# document

id: 5c85cd8ab2f65c029878ea9de230214
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13540
content:
"[...] security risks (Marselis et  al., 2017; Muller et  al., 2021b). Negative \r livelihoods impacts arise through enclosure of assets, elite capture \r (Oberlack et  al., 2016), crowding out of small farmers (Nolte and \r Ostermeier, 2017) and reducing local populations' access to commons \r (Dell'Angelo et al., 2016; Giger et al., 2019). Indigenous People are \r affected, facing high levels of violence in land acquisition conflicts \r (Dell'Angelo et al., 2021). The social burdens of land deals tend to be \r gendered (e.g., Fonjong et al., 2016; Nyantakyi-Frimpong and Bezner \r Kerr, 2017; Atuoye et al., 2021)."


id: 31132e91f9ef232ceecedec1921cb391
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5884
content:
"Local populations can experience declining access to livelihood \r resources and deteriorating food security, increasing gendered \r vulnerabilities (Yengoh et  al., 2015; Faye and Ribot, 2017; Atuoye \r et  al., 2021). Vulnerable groups displaced by land deals may face \r higher exposure to climate change (Dell'Angelo et  al., 2017). \r LSLAs affecting common-pool resources governed by Indigenous \r institutions jeopardise the resilience and adaptive capacity of local \r socio-ecological systems (Dell'Angelo et al., 2016; D'Odorico et al., \r 2017; Hak et  al., 2018; Haller, 2019; Haller et  al., 2020). Growing \r land tenure insecurity may force farmers to engage in unsustainable \r farming and forestry practices (Aha and Ayitey, 2017; Gabay and \r Alam, 2017) and hinder agroecological innovations to manage \r climate risks (Nyantakyi-Frimpong, 2020b). Social justice concerns \r and vulnerability of local populations can be addressed by promoting \r [...]"


id: fa8db52926ad4b643773c90f8b1eff9a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
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content:
"[...] land redistribution and recognition, particularly for customary lands \r of Indigenous and ethnic minorities, and land restitution to those \r who were forcibly displaced (Franco et al., 2015; Borras and Franco, \r 2018a)."


id: bcdaec0a115bfbd1e3ff083d04421f32
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30466
content:
"Agricultural intensification seeks to increase agricultural productivity \r per input unit, reducing the pressure on land use and generating \r positive impacts in GHG emissions (Mbow et al., 2019), but valuing \r the final effect requires common metrics in terms of carbon capture or \r emission reductions (Searchinger et al., 2018). It has been suggested \r to address multiple SDGs (SDG2, SDG13, SDG15) but only occasionally \r leads to simultaneous positive ecosystem service and well-being \r outcomes (Rasmussen et al., 2018). When the process relies only on \r increasing input use, there is a risk of generating adverse outcomes \r that may override positive effects, such as CO2 emissions, (McGill et al., \r 2018), NOx emissions (Hickman et  al., 2017), soil salinisation and \r groundwater depletion (Doody et al., 2015; Daliakopoulos et al., 2016; \r Fragaszy and Closas, 2016; Foster et  al., 2018; Florke et  al., 2019). \r Agricultural intensification could meet short-term food security and \r [...]"


id: 7d97ac365f0839e677975039f8db31e5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
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"Competition over use of major aquaculture feed crops (Fry et al., 2016) \r with terrestrial livestock (Troell et al., 2014), and fish use by terrestrial \r livestock, will also place pressure on fish and crop resources (medium \r confidence) (Cottrell et al., 2018). Increases in feed prices will affect \r fish and meat prices (Troell et al., 2014), and changes in agriculture \r will be needed to satisfy aquaculture demands (Blanchard et al., 2017). \r Aquaculture and livestock dietary components may also compromise \r crops and forage fish that provide essential nutrients for low-income \r households increasing nutritional insecurity, in regions of sub-Saharan \r Africa, Asia and Latin America (Troell et al., 2014). Waste fish products \r can supplement fish meal and oil to reduce competition for feed, as \r well as reducing use of fish that could go to human consumption \r (medium confidence) (Little et al., 2016; Shepherd et al., 2017; Dave \r [...]"


id: 233a9b8a2aa9d5f2356b0a14e7616c9c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
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"[...] and Routray, 2018; Naylor et al., 2021). Use of algae, bacteria, yeast \r and insect diets could replace fishmeal for aquaculture (Cohen et al., \r 2018; Hua et al., 2019; Cottrell et al., 2020), not affecting nutritional \r profiles (Campanaro et al., 2019), and fish could be reared on waste \r by-products of other food production systems (Bava et  al., 2019). \r Complete fish oil substitutions with microalgae may be possible \r without compromising omega-3 contents, but energy usage in diet \r production should be considered Cottrell et al. (2020). Substitutions \r of plant-based and alternative feeds may decrease food conversion \r efficiencies (Cottrell et al., 2020), affect omega-3 content of farmed \r seafood (Fry et al., 2016; Shepherd et al., 2017), be problematic for \r the fish themselves (Little et al., 2016; Naylor et al., 2021) and lead to \r reduced productivity (Shepherd et al., 2017)."


id: c7de17ae057c53856fa8e9363def45bb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
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content_type: text
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vector_id: 32471
content:
"Livestock and aquaculture feeds utilise crops such as soyabean \r and maize, with food conversion efficiencies similar in chicken and \r Atlantic salmon, and higher in pigs and cattle (Troell et  al., 2014; \r Fry et al., 2018b; Fry et al., 2018a). Use of wild fish meal and oil has \r been decreasing, partly due to concerns regarding vulnerable small \r pelagic fish stocks (Bindoff et  al., 2019). The instability of wild fish \r stocks has increased terrestrial crop feed components (Troell et  al., \r 2014; Blanchard et al., 2017; FAO, 2017; Cottrell et al., 2018). The use \r of wild fish in fish feeds that may have been directly consumed may \r put low-income households at risk of food insecurity (Troell et  al., \r 2014). An increasing demand for aquaculture products intensifies \r competition for feed supplies (medium confidence) (Troell et al., 2014; \r Blanchard et al., 2017). Increases in demands for animal protein and \r [...]"


id: 68cdfcb3ce76dea2406b8e2f38f1db77
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
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"[...] shifts to pescatarian diets will increase the existing competition for \r land resources, particularly in low- and medium-income countries, \r with negative impacts on food security (Makkar, 2018), but may be \r mitigated by dietary changes, novel feeds and food waste usage for \r aquatic systems (Berners-Lee et  al., 2018; Hua et  al., 2019; Cottrell \r et al., 2020)."


id: 8074d3bb4ceb6cebd8ea26ff3fe9e5c3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19728
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"Inclusive planning initiatives such as community-based anticipatory \r adaptation combined with 'two-way learning' that considers future \r scenarios and different adaptation pathways can prevent maladaptation \r (high confidence) (Dovie, 2017; Bezner Kerr et al., 2019; Neset et al., \r 2019a; Rahman and Hickey, 2019; Work et al., 2019; Butler et al., 2020; \r Nunn et al., 2020; Piggott-McKellar et al., 2020; Westoby et al., 2020; \r Table  5.20). Promising policy management tools combine temporal \r scales and mitigation-adaptation interactions and consider political \r dynamics, socioeconomic impacts and trade-offs for vulnerable groups, \r long-term support for policy leaders, efforts to establish livelihood \r 'niches' and ongoing participatory evaluation (Dovie, 2017; Holsman \r et al., 2019; Rahman and Hickey, 2019; Work et al., 2019; Butler et al., \r 2020). A focus on the most disadvantaged groups can help small\u0002scale producers at higher risk to prevent maladaptation (FAO, 2018c). \r [...]"


id: ee4ea8beb3c0b6fa6a17bf75ce6c7704
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
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"[...] Governance mechanisms have emerged that consider food security, \r socio-cultural factors, and land and water rights, using participatory, \r inclusive 'two-way learning' methods that involve vulnerable people \r alongside government (IPCC, 2018; Holsman et al., 2019; IPCC, 2019b; \r Rahman and Hickey, 2019; Butler et al., 2020)."


id: b5015fadb4fd2acaad3d8a3190c5cfa5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29080
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"A significant proportion of land targeted for A/R projects is inhabited \r and used by Indigenous Peoples and local communities (Cagalanan, \r 2016). Indigenous Peoples have rights to and/or manage at least \r 37.9  million km2\r  of land and influence land management across \r at least 28.1% of the land area (Garnett et  al., 2018). At least a \r quarter of the global land area is traditionally owned, managed, \r used or occupied by Indigenous Peoples, overlapping with 35-40% \r of the area that is formally protected (Garnett et al., 2018; Brondizio \r et  al., 2019). In many cases, A/R is implemented in areas where \r tenure rights are insecure and Indigenous Peoples' rights are at \r risk of being disregarded (Naughton-Treves and Wendland, 2014; \r Kohler and Brondizio, 2017; Garnett et al., 2018) (medium evidence,\r high agreement). Many projects are also found in areas where \r complex socio-political contexts challenge management (Jurjonas \r [...]"


id: 796325dbe85184d8dafbb642023716a1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
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"[...] and Seekamp, 2019). It is anticipated that A/R projects will create \r huge pressures on existing land uses and generate further land use \r conflicts (Aggarwal, 2014; Robinson et al., 2014; Paul et al., 2016; \r Brancalion and Chazdon, 2017; Pye et al., 2017; Bond et al., 2019). \r In addition, many afforestation projects are conducted in regions \r that are not bio-climatically suitable, leading to the degradation of \r ecosystems that are key to local livelihoods (Veldman et al., 2015; \r Robinson et al., 2016b)."


id: cb2ef989e0e4515f19e8879bc06b46fd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33084
content:
"Insurance is a financial adaptation strategy increasingly used in \r agriculture and aquaculture. A relatively new approach to agricultural \r insurance risk is the use of financial derivative products, such as index\u0002based agricultural insurance (IBAI), marketed by financial institutions \r to farmers to help them deal with weather-related production risks \r (Isakson, 2015; Jensen and Barrett, 2017). The basic idea is to rely on \r easily observed weather indices, such as precipitation or temperature, \r that co-vary with farm production. Insurance payments are received \r when the metric trigger for a region is reached, eliminating the need \r to collect farm-specific information. Proponents of index insurance \r argue that it can resolve the information costs and incentive problems \r inherent in rural financial markets, such as adverse selection, and allow \r provision of insurance coverage at a fraction of the costs of loss-based \r [...]"


id: 2dfd4bf6b18740e46878241708dca950
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
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"[...] polices (Jensen and Barrett, 2017). Buyers of index policies do not have \r to prove their ownership of assets with weather-related losses. This \r lowers transactions costs and makes it more affordable to insure small \r plots of land."


id: 48e4cf8ff242a626025be20d4aff349d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
content_type: text
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vector_id: 10045
content:
"There may be inequality in access to climate services; their use may tend \r to benefit large-scale operations and disadvantage small- and medium\u0002scale farmers and others who face issues of access due to social and \r economic inequity; also some groups such as pastoralists have not \r yet benefitted from climate services (high confidence) (Furman et al., \r 2014; Muema et  al., 2018; Awazi et  al., 2019; Nyantakyi-Frimpong, \r 2019; Paudyal et al., 2019; Vaughan et al., 2019; Nidumolu et al., 2020; \r Partey et  al., 2020). Other challenges include technology ignorance, \r data privacy and security, data access permissions, software and \r system compatibility, and understanding how to use and derive value \r from accessed data (Chatuphale and Armstrong, 2018; Drewry et al., \r 2019). More work is needed to understand the factors that prevent \r farmers and fishers from benefitting from this new information. Recent \r assessments suggest that access to, and value of, climate and weather \r [...]"


id: 394190185571812e74b35ba62acc0873
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
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"[...] information can be enhanced by the development of digital tools \r (including radio, text messages, etc.) appropriate to the specific needs \r of different vulnerable groups, as well as by including these groups in "


id: 171104580ddbd3d0f10b6db7311ff2a1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1277
content:
"The creation of index insurance requires significant prior research \r and extensive data that may not be available or sufficient in lower\u0002income countries, including identifying the most appropriate farm and \r climate variables to include and financial and regulatory support from \r the public sector (Economic Commission for Latin America and the \r Caribbean and Central American Agricultural Council of the Central \r American Integration System, 2013; Economic Commission for Latin \r America and the Caribbean and System, 2014). Some insurance \r providers bundle it with other services, such as fertilizer use or seeds \r that may not be useful to particular farmers and can increase their \r overall capital costs (Isakson, 2015). Although proponents see IBAI \r as a way to mitigate farmers' risks associated with more variable \r weather patterns (Greatrex et al., 2015), critics argue that derivative\u0002based insurance products tend to benefit wealthier farmers and fail in \r [...]"


id: b48f93fd7b62af270924c64f768d9175
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
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"[...] assisting the poorest and most marginalised farmers (Isakson, 2015; \r Taylor, 2016). Thus far, there is low agreement and medium evidence\r regarding the adaptation potential of derivatives-based insurance \r products, signalling a need for further research in this area."


id: c97ce1708f53295b39f61dd45f435712
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
content_type: text
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content:
"Community-based monitoring of forests, coral reefs, seagrass and \r mangroves are examples of local natural resource assessment that \r can support food security and livelihoods while informing regional and \r national climate change planning tools (Carter et  al., 2014; Gevana \r et al., 2018; Avtar et al., 2019). Negotiation among many stakeholders \r at multiple scales, including inclusive mechanisms to address power \r inequities in governance structures and communities, may be needed \r for CbA to be effective (Avtar et al., 2019; McNamara et al., 2020). \r Indigenous knowledge and community-based management of \r fisheries and aquaculture in the Arctic and Asia (Roux et  al., 2019; \r Chen and Cheng, 2020; Galappaththi et al., 2020a; Schott et al., 2020; \r Galappaththi et al., 2021) provide adaptive strategies for sustainable \r use. (Iticha and Husen, 2019). Community-based climate services in \r the Andes (managed through a collaboration of smallholder producers \r [...]"


id: d15359042dabf9f6b0f614298ffcf924
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34179
content:
"[...] and an international partnership) built capacity and knowledge of \r climate change dynamics as well as trust in local climate institutions, \r providing meaningful information for regional responses to climate \r change impacts (Rossa, 2020). Community-based participatory \r scenario planning can help identify multiple climate stressors and \r vulnerabilities to develop effective adaptation plans (Fernandez\u0002Gimenez et al., 2015; Bennett et al., 2016; Cross-Chapter Box MOVING \r PLATE this chapter)."


id: cd3724f329b77e8a0895e531014412d5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
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"evidence, low agreement) (Griffin et al., 2015; Chapin et al., 2016; Karg \r et al., 2016). Collective trademarks (Quinones-Ruiz et al., 2015) and \r participatory guarantee systems (Niederle et al., 2020) are examples \r of innovative institutional strategies to strengthen local and regional \r food systems. In the urban context, the city region food system (CRFS) \r approach is motivated by reducing dependence on international trade \r and associated instability and to facilitate local decision making (Karg \r et  al., 2016). CRFS includes a network within a regional landscape \r around one urban centre and surrounding peri-urban and rural regions \r (Blay-Palmer et al., 2018). UPA is promoted as an effective strategy to \r adapt to climate change in different contexts (see Section  5.12.5.3, \r Dubbeling, 2015; Lwasa et  al., 2015). To cope with the effects of \r climate change, strengthening regional food systems is becoming \r [...]"


id: 67fa86c0d5e0b0428ccda88bed803b8b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
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vector_id: 15563
content:
"[...] an explicit part of urban and regional policy, being tested in many \r different cities worldwide (Dubbeling et al., 2017; Blay-Palmer et al., \r 2018; Berner et al., 2019; Sellberg et al., 2020; van der Gaast et al., \r 2020). Strengthening both local and regional food systems has to be \r balanced against limitations and trade-offs, since modelling exercises \r of regionalisation scenarios show urban agriculture cannot achieve \r food security in areas with rapid population growth (Le Mouel et al., \r 2018). Furthermore, international trade can compensate in cases \r where the regional system fails due to extreme events or other related \r climate shocks (Section 5.11.8)."


id: 73415af7696f970b0b0d621b33c3a392
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17528
content:
"An assessment of 32 different CbA initiatives in the Pacific Islands, \r including addressing risks to food security, found high-performing \r projects had six key entry points: effective methods to improve \r adaptive capacity, appropriate to the local context, which moved \r beyond narrow geographical definitions of community to consider \r equity of impact, and ecosystem-based approaches, jointly addressing \r climatic and non-livelihood pressures and consideration of future \r climatic trends (McNamara et al., 2020). Low-performing initiatives, in \r contrast, were not sustained; these overlooked future climatic trends \r in their initiatives, such as beehive susceptibility to climate extremes, \r and had dependent, unequal relationships that lacked genuine local \r approval or ownership and did not fit local values and context (Spires \r et al., 2014; McNamara et al., 2020; Piggott-McKellar et al., 2020). CbA \r initiatives can also suffer from not having adequate local knowledge of \r [...]"


id: d4ca1c109fa3cef8c41c929a174fd41d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
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"[...] potential strategies to address future climatic scenarios, and may lead \r to maladaptation, increasing socioeconomic inequities in communities \r (Nagoda, 2015). Addressing inequity in power dynamics and building \r technical adaptive capacity of local people are some of the ways that \r CbA initiatives can support more resilient food systems (McNamara \r et al., 2020)."


id: b9cff7fea1c11cfecb2f465c9c1b815d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29904
content:
"Food sovereignty brings together adaptation options based on \r agroecological methods, access to resources, collective and CbA (HLPE, \r 2019). Addressing food security and nutrition in light of climate change \r impacts and vulnerabilities is considered to arise from a mixture of \r globalised supply chains and local production, not one or the other \r (Blesh et al., 2019; Stringer et al., 2020). Evidence on strengthening \r local and regional food systems with a food sovereignty approach, \r in terms of access to resources (land, seeds, water), shortened food \r chains and CbA strategies suggest that these strategies can positively \r contribute to climate change adaptation in many contexts (medium \r confidence) (SRCCL) but can also lead to conflict especially regarding \r management of mobile resources such as fisheries (Section 5.8, Cross\u0002Chapter Box MOVING PLATE this chapter). All these options can build \r adaptation through actions that strengthen local capacities and the \r [...]"


id: 9a696c6e50bcc9c839e2634833a85878
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
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content:
"[...] power to act within food systems. Securing and recognising tenure \r for Indigenous Peoples (Hurlbert et al., 2019) and local communities \r (Oates et al., 2020) can improve their ability to adapt by increasing \r the incentive to invest in resilient infrastructure and sustainable \r land management practices. Community seed banks and networks \r strengthen local seed systems and realise farmers' rights favouring \r access to a variety of local genetic resources, with landraces often \r more adapted to the local social, cultural and ecological environment \r and needs, and better adapted to harsh environments without external \r inputs (Mousseau, 2015; Bisht et al., 2018; Maharjan and Maharjan, \r 2018; Otieno et  al., 2018; Mbow et  al., 2019). This plays a key role \r in PPB (Section 5.4.4.5; FAO, 2019e). The integration of informal and \r formal seed system elements is important for the adaptive capacity of \r smallholder farmers (Westengen and Brysting, 2014; Westengen and \r [...]"


id: d8445e002ece578e3339d118e6878c37
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
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"Addressing gender and other social inequities (e.g., racial, ethnicity, \r age, income, geographic location) in markets, governance and control \r over resources is a key enabling condition for climate-resilient \r transitions in land and aquatic ecosystems (high confidence) (Pearse, \r 2017; Vermeulen et  al., 2018; Blesh et  al., 2019; Rao et  al., 2019b; \r Cross-Chapter Box GENDER in Chapter 18, Section 5,13,1; Tavenner \r et  al., 2019). Adaptation strategies can have negative impacts on \r marginalised social groups and worsen socioeconomic inequities \r unless explicit efforts are made to address unequal power dynamics and \r differences in access to resources in agricultural, fisheries, aquaculture, \r livestock and forestry systems (high confidence) (Glemarec, 2017; \r Haji and Legesse, 2017; Nagoda and Nightingale, 2017; Nightingale, \r 2017; Rao et al., 2019b; Huyer and Partey, 2020; Mikulewicz, 2020; \r Taylor and Bhasme, 2020; Eriksen et al., 2021). Technical approaches to \r [...]"


id: f5f6c9310621926d67f29143fd643d95
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
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"[...] adaptation that ignore inequities can worsen them; see, for example, \r the case study on Climate Smart Agriculture (Box  5.12). Enabling \r environments support inclusive decision making, capacity building, \r shifts in social rules, norms and behaviours and access to resources \r for marginalised groups for climate change adaptation (e.g., Tschakert \r et al., 2016; Ziervogel, 2019; Eriksen et al., 2021; Garcia et al., 2021)."


id: 4cc4240eaf0df153c0ad586d7779e64e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
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"(Ford et  al., 2015; Brugnach et  al., 2017; Figueroa-Helland et  al., \r 2018). Where  Indigenous  Peoples have access to and control over \r their lands and natural resources, food systems can potentially be \r more sustainably managed and more resilient (high confidence) \r (Rumbach and Foley, 2014; O'Connell-Milne, 2015; Camacho et  al., \r 2016; Janhiainen, 2017; Kihila, 2018). For example, on Solomon \r Islands, community-based adaptation combining with IK-informed \r community mapping helped boost agricultural yields sustainably (Leon \r et al., 2015), and in China people living in rich plant resource regions \r have used their wild plants IK to complement the decrease of crop \r yields during extreme droughts to ensure food security (Zhang et al., \r 2016). These cases have led scientists and local communities to call \r for more practical actions to bridge local knowledge, IK and formal \r science (Borquez et al., 2017; Klenk et al., 2017; Mukhopadhyay, 2017; \r [...]"


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created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
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vector_id: 35766
content:
"[...] Olorunfemi, 2017; Reyes-Garcia et  al., 2019). Despite this increased \r public and scientific recognition, IK is often not acknowledged or used."


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"Supporting Indigenous groups' knowledge and other excluded social \r groups can help preserve and harness underutilised resources to \r enhance nutritional and economic security, with careful measures in \r protecting Indigenous intellectual rights and avoiding commodification \r exploitation (Nakashima et  al., 2012; Nandal and Bhardwaj, 2014; \r Ghosh-Jerath et al., 2015; Ebert, 2017). In some regions, there has been a \r loss of IK about food systems, reducing adaptive capacity (Richards et al., \r 2019; Panikkar and Lemmond, 2020). Knowledge exchange between \r Indigenous elders and youth can support adaptive capacity (Osterhoudt, \r 2018; Richards et al., 2019; Zin et al., 2019). Education utilising IK and \r LK can help prevent maladaptation options (high confidence) (Melvin \r et  al., 2017; Taremwa, 2017; Forbis Jr. and Hayhoe, 2018; Narayan \r et al., 2020). There are examples of integrating IK and LK into resource \r management systems and school curricula and in local institutions with \r [...]"


id: bb8e6c58c2c0091648ce82153d19a208
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"Climate-smart agriculture (CSA) is an approach that aims to increase agricultural productivity, enhance food security, adapt to climate \r change and, where possible, reduce GHG emissions. The effective implementation of climate-smart practices is conceptually linked to an \r enabling environment in which policies, institutions and finance can re-orient agricultural systems, thereby supporting development and \r enhancing food security in a changing climate (Lipper et al., 2014; Karttunen et al., 2017). However, the concept has received criticism \r based on the absence of conceptual clarity of the interrelations between productivity, food security, adaptation and mitigation (Arenas\u0002Sanchez et al., 2019) and because of limited evidence on the efficacy of CSA for achieving adaptation and mitigation outcomes at a global \r scale (Arslan et al., 2015; Lamanna et al., 2016; Chandra et al., 2018). Some argue that CSA operates within an apolitical framework that \r [...]"


id: 703e0afea798c0d50da2a8a06de4dbf7
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"[...] tends to minimise issues concerning power, inequity and access, and is overly focused on technical approaches (Taylor, 2017; HLPE, 2019). \r CSA is explicitly referenced by more than 30 countries in their Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) (Ross et al., 2016), \r but measuring the degree of its implementation still represents a challenge."


id: da3aa8d7529031c6ca134e833f06d5f3
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"There is low agreement, medium evidence on the relationship between CSA and equity (Allen, 2018; Karlsson et al., 2018). CSA can \r potentially benefit women if they are able to take advantage of improvements in productivity, food security and adaptation decision \r making as a result of the implementation of CSA practices. Nevertheless, these advantages can be unequally realised given male \r domination in receiving information and extension services, as well as financial or resource access (Jost et al., 2016). Some (Huyer and \r Partey, 2020) argue that CSA may undermine gender equity (Collins, 2018), entrench and solidify power (Haapala, 2018), and result in the \r disproportional allocation of new labour-intensive activities to women (Jost et al., 2016). Uptake of some climate-smart technologies can \r further marginalise the most disadvantaged local groups (Roncoli et al., 2009; Haapala, 2018). Unequal sharing of benefits and burdens \r [...]"


id: 28909a055fd5adb44969c3b3bc934812
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"[...] with respect to emission reduction costs among different agricultural groups has also been observed (Budiman, 2019)."


id: 77569cd149ae8787b1474bc1b857c40c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
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content:
"Recent reviews have summarised literature on production system \r transformations, driven at least in part by a changing climate or \r changing climate variability. Such transformations may involve \r sometimes substantial shifts in farm and livelihood enterprises \r and land configurations, including intensification, diversification, \r sedentarisation and abandonment of agriculture (Vermeulen et al., 2018; \r Thornton et al., 2019). Relevant literature is summarised in Table 5.24, \r showing reported farmers' perceptions of the drivers of change and \r the different outcomes of these changes. The consequences of these \r production system transitions have been mixed; in about 40% of cases, \r the outcomes at household level have been unequivocally beneficial. \r In the other cases, there were detrimental effects on livelihoods, or \r a mixture of positive and negative effects. The effects on nutritional \r security reported in these studies were limited. Different enablers of \r [...]"


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"[...] change appear critical if transitions are to have positive outcomes. \r Policy environments, defined in terms of multi-level governance \r structures and institutions, are a key driver of systems change, as well \r as being enablers of and barriers to adaptation responses (Xu et al., \r 2008; Namgay et al., 2014; Galvin et al., 2015; Schmidt and Pearson, \r 2016; Liao and Fei, 2017). Policies around property and grazing rights \r are directly linked to small-scale food producer vulnerability, and \r land ownership changes will pose a key challenge as climate change "


id: 17c2a4ccc05824896fef427d7361ce39
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"Young people are key agents in agrifood systems: both a vulnerable group, and one that can foster systemic change (high confidence) \r (Brooks et al., 2019; Figure X; IFAD, 2019; Flynn and Sumberg, 2021; HLPE, 2021). Food systems are the largest source of employment for \r young people, but do not always provide adequate livelihoods or decent working conditions (HLPE, 2021). Regions with more youthful \r populations--such as Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and Central America--are both highly vulnerable to climate change impacts and \r reliant on agriculture, forestry, aquaculture and fisheries for livelihoods (Brooks et al., 2019; IFAD, 2019; HLPE, 2021). Rural youth in \r these sectors are particularly vulnerable, often with less access to land, water, capital and other resources, shaped by family and social \r relations, and fewer opportunities (high confidence) (Chingala et al., 2017; Ricker-Gilbert and Chamberlin, 2018; IFAD, 2019; Yeboah et al., \r [...]"


id: d16d38e9ee0c96da12d849cd786a5317
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"[...] 2020; Flynn and Sumberg, 2021; Nhat Lam Duyen, 2021). In these vulnerable regions, climate change compounds other drivers such as \r poverty to increase youth out-migration to urban areas or other regions (medium confidence) (Zin et al., 2019; Weinreb et al., 2020; HLPE, \r 2021; Stoltz et al., 2021; Voss, 2021), which can further worsen rural economies. Young low-income rural women may be particularly \r marginalised and vulnerable due to systemic gender inequities in access to land, credit, employment, institutions and other resources \r (medium confidence) (Sah Akwen, 2017; IFAD, 2019; Flynn and Sumberg, 2021)."


id: 8493add0d16f5da26dde5e34bba48b1e
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"Youth play a critical role in all sectors of the food system (HLPE, 2021; Figure Box 5.13.1), and some are actively pursuing work and \r innovation in agrifood systems (medium confidence) (Sah Akwen, 2017; 2019; Yeboah et al., 2020; Flynn and Sumberg, 2021). Climate \r change impacts may reduce youth employment options in food systems in some regions, while they are often politically marginalised \r (Brooks et al., 2019; IFAD, 2019; HLPE, 2021). At the same time, due to heightened awareness about climate change, youth may be \r more willing to apply climate adaptation strategies (medium confidence) (Ali and Erenstein, 2017; Jiri et al., 2017; Sah Akwen, 2017; \r Chamberlin and Sumberg, 2021; Doherty et al., 2021). Agrifood policy implementation of adaptation strategies could increase inclusive \r participation of youth to meet their needs (HLPE, 2021). Inclusive investments in water management, infrastructure, agrifood science, \r [...]"


id: 7ebacbafca64f2bf8d39ed6fc29a9cf6
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"[...] and policies that increase youth access to land, credit, knowledge, education, skills and other crucial resources can support dignified and \r rewarding agrifood employment (Ahsan and Mitra, 2016; Brooks et al., 2019; HLPE, 2021). Digital technologies can support agrifood \r adaptations, but digital divides must be overcome to avoid worsening inequities (HLPE, 2021). Initiatives which protect and strengthen \r youth engagement and employment in the all points of the food system, including recognition of youth's critical role and agency through \r rights-based approaches, can support sustainable food transitions (HLPE, 2021). Harnessing youth innovation and vision to address \r climate change alongside other SDGs such as gender inequity and rural poverty will be a crucial strategy to ensure resilient economies in \r food systems (high confidence) (Laube, 2016; Brooks et al., 2019; IFAD, 2019; Abay et al., 2021; HLPE, 2021)."


id: c3dbe3628be28ca2bfcea076734efd6b
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"impacts in the marginal lands intensify (Reid et al., 2014). Collective \r action at multiple scales and effective governance structures are also \r a key enabler of transformational change, for helping community \r initiatives overcome economic, social and technical barriers, and to \r strengthen social capital and farmer knowledge (Haglund et al., 2011; \r Reed et al., 2017; Vermeulen et al., 2018; Fedele et al., 2019). Market \r development has been shown to be a critical factor for successful \r adaptation at scale in sub-Saharan Africa (Ouedraogo et  al., 2017; \r Iiyama et  al., 2018; Totin et  al., 2018). At the same time, financing \r mechanisms may be a crucial enabler for different food system actors: \r de-risking agricultural production and food system investments for \r producers and input suppliers, for example, that address core market \r failures and compensate actors for extra short-term costs that can \r lead to longer-term benefits, particularly for small-scale producers and \r [...]"


id: 382aaeb1dcf4cbc110d2cfebd3a2612
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"[...] businesses with comparatively low access to technologies and services \r (Vermeulen et al., 2018; Millan, 2019; see Section 5.14.2.5)."


id: e2157a401844d24adca22fb56edb23b9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
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"Current understanding of finance flows and needs for adaptation in \r crop agriculture, livestock, fisheries, aquaculture and forest products \r relies primarily on top-down projections, with limited data (UNFCCC, \r 2018; Buchner et  al., 2019; Jachnik et  al., 2019). By one estimate, \r in 2017/2018, agriculture, forestry and land use received 24% of \r public adaptation finance (totaling USD 7 billion; half via multilateral \r development finance institutions and one-quarter from governments) \r and 35% of international grants (with 71% used for adaptation) \r (Buchner et al., 2019). According to data from OECD (2020), finance \r flows for agriculture, forestry and fisheries have risen fairly linearly \r from ca. USD 1.46 billion in 2010 (the year the Rio marker on climate \r change adaptation was introduced) to ca.  5.5  billion in 2018. Over \r the entire tracked period, the three subsectors combined received a \r total of USD 29.82 billion for activities with principal and significant \r [...]"


id: 85277222772afeecf5d3c4980a5235aa
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"[...] adaptation components.4\r  However, the data set only includes climate\u0002related development finance from bilateral, multilateral and private \r philanthropic sources, whereas private sector finance flows are not \r captured as this is notoriously difficult to track (UNEP, 2016; OECD, \r 2020; cross-ref to Cross-Chapter Box FINANCE in Chapter 17). Most of \r the funding (85%) was directed towards agriculture, with forestry (12%) \r and fisheries (3%) receiving significantly less, but across the subsectors, \r there is consistency in the sense that policy and administrative \r management and development receive the lion's share of support, \r which is predominantly given in the form of grants (72%), while debt \r instruments (26%) and equity and shares in collective investment \r vehicles (2%) contribute less. From a regional perspective, 80% were \r directed to Africa (47%), Asia-Pacific (27%), and Latin America and \r Caribbean States (7%), whereas Eastern Europe and Western Europe \r [...]"


id: 4229d3b1ad73ad2e770069c5321c6b92
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"[...] and Other States received (2%) each and 17% were destined for \r 'developing countries' without regional tags. Finally, it is noteworthy \r that 38% of adaptation finance in agriculture, forestry and fisheries is \r marked as also having mitigation benefits, and roughly a quarter of \r funding is reported as having principal or significant gender objectives."


id: 75fdc570e27dbe326c50c804b500f344
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"The examples in Table 5.24 highlight the uneven impact of adaptation \r programmes and projects in general, due in part to differences in \r institutional support and failure of policies to take into account \r inequities (Clay and King, 2019; Nightingale et al., 2020). Focusing on \r transformational adaptation, Vermeulen (2018) suggested the need \r to expand the remit of adaptation planning to consider the multi\u0002functionality of agriculture and a system-wide view of food production \r and consumption. Several authors argue that transformational change \r must address the personal, practical and political spheres, in view \r of the role of power relations and worldviews in shaping practices, \r food security and inequity (O'Brien, 2015; Nightingale, 2017; O'Brien, \r 2018; Eriksen et al., 2019; Gosnell et al., 2019). If it involves new or \r unfamiliar technology, transformation may also be highly disruptive, \r and the added vulnerabilities of food system actors at risk will need to \r [...]"


id: 5f50ecf37868f919b9f55442291df2c
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"Whether current levels of growth in adaptation finance for agriculture, \r forestry and fisheries is keeping up with estimated needs cannot be \r assessed because of the large uncertainties that surround adaptation \r cost estimates (Cross-Chapter Box FINANCE in Chapter 17). There is, \r hence, high agreement that better assessment of adaptation costs \r of climate impacts requires considerably more research (Watkiss, \r 2015; Diaz and Moore, 2017). A recent study focusing on investments \r needed to offset the effects of climate change on the prevalence \r of hunger concludes that investments in agricultural research and \r development (R&D) have to increase from USD 1.62 billion to USD \r 2.77 billion per year between 2015 and 2050 (Sulser et al., 2021a). \r In addition to agricultural R&D, significant investment increases in \r water and infrastructure in the range of USD 12.7 billion and USD \r 10.8  billion are required, respectively, a considerable portion of \r [...]"


