# document

id: 5dc474b6c4a714681938f44fe1e3b20c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13788
content:
"Progress in achieving the 20 Aichi Biodiversity targets which are \r critical for realising the SDGs has been poor with most of the targets \r not being achieved or only partially realised (SCBD 2020). There \r could be synergies and trade-offs between ecosystem services and \r human well-being. For instance, a study notes that although policy \r interventions and incentives to enhance supply of provisioning \r services (e.g.,  agricultural production) have led to higher GDP, it \r may have an adverse effect on the regulatory services of ecosystems \r (Kirchner et al. 2015). However, we are aware of the inadequacies \r of traditional GDP as an indicator of well-being. In this context the \r Dasgupta Biodiversity Review argues for using the inclusive wealth \r approach to accurately measure social well-being by tracking the \r changes in produced, human and natural capital (Dasgupta 2021). \r Targets for nature (biodiversity and ecosystem services) should be \r [...]"


id: e59032f59585f088cf98b96ce289e56d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37697
content:
"[...] refined so as to fit in with the metrics tracked by the SDGs (IPBES \r 2016; Rosa et al. 2017)."


id: 7d0d2885ff8eb02bf3f062c508278547
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19187
content:
"Combined mitigation and adaptation approaches have been \r highlighted throughout Section  7.4 regarding specific measures. \r Land-based mitigation and adaptation to the risks posed by climate \r change and extreme weather events can have several co-benefits \r as well as help promote development and conservation goals. \r Land-based mitigation and adaptation will not only help reduce \r GHG emissions in the AFOLU sector, but measures are required to \r closely link up with adaptation. In the central 2degC scenario, improved \r management of land and more efficient forest practices, a reduction \r in deforestation and an increase in afforestation, would account \r for 10% of the total mitigation effort over 2015-2050 (Keramidas \r et al. 2018). If managed and regulated appropriately, the Land \r sector could become carbon-neutral as early as 2030-2035, being \r a key sector for emissions reductions beyond 2025 (Keramidas et al. \r 2018). Nature-based solutions (NBS) with safeguards has immense \r [...]"


id: 15341315073f6d464d11faa61d547c9b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 945
content:
"[...] potential for cost-effective adaptation to climate change; but their \r impacts will vary by scale and contexts (high confidence). Griscom \r et al. 2017 estimate this potential to provide 37% of cost-effective \r CO2 mitigation until 2030 needed to meet 2degC goals with likely co\u0002benefits for biodiversity. However, due to the time lag for technology \r deployment and natural carbon gain this mitigation potential of NBS \r by 2030 or 2050 can be delayed or much lower than the estimated \r potential (Qin et al. 2021)."


id: 7580b7202ec2cf612de2c1818a0f3fe7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17900
content:
"Economic mitigation potential refers to the mitigation estimated to be possible at an annual cost of up to USD100 tCO2\r -1 mitigated. \r This cost is deemed the price at which society is willing to pay for mitigation and is used as a proxy to estimate the proportion of \r technical mitigation potential that could realistically be implemented. Between 2020 and 2050, measures concerning forests and \r other ecosystem are estimated to have an average annual mitigation potential of 7.3 (3.9-13.1) GtCO2-eq yr-1 at USD100 tCO2\r -1. \r At the same cost, agricultural measures are estimated to have a potential of 4.1 (1.7-6.7) GtCO2-eq yr-1. Emerging technologies, \r such as CH4 vaccines and inhibitors, could sustainably increase agricultural mitigation potential in future. The diverted production \r effects of changes in demand (reduced food losses, diet changes and improved and enhanced wood products use), is estimated to \r [...]"


id: f08d76fa30be782c1fcc2c95dda5434e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39696
content:
"[...] have an economic potential of 2.2 (1.1-3.6) GtCO2-eq yr-1. However, cost forms only one constraint to mitigation, with realisation \r of economic potential dependent on multiple context-specific environmental and socio-cultural factors."


id: 5ccb690a50657305b5863a8bff3ebe67
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13588
content:
"The potential of bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) remains a focus of debate with several studies evaluating the \r level at which BECCS could be sustainably implemented, published since AR5. BECCS involves sequestering carbon through plant \r growth (i.e., in trees or crops) and capturing the carbon generated when this biomass is processed for power or fuel. The captured \r carbon then requires long-term storage in for example, geological, terrestrial or ocean reservoirs, or in products. While appearing to \r create a net removal of carbon from the atmosphere, BECCS requires land, water and energy which can create adverse side effects \r at scale. Controversy has arisen because some of the models calculating the energy mix required to keep the temperature to 1.5degC \r have included BECCS at very large scales as a means of both providing energy and removing carbon from the atmosphere to offset \r [...]"


id: 1b85f7840283d4964386f890eae0929c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2032
content:
"[...] emissions from industry, power, transport or heat. For example, studies have calculated that for BECCS to achieve 11.5 GtCO2-eq \r per year of carbon removal in 2100, as envisaged in one scenario, 380-700 Mha or 25-46% of all the world's arable and cropland \r would be needed. In such a  situation, competition for agricultural land seriously threatens food production and food security, \r while also impacting biodiversity, water and soil quality, and landscape aesthetic value. More recently however, the scenarios for \r BECCS have become much more realistic, though concerns regarding impacts on food security and the environment remain, while \r the reliability of models is uncertain due to methodological flaws. Improvements to models are required to better capture wider \r environmental and social impacts of BECCS in order to ascertain its sustainable contribution in emissions pathways. Additionally, \r [...]"


id: 54bdbf750f190c8fe3c2540a5e7e6807
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12178
content:
"[...] the opportunity for other options that could negate very large-scale deployment of BECCS, such as other carbon dioxide removal \r measures or more stringent emission reductions in other sectors, could be explored within models."


id: bcf2584e87e82400a1cf404ec679adfc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30486
content:
"The global share of future urban GHG emissions is expected to \r increase through 2050, with moderate to low mitigation efforts, \r due to growth trends in population, urban land expansion, \r and infrastructure and service demands, but the extent of the \r increase depends on the scenario and the scale and timing \r of urban mitigation action (medium confidence). In modelled \r scenarios, global consumption-based urban CO2 and CH4 emissions \r are projected to rise from 29 GtCO2-eq in 2020 to 34 GtCO2-eq in \r 2050 with moderate mitigation efforts (intermediate GHG emissions, \r SSP2-4.5), and up to 40 GtCO2-eq in 2050 with low mitigation efforts \r (high GHG emissions, SSP3-7.0). With aggressive and immediate \r mitigation policies to limit global warming to 1.5degC (>50%) with no \r or limited overshoot by the end of the century (very low emissions, \r SSP1-1.9), including high levels of electrification, energy and material \r efficiency, renewable energy preferences, and socio-behavioural \r [...]"


id: 6cfb40ce22dda52cedae1c56baafa379
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"[...] responses, urban GHG emissions could approach net-zero and reach \r a maximum of 3 GtCO2-eq in 2050. Under a scenario with aggressive \r but not immediate urban mitigation policies to limit global warming \r to 2degC (>67%) (low emissions, SSP1-2.6), urban emissions could \r reach 17 GtCO2-eq in 2050.2\r  (Figure TS.13) {8.3.4}"


id: 728806ff1a925fd304edcedf6b180a0b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17391
content:
"Urban land areas could triple between 2015 and 2050, with \r significant implications for future carbon lock-in. There is \r a  large range in the forecasts of urban land expansion across \r scenarios and models, which highlights an opportunity to shape \r future urban development towards low- or net-zero GHG emissions \r and minimise the loss of carbon stocks and sequestration in the \r agriculture, forestry and other land use (AFOLU) sector due to \r urban land conversion (medium confidence). By 2050, urban areas \r could increase up to 211% over the 2015 global urban extent, with \r the median projected increase ranging from 43% to 106%. While the \r largest absolute amount of new urban land is forecasted to occur \r in Asia and Pacific, and in Developed Countries, the highest rate of \r urban land growth is projected to occur in Africa, Eastern Europe and \r West-Central Asia, and in the Middle East. The infrastructure that will \r [...]"


id: 53c63a30b07941585c6a973903fba7b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12008
content:
"[...] be constructed concomitant with urban land expansion will lock-in \r patterns of energy consumption that will persist for decades if not \r generations. Furthermore, given past trends, the expansion of urban \r areas is likely to take place on agricultural lands and forests, with \r implications for the loss of carbon stocks and sequestration. {8.3.1, \r 8.3.4, 8.4.1, 8.6}"


id: 62b23bf7ed32dfd56da182de3b1a7bee
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14654
content:
"Urban green and blue infrastructure can mitigate climate \r change through carbon sequestration, avoided emissions, and \r reduced energy use while offering multiple co-benefits (robust \r evidence, high agreement). Urban green and blue infrastructure, \r including urban forests and street trees, permeable surfaces, and \r green roofs3\r  offer potential to mitigate climate change directly \r through sequestering and storing carbon, and indirectly by inducing \r a cooling effect that reduces energy demand and reducing energy \r use for water treatment. Global urban trees store approximately \r 7.4 billion tonnes of carbon, and sequester approximately 217 million \r tonnes of carbon annually, although urban tree carbon storage and \r sequestration are highly dependent on biome. Among the multiple \r co-benefits of green and blue infrastructure are reducing the urban \r heat island (UHI) effect and heat stress, reducing stormwater runoff, \r [...]"


id: f07f0ed13bff5a4112cac519d77a1724
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39690
content:
"[...] improving air quality, and improving mental and physical health of \r urban dwellers. {8.2, 8.4.4}"


id: a945e890055ac8377a3be797ed42cecb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27003
content:
"The potential and sequencing of mitigation strategies to \r reduce GHG emissions will vary depending on a  city's land \r use, spatial form, development level, and state of urbanisation \r (i.e., whether it is an established city with existing infrastructure, \r a rapidly growing city with new infrastructure, or an emerging \r city with infrastructure buildup (high confidence). New and \r emerging cities will have significant infrastructure development needs \r to achieve high quality of life, which can be met through energy\u0002efficient infrastructures and services, and people-centred urban \r design (high confidence). The long lifespan of urban infrastructures \r locks in behaviour and committed emissions. Urban infrastructures \r and urban form can enable socio-cultural and lifestyle changes that \r can significantly reduce carbon footprints. Rapidly growing cities can \r avoid higher future emissions through urban planning to co-locate \r [...]"


id: 2c4ca9e591cb926be3737b8cc643b20c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5059
content:
"[...] jobs and housing to achieve compact urban form, and by leapfrogging \r to low-carbon technologies. Established cities will achieve the largest \r GHG emissions savings by replacing, repurposing, or retrofitting the \r building stock, targeted infilling and densifying, as well as through \r modal shift and the electrification of the urban energy system. New \r and emerging cities have unparalleled potential to become low \r or net-zero GHG emissions while achieving high quality of life by \r creating compact, co-located, and walkable urban areas with mixed \r land use and transit-oriented design, that also preserve existing \r green and blue assets. {8.2, 8.4, 8.6}"


id: 43e6123e8975fb4e998fe5e985f078a0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9179
content:
"Since AR5, there has been growing scientific literature and policy foci \r on urban strategies for climate change mitigation. There are three \r possible reasons for this. First, according to AR5 Working Group III \r (WGIII) Chapter 12 on Human Settlements, Infrastructure, and Spatial \r Planning, urban areas generate between 71% and 76% of carbon \r dioxide (CO2) emissions from global final energy use and between \r 67% and 76% of global energy (Seto et al. 2014). Thus, focusing on \r 'urban systems' (see Annex I: Glossary and Figure 8.15) addresses \r one of the key drivers of emissions. Second, more than half of the \r world population lives in urban areas, and by mid-century 7  out \r of 10 people on the planet will live in a town or a city (UN DESA \r 2019). Thus, coming up with mitigation strategies that are relevant \r to urban settlements is critical for successful mitigation of climate \r change. Third, beyond climate change, there is growing attention on \r [...]"


id: b3d039d6559b8ea50e5d2e2b684cc5e4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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content:
"[...] cities as major catalysts of change and to help achieve the objectives \r outlined in multiple international frameworks and assessments."


id: 53d335eaa7168e35a4cf2b4b9843ea28
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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vector_id: 12018
content:
"Figure 8.3: Population of the world, by area of residence and size class of urban settlement for 2018. As of 2018, 4.2 billion people or 55% of the world \r population reside in urban settlements while 45% reside in rural areas. The coloured stacked column for the urban population represents the total number of inhabitants \r for a given size class of urban settlements. Megacities of 10 million or more inhabitants have a total of only 529 million inhabitants, corresponding to 12.5% of the urban \r population. In contrast, about 1.8 billion inhabitants reside in urban settlements with fewer than 300,000 inhabitants, corresponding to 41.5% of the urban population. \r The pie chart represents the respective shares for 2018, with 42% of the urban population residing in settlements with more than 1 million inhabitants, and 58% of the \r [...]"


id: d109800fcdd7abb0917297a0892e7e66
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34130
content:
"[...] urban population residing in settlements with fewer than 1  million inhabitants. Almost half of the world's urban population (48%) live in settlements with fewer than \r 500,000 inhabitants. Source: adapted from UN DESA 2019, p. 56."


id: 5c9f2f0676416665104e3f14e866a74b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13555
content:
"Sixth, urbanisation in many emerging economies is characterised \r by informality and an informal economy (Brown and McGranahan \r 2016). The urban informal economy includes a  wide array of \r activities, including but not limited to street vending, home-based \r enterprises, unreported income from self-employment, informal \r commerce, domestic service, waste-picking, and urban agriculture. \r The urban informal economy is large and growing. Globally, about \r 44% of the urban economy is informal, although there is much \r variation between countries and regions (ILO 2018). Emerging and \r developing economies have the highest percentage of the urban \r informal economy, with Africa (76%) and the Arab States (64%) with \r the largest proportion (ILO 2018). Urban informality also extends \r to planning, governance and institutions (Roy 2009; EU 2016; \r Lamson-Hall et al. 2019). Given its prevalence, it is important for \r urban climate change mitigation strategies to account for informality, \r [...]"


id: ceb6786e130769f304c110323bdff1d6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33705
content:
"In cities, carbon cycles through natural (e.g.,  vegetation and soils) \r and managed (e.g.,  reservoirs and anthropogenic  - buildings, \r transportation) pools. The accumulation of carbon in urban pools, \r such as buildings or landfills, results from the local or global transfer \r of carbon-containing energy and raw materials used in the city \r (Churkina 2008; Pichler et al. 2017; Chen et al. 2020b). Quantitative \r understanding of these transfers and the resulting emissions and \r uptake within an urban area is essential for accurate urban carbon \r accounting (USGCRP 2018). Currently, urban areas are a net source of \r carbon because they emit more carbon than they uptake. Thus, urban \r mitigation strategies require a  twofold strategy: reducing urban \r emissions of carbon into the atmosphere, and enhancing uptake \r of carbon in urban pools (Churkina 2012) (for a broader definition of \r 'carbon cycle' and related terms such as 'carbon sink,' 'carbon stock,' \r [...]"


id: 64554e6b4846c33e7da587c8d1fac6f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14932
content:
"Burning fossil fuels to generate energy for buildings, transportation, \r industry, and other sectors is a  major source of urban GHG \r emissions (Gurney et al. 2015). At the same time, most cities do \r not generate within their boundaries all of the resources they use, \r such as electricity, gasoline, cement, water, and food needed for \r local homes and businesses to function (Jacobs 1969), requiring \r consideration of GHG emissions embodied in supply chains serving \r cities. Furthermore, urban vegetation, soils, and aquatic systems can \r both emit or remove carbon from the urban atmosphere and are \r often heavily managed. For example, urban parks, forests, and street \r trees actively remove carbon from the atmosphere through growing \r season photosynthesis. They can become a  net source of carbon \r most often during the dormant season or heat waves. Some of the \r sequestered carbon can be stored in the biomass of urban trees, soils, \r [...]"


id: 84dc02d512d820199949942d3059f4f4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20513
content:
"[...] and aquatic systems. Urban infrastructures containing cement also \r uptake carbon through the process of carbonation. The uptake of \r carbon by urban trees is at least two orders of magnitude faster than \r by cement-containing infrastructures (Churkina 2012) (Section 8.4.4 \r and Figures 8.17 and 8.18)."


id: b16b420dc0715705191d882da9bf0e17
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28439
content:
"When planning and implementing low-carbon transitions, it is \r important to consider the socio-economic context. An inclusive \r approach emphasises the need to engage non-state actors, including \r businesses, research organisations, non-profit organisations and \r citizens (Lee and Painter 2015; Hale et al. 2020). For example, \r engaging people in defining locally relevant mitigation targets and \r actions has enabled successful transformations in China (Engels \r 2018), Africa (Gopfert et al. 2019) and Malaysia (Ho et al. 2015). \r An active research and government collaboration through multiple \r stakeholder interactions in a large economic corridor in Malaysia led \r to the development and implementation of a low-carbon blueprint \r for the region (Ho et al. 2013). Many cities in LDCs and developing \r countries lack adequate urban infrastructure and housing. An \r equitable transformation in these cities entails prioritising energy \r [...]"


id: ab74686a01dbd4581ff9442624c364e1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27393
content:
"[...] access and basic services, including safe drinking water and \r sanitation, to meet basic needs of their populations."


id: dfbabf96b817be93c5ef827698897d7c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36610
content:
"Numerous studies have reviewed urban GHG accounting frameworks \r and methods with somewhat different nomenclatures and categorical \r divisions (Lin et al. 2015; Lombardi et al. 2017; Chen et al. 2019b; \r Arioli et al. 2020; Heinonen et al. 2020; Hachaichi and Baouni 2021; \r Ramaswami et al. 2021). Furthermore, accounting frameworks are \r reflected in multiple protocols used by urban practitioners (BSI 2013; \r Fong et al. 2014; ICLEI 2019b). Synthesis of these reviews and \r protocols, as well as the many individual methodological studies \r available, point to four general frameworks of urban GHG accounting: \r (i) territorial accounting (TA); (ii) community-wide infrastructure \r supply chain footprinting (CIF); and (iii and iv) consumption-based \r carbon footprint accounting (CBCF; Wiedmann and Minx 2008). The \r last, CBCF, can be further divided into accounting with a focus on \r household or personal consumption (iii: the personal carbon footprint, \r [...]"


id: c9146be4f0cd96455734db8bd07d748d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32696
content:
"[...] or PCF); and an approach in which one includes final consumption \r in an area by all consumers (iv: the areal carbon footprint, or ACF) \r (Heinonen et al. 2020). A number of small variations to these general \r categories are found in the literature (Lin et al. 2015; Chen et al. \r 2020a), but these four general frameworks capture the important \r distinctive (i.e., policy-relevant) features of urban GHG accounting."


id: 922faa3b8ac9fe643401ee81889bc61
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22936
content:
"A second major area of advance since AR5 has been in methods \r to implement, verify and scale up the different GHG footprinting \r approaches. Advances have been made in six key areas: (i) advancing \r urban metabolism accounts integrating stocks and flows, and \r considering biogenic and fossil-fuel-based emissions (Chen et al. \r 2020b); (ii) improving fine-scale and near-real-time urban use-activity \r data through new urban data science (Gately et al. 2017; Gurney et al. \r 2019; Turner et al. 2020; Yadav et al. 2021); (iii) using atmospheric \r monitoring from the ground, aircraft, and satellites combined with \r inverse modelling to independently quantify TA emissions (Lamb \r et al. 2016; Lauvaux et al. 2016, 2020; Davis et al. 2017; Mitchell \r et al. 2018; Sargent et al. 2018; Turnbull et al. 2019; Wu et al. 2020a); \r (iv)  improving supply chain and input-output modelling, including \r the use of physically based input-output models (Wachs and Singh \r [...]"


id: 2bd95963a539fbfdb41be824a715f504
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4965
content:
"[...] 2018); (v) establishing the global multi-region input-output models \r (Lenzen et al. 2017; Wiedmann et al. 2021); and (vi) generating multi\u0002sector use and supply activity data across all cities in a nation, in \r a manner where data aggregate consistently across city, province, \r and national scales (Tong et al. 2021) (Section 8.3)."


id: 401d87472c84dfff960c7be7b17608e7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8469
content:
"Figure 8.4 summarises an evaluation of the synergies and/or trade\u0002offs with the SDGs for the mitigation options for urban systems based \r on Supplementary Material 8.SM.1. The evaluations depend on the \r specific urban context, with synergies and/or trade-offs being more \r significant in certain contexts than others. Urban mitigation with \r a view of the SDGs can support shifting pathways of urbanisation \r towards greater sustainability. The feasibility of urban mitigation \r options is also malleable and can increase with more 'enabling \r conditions' (see Glossary), provided, perhaps, through institutional \r (i.e., financial or governmental) support (Section 8.5). Strengthened \r institutional capacity that supports the coordination of mitigation \r options can increase linkages with the SDGs and their synergies. \r For example, urban land use and spatial planning for walkable and \r co-located densities, together with electrification of the urban energy \r [...]"


id: c5dd2fe2684173f50d6a8c15e6715ff5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32117
content:
"[...] system, can hold more benefits for the SDGs than any one of the \r mitigation options alone (Sections 8.4.2.3, 8.4.3.1 and 8.6)."


id: 61ff533336e23bfabea0a418edb1a9cc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14514
content:
"Evidence on the co-benefits of urban mitigation measures for human \r health has increased significantly since AR5, especially through the \r use of health impact assessments, where energy savings and cleaner \r energy supply structures based on measures for urban planning, \r heating, and transport have reduced CO2, nitrogen oxides (NOx), \r and coarse particulate matter (PM10) emissions (Diallo et al. 2016). \r Some measures, especially those related to land-use planning and \r transportation, have also increased opportunities for physical activity \r for improved health (Diallo et al. 2016). In developing countries, \r the co-benefits approach has been effective in justifying climate \r change mitigation actions at the local level (Puppim de Oliveira and \r Doll 2016). Mixed-use compact development with sufficient land\u0002use diversity can have a  positive influence on urban productivity \r (Section  8.4.2). Conversely, urban spatial structures that increase \r [...]"


id: 147ee1a7d77c319a145c5b1c37b98877
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 831
content:
"[...] walking distances and produce car dependency have negative \r impacts on urban productivity considering congestion as well as \r energy costs (Salat et al. 2017)."


id: 46a75c81ba72814e6573f1c9359cb08d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9635
content:
"There are numerous synergies that come from coupling urban \r adaptation and mitigation. A  number of studies have developed \r methods to assess the synergies between mitigation and adaptation \r strategies, as well as their co-benefits (Solecki et al. 2015; Buonocore \r et al. 2016; Chang et al. 2017; Helgenberger and Janicke 2017). \r Co-benefits occur when implementing mitigation (or adaptation) \r measures that have positive effects on adaptation (or mitigation) \r (Sharifi 2021). In contrast, the trade-offs emerge when measures \r aimed at improving mitigation (adaptation) undermine the ability to \r pursue adaptation (mitigation) targets (Sharifi 2020). The magnitude \r of such co-benefits and trade-offs may vary depending on various \r factors. A  systematic review of over 50 climate change articles \r provides evidence that mitigation can contribute to resilience  - \r especially to temperature changes and flooding  - with varying \r [...]"


id: fd59f3d8504cb36703b97dd6298f182
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41929
content:
"[...] magnitudes, depending on factors such as the type of mitigation \r measure and the scale of implementation (Sharifi 2019)."


id: ab0e42cf90050dd6bb77737bf9d55512
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27321
content:
"Measures from different sectors that can provide both mitigation and \r adaptation benefits involve urban planning (Section 8.4.2), buildings \r (Sections 8.4.3.2 and 8.4.4), energy (Section 8.4.3), green and blue \r infrastructure (Section  8.4.4), transportation (Section  8.4.2), socio\u0002behavioural aspects (Section 8.4.5), urban governance (Section 8.5), \r waste (Section  8.4.5.2), and water (Section  8.4.6). In addition \r to their energy-saving and carbon-sequestration benefits, many \r measures can also enhance adaptation to climate threats, such as \r extreme heat, energy shocks, floods, and droughts (Sharifi 2021). \r Existing evidence is mainly related to urban green infrastructure, \r urban planning, transportation, and buildings. There has been \r more emphasis on the potential co-benefits of measures, such \r as proper levels of density, building energy efficiency, distributed \r and decentralised energy infrastructure, green roofs and facades, \r [...]"


id: e4a7dbcc9efea0bb7e09394298824a4d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37512
content:
"[...] and public/active transport modes. Renewable-based distributed and \r decentralised energy systems improve resilience to energy shocks \r and can enhance adaptation to water stress considering the water\u0002energy nexus. By further investment on these measures, planners and \r decision makers can ensure enhancing achievement of mitigation/\r adaptation co-benefits at the urban level (Sharifi 2021)."


id: 92b78cddf5bf925e0a96f19718a7e30e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23028
content:
"Implementing waste management and wastewater recycling \r measures can provide additional sources of income for citizens \r and local authorities. Wastewater recycling can minimise the costs \r associated with the renewal of centralised wastewater treatment \r plants (Bernstad Saraiva Schott and Canovas 2015; Gharfalkar \r et al. 2015; Gonzalez-Valencia et al. 2016; Herrero and Vilella \r 2018; Matsuda et al. 2018; Nisbet et al. 2019). Waste management \r and wastewater recycling is also a  pathway for inclusion of the \r informal sector into the urban economy with high agreement and \r medium evidence (Sharifi 2021). Additionally, authorities can sell \r energy generated from wastewater recycling to compensate for \r the wastewater management costs (Colenbrander et al. 2017; \r Gondhalekar and Ramsauer 2017). Another measure that contributes \r to reducing household costs is the promotion of behavioural \r measures such as dietary changes that can decrease the demand for \r [...]"


id: ba635c1cfb0a0d2837c65b91e3c623be
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30010
content:
"[...] costly food sources and reduce health care costs through promoting \r healthy diets (Hoppe et al. 2016) (Sections 8.4.5 and 8.4.6)."


id: 77561b961766d3e124fd38f384cb28ea
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18203
content:
"In addition to cost savings, various measures such as stormwater \r management and urban greening can enhance social equity and \r environmental justice. For example, the thermal comfort benefits \r provided by green and blue infrastructure and passive design measures \r can address issues related to energy poverty and unaffordability of \r expensive air conditioning systems for some social groups (Sharma \r et al. 2018; He et al. 2019). To achieve such benefits, however, the \r costs of integrating green and blue infrastructure and passive design \r measures into building design would need to be minimised. Another \r example is the flood mitigation benefits of stormwater management \r measures that can reduce impacts on urban poor who often reside \r in flood-prone and low-lying areas of cities (Adegun 2017; He et al. \r 2019). Generally, the urban poor are expected to be disproportionately \r affected by climate change impacts. Carefully designed measures \r [...]"


id: 43f82eb830a5855f8f30a26398994128
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9192
content:
"[...] that reduce such disproportionate impacts by involving experts, \r authorities and citizens would enhance social equity (Pandey et al. \r 2018; He et al. 2019; Mulligan et al. 2020)."


id: 3b27521af8708a89f4291ad15b6ba481
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7593
content:
"Urbanisation: A megatrend driving global climate risk and potential for low-carbon and resilient futures\r Severe weather events, exacerbated by anthropogenic emissions, are already having devastating impacts on people who live in \r urban areas, on the infrastructure that supports these communities, as well as people living in distant places (high confidence) (Cai \r et al. 2019; Folke et al. 2021). Between 2000 and 2015, the global population in locations that were affected by floods grew by \r 58-86 million (Tellman et al. 2021). The direct economic costs of all extreme events reached USD210-268 billion in 2020 (Aon 2021; \r Munich RE 2021; WMO 2021) or about USD0.7 billion per day; this figure does not include knock-on costs in supply chains (Kii 2020) \r [...]"


id: 23b62db2fa63b3096ac757bd117585de
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3477
content:
"[...] or lost days of work, implying that the actual economic costs could be far higher. Depending on RCP, between half (RCP2.6) and three\u0002quarters (RCP8.5) of the global population could be exposed to periods of life-threatening climatic conditions arising from coupled \r impacts of extreme heat and humidity by 2100 (Mora et al. 2017; Huang et al. 2019) (see WGII Section 6.2.2.1, WGII Figure 6.3, and \r WGIII Sections 8.2 and 8.3.4)."


id: 3527ac11655133cb82bb29498fed169d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6596
content:
"Urban systems are now global, as evidenced by the interdependencies between infrastructure, services, and networks driven by \r urban production and consumption; remittance flows and investments reach into rural places, shaping natural resource use far \r from the city and bring risk to the city when these places are impacted by climate change (WGIII Section 8.4 and Figure 8.15). This \r megatrend (Kourtit et al. 2015) amplifies as well as shapes the potential impacts of climate events and integrates the aims and \r approaches for delivering mitigation, adaptation, and sustainable development (medium evidence, high agreement) (Dawson et al. \r 2018; Tsavdaroglou et al. 2018; Zscheischler et al. 2018). For cities facing flood damage, wide-ranging impacts have been recorded on \r other urban areas near and far (Carter et al. 2021; Simpson et al. 2021) as production and trade is disrupted (Shughrue et al. 2020). \r [...]"


id: 4aa08398c90e4497ec82f0a99d5405e8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10373
content:
"[...] In the absence of integrated mitigation and adaptation across and between infrastructure systems and local places, impacts that bring \r urban economies to a standstill can extend into supply chains and across energy networks causing power outages."


id: 8c1363c922f3d15dc35afda84265c78d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21812
content:
"Designing for resilient and low-carbon cities today is far easier than retrofitting for risk reduction tomorrow. As urbanisation unfolds, \r its legacy continues to be the locking-in of emissions and vulnerabilities (high confidence) (Seto et al. 2016; Urge-Vorsatz et al. \r 2018) (see WGIII Section 8.4 and Figure 8.15). Retrofitting, disaster reconstruction, and urban regeneration programmes offer scope \r for strategic direction changes to low-carbon and high-resilience urban form and function, so long as they are inclusive in design \r and implementation. Rapid urban growth means new investment, new buildings and infrastructure, new demands for energy and \r transport and new questions about what a healthy and fulfilling urban life can be. The USD90 trillion expected to be invested in new \r urban development by 2030 (NCE 2018) is a global opportunity to place adaptation and mitigation directly into urban infrastructure \r [...]"


id: bd184b866bf9dfda616c21d7404e8934
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30520
content:
"[...] and planning, as well as to consider social policy including education, health care, and environmental management (Urge-Vorsatz \r et al. 2018). If this opportunity is missed, and business-as-usual urbanisation persists, social and physical vulnerability will become \r much more challenging to address."


id: c7a50a879548c7a079c44b8136305da3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32435
content:
"The policy-action gap: urban low-carbon and climate-resilient development\r Cities are critical places to realise both adaptation and mitigation actions simultaneously with potential co-benefits that extend \r far beyond cities (medium evidence, high agreement) (Gopfert et al. 2019; Grafakos et al. 2020). Given rapid changes in the built \r environment, transforming the use of materials and the land intensiveness of urban development, including in many parts of the Global \r South, will be critical in the next decades, as well as mainstreaming low-carbon development principles in new urban development in \r all regions. Much of this development will be self-built and 'informal' - and new modes of governance and planning will be required \r to engage with this. Integrating mitigation and adaptation now rather than later, through reshaping patterns of urban development \r [...]"


id: 8b86725351bf90a9bc534bad1f1d5b4d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21712
content:
"[...] and associated decision-making processes, is a prerequisite for attaining resilient and zero-carbon cities (see WGIII Sections 8.4 and \r 8.6, and WGIII Figure 8.21)."


id: 986be0d19b6078ade85834279dcdc9dd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24026
content:
"Integrated approaches to tackle common drivers of emissions and cascading risks provide the basis for strengthening synergies across \r mitigation and adaptation, and help manage possible trade-offs with sustainable development (limited evidence, medium agreement) \r (Grafakos et al. 2019; Landauer et al. 2019; Pierer and Creutzig 2019). An analysis of 315 local authority emission-reduction plans \r reveals that the most common policies cover municipal assets and structures (Palermo et al. 2020a). Estimates of emission reductions \r by non-state and sub-state actors in 10 high-emitting economies projected GHG emissions in 2030 would be 1.2-2.0 GtCO2-eq yr-1\r or 3.8-5.5% lower compared to scenario projections for current national policies (31.6-36.8 GtCO2-eq yr-1) if the policies are \r fully implemented and do not change the pace of action elsewhere (Kuramochi et al. 2020). The value of integrating mitigation \r [...]"


id: a9938aeb42a21491fccd7913c3abb07f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27056
content:
"[...] and adaptation is underscored in the opportunities for decarbonising existing urban areas, and investing in social, ecological, and \r technological infrastructure resilience (WGII Section 6.4). Integrating mitigation and adaption is challenging (Landauer et al. 2019) but \r can provide multiple benefits for the health and well-being of urban inhabitants (Sharifi 2021) (See WGIII Section 8.2.3)."


id: ef1fd023d910930c2152d45a4dbe378a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39442
content:
"Innovative governance and finance solutions are required to manage complex and interconnected risks across essential key \r infrastructures, networks, and services, as well as to meet basic human needs in urban areas (medium confidence) (Colenbrander \r et al. 2018a; Moser et al. 2019). There are many examples of 'ready-to-use' policy tools, technologies, and practical interventions \r for policymakers seeking to act on adaptation and mitigation (Bisaro and Hinkel 2018; Keenan et al. 2019; Chirambo 2021) (see \r WGIII Section 8.5.4). Tax and fiscal incentives for businesses and individuals can help support city-wide behaviour change towards \r low-carbon and risk-reducing choices. Change can start where governments have most control - often in public sector institutions \r and investment - but the challenge ahead requires partnership with private sector and community actors acting at scale and with \r [...]"


id: bd0148fac4a41f138247a0729fa800ad
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30498
content:
"[...] accountability. Urban climate governance and finance needs to address urban inequalities at the forefront if the urban opportunity is \r to realise the ambition of the SDGs."


id: a9f77ffce47494df2d99edd9612d091b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27124
content:
"Iterative and experimental approaches to climate adaptation and mitigation decision-making grounded in data and co-generated in \r partnership with communities can advance low-carbon climate resilience (medium evidence, high confidence) (Culwick et al. 2019; \r Caldarice et al. 2021; van der Heijden and Hong 2021). Conditions of complexity, uncertainty, and constrained resources require \r innovative solutions that are both adaptive and anticipatory. Complex interactions among multiple agents in times of uncertainty \r makes decision-making about social, economic, governance, and infrastructure choices challenging and can lead decision-makers \r to postpone action. This is the case for those balancing household budgets, residential investment portfolios, and city-wide policy \r responsibilities. Living with climate change requires changes to business-as-usual design-making. Co-design and collaboration with \r [...]"


id: 68a84fe6754ed0b590be4ea004caadc1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15682
content:
"[...] communities through iterative policy experimentation can point the way towards climate-resilient development pathways (Ataov \r and Peker 2021). Key to successful learning is transparency in policymaking, inclusive policy processes, and robust local modelling, \r monitoring, and evaluation, which are not yet widely undertaken (Sanchez Rodriguez et al. 2018; Ford et al. 2019)."


id: d3e342ffafbcc8ca5d0f00c40a92fbad
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34616
content:
"Local governments play an important role in driving climate action across mitigation and adaptation as managers of assets, regulators, \r mobilisers, and catalysts of action, but few cities are undertaking transformative climate adaptation or mitigation actions (limited \r evidence, medium confidence) (Heikkinen et al. 2019). Local actors are providers of infrastructure and services, regulators of zoning, \r and can be conveners and champions of an integrated approach for mitigation and adaptation at multiple levels (limited evidence, high \r confidence). New opportunities in governance and finance can enable cities to pool resources together and aggregate interventions \r to innovate ways of mobilising urban climate finance at scale (Colenbrander et al. 2019; Simpson et al. 2019; White and Wahba 2019). \r However, research increasingly points towards the difficulties faced during the implementation of climate financing in situ, such as \r [...]"


id: eebb6ed65caa903ff3196ef04a05bd35
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39383
content:
"[...] the fragmentation of structures of governance capable of managing large investments effectively (Mohammed et al. 2019) (see WGIII \r Section 8.5 and WGIII Chapter 13)."


id: 7ed5d10b8cc7ac69f21ab3159fb2c42d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19471
content:
"Scaling up transformative place-based action for both adaptation and mitigation requires enabling conditions, including land-based \r financing, intermediaries, and local partnerships (medium evidence, high agreement) (Chu et al. 2019; Chaudhuri, 2020) supported \r by a new generation of big data approaches. Governance structures that combine actors working at different levels with a different \r mix of tools are effective in addressing challenges related to implementation of integrated action while cross-sectoral coordination \r is necessary (Singh et al. 2020). Joint institutionalisation of mitigation and adaptation in local governance structures can also enable \r integrated action (Gopfert et al. 2020; Hurlimann et al. 2021). However, the proportion of international finance that reaches local \r recipients remains low, despite the repeated focus of climate policy on place-based adaptation and mitigation (Manuamorn et al. \r [...]"


id: 3cca7abb7f2acdbd7e7989cbb719751
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7879
content:
"[...] 2020). Green financing instruments that enable local climate action without exacerbating current forms of inequality can jointly \r address mitigation, adaptation, and sustainable development. Climate finance that also reaches beyond larger non-state enterprises \r (e.g.,  small and medium-sized enterprises, local communities, or non-governmental organisations (NGOs)), and is inclusive in \r responding to the needs of all urban inhabitants (e.g., disabled individuals, or citizens of different races or ethnicities) is essential \r for inclusive and resilient urban development (Colenbrander et al. 2019; Gabaldon-Estevan et al. 2019; Frenova 2021). Developing \r networks that can exert climate action at scale is another priority for climate finance."


id: c932c7da19a86d7e1d7d358cc78d788b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32721
content:
"The urban megatrend is an opportunity to transition global society. Enabling urban governance to avert cascading risk and achieve \r low-carbon, resilient development will involve the co-production of policy and planning, rapid implementation and greater cross\u0002sector coordination, and monitoring and evaluation (limited evidence, medium agreement) (Di Giulio et al. 2018; Grafakos et al. 2019). \r New constellations of responsible actors are required to manage hybrid local-city or cross-city risk management and decarbonisation \r initiatives (limited evidence, medium agreement). These may increasingly benefit from linkages across more urban and more rural \r space as recognition of cascading and systemic risk brings recognition of supply chains, remittance flows, and migration trends as \r vectors of risk and resilience. Urban governance will be better prepared in planning, prioritising, and financing the kind of measures \r [...]"


