et al., 2017). However, the lack of knowledge about trade\u0002offs and synergies at the local level and between local and global \r\nscales makes this challenging."


id: 36bf97556f001bcb2bb1de14ff9642c0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6860
content:
"Despite these constraints, forestry can serve as a foundation for CRD \r\nwhen adaptation and mitigation activities are effectively integrated \r\nfrom the stage of policy formulation with consideration of specific \r\ninstitutional structures and procedures that can help to facilitate such \r\nintegration (Locatelli et  al., 2015). Effectively integrated adaptation \r\nand mitigation activities can be achieved by encouraging collaboration \r\nbetween the two activities, promoting research on the impacts of \r\nthe integrated activities, their cost-effectiveness and their synergies \r\nwithin the complex setting of risks and uncertainty concerning the "


id: da5e198b55b1fa24a7b478bc47d22c69
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35714
content:
"emissions and increased benefits for communities (Morand et  al., \r\n2015). However, the policy perspective must be based on the country \r\ncircumstances, especially urbanisation, economic growth and energy \r\nconsumption matching with the income level of the country (Wang \r\net al., 2018)."


id: fc4fd8c98d06906764a3d4b907cc20e8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41756
content:
"local production; and use of double cropping and flex crops to provide \r\nfood and energy (Souza et al., 2017)."


id: 230c43ba313a03cc6c4ee3c43d604039
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3360
content:
"This section lists several groups of strategies, including mainstreaming \r\nand coherence; dealing with complexities through broader and \r\ninnovative governance; provision of funding and the associated cost \r\nand benefit analysis; and focusing on the community and addressing \r\nunderlying equity through transformational adaptation."


id: b92d597331aa8abd676f8fa9e67c1104
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29782
content:
"and adaptation policies objectives and policies), external coherence \r\n(climate change and development objectives), vertical integration \r\n(mainstream climate change into sectoral policies) and horizontal \r\nintegration (overarching governance structures for cross-sectoral \r\ncoordination)."


id: 380fbe324fa14bfc62c99385bf875c92
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7066
content:
"Progress of policy integration varies from the global to local level. \r\nProgress in mainstreaming and coherence is emerging globally and \r\nhas slowly made it down to the national level (Di Gregorio et al., 2017). \r\nAdaptation and mitigation should be mainstreamed into planning \r\nand implementation on food security programmes, and cross-cutting \r\noversights are required to integrate land restoration, climate policy, \r\nfood security and disaster risk management into a coherent policy \r\nframework (Woolf et al., 2015)."


id: 633bbb9a8b4fa4cf24aef5c56c252bfa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14751
content:
"There has been an increase in the literature examining adaptation \r\nand mitigation synergy in the Nationally Determined Contributions \r\nsubmitted by countries to the UNFCCC. Agriculture and energy \r\nare the two priority sectors for which there have been significant \r\npledges and commitments from countries, with, to some extent, good \r\nalignment between adaptation and mitigation. This alignment can \r\nprovide good opportunities to integrate both into national sectoral \r\npolicies (Antwi-Agyei et al., 2018a). This suggests that inclusive and \r\nsustainable economic and social development can be achieved if \r\nnational governments focus on developing coherent, cross-sector \r\napproaches that deliver potential triple wins of mitigation, adaptation \r\nand development."


id: cf86353ac3144c95c6de38227b88caa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33873
content:
"Another important strategy to better determine impacts of \r\nadaptation and mitigation and to promote inclusivity, transparency \r\nand accountability is the community-based approach. This approach \r\nalso supports adaptation and mitigation indirectly through the \r\nstrengthening of capacity and social capital. For example, in Bangkalan, \r\nIndonesia, the presence of high social capacity and readily available \r\nfree agricultural inputs are two decisive factors for effective climate \r\nchange mitigation and adaptation, as well as for enhancing community \r\nlivelihood (Sunkar and Santosa, 2018). The calls to consider Indigenous \r\nknowledge and Indigenous People to support integrated strategies in \r\nadaptation and mitigation are increasing (Ford et  al., 2016; Altieri "


id: e17e3e414ab172fad3566d223b405c9d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36943
content:
"Increasing demands for water, energy, food and materials are putting \r\npressure on resource supply, and hence the nexus approach can inform \r\ntransition pathways for interlinked resource systems (Johnson et al., \r\n2019). The nexus approach, especially the water-energy-food nexus, "


id: f9513da19ef4a6bb9d9b095b7e4b4958
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41228
content:
"and employed across different jurisdictions. For example, solar \r\nphotovoltaic (PV) presents an established way across a multitude \r\nof countries to produce low-carbon energy at a profit and reduce \r\nglobal GHG emissions. Adaptation needs, however, vary greatly from \r\nlocation to location and short-term solutions, for example investments \r\nin irrigation technologies to improve water availability for specific \r\ncrops in a growing season, may differ from longer-term solutions, \r\nfor example, switching to different crops altogether. Benefits are not \r\nalways easily quantified and often accrue to local communities over \r\ntime rather than to investors looking for the kind of returns realised in \r\nmitigation actions."


id: 7838794ef6d59545d9d8a27af492a6d1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18363
content:
"Development finance institutions mainly draw on market-rate loans \r\nand, to a lesser extent, concessional lending and grants to finance \r\nadaptation actions. There are regional differences in the choice of \r\ninstruments, too, owing to the degree of economic development: while \r\nmost of the adaptation finance flowing to the Asia-Pacific is market\u0002rate debt, the vast majority of adaptation finance flowing to sub\u0002Saharan Africa is in the form of concessional debt or grants (Richmond \r\net al., 2020)."


id: e709e4d7db8d6b10e544800e2280eb1c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37946
content:
"There are strong interconnections between NBS, climate adaptation \r\nand mitigation actions. Ecosystem-based adaptation is a nature\u0002based solution that uses ecosystem services to help communities \r\nadapt to climate change. Examples of such approaches were covered \r\nin Section  8.5.2.2. For example, mangrove restoration provides \r\nboth climate mitigation (as carbon sinks) and adaptation to climate \r\nchange (increasing the resilience of coastal communities), while also \r\nsupporting the implementation of a range of other SDGs (e.g., through \r\nincreased food security). Research has found that without mangroves, \r\nglobal flood damage costs would increase by more than USD 65 billion \r\na year (Menendez et al., 2020). There is, therefore, an urgent need to \r\ninvest in a range of NBS."


id: 904274c9a7ae3efab29cdaafbd8178ae
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22581
content:
"Adaptation finance funds actions to adapt to the impacts of climate \r\nchange, yet such actions are heavily context, scale and time specific. \r\nMany mitigation actions in the energy sector can be easily quantified "


id: 86c193e235f3cb944bc5be7a6edfce5e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20873
content:
"Box 8.9 | Adaptation financing for the poor \r\nand the need for systems transition: Eastern \r\nIndonesian Islands"


id: 37b3c1ecdd8efb67961988c589f93fd1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7007
content:
"A 4-year project in Nusa Tenggara Barat Province, Indonesia, \r\naimed to stimulate an adaptation pathways process. The goal \r\nwas to support CRD in a context with low stakeholder capacity, \r\nhigh poverty, and rapid environmental and social change. On \r\nthese archipelagic islands, livelihoods are predominantly rural, \r\nfar from political and urban centres. The project focused on \r\nintegrated top-down and bottom-up development planning \r\nthat could enable CRD at the local level, linked to provincial \r\nand national plans."


id: 469b3197f93577983ef19d11b865731a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9626
content:
"Since the AR5, there is greater documentation of the extreme measures \r\nand high-risk income alternatives that the world's poorest commonly \r\ntake to finance adaptation (Dawson, 2017; Ahmed et al., 2019). While \r\nstill a controversial topic, clear examples of extreme adaptation \r\nfinance measures include:"


id: 7c1179653682c4f77bc539df143c1580
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19035
content:
"they do not undermine other coping strategies such as risk spreading, \r\nprogrammes that ease access or subsidise loans for adaptation, mobile \r\nbanking and mobile-based financial and risk management tools, impact \r\npay-outs in the form of direct transfers and institutional support for \r\nhometown associations. International governance arrangements, such \r\nas the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage, might \r\naim primarily to clear the financing gap between global financial and \r\nrisk management institutions and the pocketbooks of the poorest \r\n(Wrathall et al., 2015)."


id: 73cdb739ac8386f9375fa7576444b8f2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17627
content:
"The chapter has moved beyond the IPCC WGII AR5 in that it lays \r\nout structural elements of vulnerability and provides quantitative \r\ninformation about climate-related vulnerability hotspots globally \r\ncomplemented by the assessment of poverty, local livelihood \r\nvulnerability and sustainable development. The assessment of non\u0002economic losses, and enabling and supportive environments for \r\nadaptation are also new aspects."


id: c0957083a15b4bd1076127fff502f2d1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31183
content:
"The chapter also advances knowledge in terms of the interconnections \r\nbetween human vulnerability, observed losses and adverse \r\nconsequences. The assessment shows that statistically relevant \r\ndifferences in observed fatalities per hazard event can be explained \r\nby hazard intensity and frequency, and are also linked to different \r\nlevels of vulnerability of a region exposed. Despite all uncertainties \r\nabout future change, the assessed literature clearly provides an \r\naccurate picture of the expected societal impacts of climate change, \r\nthe requirements for successful adaptation and the need to address \r\nthe adaptation gap from the perspective of vulnerability."


id: 3985574cba25216ecebf538c064f6bf1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7330
content:
"The chapter shows that intersectionality approaches are becoming \r\nincreasingly central to grasping how differential vulnerability to climate \r\nhazards is experienced by different social groups. Intersectionality \r\nrecognises that age, gender, class, race and ethnicity are reinforcing \r\nsocial phenomena, shaping social inequalities and experiences of the \r\nworld, and also intersect with climate hazards and vulnerability. Our \r\nassessment reveals the central role of maladaptation with robust new \r\nevidence on negative consequences of interventions on different social \r\ngroups. Well-intentioned adaptation can exacerbate past and existing \r\nvulnerabilities and undermine livelihoods. There is also evidence that, \r\ndespite maladaptation, inclusive and sustainable development at the \r\nlocal level can reduce vulnerability."


id: 273fdd1fae822b78cc366cfa8f2a543d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4073
content:
"Since AR5 L&D has taken much more central stage in sustainable \r\ndevelopment, policy, and poverty and livelihoods discourse. While \r\nthere is ambiguity about what constitutes L&D, the chapter highlights \r\nnew evidence of observed L&Ds, including slow-onset impacts (e.g., \r\nsea level rise and drought). Our assessment reveals that there is a \r\nbody of literature that explicitly addresses non-economic losses and \r\nthat these are experienced everywhere now due to human-induced \r\nclimate change. These are coupled with advancements in the science \r\nof extreme event attribution with new focus on adaptation metrics and \r\nvulnerability assessments."


id: 5532457b1259ba02898b0a23fe648edc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12262
content:
"This assessment also identifies emerging evidence of linkages between \r\nextreme and slow-onset events, NELD and livelihood shifts. This "


id: 1bfcdc790a4f6c270044ce1a4312553c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2110
content:
"that depend strongly on natural capital for both subsistence and as \r\na source of income are particularly sensitive to climate risks; and are \r\nwhere perhaps adaptive actions are most urgently needed, even with \r\nsmaller rises in temperature under the most optimistic scenarios. This \r\napplies to both the Global South and the Global North. Investments in \r\nany form of capital asset to support adaptation need to be mindful of \r\nreinforcing existing inequalities and introducing new ones, particularly \r\nif transformation takes place. This also underscores the importance of \r\ninclusive, polycentric governance in ensuring the voices of all groups \r\nare heard and that wide-ranging knowledge types are incorporated \r\nin decision making, nevertheless recognising that trade-offs are in\u0002evitable."


id: 5fc417bb3612eb3602761077d42f438
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14148
content:
"suggests that losses are leading to a range of shifts in livelihoods, \r\nwhich may be easier for some social groups than others, and which \r\nhave implications for livelihoods security across transboundary \r\nscales. Yet, climate change is only one driver. Untangling the drivers \r\nof vulnerability using intersectionality approaches is also critical. Our \r\nquantification of vulnerability hotspots supports this concern. It is \r\ncritical to seek further knowledge on the extent of livelihood shifts \r\namong the most vulnerable resulting from specific NELD, for whom, \r\nwhere and at what scale. Gaps in knowledge highlight this as an area \r\nthat needs further work in order to develop and understand further the \r\nfull extent and reach of the relationships between extreme and slow\u0002onset climate events, non-economic losses and shifting livelihoods."


id: 382a41faa5a8a0192b79a23678c6727b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7085
content:
"The chapter also highlights and provides quantitative evidence that \r\nadaptation strategies need to go beyond the idea of adapting to warming \r\nlevels only. Adaptation strategies have to reduce the adaptation gap \r\nand therewith reduce human vulnerability independent of a specific \r\nclimatic hazard. It has been shown that adaptation strategies that \r\nexplicitly address poverty and inequities, and also consider rights\u0002based approaches can generate co-benefits for resilience building of \r\nmost vulnerable groups and for sustainable development."


id: 851c720f8f8af4e9933a735e648b7a0d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20561
content:
"Evidence on the kinds of enabling environment required paints a com\u0002plex picture. The assessment highlights the interaction of different \r\ncapital assets within the broader context of key enablers in shaping \r\nthe overall enabling environment for adaptation, which itself is highly \r\ncontext dependent. In this regard, countries present different starting \r\npoints for adaptation, with some requiring, for example, more of an \r\nemphasis on institutional capacity building; others requiring transfor\u0002mation to the broader legal and political conditions. Capitals are not \r\nnecessarily substitutable but rather act as an assemblage in shaping \r\nboth perceptions of climate risk and the necessity and appropriateness \r\nof actions. At the same time there is robust evidence that livelihoods "


id: 7725466b32972372e2d7dd5c1dfd4d3f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18159
content:
"FAQ 8.1 | Why are people who are poor and disadvantaged especially vulnerable to climate change and why do \r\nclimate change impacts worsen inequality?"


id: 70f9a97e766826b956adda5247c1a1a4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17140
content:
"Poor people and their livelihoods are especially vulnerable to climate change because they usually have fewer assets and less access to \r\nfunding, technologies and political influence. Combined, these constraints mean they have fewer resources to adapt to climate change impacts. \r\nClimate change impacts tend to worsen inequalities because they disproportionately affect disadvantaged groups. This in turn further increases \r\ntheir vulnerability to climate change impacts and reduces their ability to cope and recover."


id: ed99e8ad9500c35fc56f0f90e368625f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39162
content:
"It is not just poverty that can make people more vulnerable to climate change and climate-related hazards. \r\nDisadvantage due to discrimination, gender and income inequalities and lack of access to resources (e.g., those \r\nwith disabilities or of minority groups) can mean these groups have fewer resources with which to prepare and \r\nreact to climate change and to cope with and recover from its adverse effects. They are therefore more vulnerable. \r\nThis vulnerability can then increase due to climate change impacts in a vicious cycle unless adaptation measures are \r\nsupported and made possible."


id: 323ff4be7e6b97c31633811c718f5c12
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6094
content:
"A mix of multiple development challenges, such as poverty, hunger, conflict and environmental degradation, make countries and whole regions \r\nvulnerable to climate change. Many of the people in the most vulnerable situations and in the most vulnerable regions are also highly exposed \r\nto climate hazards, such as droughts, floods or sea level rise at present and will become increasingly so in the future. Studies estimate that \r\naround 3.3 to 3.6 billion people are living in regions classified as highly vulnerable to climate change impacts, which is significantly higher than \r\nthe number of people who reside in regions classified as least vulnerable. The most vulnerable regions include East, Central and West Africa, \r\nSouth Asia, Micronesia and Melanesia, and Central America."


id: fb613630d6883e7ce5cbc609ac285856
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41599
content:
"When a country or region is considered 'vulnerable' to climate change this means that climate hazards (e.g., drought, \r\nflood, heatwaves) have a very negative impact because there is a high number of people in these areas that lack \r\nthe ability or opportunity to cope and adapt to such events, due to, for example, high average poverty, inequality \r\nand lack of institutional support. This vulnerability could be due to many different development challenges that \r\nall come together and influence each other, such as poverty, lack of access to basic infrastructure services, high \r\nnumbers of uprooted people, state fragility, low or below average life expectancy and biodiversity degradation. \r\nThese structural social issues often affect regions for many decades and make it difficult for the state and for \r\nindividuals to respond to climate change and climate-related hazards."


id: 39db58bc8deecb8e0e18c05840055f31
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7390
content:
"For example, if a region is already characterised by poverty and struggling to feed its population and provide \r\nadequate access to basic infrastructure services, such as water and sanitation, this makes them vulnerable. If this \r\nregion is then faced with an increased number of extremely dry years, this exposes them to drought and will make \r\nthings even harder causing more hunger, poverty and worsened health--these are climate impacts."


id: 3dae8d536d1cec3679808956366344f6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8020
content:
"Most vulnerable regions are in Africa, as well as in South Asia, the Pacific and the Caribbean. In these regions, there \r\nare often multiple neighbouring countries that all are highly vulnerable, for example in Central and West Africa. \r\nThese regional clusters require special attention."


id: 429daaa85fe27075e9918ef44978336e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8914
content:
"There are also highly vulnerable groups and individuals within less vulnerable regions. For example, marginalised, \r\ndisadvantaged and poor minorities within highly affluent cities. Programmes that aim to support adaptation to \r\nclimate change need to focus on reducing the vulnerability of individuals, groups, countries and regions."


id: 22506424232407ad488dddd8b564878c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3258
content:
"FAQ 8.3 | How does and will climate change interact with other global trends (e.g., urbanisation, economic \r\nglobalisation) and shocks (e.g., COVID-19) to influence livelihoods of the poor?"


id: d8b4249ea5c11bfbb6ef2f2b23984dbf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35417
content:
"For example, climate change may alter the frequency or intensity of hazards that threaten the viability of a \r\ncommunity's traditional farming or fishing livelihoods. Local farmers or fishers are then forced to adapt how they \r\nfarm or fish or abandon livelihood practices entirely. The latter may mean migrating to a city to find work. As \r\nmany communities face the same challenge, this intersects with a global trend that is affecting billions of lives and \r\nlivelihoods--urbanisation--as seen in the rapid growth of informal settlements at the peripheries of cities around \r\nthe world, particularly rapidly growing mega-cities in Africa, Asia and Latin America. These developments will be \r\naccelerated by negative impacts of climate change and increase risks that larger segments of the population enter \r\nconditions of persistent poverty."


id: 64cd53ac8af2e80f8f356d212b2fcbdb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15009
content:
"At the same time, people whose livelihoods have been upended by climate change are subject to new threats, \r\nsuch as the global COVID-19 pandemic, which has shone a light on the plight of the most vulnerable people. For \r\nexample, the elderly, Indigenous Peoples and Communities of Colour were disproportionately severely impacted by \r\nCOVID-19; also the indirect economic consequences particularly hit the poor. Hence, COVID-19 demonstrates that \r\nthe livelihoods of the poorest and most marginalised are vulnerable to other global trends beyond climate change. \r\nAlso, most severe impacts are expected in regions that are already characterised by high levels of systemic human \r\nvulnerability."


id: 5364755af01be296a7dfb1a0266d0a69
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11944
content:
"Public and private investment in different types of assets can help reduce risks from climate change. Exactly which assets require investment \r\ndepends on the specific situation. However, the provision of access to basic services, such as water and sanitation, education and health care \r\nas well as the importance of reducing inequity is shown within the assessment for many regions. The poor have fewer resources to invest, so in \r\npoorer countries greater public investment is needed. Legal, social, political, institution and economic interventions can alter human behaviour, \r\nthough care must be taken that these do not amplify existing inequalities, create new inequalities or reduce future adaptation options."