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"[...] which is relevant to the food system. In total, Sulser et al. (2021a) \r estimate that annual investment between USD 21.47  billion and \r USD 29.8  billion are needed to avoid sliding back from climate\u0002change-related increases in the prevalence of hunger but recognise \r the shortcomings of their approach and acknowledge that 'a full \r analysis of adaptation to climate change in agriculture would \r require including many other social, economic, and environmental \r dimensions'. For comparison, World Bank (2010) estimated global \r costs of USD 70-100  billion per year for agriculture, forestry \r and fisheries, infrastructure, water resources, health, ecosystem \r services, coastal zones and extreme weather events to adapt to an \r approximately 2degC warmer world between 2010 and 2050. While the \r World Bank includes more sectors, more recent publications consider \r the resulting figures to be significantly too low (Baarsch et  al., \r [...]"


id: 839c61770ab964a3a3dd144e0454f136
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"[...] 2015; UNEP, 2016; Rossi and Miola, 2017; Hallegatte et  al., 2018; \r Markandya and Gonzalez-Eguino, 2019; Chapagain et al., 2020; WGII \r Cross-Chapter Box FINANCE in Chapter 17). Therefore, despite the \r methodological and data challenges, further efforts are needed to \r better capture the economic risks of climate change and provide \r estimates of adaptation costs at global to national scales as well as \r across sectors (Watkiss, 2015; Diaz and Moore, 2017).\r Financial barriers limit implementation of adaptation options in \r agriculture, fisheries, aquaculture and forestry (high confidence)"


id: daee909c69fa1774ba29b121e36dc8bb
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"Use of climate-resilient financial strategies and instruments is limited \r by weak incentives, which commonly take the form of high upfront \r costs (Verdolini et  al., 2018), high transaction and intermediation \r costs (Havemann et al., 2020) and relatively long pay-off time. Tenant \r producers may not experience benefits from adaptation investments \r (Woodard et al., 2019). Investors seek low-risk, liquid investments and \r credit-worthy counterparties (Havemann et al., 2020), yet small- and \r medium-sized producers and supply chain actors often lack access \r to formal credit. Given limited experience and weak information for \r adaptation finance, sub-optimal outcomes may include imbalanced \r allocation of public and private finance (e.g., to less vulnerable regions \r and producers; to lower-resilience investments; to short-term benefits) \r as well as inequitable division of risks and returns (e.g., within blended \r finance structures) (Clapp, 2017; World Bank, 2018; Attridge and \r [...]"


id: 3cd91ed9ae1abc08a0f1e17f2529be64
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content:
"[...] Engen, 2019). Additionally, while risk-sharing finance strategies can \r deliver adaptation benefits, they do not inherently reduce overall risk \r and commonly cover only specified types of risks (Kellett and Peters, \r 2014; Watson et al., 2015)."


id: 5dc28f60563e8588ae8a27dde9fb0d31
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"quality changes under an IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios \r (SRES) A2 emissions scenario (Laderach et al., 2017); and development \r of participatory pathways to mid-century under RCPs 4.5 and 8.5 \r support regional adaptation planning in Hawke's Bay, New Zealand \r for agricultural producers and rural communities (Cradock-Henry et al., \r 2020). CRDPs mentioned in SROCC include shifting from providing \r coastal defences to adapting to seawater inundation in coastal regions \r (Renaud et al., 2015) and retreating coastal megacities (Solecki et al., \r 2017). Pathway frameworks continue to be used to frame the broad\u0002scale challenges of development and climate change, thereby linking \r different types of food system actor with different responses through \r time using a variety of approaches, top-down and participatory, \r qualitative and quantitative (Butler et  al., 2016; Antle et  al., 2017; \r Thornton and Comberti, 2017; Collste et al., 2019; Loboguerrero et al., \r [...]"


id: edd6b5f03467b5c49d6d309adc623ba6
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"While there is consensus that the concept of CRDPs is useful, there \r are major challenges in identifying, operationalising, monitoring and \r evaluating them (Lin et al., 2017; Bloemen et al., 2018). Management \r approaches seldom integrate across spatio-temporal scales and may be \r unable to address unidirectional change and extreme events (Holsman \r et  al., 2019). The socioeconomic complexities and implications of \r pursuing integrated outcomes make it difficult to evaluate synergies \r and trade-offs associated with different actions in local contexts \r through time (Thornton and Comberti, 2017; Ellis and Tschakert, 2019; \r Holsman et  al., 2019; Orchard, 2019). Case studies by Lo (2019) of \r transformation in a fishing town in south China and by Gajjar (2019) \r on undesirable path dependencies in development trajectories in urban \r and rural India show that overall adaptive capacity of populations \r may be decreased though politicisation and entrenchment of existing \r [...]"


id: c6d998b9003df7a5d0af2eb382ec4d15
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"[...] inequities, severely limiting the possibilities for future adaptation. A \r further challenge of implementation is timely detection of tipping \r points and abrupt exposure events in both climate and environmental \r systems (Lenton et al., 2019; Trisos et al., 2020), which may alter the \r efficacy of current and planned adaptation actions, necessitating a \r switch to other, more transformational strategies; in such cases, re\u0002energising food system actors' commitment to adaptation action may \r well be needed (Bloemen et al., 2018)."


id: 89192309aa703b8dde9551c9b7722e15
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"Integrated modelling of CRDPs will increasingly be needed to throw \r light on key SDG synergies and trade-offs into the future (Bleischwitz \r et al., 2018). In investigating possible future pressures on land under \r the SSPs, Doelman (2018) projected that the largest changes take place \r in sub-Saharan Africa in SSP3 and SSP4, mostly because of continued \r high population growth coupled with (projected) sluggish increases \r in agricultural efficiency, among other things, leading to expansion of \r agricultural land for crop and livestock production and reduced food \r security. Lassaletta (2019) evaluated global pig production in the SSPs \r and concluded that the future sustainability of pig systems will depend \r on production efficiency improvements coupled with other factors such \r as use of alternative feed sources and use of slurries on cropland. Such \r studies will be increasingly important for quantifying the potential \r [...]"


id: 49ef7074ebdc0a6668a3ee9033defcc9
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"[...] trade-offs and synergies between different SDGs, to guide adaptation \r (and mitigation) action along CRDPs in the future. The current lack \r of widely accepted and simple-to-measure indicators for tracking \r progress in adaptation is a significant hurdle to overcome. There is a \r large literature on the desirable characteristics of future global food "


id: 70605a3a361250d965df8a41c853cc82
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"Developing New Bio-Based Solutions while Mitigating Overall Biomass Demand Growth\r Many existing bio-based products have significant mitigation potential. Increased use of wood in buildings can reduce GHG emissions \r from cement and steel production while providing carbon storage (Churkina et al., 2020). Substitution of fossil fuels with biomass in \r manufacture of cement and steel can reduce GHG emissions where these materials are difficult to replace. Dispatchable power based on \r biomass can provide power stability and quality as the contribution from solar and wind power increases (WGIII Chapter 6), and biofuels \r can contribute to reducing fossil fuel emissions in the transport and industry sectors (WGIII Chapter 10 and Chapter 11). The use of bio\u0002based plastics, chemicals and packaging could be increased, and biorefineries can achieve high resource-use efficiency in converting \r [...]"


id: 99fdf9c65e5daab1710e3b65cd43f7df
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"[...] biomass into food, feed, fuels and other bio-based products (Aristizabal-Marulanda and Cardona Alzate, 2019; Schmidt et al., 2019). There \r is also scope for substituting existing bio-based products with more benign products. For example, cellulose-based textiles can replace \r cotton, which requires large amounts of water, chemical fertilizers and pesticides to ensure high yields."


id: c027856731af450f65ec86ccc444a4df
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"While increasing and diversified use of biomass can reduce the need for fossil fuels and other GHG-intensive products, unfavourable \r GHG balances may limit the mitigation value. Growth in biomass use may in the longer term also be constrained by the need to protect \r biodiversity and ecosystems' capacity to support essential ecosystem services. Biomass use may also be constrained by water scarcity and \r other resource scarcities and/or challenges related to public perception and acceptance due to impacts caused by biomass production \r and use. Energy conservation and efficiency measures and deployment of technologies and systems that do not rely on carbon, such \r as carbon-free electricity supporting, inter alia, electrification of transport as well as industry processes and residential heating (IPCC, \r 2018; UNEP, 2019), can constrain the growth in biomass demand when countries seek to phase out fossil fuels and other GHG-intensive \r [...]"


id: ead1e1e011a1040855d7db0642064f35
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"[...] products while providing an acceptable standard of living. Nevertheless, demand for bio-based products may become high where full \r decoupling from carbon is difficult to achieve (e.g., aviation, bio-based plastics, and chemicals) or where carbon storage is an associated \r benefit (e.g., wood buildings, bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS), biochar for soil amendments), leading to challenging \r trade-offs (e.g., food security, biodiversity) that need to be managed in environmentally sustainable and socially just ways."


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"Circular economy approaches (WGIII-12.6) are commonly depicted by two cycles, where the biological cycle focuses on regeneration in \r the biosphere and the technical cycle focuses on reuse, refurbishment and recycling to maintain value and maximise material recovery \r (Mayer et al., 2019a). Biogenic carbon flows and resources are part of the biological carbon cycle, but carbon-based products can be \r included in, and affect, both the biological and the technical carbon cycles (Kirchherr et al., 2017; Winans et al., 2017; Velenturf et al., \r 2019). The integration of circular economy and bioeconomy principles has been discussed in relation to organic waste management \r (Teigiserova et al., 2020), societal transition and policy development (Directorate-General for Research Innovation, 2018; Bugge et al., \r 2019) as well as coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) recovery strategies (Palahi et al., 2020). To maintain the natural resource base, \r [...]"


id: 347a7d854c437dc9027d8cf9f2ba72cd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
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"[...] circular bioeconomy emphasises sustainable land use and the return of biomass and nutrients to the biosphere when it leaves the\r technical cycle."


id: b0671e9acd851588f3fe669e6b0f9c17
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28271
content:
"Agroecological approaches can be integrated into a wide range of land management practices to support a sustainable bioeconomy and \r address equity considerations (HLPE, 2019). Relevant land use practices, such as agroforestry, intercropping, organic amendments, cover \r crops and rotational grazing, can provide mitigation and support adaption to climate change via food security, livelihoods, biodiversity \r and health co-benefits (Ponisio et al., 2015; Garibaldi et al., 2016; D'Annolfo et al., 2017; Bezner Kerr et al., 2019; Clark et al., 2019; \r Cordova et al., 2019; HLPE, 2019; Mbow et al., 2019; Renard and Tilman, 2019; Sinclair et al., 2019; Bharucha et al., 2020; Bezner Kerr \r et  al., 2021;WGII Cross-Chapter Box  NATURAL in Chapter 2). Strategic integration of appropriate biomass production systems into \r agricultural landscapes can provide biomass for bioenergy and other bio-based products while providing co-benefits such as enhanced \r [...]"


id: 1d274749fca2780c42238b0898fe2cca
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2302
content:
"[...] landscape diversity, habitat quality, retention of nutrients and sediment, erosion control, climate regulation, flood regulation, pollination \r and biological pest and disease control (WGIII Chapter12 Box on UNCCD-LDN, Christen and Dalgaard, 2013; Asbjornsen et al., 2014; \r Holland et al., 2015; Ssegane et al., 2015; Dauber and Miyake, 2016; Milner et al., 2016; Ssegane and Negri, 2016; Styles et al., 2016; \r Zumpf et al., 2017; Cacho et al., 2018; Alam and Dwivedi, 2019; Cubins et al., 2019; HLPE, 2019; Olsson et al., 2019; Zalesny et al., 2019; \r Englund et al., 2020). Such approaches can help limit environmental impacts from intensive agriculture while maintaining or increasing \r land productivity and biomass output."


id: 616020c6f7e15f03469e4414d396a5fc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14428
content:
"Transitions from conventional to new biomass production and conversion systems include challenges related to cross-sector integration \r and limited experience with new crops and land use practices, including needs for specialised equipment (WGII Chapter 5.10, Thornton \r and Herrero, 2015; HLPE, 2019). Introduction of agroecological approaches and integrated biomass/food crop production can result in \r lower food crop yields per hectare, particularly during transition phases, potentially causing indirect land use change, but can also support \r higher and more stable yields, reduce costs, and increase profitability under climate change (Muller et al., 2017; Seufert and Ramakutty, \r 2017; Barbieri et  al., 2019; HLPE, 2019; Sinclair et  al., 2019; Smith et  al., 2019c; Smith et  al., 2020a). Crop diversification, organic \r amendments and biological pest control (HLPE, 2019) can reduce input costs and risks of occupational pesticide exposure and food \r [...]"


id: 39a36a68e77ba281c953cfd1b33e5c34
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7351
content:
"[...] and water contamination (Gonzalez-Alzaga et al., 2014; European Food Safety Authority Panel on Plant Protection Products and their \r Residues et al., 2017; Mie et al., 2017), reduce farmers' vulnerability to climate change (e.g., droughts and spread of pests and diseases \r affecting plant and animal health; Delcour et al., 2015; FAO, 2020a) and enhance provisioning and sustaining ecosystem services, such as \r pollination (D'Annolfo et al., 2017; Sinclair et al., 2019)."


id: f62793b0112ee5028f1e09c3988f0109
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40667
content:
"Literature analysing the synergies and trade-offs between competing demands for land suggest that solutions are highly contextualised \r in terms of their environmental, socioeconomic and governance-related characteristics, making it difficult to devise generic solutions \r (Haasnoot et al., 2020). Aspects of spatial and temporal scale can further enhance the complexity, for instance where transboundary \r effects across jurisdictions or upstream-downstream characteristics need to be considered, or where climate change trajectories might \r alter relevant biogeophysical dynamics (Postigo and Young, 2021). Nonetheless, there is broad agreement that taking the needs and \r perspectives of multiple stakeholders into account in a transparent process during negotiations improves the chances of achieving \r outcomes that maximise synergies while limiting trade-offs (Ariti et al., 2018; Metternicht, 2018; Favretto et al., 2020; Kopacek, 2021; \r [...]"


id: 6a7cf85eec0b3bf62f42a15b6182dae8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16015
content:
"[...] Muscat et  al., 2021). Yet differences in agency and power between stakeholders or anticipated changes in access to or control of \r resources can undermine negotiation results even if there is a common understanding of the overarching benefits of more integrated \r environmental agreements and the need for greater coordination and cooperation to avoid longer-term losses to all (Aarts and Leeuwis, \r 2010; Weitz et al., 2017). There is also the risk that strong local participatory processes can become disconnected from broader national \r plans, and thus fail to support the achievement of national targets. Thus, connection between levels is needed to ensure that ambition for \r transformative change is not derailed at the local level (Aarts and Leeuwis, 2010; Postigo and Young, 2021)."


id: 9513c64af1b94f68c12fbab3263cca4a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23433
content:
"International trade in the global economy today provides important opportunities to connect producers and consumers, effectively \r buffering price volatilities and potentially offering producers in low-income countries access to global markets, which can be seen as an \r effective adaptation measure (Baldos and Hertel, 2015; Costinot et al., 2016; Hertel and Baldos, 2016; Gouel and Laborde, 2021; WGII \r Chapter 5.11).. But there is also clear evidence that international trade and the global economy can enhance price volatility, lead to food \r price spikes and affect food security due to climate and other shocks, as seen recently due to the COVID-19 pandemic (WGII Chapter 5.12, \r Cottrell et al., 2019; WFP-FSIN, 2020; Verschuur et al., 2021). The continued strong demand for food and other bio-based products, mainly \r from high- and middle-income countries, therefore, requires better cooperation between nations and global governance of trade to more \r [...]"


id: a90637ce7777ee8d5009829d2bc908c2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26948
content:
"[...] accurately reflect and disincentivise their environmental and social externalities. Trade in agricultural and extractive products driving land \r use change in tropical forest and savanna biomes is of major concern because of the biodiversity impacts and GHG emissions incurred in \r their provision (WGII Cross-Chapter Paper 7, Hosonuma et al., 2012; Forest Trends, 2014; Henders et al., 2015; Curtis et al., 2018; Pendrill \r et al., 2019; Seymour and Harris, 2019; Kissinger et al., 2021)."


id: 77451f537c5178b0e9a7831254971850
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18188
content:
"Food systems are complicated (Figure FAQ5.5.1). To improve food production, supply and distribution, we need \r to make changes throughout the food supply chain. For instance: improving the way farmers access the inputs \r needed to grow food; improving the ways in which food is grown, with climate and market information, training \r and technical know-how, water-saving and water-harvesting technologies; adopting new low-cost and less \r carbon-intensive storage and processing methods; and creating local networks of producers and processors For \r food consumers, we could consider shifts to different diets that are healthier and make more efficient use of natural \r resources; depending on context, these could involve rebalancing consumption of meat and highly processed \r foods, reducing food loss and waste, and preparing food in more energy-efficient ways. Policymakers can enable \r [...]"


id: b5b68c0dd9c7590b56203ddf8f4dae32
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29195
content:
"[...] such actions through appropriate price and trade policies, implementing policies for sustainable and low-emission \r agriculture, providing safety nets where needed, and empowering women, youth and other socially disadvantaged \r groups."


id: 5e4a91f4bc392e7209849cbdde027918
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13877
content:
"The COVID-19 pandemic has had a substantial impact on \r urban communities and climate adaptation (medium evidence,\r high agreement). The pandemic has revealed both systemic \r under-investment resulting in multiple, persistent health-related \r vulnerabilities (many of which also exacerbate climate change risk) \r and co-benefits for urban interventions to reduce future pandemic \r and climate change risk. The COVID-19 pandemic is estimated to \r have pushed an additional 119 to 124  million people into poverty \r in 2020, with South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa each contributing \r roughly two-fifths of this total (medium confidence). At city level, \r community groups, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and local \r governments face challenges to bring agencies already working on \r social and economic development into coordinated action to reduce \r urban vulnerabilities and manage risks. COVID-19 and climate change \r impacts are exacerbated by widening social inequality. Addressing the \r [...]"


id: 3dea5c8b6b0979b69016c9fc2c451ec2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8061
content:
"[...] causes of social vulnerability creates opportunity for transformative \r adaptation. {Box  6.4; 6.1.4; 6.2.2.4; 6.2.5; 6.4.1.3; Case Study 6.4; \r Cross-Chapter Box COVID in Chapter 7}"


id: 840daa7c7593e9021d9d518040b717a5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20387
content:
"The documentation of climate-related events and observed \r human and economic losses have increased since AR5 for urban \r areas and human settlements. Observed losses arise from single, \r compound, cascading and systemic events (medium evidence, \r high agreement). Losses from single events include the direct impact \r of heat stress on human health. Compound event losses arise from the \r interaction of single climate hazards with at least one other hazard \r driver such as heat with poor air quality (e.g., from traffic fumes or \r wildfire), flooding with poor water quality (e.g., from contaminated \r runoff and flood water) or land subsidence. Cascading impacts are \r observed when damages in one place or system reduce resilience and \r generate impacts elsewhere (e.g., when flood waters damage energy \r infrastructure causing blackouts and knock on financial and human \r impacts). Losses become systemic when affecting entire systems and \r [...]"


id: 8a28b3977aa2b3ca08dc6211eea041bc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21482
content:
"[...] can even jump from one system to another (e.g., drought impacting on \r rural food production contributing to urban food insecurity) (medium \r confidence). In some cases, maladaptive responses to hazards have \r exacerbated inequality in the distribution of impacts, for example \r shifting risk from one community to another. {Figure 6.2; 6.2.6; 6.3.4.1; \r 6.4.5; Cross-Chapter Paper 2; Cross-Working Group Box  URBAN in \r Chapter 6}"


id: 7bf5dab396a4cd5295a07fcf5c982712
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19018
content:
"The number of people expected to live in urban areas highly \r exposed to climate change impacts has increased substantially \r (high confidence).  An additional 2.5  billion people are projected \r to be living in urban areas by 2050, with up to 90% of this increase \r concentrated in the regions of Asia and Africa. Projections of the number \r of people expected to live in urban areas highly exposed to climate \r change impacts have increased. Sea level increase and increases in \r tropical cyclone storm surge and rainfall intensity will increase the \r probability of coastal city flooding,  with more than a billion people \r located in low-lying cities and settlements expected to be at risk from \r coastal-specific climate hazards by 2050 (high confidence).  Sea level \r rise, increases in tropical cyclone storm surges and more frequent and \r intense extreme precipitation will increase the number of people, area of \r urban land, and damages from flood hazard (high confidence). The main \r [...]"


id: 5cf6db70cafcad1fab28a5800c119f5c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13621
content:
"[...] driver for increased heat exposure is the combination of global warming \r and population growth in already-warm centres, and the majority of the \r population exposed to heatwaves will live in urban centres. An additional \r 350 million people living in urban areas are estimated be exposed to \r water scarcity from severe droughts at 1.5degC warming, and 410.7 million \r at 2degC warming. {6.1; 6.2.2; Cross-Chapter Paper 2}"


id: 8c920d1efa8fbd98f13a59fb431e3fb8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21916
content:
"City and local governments are key among multiple actors \r facilitating climate change adaptation in cities and settlements \r (medium confidence). City and local governments can invest directly \r and work in partnership with community, private sector and national \r agencies to address climate risk. Private and business investment in key \r infrastructure, housing construction and through insurance requirements \r can also drive widespread adaptive action, though at times excluding \r the priorities of the poor (medium confidence). Networked community \r actions can also go beyond neighbourhood-scale improvements to \r address widespread vulnerability. Such actions include fostering roles \r of intermediaries and multiple spaces for networked governance \r across scales of decision-making, improving development processes \r through an understanding of social and economic systems, foresight, \r experimentation and embedded solutions, and social learning. \r [...]"


id: db7f35f284f51f053f9a23623e707130
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35895
content:
"[...] Transnational networks of local government can also enhance city level \r capacity, share lessons and advocacy (medium confidence). {Table 6.2; \r 6.3.3.4; 6.3.3.5; 6.4.1; 6.4.1.1; Case Study 6.2; FAQ 6.5}"


id: 9445a05e8b82dfe344d0bb0602e5755
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23290
content:
"Globally, decisions about key infrastructure systems and urban \r expansion drive risk creation and potential action on climate \r change (high confidence). Urban infrastructure concentrates and \r connects populations, physical assets and energy use. Urban expansion \r and the compromising of green infrastructure and ecosystem services \r reduce adaptive capacity and can increase risk: the urban heat island, a \r product of expansion, can add 2degC to local warming. How settlements \r and key infrastructure are planned, designed and maintained \r determines patterns of exposure, social and physical vulnerability \r and capacity for resilience. Unplanned rapid urbanisation, including \r peri-urban development, is a major driver of risk, particularly where \r cities and settlements are expanding into land that is prone to coastal \r flooding or landslides, or where there is inadequate water to meet \r the needs of growing populations. Urban decision making processes \r [...]"


id: 970bfa33619e16d3ed6c2a1291d42d9b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23766
content:
"[...] equally shape how far low- and zero-carbon development can meet \r social needs; enhancing well-being while enabling climate change \r mitigation and advancing the SDGs. {6.1.3; 6.2.3; 6.2.4; 6.3.3; 6.3.4; \r 6.3.5; 6.4.6; Cross-Working Group Box URBAN in Chapter 6}"


id: d5d3741dc34c29715fd9b9b0fcdf9f81
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34930
content:
"Investment in urban adaptation has not kept pace with inno\u0002vations in policy and practice (medium confidence). Knowledge \r transfer and innovation in adaptation has broadened advances in so\u0002cial and ecological infrastructures including disaster risk management, \r social policy and green/blue infrastructure, especially where these are \r integrated with grey/physical infrastructure (medium evidence, high \r agreement). Innovation has also taken place at the interface of differ\u0002ence systems, for example information and communications technolo\u0002gy (ICT) and water or energy, although financial investment has been \r slow to recognise and support these activities. Adaption finance con\u0002tinues to be directed at large-scale grey/physical engineering projects, \r neglecting maintenance and reproducing risk of stranded assets if \r climate change risk accelerates beyond planned-for levels. Finance de\u0002ployed at the interface of multiple, integrated adaptation measures \r [...]"


id: fad348abc082f8480f8c0b1fb9bd43ba
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41508
content:
"[...] can support climate resilient development (high confidence). Access to \r finance is most difficult for city, local and non-state actors, and in con\u0002ditions where governance is fragile. {6.3.3; 6.3.4; 6.3.6; 6.4.5; 6.4.5.2; \r Table 6.10; Table 6.11; Box 6.8; Case Study 6.2; Case Study 6.3; Case \r Study 6.5}"


id: 1d594a4a5f84f043b6ffb36d506518c5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2345
content:
"Slow uptake of monitoring and evaluation frameworks \r constrains potential for developing climate resilient urban \r development pathways (medium confidence). A lack of agreement \r on metrics and indices to measure urban adaptation investment, \r impacts and outcomes, reduces the scope for sharing lessons and \r joined-up action across interconnected sectors and places in the face \r of compound and systemic risks. These constraints affect the potential \r for climate resilient development pathways. Limits to adaptation are \r often most pronounced in rapidly growing towns and cities and smaller \r settlements including those without dedicated local government. At \r the same time, legacy infrastructure in large and mega-cities, designed \r without taking climate change risk into account, constrains innovation \r leading to stranded assets and increasing numbers of people unable to \r avoid harm, including heat stress and flooding, without transformative \r [...]"


id: e03eb7bd18de6659b48d690127626b0e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36702
content:
"Global urbanisation offers a time-limited opportunity to work \r toward widespread and transformational adaptation and climate \r resilient development (high confidence). Current dominant models \r of energy intensive and market-led urbanisation build high carbon \r dependency and high vulnerability into cities, but this need not be the \r case. Integrated development planning that connects innovation and \r investment in social, ecological and grey/physical infrastructures can \r significantly increase the adaptive capacity of urban settlements and \r cities. Transitioning cities to low carbon development and equitable \r resilience may lead to trade-offs with dominant models of economic \r growth based on housing and infrastructure investment. Integrated \r planning approaches are important for climate resilient development to \r enable planning and monitoring of interactions between development, \r mitigation and adaptation. Urban adaptation measures can offer \r [...]"


id: 28b8c5e24df40c1fcae1261ee50c1624
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4378
content:
"[...] a considerable contribution to climate resilient development. This \r potential is realised by adaptations that extend predominant physical \r infrastructure approaches to also deploy nature-based solutions and \r social interventions. The most consistent limit for all infrastructure types \r is in risk transfer. Current adaptation approaches in cities, settlements \r and key infrastructure tend to move risk from one sector or place to \r others. Multi-level leadership and institutional capacity, together with \r financial resources (including climate finance) to support inclusive \r and sustainable adaptation in the context of multiple pressures and \r interconnected risks, can help to ensure that global urbanisation of an \r additional 2.5  billion people by 2050 reduces rather than generates \r climate risk (medium confidence). {Table  6.7; Table  6.5; 6.1.3; 6.3.6; \r 6.3.5.2; 6.4.7; Box 6.5; Cross-Working Group Box URBAN in Chapter 6; \r Cross-Chapter Paper 2}"


id: 396a8d5d5414029a844f18639c483e63
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7316
content:
"Intersectional, gender-responsive and inclusive action can ac\u0002celerate transformative climate change adaptation. The great\u0002est gains in well-being in urban areas can be achieved by \r prioritising investment to reduce climate risk for low-income \r and marginalised residents and targeting informal settlements \r (high confidence). These approaches can advance equity and envi\u0002ronmental justice over the long term in ways more likely to lead to \r outcomes that reduce vulnerability for all urban residents. Participatory \r planning for infrastructure provision and risk management to address \r climate change and underlying drivers of risk in informal and under\u0002serviced neighbourhoods, the inclusion of Indigenous knowledge and \r local knowledge, communication and efforts to build local leader\u0002ship, especially among women and youth, are examples of inclusive \r approaches with co-benefits for equity. Providing opportunities for \r [...]"


id: a7f9d21ad45ac355f9ba4af3d1f99706
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26762
content:
"[...] marginalised people, including women, to take on leadership and par\u0002ticipation in local projects can enhance climate governance and its \r outcomes (high confidence). Since AR5 (IPCC, 2014), social movements \r in many cities, including movements led by youth, Indigenous and eth\u0002nic communities have also heightened public awareness about the \r need for urgent, inclusive action to achieve adaptation that can also \r enhance well-being. {6.1.5; 6.3.5; 6.4.1.2; 6.4.7; Box 6.6, Case study \r 6.2; Case study 6.4, FAQ6.3}"


id: ea5afdec06768d5724228fab636d05fc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38587
content:
"Since the publication of AR5, there has been rapid expansion in \r policy, practice and research related to climate change and human \r settlements. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (the SDGs) \r agreed in September 2015, was preceded by the Sendai Framework for \r Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-30 and followed shortly afterwards by \r the Paris Agreement (December 2015) (United Nations, 2015b). These \r make explicit mention of 'mainstreaming of disaster risk assessments \r into land use policy development and implementation, including urban \r planning' (Sendai Framework) (UNISDR, 2015). The agreements identify \r 'sustainable cities and communities' (SDG11) and 'cities and subnational \r authorities' (Paris Agreement) as important actors in integrating climate \r and development goals (Sanchez Rodriguez, Urge-Vorsatz and Barau, \r 2018). However not all urban SDGs have measurable targets yet, \r or data, particularly in regard to children and youth, the elderly and \r [...]"


id: 5161a85243c7d3f72d00987f0361ab9f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11595
content:
"[...] disabled (Klopp and Petretta, 2017; Reckien et al., 2017; Nissen et al., \r 2020). Clear procedures for linking climate adaptation in communities \r at all scales to the SDGs is lacking (Major, Lehmann and Fitton, 2018; \r Sanchez Rodriguez, Urge-Vorsatz and Barau, 2018)."


id: 358bc5bf47abf76c1582648ef5e24927
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6674
content:
"Since AR5, there has been increasing understanding of the \r interdependence of meta-regions, large, small and rural settlements \r which may be connected through key infrastructure (Lichter and Ziliak, \r 2017), including national and trans-national infrastructure investments \r (Hanakata and Gasco, 2018). Almost all the world's non-urban \r population and its provisioning ecosystems are impacted by urban \r systems through connecting infrastructure and family and kinship ties, \r remittances and trade arrangements that influence flows of water, \r food, fibre, energy, waste and people (Trundle, 2020; McIntyre-Mills \r and Wirawan, 2018; Zhang et al., 2019; Nerini et al., 2019; Friend and \r Thinphanga, 2018). Many rural places are so deeply connected to \r urban systems that risks are observed to cascade from one to the other, \r for example, when drought in arable zones leads to food insecurity in \r cities, or where flood damage to urban transport infrastructure leads \r [...]"


id: 3cf8dfe0882f986bc6ae6bc723a58bed
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content:
"[...] to prolonged isolation of small towns and rural settlements (Friend \r and Thinphanga, 2018; McIntyre-Mills and Wirawan, 2018). A focus \r of this chapter is the experience of a range of urban settlements, \r from small to large, and the connecting infrastructure and formal and \r informal networks and systems that join them to each other. There are \r close synergies with Chapters 7 (Health, Well-being and the Changing \r Structure of Communities) and 8 (Poverty, Livelihoods and Sustainable \r Development). There are further important synergies with Working \r Group III Chapter 8 (Urban Systems and Other Settlements) and the \r Cross-Chapter Paper 2: Cities and Settlements by the Sea."


id: 7f814f343bb40b06e3e3dc401207cc77
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
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"The New Urban Agenda (NUA) (October 2016), with its focus on \r housing and sustainable urban development, commits its signatories \r to building resilient and responsive cities that foster climate change \r mitigation and adaptation (United Nations, 2016b). This agreement \r followed the Geneva UN Charter on Sustainable Housing, endorsed \r by 56 member states of the United Nations Economic Commission \r for Europe (United Nations, 2015d). The NUA aims to ensure access \r to decent, adequate, affordable and healthy housing for all, while \r reducing the impact of the housing sector on the environment and \r increasing resilience to extreme weather events (United Nations, \r 2016b). Voluntary, networked action led by cities was also illustrated \r by a November 2019 call to Mayors and youth climate activists to sign \r a voluntary pledge in a 'Race to Zero' ahead of the Conference of the \r Parties 26, which included endorsing principles of a New Green Deal \r [...]"


id: 86761dc23cdd197d8d45c52717faa61d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
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content:
"[...] (C40, 2019). Other voluntary, global, urban efforts have been led by \r the scientific community including the Research and Action Agenda \r on Cities and Climate Change Science which aims to promote research \r and reports (Prieur-Richard, Walsh and Craig, 2019)."


id: 1aa6e887c27baeff6209ee9c75c56d24
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
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content:
"The framing of 'key economic sectors and services' in AR5 focused \r primarily on three infrastructural areas (energy, water services, \r transport) and on primary and secondary economic activities \r (including recreation and tourism, insurance and financial services). \r Cities, settlements and key infrastructure are also referred to in the \r IPCC special reports released since AR5. The Special Report on Global \r Warming of 1.5degC (IPCC, 2018) examines impacts of global warming \r on urban systems and infrastructure in the context of advancing \r sustainable development and eradicating poverty. It highlights the \r risks facing residents of unplanned and informal urban settlements, \r many of which are exposed to a range of climate-related hazards \r (Sections  3.4.8 and 4.4.1.3). The Special Report on Global Warming \r of 1.5degC also identifies green infrastructure, sustainable land use \r and planning, and sustainable water management as key adaptation \r [...]"


id: 49cee3ebabc4d0ece371941901f552e9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
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"[...] options that can reduce risks in urban areas (SPM C2.4; C2.5), and \r highlights 'urban and infrastructure' as one of four system transitions \r required to limit warming to 1.5degC to create an enabling environment \r for adaptation (Section  4.3.3). Innovative governance arrangements \r that go beyond formal 'government' and political arrangements and \r that include non-state actors, networks and informal institutions \r were identified as important in addressing climate change and \r implementing responses to 1.5degC-consistent pathways (Special Report \r on Global Warming of 1.5degC [Sections 4.4.1 and 5.6.2]). In addition, \r the Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5degC mentions, with high \r confidence, the climate-related health effects of urban heat islands, \r urban heatwaves and increasing risks from some vector-borne \r diseases (illnesses caused by pathogens and parasites in human \r populations) (SPM B5.2). The report also notes both trade-offs and \r [...]"


id: bfd0d9d02db48f77313993a83feed2de
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
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"[...] important co-benefits of sustainable development in pursuit of climate \r resilient development pathways that achieve ambitious mitigation \r and adaptation in conjunction with poverty eradication and efforts to \r reduce inequalities (SPM D6)."


id: 66c2378821a952a8ea0e057fb3822ff
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
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"This assessment also considers new literature about how enabling \r environments can support adaptation in ways that are also sensitive to \r Indigenous knowledge and Local knowledge (see below Section 6.1), \r social justice (6.4.3.4)) and climate mitigation (Section 6.3.5.2). It builds \r on the findings of AR5 which highlighted the concentration of global \r climate risks in urban areas, the complex causal chains that mediate \r climate impacts for smaller settlements and rural areas, and the multiple \r issues shaping and influencing economic sectors and infrastructure. \r This integrated chapter enables a more detailed analysis of the \r inter-connected drivers of risk that affect urban people and settlements \r of different sizes. This discussion also highlights the inter-connections \r within and between urban areas, and between different types of \r infrastructure and how these complex relationships accentuate or limit \r [...]"


id: a5685b670ac51fcf7d4ceb7cd3dce4db
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26331
content:
"[...] the effects of climate change and the institutional structures that play a \r critical role in mediating and govern these relationships."