id: 878b5851cdcd142c69d1699b661fb6d4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21003
content:
"[...] that can reduce GHG emissions and improve resilience at scale when they consider a view of cascading risks and carbon lock-ins \r globally, while also acting locally to address local limitations and capacities, including the needs and priorities of urban citizens \r (Colenbrander et al. 2018a; Rodrigues 2019)."


id: 2a45b03f8cb9c3612e5662067134ff8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4658
content:
"Figure 8.5: Urban population density by decade (1970-2010) grouped by the AR6 WGIII 10-region aggregation. Panel (a) displays the results from all case \r study locations with a population >300,000. Panels (b) and (c) show results grouped by city size: (b) cities with a population >2 million (large urban centres), and (c) those \r with a population >300,000 but <2 million (small and medium urban centres). Box plots show the median, first and third quartiles, and lower and upper mild outlier thresholds \r of bootstrapped average urban population densities at the turn of each decade. The estimates are shown on a logarithmic scale. The data shows an overall trend of declining \r urban population densities among all but one region in the last four decades, at varying rates - although the Latin America and Caribbean region indicates relatively constant \r [...]"


id: ee97d10eb7b7b944eafd7b939b4bc158
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39354
content:
"[...] urban population density over time. The Middle East region is the only region to present with an increase in urban population density across all city sizes. Source: adapted from\r Guneralp et al. (2020)."


id: 7ede5568262f07b865dc6537c7c43105
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19476
content:
"Informal urban areas can avoid the conventional trajectory of urban \r development by utilising large-scale strategies, such as micro-scale \r technologies, modal shifts towards compact, walkable urban form, \r as well as decentralised or meso-scale utilities of water, sanitation, \r and service centres - thereby mitigating emissions associated with \r transport and treating wastes (Tongwane et al. 2015; Yang et al. \r 2018). Some specific mitigation options include spatial adjustments \r for walkability of neighbourhoods, low-energy-intensive mobility, \r low-energy-intensive residential areas, low-carbon energy sources \r at city scale, off-grid utilities, and electrification and enhancement \r of the urban ecology - all of which have multiple potential benefits \r (Colenbrander et al. 2017; Fang et al. 2017; Laramee et al. 2018; van der \r Zwaan et al. 2018; Wu et al. 2018; Silveti and Andersson 2019). Some \r of the co-benefits of the various mitigation options include more job \r [...]"


id: 4a9760780c4dfab9badfe3afb7e45877
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10364
content:
"[...] opportunities and business start-ups, increased incomes, air quality \r improvement, and enhanced health and well-being (Gebreegziabher \r et al. 2014; Dagnachew et al. 2018; Keramidas et al. 2018; Adams \r et al. 2019; Ambole et al. 2019; Boltz et al. 2019; Moncada et al. 2019; \r Weimann and Oni 2019; Manga et al. 2020) (Section 8.2)."


id: 60b10e7bf9f6d0e070987bc1d2b918b1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14310
content:
"A third trend in is urban land growth taking place on agricultural land, \r carbon stocks, and other land uses (see 'carbon stock' and 'AFOLU' - \r agriculture, forestry, and other land uses - in Glossary). As Figure 8.7 \r shows, over 60% of the reported urban expansion (nearly 40,000 km2\r ) \r from 1970 to 2010 was formerly agricultural land (Guneralp et al. 2020). \r This percentage increased to about 70% for global urban expansion \r that occurred between 1992 and 2015, followed by grasslands (about \r 12%) and forests (about 9%) (Liu et al. 2020a). In terms of percent \r of total urban land expansion, the largest conversion of agricultural \r lands to urban land uses from 1970 to 2010 took place in the Eastern \r Asia, and South-East Asia and Pacific regions; the largest proportional \r losses of natural land cover were reported for the North America and \r Australia, Japan and New Zealand regions (Guneralp et al. 2020). At \r [...]"


id: 780131d55a301f3dc7690249a8fea1b6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18322
content:
"[...] a sub-regional level, agricultural land constituted the largest proportion \r of land converted to urban areas in China, India, Europe, Southeast \r Asian countries and the central United States between 1995 and 2015; \r in the eastern United States, most new urban land was converted \r from forests (Liu et al. 2020a). Urban expansion through 2040 may \r lead to the loss of almost 65 Mt of crop production - a scenario that \r underscores the ongoing relationship between urbanisation and \r AFOLU (van Vliet et al. 2017) (Chapter 7)."


id: fba6931bccf3525cb386c13b71baa10c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41644
content:
"Figure 8.9: Changes in six metrics associated with urban and national-scale carbon dioxide (CO2) and methane (CH4) emissions represented in the AR6 \r WGIII 6-region aggregation, with (a) 2000 and (b) 2015. The trends in Luqman et al. (2021) were combined with the work of Moran et al. (2018) to estimate the regional \r urban CO2-eq share of global urban emissions, the urban share of national CO2-eq emissions, and the urban per capita CO2-eq emissions by region. This estimate is derived \r from consumption-based accounting that includes both direct emissions from within urban areas and indirect emissions from outside urban areas related to the production \r of electricity, goods, and services consumed in cities. It incorporates all CO2 and CH4 emissions except aviation, shipping and biogenic sources (i.e., land-use change, forestry, \r [...]"


id: 7c61bb215505a02345b4fb71f4f49332
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19085
content:
"[...] and agriculture). The dashed grey line represents the global average urban per capita CO2-eq emissions. The regional urban population share, regional CO2-eq share in total \r emissions, and national per capita CO2-eq emissions by region are given for comparison. Source: adapted from Gurney et al. (2022).5"


id: a249a47fe29ede4cf9e38c486c74fd45
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25782
content:
"First, urban land areas will expand significantly by 2050 - by as much \r as 211% (see SSP5 forecast in Huang et al. 2019), but likely within \r a large potential range of about 43-106% over the 2015 extent by \r 2050 - to accommodate the growing urban population (Table 8.1). \r Globally, there are large uncertainties and variations among the \r studies  - and between the SSPs  - about the rates and extent of \r future urban expansion, owing to uncertainties about economic \r development and population growth (ranges of estimates are \r provided in Table 8.1). Overall, the largest urban extents are forecasted \r under SSP5 (fossil fuel-intensive development) for both 2050 and \r 2100, whereas the smallest forecasted urban extents are under \r SSP3 ('regional rivalry'). Forecasted global urban extents could reach \r between 1 and 2.2 million km2\r  (median of 1.4 million km2, a 106% \r increase) in 2050 under SSP5, and between 0.85 and 1.5 million km2\r (median of 1 million km2\r [...]"


id: 7f005b17dd26e688651ae0efdc278990
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19496
content:
"[...] , a 43% increase) in 2050 under SSP3. Under \r SSP1, which is characterised by a focus on sustainability with more \r compact, low-emissions development, urban extents could reach "


id: 415951258cc6e4cc488ece3f6c5d0d7e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8681
content:
"studies is significant. Under SSP1, urban land areas could increase \r by between 69,000 and 459,000 km2\r  in Developed Countries, \r 77,000-417,000 km2\r  in Asia and Pacific, and 28,000-216,000 km2\r in Africa. Under SSP3, where urban land expansion is forecasted to \r be the lowest, urban land areas could increase by between 23,000 \r and 291,000 km2\r  in Developed Countries, 57,000-168,000 km2 in \r Asia and Pacific, and 16,000-149,000 km2\r  in Africa. Under SSP5, \r where urban land expansion is forecasted to be the highest, urban \r land area could increase by between 129,000 and 573,000 km2\r  in \r Developed Countries, 83,000-472,000 km2\r  in Asia and Pacific, and \r 40,000-222,000 km2\r  in Africa (Huang et al. 2019; Li et al. 2019b; \r Chen et al. 2020a; Gao and O'Neill 2020). By 2100, however, the \r Developed Countries region is expected to have the most urban \r expansion only in SSP5. In SSP2 and SSP4, the Developed Countries \r [...]"


id: 6c981116689f8db49b16322aee8fc55
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16395
content:
"[...] and Asia and Pacific regions have about equal amounts of new urban \r land; in SSP3, Asia and Pacific has more new urban land forecasted."


id: 802d6c2c14004bee46f30aacee74c1d8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19680
content:
"Second, there is a wide variation in estimates of urban land expansion \r across regions (using the AR6 WGIII 6-region aggregation). Across all \r four sets of forecasts, current urban land (circa 2015) is the largest \r in Developed Countries and in the Asia and Pacific region, with \r approximately two-thirds of the current urban extent occurring in \r those two regions (Table 8.1 and Figure 8.10). The largest increases \r in urban land by 2050 are expected in the Asia and Pacific and \r Developed Countries regions, across all the SSPs. However, the rate \r of increase in urban land in Eastern Europe and West-Central Asia, \r Latin America and Caribbean, and the Middle East is significant and \r urban land could more than double by 2050. One-third of the studies \r conclude that the United States, China, and India will experience \r continued urban land expansion at least until 2050 (Huang et al. \r 2019; Li et al. 2019b). However, Li et al. (2019) report that, after \r [...]"


id: 2886af35f88cbc1d972e5c8626233b05
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4337
content:
"[...] 2050, China could experience a decrease in the rate of urban land \r expansion, while growth will continue for India. This is not surprising \r since India's urban demographic transition will only get underway \r after the middle of the century, when the urban population is \r expected to exceed the rural population. In contrast, China's urban \r demographic transition could be nearly complete by 2050."


id: 1e5bf131d5fd33b1654951a7edff6462
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2539
content:
"Fourth, both the range of estimates and their implications on land\u0002use competition and urban life point to an opportunity for urban \r areas to consider their urban form when developing. Under the current \r urbanisation trajectory, 50-63% of newly expanded urban areas are \r expected to occur on current croplands (Chen et al. 2020a). However, \r there is significant regional variation; between 2000 and 2040, 12.5% \r of cropland in China and 7.5% of cropland in the Middle East and \r North Africa could potentially be displaced due to urban expansion, \r compared to the world average of 3.7% (van Vliet et al. 2017). As \r urban clusters increase in size and greenspace is converted, future \r urban land expansion is expected to intensify UHIs and exacerbate \r night-time extreme temperatures. An urban footprint increase of 78-\r 171% by 2050 over the urban footprint in 2015 is expected to result in \r average summer daytime and night-time warming in air temperature \r [...]"


id: 287c21fc298d3eaf0d346934c40f0c36
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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vector_id: 4326
content:
"Figure 8.14: Comparison of urban emissions under different urbanisation scenarios (GtCO2-eq yr-1) for the AR6 WGIII 6-region aggregation. The panels \r represent the estimated urban emissions change in two different scenarios for the time period 2020-2030. Panel (a) represents resource efficient and compact urbanisation \r while panel (b) represents urbanisation with moderate progress. The two scenarios are consistent with estimated urban emissions under the SSP1-RCP1.9-SPA1 and \r SSP2-RCP4.5-SPA2 scenarios, respectively (Figure 8.13). In both panels, urban emissions estimates for the year 2020 are marked by the lines for each region. In the resource \r efficient and compact scenario, various reductions in urban emissions that take place by 2030 are represented by the dashed areas within the bars. The remaining solid shaded \r [...]"


id: a717960bafaf5585e6af41af1bd9a62a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26612
content:
"[...] areas represent the remaining urban emissions in 2030 for each region on the path towards net-zero emissions. The total reductions in urban emissions worldwide that are given \r by the last dashed grey bar in panel (a) is estimated to be 9.8 GtCO2-eq yr-1 between 2020 and 2030 in this scenario. In the scenario with moderate progress, there are no \r regions with reductions in urban emissions. Above the white lines that represent urban emissions in 2020, the grey shaded areas are the estimated increases for each region so \r that the total urban emissions would increase by 3.4 GtCO2-eq yr-1 from 2020 levels in 2030 under this scenario. The values are based on urban scenario analyses as given in \r Gurney et al. (2021, 2022). Source: synthesised based on data from Gurney et al. (2022).9"


id: 3990d804be38e329ab3d7ad2d94d5fc8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7338
content:
"eq, representing between 67% and 72% of global CO2 and CH4\r emissions, excluding aviation, shipping, and biogenic sources of \r emissions. By 2050, with moderate to low urban mitigation efforts, \r urban emissions are projected to rise to 34.0 GtCO2-eq (SSP2-\r RCP4.5) or 40.2 GtCO2-eq (SSP3-RCP7.0) - driven by growing urban \r population, infrastructure, and service demands. However, scenarios \r that involve rapid urbanisation can have different outcomes as seen \r in SSP1-RCP1.9 based on green growth, versus SSP5-RCP8.5 with \r the strongest carbon lock-in lacking any decarbonisation. Other \r scenarios involve mixed and/or low urbanisation, along with other \r differences, including the implementation of electrification, energy, \r and material efficiency, technology development and innovation, \r renewable energy preferences, and behavioural, lifestyle, and dietary \r responses (Table  8.2). With aggressive and immediate mitigation \r [...]"


id: 33644419637616c1c9232d8308991a1e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6293
content:
"[...] efforts to limit global warming to 1.5degC (>50%) with no or limited \r overshoot, urban GHG emissions could approach net-zero and \r reach a  maximum of 3.3 GtCO2-eq in 2050 (SSP1-RCP1.9). Under \r aggressive but not immediate urban mitigation efforts to limit global \r warming to 2degC (>67%), urban emissions could reach 17.2 GtCO2-eq \r in 2050 (SSP1-RCP2.6)."


id: 3e3404e7a13138516508b194bf851957
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8121
content:
"Similar analysis by the urban networks C40 and GCoM examine \r current and future GHG emissions on smaller subsets of global cities, \r offering further insight on the potential emissions impacts of urban \r mitigation options. However, this analysis is limited to just a sample \r of the global urban landscape and primarily focused on cities in \r the Global North (GCoM 2018, 2019; C40 Cities et al. 2019) with \r methods to project avoided emissions in development (Kovac et al. \r 2020). Different scopes of analysis between sectors, as well as limited \r knowledge of the impact of existing and new urban infrastructure, \r limit the possibility of direct comparisons in emissions. Still, the \r shares of urban mitigation potential ranges between 77.7% and \r 78.9% for combined strategies that involve decarbonised buildings \r and transport in urban infrastructure, and the wedges approach \r the remaining emissions reductions also considering construction \r [...]"


id: f6346cc118a547c4bc7571e9ec4ceed1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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vector_id: 40677
content:
"[...] materials and waste. This data supports urban areas pursuing \r a package of multiple, integrated mitigation strategies in planning \r for decarbonisation (Sections 8.4 and 8.6, and Figure 8.21)."


id: 948ef3a4fe238255e39aadcc121036eb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23345
content:
"Urban areas are systems where multiple mitigation options  - \r especially when integrated  - have cascading effects across \r transport, energy, buildings, land use, and behaviour. These \r cascading effects take place both within and across urban systems \r (Figure  8.15). Mitigation actions also occur at multiple urban \r scales, from households and blocks to districts and city regions, \r and can be implemented as standalone sectoral strategies, such as \r increasing energy efficiency for appliances, and also as system-wide \r actions. In reducing emissions locally, urban areas can help lower \r emissions outside of their administrative boundaries through their \r use of materials and resources, and by increasing the efficiency of \r infrastructure and energy use beyond what is possible with individual \r sectoral strategies. Urban mitigation policies that implement multiple \r integrated interventions will provide more emissions savings than \r [...]"


id: 9f5f9716e53358bf26c27a73d7c57db1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25262
content:
"The Illustrative Mitigation Pathways (IMPs) represent different \r strategies for maintaining temperature goals that are compliant \r with the Paris Agreement, as well as their comparison with the \r continuation of current policies (Sections  1.5 and 3.2.5, and \r Table  8.3). The key characteristics that define the IMPs involve \r aspects of energy, land use, lifestyle, policy, and innovation. Urban \r areas provide cross-cutting contexts where each of these key \r characteristics can be enabled and have a  particularly important \r role in the transformation pathways for renewable energy (IMP\u0002Ren), low demand (IMP-LD), and shifting to sustainability (IMP-SP). \r Pathways that are compliant with the Paris Agreement include such \r urban implications as a reversal of decreasing land-use efficiency in \r urban areas to lower energy demand based on spatial planning for \r compact urban form (Section 8.4.2), changes in urban infrastructure \r [...]"


id: 3fc0a498d38b20c7a95f598d8b430041
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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"[...] for supporting demand flexibility to handle variable energy supply \r (Section 8.4.3), as well as policies and governance that are conducive \r to innovation in urban areas (Section  8.5). Spatial planning for \r compact urban form can enable reduced energy demand and changes \r in service provisioning, including through walkable neighbourhoods \r and mixed land use, providing venues for socio-behavioural change \r towards active transport (Section  8.4.5). Electrification and sector \r coupling in urban infrastructure can, for instance, be an important \r enabler of supporting higher penetrations of renewable energy in \r the energy system."


id: b132992e7e5796a3e50914bdcc4aa378
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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vector_id: 28407
content:
"Carbon lock-in occurs as the result of interactions between \r different geographic and administrative scales (institutional lock\u0002in) and across sectors (infrastructural and technological lock-in), \r which create the conditions for behavioural lock-in covering both \r individual and social structural behaviours (Seto et al. 2016) (see \r Glossary for a broader definition of 'lock-in'). The way that urban \r areas are designed, laid out, and built (i.e., urban form) affects and \r is affected by the interactions across the different forms of carbon \r lock-in (Figures 8.15 and 8.16). Cities are especially prone to carbon \r lock-in because of the multiple interactions of technological, \r institutional, and behavioural systems, which create inertia and \r path dependency that are difficult to break. For example, the \r lock-in of gasoline cars is reinforced by highway and energy \r infrastructures that are further locked-in by social and cultural \r [...]"


id: ae2c666af90d5d6a87921f1afb7a3158
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"[...] preferences for individual mobility options. The dominance of cars \r and their supporting infrastructures in auto-centric urban forms is \r further reinforced by zoning and urban development patterns, such \r as dispersed and low-density housing distantly located from jobs, \r that create obstacles to creating alternative mobility options (Seto \r et al. 2016; Linton et al. 2021)."


id: f35208c388c070678cc3e2b775d851
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
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content:
"Figure 8.15 (continued): Urban systems, lock-in, and cascading effects of mitigation strategies. Cities are systems of interconnected sectors, activities, and \r governance structures. Urban-scale mitigation action can have cascading effects across multiple sectors, as shown in panel (a), as well as regional, national, and global impacts \r through supply chains, resource flows, and institutions, as shown in panel (b). Mitigation efforts implemented at larger scales of governance or in sectors that transcend \r urban boundaries, like energy and transportation, can also facilitate and amplify mitigation at the urban scale, as shown by the arrows extending in both directions across \r layers (a). Because urban areas are connected locally and globally, urban mitigation efforts can also impact other cities and surrounding areas (agriculture, forestry and other \r [...]"


id: 3198c4313f38fa52942df3a5e8ceb7e7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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content:
"[...] land use (AFOLU)). Cities are prone to carbon lock-in due to the numerous reinforcing interactions among urban infrastructures and technologies, institutions, and individual \r and collective behaviours; see the side arrows extending across the layers in panel (a): the yellow arrow represents the infrastructure and technological lock-in involving user \r technologies and supporting infrastructure, the blue arrow indicates lock-in of local to international institutions, and the pink arrow represents behavioural lock-in for individuals \r and society. Urban carbon lock-in is strongly determined by urban form, in particular the layout of streets and land-use mix. The different coloured spatial patterns represent \r varying levels of co-location of housing and jobs, and mobility options (Figure 8.16). Efforts to break urban carbon lock-in require meta-transformations to break inertia in and \r [...]"


id: 405b80d52531a6b029ce9b575a00ec69
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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vector_id: 8518
content:
"[...] among infrastructures, institutions, and behaviours. Source: adapted in part from Seto et al. (2016)."


id: fcf2d88eba518683fe85309e31a0c7d5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41862
content:
"The AR5 concluded that infrastructure and four dimensions of \r urban form are especially important for driving urban energy use: \r density, land-use mix, connectivity, and accessibility. Specifically, \r low-carbon cities have the following characteristics: (i) co-located \r medium to high densities of housing, jobs, and commerce; (ii) high \r mix of land uses; (iii) high connectivity of streets; and (iv) high levels \r of accessibility, distinguished by relatively low travel distances and \r travel times that are enabled by multiple modes of transportation. \r Urban areas with these features tend to have smaller dwelling \r units, smaller parcel sizes, walking opportunities, high density of \r intersections, and are highly accessible to shopping. For brevity, \r we will refer to these characteristics collectively as 'compact \r and walkable urban form' (Figure  8.16). Compact and walkable \r urban form has many co-benefits, including mental and physical \r [...]"


id: b9887a9a368f6f14fbf92ff8d073c848
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29851
content:
"[...] health, lower resource demand, and saving land for AFOLU.  In \r contrast, dispersed and auto-centric urban form is correlated \r with higher GHG emissions, and characterised by separated land \r uses, low population and job densities, large block size, and low \r intersection density."


id: 597c9ad83f2dee4fe4e1db7c00c2949b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12980
content:
"Figure 8.16: Urban form and implications for GHG emissions. Compact and walkable urban form is strongly correlated with low GHG emissions and characterised by \r co-located medium to high densities of housing and jobs, high street density, small block size, and mixed land use (Seto et al. 2014). Higher population densities at places of \r origin (e.g., home) and destination (e.g., employment, shopping) concentrate demand and are necessary for achieving the Avoid-Shift-Improve (ASI) approach for sustainable \r mobility (Chapters 5 and 10). Dispersed and auto-centric urban form is strongly correlated with high GHG emissions, and characterised by separated land uses, especially of \r housing and jobs, low street density, large block sizes, and low urban densities. Separated and low densities of employment, retail, and housing increase average travel distances \r [...]"


id: 9d776908ee6b73f476a47d096fbbe416
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24941
content:
"[...] for both work and leisure, and make active transport and modal shift a challenge. Since cities are systems, urban form has interacting implications across energy, buildings, \r transport, land use, and individual behaviour. Compact and walkable urban form enables effective mitigation while dispersed and auto-centric urban form locks-in higher levels \r of energy use. The colours represent different land uses and indicate varying levels of co-location and mobility options."


id: 74b4d173ca551c86b520b59781953317
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17772
content:
"Meta-analyses of the reduction in VMT and the resulting GHG emissions \r consider the existing and still dominant use of emitting transportation \r technology, transportation fleets, and urban form characteristics. Varied \r historical legacies of transportation and the built environment, which \r can be utilised to develop more sustainable cities (Newman et al. 2016, \r 2017), are often not taken into account directly. Metropolitan policies \r and spatial planning, as evident in Copenhagen's Finger Plan, as well \r as strategic spatial planning in Stockholm and Seoul, have been major \r tools to restructure urban regions and energy patterns (Sung and Choi \r 2017). Road prices and congestion charges can provide the conditions \r for urban inhabitants to shift mobility demands and reduce vehicle \r use (Section  5.6.2). Surprisingly, even cities with higher population \r densities and a greater range of land uses can show declines in these \r [...]"


id: 845c48daa3f59421e467ca8148b53ef0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20436
content:
"[...] important attributes, which can lead to emissions increases, such as \r found in a study of 323 East and South East Asian cities (Chen et al. \r 2020c). Conversely, the annual CO2 emissions reduction of passenger \r cars in compact versus dispersed urban form scenarios can include at \r least a 10% reduction by 2030 (Matsuhashi and Ariga 2016). When \r combined with advances in transport technology, this share increases \r to 64-70% in 2050 based on compact urban form scenarios for 1727 \r municipalities (Kii 2020)."


id: 6a84e1a5c51f25d244fc18d33b28a22c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16026
content:
"As a  reaffirmation of AR5, population density reduces emissions \r per capita in the transport, building, and energy sectors (Baur et al. \r 2015; Gudipudi et al. 2016; Wang et al. 2017; Yi et al. 2017) (see \r also Sections 8.3.1 and 8.3.4 on past trends and forecasts of urban \r population density and land expansion). Urban compactness tends \r to reduce emissions per capita in the transport sector, especially for \r commuting (Matsuhashi and Ariga 2016; Lee and Lim 2018; Lee and \r Lee 2020). The relative accessibility of neighbourhoods to the rest of \r the region, in addition to the density of individual neighbourhoods, \r is important (Ewing et al. 2018). Creating higher residential and \r employment densities, developing smaller block sizes, and increasing \r housing opportunities in an employment area can significantly \r reduce household car ownership and car driving, and increase the \r share of transit, walk, and bicycle commuting (Ding et al. 2018). In \r [...]"


id: e401d0b3233b25d175d42a9c3ac2c9a8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37409
content:
"[...] addition to population density, land-use mix, rail transit accessibility, \r and street design reduce emissions from transport (Dou et al. 2016; \r Cao and Yang 2017; Choi 2018). The impact of population density \r and urban compactness on emissions per capita in the household or \r energy sector is also associated with socioeconomic characteristics \r or lifestyle preferences (Baiocchi et al. 2015; Miao 2017). Changes \r in the attributes of urban form and spatial structure have influences \r on overall energy demand across spatial scales, particularly street, \r block, neighbourhood, and city scales, as well as across the building \r (housing) and transport (mobility) sectors (Silva et al. 2017). \r Understanding the existing trade-offs (or synergetic links) between \r urban form variables across major emissions source sectors, and how \r they impact the size of energy flows within the urban system, is key \r to prioritising action for energy-efficient spatial planning strategies, \r [...]"


id: 7b552a7dcc8cfc683582ca95ba48c1d5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18899
content:
"benefit from urban design parameters, including density, block \r area, and  elongation that represent the influence of urban density \r on energy density (Fonseca and Schlueter 2015; Shi et al. 2020). Heat\u0002demand density is a  function of both population density and \r heat demand per capita and can be equally present in urban areas \r with high population density or high heat demand per capita (Moller \r et al. 2019; Persson et al. 2019). Low-temperature networks that \r utilise waste heat or renewable energy can provide an option to avoid \r carbon lock-in to fossil fuels while layout and eco-design principles \r can further optimise such networks (Gang et al. 2016; Buffa et al. \r 2019; Dominkovic and Krajacic 2019). Replacing gas-based heating \r and cooling with electrified district heating and cooling networks, for \r instance, provides 65% emissions reductions also involving carbon\u0002aware scheduling for grid power (De Chalendar et al. 2019). The \r [...]"


id: b086201a747d130a9ff32313409fc184
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28291
content:
"[...] environmental and ecological benefits increase through the interaction \r of urban energy and spatial planning (Tuomisto et al. 2015; Bartolozzi \r et al. 2017; Denarie et al. 2018; Zhai et al. 2020). These interactions \r include support for demand-side flexibility, spatial planning using \r geographic information systems, and access to renewable and urban \r waste heat sources (Moller et al. 2018; REN21 2020; Sorknaes et al. \r 2020; Dorotic et al. 2019) (see Table 8.SM.2 for other references)."


id: 14b8cb18b0c792461f22a3fb5cee937e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 873
content:
"Pursuing the electrification of mobility, heating, and cooling systems, \r while decarbonising electricity and energy carriers, and switching \r to net-zero materials and supply chains, represent important \r strategies for urban mitigation. Electrification of energy end uses \r in cities and efficient energy demand for heating, transport, and \r cooking through multiple options and urban infrastructure, has an \r estimated mitigation potential of at least 6.9 GtCO2-eq by 2030 \r and 15.3 GtCO2-eq by 2050 (Coalition for Urban Transitions 2019). \r Energy efficiency measures in urban areas can be enabled by urban \r form, building codes, retrofitting and renovation, modal shifts, and \r other options. Decarbonising electricity supply raises the mitigation \r potential of efficient buildings and transport in urban areas to about \r 75% of the total estimate (Coalition for Urban Transitions 2019). \r [...]"


id: c964568714cdcecf58861a46853f8eac
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32758
content:
"[...] In addition, relatively higher-density urban areas enable more cost\u0002effective infrastructure investments, including electric public transport \r and large-scale heat pumps in districts that support electrification. \r Urban policymakers can play a key role in supporting carbon-neutral \r energy systems by acting as target setters and planners, demand \r aggregators, regulators, operators, conveners, and facilitators for \r coordinated planning and implementation across sectors, urban \r form, and demand (IEA 2021a; IRENA 2021)."


id: ffc882d52058ca8f8063eaee1f16a8d4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42390
content:
"As an enabler, electrification supports integrating net-zero energy \r sources in urban infrastructure across sectors, especially when there \r is more flexible energy demand in mobility, heating, and cooling to \r absorb greater shares of variable renewable energy. In the transport \r sector, smart charging can reduce electric vehicle impacts on peak \r demand by 60% (IEA 2021a). Urban areas that connect efficient \r building clusters with the operation of smart thermal grids in \r district heating and cooling networks with large-scale heat pumps \r can support higher penetrations of variable renewable energy \r in smart energy systems (Lund et al. 2014, 2017). Higher urban \r densities provide the advantage of increasing the penetration of \r renewable power for deep decarbonisation, including mixed-use \r neighbourhoods for grid balancing and electric public transport \r (Hsieh et al. 2017; Tong et al. 2017; Fichera et al. 2018; Kobashi et al. \r [...]"


id: 7a5c5ce938e35b5eb6259ec1f7a2088c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18724
content:
"Smart electricity grids enable peak demand reductions, energy \r conservation, and renewable energy penetration, and are a subset \r of smart energy systems. GHG emission reductions from smart grids \r range from 10 to 180 gCO2 kWh-1 (grams of CO2 per kilowatt-hour) \r with a median value of 89 gCO2 kWh-1, depending on the electricity \r mix, penetration of renewable energy, and the system boundary \r (Moretti et al. 2017). Smart electricity grids are characterised by \r bi-directional flows of electricity and information between generators \r and consumers, although some actors can be both as 'prosumer' (see \r Glossary). Two-way power flows can be used to establish peer-to\u0002peer trading (P2P) (Hansen et al. 2020). Business models based on \r local citizen utilities (Green and Newman 2017; Green et al. 2020; \r Syed et al. 2020) and community batteries (Mey and Hicks 2019; \r Green et al. 2020) can support the realisation of distributed energy \r [...]"


id: 83d511a1e7204da032e7baf797d2a3cf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20338
content:
"[...] and solar energy cities (Galloway and Newman 2014; Byrne and \r Taminiau 2016; Stewart et al. 2018; Allan 2020)."


id: ec4a7a129eb1bbb5c2537a12ed3de00
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38937
content:
"Figure 8.17: Relative volume of a given weight, its carbon emissions, and carbon storage capacity of primary structural materials comparing one tonne \r of concrete, steel, and timber. Concrete and steel have substantial embodied carbon emissions with minimal carbon storage capacities, while timber stores a considerable \r quantity of carbon with a relatively small ratio of carbon emissions-to-material volume. The displayed carbon storage of concrete is the theoretical maximum value, which may \r be achieved after hundreds of years. Cement ratios of 10%, 15%, and 20% are assumed to estimate minimum, mean, and maximum carbon storage in concrete. Carbon \r storage of steel is not displayed as it is negligible (0.004 tonne C per tonne of steel). The middle-stacked bars represent the mean carbon emission or mean carbon storage \r [...]"


id: 768a06d8027dc60f227dc1719cf83077
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18073
content:
"[...] values displayed in bold font and underlined. The darker and lighter coloured stacked bars depict the minimum and maximum values. Grey tones represent carbon emissions \r and green tones are given for storage capacity values. Construction materials have radically different volume-to-weight ratios, as well as material intensity (see representations \r of structural columns in the upper panel. These differences should be accounted for in the estimations of their carbon storage and emissions (see also Figure 8.22). Source: \r adapted with permission from Churkina et al. (2020)."


id: c54aea98c768c8bd486b87ede49c3eb0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32014
content:
"The initial carbon debt incurred in the production stage, even in \r sustainable buildings, can take decades to offset through operational \r stage energy efficiencies alone. Increased reduction in the energy \r demands and GHG emissions associated with the manufacture of \r mineral-based construction materials will be challenging, as these \r industries have already optimised their production processes. Among \r the category of primary structural materials, it is estimated that \r final energy demand for steel production can be reduced by nearly \r 30% compared to 2010 levels, with 12% efficiency improvement \r for cement (Lechtenbohmer et al. 2016). Even when industries are \r decarbonised, residual CO2 emissions will remain from associated \r chemical reactions that take place in calcination and use of coke \r from coking coal to reduce iron oxide (Davis et al. 2018). Additionally, \r carbon sequestration by cement occurs over the course of the \r [...]"


id: 178e6b42f0efd3b2a4988d64fa0a6335
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1351
content:
"[...] building lifecycle in quantities that would offset only a fraction of \r their production stage carbon spike (Xi et al. 2016; Davis et al. 2018). \r Moreover, there are collateral effects on the carbon cycle related \r to modern construction and associated resource extraction. The \r production of cement, asphalt, and glass requires large amounts of \r sand extracted from beaches, rivers, and seafloors, disturbing aquatic \r ecosystems and reducing their capacity to absorb atmospheric \r carbon. The mining of ore can lead to extensive local deforestation \r and soil degradation (Sonter et al. 2017). Deforestation significantly \r weakens the converted land as a carbon sink and in severe cases may \r even create a net emissions source."


id: 7aae809a25870bc32d90c8e884dae4eb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18780
content:
"Figure 8.18: Key mitigation benefits, adaptation co-benefits, and SDG linkages of urban green and blue infrastructure. Panel (b) evaluates those strategies in \r the context of their mitigation benefits, adaptation co-benefits, and linkages to the SDGs. Urban forests and street trees provide the greatest mitigation benefit because of their \r ability to sequester and store carbon while simultaneously reducing building energy demand. Moreover, they provide multiple adaptation co-benefits and synergies based on \r the linkages to the SDGs (Figure 8.4). The assessments of mitigation benefits are dependent on context, scale, and spatial arrangement of each green and blue infrastructure \r type and their proximity to buildings. Mitigation benefits due to reducing municipal water use are based on reducing wastewater loads that reduce energy use in wastewater \r [...]"


id: 2c17262c426d40e7a2c4f7dfb6d848d3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5018
content:
"[...] treatment plants. The sizes of the bars are illustrative and their relative size is based on the authors' best understanding and assessment of the literature."


id: deb051ace5f4103bbd7dba1bf9e9cbbc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36440
content:
"Global urban tree carbon storage is approximately 7.4 billion tonnes \r (GtC) given 363 million hectares of urban land, 26.5% tree cover, and \r an average carbon storage density of urban tree cover of 7.69 kgC m-2\r (kilograms carbon per square metre) (Nowak et al. 2013; World \r Bank et al. 2013). Estimated global annual carbon sequestration \r by urban trees is approximately 217 million tonnes (MtC) given \r an average carbon sequestration density per unit urban tree cover \r of 0.226 kgC m-2 (Nowak et al. 2013). With an average plantable \r (non-tree and non-impervious) space of 48% globally (Nowak and \r Greenfield 2020), the carbon storage value could nearly triple if all \r this space is converted to tree cover. In Europe alone, if 35% of the \r urban surfaces (26,450 km2\r ) were transformed into green surfaces, \r the mitigation potential based on carbon sequestration would be an \r estimated 25.9 MtCO2 yr-1 with the total mitigation benefit being \r [...]"


id: 2131e5e23fd9f49de64a1e1727f50f54
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3056
content:
"[...] 55.8 MtCO2 yr-1, including an energy saving of about 92 TWh yr-1\r (Quaranta et al. 2021). Other co-benefits include reducing urban \r runoff by about 17.5% and reducing summer temperatures by \r 2.5degC-6degC (Quaranta et al. 2021)."


id: a0764a345d5dabecad2a2bdd50372ff7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25446
content:
"Urban forested natural areas have unique benefits as they can provide habitat for native plants and animals, protecting local \r biodiversity in a  fragmented landscape (Di Giulio et al. 2009). Forests can have a  greater cooling effect on cities than designed \r greenspaces, and the bigger the forest the greater the effect (Jaganmohan et al. 2016). In New York City, urban forested natural \r areas have been found to account for the majority of trees estimated in the city (69%), but are a minority of the total tree canopy \r (25%, or 5.5% of the total city land area) (Pregitzer et al. 2019a). In New York City, natural areas are estimated to store a mean of \r 263.5 MgC ha-1 (megagram carbon per hectare), adding up to 1.86 TgC (teragram carbon) across the city, with the majority of carbon \r (86%) being stored in the trees and soils (Pregitzer et al. 2021). These estimates are similar to per-hectare estimates of carbon storage \r [...]"


id: f8c3eeaf22fdf0919dbd5e5a3184757e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41128
content:
"[...] across different pools in non-urban forest types (Table 1), and 1.5 times greater than estimates for carbon stored in just trees across \r the entire city (Pregitzer et al. 2021)."


id: d9974c0edd0d628440e6df24ab1b3995
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35582
content:
"Urban systems shape the behaviour and social structures of their \r residents through urban form, energy systems, and infrastructure - \r all of which provide a  range of options for consumers to make \r choices about residential location, mobility, energy sources, and the \r consumption of materials, food, and other resources. The relative \r availability of options across these sectors has implications on urban \r emissions through individual behaviour. In turn, urban GHG emissions, \r as well as emissions from the supply chains of cities, are driven by the \r behaviour and consumption patterns of residents, with households \r accounting for over 60% of carbon emissions globally (Ivanova et al. \r 2016). The exclusion of consumption-based emissions and emissions \r that occur outside of city boundaries as a result of urban activities, \r however, will lead to significant undercounting. For example, a study \r of 79 major cities found that about 41% of consumption-based \r [...]"


id: 814413aa808aaf385aecf164ffda0b94
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19876
content:
"Greenways support stormwater management to mitigate water \r runoff and urban floods by reducing the water volume (e.g., through \r infiltration) and by an attenuation or temporal shift of water discharge \r (Fiori and Volpi 2020; Pour et al. 2020). Using green infrastructure \r delays the time to runoff and reduces water volume but depends \r on the magnitude of floods (Qin et al. 2013). Measures are most \r effective for flood mitigation at a local scale; however, as the size of \r the catchment increases, the effectiveness of reducing peak discharge \r decreases (Fiori and Volpi 2020). Reduction of water volume through \r infiltration can be more effective with rainfall events on a lower return \r rate. Overall, the required capacity for piped engineered systems \r for water runoff attenuation and mitigation can be reduced while \r lowering flow rates, controlling pollution transport, and increasing \r the capacity to store stormwater (Srishantha and Rathnayake 2017). \r [...]"