id: 709685f6ededf09ff027d9fc891a760c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17065
content:
"At the same time, legal, social, political, institutional and economic solutions can alter human behaviour (e.g., \r\nthrough enforcement of building codes to prevent construction on low-lying land prone to flooding, timely \r\nprovision of weather information and early warning systems, knowledge-sharing activities, including adaptation \r\nstrategies grounded in Indigenous knowledge, crop insurance schemes, incentives such as payments to stop people \r\ncutting down trees or to enable them to plant them and social protection to provide a safety net in times of crisis)."


id: aaa804c262555ab31f1e27caf4d3283
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27247
content:
"The poorest groups often require greater public adaptation investments. Efforts to support adaptation need to be \r\nmindful of reinforcing existing inequalities and introducing new ones, making sure they are inclusive, culturally \r\nsensitive and that the voices of all groups of people are heard. It is also important that adaptations which reduce \r\nimmediate risks for the poor do not rule out adaptation options that could help them later on or which could cause \r\nthem to increase their emissions. Political will is needed to put people at the centre of climate change risk reduction \r\nefforts, including support for their livelihoods."


id: fe5128358c08861174e58327e323ea1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42111
content:
"FAQ 8.5 | How do present adaptation and future responses to climate change affect poverty and inequality?\r\nPresent adaptation can help to reduce the current and possibly future impacts of climate change. Future responses to climate change can reduce \r\npoverty and inequality, and even help transition toward climate-resilient livelihoods and climate resilient development. Pro-poor adaptation \r\nplanning is necessary to ensure future risks for the poor are being accounted for and the inequality underlying the poverty is being addressed."


id: cc8cce7665dd81d94a846f1b8230037e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33309
content:
"There are many ways in which poverty and inequality are influenced by climate change. The livelihood sources \r\nof the poor are likely to be affected and cumulative effects of losses and damages, and may influence future \r\npoverty. There are cases when present adaptation worsens future poverty and exacerbates inequality--this is called \r\nmaladaptation. The risks of maladaptation are greater in societies characterised by high inequality, and in many \r\ncases the poor and most vulnerable groups are the ones most adversely affected."


id: 815bb0221ec70a219bc502e9eb7a5049
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19890
content:
"Effective decision making in adaptation should be informed by past, present and future climate data, information \r\nand scenarios to cater for reliable plans and actions for climate-resilient livelihoods. Adaptation lessons from the \r\npast play an important role in decision making regarding responses to climate change. There is an emerging debate \r\non the role of learning, particularly forward-looking (anticipatory) learning, as a key element or important aspect \r\nfor adaptation and resilience in the context of climate change. Memory, monitoring of key drivers of change, \r\nscenario planning and measuring anticipatory capacity are seen as crucial ingredients for future adaptation and \r\nresilience pathways, and, hence overcoming maladaptation. Moreover, climate resilient development calls for \r\nensuring synergies between adaptation, mitigation and development are maximised, while trade-offs, especially \r\nthose affecting the poor, are minimised."


id: ab9a0adb2d8ce8422874bf5b37b0bd44
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27427
content:
"Coordinating Lead Authors: Christopher H. Trisos (South Africa), Ibidun O. Adelekan (Nigeria), \r\nEdmond Totin (Benin)"


id: 3da83dd5e533b340d9543385ad3a4bcb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8014
content:
"Lead Authors: Ayansina Ayanlade (Nigeria), Jackson Efitre (Uganda), Adugna Gemeda (Ethiopia), \r\nKanungwe Kalaba (Zambia), Christopher Lennard (South Africa), Catherine Masao (Tanzania), \r\nYunus Mgaya (Tanzania), Grace Ngaruiya (Kenya), Daniel Olago (Kenya), Nicholas P. Simpson \r\n(Zimbabwe/South Africa), Sumaya Zakieldeen (Sudan)"


id: d6d93211db3645b4f82020952836aaf9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35107
content:
"Review Editors: Stuart Mark Howden (Australia), Robert (Bob) J. Scholes (South Africa), Pius \r\nYanda (Tanzania)"


id: 78ffdbcc712b7c76a8cba06b3d73b15e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18477
content:
"Trisos, C.H., I.O. Adelekan, E. Totin, A. Ayanlade, J. Efitre, A. Gemeda, K. Kalaba, C. Lennard, C. Masao, Y. Mgaya, \r\nG. Ngaruiya, D. Olago, N.P. Simpson, and S. Zakieldeen, 2022: Africa. In: Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation \r\nand Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel \r\non Climate Change [H.-O. Portner, D.C. Roberts, M. Tignor, E.S. Poloczanska, K. Mintenbeck, A. Alegria, M. Craig, \r\nS. Langsdorf, S. Loschke, V. Moller, A. Okem, B. Rama (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, \r\nNY, USA, pp. 1285-1455, doi:10.1017/9781009325844.011."


id: 556585ea7ffb2607c4e602bdcf42da2b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12301
content:
"resources can provide more actionable insights on climate risks and \r\nadaptation options in Africa. {9.1,5 9.4.5, 9.5.2}"


id: a1fd2a0889484b80952a0d95d9c96850
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25735
content:
"Adaptation generally is cost-effective, but annual finance \r\nflows targeting adaptation for Africa are billions of US dollars \r\nless than the lowest adaptation cost estimates for near-term \r\nclimate change (high confidence). Finance has not targeted more \r\nvulnerable countries (high confidence). From 2014-2018 more finance \r\ncommitments were debt than grants and--excluding multilateral \r\ndevelopment banks--only 46% of commitments were disbursed \r\n(compared to 96% for other development projects). {9.4.1}"


id: edb90d4e3403b067d28072758e1f035f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39181
content:
"Africa is one of the lowest contributors to greenhouse gas \r\nemissions causing climate change, yet key development sectors \r\nhave already experienced widespread losses and damages \r\nattributable to human-induced climate change, including \r\nbiodiversity loss, water shortages, reduced food production, \r\nloss of lives and reduced economic growth (high confidence1\r\n).\r\n{9.1.1, 9.1.6, 9.2, 9.6.1, 9.8.2, 9.10.2, 9.11.1, Box 9.4}"


id: 6d2bdc7ec785545eebe5257bc736bf2c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16485
content:
"Adaptation costs will rise rapidly with global warming (very \r\nhigh confidence). Increasing public and private finance flows \r\nby billions of dollars per year, increasing direct access to \r\nmultilateral funds, strengthening project pipeline development \r\nand shifting more finance to project implementation would help \r\nrealise transformative adaptation in Africa (high confidence). \r\nConcessional finance will be required for adaptation in low-income \r\nsettings (high confidence). Aligning sovereign debt relief with climate \r\ngoals could increase finance by redirecting debt-servicing payments to \r\nclimate resilience. {9.4.1}"


id: 5e5f5c6b317166fd1846e75d983040c2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13896
content:
"Between 1.5degC and 2degC global warming--assuming localised \r\nand incremental adaptation--negative impacts are projected \r\nto become widespread and severe with reduced food \r\nproduction, reduced economic growth, increased inequality \r\nand poverty, biodiversity loss, increased human morbidity \r\nand mortality (high confidence). Limiting global warming \r\nto 1.5degC is expected to substantially reduce damages to \r\nAfrican economies, agriculture, human health, and ecosystems \r\ncompared to higher levels of global warming (high confidence). \r\n{9.2, 9.6.2, 9.8.2, 9.8.5, 9.10.2, 9.11.2}"


id: ef6940ed12406986c9c2b0bb0c5c9238
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39491
content:
"Governance for climate resilient development includes long\u0002term planning, all-of-government approaches, transboundary \r\ncooperation and benefit-sharing, development pathways that \r\nincrease adaptation and mitigation and reduce inequality, and \r\nimplementation of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) \r\n(high confidence). {9.3.2, 9.4.2, 9.4.3}"


id: 802fb302227ac9642de07e73ec50f2c6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19681
content:
"Exposure and vulnerability to climate change in Africa \r\nare multi-dimensional with socioeconomic, political and \r\nenvironmental factors intersecting (very high confidence). \r\nAfricans are disproportionately employed in climate-exposed sectors: \r\n55-62% of the sub-Saharan workforce is employed in agriculture and \r\n95% of cropland is rainfed. In rural Africa, poor and female-headed \r\nhouseholds face greater livelihood risks from climate hazards. In urban \r\nareas, growing informal settlements without basic services increase \r\nthe vulnerability of large populations to climate hazards, especially \r\nwomen, children and the elderly. {9.8.1, 9.9.1, 9.9.3, 9.11.4, Box 9.1}"


id: f12f0172c195108525ce364b3c28e93a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39818
content:
"Cross-sectoral 'nexus' approaches provide significant oppor\u0002tunities for large co-benefits and/or avoided damages (very \r\nhigh confidence). For example, climate change adaptation benefits \r\npandemic preparedness, 'One Health' approaches benefit human and \r\necosystem health, and ecosystem-based adaptation can deliver adap\u0002tation and emissions mitigation (high confidence). {9.4.3, 9.6.4, 9.11.5; \r\nBox 9.6}"


id: b3de6e7f196c030759cb5bf3947d4b69
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28886
content:
"Adaptation in Africa has multiple benefits, and most assessed \r\nadaptation options have medium effectiveness at reducing \r\nrisks for present-day global warming, but their efficacy at \r\nfuture warming levels is largely unknown (high confidence).\r\n{9.3, 9.6.4, 9.8.3, 9.11.4}"


id: e10fb9e7d94abf11ae3cbfe0d781d7bd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36859
content:
"Without cross-sectoral, transboundary and long-term planning, \r\nadaptation and mitigation response options in one sector can \r\nbecome response risks, exacerbating impacts in other sectors \r\nand causing maladaptation (very high confidence). For example, \r\nmaintaining indigenous forest benefits biodiversity and reduces \r\ngreenhouse gas emissions, but afforestation--or wrongly targeting \r\nancient grasslands and savannas for reforestation--harms water \r\nsecurity and biodiversity, and can increase carbon loss to fire and \r\ndrought. Planned hydropower projects may increase risk as rainfall \r\nchanges impact water, energy and food security, exacerbating trade\u0002offs between users, including across countries. {9.4.3, Boxes 9.3, 9.5}"


id: a79438689ff977aadad3c3b23d329413
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26695
content:
"Climate-related research in Africa faces severe data constraints, \r\nas well as inequities in funding and research leadership that \r\nreduces adaptive capacity (very high confidence). Many countries \r\nlack regularly reporting weather stations, and data access is often \r\nlimited. From 1990-2019, research on Africa received just 3.8% of \r\nclimate-related research funding globally: 78% of this funding for \r\nAfrica went to EU and north American institutions and only 14.5% to \r\nAfrican institutions. The number of climate research publications with \r\nlocally based authors are among the lowest globally and research led \r\nby external researchers may focus less on local priorities. Increased \r\nfunding for African partners, and direct control of research design and "


id: 322d86b45dbc9b95a1a79b04e350e624
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6084
content:
"Africa), increasing exposure to pluvial and riverine flooding \r\n(high confidence). {9.5.3-7, 9.7}"


id: ece4ff8276957111d581135712f52de4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39047
content:
"Glaciers on the Rwenzoris and Mt Kenya are projected to disappear \r\nby 2030, and by 2040 on Kilimanjaro (medium confidence). {9.5.8}"


id: af4e1dca53fb89a33b6a80b514d4b36b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28076
content:
"Climate information services that are demand driven and \r\ncontext specific (e.g., for agriculture or health) combined with \r\nclimate change literacy can be the difference between coping \r\nand informed adaptation responses (high confidence). Across \r\n33 African countries, 23-66% of people are aware of human-caused \r\nclimate change--with larger variation at sub-national scales (e.g., \r\n5-71% among states in Nigeria). Climate change literacy increases \r\nwith education level but is undermined by poverty, and literacy rates \r\naverage 12.8% lower for women than men. Around 71% of Africans \r\nthat are aware of climate change agree it should be stopped. Production \r\nof salient climate information in Africa is hindered by limited availability \r\nof and access to weather and climate data. {9.4.5, 9.5.1, 9.8.4, 9.10.3}"


id: 318eb54594616e7466738e6583c2bd73
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5964
content:
"In east and southern Africa, tropical cyclones making landfall \r\nare projected to become less frequent but have more intense \r\nrainfall and higher wind speeds at increasing global warming \r\n(medium confidence). {9.5.7}"


id: 3b19b92d3de605773e9598b8eec7125a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7584
content:
"Heat waves on land, in lakes and in the ocean will increase \r\nconsiderably in magnitude and duration with increasing global \r\nwarming (very high confidence). Under a 1.5degC-compatible \r\nscenario, children born in Africa in 2020 are likely to be exposed \r\nto 4-8  times more heat waves compared to people born in 1960, \r\nincreasing to 5-10  times for 2.4degC global warming. The annual \r\nnumber of days above potentially lethal heat thresholds reaches 50-\r\n150 in west Africa at 1.6degC global warming, 100-150 in central Africa \r\nat 2.5degC, and 200-300 over tropical Africa for >4degC. {9.5.2, 9.5.3, \r\n9.5.4, 9.5.5, 9.5.6, 9.7.2.1}"


id: d7ee2e1c1eb368b9c3fdc5bec3e5bc82
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35296
content:
"Ecosystem-based adaptation can reduce climate risk while \r\nproviding social, economic and environmental benefits (high \r\nconfidence). Direct human dependence on ecosystem services in \r\nAfrica is high. Ecosystem protection and restoration, conservation \r\nagriculture practices, sustainable land management, and integrated \r\ncatchment management can support climate resilience. Ecosystem\u0002based adaptation can cost less than grey infrastructure in human \r\nsettlements (e.g., using wetlands and mangroves as coastal protection). \r\n{9.6.4, 9.7.3, 9.8.3, 9.9.5, 9.12.3, Box 9.7}"


id: 919f224552b8451b29e7ade1ca912c1b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22846
content:
"Most African countries will enter unprecedented high temperature \r\nclimates earlier in this century than generally wealthier, higher \r\nlatitude countries, emphasising the urgency of adaptation \r\nmeasures in Africa (high confidence). {9.5.1}"


id: 2cdf90c252a5e1cee9459a9f57b05439
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5164
content:
"Multiple African countries are projected to face compounding \r\nrisks from reduced food production across crops, livestock \r\nand fisheries, increased heat-related mortality, heat-related \r\nloss of labour productivity and flooding from sea level rise, \r\nespecially in west Africa (high confidence). {9.8.2, 9.8.5, 9.9.4, \r\n9.10.2, 9.11.2}"


id: dc34e95ce11c3fe465c9f8bf3108936d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36016
content:
"Increasing mean and extreme temperature trends across \r\nAfrica are attributable to human-caused climate change (high \r\nconfidence). {9.5.1, 9.5.2}"


id: d1eb66794dc057bab4d3b0c51d0bd548
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34279
content:
"Climate change has increased heat waves (high confidence) \r\nand drought (medium confidence) on land, and doubled the \r\nprobability of marine heatwaves around most of Africa (high \r\nconfidence). Multi-year droughts have become more frequent in west \r\nAfrica, and the 2015-2017 Cape Town drought was three times more \r\nlikely2 due to human-caused climate change. {9.5.3-7, 9.5.10}"


id: 4446a1ef6e0830a51d7d13a009ccbd58
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9248
content:
"Recent extreme variability in rainfall and river discharge \r\n(around -50% to +50% relative to long-term historical means) \r\nacross Africa have had largely negative and multi-sector \r\nimpacts across water-dependent sectors (high confidence).\r\n{9.7.2, 9.10.2} Hydrological variability and water scarcity have induced \r\ncascading impacts from water supply provision and/or hydroelectric \r\npower production to health, economies, tourism, food, disaster risk \r\nresponse capacity and increased inequality of water access. {Box 9.4}"


id: 25d74df2bda378a18b27c687c46dabc8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3839
content:
"Increases in drought frequency and duration are projected over \r\nlarge parts of southern Africa above 1.5degC global warming \r\n(high confidence), with decreased precipitation in North Africa \r\nat 2degC global warming (high confidence), and above 3degC global \r\nwarming, meteorological drought frequency will increase, and \r\nduration will double from approximately 2 months to 4 months \r\nin parts of North Africa, the western Sahel and southern Africa \r\n(medium confidence). {9.5.2, 9.5.3, 9.5.6.}"


id: ed76fcbaf27b979c2c7125a396bce111
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39144
content:
"Extreme hydrological variability is projected to progressively \r\namplify under all future climate change scenarios relative to \r\nthe current baseline, depending on region (high confidence).\r\nProjections of numbers of people exposed to water stress by the 2050s \r\nvary widely--decreases/increases by hundreds of millions, with higher \r\nnumbers for increases--with disagreement among global climate "


id: 3cab716383a79646d83d9838ed64c371
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7860
content:
"models on the major factor driving these large ranges. Populations in \r\ndrylands are projected to double by 2050. Projected changes present \r\nheightened cross-cutting risks to water-dependent sectors, and require \r\nplanning under deep uncertainty for the wide range of extremes \r\nexpected in future. {9.7.1, 9.7.2, 9.9.4}"


id: 825fea9707582bef045cf01f2aba61e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20064
content:
"Climate change threatens livestock production across \r\nAfrica (high agreement, low evidence). Rangeland net primary \r\nproductivity is projected to decline 42% for west Africa by 2050 at 2degC \r\nglobal warming. Vector-borne livestock diseases and the duration of \r\nsevere heat stress are both projected to become more prevalent under \r\nwarming. {9.8.2}"


id: 137f2286656bf6701e8be3b8bf5d9fff
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 639
content:
"Climate change poses a significant threat to African marine and \r\nfreshwater fisheries (high confidence). Fisheries provide the main \r\nsource of protein for approximately 200  million people in Africa and \r\nsupport the livelihoods of 12.3 million people. At 1.5degC global warming, \r\nmarine fish catch potential decreases 3-41%, and decreases by 12-69% \r\nat 4.3degC by 2081-2100 relative to 1986-2005 levels, with the highest \r\ndeclines for tropical countries. Under 1.7degC global warming, reduced fish \r\nharvests could leave 1.2-70 million people in Africa vulnerable to iron \r\ndeficiencies, up to 188 million for vitamin A deficiencies, and 285 million \r\nfor vitamin B12 and omega-3 fatty acids by mid-century. For inland \r\nfisheries, 55-68% of commercially harvested fish species are vulnerable \r\nto extinction under 2.5degC global warming by 2071-2100. {9.8.5}"


id: bf9466198d9ddd0737534bf22db061a3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30969
content:
"Climate change has reduced economic growth across Africa, \r\nincreasing income inequality between African countries \r\nand those in temperate northern hemisphere climates (high \r\nconfidence). One estimate suggests gross domestic product (GDP) \r\nper capita for 1991-2010 in Africa was on average 13.6% lower \r\nthan if climate change had not occurred. Impacts manifest largely \r\nthrough losses in agriculture, as well as tourism, manufacturing and \r\ninfrastructure. {9.6.3, 9.11.1}"


id: d78e1e0d946e9640ce70dc8d83d3a640
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35227
content:
"Climate variability and change undermine educational attainment \r\n(high agreement, medium evidence). High temperatures, low \r\nrainfall and flooding, especially in the growing season, may mean \r\nchildren are removed from school to assist income generation. Early life \r\nundernutrition associated with low harvests or weather-related food \r\nsupply interruptions can impair cognitive development. {9.11.1.2}"


id: c5fc725a947a1771aea6010c4c59e982
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32144
content:
"Climate variability and change already negatively impacts the \r\nhealth of tens of millions of Africans through exposure to non\u0002optimal temperatures and extreme weather, and increased \r\nrange and transmission of infectious diseases (high confidence).\r\n{9.10.1}"


id: ab8106e7979dcc69bce07e0dd273ac04
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27406
content:
"Limiting global warming to 1.5degC is very likely to positively \r\nimpact GDP per capita across Africa. Increasing economic damage \r\nforecasts under high emissions diverge from low emission pathways \r\nby 2030. Inequalities between African countries are projected to widen \r\nwith increased warming. Across nearly all African countries, GDP per \r\ncapita is projected to be at least 5% higher by 2050 and 10-20% higher \r\nby 2100 if global warming is held to 1.5degC compared with 2degC. {9.11.2}"


id: 76e586073caa4a15314302587db54c23
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18128
content:
"In Africa, climate change is reducing crop yields and productivity \r\n(high confidence). Agricultural productivity growth has been reduced \r\nby 34% since 1961 due to climate change, more than any other \r\nregion. Maize and wheat yields decreased on average 5.8% and 2.3%, \r\nrespectively in sub-Saharan Africa due to climate change in the period \r\n1974-2008. Farmers and pastoralists perceive the climate to have \r\nchanged and over two-thirds of Africans perceive climate conditions for \r\nagricultural production have worsened over the past 10 years. Woody \r\nplant encroachment has reduced fodder availability. {9.4.5, 9.6.1, 9.8.2}"


id: 9ed2efda6669202d7d0f744910279aeb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25163
content:
"Future warming will negatively affect food systems in Africa \r\nby shortening growing seasons and increasing water stress \r\n(high confidence). By 1.5degC global warming, yields are projected \r\nto decline for olives (north Africa) and sorghum (west Africa) with a \r\ndecline in suitable areas for coffee and tea (east Africa). Although yield \r\ndeclines for some crops may be partially compensated by increasing \r\natmospheric CO2 concentrations, global warming above 2degC will result \r\nin yield reductions for staple crops across most of Africa compared \r\nto 2005 yields (e.g., 20-40% decline in west African maize yields), \r\neven when considering adaptation options and increasing CO2\r\n(medium confidence). Relative to 1986-2005, global warming of 3degC \r\nis projected to reduce labour capacity in agriculture by 30-50% in sub\u0002Saharan Africa. {9.8.2, 9.8.3, 9.11.2}"


id: eef4ec112ee8eed8f3644f8bba04ea34
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39410
content:
"Exposure of people, assets and infrastructure to climate hazards \r\nis increasing in Africa compounded by rapid urbanisation, \r\ninfrastructure deficit, and growing population in informal \r\nsettlements (high confidence)."