id: 779d10dd9031cc5d518d216462cab89d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
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"This chapter has five main sections. The first elaborates on changes in the \r international policy context since 2014, highlighting the implications \r that this has for responses to climate change in cities, settlements and \r key infrastructure. Section 6.2 is focused on observed and projected \r climate risks, paying particular attention to the ways in which these \r are created through processes of urbanisation and infrastructural \r investment. Section 6.3 takes an integrated and holistic approach to an \r assessment of adaptive actions relevant to key infrastructures (those \r that form the material basis for resilience in cities and settlements, \r drive economies and are essential for human well-being). Section 6.4 \r assesses the enabling conditions and leadership qualities associated \r with adaptation processes that can also meet the equity agenda of \r the SDGs, to leave no-one behind, including the role of governance, \r [...]"


id: 1e20eeef62d8b1d6171f4ee2e9c2cbf2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"The Special Report on Oceans and Cryosphere (SROCC) similarly \r emphasizes the role governance plays in reducing disaster risk, \r through planning, and zoning (IPCC, 2019b). It identifies vulnerability \r factors such as poverty, which can undermine resilience and \r sustainable development in urban communities (IPCC, 2019b SPM \r C3.1,and Section 2.3.2) The SROCC report shows that the emerging \r climate-related challenges are impacting the accessibility and \r availability of vital resources and blurring the public and private \r boundaries of risk and responsibility (Cross-Chapter Box 3). According \r to the SROCC report, new governance arrangements are emerging \r to address these challenges, including participatory and networked \r structures, and institutions linking formal and informal networks \r involving state, private sector, Indigenous and civil society actors \r (Cross-Chapter Box  3). The SROCC report calls for place-specific \r [...]"


id: 1fb61aca553b5b9828d546c881b9bd50
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"[...] action because there is no single climate governance panacea \r for the ocean, coasts and cryosphere (Cross-Chapter Box  3). The \r SROCC report highlights evidence of the importance of inclusivity, \r fairness, deliberation, reflexivity, responsiveness, social learning, the \r co-production of knowledge, and respect for ethical and cultural \r diversity in climate-related urban decision making (Cross-Chapter \r Box 3). In addition, the Special Report on Climate Change and Land \r notes that urbanisation can intensify extreme rainfall events over the \r city or downwind of urban areas and have can significant consequences \r for heat island effects on loss of food production, posing additional "


id: b8e598453ea676eee62871dacc0f850f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"The AR5 conceptualised cities and settlements as complex \r interdependent systems that could be engaged in supporting climate \r change adaptation (Revi et  al., 2014 8.8.2). Effective municipal \r governance systems and cooperative multi-level governance supported \r adaptation action. The AR5 report expressed medium confidence\r that governance interventions can help develop synergies across \r geographical and institutional scales. Urban areas face challenges of \r infrastructure investment and maintenance, land use management, \r livelihood creation and ecosystem services protection. AR5 also \r considered how urban localities can encourage incremental and \r transformative adaptation, build resilience and support sustainable \r development. The assessment identified the need for multi-level and \r multi-partner action in rapidly growing cities where institutions and \r infrastructure are still not established to meet the growing demands of \r [...]"


id: 5622fd5ac8ef339ea9be9a7771be76e2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
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vector_id: 12429
content:
"[...] the cities. However, there was only medium confidence that adaptation \r action was happening in the AR5 review period."


id: c59d55a9522af886c13e2d0870357ee2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
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content:
"2018; Bassolas et  al., 2019). Key or critical infrastructure provides \r much of the material basis of cities and settlements, as well as the \r mechanisms for enabling flows of people, goods, data, waste, energy \r (through urban metabolism processes of consumption and production) \r and capital, between urban regions and rural areas (Blay-Palmer et al., \r 2018; Dijst et  al., 2018). An overview of this process of 'planetary' \r urbanisation is provided in Box  6.1. The balance of accumulated \r scientific knowledge on climate risks, impact and adaptation has \r been generated from studies in large and medium-sized cities of \r 1 million or more. While these larger cities continue to grow rapidly \r (UNDESA 2018), settlements of more than 5  million people contain \r less than a quarter of the world's urban population, and more than \r half of the world's urban residents live in settlements of 1 million or \r less (Table 6.1). There is a key gap in knowledge, especially concerning \r [...]"


id: 9b894c2b9adf43fe730247388d78177b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"[...] urban enabling environments and how smaller settlements can be \r supported to accelerate equitable and sustainable adaptation in the \r face of financial and governance constraints (Birkmann et al., 2016; \r Shi et al., 2016; Dulal, 2019; Rosenzweig et al., 2018b)."


id: ff99966fd3e9e8533aaa444672f95e2c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
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vector_id: 42367
content:
"Definitions of 'urban' have become more nuanced since the AR5 \r review with the publication of the OECD report 'A new perspective \r on urbanisation' (OECD and European Commission, 2020). This report \r presents two new global definitions of urbanisation reflecting the \r degree of urbanisation on a continuum of cities, towns and semi-dense \r areas, and rural areas. The OECD estimates almost half the world's \r population (48%) live in cities, while just 24% live in rural areas and \r 28% live in towns and semi-dense areas (28%). In addition, the OECD \r report defines metropolitan areas as functional urban areas together \r with their surrounding commuting zones 'to capture the full extent' of a \r city's working population. Metropolitan areas account for 54% of total \r world population, with the OECD estimating that commuting zones \r representing 17% of the overall metropolitan population, rising to 31% \r in high-income countries. In the context of these global definitions, \r [...]"


id: 860811cb61cb2c87b64f9e42d132566e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
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content:
"[...] this chapter identifies 'cities and settlements' as concentrated human \r habitation centres (along a dynamic continuum from rural to urban) \r (Murali et al., 2019; Ward and Shackleton, 2016) (Figure 6.1) that are \r fundamentally inter-connected to other urban centres and rural areas \r as nodes within broader networks."


id: e2a75673b13bec0635e8393690908805
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37178
content:
"Cities are complex entities where social, ecological and physical systems \r interact in planned and unplanned ways (Markolf et  al., 2018). The \r complexity of cities, settlements and key infrastructure (Figure 6.2) where \r multiple functional systems continuously interact makes it difficult to \r distinguish risks (Box 6.1). The literature often resolves this by offering \r discrete assessments for specific sectors (see Section 6.3). This fragmented \r approach to understanding climate change associated impacts and \r risks is then reflected also in siloed approaches to risk management \r and adaptation financing (see Section 6.4). Recent literature notes that \r resilience planning has begun to overcome this tendency by presenting \r climate change impacts, losses and damages, and urban processes, as \r unfolding together in interacting and cascading pathways (Fraser et al., \r 2020; Eriksen et al., 2020) (Figure 6.2). The chapter reflects this change in \r [...]"


id: 5874570a6c4a1713e9dc1e31971f1cca
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"[...] the literature by presenting climate change impacts through a series of \r risk assessments, including by hazard type, through indirect impacts on \r health or food security, key infrastructure systems, land use and human \r mobility, water flows and on structural conditions, such as poverty and \r justice in the city (see Sections 6.3 and 6.4). In a departure from AR5 \r we also consider the consequential interactions of climate risks, impacts, \r adaptation and climate mitigation (see also Cross-Working Group \r Box URBAN in Chapter 6)."


id: 5269588bbc5af2f019db67d8a5111aef
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11779
content:
"This chapter also assesses conditions supporting incremental and \r transformative adaptation (Section 6.4). Incremental and transformative \r adaptation are both important but serve distinct roles in the interaction \r of urban systems, climate risk and risk management, and in advancing \r social justice, just transitions and climate resilient development (see \r Section 6.4). Climate resilient development pathways are an emerging \r concept in the literature since the AR5 (Schipper et al., 2020). Climate \r resilient development is an iterative process of systemic change that \r integrates both mitigation and adaptation efforts (see Annex II: Glossary). \r Initial studies highlight the way rapid urbanisation and precarious urban \r housing and land tenure can undermine climate resilient development, \r while human settlements that are managed to protect housing tenancy \r and land tenure rights can advance land use planning and social learning \r [...]"


id: 42559c98863125140fc158e21cfac285
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content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8867
content:
"[...] while reducing inequalities and vulnerability and enhancing resilient \r development (Mitchell, Enemark and Van der Molen, 2015; Bellinson "


id: 268ee03bdaeebee21435d3c6736058f9
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3946
content:
"The latest population projections from UNDESA (2018) reinforce the \r trends identified previously, with even higher estimates for global \r urban populations. The 2012 data used in AR5 projected a global urban \r population of 4984 million in 2030 and 6252 million in 2050; the 2018 \r revisions project 5167 million and 6680 million respectively. Particularly \r noteworthy is the higher projection provided for sub-Saharan Africa's \r urban population: increasing from 596  million to 666  million in \r 2030, and from 1069 million to 1258 million in 2050. These figures \r highlight the continued trend toward larger urban populations, and the \r particular significance of this in areas which currently have relatively \r small proportions of their populations living in towns and cities; this \r is also true in some Small Island States (e.g., the Solomon Islands) \r (McEvoy et al., 2020). The proportion of the global urban population \r [...]"


id: 86a1b6c292ad7caa9488fec8b7bacc2b
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content:
"[...] living in megacities (with populations of more than 10 million people) \r is expected to continue growing slowly (to 16% of the urban total, or \r 862  million people, living in 48 agglomerations) by 2035 (UNDESA, \r 2018). The size and form of these megacities presents particular \r challenges with climate change impacts, in areas including air quality \r (Baklanov, Luisa and Molina, 2016), flooding (Januriyadi et al., 2018), \r and temperature increase (Darmanto et al., 2019) (see Section 6.2.3)."


id: 870766962c97b30eaf94de25789e3ee1
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vector_id: 20917
content:
"urban settlements or neighbourhoods that developed outside the formal \r system that is meant to record land ownership and tenure and without \r meeting a range of regulations relating to planning and land use, built \r structures and health and safety. Informality is a broader concept than \r 'slums', which are usually defined using measures of housing quality, \r provision of services and overcrowding. While most countries do not \r generate formal statistics on the number of people living in informal \r settlements, UN Habitat provides regional and global estimates of the \r number of urban households that are 'slum' households and therefore \r likely to include most residents of informal settlements. These estimates \r suggest that there were 1034 million slum dwellers in 2018, including \r some 56% of the urban population in sub-Saharan Africa and more \r than 30% of the urban population of South Asia (UN-Habitat, 2020). \r Informality is particularly important in understanding climate risks \r [...]"


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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32970
content:
"[...] and responses in cities and settlements, and also in relation to key \r infrastructure (Trundle, 2020; Taylor et al., 2021)."


id: 209e62599a286864ab4605a4501ec088
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:54
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2963
content:
"by 2050, with up to 90% of this increase concentrated in the regions \r of Asia and Africa, particularly in India, China and Nigeria, where 35% \r of this urban growth is projected to occur (UNDESA, 2018). Growth \r rates are slowing down in North America, South America and Europe \r (UNDESA, 2018). Much global growth continues to outstrip the ability \r of governments or the private sector to plan, fund and provide for \r sustainable urban infrastructure and this is most marked in low-income \r and informal settlements (Angel et al., 2016). Rural migration as a driver \r of urbanisation is discussed in 6.2.4.3, and literature has documented \r the way urban expansion and the conversion of agricultural land is \r also driven by investment incentives and weak planning policies \r (Colsaet, Laurans and Levrel, 2018; Woodworth and Wallace, 2017). At \r the same time, early evidence suggests that, at least in some locations, \r out-migration from cities occurred as a result of the COVID-19 \r [...]"


id: dfed3fa5e2735322f52f89004976792d
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36639
content:
"[...] pandemic (Rajan, Sivakumar and Srinivasan, 2020), but the evidence \r is not clear and in some cases may have increased migration to other \r megacities (Chow et al., 2021). There is also growing recognition that \r poor planning has exacerbated the concentrated of deprivation in \r specific locations, deepening a cycle of exclusion and marginalisation \r (UNDESA, 2020)."


id: cefb2ee13fbd8435e19d32c989f36c2
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33751
content:
"The scale, reach and complexity of contemporary urbanisation compounds climate risks and conditions adaptation (high confidence) \r (Miller and Hutchins, 2017; Rosenzweig et al., 2018b). Urbanisation manifests as a heterogeneous and plural process with varied spatial \r manifestations (Oswin, 2018) that extends beyond cities and settlements, defining actions elsewhere in what has been called 'planetary \r urbanization' (Brenner, 2014b). While the concept of planetary urbanisation is contested, for example for a predominantly Eurocentric \r focus (Veglio, 2021), the concept has reflected human urbanisation as a mega-trend of urban expansion and landuse intensification \r (Capon, 2017; Lauermann, 2018). Three dimensions of planetary urbanisation are currently shaping adaptation actions: the new forms \r and scales of urbanisation, the blurring of boundaries around clearly demarcated territories, and the fragmentation of the urban hinterland \r [...]"


id: 14aeda28243ac64880c3af87e199455e
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 865
content:
"[...] into units that serve productive functions for the reproduction of urban space under capitalism (Brenner and Schmid, 2017)."


id: ddd03ef7f490efd59054b448c5a7fef5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36287
content:
"Planetary scale urbanisation challenges current understandings of spatial settlements and how risk affects urban communities (limited \r evidence, medium agreement) (Ruddick et al., 2018). Massive urbanisation manifests in large agglomerations such as metropolitan areas \r and urban regions, conurbations with unique risk challenges, particularly when interacting with other drivers of vulnerability (Adetokunbo \r and Emeka, 2015; Maragno, Pozzer and Musco, 2021). Experiences of regional collaboration to scale adaptation to metropolitan areas \r have shown to be effective, particularly facilitating information and technology exchanges and institutional cooperation (Shi, 2019; \r Lundqvist, 2016), but may face challenges such as addressing administrative and fiscal requirements and enrolling local populations in \r a meaningful participation process (Shi, 2019). For example, the coordination of planning policies in the Vienna-Bratislava metropolitan \r [...]"


id: 72c5e0ecb499c4e242a5d0ad62aaf11d
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vector_id: 17435
content:
"[...] region, further divided by an international border, demonstrates that institutional coordination alone is not sufficient to deliver effective \r spatial governance: instead, meaningful spatial policies required the involvement of multiple actors (Patti, 2017). In addition to \r institutional coordination, adaptation in rapidly urbanising areas requires understanding how these processes magnify risk and condition \r urban responses (see also Section 6.3)."


id: d65e88390d1aab1fbbd6e5515fb4b341
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35025
content:
"Rural areas provide ecosystem services that benefit cities directly, including through reducing hazards (runoff, and temperature) and \r through carbon storage, and can be maintained through urban markets and other inputs (Gebre and Gebremedhin, 2019). Most urban \r areas extend into dispersive peri-urban areas where urban and rural land uses co-exist (Simon, 2016) and/or suburban areas which are \r lower density and primarily residential in function. Moreover, the urban and rural differentiation creates normative expectations at the \r heart of planning conflicts and constraints of urban governance (Taylor, Butt and Amati, 2017). Expanding peri-urban areas pose specific \r structural constraints to addressing risks. In Bogota, Colombia, a study found marked inequalities as more impoverished families had \r restricted access to peri-urban forests, trees and tree services (Escobedo et al., 2015). Factors such as limited land ownership and tenure \r [...]"


id: 47bd6586ce538af99889089ed8ec67e8
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9838
content:
"[...] insecurity in peri-urban areas hinder people's ability to invest in permanent infrastructure to buffer themselves from flood events, as \r witnessed in the slums in Nairobi (Thorn, Thornton and Helfgott, 2015). Building resilience and adaptation via community mobilisation \r may not be effective in peri-urban areas shaped by migration, agricultural intensification and industrialisation (Wandl and Magoni, 2017)."


id: d5b6b604edb67b2eee11c889cf5edaaa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34912
content:
"Urbanisation on an immense scale blurs the boundaries that previously defined cities and settlements (Arboleda, 2016a; Shaw, 2015; \r Brenner, 2014a; OECD and European Commission, 2020; Schmid, 2018; Davidson et al., 2019; Wu and Keil, 2020). For example, peri-urban \r areas typically extend over multiple government jurisdictions (Wandl and Magoni, 2017). Adaptation actions can be difficult to plan, \r coordinate, implement and evaluate in these transboundary contexts (Solecki et al., 2018; Srivastava, 2020; Funfgeld, 2015; Rukmana, \r 2020; Carter et al., 2018). In Medellin, Colombia, a 46-mile-long green belt is being built to stop urban expansion while also protecting \r urban forests, providing access to green spaces, and reducing urban heat island effects (Anguelovski et al., 2016). However, large-scale \r infrastructure projects such as this one require coordination between regional transport authorities and the different municipalities in \r [...]"


id: ecad98827ce1a47590034dd7739f788f
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38996
content:
"[...] charge of housing and public services, in addition to consulting communities on their social impact (Chu, Anguelovski and Roberts, 2017). \r Local and regional authorities have competing mandates, such as a competition for taxpaying residents in peri-urban, commuting zones, \r and different infrastructure investment logics, political drivers and constituent needs. Smaller discrete infrastructure projects that actively \r engage local populations may provide better opportunities to build resilience across fragmented spaces (Santos, 2017; Kamalipour and \r Dovey, 2020)."


id: bf3739d9111320fa3ce16e6b03e52d84
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30911
content:
"Suburbanisation follows a gradual movement of citizens from high-density urban centres to the suburbs (Pieretti, 2014). The development \r of enclaves for higher-income people that appropriate resources and constrain access to those resources for disadvantaged populations \r has been recorded in places as distant as Santiago de Chile, People's Republic of China, India, Indonesia and the Philippines (Calvet and \r Castan Broto, 2016; Phelps, Miao and Zhang, 2020; Bulkeley, Castan Broto and Edwards, 2014; Buchori et al., 2021; Kleibert, 2018). The \r appropriation of land and resources in enclaves defends exclusive, privileged communities at the expense of everyone else. Enclaves \r exacerbate inequalities because those who cannot afford to live in the enclave suffer the fragmentation of public services, restrictions in \r access to resources, and greater exposure to climate risks (Hodson, 2010; Haase et al., 2017). Moreover, suburbanisation is linked to the \r [...]"


id: 6602270b6a3cd5003b4ec7ce41e7e76e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15204
content:
"[...] privatisation of public spaces and the decline of public infrastructures, collective spaces and green projects (Long and Rice, 2019; North, \r Nurse and Barker, 2017). Climate gentrification, whereby vulnerable communities are displaced from urban areas with lower climate risks \r (UN-Habitat, 2020), reconfigures urban areas, for example, as higher-income populations move away from the city centres, as shown in \r North American cities that have already suffered climate-related impacts such as Miami, Philadelphia and New Orleans (Keenan, Hill and \r Gumber, 2018; Shokry, Connolly and Anguelovski, 2020; De Koning and Filatova, 2020; Aune, Gesch and Smith, 2020)."


id: e6189009c56f3a9fd8d1dd463e8fe0b3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37778
content:
"Adaptation and related concepts of urban climate resilience are also con\u0002cerns for the broader agenda of sustainable development (Wachsmuth, \r Cohen and Angelo, 2016). Urban areas can play a positive role in ad\u0002vancing sustainability, but the pace and scale of urban development \r can also undermine progress in SDGs (Barnett and Parnell, 2016; Maes\r et al., 2019; Anarfi, Hill and Shiel, 2020) (high confidence). With careful \r planning, urbanisation can be a transformative force, enhancing equity \r and well-being through co-benefits and synergies between climate \r change adaptation, equitable urban development and mitigation (me\u0002dium evidence, medium agreement) (Parnell, 2016a; Solecki et al., 2015; \r Sharifi, 2020). Cities can be effective change agents when supported by \r networked local and national institutions, including professional bodies \r (high confidence) (Andonova, Hale and Roger, 2017; Brandtner and \r Suarez, 2021; Heidrich et  al., 2016; Kern, 2019; Farzaneh and Wang, \r [...]"


id: 6e9d47ae706e512b19839545bdb76544
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16728
content:
"[...] 2020). Low Emission Development Strategies (LEDS) have developed \r effective science-policy interactions to support energy-system, environ\u0002mental and economic development planning strategies in the city of \r Shanghai, China (Farzaneh and Wang, 2020). New literature is emerging \r about how adaptive changes at the urban level could integrate both far \r reaching rapid emission reduction and community protection in trans\u0002formative ways (Wamsler and Raggers, 2018; Rosenzweig and Solecki, \r 2018; UN-Habitat, 2020; Ziervogel, 2019a). There is an increasing con\u0002sensus about the need for integrated governance of urban areas with\u0002in and across regions, so that urban risk management and adaptation \r happen hand in hand with more general processes of transition toward \r more sustainable urban regions (Simon, 2016; UN-Habitat, 2020)."


id: fff40a0b0a8d1a82b80330e68cca6a05
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42425
content:
"Since AR5, there has also been increasing recognition of the contribution \r of diverse knowledges including local and Indigenous knowledge in \r contributing to the development and interpretation of urban relevant \r climate change data and policy for effective action (Klenk et al., 2017; \r Hosen, Nakamura and Hamzah, 2020; Makondo and Thomas, 2018). \r Indigenous and local knowledge inform coping strategies in urban \r adaptation planning and new directions for action (Nakashima, \r Krupnik and Rubis, 2018; Abudu Kasei, Dalitso Kalanda-Joshua and Tutu \r Benefor, 2019). Indigenous and local knowledge is also found to shape \r perceptions about urban climate risk awareness, its acceptable limits, \r causation and preferences for adaptation (see also Pyhala et al., 2016 \r for a review; see Jaakkola, Juntunen and Nakkalajarvi, 2018 for impacts \r on Indigenous peoples in the EU; Saboohi et al., 2019). Local perceptions \r about climate change in turn influence adaptation behaviours in \r [...]"


id: ed3413bacd906fb0eaad84966c7e1a66
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39112
content:
"[...] settlements and urban communities (Lee et al., 2015; Larcom, She and \r van Gevelt, 2019). Engagement with Indigenous and local knowledge \r is an enabling condition for planning community-appropriate climate \r adaptation responses (Fernandez-Llamazares et  al., 2015). Urban \r decision making that includes Indigenous and local knowledge \r has co-benefits for addressing indigenous dispossession, historical \r inequities and marginalisation of indigenous values that occurred \r (Parsons et  al., 2019; Carter, 2019; Maldonado et  al., 2016; Orlove\r et al., 2014; Pearce et al., 2015). Indigenous and local knowledge can \r help deliver culturally appropriate strategies and local choices for urban \r risk management through, for example community-based observation \r networks (Alessa et al., 2016), integrating ecosystem-based adaptation \r strategies in institutional structures (Nalau et al., 2018), using multiple \r evidence-based approaches (Tengo et al., 2014), and adopting forms \r [...]"


id: 6bd32ad44c3db274fd1b6698f9b89dc9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16270
content:
"[...] of governance that centre Indigenous peoples in urban adaptation and \r decision making (Horn, 2018; Parsons, Fisher and Nalau, 2016)."


id: 55b08106818856a98bdafc553d35c6e4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12347
content:
"As a blueprint for advancing human dignity, the SDGs emphasize the \r need to consider how to achieve a better and more sustainable future \r while 'leaving no one behind.' In doing so, they highlight an agenda \r focused on well-being, equality and justice. The objective for SDG11 is \r defined as: 'Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient \r and sustainable' with 10 associated targets including ensuring access \r for all to adequate, safe and affordable housing and basic services; \r participatory planning; safeguarding heritage features; reducing \r disasters, particularly water related disasters and economic impacts on \r the poor; and promoting resource efficiency, mitigation and adaptation \r to climate change, resilience to disasters, and develop and implement \r plans, in line with the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction. \r Similarly, SDG9 aims to build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive \r [...]"


id: a011061a201970d11197d9f19bd42039
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25373
content:
"[...] and sustainable industrialisation and foster innovation, with associated \r targets. The IPCC 1.5 special report emphasized that there are often \r co-benefits in pursuit of SDGs and adaptation strategies where \r 'well-designed mitigation and adaptation responses can support \r poverty alleviation, food security, healthy ecosystems, equality and \r other dimensions of sustainable development' (IPCC, 2018 FAQ5.1). \r However there may also be negative trade-offs, for example between \r pursuit of growth and reducing climate change risk (International \r Council for Science, 2017; IPCC, 2018 Executive Summary; Roy et al., \r 2018a)."


id: ca510d1decd3831bed714d3dd2c1816e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32939
content:
"New urban activists and stakeholders, including youth, and Indigenous \r and minority communities and NGOs alongside business groups have \r also been visible in the global urban climate debate, pressing for \r faster, more far-reaching change (Frantzeskaki et al., 2016; O'Brien, \r Selboe and Hayward, 2018; Alves, Campos and Penha-Lopes, 2019; \r Smith and Patterson, 2018; Crnogorcevic, 2019; Campos et al., 2016; \r Hayward, 2021). Emergent urban social movements for climate \r justice often build on established international networks including \r local activists such as Shack and Slum Dwellers International, while \r others are inspired by Indigenous movements and are focused on \r human rights, indigenous sovereignty and land claims, access to \r water, intergenerational justice, and gender and youth movements \r coordinated on social media (Agyeman et  al., 2016; Cohen, 2018; \r Ulloa, 2017; Hayward, 2021; Prendergast et al., 2021). The emergence \r [...]"


id: 9a95f8dc046e61c32a65e542fc7e9a7a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24439
content:
"[...] of climate justice movements in urban communities has the potential \r to reframe policy discussion in cities in ways that also bring inequality \r and climate justice to the fore (Sheller and Urry, 2016), underscoring \r growing public calls for more far-reaching, transformative changes \r toward socially just urban transformations (Akbulut et  al., 2019; \r Foran, 2019; Vandepitte, Vandermoere and Hustinx, 2019; Smith and \r Patterson, 2018)."


id: d982dd15af5df44b5e35616b80ef7cb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35565
content:
"In addition to direct climate impacts, interactions among changing \r urban form, exposure and vulnerability can create climate \r change-induced risks and losses for cities and settlements. Climate \r change already interacts with ongoing global trends in urbanisation \r to create regionally specific impacts and risk profiles. Through \r demographic change and encroachment into natural and agricultural \r lands and coastal zones, rapidly expanding urban settlements can \r place new physical assets and people in locations with high exposure \r (Tessler et al., 2015; Arnell and Gosling, 2016; Kundzewicz et al., 2014). \r Increasing rates of global urbanisation will pose additional challenges \r to areas that have high levels of poverty, unemployment, informality, \r and housing and service backlogs (Jiang and O'Neill, 2017; Williams\r et al., 2019). There is some evidence to suggest that climate change \r impacts themselves are increasing urbanisation rates, generating \r [...]"


id: becb7cbb84a7668bc72d519aa26eef22
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30837
content:
"[...] a challenging feedback loop. In sub-Saharan Africa, for example, \r manufacturing towns have experienced growth because of population \r movement following droughts in agricultural hinterlands (Henderson, \r Storeygard and Deichmann, 2017). The rapid rate of urbanisation \r therefore presents a time-limited opportunity to work toward risk \r reduction and transformational adaptation in towns and cities. The \r following sections explore these dynamic interactions between urban \r systems and climate change, and how these shape risk for people and \r for key infrastructures."


id: ec47d40da8ddc6d09f40cd5b0139dead
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38934
content:
"This section assesses observed and expected impacts from the \r main hazards identified for cities, settlements and infrastructure; \r temperature extremes (and the urban heat island), flooding (including \r sea level rise), water scarcity and security, as well as other hazards that \r are either less well-studied and/or likely to affect only a limited number \r of locations. The data assessed in this section are limited by uneven \r coverage. Despite improvements since AR5, data continue to be more \r complete for extreme events than for chronic hazards and everyday \r risks, which may have high aggregate impacts and disproportionately \r erode the well-being of urban poor households, especially for the most \r vulnerable, including women, children, the aged, disabled and homeless \r (van Wesenbeeck, Sonneveld and Voortman, 2016; Kinay et al., 2019; \r Connelly et al., 2018). Data coverage is also less comprehensive for \r smaller settlements in poorer countries, the locations where urban \r [...]"


id: cefccc47177129d94ad52d61424c3096
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33755
content:
"[...] growth is often high and adaptive capacities are often low (e.g., Rufat\r et al., 2015). Thus, data gaps frequently coincide with highly vulnerable \r populations (Rufat et  al., 2015; Satterthwaite and Bartlett, 2017). \r Here, even small changes in livelihoods, health, or representation \r and voice can rapidly bring households into positions of risk, even \r when hazard conditions are relatively stable (Ziervogel et al., 2017). \r These structural limits in available data are discussed also in Section 7 \r (Health, Well-being and the Changing Structure of Communities) and \r Section 8 (Poverty, Livelihoods and Sustainable Development), and in \r Doblas-Reyes et  al. (2021) Box  10.3. There are implications also for \r adaptation (Section 6.3), where the greater availability of evidence on \r exposure-driven risk can limit resilience-building interventions that \r focus on the reduction of vulnerability."


id: b85e3876de08f520b97e19f7a6f0f8a6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29651
content:
"The challenges of managing these risks are amplified by the complex \r interactions between climate and urban scenarios, owing to the \r smaller spatial-temporal scales of urban areas in climate change \r modelling relative to global climate models (GCM) and shared \r socioeconomic pathways (SSP); geographical or geomorphological \r variations in city location; uncertainties arising from incomplete \r assumptions about socio-economic pathways at urban scales affecting \r urban demographics, for example, fertility rates and life expectancies \r or increased rural-urban migration; and challenges in modelling the \r urban climate and in developing urban climate observational networks \r in cities (WGI Box 10.3; Kamei, Hanaki and Kurisu, 2016; Yu, Jiang and \r Zhai, 2016; Jiang and O'Neill, 2017; Baklanov et al., 2018). Additionally, \r carbon-intensive economic growth, increasing inequalities, global \r pandemics, and uncontrolled or unmanaged urbanisation will \r [...]"


id: 1ecbfa48a5d4c947e4232c7c866db235
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2620
content:
"[...] exacerbate the exposure and vulnerability of urban systems modelled \r in existing climate scenarios and pathways (high confidence) (Phillips\r et  al., 2020; Jackson, 2021; Raworth, 2017; Moraci et  al., 2020). \r Mitigating these outcomes requires new forms of urban governance \r for climate adaptation, disaster risk reduction and building resilience \r (see Section 6.4)."


id: e8d3ff5bdbc5757a4603025e7d7de3a7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38313
content:
"resistance, presence of solar shading, thermal mass, ventilation, \r orientation and geographical location (e.g., Liu and Coley, 2015; van \r Hooff et al., 2014; Vardoulakis et al., 2015; Dodoo and Gustavsson, \r 2016; Invidiata and Ghisi, 2016; Makantasi and Mavrogianni, 2016; \r Mulville and Stravoravdis, 2016; Taylor et al., 2016; Hamdy et al., 2017; \r Perez-Andreu et al., 2018; Salthammer et al., 2018; Dino and Meral \r Akgul, 2019; Osman and Sevinc, 2019; Roshan, Oji and Attia, 2019; \r Alves, Goncalves and Duarte, 2021). Most of these studies employed \r numerical simulations in which different climate scenarios were used \r to construct future climate data. In hot climates, energy-efficient \r buildings with high insulation values and high airtightness, which have \r insufficient protection from solar heat gains and/or limited ventilation \r capabilities, are generally more vulnerable to overheating than older \r buildings with lower insulation levels (e.g., van Hooff et  al., 2014; \r [...]"


id: aa0bffe929add9bf1640e657efbdc6e0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27141
content:
"[...] Vardoulakis et al., 2015; Makantasi and Mavrogianni, 2016; Mulville \r and Stravoravdis, 2016; Salthammer et al., 2018; Fisk, 2015; Hamdy\r et al., 2017; Fosas et al., 2018; Ozarisoy and Elsharkawy, 2019; see also \r Fox-Kemper et  al., 2021 9.7 for building heat mitigation/adaptation \r links)."


id: 3d3e9962f45685cb78dbaad97b1d7c84
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7953
content:
"Heat risk is associated with a range of health issues for urban \r residents, with the consequences of higher urban temperatures being \r unevenly distributed across urban populations (high confidence). Clear \r evidence exists of increased health risks to elderly populations in \r settlements, especially higher levels of mortality in elderly populations \r from urban heat islands during heatwave events (Fernandez Milan \r and Creutzig, 2015; Taylor et al., 2015; Ward et al., 2016a; Heaviside, \r Macintyre and Vardoulakis, 2017; Gough et al., 2019; Xu et al., 2020a), \r while health and fitness variables are also major determinants of the \r effects of heat stress (Schuster et al., 2017) (see also Table 7.2). Heat \r stress and dehydration are also related to behavioural and learning \r concerns, with dehydration impairing concentration and cognition \r for both adults and children (Merhej, 2019). Literature on paediatric \r heat exposure is associated with increases in emergency department \r [...]"


id: 938b3499763ea73408548e51e7aff0b6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23163
content:
"[...] visits for heat-related illnesses, electrolyte imbalances, fever, renal \r disease and respiratory disease in young children (Winquist et  al., \r 2016), with less severe outcomes such as lethargy, headaches, rashes, \r cramps and exhaustion negatively affecting children in school and play \r environments (Vanos, 2015; Hyndman, 2017). Young children in cities \r are particularly sensitive to heatwaves, and may have little experience \r or capacity to cope with heat extremes (Norwegian Red Cross, 2019). \r Such vulnerability of young children to heat is compounded with \r projected urbanisation rates and poor infrastructure, particularly \r in South Asian and in African cities (Smith, 2019). There is evidence \r that socioeconomically disadvantaged populations are more likely to \r live in hotter parts of cities associated with higher-density residential \r land use in dwellings with less effective insulation built with poorer \r [...]"


id: c8002f0770ac876e9b0cfb193268bdb3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32493
content:
"[...] or older construction materials (Inostroza, Palme and de la Barrera, \r 2016; Tomlinson et al., 2011). Specific emerging risks for occupational \r and related heat illnesses are found in urban tropical or subtropical \r low- and middle-income countries (Andrews et al., 2018; Green et al., \r 2019)."


id: d522f8600ebbfc0b2cd07e8db5f52dc0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34822
content:
"Higher urban temperatures result in lower labour productivity levels \r and economic outputs (medium confidence) (Graff Zivin and Neidell, \r 2014; Yi and Chan, 2017; Houser et  al., 2015; Stevens, 2017; see \r Section  8.2.1). Globally, urban heat stress is projected to reduce \r labour capacity by 20% in hot months by 2050 compared with a \r current 10% reduction (Dunne, Stouffer and John, 2013). Burke et al. \r (2015) demonstrate a nonlinear relationship between temperature \r and global economic productivity, with potential global losses of 23% \r by 2100 due to climate change alone. In specific cases, Zander et al. \r (2015) estimate heat-related reductions in urban labour productivity \r in Australia to cost USD 3.6-5.1  billion yr-1, based on self-reported \r performance reduction and absenteeism among 1726 workers in \r 2013-142\r ; while the high-temperature subsidies given in China at \r outdoor air temperatures above 35degC are projected to increase to USD \r [...]"


id: 3c66804862e88b659524e694fc68d923
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7817
content:
"[...] 35.7  billion yr-1 after 2030 (compared with USD 5.5  billion yr-1 for \r 1979-2005) (Zhao et al., 2016)3\r ."