id: 6a3bca32865488e6d133a9e63735ac1d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15968
content:
"[...] Benefits for flood mitigation require a careful consideration of the \r spatial context of the urban area, the heterogeneity of the rainfall \r events, and characteristics of implementation (Qiu et al. 2021). \r Maintenance costs and stakeholder coordination are other aspects \r requiring attention (Mguni et al. 2016)."


id: 4f9bb698832adf1908b3876fe4a7478e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11293
content:
"Providing a  connected system of greenspace throughout the \r urban area may promote active transportation (Nieuwenhuijsen \r and Khreis 2016), thereby reducing GHG emissions. Soft solutions \r for improving green infrastructure connectivity for cycling is an \r urban NBS mitigation measure, although there is low evidence for \r emissions reductions. In the city of Lisbon, Portugal, improvements in \r cycling infrastructure and bike-sharing system resulted in 3.5 times \r more cyclists within two years (Felix et al. 2020). In Copenhagen, the \r cost of cycling (0.08 EUR km-1) is declining and is about six times \r lower than car driving (Euro 0.50/km) (Vedel et al. 2017). In addition, \r participants were willing to cycle 1.84 km longer if the route has \r a  designated cycle track and 0.8 km more if there are also green \r surroundings. Changes in urban landscapes, including through \r the integration of green infrastructure in sustainable urban and \r [...]"


id: 61785eaff89bc94dcf777fabac7d6635
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14446
content:
"[...] transport planning, can support the transition from private motorised \r transportation to public and physically active transportation in \r carbon-neutral, more liveable and healthier cities (Nieuwenhuijsen \r and Khreis 2016; Nieuwenhuijsen 2020). Car infrastructure can be \r also transferred into public open and green space, such as in the \r Superblock model in Barcelona's neighbourhoods (Rueda 2019). \r Health impact assessment models estimated that 681 premature \r deaths may be prevented annually with this implementation (Mueller \r et al. 2020) and the creation of greenways in Maanshan, China has \r stimulated interest in walking or cycling (Zhang et al. 2020)."


id: 7ad891d4f5baa5d71adba4e8f92696f9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18814
content:
"clothes washing (5.0-5.7%), and optimising dishwashing (1-1.1%) \r (Levesque et al. 2019). Building standards and mandates could work \r towards making these options required or more readily available and \r accessible. Residential appliance use, water heating, and thermostat \r settings can be influenced by feedback on energy use, particularly \r when paired with real-time feedback and/or instructions on how to \r reduce energy use (Kastner and Stern 2015; Stern et al. 2016; Wynes \r et al. 2018; Tiefenbeck et al. 2019). The energy-saving potentials of \r changing occupant behaviour can range between 10% and 25% \r for residential buildings, and between 5% and 30% for commercial \r buildings (Zhang et al. 2018). Households are more likely to invest \r in energy-related home technologies if they believe it financially \r benefits (rather than disadvantages) them, increases comfort, or will \r benefit the natural environment (Kastner and Stern 2015). Social \r [...]"


id: 26296ca2c486d77407b27fa90841a32d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3883
content:
"[...] influences and availability of funding for household energy measures \r also support behaviour change (Kastner and Stern 2015)."


id: 470d6c6e0ae9cb07a11f012e6a8bf9a6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9700
content:
"The implementation of the waste hierarchy from waste prevention \r onward, as well as the effectiveness of waste separation at \r source, involves socio-behavioural options in the context of urban \r infrastructure (Sun et al. 2018a; Hunter et al. 2019). Managing \r and treating waste as close to the point of generation as possible, \r including distributed waste treatment facilities, can minimise \r transport-related emissions, congestion, and air pollution. Home \r composting and compact urban form can also reduce waste transport \r emissions (Oliveira et al. 2017). Decentralised waste management \r can reinforce source-separation behaviour since the resulting \r benefits can be more visible (Eisted et al. 2009; Hoornweg and Bhada\u0002Tata 2012; Linzner and Lange 2013). Public acceptance for waste \r management is greatest when system costs for citizens are reduced, \r there is greater awareness of primary waste separation at source, \r [...]"


id: fa908d307e6a25a6172ad65b00423729
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41457
content:
"[...] and there are positive behavioural spill-overs across environmental \r policies (Milutinovic et al. 2016; Boyer and Ramaswami 2017; Diaz\u0002Villavicencio et al. 2017; Slorach et al. 2020). In addition to the choice \r of technology, the costs of waste management options depend on \r the awareness of system users that can represent time-dependent \r costs (Khan et al. 2016; Chifari et al. 2017; Ranieri et al. 2018; Tomic \r and Schneider 2020). Waste management systems and the inclusion \r of materials from multiple urban sectors for alternative by-products \r can increase scalability (Eriksson et al. 2015; Boyer and Ramaswami \r 2017; D'Adamo et al. 2021). As a broader concept, circular economy \r approaches can contribute to managing waste (Box  12.8) with \r varying emissions impacts (Section 5.3.4)."


id: 52533dc3ff5ee6eccadd4ac81b3541c6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11759
content:
"Accessibility as a criterion widens the focus beyond work trips and \r VKT/VMT, paying attention to a broader set of destinations beyond \r workplaces, as well as walking and biking trips or active travel. It \r holds promise for targeting and obtaining greater reductions in GHG \r emissions in household travel by providing access through walking, \r biking, and public transit. Accessibility as a criterion for urban form \r has been embedded in neighbourhood form models since at least \r the last century and in more recent decades in the 'urban village' \r concept of the New Urbanism (Duany and Plater-Zyberck 1991) and \r TODs (Calthorpe 1993). However, accessibility did not gain much \r traction in urban planning and transportation until the last decade. \r The experience of cities and metropolitan areas with the COVID-19 \r pandemic has led to a further resurgence in interest and importance \r (Handy 2020; Hu et al. 2020), and it is becoming a criterion at the \r [...]"


id: eda38f487deda0f8ad07521fe0f81079
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39166
content:
"[...] core of the concept of the 15/20-minute city (Moreno et al. 2021; \r Pozoukidou and Chatziyiannaki 2021). Initially, neighbourhoods \r have been designed to provide quality, reliable services within 15 or \r 20 minutes of active transport (i.e., walking or cycling), as well as \r a  variety of housing options and open space (Portland Bureau of \r Planning and Sustainability 2012; Pozoukidou and Chatziyiannaki \r 2021; State Government of Victoria 2021). Community life circles \r strategy for urban areas has also emphasised walking access and \r health (Weng et al. 2019; Wu et al. 2021). The growing popularity \r of the 15/20-minute city movement has significant potential for \r reducing VMT/VKT and associated GHG emissions."


id: 2fab2f299c457cd58132a420ad387d7a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5647
content:
"Currently, cross-sectoral integration is one of the main thematic \r areas of climate policy strategies among the actions that are adopted \r by signatories to an urban climate and energy network (Hsu et al. \r 2020c). Although not as prevalent as those for efficiency, municipal \r administration, and urban planning measures (Hsu et al. 2020c), \r strategies that are cross-cutting in nature across sectors can provide \r important emission-saving opportunities for accelerating the pace \r of climate mitigation in urban areas. Cross-sectoral integration \r also involves mobilising urban actors to increase innovation in \r energy services and markets beyond individual energy efficiency \r actions (Hsu et al. 2020c). Indeed, single-sector versus cross-sector \r strategies for 637 cities from a  developing country can enable an \r additional 15-36% contribution to the national climate mitigation \r reduction potential (Ramaswami et al. 2017a). The strategies at \r [...]"


id: 819e87a61d73f4d656305e41e0cf9547
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19934
content:
"[...] the urban level involved those for energy cascading and exchange \r of materials that connected waste, heat, and electricity strategies \r (Section 8.5 and Box 8.4)."


id: a0e9322a234fd199ac85e37447c17cbb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25534
content:
"Governance and other institutions act as core components to urban \r systems by facilitating and managing linkages between different \r sectors, geographic regions, and stakeholders. This position renders \r subnational governments and institutions key enablers of climate \r change mitigation (Seto et al. 2016, 2021; Hsu et al. 2018, 2020c; \r Vedeld et al. 2021) (Section 8.4.1). Indeed, since AR5 more research \r has emerged identifying these actors as vehicles through which \r to accelerate local-to-global efforts to decarbonise (IPCC 2018a; \r Hsu et al. 2020b; Salvia et al. 2021; Seto et al. 2021) (Chapter 13, \r Sections  4.2.3, 14.5.5, 15.6.5 and 16.4.7, and 'subnational actors' \r in Glossary). The current extent (Section  8.3.3) and projected rise \r (Section 8.3.4.2) in the urban share of global emissions underscores \r the transformative global impact of supporting urban climate \r governance and institutions (Section 8.5.2). Further, the multisector \r [...]"


id: 629edd188640558aab956a3a6bae7526
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14642
content:
"When sufficient local autonomy is present, local policies have the \r ability to upscale to higher levels of authority, imparting influence \r at higher geographic scales. Established urban climate leaders with \r large institutional capacity can influence small and mid-sized cities, \r or other urban areas with less institutional capacity, to enact effective \r climate policies, by engaging with those cities through transnational \r networks and by adopting a public presence of climate leadership \r (Chan et al. 2015; Kern 2019; Seto et al. 2021) (Section  8.5.3). \r Increasingly, subnational actors are also influencing their national \r and international governments through lobbying efforts that call \r on them to adopt more ambitious climate goals and provide more \r support for subnational GHG mitigation efforts (Linton et al. 2021; \r Seto et al. 2021). These dynamics underscore the importance of \r relative local autonomy in urban GHG mitigation policy. They also \r [...]"


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created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 902
content:
"[...] highlight the growing recognition of subnational authorities' role in \r climate change mitigation by national and international authorities."


id: 215988544eeff11a46e218641dae0835
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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vector_id: 3080
content:
"The confluence of political will and policy action at the local level, \r and growing resources offered through municipal and regional \r networks and agreements, have provided a  platform for urban \r actors to engage in international climate policy (Section  8.5.3). \r This phenomenon is recognised in the Paris Agreement, which, for \r the first time in a multilateral climate treaty, referenced the crucial \r role subnational and non-state actors like local communities have in \r meeting the goals set forth in the agreement (UNFCCC 2015). The \r Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (Widerberg and Pattberg 2015), \r as well as UN-Habitat's NUA and the 2030 Development Agenda, are \r other examples of the international sphere elevating the local level \r to global influence (Fuhr et al. 2018). Another facet of local-to-global \r action is the emergence of International Cooperative Initiatives \r (ICIs) (Widerberg and Pattberg 2015). One such ICI, the City Hall \r [...]"


id: cfa1c96657cd3f6cc710b34fff650597
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33887
content:
"[...] Declaration, was signed alongside the Paris Agreement during the \r first Climate Summit for Local Leaders. Signatories included hundreds \r of local government leaders, in partnership with private sector "


id: 5b29f3cdb2c5af7a04c3c7150cc2ea4e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13290
content:
"A significant research question that has been paid more attention in \r both the scientific and policy communities is related to subnational \r actors' role in and contribution to global climate mitigation. The 2018 \r UN Environment Programme's (UNEP) annual Emissions Gap report \r in 2018 included for the first time a special chapter on subnational \r and non-state (i.e.,  businesses and private) actors and assessed the \r landscape of studies aiming to quantify their contributions to global \r climate mitigation. Non-state action on net-zero GHG or CO2 emissions \r continues to be emphasised (UNEP 2021) (Box 8.4). There has been \r an increase in the number of studies aiming to quantify the overall \r aggregate mitigation impact of subnational climate action globally. \r Estimates for the significance of their impact vary widely, from up to 30 \r MtCO2-eq from 25 cities in the United States in 2030 (Roelfsema 2017), \r to a  2.3 GtCO2-eq reduction in 2030 compared to a  current policy \r [...]"


id: b795a81b0d146d121f1728f5172a1919
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"[...] scenario from over 10,239 cities participating in GCoM (Hsu et al. 2018; \r GCoM 2019). For regional governments, the Under 2 Coalition, which "


id: 3b517763368f60ebb16ee8255dbe9c34
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7624
content:
"Subnational governments that participate in transnational \r climate networks, however, are primarily located in developed \r countries, particularly Europe and North America, with far less \r representation in developing countries. In one of the largest studies \r of subnational climate mitigation action, more than 93% of just over \r 6000 quantifiable subnational climate commitments come from cities \r and regions based in the European Union (NewClimate Institute et al. \r 2019). Such gaps in geographic coverage have been attributed to \r factors such as the dominating role of Global North actors in the \r convening and diffusion of 'best practices' related to climate action \r (Bouteligier 2013), or the more limited autonomy or ability of \r subnational or non-state actors in Global South countries to define \r boundaries and interests separately from national governments, \r particularly those that exercise top-down decision-making or have \r [...]"


id: 66e5fcd2db77225eac9309800e71e10f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15368
content:
"[...] vertically integrated governance structures (Bulkeley et al. 2012). \r Many of the participating subnational actors from under-represented \r regions are large megacities (of 10 million people or more) that will \r play a pivotal role in shaping emissions trajectories (Data Driven Yale \r et al. 2018; NewClimate Institute et al. 2019)."


id: 7184a1cc02bd20326579ca1e1afefa02
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17220
content:
"Meeting the goals of the Paris Agreement will require fundamental \r changes that will be most successful when cities work together \r with provincial and national leadership and legislation, third-sector \r leadership, transformative action, and supportive financing. Urban \r governments often obtain their powers from provincial, state and/\r or national governments, and are subjected to laws and regulations \r to regulate development and implement infrastructure. In addition, \r the sources of revenue are often set at these levels so that many \r urban governments rely on state/provincial and national government \r funds for improving infrastructure, especially transit infrastructure. \r The increasing financialisation of urban infrastructures is another \r factor that can make it more difficult for local governments to \r determine infrastructure choices (O'Brien et al. 2019). Urban transit \r system operations, in particular, are heavily subsidised in many \r [...]"


id: 39d910142953fd47286eea36dcaf15e7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"[...] countries, both locally and by higher levels of government. As a result \r of this interplay of policy and legal powers among various levels of \r government, the lock-in nature of urban infrastructures and built \r environments will require multi-level governance responses to ensure \r meeting decarbonisation targets. The reliance on state and national \r policy and/or funding can accelerate or impede the decarbonisation \r of urban environments (McCarney et al. 2011; McCarney 2019)."


id: 1fa09a6a8475c87688b83787e1ba6a4d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2775
content:
"The world's infrastructure spending is expected to more than double \r from 2015 to 2030 under a low-carbon and climate-resilient scenario. \r More than 70% of the infrastructure will concentrate in urban areas \r by requiring USD4.5-5.4 trillion per year (CCFLA 2015).  However, \r today's climate finance flows for cities or 'urban climate finance', \r estimated at USD384 billion annually on average in 2017/18, are \r insufficient to meet the USD4.5-5.4 trillion annual investment needs \r for urban mitigation actions across key sectors (CCFLA 2015; CPI and \r World Bank 2021; Negreiros et al. 2021). Low-carbon urban form \r (e.g., compact, high-density, and mixed-use characteristics) is likely \r to economise spending in infrastructure along with the application \r of new technologies and renewable energies that would be able \r to recover the increasing upfront cost of low-carbon infrastructure \r from more efficient operating and energy savings (medium evidence,\r [...]"


id: 2aeff526b1d3c26ec44447eb1d265312
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4791
content:
"[...] high agreement) (Global Commission on the Economy and Climate \r 2014; Foxon et al. 2015; Bhattacharya et al. 2016; Floater et al. 2017; \r Colenbrander et al. 2018b)."


id: ff6f66e2fb8df6a032c575fd36220062
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42346
content:
"As a combined evaluation, integrating multiple mitigation options in \r urban systems involves the greatest requirement for strengthening \r institutional capacity and governance through cross-sectoral \r coordination. Notably, integrated action requires significant effort \r to coordinate sectors and strategies across urban growth typologies \r (Sections 8.4 and 8.6, and Figure 8.21). Institutional capacity, if not \r strengthened to a suitable level to handle this process - especially \r to break out of carbon lock-in  - can fall short of the efforts this \r entails. These conditions can pose barriers for realising cross-sectoral \r coordination while the formation of partnerships and stakeholder \r engagement take place as important enablers. Overcoming \r institutional challenges for cross-sectoral coordination can support \r realising synergies among the benefits that each mitigation option \r can offer within and across urban systems, including for the SDGs. \r [...]"


id: a8c273c8fcc64e18b60cfa28c82affdb
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26898
content:
"[...] These include those that can be involved in co-located and walkable \r urban form together with decarbonising and electrifying the urban \r energy system as well as urban green and blue infrastructure, \r providing the basis for more liveable, resource efficient and compact \r urban development with benefits for urban inhabitants (Section 8.2)."


id: 73bb057d256e655707e370b2aa687357
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17611
content:
"Yet urban mitigation options that can be implemented to transform \r urban systems involve the interplay of multiple enablers and \r barriers. Based on a  framework for assessing feasibility from \r a multi-dimensional perspective, feasibility is malleable and various \r enablers can be brought into play to increase the implementation of \r mitigation options. The scope of this assessment enables an approach \r for considering multiple aspects that have an impact on feasibility \r as a tool for policy support (Singh et al. 2020). In Figure 8.19, the \r assessment framework that is based on geophysical, environmental\u0002ecological, technological, economic, socio-cultural, and institutional \r dimensions is applied to identify the enablers and/or barriers in \r implementing mitigation options in urban systems. The feasibility of \r options may differ across context, time, and scale (Section 8.SM.2). \r The line of sight upon which the assessment is based includes urban \r [...]"


id: e85f41450fde0b95809ed5b283fbe6f4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38214
content:
"[...] case studies (Lamb et al. 2019) and assessments of land use and \r spatial planning in IPCC SR1.5 (IPCC 2018a)."


id: e17c6a998d92e3216df165d8610f490
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36940
content:
"Across the enablers and barriers of different mitigation options, \r urban land use and spatial planning for increasing co-located \r densities in urban areas has positive impacts in multiple indicators, \r particularly reducing land use and preserving carbon sinks when the \r growth in urban extent is reduced and avoided, which if brought \r into interplay in decision-making, can support the enablers for its \r implementation. Improvements in air quality are possible when \r higher urban densities are combined with modes of active transport, \r electrified mobility as well as urban green and blue infrastructure \r (Sections 8.3.4, 8.4 and 8.6). The demands on geophysical resources, \r including materials for urban development, will depend on whether \r additional strategies are in place with largely negative impacts under \r conventional practices. The technological scalability of multiple \r urban mitigation options is favourable while varying according to \r [...]"


id: 995ffc99073f7753b649992b60b84f28
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24206
content:
"[...] the level of existing urban development and scale of implementation \r (Tables 8.SM.3 and 8.SM.4)."


id: 2576832d60441f22a36c308ce70f690b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3776
content:
"Similarly, multiple mitigation options have positive impacts on \r employment and economic growth, especially when urban densities \r enable productivity. Possible distributional effects, including \r availability of affordable accommodation and access to greenspace, \r are best addressed when urban policy packages combine more \r than one policy objective. Such an approach can provide greater \r support to urban mitigation efforts with progress towards shifting \r urban development to sustainability. The electrification of the urban \r energy system involves multiple enablers that support the feasibility \r of this mitigation option, including positive impacts on health and \r well-being. In addition, increases in urban densities can support \r the planning of district heating and cooling networks that can \r decarbonize the built environment at scale with technology readiness \r levels increasing for lower temperature supply options. Preventing, \r [...]"


id: c842992c5385f5817f45dcb01adba339
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32544
content:
"[...] minimising, and managing waste as an urban mitigation option can \r be enabled when informality in the sector is transformed to secure \r employment effects and value-addition based on the more circular \r use of resources (Sections 8.4.3 and 8.4.5, and Tables 8.SM.3 and \r 8.SM.4 in Supplementary Material 8.2)."


id: dec3fc1dbff1dfb64beab709637561b6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36458
content:
"The most effective and appropriate packages of mitigation \r strategies will vary depending on several dimensions of a city. This \r section brings together the urban mitigation options described \r in Section  8.4 and assesses the range of mitigation potentials for \r different types of cities. There is consensus in the literature that \r mitigation strategies are most effective when multiple interventions \r are coupled together. Urban-scale interventions that implement \r multiple strategies concurrently through policy packages are more \r effective and have greater emissions savings than when single \r interventions are implemented separately. This is because a  city\u0002wide strategy can have cascading effects across sectors, that have \r multiplicative effects on GHG emissions reduction within and outside \r a city's administrative boundaries. Therefore, city-scale strategies can \r reduce more emissions than the net sum of individual interventions, \r [...]"


id: 1759becff59fac98398ea62c96336059
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"[...] particularly if multiple scales of governance are included (Sections 8.4 \r and 8.5). Furthermore, cities have the ability to implement policy \r packages across sectors using an urban systems approach, such as \r through planning, particularly those that affect key infrastructures \r (Figures 8.15, 8.17 and 8.22)."


id: 67bffb5b5f24825d83076530a8fb76e4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15523
content:
"Taken together, urban form (Figure  8.16) and growth typology \r (Figure 8.20) can act as a roadmap for cities or sub-city communities \r looking to identify their urban context and, by extension, the \r mitigation opportunities with the greatest potential to reduce GHG \r emissions. Specifically, this considers whether a  city is established \r with existing and managed infrastructure; rapidly growing with \r new and actively developing infrastructure; or emerging with large \r amounts of infrastructure build-up. The long lifespan of urban \r infrastructure locks in behaviour and committed emissions. Therefore, \r the sequencing of mitigation strategies is important for determining \r emissions savings in the short and long term. Hence, different types \r of cities will have different mitigation pathways, depending upon \r a city's urban form and state of that city's urban development and \r infrastructure; the policy packages and implementation plan that \r [...]"


id: 9c77f90a2b2e1ac35efc6f64d31b2c80
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24781
content:
"[...] provide the highest mitigation potential for rapidly growing cities with \r new infrastructures will differ from those for established cities \r with existing infrastructure."


id: 84710d7717460a744466322044b99edb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20445
content:
"Figure 8.20: Urban growth typologies define the main patterns of urban development. Emerging urban areas are undergoing the buildup of new infrastructure. \r These are new urban areas that are budding out. Rapidly growing urban areas are undergoing significant changes in either outward and/or upward growth, accompanied by \r large-scale development of new urban infrastructure. Established urban areas are relatively stable with mature urban form and existing urban infrastructures. Each of these \r typologies represents different levels of economic development and state of urbanisation. Rapidly growing urban areas that are building up through vertical development are \r often those with higher levels of economic development. Rapidly growing urban areas that are building outward through horizontal expansion are found at lower levels of \r [...]"


id: 47ff6fc2b0272a1e17a553017c103e0c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9883
content:
"[...] economic development and are land intensive. Like with urban form, different areas of a single city can undergo different growth typologies. Therefore a city will be comprised \r of multiple urban growth typologies. Source: synthesized from Mahtta et al. (2019) and Lall et al. (2021)."


id: fb4ba4f1d58d12d84cbba6166d98ed27
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41589
content:
"Figure 8.21: Priorities and potentials for packages of urban mitigation strategies across typologies of urban growth (Figure 8.20) and urban form \r (Figure 8.16). The horizontal axis represents urban growth typologies based on emerging, rapidly growing, and established urban areas. The vertical axis shows the continuum \r of urban form, from compact and walkable, to dispersed and auto-centric. Urban areas can first locate their relative positioning in this space according to their predominant style \r of urban growth and urban form. The urban mitigation options are bundled across four broad sectors of mitigation strategies: (i) spatial planning, urban form, and infrastructure \r (blue); (ii) electrification and net-zero-emissions resources (yellow); (iii) urban green and blue infrastructure (green); and (iv) socio-behavioural aspects (purple). The concentric \r [...]"


id: 2d78d3138f65b4524db817efd190101d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"[...] circles indicate lower, medium, and higher mitigation potential considering the context of the urban area. For each city type (circular graphic) the illustrative urban mitigation \r strategy that is considered to provide the greatest cascading effects across mitigation opportunities is represented by a section that is larger relative to others; those strategy \r sections outlined in black are 'entry points' for sequencing of strategies. Within each of the larger strategy sections (i.e., spatial planning, urban green and blue infrastructure, \r etc.), the size of the sub-strategy sections are equal and do not suggest any priority or sequencing. The relative sizes of the strategies and extent of mitigation potential are \r illustrative and based on the authors' best understanding and assessment of the literature."


id: 196004047d0a76afc40a652854ca46b6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1681
content:
"System-wide energy savings and emissions reductions for low\u0002carbon urban development are widely recognised to require both \r behavioural and structural changes (Zhang and Li 2017). Synergies \r between social and ecological innovation can reinforce the \r sustainability of urban systems while decoupling energy usage and \r economic growth (Hu et al. 2018; Ma et al. 2018). In addition, an \r integrated sustainable development approach that enables cross\u0002sector energy efficiency, sustainable transport, renewable energy, \r and local development in urban neighbourhoods can address \r issues of energy poverty (Puksec et al. 2018). In this context, cross\u0002sectoral, multi-scale, and public-private collaborative action is crucial \r to steer societies and cities closer to low-carbon futures (Holscher \r et al. 2019). Such actions include guiding residential living area per \r capita, limiting private vehicle growth, expanding public transport, \r [...]"


id: 8198a15e9d41390a9304d0f5a4b5f07b
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19928
content:
"[...] improving the efficiency of urban infrastructure, enhancing urban \r carbon pools, and minimising waste through sustainable, ideally \r circular, waste management (Lin et al. 2018). Through a coordinated \r approach, urban areas can be transformed into hubs for renewable \r and distributed energy, sustainable mobility, as well as inclusivity \r and health (Newman et al. 2017; Newman 2020)."


id: e1cf26fafac69a3d0090a3d46b3edd43
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37005
content:
"A shared understanding for urban transformation through \r a  participatory approach can largely avoid maladaptation and \r contribute to equity (Moglia et al. 2018). Transformative urban \r futures that are radically different from the existing trajectories of \r urbanisation, including in developing countries, can remain within \r planetary boundaries while being inclusive of the urban poor (Friend \r et al. 2016). At the urban policy level, an analysis of 12,000 measures \r in urban-level monitoring emissions inventories based on the mode \r of governance further suggests that local authorities with lower \r population have primarily relied on municipal self-governing while \r local authorities with higher population more frequently adopted \r regulatory measures as well as financing and provision (Palermo et al. \r 2020b). Policies that relate to education and enabling were uniformly \r [...]"


id: 311500512cde3fea63d3c3393c23b1b4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5885
content:
"[...] adopted regardless of population size (Palermo et al. 2020b). Multi\u0002disciplinary teams, including urban planners, engineers, architects, \r and environmental institutions, can support local decision-making \r capacities, including for increasing energy efficiency and renewable \r energy considering building intensity and energy use (Mrowczynska \r et al. 2021) (Section 8.5)."


id: ff4ecec575b71dff5e2a7808001aed48
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42325
content:
"Rapidly growing cities have entry points into an integrated \r strategy based on spatial planning, urban form and infrastructure \r (Figure 8.21). For rapidly growing cities that may be co-located and \r walkable at present, remaining compact is better ensured when \r co-location and mixed land use, as well as TOD, continues to be \r prioritised (Section  8.4.2). Concurrently, ensuring that electricity \r and energy carriers are decarbonised while electrifying mobility, \r heating and cooling will support the mitigation potential of these \r cities. Along with an integrated approach across other illustrative \r strategies, switching to net-zero materials and supply chains holds \r importance (Section 8.4.3). Cities that remain compact and walkable \r can provide a  greater array of locational and mobility options to \r the inhabitants that can be adopted for mitigation benefits. Rapidly \r growing cities that may currently be dispersed and auto-centric \r [...]"


id: 5b7a789e5259fcd98a187cb6b0169831
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13336
content:
"[...] can capture high mitigation potential through urban infill and \r densification. Conserving existing green and blue assets, thereby \r protecting sources of carbon storage and sequestration, as well as \r biodiversity, have high potential for both kinds of existing urban \r form, especially when the rapid growth can be controlled.  "


id: 47844482cf90e15e3fed4c828af8c5df
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9797
content:
"Rapidly growing cities have significant opportunities for integrating \r climate mitigation response options in earlier stages of urban \r development, which can provide even greater opportunities for \r avoiding carbon lock-in and shifting pathways towards net-zero \r GHG emissions. In growing cities that are expected to experience \r large increases in population, a  significant share of urban \r development remains to be planned and built. The ability to shift \r these investments towards low-carbon development earlier in the \r process represents an important opportunity for contributing to \r net-zero GHG emissions at the global scale. In particular, evidence \r suggests that investment in low-carbon development measures and \r reinvestment based on the returns of the measures, even without \r considering substantial co-benefits, can provide tipping points for \r climate mitigation action and reaching peak emissions at lower \r levels while decoupling emissions from economic growth, even in \r [...]"


id: 732ad3aaa420131bc066da64d5643d8f
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17512
content:
"[...] fast-growing megacity contexts with well-established infrastructure \r (Colenbrander et al. 2017)."


id: e8ea8aa81753ed5ff3ede9afde7126f1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38327
content:
"In low-energy-driven urban design, parameters are evaluated based \r on the energy performance of the urban area in the early design phase \r of future urban development (Shi et al. 2017b). Energy-driven urban \r design generates and optimises urban form according to the energy \r performance outcome (Shi et al. 2017b). Beyond the impact of urban \r form on building energy performance, the approach focuses on the \r interdependencies between urban form and energy infrastructure in \r urban energy systems. The process can provide opportunities for both \r passive options for energy-driven urban design, such as the use of \r solar gain for space heating, or of thermal mass to moderate indoor \r temperatures, as well as active options that involve the use of energy \r infrastructure and technologies while recognising interrelations of \r the system. Future urban settlements can also be planned and built \r with net-zero CO2 or net-zero GHG emissions, as well as renewable \r [...]"


id: ab4a388ddf1cbfca5a76eee273973e97
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27361
content:
"[...] energy targets, in mind. Energy master planning of urban areas that \r initially target net-zero operational GHG emissions can be supported \r with energy master planning from conceptual design to operation, \r including district-scale energy strategies (Charani Shandiz et al. 2021)."


id: c99ca8a4a0edf3818d3630c0491ae77d
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vector_id: 32796
content:
"Low-carbon urban development that triggers economic decoupling \r can have a positive impact on employment and local competitiveness \r (Kalmykova et al. 2015; Chen et al. 2018b; Garcia-Gusano et al. 2018; \r Hu et al. 2018; Shen et al. 2018). In addition, sustainable urban \r transformation can be supported with participatory approaches \r that provide a  shared understanding of future opportunities \r and challenges where public acceptance increases with citizen \r engagement and citizen empowerment as well as an awareness of \r co-benefits (Blanchet 2015; Bjorkelund et al. 2016; Flacke and de \r Boer 2017; Gao et al. 2017; Neuvonen and Ache 2017; Sharp and \r Salter 2017; Wiktorowicz et al. 2018; Fastenrath and Braun 2018; \r Gorissen et al. 2018; Herrmann et al. 2018; Moglia et al. 2018). \r Sustainable and low-carbon urban development that integrates \r issues of equity, inclusivity, and affordability, while safeguarding \r [...]"


id: 12f92dc7d01e3c3acb5238aaa224ab3b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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vector_id: 544
content:
"[...] urban livelihoods, providing access to basic services, lowering energy \r bills, addressing energy poverty, and improving public health can also \r improve the distributional effects of existing and future urbanisation \r (Friend et al. 2016; Claude et al. 2017; Colenbrander et al. 2017; Ma \r et al. 2018; Mrowczynska et al. 2018; Puksec et al. 2018; Wiktorowicz \r et al. 2018) (Section 8.2)."


id: ea19a5a56a6139d7102cf85b7e50a775
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38537
content:
"Though there has been a  rapid rise in quantification and analysis \r of urban emissions, gaps remain in comprehensive global coverage, \r particularly in the Global South, and reliance on standardised \r frameworks and systematic data are lacking (Gurney and Shepson \r 2021; Mueller et al. 2021). The development of protocols by (BSI \r 2013; Fong et al. 2014; ICLEI 2019b) that urban areas can use to \r organise emissions accounts has been an important step forward, but \r no single agreed-upon reporting framework exists (Lombardi et al. \r 2017; Chen et al. 2019b; Ramaswami et al. 2021). Additionally, there \r is no standardisation of emissions data and limited independent \r validation procedures (Gurney and Shepson 2021). This is partly \r driven by the recognition that urban emissions can be conceptualised \r using different frameworks, each of which has a different meaning \r for different urban communities (Section 8.1.6.2). Equally important \r [...]"


id: 19e5e55709eb4a70fb0b46e59bbe96e8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1752
content:
"[...] is the recognition that acquisition and analysis of complex data used \r to populate urban GHG inventory protocols remains a  barrier for \r local practitioners (Creutzig et al. 2019). The limited standardisation \r has also led to incomparability of the many individual or city \r cluster analyses that have been accomplished since AR5. Finally, \r comprehensive, global quantification of urban emissions remains \r incomplete in spite of recent efforts (Moran et al. 2018; Zheng \r et al. 2018; Harris et al. 2020; Jiang et al. 2020; Wei et al. 2021; \r Wiedmann et al. 2021)."


id: d48d8ba9c77e29bb71d0a2321bb0e0a5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34718
content:
"The most impactful urban mitigation plans reduce urban GHG emissions by considering the long lifespan of urban layout and urban \r infrastructures (Sections  8.4.1 and 8.6). Chapter  8  identifies three overarching mitigation strategies with the largest potential \r to decrease current, and avoid future, urban emissions: (i) reducing or changing urban energy and material use towards more \r sustainable production and consumption across all sectors including through spatial planning and infrastructure that supports \r compact, walkable urban form (Section  8.4.2); (ii) decarbonise through electrification of the urban energy system, and switch \r to net-zero-emissions resources (i.e., low-carbon infrastructure) (Section 8.4.3); and (iii) enhance carbon sequestration through \r urban green and blue infrastructure (e.g., green roofs, urban forests and street trees), which can also offer multiple co-benefits like \r [...]"


id: 47371bbdf20ca943f145a50dde3d1305
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9730
content:
"[...] reducing ground temperatures and supporting public health and well-being (Section 8.4.4). Integrating these mitigation strategies \r across sectors, geographic scales, and levels of governance will yield the greatest emissions savings (Sections 8.4 and 8.5)."


id: bfa8e123c6cd3c044a78ed0d0bdf3e54
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30994
content:
"There are two different emissions estimation techniques applied, individually or in combination, to the four frameworks outlined \r in Section 8.1.6.2 to estimate urban GHG emissions: 'top-down' and 'bottom-up'. The top-down technique uses atmospheric GHG \r concentrations and atmospheric modelling to estimate direct (scope 1) emissions (see Glossary). The bottom-up technique estimates \r emissions using local activity data or direct measurements such as in smokestacks, traffic data, energy consumption information, and \r building use. Bottom-up techniques will often include indirect emissions (see Glossary) from purchased electricity (scope 2) and the \r urban supply chain (scope 3). Inclusion of supply-chain emissions often requires additional data such as consumer purchasing data \r and supply chain emission factors. Some researchers also take a hybrid approach combining top-down and bottom-up estimation \r [...]"


id: 8658f1af3f982ef05379e9e2bac511c0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20799
content:
"[...] techniques to quantify territorial emissions. Individual self-reported urban inventories from cities have shown chronic underestimation \r when compared to estimates using combined top-down/bottom-up atmospherically calibrated estimation techniques."


id: 2b72f811c3316b1a6b229710be7b247f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"according to the specific urban area. Synergies and/or trade-offs may \r be more significant in certain contexts than others. Table 8.SM.1\r includes the evaluation of the SDG linkages of the mitigation options \r for urban systems and indicates the levels of confidence as high (H), \r medium (M) and low (L). Table 8.SM.2 includes the references/line \r of sight for these SDG linkages with 64 references that involve the \r urban context and extends the mappings that are provided in Thacker \r et al. (2019) and Fuso Nerini et al. (2018) in addition to the synthesis \r that is provided in the main chapter text. The evaluations further \r support Chapter 17 on 'Accelerating the transition in the context of \r sustainable development'. Urban mitigation with a view of the SDGs \r can support shifting pathways of urbanisation towards sustainability \r (also see Cross-Chapter Box 5 on 'Shifting development pathways to \r increase sustainability and broaden mitigation options' in Chapter 4). \r [...]"


id: f1225f0171e41ab76fb205ffc3c62cd2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39805
content:
"[...] Moreover, the multi-dimensional feasibility assessment of mitigation \r options for urban systems indicates that feasibility is malleable and \r can increase when more enablers come into play. Strengthened \r institutional capacity that supports scale and coordination can \r increase the synergies of the urban mitigation options with the SDGs."


id: e1d022b051d527eba603b92e3a2c89ef
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37006
content:
"are evaluated as low, medium or high based on the robustness and \r agreement of the evidence and shaded in light to dark tones. Lines \r of sight that are used per indicator of the feasibility assessment are \r contained in Table 8.SM.4, including 414 references across urban \r mitigation options. Lines of sight utilise the systematic assessment \r of urban case studies considering 1373 scientific references during \r the  timeframe of the AR6 cycle based on Lamb et al. (2019) \r and  additional systematic searches according to the indicators \r of the  feasibility assessment. The lines of sight further build upon \r the feasibility assessment for land use and urban planning that \r was initiated by SR1.5 (IPCC 2018). The feasibility assessment for \r integrating sectors, strategies and innovations is based on multiple \r urban mitigation options implemented concurrently, such as \r co-located densities and electrification of the urban energy system \r [...]"


id: d1800f8ae9f47bf0030ef538276bd92f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34210
content:
"[...] whenever relevant (Figure 8.21). The feasibility assessment method \r is explained in detail in Annex II.11 and Annex II.12."


id: 366791584afd4f1f039e22ad55a1ecb2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6806
content:
"the thermal mass of buildings (to store heat for the cold season and \r to protect occupants from high temperatures (i.e., heatwaves), when \r designing energy services, moving from ownership to usership of \r appliances and towards more shared space, are among the sufficiency \r measures already implemented in the leading municipalities. At the \r global level, the main drivers of emissions include (i) population \r growth, especially in developing countries, (ii) increase in floor area \r per capita, driven by the increase of the size of dwellings while the \r size of households kept decreasing, especially in developed countries, \r (iii) the inefficiency of the newly constructed buildings, especially in \r developing countries, and the low renovation rates and ambition \r level in developed countries when existing buildings are renovated, \r (iv) the increase in use, number and size of appliances and equipment, \r especially ICT and cooling, driven by the growing welfare (income), \r [...]"