id: 3dcb8b76cc6c49995e89ac774e763405
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8038
content:
"High population growth and urbanisation in low-elevation \r\ncoastal zones will be a major driver of exposure to sea level rise \r\nin the next 50 years (high confidence). By 2030, 108-116 million \r\npeople in Africa will be exposed to sea level rise (compared to "


id: 32db54844b2fc6e03f8d275a3b432b5a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6213
content:
"and vegetation distributions (high confidence). Impacts include \r\nrepeated mass coral bleaching events in east Africa, and uphill (birds) \r\nor poleward (marine species) shifts in geographic distributions. For \r\nvegetation, the overall observed trend is woody plant expansion, \r\nparticularly into grasslands and savannas, reducing grazing land and \r\nwater supplies. {9.6.1, 9.6.2, 9.8.2}"


id: 338ef090e7a6763d3db856124f01f69c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6322
content:
"54 million in 2000), increasing to 190-245 million by 2060 (medium \r\nconfidence). {9.9.1, 9.9.4}"


id: 3bbd52015810103c6e50297660ec1129
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7696
content:
"The outcome of the effect of the interaction of increasing \r\nCO2 and aridity that operate in opposing directions on future \r\nbiome distributions is highly uncertain. Further increasing CO2\r\nconcentrations could increase woody plant cover, but increasing aridity \r\ncould counteract this, destabilising forest and peatland carbon stores \r\nin central Africa (low confidence). Changes in vegetation cover could \r\noccur rapidly if tipping points are crossed {9.6.1, 9.6.2, 9.8.2}"


id: c4e9a109b4f3ce42b2644f9134481481
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31951
content:
"African biodiversity loss is projected to be widespread and \r\nescalating with every 0.5degC increase above present-day global \r\nwarming (high confidence). Above 1.5degC, half of assessed species \r\nare projected to lose over 30% of their population or area of suitable \r\nhabitat. At 2degC, 36% of freshwater fish species are vulnerable to \r\nlocal extinction, 7-18% of terrestrial species assessed are at risk of \r\nextinction, and over 90% of east African coral reefs are projected \r\nto be destroyed by bleaching. Above 2degC, risk of sudden and severe \r\nbiodiversity losses becomes widespread in west, central and east \r\nAfrica. Climate change is also projected to change patterns of invasive \r\nspecies spread. {9.6.2, Figure 9.19}"


id: 5f9ae21ef609a070ad9883d1b4ecc4b8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14132
content:
"Most climate-related migration observed currently is within \r\ncountries or between neighbouring countries, rather than to \r\ndistant high-income countries (high confidence). Urbanisation has \r\nincreased when rural livelihoods were negatively impacted by low rainfall. \r\nOver 2.6  million and 3.4  million new weather-related displacements \r\noccurred in sub-Saharan Africa in 2018 and 2019. {Box 9.8}"


id: 2b90bde27dcd29df89490c62b39afe49
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4921
content:
"There is increasing evidence linking increased temperatures \r\nand drought to conflict risk in Africa (high confidence). \r\nAgriculturally dependent and politically excluded groups are \r\nespecially vulnerable to drought-associated conflict risk. However, \r\nclimate is one of many interacting risk factors, and may explain \r\na small share of total variation in conflict incidence. Ameliorating \r\nethnic tensions, strengthening political institutions and investing in \r\neconomic diversification could mitigate future impacts of climate \r\nchange on conflict. {Box 9.9}"


id: 8997708708d576cc6dcb73ca839e8c1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21383
content:
"Climate change is projected to increase migration, especially \r\ninternal and rural to urban migration (high agreement, medium \r\nevidence). With 1.7degC global warming by 2050, 17-40 million people \r\ncould migrate internally in sub-Saharan Africa, increasing to 56-\r\n86 million for 2.5degC (>60% in west Africa) due to water stress, reduced \r\ncrop productivity and sea level rise. This is a lower-bound estimate \r\nexcluding rapid-onset hazards such as floods and tropical cyclones. \r\n{Box 9.8}"


id: 4371ac17b75fccada69610d13c33837c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9089
content:
"African cultural heritage is already at risk from climate hazards, \r\nincluding sea level rise and coastal erosion. Most African \r\nheritage sites are neither prepared for, nor adapted to, future \r\nclimate change (high confidence). {9.12}"


id: a90ab1092db989b3837bfbfac2d45313
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26950
content:
"Climate-related infrastructure damage and repairs will be a \r\nfinancially significant burden to countries (high confidence). \r\nWithout adaptation, aggregate damages from sea level rise and coastal \r\nextremes to 12 major African coastal cities in 2050 under medium and \r\nhigh emissions scenarios will be USD 65 billion and USD 86.5 billion, \r\nrespectively. Potential costs of up to USD  183.6  billion may be \r\nincurred through 2100 to maintain existing road networks damaged \r\nfrom temperature and precipitation changes due to climate change. \r\nIncreased rainfall variability is expected to affect electricity prices in \r\ncountries highly dependent on hydropower. {9.9.4, Boxes 9.4, 9.5}"


id: 5a4d0e31961e3fbe7a27d7f04f6e9467
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13134
content:
"With global warming increasing above present-day levels, the \r\nability of adaptation responses to offset risk is substantially \r\nreduced (high confidence). Crop yield losses, even after adaptation, \r\nare projected to rise rapidly above 2degC global warming. Limits to \r\nadaptation are already being reached in coral reef ecosystems. \r\nImmigration of species from elsewhere may partly compensate for \r\nlocal extinctions and/or lead to local biodiversity gains in some regions. \r\nHowever, more African regions face net losses than net gains. At 1.5degC "


id: 69db05cfd31d0b8730dd2dde928750b4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15890
content:
"scenario planning, monitored groundwater use, waterless on\u0002site sanitation, rainwater harvesting and water re-use, reducing \r\nrisk to human settlements, food systems, economies and human \r\nhealth (high confidence). {9.8, 9.9, 9.10, 9.11}"


id: a64f3334f011ef114dbceae877a00ac9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26479
content:
"global warming, over 46% of localities face net losses in terrestrial \r\nvertebrate species richness with net increases projected for under 15% \r\nof localities. {9.6.1.4, 9.6.2.2, 9.8.2.1, 9.8.2.2, 9.8.4}"


id: 9c6ed3ca28bca3b74b4e2281f88834b0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24775
content:
"Technological, institutional and financing factors are major \r\nbarriers to climate adaptation feasibility in Africa (high con\u0002fidence). {9.3, 9.4.1}"


id: f02dda85af20d35e78a6d9ec1c3e32b5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39644
content:
"Water sector adaptation measures show medium social and \r\neconomic feasibility but low feasibility for most African cities \r\ndue to technical and institutional restrictions, particularly for \r\nlarge supply dams and centralised distribution systems (medium \r\nconfidence). {9.3.1, 9.7.3} Use of integrated water management, \r\nwater supply augmentation and establishment of decentralised water \r\nmanagement systems can reduce risk. Integrated water management \r\nmeasures including sub-national financing, demand management \r\nthrough subsidies, rates and taxes, and sustainable water technologies \r\ncan reduce water insecurity caused by either drought or floods (medium \r\nconfidence). {9.7.3, Box 9.4}"


id: 907b1b883a7f68c15fbad2b582cba7c8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22623
content:
"There is limited evidence for economic growth alone reducing \r\nclimate damages, but under scenarios of inclusive and sustainable \r\ndevelopment, millions fewer people in Africa will be pushed \r\ninto extreme poverty by climate change and negative impacts \r\nto health and livelihoods can be reduced by 2030 (medium \r\nconfidence). {9.10.3, 9.11.4}"


id: 9bef78f26498a3f48bfd87d717b0d7a2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24684
content:
"Gender-sensitive and equity-based adaptation approaches reduce \r\nvulnerability for marginalised groups across multiple sectors \r\nin Africa, including water, health, food systems and livelihoods \r\n(high confidence). {9.7.3, 9.8.3, 9.9.5, 9.10.3, 9.11.4, Boxes 9.1, 9.2}"


id: bb712c733aa80179b35269c8259d4559
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30197
content:
"Agricultural and livelihood diversification, agroecological \r\nand conservation agriculture practices, aquaculture, on-farm \r\nengineering and agroforestry can increase resilience and \r\nsustainability of food systems in Africa under climate change \r\n(medium confidence). However, smallholder farmers tend to address \r\nshort-term shocks or stresses by deploying coping responses rather \r\nthan transformative adaptations. Climate information services, \r\ninstitutional capacity building, secure land tenure, and strategic \r\nfinancial investment can help overcome these barriers to adaptation \r\n(medium confidence). {9.3.1, 9.4.5, 9.8.3, 9.8.5}"


id: aaa544a20b0587fc5b5ae19ee11532a9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27243
content:
"Integrating climate adaptation into social protection pro\u0002grammes, such as cash transfers, public works programmes and \r\nhealthcare access, can increase resilience to climate change \r\n(high confidence). Nevertheless, social protection programmes may \r\nincrease resilience to climate-related shocks, even if they do not spe\u0002cifically address climate risks. {9.4.2, 9.10.3, 9.11.4}"


id: 9f7606d36c1429e9f69c827eb08090c4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25271
content:
"The diversity of African Indigenous Knowledge and local knowl\u0002edge systems provide a rich foundation for adaptation actions \r\nat local scales (high confidence). African Indigenous Knowledge \r\nsystems are exceptionally rich in ecosystem-specific knowledge used \r\nfor management of climate variability. Integration of Indigenous \r\nKnowledge systems within legal frameworks, and promotion of In\u0002digenous land tenure rights can reduce vulnerability. {9.4.4, Boxes \r\n9.1, 9.2}"


id: 16df6fca506f5a246d3ef50d7c217ba3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1242
content:
"African countries and communities are inadequately insured \r\nagainst climate risk, but innovative index-based insurance \r\nschemes can help transfer risk and aid recovery, including \r\nin food systems (medium confidence). Despite their potential, \r\nuptake of climate insurance products remains constrained by lack of \r\naffordability, awareness and product diversity. {9.4.5, 9.8.4, 9.11.4.1}"


id: 75b3ea1fe3f519c09b0db911991cc966
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17937
content:
"Human migration is a potentially effective adaptation strategy \r\nacross food systems, water, livelihoods and in climate-induced \r\nconflict areas, but can also be maladaptive if vulnerability is \r\nincreased, particularly for health and human settlements (high \r\nconfidence). Migration of men from rural areas can aggravate the \r\nwork burden faced by women. The more agency migrants have (i.e., \r\ndegree of voluntarity and freedom of movement) the greater the \r\npotential benefits for sending and receiving areas (high agreement, \r\nmedium evidence).{9.3, 9.8.3, 9.9.1-3, 9.10.2.2.2, Boxes 9.8, 9.9, \r\nCross-Chapter Box MIGRATE in Chapter 7}"


id: 6cccd4d7ce130b4f1122387b2f136aee
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16420
content:
"Early warning systems based on targeted climate services \r\ncan be effective for disaster risk reduction, social protection \r\nprogrammes, and managing risks to health and food systems \r\n(e.g., vector-borne disease and crops) (high confidence). {9.4.5, \r\n9.5.1, Box 9.2, 9.8.4, 9.8.5, 9.10.3, 9.11.4}"


id: 28540fc0f6c2ae413fb05712bc0595cb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4294
content:
"Risk-sensitive infrastructure delivery and equitable provision \r\nof basic services can reduce climate risks and provide net \r\nfinancial savings (high confidence). However, there is limited \r\nevidence of proactive climate adaptation in African cities. Proactive \r\nadaptation policy could reduce road repair and maintenance costs \r\nby 74% compared to a reactive policy. Adapting roads for increased \r\ntemperatures and investment in public transport are assessed as 'no \r\nregret' options. In contrast, hydropower development carries risk of \r\nregrets due to damages when a different climate than was expected \r\nmaterialises. Energy costs for cooling demands are projected to \r\naccumulate to USD 51.3 billion by 2035 at 2degC global warming and to \r\nUSD 486.5 billion by 2076 at 4degC. {9.8.5}"


id: 9f7852588aa324c318c6d82d70787054
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25274
content:
"This chapter assesses the scientific evidence on observed and projected \r\nclimate change impacts, vulnerability and adaptation options in Africa. \r\nThe assessment refers to five African sub-regions--north, west, \r\ncentral, east and southern--closely following the African Union (AU), \r\nbut including Mauritania in west Africa and Sudan in north Africa \r\nbecause much of the literature assessed places these countries in these \r\nregions (Figure 9.1). Madagascar and other island states are addressed \r\nin Chapter 15."


id: 4eb6868d88b9dee86c4a01bf23607b6f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11123
content:
"The contribution of Africa is among the lowest of historical greenhouse \r\ngas (GHG) emissions responsible for human-induced climate change \r\nand it has the lowest per capita GHG emissions of all regions currently \r\n(high confidence) (Figure  9.2). Yet Africa has already experienced \r\nwidespread impacts from human-induced climate change (high \r\nconfidence) (Figure 9.2; see Table 9.1)."


id: e86df258171603499721aefd55249f8e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38229
content:
"Since AR5 (Assessment Report 5), there have been notable policy \r\nchanges in Africa and globally. The Paris Agreement, 2030 Sustainable \r\nDevelopment Goals (SDGs), the Sendai Framework and Agenda 2063 \r\nemphasise interlinked aims to protect the planet, reduce disaster risk, \r\nend poverty and ensure all people enjoy peace and prosperity (AU, \r\n2015; UNFCCC Paris Agreement, 2015; UNISDR Sendai Framework, \r\n2015; United Nations General Assembly, 2015). To match these \r\ninterlinked ambitions, this chapter assesses risks and response options \r\nboth for individual sectors and cross-sectorally to assess how risks \r\ncan compound and cascade across sectors, as well as the potential \r\nfeasibility and effectiveness, co-benefits and trade-offs and potential for \r\nmaladaptation from response options (Simpson et al., 2021b; Williams \r\net al., 2021)."


id: d16890e09a21880b99119afa0b77eace
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34196
content:
"Based on an analysis of 1022 mentions of Africa or African countries \r\nacross the three AR6 Special Reports, the following main conclusions \r\nemerged."


id: edc2b37fcacf75d99367383672f01ae6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39188
content:
"(d) Total emissions in Africa since 1990, broken down by GHG (left) and sector (right). Methane and CO2 emissions comprise an almost equal share of GHG emissions in Africa, \r\nwith the largest emissions sectors being energy and agriculture (Crippa et al., 2021). Agriculture emissions in panel (d) do not include land use, land use change and forestry \r\n(LULUCF CO2). One-hundred-year global warming potentials consistent with WGI estimates are used. Emissions data are from Crippa et al. (2021), compiled in Working Group III \r\n(WGIII) Chapter 2."


id: a05ef3b27d005dfc66929b2d5d0b9f9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25425
content:
"Figure 9.3 |  Climate-related research on Africa has received a very small percentage (around 4%) of global climate research funding (a).\r\n(b) As a percentage of all research funding allocated to a region, climate research has, since 2010, made up 5% of Africa-related research funding compared to a 3% share for \r\nclimate research in global research funding."


id: f5b573df6f4ffa9056e226277b0583a6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40592
content:
"(d) Most funding for climate-related research on Africa flows to institutions based in Europe and the USA. Funding comes mainly from government organisations with private \r\nphilanthropy providing only around 1% (Overland et al., 2021)."


id: 5c293223e92c08d766f9da1ce7411ac1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13468
content:
"(e) Africa-related climate research funding focuses mostly on food systems, ecosystems and freshwater, while health, poverty, security and conflict, and urban areas have received \r\nthe least."


id: cbb8f145bccb078149d7767b8c69d264
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33166
content:
"(f) Research on climate mitigation received only 17% of funding while climate impacts and adaptation each received 40%. A greater proportion of Africa-focused climate funding \r\nhas gone to social sciences and humanities (28%) than is the case globally (12%) (Overland et al., 2021). Data are from an analysis of 4,458,719 research grants in the Dimensions \r\ndatabase with a combined value of USD 1.51 trillion awarded by 521 funding organisations globally (Overland et al. 2021). The Dimensions database is the world's largest database \r\non research funding flows (Overland et al. 2021). It draws on official data from all major funding organisations in the world, mainly government research councils or similar \r\ninstitutions. Note: The South African National Research Foundation is the only African research funding body that is sufficiently large to be included in Dimensions."


id: af845407e0f9084291f405c7d2651ac0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28112
content:
"Figure 9.4 |  Major gaps in climate change research funding, participation and publication exist within Africa, and for Africa compared to the res\r\nworld."


id: 72d4cde264260d83afd2ee8509300451
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17450
content:
"(a) Funding: Amount of climate change research funding focused on African countries 1990-2020 (Overland et al., 2021). Considering population size, research on Egypt and \r\nNigeria stands out as particularly underfinanced."


id: 8a01fb564798fe6b8629c6aea1fc5aa6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21449
content:
"(b) Participation: Percentage of peer-reviewed climate change papers on impacts and adaptation published on a given country that also include at least one author based in that \r\ncountry (Pasgaard et al. 2015)."