id: 69adc122cb487cc459859aac249baa42
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15860
content:
"Urban flooding risks are also increased by urban expansion and land \r use and land cover change which enlarges impermeable surface \r areas through soil sealing, impacting drainage of floodwaters with \r consequent sewer overflows (high confidence) (Arnbjerg-Nielsen\r et  al., 2013; Ziervogel et  al., 2016; Aroua, 2016; Kundzewicz et  al., \r 2014). These risks are also driven by increasing societal complexity, \r urban developmental policy on flood control and long-term economic \r growth (Berndtsson et al., 2019), including in mega-cities (Januriyadi\r et al., 2018). The increase in flood risk from urban development can be \r considerable; based on modelling of two RCP (4.5 and 8.5) scenarios, \r Kaspersen et al. (2017) noted flooding in four European cities could \r increase by up to 10% for every 1% increase in impervious surface area. \r Risks are also compounded by the location of settlements, with greater \r risks within cities located in low elevation coastal zones subject to sea \r [...]"


id: 497fed508932eefce990a5ad9a44e9af
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10156
content:
"[...] level rise, potential land subsidence and exposure to tropical cyclones \r ((Koop and van Leeuwen, 2017; Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018; see also \r Section CCP2.2) and within informal settlements, where generally little \r investment in drainage solutions exists and flooding regularly disrupts \r livelihoods and disproportionately undermines local food safety and \r security for the urban poor (Dodman, Colenbrander and Archer, 2017; \r Dodman et al., 2017; Kundzewicz et al., 2014; Sections 5.4 and 5.8)."


id: e2773ead58ef485cacb0bd83dc925348
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37142
content:
"Future risks of urban flooding is increasing in conjunction with \r continued increases in global surface temperature (high confidence) \r (IPCC, 2019b; Winsemius et  al., 2015; Kulp and Strauss, 2019; \r Hoegh-Guldberg et  al., 2018). In particular, Asian cities are highly \r exposed to future flood risks arising from urbanisation processes. \r Between 2000 and 2030, rapid urbanisation in Indonesia will elevate \r flood risks by 76-120% for river and coastal floods, while sea level rise \r will further increase the exposure by 19-37% (Muis et al., 2015). In \r Can Tho, Vietnam, current urban development patterns put new assets \r and infrastructure at risk due to sea level rise and river flooding in \r the Mekong Delta (Chinh et al., 2017; Chinh et al., 2016). Flooding in \r urban areas is exacerbated both by the encroachment of urban areas \r into areas that retain water and by the lack of infrastructure such as \r embankments and flood walls, as is the case for large areas of Dhaka \r [...]"


id: bdcbd58c05655fdfd46d40ca1aa151a6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30654
content:
"[...] East (Haque, Bithell and Richards, 2020). Zhou et al. (2019) have also \r shown that for the city of Hohhot, China, the increase in impervious \r surfaces contributes between 2-4  times more to modelled annual \r flood risk compared with risk induced by climate change."


id: 40e5228f2c4c9697ffe27a6f041498ac
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8605
content:
"Flood risks in settlements arise from hydrometeorological events \r interacting with the urban system which exposes settlements to river \r (fluvial) floods, flash floods, pluvial (precipitation-driven) floods, sewer \r floods, coastal floods and glacial lake outburst floods (IPCC, 2012). \r Sea level increase and increases in tropical cyclone storm surge and \r rainfall intensity will increase the probability of coastal city flooding \r (high confidence) (WGI Box TS14). Globally, the increase in frequencies \r and intensities of extreme precipitation from global warming will \r likely4 expand the global land area affected by flood hazards (medium \r confidence) ((Alfieri et al., 2018; Alfieri et al., 2017; Hoegh-Guldberg\r et  al., 2018); Section  4.2.4.2). Mishra et  al. (2015) noted that out \r of 241 urban areas, only 17% of cities experienced statistically \r significant increases in frequencies of extreme precipitation events \r [...]"


id: d345aa58e6420f890aa9c7bf5d785e73
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34512
content:
"[...] from 1973 to 2012. In the future, there is some evidence that changes \r in high-intensity short duration (sub-daily) rainfall in urban areas will \r increase (limited evidence, medium agreement) (Kendon et al., 2014; \r Ban, Schmidli and Schar, 2015; Abiodun et al., 2017)."


id: accc837aa43d80e0ceeb6c2b1d3ce2e5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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vector_id: 27644
content:
"flooding may increase by PS60-200 million for projected 2-4degC warming \r scenarios; enhanced adaptation actions could manage flooding up to a \r 2degC scenario but will be insufficient beyond that (Sayers et al., 2015). \r Analyses conducted in South Korea suggests that future flood levels \r could exceed current flood protection design standards by as much \r as 70% by 2100, considerably increasing urban flood risk (Kang et al., \r 2016). Modelling of urban flood damage in the Kelani River Basin in Sri \r Lanka showed increased frequency of flooding by 2030 could increase \r potential urban property damage by up to 10.2% (Komolafe Akinola, \r Herath and Avtar, 2018). Urban flood impacts may also exacerbate \r health burdens (including disease outbreaks of malaria, typhoid and \r cholera), which are compounded by damage to medical facilities (e.g., \r damage to hospitals and disruption of medicinal supply chains), as \r observed in urban areas of Ghana (Gough et al., 2019). In addition, \r [...]"


id: bbf04f2769b7c7ec0c2d976270e635a8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30297
content:
"[...] emerging research shows the cascading consequences of hazard \r events, in this case urban flooding, on other risks to well-being in \r ways that are particularly severe for the urban poor, including mental \r ill-health, incidents of domestic violence impacting children and \r women, chronic diseases and salinity of drinking water ((Matsuyama, \r Khan and Khalequzzaman, 2020); Section  4.2.4.5; Section  6.2.4.2; \r Box 7.2; Section 8.4.5.2)."


id: 1928a96d5d4ceabcac590c2ed1a60ede
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1642
content:
"Risks of urban water scarcity and security are compounded by \r vulnerabilities such as service availability and quality of infrastructure \r to supply water for increased urban demand from in-migration to \r cities (medium confidence) (Ahmadalipour et  al., 2019; Dong et  al., \r 2020; Reynolds et al., 2019; Thomas et al., 2017; Mullin, 2020). Risks \r to local water security in cities are also exacerbated by drivers such \r as dependence on imported water resources from distant locales that \r may be exposed to additional drought risks (high confidence) (Ahams\r et al., 2017; Li et al., 2019b; Marston et al., 2015; Zhao et al., 2020; \r Zhang et al., 2020); from considerable projected urban expansion in \r drought-stressed areas, for example, across drylands of Western Asia \r and North Africa (Guneralp et  al., (2015); and by export of virtual \r water (i.e., export of water embedded in food and energy) from local \r sources to distant trading partners (Djehdian et al., 2019; D'Odorico\r [...]"


id: a725e63762af4e76b268bebd5ec2f8b9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26623
content:
"[...] et al., 2018; Fulton and Cooley, 2015; Rushforth and Ruddell, 2016; \r Verdon-Kidd et al., 2017; Vora et al., 2017)."


id: 9a6d7092796f784b5761a36687deb24f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24413
content:
"Urban water scarcity occurs when gaps exist between supply and \r demand of available freshwater resources (Zhang et al., 2019). Urban \r water security requires a sustainable quantity and quality of water \r to meet community and ecosystem needs in a changing climate \r (Romero-Lankao and Gnatz, 2019; Allan, Kenway and Head, 2018; \r Huang, Xu and Yin, 2015; Chen and Shi, 2016). Risks arising from urban \r water scarcity worldwide are very likely increasing due to climate drivers \r (e.g., warmer temperatures and droughts) and urbanisation processes \r (e.g., land use changes, migration to cities and changing patterns \r of water use including over extraction of surface and groundwater \r resources) affecting supply and demand (high confidence) (Allan, \r Kenway and Head, 2018; Crausbay et  al., 2020; Haddeland et  al., \r 2014; Pickard et al., 2017; De Stefano et al., 2015; Sun et al., 2019; Van \r Loon et al., 2016; Zhang et al., 2019; Section 4.2.4.4; See Box 8.6 for \r [...]"


id: 6d3abc6bcefef2e2123188bb1f59d5f1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16493
content:
"[...] case study on 2018 Cape Town drought). Florke et al. (2018) estimates \r that nearly a third of all major cities worldwide may exhaust their \r current water resources by 2050. Globally, projections suggest that \r 350 million (+- 158.8 million) more people living in urban areas will \r be exposed to water scarcity from severe droughts at 1.5degC warming \r and 410.7 million (+- 213.5 million) at 2degC warming (Liu et al., 2018)."


id: bda316659041484febea1858be10e1ff
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30621
content:
"Cold spells. Although frequencies and intensities of cold spells/\r cold waves are virtually certain to have decreased globally, and are \r projected to consistently decrease for most warming levels (high \r confidence; WGI Table  11.2), cold weather events can periodically \r occur and impact urban areas and their connected infrastructures. For \r cities in eastern Canada, the intra-annual distribution of freezing rain \r events may become more frequent from December to February, and less \r frequent in other months by 2100 (Cheng, Li and Auld, 2011). Freezing \r rain is also a risk to urban populations and infrastructure. In general, \r higher population mortality rates likely occur during the winter season, \r while more temperature-attributable deaths are caused by cold than \r by heat in cities located in temperate climates (Gasparrini et al., 2015; \r Chen et al., 2017; Ryti, Guo and Jaakkola, 2016). Winter mortality is \r [...]"


id: b6c24e76f66eb0ac85e9fca24f11096d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29354
content:
"[...] unlikely to significantly decrease due to warming trends, partly because \r a range of other medical factors (e.g., influenza seasons and elevations \r in cardiac risk factors) also drive this winter-excess mortality (Kinney\r et al., 2015). However, the evidence is unclear whether mortality related \r to cold waves will decrease in coming decades in European (Smid\r et al., 2019) or US cities (Wang et al., 2016). While projected global \r cold extremes are expected to decrease in frequency and intensity, the \r higher regional variability of future climates means that cold waves \r may remain locally important threats, including in milder regions where \r there are larger temperature differences between 'normal' winter days \r and extreme cold events, and where there is less capacity to adapt (Ma, \r Chen and Kan, 2014; Ho et al., 2019). This will be accentuated in many \r cities, particularly in Europe, by anticipated demographic changes that \r [...]"


id: 84c1f2200c74d3a7364b3dde5afc39dc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20501
content:
"[...] result in a more elderly population susceptible to cold wave health risks \r (Smid et al., 2019)."


id: 1fe01d13576fc5bff71ee41657a21742
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2815
content:
"Landslides. While geomorphological events (e.g., land subsidence from \r permafrost thaw at high latitudes or from groundwater extraction) and \r factors associated with the built environment (e.g., settlement location \r adjacent to steep slopes and zonation laws for building construction) \r are major factors determining urban landslide risk, these can also \r be influenced by a range of climatic variables, namely precipitation \r (frequency, intensity and duration), snow melt and temperature \r change. Some 48 million people are exposed to landslide risk in Europe \r alone, with the majority in smaller urban centres (Mateos et al., 2020). \r Travassos et  al. (2020) also documented all landslide deaths in the \r Sao Paulo Macro Metropolis Region from 2016 to 2019 that occurred \r from extreme rainfall events in vulnerable areas prone to landslides. \r An increase in the number of people exposed to urban landslide risks is \r [...]"


id: 423dc5c7a35e3baf49df1490c9216049
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8855
content:
"[...] projected for landslide-prone settlements lying within regions projected \r to experience a corresponding increase in extreme rainfall (Gariano \r and Guzzetti, 2016). In addition, human factors such as expansion of \r towns onto unstable land and land use changes within settlements "


id: 81ae4ed00c23d3af4939463c2b250aa8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19944
content:
"For some air pollutants, for example concentrations of PM2.5 in several \r US, Western European and Chinese cities have recently decreased as \r a result of clean air regulations that have controlled emissions from \r sources such as motor vehicles, fossil fuel power plants and major \r industries (Zheng et al., 2018a; Fleming et al., 2018). These decreases \r have brought substantial improvements in public health in settlements \r within these regions (Ciarelli et al., 2019; Zhang et al., 2018). In South \r Asia, Southeast Asia and Africa, however, concentrations of other \r air pollutants, for example tropospheric ozone, oxides of nitrogen \r and volatile organic compounds are likely to continue to grow and \r peak by mid-century before they subside due to global urbanisation \r assumptions embedded in the SSPs (Naik et al., 2021 Sections 6.2.1; \r 6.7.1.2). Broadly, future air pollutant emissions are projected to decline \r globally by 2050 as societies become wealthier and more willing \r [...]"


id: 6c581f571d9252d6fdc852dea913e82f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16354
content:
"[...] to invest in air pollution controls, but the trajectories vary among \r pollutants, world regions and scenarios (Silva et al., 2016b; Rao et al., \r 2017; Silva et al., 2016c). Whereas cities in East Asia and South Asia \r currently have large exposure to anthropogenic air pollution, African \r cities may emerge by 2050 as the most polluted because of growing \r populations and demand for energy, increased urbanisation and \r relatively weak regulations to control emissions (Liousse et al., 2014)."


id: cc4c8fdeb115a11dff55efe735dc75a1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33263
content:
"Studies modelling climate change impacts on air quality find that the \r spatiotemporal patterns of concentration changes vary strongly at \r urban scales, and that often those patterns differ among the different \r years modelled due to internal variability (Saari et  al., 2019) and \r different models used (Weaver et al., 2009). Changes in PM2.5 due to \r climate change are less clear than for ozone and may be relatively \r smaller (Westervelt et al., 2019) as climate change can affect PM2.5\r species differently (Fiore, Naik and Leibensperger, 2015). For Beijing, \r climate change is expected to cause a 50% increase in the frequency \r of meteorological conditions conducive to high PM2.5 concentrations \r (Cai et al., 2017). The impacts of future climate change on air quality \r and consequent risks on human health have been studied at urban \r (Knowlton et  al., 2004; Physick, Cope and Lee, 2014) and national \r scales (Fann et al., 2015; Orru et al., 2013; Doherty, Heal and O'Connor, \r [...]"


id: e33d864c363137c2a2145e307c8a70cd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37277
content:
"[...] 2017); globally, these studies have found a likely net increased risk \r of climate change on air pollution-related health (low confidence). \r They have focused mainly on the USA and Europe, with few studies \r elsewhere (Orru, Ebi and Forsberg, 2017), although the relationship \r between climate and air quality in megacities is particularly complex \r (Baklanov, Luisa and Molina, 2016). Silva et al. (2017) found that global \r premature mortality attributable to climate change (and not from \r urbanisation) from ozone and PM2.5 will increase by about 260,000 \r deaths per year in 2100 under RCP8.5, but substantial variance in \r results exists between individual models."


id: 43bea1be225aac694592dae1e6a8a2fb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9144
content:
"Air Pollution. Despite recent observed improvements in air quality \r arising from COVID-19 restrictions (Krecl et  al., 2020; Naik et  al., \r 2021 Cross-Chapter Box  6.1), significant risks to human health in \r cities leading to premature mortality very likely arise from exposure \r to decreased outdoor air quality from a combination of biogenic \r (e.g., wildfires at the WUI that advect into the urban atmosphere \r [Reddington et al., 2014; Naik et al., 2021 Chapter 12 Box 12.1]) and \r anthropogenic sources that are influenced by climate change (e.g., \r fine particulate matter such as PM2.5, tropospheric ozone, oxides of \r nitrogen and volatile organic compounds [Burnett et al., 2018; Knight\r et al., 2016; Turner et al., 2016; West et al., 2016; Chang et al., 2019b; \r Li et al., 2019a; Alexader, Luisa and Molina, 2016; Naik et al., 2021 \r Sections  6.5.1, 6.7.1.1, 6.7.1.2]). Risks of premature mortality from \r indoor air pollution in cities, arising from biomass burning for heating \r [...]"


id: 8652226f47f4d35947704a39473297f0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20790
content:
"[...] in winter or cooking, indoor pesticide use or exposure to volatile \r organic compounds from poor thermal insulation in buildings, are \r also likely to occur (Leung, 2015; Peduzzi et al., 2020; Cross-Chapter \r Box HEALTH in Chapter 7)."


id: c0a249946872545b4d0fb058ed3bab10
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31190
content:
"Migration, displacement and resettlement each play a foundational \r role in differentiated vulnerability (see Cross-Chapter Box  MIGRATE \r in Chapter 7). The relationship between migration and vulnerability \r is complex (robust evidence, high agreement), and is the first of the \r three components discussed within this section. Climate change, as a \r push factor, is only one among multiple drivers (political, economic and \r social) related to environmental migration (Heslin et al., 2019; Planitz, \r 2019; Luetz and Merson, 2019). There is consensus that it is difficult \r to pin climate change as the sole driver of internal (within national \r boundaries) rural to urban migration decisions owing to, among other \r factors, the disconnect between national and international policies \r (Wilkinson et al., 2016), the lack of unifying theoretical frameworks \r and the complex interactions between climatic and other drivers \r (social, demographic, economic and political) at multiple scales \r [...]"


id: 35b9f8fbad01bf89dd0cba582cad6451
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"[...] (Cattaneo et al., 2019; Borderon et al., 2019). Environmental migration, \r including rural to urban migration, triggered by climate change may \r ensue from either slow- or rapid-onset climatic events and could be \r either temporary, cyclical or permanent movement that occurs within \r or beyond national boundaries (Heslin et al., 2019; Silja, 2017)."


id: afbb0823872ba4b78b313649a2dbc8df
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28150
content:
"For individuals in urban communities, new literature highlights \r how differences in vulnerability established by social and economic \r processes are further differentiated by household and individual \r variability and intersectionality (Kaijser and Kronsell, 2014; Kuran et al., \r 2020).This includes differences in wealth and capacity (Romero-Lankao, \r Gnatz and Sperling, 2016); gender and non-binary gender (Michael \r and Vakulabharanam, 2016; Sauer and Stiess, 2021; Mersha and van \r Laerhoven, 2018); education, health, political power and social capital \r (Lemos et al., 2016); age, including young and elderly, low physical \r fitness, pre-existing disability, length of residence and social and ethnic \r marginalisation (Inostroza, Palme and de la Barrera, 2016; Schuster\r et al., 2017; Malakar and Mishra, 2017). An increasing proportion of \r refugees and displaced people now live in urban centres, and their \r characteristics also make them vulnerable to a range of shocks and \r [...]"


id: e3fcd9887fb5de54ce257616071320a7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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content:
"[...] stresses (Earle, 2016). While some individuals, including children, may \r be able to exercise agency to reduce their risk (Treichel, 2020), and \r some indicators are culturally specific, overall, poor, marginalised, \r socially isolated and informal urban households are particularly at risk \r (high confidence) (Brown and McGranahan, 2016; Kim et al., 2020b; \r Huq et al., 2020a; Huq et al., 2020b)."


id: 9e48deb72b6d953ab809a00dc86c1467
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25076
content:
"Climate-induced migration is not necessarily higher among poorer \r households whose mobility is more likely to be limited due to the \r poverty trap (i.e., lack of financial resources) (high confidence) \r (Cattaneo et  al., 2019; Kaczan and Orgill-Meyer, 2020; Silja, 2017). \r For example, in Bangladesh, vulnerability of rural populations is \r increasing, so many of the poorest employ migration as a strategy of \r last resort (Paprocki, 2018; Penning-Rowsell, Sultana and Thompson, \r 2013; Adri and Simon, 2018) that occurs as soil salinity (as opposed \r to inundation alone) increases and is paralleled by economic \r diversification (i.e., aquaculture) (Chen and Mueller, 2018). There is \r robust evidence and high agreement that rapid-onset climatic events \r trigger involuntary migration and short-term, short-distance mobilities \r (Cattaneo et  al., 2019). There is also robust evidence and high \r agreement that slow-onset climatic events (such as droughts and sea \r [...]"


id: 7cd755574778e41dce57a5b7b6c1eb06
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19157
content:
"[...] level rise) lead to long-distance internal displacement, more so than \r local or international migration (Kaczan and Orgill-Meyer, 2020; Silja, \r 2017), while sea level rise is expected to lead to the displacement of \r communities along coastal zones, such as in Florida in the USA (Hauer, \r 2017; Butler, Deyle and Mutnansky, 2016)."


id: 4b400734d77fa7c60f0d75a3b71a0029
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10488
content:
"Regardless of the reasons and the initiators for migration, community \r control over resettlement both at the origin and destination leads to \r more positive outcomes for both the communities being resettled and \r the receiving communities (high confidence) (Perumal, 2018; Ferris, \r 2015; Price, 2019; Mortreux and Adams, 2015; Tadgell, Doberstein and \r Mortsch, 2018; Luetz and Havea, 2018). The protection of livelihoods \r contributes to ensuring the well-being (physical and mental) and the \r protection of the rights of communities (high confidence) (Ferris, 2015; \r Price, 2019). There is limited evidence but high agreement that the \r outcomes of resettlement initiatives are complex and multi-faceted \r (Ferris, 2015). For example, in Shangnan County, northwest China, the \r Massive Southern Shaanxi Migration Program, based on voluntary \r participation, reduced risk exposure and improved the quality of life \r in general, but also disproportionately increased the vulnerability \r [...]"


id: 1c328a11f17eebaca773fd9032800f3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2149
content:
"[...] of disadvantaged groups (the poor, migrants, and those left behind) \r (Lei et al., 2017). Similarly, vulnerability increased due to the loss of \r connection to place and community bonds in Mekong Delta, Vietnam \r (Miller, 2019), and due to unsafe construction, poor infrastructure, \r institutional incapacity and general neglect in resettlement initiatives \r in Malawi, sub-Saharan Africa (Kita, 2017)."


id: 975e07cfd36e80c8e2b40510cd5c6b9c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23838
content:
"Migration, including rural-urban migration, is also recognised as an \r adaptation strategy in some circumstances, whether this is voluntary \r or planned (Jamero et al., 2019; Esteban et al., 2020a; Bettini, 2014). \r Voluntary migration can be an element of household strategies to \r diversify risk, depending on the nature of the climatic stress, and \r interacts with household composition, individual characteristics, social \r networks, and historical, political and economic contexts (Hunter, \r Luna and Norton, 2015; Carmin et al., 2015; Hayward et al., 2020). \r For example, in Colombia, rural to urban migration is differentiated \r across gender depending on the climatic stress whereby men migrate \r due to droughts, while women migrate due to excessive rain triggers \r (Tovar-Restrepo and Irazabal, 2013). Especially in Pacific small island \r developing states, migration can be a strategy for urban settlements \r or tribal communities to relocate in customary areas, as in the case \r [...]"


id: 1b9d30b59bba096e6f806a5bcfed8c55
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2042
content:
"[...] of Vunidogoloa in Fiji (McMichael, Katonivualiku and Powell, 2019; \r Hayward et al., 2020); it can be a livelihood strategy as shown in the \r Cataret Islands in Papua New Guinea (Connell, 2016); or it can be \r used to enhance education and international networks (i.e., voluntary \r 'migration with dignity') as is the case in Kiribati (Heslin et al., 2019; \r Voigt-Graf and Kagan, 2017)."


id: 3b046cae282c79ec06fdbb77d6c05388
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7574
content:
"Projected climatic changes, such as changing precipitation patterns, \r temperatures and sea levels, contribute to pressures on human \r well-being and the functioning of infrastructure systems (high \r confidence). Furthermore, risks evolve due to macro-scale drivers of \r change such as urbanisation, economic development, land use changes \r and other emergent factors (Adger, Brown and Surminski, 2018). \r Infrastructure networks are rapidly growing around the world (see \r Table 6.3). Since the quality and accessibility of infrastructure services \r are varied, it is important to understand how climate change poses \r different kinds of risk on them. Infrastructure can be broadly understood \r to include social infrastructure (housing, health, education, livelihoods \r and social safety nets, security, cultural heritage/institutions, disaster \r risk management and urban planning), ecological infrastructure (clean \r air, flood protection, urban agriculture, temperature, green corridors, \r [...]"


id: a205a0955a025bb7d8e7b56788aac540
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25740
content:
"[...] watercourses and riverways) and physical infrastructure (energy, \r transport, communications [including digital], built form, water and \r sanitation and solid waste management) (Thacker et al., 2019). This \r section focuses especially on physical infrastructure where the literature "


id: 54828400fed6110fcf7152e7567b293d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12143
content:
"Energy infrastructure underpins modern economies and quality of \r life. Disruption to power or fuel supplies impacts upon all other \r infrastructure sectors, and affects businesses, industry, healthcare and \r other critical services both within and across jurisdictional boundaries \r (Groundstroem and Juhola, 2019). The economic impacts of climate \r change risks are significant, for example in the EU, the expected \r annual damages to energy infrastructure, currently EUR0.5  billion yr-1, \r are projected to increase 1612% by the 2080s (Forzieri et al., 2018). \r In China, 33.9% of the population are vulnerable to electricity supply \r disruptions from a flood or drought (Hu et al., 2016), whilst in the USA, \r higher temperatures are projected to increase power system costs by \r about USD 50 billion by the year 2050 (Jaglom et al., 2014). In a study \r of 11 Central and Eastern European countries, researchers found that \r [...]"


id: e126e1f7a8caa3d3b09fde6408183752
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36879
content:
"[...] energy poverty is exacerbated by existing infrastructure deficits and \r energy efficient building stock, as well as income inequality, which can \r lead to reduced economic productivity (Karpinska and Smiech, 2020). \r Climate change is expected to alter energy demand (Viguie et  al., \r 2021), for example heatwaves increase spot market prices (Pechan \r and Eisenack, 2014), with a disproportionate impact on the poorest \r and most vulnerable populations. Energy infrastructure are susceptible \r to a range of climate risks (Cronin, Anandarajah and Dessens, 2018), \r whilst issues pertaining to energy demand are considered by Working \r Group III."


id: 5fdd0c696d1a35fbfdb013a2a8dc94fe
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14174
content:
"Most thermoelectric plants require water for cooling, many are therefore \r situated near rivers and coasts and thus vulnerable to flooding. Increases \r in water temperature or restrictions on cooling water availability \r affect hydroelectric and thermoelectric plants. A 1degC increase in the \r temperature of water used as coolant yields a decrease of 0.12-0.7% \r in power output (Mima and Criqui, 2015; Ibrahim, Ibrahim and Attia, \r 2014). Excess biological growth, accelerated by warmer water, increases \r risk of clogging water intakes (Cruz and Krausmann, 2013). While some \r regions are expected to experience increased capacity under climate \r change (namely India and Russia), global annual thermal power plant \r capacity is likely to be reduced by between 7% in a mid-century RCP2.6 \r scenario and 12% in a mid-century RCP8.5 scenario (van Vliet et al., \r 2016). Worldwide, hydroelectric capacity reductions are projected at \r [...]"


id: 4bf9a76f230e74a1e4cd4b61449246e2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10634
content:
"[...] 0.4-6.1% (van Vliet et al., 2016). Analysis of the UK's water for energy \r generation abstractions showed that an energy mix of high nuclear or \r carbon capture technologies could require as much as six times the \r current cooling water demands (Byers, Hall and Amezaga, 2014; Byers \r et al., 2016)."


id: b8062685274acafaea9673a756f3343f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29590
content:
"Climate change can, for example, influence energy consumption \r patterns by changing how household and industrial consumers \r respond to short-term weather shocks, as well as how they adapt \r to long-term changes (Auffhammer and Mansur, 2014). Recent \r studies from Stockholm, Sweden, show that future heating demand \r will decrease while cooling demand will increase (Nik and Sasic \r Kalagasidis, 2013). A study from the USA showed that climate change \r will impact buildings by affecting peak and annual building energy \r consumption (Fri and Savitz, 2014). From an infrastructure standpoint, \r the vulnerability of current hydropower and thermoelectric power \r generation systems may change due to changes in climate and \r water systems and projected reduction of usable capacities (van Vliet \r et  al., 2016; Byers et  al., 2016). These examples show how energy \r infrastructure planning under climate change must take into account \r [...]"


id: 852bb2df15f25b2884310ff71c81be6e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20569
content:
"[...] a greater number of scenarios and investigate impacts on particular \r energy segments (Sharifi and Yamagata, 2016)."


id: e9ec117edf47ac7ef10b6071f1a806bf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38507
content:
"Since AR5, research has highlighted the implications for disruption to \r global supply chains (Becker et al., 2018; Shughrue and Seto, 2018; \r Pato, 2015), and has made advancements in quantifying costs of \r climate risks to transportation infrastructure. Climate risks to transport \r infrastructure (from heat- and cold waves, droughts, wildfires, \r river and coastal floods, and windstorms) in Europe could rise from \r EUR0.5  billion to over EUR10  billion by the 2080s (Forzieri et  al., 2018). \r Across the Arctic, nearly four million people and 70% of all current \r infrastructure, including resource extraction and transportation routes, \r will be at risk by 2050 (Hjort et  al., 2018), although the design of \r specific infrastructure may also affect the degree of infrastructure \r damage, depending on local geological and ecological conditions. \r Globally, Koks et al. (2019) calculated that approximately 7.5% of road \r and railway assets are exposed to a 1-in-100 year flood events, and \r [...]"


id: a8b4e950aedc5ea19a6fa379a595658e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26888
content:
"[...] total global expected annual damages (EAD) of USD 3.1-22  billion \r (mean USD 14.6  billion) due to direct damage from cyclone winds, \r surface and river flooding, and coastal flooding. The majority of this is \r caused by surface water and fluvial flooding (mean USD 10.7 billion). \r Although twice as much infrastructure is exposed to cyclone winds \r compared with flooding, a mean EAD of USD 0.5 billion is significantly \r less than for coastal flooding (USD 2.3 billion), as cyclone damages \r are largely limited to bridge damage and the cost of removing trees \r fallen on road carriageways and railway tracks. This is small relative \r to global gross domestic product (GDP; ~0.02%). However, in some \r countries EAD equates to 0.5-1% of GDP, which is the same order \r of magnitude as typical national transport infrastructure budgets, but \r especially significant for countries such as Fiji that already spend 30% \r of their government budget on transport (World Bank Group, 2017). \r [...]"


id: cc2a3e636c50fd1c831372d7203cb1a7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33239
content:
"[...] Koks et al. (2019) did not assess future climate change impacts, but \r comparable studies calculating changes in EAD from flooding based \r upon land use show increases of 170-1370%, depending on global \r greenhouse gas emissions levels (Alfieri et al., 2017; Winsemius et al., \r 2015). Moreover, Schweikert et  al., (2014) report that climate risks \r to transport infrastructure could cost as much as 5% of annual road \r infrastructure budgets by 2100, with disproportionate impacts in some \r low and lower middle-income countries."


id: d0acc748bf825cb79d6305375d300fdf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34064
content:
"Electricity Transmission and Distribution. Electricity transmission \r and distribution networks span large distances, with overhead power \r lines often traversing exposed areas. Power lines and other assets, such \r as substations, are often located near population centres, including \r those in floodplains. Structural damage to overhead distribution lines \r will increase in areas projected to see more ice or freezing rain (e.g., \r most of Canada), snowfall (e.g., Japan) or wildfires (e.g., California, \r USA) (Bompard et al., 2013; Mitchell, 2013; Sathaye et al., 2013; Jeong \r et al., 2018; Ohba and Sugimoto, 2020). Electricity outages may last \r for prolonged periods of time and across vast areas, in addition to \r potentially disproportionately affecting poorer or more vulnerable \r communities. Increases in windstorm frequency and intensity increase \r the risk of direct damage to overhead lines and pylons, in many \r [...]"


id: 9bc0ece485595027dc2a8725a3df8f7e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24661
content:
"[...] locations this is limited but Tyusov et al. (2017) calculate an increase as \r high as 30% in parts of Russia. Where the mode of failure is recorded, \r transmission pylons are seen to be more susceptible to wind damage, \r whilst distribution pylons are more likely to be affected by treefall and \r debris (Karagiannis et al., 2019). Increased temperatures can lead to \r the de-rating (lower performance) of power lines, whose resistance \r increases with temperature with efficiency reductions of 2-14% being \r projected by 2100 (Cradden and Harrison, 2013; Bartos et al., 2016)."


id: 81708a09338d0d0210b9031b51ec463f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19901
content:
"Fuels Extraction and Distribution. Non-electric energy infrastructure \r is susceptible to many of the same impacts as electric infrastructure. \r Extreme weather events impact extraction (onshore and offshore) and \r refining operations of petroleum, oil, coal, gas and biofuels. Disruption \r of road, rail and shipping routes (see Section 6.2.5.2) interrupts fuel \r supply chains. However, there are a number of risks that are specific \r to these sectors. Heat can lead to expansion in oil and gas pipes, \r increasing the risk of rupture (Sieber, 2013), whilst heatwaves and \r droughts can reduce the availability of biofuel (Moiseyev et al., 2011; \r Schaeffer et  al., 2012). Subsidence and shrinkage of soils damages \r underground assets such as pipes intakes (Cruz and Krausmann, \r 2013), while additional human activity such as extractive drilling may \r induce earthquakes, as observed in the northern Dutch province of \r Groningen (Van der Voort and Vanclay, 2015). In Alaska, USA, the thaw \r [...]"


id: 56b81d85d22064d0bfc849d9bd5cfa44
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12507
content:
"[...] of permafrost and subsequent ground instability is estimated to lead to \r USD 33 million damages to fuel pipelines in an end-of-century RCP8.5 \r scenario (Melvin et al., 2017), with low-lying coastal deltas particularly \r vulnerable (Schmidt, 2015)."


id: 5a308bf9ea2f4ac93cde8cc971c53808
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13115
content:
"Changes in rainfall and temperature patterns are expected to increase \r geotechnical failures of embankments and earthworks (Briggs, \r Loveridge and Glendinning, 2017; Tang et  al., 2018; Powrie and \r Smethurst, 2018) from landslides, subsidence, sinkholes, desiccation \r and freeze-thaw action. For instance, Pk et al. (2018) show this could \r lead to a 30% reduction in the engineering factor of safety of earth \r embankments in Southern Ontario (Canada). Increased river flows in \r many catchments will also increase failures from bridge scours (Forzieri\r et al., 2018). HR Wallingford (2014) calculate that the projected 8% \r increase in scouring from high river flows in the UK will lead to 1 in \r 20 bridges being at high risk of failure by the 2080s, whilst in the \r USA the 129,000 bridges currently deficient could increase by 100,000 \r (Wright et al., 2012). With respect to temperature, analysis by Forzieri \r et al. (2018) concludes that heatwaves will be the most significant risk \r [...]"


id: e68322a2e39b2b1e234ead8e458cdefe
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37852
content:
"[...] to EU transport infrastructure in the 2080s, as a result of buckling of \r roads and railways due to thermal expansion, melting of road asphalt \r and softening of pavement material. In the USA, over 50% more roads \r will require rehabilitation (Mallick et al., 2018), whilst USD 596 million "


id: e311a4925461f2f636e2882e3a8a4c6c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37244
content:
"Many airports, and by their nature ports, are in the low elevation \r coastal zone, making them especially vulnerable to flooding and \r sea level rise. Under a 2o\r C scenario, the number of airports at risk of \r storm surge flooding increases from 269 to 338 or as many as 572 \r in an RCP8.5 scenario; these airports are disproportionately busy and \r account for up to 20% of the world's passenger routes (Yesudian and \r Dawson, 2021). Airport and port operations could be disrupted by icing \r of aircraft wings, vessels, decks, riggings and docks (Doll, Klug and \r Enei, 2014; Chhetri et al., 2015). Warming will increase microbiological \r corrosion of steel marine structures (Chaves et al., 2016). Fog, high \r winds and waves can disrupt port and airport activity, but changes \r are uncertain and with regional variation (Mosvold Larsen, 2015; \r Izaguirre et al., 2021; Becker, 2020; Leon-Mateos et al., 2021; Taszarek, \r Kendzierski and Pilguj, 2020; Danielson, Zhang and Perrie, 2020; Kawai\r [...]"