id: b789cef8a6a0eaed1a01676f84b865b5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29498
content:
"[...] and (v) the continued reliance on fossil fuel-based electricity and heat \r slow decarbonisation of energy supply. These factors taken together \r are projected to continue driving GHG emissions in the building sector \r in the future (high evidence, high agreement) {9.2, 9.3, 9.4, 9.5, 9.6, \r and 9.9}."


id: ce1e38a5d668a810ca0c7d18e49064d7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33592
content:
"Global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from buildings were \r in 2019 at 12 GtCO2-eq, equivalent to 21% of global GHG \r emissions that year, out of which 57% were indirect emissions \r from offsite generation of electricity and heat, 24%  direct \r emissions produced onsite and 18% were embodied emissions \r from the use of cement and steel (high evidence, high \r agreement). More than 95% of emissions from buildings were \r CO2 emissions, CH4 and N2O represented 0.08%, and emissions \r from halocarbon contributed by 3% to global GHG emissions from \r buildings. If only CO2 emissions would be considered, the share of \r CO2 emissions from buildings out of global CO2 emissions increases \r to 31%. Global final energy demand from buildings reached 128.8 EJ \r in 2019, and global electricity demand was slightly above 43 EJ. The \r former accounted for 31% of global final energy demand and the latter \r for 18% of global electricity demand. Residential buildings consumed \r [...]"


id: ab15af73160580ea9dabc3f8c5b1930
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27325
content:
"[...] 70% of global final energy demand from buildings. Over the period \r 1990-2019, global CO2 emissions from buildings increased by 50%, \r global final energy demand grew by 38% and global final electricity \r demand increased by 161% (high evidence, high agreement) {9.3}."


id: 245141195bd59082ebbfbc4d9a46df90
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3580
content:
"Bottom-up studies show a mitigation potential up to 85% in \r Europe and North America and up to 45% in Australia, Japan and \r New Zealand, compared to the baselines by 2050, even though \r they sometimes decline (robust evidence, high agreement). In \r developing countries, bottom-up studies estimate the potential \r of up to 40-80% in 2050, as compared to their sharply growing \r baselines (medium evidence, high agreement). The aggregation \r of results from all these bottom-up studies translates into \r a global mitigation potential by 2050 of at least 8.2 GtCO2, \r which is equivalent to 61% of their baseline scenario. The largest \r mitigation potential (5.4 GtCO2) is available in developing countries \r while Developed Countries will be able to mitigate 2.7 GtCO2. These \r potentials represent the low estimates, and the real potential is likely \r to be higher. These estimated potentials would be higher if embodied \r emissions in buildings and those from halocarbons would be included \r [...]"


id: beb2467bc04453b7cf6dc42e7e542d7e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30815
content:
"Drivers of GHG emissions in the building sector were assessed \r using the SER (Sufficiency, Efficiency, Renewables) framework. \r Sufficiency measures tackle the causes of GHG emissions \r by avoiding the demand for energy and materials over the \r lifecycle of buildings and appliances. Sufficiency differs from \r efficiency in that the latter is about the continuous short-term marginal \r technological improvements, which allows doing less with more in \r relative terms without considering the planetary boundaries, while \r the former is about long-term actions driven by non-technological \r solutions (i.e., land-use management and planning), which consume \r less in absolute term and are determined by biophysical processes. \r Sufficiency addresses the issue of a fair consumption of space and \r resources. The remaining carbon budget, and its normative target for \r distributional equity, is the upper limit of sufficiency, while requirements \r [...]"


id: fe8751557e83759c25770dfcc3359f90
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42152
content:
"[...] for a decent living standard define the minimum level of sufficiency. \r The SER framework introduces a hierarchical layering which reduces \r the cost of constructing and using buildings without reducing the \r level of comfort of the occupant. Sufficiency interventions in buildings \r include the optimisation of the use of building, repurposing unused \r existing buildings, prioritising multi-family homes over single-family \r buildings, and adjusting the size of buildings to the evolving needs \r of households by downsizing dwellings. Sufficiency measures do not \r consume energy during the use phase of buildings. "


id: f8118e6b0b99eb3016454c4881b44e6c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41018
content:
"The development, since the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report \r (AR5), of integrated approaches to construction and retrofit of \r buildings has led to the widespread adoption of zero energy/\r carbon buildings in all climate zones. The complementarity and the \r interdependency of measures lead to cost reduction while optimising \r the mitigation potential grasped and avoiding the lock-in-effect. The \r growing consideration of integrated approach to construction of new \r buildings as well as to the renovation of existing buildings results in \r a lower relevance of the step-by-step approach to renovate buildings \r and to breaking down the potential into cost categories, as to deliver \r deep mitigation and cost savings technologies and approaches shall \r be applied together in an integrated and interdependent manner \r (medium evidence, high agreement). The potential associated with \r the sufficiency measures as well as the  exchange of appliances, \r [...]"


id: b209e393a97977300fd74fef9b86303
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28545
content:
"[...] equipment, and lights with efficient ones is at cost below \r USD0  tCO2\r -1 (high evidence, high agreement). The construction of \r high-performance buildings will become by 2050 a business-as-usual \r technology with costs below USD20 tCO2\r -1 in developed countries \r and below USD100 tCO2\r -1 in developing countries (medium \r evidence, high agreement). For existing buildings, there have been "


id: 8b694c2b9f2a465ec64aa60b76e18ccf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21687
content:
"Actions are needed to adapt buildings to future climate while \r ensuring well-being for all. The expected heatwaves will \r inevitably increase cooling needs to limit the health impacts \r of climate change (medium evidence, high agreement). \r Global warming will impact cooling and heating needs but also the \r performance, durability and safety of buildings, especially historical \r and coastal ones, through changes in temperature, humidity, \r concentrations of CO2 and chloride, and sea level rise. Adaptation \r measures to cope with climate change may increase the demand \r for energy and materials leading to an increase in GHG emissions \r if not mitigated. Sufficiency measures such as bioclimatic design \r of buildings, which consider the expected future climate, and \r includes natural ventilation, white walls and nature-based solutions \r (e.g.,  green roofs) will decrease the demand for cooling. Shared \r cooled spaces with highly efficient cooling solutions are among \r [...]"


id: 59cbfa759ff541fe8e2300cb5456eff0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13040
content:
"[...] the mitigation strategies which can limit the effect of the expected \r heatwaves on people health. Sufficiency, efficiency, and renewable \r energy can be designed to reduce buildings' vulnerability to climate \r change impacts (medium evidence, high agreement) {9.7, 9.8}. "


id: 476ec309c42bd7d5c91b9d3c852babd4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9778
content:
"Policy packages based on the SER (Sufficiency, Efficiency, \r Renewables) framework could grasp the full mitigation \r potential of the global building stock (medium evidence,\r high agreement). Low ambitious policies will lock buildings in \r carbon for decades as buildings last for decades if not centuries \r (high evidence, high agreement). Building energy codes is the \r main regulatory instrument to reduce emissions from both \r new and existing buildings (high evidence, high agreement). \r Most advanced building energy codes include bioclimatic design \r requirements to capture the sufficiency potential of buildings, \r efficiency requirements by using the most efficient technologies and \r requirements to increase the integration of renewable energy solutions \r to the building shape. Some announced building energy  codes \r extend these requirements from the use phase to the whole building \r lifecycle. Building energy codes are proven to be especially effective \r [...]"


id: c1374af69bde663da5abe961c874d33
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31291
content:
"[...] if compulsory and combined with other regulatory instruments \r such as minimum energy performance standard for appliances and \r equipment, especially if the performance level is set at the level of \r the best available technologies in the market (robust evidence, high \r agreement). Market-based instruments such as carbon  taxes with \r recycling of the revenues and personal or building carbon allowances \r also contribute to foster the decarbonisation of the building sector \r (robust evidence, high agreement). Requirements to limit the use \r of land and property taxes are also considered effective policies to \r limit urban sprawl and to prioritise multi-family buildings over single\u0002family homes (medium evidence, high agreement) {9.9}. "


id: 446ac4d53ebe1939bb95c7ab26266aec
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9270
content:
"COVID-19 emphasised the importance of buildings for human \r well-being. However, the lockdown measures implemented to \r avoid the spread of the virus have also stressed the inequalities \r in the access for all to suitable and healthy buildings, which \r provide natural daylight and clean air to their occupants\r (low evidence, high agreement). Meeting the new WHO health \r requirements, has also put an emphasis on indoor air quality, \r preventive maintenance of centralised mechanical heating, ventilation, \r and cooling systems. Moreover, the lockdown measures have led to \r spreading the South Korean concept of officetel (office-hotel) to many \r countries and to extending it to officetelschool. The projected growth, \r prior to the COVID-19, of 58% of the global residential floor area \r by 2050 compared to the 290 billion m2 yr-1 in 2019 might well be \r insufficient. Addressing the new needs for more residential buildings \r [...]"


id: 13903710f310937ffcc833d63e3c493f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 656
content:
"[...] may not, necessarily mean constructing new buildings, especially in \r the global North. Repurposing existing non-residential buildings, no \r longer in use due to the expected spread of teleworking triggered by \r the health crisis and enabled by digitalisation, could be the way to \r overcome the new needs for officetelschool buildings triggered by the \r health crisis (low evidence, high confidence) {9.1, 9.2}."


id: 34ec580fde3c5df6f534b6e5f4ef6ae8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6554
content:
"Total GHG emissions in the building sector reached 12 GtCO2-eq \r in 2019, equivalent to 21% of global GHG emissions that year, of \r which 57% were indirect CO2 emissions from offsite generation \r of electricity and heat, followed by 24% of direct CO2 emissions \r produced on-site and 18% from the production of cement and steel \r used for construction and/or refurbishment of buildings. If only \r CO2 emissions would be considered, the share of buildings CO2\r emissions increases to 31% out of global CO2 emissions. Energy \r use in residential and non-residential buildings contributed 50% \r and 32% respectively, while embodied emissions contributed 18% \r to global building CO2 emissions. Global final energy demand from \r buildings reached 128.8 EJ in 2019, equivalent to 31% of global \r final energy demand. Residential buildings consumed 70% out of \r global final energy demand from buildings. Electricity demand from \r buildings was slightly above 43 EJ in 2019, equivalent to more than \r [...]"


id: 9b6fb4775e915aad78ace7fcb25cc053
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24600
content:
"[...] 18% of global electricity demand. Over the period 1990-2019, global \r CO2 emissions from buildings increased by 50%, global final energy \r demand grew by 38%, with 54% increase in non-residential buildings \r and 32% increase in residential ones. Among energy carriers, the \r growth in global final energy demand was strongest for electricity, \r which increased by 161%."


id: cf5833f2398b01d2eb14628a98544d2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33829
content:
"Sufficiency is not a  new concept, its root goes back to the Greek word sophrosune, which was translated in Latin to sobrietas, \r in a  sense of enough (Cezard and Mourad 2019). The sufficiency concept was introduced to the sustainability policy debate by \r (Sachs 1993) and to academia by (Princen 2003). Since 1997, Thailand considers sufficiency, which was framed already in 1974 as \r Sufficiency Economy Philosophy, as a new paradigm for development with the aim of improving human well-being for all by shifting \r development pathways towards sustainability (Mongsawad 2012). The Thai approach is based on three principles (i) moderation, \r (ii) reasonableness, and (iii) self-immunity. Sufficiency goes beyond the dominant framing of energy demand under efficiency and \r behaviour. Sufficiency is defined as avoiding the demand for materials, energy, land, water and other natural resources while delivering \r [...]"


id: fe70c52ddeb30d572ee6a84520ea4f30
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42140
content:
"[...] a decent living standard for all within the planetary boundaries (Saheb 2021b, Princen 2005). Decent living standards are a set of \r essential material preconditions for human well-being which includes shelter, nutrition, basic amenities, health care, transportation, \r information, education, and public space (Rao and Baer 2012; Rao and Min 2018; Rao et al. 2019). Sufficiency addresses the issue \r of a fair consumption of space and resources. The remaining carbon budget, and its normative target for distributional equity, is the \r upper limit of sufficiency, while requirements for a decent living standard define the minimum level of sufficiency. Sufficiency differs \r from efficiency in that the latter is about the continuous short-term marginal technological improvements which allow doing more"


id: bb10ad65d711332f29441f5932d5a581
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30133
content:
"Downsizing dwellings through cohousing strategies by repurposing existing buildings and clustering apartments when buildings \r are renovated and by prioritising multi-family buildings over single-family homes in new developments (Wilson and Boehland 2005; \r Duffy 2009; Fuller and Crawford 2011; Stephan et al. 2013; Huebner and Shipworth 2017; Sandberg 2018; McKinlay et al. 2019; \r Ellsworth-Krebs 2020; Ivanova and Buchs 2020; Berrill and Hertwich 2021) are among the sufficiency measures that avoid the \r demand for materials in the construction phase and energy demand for heating, cooling and lighting in the use phase, especially \r if the conditioned volume and window areas are reduced (Duffy 2009; Heinonen and Junnila 2014). Less space also means less \r appliances and equipment and changing preferences towards smaller ones (Aro 2020). Cohousing strategies provide users, in both \r [...]"


id: 5b3c329788e479b6fb4dbac2c758d662
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13300
content:
"[...] new and existing buildings, a shared space (i.e., for laundry, offices, guest rooms and dining rooms) to complement their private space. \r Thus, reducing per capita consumption of resources including energy, water and electricity (Klocker et al. 2012; N. Klocker 2017), \r while offering social benefits such as limiting loneliness of elderly people and single parents (Wankiewicz 2015; Riedy et al. 2019). \r Senior cooperative housing communities and eco-villages are considered among the cohousing examples to scale-up (Kuhnhenn \r et al. 2020). Local authorities have an important role to play in the metamorphosis of housing by proposing communal spaces to be \r shared (Williams 2008; Marckmann et al. 2012) through urban planning and land-use policies (Duffy 2009; Newton et al. 2017). Thus, \r encouraging inter-generational cohousing as well as interactions between people with different social backgrounds (Williams 2008; \r [...]"


id: b4bb657c094156cef32d517f7ea4dd41
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29046
content:
"[...] Lietaert 2010). Progressive tax policies based on a cap in the per-capita floor area are also needed to adapt the size of dwellings to \r households' needs (Murphy 2015; Akenji 2021). "


id: 2d1e2f5578d303f8504e9fc0d003dd17
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5219
content:
"COVID-19 emphasised the importance of buildings for human well\u0002being, however, the lockdown measures implemented to avoid the \r spread of the virus has also stressed the inequalities in the access for \r all to suitable and healthy buildings, which provide natural daylight \r and clean air to their occupants (see also Cross-Chapter Box  1 in \r Chapter 1). COVID-19 and the new health recommendations (World \r Health Organization 2021) emphasised the importance of ventilation \r and the importance of indoor air quality (Sundell et al. 2011; Nazaroff \r 2013; Fisk 2015; Guyot et al. 2018; Wei et al. 2020). The health crisis \r has also put an emphasis on preventive maintenance of centralised \r mechanical heating, ventilation, and cooling systems. Moreover, the \r lockdown measures have led to spreading the South Korean concept \r of officetel (office-hotel) (Gohaud and Baek 2017) to many countries \r and to extending it to officetelschool. Therefore, the projected growth, \r [...]"


id: e2341e191b5427b27a46e90a84bd01da
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37078
content:
"[...] prior to the COVID-19, of 58% of the global residential floor area \r by 2050 compared to the 290 billion m2 yr -1 in 2019 might well be \r insufficient. However, addressing the new needs for more residential \r buildings may not, necessarily mean constructing new buildings. In \r fact, repurposing existing non-residential buildings, no longer in use \r due to the expected spread of teleworking triggered by the health \r crisis and enabled by digitalisation, could be the way to overcome the \r new needs for officetelschool triggered by the health crisis."


id: 9a0667d5b57897622364f9254f576b71
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24336
content:
"At a  global level, from historical perspective (from the Neolithic \r to the present), building techniques have evolved to be able to \r solve increasingly complex problems. Vernacular architecture has \r evolved over many years to address problems inherent in housing. \r Through a process of trial and error, populations have found ways \r to cope with the extremes of the weather. The industrial revolution \r was the single most important development in human history \r over the past three centuries. Previously, building materials were \r restricted to a few manmade materials (lime mortar and concrete) \r along with those available in nature as timber and stone. Metals \r were not available in sufficient quantity or consistent quality to \r be used as anything more than ornamentation. The structure was \r limited by the capabilities of natural materials; this construction \r method is called on-site construction which all the work is done \r [...]"


id: 76c5f642a637c7a0de4bc45707b12277
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18110
content:
"[...] sequentially at the buildings site. The Industrial Revolution \r changed this situation dramatically, new building materials \r emerged (cast-iron, glass structures, steel-reinforced concrete, "


id: 13a1d139f033679c81c5f073f6d49b14
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 671
content:
"Over the period 1990-2019, global CO2 emissions from buildings \r increased by 50%. Global indirect CO2 emissions increased by \r 92%, driven by the increase of fossil fuels-based electrification, \r while global direct emissions decreased by 1%. At regional level, \r emissions in residential buildings decreased in Developed Countries, \r except in Australia, Japan and New Zealand, while they increased \r in developing countries. The highest decrease was observed in \r Europe and Eurasia, with 13.6% decrease of direct emissions and \r 33% decrease of indirect emissions, while the highest increase of \r direct emissions occurred in Middle East, 198%, and the highest \r increase of indirect emissions occurred in Eastern Asia, 2258%. \r Indirect emissions from non-residential buildings increased in all \r regions. The highest increase occurred in Eastern Asia, 1202%, and \r the lowest increase occurred in Europe and Central Asia, 4%, where \r [...]"


id: 5dd559f6154658a953d2fb82a14e7915
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13806
content:
"[...] direct emissions from non-residential buildings decreased by 51%. \r Embodied emissions have also increased in all regions. The highest \r increase occurred in Southern Asia, 334%, while the lowest increase \r occurred in North America, 4% (Figure 9.3b). "


id: f2842b4c26fc824e61d69cbb889460ad
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40063
content:
"Total GHG emissions in the building sector reached 12 GtCO2-eq in \r 2019, equivalent to 21% of global GHG emissions that year. 57% \r of GHG emissions from buildings were indirect CO2 emissions from \r generation of electricity and heat off-site, 24% were direct CO2\r emissions produced on-site, and 18% were from the production \r of cement and steel used for construction and refurbishment of \r buildings (see Cross-Chapter Box 3 and Cross-Working Group Box 1 \r in Chapter 3, and Figure 9.3a). Halocarbon emissions were equivalent \r to 3% of global building GHG emissions in 2019. In the absence of \r the breakdown of halocarbon emissions per  end-use sectors, they \r have been calculated for the purpose of this chapter, by considering \r that 60% of global halocarbon emissions occur in buildings (Hu et al. \r 2020). CH4 and N2O emissions were negligible, representing 0.08% \r each out of the 2019 global building GHG emissions. Therefore, this \r [...]"


id: e1db0537e86f67dcc9b4f85b6c7bba20
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37015
content:
"[...] chapter considers only CO2 emissions from buildings. By limiting the \r scope of the assessment to CO2 emissions, the share of emissions from \r buildings increases to 31% of global 2019 CO2 emissions. Energy use \r in residential and non-residential buildings contributed 50% and \r 32% respectively, while embodied emissions contributed 18% to \r global building CO2 emissions."


id: 6af7fd833cd1aa5cf650edfa048a9afe
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16110
content:
"At regional level, by 2050, the lowest emissions are projected \r to occur in developed Asia and Pacific, with 6.73 MtCO2 under \r RECC-LED scenario and 12.4 MtCO2 under the IEA-SDS, and the \r highest emissions are projected to occur in Europe and Eurasia in all \r three scenarios, with 152 MtCO2 in IEA-SDS, 199 MtCO2 in RECC-LED \r scenario and 381 MtCO2 in IMAGE-LiRE scenario. Emissions in Africa \r are projected to decrease to 10 MtCO2 in RECC-LED, this is nine \r time less than those of 2019, while they are projected to increase by \r 25% in IEA-SDS compared to those of 2019. Compared to IEA-SDS \r and IMAGE-LiRE, RECC-LED projects the highest decreases, over \r the period 2020-2030, of direct emissions in residential buildings \r in all regions, up to 45% in Australia, Japan and New Zealand, and \r Eastern Asia and the highest decreases of indirect emissions, ranging \r from 52% in Eastern Asia to 86% in Latin America and Caribbean. \r [...]"


id: b84a7362be66122d22016d2d9de172
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29634
content:
"[...] Over the same period, the IEA-SDS projects the highest decreases \r of indirect emissions to occur in Australia, Japan and New Zealand, \r and North America. IMAGE-LiRE projects the lowest decreases of \r emissions over the same decade in almost all regions (Figure 9.3b). "


id: 545dbf1211a9de9f005ff719cab398e1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12122
content:
"decomposition of emissions into four driving factors is shown in \r Equation 1, where m2\r  refers to total floor area, EJ refers to final \r energy demand, and MtCO2 refers to the sum of direct and indirect \r CO2 emissions in the use phase. The allocation of changes in emissions \r between two cases k and k-1 to changes in a single driving factor D \r is shown in Equation  2. To calculate changes in emissions due to \r a single driver such as population growth, D will take on the value of \r population in the two compared cases. The superscript k stands for \r the case, defined by the time period and scenario of the emissions, for \r example, IEA-CPS baseline scenario in 2050. When decomposing \r emissions between two cases k and k-1, either the time-period, or \r the scenario remains constant. The decomposition was done at the \r highest regional resolution available from each model output, and \r then aggregated to regional or global level. For changes in emissions \r [...]"


id: ae4b5cbb309c46c4cb05b3c0145639cf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27896
content:
"[...] within a  scenario over time, the decomposition is done for every \r decade, and the total 2020-2050 decomposition is then produced by \r summing decompositions of changes in emissions each decade."


id: c024887adf3f060f0ec4caf1650b07ad
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31099
content:
"effect. By setting a cap in the growth of the floor area per capita \r in developed countries, 5% of emission reductions in IMAGE-LiRE \r scenario derives from sufficiency. However, compared to 2020, the \r lack of sufficiency measures in the baseline scenario will contribute \r to increasing emissions by 31%. RECC-LED scenario shows the \r highest global sufficiency potential captured compared to its \r baseline scenario in 2050 as this scenario assumes a reduction in the \r floor area per capita in Developed Countries and slower floor area \r growth in emerging economies. The four scenarios show a  higher \r contribution of the decarbonisation of energy supply to reducing \r emissions than the reduction of energy demand through sufficiency \r and efficiency measures (Figure 9.6a). At regional level, the emissions \r reduction potential from sufficiency is estimated at 25% in North \r America under both IMAGE-LiRE and RECC-LED scenarios and at \r [...]"


id: 21a75a11bb626dc46946fdd55593312d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3129
content:
"[...] 19% in both Eastern Asia and Europe/Eurasia regions (Figure 9.6b). \r The highest decarbonisation potential due to growth of renewable \r energy is 75% in Southern Asia under IMAGE-LiRE scenario. "


id: 47dcfd8898c762fca2563d7275c25a14
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9855
content:
"Hydrogen emerged in the policy debate as an important energy \r carrier for the decarbonisation of the energy system. In the case of the \r building sector, depending on how hydrogen is sourced (Box 12.3), \r converting gas grids to hydrogen might be an appealing option to \r decarbonise heat without putting additional stress on the electricity \r grids. However, according to (Element Energy Ltd 2018; Strbac et al. \r 2018; Frazer-Nash Consultancy 2018; Broad et  al. 2020; Gerhardt \r et al. 2020) the delivered cost of heat from hydrogen would be much \r higher than the cost of delivering heat from heat pumps, which could \r also be used for cooling. Repurposing gas grids for pure hydrogen \r networks will also require system modifications such as replacement \r of piping and replacement of gas boilers and cooking appliances, \r a factor cost to be considered when developing hydrogen roadmaps \r for buildings. There are also safety and performance concerns with \r [...]"


id: 40abcebf819e1b6ddc79b6fbc7e516a5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8562
content:
"[...] domestic hydrogen appliances (Frazer-Nash Consultancy 2018). Over \r the period 1990-2019, hydrogen was not used in the building sector \r and scenarios assessed show a  very modest role for hydrogen in \r buildings by 2050 (Figure 9.7). "


id: 96fb3b789ef2629ae081308110c827ba
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23754
content:
"In a warming world (IPCC 2021) with a growing population and expanding middle-class, the demand for cooling is likely to increase \r leading to increased emissions if cooling solutions implemented are carbon intensive (Santamouris 2016; Sustainable Energy for All \r 2018; Dreyfus et al. 2020b; Kian Jon et al. 2021; UNEP and IEA 2020). Sufficiency measures such as building design and forms, which \r allow balancing the size of openings, the volume, the wall and window area, the thermal properties, shading, and orientation are all \r non-cost solutions, which should be considered first to reduce cooling demand. Air conditioning systems using halocarbons are the \r most common solutions used to cool buildings. Up to 4 billion cooling appliances are already installed and this could increase to up \r to 14 billion by 2050 (Peters 2018; Dreyfus et al. 2020b). Energy efficiency of air conditioning systems is of a paramount importance \r [...]"


id: 6252ca2fec5e7dc6839225579278650c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14573
content:
"[...] to ensuring that the increased demand for cooling will be satisfied without contributing to global warming through halocarbon \r emissions (Campbell 2018; Shah et al. 2015, 2019; UNEP and IEA 2020). The installation of highly efficient technological solutions with \r low global warming potential (GWP), as part of the implementation of the Kigali amendment to the Montreal Protocol, is the second \r step towards reducing GHG emissions from cooling. Developing renewable energy solutions integrated to buildings is another track \r to follow to reduce GHG emissions from cooling. "


id: 13ecc8a44954389cf96d1bd27215b614
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 723
content:
"Building electricity demand was slightly above 43 EJ in 2019, which is equivalent to more than 18% of global electricity demand. Over \r the period 1990-2019, electricity demand increased by 161%. The increase of global electricity demand is driven by the combination \r of rising incomes, income distribution and the S-curve of ownership rates (Wolfram et al. 2012; Gertler et al. 2016). Electricity is used \r in buildings for plug-in appliances, in other words, refrigerators, cleaning appliances, connected and small appliances and lighting. \r An important emerging trend in electricity demand is the use of electricity for thermal energy services (cooking, water and space \r heating). The increased penetration of heat pumps is the main driver of the use of electricity for heating. Heat pumps used either \r individually or in conjunction with heat networks can provide heating in cold days and cooling in hot ones. (Lowes et al. 2020) \r [...]"


id: 586c4055c2a71773eb646d48ca1b6ef
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12805
content:
"[...] suggests electricity is expected to become an important energy vector to decarbonise heating. However, the use of heat pumps will \r increase halocarbon emissions (UNEP and IEA 2020). Connolly (2017), Bloess et al. (2018), and Barnes and Bhagavathy (2020) argue \r for electrification of heat as a cost-effective decarbonisation measure, if electricity is supplied by renewable energy sources (Ruhnau \r et al. 2020). The electrification of the heat supplied to buildings is likely to lead to an additional electricity demand and consequently \r additional investment in new power plants. Thomassen et al. (2021) identifies flexibility as a key enabler of larger heat electrification \r shares. Importantly, heat pumps work at their highest efficiency level in highly efficient buildings and their market uptake is likely to \r require incentives due to their high up-front cost (Hannon 2015; Heinen et al. 2017). "


id: 8a9dc1defa474f92bc0a95b26eec1642
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21560
content:
"Digitalisation occurs also at the construction stage. (European Union 2019; Witthoeft and Kosta 2017) identified seven digital \r technologies already in use in the building sector. These technologies include (i) Building Information Modelling/Management (BIM), \r (ii) additive manufacturing, also known as 3D printing, (iii) robots, (iv) drones, (v) 3D scanning, (vi) sensors, and (vii) internet of things \r (IoT). BIM supports decision making in the early design stage and allows assessing a variety of design options and their embodied \r emissions (Basbagill et al. 2013; Rock et al. 2018). 3D printing reduces material waste and the duration of the construction phase \r as well as labour accidents (Dixit 2019). Coupling 3D printing and robots allows for increasing productivity through fully automated \r prefabricated buildings. Drones allow for a better monitoring and inspection of construction projects through real-time comparison \r [...]"


id: 6b564e605a6972705f547c136728d83b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16184
content:
"[...] between planned and implemented solutions. Coupling drones with 3D scanning allows predicting building heights and energy \r consumption (Streltsov et  al. 2020). Sensors offer a  continuous data collection and monitoring of end-use services (i.e.,  heating, \r cooling, and lighting), thus allowing for preventive maintenance while providing more comfort to end-users. Coupling sensors with \r IoT, which connects to the internet household appliances and devices such as thermostats, enable demand-response, and flexibility to \r reduce peak loads (IEA 2017a; Lyons 2019). Overall, connected appliances offer a variety of opportunities for end-users to optimise \r their energy demand by improving the responsiveness of energy services (IEA 2017a; Nakicenovic et al. 2019) through the use of \r digital goods and services (Wilson et al., 2020) including peer-to-peer electricity trading (Morstyn et al. 2018)."


id: 4d0d1a980ba4efc29abbb6235002d402
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10828
content:
"be 32% lower in 2050 than 2020 in a baseline scenario, primarily \r due to a lower growth rate of building floor area per population. \r This is because the global population growth rate slows over the \r coming decades, leading to less demand for new floor area relative \r to total population. Further baseline reductions in embodied \r emissions between 2020 and 2050 derive from improvements \r in material production and a gradual decline in GHG intensity of \r energy supply. In a  LED + 2degC policy scenario, 2050 embodied \r emissions are 86% lower than the baseline. This reduction of 2050 \r emissions comes from contributions of comparable magnitude \r from three sources; slower floor area growth leading to less floor \r area of new construction per  capita (sufficiency), reductions in \r the mass of materials required for each unit of newly built floor \r area (material efficiency), and reduction in the GHG intensity of \r material production, from material substitution to lower carbon \r [...]"


id: e6fdf59b296e1976af1b348180cb83fd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37931
content:
"The literature evaluating the embodied energy in building materials \r is extensive, but that considering embodied carbon is much more \r scarce (Cabeza et al. 2021). Recently this evaluation is done using the \r methodology lifecycle assessment (LCA), but since the boundaries \r used in those studies are different, varying, for example, in the \r consideration of cradle to grave, cradle to gate, or cradle to cradle, \r the comparison is very difficult (Moncaster et al. 2019). A summary of \r the embodied energy and embodied carbon cradle to gate coefficients \r reported in the literature are found in Figure 9.9 (Alcorn and Wood \r 1998; Crawford and Treolar 2010; Vukotic et al. 2010; Symons 2011; \r Moncaster and Song 2012; Cabeza et al. 2013; De Wolf et al. 2016; \r Birgisdottir et al. 2017; Pomponi and Moncaster 2016, 2018; Omrany \r et al. 2020; Cabeza et al. 2021). Steel represents the materials with \r higher embodied energy, 32-35 MJ kg-1; embodied energy in masonry \r [...]"


id: 4b80027deb631c9d024007a8cd19c58a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10536
content:
"[...] is higher than in concrete and earth materials, but surprisingly, some \r types of wood have more embodied energy than expected; there are \r dispersion values in the literature depending on the material. On the \r other hand, earth materials and wood have the lowest embodied \r carbon, with less than 0.01 kgCO2 per kg of material (Cabeza et al. \r 2021). The concept of buildings as carbon sinks arise from the idea \r that wood stores considerable quantities of carbon with a relatively \r small ratio of carbon emissions to material volume and concrete has \r substantial embodied carbon emissions with minimal carbon storage \r capacity (Sanjuan et al. 2019; Churkina et al. 2020)."


id: 4a9f4b3bd6281e0aa7669c100a6b90f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10371
content:
"The attribution of changes in embodied emissions to changes in the \r drivers of population, sufficiency, material efficiency, and GHG \r intensity of material production is calculated using additive log\u0002mean divisia index decomposition analysis (Ang and Zhang 2000). \r The decomposition of emissions into four driving factors is shown in \r Equation 9.3, where m2\r NC refers to floor area of new construction, \r kgMat refers to mass of materials used for new construction, and \r kgCO2e refers to embodied GHG emissions in CO2e. The allocation of \r changes in emissions between two cases k and k-1 to changes in \r a single driving factor D is shown in Equation 9.4. For instance, to \r calculate changes in emissions due to population growth, D will take \r on the value of population in the two cases being compared. The \r superscript k stands for the time period and scenario of the \r emissions, for example, SSP2 baseline scenario in 2050. When \r [...]"


id: 6cdbefd610345f7e4aaea74c2b84e0b0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16430
content:
"[...] decomposing emissions between two cases k and k-1, either the \r time period or the scenario stays constant. The decomposition is \r done for every region at the highest regional resolution available, \r and aggregation (e.g., to global level) is then done by summing over \r regions. For changes in emissions within a  scenario over time \r (e.g., SSP baseline emissions in 2020 and 2050), the decomposition \r is made for every decade, and the total 2020-2050 decomposition is \r then produced by summing decompositions of changes in emissions \r each decade."


id: dd2fd3e85e4f21f568171d4d767ff19f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36180
content:
"Embodied emissions from production of materials are an important \r component of building sector emissions, and their share is \r likely to increase as emissions from building energy demand \r decrease (Rock et  al. 2020). Embodied emissions trajectories can \r be lowered by limiting the amount of new floor area required \r (Berrill and Hertwich 2021; Fishman et  al. 2021), and reducing \r the quantity and  GHG intensity of materials through material \r efficiency measures such as light-weighting and improved building \r design, material substitution to lower-carbon alternatives, higher \r fabrication yields and scrap recovery during material production, \r and re-use or lifetime extension of building components (Allwood \r et al. 2011; Heeren et al. 2015; Hertwich et al. 2019; Churkina et al. \r 2020; Pamenter and Myers 2021; Pauliuk et al. 2021). Reducing the \r GHG intensity of energy supply to material production activities \r also has a large influence on reducing overall embodied emissions. \r [...]"


id: dd1f0fab871106387bbe131c73328d53
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36168
content:
"[...] Figure  9.10 shows projections of embodied emissions to 2050 \r from residential buildings in a  baseline scenario (SSP2 baseline) \r and a scenario incorporating multiple material efficiency measures \r and a much faster decarbonisation of energy supply (LED and 2degC \r policy) (Pauliuk et al. 2021). Embodied emissions are projected to "


id: be6875e93476167b57110af8c267892f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30761
content:
"Figure 9.11 | Energy savings potential of technology strategies for climate change mitigation in buildings. Sources: adapted from Imanari et al. (1999); Cabeza \r et al. (2010); Fallahi et al. (2010); Privara et al. (2011); Radhi (2011); Asdrubali et al. (2012); Capozzoli et al. (2013); Chen et al. (2013); de Gracia et al. (2013); Seong and Lim \r (2013); Sourbron et al. (2013); Bojic et al. (2014); Haggag et al. (2014); Sarbu and Sebarchievici (2014); Spanaki et al. (2014); Vakiloroaya et al. (2014); Djedjig et al. (2015); \r Mujahid Rafique et al. (2015); Yang et al. (2015); Andjelkovic et al. (2016); Costanzo et al. (2016); Coma et al. (2016); Harby et al. (2016); Navarro et al. (2016); Pomponi \r et al. (2016); Coma et al. (2017); Khoshbakht et al. (2017); Saffari et al. (2017); Luo et al. (2017); Jedidi and Benjeddou (2018); Romdhane and Louahlia-Gualous (2018); \r [...]"


id: 7fc994164894946a43d2d18e565f390a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19620
content:
"[...] Lee et al. (2018); Alam et al. (2019); Bevilacqua et al. (2019); Gong et al. (2019); Hohne et al. (2019); Irshad et al. (2019); Langevin et al. (2019); Liu et al. (2019); Omara and \r Abuelnour (2019); Rosado and Levinson (2019); Soltani et al. (2019); Varela Lujan et al. (2019); Zhang et al. (2019); Annibaldi et al. (2020); Cabeza and Chafer (2020); Dong \r et al. (2020); Nematchoua et al. (2020); Ling et al. (2020); Mahmoud et al. (2020); Peng et al. (2020); Zhang et al. (2020c); Yu et al. (2020)."


id: 5cc11cdd08349367af42598be712e689
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13580
content:
"The integration of energy generation on-site means further contribution \r of buildings towards decarbonisation (Urge-Vorsatz  et  al.  2020). \r Integration of renewables in buildings should always come after \r maximising the reduction in the demand for energy services through \r sufficiency measures and maximising efficiency improvement to \r reduce energy consumption, but the inclusion of energy generation \r would mean a step forward to distributed energy systems with high \r contribution from buildings, becoming prosumers (Sanchez Ramos et al. \r 2019). Decrease price of technologies such as photovoltaic (PV) and the \r integration of energy storage (de Gracia and Cabeza 2015) are essential \r to achieve this objective. Other technologies that could be used are \r photovoltaic/thermal (Sultan and Ervina Efzan 2018), solar/biomass \r hybrid systems (Zhang et al. 2020b), solar thermoelectric (Sarbu and \r Dorca 2018), solar powered sorption systems for cooling (Shirazi et al. \r [...]"


id: cb4f7a7e1858056b0c5e00fe403d0dd7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33099
content:
"District heating networks have evolved from systems where heat was \r produced by coal or waste and storage was in the form of steam, to much \r higher energy efficiency networks with water or glycol as the energy \r carrier and fuelled by a wide range of renewable and low carbon fuels. \r Common low carbon fuels for district energy systems include biomass, \r other renewables (i.e., geothermal, PV, and large solar thermal), industry \r surplus heat or power-to-heat concepts, and heat storage including \r seasonal heat storage (Lund et al. 2018). District energy infrastructure \r opens opportunities for integration of several heat and power sources \r and is 'future proof' in the sense that the energy source can easily be \r converted or upgraded in the future, with heat distributed through \r the existing district energy network. Latest developments include \r the inclusion of smart control and AI (Revesz et  al. 2020), and low \r [...]"


id: aff9aa4ddfaea93eb7f99c7d1dec76a9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28199
content:
"[...] temperature thermal energy districts. Authors show carbon emissions \r reduction up to 80% compared to the use of gas boilers."