id: c55965da7b80df8fa522ec71591a7fde
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32029
content:
"(c) Number of publications of climate change adaptation research focused on individual countries identified from a global sample of 62,191 adaptation-relevant peer-reviewed \r\narticles published from 1988-2020 (Sietsma et  al., 2021). There is a general lack of adaptation-related research on many vulnerable countries in Africa. Topic biases in \r\nadaptation-relevant research also exist where research focuses more on disaster and development-related topics in global south countries (but published by authors from the global \r\nnorth), while research on global north countries focuses more on governance topics (Sietsma et al., 2021)."


id: 90ab76543f5b94b71334ed4540d49127
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22659
content:
"Climate-related research in Africa faces severe funding constraints \r\nwith unequal funding relationships between countries and with \r\nresearch partners in Europe and North America (high confidence). \r\nBased on analysis of over 4  million research grants from 521 \r\nfunding organisations globally, it is estimated that, from 1990-2020, \r\nUSD  1.26  billion funded Africa-related research on climate impacts, \r\nmitigation and adaptation. This represents only 3.8% of global funding \r\nfor climate-related research--a figure incommensurate with Africa's \r\nhigh vulnerability to climate change (see Figure 9.3; Box 9.1; Chapter 8 \r\nFigure 8.6; Overland et al., 2021). Almost all funding for Africa-related "


id: 5b63df98597158b353f2dd3eb00f117
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13323
content:
"climate research originates outside Africa and goes to research \r\ninstitutions outside Africa (Blicharska et  al., 2017; Bendana, 2019; \r\nSiders, 2019; Overland et al., 2021). From 1990-2020, 78% of funding \r\nfor Africa-related climate research flowed to institutions in Europe "


id: 6527a885304865ed1ef6f9e6926bd98f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15062
content:
"and the USA--only 14.5% flowed to institutions in Africa (Figure 9.3; \r\nOverland et al., 2021). Kenya (2.3% of total funding) and South Africa \r\n(2.2%) are the only African countries among the top 10 countries in \r\nthe world in terms of hosting institutions receiving funding for climate\u0002related research on Africa (Overland et al., 2021)."


id: 80539de81c3a4694a76538bea33361ec
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19708
content:
"United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) \r\nas stated in its Article 2 (Oppenheimer et al., 2014). The process for \r\nidentifying key risks for Africa included reviewing risks from Niang \r\net  al. (2014) and assessing new evidence on observed impacts and \r\nprojected risks in this chapter."


id: 912cce7eafa4d9ff86cba18c244fd1f8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22747
content:
"Several key risks were identified for both ecosystems and people \r\nincluding species extinction and ecosystem disruption, loss of food \r\nproduction, reduced economic output and increased poverty, increased \r\ndisease and loss of human life, increased water and energy insecurity, \r\nloss of natural and cultural heritage and compound extreme events \r\nharming human settlements and critical infrastructure (Table 9.2). In \r\norder to provide a sector- and continent-level perspective, the key risks \r\naggregate across different regions and combine multiple risks within \r\nsectors. For detailed assessments of observed impacts and future risks \r\nwithin each sector and each sub-region of Africa, see the sector-specific \r\nsections of this chapter (Sections 9.6 to 9.12)."


id: ccdad8671b2ab75c57f1679275deae42
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33372
content:
"Assessment of impacts, vulnerability, and adaptation highlights climate \r\nchange is leading to loss and damage across Africa, that breach current \r\nand projected adaptation limits (Table 9.1; Cross-Chapter Box LOSS in \r\nChapter 17)."


id: accd90b387df891929ab3d0994426362
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27645
content:
"A key risk is defined as a potentially severe risk. In line with AR5, \r\n'severity' relates to dangerous anthropogenic interference with the \r\nclimate system, the prevention of which is the ultimate objective of the "


id: fe9f993eb50966495eea18602fb6cfdd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42179
content:
"and tea in east Africa and sorghum in west Africa (Figures 9.22; 9.23; \r\nSections 9.8.2.1; 9.8.2.2), and >12% decline in marine fisheries catch \r\npotential for multiple west African countries, potentially leaving \r\nmillions at risk of nutritional deficiencies (Figure 9.25; Section 9.8.5); \r\ntens of millions more people exposed to vector-borne diseases in east \r\nand southern Africa (malaria), and north, east and southern Africa \r\n(dengue, zika), increased risk of malnutrition in central, east and west \r\nAfrica, and more than 15 additional deaths per 100,000 annually due \r\nto heat in parts of west, east and north Africa (Figures  9.32; 9.35; \r\nSections 9.10.2; 9.9.4.1)."


id: 9e14bcfe3e50bc65504bd3407e2a394b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25048
content:
"Based on a systematic assessment of observed climate adaptation \r\nresponses in the scientific literature covering 827 adaptation response \r\ntypes in 553 studies (2013-2021), and expert elicitation process, 24 \r\ncategories of adaptation responses in Africa were identified (Williams \r\net  al., 2021; Figure  9.7). This assessment excluded autonomous \r\nadaptation in ecosystems, such as migration and evolution of animal \r\nand plant species."


id: f48a2eec9b2f6e49d030ff8be32d6358
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40398
content:
"The majority of adaptation studies were in west and east Africa \r\n(Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya and Tanzania), followed by southern Africa, \r\nwith the least coming from central and north Africa (Figure  9.7; \r\nWilliams et al., 2021). Most studies were on adaptation actions in the \r\nfood sector, with the least on health (Figure 9.7). The five adaptation \r\nresponse categories with the highest number of reported actions were \r\nsustainable water management (food sector), resilient infrastructure \r\nand technologies (health sector), agricultural intensification (food \r\nsector), human migration (poverty and livelihoods) and crop \r\nmanagement (food sector)."


id: 42acbbd640a8c8f5ec25b27abe224dd9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8925
content:
"No adaptation response categories were assessed to have high \r\nfeasibility of implementation. Technological barriers dominate factors \r\nlimiting implementation (92% of adaptation categories have low \r\ntechnological feasibility) followed by institutional barriers (71% \r\nof adaptation categories have low institutional feasibility). This \r\nassessment matches review studies finding institutional responses \r\nto be least common in Africa and highlight inadequate institutional \r\ncapacities as key limits to human adaptation (Berrang-Ford et  al., \r\n2021; Thomas et al., 2021) (Cross-Chapter Box FEASIB in Chapter 18). \r\nFeasibility is higher for the social dimension of adaptation responses \r\n(with moderate feasibility for 88% of categories). The largest evidence \r\ngap is for environmental feasibility for which 67% could not be \r\nassessed due to insufficient evidence (Figure 9.7)."


id: 59593e5dc305ee1a761b2827703e9b69
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12955
content:
"The feasibility and effectiveness of existing adaptation options \r\nunder current levels of warming are assessed in Section 9.10.2 and \r\nadaptation options considering future levels of warming are assessed \r\nin the chapter section for each sector."


id: 27585477e64281b7ee73267907d32047
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4098
content:
"feasibility and low institutional and technological feasibility. Bulk \r\nwater infrastructure was assessed to have high effectiveness, but low \r\ninstitutional and technological feasibility. Increasing variability in climate \r\nand environmental challenges has made sustainable and resilient \r\ninfrastructure design a key priority (Minsker et al., 2015). RIT is, however, \r\ngenerally new in the African context (Cumming et al., 2017) and that \r\nmay be why there is limited evidence to assess some of its dimensions \r\n(economic and environmental feasibility). Construction of resilient public \r\nwater infrastructures that include safeguards for sanitation and hygiene \r\nare expensive and, across national and local levels, planning for its \r\nconstruction poses multiple challenges (Choko et al., 2019)."


id: a7622774d5fc8cdc5921906253497ff0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26665
content:
"(e.g., efficient irrigation) and less water-intensive cropping (also see \r\nSection 9.8.3), and was the most reported adaptation response in the \r\nfood sector. SWM was assessed with medium economic and social \r\nfeasibility and low environmental, institutional and technological \r\nfeasibility. The feasibility of this adaptation category may depend \r\nlargely on socioeconomic conditions (Amamou et al., 2018; Harmanny \r\nand Malek, 2019; Schilling et  al., 2020), as many African farmers \r\ncannot afford the cost of SWM facilities (Section 9.8.4)."


id: 2090c16682e7aaf139e41630f45da68
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2954
content:
"Resilient Infrastructure and Technologies (RIT) for health include improved \r\nhousing to limit exposure to climate hazards (Stringer et al., 2020), and \r\nimproved water quality, sanitation and hygiene infrastructure (e.g., \r\ntechnology across all sectors to prevent contamination and pollution \r\nof water, improved water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) approaches \r\nsuch as promotion of diverse water sources for water supply, improving \r\nhealth infrastructure) (Section 9.10.3). Overall, RIT had medium social "


id: 27034a03d83e26b33c3f13760b56696b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4030
content:
"Figure 9.7 |  Assessment of the feasibility and effectiveness of observed climate adaptation responses under current climate conditions for 24 categories of \r\nadaptation responses across regions of Africa. The assessment comprised evaluation of each adaptation category along six dimensions: for feasibility these were economic \r\nviability, environmental sustainability, social validity, institutional relevance, and technological availability; and for effectiveness this was potential for risk reduction (considering current \r\nclimate conditions) (Williams et al., 2021). Fifty-six experts on the African region were consulted using a structured, expert-driven elicitation process to increase the coverage and \r\nrobustness of the continent-wide adaptation feasibility and effectiveness assessment in Williams et al. (2021). Assessment included both peer-reviewed articles and grey literature."


id: 536c56c369f6bce93361288d72e3a52e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11951
content:
"(Nziguheba et  al., 2015; Ritzema et  al., 2017). Yet many of these \r\noptions currently face low institutional and technological feasibility \r\n(Figure  9.7). Social and economic feasibility is higher, but barriers \r\ninclude high cost of farm inputs (land, capital and labour), lack of \r\naccess to timely weather information and lack of water resources can \r\nmake this option quite challenging for African smallholder farmers \r\n(Sections 9.8.1; 9.11.4; Kihila, 2017; Williams et al., 2019b)."


id: bb3cc8a22b27b720e41d9952c08d0e66
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30159
content:
"Human migration was assessed to have high potential for risk \r\nreduction (Cross-Chapter Box  MIGRATE in Chapter 7, Box  9.8; Rao \r\net  al., 2019; Sitati et  al., 2021). However, it had low feasibility for \r\neconomic, institutional and technological dimensions, with limited \r\nevidence on environmental feasibility. Institutional factors such \r\nas the implementation of top-down policies have been reported as \r\nlimiting options for coping locally, resulting in migration (Brockhaus \r\net  al., 2013). Limited financial and technical support for migration \r\nlimits the extent to which it can make meaningful contributions to \r\nclimate resilience (Djalante et al., 2013; Trabacchi and Mazza, 2015). \r\nInternational and domestic remittances are an important resource that \r\ncan help aid recovery from climate shocks, but inadequate finance \r\nand banking infrastructure can limit cash transfers (Box  9.8). Male \r\nmigration can increase burdens of household and agricultural work, "


id: 4b1d31948d7f8a34083f43f04ec2f58c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10460
content:
"Crop management includes adjusting crop choices, planting times, or the \r\nsize, type and location of planted areas (Altieri et al., 2015; Nyagumbo \r\net  al., 2017; Dayamba et  al., 2018). This option faces environmental, \r\ninstitutional and technological barriers to feasibility. Social and \r\neconomic barriers to implementation are fewer. Factors such as tenure \r\nand ownership rights, labour requirements, high investment costs and \r\nlack of skills and knowledge on how to use the practices are reported \r\nto hinder implementation of crop management options by smallholder \r\nfarmers (Muller and Shackleton, 2013; Nyasimi et al., 2017). For instance, "


id: 2e4e8f2f3740922038da2754c25c2677
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5420
content:
"Climate-smart agriculture (CSA) offers opportunities for smallholder \r\nfarmers to increase productivity (SDG 2), build adaptive capacity while \r\nreducing the emission of GHGs (SDG 13) from agricultural systems \r\n(Lipper et  al., 2014; Mutenje et  al., 2019). CSA practices including \r\nconservation agriculture, access to climate information, agroforestry \r\nsystems, drip irrigation, planting pits and erosion control techniques \r\n(Partey et al., 2018; Antwi-Agyei et al., 2021) can improve soil fertility, \r\nincrease yield and household food security (Zougmore et  al., 2016; \r\nZougmore et al., 2018), thereby contributing to the realisation of SDG \r\n2 in Africa (Mbow et al., 2014)."


id: 53c5618f00cd34a5db9f89b14a64b371
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12007
content:
"especially for women (Poudel et al., 2020; Rao et al., 2020; Zhou et al., \r\n2020). The more agency migrants have (that is, degree of voluntarity \r\nand freedom of movement), the greater the potential benefits for \r\nsending and receiving areas (high agreement, medium evidence) \r\n(Cross-Chapter Box MIGRATE in Chapter 7; Box 9.8)"


id: 87f5885c93b3b81a917c41b51a0f985a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21075
content:
"Adaptation options within a number of categories, including sustainable \r\nagriculture practices, agricultural intensification, fisheries management, \r\nhealth advisory services and education, social infrastructure, \r\ninfrastructure and built environment, and livelihood diversification, \r\nwere observed to reduce socioeconomic inequalities (Williams et  al., \r\n2021). Whether adaptation options reduce inequality can be a key \r\nconsideration enhancing acceptability of policies and adaptation \r\nimplementation (Box 9.1; Section 9.11.4; Islam and Winkel, 2017)."


id: 8c2b51b73d05e6ca594929414a1bb776
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21834
content:
"Synergies between the adaptation to climate change and progress \r\ntowards the SDGs present potential co-benefits for realising multiple \r\nobjectives towards climate resilient development in Africa, increasing \r\nthe efficiency and cost-effectiveness of climate actions (Cohen et al., \r\n2021). However, designing adaptation policy under conditions of \r\nscarcity, common to many African countries, can inadvertently lead to \r\ntrade-offs between adaptation options, as well as between adaptation \r\nand mitigation options, can reinforce inequality, and fail to address \r\nunderlying social vulnerabilities (Kuhl, 2021)."


id: c25021952f514466ce71c62fee7c812a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31469
content:
"Adaptation options, such as access to climate information, provision \r\nof climate information services, growing of early maturing varieties, \r\nagroforestry systems, agricultural diversification and growing of \r\ndrought-resistant varieties of crops may deliver co-benefits, providing \r\nsynergies that result in positive outcomes. For instance, in sub\u0002Saharan African drylands including northern Ghana and Burkina Faso \r\nand large parts of the Sahel, migration as a result of unfavourable \r\nenvironmental conditions closely linked to climate change has \r\noften provided opportunities for farmers to earn income (SDG 1) \r\nand mitigate the effects of climate-related fluctuations in crop and \r\nlivestock productivity (SDG 2) (Zampaligre et al., 2014; Antwi-Agyei \r\net al., 2018; Wiederkehr et al., 2018). Renewable energy can mitigate \r\nclimate effects (SDG 13), improve air quality (SDG 3), wealth and \r\ndevelopment (SDGs 1, 2)."


id: e909aaa2bc2c1c549f4ba15af998989c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38356
content:
"Climate resilient development (CRD) is a process of implementing \r\nGHG mitigation and adaptation measures to support sustainable \r\ndevelopment for all (Denton et  al., 2014; Andrijevic et  al., 2020; \r\nOwen, 2020; Cornforth et al., 2021). It emphasises equity as a core \r\nelement of sustainable development as well as conditions for inclusive \r\nand sustained economic growth, shared prosperity and decent work \r\nfor all, taking into account different levels of national development \r\nand capacities as encoded in the SDGs (Section  9.3.2; Chapter 18 \r\nSection 18.1). This section identifies five key dimensions of CRD for \r\nAfrica: climate finance, governance, cross-sectoral and transboundary \r\nsolutions, adaptation law, and climate services and literacy."


id: 395cd8734940f51e4c180582223603fd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7304
content:
"Different types of irrigation including drip and small-scale irrigation can \r\ncontribute towards increased agricultural productivity (SDG 2), improved \r\nincome (SDG 1) and food security (SDG 2) and increase resilience to \r\nlong-term changes in precipitation (SDG 13) (Bjornlund et al., 2020). \r\nIn Kenya and Tanzania, small-scale irrigation provides employment \r\nopportunities and income to both farmers and private businesses (SDGs \r\n8 and 9) (Lefore et al., 2021; Simpson et al., 2021c). Land management \r\npractices including the use of fertilizers and mulching have also been \r\nhighlighted as adaptation options improving soil fertility for better \r\nyields (SDG 2) and delivering opportunities to reduce the climate \r\nchange effects (SDG 13) (Muchuru and Nhamo, 2019)."


id: 44d2c9aa7a436164caf442eeb64638f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9333
content:
"Access to adequate financial resources is crucial for climate change \r\nadaptation (Cross-Chapter Box  FINANCE in Chapter 17). Since the \r\nCopenhagen Accord (UNFCCC, 2009), and then extended by the Paris \r\nAgreement (UNFCCC Paris Agreement, 2015 see Article 4.4, and also 4.8, \r\n4.9), developed countries are expected to scale up climate finance for \r\ndeveloping countries toward a collective goal of USD 100 billion per year \r\nby 2020, with a balanced allocation between adaptation and mitigation."


id: 8e1f4018a424487135346fe812d025f0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22200
content:
"There is limited research providing quantitative estimates of \r\nadaptation costs across Africa. Adaptation costs in Africa have been \r\nestimated at USD  7-15  billion per year by 2020 (Schaeffer et  al., \r\n2013), corresponding to USD  5-11 per capita per year. The African \r\nDevelopment Bank estimates costs of near-term adaptation needs \r\nidentified in the Intended NDCs (INDCs) of African countries as \r\nUSD 7.4 billion per year from 2020, recognising INDCs describe only \r\na limited subset of adaptation needs (AfDB, 2019). Many African \r\ncountries, particularly Least Developed Countries (LDCs), express \r\na stronger demand for adaptation finance--a study of financial \r\ndemands in INDCs for 16 African countries suggests a ratio around \r\n2:1 for adaptation to mitigation finance with demand for Eritrea and \r\nUganda approximately 80% for adaptation (Zhang and Pan, 2016)."


id: a7dad522a6950bdf090fef6fc4940ad7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26740
content:
"The multilateral development banks (MDBs) report 43% of their climate\u0002related commitments to sub-Saharan Africa in 2018 targeted adaptation \r\n(EBRD et al., 2021). Sources other than international public finance are \r\nmore difficult to track and there is limited data on Africa (Cross-Chapter \r\nBox  FINANCE in Chapter 17). Considering a wider range of finance \r\ntypes (including private flows and domestic mobilisation), an estimated \r\nannual average of roughly USD 19 billion in climate finance for 2017-\r\n2018 went to sub-Saharan Africa, of which only 5% was for adaptation \r\n(CPI, 2019; Adhikari and Safaee Chalkasra, 2021). The mobilisation of \r\nprivate finance by developed country governments, through bilateral and "


id: b6e2eea8dd40d6404f1bc91d62f8a3d0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29378
content:
"Although analysts face challenges related to the nature of climate \r\nchange impacts (Sussman et al., 2014) and data limitations (Li et al., \r\n2014) when estimating all costs and benefits for adaptation measures in "


id: acb3d99814ef65c4639d37968ce99880
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27630
content:
"Figure 9.9 |  Adaptation finance for Africa has focused most on agriculture and water, and disbursement ratios for climate-related finance are very low \r\n(a) The amounts of finance targeting adaptation committed to different sectors across Africa from 2014-2018 in millions of USD as reported to OECD and including multilateral \r\ndevelopment banks (Savvidou et al., 2021). "


id: 51187d33f03cefd68cdd53487d452ea
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11549
content:
"(c) disbursement ratios for adaptation finance broken down by each African sub-region for 2014-2018 (for all funders reporting to OECD except multilateral development banks). \r\nSource: Savvidou et al. (2021)."