id: 59d2c4e052da5ee875584baed7f715ad
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13046
content:
"In the USA, for example, 15.4  million housing units fall within a \r 1-in-100-year floodplain (Wing et  al., 2018). Assessment of the \r Miami-Dade area in Florida noted that coastal inundation caused by \r tidal flooding (and to a lesser extent sea level rise) resulted in over \r USD 465 million in lost real-estate market value between 2005 and \r 2016 (McAlpine and Porter, 2018), although property values have \r increased from high-end housing construction and climate adaptation \r measures (Kim, 2020). Emergent risk reflecting novel research include \r aggravated moisture problems in buildings from wind driven rain (Nik\r et  al., 2015). Future risks from future sea level rise are elaborated \r in Section CCP2.2.1. Housing infrastructure are also susceptible \r to extreme heat and wind events (Stewart et al., 2018). These risks \r are further elaborated on in Section  6.2.3, although it is important \r to note that heat risks, in particular, tend to be concentrated within \r [...]"


id: faca33fa900fe4f351eaeb26ba1714e3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41497
content:
"[...] communities with a higher proportion of social housing (Mavrogianni\r et al., 2015; Sameni et al., 2015) or low-cost government-built houses \r and informal settlements."


id: 369072bf8ff9da2cc3f775c1e57c5483
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6834
content:
"Healthcare facilities (hospitals, clinics, residential homes) will suffer \r increasing shocks and stresses related to climate variability and \r change (Corvalan et  al., 2020). Some may be sudden shocks from \r extreme weather events, which both threaten the facility, staff and \r patients and increase the number of people seeking health care. There \r are extensive reports of health facilities being damaged after major \r floods and windstorms (e.g., 2010 floods in Pakistan, Hurricane Sandy \r in the USA) which can be further exacerbated by power and water \r supply failures (Powell, Hanfling and Gostin, 2012). Disruption to \r services may persist for many months because of damage to buildings, \r loss of drugs and equipment, and damaged transport infrastructure \r significantly increasing travel time for patients (Hierink et al., 2020). \r The impacts of climate change on the health of residents of 'slum' \r settlements will also compound the existing health burdens faced by \r [...]"


id: 6c48b12dd2f8e4a0bd6e4b613f99ee3e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16343
content:
"[...] these individuals, including infectious disease and other environmental \r public health concerns (Lilford et al., 2016; Mberu et al., 2016)."


id: 77371d4da772d7aaca72cd90aeda6759
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18180
content:
"Compound events can be initiated via hazards such as single extreme \r events, or multiple coincident events overlapping and interacting with \r exposed urban systems or sectors as compound climate risks (Leonard\r et al., 2014; IPCC, 2019b; Piontek et al., 2014). Hydrometeorological \r hazards, such as extreme precipitation from tropical cyclones, fronts \r and thunderstorms, often combine with storm surges and freshwater \r discharge leading to high compound risks at exposed settlements \r (Zheng, Westra and Sisson, 2013; Chen and Liu, 2014; Ourbak and \r Magnan, 2018; Dowdy and Catto, 2017). The compounding effect \r between these hydrometeorological hazards suggest that the combined \r impact of these events are greater than each of these variables on its \r own, and can amplify risks in affected settlements (Kew et al., 2013; \r Vitousek et  al., 2017). These risks are concentrated in coastal cities \r exposed to sea level rise and severe storms (van den Hurk et al., 2015; \r [...]"


id: 87d8ad3c80d81b1b58f7c1e5fa596c63
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21054
content:
"[...] Wahl et al., 2015; Paprotny et al., 2018b; Lagmay et al., 2015), or in \r settlements located in valleys prone to slope failure, such as the 2013 \r Uttarakhand floods and landslides arising from extreme precipitation \r and glacial lake outbursts along the Mandakini river in India (Ziegler\r et al., 2016; Barata et al., 2018)."


id: 36cf030dc020f03ba5de7c9a948277d6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6867
content:
"Cascading climate events occur when an extreme event triggers a \r sequence of secondary events within natural and human systems \r that causes additional physical, natural, social or economic disruption. \r The resulting impact can be significantly larger than the initial \r hazard (IPCC, 2019b). Each step in a risk cascade can generate direct \r (immediate impacts) and secondary (consequential impacts) losses. \r Risks from these cascading impacts are complex and multi-dimensional \r (Hao, Singh and Hao, 2018; Zscheischler and Seneviratne, 2017). For \r instance, combined droughts and heatwaves increases risks of urban \r water scarcity (Miralles et al., 2019; Gillner, Brauning and Roloff, 2014; \r Gill et al., 2013), as well as increasing wildfire extent and lowering \r snowpack conditions that affected peri-urban settlements adjacent \r to forested areas, as observed in California during the 2014 drought \r (AghaKouchak et al., 2014). Similarly, heatwaves can increase the risk \r [...]"


id: f7dadd3a167970c921caf8abd6aa0644
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40979
content:
"Secondary impacts occurring sequentially after an extreme hazard \r can severely affect disaster management, especially in complex urban \r systems (robust evidence, high agreement). Over time, relatively small \r perturbations can cascade outward from a primary failure, triggering \r further failures in other dependent parts of the network some distance \r away from the primary failure (Penny et al., 2018). In some cities, such \r as those prone to compound flood hazards, these dependent network \r parts can be dams, levees or other critical flood protection infrastructure \r that are essential for managing these cascading risks (Serre and \r Heinzlef, 2018; Fekete, 2019). Failure of these infrastructure systems \r can result in sequential failures in urban transport (Zaidi, 2018), energy \r networks (Sharifi and Yamagata, 2016), urban biodiversity (Solecki \r and Marcotullio, 2013) and so-called na-tech disasters; when natural \r [...]"


id: a1ae390a489407084a6293c90d4fd21f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25665
content:
"[...] hazards trigger technological disasters (Girgin, Necci and Krausmann, \r 2019). This risk cascade can propagate more widely by stopping flows \r of people, goods and services, with economic consequences beyond \r urban areas (Wilbanks and Fernandez, 2014)."


id: 8d813d971a2444ecf89dd27345964402
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22083
content:
"Urban areas and their infrastructure are susceptible to both \r compounding and cascading risks arising from interactions between \r severe weather from climate change and increasing urbanisation \r (medium evidence, high agreement) (Moretti and Loprencipe, 2018; \r Markolf et  al., 2019). Risks are complex and multi-dimensional, \r and can significantly amplify the impact of single events across \r space, scale and time. Impacts are determined by the magnitude \r of urban vulnerability and/or the interdependence of urban critical \r infrastructure (Pescaroli and Alexander, 2018; Zuccaro, De Gregorio \r and Leone, 2018). Poorer and wealthier settlements and cities \r are then both at risk from compound and cascading risks though \r potentially through contrasting mechanisms. For richer and poorer \r cities, managing climate risk as part of compound and cascading risks \r that can also include technological, biological and political risks places \r [...]"


id: 8b6fb15edf212ebba9a97c8a1279a827
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21692
content:
"[...] renewed emphasis on investment in generic capabilities that reduce \r vulnerability and on risk monitoring capability to track and respond \r to impacts across infrastructures and places (limited evidence, high \r agreement). Considering climate risk and managing such risk as part \r of complex, compounding and/or cascading risks is in its infancy but \r rapidly being accepted as necessary, especially when considering the \r wider poverty and justice implications of climate change arising from \r differentiated vulnerability in cities."


id: 399cc36664719362eb9001951f0313c9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7347
content:
"Planning and implementing climate adaptation in cities and settlements \r can be hampered by incomplete scientific knowledge, a lack of \r awareness of cascading impacts (and residual risks), mismanagement of \r actions, human capacity and financing deficits, as well as opportunities \r for eroding long-term sustainable development priorities (Juhola et al., \r 2016). These tensions can become acute in fragile and conflict affected \r states (see Box 6.3). It is important to differentiate between the climatic \r drivers of risk and social drivers that may compound risk exposures \r and experiences (Brown, 2014; Nightingale et  al., 2020), especially \r since technically- and scientifically-informed adaptation actions \r can be redirected depending on socioeconomic, political or cultural \r conditions on the ground (Eriksen, Nightingale and Eakin, 2015). The \r implementation of adaptation, whether by government, private sector or \r [...]"


id: 4003f88f3f6e3333717147788766c701
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8452
content:
"[...] civil society actors, can therefore lead to unanticipated and unintended \r amplification of political, economic and ecological risks (Swatuk et al., \r 2020). Many cities are still in the phase of piloting or testing out \r appropriate adaptation actions, although there is emerging consensus \r that adaptation plans and projects should acknowledge trade-offs, \r intentionally avoid past development mistakes, not lock-in detrimental \r impacts or further risks arising from implementation and explicitly \r anticipate the risks of maladaptation in decision making (Magnan\r et  al., 2016; Gajjar, Singh and Deshpande, 2019). Maladaptation \r describes actions that lead to increased vulnerability or risk to \r climate impacts or diminish welfare. Urban examples include green \r gentrification which offers nature-based solutions to the few, social \r safety nets that promote risk inducing subsidies. Whether an action is \r maladapted can depend on context, for example air conditioning can \r [...]"


id: 14d67bbcfcd223bcfd21754f5cb54b0d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 893
content:
"[...] reduce risk for the individual but is maladaptive at a societal level \r (see Section 6.3.4.2). It is informed by process; corruption can distort "


id: 9a31512169abea67076d803720e55f0a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24367
content:
"Downstream impacts occur because adaptive capacity is often \r unequally distributed across sectors and communities (Matin, Forrester \r and Ensor, 2018; Makondo and Thomas, 2018). In cities and settlements, \r adaptation interventions can displace ecological impacts to more \r vulnerable areas or directly lead to socioeconomically exclusionary \r outcomes (Anguelovski et al., 2016), particularly when adaptation plans \r and actions are primarily assessed through the prism of economic and/\r or financial viability (Shi et al., 2016; Klein, Juhola and Landauer, 2017). \r As a result, adaptation actions make only minimal contributions to the \r reduction of vulnerability, as the increased vulnerability of excluded \r communities more than offsets the decreased vulnerability of more \r well-off communities. Numerous examples, ranging from the mega \r coastal planning in Jakarta, Indonesia (Salim, Bettinger and Fisher, 2019; \r Goh, 2019), fragmentation of urban infrastructure intended to promote \r [...]"


id: 45113fa4fe54c22abe10a6af1b7af6ae
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9378
content:
"[...] climate resilience in Manila, Philippines (Meerow, 2017), exclusionary \r modes of flood control in Sao Paulo, Brazil (Henrique and Tschakert, \r 2019), strategies to reduce risks in the event of mudslides in Sarno, \r Italy (D'Alisa and Kallis, 2016), and involuntary community relocations \r in Vietnam (Lindegaard, 2020) and Mozambique (Arnall, 2019) all point \r to how an economic logic to adaptation can lead to exclusion of lower \r income, informal or minority communities in adaptation."


id: ecc7820118f2105700af991436451b7c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39025
content:
"A specific form of maladaptation is so-called green gentrification, this \r privileges wealthy urban residents in urban greening projects (Rice\r et  al., 2020; Shokry, Connolly and Anguelovski, 2020; Anguelovski, \r Irazabal-Zurita and Connolly, 2019; Blok, 2020). For example, in \r Miami-Dade County, Florida, USA, researchers found that adaptation \r functionality had a positive effect on property values (Keenan, Hill \r and Gumber, 2018). In New York City and Atlanta, Georgia, USA, \r research has shown that adaptation investments can increase \r property values and lead to neighbourhood change (Immergluck and \r Balan, 2018; Gould and Lewis, 2018). In the Gold Coast and Sunshine \r Coast, South East Queensland, Australia, where local communities \r have a strong preference for waterfront living, local governments \r are pressured by property developers to protect these coastal zones \r (Torabi, Dedekorkut-Howes and Howes, 2018). In Lagos, Nigeria, \r [...]"


id: f371c41771c22bfb20298f198dd7e098
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40207
content:
"[...] efforts to achieve climate resilience and sustainability through future \r city practices risk perpetuating the enclosure and commodification of \r land (Ajibade, 2017). The exclusionary outcomes of some adaptation \r interventions can therefore further heighten the risk to communities \r that are socioeconomically more vulnerable. See Section  6.3 for \r further discussion of equity and justice considerations in local climate \r adaptation."


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"Adaptation pathways are composed of sequences of adaptation \r actions connected through collaborative learning with the possibility \r of enabling transformations in urban and infrastructure systems \r (Werners et  al., 2021). Individual adaptation actions co-evolve with \r risks (see Section  6.2) and development processes (Section  6.4) \r to compose more or less planned adaptation pathways that can \r include a range of unanticipated outcomes. This section engages \r with this complexity by approaching adaptation through the notion \r of infrastructure. The adaptation options for individual infrastructure \r systems are reviewed, and in Section  6.4 brought together through \r assessment of cross-cutting enabling conditions. Interpreted broadly, \r infrastructure includes the social systems, ecological systems and grey/\r physical systems that underpin safe, satisfying and productive life in \r the city and beyond (Grimm et al., 2016). Social infrastructure includes \r [...]"


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"[...] housing, health, education, livelihoods and social safety nets, cultural \r heritage/institutions, disaster risk management and security and urban \r planning. Ecological infrastructure includes nature-based services: \r temperature regulation, flood protection and urban agriculture. \r Grey, or physical infrastructure, includes energy, transport, water \r and sanitation, communications (digital), built form and solid waste \r management. Framing infrastructure in this way enables an assessment \r of adaptation that is not constrained to the administrative boundaries \r of urban settlements, but also includes the flows of material, people \r and money between urban, peri-urban and more rural places, and \r can include adaptation actions deployed by government, individuals \r and the private sector. Recognising the complexity of adaptation and "


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"Finally, some adaptation policies or actions can erode the \r preconditions for sustainable and resilient development by indirectly \r increasing society's vulnerability (Neset et  al., 2019; Juhola et  al., \r 2016). Mandates to mainstream adaptation into existing development \r logics and structures perpetuates development-as-usual, reinforcing \r technocratic forms of local governance and locking in structural causes \r of marginalisation and differential vulnerability (Scoville-Simonds, \r Jamali and Hufty, 2020). Adaptation policy examples include: \r Australia's adaptation policy focus on financial strategies, preference \r for business-as-usual scenarios and incremental change will not \r contribute to transformative change (Granberg and Glover, 2014); \r Surat, India, where a focus on adapting industries and economically \r important assets in the city can divert policy attention away from \r general social equity and urban sustainability priorities (Chu, 2016; Blok, \r [...]"


id: b7ca12f620813bdaff078ca40d394d81
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"[...] 2020); Cambodia, where conflict between adaptation practitioners and \r local communities and non-compliance with regulatory safeguards \r led to conflict and potential for maladaptation (Work et  al., 2018). \r Finally, although insurance has the potential to incentivise practices \r to reduce risks, including through measures to reduce premiums (see \r Section  6.4.5 for additional details), researchers of insurance-led \r adaptation actions have argued that, since insurance regimes privilege \r normality, they tend to structurally embed risky behaviour and inhibit \r change (O'Hare, White and Connelly, 2016). All of these examples \r illustrate how incremental strategies that rely on business-as-usual "


id: 1285fbaf9304610cc9fa750a4bed0e96
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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"Figure 6.4 |  The Urban Adaptation Gap. This is a qualitative assessment presenting individual, non-comparative data for world regions from 25 AR6 Coordinating Lead Authors \r (CLAs) and Lead Authors (LAs), the majority from regional chapters. Respondents were asked to make expert summary statements based on the data included within their chapters \r and across the AR6 report augmented by their expert knowledge. Multiple iterations allowed opportunity for individual and group judgement. Urban populations and risks are very \r diverse within regions making the presented results indicative only. Variability in data coverage leads to the overall analysis having medium agreement, medium evidence. Major \r trends identified in 6.3.1 at least meet this level of confidence. Analysis is presented for current observed climate change associated hazards and for three adaptation scenarios: \r [...]"


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"[...] (1) current adaptation (based on current levels of risk management and climate adaptation), (2) planned adaptation (assessing the level of adaptation that could be realised if all \r national, city and neighbourhood plans and policies were fully enacted), (3) transformative adaptation (if all possible adaptation measures were to be enacted). Assessments were \r made for the lowest and highest quintile by income. Residual risk levels achieved for each income class under each adaptation scenario are indicated by five adaptation levels: \r no risk, occasional discomfort, occasional impacts on well-being, frequent impacts on well-being, extreme events and/or chronic risk. The urban adaptation gap is revealed when \r levels of achieved adaptation fall short of delivering 'no risk'. The graphic uses IPCC Regions, and has split Asia into two regions: North and East Asia, and Central and South Asia. \r Technical support is acknowledged from Greg Dodds and Sophie Wang"


id: 7b832eb35814bd0d5af73a2d55c6ab
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"Conventional zoning regulations (in which only one kind of use \r is permitted in a given area) and land use planning range in scale \r from the regional to the local and can be deployed to minimise risks \r through protection, accommodation or retreat. Protection entails, in \r addition to allocating zones for protective urban infrastructure (such \r as seawalls, levees and dykes, and slope revetments), avoidance \r measures that restrict or prevent urban development (e.g., through \r growth containment and/or no-build zones). Accommodation involves \r land use modifications and/or conversions while retreat requires either \r compulsory or voluntary relocations and may entail buyouts (Butler, \r Deyle and Mutnansky, 2016; Leon and March, 2016; Lyles, Berke and \r Overstreet, 2018). Risk eliminating retreat measures are less widely \r adopted than other risk reducing zoning and land use measures \r (Anguelovski et al., 2016; Butler, Deyle and Mutnansky, 2016; Lyles, \r [...]"


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"[...] Berke and Overstreet, 2018). This is attributed to the controversies \r of relocation and to the complexities of buyouts (Butler, Deyle and \r Mutnansky, 2016; King et al., 2016)."


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"Evidence from both richer countries and the Global South reveals \r that conventional zoning is more effective when governance \r systems facilitate the implementation of land use policies for climate \r adaptation that preclude negative human-nature interactions and that \r curb spatial inequity, both of which can trigger climate gentrification \r and increase the vulnerability of economically disadvantaged groups \r to climate-related risk (high confidence) (Marks, 2015; Liotta et  al., \r 2020; Keenan, Hill and Gumber, 2018). Cascading benefits of zoning \r and land use planning for climate adaptation are associated with \r the use of soft land cover, green infrastructure and improvement of \r livability through better conditions for walkability and cycling. This \r decreases auto-dependency and contributes to health and economic \r development (by attracting businesses and retail that stimulate \r economic prosperity and increase property values) (Larsen, 2015; \r [...]"


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"[...] Carter et al., 2015). Such increases in property values have also been \r observed in zones and areas protected from risks (such as flooding), \r where it may trigger spatial inequity leading to climate gentrification \r (Marks, 2015; Votsis, 2017; Votsis and Perrels, 2016; Keenan, Hill and \r Gumber, 2018)."


id: cd26eba2763c83f102032cd3240ff989
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"Nalau and Becken, 2018; Perera and Emmanuel, 2018; Anguelovski\r et al., 2016; Carter et al., 2015; Tsuda and Duarte, 2018; Nolon, 2016); \r with community-based adaptations (trade-offs and valuations, i.e., \r which land uses are valued more) (Larsen, 2015; Nalau and Becken, \r 2018; Perera and Emmanuel, 2018; Anguelovski et  al., 2016; Carter\r et al., 2015; McPhearson et al., 2018; Nolon, 2016); and with built form \r regulations and codes (Leon and March, 2016; Yiannakou and Salata, \r 2017; Perera and Emmanuel, 2018; Straka and Sodoudi, 2019; Larsen, \r 2015; Nolon, 2016). The imposition of planning-based tools such as \r scenario planning, flexible zoning and development incentivisation \r (among others) has the capacity to influence and encourage these \r adaptations (United States Environmental Protection Agency, 2017). \r Local risk-reduction inputs can inform land use adaptation policies \r (accommodation and/or avoidance, specifically growth containment \r [...]"


id: afefb342657d644a3ecf3f1dcf3a4a8f
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"[...] and no-build zones) that are better integrated within larger urban \r plans (Lyles, Berke and Overstreet, 2018; Nalau and Becken, 2018; \r Tsuda and Duarte, 2018) (limited evidence, high agreement)."


id: 6971c50d13020203ebe61aa70f7ea0ed
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"Social protection, or social security, is defined as the set of policies and \r programmes designed to reduce and prevent poverty and vulnerability \r throughout the lifecycle (ILO, 2017). Safety nets are intended to protect \r vulnerable households from impacts of economic shocks, natural \r hazards and disasters, and other crises. The UN policy frameworks for \r sustainable development, including the Sendai Framework for Disaster \r Risk Reduction 2015-2030, the new Strategic Framework 2018-2030 \r of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) \r and UNFCCC, highlight the essential role of social protection in \r promoting comprehensive risk management (Aleksandrova, 2019). \r Since the term Adaptive Aocial Protection was introduced by the World \r Bank (2015) and the IPCC (2014), it has been an emerging strategic tool \r to integrate poverty reduction, disaster risk reduction and humanitarian \r development into adaptation to climate change (Bene, Cornelius and \r [...]"


id: a64c901bd466fb3876932a4d6cee527d
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"Implementation of zoning and land use measures for climate adaptation \r from cities across diverse contexts remains limited (high agreement,\r robust evidence) owing to a range of challenges. A range of evidence \r from multiple locations indicates the challenges of mainstreaming \r land use planning for climate adaptation, including in Bangkok, \r Thailand (Marks, 2015), Legazpi City and Camalig Municipality in the \r Philippines (Cuevas et al., 2016; Cuevas, 2016), the USA (Cuevas et al., \r 2016; Cuevas, 2016), British Columbia, Canada (Stevens and Senbel, \r 2017), and Australia (Serrao-Neumann et al., 2017). Mainstreaming is \r hindered by a lack of clarity of implementation strategies for climate \r adaptation, insufficient funding, competing priorities (especially \r among professional planners and politicians), institutional challenges \r (see Jabareen's [2015] study of 20 cities globally) and the need to fill \r data gaps and continuously update weather statistics (Oberlack and \r [...]"


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"[...] Eisenack, 2018) (medium evidence, high agreement). At the same \r time, however, limited evidence from cities around the world such as \r the urban regions of Stuttgart and Berlin in Germany (Larsen, 2015), \r Greater Manchester in the UK (Carter et al., 2015), and Colombo in \r Sri Lanka (Perera and Emmanuel, 2018) reveals that risk reduction \r through zoning and land use can effectively protect and expand green \r infrastructure and soft land cover to alleviate pluvial flooding and \r decrease the urban heat island effect. This evidence points that one \r of the primary roles of land use planning is to guide the development \r of the urban form. As such, it underpins and establishes the basis \r for other infrastructure systems such as physical infrastructure and \r nature-based solutions (Morrissey, Moloney and Moore, 2018)."


id: fbd4ee1afb61ee4c9824da273ff61409
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"Adaptive social protection (ASP) is defined as a resilience-building \r approach by combining elements of social protection, disaster risk \r reduction and climate change adaptation, so as to break the cycle of \r poverty and vulnerability of household by investing in their capacity \r to prepare for, cope with and adapt to all types of shocks, especially \r under climate change and other global challenges (Bowen et  al., \r 2020; Ivaschenko et al., 2018). ASP has been justified as an effective \r instrument to build household and community resilience to climate \r extremes and slow-onset climate events such as sea level rise and \r environmental degradation (Schwan and Yu, 2018; Aleksandrova, \r 2019). In contexts of extreme poverty or climatic extremes, international \r development organisations, national provisions and market charities \r are complementary where family and kinship networks are weak and \r inadequate. To deal with short-term vulnerability to climate shocks, ASP \r [...]"


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"[...] can act as a crucial complement to risk management tools provided by \r communities and markets, tools which tend to be insufficient in the \r face of large or systemic shocks, by providing predictable transfers, \r developing human capital and diversifying livelihoods (Hallegatte\r et al., 2016). ASP can also facilitate long-term change and adaptation \r by improving education and health levels, as well as providing a \r proactive approach to managing climate-induced migration in both \r rural and urban areas (Schwan and Yu, 2018; Adger et al., 2014)."


id: a393bfb4729e3dd4b7cd07b826f211eb
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"ASP may be very good at reducing extreme poverty by helping to meet \r individual or household needs but not collective needs to mitigate \r long-term climate shocks. For example, few programmes consider \r risk assessment and climate-proof infrastructures as anticipatory \r measures to foster early action and preparedness (Aleksandrova, 2019; \r Costella et al., 2017). They therefore need to enable the adoption of \r forward-looking strategies for long-lasting adaptation (Tenzing, 2020). \r Some examples from China show social protection can improve \r adaptive capacity of urban communities with social medical insurance, \r housing subsidies, weather-index insurance, post-disaster construction, \r relocation planning, livelihood shift strategies, and so on. (Pan et al., \r 2015; Zheng et  al., 2018b; Rao and Li, 2019; Song, Zheng and Lin, \r 2021). However, social protection may lead to maladaptation in urban \r policy when social security, or similar tools (for example insurance) \r [...]"


id: 575cfd3e507aa4f72370cf3f867411cb
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"[...] to compensate for exposure deincentivise risk reduction (Grove, \r 2021). In many developing countries, high concentrations of poor \r and vulnerable groups living in disaster-prone zones of urban centres, \r new urban dwellers and informal residents are often excluded from \r community-based networks and social services (Aleksandrova, 2019). \r Risk transfer tools (such as insurance) and risk retention measures \r (such as social safety nets) can avoid and minimise the burden of loss \r and damage and limit secondary and indirect effects (Aleksandrova, \r 2019; Roberts and Pelling, 2018)."


id: 464da0132193541893177ad568e342bd
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"There is growing evidence of the benefits of early warning systems \r for urban preparedness decision making and action for climate and \r weather-related hazards such as cyclones, hurricanes and floods \r (medium evidence; high agreement) (Lumbroso, Brown and Ranger, \r 2016; Zia and Wagner, 2015; Marchezini et  al., 2017). Climate \r forecasting is constantly evolving and becoming increasingly accurate. \r Global organisations such as the World Meteorological Organizations \r are increasingly focusing on new and emerging technologies such as \r crowdsourced data collection to support integrated city services and \r early warning systems (Baklanov et al., 2018). However, while climate \r forecasting is an increasingly central tool for risk management agencies, \r a focus on urban areas or key infrastructure is still considerably rare \r (Lourenco et  al., 2015; Nissan et  al., 2019; Harvey et  al., 2019). \r The significant rise in urban risks poses significant challenges to \r [...]"


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"[...] humanitarian agencies. Humanitarian responses and local emergency \r management are vital for disaster risk reduction yet are compromised \r in urban contexts where it is difficult to confirm property ownership \r and where renters and informal dwellers are often excluded from "


id: 3d0a6fd22633f98b6c1c737f677ccaec
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"decision-making and planning (Parker and Maynard, 2015; Maynard\r et al., 2017). Disaster survivors and growing urban refugee populations \r are often displaced across the city thereby complicating efforts to track \r and provide support (Maynard et al., 2017).\r Existing early warning systems remain insufficient and the complexity \r of urban landforms makes accurate and detailed early warning \r difficult (medium evidence; high agreement) (Jones et al., 2015). This \r is particularly the case in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) \r where urban centres are often characterised by rapid expansion \r of interlinked formal and informal human settlements and land use \r zones. In such contexts, early warning services vary in effectiveness \r within the same urban centre (Allen et  al., 2020c; Rangwala et  al., \r 2018). Often, forecast-based action follows linear structures where \r forecast information is applied mainly for responding to negative \r [...]"


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"[...] impacts rather than anticipatory decision-making and preparation to \r avoid such impacts (Marchezini et al., 2017). Early warning systems are \r effective for warning of threshold breaching events including cyclonic \r activity and riverine flooding but less able to provide localised warning, \r though capability is rapidly increasing. Probabilistic risk forecasting \r and forecast based early action are only beginning to be applied to \r urban contexts and often those that are most vulnerable do not receive \r warnings regarding hazardous events (Nissan et al., 2019). There is less \r capacity for early warning systems in LMICs with key challenges linked \r to a lack of well-established risk baseline information; accessibility, \r communication and understanding of forecast information, as well as \r political and institutional barriers and limited resources and capacities \r to act on such information (Jones et al., 2015; Mustafa et al., 2015; \r [...]"


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"[...] Zia and Wagner, 2015; Marchezini et al., 2017; Gotgelf, Roggero and \r Eisenack, 2020). Political and institutional barriers to the incorporation \r of climate information to decision-making are not limited to LMICs \r (Harvey et al., 2019). For example, comprehensive studies on sectoral \r use of climate information in Europe revealed that, despite climate \r services becoming increasingly accessible and well resourced, there \r is limited organisational uptake of seasonal climate forecasts across \r key sectors (e.g., energy, transport, water and infrastructure) in \r informing their decision making processes (Soares and Dessai, 2016; \r Soares, Alexander and Dessai, 2018). This is due both to technical and \r non-technical barriers such as lack of awareness and knowledge of \r climate information and forecasting (Soares and Dessai, 2016; Soares, \r Alexander and Dessai, 2018)."


id: 48ba5db2c29ee63f018ec44d2b6ab204
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"The inclusion of Local knowledge and Indigenous knowledge in urban \r vulnerability and risk assessments can strongly enhance local resilience, \r but its effectiveness is constrained by wider decision making and policy \r contexts dominated by top-down approaches (medium evidence; high \r agreement) (Jones et  al., 2015; Sword-Daniels et  al., 2018; Nissan\r et  al., 2019). Established non-state actors such as Shack and Slum \r Dwellers International are particularly effective at implementing \r inclusive approaches for local knowledge incorporation into urban \r decision-making. Climate change and disaster risk exacerbate existing \r problems of economic development, yet macro-economic planning \r seldom incorporates adaptation. Recent evidence also confirms the \r role of Indigenous knowledge and local knowledge in management \r practices to reduce climate risks through early warning preparedness \r and response (see also Section 6.3.2.3). These practices are particularly \r [...]"


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"[...] important where alternative early warning methods are absent. For \r instance, Abudu Kasei et al. (2019) show that Indigenous knowledge \r gathered through observations on changes in natural indicators \r (such as links between rainfall patterns, certain flora and fauna, and \r temperature changes) could be applied to develop early warning of \r climate hazards (floods and droughts) in informal urban settlements \r in African countries such as Ghana. Similarly, Hiwaski et  al. (2015) \r show that observations of changes in the environment and celestial \r bodies are used to predict climate-related hazards in Indonesia, the \r Philippines and Timor-Leste where communities in turn use local \r materials and methods, and customary practices to respond to the \r impacts of climate change."


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content:
"Insurance is a risk transfer mechanism for middle- and high-income \r countries, yet is less widely available in LMICs (Surminski and \r Thieken, 2017). Additionally, where insurance options do exist in \r LMICs, these are not usually available to large populations living or \r operating in the informal sector. Flood insurance is widely available \r in many Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development \r (OECD) countries but the demand and uptake differ significantly \r across countries (Hanger et  al., 2018). This financial tool is subject \r to increasing pressure under the changing climate, with growing \r concerns around affordability and availability. More integrative \r approaches are required, such as where changes in the insurance \r industry are closely linked to adaptation strategies, building standards \r and land use planning and their application (Cremades et al., 2018). \r This is particularly important in LMICs and of central concern for all \r [...]"


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"[...] insurance schemes is ensuring access, fairness and affordability for the \r most poor and vulnerable. However, there are some notable examples "


id: 47e04f166fb9e7915e9ea33ab12f02e2
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"Globally, a considerable diversity of tools and frameworks for urban \r resilience assessments are being developed at multiple scales (Arup \r and Rockefeller, 2015; Elias-Trostmann et  al., 2018). These include \r hybrids such as ecosystem-based disaster risk reduction (Eco-DRR) \r (Begum et  al., 2014).While important advances have been made in \r assessing urban resilience, much debate remains around such tools and \r assessment approaches regarding issues such as validation, dynamics \r in exposure and vulnerability, and appropriateness of generic methods \r in high-density urban settlements (Leitner et al., 2018; Cardoso et al., \r 2020; Rufat et al., 2019). Disaster impact and recovery time are strongly \r influenced by the behaviour and actions of individuals, communities, \r businesses, and government organisations (Merilainen, 2020; Rasanen\r et al., 2020). For example, the review by Aaerts et al. (2018) shows how \r the limitations of existing flood risk assessment methods (which tend \r [...]"


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"Climate resilient health systems are a vital part of adaptation to \r protect the most vulnerable from climate change (WHO, 2020). \r Cardiovascular fitness for example is a root cause of morbidity and \r mortality form heat stress (Schuster et  al., 2017). The World Health \r Organization has developed a framework of climate-resilient health \r systems that addresses both mitigation and adaptation goals (WHO, \r 2015). Universal health coverage (UHC) is an essential component of \r climate-resilient health systems. In most countries, access to health \r services is better in urban than in rural areas. However, there remain \r large urban populations with insufficient coverage of health services \r (WHO and WB, 2015) and UHC tracking needs to take better account \r of inequalities in coverage, including differences in access within \r cities and further disaggregation of urban populations by income. \r Thus, health sector investment is an important tool in adaptive action \r [...]"


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"[...] and capacity. Analyses of health survey data shows that, globally, \r access to health care is increasing toward UHC targets (Lozano et al., \r 2020). Financing for global health has increased steadily in the last \r two decades and modelling shows this trend is likely to continue \r to 2050, but at a slower pace of growth and the current disparities \r in per-capita health spending persist between high and low/middle \r income countries, leading to insufficient health service coverage for \r the poorest populations (Chang et al., 2019a). Out-of-pocket spending \r is projected to remain substantial in LMIC and will remain the only \r means to access health care for many poor urban populations."