id: f367a5ac15a9db547fa53d69acd1dd04
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40195
content:
"Warehouses are major contributors to the rise of greenhouse gas \r emissions in supply chains (Bartolini et  al. 2019). The expanding \r e-commerce sector and the growing demand for mass customisation \r have even led to an increasing need for warehouse space and buildings, \r particularly for serving the uninterrupted customer demand in the \r business-to-consumer market. Although warehouses are not specifically \r designed to provide their inhabitants with comfort because they are \r mainly unoccupied, the impact of their activities in the global GHG \r emissions is remarkable. Warehousing activities contribute roughly \r 11% of the total GHG emissions generated by the logistics sector across \r the world. Following this global trend, increasing attention to green \r and sustainable warehousing processes has led to many new research \r results regarding management concepts, technologies, and equipment \r to reduce warehouses carbon footprint, that is, the total emissions of \r [...]"


id: c79198dd55b172b3c99749a6b8f7d305
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32422
content:
"With demand-side measures (DSM), such as shifting demand \r a  few hours, peak net demand can be reduced by up to 10-20% \r (Stotzer et al. 2015); a similar potential is available for short-term \r load shifting during evening hours (Aryandoust and Lilliestam 2017). \r Although different household types show different consumption \r patterns and thus an individual availability of DSM capacity during \r the day (Fischer et al. 2017), there is limited (Shivakumar et al. 2018) \r or inexistent (Drysdale et al. 2015; Nilsson et al. 2017) information \r of consumers' response to time of use pricing, specifically among \r those living in apartments (Bartusch and Alvehag 2014). Behavioural \r benefits are identified in terms of increased level of energy awareness \r of the users (Rehm et al. 2018), measured deliberate attempts of the \r consumers to reduce and/or shift their electricity usage (Bradley et al. \r 2016). Real-time control and behavioural change influence 40% \r [...]"


id: 274562a1d784cc4b2f8404ff792befff
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4078
content:
"[...] of the electricity use during the operational life of non-residential \r buildings (Kamilaris et al. 2014). "


id: 345d2b530e6fe3c868acca618cd5685
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6448
content:
"The sharing economy generates an increased utilisation rate of \r products or systems by enabling or offering shared use, access \r or ownership of products and assets that have a  low ownership \r or use rate. Measures include conditioned spaces (accommodation, \r facility rooms, offices) as well as tools and transfer of ownership \r (i.e., second-hand or donation) (Rademaekers et al. 2017; Mercado \r 2018; Hertwich et al. 2020; Cantzler et al. 2020; Harris et al. 2021; \r Mata et al. 2021a). The evidence on the link between user behaviour \r and net environmental impacts of sharing options is still limited \r (Laurenti et al. 2019; Mata et al. 2020a; Harris et al. 2021) and even \r begins to be questioned, due to rebounds that partially or fully offset \r the benefits (Agrawal and Bellos 2017; Zink and Geyer 2017). For \r example, the costs savings from reduced ownership can be allocated \r to activities with a  higher carbon intensity, or result in increased \r [...]"


id: 33ec071fcdb9708e0de671c54ab03e22
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6377
content:
"[...] mobility. Both reduced ownership and other circular consumption \r habits show no influence on material footprint, other than mildly \r positive influence in low-income households (Junnila et  al. 2018; \r Ottelin et al. 2020)."


id: cb2596fdea6896a79fb7c64023131a25
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33080
content:
"The studies presented in Figure  9.15 rely on all, the combination, \r or either of the following mitigation strategies: the construction \r of new high energy-performance buildings taking the advantage of \r building design, forms, and passive construction methods; the thermal \r efficiency improvement of building envelopes of the existing stock; the \r installation of advanced HVAC systems, equipment and appliances; \r the exchange of lights, appliances, and office equipment, including \r ICT, water heating, and cooking with their efficient options; demand\u0002side management, most often controlling comfort requirements and \r demand-side flexibility and digitalisation; as well as onsite production \r and use of renewable energy. Nearly all studies, which assess \r the technological potential assume such usage of space heating, \r cooling, water heating, and lighting that does not exceed health, \r living, and working standards, thus realising at least a  part of the \r [...]"


id: e816a7c88a6445dec6179c1350f57703
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38150
content:
"[...] non-technological potential, as presented in Figure 9.14. The results \r presented in Figure  9.15 relate to measures applied within the \r boundaries of the building sector, including the reduction in direct and \r indirect emissions. The results exclude the impact of decarbonisation \r measures applied within the boundaries of the energy supply sector, \r that is, the decarbonisation of grid electricity and district heat. "


id: 9cf7450d49aafe4bf727f092cdb0beac
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24854
content:
"Government support is needed as an initiator but also to reinforce \r building retrofit targets, promote more stringent energy and material \r standards for new constructions, and protect consumer interests \r (Hongping 2017; Fischer and Pascucci 2017; Patwa et al. 2020). Taxes \r clearly incentivise waste reduction and recycling (Rachel and Travis \r 2011; Ajayi et  al. 2015; Volk et  al. 2019). In developing countries, \r broader, international, market boundaries can allow for a  more \r attractive business model (Mohit et al. 2020). Participative and new \r ownership models can favour the adoption of prefabricated buildings \r (Steinhardt and Manley 2016). Needs for improvements are observed, \r in terms of design for flexibility and deconstruction, procurement \r and prefabrication and off-site construction, standardisation and \r dimensional coordination, with differences among solutions (Osmani \r 2012; Coehlo et al.2013; Lu and Yuan 2013; Cossu and Williams 2015; \r [...]"


id: acc9c12177ffa315102fc4bb607d1f5e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27641
content:
"Figure 9.15 | Potential GHG emission reduction in buildings of different world countries grouped by region, as reported by sixty-seven bottom-up \r studies. Sources: North America: Canada (Trottier 2016; Radpour et al. 2017; Subramanyam et al. 2017a,b; Zhang et al. 2020a), the Unites States of America (Gagnon et al. \r 2016; Nadel 2016; Yeh et al. 2016; Wilson et al. 2017; Zhang et al. 2020a); Europe: Albania (Novikova et al. 2020, 2018c), Austria (Ploss et al. 2017), Bulgaria, the Czech \r Republic, Hungary (Csoknyai et al. 2016), France (Ostermeyer et al. 2018b), the European Union (Duscha et al. 2019; Roscini et al. 2020; Brugger et al. 2021), Germany \r (Markewitz et al. 2015; Burger et al. 2019; Ostermeyer et al. 2019b), Greece (Mirasgedis et al. 2017), Italy (Calise et al. 2021; Filippi Oberegger et al. 2020), Lithuania (Toleikyte \r [...]"


id: edf45ecac52fbcf10ff55e2fac8a530a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39234
content:
"[...] et al. 2018), Montenegro (Novikova et al. 2018c), Netherlands (Ostermeyer et al. 2018c), Norway (Sandberg et al. 2021), Serbia (Novikova et al. 2018a), Switzerland (Iten et al. \r 2017; Streicher et al. 2017), Poland (Ostermeyer et al. 2019a), the United Kingdom (Ostermeyer et al. 2018a); Eurasia: Armenia, Georgia (Timilsina et al. 2016); the Russian \r Federation (Bashmakov 2017; Zhang et al. 2020a); Australia (Energetics 2016; Butler et al. 2020; Zhang et al. 2020a), Japan (Momonoki et al. 2017; Wakiyama and Kuramochi \r 2017; Minami et al. 2019; Zhang et al. 2020a; Sugyiama et al. 2020); Africa: Egypt (Makumbe et al. 2017; Calise et al. 2021), Morocco (Merini et al. 2020), Nigeria (Dioha et al. \r 2019; Kwag et al. 2019; Onyenokporo and Ochedi 2019), Rwanda (Colenbrander et al. 2019), South Africa (Department of Environmental Affairs 2014), Uganda (de la Rue du \r [...]"


id: 47b25e15f344481349a2e3d59a72fb09
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9828
content:
"[...] Can et al. 2018), Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia (Krarti -2019); Middle East - Qatar (Krarti et al. 2017; Kamal et al. 2019), Saudi Arabia (Alaidroos and Krarti \r 2015; Khan et al. 2017), Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, State of Palestine, Syrian Arab Republic, United Arab Emirates, Yemen (Krarti 2019); \r Eastern Asia - China (Tan et al. 2018; Zhou et al. 2018; Xing et al. 2021; Zhang et al. 2020); Southern Asia: India (Yu et al. 2018; de la Rue du Can et al. 2019; Zhang et al. \r 2020); South-East Asia and Pacific: Indonesia (Kusumadewi and Limmeechokchai 2015, 2017), Thailand (Kusumadewi and Limmeechokchai 2015, 2017; Chaichaloempreecha \r et al. 2017), Vietnam (ADB 2017), respective countries from the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) (Zhang et al. 2020a); Latin America and Caribbean: Brazil (de Melo \r [...]"


id: 5ff9202d331ee3912ca638e594b2d496
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14194
content:
"[...] and de Martino Jannuzzi 2015; Gonzalez-Mahecha et al. 2019), Colombia (Prada-Hernandez et al. 2015), Mexico (Grande-acosta and Islas-samperio 2020; Rosas-Flores and \r Rosas-Flores 2020)."


id: 7668c65036739da4dce5ce6a2d3bc680
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18059
content:
"Figure 9.16 argues that it is possible to mitigate 8.2 GtCO2 or 61% \r of global building emissions in 2050, as compared to their baseline. \r At least 1.4 GtCO2 or 10% of baseline emissions could be avoided \r introducing the sufficiency approaches. Further 5.6 GtCO2 or 42% \r of baseline emissions could be mitigated with the help of energy \r efficiency technologies and practices. Finally, at least 1.1 GtCO2 or \r 9% of baseline emissions could be reduced through the production \r and use of onsite renewable energy. Out of the total potential, the \r largest share of 5.4 GtCO2 will be available in developing countries; \r these countries will be able to reduce 59% of their baseline emissions. \r Developed Countries will be able to mitigate 2.7 GtCO2 or 65% of \r their baseline emissions. Only few potential studies, often with only \r few mitigation options assessed, were available for the countries of \r South-East Asia and Pacific, Africa, and Latin America and Caribbean; \r [...]"


id: 2a1e6e81c298cc5bc0ce468b34c7e0b2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4621
content:
"[...] therefore, the potential estimates represent low estimates, and the \r real potentials are likely be higher."


id: cf480db30bc1bd666c830339cedd86ae
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33817
content:
"Advanced HVAC technologies backed-up with demand-side \r management, and onsite integrated renewables backed-up with \r demand-side flexibility and digitalisation measures are typically a part \r of the retrofit or construction strategy. Among HVAC technologies, \r heat pumps are very often modelled to become a  central heating \r and cooling technology supplied with renewable electricity. The \r estimates of HVAC cost-effectiveness, including heat pumps, vary in \r modelling results from very cost-effective to medium (Department of \r Environmental Affairs 2014; Prada-Hernandez et al. 2015; Akander \r et al. 2017; Hirvonen et al. 2020). Among demand-side management, \r demand-side flexibility and digitalisation options, various sensors, \r controls, and energy consumption feedback devices have typically \r negative costs, whereas advanced smart management systems as \r well as thermal and electric storages linked to fluctuating renewables \r [...]"


id: 75bc5f8d9ac442393d84887588fc322b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17945
content:
"[...] are not yet cost-effective (Nguyen et al. 2015; Prada-Hernandez et al. \r 2015; Huang et al. 2019; Uchman 2021; Duman et al. 2021; Sharda \r et al. 2021; Rashid et al. 2021). Several Developed Countries achieved \r to make onsite renewable energy production and use profitable for at \r least a part of the building stock (Horvath et al. 2016; Akander et al. \r 2017; Vimpari and Junnila 2019; Fina et al. 2020), but this is not yet \r the case for developing countries (Kwag et al. 2019; Cruz et al. 2020; \r Grande-Acosta and Islas-Samperio 2020). Due to characteristics \r and parameters of different building types, accommodating the \r cost-optimal renewables at large scale is especially difficult in non\u0002residential buildings and in urban areas, as compared to residential \r buildings and rural areas (Horvath et al. 2016; Fina et al. 2020). "


id: a25c93686d2a0968c5d3929094381322
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25788
content:
"The novelty since AR5 is that a growing number of bottom-up studies \r considers the measures as an integrated package recognising their \r technological complementarity and interdependence, rather than \r the linear process of designing and constructing buildings and \r their systems, or incremental improvements of individual building \r components and energy-using devices during building retrofits, \r losing opportunities for the optimisation of whole buildings. \r Therefore, integrated measures rather than the individual measures \r are considered for the estimates of costs and potentials. Figure 9.17 \r presents the indicative breakdown of the potential reported in \r Figure 9.16 by measure and cost, to the extent that it was possible \r to disaggregate and align to common characteristics. Whereas the \r breakdown per measure was solely based on the literature reviewed \r in Section  9.6.1, the cost estimates additionally relied on the \r [...]"


id: ca78dc6552fc24a6c6b1bdbc2a7497b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32961
content:
"[...] literature presented in this section, Figure 9.20, and Supplementary \r Material Table  9.SM.6. The literature reviewed reports fragmented \r and sometimes contradicting cost-effectiveness information. \r Despite a large number of exemplary buildings achieving very high \r performance in all parts of the world, there is a lack of mainstream \r literature or official studies assessing the costs of these buildings at \r scale (Lovins 2018; Urge-Vorsatz et al. 2020)."


id: 6ec7720486df1b32b2f6076c5023f06d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16761
content:
"strategies: very 'deep' envelope retrofits followed by the exchange \r of HVAC with various advanced alternatives (Csoknyai et al. 2016; \r Novikova et al. 2018c,b; Duscha et al. 2019; Filippi Oberegger et al. \r 2020) or more shallow retrofits followed by switching to low-carbon \r district heating or by the exchange of current HVAC with heat pumps \r linked to onsite renewables backed up energy storages (Yeh et  al. \r 2016; Kotzur et  al. 2020; Hirvonen et  al. 2020). The factors, which \r impact the feasibility of these strategies, therefore, are the building \r retrofit rates and replacement rates of building systems. To achieve \r the building stock decarbonisation by 2050, most studies reviewed \r in Figure 9.16 assume 'deep' retrofit rates between 2.5% and 5%, \r and even 10% per  annum. Esser et  al. (2019) reported that the \r annual renovation rate in EU-28 is around 0.2%, with relatively small \r variation across individual EU member states. Sandberg et al. (2016) \r [...]"


id: 5e1e9abe1b3534e7ddcd4db4533e18c9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13854
content:
"[...] simulated retrofit rates in eleven European countries and concluded \r that only minor future increases in the renovation rates of 0.6-1.6% \r could be expected. Therefore, without strong policies supporting \r these renovations, the feasibility to achieve such high 'deep' retrofit \r rates is low. "


id: 9bddefc7d05fba26ef79d3209d2707f9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24676
content:
"For a  few studies, which conducted an assessment of the sector \r transformation aiming at emission reduction of 50-80% in 2050 \r versus their baseline, the incremental investment need over the \r modelling period is estimated at 0.4-3.3% of the country annual \r GDP of the scenario first year (Markewitz et  al. 2015; Bashmakov \r 2017; Novikova et  al. 2018c; Kotzur et  al. 2020). These estimates \r represent strictly the incremental share of capital expenditure \r and sometimes installation costs. Therefore, these figures are not \r comparable with investment tracked against the regional or national \r sustainable finance taxonomies, as recently developed in the EU \r (European Parliament and the Council 2020), Russia (Government of \r Russian Federation 2021), South Africa (National Treasury of Republic \r of South Africa 2021), and others, or the growing literature on \r calculating the recent finance flows (Novikova et al. 2019; Valentova \r [...]"


id: 824a90ada8a6bbb8834966bb5e7da2ad
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20050
content:
"[...] et al. 2019; Kamenders et al. 2019; Macquarie et al. 2020; Hainaut \r et al. 2021), because they are measured against other methodologies, \r which are not comparable with the methodologies used to derive the \r incremental costs by integrated assessment models and bottom-up \r studies. Therefore, the gap between the investment need and recent \r investment flows is likely to be higher, than often reported."


id: b1301da37be35e4e4f2412f5387c84ae
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28402
content:
"(Hertwich et al. 2019). Even through the data records a permanent \r energy efficiency improvement of individual devices (Figure  9.12), \r their growing offsets energy savings delivered by this improvement. \r The emerging literature suggests addressing the growing number of \r energy services and devices as a part of climate and energy policy \r (Bierwirth and Thomas 2019b). Section 9.5.2.2 describes measures \r for limiting demand for these services and Section 9.5.3.6 addresses \r reducing the number of technologies through their ownership and \r use patterns. (Grubler et al. 2018) also suggested redefining energy \r services and aggregating appliances, illustrating the reduction of \r energy demand by a  factor of 30 to substitute over 15 different \r end-use devices with one integrated digital platform. More research \r is needed to understand opportunities to realise this sufficiency \r potential for appliances, and more research is needed to understand \r [...]"


id: 448f6bc0e52df19e69d0450d28f5967b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9293
content:
"The literature emphasises the critical role of the time between in \r 2020 and 2030 for the building sector decarbonisation (IEA 2020a; \r Roscini et al. 2020). To set the sector at the pathway to realise its \r whole mitigation potential, it is critical to exponentially accelerate \r the learning of this know-how and skills to reduce the costs and \r remove feasibility constraints to enable the penetration of advanced \r technologies at speed that the world has not seen before. The World \r Energy Outlook (IEA 2020c) shown in the Net Zero Emissions by 2050 \r Scenario (Box 9.2) the challenges and commitments the sector will \r have to address by 2030. These include bringing new buildings and \r existing buildings to near zero, with a half of existing buildings in \r Developed Countries and a third of existing buildings in developing \r countries being retrofitted by 2030. These also mean banning the \r sale of new fossil fuel-fired boilers, as well as making heat pumps \r [...]"


id: a49bdf927d8999875aea14fa9a1f1880
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26175
content:
"[...] and very efficient appliances standard technologies. The Net Zero \r Emissions by 2050 Scenario achieves almost fully to decarbonise \r the sector by 2050, with such commitments reflected neither in \r the planning and modelling efforts (Section  9.9) nor in policies \r and commitments (Section  9.9) of most world countries, with the \r countries of South-East Asia and Pacific, Southern Asia, Africa, and \r Latin America and Caribbean having the least research. "


id: 3614fe5d00b0413fef1b9e0f65c36531
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6768
content:
"The difference between baselines is among the main reason for \r difference between the potential estimates in 2030 reported by \r Chapter 6 on buildings of AR4 (Levine et al. 2017) and the current \r section of AR6. For Developed Countries, the sector direct and indirect \r baseline emissions in AR6 are 43% and 28% lower than those in \r AR4 respectively. For developing countries, the sector direct baseline \r emissions in AR6 are 47% lower than those in AR4, and the sector \r indirect baseline emissions are 3% higher than those in AR4. As AR6 \r is closer to 2030 than AR4 and thus more precise, the likely reason \r for the difference (besides the fact that some potential was realised) \r is that AR4 overall overestimated the future baseline emissions, and \r it underestimated how quickly the fuel switch to electricity from \r other energy carriers has been happening, especially in developing \r countries. As illustrated, the baseline is one of determinant of \r [...]"


id: 3883b83a329e1c49a46414b95649e8f5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7153
content:
"[...] the potential size and hence, all reported estimates shall only be \r interpreted together with the baseline developments. "


id: bd110cf6a9e81612c080a0c98b647d8f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30512
content:
"for building construction instead of conventional materials, such \r as concrete and steel, because more carbon is stored in bio-based \r construction materials than released during their manufacturing. \r Assuming the aggressive use of timber in mid-rise urban buildings, \r Churkina et al. (2020) estimated the associated mitigation potential \r between 0.04-3.7 GtCO2 per year depending on how fast countries \r adopt new building practices and floor area per  capita. Based on \r a simplified timber supply-demand model for timber-based new floor \r area globally by 2050, Pomponi et al. (2020) showed that the global \r supply of timber can only be 36% of the global demand for it between \r 2020 and 2050; especially much more forest areas will be required \r in Asian countries, such as China and India and American countries, \r such as the USA, Mexico, and Argentina. Goswein et  al. (2021) \r conducted a similar detailed analysis for Europe and concluded that \r [...]"


id: f5fc0d9e05db9e79f06a10aad783647
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40634
content:
"[...] current European forest areas and wheat plantations are sufficient to \r provide timber and straw for the domestic construction sector. "


id: 12c2d300d6cf2e10e213166f6d947094
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 504
content:
"The increased use of timber and other bio-based materials in buildings \r brings not only benefits, but also risks. The increased use of timber \r can accelerate degradation through poor management and the \r pressure for deforestation, as already recorded in the Amazon and \r Siberia forests, and the competition for land and resources (Carrasco \r et al. 2017; Brancalion et al. 2018; Hart and Pomponi 2020; Pomponi \r et al. 2020). Churkina et al. (2020) emphasised that promoting the \r use of more timber in buildings requires the parallel strengthening \r of legislation for sustainable forest management, forest certification \r instruments, and care for the people and social organisations that \r live in forests. In tropical and subtropical countries, the use of \r bamboo and other fibres brings more benefits and less risks than \r the use of timber (ibid). One of the main barriers associated with the \r use of bio-based materials in buildings is fire safety, although there \r [...]"


id: 96a23ca9dec5b1ba2e15bd49b813735
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23704
content:
"[...] is extensive research on this topic (Ostman et  al. 2017; Audebert \r et al. 2019). This is a particularly important criterion for the design of \r medium and high-rise buildings, which tend to be the most adequate \r typologies for denser and more compact cities. Overall, more robust \r models are needed to assess the interlinkages between the enhanced \r use of bio-based materials in the building stock and economic and \r social implications of their larger supply, as well as the associated \r competition between forest and land-use activities (for food), and \r ecological aspects. Furthermore, more research is required on how \r to change forest and building legislation and design a combination \r of policy instruments for the specific political, economic and cultural \r county characteristics (Hildebrandt et al. 2017). Benefits and risks of \r enhanced use of wood products in buildings are also discussed in \r Chapter 7, Section 7.4.5.3."


id: 43b3aca3491e182c039a068b42a9e908
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9139
content:
"Increasing temperatures can lead to higher cooling needs and, \r therefore, energy consumption (Li et  al. 2012; Schaeffer et  al. \r 2012; Wan et  al. 2012; Clarke et  al. 2018; International Energy \r Agency 2018; Andric et al. 2019). Higher temperatures increase the \r number of days/hours in which cooling is required and as outdoor \r temperatures increase, the cooling load to maintain the same indoor \r temperature will be higher (Andric et al. 2019). These two effects are \r often measured by cooling degree-days1\r  (CDD) and there is a vast \r literature on studies at the global (Isaac and van Vuuren 2009; Atalla \r et  al. 2018; Clarke et  al. 2018; Mistry 2019; Biardeau et  al. 2020) \r and regional level (Zhou et al. 2014; Bezerra et al. 2021; Falchetta \r and Mistry 2021). Other studies use statistical econometric analyses \r to capture the empirical relationship between climate variables and \r energy consumption (Auffhammer and Mansur 2014; van Ruijven \r [...]"


id: ace4201ba2d32276dd0479275d0380b5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27660
content:
"[...] et al. 2019). A third effect is that higher summer temperatures can \r incentivise the purchase of space cooling equipment (Auffhammer \r 2014; De Cian et  al. 2019; Biardeau et  al. 2020), especially in \r developing countries (Pavanello et al. 2021). "


id: a7bb59b8a9939018f39aef1a011d5f8b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26725
content:
"Studies have assessed the increases in energy demand to meet indoor \r thermal comfort under future climate (de Wilde and Coley 2012; \r Li et al. 2012; Clarke et al. 2018; Andric et al. 2019). Higher cooling \r needs may induce increases in energy demand (Wan et  al. 2012; \r Li et al. 2012), which could lead to higher emissions, when electricity \r is fossil-based (International Energy Agency 2018; Biardeau et  al. \r 2020), and generate higher loads and stress on power systems (Dirks \r et al. 2015; Auffhammer et al. 2017). In this regard, increasing energy \r efficiency of space cooling appliances and adopting dynamic cooling \r setpoint temperatures, can reduce the energy needs for cooling and \r limit additional emissions and pressures on power systems (Davide \r et  al. 2019; Bienvenido-Huertas et  al. 2020; Bezerra et  al. 2021) \r (Section 9.4, Figure 9.11 and Supplementary Material Tables 9.SM.1 \r to 9.SM.3). This can also be achieved with on-site renewable energy \r [...]"


id: e3dc95fa80755181d98705ee3d37fee3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37379
content:
"[...] production, especially solar PV for which there can be a  timely \r correlation between power supply and cooling demand, improving \r load matching (Salom et al. 2014; Grove-Smith et al. 2018)."


id: eaccc6be18da0cb6866f2f2e2d1b08f9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38669
content:
"Since adaptation of the existing building stock may be more expensive \r and require building retrofit, climate change must be considered \r in the design of new buildings to ensure performance robustness in \r both current and future climates, which can have implications for \r construction costs (Hallegatte 2009; Pyke et al. 2012; de Wilde and \r Coley 2012; de Rubeis et al. 2020; Picard et al. 2020) and emissions \r (Liu and Cui 2018). Building energy codes and regulations are usually \r based on cost-effectiveness and historical climate data, which can lead \r to the poor design of thermal comfort in future climate (Hallegatte \r 2009; Pyke et al. 2012; de Wilde and Coley 2012) and non-efficient \r active adaptive measures based on mechanical air conditioning \r (De Cian et al. 2019) (Section 9.4, Figure 9.11 and Supplementary \r Material Tables 9.SM.1 to 9.SM.3). However, uncertainty about future \r climate change creates difficulties for projecting parameters for the \r [...]"


id: 78ae97fe73c4ee326dc5df06adce433d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18424
content:
"[...] design of new buildings (Hallegatte 2009; de Wilde and Coley 2012). \r This can be especially relevant for social housing programs (Rubio\u0002Bellido et al. 2017; Triana et al. 2018; Gonzalez Mahecha et al. 2020) \r in developing countries. "


id: ca2dbb2dd3a9917c136f4f806fe5857d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32909
content:
"non-residential sector holds numerous multiple impacts (co-benefits, \r adverse side-effects, trade-offs, risks, etc.) for the economy, society \r and end-users, in both developed and developing economies, which \r can be categorised into the following types (IEA 2014; Urge-Vorsatz \r et al. 2016; Ferreira et al. 2017; Thema et al. 2017; Reuter et al. 2017; \r US EPA 2018; Nikas et al. 2020): (i) health impacts due to better indoor \r conditions, energy/fuel poverty alleviation, better ambient air quality \r and reduction of the heat island effect; (ii) environmental benefits \r such as reduced local air pollution and the associated impact on \r ecosystems (acidification, eutrophication, etc.) and infrastructures, \r reduced sewage production, and so on; (iii) improved resource \r management including water and energy; (iv) impact on social well\u0002being, including changes in disposable income due to decreased \r energy expenditures and/or distributional costs of new policies, fuel \r [...]"


id: 5a4d7df8f3e947a56c60fe263fb4e4a0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13135
content:
"[...] poverty alleviation and improved access to energy sources, rebound \r effects, increased productive time for women and children, and \r so on; (v) microeconomic effects (e.g.,  productivity gains in non\u0002residential buildings, enhanced asset values of green buildings, \r fostering innovation); (vi) macroeconomic effects, including impact \r on GDP driven by energy savings and energy availability, creation of \r new jobs, decreased employment in the fossil energy sector, long\u0002term reductions in energy prices and possible increases in electricity \r prices in the medium run, possible impacts on public budgets, and \r so on; and (vii) energy security implications (e.g., access to modern \r energy resources, reduced import dependency, increase of supplier \r diversity, smaller reserve requirements, increased sovereignty \r and resilience). "


id: bb0fbe0f51f1ebc523812648900be33f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30132
content:
"Notes: The strength of interaction between mitigation actions and SDGs is described with a seven-point scale (Nilsson et al., 2016). Also, the blue bullet shows the interactions \r between co-benefits/risk associated with mitigation actions and the SDGs. SDG 1: Sufficiency and efficiency measures result in reduced energy expenditures and other financial \r savings that further lead to poverty reduction. Access to modern energy forms will largely help alleviate poverty in developing countries as the productive time of women and \r children will increase, new activities can be developed, and so on. The distributional costs of some mitigation policies promoting energy efficiency and lower carbon energy may \r [...]"


id: 7bd344fad561550be6164e519f064362
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18996
content:
"[...] reduce the disposable income of the poor. SDG 2: Energy sufficiency and efficiency measures result in lower energy bills and avoiding the 'heat or eat' dilemma. Improved cook\u0002stoves provide better food security and reduces the danger of fuel shortages in developing countries; under real-world conditions these impacts may be limited as the households \r use these stoves irregularly and inappropriately. Green roofs can support food production. Improving energy access enhances agricultural productivity and improves food security; \r on the other hand, increased bioenergy production may restrict the available land for food production. SDG 3: All categories of mitigation action result in health benefits through \r better indoor air quality, energy/fuel poverty alleviation, better ambient air quality, and reduction of the heat island effect. Efficiency measures with inadequate ventilation may \r [...]"


id: 39252de28d8e3987fa842a4763f69679
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7262
content:
"[...] lead to the \"sick building\" syndrome symptoms. SDG 4: Energy efficiency measures result in reduced school absenteeism due to better indoor environmental conditions. Also, fuel \r poverty alleviation increases the available space at home for reading. Improved access to electricity and clean fuels enables people living in poor developing countries to read, \r while it is also associated with greater school attendance by children. SDG 5: Efficient cook-stoves and improved access to electricity and clean fuels in developing countries will \r result in substantial time savings for women and children, thus increasing the time for rest, communication, education and productive activities. SDG 6: Reduced energy demand \r due to sufficiency and efficiency measures as well as an upscaling of renewable energy sources (RES) can lead to reduced water demand for thermal cooling at energy production \r [...]"


id: 96a5bd4f7e5a3381e4dd83d7819ce33c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23708
content:
"[...] facilities. Also, water savings result through improved conditions and lower space of dwellings. Improved access to electricity is necessary to treat water at homes. In some \r situations, the switch to bioenergy could increase water use compared to existing conditions. SDG 7: All categories of mitigation action result in energy/fuel poverty alleviation \r in both developed and developing countries as well as in improving the security of energy supply. SDG 8: Positive and negative direct and indirect macroeconomic effects (GDP, \r employment, public budgets) associated with lower energy prices due to the reduced energy demand, energy efficiency and RES investments, improved energy access and fostering \r innovation. Also, energy efficient buildings with adequate ventilation, result in productivity gains and improve the competitiveness of the economy. SDG 9: Adoption of distributed \r [...]"


id: 92d6d2396ba1b3fcd7ed7a7418dabdd2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23050
content:
"[...] generation and smart grids helps in infrastructure improvement and expansion. Also, the development of 'green buildings' can foster innovation. Reduced energy demand due to \r sufficiency and efficiency measures as well as an upscaling of RES can lead to early retirement of fossil energy infrastructure. SDG 10: Efficient cook-stoves as well as improved \r access to electricity and clean fuels in developing countries will result in substantial time savings for women and children, thus enhancing education and the development of \r productive activities. Sufficiency and efficiency measures lead to lower energy expenditures, thus reducing income inequalities. The distributional costs of some mitigation policies \r promoting energy efficiency and lower carbon energy as well as the need for purchasing more expensive equipment and appliances may reduce the disposable income of the poor \r [...]"


id: 736da84808ace94f5106ffbd0bd4bc4d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17562
content:
"[...] and increase inequalities. SDG 11: Sufficiency and efficiency measures as well as fuel switching to RES and improvements in energy access would eliminate major sources (both \r direct and indirect) of poor air quality (indoor and outdoor). Helpful if in-situ production of RES combined with charging electric two, three and four wheelers at home. Buildings \r with high energy efficiency and/or green features are sold/rented at higher prices than conventional, low energy efficient houses. SDG 12: Energy sufficiency and efficiency \r measures as well as deployment of RES result in reduced consumption of natural resources, namely fossil fuels, metal ores, minerals, water, and so on. Negative impacts on natural \r resources could be arisen from increased penetration of new efficient appliances and equipment. SDG 13: See Sections 9.4-9.6. SDG 15: Efficient cookstoves and improved \r [...]"


id: e096f1359db12675118db02c91abb629
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36767
content:
"[...] access to electricity and clean fuels in developing countries will result in halting deforestation. SDG 16: Building retrofits are associated with lower crime. Improved access to \r electric lighting can improve safety (particularly for women and children). Institutions that are effective, accountable and transparent are needed at all levels of government for \r providing energy access and promoting modern renewables as well as boosting sufficiency and efficiency. SDG 17: The development of zero energy buildings requires among \r others capacity building, citizen participation as well as monitoring of the achievements."


id: f4501d0c3b1437816478e88faa645e17
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40356
content:
"Sources: Brounen and Kok (2011); Deng et al. (2012); Zheng et al. (2012); Hogberg (2013); Hyland et al. (2013); Kahn and Kok (2014); Koirala et al. (2014); Maidment et al. \r (2014); Mirasgedis et al. (2014); Scott et al. (2014); Bailis et al. (2015); Boermans et al. (2015); Fuerst et al. (2015, 2016); Galan-Marin et al. (2015); Hasegawa et al. (2015); \r Hejazi et al. (2015); Holland et al. (2015); Liddell and Guiney (2015); Liu et al. (2015a); Mattioli and Moulinos (2015); Payne et al. (2015); Torero (2015); Willand et al. (2015a); \r Winter et al. (2015); Baimel et al. (2016); Camarinha-Matos (2016); Cameron et al. (2016); De Ayala et al. (2016); European Commission (2016); Fricko et al. (2016); Hanna et al. \r (2016); Jensen et al. (2016); Levy et al. (2016); Markovska et al. (2016); Rao et al. (2016); Smith et al. (2016); Sola et al. (2016); Song et al. (2016); Urge-Vorsatz et al. (2016); \r [...]"


id: 37b65f5ef50e9453ec72848e84ce32ba
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7011
content:
"[...] Balaban and Puppim de Oliveira (2017); Berrueta et al. (2017); Burney et al. (2017); Mehetre et al. (2017); Mofidi and Akbari (2017); Niemela et al. (2017); Ortiz et al. (2017); \r Rao and Pachauri (2017); Thema et al. (2017); Thomson et al. (2017a); Zhao et al. (2017); Barnes and Samad (2018); Cedeno-Laurent et al. (2018); Goldemberg et al. (2018); \r Grubler et al. (2018); Jeuland et al. (2018); MacNaughton et al. (2018); McCollum et al. (2018); Mzavanadze (2018a); Rosenthal et al. (2018); Saheb et al. (2018b,a); Steenland \r et al. (2018); Tajani et al. (2018); Venugopal et al. (2018); Walters and Midden (2018); Wierzbicka et al. (2018); Alawneh et al. (2019); Batchelor et al. (2019); Bleyl et al. (2019); \r Cajias et al. (2019); Marmolejo-Duarte and Chen (2019); Mastrucci et al. (2019); ESMAP et al. (2020); Teubler et al. (2020); Van de Ven et al. (2020); Nikas et al. (2020); \r Blair et al. (2021). "


id: bc0cf6739fd5074a65b6f8082e681bb9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30323
content:
"In 2018, approximately 2.8 billion people worldwide, most of whom \r live in Asia and Africa, still use polluting fuels, such as fuelwood, \r charcoal, dried crops, cow dung, and so on, in low-efficiency stoves \r for cooking and heating, generating household air pollution (HAP), \r which adversely affects the health of the occupants of the dwellings, \r especially children and women (World Health Organization 2016; \r Rahut et al. 2017; Mehetre et al. 2017; Das et al. 2018; Liu et al. 2018; \r Quinn et al. 2018; Rosenthal et al. 2018; Xin et al. 2018; IEA 2020a). \r Exposure to HAP from burning these fuels is estimated to have caused \r 3.8 million deaths from heart diseases, strokes, cancers, acute lower \r respiratory infections in 2016 (World Health Organization 2018). \r It is acknowledged that integrated policies are needed to address \r simultaneously universal energy access, limiting climate change \r and reducing air pollution (World Health Organization 2016). Rafaj \r [...]"


id: cb6aebe09da4ac55690f2d7ff28390f0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33117
content:
"[...] et al. (2018) showed that a scenario achieving these SDGs in 2030 \r will imply in 2040 two million fewer premature deaths from HAP "


id: 72751612ec96397cdb7f7481644a51ca
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17374
content:
"illnesses, asthma, and so on (Lacroix and Chaton 2015; Payne et al. \r 2015; Camprubi et al. 2016; Wilson et al. 2016; Ormandy and Ezratty \r 2016; Thema et  al. 2017). In addition, lack of affordable warmth \r can generate stress related to chronic discomfort and high bills, \r fear of falling into debt, and a sense of lacking control, which are \r potential drivers of further negative mental health outcomes, such as \r depression (Howden-Chapman et al. 2012; Liddell and Guiney 2015; \r Payne et  al. 2015; Wilson et  al. 2016). Health risks from exposure \r to cold and inadequate indoor environmental quality may be higher \r for low-income, energy-poor households, and in particular for those \r with elderly relatives, young children, and members with existing \r respiratory illness (Payne et al. 2015; Thomson et al. 2017b; Nunes \r 2019). High temperatures during summer can also be dangerous \r for people living in buildings with inadequate thermal insulation \r [...]"


id: d4c5a882c249087a2eb90c5719bc481c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34751
content:
"[...] and inappropriate ventilation (Ormandy and Ezratty 2016; Sanchez\u0002Guevara et al. 2019; Thomson et al. 2019). Summer fuel poverty (or \r summer overheating risk) may increase significantly in the coming \r decades under a warming climate (Section 9.7), with the poorest, who \r cannot afford to install air conditioning, and the elderly (Nunes 2020) \r being the most vulnerable. "


id: 5301a889472301b423d656399c7dd979
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11862
content:
"Charlier et al. 2018), moderating the potential health gains associated \r with implemented energy efficiency programs. This can be avoided if \r implemented policies to tackle fuel poverty target the most socially \r vulnerable households (Lacroix and Chaton 2015; Camprubi et  al. \r 2016). Mzavanadze (2018a) estimated that in EU-28 accelerated \r energy efficiency policies, reducing the energy demand in residential \r sector by 333 TWh in 2030 compared to a  reference scenario, \r coupled with strong social policies targeting the most vulnerable \r households, could deliver additional co-benefits in the year of 2030 \r of around 24,500 avoided premature deaths due to indoor cold \r and around 22,300 disability adjusted life years (DALYs) of avoided \r asthma due to indoor dampness. The health benefits of these policies \r amount to EUR4.8 billion in 2030. The impacts on inhabitants in \r developing countries would be much greater than those in EU-28 \r [...]"