id: e009507360a29e624578d219ab008ce
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36659
content:
"multilateral financial support, is lower in Africa relative to other world \r\nregions. Globally, in 2016-2018, Africa made up only 17% of mobilised \r\nprivate finance relevant for climate change (OECD, 2020)."


id: 333302d3a9004c5596d05be35aa876f2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6265
content:
"but decreased in central Africa (Savvidou et  al., 2021) (Figure  9.8b). \r\nClimate-related finance was >50% for adaptation in 19 countries, while \r\n26 received >50% for mitigation (Savvidou et al., 2021)."


id: 384c8fcf23b4a9adc1e3c64a38dd60f8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7111
content:
"Strong differences exist among African sub-regions. Finance commitments \r\ntargeting adaptation increased from 2014-2018 for east and west Africa "


id: 3e4714ebd776c67789992d1e8f3f98a0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8133
content:
"regions (Fonta et  al., 2018). This suggests the quality of proposals \r\nand therefore the capacity to develop fundable proposals remains \r\ninadequate in the region."


id: 9cc713d0e1779bf4a1853b2042f0d08f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24819
content:
"exacerbate fiscal challenges, especially in light of high sovereign debt \r\nlevels from the COVID-19 pandemic (Bulow et al., 2020; Estevao, 2020). \r\nFrom 2014-2018, more finance commitments targeting adaptation \r\nin Africa were debt instruments (57%) than grants (42%) (Savvidou \r\net al., 2021)."


id: 26042de6e16c954f4d3e410676dede75
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3864
content:
"For Africa combined, the sectors targeted with most support for \r\nadaptation are agriculture and water supply and sanitation, which \r\naccount for half of total adaptation finance from 2014-2018 \r\n(Figure 9.9a). The sectoral distribution has changed little over these \r\nyears, suggesting adaptation planners and funders are maintaining a \r\nrelatively narrow view of where support is needed and how to build \r\nclimate resilience (Savvidou et al., 2021)."


id: 341cad4d75a02449cb2c299ebf0536a3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6409
content:
"Adaptation finance has not been targeted more towards more \r\nvulnerable countries (Barrett, 2014; Weiler and Sanubi, 2019; Doshi \r\nand Garschagen, 2020; Savvidou et al., 2021). Reasons for this include \r\nfast-growing middle-income countries offering larger gains in emission \r\nreductions, so finance has favoured mitigation in these economies, \r\neven within sub-Saharan Africa, and as more climate finance uses debt \r\ninstruments, mitigation projects are further preferred because returns \r\nare perceived to be more certain (Rai et al., 2016; Lee and Hong, 2018; \r\nCarty et al., 2020; Simpson et al., 2021c)."


id: b2a77f65220bb6f09153a830cdfe3a67
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28667
content:
"yet there is often a lack of coordination, clear leadership or governance \r\nmandates (Shackleton et al., 2015; Leck and Simon, 2018) and unequal \r\npower relations between African countries and developed countries can \r\nhinder progress on governance of financial markets, budget allocations \r\nand technology transfer to address addressing climate technology gaps \r\nin Africa (Rennkamp and Boyd, 2015; Olawuyi, 2018)."


id: b0404a9d9c4395277f02c4a49cc908a2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28246
content:
"Policy implementation can be slow due to the absence of support \r\nmechanisms and dependency on funding by international partners \r\n(Leck and Roberts, 2015; Ozor and Nyambane, 2020). In many countries, \r\ncommitment to climate policy objectives is low (Naess et al., 2015), \r\nparticularly in light of competing development imperatives and post\u0002COVID-19 recovery efforts (Caetano et al., 2020), although COVID-19 \r\nrecovery efforts offer significant opportunities for health, economic \r\nand climate resilience co-benefits (Sections  9.4.3; 9.11.5; Cross\u0002Chapter Box COVID in Chapter 7). Another challenge relates to long\u0002term planning and decision making which is hampered by uncertainty \r\nrelated to future socioeconomic and GHG emissions scenarios (Coen, \r\n2021), political cycles and short-term political appointment terms \r\n(Pasquini et al., 2015)."


id: 52940f15ca6586c2c43733fe94b208cb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11812
content:
"Lack of community agency in climate governance affects the capacity \r\nfor citizen-led climate interventions in Africa (Antwi-Agyei et al., 2015; \r\nMersha and Van Laerhoven, 2016). This is attributed partly to low civic \r\neducation, limited participation power of citizens and tokenism due \r\nto perceived lack of immediate benefits (Odei Erdiaw-Kwasie et  al., \r\n2020), as well as low rates of climate change literacy in many regions \r\n(Section 9.4.3; Simpson et al., 2021a). Participation in climate policy \r\nalso extends to the private sector, which has been relatively uninvolved \r\nin adaptation discussions to date (Crick et al., 2018)."


id: 8cebc89bb8ae1108212fa61c9a71208d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21977
content:
"Africa requires substantial resources and support to adapt to the \r\nunavoidable consequences of climate change, a pertinent climate \r\njustice concern for governments. However, the mechanisms needed to \r\nredress current power imbalances, structural and systemic inequality \r\nare often absent (Saraswat and Kumar, 2016; see Section  9.11.4) \r\nand policies that underpin environmental justice concerns, including \r\ndistributive justice, participation, recognition and capability (Shi et al., \r\n2016; Chu et al., 2017) are also needed."


id: 9c633be5fc7c302a6ff7b871bd136b55
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24764
content:
"Good governance can contribute to positive climate outcomes and \r\nCRD in Africa through long-term planning, development-focused policy \r\nenvironments, the development of robust and transformational policy \r\narchitecture, inclusive participation and timely implementation of NDCs \r\n(Bataille et al., 2016; Werners et al., 2021; see Table 9.3 for examples)."


id: 11fe2d4bacfbdcd4d224b3f125eefca9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 353
content:
"African governments are developing and revising ambitious adaptation \r\npolicies that are enforceable and aligned with wider societal \r\ndevelopment goals, including an enabling environment for finance and \r\ninvestment in the jobs and skills development necessary to support \r\na just transition (Section 9.4.5; ILO, 2019). If appropriately designed, \r\nsuch institutions offer the opportunity to foster adaptive governance \r\nthat is collaborative, multi-level and decentralised, offering integration \r\nof policy domains, flexibility and an emphasis on non-coerciveness and \r\nadaptation (Ruhl, 2010)."


id: 5af9acca61b994bdfa33c17055a0af90
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13257
content:
"community members in decision making, increasing the capacity of \r\nthese communities to respond to climate change (Reid, 2014)."


id: a4445036ed318a851e48e5475eb9deac
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26094
content:
"Coordination across multiple sectors, supported with leadership from \r\nthe highest levels of government, has shown to improve implementation \r\neffectiveness and anticipated scaling up (Rigaud et al., 2018). This high\u0002level engagement promotes the inclusion of climate resilience and \r\nadaptation targets in national planning and budgeting. Financial and \r\ncapacity support is essential (Adenle et al., 2017; UNEP, 2021), as is \r\nthe tracking of national progress towards development goals (Box 9.6)."


id: da77d865228584e7f4c2fd7272287774
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35736
content:
"Specific indicators can be included in the performance metrics and \r\nmonitoring frameworks for each sector, policy intervention and budget \r\nplanning cycle (Wojewska et al., 2021). Many countries in Africa are also \r\nrevamping their institutional coordination mechanisms to reflect an all\u0002of-government approach and partnership with non-state stakeholders \r\nwith diverse capabilities and expertise (see examples from Rwanda \r\nand Zambia in Table 9.3). This includes Cape Town's drought response \r\nin 2017/2018 where non-state actors actively partnered with the state \r\nresponse around water management/savings practices (Simpson et al., \r\n2020a; 2020b; Cole et al., 2021b)."


id: 9191b57828b2458cec0aca5a92d8a05
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22834
content:
"In Africa, climate governance occurs in a context of deep inequality \r\nand asymmetric power relations--both within countries and between \r\ncountries--making adequate mechanisms for multi-stakeholder \r\nparticipation essential (Sapiains et al., 2021). This requires the creation \r\nof avenues for the voices of marginalised groups in policy processes \r\nand enabling policy environments that can catalyse inclusive action \r\nand transformational responses to climate change (Totin et al., 2018; \r\nRevi et  al., 2020; Ziervogel et  al., 2021), safeguarding protection \r\nagainst the climate harms of the most vulnerable in society, particularly \r\nof women and children (see also Box 9.1). Community-based natural \r\nresource management in pastoral communities was observed to \r\nimprove institutional governance outcomes through involving "


id: a2297a78f5bb3eea7145d782572de69e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25766
content:
"and risk pathways across country boundaries and regions (although \r\nwith different levels of impact) accelerate the urgency for integrated \r\napproaches to manage and benefit from shared resources and promote \r\ntheir security for populations and economies (Namara and Giordano, \r\n2017; Frame et al., 2018; Carter et al., 2021). At the same time, natural \r\nresources such as water generate economic benefits shared across \r\nboundaries, such as hydroelectric power generation and regional food \r\nsecurity (Dombrowsky and Hensengerth, 2018)."


id: ee62993104119715a60c553a5c1eb45f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39315
content:
"working in widely different sectors (Simpson et al., 2021b). Traditional \r\nrisk assessments typically only consider one climate hazard and one \r\nsector at a time, but this can lead to substantial misestimation of risk \r\nbecause multiple climate risks can interact to cause extreme impacts \r\n(Zscheischler et al., 2018; Simpson et al., 2021b)."


id: e6869b8abc6f68c7ecd2e578a084a2b7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37854
content:
"Because multiple risks are interlinked and can cascade and amplify \r\nrisk across sectors, cross-sectoral approaches that consider these \r\ninterlinkages are essential for CRD, especially for managing trade-offs \r\nand co-benefits among SDGs, mitigation and adaptation responses \r\n(Liu et al., 2018a)."


id: bf6abc406da4bacc8b100282bfcc8c32
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30942
content:
"Poor governance, particularly at the transboundary level, can undermine \r\nwater security and climate change is likely to add new challenges to pre\u0002existing dynamics, emphasising the necessity of formal transboundary \r\narrangements (Jensen and Lange, 2013; UNECA, 2016). Further, it can \r\nconstrain access to critical financial resources at a time when it is \r\nneeded most. This is particularly the case when climate impact pathways \r\nmanifest at the transboundary level (Challinor et  al., 2018; Simpson \r\net al., 2021b), but where the need to protect sovereign interests can \r\nblock regionally integrated institutional arrangements that are pivotal \r\nfor accessing the multilateral climate funds for transboundary climate \r\ninvestments that include resilient infrastructure and greater water \r\nbenefits across Africa's shared river basins (Cross-Chapter Box INTEREG \r\nin Chapter 16; Carter et al., 2021)."


id: 5da7290c2b64304602235ac045454b8e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13771
content:
"In Africa, placing cross-sectoral approaches at the core of CRD provides \r\nsignificant opportunities to deliver large benefits and/or avoided \r\ndamages across multiple sectors including water, health, ecosystems \r\nand economies (very high confidence) (Boxes 9.5; 9.6; 9.7). They can \r\nalso prevent adaptation or mitigation action in one sector exacerbating \r\nrisks in other sectors and resulting in maladaptation, for example, from \r\nlarge-scale dam construction or large-scale afforestation (e.g., water-\r\nenergy-food nexus and large-scale tree planting efforts) (Boxes 9.3; \r\n9.5)."


id: 2a8e4b015e5816497c5926ec3426e5f9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4715
content:
"Cross-sectoral or 'nexus' approaches can improve the ability of \r\ndecision makers to foresee and prevent major climate impacts. Barriers \r\nto developing nexus approaches arise from rigid sectoral planning, \r\nregulatory and implementation procedures, entrenched interests, and \r\npower structures and established sectoral communication structures. \r\nOpportunities for overcoming these barriers include creating a \r\ndedicated home for co-development of nexus risk assessment \r\nand solutions, promoting co-leadership of projects by multiple \r\nsectors, specific budget allocations for nexus projects, facilitating \r\nand coordinating services, compiling useful strategies into toolkits, \r\nameliorating inequitable power relations among participants and \r\nmeasuring progress on nexus approaches through metrics (Palmer \r\net al., 2016; Baron et al., 2017)."


id: f31d0fd49e4f868a3b30000262791744
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40156
content:
"In response, the African Development Bank is supporting two of the \r\nmost climate-vulnerable and larger African river basins to leverage GCF \r\nand Global Environment Facility (GEF) funds to finance Programmes for \r\nIntegrated Development and Adaptation to Climate Change (PIDACC). \r\nPIDACC finance is approved at the multinational level in the Niger basin \r\nwhich is shared by nine west and central African States (AfDB, 2018c; \r\nGCF, 2018a), while a PIDACC proposal is currently under development \r\nfor the Zambezi basin (Zambezi Watercourse Commission, 2021)."


id: 1f76fbfa3c51966fad6353522a05a5ae
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2747
content:
"Beyond cross-sectoral collaboration, international cooperation is vital \r\nto avert dangerous climate change as its impacts reach beyond the \r\njurisdiction of individual states. International good practice and regional \r\nagreements, protocols and policies together recognise that regional \r\nintegration, cooperative governance and benefit-sharing approaches \r\nare cornerstones of effective resource security and climate change \r\nresponses in Africa (Jensen and Lange, 2013; World Bank, 2017a; \r\nDombrowsky and Hensengerth, 2018). Natural resource development, \r\nparticularly governance of shared river basins, exemplifies opportunities \r\nfor governance responses for African nations that can be cooperative, \r\nregionally integrated and climate resilient."


id: 9bd29d0252ab8a7b855252da4e7bd804
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24668
content:
"In Africa, climate vulnerability crosses geopolitical divides as regional \r\nclusters of fragile and high vulnerability countries exist, emphasising \r\nthe need for transboundary cooperation (Birkmann et al., 2021; Buhaug \r\nand von Uexkull, 2021). Natural resource security is increasingly reliant \r\non transboundary governance, regional integration and cooperation \r\n(Namara and Giordano, 2017). There are 60 international or shared river \r\nbasins on the continent, a function of colonial divides and topography, \r\nwith some basins shared by four or more countries (UNECA, 2016; \r\nPopelka and Smith, 2020). Climate changes which result in impact "


id: 45df40c1d8fd315d1d7b889a53468f90
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9514
content:
"Enhanced transboundary governance arrangements suggest that \r\ncountries are joining forces to coherently manage and protect natural \r\nresources (Spalding-Fecher et  al., 2014; AfDB, 2021). Underlying \r\ngovernance issues and political economy interests block or advance \r\nsuch transitions to regionally integrated resource management and \r\nbenefit-sharing, the market drivers of water security (AMCOW, 2012; "


id: 77c7ecca3fc516f173d807e288426e2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18283
content:
"Robust legislative frameworks, both climate change specific and non\u0002specific, can foster adaptive responses to climate change, particularly \r\nin LDCs (Nachmany et  al., 2017). As discussed in Chapter 17, there \r\nare many reasons for this. The successful implementation of policy \r\nobjectives across the continent is often contingent upon or at least \r\nsupported by an underlying legislative framework (Averchenkova and \r\nMatikainen, 2017; Scotford et al., 2017). There are also wider systemic \r\nand structural reasons for developing climate change legislation, \r\nincluding the promotion of coordination within government, its policy \r\nentrenching role, its symbolic value and its potential to support climate \r\nfinance flows (Nachmany et al., 2017; Scotford and Minas, 2019)."


id: 3df1ff2c87269a32d09db91bb5105f6f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8068
content:
"appropriate body of law with a strong focus on adaptation responses \r\n(Rumble, 2019). As discussed in Chapter 17, however, there remains the \r\nneed for in-country expert input on how the domestic legal landscape \r\nmay influence their operation, and for each jurisdiction to independently \r\ninterrogate its adaptation needs and objectives (Scotford et al., 2017)."


id: c3f7986190c9a395a2c55355b26d5c40
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31757
content:
"Legal systems, however, also have the potential to be maladaptive. \r\nLaws may be brittle, often assuming and reinforcing a static state, and \r\nthe boundary of the law may not align to the relevant location, scale or \r\nimpact (Craig, 2010; Arnold and Gunderson, 2013; Wenta et al., 2019). \r\nThis necessitates the review and revision of existing laws to remove \r\nsuch barriers and foster adaptive management (Craig, 2010; Ruhl, \r\n2010; Cosens et al., 2017) and, where necessary, the promulgation of \r\nnew laws."


id: e1a6543d1a81a11341ff6672290d754f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36970
content:
"Numerous African states have also included dedicated climate change\u0002related provisions within various existing statutes that regulate \r\nthe environment or disaster management. For example, Tanzania's \r\nEnvironmental Management Act 20 of 2004 contains dedicated \r\nprovisions to address climate change. Rwanda's Law on Environment \r\n48/2018 also contains detailed provisions on mainstreaming climate \r\nchange into development planning processes, education on climate \r\nchange, vulnerability assessments and the promotion of measures \r\nto enhance adaptive capacity. Some countries have also developed \r\nlaws dedicated to a specific aspect of adaptation. For example, the \r\nConservation and Climate Adaptation Trust of Seychelles Act 18 of 2015 \r\nestablishes a trust fund to finance climate change adaptation responses \r\nin Seychelles. Similarly, many countries including Algeria, Burkina Faso, "


id: ace3ccec9114e1c394db02b41109229a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27658
content:
"There has been a rise in framework and sectoral climate change laws \r\nacross Africa, as illustrated in Figure  9.10. The map illustrates the \r\ntwo framework statutes which have been promulgated in Benin and \r\nKenya, as well as the three framework bills which have been drafted \r\nin Nigeria, South Africa and Uganda. There are also discussions taking \r\nplace in Zimbabwe and Ghana regarding the potential development of \r\na draft framework climate change bill. A review of the climate change \r\nframework laws indicates evidence of cross-pollination in design across \r\nAfrican jurisdictions, creating the potential for a unique and regionally "


id: e596c76a1586b4a7b7bab935a4175d7b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37701
content:
"of climate change considerations within the local sphere of government, \r\nand a willingness to foster such practices (Mwanga, 2019)."


id: d5f70e623db5818eff8aa1715b4474e4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34962
content:
"Djibouti, Ghana, Namibia, Malawi, Mauritius, Madagascar, Mozambique, \r\nTanzania and South Africa have dedicated disaster management laws. \r\nAt this stage, it is still too early to determine whether these laws \r\nare having any substantive influence in strengthening resilience and \r\nreducing vulnerability and, as discussed in Chapter 17, this is identified \r\nas a knowledge gap requiring further research."


id: 8ea29aff3c318c599fb59bdc07ff5231
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22281
content:
"Laws are now being developed to formalise and entrench institutional \r\nstructures, specifying their mandate, function, membership and related \r\nprocedures. A useful example of such an approach can be found in the \r\nNigerian Climate Change Bill which establishes the National Climate \r\nCouncil on Climate Change headed and chaired by the Vice-President, \r\nwith a wide membership of ministers, the Chairmen of the Governors' \r\nForum and Association of Local Governments, as well as the private \r\nsector and non-governmental organisation (NGO) representatives."


id: ebfd8d232672e1afb938f5dfe02e7801
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38885
content:
"Climate change framework laws can play an instrumental role in \r\nachieving mainstreaming by directing relevant actors to integrate \r\nadaptation considerations into existing mandates, operations and \r\nplanning instruments (Rumble, 2019). By way of example, the \r\nSouth African Draft Climate Change Bill contains a general duty to \r\n'coordinate and harmonise the policies, plans, programmes and \r\ndecisions of the national, provincial and local spheres of government' \r\nto achieve, among other things, the climate change objectives of the \r\nBill and national adaptation objectives."