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"Given the amount of time that children spend in school settings, \r adapting educational infrastructure and programmes to climate \r change is highly important. This includes not only making physical \r structures safe, but also providing students with the knowledge \r and confidence to support individual and family-based adaptation. \r Several UN agencies (e.g., UNICEF and UNDRR) and international \r non-governmental agencies (e.g., Plan International) have prioritised \r safer schools and child-centred risk management that often focus on \r schools as places that should be prioritised for retrofitting and safe \r construction, but also as focal points for knowledge dissemination and \r community organising where impacts can extend beyond the school \r to reduce risk among students' families. Universities and think tanks, \r as well as the third and private sector are key support mechanisms, \r particularly at the local level and when working in collaboration with \r [...]"


id: 4120fb288c36824280d99ffe95044c1b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8640
content:
"[...] local government and communities. They can support the development \r of critical educational resources and innovative communication \r methods, as well as facilitate the design and implementation of \r climate policies and related action plans."


id: f4b79b9391a7fc1e93270c06bf835a4e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40428
content:
"The climate change adaptation options for built cultural heritage fall \r into seven categories (Rockman et  al., 2016; Fatoric and Seekamp, \r 2017b). Financial constraints are the primary barriers that underpin \r the first four adaptation options: no action at all, merely monitoring \r and/or documenting, or annual maintenance (Xiao et al., 2019; Sesana\r et al., 2019; Fatoric and Seekamp, 2017a; Fatoric and Seekamp, 2017b; \r Fatoric and Seekamp, 2018). Core and shell preservation, the fifth and \r sixth categories, are cost effective when they improve the condition of \r built cultural heritage (BCH) (Bertolin and Loli, 2018; Loli and Bertolin, \r 2018a; Loli and Bertolin, 2018b), while elevation and/or relocation, the \r final adaptation options, are extremely costly and might jeopardise the \r historic value (Xiao et al., 2019). To date, however, evidence indicates \r that adaptation actions prioritise archaeological sites (Carmichael\r [...]"


id: 18366c1c87aa492b35f0ee8aaf23ae84
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1459
content:
"[...] et al., 2017; Fatoric and Seekamp, 2018; Pollard et al., 2014; Dawson, \r 2013). The efficacy of adaptation of historic buildings can be increased \r through increased and stable funding, incentives, stakeholder \r engagement, and legal and political frameworks (Dutra et al., 2017; \r Fatoric and Seekamp, 2018; Fatoric and Seekamp, 2017b; Fatoric and \r Seekamp, 2017a; Leijonhufvud, 2016; Phillips, 2015; Sesana et  al., \r 2019; Sesana et al., 2018; Sitas, 2020)."


id: a28417e98ccdbb2eabc2602160d15414
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25810
content:
"(medium evidence, high agreement). Climate change education in \r urban settlements has increasingly focused on enhancing children \r and young people's political agency in schools, universities, and in \r formal and informal media settings (Cutter-Mackenzie and Rousell, \r 2019). However, an ambiguous framing of climate impacts and \r adaptation, for example around the science of urban heat islands \r by the media, can also exacerbate local community confusion and \r uncertainty (Iping et  al., 2019) and further training and capacity \r building opportunities such as for vocational qualifications is still \r required across diverse settings (Simmons, 2021). Communication \r strategies deployed in formal education and social media can be highly \r influential in exchanging information and establishing narratives and \r viewpoints that frame what adaptive action is legitimate, especially \r in large cities (Simpson, Napawan and Snyder, 2019). However, the \r [...]"


id: 3ebc103e9b3e7d6d997fd03610590286
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8228
content:
"[...] effectiveness of communication strategies for change, for example \r from Mayoral offices, can also be influenced by wider political and \r structural drivers including community literacy or political partisanship \r (Boussalis, Coan and Holman, 2019). Recent research (e.g., Macintyre\r et  al., 2018) highlights the need for new learning approaches to \r climate education from school age to adult education. Emphasis is \r on inclusivity in learning and recognising diverse perspectives across \r multiple levels and settings, from formal and informal education to \r wider social learning. Informal learning that takes place outside of \r school settings, such as in libraries and botanical gardens, in everyday \r life is increasingly recognised as a key arena for climate education, \r life-long learning and nurturing environmental citizenship and activism \r (Paraskeva-Hadjichambi et al., 2020)."


id: 5a484417999ae803e37304929d948d79
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13131
content:
"The integration of culture into urban policy and planning is increasingly \r recognised as critical to developing sustainable and resilient cities, \r and features in international agreements such as the SDGs (limited \r evidence; high agreement) (Sitas, 2020). However, urban cultural \r policies are still limited, for example, Cape Town is the only African \r city to have developed a city-level cultural policy (Sitas, 2020). Cultural \r heritage refers to both tangible (e.g., historic buildings and sites) and \r intangible (e.g., oral traditions and social practices) resources inherited \r from the past (Fatoric and Egberts, 2020; Jackson, Dugmore and Riede, \r 2018). Learning about past societal and environment changes through \r heritage offers opportunity for reflection and transfer of knowledge and \r skills. This takes place in multiple contexts such as museums and cultural \r landscapes, and in everyday life (Fatoric and Egberts, 2020; Jackson, \r [...]"


id: cbe1c8cc17f671f7e308bbe0dc0ca39f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33195
content:
"[...] Dugmore and Riede, 2018). Cultural heritage is primarily associated \r with identity and is closely intertwined with the complexities of history, \r politics, economics and memory. Climate change adds another layer \r of complexity to cultural heritage and resource management (Fatoric \r and Seekamp, 2017b). Changing climatic conditions are already \r negatively impacting World Heritage Sites such as the Cordilleras' Rice \r Terraces of the Philippines and earthen architecture sites, for example \r the Djenne mosque in Mali, are particularly vulnerable to changes in \r temperature and water interactions (UNESCO, 2021). Climate change \r impacts intangible cultural heritage across diverse settings such as in \r the Caribbean and Pacific Small Island Developing States (SIDS) where \r traditional ways of life and related aspects such as oral traditions \r and performing arts are under threat from extreme weather events \r (UNESCO, 2021)."


id: 42ef3da299a52738f18ae6ba14734014
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8971
content:
"groups (Poulsen et al., 2015; Poulsen, Neff and Winch, 2017; Maughan, \r Laycock Pedersen and Pitt, 2018; Simon-Rojo, 2019; Cederlof, 2016). \r Co-benefits include a wide range of social and environmental benefits \r (Brink et al., 2016; Alves et al., 2019) for human physical and mental \r health (Kabisch, van den Bosch and Lafortezza, 2017; Sarkar, Webster \r and Gallacher, 2018; Engemann et al., 2019; Rojas-Rueda et al., 2019), \r climate mitigation (De la Sota et al., 2019) and as habitat for local \r biodiversity (Ziter, 2016; Knapp, Schmauck and Zehnsdorf, 2019). \r At the same time, concerns about the unintended consequences of \r investing in green infrastructure for NBS, such as how it may contribute \r to gentrification (Turkelboom et  al., 2018; Anguelovski et  al., 2018; \r Haase et al., 2017), create more public use, increase water demand \r (Nouri, Borujeni and Hoekstra, 2019) or contribute to criminal activity \r [...]"


id: 957e97a797ce3438e742579bff653c4c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23504
content:
"[...] (Cilliers and Cilliers, 2015) underlines the challenges of investing in \r adaptation in complex urban systems (see Section 6.2.6). Additionally, \r more place-based analyses of the efficacy of NBS for reducing climate \r impacts across varying urban contexts and future climate scenarios are \r needed to better understand the cost effectiveness of investing in NBS \r to provide disaster risk reduction and deliver critical co-benefits for \r human well-being. Cooperation between scientists, decision-makers \r and Indigenous knowledge-holders can supplement current efforts and \r ensure that investments in NBS do not negatively impact indigenous \r communities (Ban et al., 2018; Seddon et al., 2021; Townsend, Moola \r and Craig, 2020)."


id: 4dd1f502a99225b25fe1694e010f07bf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10960
content:
"Well-functioning ecosystems can play a significant role in buffering \r cities, settlements and infrastructure from climate hazards at multiple \r scales (robust evidence, high agreement). Nature-based solutions \r (NBS) are actions to protect, sustainably manage and restore natural \r or modified ecosystems that address societal challenges effectively \r and adaptively, simultaneously providing human well-being and \r biodiversity benefits (Cohen-Shacham et al., 2016). Widely recognised \r as low-regret measures for disaster risk reduction and climate change \r adaptation, green and blue infrastructure investments and natural \r area conservation in cities can provide NBS across scales to reduce \r temperature shocks and provide natural flood defences among other \r adaptation and resilience benefits (McPhearson et al., 2018; Andersson\r et al., 2019; Frantzeskaki et al., 2019). Blue infrastructure, for example, \r provides ecological and hydrological functions (e.g., evaporation, \r [...]"


id: 3275dadcae12d2f571a4cedf0e7b8099
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6133
content:
"[...] transpiration, drainage, infiltration, detention) critical to sustainable \r urban water management (Ioja et al., 2021). Public parks, urban forests, \r street trees and green roofs, as well as lakes, ponds and streams are \r widely documented for providing local cooling, grass and riparian \r buffers, forested watersheds can enhance flood and drought protection \r for cities and settlements, and mangrove stands and wetlands in coastal \r areas can reduce storm surges. Despite increasing knowledge about \r NBS (here encompassing literature on ecosystem services for climate \r change adaptation and resilience, ecosystem-based adaptation, and \r benefits of green and blue infrastructure for adaptation), recent studies \r indicate that nature-based approaches to adaptation and resilience \r are still under-recognised and under-invested in urban planning and \r development (Matthews, Lo and Byrne, 2015; Geneletti and Zardo, \r [...]"


id: ae17b68ee280999338542ea72142afcc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27871
content:
"[...] 2016; Frantzeskaki et al., 2019), despite the potential scale of benefits, \r for example, a recent study covering 70 cities in Latin America calculated \r that 96 million people would benefit from improving main watersheds \r with green infrastructure (Tellman et al., 2018)."


id: 23de27f1ae5ebd1e1f4dabd2ed06094b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3496
content:
"Nature-based strategies, including street trees, green roofs, green walls \r and other urban vegetation, can reduce heat and extreme heat by \r cooling private and public spaces (robust evidence, high agreement). \r Shading and evapotranspiration are the primary mechanisms for \r vegetation-induced urban cooling (Coutts et  al., 2016). Shading \r reduces mean radiant temperature, which is the dominant influence \r on outdoor human thermal comfort under warm, sunny conditions \r (Thorsson et al., 2014; Viguie et al., 2020). Outdoor green space and \r parks may also slightly reduce indoor heat hazard (Viguie et al., 2020). \r Apart from lowering temperature, NBS may also contribute to lower \r energy costs by reducing extra demand for conventional sources of \r cooling (e.g., air conditioning) (Viguie et al., 2020; Foustalieraki et al., \r 2017), especially during peak demand periods. Homes with shade trees \r that are located in cities where air conditioning systems are common \r [...]"


id: 9742ad1a7e5c35d3a981d0146bf4253c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23809
content:
"[...] can save over 30% of residential peak cooling demand (Zardo et al., \r 2017; Wang et al., 2015). Green roofs have been shown to significantly \r lower surface temperatures on buildings (Bevilacqua et al., 2017) and \r modelling suggests that green roofs, if employed widely throughout \r urban areas, have the potential to impact the regional heat profile of \r cities (Bevilacqua et al., 2017; Rosenzweig, Gaffin and Parshall, 2006). \r Community or allotment gardens, backyard greening and other types \r of low vegetation, as well as lakes, ponds, rivers and streams, can \r also provide local cooling benefits to nearby residents (Gunawardena, \r Wells and Kershaw, 2017; Larondelle et al., 2014; Santamouris, 2020)."


id: 1504a46504463abe85267df69d73b8bb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 910
content:
"Grey infrastructure often damages or eliminates biophysical processes \r (e.g., through soil sealing, stream burial or altered hydrology) \r necessary to sustain ecosystems, habitats and livelihoods, where urban \r ecological infrastructure (Childers et al., 2019) can be more flexible \r and cost effective for providing flood risk reduction and other benefits \r (Palmer et al., 2015). Hybrid approaches are emerging that integrate \r ecological and grey (engineered) infrastructure in adaptation planning \r and hazard protection (Grimm et al., 2016; Depietri and McPhearson, \r 2017). Explicit policy uptake by city authorities is increasing (Hansen\r et  al., 2015; Holscher et  al., 2019), such as in New York where in \r 2010 the city committed to a hybrid infrastructure plan for storm \r water management, investing USD 5.3 billion over 20 years, of which \r USD 2.4  billion was targeted for green infrastructure investments \r (NYC, 2010). A subset of services from urban ecosystems are being \r [...]"


id: a7c4325346c45baeae2908e755c4163d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26731
content:
"[...] increasingly invested in as NBS for climate adaptation pathways \r (Keeler et al., 2019; Kabisch et al., 2016) and included as regulatory \r drivers through flood management, hazard mitigation and air pollution \r regulations that encourage or enforce the implementation of green \r infrastructure practices (Davis et al., 2020)."


id: feb941b333ed5a11dc1d172355d75d4f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42203
content:
"Trees can also have negative effects by increasing pedestrian exposure \r to pollution if they are introduced in heavily travelled street canyons \r where air pollutants can be trapped (Vos et  al., 2013; Gromke and \r Blocken, 2015). To maximise the adaptation benefits of NBS for \r improving air quality, planners and managers can target tree selection \r for species with low VOC emissions, low allergen emissions and high \r pollutant deposition potential (Keeler et  al., 2019), and combine \r with low pollution transportation policies. Studies suggest sensitive \r planting of roadside tree canopies can have positive effects on air \r pollutants (Beckett, Freer Smith and Taylor, 2000; Yang, Chang and \r Yan, 2015). For example, Xue et  al. (2021) found that the PM2.5 \r reduction between 2013 and 2017 in China was associated with a \r saving of approximately USD 111 billion yr-1 nationally. Tree planting \r near schools, nursing homes and hospitals can ensure that benefits \r [...]"


id: d145a4af4cb4916508e5941743ea20a0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34168
content:
"[...] provided by trees are delivered to the local populations that stand to \r benefit the most from improved air quality, but species need to be \r adapted to regional climate to provide benefits over time (Donovan, \r 2017; Nowak et al., 2018)."


id: 866fd4ebf85542381fa71660d0faf361
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20817
content:
"increases shade provision and evapotranspiration (Hamstead et  al., \r 2016; Grilo et  al., 2020; Herath, Halwatura and Jayasinghe, 2018; \r Knight et al., 2021). However, local cooling by vegetation depends on \r regional climate context, geographic setting of the city, urban form, \r the density and placement of the trees, in addition to a variety of other \r ecological, technical, and social factors, such as local stewardship \r (Salmond et al., 2016). Green spaces less than 0.5-2.0 ha may have \r negligible cooling effects at regional scales, but impacts of shading \r can have microscale cooling benefits (Gunawardena, Wells and \r Kershaw, 2017; Zardo et al., 2017). Vegetation impacts on day versus \r night-time cooling varies (Imran et al., 2019) as does cooling potential \r in temperate versus tropical climates. The supply of cooler air from \r surrounding peri-urban and rural areas can impact cooling in the urban \r core suggesting that regional adaptation planning for NBS is important \r [...]"


id: f2ccf4504a09ecdd3e1a5e7262e0e8a6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40115
content:
"[...] to maintain or extend ventilation paths from the urban fringe into the \r city centre (Schau-Noppel, Kossmann and Buchholz, 2020)."


id: b0ca138eb005a2d66d2d8bc28cedfd3f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28330
content:
"To maximize the adaptation benefits of NBS for regulating urban heat, \r it can be helpful to prioritise tree planting and other urban greening \r investments in areas where heat vulnerability and risk are the highest, \r especially communities that lack urban tree canopy or accessibility to \r parks to cool off during hot days or heatwaves (Ziter et  al., 2019). \r Planting trees closely together or in partly permeable vegetated \r barriers along streets can improve local cooling benefits. Additionally, \r choosing tree species with leaves that have the greatest leaf area \r index or the largest leaves can improve cooling performance, as those \r trees have the greatest shading and evapotranspiration benefits \r that, in turn, provide the greatest cooling effects (Keeler et al., 2019). \r Drought-resistant trees, often native trees, are ideal to avoid high \r watering costs, though dry or water scarce areas may limit adoption of \r [...]"


id: cf2554db84ec21ce8cde0e5957d244f0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33790
content:
"[...] urban vegetation as an NBS strategy (Coutts et al., 2013). Native trees \r and permaculture can provide additional benefits for local biodiversity \r as shown in study in Melbourne, Australia which found that increasing \r vegetation from 10% to 30% increased occupancy of bats, birds, \r bees, beetles and bugs by up to 130% (Threlfall et  al., 2017), with \r particularly high impact on native species.. Additionally, planting fruit \r or nut trees can provide co-benefits for local food production, and yet \r choice of species and placement is important to consider with respect \r to local cultural needs and norms (Adegun, 2018; Adegun, 2017)."


id: 7051b13526157c664cede97be31ce2ee
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17019
content:
"Urban parks and open spaces, forests, wetlands, green roofs and \r engineered stormwater treatment devices help manage stormwater \r and wastewater by reducing the volume of stormwater runoff, reducing \r surface flooding, and reducing contamination of runoff by pollutants \r (robust evidence, high agreement). Engineered devices include \r bioswales, rain gardens, and detention and retention ponds, and are \r becoming common and standard approaches to mitigate the negative \r effects of impervious surfaces on stormwater quality and surface \r flooding in cities (Zhou, 2014; McPhillips et  al., 2020). Allotment \r gardens, street trees, green roofs and urban forests may also help \r reduce runoff and provide a stormwater retention service (Pennino, \r McDonald and Jaffe, 2016; Berland et al., 2017; Gittleman et al., 2017). \r Modelling and empirical studies show that NBS at small spatial scales \r lead to improvements in water quality and reduction of peak flows \r [...]"


id: 9d514894e533d08b2ef143a5b00b7f81
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24908
content:
"[...] (Moore et  al., 2016; Keeler et  al., 2019; Webber et  al., 2020). Peak \r flow reductions are greatest for small rain events. For example, D-Ville \r et al. (2018) observed a 30-70% reduction in peak flow for the 1-in\u000230 year storm, but performance reduces for more intense rainfall or if \r saturated (Garofalo et al., 2016). Employing NBS to reduce flooding \r on roads can be an important adaptation mechanism for reducing the \r impact of flooding events on traffic flows (Pregnolato et al., 2016)."


id: 12a0091a984e62c5205939f8b81db77b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 479
content:
"NBS in cities can help regulate air quality by absorbing air pollutants \r (medium evidence, medium agreement). For example, planting trees\r or vegetated barriers along streets or in urban forests can reduce \r particulate matter, the ambient air pollutant with the largest global \r health burden (Janhall, 2015; Tiwary, Reff and Colls, 2008; Matos\r et  al., 2019; McDonald et  al., 2016). However, findings show that \r trees can also positively affect ground-level ozone (Calfapietra et al., \r 2013; Kroeger et al., 2014), airborne pollen concentrations (Willis and \r Petrokofsky, 2017) and indirectly affect air quality through reduced \r emissions from energy production offset by shade provision (Keeler\r et  al., 2019). Certain tree species however can also be detrimental \r to urban ozone formation by emitting significant amounts of reactive \r biogenic volatile organic compounds (VOCs). Decreasing urban \r emissions of VOCs is an increasingly important ozone mitigation \r [...]"


id: 7c63512b2726a3843f7ba9c3ee0878a3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19087
content:
"Overall, NBS are attractive adaptation options for stormwater \r management and to reduce impacts of pluvial and fluvial flooding in \r cities (Rosenzweig et al., 2018a) compared, and in combination, with \r grey infrastructure. Cities with combined sewer infrastructure are likely\r to see benefits from NBS due to reductions in stormwater quantity \r and reduced sewage overflows. Cities where a large proportion \r of residents lack access to piped infrastructure and drink surface \r water may see large benefits, especially to human health, from NBS \r investments (Keeler et al., 2019). Where future large-scale upgrades or \r installation of grey infrastructure will be necessary, new and growing \r cities may have more opportunity to realise large net benefits from \r investments in NBS. Older cities, and new, rapidly urbanising areas \r that lack large-scale water infrastructure may see the greatest benefits \r from enhanced NBS, relative to cities where heavy investments \r [...]"


id: 8abfd7af4fccb16881f430276af794c5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21581
content:
"[...] infrastructure upgrades have already been made. Cities facing climate \r changes that include more frequent or extreme precipitation may also \r see large water quality benefits from investment in NBS (Keeler et al., \r 2019). Overall, there is increasing evidence that NBS for addressing \r stormwater is cost effective (Bixler et  al., 2020; Kozak et  al., 2020; \r Mguni, Herslund and Jensen, 2016), especially in cities facing a need \r to update current infrastructures."


id: 72f55d87f6a1a0951c7719f29717c4cf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17473
content:
"Coastal ecosystems including coral and oyster reefs, coastal forests \r including mangroves and other tree species, salt marshes and other \r types of wetland habitat, seagrass, dunes and barrier islands can \r reduce impacts of coastal flooding and storms (robust evidence, high \r agreement) (Zhao, Roberts and Ludy, 2014; Boutwell and Westra, \r 2016; Narayan et al., 2017; Yang, Kerger and Nepf, 2015; Bridges et al., \r 2015; World Bank, 2016) (see also Section CCP2 Cities and Settlements \r by the Sea). Recent literature highlights the value of nature-based \r approaches for coastal protection in terms of avoided damages and \r human well-being (Narayan et  al., 2017; Silva et  al., 2016a). NBS \r can protect coasts from flooding through reducing the wave energy \r by drag friction, reducing wave overtopping by eliminating vertical \r barriers, and absorbing floodwaters in soil (Arkema, Scyphers and \r Shepard, 2017; Dasgupta et al., 2019; Zhu et al., 2020). For example, \r [...]"


id: 68a5f33809864e1eb40fb466ce1935ca
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15679
content:
"[...] coastal and marine vegetation and reefs can dissipate wave energy, \r attenuate wave heights and nearshore currents, decrease the extent \r of wave run-up on beaches, and trap sediments (Ferrario et al., 2014; \r Bridges et  al., 2015). These effects result in lower water levels and \r reduce shoreline erosion, which in turn has potential to save lives and \r prevent expensive property damages (Narayan et al., 2017)."


id: ebdd2dfff1ed624374ec38b55a95bdde
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38860
content:
"Cities manage flood risk using different types of adaptation and \r regulatory mechanisms (Naturally Resilient Communities, 2017). Built \r flood-control infrastructure, such as levees and stream channelisation, \r reduces the demand for nature-based flood impact reduction. \r Cities facing flood risk that do not currently have extensive grey \r flood-mitigation infrastructure may find NBS to be an appealing, \r lower cost solution (Keeler et al., 2019). In cities where flood-control \r grey infrastructure already exists, there is less demand for NBS of \r flood protection, but NBS may provide important back up, especially \r in a changing climate that may increase flood hazards (City of Los \r Angeles, 2017; Elmqvist et al., 2019). Overall, city and basin-wide NBS \r for riverine flood impact reduction can reduce the generation of new \r hazards by making space for water which can reduce the potential for \r a false sense of security provided by traditional flood management \r [...]"


id: 96173e8551dc8ab84b3ec31d80fce2e5
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"The role of NBS has been increasingly recognised for improving urban \r water management, emphasising it's contribution for climate-adapted \r development and sustainable urbanisation (robust evidence, high \r agreement) (Wong and Brown, 2009). NBS that protect or restore the \r natural infiltration capacity of a watershed can increase the water \r supply service to various extents, improving drought protection and \r providing resilient water supply (Drosou et  al., 2019; Krauze and \r Wagner, 2019), although different forms of NBS (e.g., street trees, \r parks and open space, community gardens, and engineered devices \r such as rain gardens, bioswales or retention ponds) contribute in \r different ways to increasing stormwater infiltration. Additional sources \r of water may be available to replace the water supplied by NBS, \r such as rainwater harvesting, inter-basin transfers or desalination \r plants. Reliance on naturally sourced, locally available surface water \r [...]"


id: 614b6dc1f1f9fcf1398464217420bce5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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"[...] and groundwater is more energy efficient and economical than \r desalination or water reuse for potable use (Boelee et al., 2017), while \r rainwater harvesting is even more economical. Increasing the amount \r of green space in urban areas can secure and regulate water supplies, \r improving water security (Liu and Jensen, 2018; Bichai and Cabrera \r Flamini, 2018). However, Bhaskar et al. (2016) reviewed the effect of \r urbanisation and NBS on baseflow and suggest that the confounded \r effects of infiltration and evapotranspiration losses, combined with \r the subsurface infrastructure (sewer systems) and geology, makes it \r difficult to predict the magnitude of baseflow enhancement resulting \r from the implementation of NBS in cities."


id: fd59d3c4c98c5a82ea904d8824c97c6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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content:
"At the same time, investments in vertical agriculture continue to expand, \r such as in Singapore where private investment in food production is \r occurring in high rise buildings (Wong, Wood and Paturi, 2020). Not \r all cities can benefit similarly from vertical agriculture since higher \r heating costs to produce vegetables indoors during northern winters \r consumes considerable amounts of energy and may generate fossil \r fuel emissions depending on the energy source (Goldstein et al., 2016a; \r Mohareb et al., 2017). Some regions can benefit from more traditional \r outdoor urban farming, such as in South and Southeast Asia, which can \r support multiple growing cycles per year for some crops, particularly in \r tropical areas where irrigation is available. Light availability, soil health \r and water availability will impact food production in urban areas. For \r example, a study conducted in Vancouver, Canada, demonstrated that \r [...]"


id: 94bcf9487cf4cfeeb373359fa62130b2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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"[...] light attenuation from buildings and trees can reduce both crop yield \r and water demand for crop growth (Johnson et al., 2015)."


id: da7bc66dea7992b523b7f539612c5528
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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"recent decades (see Section 5 4.2.4; Tramblay et al., 2019). The design \r process for physical infrastructure projects and significant construction \r (e.g., residential or industrial estates and large industrial development) \r typically includes risk assessments and social and environmental impact \r assessments that consider neighbouring land uses and connected \r infrastructure. Land use planning can consider diverse land uses \r and their interactions at the neighbourhood level (Section  6.3.2.1). \r Resilience planning aims to bring together integrated, systemic views \r and enable joined-up planning at the city level (as well as lower scales) \r (Section  6.3.2.1). There is however a lack of long-term studies that \r assess the climate change impacts on urban form, including informal \r settlements (Bai et  al., 2018; Ramyar, Zarghami and Bryant, 2019), \r leading to impact assessments that often overlook urban form (Ramyar, \r [...]"


id: 4ba7abe7e80f0f6083c76d6c876a9e3e
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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content:
"[...] Zarghami and Bryant, 2019). Additionally, context-specific spatial tools \r and community based approaches lack a precise connection to urban \r morphology. For example, there is a need for further studies that \r connect solar radiation, urban morphology (e.g., aspect and plot ratio), \r and the urban heat island spatio-temporal variability (Giridharan and \r Emmanuel, 2018; Li et al., 2019c)."


id: 2c2f04672140e22bf4bd87e73fe6256e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
content_type: text
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vector_id: 5032
content:
"Globally, it is estimated that as much as USD 94 trillion of investment \r is required between 2016 and 2040 to replace, upgrade and extend \r the world's physical infrastructure (Oxford Economics, 2017), much \r of which is ageing and will require replacement. Given the typical \r lifespan of infrastructure, this is both an opportunity and an imperative \r to ensure this investment is low carbon and resilient to climate change \r risks (Grafakos et  al., 2020). 'Grey' or physical infrastructure is a \r priority for adaptation because its performance is sensitive to climate \r (particularly extreme events) and decisions on design and renovation \r have long-lasting implications and are hard to reverse (Urge-Vorsatz\r et al., 2018). Avoiding longer-term impacts on society, the economy \r and the environment will require future investment and retrofitting \r of existing infrastructure, to be undertaken in the context of the risks \r [...]"


id: 2a65eddc88d54d98d141b353afdbfd61
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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"[...] of climate change (Dawson et  al., 2018; Rosenzweig et  al., 2018b). \r However, evidence from Africa shows that the benefits of pro-active \r adaptation measures and policies for infrastructure can result in net \r savings depending on the country context (Section 9.8.5)."


id: 31c2c2f304ae0bf323a23231c82d81ac
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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vector_id: 6001
content:
"Several tools and models have emerged in response to \r recommendations from AR5, including models that assess the impacts \r of urban heat island (Ramyar, Zarghami and Bryant, 2019), climatic \r uncertainty (Dhar and Khirfan, 2017), flood vulnerability (Abebe, Kabir \r and Tesfamariam, 2018) and inundation (Barau et al., 2015; Ford et al., \r 2019). For example, findings from Kano, Nigeria, reveal that a lack of \r distribution of certain urban morphological features, including open \r spaces and streets (both pervious and impervious), roof and building \r materials (e.g., concrete and metallic) and urban ecological features \r (e.g., urban ponds and ecological basin), exacerbates inundations \r and their associated impacts (Barau et al., 2015). Also, findings about \r the urban forms of coastal settlements, particularly in small islands, \r reveal that they often experience severe beach erosion due to wave \r action, sea level rise and storm surge that leads to landward retreat \r [...]"


id: 5076262690ad8c52dfd7dce38c6ad93d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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content:
"[...] of coastline which threatens their social and economic activities (Dhar \r and Khirfan, 2016; Lane et  al., 2015; Khirfan and El-Shayeb, 2019). \r Despite these examples, very limited research is available to offer \r assessments of different urban scale morphologies and urban scale \r adaptation planning, including planning adaptation across supply \r chains and networked relationships with distant urban and rural \r places connected through trade and resource (financial, human and \r material) or waste flows."


id: c8e11d93306adcff58d8a45a0269397
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32668
content:
"Engineered measures for hazard mitigation such as seawalls, slope \r revetments and river levees, as well as air conditioning are increasingly \r implemented in urban centres, but many engineering interventions are \r less affordable and accessible in LMICs because of high construction \r and maintenance costs. These adaptive measures can also counter \r mitigation objectives because of reliance on climate-polluting energy \r sources. Despite this, engineering measures such as seawalls for \r tsunami protection and cooling areas in cities provide critical hazard \r reduction functions in urban contexts (Depietri and McPhearson, \r 2017). As Pelling et  al. (2018) highlight, sustainable risk reduction \r can be better achieved where these engineering measures include the \r at-risk poor majority and inclusive planning to support pro-poor risk \r reduction. Inclusive design and management of physical infrastructure \r can enhance contributions to climate resilient development (Table 6.6 \r [...]"


id: aa8c3be006508d3905f419a43cf93394
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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content:
"[...] and Supplementary Material). This section covers urban morphology \r and built form, building design, information and communication \r technology, energy, transport, water and sanitation, and coastal \r management. All these domains of physical infrastructure will require \r adaptation to cope with a changing climate; many of them can also \r contribute to broader adaptation for cities and settlements."


id: 801764ee26c87f121cf34cb827f9c578
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content:
"and Kershaw, 2017), although these effects are now well studied and \r newer performance standards should account for ageing and soiling \r effects on reflectivity (Paolini et al., 2014). Ageing of 'cool pavements' \r is more complex, which makes their long-term performance less reliable \r to predict (Lontorfos, Efthymiou and Santamouris, 2018). The cooling \r performance of green roofs is highly variable and depends on the \r actual water content of the green roof substrate, with dry vegetation \r performing poorly in terms of cooling (Parison et  al., 2020b). This \r holds true for regular vegetation and NBS in general (Daniel, Lemonsu \r and Viguie, 2018). For all built environment adaptations, changes are \r locked-in for a long time, and are likely to be expensive so that care is \r needed to avoid potential negative impacts on social equity (Cabrera \r and Najarian, 2015; Romero-Lankao et  al., 2018; Fried et  al., 2020; \r [...]"


id: aaae9d173d16f287c4f3ff5715bb94a6
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vector_id: 27250
content:
"[...] Rode et al., 2017) and carbon-intensive construction (Bai et al., 2018; \r Seto et al., 2016)."


id: fe5b00fc2762dc993c314ec78b6af086
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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content:
"Architectural and urban design regulations at the single-building \r scale (building codes and guidelines) facilitate climate responsive \r buildings that adapt to a changing climate and have the potential to \r collectively change user behaviour during extreme weather events \r (Osman and Sevinc, 2019). They include buildings that are adaptive \r to ensure user comfort during extremes of hot and cold as well \r as to floods (e.g., building on stilts and amphibian architecture). \r Changes to design standards can scale quickly and widely, but \r retrofit of existing buildings is expensive, so care must be taken to \r avoid potential negative impacts on social equity (Schunemann et al., \r 2020; Matopoulos, Kovacs and Hayes, 2014; Ajibade and McBean, \r 2014; Bastidas-Arteaga and Stewart, 2019). Buildings can be adapted \r to the negative consequences of climate change by altering their \r characteristics, for example increasing the insulation values (e.g., van \r [...]"


id: e177509402415774b913ed095ab01a9e
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content:
"[...] Hooff et al., 2014; Makantasi and Mavrogianni, 2016; Fisk, 2015; Fosas\r et al., 2018; Barbosa, Vicente and Santos, 2015; Invidiata and Ghisi, \r 2016; Perez-Andreu et al., 2018; Taylor et al., 2018; Triana, Lamberts \r and Sassi, 2018), adding solar shading (e.g., van Hooff et al., 2014; \r Makantasi and Mavrogianni, 2016; Barbosa, Vicente and Santos, 2015; \r Invidiata and Ghisi, 2016; Perez-Andreu et al., 2018; Taylor et al., 2018; \r Triana, Lamberts and Sassi, 2018; Dodoo and Gustavsson, 2016; Osman \r and Sevinc, 2019), increasing natural ventilation, preferably during the \r night (e.g., van Hooff et al., 2014; Makantasi and Mavrogianni, 2016; \r Perez-Andreu et al., 2018; Triana, Lamberts and Sassi, 2018; Dodoo and \r Gustavsson, 2016; Osman and Sevinc, 2019; Mulville and Stravoravdis, \r 2016; Cellura et al., 2017; Fosas et al., 2018; Dino and Meral Akgul, \r 2019), solar orientation of bedroom windows (Schuster et al., 2017), \r [...]"


id: 62f6e320f2f68880a96ff4537dcd3f18
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14709
content:
"[...] applying high-albedo materials for the building envelope (van Hooff\r et al., 2014; Invidiata and Ghisi, 2016; Baniassadi et al., 2018; Triana, \r Lamberts and Sassi, 2018), altering the thermal mass (van Hooff et al., \r 2014; Mulville and Stravoravdis, 2016; Din and Brotas, 2017), adding \r green roofs/facades to poorly insulated buildings (Geneletti and Zardo, \r 2016; Skelhorn, Lindley and Levermore, 2014; van Hooff et al., 2014; \r de Munck et  al., 2018; Feitosa and Wilkinson, 2018) and for water \r harvesting (Sepehri et al., 2018).\r In general, the most promising adaptation measures are a combination \r of solar shading with increased levels of insulation and ample \r possibilities to apply natural ventilation to cool down a building (e.g., "


id: 4b4086024de7c2c2109af9647f34a93f
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content:
"In addition, wind towers, solar chimneys and air vents are features that \r facilitate cool air circulation within buildings while dissipating heat \r (Bhamare, Rathod and Banerjee, 2019). These features may be arranged \r to address hotspots or highly frequented spaces within buildings. \r Similar to NBS, the effectiveness of passive cooling to ameliorate \r the urban heat island varies widely depending on the location of \r the sun, wind direction and the type of strategy used. For instance, \r natural ventilation strategies (e.g., wind towers, solar chimneys, etc.) \r have shown temperature reductions of up to 14degC (Bhamare, Rathod \r and Banerjee, 2019; Calautit and Hughes, 2016; Rabani et al., 2014). \r Shading strategies alone can reduce indoor temperatures by 3degC, \r while heat sinks (in which heat is directed at a medium such as water) \r may result in indoor temperatures up to 6degC lower than the outdoor \r temperature (Oropeza-Perez and Ostergaard, 2018). More systemic \r [...]"


id: 1eee473c4de080ecad0d80b706b18139
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content:
"[...] interventions, such as altering urban form through urban planning, \r can mitigate the urban heat island across suburbs and cities (Lee and \r Levermore, 2019; Takkanon and Chantarangul, 2019; Yin et al., 2018; \r Liang and Keener, 2015; Emmanuel and Steemers, 2018). Experience in \r Kano (Nigeria) has shown that incorporating Indigenous knowledge \r into building design and urban planning can increase resilience to heat \r and flood risks (Barau et al., 2015). A review by Lemi (2019) suggests \r that traditional ecological knowledge can provide wider climate \r change adaptation benefits."