id: 963abe667bcd7cf77aa2e52f93f9109c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23624
content:
"According to World Health Organization (2018) around 4.2 million \r premature deaths worldwide (in both cities and rural areas) are \r attributed to outdoor air pollution. According to the results of the \r quantitative model (Gu et  al. 2018), the premature mortalities \r attributed to PM2.5 and O3 emissions may reach 168000-1796000 \r (95% Cl) in 2010. Mitigation actions in residential and non-residential \r sectors decrease the amount of fossil fuels burnt either directly in \r buildings (for heating, cooking, etc.) or indirectly for electricity \r generation and thereby reduce air pollution (e.g., PM, O3, SO2, NOx), \r improve ambient air quality and generate significant health benefits \r through avoiding premature deaths, lung cancers, ischemic heart \r diseases, hospital admissions, asthma exacerbations, respiratory \r symptoms, and so on (Levy et  al. 2016; Balaban and Puppim de \r Oliveira 2017; MacNaughton et al. 2018; Karlsson et al. 2020). Several \r [...]"


id: 8e9df6813c3347e1634768ff8fcb5da5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22277
content:
"[...] studies have monetised the health benefits attributed to reduced \r outdoor air pollution due to the implementation of mitigation actions \r in buildings, and their magnitude expressed as a ratio to the value of \r energy savings resulting from the implemented interventions in each \r case, are in the range of 0.08 in EU, 0.18 in Germany, 0.26-0.40 in US, \r 0.34 in Brazil, 0.47 in Mexico, 0.74 in Turkey, 8.28 in China and 11.67 \r in India (Joyce et al. 2013; Levy et al. 2016; Diaz-Mendez et al. 2018; \r MacNaughton et al. 2018). In developed economies, the estimated \r co-benefits are relatively low due to the fact that the planned \r interventions influence a  quite clean energy source mix (Tuomisto \r et al. 2015; MacNaughton et al. 2018). On the other hand, the health \r co-benefits in question are substantially higher in countries and \r regions with greater dependency on coal for electricity generation \r and higher baseline morbidity and mortality rates (Kheirbek et  al. \r [...]"


id: 69ac96aec20c6a3bb1eff4b84e286696
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15856
content:
"Apart from thermal comfort, the internal environment of buildings \r impacts public health through a  variety of pathways including \r inadequate ventilation, poor indoor air quality, chemical contaminants \r from indoor or outdoor sources, outdoor noise, or poor lighting. \r The implementation of interventions aiming to improve thermal \r insulation of buildings combined with inadequate ventilation may \r increase the risk of mould and moisture problems due to reduced air \r flow rates, leading to indoor environments that are unhealthy, with \r the occupants suffering from the sick building syndrome symptoms \r (Willand et  al. 2015; Cedeno-Laurent et  al. 2018; Wierzbicka et  al. \r 2018). On the other hand, if the implementation of energy efficiency \r interventions or the construction of green buildings is accompanied \r by adequate ventilation, the indoor environmental conditions are \r improved through less moisture, mould, pollutant concentrations, \r [...]"


id: adeda69e0de7358c880c35d66b58efd0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27844
content:
"[...] and allergens, which result in fewer asthma symptoms, respiratory \r risks, chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases, heart disease risks, \r headaches, cancer risks, and so on (Allen et al. 2015; Hamilton et al. \r 2015; Thomson and Thomas 2015; Cowell 2016; Doll et  al. 2016; \r Wilson et  al. 2016; Militello-Hourigan and Miller 2018; Underhill \r et  al. 2018; Cedeno-Laurent et  al. 2018). Fisk (2018) showed that \r increased ventilation rates in residential buildings results in health \r benefits ranging from 20% to several-fold improvements; however, \r these benefits do not occur consistently, and ventilation should \r be combined with other exposure control measures. As adequate \r ventilation imposes additional costs, the sick building syndrome \r symptoms are more likely to be seen in low income households \r (Shrubsole et al. 2016). "


id: c3783ba5066c91b64cbe2421402b6d96
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31668
content:
"households to affordably heat/cool a larger area of the home, thus \r increasing the space available to a family and providing more private \r and comfortable spaces for several activities like homework (Payne \r et  al. 2015). By reducing energy expenditures and making energy \r bills more affordable for households, a 'heat or eat' dilemma can be \r avoided resulting in better nutrition and reductions in the number \r of low birthweight babies (Payne et al. 2015; Tonn et al. 2018). Also, \r renovated buildings and the resulting better indoor conditions, \r can enable residents to avoid social isolation, improve social \r cohesion, lower crime, and so on (Payne et al. 2015). The European \r Commission (2016) found that under an ambitious recast of Energy \r Performance Buildings Directive (EPBD), the number of households \r that may be lifted from fuel poverty across the EU lies between \r 5.17 and 8.26 million. To capture these benefits, mitigation policies \r [...]"


id: cde9f1bb7873298a06938ed3f57479b6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
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content:
"[...] and  particularly energy renovation programmes should target the \r most vulnerable among the energy-poor households, which very often \r are ignored by the policy makers. In this context, it is recognised that \r fuel poverty should be analysed as a multidimensional social problem \r (Thomson et  al. 2017b; Baker et  al. 2018; Charlier and Legendre \r 2019; Mashhoodi et al. 2019), as it is related to energy efficiency, \r household composition, age and health status of its members, \r social conditions (single parent families, existence of unemployed \r and retired people, etc.), energy prices, disposable income, and so \r on. In addition, the geographical dimension can have a significant \r impact on the levels of fuel poverty and should be taken into account \r when formulating response policies (Besagni and Borgarello 2019; \r Mashhoodi et al. 2019)."


id: 5e05a44c6b023eacc45c36409ccb976
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"In 2018 almost 0.79 billion people in developing countries did not \r have access to electricity, while approximately 2.8 billion people \r relied on polluting fuels and technologies for cooking (IEA 2020a). \r Only in sub-Saharan Africa, about 548 million people (i.e.,  more \r than 50% of the population) live without electricity. In developed \r economies, the EU Energy Poverty Observatory estimated that in EU\u000228 44.5 million people were unable to keep their homes warm in 2016, \r 41.5 million had arrears on their utility bills the same year, 16.3% \r of households faced disproportionately high energy expenditure in \r 2010, and 19.2% of households reported being uncomfortably hot \r during summer in 2012 (Thomson and Bouzarovski 2018). Okushima \r (2016), using the 'expenditure approach', estimated that fuel poverty \r rates in Japan reached 8.4% in 2013. In the US, in 2015, 17 million \r households (14.4% of the total) received an energy disconnect/\r [...]"


id: a19e7cd00cc29cf99b384f273d61d47a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25651
content:
"[...] delivery stop notice and 25 million households (21.2% of the total) \r had to forgo food and medicine to pay energy bills (Bednar and \r Reames 2020). "


id: 24ada5b0594f805f4064c86a2e018edc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3647
content:
"In most low- and middle-income developing countries women and \r children (particularly girls) spend a significant amount of their time for \r gathering fuels for cooking and heating (World Health Organization \r 2016; Rosenthal et al. 2018). For example, in Africa more than 70% \r of the children living in households that primarily cook with polluting \r fuels spend at least 15 hours and, in some countries, more than \r 30 hours per  week in collecting wood or water, facing significant \r safety risks and constraints on their available time for education and \r rest (World Health Organization 2016; Mehetre et  al. 2017). Also, \r in several developing countries (e.g., in most African countries but \r also in India, in rural areas in Latin America and elsewhere) women \r spend several hours to collect fuel wood and cook, thus limiting \r their potential for productive activities for income generation or \r rest (Garcia-Frapolli et  al. 2010; World Health Organization 2016; \r [...]"


id: b7352ded5880c57ef39d6f1e44ecef15
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29444
content:
"[...] Mehetre et al. 2017). Expanding access to clean household energy \r for cooking, heating and lighting will largely help alleviate these \r burdens (Malla et al. 2011; World Health Organization 2016; Lewis \r et al. 2017; Rosenthal et al. 2018). Jeuland et al. (2018) found that the \r time savings associated with the adoption of cleaner and more fuel\u0002efficient stoves by low-income households in developing countries \r are amount to USD1.3-1.9 per  household per  month, constituting \r the 23-43% of the total social benefits attributed to the promotion \r of clean stoves. "


id: 4bc2bd8a2d905ea2bac75ec7c70649d3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10589
content:
"this review, 31 found neutral to positive effects of green buildings on \r productivity and only 3 studies indicated detrimental outcomes for \r office occupants in terms of job performance. Particularly longitudinal \r studies, which observe and compare the office users' reactions over \r time in conventional and green buildings, show that green buildings \r have neutral to positive effects on occupants well-being and work \r performance (Thatcher and Milner 2016; Candido et al. 2019; Kozusznik \r et al. 2019). Bleyl et al. (2019) estimated that deep energy retrofits in \r office buildings in Belgium would generate a workforce performance \r increase of EUR10.4 to EUR20.8 m-2 renovated. In Europe every \r 1degC reduction in overheating during the summer period increases \r students learning performance by 2.3% and workers performance in \r office buildings by 3.6% (Kockat et al. 2018b). Considering the latter \r indicator, it was estimated that by reducing overheating across Europe, \r [...]"


id: dce7051016f8e20bac12c12dc4731772
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36128
content:
"[...] the overall performance of the workers in office buildings can increase \r by 7-12% (Kockat et al. 2018b)."


id: bba2eb531b5fef3f75ade8a0d199948d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"A significant number of studies confirm that homes with high energy \r efficiency and/or green features are sold at higher prices than \r conventional, low energy efficient houses. A review of 15 studies \r from 12 different countries showed that energy efficient dwellings \r have a  price premium ranging between 1.5% and 28%, with \r a median estimated at 7.8%, for the highest energy efficient category \r examined in each case study compared to reference houses with \r the same characteristics but lower energy efficiency (the detailed \r results of this review are presented in Supplementary Material \r Table 9.SM.5). In a given real estate market, the higher the energy \r efficiency of dwellings compared to conventional housing, the higher \r their selling prices. However, a  number of studies show that this \r premium is largely realised during resale transactions and is smaller \r or even negative in some cases immediately after the completion \r [...]"


id: dd047225e0b00f5cbcc59ce849c434e7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36147
content:
"[...] of the construction (Deng and Wu 2014; Yoshida and Sugiura 2015). \r A relatively lower number of studies (also included in Supplementary \r Material Table 9.SM.5) show that energy efficiency and green features \r have also a positive effect on rental prices of dwellings (Hyland et al. \r 2013; Cajias et al. 2019), but this is weaker compared to sales prices, \r and in a developing country even negative as green buildings, which \r incorporate new technologies such as central air conditioning, are \r associated with higher electricity consumption (Zheng et al. 2012). "


id: 8daabc4ef551c785d7250dbfc2b50d44
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22114
content:
"Low-carbon buildings, and particularly well-designed, operated and \r maintained high-performance buildings with adequate ventilation, \r may result in productivity gains and improve the competitiveness of the \r economy through three different pathways (MacNaughton et al. 2015; \r European Commission 2016; Niemela et al. 2017; Mofidi and Akbari \r 2017; Thema et al. 2017; Bleyl et al. 2019): (i) increasing the amount of \r active time available for productive work by reducing the absenteeism \r from work due to illness, the presenteeism (i.e., working with illness \r or working despite being ill), and the inability to work due to chronic \r diseases caused by the poor indoor environment; (ii) improving the \r indoor air quality and thermal comfort of non-residential buildings, \r which can result in better mental well-being of the employees and \r increased workforce performance; and (iii) reducing the school \r absenteeism due to better indoor environmental conditions, which \r [...]"


id: ce536f3cfdb0c9741dfa5c5f80bba38e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33637
content:
"[...] may enhance the future earnings ability of the students and restrict the \r parents absenteeism due to care-taking of sick children."


id: dc4be94b37e42e4e74a626d8ecc5c014
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36029
content:
"Productivity gains due to increased amount of active time for work \r is directly related to acute and chronic health benefits attributed to \r climate mitigation actions in buildings (Section 9.8.2.2). The bulk of \r studies quantifying the impact of energy efficiency on productivity \r focus on acute health effects. Proper ventilation in buildings is of \r particular importance and can reduce absenteeism due to sick days \r by 0.6-1.9 days per  person per  year (MacNaughton et  al. 2015; \r Ben-David et al. 2017; Thema et al. 2017). In a pan-European study, \r (Chatterjee and Urge-Vorsatz 2018) showed that deep energy \r retrofits in residential buildings may increase the number of active \r days by 1.78-5.27 (with an average of 3.09) per year and person \r who has actually shifted to a  deep retrofitted building. Similarly, \r the interventions in the non-residential buildings result in increased \r active days between 0.79 and 2.43 (with an average of 1.4) per year \r [...]"


id: 57156add4ca364cf3a1938bf09f2a1f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12575
content:
"GHG emission reduction actions in the sector of buildings affect energy \r systems by: (i) reducing the overall consumption of energy resources, \r especially fossil fuels; (ii) promoting the electrification of thermal \r energy uses; and (iii) enhancing distributed generation through the \r incorporation of RES and other clean and smart technologies in \r buildings. Increasing sufficiency, energy efficiency and penetration of \r RES result in improving the primary energy intensity of the economy \r and reducing dependence on fossil fuels, which for many countries \r are imported energy resources (Boermans et  al. 2015; Markovska \r et al. 2016; Thema et al. 2017). The electrification of thermal energy \r uses is expected to increase the demand for electricity in buildings, \r which in most cases can be reversed (at national or regional level) by \r promoting nearly zero energy new buildings and a deep renovation \r of the existing building stock (Boermans et  al. 2015; Couder and \r [...]"


id: f59987ca6ad01ff2943ed84a01a40cd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40575
content:
"[...] Verbruggen 2017). In addition, highly efficient buildings can keep \r the desired room temperature stable over a  longer period and \r consequently they have the capability to shift heating and cooling \r operation in time (Boermans et  al. 2015). These result in reduced \r peak demand, lower system losses and avoided generation and \r grid infrastructure investments. As a  significant proportion of the \r global population, particularly in rural and remote locations, still lack \r access to modern energy sources, renewables can be used to power \r distributed generation or micro-grid systems that enable peer-to\u0002peer energy exchange, constituting a crucial component to improve \r energy security for rural populations (Leibrand et al. 2019; Kirchhoff \r and Strunz 2019). For successful development of peer-to-peer micro\u0002grids, financial incentives to asset owners are critical for ensuring \r their willingness to share their energy resources, while support \r [...]"


id: c8af781fcc575a582f32a2078f615a0c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32626
content:
"[...] measures should be adopted to ensure that also non-asset holders \r can contribute to investments in energy generation and storage \r equipment and have the ability to sell electricity to others (Kirchhoff \r and Strunz 2019)."


id: 30be17358153bfa77228feea46520e3c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5830
content:
"Investments required for the implementation of mitigation actions, \r create, mainly in the short-run, increase in the economic output \r and employment in sectors delivering energy efficiency services and \r products, which are partially counterbalanced by less investments \r and  lower production in other parts of the economy (Yushchenko \r and Patel 2016; European Commission 2016; Thema et al. 2017; US \r EPA 2018) (see also Cross-Working Group Box 1 in Chapter 3). The \r magnitude of these impacts depends on the structure of the economy, \r the extent to which energy saving technologies are produced \r domestically or imported from abroad, but also from the growth \r cycle of the economy with the benefits being maximised when the \r related investments are realised in periods of economic recession \r (Mirasgedis et  al. 2014; Yushchenko and Patel 2016; Thema et  al. \r 2017). Particularly in developing countries if the mitigation measures \r [...]"


id: cd2f29084759e0012343687d8e756b03
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33436
content:
"[...] and other interventions to improve energy access (Figure 9.19) are \r carried out by locals, the impact on economy, employment and social \r well-being will be substantial (Mills 2016; Lehr et al. 2016). As many \r of these programs are carried out with foreign assistance funds, it is \r essential that the funds be spent in-country to the full extent possible, \r while some portion of these funds would need to be devoted to \r institution building and especially training. (Mills 2016) estimated \r that a market transformation from inefficient and polluting fuel-based \r lighting to solar-LED systems to fully serve the 112 million households \r that currently lack electricity access will create directly 2 million new \r jobs in these developing countries, while the indirect effects could \r be even greater. IEA (2020a) estimated that 9-30 jobs would be \r generated for every million dollars invested in building retrofits or \r [...]"


id: d1a0736493d4d9112a47cf71308111b9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34229
content:
"[...] in construction of new energy efficient buildings (gross direct and \r indirect employment), with the highest employment intensity rates \r occurring in developing countries. Correspondingly, 7-16 jobs \r would be created for every million dollars spent in purchasing highly \r efficient and connected appliances, while expanding clean cooking \r through LPG could create 16-75 direct local jobs per million dollars \r invested. Increases in product and employment attributed to energy \r efficiency investments also affect public budgets by increasing \r income and business taxation, reducing unemployment benefits, \r and so on. Thema et al. (2017), thus mitigating the impact on public \r deficit of subsidising energy saving measures (Mikulic et al. 2016). "


id: 81d6ae302fe8d283eaaa29613eb188bf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19965
content:
"Gupta et al. 2017). Barriers identified for the refurbishment of exiting \r building or construction of new efficient buildings includes: lack \r of high-performance products, construction methods, monitoring \r capacity, investment risks, policies intermittency, information gaps, \r principal agent problems (both tenant and landlord face disincentives \r to invest in energy efficiency), skills of the installers, lack of a trained \r and ready workforce, governance arrangements in collectively owned \r properties and behavioural anomalies (Gillingham and Palmer 2014; \r Buessler et al. 2017; Yang et al. 2019; Do et al. 2020; Dutt 2020; Song \r et al. 2020). A better understanding of behavioural barriers (Frederiks \r et al. 2015) is essential to design effective policies to decarbonise \r the building sector. Energy efficiency in buildings faces one \r additional problem: the sector is highly heterogeneous, with many \r different building types, sizes and operational uses. Energy efficiency \r [...]"


id: 2dd7849b2ec14b35da80f06ce197ebc8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5344
content:
"[...] investments do not take place in isolation but in competition with \r other priorities and as part of a  complex, protracted investment \r process (Cooremans 2011). Therefore, a focus on overcoming barriers \r is not enough for effective policy. Organisational context is important \r because the same barrier might have very different organisational \r effects and require very different policy responses (Mallaburn \r 2018). Cross-Chapter Box  2 in Chapter  2 presents a  summary of \r methodologies for estimating the macro-level impact of policies on \r indices of GHG mitigation."


id: 6b415daddfe334c779ca90b4d694e2fe
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16169
content:
"Reaching deep decarbonisation levels throughout the lifecycle \r of buildings depends on multidimensional criteria for assessing \r the feasibility of mitigation measures, including criteria related to \r geophysical, environmental-ecological, technological, economic, \r socio-cultural and institutional dimensions. An assessment of \r 16 feasibility criteria for mitigation measures in the buildings sector \r indicates whether a specific factor, within broader dimensions, acts \r as a barrier or helps enabling such mitigation measures (Figure 9.20, \r Supplementary Material Table  9.SM.6, and Annex II.11). Although \r mitigation measures are aggregated in the assessment of Figure 9.20 \r and feasibility results can differ for more specific measures, generally \r speaking, the barriers to mitigation measures in buildings are few, \r sometimes including technological and socio-cultural challenges. \r However, many co-benefits could help enable mitigation in the \r [...]"


id: 27fabdd4ba0810c30242e52cc1885a22
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4232
content:
"[...] buildings sector. For instance, many measures can have positive \r effects on the environment, health and well-being, and distributional \r potential, all of which can boost their feasibility. The feasibility of \r mitigation measures varies significantly according to socio-economic \r differences across and within countries."


id: 41b624e5c0aa49baba3ca12b3930dfb6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8753
content:
"There is great variation in estimates of the direct and indirect \r rebound effects, which stems from the end-uses included in the \r analysis, differences in definitions and methods used to estimate \r the rebound effects, the quality of the data utilised, the period of \r analysis and the geographical area in consideration (International \r Risk Governance Council 2013; Galvin 2014; Gillingham et al. 2016). \r Several studies examined in the context of this assessment (see \r Supplementary Material Table 9.SM.7) showed that direct rebound \r effects for residential energy consumption, which includes heating, \r are significant and range between -9% and 127%. The direct \r rebound effects for energy services other than heating may be lower \r (Chen et al. 2018; Sorrell et al. 2018). The rebound effects may be \r reduced with the time as the occupants learn how to optimally use \r the systems installed in energy renovated buildings (Cali et al. 2016) \r [...]"


id: c28953c1c8a2292455d0b7faff60564
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31511
content:
"[...] and seem to be lower in the case of major renovations leading to \r NZEB (Corrado et al. 2016). The combined direct and indirect or the \r indirect only rebound effects were found to range between -2% \r and 80%, with a  median at 12% (see Supplementary Material \r Table 9.SM.7). In non-residential buildings the rebound effects may \r be smaller, as the commercial sector is characterised by lower price \r elasticities of energy demand, while the comfort level in commercial \r buildings before renovation is likely to be better compared to \r residential buildings (Qiu 2014)."


id: a8bfd54378aec8942b85d441f142987d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26895
content:
"Lorek and Spangenberg (2019b) investigated the limitations of the \r theories of planned behaviour and social practice and proposed an \r approach combining both theories resulting in a heuristic sufficiency \r policy2\r  tool. Lorek and Spangenberg (2019b) showed that increased \r living area per  person counteracts efficiency gains in buildings \r and called for sufficiency policy instruments to efficiency by limit \r building size. This could be achieved via mandatory and prescriptive \r measures, for example, progressive building energy codes (IEA 2013), \r or financial penalties in the form of property taxation (e.g., non-linear \r and progressive taxation), or with mandatory limits on building size \r per  capita. Heindl and Kanschik (2016) suggested that voluntary \r policies promoting sufficiency and proposed that sufficiency should be \r 'integrated in a more comprehensive normative framework related to \r welfare and social justice'. Alcott highlighted that in sufficiency there is \r [...]"


id: 461c27e20d12b1993332d3d14bbf6807
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9551
content:
"[...] a loss of utility or welfare (Alcott, 2008). Thomas et al. (2019) described \r some of the possible policies, some based on the sharing economy \r principles, for examples co-sharing space, public authorities facilitating \r the exchange house between young and expanding families with elderly \r people, with reduced need for space. Policies for sufficiency include \r land-use and urban planning policies. Berril et  al. (2021) proposed \r removing policies, which support supply of larger home typologies, for \r example, single-family home or local land-use regulations restricting \r construction of multifamily buildings. In non-residential building, \r sufficiency could be implemented through the sharing economy, for \r example with flexible offices space with hot-desking. "


id: 57ed5358973f5e30584491921844718a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12732
content:
"to enhance robustness against risks and uncertainties in both short \r and long-term and addressing the different stakeholder perspectives \r (Forouli et al. 2019; Nikas et al. 2020; Doukas and Nikas 2020). This is \r due to: the many barriers; the different types of buildings (residential, \r non-residential, etc.); the different socio-economic groups of the \r population (social housing, informal settlement, etc.); the country \r development status; the local climate (cooling and/or heating), \r ownership structure (tenant or owner), the age of buildings. Effective \r policy packages include mandatory standards, codes, the provision of \r information, carbon pricing, financing, and technical assistance for \r end-users. Important element related to policy packages is whether \r the policies reinforce each other or diminish the impact of individual \r policies, due to policy 'overcrowding'. Examples are the EU policy \r package for efficiency in buildings (Rosenow and Bayer 2017; BPIE, \r [...]"


id: 5188bb9274f259bf895e72fd0efc2281
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11622
content:
"[...] 2020; Economidou et al. 2020) and China goal of 10 million m2\r  NZEB \r during the 13th Five-Year Plan, presented in the Supplementary \r Material (Supplementary Material Section 9.SM.4) (see also Cross\u0002Chapter Box  10 in Chapter  14 for integrated policymaking for \r sector transitions)."


id: a8e18708e06d1db744011e82968957cc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26921
content:
"Scholars have identified the 'energy efficiency gap' (Hirst and \r Brown 1990; Jaffe and Stavins 1994; Alcott and Greenstone 2012; \r Gillingham and Palmer 2014; Stadelmann 2017) and policies to \r overcome it. Markandya et  al. (2015) and Shen et  al. (2016) have \r classified energy efficiency policies in three broad categories: the \r command and control (e.g.,  mandatory building energy codes; \r mandatory appliances standards, etc.); price instruments (e.g., taxes, \r subsides, tax deductions, credits, permits and tradable obligations, \r etc.); and information instruments (e.g., labels, energy audits, smart \r meters and feed-back, etc.). Based on the EU Energy Efficiency \r Directive, the MURE and the IEA energy efficiency policy databases \r (Bertoldi and Mosconi 2020), Bertoldi (2020) proposed six policy \r categories: regulatory, financial and fiscal; information and \r [...]"


id: 21e16f204010094be70dd994515c537b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3183
content:
"[...] awareness; qualification, training and quality assurance; market\u0002based instruments: voluntary action. The categorisation of energy \r efficiency policies used in this chapter is aligned with the taxonomy \r used in Chapter 13, sub-section 13.5.1 (economic or market-based \r instruments, regulatory instruments, and other policies). However, \r the classification used here is more granular in order to capture the \r complexity of end-use energy efficiency and buildings. "


id: edd4f8ba034444f0b1be4a254824ec39
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39204
content:
"energy consumption, especially in the case of the rapid urbanisation \r content in China'. Ex post policy evaluation shows that stringent \r buildings' codes reduce energy consumption in buildings and CO2\r emissions and are cost-effective (Aroonruengsawat 2012; Jacobsen \r and Kotchen 2013; Scott et  al. 2015; Levinson 2016; Kotchen \r 2017; Yu et  al. 2017; Yu et  al. 2018; Aydin and Brounen 2019). \r Progressive building energy codes include requirements on efficiency \r improvement but also on sufficiency and share of renewables (Clune \r et  al. 2012; Rosenberg et  al., 2017) and on embodied emissions \r (Schwarz et al. 2020), for example the 2022 ASHRAE Standard 90.1 \r includes prescriptive on-site renewable energy requirements for non\u0002residential building. Evans et  al. (2017; 2018) calls for strengthen \r the compliance checks with efficiency requirements or codes when \r buildings are in operation and highlighted the need for enforcement \r [...]"


id: ea25ade16f5f9a3ac1d3817818e2568f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38548
content:
"[...] of building energy codes to achieve the estimate energy and carbon \r savings recommending actions to improve enforcements, including \r institutional capacity and adequate resources."


id: 7308e6f39955aef4170d5d1d2d9bb0a8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17491
content:
"Evans et  al. (2017; 2018) identified strengthening the compliance \r checks with codes when buildings are in operation and the need \r for enforcement of building energy codes in order to achieve the \r estimate energy and carbon savings, recommending actions to \r improve enforcements, including institutional capacity and adequate \r resources. Another important issue to be addressed by policies is the \r 'Energy Performance Gap' (EPG), that is, the gap between design and \r policy intent and actual outcomes. Regulatory and market support \r regimes are based on predictive models (Cohen and Bordass 2015) \r with general assumptions about building types, the way they are \r used and are not covering all energy consumption. In the perspective \r of moving towards net zero carbon, it is important that policy capture \r and address the actual in-use performance of buildings (Gupta et al. \r 2015; Gupta and Kotopouleas 2018). Outcome-based codes are \r [...]"


id: 6e7cc1dcd44a4d0ecf204988a521414c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16703
content:
"[...] increasingly important because they overcome some limitations of \r prescriptive building energy codes, which typically do not regulate \r all building energy uses or do not regulate measured operational \r energy use in buildings. Regulating all loads, especially plug and \r process loads, is important because they account for an increasingly \r large percentage of total energy use as building envelope and space\u0002conditioning equipment are becoming more efficient (Denniston \r et al. 2011; Colker 2012; Enker and Morrison 2020)."


id: c3c193d663bea5c9cfb19a091029c271
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31714
content:
"Energy consumption feedback with smart meters, smart billing and \r dedicated devices and apps is another instrument recently exploited \r to reduce energy consumption (Karlin et  al. 2015; Buchanan et  al. \r 2018; Zangheri et  al. 2019) very often coupled with contest-based \r interventions or norm-based interventions (Bergquist et  al. 2019). \r Hargreaves et al. (2018) proposes five core types of action to reduce \r energy use: turn it off, use it less, use it more carefully, improve its \r performance, and replace it/use an alternative. According to Aydin \r et  al. (2018), technology alone will not be enough to achieve the \r desired energy savings due to the rebound effect. The lack of interest \r from household occupants, confusing feedback message and difficulty \r to relate it to practical intervention, overemphasis on financial \r savings and the risks of 'fallback effects' where energy use returns \r to previous levels after a  short time or rebound effects has been \r [...]"


id: f5e79a66ea9a79061be86f583ad9c77f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40620
content:
"[...] pointed out (Buchanan et al. 2015) as the main reasons for the failing \r of traditional feedback. Labanca and Bertoldi (2018) highlight the \r current limitations of policies for energy conservation and suggests \r complementary policy approach based on social practices theories. "


id: e03a8f81692c2eb5a9a717b74ef511ab
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36699
content:
"Minimum Energy Performance Standards (MEPSs). Mandatory \r minimum efficiency standards for building technical equipment \r and appliances (e.g., HVAC, appliances, ICT, lighting, etc.) is a very \r common, tested and successful policy in most of the OECD countries \r (e.g., EU, US, Canada, Australia, etc.) for improving energy efficiency \r (Scott et al. 2015; Wu et al. 2019; Sonnenschein et al. 2019). Brucal \r and Roberts (2019) showed that efficiency standards reduce product \r price. McNeil et  al. (2019) highlighted how efficiency standards \r will help developing countries in reducing the power peak demand \r by a  factor of two, thus reducing large investment costs in new \r generation, transmission, and distribution networks. Mandatory \r standards have been implemented also other large economies, for \r example, Russia, Brazil, India, South Africa, China, Ghana, Kenya and \r Malaysia (Salleh et al. 2019), with an increase in the uptake also in \r [...]"


id: e621f700d3e42a61f8f275da6843127c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37788
content:
"[...] developing countries, for example, Ghana, Kenya, Tunisia, and so on. \r In Japan, there is a successful voluntary programme the Top Runner, \r with similar results of mandatory efficiency standards (Inoue and \r Matsumoto 2019)."


id: 38067c501a56b1568227ab03cd0b80ad
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7063
content:
"Carbon allowances. A number of authors (Raux et al. 2015; Fan et al. \r 2016; Fawcett and Parag 2017; Li et al. 2015, 2018; Marek et al. 2018; \r Wadud and Chintakayala 2019) have investigated personal carbon \r allowances introduced previously (Ayres 1995; Fleming 1997; Raux \r and Marlot 2005; Bristow et al. 2010; Fawcett 2010; Starkey 2012). \r Although there is not yet any practical implementation of this policy, \r it offers an alternative to carbon taxes, although there are some \r practical issues to be solved before it could be rolled out. Recently the \r city of Lahti in Finland has introduced a personal carbon allowance \r in the transport sector (Kuokkanen et  al. 2020). Under this policy \r instrument governments allocate (free allocation, but allowances \r could also be auctioned) allowances to cover the carbon emission for \r one year, associated with energy consumption. Trade of allowances \r between people can be organised. Personal carbon allowances can \r [...]"


id: 47734e2d62827c42e2a45d32649116d4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9785
content:
"[...] also foster renewable energies (energy consumption without carbon \r emissions) both in the grid and in buildings (e.g.,  solar thermal). \r Personal carbon allowances can make the carbon price more explicit \r to consumers, allowing them to know from the market value of each \r allowance (e.g.,  1 kg of CO2). This policy instrument will shift the \r responsibility to the individual. Some categories may have limited \r ability to change their carbon budget or to be engaged by this policy \r instruments. In addition, in common with many other environmental \r policies the distributional effects have to be assessed carefully as \r this policy instrument may favour well off people able to purchase \r additional carbon allowances or install technologies that reduce their \r carbon emissions (Burgess 2016; Wang et al. 2017)."


id: d772957bca97135b50b74399296734
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35213
content:
"Information campaign. Provision of information (e.g.,  public \r campaigns, targeted technical information, etc.) is a common policy \r instrument to change end-user behaviour. Many authors agree \r that the effect of both targeted and general advertisement and \r campaigns have a short lifetime and the effects tend to decrease \r over time (Reiss and White 2008; Simcock et  al. 2014; Diffney \r et al. 2013). The meta-analysis carried out by (Delmas et al. 2013) \r showed that energy audits and personal information were the \r most effective followed by providing individuals with comparisons \r with their peers' energy use including 'non-monetary, information\u0002based' (Delmas et al. 2013). An effective approach integrates the \r social norm as the basis for information and awareness measures \r on energy behaviour (Schultz et al. 2007; Gifford 2011). Information \r is more successful when it inspires and engages people: how \r people feel about a  given situation often has a  potent influence \r [...]"


id: f87fe27cefbced98a36c04d88a6e7f30
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41078
content:
"prices tend to reduce the energy consumption particularly in less \r affluent households, and thus attention is needed in order to avoid \r unintended effects such as energy poverty. Bourgeois et al. (2021) \r showed that using carbon tax revenue to finance energy efficiency \r investment reduces fuel poverty and increases cost-effectiveness. \r (Giraudet et  al. 2021) assessed the cost-effectiveness of various \r energy efficiency policies in France, concluding that a carbon tax is the \r most effective. In particular, revenues could be invested in frontline \r services that can provide a  range of support  - including advising \r householders on how to improve their homes. Hence, the introduction \r of a carbon tax can be neutral or even positive to the economy, as \r investments in clean technologies generate additional revenues. \r In addition, in the long term, a  carbon/energy tax could gradually \r replace the tax on labour reducing labour cost (e.g., the example of \r [...]"


id: 1cfb320daec63e3b7689fd28535631cf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2279
content:
"[...] the German Eco-tax), thus helping to create additional jobs in the \r economy. In literature, this is known as double dividend (Murtagh \r et al. 2013; Freire-Gonzalez and Ho 2019). Urban economic researches \r (Creutzig 2014; Borck and Brueckner 2018; Rafaj et al. 2018) have \r highlighted that higher carbon price would translate in incentives for \r citizens to live closer to the city centre, which often means less floor \r space, less commuting distance and thus reduced emissions. Xiang \r and Lawley (2019) indicated that the carbon tax in British Columbia \r substantially reduced residential natural gas consumption. Saelim \r (2019) showed that simulated carbon tax on residential consumption \r in Thailand will have a low impact on welfare and it will be slightly \r progressive. Lin and Li (2011) indicate that a carbon tax could reduce \r the energy consumption and boost the uptake of energy efficiency \r and renewable energies, while at the same time may impact social \r [...]"


id: dacb8a4c22d65855468003ceb232d256
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35788
content:
"[...] welfare and the competitiveness of industry. Solaymani (2017) \r showed that in Malaysia a tax with revenue recycling increases in \r the welfare of rural and urban households. Van Heerden et al. (2016) \r explored economic and environmental effects of the CO2 tax in South \r Africa highlighting the negative impact on GDP. This negative impact \r of the carbon tax on GDP is, however, greatly reduced by the manner \r in which the tax revenue is recycled. National circumstances shall be \r taken into consideration in introducing energy taxes, considering the \r local taxation and energy prices context with regard to sustainable \r development, justice and equity."


id: c2090ac76e9d291c0035fe7c8d80aea2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31436
content:
"Utilities programmes, energy efficiency resource standard \r and energy efficiency obligations. Ratepayer-funded efficiency \r programmes, energy efficiency obligations, energy efficiency resource \r standards and white certificates have been introduced in some EU \r Member States, in several US States, Australia, South Korea and \r Brazil (Bertoldi et al. 2013a; Palmer et al. 2013; Brennan and Palmer \r 2013; Giraudet and Finon 2015; Wirl 2015; Rosenow and Bayer 2017; \r Aldrich and Koerner 2018; Choi et al. 2018a; Fawcett and Darby 2018; \r Fawcett et al. 2019; Nadel, 2019; Sliger and Colburn, 2019; Goldman \r et  al. 2020). This policy instrument helps in improving energy \r efficiency in buildings, but there is no evidence that it can foster deep \r renovations of existing buildings. Recently this policy instrument has \r been investigated is some non-OECD countries such as Turkey, where \r white certificates could deliver energy savings with some limitations \r [...]"


id: db73846976af74ef0f003004fcf67c31
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35886
content:
"[...] (Duzgun and Komurgoz 2014) and UAE, as a useful instrument to \r foster energy efficiency in buildings (Friedrich and Afshari 2015). \r Another similar market based instrument is the energy saving \r auction mechanism implemented in some US states, Switzerland, \r and in Germany (Langreder et al. 2019; Rosenow et al. 2019; Thomas \r and Rosenow 2020). Energy efficiency projects participate in auctions \r for energy savings based on the cost of the energy saved and receive \r a financial incentive, if successful."


id: b2f5896561c59fbd9f72b3b48f6dec44
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28724
content:
"Loans provide liquidity and direct access to capital important in deep \r renovation projects (Rosenow et al. 2014). There is empirical evidence \r (Giraudet et al. 2021), that banks make large profits on personal loans \r for renovation purposes. International financing institutions (IFIs) and \r national governments provided subsidies in public-private partnerships \r so that financial institutions can offer customers loans with attractive \r terms (Olmos et al. 2012). Loan guarantees are effective in reducing \r intervention borrowing costs (Soumare and Lai 2016). Combination \r of grants and subsidised loans financed by IFIs could be an effective \r instrument together with guarantees. An important role in financing \r energy efficiency can be played by green banks, which are publicly \r capitalised entities set up to facilitate private investment in low\u0002carbon, including energy efficiency (Bahl 2012; Tu and Yen 2015; Linh \r and Anh 2017; Khan 2018). Green banks have been established at the \r [...]"


id: 1a037282743416ce118949e584c50065
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1774
content:
"Energy Performance Contracting (EPC) is an agreement between \r a building owner and Energy Services Company (ESCO) for energy \r efficiency improvements. EPC is a  common financing vehicle for \r large buildings and it is well developed in several markets (Carvallo \r et al. 2015; Bertoldi and Boza Kiss, 2017; Stuart et al. 2018; Ruan \r et  al. 2018; Nurcahyanto et  al. 2020; Zheng et  al. 2021). Quality \r standards are a part of the EPC (Augustins et al. 2018). Guarantees \r can facilitate the provision of affordable and sufficient financing for \r ESCOs (Bullier and Milin 2013). The ESCO guarantees a certain level \r of energy savings and it shields the client from performance risk. The \r loan goes on the client's balance sheet and the ESCO assumes full \r project performance risk (Deng et al. 2015). One of the limitations is \r on the depth of the energy renovation in existing buildings. According \r to (Giraudet et  al. 2018), EPC is effective at reducing information \r [...]"