id: 675746878f793ee53d62d260a00ee3ac
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15453
content:
"Policy actors across Africa perceive that human-caused climate \r\nchange is already impacting their locales through a range of negative \r\nsocioeconomic and environmental effects (Pasquini, 2020; Steynor and \r\nPasquini, 2020). They are highly concerned about and motivated to \r\naddress these impacts (Hambira and Saarinen, 2015; Pasquini, 2020). \r\nTransformative responses to the impacts of climate change facilitate \r\nCRD and are informed by perceptions of climate variability and change \r\nand climate change literacy (Figure 9.11)."


id: 7a3275a333e4e25e1ba1dec31f023cf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18695
content:
"Another common theme is the requirement to develop national climate \r\nchange adaptation strategies and plans. Many laws further entrench \r\ntheir longevity by requiring them to be subject to strong community \r\nparticipation and consultation, as demonstrated by the Kenyan Climate \r\nChange Act and the Nigerian Climate Change Bill."


id: ff285703db38d61be865c7e42dda6571
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42295
content:
"Climate services (CS) broadly include the generation, tailoring and \r\nprovision of climate information for use in decision making at all levels \r\nof society (Street, 2016; Vaughan et al., 2018). There is a range of climate \r\nservice providers in Africa, including primarily National Meteorological \r\nand Hydrological Services (NMHS) and partner institutions, \r\ncomplemented by NGOs, the private sector and research institutions \r\n(Snow et al., 2016; Harvey et al., 2019), which offer the potential for \r\npublic-private partnerships (Winrock, 2018; Harvey et al., 2019)."


id: 5fcfbb8334dbce0094d4d607999bf273
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14164
content:
"International development funding has progressed the provision of \r\nCS and, together with technological advances and capacity-building \r\ninitiatives, has increased the reliability of CS across Africa (Vogel \r\net al., 2019). Most CS investments have been towards the agricultural \r\nsector, with other focal sectors, including pastoralism, health, water, \r\nenergy and disaster risk reduction, having only small CS initiatives \r\ndirected towards them (Nkiaka et al., 2019; Carr et al., 2020). Despite \r\nthis focus and investment, however, there remains a mismatch \r\nbetween the supply and uptake of CS in Africa as information is \r\noften inaccessible, unaffordable, not relevant to context or scale, \r\nand is poorly communicated (Singh et  al., 2018; Antwi-Agyei et  al., \r\n2021) (Table 9.4; Sections 9.4.1.5.1 and 9.13.4.1). Observational data \r\nrequired for effective regional CS, including trend analyses, seasonal "


id: c3210b85e517611ad1683f243c6390cc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31604
content:
"Figure 9.11 |  Climate services and climate literacy are important for informing transformative responses to climate change (including adaptation and \r\nmitigation responses) "


id: c0e4a2e3cef522d7bd58b6479d7d6bc1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31237
content:
"(b, c) Percentage of studies that have recorded that perception of temperature changes and precipitation changes agreed with local meteorological or climate records across 33 \r\nAfrican countries (size of bubble indicates number of studies per country for both b and c. In b, agreement with temperature changes is indicated for all studies within a country in \r\nred, and articles indicating no agreement in orange; while in c, agreement with precipitation changes is indicated per country in dark blue and articles indicating no agreement in \r\nlight blue. A total of 144 studies assessed across the 33 countries)."


id: ab800e6763d50afea73a34ada19d76a4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27403
content:
"(d) Country-level rates of climate change literacy for 33 African countries (i.e., percentage of the population that have heard about climate change and think that human activity \r\nis wholly or partly the cause of climate change) Simpson et al. (2021a)."


id: e9192c6a5d84cb93937dc23db1dcabe5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38362
content:
"climate assessment, modelling and model evaluation, is sparse and \r\noften of poor quality (Figure 9.11) and usually requires payment which \r\nrenders it unaffordable (Winrock, 2018).\r\nA number of these challenges can be addressed through the transdis\u0002ciplinary co-production of CS (Alexander and Dessai, 2019; Vogel et al., \r\n2019; Carter et  al., 2020). Co-production of CS involves climate in\u0002formation producers, practitioners and stakeholders, and other knowl\u0002edge holders participating in equitable partnerships and dialogues to \r\ncollaboratively identify climate-based risk and develop scale-relevant \r\nclimate information to address this risk (Table  9.4) (Vincent et  al., \r\n2018; Carter et al., 2020)."


id: eccb38cb184ccd65d30766ecbf9a2a69
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39026
content:
"Table 9.4 |  Challenges and opportunities for Climate Services in Africa for the supply and uptake of climate services."


id: abf41e534b980179a4b10dc7ad948c57
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27489
content:
"increased drought frequency, shorter rainy season and rainy season \r\ndelay, and increased temperatures (Figure 9.11; Rurinda et al., 2014; \r\nBoansi et al., 2017; Ayanlade et al., 2018), but not in all cases or not for \r\nall perceived changes, with common discrepancies in perceived lower \r\nrainfall totals (Alemayehu and Bewket, 2017; Ayal and Leal Filho, 2017; \r\nSimpson et al., 2021a)."


id: e26f50e12a6699dab3feadb92dddf46a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37135
content:
"However, the effectiveness of co-production processes are hindered \r\nby aspects such as inequitable power relationships between different \r\ntypes of knowledge holders (e.g., scientists and practitioners), \r\ninequitable distribution of funding between developed country and \r\nAfrican partners that favours developed country partners, an inability \r\nto develop sustained trust relationships as a result of short-funding \r\ncycles, a lack of flexibility due to product-focused engagements and the \r\nscalability of co-production to enable widespread reach across Africa \r\nas the process is usually context specific (high confidence) (Vincent \r\net al., 2018; Vogel et al., 2019; 2020a)."


id: 1e884fc794c3c95aded11bae1c9ab698
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2574
content:
"Farming experience, access to extension services and increasing \r\nage are the most frequently cited factors positively influencing the \r\nperceptions of climate changes (Alemayehu and Bewket, 2017; Oduniyi \r\nand Tekana, 2019). Personal experience of climate-related changes \r\nand their impacts appears to be an important factor influencing \r\nperceptions through shaping negative associations, for example, \r\nexperience of flash floods (Elshirbiny and Abrahamse, 2020) or direct \r\neffect on economic activity, indicating that perception is not restricted \r\nto crop farmers (Liverpool-Tasie et  al., 2020). However, perceptions \r\nshow common misconceptions about the causes of climate change, \r\nwhich has implications for climate action (Elshirbiny and Abrahamse, \r\n2020), highlighting the importance of climate change literacy."


id: f6cf96a108d0b2b5e3817475445d1c88
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40790
content:
"Despite these challenges, the inclusive nature of co-production has\r\nhad a positive influence on the uptake of CS into decision making \r\nwhere it has been applied (Table 9.4; Figure 9.12; Vincent et al., 2018; \r\nVogel et al., 2019; Carter et al., 2020; Chiputwa et al., 2020) (medium \r\nconfidence), through sustained inter/transdisciplinary relationships \r\nand capacity development (Norstrom et al., 2020), strategic financial \r\ninvestment, fostering of ownership of resulting products and the \r\ncombining of scientific and other knowledge systems (Carter et  al., \r\n2020; Steynor et  al., 2020a). There is high confidence that together \r\nwith improved institutional capacity building and strategic financial \r\ninvestment, CS can help African stakeholders adapt to projected \r\nclimate risks (Figure 9.11)."


id: c2291e794676077cda1c1a2ffbc47c12
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31452
content:
"Understanding the human cause of climate change is a strong \r\npredictor of climate change risk perception (Lee et  al., 2015) and a \r\ncritical knowledge foundation that can affect the difference between \r\ncoping responses and more informed and transformative adaptation \r\n(Figure 9.11; Oladipo, 2015; Mutandwa et al., 2019). At a minimum, \r\nclimate change literacy includes both having heard of climate change \r\nand understanding it is, at least in part, caused by people (Simpson \r\net al., 2021a). However, large inequalities in climate change literacy \r\nexist between and within countries and communities across Africa."


id: 75e9a1f5c2fff48d0ffcc3f1b0fa3e98
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17970
content:
"Perceptions of climate variability and change affect whether and how \r\nindividuals and institutions act, and thus contribute to the success or \r\nfailure of adaptation policies related to weather and climate (Silvestri \r\net al., 2012; Arbuckle et al., 2015; Simpson et al., 2021a)."


id: bc77125d60d5e25a368fdea0b9ded7f5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30403
content:
"The average national climate change literacy rate in Africa is only 39% \r\n(country rates range from 23-66%) (Figure 9.11). Of 394 sub-national \r\nregions surveyed by Afrobarometer, 8% (37 regions in 16 countries) \r\nhave a climate change literacy rate lower than 20%, while only 2% \r\n(8 regions) score higher than 80%, which is common across European \r\ncountries (Simpson et  al., 2021a). Striking differences exist when \r\ncomparing sub-national units within countries. Climate change literacy \r\nrates in Nigeria range from 71% in Kwara to 5% in Kano, and within \r\nBotswana from 69% in Lobatse to only 6% in Kweneng West (Simpson \r\net al., 2021a). Education is the strongest positive predictor of climate \r\nchange literacy, particularly tertiary education, but poverty decreases \r\nclimate change literacy and climate change literacy rates average \r\n12.8% lower for women than men (Simpson et al., 2021a)."


id: 8670cc4246f4b5f3c9dc70fff7da364d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20818
content:
"As the identified factors driving climate change literacy overlap \r\nwith broader developmental challenges on the continent, policies \r\ntargeting these factors (e.g., increased education) can potentially yield \r\nco-benefits for both climate change adaptation as well as progress \r\ntowards SDGs, particularly education and gender equality (Simpson \r\net al., 2021a). Progress towards greater climate change literacy affords \r\na concrete opportunity to mainstream climate change within core \r\nnational and sub-national developmental agendas in Africa towards \r\nmore CRD pathways. Synergies with CS can also overcome gendered \r\ndeficits, for example, although women are generally less climate \r\nchange aware and more vulnerable to climate change than men in "


id: 75754f29daae6e4aa8cd45c894ececdd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17894
content:
"Rural communities, particularly farmers, are the most studied \r\ngroups for climate change perception. They perceive the climate \r\nto be changing, most often reporting changes in rainfall variability, \r\nincreased dry spells, decreases in rainfall and increased temperatures \r\nor temperature extremes. They perceive these changes to bring a range \r\nof negative socioeconomic and environmental effects (Alemayehu and \r\nBewket, 2017; Liverpool-Tasie et al., 2020; Simpson et al., 2021a). In \r\nsome cases, farmers' perceptions of changes in weather and climate \r\nfrequently match climate records for decreased precipitation totals, "


id: 94d91bef54427dd72844919d28fd713
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23393
content:
"Vulnerability in Africa is socially, culturally and geographically differentiated among climatic regions, countries and local communities, with \r\nclimate change impacting the health, livelihoods and food security of different groups to different extents (Gan et al., 2016; Onyango et al., \r\n2016a; Gumucio et al., 2020). This synthesis emphasises intersectionality within vulnerable groups as well as their position within dynamic \r\nsocial and cultural contexts (Wisner, 2016; Kuran et al., 2020), and highlights the differential impacts of climate change and restricted \r\nadaptation options available to vulnerable groups across African countries (see also Cross-Chapter Box GENDER in Chapter 18)."


id: 3f5474f15d09daeaaa95bc78e1d915de
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8334
content:
"Figure  Box  9.1.1 |   Factors contributing to the progression of vulnerability to climate change in African contexts considering socioeconomic \r\nprocesses, resource access, livelihood changes, and intersectional vulnerability among social groups. This figure reflects a synthesis of vulnerability across \r\nsections of this chapter and highlights how the interactions of multiple dimensions of vulnerability compound each other to increase overall vulnerability (Potts, 2008; "


id: ebf46d0425b76637651ee16384061c9d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38876
content:
"The differential impacts of climate change and adaptation options available to vulnerable groups in Africa are a critical knowledge gap. \r\nMore research is needed to examine the intersection of different dimensions of social status on climate change vulnerability in Africa \r\n(Thompson-Hall et al., 2016; Oluwatimilehin and Ayanlade, 2021). More analysis of vulnerability based on gender and other social and \r\ncultural factors is needed to fully understand the impacts of climate change, the interaction of divergent adaptive strategies, as well as \r\nthe development of targeted adaptation and mitigation strategies, for example, for women in patrilineal kinship systems, people living \r\nwith disabilities, youth, girls and the elderly. Finally, there is an urgent need to build capacity among those conducting vulnerability \r\nassessments, so that they are familiar with this intersectionality lens."


id: 1806c595155406cb1d1eb39efcebe677
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1432
content:
"Additional information and capacity development through education and early warning systems could enhance vulnerable groups' ability \r\nto cope and adapt their livelihoods (Jaka and Shava, 2018). However, some groups of people may struggle to translate information into \r\nactual changes (Makate et al., 2019; McOmber et al., 2019). Lack of access to assets and social networks, for example, among older \r\npopulations, are critical limitations to locally driven or autonomous adaptation and limit potential benefits from planned adaptation \r\nactions (e.g., adoption of agricultural technologies or effective use of early warning systems)."


id: 5f2af0e59e76d39302749be75f642f4b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14047
content:
"There is an urgent need for societal and political change to realise potential benefits for these vulnerable groups in the long term (Nyasimi \r\net al., 2018). There is a need for gender-sensitive climate change policies in many African countries and gender-responsive policies, \r\nimplementation plans and budgets for all local-level initiatives (Wrigley-Asante et al., 2019)."


id: 7ec7480fd9654cf34758264c93a6e31d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19458
content:
"Africa, they are generally more likely to adopt climate-resilient crops \r\nwhen they are climate change aware and have exposure to extension \r\nservices (Acevedo et al., 2020; Simpson et al., 2021a)."


id: 6e1f52600bf1e48807bbc9bb57313fd2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16636
content:
"(Figure  9.13b), and in some regions different observed precipitation \r\ndatasets disagree on the direction of rainfall trends (Panitz et al., 2013; \r\nSylla et al., 2013; Contractor et al., 2020). The uncertainty of observed \r\nrainfall trends results from a number of sources, including high \r\ninterannual and decadal rainfall variability, different methodologies \r\nused in developing rainfall products, and the lack of and poor quality \r\nof rainfall station data (Figure 9.15; Gutierrez et al., 2021)."


id: a69c48941187a5b52379716afe3b54a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26527
content:
"This section assesses observed and projected climate change over Africa. \r\nIn Working Group I of the IPCC AR6 (WGI), four chapters make regional \r\nassessments of observed and projected climate change (Doblas-Reyes \r\net al., 2021; Gutierrez et al., 2021; Ranasinghe et al., 2021; Seneviratne \r\net  al., 2021), which facilitates a more nuanced assessment in this \r\nsection of climate and ocean phenomena that impact African systems."


id: 6fdfaebcde2ba22dd43ad917c689e0e0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16940
content:
"With increased GHG emissions, mean temperature is projected to \r\nincrease over the whole continent, as are temperature extremes \r\nover most of the continent (Figure 9.16a, b). Increased mean annual \r\nrainfall is projected over the eastern Sahel, eastern east Africa and \r\ncentral Africa (Figures 9.14; 9.16c). In contrast, reduced mean annual \r\nrainfall and increased drought (meteorological and agricultural) are \r\nprojected over southwestern southern Africa and coastal north Africa, \r\nwith drought in part as a result of increasing atmospheric evaporative \r\ndemand due to higher temperatures (Figure 9.16e; Ukkola et al., 2020; \r\nRanasinghe et al., 2021; Seneviratne et al., 2021). The frequency and \r\nintensity of heavy precipitation are projected to increase across most of \r\nAfrica, except northern and southwestern Africa (Figures 9.14; 9.16d)."


id: 1ecf972b01e9b3ea9a0f1663acc9e06f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2623
content:
"Temperature increases due to human-caused climate change are \r\ndetected across Africa and many regions have warmed more rapidly \r\nthan the global average (Figure  9.13a; Ranasinghe et  al., 2021). A \r\nsignal of increased annual heatwave frequency has already emerged \r\nfrom the background natural climate variability over the whole \r\ncontinent (Figure  9.14; Engdaw et  al., 2021). However, detection of \r\nstatistically significant rainfall trends is evident in only a few regions "


id: 3d4111b1d68afca3fd203268c30b3690
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7956
content:
"Most African countries are expected to experience high temperatures \r\nunprecedented in their recent history earlier in this century than generally \r\nwealthier, higher latitude countries (high confidence). As low latitudes "


id: 9e9ecac60d68378f4970f035a876bbac
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25136
content:
"measured; development and running of early warning systems; \r\nclimate projection and impact studies; and extreme event attribution \r\nstudies (Harrison et al., 2019; Otto et al., 2020). "


id: 6cf04d13a0cabbb6915f25576310b7b3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16441
content:
"Sustained station observation networks (Figure  9.15) are essential \r\nfor the long-term analysis of local and regional climate trends, \r\nincluding for temperature and rainfall, as well as: the calibration of \r\nsatellite-derived climate products; development of gridded climate \r\ndatasets using interpolated and blended station-satellite products \r\nthat form the baseline from which climate change departures are "


id: 520c4e2b7b82cd0f79b482e05726ca8f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11711
content:
"over the Sahara and the Sahel (Fontaine et  al., 2013; Moron et  al., \r\n2016). Trends in mean maximum (TX) and minimum (TN) temperatures \r\nrange between +2degC and +3degC per century over north Africa, and the \r\nfrequencies of hot days (TX > 90th percentile, TX90p) and tropical nights \r\n(TN > 20degC), as well as the frequencies of warm days and nights, roughly \r\nfollow these mean TX and TN trends (Fontaine et al., 2013; Moron et al., \r\n2016; Ranasinghe et  al., 2021; Seneviratne et  al., 2021). Warm spell \r\nduration has increased in many north African countries (Donat et  al., \r\n2014a; Filahi et al., 2016; Lelieveld et al., 2016; Nashwan et al., 2018) \r\nand heatwave magnitude and spatial extent have increased across north \r\nAfrica since 1980, with an increase in the number of events since 2000 \r\nthat is beyond the level of natural climate variability (Russo et al., 2016; \r\nCeccherini et al., 2017; Engdaw et al., 2021)."


id: 40dc26120f7d7e5c27de9aa5a1cf0020
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8596
content:
"Mean and seasonal temperatures have increased at twice the global rate \r\nover most regions in north Africa due to human-induced climate change \r\n(Ranasinghe et  al., 2021; Figures  9.13a and; 9.14) (high confidence).\r\nIncreasing temperature trends have been particularly strong since the \r\n1970s (between 0.2degC per decade and 0.4degC per decade), especially in \r\nthe summer (Tanarhte et al., 2012; Donat et al., 2014a; Lelieveld et al., \r\n2016). Similar warming signals have been observed since the mid-1960s "


id: 1d4ebea5eb14804aa3acd4e88c37b0e9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2334
content:
"Mean annual precipitation decreased over most of north Africa \r\nbetween 1971-2000 (Donat et al., 2014a; Hertig et al., 2014; Nicholson \r\net al., 2018; Zittis, 2018), with a gradual recovery to normal or wetter \r\nconditions in Algeria and Tunisia since 2000 and over Morocco since \r\n2008 (Nouaceur and Murarescu, 2016). Since the 1960s days with more \r\nthan 10 mm of rainfall have decreased and the number of consecutive \r\ndry days have increased in the eastern parts of north Africa, while in the \r\nwestern parts of north Africa heavy rainfall and flooding has increased \r\n(Donat et  al., 2014a). Aridity, the ratio of potential evaporation to \r\nprecipitation, has increased over the Mediterranean and north Africa \r\ndue to significant decreases in precipitation (Greve et al., 2019)."