id: ea8e2bc72fb9f0a8ca621175fdf111f1
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"Information and communication technologies (ICTs) are deeply \r intertwined with the functioning of urban and infrastructure systems, \r and are at the core of the 'smart city' concept (Angelidou, 2015). ICT \r is more flexible than other physical infrastructure, although as other \r sectors are increasingly reliant on ICT, it is creating new climate-related \r failure mechanisms (Norman, 2018; Maki et al., 2019). ICT assets and \r networks in urban, national and international communications systems \r will need to be strengthened to enable ICT infrastructure to better cope \r with climate change, and to enable ICT infrastructure to support the \r resilience of cities, settlements and other infrastructure. The increased \r pervasiveness of ICT in smart cities, smart infrastructure and day-to-day \r living, will evidently have long-term implications for exposure to \r climate change risks and how cities manage those risks (Norman, 2018; \r [...]"


id: 4a25caa6121ced3ee3e4cacc2d7fbed
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"[...] Maki et  al., 2019). For example, even if the ICT network is resilient \r to heatwaves, it is dependent on the electricity network to power it. \r Conversely, other networks are dependent upon ICT for control systems, \r for example smart grids for energy. There is limited information on how \r these interdependencies, and associated risks, will evolve."


id: 4080faf828adfcf711e1e50a4ce10f1c
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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content:
"Although networked like many other infrastructure systems, ICT \r components have some distinctive properties. They are relatively \r cheap, and the advent of wireless communications has enabled ICT \r to have the widest reach of all infrastructures. Components can be \r rapidly deployed or repaired, and generally ICT networks are therefore \r built with inherent redundancy and flexibility (Sakano et  al., 2016). \r Components have a wide range of expected lifetimes which leads \r to faster cycles of innovation. There is therefore greater potential to \r accelerate uptake of climate resilience in this infrastructure sector, but \r conversely, this can increase waste and (energy intensive) resource \r consumption. For example, mobile phones and computers may last as \r little as a year, cables and switching units may be moved and upgraded \r to improve bandwidth every few years, poles and masts are typically \r designed to last several decades, whilst exchanges and other critical \r [...]"


id: c9d50e54cceffa7c78dab796fc8ce8c7
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content:
"Several options are available to reduce the impacts of reduced \r cooling water for thermoelectric power generation, increases in water \r temperature and lower flows for hydropower generation. These include \r (i) switching from freshwater to seawater (if available) or air cooling; \r (ii) replacing once-through cooling systems with recirculation systems; \r (iii) replacing fuel sources for thermoelectric power generation; (iv) \r increasing the efficiency of hydro and thermoelectric power plants; (v) \r relaxing discharge temperature rules to allow warmer water to enter \r rivers; (vi) installation of screens to stop algae or jellyfish blooms clogging \r intakes; (vii) reducing power production and managing demand; and \r (viii) changing reservoir operation rules (where available). Shreshta \r et al. (2021) show that changing reservoir operation rules can offset \r reduced water availability under RCP8.5 until 2050, but is insufficient \r [...]"


id: 4bf710abce47311bccb936e66d728a1e
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content:
"[...] by the 2080s. van Vliet et al., (2016) showed that a 10% increase in \r hydroelectric generation efficiency can compensate for reduced water \r availability in most regions. Higher efficiency thermoelectric plans \r offset impacts under lower climate change scenarios but are shown \r to be inadequate under RCP8.5 by the 2080s; whereas a switch \r to seawater and dry (air) cooling provides a net increase under this \r scenario. However, these technologies can increase costs. Increasing \r the temperature of water discharged from the power station can have \r negative environmental impacts (Thome et al., 2016; Yang et al., 2015)."


id: f6cfdb419d303dd191ee47620cb429de
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"A wide range of adaptation options are available for transport \r infrastructure and most provide a good benefit cost ratio (Doll, Klug \r and Enei, 2014; Forzieri et  al., 2018). Options include upgrading \r infrastructure (which can often be achieved autonomously as part \r of standard repair and replacement schedules) and strengthening \r or relocating (critical) assets. Adaptation of road and rail networks \r in Australasia includes re-routing, coastal protection, improved \r drainage and upgrading of rails (Table 11.7.) In areas with substantial \r infrastructure deficits, such as much of Africa, investments in public \r transport and transit-oriented development are highlighted as desired \r mitigation-adaptation interventions within cities of South Africa, \r Ethiopia and Burkina Faso (Section  9.8.5.3). Adapting low carbon \r transport infrastructure will be crucial to ensure resilience to climate \r change impacts whilst simultaneously delivering mitigation goals \r [...]"


id: e92c1f1250e999a89d424c38f4f34a0d
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content:
"New technologies and design innovations can improve the resilience \r of cars, trains, boats and other vehicles to cope with more extreme \r weather. Mobility transitions have the potential to improve mobility \r and accessibility, to influence urban form and to reduce vehicular \r use (and thereby infrastructure degradation), vehicle miles travelled \r and vehicle-based emissions (Sperling, Pike and Chase, 2018). For \r example, use of electric vehicles, hydrogen vehicles and greater uptake \r of public transport and other vehicles that reduce exhaust head \r emissions reduces the urban heat island (Kolbe, 2019). Carsharing \r can reduce carbon emissions by over 50% (Shaheen, Martin and \r Hoffman-Stapleton, 2019). Ride hailing, matching non-professional \r drivers of private vehicles with paying passengers, positively impacts \r low-income, low-car ownership households in Los Angeles (Brown, \r 2018), and fills market gaps in cities where public transit infrastructure \r [...]"


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vector_id: 817
content:
"[...] is inadequate, unreliable or unsafe (Suatmadi, Creutzig and Otto, 2019; \r Vanderschuren and Baufeldt, 2018), but can also create a precarious \r and insecure job market that impacts well-being (Fleming, 2017). \r Whether the resulting impacts are positive or negative, largely depends \r on local, national and international policy and practices."


id: b03814b6b138046b03101d96ab68819a
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vector_id: 28239
content:
"Prevention or attenuation solutions include: rooftop detention, \r reservoirs, bioretention, permeable paving, infiltration techniques, \r open drainage, floating structures, wet-proofing, raised structures, \r coastal defences, barriers and levees, and have been deployed in \r diverse configurations and environments around the world (Matos \r Silva and Costa, 2016). Barcelona (Spain) reached 90% impermeable \r surface cover by the 1980s, and has recently begun implementing \r artificial detention, underground reservoirs and permeable pavement \r technologies (Favaro and Chelleri, 2018; Matos Silva and Costa, 2016). \r Florida Power and Light (USA), which provides service to approximately \r 10 million people, is investing USD 3 billion in flood protection and \r the hardening of assets (for example, upgrading wooden poles to \r steel and concrete) (Brody, Rogers and Siccardo, 2019). The City of \r Seattle recommends increasing preventative maintenance activities, \r [...]"


id: ca9c9c36f717ddc724ee0df380904420
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vector_id: 32987
content:
"[...] the regular review of appropriate pavement technologies and \r modifications to subgrades and drainage facilities for high-risk areas \r (City of Seattle, 2017), whilst also providing benefits to transport \r disruption (Arrighi et al., 2019). Adaptation in African cities is often \r dominated by informal responses (Owusu-Daaku and Diko, 2018). In \r the absence of centralised responses, low-income residents in Nairobi \r (Kenya) dig trenches and construct temporary dikes to protect homes, \r and in Accra (Ghana) the community has developed a range of social \r responses, including communal drains and local evacuation teams, to \r help protect people and critical valuables, although these innovations \r require connection to city-wide infrastructure to effectively reduce \r widespread risk (Amoako, 2018)."


id: dd51ec4775e2dcad529e0e61b51f868e
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content:
"In contrast to a 'fail-safe' approach to design which emphasises \r strengthening infrastructure against more intense environmental \r conditions, 'safe-to-fail' flood strategies allow infrastructure to fail in \r its ability to carry out its primary function but control the consequences \r of the failure. Examples include the use of a bioretention basin in \r Scottsdale (Arizona, USA) to accommodate excess runoff and help \r drain the city; a subsidy for affected farmers for lost crop production \r as part of the Netherlands' Room for the River programme; targeted \r destruction of a levee to control flooding in the Mississippi River Valley \r in 2011 (Kim et al., 2019). Water-sensitive urban design, low-impact \r development, sponge cities, sustainable urban drainage and natural \r flood management involve deployment of systems and practices \r that use or mimic natural processes that result in the infiltration, \r evapotranspiration or use of stormwater to protect water quality and \r [...]"


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"[...] associated aquatic habitat. These are being designed and implemented \r at increasingly ambitious scales. For example, China's Sponge City "


id: 6d9d6ad747355000b35801cb09928ec5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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"Questions of equity and justice influence adaptation pathways for \r cities, settlements and infrastructure (see also Chapter 8). Although \r infrastructure, ranging from social to ecological and physical to \r digital, can help to reduce the impacts of climate change (Stewart \r and Deng, 2014; Baro Porras et al., 2021), there is limited evidence of \r how infrastructures, implemented to reduce climate risk, also reduce \r inequality. Rather, there is more evidence to suggest that both adaptation \r plans and associated infrastructure implementation pathways are \r increasing inequality in cities and settlements (Chu, Anguelovski and \r Carmin, 2016; Anguelovski et  al., 2016; Romero-Lankao and Gnatz, \r 2019). Social, economic and cultural structures that marginalise \r people by race, class, ethnicity and gender all contribute in complex \r ways to climate injustices and need to be urgently addressed for \r adaptation options to shift to benefit those most vulnerable, rather \r [...]"


id: b4c5da6a717b714e5a2cd464cbb9fbb7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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"[...] than mainly benefitting the already privileged and maintaining the \r status quo (Thomas et al., 2019; Porter et al., 2020; Ranganathan and \r Bratman, 2019). Innovation and imagination are needed in adaptation \r responses to ensure that cities and settlements shift from perpetuating \r structural domination and inequality to fairer cities (Porter et  al., \r 2020; Henrique and Tschakert, 2019; Parnell, 2016b). To support these \r possibilities, this section explores adaptation through the lens of \r distributive and procedural justice. Although not expanded on here, \r spatial and recognition injustices are equally important (Fisher, 2015; \r Chu and Michael, 2018; Campello Torres et  al., 2020). Recognition \r can be supported through a capabilities approach that helps to bring \r attention to past cultural domination and enable citizens to develop \r the functioning life they choose (Schlosberg, Collins and Niemeyer, \r [...]"


id: 7dae1c22068ebd6066f9fbd796c74684
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"[...] 2017). This brings a focus on local action, emphasising the relevance \r to vulnerability reduction and resilience building of individual and \r local/community capacities and supporting structures. This blurs \r the distinction between climate change adaptation and community \r development, with the former firmly embedded in the latter. Struggles \r for recognition are deeply political and central to adaptation responses \r which requires increased focus on power to support more equitable \r and just adaptation (Nightingale, 2017). Justice questions are not \r static, Box  6.4 overviews the implications of COVID-19 for urban \r justice and vulnerability."


id: 319fce3057c37b67f4b8b9a0912d752c
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"Physical infrastructure can provide substantial benefits, be constructed \r quickly and has enabled coastal cities and settlements around the \r world to flourish and grow. Multifunctional physical infrastructure \r can also provide economic and social co-benefits. These include \r integration of transport, recreation, agriculture (e.g., cattle pasture), \r founding for wind turbines, housing, office or industry into the coastal \r management infrastructure (Anvarifar et al., 2017; Kothuis and Kok, \r 2017). However, physical infrastructures can also disrupt natural \r processes, often leading to undesirable impacts such as pollution, \r degradation of ecosystems and displacement of erosion and flood \r risk to other locations (Wang et al., 2018b; Dawson, 2015; Nicholls, \r Dawson and Day, 2015). Coastal management strategies that take \r a hybrid approach, integrating physical and natural infrastructure, \r provide the best opportunities for managing risk and achieving wider \r [...]"


id: 2eafe9e35e4ff1f015f6a07504fb9505
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"[...] socioeconomic and environmental benefits (Depietri and McPhearson, \r 2017; Morris et al., 2018; Schoonees et al., 2019; Powell et al., 2019)."


id: c108963fbd2d9abc10831c4bbf59a82b
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"COVID-19 impacts have highlighted the depth and unevenness of systemic social vulnerability and the compounding characteristics of \r contemporary development models, with direct relevance to climate change risk accumulation and its reduction (Patel et al., 2020b; \r Manzanedo and Manning, 2020; Bahadur and Dodman, 2020). This is plain at the global level: of the estimated 119-124 million additional \r people induced into poverty by COVID-19 in 2020, South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa each contribute two-fifths (Lakner et al., 2021). \r These are rapidly urbanising and highly climate-hazard-exposed world regions, indicating COVID-19 impacts may further concentrate \r risk in these regions. Within cities, COVID-19 and climate change risk and loss is concurrent by gender, race and income or livelihood, \r for example, when vulnerable elderly populations are simultaneously exposed to COVID-19 and heatwave risk. Globally, in 2020, about \r [...]"


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"[...] 431.7 million vulnerable people were exposed to extreme heat during the COVID-19 pandemic, including about 75.5 million during the \r July and August 2020 European heatwave, with an excess mortality of over 9000 people arising from heat exposure (Walton and van \r Aalst, 2020)."


id: f588184521b38ce0016be358830852ff
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"The pandemic has demonstrated the multiple, often reinforcing, ways in which specific drivers of vulnerability interact both in generating \r urban risk and shaping who is more or less able to recover (Phillips et al., 2020; Honey-Roses et al., 2020) (see Section 6.2). Again, this \r is not a new lesson for urban climate change adaptation, but it is a lesson that has not yet been seen to enter into routine practice for \r urban adaptation. Two key challenges for climate change adaptation are the associations between COVID-19 risk and urban connectivity \r and overcrowding. Connectivity has been presented in urban adaptation policy as a virtue, a means to share risk and diversity inputs (Ge\r et al., 2019; Kim and Bostwick, 2020), COVID-19 has surfaced the unevenness with which people and places are connected and also the \r need to balance connectivity against risk transfer, through the failure of food supply chains or remittance flows, as well as by the direct \r [...]"


id: a76ffb7939efea8b788ff53fa0ade9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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"[...] transfer of disease (Challinor et al., 2018). High-density living has advantages for urban resource efficiency including benefiting climate \r change mitigation. When high-density living is not supported by adequate access to critical infrastructure (sufficient internal living space, \r access to potable water and sanitation, access to open green space), this exacerbates overcrowding and generates vulnerability to \r multiple risks, including climate change hazards and communicable disease (Bamweyana et al., 2020; Hamidi, Sabouri and Ewing, 2020; \r Peters, 2020; Satterthwaite et al., 2020). Where overcrowding coincides with precarious livelihoods, for example in informal settlements, \r risk is further elevated (Wilkinson, 2020). Neighbourhood associations (a benefit of high-density living) have been an important source \r of resilience through providing trusted information, access to food and water for washing during the pandemic and serving populations \r [...]"


id: 74ff6b716d860f25e3bac10a7fd133f
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"[...] unable to access government or market provision (Pelling et al., 2021). Here local organising has not only met gaps in service provision, \r but opened dialogue to vision and organise for alternative development futures. These distinctly urban challenges should be read as a \r sub-set of wider cross-cutting lessons for recovery from COVID-19 (see Cross-Chapter Box COVID in Chapter 7)."


id: ad7535a33fe6d6ce2d4d128bb9ed1b32
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"Procedural justice, which focuses on the institutional processes by \r which adaptation decisions are made, brings attention to the lack \r of opportunity for engaging in political decision making and limited \r representation of diverse voices in cities and settlements, and in \r relation to investment in infrastructure (Coates and Nygren, 2020; \r Henrique and Tschakert, 2019). Even when inclusive adaptation \r processes are run, they seldom produce procedurally just outcomes \r (Malloy and Ashcraft, 2020). Understanding who is excluded and \r included is important (Sara, Pfeffer and Baud, 2017). One example \r is the increasing numbers of migrants who are confronted with lack \r of access to citizenship rights and housing tenure (Romero-Lankao \r and Norton, 2018). Often, migrants are not allowed to formally claim \r public provisions in health, finance and shelter (Chu and Michael, \r 2018). Further, migrants and their settlements are likely unrecognised \r [...]"


id: eca0890a363af03ebfdbeb99bcc4aabe
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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"[...] in spatial or infrastructure development plans. In this context, social \r infrastructure, zoning and land use planning for climate adaptation \r has triggered inequity through omission, as some planning process \r have been racialised and excluded groups such as migrants and ethnic \r minorities (Anguelovski et al., 2016). Urban adaptation policy-making \r processes that explicitly integrate multiple stakeholder interests can \r help to balance top-down solutions (Reckien et al., 2018a)."


id: a78656f85ea4972b6d1ecb3a2d294af9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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"The delivery of climate change action has revealed numerous \r co-benefits between adaptation and mitigation, around diverse areas \r such as implementing NBS and delivering health and development \r benefits (Urge-Vorsatz et  al., 2014; Suckall, Stringer and Tompkins, \r 2015; Puppim de Oliveira and Doll, 2016; Spencer et  al., 2017). \r There has been a strong interest in delivering development benefits \r alongside climate mitigation, thus benefiting the overall infrastructure \r base (Suckall, Stringer and Tompkins, 2015). Some of these co-benefits \r have also emerged in experiences of urban planning, pointing toward \r the dilemma of separating adaptation and mitigation in a context in \r which integration, rather than an analytical differentiation, was seen \r as being required to transcend work in silos (Aylett, 2015). Because \r urban planning needs to carefully consider long time scales, the \r neat separation between mitigation and adaptation runs counter to \r [...]"


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"[...] integrated forms of planning that can consider scales (time and space) \r carefully and that are aimed to deliver the sustainable city as a whole \r (Solecki et al., 2015; Grafakos et al., 2020)."


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"Identifying who is least able to adapt to climate risks sufficiently \r is important (Thomas et  al., 2019). Some people may have few \r opportunities to relocate away from flooded areas in the long term \r or to evacuate in the short term. It is also harder for many from \r low-income areas to rebuild after an extreme event. Lack of housing \r tenure and sub-standard housing has been shown to limit the ability \r of residents to improve and manage their landscapes and therefore \r it is hard for them to enhance energy efficiency (Dempsey et  al., \r 2011). Access to information is critical for adapting to climate risk \r and reducing vulnerability to hazards, yet access to this information is \r often not equally available (Ma et al., 2014). For example, low literacy \r can hamper ability to respond to early warning information (Dugan\r et  al., 2011). In other instances, racial violence has surfaced during \r disasters, with Black victims' lives being seen as less important than \r [...]"


id: 1e2d2e4b8d830cbfe094bf8083c814ee
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"possibility of achieving such triple wins remains scarce (Tompkins\r et  al., 2013; Sharifi, 2020), emerging examples show important \r developments. For example, establishing safe and convenient walking \r and cycling infrastructure can lead to improvements in population \r health, thereby highlighting the close interaction between urban land \r use, infrastructure and population health (Schuster et al., 2017), while \r clean cooking has the potential to deliver positive health outcomes \r alongside improvements in air quality and emissions reductions and \r through reducing pressure on woodland as a fuel source for expanding \r urban populations (Msoffe, 2017). Furthermore, active transport \r infrastructure reduces air pollution and related health risks, and helps \r to mitigate further climate change (Schuster et al., 2017). These are \r supported by city networks such as the C40 Clean Air Cities Declaration \r and the Clean Air Coalition that complements WHO guidelines \r [...]"


id: da996848eea45efc20f55c7f0244ba80
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"[...] and standards, for example through the Breathe Life Campaign. In \r conclusion, in both urban environments and infrastructural sectors, \r triple wins are only realisable through broader perspectives that \r link climate compatible development to institutional change or the \r achievements of wider welfare objectives such as those enshrined in \r the United Nations 2030 Agenda of Development (Castan Broto et al., \r 2015; England et al., 2018) (medium evidence, high agreement)."


id: d7df8621c390b288a30673ad57df19de
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"The aspiration to deliver climate change action within a broader \r agenda of transformative change, introduced in the SREX report, \r received renewed attention after the publication of IPCC Special \r Report on Global Warming of 1.5degC, which argues for a focus on \r urban transformations and highlighted that informal settlements \r were vital for understanding the delivery of these transformations. \r Deep decarbonisation has emerged as a new idea that regards the \r development of low or zero carbon pathways as a condition for good \r adaptation in the long term. Decarbonisation becomes urgent in \r the face of growing impacts attributable to climate change (Ribera\r et al., 2015; Bataille et al., 2016; Wesseling et al., 2017). Urbanisation \r opens opportunities for deep mitigation in low-impact developments, \r and hence, it is imperative to understand the implications of those \r opportunities for climate action (Mulugetta and Broto, 2018). These \r [...]"


id: aaa7c39818de053a6717e760a79f8829
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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"[...] gains are not limited to urban areas. The reliance on connected urban-\r rural systems for water, food and fuel has led to city government and \r urban-based businesses supporting landscape adaptations in rural \r hinterlands with strong potential for mitigation and rural development \r co-benefits. Water Funds bring downstream urban public and private \r finance to support upstream rural residents to make land use and \r agricultural management decisions to avoid damaging runoff, soil \r erosion and downstream sedimentation with reduction in water quality \r and increased flood risk. There are more than 30 Water Funds in Latin \r America and sub-Saharan Africa. These operate at landscape scale; \r the Upper Tana-Nairobi Water Fund, Kenya (Vogl et al., 2017), planned \r for a USD 10  million investment in Water Fund-led conservation \r interventions, with a projected return of USD 21.5 million in economic \r benefits over a 30-year timeframe (Apse and Bryant, 2015). However, \r [...]"


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"[...] these investments do not occur where communities lack funding or \r the institutions to direct funding from downstream beneficiaries to \r upstream residents (Brauman et al., 2019)."


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"Adaptation in urban areas and settlements can be incremental (when \r it addresses the causes of problems but without fundamentally \r changing the social and political structures that drive it, for example \r through planning or new regulations), reformist (when it changes the \r features that cause problems but without fundamentally changing the \r structures) or transformative (when it addresses fundamental systems \r attributes and outcomes such as reducing inequality in political and \r socioeconomic structures or enhancing well-being [Mendizabal et al., \r 2018; Rosenzweig and Solecki, 2018] which change the situation \r completely) (Heikkinen, Yla-Anttila and Juhola, 2019; Roberts and \r Pelling, 2020; O'Brien, Selboe and Hayward, 2018). In the context of \r the SGDs mission to leave-no-one behind, transformative adaptation \r addresses fundamental systems' functions to enable enhanced social \r justice and socio-ecological well-being. Incremental adaptation actions \r [...]"


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"[...] seek to maintain the essence and integrity of a system or process at \r a given scale (see Annex II: Glossary). Adaptation that seeks only to \r defend existing development status will not contribute to enhanced \r well-being and is not transformative, even if fundamental infrastructure \r engineering or legislative systems are changed to maintain the status \r quo in the face of increasing risk (Mendizabal et al., 2018)."


id: c85b6547525667d364994d9b2bf3b155
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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"City populations and non-state actors, together with local and \r regional governments, can play an essential role in creating enabling \r conditions for action, including, for example, civil society mobilising \r concerns of marginalised voices and future generations, as indicated \r in the worldwide student mobilisations against climate change (Wood, \r 2019; Maor, Tosun and Jordan, 2017; Cloutier, Papin and Bizier, 2018; \r Prendergast et al., 2021), which may then be prioritised by local and \r regional governments. National governments also play a crucial role, \r for example in facilitating resources and finance for urban adaptation \r actions, alongside financial organisations and the business sector (see \r Section 6.4.5). This section starts assessing adaptation experiences in \r cities, settlements and infrastructures since the AR5, before reviewing \r evidence of how to foster enabling conditions for adaptation through \r [...]"


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"Multi-level governance measures that support local governments \r can foster robust adaptation approaches and address risks and \r vulnerabilities across scales (high confidence) (Westman, Broto and \r Huang, 2019; Hardoy et al., 2014; Romero-Lankao and Hardoy, 2015). \r Effective action by local government requires national government's \r support (medium confidence). For example, Araos et  al. (2017) \r documents the case of Dhaka, Bangladesh, where a national plan \r prioritises measures for protecting coasts and agricultural production. \r In this context, the local government has minimal access to human and \r financial resources. Without national support, the local government \r struggles to coordinate action among different stakeholders. National \r urban adaptation directives can influence municipal governments' \r action and planning, but evidence suggests that national policy alone \r is not sufficient to deliver action on the ground without understanding \r [...]"


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"Flexible institutions that allow for both top-down and bottom-up action \r can bring capacities together from across levels of government and \r actors within a settlement (Sharifi and Yamagata, 2017). Predominant \r planning and capacity-building strategies, however, lack the flexibility \r to address the needs of a rapidly changing environment (Carter et al., \r 2015; Dhar and Khirfan, 2017; Juhola, 2016). Efforts to adapt to new \r challenges may have to speed up. This is especially true in urban areas \r and settlements with lower levels of development and experiencing \r rapid urbanisation, growing inequality and exposure to multiple \r hazards (Dulal, 2019; Grafakos et al., 2019; Solecki et al., 2018). Even \r within cities that share similar characteristics, there are considerable \r differences in the level of investment in adaptation (Georgeson et al., \r 2016). There is also a danger that uncoordinated actions for climate \r [...]"


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"[...] change mitigation and adaptation may constrain future adaptation \r opportunities or create maladaptation (Juhola et  al., 2016). The \r evidence emerging since the AR5 suggests that institutional change \r can be accelerated by closer collaboration between the diverse actors \r and deployment of the diverse approaches that can deliver adaptation."


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"The assessment of cases of local adaptation demonstrates that most \r urban adaptation is led by local governments (although the local \r government is also a heterogeneous category and local governance \r arrangements may vary across administrative and political contexts) \r (high confidence) (Amundsen et al., 2018; Lesnikowski et al., 2021). \r Local government reform at different levels can improve local \r adaptation, whether this is by strengthening specific teams or building \r cross-departmental linkages (high confidence) (Paterson et al., 2017; \r Shi, 2019; Wamsler and Raggers, 2018). Adaptation success often \r depends on having political champions driving the adaptation agenda \r alongside measures such as access to a knowledge base, resources at \r hand, political stability and the presence of dense social networks that \r can be supported through local government reform (Pasquini et al., \r 2015). Aligning adaptation objectives with other potential benefits \r [...]"


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"[...] of sustainable development also supports adaptation. Specifically, \r policies and plans that link adaptation to the objectives of Agenda "


id: 3992c706853c19f0d93d1c57ef2674bb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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"urbanising countries (Nagendra et  al., 2018). Business continuity \r describing private sector preparedness notes that firms underestimate \r the impacts of climate risks on their business models (Goldstein et al., \r 2019; Forino and von Meding, 2021; Korber and McNaughton, 2017; \r Crick et  al., 2018b). There is little research on how businesses can \r play a leading role in urban adaptation (Klein et al., 2018). A global \r assessment of the private sector's role in urban adaptation using \r data from 402 cities shows that most adaptation projects focus on \r the public sector and do not address private sector concerns or local \r people's participation (Klein et  al., 2018). Recorded private sector \r action is recognised through partnerships and participation (Peterson \r and Hughes, 2017; Hughes and Peterson, 2018). There are a few \r examples of studies of private sector-led adaptation action which \r adopts a national focus (Crick et al., 2018a; Crick et al., 2018b). This \r [...]"


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content:
"[...] lack of evidence contrasts with a well-developed body of literature on \r private sector-led mitigation (Averchenkova et al., 2016). "


id: 665f08f7c7c9f026710a6a1c6df38716
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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content:
"Community based adaptation includes a range of initiatives that put \r communities at the centre of planning for adaptation, often led by \r communities themselves (Reid, 2016). Community based adaptation is \r a comprehensive and effective strategy to deliver resilience at a human \r scale (Trogal et al., 2018; Greenwalt et al., 2020). Many community \r based responses to climate impacts represent coping strategies \r developed within households with a small effect on adaptation \r capacities beyond incremental improvements. Residents adopt private \r coping strategies to reduce exposure to and the impacts of heat, floods, \r flash floods, landslides, storms and diseases on their lives (Hambati \r and Yengoh, 2018). These coping strategies include the construction \r of physical protection against flooding, reforestation, the construction \r of terraces, flood diversion measures and interventions to protect \r houses (such as raised doorsteps or use of sandbags and adoption \r [...]"


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content:
"[...] of building techniques for making homes resilient to storms and \r landslides), ventilation of houses, urban agriculture and redefinition \r of daily practices and livelihoods (Navarro et al., 2020; Malabayabas \r and Baconguis, 2017; Apreda, 2016; de Andrade and Szlafsztein, 2020; \r Sahay, 2018; Bausch, Eakin and Lerner, 2018)."


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"Businesses have an essential role in urban adaptation actions, through \r the collective formulation of adaptation strategies, the provision \r of critical adaptive interventions and collaboration in partnerships. \r Businesses in the property sector, such as real estate developers, \r are on the frontline of climate change impacts but display differing \r attitudes toward climate adaptation. A study of property businesses \r in cities in Australia (Taylor et  al., 2012) showed that speeding up \r planning approval processes facilitated adaptation actions, and joint \r private-public decision-making was the preferred mode of governance \r for responding to climate concerns. Property businesses in cities in \r Sweden had a limited and reactive engagement in climate issues and \r resisted regulation (Storbjork et  al., 2018). Corporate, private sector \r interventions in urban risk reduction more broadly remain limited, with \r a mix of public and private responsibility for planning, implementing \r [...]"


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"[...] and maintaining adaptations in the built environment, and yet limited \r engagement of private sector actors in providing healthcare measures \r for heat prevention (medium confidence) (Mees, 2017)."


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"Individual coping strategies are generally ineffective in reducing \r extreme risks and they rarely address the underlying structural \r causes of vulnerability (high confidence) (Sahay, 2018; Rozer et  al., \r 2016; Jay et  al., 2021). Expending resources on private coping \r strategies in some cases may divert resources and capacity for wider \r community adaptation efforts (de Andrade and Szlafsztein, 2020). \r However, individual coping strategies can provide foundations for the \r implementation of collaborative action in communities, building on \r people's experiences, in ways which may have a longer-term, durable \r impact on developing resilience (high confidence) (McEwen et  al., \r 2018). Community based adaptation can be effective at different \r scales, whether this is to manage transboundary issues (Limthongsakul, \r Nitivattananon and Arifwidodo, 2017), support the replication of local \r solutions (Daniere et  al., 2016), increase the uptake of adaptation \r [...]"


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"[...] measures (Liang et al., 2017) or inform the design of more effective \r policies for resilience (Berquist, Daniere and Drummond, 2015; \r Odemerho, 2015). Community action may be mediated by NGOs or \r third sector organisations who play a coordinating or enabling role, \r particularly where other local government mechanisms are absent."


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"There is little published literature documenting the heterogeneity \r of business and the private sector's responses to climate impacts \r (Linnenluecke, Birt and Griffiths, 2015; Doh, Tashman and Benischke, \r 2019). Firms have varying abilities to introduce climate adaptation \r measures related to staff availability, levels of awareness, perceptions \r of responsibility and duration of contracts (short-term projects implies \r less interest in adaptation outcomes) (Shearer et al., 2016). The impact \r of COVID-19 has serious but uncertain implications for both access \r to finances for sustainable development by LMICs and sub-national \r governments, and the possibility of stimulating maladaptive \r infrastructure and policy responses (OECD, 2020; Sovacool, Del Rio and \r Griffiths, 2020). The response of businesses to disasters influences the \r resilience in the communities in which they operate (McKnight and \r Linnenluecke, 2016; Linnenluecke and McKnight, 2017). However, \r [...]"


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"[...] at the same time there is a growing literature that warns against \r the conflict interests that businesses may have in their adaptation \r strategies. For example, real estate responses to flooding have led to \r processes of climate gentrification, whereby lower income populations \r are displaced toward higher risk areas which stablishes racialised \r and class-based patterns of inequality of exposure to risk, with hard \r evidence rapidly growing specially in US cities (Keenan, Hill and \r Gumber, 2018a; Shokry, Connolly and Anguelovski, 2020; De Koning "


id: cb06cf182f0443af6ab3255548bdd101
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"Public-private partnerships are increasingly relevant for collaborative \r development of urban adaptation (Klein et  al., 2018). Partnerships \r can deliver infrastructure, coordinate policy and support learning. \r The main limitation of partnerships is scale, as partnership action is \r usually limited to discrete projects or objectives. Partnerships tend to \r be linked to reactive (rather than proactive) adaptation projects and \r the deviation of objectives away from adaptation concerns (Harman, \r Taylor and Lane, 2015). Partnerships can support capacity building in \r public and private organisations and facilitate networking efforts that \r extend beyond the private sector to communities and NGOs (Bauer \r and Steurer, 2014; Castan Broto et al., 2015). Public actors can benefit \r from the private sector's innovation and implementation capacity, \r and businesses can de-risk investments. Still, partnerships can also \r strengthen the ideologies of growth and managerialism within the \r [...]"


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"[...] operations of the local government (Taylor et al., 2012). Reconciling \r divergent norms and routines within public and private organisations \r remains one of the challenges to establishing successful public-private \r partnerships for adaptation (Lund, 2018). Administrative and political \r culture influences the nature of interactions between public and private \r sector actors in urban adaptation agendas (Bauer and Steurer, 2014), \r with negative consequences such as the imposition of vertical chains \r of commands on horizontal collaborations, and the need to formalise \r contractual relations (Klein and Juhola, 2018)."


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"Unnikrishnan et  al. (2018) have documented how the colonial and postcolonial history of water management in Bengaluru shapes \r the water infrastructure and provision systems today. Water access inequalities can be traced to the patterns of spatial development \r developed by colonial policies. Records from the sixth century onwards show how city rulers invested in an interconnected, community \r managed network of tanks and open wells, regularly recharged through harvested rainwater. The water system was changed at the \r end of the 18th century, as first the colonial state, then the post-independence government of Karnataka took responsibility for water \r management. Ideas of modernist planning influenced the development of new water infrastructure and piped networks, including the \r first piped infrastructure, bringing water from sources 30 km away, including the Hesaraghatta and then the TG Halli reservoirs. The old \r [...]"


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"[...] network of tanks gradually deteriorated as tanks became disused, polluted or built over. More prolonged and costly water transfers took \r place in the post-colonial period, delivering water from the Cauvery River in a massive engineering project with a high energetic cost and \r enmeshed in inter-state conflicts over water use (Castan Broto and Sudhira, 2019). Scarcity is still a problem in Bengaluru. The citizen \r response has been an activist movement to reclaim the city's tanks, accompanied by a plea to reconsider current water uses within the \r city, including actions to protect and rejuvenate water wells (Nagendra, 2016). Unnikrishnan et al. (2018) document different actions \r led by citizen-led collectives, including projects for lake rejuvenation, filtering technologies to treat sewage, recovering the value of lakes \r through a share of photos and art projects, and involvement of local knowledge in-tank restoration. Those efforts suggest an untapped \r [...]"


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"Since the late 1990s, transnational municipal networks (TMNs) have \r increased awareness of climate change and served as a bridge for cities \r to access critical financial resources from private and philanthropic \r sources (Rashidi and Patt, 2018; Funfgeld, 2015). Recently, TMNs \r have taken on more programmatic functions, working with cities \r to strategise, plan and incrementally improve their organisation \r functions in the face of climate change. For example, the Rockefeller \r Foundation's 100 Resilient Cities program (2014-2019) provided a \r two-year salary for a Chief Resilience Officer (CRO) to be situated in \r a municipal authority to bridge silos, incentivise change and develop \r development strategies for resilience (Bellinson and Chu, 2019; Spaans \r and Waterhout, 2017). In these cases, external actors have enabled \r broad organisation change, resource mobilisation pathways and \r alternative forms of agenda-setting in cities (Chu, 2018; Hakelberg, \r [...]"