id: cc3043258a92e2824b35983a997d1458
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33244
content:
"Both FiT and RPS can support the development of RES. Scholars \r compared the effectiveness of RPSs and FiTs with mix results and \r different opinions, with some scholars indicating the advantages of \r RPS (Ciarreta et al. 2014, 2017; Xin-gang et al. 2017), while Nicolini \r and Tavoni (2017) showed that in Italy FiTs are outperforming RPSs \r and Tradable Green Certificates (TGCs). Garcia-Alvarez et  al. (2018) \r carried out an empirical assessment of FiTs and RPSs for PV systems \r energy in EU over the period 2000-2014 concluding that that FiTs \r have a  significant positive impact on installed PV capacity. This is \r due to the small size of many rooftop installations and the difficulties \r in participating in trading schemes for residential end users. Similar \r conclusions were reached by (Dijkgraaf et al. 2018) assessing 30 OECD \r countries and concluding that there is a 'positive effect of the presence \r of a FiT on the development of a country's added yearly capacity of \r [...]"


id: e1245bca65625817e62080d6d710665
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36876
content:
"[...] PV'. Other scholars (Lewis and Wiser 2007; Lipp 2007; Cory et al. 2009; \r Couture and Gagnon 2010) concluded that FiT can create a  stable \r investment framework and long-term policy certainty and it is better \r than RPS for industrial development and job creation. Ouyang and Lin \r (2014) highlighted that RPS has a better implementation effect than \r FiT in China, where FiT required very large subsidy. Ford et al. (2007) \r showed that TGC is a market-based mechanism without the need for \r government subsidies. Marchenko (2008) and W,edzik et  al. (2017) \r indicate that the TGCs provide a source of income for investors. Choi \r et al. (2018a) analysed the economic efficiency of FiT and RPS in the \r South Korean, where FiT was implemented from 2002 to 2011 followed \r by an RPS since 2012 (Park and Kim 2018; Choi et al. 2018b). Choi \r concluded that RPS was more efficient for PV from the government's \r perspective while from an energy producers' perspective the FiT was \r [...]"


id: abafce2a8f8c79242b1c12070ca78efc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27453
content:
"[...] more efficient. Some scholars proposed a policy combining FiT and RPS \r (Cory et al. 2009). Kwon (2015) and del Rio et al. (2017) concluded that \r both FiT and RPS are effective, but policy costs are higher in RPSs than \r FiTs. RPS, REC trading and FiT subsidy could also be implemented as \r complementary policies (Zhang et al. 2018). \r Tenders are a fast spreading and effective instrument to attract and \r procure new generation capacity from renewable energy sources \r (Bayer et  al. 2018; Batz and Musgens 2019; Bento et  al.  2020; "


id: 78ce2b388d00d8afd61e19562f5e9357
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18440
content:
"electricity consumers to become prosumers and actively participate in \r the market'. Klein et al. (2019) explore the policy options for aligning \r prosumers with the electricity wholesale market, through price and \r scarcity signals. Policies should allow for active markets participation \r of small prosumers (Brown et al. 2019; Zepter et al. 2019), local energy \r communities and new energy market actors such as aggregators (Iria \r and Soares 2019; Brown et  al. 2019). Energy Communities are new \r important players in the energy transition (Sokolowski 2020; Gjorgievski \r et al. 2021). Citizens and local communities can establish local energy \r communities, providing local RES production to serve the community, \r alleviate energy poverty and export energy into the grid (DellaValle and \r Sareen, 2020; Hahnel et al. 2020). Energy Communities have as primary \r purpose to provide environmental, economic, or social community \r benefits by engaging in generation, aggregation, energy storage, \r [...]"


id: 1e04cb7f5c25a60d5221e68f9a065d2a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2480
content:
"[...] energy efficiency services and charging services for electric vehicles. \r Energy communities help in increasing public acceptance and mobilise \r private funding. Demand response aggregators (Mahmoudi et al. 2017; \r Henriquez et al. 2018) can aggregate load reductions by a group of \r consumers, and sell the resulting flexibility to the electricity  market \r (Zancanella et al. 2017). Regulatory frameworks for electricity markets \r should allow demand response to compete on equal footing in energy \r markets and encourage new business models for the provision of \r flexibility to the electricity grid (Shen et al. 2014). Renewable energy and \r sufficiency requirements could be included in building energy codes \r and  implemented in coordination with each other and with climate \r policies, for example, carbon pricing (Oikonomou et al. 2014)."


id: 9c4db37ff9cdae8755b932b1f32efd30
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24755
content:
"Financing mechanisms for RES are particularly needed in developing \r countries. Most of the common supporting mechanisms (FiT, RPSs, \r PPA, auctions, net metering, etc.) have been implemented in some \r developing countries (Donastorg et  al. 2017). Stable policies and an \r investment-friendly environment are essential to overcome financing \r barriers and attract investors (Donastorg et  al. 2017). Kimura et  al. \r (2016) identified the following elements as essential for fostering \r RES in developing countries: innovative business models and financial \r mechanisms/structures; market creation through the implementation of \r market-based mechanisms; stability of policies and renewable energy \r legislation; technical assistance to reduce the uncertainty of renewable \r energy production; electricity market design, which reflects the impact \r on the grid capacity and grid balancing; improved availability of financial \r resources, in particular public, and innovative financial instruments, \r [...]"


id: ca76b18da853ef1c03a33810e7d32a94
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32958
content:
"[...] such as carbon financing (Lim et al. 2013; Park et al. 2018; Kim and \r Park 2018); green bonds; public foreign exchange hedging facility for \r renewable energy financing, credit lines; grants and guarantees."


id: 56571301260ede0055d747e2ce81d6ab
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12458
content:
"during the next thirty years (the global GDP in 2019 was USD88 trillion). \r As the following figures illustrate, only a very small share of it is currently \r being invested, leaving a very large investment gap still to address. \r The incremental capital expenditure on energy efficiency in buildings \r has grown since AR5 to reach the estimated USD193 billion in 2021; \r Europe was the largest investing region, followed by the USA and \r China (Figure 9.21). The incremental capital expenditure on renewable \r energy heat vice versa declined to reach USD24 billion in this year; the \r leading investor was China, followed by Europe (ibid). The total capital \r expenditure on distributed small-scale (less than 1MW) solar systems \r in 2019 was USD52.1 billion, down from the peak of USD71 billion in \r 2011; most of this capacity is installed in buildings (Frankfurt School\u0002UNEP Centre/BNEF 2020). The US was the largest country market \r [...]"


id: 12408c7b9d66438ac8fa7a0c4fee3c2d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 407
content:
"[...] with USD9.6 billion investment; notably USD5 billion was deployed in \r the Middle East and Africa (ibid). IEA (2021b) provided an estimate \r of annual average incremental investment needs in building sector \r decarbonation between 2026 and 2030 of USD711 billion, including \r USD509 billion in building energy efficiency and USD202 billion in \r renewable heat for end-use and electrification in buildings. Such \r investment would allow being on track towards meeting the goals \r of the WEO Net Zero Emissions Scenario, as presented in Box  9.2. \r To  reach these levels, the respective investment must grow from \r their average volumes in 2016-2020 factor 3.6 and 4.5 respectively. \r As the investment  needs estimated by (IEA 2021b) are significantly \r lower the  investment intervals reported by bottom-up literature \r (Section 9.6.3), the actual investment gap is likely to be higher. "


id: e84d47ea76f7bca2d10a5d81e1808a82
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38206
content:
"Some policies are best implemented at international level. Efficiency \r requirements for traded goods and the associated test methods could \r be set at global level in order to enlarge the market, avoid technical \r barriers to trade; reduce the manufacturers design and compliance \r costs. International standards could be applied to developing countries \r when specific enabling conditions exist, particularly in regard to \r technology transfer, assistance for capacity buildings and financial \r support. This would also reduce the dumping of inefficient equipment \r in countries with no or lower efficiency requirements. An example is the \r dumping of new or used inefficient cooling equipment in developing \r countries, undermining national and local efforts to manage energy, \r environment, health, and climate goals. Specific regulations can be \r put in place to avoid such environmental dumping, beginning with the \r 'prior informed consent' as in the Rotterdam Convention and a later \r [...]"


id: e6a199081e30c10937ed529553303afe
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37869
content:
"[...] stage with the adoption of minimum efficiency requirements for \r appliances (Andersen et al. 2018; UNEP 2017). Dreyfus et al. (2020a) \r indicates that global policies to promote best technologies currently \r available have the potential to reduce climate emissions from air \r conditionings and refrigeration equipment by 210-460 GtCO2-eq by \r 2060, resulting from the phasing down of HFC and from improved \r energy efficiency. Another example is the commitment by governments \r in promoting improvements in energy efficiency of cooling equipment \r in parallel with the phasedown of HFC refrigerants enshrined in the \r Biarritz Pledge for Fast Action on Efficient Cooling signed in 2019. \r The policy development and implementation costs will be reduced as \r the technical analysis leading to the standard could be shared among \r governments. However, it is important that local small manufacturing \r companies in developing countries have the capacity to invest in \r [...]"


id: 88d9ce1093cda797e14f69ebdec0c8d0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21241
content:
"[...] updating production lines for meeting new stringent international \r efficiency requirements. "


id: 27b67ef4c24ba847137a50ac7e59a1ed
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4172
content:
"Building energy consumption is dependent on local climate and \r building construction traditions, regional and local government \r share an important role in promoting energy efficiency in buildings \r and on-site RES, through local building energy codes, constructions \r permits and urban planning. In South Korea, there is a green building \r certification system operated by the government, based on this, \r Seoul has enacted Seoul's building standard, which includes more \r stringent requirements. Where it is difficult to retrofit existing \r buildings, for example, historical buildings, cities may impose target \r at district level, where RES could be shared among buildings with \r energy positive buildings compensating for energy consuming \r buildings. Local climate and urban plans could also contribute to \r the integration of the building sector with the local transport, water, \r and energy sectors, requiring, for example, new constructions in \r [...]"


id: dbed9b236e761e97575886dd3be637de
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35977
content:
"[...] areas served by public transport, close to offices or buildings to be \r ready for e-mobility. Buildings GHG emission reduction shall also \r be considered in greenfield and brownfield developments and urban \r expansion (Loo et al. 2017; Salviati and Ricciardo Lamonica 2020), \r including co-benefits (Zapata-Diomedi et al. 2019)."


id: cdeefe9ace7b6b7dab649a2767e48439
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33565
content:
"International agreements (Kyoto, Montreal/Kigali, Paris, etc.) play an \r important role in establishing national energy-efficiency and renewable \r energy policies in several countries (Dhar et al. 2018; Bertoldi 2018). \r Under the Paris Agreement, some NDCs contain emission reduction \r targets for subsectors, for example, buildings, policies for subsectors \r and energy efficiency and/or renewable targets (see also Cross\u0002Chapter Box 5 in Chapter 4). In the EU since 2007 climate and energy \r policies are part of a co-ordinated policy package. EU Member States \r have prepared energy efficiency plans every three years and long-term \r renovation strategies for buildings (Economidou et al. 2020). Under \r the new Energy and Climate Governance Regulation EU Member \r States have submitted at the end of 2020 integrated National Energy \r and Climate Plans, including energy efficiency and renewable plans. \r (Oberthur 2019; Schlacke and Knodt 2019). The integration of energy \r [...]"


id: 6720700e2e52b41adf014c195ead51e7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15420
content:
"construction companies; equipment manufacturers; utilities, \r etc.), several studies highlighted the importance of stakeholder \r consultation and active participation in policy making and policy \r implementation (Vasileiadou and Tuinstra 2013; Ingold et  al. \r 2020), including voluntary commitments and citizen assemblies. \r In particular, energy user's role will be transformed from passive role \r to an active role, as outlined in the concept of energy citizenship \r (Campos and Marin-Gonzalez 2020). The energy citizens need \r and voice should therefore be included in policy processes among \r traditional business players, such as incumbent centralised power \r generation companies and utilities (Van Veelen 2018). Architects and \r engineers play an important role in the decarbonisation of buildings. \r The professional bodies can mandate their members support energy \r efficiency and sufficiency. For example, the US AIA states in their \r [...]"


id: a8ab91735f63bbb46c22bc0131ec8dc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26881
content:
"[...] code of ethics that architects must inform clients of climate risks and \r opportunities for sustainability. The capacity and quality of workforce \r and building construction, retrofit, and service firms are essential to \r execute the fast transition in building systems (Cross-Chapter Box 12 \r in Chapter 16)."


id: 60d6116d623d25b43655ca4765bdf338
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14337
content:
"The concept of institutional capacity is increasingly connected with \r the issue of public governance, emphasising the broad institutional \r context within which individual policies are adopted. Institutions \r are durable and are sources of authority (formal or informal) \r structuring repeated interactions of individuals, companies, civil \r society groups, governments, and other entities. Thus, institutional \r capacity also represents a  broader 'enabling environment' which \r forms the basis upon which individuals and organisations interact. \r In general terms, capacity is 'the ability to perform functions, solve \r problems and set and achieve objectives' (Fukuda-Parr et al. 2002). \r Institutional capacity is an important element for regional sustainable \r development (Farajirad et  al. 2015). The role and importance of \r institutional capacity is fundamental in implementing the building \r decarbonisation. Central and local governments, regulatory \r [...]"


id: f2c319d533debe96fcf18898f4c2407e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40111
content:
"[...] organisations, financial institutions, standardisation bodies, test \r laboratories, building construction and design companies, qualified \r workforce and stakeholders are key players in supporting the \r implementation of building decarbonisation. "


id: c9043fbe9997244054c2e337337d2e5c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32685
content:
"Governments (from national to local) planning to introduce \r efficiency, RES, and sufficiency policies needs technical capacity \r to set sectoral targets and design policies and introduce effective \r and enforcement with adequate structure and resources for their \r implementation. Policies discussed and agreed with stakeholders \r and based on impartial data and impact assessments, have a higher \r possibility of success. Public authorities need technical and economics \r competences to understand complex technical issues and eliminate \r the knowledge gap in comparison to private sector experts, human \r and financial resources to design, implement, revise, and evaluate \r policies. The role of energy efficiency policy evaluation needs to be \r expanded, including the assessment of the rebound effect (Vine \r et  al. 2013). For developing countries international support for \r institutional capacity for policy development, implementation and \r [...]"


id: 46787a10b4ac6a782087292a71bd88e2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9610
content:
"[...] evaluation is of key importance for testing laboratory, standards \r institute, enforcement and compliances technicians and evaluation "


id: e2b5c66ea9f174fd7d3b3e0b49d44bd1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37188
content:
"Mitigation actions in buildings generate multiple co-benefits (e.g.,  health benefits due to the improved indoor and outdoor \r conditions, productivity gains in non-residential buildings, creation of new jobs particularly at local level, improvements in social \r well-being etc.) beyond their direct impact on reducing energy consumption and GHG emissions. Most studies agree that the value \r of these multiple benefits is greater than the value of energy savings and their inclusion in economic evaluation of mitigation \r actions may improve substantially their cost-effectiveness. It is also worth mentioning that in several cases the buildings sector \r is characterised by strong rebound effects, which could be considered as a co-benefit in cases where the mechanisms involved \r provide faster access to affordable energy but also a trade-off in cases where the external costs of increased energy consumption \r [...]"


id: 6f6152b4bcad782cdf8bd100f30a3e3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16858
content:
"[...] exceed the welfare benefits of the increased energy service consumption, thus lowering the economic performance of mitigation \r actions. The magnitude of these co-benefits and trade-offs are characterised by several uncertainties, which may be even higher in \r the future as mitigation actions will be implemented in a changing climate, with changing building operation style and occupant \r behaviour. Mitigation measures influence the degree of vulnerability of buildings to future climate change. For instance, temperature \r rise can increase energy consumption, which may lead to higher GHG emissions. Also, sea level rise, increased storms and rainfall \r under future climate may impact building structure, materials and components, resulting in increased energy consumption and \r household expenditure from producing and installing new components and making renovations. Well-planned energy efficiency, \r [...]"


id: cb1fd603aa349db843d3e00648f45777
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33077
content:
"[...] sufficiency and on-site renewable energy production can help to increase building resilience to climate change impacts and reduce \r adaptation needs."


id: 3cd03b864f8681e10f21968428e1771b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7884
content:
"Several barriers (information, financing, markets, behavioural, etc.) still prevents the decarbonisation of buildings stock, despite \r the several co-benefits, including large energy savings. Solutions include investments in technological solutions (e.g., insulation, \r efficient equipment, and low-carbon energies and renewable energies) and lifestyle changes. In addition, the concept of sufficiency \r is suggested to be promoted and implemented through policies and information, as technological solutions will be not enough to \r decarbonise the building sector. Due to the different types of buildings, occupants, and development stage there is not a single policy, \r which alone will reach the building decarbonisation target. A range of policy instruments ranging from regulatory measures such \r as building energy code for NZEBs and appliance standards, to market-based instruments (carbon tax, personal carbon allowance, \r [...]"


id: 456e5006ea7e707312b2bf603754ba68
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9434
content:
"[...] renewable portfolio standards, etc.) and information. Financing (grants, loans, performance base incentives, pays as you save, etc.) is \r another key enabler for energy efficiency technologies and on-site renewables. Finally, effective governance and strong institutional \r capacity are key to have an effective and successful implementation of policies and financing."


id: 57633881def8a9750b22c74c03336626
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12634
content:
"In 1992, a first EU law (Save Directive) encouraged EU Member States (MSs) to adopt energy performance standards in building \r energy codes, this resulted in mix action by MSs, with only a few adopting stringent energy performances requirements. To reinforce \r the action by MSs and align it, in 2002 the EU adopted the Energy Performance Buildings Directive (EPBD 2002), requiring MSs to \r adopt minimum efficiency performance standards for buildings according to a common methodology both for new and existing \r buildings, when undergoing major renovation (Bertoldi 2019). The EPBD is a regulatory measure, with its implementation left to \r individual MSs. This has resulted in very different levels of stringency among MSs. In addition, the enforcement of control on the \r application of the energy performance requirements is left to national authorities and finally delegated to local authorities, who \r [...]"


id: fecbef612839f182c57b4f6d2bdb719f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42221
content:
"[...] may lack the technical knowledge or manpower to check compliance with legal requirements. This has resulted in low compliance \r with normative requirements in many MSs. The 2002 EPBD has also introduce the obligation to show an energy performance \r certificate when a building is sold or rented (information policy) (Li et al. 2019a). In 2010, the EPBD was amended by introducing the \r requirements for MSs to set the national energy requirement for new and existing buildings at the cost-optimal level and providing \r a common methodology for calculating it (Zangheri et al. 2018; Corgnati et al. 2013). The 2010 EPBD introduced the requirement for \r all new buildings to be nearly zero energy (nZEBs) by 2021, however definitions of nZEBs are again left to EU Member States, which \r have different requirements for energy consumption limits and contribution of renewables (Attia et al. 2017; Grove-Smith et al. 2018; \r [...]"


id: fb61f5fb7a5d1149931359193580a779
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41600
content:
"[...] D'Agostino and Mazzarella 2019; Economidou et al. 2020). In 2018 the latest amendment of the EPBD introduced the requirements \r for MSs to prepare Long-Term Renovation Strategies (LTRSs) with an overarching decarbonisation target of the national building stock \r by 2050. In late 2021 the Commission will propose a new amendment to align it with the new -55% GHG target for 2030 and the \r decarbonisation goal of 2050."


id: beace37f458a8a920ba87d4b2862c868
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30811
content:
"The 2012 Energy Efficiency Directive (EED) requested MSs: to adopt smart meters and smart billing and to charge consumers on their \r real heating energy consumption, to remove the split-incentive barriers, to foster energy efficient procurement by public authorities, \r to renovate each year at least 3% of the building stock of central governments. Article 7 of the EED established the obligation for \r MSs  to set up mandatory obligation for energy companies to save at least 1.5% of their energy sales by implementing energy \r efficiency actions in end-users, including measure on buildings (Fawcett et al. 2019 or alternative policy measures delivering the same \r amount of energy savings (Rosenow and Bayer 2017). The EED encourages the setting up of financing programmes for the renovation \r of buildings. MSs have implemented a number of financial mechanisms such as low interest loans, grants, guarantees funds, revolving \r [...]"


id: 66b2b3e55acdfff23fd32ec241aebc9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15329
content:
"[...] funds and so on (Bertoldi 2020). Moreover, the EU Regional and Cohesion Funds are also used by MSs for the renovation of existing \r buildings. Some of the instruments used at national level to finance the renovation of dwellings occupied by low-income families \r result from the auctioning of allowances under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, which is used in some MSs."


id: 8cd83d98db0629d44e4a0534724607f1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21966
content:
"Despite the comprehensiveness of the EU policy package, the monitoring of the progress made in reducing GHG from the EU \r building stock shows that the EU would miss its buildings' decarbonisation target for 2050. The following issues were identified as \r major obstacles to Europe's decarbonisation strategy of the building stock. The inconsistencies between the overarching target of a \r decarbonised building stock by 2050 and the energy requirement in case of major renovation of existing buildings. Both requirements \r are included in the EPBD. As of today, there is enough evidence about the lock-in effect of the renovation requirements included in the \r EPBD. The complexity, and sometimes the impossibility, of bundling public finance targeting GHG mitigation of buildings, with private \r finance. The Smart Finance for Smart Building (SFSB) initiative addresses this issue only partially. The lack of rigorous monitoring, \r [...]"


id: 2eb762e50e52ac72f02efe510eb6c788
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5497
content:
"[...] verification and enforcement (MV&E) for both buildings (including the Energy Performance Gap) and appliances performances, which \r reduce the level of expected savings. There is no concrete measure to avoid the direct rebound effect and the current energy prices \r are relatively low. In addition, there are no specific policies and measures at EU level to address energy sufficiency. Regulations and \r technical standards do not include the lifecycle CO2 emissions in the performance of the buildings. The complexity of the governance \r structure at different levels (EU, National, Regional and Local), with many options left to individual MSs, for example the definition \r of 'near zero energy buildings' (nZEBs). The complexity of managing several instruments, often dealt by different national ministries \r and departments (industry, environment, construction, urbanisation, etc.) and, finally, the disconnect between high-level EU targets \r [...]"


id: 6dd6bb8c1cd4f6d70f94c90c8beda8b4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16588
content:
"[...] and the lack of ambition of individual policies, which makes the decarbonisation of the EU building stock more challenging. The \r 2020 Renovation Wave Communication addresses the above issues, in particular on financing renovation of buildings. As indicated \r the planned revision of the EPBD and EED in 2021 will partly address the above shortcoming, by addressing the new 2030 target \r and climate neutrality at 2050. Moreover, the EU financing instrument for the post-Covid recovery, the 'EU Next Generation', has \r earmarked funding for the climate transition, including building renovations. EU MSs have to prepare national Resilience and Recovery \r Plans. In addition, the EU launched the New Bauhaus Initiative, which aims to change and improve EU citizens daily life in buildings \r by creating a new lifestyle that matches sustainability, low carbon and affordability with good design. Finally, the EU Commission has \r proposed to extend the EU Emission Trading Systems to buildings."


id: d15f514afcd0bf6fdec5127c1eb7bfe7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34188
content:
"Since the IPCC's Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) there has been \r a growing awareness of the need for demand management \r solutions combined with new technologies, such as the \r rapidly growing use of electromobility for land transport and \r the emerging options in advanced biofuels and hydrogen\u0002based fuels for shipping and aviation. There is a  growing \r need for systemic infrastructure changes that enable behavioural \r modifications and reductions in demand for transport services that \r can in turn reduce energy demand. The response to the COVID-19 \r pandemic has also shown that behavioural interventions can reduce \r transport-related GHG emissions. For example, COVID-19-based \r lockdowns have confirmed the transformative value of telecommuting \r replacing significant numbers of work and personal journeys as well \r as promoting local active transport. There are growing opportunities \r to implement strategies that drive behavioural change and support \r [...]"


id: c7d51f8fbfc9a8bd7add8b3ecf68d85
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32462
content:
"Land-based, long-range, heavy-duty trucks can be decarbonised \r through battery electric haulage (including the use of electric \r road systems), complemented by hydrogen- and biofuel\u0002based fuels in some contexts (medium confidence). These \r same technologies and expanded use of available electric rail \r systems can support rail decarbonisation (medium confidence).\r Initial deployments of battery electric, hydrogen- and bio-based \r haulage are underway, and commercial operations of some of these \r technologies are considered feasible by 2030 (medium confidence). \r These technologies nevertheless face challenges regarding driving \r range, capital and operating costs, and infrastructure availability. In \r particular, fuel cell durability, high energy consumption, and costs \r continue to challenge the commercialisation of hydrogen-based fuel \r cell vehicles. Increased capacity for low-carbon hydrogen production \r would also be essential for hydrogen-based fuels to serve as an \r [...]"


id: 9f486eb99760aad6ff1e23b6f53052b7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25249
content:
"Changes in urban form, behaviour programmes, the circular \r economy, the shared economy, and digitalisation trends \r can support systemic changes that lead to reductions in \r demand for transport services or expand the use of more \r efficient transport modes (high confidence). Cities can reduce \r their transport-related fuel consumption by around 25% through \r combinations of more compact land use and the provision of less \r car-dependent transport infrastructure. Appropriate infrastructure, \r including protected pedestrian and bike pathways, can also support \r much greater localised active travel.1\r  Transport demand management \r incentives are expected to be necessary to support these systemic \r changes (high confidence). There is mixed evidence of the effect \r of circular economy initiatives, shared economy initiatives, and \r digitalisation on demand for transport services. For example, while \r dematerialisation can reduce the amount of material that needs \r [...]"


id: 1f07a4d72860cf8379a2c67aed2cb445
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2661
content:
"[...] to be transported to manufacturing facilities, an increase in online \r shopping with priority delivery can increase demand for freight \r transport. Similarly, while teleworking could reduce travel demand, \r increased ridesharing could increase vehicle-km travelled. {Chapter 1, \r Chapter 5, 10.2, 10.8}"


id: cb025a0a43c612ca74db72ef9dfa3c51
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33057
content:
"Decarbonisation options for shipping and aviation still require \r R&D, though advanced biofuels, ammonia, and synthetic fuels \r are emerging as viable options (medium confidence). Increased \r efficiency has been insufficient to limit the emissions from shipping \r and aviation, and natural gas-based fuels are likely inadequate \r to meet stringent decarbonisation goals for these segments (high \r confidence). High energy density, low-carbon fuels are required, but \r they have not yet reached commercial scale. Advanced biofuels could \r provide low-carbon jet fuel (medium confidence). The production of \r synthetic fuels using low-carbon hydrogen with CO2 captured through \r direct air capture (DAC) or bioenergy with carbon capture and storage \r (BECCS) could provide jet and marine fuels but these options still \r require demonstration at scale (low confidence). Ammonia produced \r with low-carbon hydrogen could also serve as a marine fuel (medium \r [...]"


id: 48879f2a6c71270c0c04c76960b59421
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9974
content:
"[...] confidence). Deployment of these fuels requires reductions in \r production costs. {10.2, 10.3, 10.4, 10.5, 10.6, 10.8}"


id: ccdf0fc58cd4bbf3045c8768395cde8a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33381
content:
"Scenarios from bottom-up and top-down models indicate that \r without intervention, CO2 emissions from transport could grow \r in the range of 16% and 50% by 2050 (medium confidence). The \r scenarios literature projects continued growth in demand for freight \r and passenger services, particularly in developing countries in Africa \r and Asia (high confidence). This growth is projected to take place \r across all transport modes. Increases in demand notwithstanding, \r scenarios that limit warming to 1.5degC with no or limited overshoot \r suggest that a  59% reduction (42-68% interquartile range) in \r transport-related CO2 emissions by 2050, compared to modelled \r 2020 levels is required. While many global scenarios place greater \r reliance on emissions reduction in sectors other than transport, \r a  quarter of the 1.5degC degree scenarios describe transport-related \r CO2 emissions reductions in excess of 68% (relative to modelled \r [...]"


id: 3dc8293f6e183f235d01ffee00ec193e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8034
content:
"[...] 2020 levels) (medium confidence). Illustrative mitigation pathways \r 1.5 renewables (REN) and 1.5 low demand (LD) describe emission \r reductions of 80% and 90% in the transport sector, respectively, \r by 2050. Transport-related emission reductions, however, may not \r happen uniformly across regions. For example, transport emissions \r from the Developed Countries and Eastern European and West\u0002Central Asian countries decrease from 2020 levels by 2050 across \r all scenarios compatible with a 1.5degC goal (C1-C2 group), but could \r increase in Africa, Asia and Pacific, Latin America and Caribbean, and \r the Middle East in some of these scenarios.2\r  {10.7}"


id: 15bb28ceeab2df7e00ceecc91f587c57
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1038
content:
"Legislated climate strategies are emerging at all levels \r of government and, together with pledges for personal \r choices, could spur the deployment of demand- and supply\u0002side transport mitigation strategies (medium confidence).\r At the local level, legislation can support local transport plans \r that include commitments or pledges from local institutions to \r encourage behaviour change by adopting an organisational culture \r that motivates sustainable behaviour, with inputs from the creative \r arts. Such institution-led mechanisms could include bike-to-work \r campaigns, free transport passes, parking charges, or eliminating car \r benefits. Community-based solutions like solar sharing, community \r charging, and mobility as a service can generate new opportunities to \r facilitate low-carbon transport futures. At the regional and national \r levels, legislation can include vehicle and fuel efficiency standards, \r R&D support, and large-scale investments in low-carbon transport \r [...]"


id: 5bbe5b9a411042a622705a650e3df325
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13399
content:
"As of 2019, the largest source of transport emissions is the movement \r of passengers and freight in road transport (6.1 GtCO2-eq, 69% of the \r sector's total). International shipping is the second largest emission \r source, contributing 0.8 GtCO2-eq (9% of the sector's total), and \r international aviation is third with 0.6 GtCO2-eq (7% of the sector's \r total). All other transport emissions sources, including rail, have \r been relatively trivial in comparison, totalling 1.4 GtCO2-eq in 2019. \r Between 2010 and 2019, international aviation had among the fastest \r growing GHG emissions among all segments (+3.4% per year), while \r road transport remained one of the fastest growing (+1.7% per year) \r among all global energy-using sectors. Note that the COVID-19-\r induced economic lockdowns implemented since 2020 have had \r a very substantial impact on transport emissions - higher than any \r other sector (Chapter  2). Preliminary estimates from Crippa et  al. \r [...]"


id: e71e46404035b64694d3af3155e012b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37959
content:
"[...] (2021) suggest that global transport CO2 emissions declined to \r 7.6 GtCO2 in 2020, a reduction of 11.6% compared to 2019 (Crippa \r et al. 2021; Minx et al. 2021). These lockdowns affected all transport \r segments, and particularly international aviation (estimated 45% \r reduction in 2020 global CO2 emissions), road transport (-10%), and \r domestic aviation (-9.3%). By comparison, aggregate CO2 emissions \r across all sectors are estimated to have declined by 5.1% as a result \r of the COVID-19 pandemic (Section 2.2.2)."


id: c67fe6dae5a0ac2ddc5f7403288d0118
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
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vector_id: 32229
content:
"On-road passenger and freight vehicles dominate global transport\u0002related CO2 emissions and offer the largest mitigation potential (Taptich \r et al. 2016; Halim et al. 2018). This chapter examines a wide range \r of possible transport emission reduction strategies. These strategies \r can be categorised under the 'Avoid-Shift-Improve' (ASI) framework \r described in Chapter 5 (Taptich et al. 2016). 'Avoid' strategies reduce \r total vehicle travel. They include compact communities and other \r policies that minimise travel distances and promote efficient transport \r through pricing and demand management programmes. 'Shift' \r strategies shift travel from higher-emitting to lower-emitting modes. \r These strategies include more multimodal planning that improves \r active and collective transport modes, complete streets roadway \r design, high occupant vehicle priority strategies that favour shared \r modes, Mobility as a Service (MaaS), and multimodal navigation and \r [...]"


id: 1d5dc03152671587777ec1b0d847440b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2348
content:
"[...] payment apps. 'Improve' strategies reduce per-kilometre emission \r rates. These strategies include hybrid and electric vehicle incentives, \r lower-carbon and cleaner fuels, high-emitting vehicle scrappage \r programmes, and efficient driving and anti-idling campaigns (Lutsey \r and Sperling 2012; Gota et al. 2015). These topics are assessed within \r the rest of this chapter, including how combinations of ASI with new \r technologies can potentially lead from incremental interventions \r into low-carbon transformative transport improvements that include \r social and equity benefits (Section 10.8)."


id: d9a5ab6cd1f6acca87ad018c95e4d087
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35588
content:
"Available evidence suggests that transport-related CO2 emissions \r would need to be restricted to about 2 to 3 Gt in 2050 (1.5degC \r scenario-1.5DS, B2DS), or about 70 to 80% below 2015 levels, to meet \r the goals set in the Paris Agreement. It also indicates that a balanced \r and inter-modal application of Avoid, Shift, and Improve measures is \r capable of yielding an estimated reduction in transport emissions of \r 2.39 GtCO2-equivalent by 2030 and 5.74 GtCO2-equivalent by 2050 \r (IPCC 2018; Gota et al. 2019). Such a transformative decarbonisation \r of the global transport system requires, in addition to technological \r changes, a  paradigm shift that ensures prioritisation of high\u0002accessibility transport solutions that minimise the amount of mobility \r required to meet people's needs, and favours transit and active \r transport modes (Lee and Handy 2018; SLoCaT 2021). These changes \r are sometimes called disruptive as they are frequently surprising in \r [...]"


id: 27f811cf4afe164fb862e27e0aaa6e15
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4228
content:
"Climate change impacts such as extremely high temperatures, intense \r rainfall leading to flooding, more intense winds and/or storms, and \r sea level rise can seriously impact transport infrastructure, operations, \r and mobility for road, rail, shipping, and aviation. Studies since AR5 \r confirm that serious challenges to all transport infrastructures are \r increasing, with consequent delays or derailing (Miao et  al. 2018; \r Moretti and Loprencipe 2018; Perez-Morales et al. 2019; Palin et al. \r 2021). These impacts have been increasingly documented but, \r according to Forzieri et  al. (2018), little is known about the risks \r of multiple climate extremes on critical infrastructures at local to \r continental scales. All roads, bridges, rail systems, and ports are likely \r to be affected to some extent. Flexible pavements are particularly \r vulnerable to extreme high temperatures that can cause permanent \r deformation and crumbling of asphalt (Underwood et al. 2017; Qiao \r [...]"


id: 735cdf69b9b532bad5a3dab9666ea48e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17549
content:
"[...] et al. 2019). Rail systems are also vulnerable, with a variety of hazards, \r both meteorological and non-meteorological, affecting railway asset \r lifetimes. Severe impacts on railway infrastructure and operations \r can arise from the occurrence of temperatures below freezing, excess \r precipitation, storms and wildfires (Thaduri et al. 2020; Palin et al. \r 2021) as can impacts on underground transport systems (Forero\u0002Ortiz et al. 2020)."


id: bd2aaf0ec58300c7e750197e8229e97c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30535
content:
"The assessment of transport innovations and their mitigation potentials \r is at the core of how this chapter examines the possibilities for changing \r transport-related GHG trajectories. The transport technology innovation \r literature analysed in this chapter emphasises how a  mixture of \r mitigation technology options and social changes are now converging \r and how, in combination, they may have potential to accelerate trends \r toward a low-carbon transport transition. Such changes are considered \r disruptive or transformative (Sprei 2018). Of the current transport \r trends covered in the literature, this chapter focuses on three key \r technology and policy areas: electro-mobility in land-based transport \r vehicles, new fuels for ships and planes, and overall demand reductions \r and efficiency. These strategies are seen as being necessary to integrate \r at all levels of governance and, in combination with the creation of \r [...]"


id: 19141cd94b20da7e7f88f522a720c9d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1628
content:
"[...] fast, extensive, and affordable multimodal public transport networks, \r can help achieve multiple advantages in accordance with SDGs"


id: 9cf3defb5983bd460d7144d566c3c1bb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24850
content:
"Since AR5 there has been a growing awareness of the potential and \r actual impacts from global sea level rise due to climate change on \r transport systems (Dawson et al. 2016; Rasmussen et al. 2018; IPCC \r 2019; Noland et al. 2019), particularly on port facilities (Stephenson \r et al. 2018; Yang et al. 2018b; Perez-Morales et al. 2019). Similarly, \r recent studies suggest changes in global jet streams could affect \r the aviation sector (Staples et al. 2018; Becken and Shuker 2019), \r and extreme weather conditions can affect runways (heat buckling) \r and aircraft lift. Combined, climate impacts on aviation could result \r in payload restrictions and disruptions (Coffel et al. 2017; Monioudi \r et  al. 2018). According to Williams (2017), studies have indicated \r that the amount of moderate-or-greater clear-air turbulence on \r transatlantic flight routes in winter will increase significantly in \r the future as the climate changes. More research is needed to fully \r [...]"


id: 1119af0fd95c6d7e401884e000451967
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 203
content:
"Since AR5, urban design has increasingly been seen as a  major \r way to influence the GHG emissions from urban transport systems. \r Indeed, research suggests that implementing urban form changes \r could reduce GHG emissions from urban transport by 25% in \r 2050, compared with a business-as-usual scenario (Creutzig et al. \r 2015b; Creutzig 2016). Researchers have identified a  variety \r of variables to study the relationship between urban form and \r transport-related GHG emissions. Three notable aspects summarise \r these relationships: urban space utilisation, urban spatial form, \r and urban transportation infrastructure (Tian et  al. 2020). Urban \r density (population or employment density) and land-use mix \r define the urban space utilisation. Increases in urban density and \r mixed function can effectively reduce per capita car use by reducing \r the number of trips and shortening travel distances. Similarly, the \r continuity of urban space and the dispersion of centres reduces \r [...]"