id: 43e435feef8af26c63cd5f333f98c2cf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9178
content:
"Mean annual precipitation is projected to decrease in north Africa at \r\nwarming levels of 2degC and higher (high confidence) with the most \r\npronounced decreases in the northwestern parts (Figures 9.13a and; \r\n9.14; Schilling et al., 2012; Filahi et al., 2017; Barcikowska et al., 2018; \r\nRanasinghe et al., 2021). Meteorological drought over Mediterranean \r\nnorth Africa in CMIP5 and CMIP6 models are projected to increase \r\nin duration from approximately 2  months during 1950-2014 to \r\napproximately 4 months in the period 2050-2100 under RCP8.5 and "


id: ed5f83e6fe24bc9a8d19267ad542d045
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39131
content:
"Projected changes \r\nof climate variables and hazards\r\n(relative to 1995-2014 average)\r\nat 1.5degC, 2degC and 3degC of global warming\r\nabove pre-industrial (1850-1900)"


id: 1665ebe9c3a7bd3ead5f01803e92d348
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1155
content:
"(f) Mean sea surface temperature change (degC). All figures are derived from the WGI Interactive Atlas and show results from between 26 to 33 CMIP6 (Coupled Model Intercomparison \r\nProject) global climate models depending on the climate variable. CMIP6 models include improved representations of physical, biological, and chemical processes as well as higher \r\nspatial resolutions compared to previous CMIP5 models (Eyring et al., 2021). Robustness of the projected change signal is indicated by hatching - no overlay indicates high model \r\nagreement, where at least 80% of models agree on sign of change; diagonal lines (/) indicate low model agreement, where fewer than 80% of models agree on sign of change. \r\nNOTE: Model agreement is computed at a gridbox level and is not representative of regionally aggregated results over larger regions (Gutierrez et al., 2021)."


id: 807d9d30b6bfb4b0afcd2d4fba4999a2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19736
content:
"be almost double the 1981-2010 average at GWL 2degC (Dosio, 2017; \r\nBathiany et al., 2018; Gutierrez et al., 2021; Ranasinghe et al., 2021). \r\nHeatwave frequency and intensity are projected to increase under all \r\nscenarios, but limiting global warming to 1.5degC leads to a decreased \r\nheatwave magnitude (-35%) and frequency (-37%) compared to 2degC \r\nglobal warming (Dosio, 2017; Weber et  al., 2018; Nangombe et  al., \r\n2019). Children born in 2020, under a 1.5degC-compatible scenario will \r\nbe exposed to 4-6 times more heatwaves in their lifetimes compared \r\nto people born in 1960; this exposure increases to 7-9  times more \r\nheatwaves at GWL 2.4degC (Thiery et al., 2021)."


id: e3a06a2ed12b1f4311fd0cce30c9cec6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37337
content:
"SSP5-85 (Ukkola et  al., 2020). Extreme rainfall (monthly maximum \r\n1-day rainfall - RX1 day) in the region is projected to decrease (Donat \r\net al., 2019)."


id: ef4781687c4772b3ea3dfc5a8cecf2d9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39467
content:
"During 1984-2012, north Africa experienced a decreasing dust trend \r\nwith north African dust explaining more than 60% of global dust \r\nvariations (Shao et al., 2013). Dust loadings and related air pollution \r\nhazards (from fine particles that affect health) are projected to \r\ndecrease in many regions of the Sahara as a result of decreased wind \r\nspeeds (Evan et al., 2016; Ranasinghe et al., 2021)."


id: f24983dc9c04dc16451e465e860e6ed7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40021
content:
"The number of dangerous heat days (TX >40.6degC) is projected to \r\nincrease from approximately 60 per year in 1985-2005 to approximately \r\n110, 130 and 140 under RCP2.6, RCP4.5 and RCP8.5, respectively, in \r\nthe 2060s and to 105, 145 and 196 in the 2090s (Rohat et al., 2019). \r\nOver tropical west Africa, heat-related mortality risk through increased \r\nheat and humidity is 6-9 times higher than the 1950-2005 average at \r\nGWL 2degC, 8-15 times at GWL 2.65degC and 15-30 times at GWL 4.12degC \r\n(Ahmadalipour and Moradkhani, 2018) (Coffel et al., 2018). The number \r\nof potentially lethal heat days per year is projected to increase from <50 \r\nduring 1995-2005 to 50-150 at GWL 1.6degC, 100-250 at GWL 2.5degC \r\nand 250-350 at GWL 4.4degC, with highest increases in coastal regions \r\n(Mora et al., 2017). Increasing urbanisation concentrates this exposure \r\nin cities, such as Lagos, Niamey, Kano and Dakar (Section 9.9.3.1; Coffel \r\net al., 2018; Rohat et al., 2019)."


id: 401bb4c4a0afe4948c50374e6df94156
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8466
content:
"Observed mean annual and seasonal temperatures have increased \r\n1-3degC since the mid-1970s with the highest increases in the Sahara and \r\nSahel (Figures 9.13a; Cook and Vizy, 2015; Lelieveld et al., 2016; Dosio, \r\n2017; Nikiema et al., 2017; Gutierrez et al., 2021; Ranasinghe et al., \r\n2021) and positive trends in mean annual maximum (TX) and minimum \r\n(TN) of 0.16degC and 0.28degC per decade, respectively (Mouhamed et al., \r\n2013; Moron et al., 2016; Russo et al., 2016; Barry et al., 2018). The \r\nfrequency of very hot days (TX > 35degC) and tropical nights has increased \r\nby 1-9 days and 4-13 nights per decade between 1961-2014 (Moron \r\net al 2016), and cold nights have become less frequent (Fontaine et al., \r\n2013; Mouhamed et al., 2013; Barry et al., 2018). In the 21st century, \r\nheatwaves have become hotter, longer and more extended compared \r\nto the last two decades of the 20th century (Mouhamed et al., 2013; \r\nMoron et al., 2016; Russo et al., 2016; Barbier et al., 2018)."


id: fddc287b25ff4927ef6f764efea2f5f7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42027
content:
"Negative trends in rainfall accompanied by increased rainfall variability \r\nwere observed between 1960s-1980s over west Africa (Nicholson \r\net  al., 2018; Thomas and Nigam, 2018), caused by a combination \r\nof anthropogenic aerosols and GHGs emitted between the 1950s \r\nand1980s (Booth et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2016; Giannini and Kaplan, \r\n2019; Douville et al., 2021). Declining rainfall trends ended by 1990 \r\ndue to the growing influence of GHGs and reduced cooling effect \r\nof aerosol emissions, with a trend to wetter conditions emerging in \r\nthe mid-1990s accompanied by more intense, but fewer precipitation \r\nevents (Sanogo et al., 2015; Sylla et al., 2016; Kennedy et al., 2017; \r\nBarry et  al., 2018; Bichet and Diedhiou, 2018a; 2018b; Thomas and \r\nNigam, 2018). A shift to a later onset and end of the west African \r\nmonsoon is also reported in west Africa and Sahel (low confidence) \r\n(Chen et  al., 2021; Ranasinghe et  al., 2021). Between 1981-2014 "


id: a924f5b86959dde5fbba2b12044272c4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26978
content:
"At 1.5degC, 2degC and 3degC of global warming above pre-industrial levels, \r\nmean annual temperatures in west Africa are projected to be on \r\naverage, 0.6degC, 1.1degC and 2.1degC warmer than the 1994-2005 average, \r\nrespectively (Figure  9.16a). Under mid- and high-emission scenarios \r\nend of century summer temperatures are projected to increase by 2degC \r\nand 5degC, respectively (Sylla et  al., 2015a; Russo et  al., 2016; Dosio, \r\n2017). The annual number of hot days is projected to increase at all \r\nglobal warming levels with larger increases at higher warming levels \r\n(Figure  9.16b). By 2060 the frequency of hot nights is projected to "


id: 4d801df47381f51c584835ff803a3cd3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10914
content:
"the Gulf of Guinea and the Sahel have experienced more intense \r\nprecipitation events (Panthou et al., 2014; Bichet and Diedhiou, 2018a; \r\nPanthou et al., 2018) and the frequency of mesoscale storms has tripled \r\n(Taylor et al., 2017; Callo-Concha, 2018). Extreme heavy precipitation \r\nindices show increasing trends from 1981-2010 (Barry et al., 2018), \r\nincreasing high flow events in large Sahelian rivers as well as small \r\nto mesoscale catchments leading to pluvial and riverine flooding \r\n(Douville et  al., 2021). Meteorological, agricultural and hydrological \r\ndrought in the region has increased in frequency since the 1950s \r\n(medium confidence) (Seneviratne et al., 2021)."


id: e2c4be0430ba568b95566bdc5f1ca319
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37194
content:
"Mean annual temperature across central Africa has increased by \r\n0.75degC-1.2degC since 1960 (Aloysius et al., 2016; Gutierrez et al., 2021). \r\nThe number of hot days, heatwaves and heatwave days increased \r\nbetween 1979-2016 (Hu et  al., 2019) and cold extremes have \r\ndecreased (Figure 9.14; Aguilar et al., 2009; Seneviratne et al., 2021). \r\nUncertainties associated with the poor ground-based observation \r\nnetworks in the region and associated observational uncertainties \r\n(Section 9.5.1.1) result in an assessment of medium confidence in an \r\nincrease in the number of heat extremes over the region."


id: 2136fc99ade6c275d6211cc4087b2187
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3061
content:
"The frequency and intensity of extremely heavy precipitation are projected \r\nto increase under mid- and high-emission scenarios (Figures 9.13a; 9.14; \r\nSylla et al., 2015b; Diallo et al., 2016; Akinsanola and Zhou, 2019; Giorgi \r\net al., 2019; Dosio et al., 2021; Li et al., 2021; Seneviratne et al., 2021). \r\nHowever, heavy rainfall statistics from global and regional climate models \r\nmay be conservative as very-high-resolution, convection-permitting \r\nclimate models simulate more intense rainfall than these models (Stratton \r\net al., 2018; Berthou et al., 2019; Han et al., 2019; Kendon et al., 2019)."


id: b172bf52b31c63946dbc193b11e54eab
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28441
content:
"At 2degC global warming, west Africa is projected to experience a drier, \r\nmore drought-prone and arid climate, especially in the last decades of \r\nthe 21st century (Sylla et al., 2016; Zhao and Dai, 2016; Klutse et al., \r\n2018). The duration of meteorological drought in the western parts of \r\nWest Africa is projected to increase from approximately 2 months during \r\n1950-2014 to approximately 4 months in the period 2050-2100 under \r\nRCP8.5 and SSP5-8.5 (Ukkola et al., 2020). Increased intensity of heavy \r\nprecipitation events combined with increasing drought occurrences will \r\nsubstantially increase the cumulative hydroclimatic stress on populations \r\nin west Africa during the late 21st century (Giorgi et al., 2019)."


id: 47160b0c038be016324e6bfe286ef198
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9708
content:
"The severe lack of station data over the region leads to large uncertainty \r\nin the estimation of observed rainfall trends and low confidence in \r\nchanges in extreme rainfall (Figure  9.13b; Creese and Washington, \r\n2018; Gutierrez et al., 2021; Ranasinghe et al., 2021). There is some \r\nevidence of drying since the mid-20th century through decreased mean \r\nrainfall and increased precipitation deficits (Gutierrez et  al., 2021), \r\nas well as increases in meteorological, agricultural and ecological \r\ndrought (medium confidence) (Seneviratne et  al., 2021). However, \r\nthere is spatial heterogeneity in annual rainfall trends between 1983-\r\n2010 ranging from -10 to +39 mm per year (Maidment et al., 2015), "


id: a81f068bc5a312c9a0b8ddd05b0e5453
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26793
content:
"> 40.6 degC) compared to 1985-2005 including Blantyre-Limbe, Lusaka \r\nand Kampala (Mora et al., 2017; Rohat et al., 2019). Children born in \r\n2020, under a 1.5degC-compatible scenario will be exposed to 3-5 times \r\nmore heatwaves in their lifetimes compared to people born in 1960; \r\nthis exposure increases to 4-9 times more heatwaves at GWL 2.4degC \r\n(Thiery et  al., 2021). The number of potentially lethal heat days per \r\nyear is projected to increase from <50 during 1995-2005 to <50 at \r\nGWL 1.6degC, 50-120 at GWL 2.5degC and 150-350 at GWL 4.4degC with \r\nlargest increases at the coast (Mora et al., 2017), highlighting the new \r\nemergence of dangerous heat conditions in these areas."


id: dc31e9e20015797de24e1761ea65015a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36013
content:
"with a decline in mean seasonal April-June precipitation of -69 mm \r\nper year in most regions except in the northwest (Zhou et al., 2014; \r\nHua et al., 2016; Klotter et al., 2018; Hu et al., 2019). Southern and \r\neastern central Africa were identified as drought hotspots between \r\n1991-2010 (Spinoni et al., 2014)."


id: b3f0885a01a70a90943544dbcaa794c5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28900
content:
"Under low emission scenarios and at GWL 1.5degC and GWL 2degC there \r\nis low confidence in projected mean rainfall change over the region \r\n(Figure 9.16c). At GWL 3degC and GWL 4.4degC, an increased mean annual \r\nrainfall of 10-25% is projected by regional climate models (Coppola \r\net al., 2014; Pinto et al., 2015) and the intensity of extreme precipitation \r\nwill increase (high confidence) (Figure  9.16c, d; Sylla et  al., 2015a; \r\nDiallo et al., 2016; Dosio et al., 2019; Gutierrez et al., 2021; Ranasinghe \r\net al., 2021; Seneviratne et al., 2021). This is projected to increase the \r\nlikelihood of widespread flood occurrences before, during and after the \r\nmature monsoon season (Figure 9.14)."


id: e74e5e0734fc568e4ef1dfcb3bf6d463
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37986
content:
"Over equatorial east Africa the short rains (October-November-\r\nDecember) have shown a long-term wetting trend from the 1960s until \r\npresent (Manatsa and Behera, 2013; Nicholson, 2015; 2017), which is \r\nlinked with western Indian Ocean warming and a steady intensification \r\nof Indian Ocean Walker Cell (Liebmann et al., 2014; Nicholson, 2015)."


id: 6f2f888ea369b879a94473c04b5af394
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16830
content:
"Convection-permitting simulations (4.5 km spatial resolution) simulate \r\nincreased dry spell length not apparent at coarser resolutions, suggesting \r\ndrying in addition to more intense extreme rainfall (Stratton et  al., \r\n2018). Although reduced drought frequency is indicated in Figure 9.16e, \r\nthe SPI metric does not account for the effect of increased temperature \r\non drought (increased moisture deficit), and metrics that account for \r\nthis indicate slightly increased drought frequency or no change (Spinoni \r\net al., 2020). Therefore, there is low confidence in projected changes of \r\ndrought frequency over the region (Figure 9.14)."


id: e8082964bd419b395860a8e5dccca472
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38137
content:
"In contrast, the long rainfall season (March-April-May) has experienced \r\na long-term drying trend between 1986 and 2007, with rainfall declines \r\nin each of these months and a shortening of the wet season (Rowell et al., \r\n2015; Wainwright et  al., 2019). Unlike previous decades, since around \r\n2000, the long rains have exhibited a significant relationship with the El \r\nNino-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) (Park et al., 2020), as multiple droughts \r\nhave occurred during recent La Nina events and when the western to \r\ncentral Pacific sea surface temperature gradient was La Nina-like (Funk \r\net al., 2015; Funk et al., 2018a). Wetter-than-average rainfall years within \r\nthis long-term drying trend are often associated with a stronger amplitude \r\nof the Madden-Julian Oscillation (Vellinga and Milton, 2018)."


id: 6138542b11afa30a24ae3e5657fba82b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14403
content:
"In the northern, summer rainfall region (June-September), a decline \r\nin rainfall occurred in the 1960s and rainfall has remained relatively \r\nlow, while interannual variability has increased since the late 1980s \r\n(Nicholson, 2017); the cause of this drying trend is uncertain."


id: 47f711285b812119de3e5ff500a44acd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9880
content:
"Mean temperatures over the region have increased by 0.7degC-1degC \r\nfrom 1973 to 2013, depending on the season (Ayugi and Tan, 2018; \r\nCamberlin, 2018). Increases in TX and TN are evident across the region \r\naccompanied by significantly increasing trends of warm nights, warm \r\ndays and warm spells (Russo et al., 2016; Gebrechorkos et al., 2019; \r\nNashwan and Shahid, 2019). The greatest increases are found in \r\nnorthern and central regions."


id: ec68f7dc238c6aa3c17328bc02e2fb31
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38952
content:
"Since 2005, drought frequency has doubled from once every 6 to \r\nonce every 3  years and has become more severe during the long \r\nand summer rainfall seasons than during the short rainfall season \r\n(Ayana et al., 2016; Gebremeskel Haile et al., 2019). Several prolonged \r\ndroughts have occurred predominantly within the arid and semi-arid \r\nparts of the region over the past three decades (Nicholson, 2017)."


id: 23fe03bf2fd4c5c36b35ff3c0f6d5713
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3511
content:
"At 1.5degC, 2degC and 3degC of global warming above pre-industrial levels, \r\nmean annual temperatures in east Africa are projected to be on \r\naverage, 0.6degC, 1.1degC and 2.1degC warmer than the 1994-2005 average, \r\nrespectively (Figure 9.16a). Highest increases are projected over the \r\nnorthern and central parts of the region and the lowest increase \r\nover the coastal regions (Otieno and Anyah, 2013; Dosio, 2017). The \r\nmagnitude and frequency of hot days are projected to increase from \r\nGWL 2degC and above with larger increases at higher GWLs (Figure 9.16a, \r\nb; Dosio, 2017; Bathiany et al., 2018; Dosio et al., 2018; Kharin et al., \r\n2018). At GWL 4.6degC a number of east African cities are projected to \r\nhave an up to 2000-fold increase in exposure to dangerous heat (days "


id: fd67e5557b85155a3bb006618eb5f6de
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41936
content:
"Higher mean annual rainfall, particularly in the eastern parts of east \r\nAfrica are projected at GWL 1.5degC and 2degC by 25 CORDEX models \r\n(Nikulin et  al., 2018; Osima et  al., 2018). The additional 0.5degC of \r\nwarming from 1.5degC increases average dry spell duration by between \r\ntwo and four days, except over southern Somalia where this is reduced \r\nby between 2-3  days (Hoegh-Guldberg et  al., 2018; Nikulin et  al., \r\n2018; Osima et al., 2018; Weber et al., 2018)."


id: c7392aa743ef6475e34ee0f78eb7e728
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32368
content:
"During the short rainy season, a longer rainfall season (Gudoshava \r\net  al., 2020) and increased rainfall of over 100 mm on average is "


id: 2135d0123c39443d8b70a3cd62f19cb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3060
content:
"with low mitigation (Iyakaremye et al., 2021). Children born in 2020, \r\nunder a 1.5degC-compatible scenario will be exposed to 3-4  times \r\nmore heatwaves in their lifetimes compared to people born in 1960, \r\nalthough in Angola this is 7-8  times; at GWL 2.4degC this exposure \r\nincreases to 5-9 times more heatwaves (>10 times in Angola) (Thiery \r\net al., 2021)."


id: 98f8c60c098adc097ccc33a9c9e03547
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24130
content:
"projected over the eastern Horn of Africa and regions of high/complex \r\ntopography at GWL 4.5degC (Dunning et al., 2018; Endris et al., 2019; \r\nOgega et al., 2020)."


id: 386c8773d3f36c5bb90455a1eb1eb1cf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7134
content:
"During the long rainy season, there is low confidence in projected \r\nmean rainfall change (Gutierrez et al., 2021). Although some studies \r\nreport projected increased end of century rainfall (Otieno and Anyah, \r\n2013; Kent et al., 2015), the mechanisms responsible for this are not \r\nwell-understood and a recent regional model study has detected no \r\nsignificant change (Cook et al., 2020b). Projected wetting is opposite \r\nto the observed drying trends, giving rise to the 'east African rainfall \r\nparadox' (Rowell et al., 2015; Wainwright et al., 2019). In other parts \r\nof east Africa, no significant trend is evident (Ogega et  al., 2020), \r\nagreement on the sign of change is low, and in some regions, CMIP5 \r\nand CORDEX data show opposite signs of change (Lyon et al., 2017; \r\nLyon and Vigaud, 2017; Osima et al., 2018; Kendon et al., 2019; Ogega \r\net al., 2020)."


id: f9f3250c3b97eb918da1cda80546c7fb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41339
content:
"Heavy rainfall events are projected to increase over the region at \r\nglobal warming of 2degC and higher (high confidence) (Nikulin et  al., \r\n2018; Finney et al., 2020; Ogega et al., 2020; Li et al., 2021). Drought \r\nfrequency, duration and intensity are projected to increase in Sudan, \r\nSouth Sudan, Somalia and Tanzania but decrease or not change over \r\nKenya, Uganda and the Ethiopian Highlands (Liu et al., 2018c; Nguvava \r\net al., 2019; Haile et al., 2020; Spinoni et al., 2020)."


id: 3b2c53cea3263cffbaaffa65fac4b0cb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7597
content:
"Mean annual temperatures over the region increased by between \r\n1.04degC and 1.44degC over the period 1961-2015 depending on the \r\nobservational dataset (Gutierrez et  al., 2021) and, in northern \r\nBotswana and Zimbabwe, they have increased by 1.6degC-1.8degC \r\nbetween 1961-2010 (Engelbrecht et al 2015). The annual number of \r\nhot days have increased in southern Africa over the last four decades \r\n(Ceccherini et al., 2017; Kruger and Nxumalo, 2017a; 2017b) and there \r\nis increasing evidence of increased heat stress impacting agriculture \r\nand human health (Section 9.10.2). The occurrence of cold extremes, \r\nincluding frost days, have decreased (Figure 9.14; Kruger and Nxumalo, \r\n2017b)."


id: 9677ab3be05371f6d2e9a1a15ed29cd8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23674
content:
"Mean annual rainfall in the summer rainfall region is projected to \r\ndecrease by 10-20%, accompanied by an increase in the number of \r\nconsecutive dry days during the rainy season under RCP8.5 (Kusangaya \r\net  al., 2014; Engelbrecht et  al., 2015; Lazenby et  al., 2018; Maure \r\net al., 2018; Spinoni et al., 2019). The western parts of the region are \r\nprojected to become drier, with increasing drought frequency, intensity \r\nand duration likely under RCP8.5 (high confidence) (Figures 9.16c, e; \r\n9.14; Engelbrecht et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2018b; 2018c; Ukkola et al., \r\n2020), including multi-year droughts (Zhao and Dai, 2016; Dosio, \r\n2017)."


id: 90e221de014effece8a51a92d52925c6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22697
content:
"Dryness in the summer rainfall region is expected to increase at 1.5degC \r\nand higher levels of global warming (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018) and \r\ntogether with higher temperatures will enhance evaporation from the \r\nregion's mega-dams and reduce soil-moisture content (Section 9.7.1; \r\nEngelbrecht et al., 2015). Increases in drought frequency and duration \r\nare projected over large parts of southern Africa at GWL 1.5degC (Liu \r\net  al., 2018b; 2018c; Seneviratne et  al., 2021) and unprecedented \r\nextreme droughts (compared to the 1981-2010 period) emerge at \r\nGWL 2degC (Spinoni et  al., 2021). Meteorological drought duration is \r\nprojected to increase from approximately 2 months during 1950-2014 \r\nto approximately 4 months in the mid-to-late-21st century future under \r\nRCP8.5 (Ukkola et al., 2020). Heavy precipitation in the southwestern "


id: 66173bc00e5ea2bca8f5886e921b5522
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15223
content:
"At 1.5degC, 2degC and 3degC of global warming above pre-industrial levels, \r\nmean annual temperatures in southern Africa are projected to be \r\non average, 1.2degC, 2.3degC and 3.3degC warmer than the 1994-2005 \r\naverage respectively (Figure 9.16a). The annual number of heatwaves \r\nis projected to increase by between 2-4 (GWL 1.5degC), 4-8 (GWL 2degC) \r\nand 8-12 (GWL 3degC) and hot and very hot days are virtually certain to \r\nincrease under 1.5degC and 2degC of global warming (Engelbrecht et al., \r\n2015; Russo et al., 2016; Dosio, 2017; Weber et al., 2018; Seneviratne \r\net al., 2021). Cold days and cold extremes are projected to decrease \r\nunder all emission scenarios with the strongest decreases associated "


id: e03441943f79f191bbf3342b1f3bbc8a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36696
content:
"region is projected to decrease (Donat et al., 2019) and increase in the \r\neastern parts of southern Africa at all warming levels (Li et al., 2021; \r\nSeneviratne et al., 2021)."


id: b2591d8f660b4cf692f2095554a1547b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28614
content:
"Rouault, 2005). The SAM shows a systematic positive trend over the \r\nlast five decades (Niang et al., 2014)."


id: 5d524971174ee32b1ba31965990ea41a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13703
content:
"There is no clear indication that climate change will impact the \r\nfrequencies of ENSO and IOD (Stevenson et  al., 2012; Endris et  al., \r\n2019), although there is some indication that extreme ENSO events \r\nand extreme phases of the IOD, particularly the positive phase, may \r\nbecome more frequent with implications for extreme events associated \r\nwith these features, such as drought (Collins et al., 2019; Cai et al., \r\n2021; Seneviratne et  al., 2021). Under high-emission scenarios, a \r\npositive trend in SAM is projected to continue through the 21st century, \r\nhowever, under low emission scenarios, this trend is projected to be \r\nweak or even negative given the potential for ozone hole recovery \r\n(Arblaster et al., 2011)."


id: ea6053263ef2e7808e82ab041424fb71
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38595
content:
"There is limited evidence of an increased frequency of Category 5 \r\ntropical cyclones in the southwestern Indian Ocean (Fitchett et al., 2016; \r\nRanasinghe et al., 2021; Seneviratne et al., 2021) and more frequent \r\nlandfall of tropical cyclones over central to northern Mozambique \r\n(Malherbe et  al., 2013; Muthige et  al., 2018). There is a projected \r\ndecrease in the number of tropical cyclones making landfall in the \r\nregion at 1degC, 2degC and 3degC of global warming, however, they are \r\nprojected to become more intense with higher wind speeds so when \r\nthey do make landfall the impacts are expected to be high (medium \r\nconfidence) (Malherbe et al., 2013; Muthige et al., 2018; Ranasinghe \r\net al., 2021)."


id: ab5a752a2c6897297aad7d86adb8a400
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27376
content:
"Marine heatwaves are periods of extreme warm sea surface \r\ntemperature that persist for days to months and can extend up to \r\nthousands of kilometres (Hobday et al., 2016; Scannell et al., 2016), \r\nnegatively impacting marine ecosystems (Section 9.6.1.4)."


id: 4fa237d74f7c886f414b0d8b91439177
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11297
content:
"Total glacial area on Mount Kenya decreased by 121 x 103 m2 (44%) \r\nduring 2004-2016 (Prinz et al., 2016), Kilimanjaro from 4.8 km2\r\n in 1984 \r\nto 1.7 km2\r\n in 2011 (Cullen et al., 2013) and in the Rwenzori Mountains \r\nfrom ~2 km2\r\n in 1987 to ~1 km2 in 2003 (Taylor et al., 2006). Declining \r\nglacial areas in east Africa are linked to rising air temperatures (Taylor \r\net  al., 2006; Hastenrath, 2010; Veettil and Kamp, 2019), and in the \r\ncase of Kilimanjaro and Mount Kenya, declining precipitation and \r\natmospheric moisture (Molg et al., 2009a; 2009b; Prinz et al., 2016; \r\nVeettil and Kamp, 2019)."


id: 96470cc9b73f13feeaea9e0e4071fc28
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23634
content:
"The number of marine heatwaves doubled in mediterranean north \r\nAfrica and along the Somalian and southern African coastlines from \r\n1982-2016 (Frolicher et  al., 2018; Oliver et  al., 2018; Laufkotter \r\net  al., 2020), very likely as a result of human-caused climate \r\nchange (Seneviratne et  al., 2021). Marine heatwave intensity has \r\nincreased along the southern African coastline (Oliver et al., 2018). \r\nIn the ecologically sensitive region west of southern Madagascar, the \r\nlongest and most intense marine heatwave in the past 35 years was \r\nrecorded during the austral summer of 2017 in the region, it lasted \r\n48 days and reached a maximum intensity of 3.44degC above the 35-\r\nyear average (Mawren et al., 2021). Satellite-derived measurements \r\nof coastal marine heatwaves may under-report their intensity as \r\nmeasured against coastal in situ measurements (Schlegel et  al., \r\n2017)."


id: d960d5af1d1b4dc1a6511f4e32229385
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35546
content:
"Glacial ice cover is projected to disappear before 2030 on the Rwenzori \r\nMountains (Taylor et al., 2006) and Mount Kenya (Prinz et al., 2018) \r\nand by 2040 on Kilimanjaro (Cullen et al., 2013). The loss of glaciers is \r\nexpected to result in a loss in tourism revenues, especially in mountain \r\ntourism (Wang and Zhou, 2019)."


id: 7301c61936a91f9f8bcd9acb6c6da077
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17486
content:
"The ENSO, Indian Ocean Dipole (IOD) and Southern Annular Mode \r\n(SAM) are the primary large-scale drivers of African seasonal and \r\ninterannual climate variability. The diurnal temperature range tends to \r\nbe greater during La Nina than El Nino in northeastern Africa (Hurrell \r\net al., 2003; Donat et al., 2014a), and in southern Africa, the El Nino \r\nwarming effect has been stronger for more recent times (1979-2016) \r\ncompared to earlier period (1940-1978) (Lakhraj-Govender and Grab, \r\n2019). In east Africa, ENSO and IOD exert an interannual control \r\non particularly October-November-December (short rains) and \r\nJune-July-August-September seasons. In southern Africa, El Nino is \r\nassociated with negative rainfall and positive temperature anomalies \r\nwith the opposite true for La Nina. The SAM exerts control on rainfall \r\nin the southwestern parts of the region and a positive SAM mode is \r\noften associated with lower seasonal rainfall in the region (Reason and "


id: 3608f254bd10349ace9139a42a42e829
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6755
content:
"This box aims to map the diversity of Indigenous Knowledge and local knowledge systems in Africa and highlights the potential of \r\nthis knowledge to enable sustainability and effective climate adaptation. This box builds on the framing of the IPCC system for which \r\n'indigenous knowledge (IK) refers to the understandings, skills and philosophies developed by societies with long histories of interaction \r\nwith their natural surroundings' (IPCC, 2019b), while 'local knowledge (LK) refers to the understandings and skills developed by individuals \r\nand populations, specific to the place where they live' (Cross-Chapter Box INDIG in Chapter 18; IPCC, 2019b)."


id: 1852695f5f6d555d405904baa423ce56
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1483
content:
"In most African Indigenous agrarian systems, local communities integrate IK to anticipate or respond to climate variability (Mafongoya \r\net al., 2017). This holds potential for a more holistic response to climate change, as Indigenous Knowledge and local knowledge (IKLK) \r\napproaches seek solutions that increase resilience to a wide range of shocks and community stresses (IPCC, 2019b). In Africa, IKLK are \r\nexceptionally rich in ecosystem-specific knowledge, with the potential to enhance the management of natural hazards and climate \r\nvariability (high confidence), but there is uncertainty about IKLK for adaptation under future climate conditions."


id: 9060a69345ee83656f7963b2da3f19b9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22602
content:
"Communities across Africa have long histories of using IKLK to cope with climate variability, reduce vulnerability and improve the capacity \r\nto cope with climate variability (Iloka Nnamdi, 2016; Mapfumo et al., 2017). The adaptation is mostly incremental, such as customary \r\nrainwater harvesting practices and planting ahead of rains (Ajibade and Eche, 2017; Makate, 2019), which are used to address the \r\nlate-onset rains and rainfall variability. Although IKLK adaptation practices implemented by African communities are incremental, such \r\npractices record higher evidence of climate risk reduction compared to practices influenced by other knowledge types (Williams et al., \r\n2020). African communities have used IKLK to cope, adapt to and manage climate hazards, mainly floods, wildfires, rainfall variability and \r\ndroughts (see Box Table 9.2.1; IPCC, 2018b; IPCC, 2019b)."


id: 61af676aaf149a2d7309bc78b7469d0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14475
content:
"Table Box 9.2.1 |  Selected studies where Indigenous knowledge and local knowledge have been used to cope with climate variability and climate change impacts in \r\nAfrica."


id: fe93ab81ed1f732c6e038ba13751b862
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42159
content:
"IKLK and adaptation/coping strategies in Table Box 9.2.1 are supportive measures that communities cannot solely rely upon, but which \r\ncan be used to complement other adaptation options to increase community resilience."


id: 6ff546346cff6085fff39c04ca1ff1b3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16952
content:
"The diversity of African languages is crucial for climate adaptation. Africa has over 30% of the world's Indigenous languages (Seti et al., \r\n2016), which are exceptionally rich in ecosystem-specific knowledge on biodiversity, soil systems and water (Oyero, 2007; Mugambiwa, \r\n2018). Taking into consideration the low level of literacy in Africa, especially among women and girls, Indigenous languages hold great \r\npotential for more effective climate change communication and services that enable climate adaptation (Brooks et al., 2005; Ologeh \r\net al., 2018; IPCC, 2019b). African traditional beliefs and cultural practices place great value on the natural environment, especially land \r\nas the dwelling place of the ancestors and source of livelihoods (Tarusarira, 2017; see Section 9.12)."


id: f40de8a2c883f35b95987a38e17d7285
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40308
content:
"Figure Box 9.2.1 |  Indigenous earth walls (hayit) built by Indigenous people in Akobo, Jonglei Region, South Sudan, to protect their houses and \r\ninfrastructure from the worst flood in 25 years that occurred in 2019. The wall is 1-2 m high. Photo credit: Laurent-Charles Tremblay-Levesque."


id: c19087313ccc239ce2dba0f42d70d8f8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31358
content:
"in the Sahel, appear transitory and localised rather than widespread \r\nand permanent (Dardel et al., 2014; Pandit et al., 2018; Sterk and \r\nStoorvogel, 2020)."


id: 4a991ec697a85ceb6566ecf0d86de147
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10365
content:
"There is high agreement that land use activities counteract or exacerbate \r\nclimate-driven vegetation change (Aleman et al., 2017; Timm Hoffman \r\net al., 2019). Decreased woody plant biomass in 11% of sub-Saharan \r\nAfrica was attributed to land clearing for agriculture (Brandt et al., 2017; \r\nOrdway et al., 2017). Localised loss of tree cover in Miombo woodlands \r\nand 16.6+-0.5 Mha of forest loss in the Congo Basin between 2000-2014 \r\nwas driven largely by forest clearing and drought mortality (McNicol \r\net al., 2018; Tyukavina et al., 2018)."


id: e8ffd81a13d50b106c3dd14d9990fa1d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38343
content:
"water quality and productivity of algae, invertebrates and fish (high \r\nconfidence). In deeper lakes, warmer surface waters and decreasing \r\nwind speeds reduced shallow waters mixing with nutrient-rich deeper \r\nwaters, reducing biological productivity in the upper sunlit zone \r\n(Ndebele-Murisa, 2014; Saulnier-Talbot et al., 2014). In several lakes, \r\nclimate change was identified as causing changes in insect emergence \r\ntime (Dallas and Rivers-Moore, 2014) and in loss of fish habitats \r\n(Natugonza et  al., 2015; Gownaris et  al., 2016). This set of changes \r\ncan harm human livelihoods, for example, from reduced fisheries \r\nproductivity (see Section 9.8.5; Ndebele-Murisa, 2014; Ogutu-Ohwayo \r\net al., 2016) and reduced water supply and quality (Section 9.7.1)."


id: 8c1f31dd123656540a15e2bf6703a273
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21826
content:
"Small climatic variations have large impacts on ecosystem function \r\nin Africa's freshwaters (Ndebele-Murisa, 2014; Ogutu-Ohwayo et  al., \r\n2016). Warming of water temperatures from 0.2degC to 3.2degC occurred in \r\nseveral lakes over 1927-2014 and has been attributed to human-caused \r\nclimate change (Figure  9.17; Ogutu-Ohwayo et  al., 2016). Increased \r\ntemperature, changes in rainfall and reduced wind speed altered the \r\nphysical and chemical properties of inland water bodies, affecting "


id: 6dc26b58544bdd47cc285ae6054bba52
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16569
content:
"reversing climate- and CO2-driven greening in savannas (Aleman \r\net al., 2018; Quesada et al., 2018)."


id: 360d88076942a2d5afde6eb14de00ccb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6757
content:
"Vegetation growth simulated by dynamic vegetation models is often \r\nhighly sensitive to CO2 fertilisation. These models project the African \r\ntropical forest carbon sink to be stable or strengthened under scenarios \r\nof future climate change (Huntingford et al., 2013; Martens et al., 2021). \r\nIn contrast, statistical modelling suggests it has begun to decline and \r\nwill weaken further, decreasing from current estimates of 0.66 tonnes \r\nof carbon removed from the atmosphere per hectare per year to 0.55 \r\ntonnes of carbon (Hubau et al., 2020). Increasing rainfall seasonality \r\nand aridity over central Africa (Haensler et  al., 2013) threatens the \r\nmassive carbon store in the Congo Basin's Cuvette Centrale peatlands, \r\nestimated at 30.6 billion tonnes (Dargie et al., 2019)."


id: 33d55963fb7d8e5ea885f5415f7ca67
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6359
content:
"Local extinction is when a species is extirpated from a local site. \r\nThe magnitude and extent of local extinctions predicted across \r\nAfrica increase substantially under all future GWLs (high confidence) "


id: dcc14b12e6cf0bb9bac6ff372e8de8b9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:56
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:56
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36100
content:
"Aridity is an important determinant of these biomes, however the distribution of \r\ngrasslands, savannas and forests are also strongly shaped by interactions between \r\ndisturbance and climate and as such changes in disturbances are also important \r\ndeterminants of biomes boundaries. Multiple stable biome states are often possible at \r\nthe transition between savanna and forest. Shifts in rainfall seasonality are not \r\ndepicted here, though through altering disturbance regimes and drought intensity, this \r\nis also expected to be an important factor."


id: 7121d3457059ae91cf29453109dde48f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:56
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:56
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17166
content:
"Forests expand into savannas;\r\nsavannas experience densification and tending to \r\nbecome closed canopy systems."


id: 4fa13eae7954f7c1c741ce102aa8ace2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:56
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:56
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11296
content:
"As CO2\r\n increases the water use efficiency of \r\ntrees and grasses increases causing woody \r\nproliferation in arid savannas. This may also \r\ninduce expansion of grasses into arid shrublands."


id: cfab99fcbe2fe1ee380b506f525887fd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:56
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:21:56
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33895
content:
"(Table 9.5; Figure 9.19). Above 2degC, the risk of sudden disruption or \r\nloss of local biodiversity increases and becomes more widespread, \r\nespecially in central, west and east Africa (Trisos et al., 2020)."