id: 1f5d05e86301718738274b3e2f40cbef
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2722
content:
"[...] travel distances (Tian et al. 2020), though such changes are rarely \r achieved without shifting transport infrastructure investments \r away from road capacity increases (Newman and Kenworthy 2015; \r McIntosh et al. 2017). For example, increased investment in public \r transport coverage, optimal transfer plans, shorter transit travel \r time, and improved transit travel efficiency make public transit more \r attractive (Heinen et al. 2017; Nugroho et al. 2018a; Nugroho et al. \r 2018b) and hence increase density and land values (Sharma and \r Newman 2020). Similarly, forgoing the development of major roads \r for the development of pedestrian and bike pathways enhances the \r attractiveness of active transport modes (Zahabi et al. 2016; Keall \r et al. 2018; Tian et al. 2020)."


id: 185bbe50c42de4adff989498e60e124c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1495
content:
"There is evidence that suggests decoupling of transport emissions and \r economic growth is already happening in developed and developing \r countries. Europe and China have shown the most dramatic changes \r (Huizenga et  al. 2015; Gao and Newman 2018; SLoCaT 2018b) \r and many cities are demonstrating decoupling of transport-related \r emissions through new net zero urban economic activity (Loo and \r Banister 2016; SLoCaT 2018a). A continued and accelerated \r decoupling of the growth of transport-related GHG emissions from \r economic growth is crucial for meeting the SDGs, as outlined in \r Section 10.1. This section focuses on several overlapping components \r of systemic change in the transport sector that affect the drivers of \r GHG emissions: urban form, physical geography, and infrastructure; \r behaviour and mode choice; and new demand concepts. Table 10.3 \r at the end of the section provides a high-level summary of the effect \r [...]"


id: 41c7adeefcc580ff696c80e53fbbd9c0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8770
content:
"Global emissions trajectories of urban transport will be decided in rapidly urbanising Asia and Africa. Urban transport-related GHG \r emissions are driven by incomes and car ownership but there is considerable variation among cities with similar income and car ownership \r levels (Newman and Kenworthy 2015). While electrification is a key strategy to decarbonise urban transport, urban infrastructures can \r make a difference of up to a factor of 10 in energy use and induced GHG emissions (Erdogan 2020). Ongoing urbanisation patterns \r risk future lock-in of induced demand on GHG emissions, constraining lifestyles to energy-intensive and high CO2-related technologies \r (Erickson and Tempest 2015; Seto et al. 2016) (Sections 5.4, 8.2.3 and 10.2.1). Instead, climate solutions can be locked into urban policies \r and infrastructures (Urge-Vorsatz et al. 2018) especially through the enhancement of the walking and transit urban fabric. Avoiding urban \r [...]"


id: b49f18c6663ff70b153b704e8963ca68
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29029
content:
"[...] sprawl, associated with several externalities (Dieleman and Wegener 2004), is a necessary decarbonisation condition, and can be guided \r macro-economically by increasing fuel prices and marginal costs of motorised transport (Creutzig 2014). Resulting urban forms not only \r reduce GHG emission from transport but also from buildings, as greater compactness results in reduced thermal loss (Borck and Brueckner \r 2018). Health benefits from reduced car dependence are an increasing element driving this policy agenda (Speck 2018) (Section 10.8)."


id: 2f88ea63ee22a4edba9da1741c6a77d4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5625
content:
"Shift: mode choice for urban and intercity transport. Shifting \r demand patterns (as opposed to avoiding demand) can be particularly \r important in decarbonising the transport sector. As a  result, the \r cross-elasticity of demand across transport modes is of particular \r interest for understanding the opportunities for modal shift. The \r cross-elasticity represents the demand effect on mode i (e.g., bus) \r when an attribute of mode j (e.g., rail) changes marginally. Studies \r on the cross-elasticities of mode choice for urban travel suggest that \r the cross-elasticity for car demand is low, but the cross-elasticities of \r walking, bus, and rail with respect to cars are relatively large (Fearnley \r et al. 2017; Wardman et al. 2018). In practice, these cross-elasticities \r suggest that car drivers are not very responsive to increased prices \r for public transit, but transit users are responsive to reductions in the \r [...]"


id: 1006c9dc4ec8891e2853ef9b89fd0ae3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:16
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:16
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4
content:
"[...] cost of driving. When looking at the cross-elasticities of public transit \r options (bus vs metro vs rail), research suggests that consumers are \r particularly sensitive to in-vehicle and waiting time when choosing \r public transit modes (Fearnley et  al. 2018). These general results \r provide additional evidence that increasing the use of active and \r public transport requires interventions that make car use more \r expensive while making public transit more convenient (e.g., smart \r apps that tell the user the exact time for transit arrival (Box 10.1))."


id: ec742d94bb4e7b4eb1299eab3c922d81
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:16
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:16
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38959
content:
"The price elasticity of demand measures changes in demand as \r a result of changes in the prices of the services. In a meta-analysis of \r the price elasticity of energy demand, Labandeira et al. (2017) report \r the average long-term price elasticity of demand for gasoline and \r diesel to be -0.773 and -0.443, respectively. That is, demand will \r decline with increasing prices. A similar analysis of long-term data in \r the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), Sweden, Australia, \r and Germany reports the gasoline price elasticity of demand for car \r travel (as measured through vehicle-kilometre - vkm - per capita) \r ranges between -0.1 and -0.4 (Bastian et al. 2016). For rail travel, \r the price elasticity of demand has been found to range between \r -1.05 and -1.1 (Zeng et al. 2021). Similarly, price elasticities for air \r travel range from -0.53 to -1.91 depending on various factors such \r as purpose of travel (business or leisure), season, and month and day \r [...]"


id: c0aba458326b7cdb7ec1ba8c04aabd1a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:16
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:16
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31197
content:
"[...] of departure (Morlotti et al. 2017). The price elasticities of demand \r suggest that car use is inelastic to prices, while train use is relatively \r inelastic to the cost of using rail. Conversely, consumers seem to be \r more responsive to the cost of flying, so that strategies that increase \r the cost of flying are likely to contribute to some avoidance of \r aviation-related GHG emissions."


id: ec9b8952415e01777d66dae9881e1831
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:16
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:16
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38986
content:
"The literature on mode competition for intercity travel reveals that \r while cost of travel is a significant factor (Zhang et al. 2017), sensitivity \r decreases with increasing income as well as when the cost of the \r trip was paid by someone else (Capurso et al. 2019). Some research \r suggests little competition between bus and air travel but the cross\u0002elasticity between air and rail suggest strong interactions (Wardman \r et  al. 2018). Price reduction strategies such as discounted rail fares \r could enhance the switch from air travel to high-speed rail. Both air \r fares and flight frequency impact high-speed rail (HSR) usage (Zhang \r et al. 2019b). Airline companies reduce fares on routes that are directly \r competing with HSR (Bergantino et al. 2018a) and charge high fares \r on non-HSR routes (Xia and Zhang 2016). On the Rome to Milan route, \r better frequency and connections, and low costs of HSR resulting from \r competition between HSR companies have significantly reduced air \r [...]"


id: fdbf0958f1c95c34276feb084bf92607
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:16
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:16
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42003
content:
"Improve: consumer preferences for improved and alternative \r vehicles. While reductions in demand for travel and changes in \r mode choice can contribute to reducing GHG emissions from the \r transport sector, cars are likely to continue to play a prominent role. \r As a  result, improving the performance of cars will be crucial for \r the decarbonisation of the transport sector. Sections 10.3 and 10.4 \r describe the technological options available for reduced CO2 emissions \r from vehicles. The effectiveness in deploying such technologies will \r partly depend on consumer preferences and their effect on adoption \r rates. Given the expanded availability of electric vehicles, there is also \r a growing body of work on the drivers of vehicle choice. A survey in \r Nanjing found women had more diverse travel purposes than men, \r resulting in a  greater acceptance of electric bikes (Lin et  al. 2017). \r Individuals are more likely to adopt an electric vehicle (EV) when they \r [...]"


id: d6064b2e79c788638b912f090a888317
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:16
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:16
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34972
content:
"[...] think this adoption benefits the environment or implies a  positive \r personal attribute (Noppers et al. 2014; Noppers et al. 2015; Haustein \r and Jensen 2018). Other work suggests that people's preference for EVs \r depends upon vehicle attributes, infrastructure availability, and policies \r that promote EV adoption, specifically, purchasing and operating costs, \r driving range, charging duration, vehicle performance, and brand \r diversity (Liao et  al. 2016). Behaviour change to enable transport \r transformations will need to make the most of these factors while also \r working on the more structural issues of time, space, and cost."


id: d8599903f73ce393fdac64f48c019b9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:16
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:16
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35364
content:
"There is growing evidence that this more structured form of behavioural \r change through shared economy practices, supported by a larger group \r than a single family, has a much greater potential to save transport \r emissions, especially when complemented with decarbonised grid \r electricity (Greenblatt and Shaheen 2015; Sharp 2018). Carpooling, \r for example, could result in an 11% reduction in vehicle-kilometres \r and a 12% reduction in emissions, as carpooling requires less empty \r or non-productive passenger-kilometres (pkm) (ITF 2020a; ITF 2020b). \r However, the use of local shared mobility systems such as on-demand \r transport may create more transport emissions if there is an overall \r modal shift out of transit (ITF 2018a; Schaller 2018). Similarly, some \r work suggests that commercial shared vehicle services such as Uber \r and Lyft are leading to increased vehicle km travelled (and associated \r GHG emissions) in part due to deadheading (Schaller 2018; Tirachini \r [...]"


id: 2d17bc1e0d045cd0e296a4fde99f6f98
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:16
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:16
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5214
content:
"[...] and Gomez-Lobo 2020; Ward et al. 2021). Successful providers compete \r by optimising personal comfort and convenience rather than enabling \r a sharing culture (Eckhardt and Bardhi 2015), and concerns have been \r raised regarding the wider societal impacts of these systems and for \r specific user groups such as older people (Fitt 2018; Marsden 2018). \r Concerns have also been expressed over the financial viability of demand\u0002responsive transport systems (Ryley et al. 2014; Marsden 2018), how \r the mainstreaming of shared mobility systems can be institutionalised \r equitably, and the operation and governance of existing systems that \r are only mode- and operator-focused (Akyelken et al. 2018; Jittrapirom \r et al. 2018; Pangbourne et al. 2020; Marsden 2018)."


id: 5edae23eae968f88ab29cd64d3be6c58
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:16
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:16
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13981
content:
"Circular economy. The problem of resources and their environmental \r impacts is driving the move to a  circular economy (Bleischwitz \r et al. 2017). Circular economy principles include increased material \r efficiency, reusing or extending product lifetimes, recycling, and \r green logistics. Dematerialisation, the reduction in the quantity of the \r materials used in the production of one unit of output, is a circular \r economy principle that can affect the operations and emissions of \r the transport sector, as reductions in the quantities of materials used \r reduce transport needs, while reductions in the weight of products \r improve the efficiency of transporting them. Dematerialisation can \r occur through more efficient production processes but also when \r a  new product is developed to provide the same functionality as \r multiple products. The best example of this trend is a smart phone, \r which provides the service of at least 22 other former devices (Rifkin \r [...]"


id: 4f2c36559397b5986a7d8bf6a5ee1d1b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:16
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:16
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11214
content:
"[...] 2019). A move to declutter lifestyles can also drive dematerialisation \r (Whitmarsh et al. 2017). Some potential for dematerialisation has been \r suggested due to 3-D printing, which would also reduce transport \r emissions through localised production of product components \r (d'Aveni 2015; UNCTAD 2018). There is evidence to suggest, however, \r that reductions in material use resulting from more efficient product "


id: 75fda044a5df916989aad7ff6aecfa8f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:16
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:16
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17984
content:
"some of the challenges facing the adoption of emerging technologies \r (Marletto 2014; Chen et al. 2016; Weiss et al. 2018; Taiebat and Xu \r 2019) and enable the expected large growth in emerging cities to be \r more sustainable (Docherty et al. 2018). However, ICT, in particular the \r internet of things (IoT), could also cause more global energy demand \r (Hittinger and Jaramillo 2019). Box 10.1 summarises the main smart \r technologies being adopted rapidly by cities across the world and their \r use in transport. There is a growing body of literature about the effect of \r smart technology (including sensors guiding vehicles) on the demand \r for transport services. Smart technologies can improve competitiveness \r of transit and active transport over personal vehicle use by combining \r the introduction of new electro-mobility that improves time and cost \r along with behaviour change factors (Palsson et  al. 2017; SLoCaT \r 2018a; SLoCaT 2018b; SLoCaT2021). However, it is unclear what the \r [...]"


id: 14ecfa516f7643b971604f61ccd586bf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:16
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:16
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 904
content:
"[...] net effect of smart technology on GHG emissions from the transport \r sector will be (Debnath et al. 2014; Lenz and Heinrichs 2017)."


id: d6d98da363cc455f523725fb5f4ff981
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:16
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:16
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35108
content:
"Blockchain or distributed ledger technology. Blockchain technology provides a non-hackable database that can be programmed to \r enable shared services like a local, solar microgrid where both solar and shared electric vehicles can be managed (Green and Newman \r 2017). Blockchain can be used for many transport-related applications including being the basis of MaaS or any local shared mobility \r service as it facilitates shared activity without intermediary controls. Other applications include verified vehicle ownership documentation, \r establishing identification, real-time road user pricing, congestion zone charging, vehicle-generated collision information, collection of \r tolls and charges, enhanced freight tracking and authenticity, and automated car parking and payments (Hargroves et al. 2020). This \r type of functionality will be particularly valuable for urban regeneration along a transit activated corridor, where it can be used for \r [...]"


id: 470e05a02725d1e471e22921232fb6fb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:16
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:16
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9702
content:
"[...] managing shared solar in and around station precincts as well as managing shared vehicles linked to the whole transport system \r (Newman et al. 2021). This technology can also be used for road user charging along any corridor and by businesses accessing any \r services and in managing freight (Carter and Koh 2018; Nguyen et al. 2019; Hargroves et al. 2020; Sedlmeir et al. 2020)."


id: 2ff9947625166188d1aa76128be84c88
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:16
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:16
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5696
content:
"Autonomous vehicles are the other emerging transport technology \r that have the potential to significantly improve ride quality and \r safety. Planes and high-speed trains are already largely autonomous \r as they are guided in all their movements, especially coming into \r stations and airports, although that does not necessarily mean they \r are driverless. Automation is also being used in new on-road transit \r systems like trackless trams (Ndlovu and Newman 2020)). Private \r vehicles are being fitted with more and more levels of autonomy \r and many are being trialled as 'driverless' in cities (Aria et  al. \r 2016; Skeete 2018). If autonomous systems can be used to help \r on-road transit become more time- and cost-competitive with cars, \r then the kind of transformative and disruptive changes needed to \r assist decarbonisation of transport become more feasible (Bosch \r et al. 2018; Kassens-Noor et al. 2020; Abe 2021). Similarly, vehicle \r [...]"


id: ffe40c54eac837be071eaa84bc0ceb6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:16
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:16
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42415
content:
"[...] automation could improve vehicle efficiency and reduce congestion, \r which would in turn reduce emissions (Vahidi and Sciarretta 2018; \r Massar et al. 2021). On the other hand, if autonomous cars make \r driving more convenient, they could reduce demand for transit (Auld \r et al. 2017; Sonnleitner et al. 2021). Paradoxically, autonomous cars \r could provide access to marginal groups such as the elderly, people \r with disabilities, and those who cannot drive, which could in turn \r increase travel demand (as measured by pkm) (Harper et al. 2016)."


id: 7f5b1885ddedeec07016b5ac1a72fdae
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:16
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:16
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19561
content:
"Natural gas-based vehicles have certain advantages over \r conventional fuel-powered ICE vehicles, including lower emissions \r of criteria air pollutants, no soot or particulate, low carbon to \r Hydrogen ratio, moderate noise, a wide range of flammability limits, \r and high octane numbers (Kim 2019; Bayat and Ghazikhani 2020). \r Furthermore, the technology readiness level (TRL) of natural gas \r vehicles is very high (TRL 8-9), with direct modification of existing \r gasoline and diesel vehicles possible (Transport and Environment \r 2018; Peters et al. 2021; Sahoo and Srivastava 2021). On the other \r hand, methane emissions from the natural gas supply chain and \r tailpipe CO2 emissions remain a  significant concern (Trivedi et  al. \r 2020). As a result, natural gas as a transition transportation fuel may \r be limited due to better alternative options being available and due \r to regulatory pressure to decarbonise the transport sector rapidly. \r [...]"


id: 25d799bb7a2fa9452972615fab296e5d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:16
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:16
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vector_id: 3840
content:
"[...] For example, the International Maritime Office (IMO) has set a target \r of 40% less carbon intensity in shipping by 2030, which cannot be \r obtained by simply switching to natural gas."


id: 32062bb72e41b7c6f472a280db1b1042
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:16
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:16
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content:
"Biofuels. Since AR5, the faster than anticipated adoption of \r electromobility, primarily for LDVs, has partially shifted the \r debate around the primary use of biofuels from land transport to \r the shipping and aviation sectors (IEA 2017a; Davis et  al. 2018). \r At the same time, other studies highlight that biofuels may have \r to complement electromobility in road transport, particularly in \r developing countries, offering relevant mitigation opportunities \r in the short- and mid-term (up to 2050) (IEA 2021b). An important \r advantage of biofuels is that they can be converted into energy \r carriers compatible with existing technologies, including current \r powertrains and fuel infrastructure. Also, biofuels can diversify \r the supply of transport fuel, raise energy self-sufficiency in many \r countries, and be used as a strategy to diversify and strengthen the \r agro-industrial sector (Puricelli et al. 2021). The use of biofuels as \r [...]"


id: 8b4e651793faf63f263c96737bebb027
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:16
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:16
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"[...] a mitigation strategy is driven by a combination of factors, including \r not only the costs and technology readiness levels of the different \r biofuel conversion technologies, but also the availability and costs \r of both biomass feedstocks and alternative mitigation options, \r and the relative speed and scale of the energy transition in energy \r and transport sectors (Box 10.2)."


id: e9cf58de19e6ad3ef3aad01f5cfd9dd6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:16
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:16
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vector_id: 38482
content:
"1.8 % improvement per year between 2005 and 2016 (GFEI 2020). \r Table  10.4 summarises recent and forthcoming improvements to \r ICE technologies and their effect on emissions from these vehicles. \r However, these improvements are not sufficient to meet deep \r decarbonisation levels in the transport sector. While there is significant \r and growing interest in electric and fuel-cell vehicles, future scenarios \r indicate that a large number of LDV may continue to be operated by \r ICE in conventional, hybrid, and plug-in hybrid configurations over the \r next 30 years (IEA 2019a), unless they are regulated away through \r ICE vehicle sales bans (as some nations have announced) (IEA 2021a). \r Moreover, ICE technologies are likely to remain the prevalent options \r for shipping and aviation. Thus, reducing CO2 and other emissions from \r ICEs through the use of low-carbon or zero-carbon fuels is essential \r to a balanced strategy for limiting atmospheric pollutant levels. Such \r [...]"


id: cf07cbb11b918c5048190861713ea8f1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:16
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:16
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vector_id: 33768
content:
"[...] alternative fuels for ICE vehicles include natural gas-based fuels, \r biofuels, ammonia, and other synthetic fuels."


id: 9b86cd57d5f5d8fb85a5d57ead074935
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
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vector_id: 24611
content:
"Many studies have addressed the lifecycle emissions of biofuel \r conversion pathways for land transport, aviation, and marine \r applications (Koeble et  al. 2017; Staples et  al. 2018; Tanzer et  al. \r 2019). Bioenergy technologies generally struggle to compete with \r existing fossil fuel-based ones because of the higher costs involved. \r However, the extent of the cost gap depends critically on the \r availability and costs of biomass feedstock (IEA 2021b). Ethanol from \r corn and sugarcane is commercially available in countries such as \r Brazil and the US. Biodiesel from oil crops and hydro-processed esters \r and fatty acids are available in various countries, notably in Europe \r and parts of Southeast Asia. On the infrastructure side, biomethane \r blending is being implemented in some regions of the US and Europe, \r particularly in Germany, with the help of policy measures (IEA 2021b). \r While many of these biofuel conversion technologies could also be \r [...]"


id: 20326ac568bd70ed0c3dab87b99af128
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2875
content:
"[...] implemented using seaweed feedstock options, these value chains \r are not yet mature (Jiang et al. 2016)."


id: 445462576473118303d5d423d7c8f3c3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
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content:
"Natural Gas. Natural gas could be used as an alternative fuel to \r replace gasoline and diesel. Natural gas in vehicles can be used as \r compressed natural gas (CNG) and liquefied natural gas (LNG). CNG \r is gaseous at relatively high pressure (10 to 25 megapascal (MPa)) \r and temperature (-40 to 30degC). In contrast, LNG is used in liquid \r form at relatively low pressure (0.1 MPa) and temperature (-160degC). \r Therefore, CNG is particularly suitable for commercial vehicles and \r light- to medium-duty vehicles, whereas LNG is better suited to \r replace diesel in HDVs (Dubov et al. 2020; Dziewiatkowski et al. 2020; \r Yaici and Ribberink 2021). CNG vehicles have been widely deployed \r in some regions, particularly in Asian-Pacific countries. For example, \r there are about 6 million CNG vehicles in China, the most of any \r country (Qin et al. 2020). However, only 20% of vehicles that operate \r using CNG were originally designed as CNG vehicles, with the rest \r [...]"


id: 42ae9a5390c99c94e3b7d8011f4452a7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
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vector_id: 8926
content:
"[...] being gasoline-fuelled vehicles that have been converted to operate \r with CNG (Chala et al. 2018)."


id: fac72ba262fb47e0cd5e19957acd4950
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
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content:
"Box 10.2 | Bridging Land Use and Feedstock Conversion Footprints for Biofuels\r Under specific conditions, biofuels may represent an important climate mitigation strategy for the transport sector (Daioglou et al. 2020; \r Muratori et al. 2020). Both the IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5degC and the IPCC Special Report on Climate Change and\r Land highlighted that biofuels could be associated with climate mitigation co-benefits and adverse side effects to many SDGs. These side \r effects depend on context-specific conditions, including deployment scale, associated land-use changes and agricultural management \r practices (Section 7.4.4 and Box 7.10). There is broad agreement in the literature that the most important factors in determining the \r climate footprint of biofuels are the land use and land-use change characteristics associated with biofuel deployment scenarios (Elshout \r [...]"


id: 637c4b867ca0956861f212c712ff89c1
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
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vector_id: 14795
content:
"[...] et al. 2015; Daioglou et al. 2020). This issue is covered in more detail in Box 7.1. While the mitigation literature primarily focuses on the \r GHG-related climate forcings, note that land is an integral part of the climate system through multiple geophysical and geochemical \r mechanisms (albedo, evaporation, etc.). For example, Sections 2.2.7 and 7.3.4 in the AR6 WGI report indicate that geophysical aspects \r of historical land-use change outweigh the geochemical effects, leading to a net cooling effect. The land-related carbon footprints of \r biofuels presented in Sections 10.4-10.6 are adopted from Chapter 7 (Section 7.4.4, Box 7, and Figure 7.1). The results show how the \r land-related footprint increases due to an increased outtake of biomass, as estimated with different models that rely on global supply \r scenarios of biomass for energy and fuel of 100 exajoules (EJ). The integrated assessment models and scenarios used include the EMF \r [...]"


id: 8c1510293ef8462340cf219aa1169f9d
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
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content:
"[...] 33 scenarios (IAM-EMF33), from partial models with constant land cover (PM-CLC), and from partial models with natural regrowth \r (PM-NGR). These results are combined with both biomass cultivation emission ranges for advanced biofuels aligned with Koeble et al. \r (2017), El Akkari et al. (2018), Jeswani et al. (2020), and Puricelli et al. (2021) and conversion efficiencies and conversion phase emissions \r as described in Table 10.5. The modelled footprints resulting from land-use changes related to delivering 100 EJ of biomass at global \r level are in the range of 3-77 gCO2-eq per MJ of advanced biofuel (median 38 gCO2-eq MJ-1) at an aggregate level for Integrated \r Assessment Models (IAMs) and partial models with constant land cover (Daioglou et al. 2020; Rose et al. 2020). The results for partial \r models with natural regrowth are much higher (91-246 CO2-eq MJ-1 advanced biofuel). The latter ranges may appear in contrast with \r [...]"


id: e9b4ab8b7ae1ae82e58b9fa59043ac95
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
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vector_id: 38471
content:
"[...] the results from the scenario literature in Section 10.7, where biofuels play a role in many scenarios compatible with low warming \r levels. This contrast is a result of different underlying modelling practices. The general modelling approach used for the scenarios in \r the AR6 database accounts for the land-use change and all other GHG emissions along a given transformation trajectory, enabling \r assessments of the warming level incurred. The results labelled 'EMF33' and 'partial models with constant land cover' are obtained \r with this modelling approach. The results in the category 'partial models with natural regrowth' attribute additional CO2 emissions to \r the bioenergy system, corresponding to estimated uptake of CO2 in a counterfactual scenario where land is not used for bioenergy, but \r instead subject to natural vegetation regrowth. While the partial analysis provides insights into the implications of alternative land-use \r [...]"


id: a1efde9038e5000e1c7379236ec1d8ad
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25725
content:
"[...] strategies, such analysis does not identify the actual emissions of bioenergy production. As a result, the partial analysis is not compatible \r with the identification of warming levels incurred by an individual transformation trajectory, and therefore not aligned with the general \r approach applied for the scenarios in the AR6 database."


id: 5c07b83721c93b33ba6c17bee2287090
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
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vector_id: 13451
content:
"Technologies to produce advanced biofuels from lignocellulosic \r feedstocks have suffered from slow technology development and \r are still struggling to achieve full commercial scale. Their uptake is \r likely to require carbon pricing and/or other regulatory measures, \r such as clean fuel standards in the transport sector or blending \r mandates. Several commercial-scale advanced biofuels projects are \r in development in many parts of the world, encompassing a wide \r selection of technologies and feedstock choices, including carbon \r capture and sequestration (CCS) that supports carbon dioxide \r removal. The success of these projects is vital to moving forward the \r development of advanced biofuels and bringing many of the advanced \r biofuels value chains closer to the market (IEA 2021b). Finally, biofuel \r production and distribution supply chains involve notable transport \r and logistical challenges that need to be overcome (Mawhood et al. \r [...]"


id: cf10f2761f4f9561cd4488c55dffd05f
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
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vector_id: 33778
content:
"the production of financially competitive bio-based SAF in many \r regions. However, production facilities involve significant capital \r investment and estimated levelised costs are typically more than \r twice the selling price of conventional jet fuel. In some cases (notably \r for vegetable oils), the feedstock price is already higher than that of \r fossil jet fuel (Mawhood et al. 2016). Some promising technological \r routes for producing SAF from lignocellulosic feedstocks are below \r technology readiness level (TRL) 6 (pilot scale), with just a  few \r players involved in the development of these technologies. Although \r it would be physically possible to address the mid-century projections \r for substantial use of biofuels in the aviation sector (according to the \r International Energy Agency (IEA) and other sectoral organisations \r (ICAO 2017)), this fuel deployment scale could only be achieved \r with very large capital investments in bio-based SAF production \r [...]"


id: 73cdc005992e1e123de342fc0e272c1e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
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vector_id: 17628
content:
"For conventional internal combustion engines, the use of ammonia \r remains challenging due to the relatively low burning velocity \r and high ignition temperature. Therefore, Frigo and Gentili (2014) \r have suggested a  dual-fuelled spark ignition engine operated by \r liquid ammonia and hydrogen, where hydrogen is generated from \r ammonia using the thermal energy of exhaust gas. On the other \r hand, the high-octane number of ammonia means good knocking \r resistance of spark ignition engines and is promising for improving \r thermal efficiency. For compression ignition engines, the high-ignition \r temperature of ammonia requires a high compression ratio, causing \r an increase in mechanical friction. Since Gray et  al. (1966), many \r studies have shown that the compression ratio can be reduced by \r mixing ammonia with secondary fuels such as diesel and hydrogen \r with low self-ignition temperatures, as summarised by Dimitriou and \r [...]"


id: 3abcf507ee10195637b8c355f1834dee
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
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content:
"[...] Javaid (2020). Using a  secondary fuel with a  high cetane number \r and  the adoption of a  suitable fuel injection timing has enabled \r highly efficient combustion of compression ignition engines in \r the dual fuel mode with ammonia ratios up to 95% (Dimitriou \r and Javaid 2020). One major challenge for realising an ammonia\u0002fuelled engine is the reduction of unburned ammonia, as described \r in Section 6.4.5 (Reiter and Kong 2011). Processes being examined \r include the use of exhaust gas recirculation (EGR) (Pochet et al. 2017) \r and after treatment systems. However, these processes require space, \r which is a constraint for LDVs and air transport but more practical \r for ships. Shipbuilders are developing an ammonia engine based \r on the existing diesel dual-fuel engine to launch a service in 2025 \r (Brown 2019; MAN-ES 2019). Ammonia could therefore contribute \r significantly to decarbonisation in the shipping sector (Section 10.6), \r [...]"


id: 17ef148400e87b183f0f7d2e9094582a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
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vector_id: 1413
content:
"In comparison to the aviation sector, the prospects for technology \r deployment are better in the shipping sector. The advantage \r of shipping fuels is that marine engines have a  much higher \r operational flexibility on a  mix of fuels, and shipping fuels do \r not need to undergo as extensive refining processes as road and \r aviation fuels to be considered drop-in. However, biofuels in marine \r engines have only been tested at an experimental or demonstration \r stage, leaving open the question about the scalability of the \r operations, including logistics issues. Similar to the aviation \r sector, securing a  reliable, sustainable biomass feedstock supply \r and mature processing technologies to produce price-competitive \r biofuels at a large scale remains a challenge for the shipping sector \r (Hsieh and Felby 2017). Other drawbacks include industry concerns \r about oxidation, storage, and microbial stability for less purified \r [...]"


id: 12f670ff2bfb2c5422aa3c0663cc9204
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
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vector_id: 542
content:
"[...] or more crude biofuels. Assuming that biofuels are technically \r developed and available for the shipping sector in large quantities, \r a  wider initial introduction of biofuels in the sector is likely to \r depend upon increased environmental regulation of particulate \r and GHG emissions. Biofuels may also offer a significant advantage \r in meeting ambitious sulphur emission reduction targets set by \r the sectoral organisations. More extensive use of marine biofuels \r will most likely be first implemented in inner-city waterways, \r inland river freight routes, and coastal green zones. Given the high \r efficiency of the diesel engine, a large-scale switch to a different \r standard marine propulsion method in the near to medium-term \r future seems unlikely. Thus, much of the effort has been placed on \r developing biofuels compatible with diesel engines. So far, biodiesel \r blends look promising, as it is used in land transport. Hydrotreated \r [...]"


id: 2ab231a42818ede768c3112fe62897cd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4735
content:
"[...] vegetable oil (HVO) is also a  technically good alternative and is \r compatible with current engines and supply chains, while the \r introduction of multifuel engines may open the market for ethanol \r fuels (Hsieh and Felby 2017)."


id: 4d58ebeaf3ffed9b126106209d4849a9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10887
content:
"Synthetic fuels. Synthetic fuels can contribute to transport \r decarbonisation through synthesis from electrolytic hydrogen \r produced with low-carbon electricity or hydrogen produced with \r CCS, and captured CO2 using the Fischer-Tropsch process (Liu et al. \r 2020a). Due to similar properties of synthetic fuels to those of fossil \r fuels, synthetic fuels can reduce GHG emissions in both existing \r and new vehicles without significant changes to the engine design.\r While the Fischer-Tropsch process is a well-established technology \r (Liu et  al. 2020a), low-carbon synthetic fuel production is still at \r the demonstration stage. Even though their production costs are \r expected to decline in the future due to lower renewable electricity \r prices, increased scale of production, and learning effects, synthetic \r fuels are still up to three times more expensive than conventional \r fossil fuels (Section  6.6.2.4). Furthermore, since the production \r [...]"


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content:
"[...] of synthetic fuels involves thermodynamic conversion loss, there \r is a concern that the total energy efficiency is lower than that of \r electric vehicles (Yugo and Soler 2019). Given these high costs and \r limited scales, the adoption of synthetic fuels will likely focus on \r the aviation, shipping, and long-distance road transport segments, \r where decarbonisation by electrification is more challenging. In \r particular, synthetic fuels are considered promising as an aviation \r fuel (Section 10.5)."


id: 4def804067eeb793d1ddff9ab50549a5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
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vector_id: 10976
content:
"Externalities from resource extraction are another concern, though \r current volumes of lithium are much smaller than other metals (steel, \r aluminium). As a result, lithium was not even mentioned in UNEP's \r global resource outlook (IRP 2019). Nonetheless, it is essential to \r manage demand and limit externalities since the demand for lithium \r is going to increase many times in the future. Reuse of LIBs used \r in EVs for stationary energy applications can help in reducing the \r demand for LIBs. However, the main challenges are the difficulty in \r accessing the information on the health of batteries to be recycled \r and technical problems in remanufacturing the batteries for their \r second life (Ahmadi et al. 2017). Recycling lithium from used batteries \r could be another possible supply source (Winslow et al. 2018). While \r further R&D is required for commercialisation (Ling et  al., 2018), \r recent efforts at recycling LIBs are very encouraging (Ma et al. 2021). \r [...]"


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content:
"[...] The standardisation of battery modules and packaging within and \r across vehicle platforms, increased focus on design for recyclability, \r and supportive regulation are important to enable higher recycling \r rates for LIBs (Harper et al. 2019)."


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vector_id: 14603
content:
"Before the recent growth in market share of LIBs, lead-acid batteries, \r nickel batteries, high-temperature sodium batteries, and redox \r flow batteries were of particular interest for the transport sector \r (Placke et  al. 2017). Due to their low costs, lead-acid batteries \r have been used in smaller automotive vehicles, e.g.,  e-scooters \r and e-rickshaws (Dhar et  al. 2017). However, their application \r in electric vehicles will be limited due to their low specific energy \r (Andwari et  al. 2017). Nickel-metal hydride (NiMH) batteries have \r a better energy density than lead-acid batteries and have been well \r optimised for regenerative braking (Cano et  al. 2018). As a  result, \r NiMH batteries were the battery of choice for hybrid electric vehicles \r (HEVs). Ni-Cadmium (NiCd) batteries have energy densities lower \r than NiMH batteries and cost around ten times more than lead-acid \r batteries (Table  6.5). For this reason, NiCd batteries do not have \r [...]"


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vector_id: 14124
content:
"[...] major prospects within automotive applications. There are also no \r examples of high-temperature sodium or redox flow batteries being \r used within automotive applications."


id: a7017855f36a3a5ed27dcb2dcb06d99c
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:17
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content:
"Several next-generation battery chemistries are often referred to \r as post-LIBs (Placke et  al. 2017). These chemistries include metal\u0002sulphur, metal-air, metal-ion (besides Li), and all-solid-state batteries. \r The long development cycles of the automotive industry (Cano et al. \r 2018) and the advantages of LIBs in terms of energy density and cycle \r life (Table 6.5) mean that it is unlikely that post-LIB technologies will \r replace LIBs in the next decade. However, lithium-sulphur, lithium-air, \r and zinc-air have emerged as potential alternatives for LIBs. These \r emerging chemistries may also be used to supplement LIBs in dual\u0002battery configurations, to extend the driving range at lower costs \r or with higher energy density (Cano et  al. 2018). Lithium-sulphur \r (Li-S) batteries have a lithium metal anode with a higher theoretical \r capacity than lithium-ion anodes and much lower-cost sulphur \r cathodes relative to typical Li-ion insertion cathodes (Manthiram \r [...]"


id: 4f1b1f9c4eef7566fe5ca0f9fcd601e4
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vector_id: 11201
content:
"[...] et  al. 2014). As a  result, Li-S batteries are much cheaper than LIB \r to manufacture and have a  higher energy density (Table  6.5). \r Conversely, these batteries face challenges from sulphur cathodes, \r such as low conductivity of the sulphur and lithium sulphide phases, \r and the relatively high solubility of sulphur species in common \r lithium battery electrolytes, leading to low cycle life (Cano et  al. \r 2018). Lithium-air batteries offer a further improvement in specific \r energy and energy density above Li-S batteries owing to their use \r of atmospheric oxygen as a cathode in place of sulphur. However, \r their demonstrated cycle life is much lower (Table 6.5). Lithium-air \r batteries also have low specific power. Therefore, lithium-air require \r an extra battery for practical applications (Cano et al. 2018). Finally, \r zinc-air batteries could more likely be used in future EVs because "


id: 5433fe565546bd26a6d637f733561b20
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vector_id: 12092
content:
"Commercial application of LIBs in automotive applications started \r around 2000 when the price of LIBs was more than USD1000 per kWh \r (Schmidt et al. 2017). By 2020, the battery manufacturing capacity \r for automotive applications was around 300 GWh per  year (IEA \r 2021a). Furthermore, by 2020, the average battery pack cost had \r come down to USD137 per kWh, a reduction of 89% in real terms \r since 2010 (Henze 2020). Further improvements in specific energy, \r energy density (Nykvist et al. 2015; Placke et al. 2017) and battery \r service life (Liu et al. 2017) of LIBs are expected through additional \r design optimisation (Table  6.5). These advances are expected to \r lead to EVs with even longer driving ranges, further supporting the \r uptake of LIBs for transport applications (Cano et al. 2018). However, \r the performance of LIBs under freezing and high temperatures is \r a concern (Liu et al. 2017) for reliability. Auto manufacturers have \r [...]"


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content:
"[...] some pre-heating systems for batteries to see that they perform well \r in very cold conditions (Wu et al. 2020)."


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vector_id: 19632
content:
"per kilogram (W/kg)) than batteries. However, the energy density is \r poor (1-4 watt-hours per kilogram (Wh/kg)) compared to batteries, \r and there is an issue of self-discharge (Gonzalez et al. 2016; Poonam \r et al. 2019). To improve the energy density, electrochemical double \r layer capacitors (EDLCs; supercapacitor) and hybrid capacitors \r (10-24 Wh/kg, 900-9000 W/kg at the product level) such as Li-ion \r capacitors have been developed. The highest energy density of the \r LIC system (100-140 Wh/kg in the research stage) are approaching \r that of the Li-ion battery systems (80-240 Wh/kg in the product \r stage) (Naoi et  al. 2012; Panja et  al. 2020). Examples of effective \r use of capacitors include a  12-tonne truck with a  capacitor-based \r kinetic energy recovery system that has been reported to save up \r to 32% of the fuel use of a standard truck (Kamdar 2017). Similarly, \r an EDLC bank applied to electric railway systems has been shown to \r [...]"