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"Institutional change refers to processes that aim to shift existing \r norms and practices within organisations to deliver more effective \r action for adaptation. Institutional change at the local level can be \r achieved with diverse strategies (Patterson, de Voogt and Sapiains, \r 2019). Table  6.7 illustrates various instruments that enable the \r institutionalisation of climate adaptation concerns into policy and \r planning. As Table  6.7 shows, institutional change is often used as \r synonymous with mainstreaming. Both terms refer to the integration \r of climate adaptation concerns into other areas of work and as part of \r practical routines and arguments (Chu, Anguelovski and Carmin, 2016; \r Storbjork and Uggla, 2015; Runhaar et al., 2018; Uittenbroek et al., \r 2014). Early assessments understood mainstreaming as activities \r that integrate climate adaptation into long-range and sectoral plans \r (Anguelovski and Carmin, 2011; Aylett, 2015). Since then, efforts to \r [...]"


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"[...] mainstream climate adaptation have grown into agendas around \r the community and economic development (Ayers et  al., 2014), \r climate mitigation (Gopfert, Wamsler and Lang, 2019), spatial and \r infrastructure planning (Anguelovski, Chu and Carmin, 2014), urban \r finance (Musah-Surugu et  al., 2018; Keenan, Chu and Peterson, \r 2019), public health (Araos et al., 2015), environmental management \r (Wamsler, 2015; Kabisch et al., 2016) and multi-level decision making \r (Ojea, 2015; Visseren-Hamakers, 2015). Such efforts require various \r degrees of regulatory or programmatic action to integrate adaptation \r with other concerns (Wamsler and Pauleit, 2016). However, institutional \r change has a broader remit than mainstreaming adaptation, as it may \r include, for example, changing the organisations already dealing with \r climate adaptation and make them more effective including changes \r in inputs, procedures and options (Patterson, de Voogt and Sapiains, \r 2019)."


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"Cities can leverage input-driven institutional change even without \r national support for climate change adaptation or mitigation. For \r example, where cities have defined policymaking and budget raising \r powers, city level political leadership can support adaptation action \r going beyond national policy (Hamin, Gurran and Emlinger, 2014; \r Shi, Chu and Debats, 2015; Carlson and McCormick, 2015). Examples \r include the Surat Climate Change Trust in Surat, India (Chu, 2016) and \r Initiative for Urban Climate Change and Environment in Semarang, \r Indonesia (Taylor and Lassa, 2015). In Saint Louis, Senegal, support \r from national and state-level actors enabled local institutional change \r (Vedeld et  al., 2016). Processual levers may be also mobilised in \r situations of political instability (which disrupts patterns in champions \r and networks), clientelism (which can cause environmental projects \r to be discontinued) (Pasquini et al., 2015) or in contexts where there \r [...]"


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"[...] are high political and socioeconomic inequalities (Harris, Chu and \r Ziervogel, 2018; Chu, Anguelovski and Carmin, 2016)."


id: 5f49ba4a4d9758d8fa4dade66faecece
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"Output-driven institutional change is shaped by organisational \r products such as strategies, plans, policies and evaluative metrics \r (Patterson and Huitema, 2019; Bellinson and Chu, 2019) (See Table \r 6.8). There are numerous examples of institutional change through \r planning outcomes. For example, Manizales, Colombia has included \r climate adaptation into long-established environmental policy \r (Biomanizales) and a local environmental action plan (Bioplan), which \r follows on from a long coherent trajectory of climate change policy \r (Hardoy and Velasquez Barrero, 2014). A significant number of North \r American cities have integrated adaptation into long-range plans, \r while fewer cities integrate adaptation in sustainable development \r plans or sectoral plans (Aylett, 2015). Canadian cities are more likely \r to have a plan specifically focused on adaptation rather than having \r adaptation integrated into municipal long-range planning (Aylett, \r [...]"


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"[...] 2015). In the European Union, adaptation plans depended on national \r climate legislation or, in fewer cases, the influence of an international \r climate network (Reckien et  al., 2018b). A comparative report from \r the Covenant of Mayors, however, suggests that the adaptation pillar \r needs development to demonstrate the effectiveness of adaptation \r responses and their integration with mitigation goals (Bertoldi et al., \r 2020). Municipalities in Sweden have been called 'pre-reactive' because \r adequate strategic guidelines are in place to frame the accessibility, \r aesthetics and adaptability of waterfront developments (Storbjork and "


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"A policy action gap arises when administrative, communication, \r financial and other organisational blockages and inertia interrupt \r implementation of policy, the intent of political leadership and \r delivery of adaptation interventions on the ground (Ampaire et  al., \r 2017; Bell, 2018; Shi, 2019). Political and policy confidence are key \r enabling conditions for adaptation decision making. As the AR5 \r already acknowledged, political inaction can arise where there is low \r confidence that adaptation actions can deliver a safer future for all \r (Chan et al., 2015a). For example, in some administrative jurisdictions \r (most of them local governments), calls by social movements for \r the adoption of Climate Emergency Declarations were addressed, \r however, practical outcomes in terms of adaptation have been limited, \r and may have foreclosed other future local actions (Nissen et  al., \r 2020; Ruiz Campillo, Castan Broto and Westman, 2020) and raised \r [...]"


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"[...] concerns about maladaptation (Long and Rice, 2019). Political inaction \r for climate justice is particularly visible in contexts of informality \r (Ziervogel, 2020). Studies of city and local authority decision-making \r in South America (Di Giulio et  al., 2019), Asia (Araos et  al., 2017) \r and Europe (Lesnikowski et  al., 2021) indicate that where there is "


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"aligned with transformative efforts to address structural drivers of \r vulnerability (high confidence). For example, mainstream actions \r that seek to advance other development objectives, as explained \r above, may reduce adaptation to 'low-hanging fruits', which may \r maintain business-as-usual practices without any fundamental \r transformation of the social, institutional and economic systems that \r drive vulnerabilities (Aylett, 2014). However, as explained above, \r mainstreaming can also generate wider processes of institutional \r change (Section 6.4.2). Mainstream strategies may help to demonstrate \r how policy and frameworks can produce practical outcomes on the \r ground (Biesbroek and Delaney, 2020). However, previous experiences \r in other sectors, such as gender mainstreaming, have shown the \r limitations of the mainstreaming approach, particularly in terms of \r addressing the structural drivers of inequality and vulnerability, and \r [...]"


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"[...] in achieving justice for those who suffer most (Moser, 2017). Local \r governments in particular, can link mainstreaming efforts with specific \r strategies that support justice in adaptation, including redistribution \r efforts to address vulnerabilities (see Section  6.3.2), representation \r in local institution and deliberative processes, and recognition of the \r conditions for self-realisation, including personal and collective safety \r (Agyeman et al., 2016; Castan Broto and Westman, 2017; Castan Broto \r and Westman, 2019; Hess and McKane, 2021)."


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"Success in urban adaptation is most often understood as requiring \r measurable outcomes and evaluation (see also Section 6.4.6). However, \r many adaptation outcomes are not measurable (medium evidence,\r medium agreement) (Bene et  al., 2018). Adaptation action solely \r focused on action tends to ignore areas in the city for which there is no \r existing data even though actions in these areas may play an essential \r role in shaping resilience and its limits. Informal settlements and \r informal economies, which are integral in managing urban resources \r for effective climate adaptation, are not routinely included in formal \r urban and national monitoring(Guibrunet and Castan Broto, 2016). The \r resulting understanding and monitoring of city needs, capacities and \r actions that feed into policy is incomplete. The innovation, as well as \r particular concerns and capacities of the informal sector, which is often \r highly gendered, are not always measured (Brown and McGranahan, \r [...]"


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"[...] 2016). An emphasis on measurable adaptation outcomes may lead \r to prioritising techno-economic measures to adaptation at the local \r level. Technocratic approaches to environmental policy continue to \r shape local sustainability politics (Bulkeley, 2015). The deployment \r of such technocratic approaches at the local scale is detrimental for \r democratic and collaborative practices (Metzger and Lindblad, 2020). \r For example, while China has received praise in terms of delivering \r urban policies that put climate change at its core, thus suggesting its \r role providing leadership in climate change debates (Liu et al., 2014; \r Wang and He, 2015; Fu and Zhang, 2017), other analyses suggest that \r processes of planning should take greater account of certain groups \r and interests (Westman and Broto, 2018). Urban sustainability policy \r may, as a result, fail to deliver collaborative social and environmental \r objectives, and this is maladaptive in terms of CRD."


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"Coordination of adaptation policy goals cuts across cities to integrate \r them into international processes of climate policy formulation; \r coordination in cities produces effective collective outcomes, \r cementation of common standards and methodologies for climate \r action (e.g., emission inventories) (high agreement, medium evidence) \r (Gordon and Johnson, 2017; Hsu and Rauber, 2021). A collective \r global response has become a significant concern in international \r climate policy (Chan et al., 2015a). The UNFCCC has adopted a role as \r an orchestrator, including providing framework for city governments \r (Backstrand and Kuyper, 2017). Within cities, coordination can arise \r from active programming; for example, in Rotterdam and New York \r City, local authorities adopted long-term objectives and conditions for \r action, bringing together a multiplicity of actors across sectors to orient \r contributions, share knowledge and coordinate actions (Holscher\r [...]"


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"[...] et  al., 2019). Where national politics is supportive, coordination \r between city and national government is an asset (Chan and Amling, \r 2019; Inch, 2019). The use of social media and digital mechanisms for \r coordination with public interest is ambiguous: in China, Weibo has \r facilitated an expansion of public engagement, although it remains top \r down and dominated by a few influencial actors (Liu and Zhao, 2017; \r Yang and Stoddart, 2021). The pilot project #OurChangingClimate \r is one example of engaging youth with an understanding of their \r communities and their resilience or vulnerability to climate change \r (Napawan, Simpson and Snyder, 2017)."


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"Cooperative governance models provide insights for designing forms \r of participatory and collaborative planning through which communities \r and state actors can identify concrete actions and resources to improve \r services and mitigate structural vulnerabilities to disasters (Castan \r Broto et al., 2015). Experiences of co-production of sanitation services \r show how co-production may improve outcomes, while at the same \r time opening up avenues for grassroots organisations to claim political \r influence (McGranahan and Mitlin, 2016). Co-production may change \r institutions in response to external interventions (Das, 2016). Although \r there are drawbacks in terms of the extent to which co-production \r can be used to legitimise unfair interventions within a given context, \r co-production may also be a tool for improving the accountability of \r dominant groups to vulnerable sectors of the population (Nastiti et al., \r [...]"


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"[...] 2017). There are limitations to co-production. The city of Barcelona, \r Spain, used co-production methodologies to develop the Barcelona \r Climate Plan. However, policymakers and civil servants were reluctant \r to use lay knowledge from participants and political deadlines \r constrained the time dedicated to deliberation (Satorras et al., 2020)."


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"Since AR5, there has been a growing literature about the role of urban design, creating new opportunities for both incremental and \r transformative adaptive responses to climate change (medium evidence, high agreement). For example, some of these creative design \r approaches compliment and extend regulatory and land use planning approaches such as form-based codes and established certifications \r such as Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design-Neighbourhood Design (LEED-ND) (Garde, 2018; Garde and Hoff, 2017) and the \r USA's Sustainable Sites Initiative (SITES) (Valente, 2014). Emphasis on sufficiency has also influenced urban design, for example, with the \r mobilisation of 'doughnut' economics that emphasise both a social foundation and an environmental ceiling, for example Amsterdam \r (Raworth, 2017). However, such cases are rare, substantial public investment is often required (high confidence, high agreement) (see \r [...]"


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"[...] also Section  6.4.7 on finance and insurance). Other approaches underscore innovation and creativity, at the essence of which are \r context-specific interventions that draw on a compendium of urban design principles such as indeterminacy (to accommodate climate \r uncertainty), polyvalency and diversity, and harmony with nature (Dhar and Khirfan, 2017). Creative interventions include the daylighting \r of buried streams to create climate adaptive public realms (Khirfan et al., 2020; Khirfan, Mohtat and Peck, 2020). For example, the \r demolition of a major expressway and the restoration of the Cheonggyecheon Stream reorganised downtown Seoul, South Korea, and \r significantly contributed to climate change adaptation through stormwater management and reducing the urban heat island effect \r (Kim and Jung, 2019). Biomimicry and ecological infrastructure are design features that governance bodies can use to reshape space \r [...]"


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"[...] and contribute to place making (Santos Nouri and Costa, 2017; Prior et al., 2018). For example, urban metabolism and local ecological \r knowledge has constituted the essence of urban design interventions on the Island of Tobago in ways that capitalise on the contiguous \r relationship between ecosystems (e.g., the mangrove forest) and human actions (rainwater harvesting and grey water management) \r (Khirfan and Zhang, 2016). While lack of funding or design capacity, restrictive planning regulations, inequality and competing urban \r agendas can create barriers for the implementation of creative design solutions. Transition architecture movements are also driving local \r urban adaptation experiments and exploring ways local learning can be scaled up (Tubridy, 2020; Irwin, 2019)."


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content:
"to occur if people have the agency to influence decisions and enact \r change (Archer and Dodman, 2015). Cities are also more likely to build \r and develop infrastructure that serves the needs of disadvantaged \r groups when urban climate governance encourages wider community \r participation and inclusion (Ziervogel, 2019a; Holscher et  al., 2019; \r Anguelovski et al., 2016). This can help to stimulate innovation, shift \r power relations and address diverse needs (Martel and Sutherland, \r 2019; Chu, Schenk and Patterson, 2018). Experiments in including \r marginalised groups in adaptation planning are starting to emerge in \r places such as Quito (Ecuador), Lima (Peru), Manizales (Colombia) and \r Surat (India), where disadvantaged youth, informal settlers and other \r vulnerable communities are included in discussions of short-/long-term \r adaptation needs and fair distribution of adaptation resources (Chu, \r Anguelovski and Carmin, 2016; Sara, Pfeffer and Baud, 2017; Hardoy \r [...]"


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"[...] and Velasquez Barrero, 2014). These processes can also support \r citizens to manage risks as they encounter them in their everyday life \r (Ziervogel et al., 2017)."


id: d302e348105ec0eaf5cf3177213b4350
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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"The failure to deliver inclusive and sustainable adaptation contributes \r to a collective inability to mobilise the power of creative community \r vision (medium evidence, high agreement). Urban design plays a \r central role to support creative adaptation strategies (Box 6.7). Much \r adaptation action repeats previous experiences. However, the potential \r for building resilience to deliver adaptation, especially transformative \r adaptation, requires an articulation of collective visions of the future \r and the imagination of new or alternative urban futures (Glaas et al., \r 2018), including through design and deliberate engagement with \r cultural artefacts, technologies and performances (Jordan, 2020). Social \r movements can be powerful sources of such alternative visions of the \r future, as exemplified by recent Youth Climate Strikes and Extinction \r Rebellion (limited evidence, medium agreement). Community \r protest such as Youth Climate Strikes have influenced urban climate \r [...]"


id: 4d224edb8b65e89fdb42eb9f132f4b13
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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"[...] policy agendas including the declaration of climate emergency in \r municipalities worldwide, fostering a new debate on climate change, \r although their impact on local policy is ambiguous (Davidson et al., \r 2020; Thomas, Cretney and Hayward, 2019; Prendergast et al., 2021; \r Ruiz Campillo, Castan Broto and Westman, 2020). Social movements \r on climate mitigation, such as the Transition Movement and Transition \r Towns (Feola and Nunes, 2014), and school strikes may serve as an \r example for mobilisations more specifically about climate adaptation \r and the way new, networked, grassroots citizen activism and \r community organisations can encourage urban institutional change \r (Gunningham, 2019; Jordan et al., 2018; Wahlstrom et al., 2019). Other \r strategies such as cultural production and exhibitions may also have \r an impact (Stripple, Nikoleris and Hildingsson, 2021)."


id: f64b31784a0d9d10db60fc77911ff063
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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"Table 6.9 presents a defined framework of ideas that local institutions, \r mostly local governments, can put into practice to improve their \r adaptive capacity. Enabling transformative capacity requires novel \r governance arrangements based on broad participation, a diversity of \r actor networks, socially embedded leadership and empowerment of \r communities, alongside an understanding of the system dynamics, which \r refers to system awareness, collective visions, practical experimentation, \r reflexivity, capacity building, institutional mainstreaming and the \r multiple levels of agency or scales (Ziervogel, Cowen and Ziniades, \r 2016; Ziervogel, 2019a; Wolfram, 2019; Holscher and Frantzeskaki, \r 2020; Castan Broto et al., 2018). Many of the transformative capacity \r components are already visible in local adaptation actions, but many \r efforts emphasise one element at the expense of others without \r delivering a systemic perspective. In particular, measures to facilitate \r [...]"


id: b9bb59e7a0ff310f915ddec71d2421c1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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"[...] the empowerment of communities, reflexivity and social learning are \r rare but often point toward heightened capacities for transformative, \r alongside incremental, adaptation (Castan Broto et  al., 2018). \r Transformative capacity frameworks may foster inclusive governance \r to deliver risk management that works for the poor in countries such \r as South Africa (Ziervogel, 2019a)."


id: 526645844d2bf09b160bca96b27bdf87
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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"In delivering adaptation in cities, settlements and infrastructure, \r however, there is a need to understand and measure the adaptive \r capacity and limits to manage future risks in communities, institutions \r and organisations (Filho et al., 2019). However efforts to track urban \r adaptation lack consistent methods, metrics and data gathering \r (Olazabal et al., 2019b). The scale of complex, cascading challenges, \r limited finance and governance capacity, combined with the impacts \r of growing social inequality and sustainable development priorities \r can result in both soft and hard limits on cities government's capacity \r to adapt to climate change (Chanza, 2018; Sanchez Rodriguez, \r Urge-Vorsatz and Barau, 2018; Lehmann et al., 2015; Di Giulio et al., \r 2018). Hard limits to adaptation are identified when it is unfeasible \r to avoid severe risks, while soft limits exist when technological and \r socioeconomic options are not immediately deployable (IPCC, 2014). \r [...]"


id: 99fc72607314914311c2dc01b84541a1
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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"[...] In urban contexts, soft limits may become hard limits when large \r numbers of people are unable to avoid severe climate-related risks \r of loss and damage (Mechler et  al., 2020). Climate change-related \r loss and damage that are intangible also require more caution in \r assessment processes (Roberts and Pelling, 2018; Andrei et al., 2015; \r Barnett et  al., 2016; Thomas and Benjamin, 2018). Incorporating \r Indigenous knowledge can identify people-oriented and place-specific \r scenarios, leading to development of urban adaptation policies that \r foster identity, dignity, self-determination and better collective decision \r making/capacity to act (McShane, 2017; Preston, 2017), and are also \r sensitive to the local context and limits of community adaptation \r (Makondo and Thomas, 2018)."


id: 5ed47108ffed199b2827ec9f2860910f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Urban transformations represent forms of adaptation that challenge \r the principles in which a society is established (Pelling, O'Brien and \r Matyas, 2015) and can be deployed to go beyond the existing limits \r of development justice and climate change adaptation capacity. While \r not all adaptation will be transformative, transformative capacities \r support both ongoing adaptation efforts and the broader systemic \r change processes that align adaptation efforts with decarbonisation \r requirements and the delivery of SDGs. 'Urban transformative capacity' \r focuses on understanding what elements of a system to respond to \r external changing conditions in a manner that transforms the system \r toward a more sustainable state (Ziervogel, Cowen and Ziniades, \r 2016). The capacities required to deliver adaptation action in cities and \r settlements are 'transformative capacities', because they move away \r from thinking of adaptation as an adjustment to a changing external \r [...]"


id: 6575a75cdef545c5a07e7f2a4a847878
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"[...] environment to think instead of it as a reconfiguration of infrastructures \r and institutions to build resilience in the surrounding environment \r (Pelling, 2010; Matyas and Pelling, 2015). Reflective and iterative \r learning is integral to fostering transformative capacity (c.f. Luederitz\r et al., 2017). Transformative capacity extends across multiple agency \r levels or geographical locations, as well as various domains (Wilson\r et al., 2013; Olsson, Bodin and Folke, 2010; Keeler et al., 2019b). The \r components of transformative capacity in cities and settlements can be \r grouped into three categories (see Table 6.9): (1) agency and forms of \r interaction, (2) development processes and (3) relational dimensions \r (Wolfram, 2016). Alongside different forms of technical expertise, there \r is a need to broaden the interventions of disadvantaged populations in \r urban sustainability (Wolfram, Borgstrom and Farrelly, 2019)."


id: 61607c9d633cc11a451b80fa5ba736d8
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"However, investments in ex ante urban climate adaptation may prove \r less attractive to these financiers than other opportunities because of \r their long maturities and high risk (Keenan, Chu and Peterson, 2019) \r (see also Table  6.11). Many generate economic returns primarily \r through avoided losses from climate impacts, which are difficult \r to measure and are, in any case, more attractive to funders than \r financiers (Kaufman, 2014). Ex post, insurance already plays a critical \r role in protecting urban households, firms and other stakeholders \r from the full economic costs of high-severity, low-frequency events \r by sharing risk over time and space. Insurance can also be designed to \r incentivise risk-reducing behaviours and investments (Banhalmi-Zakar\r et  al., 2016; Paddam and Wong, 2017). Some researchers suggest \r that, in urban environments, insurance practices are helping to \r establish adaptation and risk as a new area of public health and \r [...]"


id: 86fa90d0b16907d10eba2db35f3eb6cc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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content:
"[...] public protection. For example, local governments are using new risk \r transfer instruments, such as re-insurance and catastrophe bonds, to \r fund investments in resilience projects and disaster recovery (Collier \r and Cox, 2021). However, the commercial feasibility of private sector \r insurance depends on more robust estimates of current and future \r risks, and premiums commensurate with the ability and willingness of \r consumers to pay. Therefore, ex ante investments must complement \r insurance schemes to improve climate modelling and reduce climate \r risk (Surminski, Bouwer and Linnerooth-Bayer, 2016). The private sector \r also faces practical barriers to invest in adaptation."


id: 34716782bd3f68e4e12096f57b7ff2b7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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content:
"Since the 1960s, gross capital formation (sometimes called Gross domestic investment) has been less than 22% in Africa, whilst in East \r Asian countries, it has risen to 42% (OECD, 2016). Africa faces an estimated 40% infrastructure financing gap, but this gap is almost \r certainly higher in the continent's rapidly growing cities (Baker and McKenzie, 2015). Relative poverty, weak or absent local fiscal \r systems, and contested tenure that prevents land being used as collateral, have restricted investment in African cities (Berrisford, Cirolia \r and Palmer, 2018; Dodman et al., 2017). Sub-Saharan African countries are reaching the 40% urban threshold at national per capita \r incomes of around USD 1000 per annum, significantly poorer than South-East Asian and Latin American cities at the same level of \r urbanisation (Freire, Lall and Leipziger, 2014). Absolute poverty, in conjunction with weak revenue collection and low levels of investment, \r [...]"


id: b2c947b9ec5aa771382f97811767899a
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"[...] render conventional infrastructure finance difficult (Smolka, 2013; Global Commission on Economy and Climate, 2017; Berrisford, Cirolia \r and Palmer, 2018; Cirolia and Mizes, 2019). Sprawled urban development in Africa might make the provision of public services both more \r energy intensive and three times more expensive than high-density developments (Collier and Venables, 2016)."


id: 72b11deb9139e7c2b8c40e43be278905
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content:
"Corruption in urban adaptation and disaster risk management finance \r is a considerable but little researched challenge observed from all world \r regions (Sanderson et al., 2021). Corruption generates maladaptation, \r increasing risk, for example where infrastructure is constructed with \r faulty design, substandard materials and inadequate maintenance \r (Kabir et al., 2021). More widely, corruption increases vulnerability \r and reduces capacity by damaging the body politic, distorting markets \r and reducing economic growth (Alexander, 2017). The construction \r and infrastructure industries are repeatedly identified as sources of \r corruption (GIACC, 2020; Chan and Owusu, 2017; Sanderson et al., \r 2021). Corruption and misuse of climate finance is exacerbated \r by limited public access to information, political considerations in \r finance decision making and lack of accountability for decisions and \r actions (Kabir et al., 2021). In construction, Owusu et al. (2019) found \r [...]"


id: a61e308efbff733ba87320481be86ff1
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content:
"[...] causes included too-close relationships, poor professional ethical \r standards, negative industrial and working conditions, negative \r role models and inadequate sanctions throughout the phases of \r construction. Post-disaster response and reconstruction, and periods \r of surge funding following international or national policy priorities \r are especially vulnerable to corruption, with increased funding and \r pressure to lower norms of financial management (Imperiale and \r Vanclay, 2021). Mixed delivery mechanisms have been shown to \r reduce corruption, for example where civil society organisations \r are involved in project approval stages, although there is also a risk \r that civil society organisations will themselves become entangled \r in corruption. International donors have a role to play in working \r with government and civil society to promote wider scrutiny and \r transparency of financing processes and project delivery through \r [...]"


id: 4ee3637885efed93679b901ce04518b4
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vector_id: 11157
content:
"[...] promoting media and press freedom and legislation for access to \r information to reduce corruption by enhancing transparency and \r accountability (Kabir et al., 2021)."


id: 7cdd4f33fdb16f15cb7ee4fbc414611b
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content:
"The challenges related to the evaluation of adaptation progress (lack of \r methods, agreed metrics, data and definitions, including the ambiguity \r of the concept of 'adaptation') have been widely recognised after \r the Paris Agreement by multiple organisations, including the OECD, \r the World Bank, the European Environment Agency and the Global \r Environment Facility (Ford et al., 2015; Magnan, 2016; Bours, McGinn \r and Pringle, 2014). Monitoring and evaluation systems in urban areas \r will necessarily be incremental and additive, and will have to build on \r existing indicator systems (Solecki and Rosenzweig, 2020). There is a \r need to develop practical and efficient frameworks to assess adaptation \r progress across all levels of public and private decision making. \r This should include the assessment and consideration of top-down \r adaptations alongside informal, bottom-up community actions, or \r corporate-led programmes developed to reduce vulnerabilities and \r [...]"


id: f6af488698fac910c4573a0865feb3d8
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"The IPCC's Fifth Assessment Report acknowledged the lack of standard \r metrics to measure and monitor success in urban adaptation and \r suggested a list of indicators that could be developed, while also taking \r note of the localised nature of adaptation (see also (Rufat et al., 2015)). \r However, predominant approaches are typically not conducted at the \r appropriate scale to inform adaptation decision-making (Ford et al., \r 2018). While some scholars advocate the use of a unifying indicator of \r social vulnerability (Spielman et al., 2020), others propose to develop \r flexible sets of comparable indicators that can be adjusted to different \r contexts (Leiter et al., 2019). Risk-based approaches are seen as an \r alternative in a context where the monitoring of decision-relevant \r variables in urban climate adaptation planning is essential to link \r climatic risk assessment and action (Hallegatte and Engle, 2019; \r Kingsborough, Borgomeo and Hall, 2016; McDermott and Surminski, \r [...]"


id: 29ddeecd664c75f56ab5527325045d33
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"[...] 2018). Because of the need to define normative frameworks for risk \r evaluation, what is acceptable, for what purpose and for how long \r (Galarraga et al., 2018), these approaches may offer an opportunity \r for the generation of a shared understanding on goals and limitations \r of adaptation (McDermott and Surminski, 2018). However, risk-based \r indicators may also create a bias toward quantifiable variables that \r tend to be based on climatic modelling outputs, engineering or \r financial assessments. Based on this and various examples of urban \r development projects, Hallegatte and Engle (2019) claim it is important \r to consider output-based indicators and process-based indicators that \r talk about government, voice and empowerment. Overall, dozens of \r indicator-based approaches to assess climate adaptation have been \r proposed across the scientific and policy literature, especially in the \r broader framework of (community) resilience assessment tools (Sharifi, \r [...]"


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"[...] 2016; Feldmeyer et al., 2019), and in different sectors, for example the \r climate benefits of NBS (Kabisch et  al., 2016; Donatti et  al., 2020). \r Although these efforts may help to mainstream the evaluation of \r adaptation in current city evaluation initiatives, the development of \r comprehensive monitoring and evaluation systems is lacking."


id: f3b5ec013caa7e2cbd3327ed7fe2fa4c
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"Transformation is often approached as a process of institutional \r transformation, akin to the process described in Section 6.4.2 (see, for \r example, Duijn and van Buuren, 2017). Transformation engages with \r critiques of adaptation or risk reduction as an individual responsibility \r (Sou, 2018). The idea is to use transformation to focus on coordinating \r collective efforts (Haque et al, 2014). The coordination of multiple \r actors is a condition to enable transformative institutions (Torabi et \r al, 2018) and link adaptation action to development efforts (Chu et \r al, 2017; Roberts and O'Donoghue, 2013). The role of communities \r and citizens in such an approach to transformation is ambiguous. \r Sometimes communities and citizens are presented as critical agents of \r transformation (Limthongsakul et al, 2017). Other times, however, they \r are simply situated within strong and durable networks that provide \r [...]"


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"[...] the institutional setting to build resilience (Daniere et al., 2016). Despite \r the political nature of transformative approaches and the evidence that \r transformative approaches rely on protest and political activism, few \r authors recognise this strategy (but see Bahadur and Tanner, 2014; Chu, \r Anguelovski and Roberts, 2017; Dierwechter and Wessells, 2013)."


id: c9147c74036b235ef441db548ecee0cb
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content:
"Transformation is also more than a single instance of institutional \r change. Historical perspectives on transformation enable an \r understanding of the chain of institutional changes that ultimately \r lead to significant or far-reaching reconfiguration of infrastructure \r and service provision (Rojas et al, 2015). Paradigm changes, such as \r new engagements with nature and green infrastructure, will improve \r adaptation outcomes (Roberts et  al., 2012). Changes of paradigms, \r however, are not inherently positive and may clash with existing \r interests or involve trade-offs with other priorities. When care is taken \r to ensure greater inclusion in urban decision-making, disadvantaged, \r vulnerable communities are less likely to be disadvantaged. For \r example, indigenous traditions of nature management provide entry \r points for the sustainable management of resources, such as seed \r banks, urban agriculture and the local management of watersheds \r [...]"


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"[...] and floods, may be at odds with conventional structures of expert \r knowledge (Cid-Aguayo, 2016; Chandra and Gaganis, 2016). These \r traditions are vital both because of the solution space that they open \r in the local context and how they serve to create resilience through \r collective and intergenerational learning (Chandra and Gaganis, 2016)."


id: dcf120decca300c8386508e21f5da541
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"There is little evidence on how best to make monitoring and evaluation \r approaches practical at the local scale. Cities worldwide face important \r social, environmental and economic conflicts related to resource \r inequality, poverty, environmental pollution and social tensions that \r coexist with climatic risks. It makes sense to integrate climate change \r adaptation assessment goals and needs into existing frameworks for \r the sake of efficiency. This will benefit small urban areas and cities \r in developing regions that often face data scarcity and may also find \r available indicators irrelevant to their realities and, thus, be required \r to adjust them (Simon et al., 2016). Efforts to coordinate frameworks \r for the assessment of sustainability (e.g., Local Agenda, sustainability \r appraisals), resilience (e.g., 100 Resilient Cities, new standards for \r urban resilience), greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reporting (e.g., \r [...]"


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content:
"[...] Global Covenant of Mayors for Energy and Climate) can be deployed \r to learn about contexts. However, they need to be applied with caution \r as enforcing external requirements may lead to local tensions during \r their application (for example Roberts et al., 2020). In a context where \r adaptation efforts need to be aggregated and evaluated across nations \r (Magnan, 2016) and their implications on wider objectives such "


id: 5e08b4428e150a2c859916487702bd07
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content:
"While aspects of transformative capacity identified in the literature \r may facilitate far-reaching change, there is limited evidence of actual \r transformations as an outcome of adaptation. While community led \r resilience agendas may tackle poverty related issues, they struggle \r to tackle city-wide structural forms of inequality (Chu, Schenk and \r Patterson, 2018). Processes of shared learning and co-production of \r knowledge can reinforce existing power dynamics and be limited by \r technical framings of vulnerability that marginalise political issues \r (Orleans Reed et al., 2013). These issues are especially acute in relation \r to land use decisions where short-term fiscal and commercial interests \r conflict with long-term vulnerability reduction objectives (Brown, \r Dayal and Rumbaitis Del Rio, 2012). It can be difficult for adaptation \r actions to target cities' underlying political-economic structure, \r such as entrenched political-economic interests, elite influence over \r [...]"


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content:
"[...] decision making or neoliberal planning logics that maintain and \r reproduce inequality (Chu, Anguelovski and Roberts, 2017). Urban \r resilience plans may be formulated in disconnection from broader \r development strategies, which leads to a limited ability to tackle \r underlying structures of political power and urban development \r practices (Weinstein et al., 2019). Evidence from Kolkata demonstrates \r the limitations of resilience plans to address underlying conditions \r of vulnerability, including the commodification of hazardous land, \r under-provision of informal settlements and spatial segregation of the \r urban poor (Rumbach, 2017)."


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content:
"Indigenous knowledge and local knowledge have an important role \r to play in urban planning and management. They can support impact \r detection and evaluation in urban areas (Codjoe et al, 2014), weather \r forecasting in urban areas (Magee et al., 2016; Ebhuoma and Simatele, \r 2019), climate change adaptation in urban agriculture (Wahab and \r Popoola, 2018; Solomon et al., 2016), urban food security (Simatele \r and Simatele, 2015), planning and managing  urban  solid  waste \r (Kosoe et al, 2019), urban flood management (Thorn et al, 2015; \r Jameson and Baud, 2016; Hooli, 2016), drought perception and \r coping strategies (Saboohi et  al., 2019), and ecological restoration \r and urban commons management (Nagendra, 2016; Nagendra and \r Mundoli, 2019). They can help define baselines for past climate and \r ecological change, providing a historical perspective on changes in \r urban commons such as lakes and trees (Nagendra, 2016), as well \r [...]"


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vector_id: 14257
content:
"[...] as past climatic changes or climate baselines (Ajayi and Mafongoya, \r 2017) and shifting baseline syndrome (Fernandez-Llamazares et  al., \r 2015; Soga and Gaston, 2018; see Businger et al., 2018 for a review \r of hurricane history in Hawaiian newspapers; also Wickman, 2018). \r Incorporating Indigenous knowledge and local knowledge can help \r generate more people-oriented and place-specific approaches, leading \r to adaptation policies that foster identity, dignity, self-determination \r and better collective decision making and capacity to act (Preston, \r 2017; McShane, 2017) (see also Section 6.1)."


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vector_id: 8916
content:
"Planning for transformative adaptation is more likely where communities \r can learn collectively (medium evidence, medium agreement) \r (Restemeyer, van den Brink and Woltjer, 2017; Kabisch et al., 2017; Fraser\r et al., 2017; Putri, Dalimunthe and Prasojo). Greater citizen engagement \r facilitates implementing specific measures for radical policymaking \r or the mainstreaming of environmental knowledge into adaptation \r practices (Reed et al, 2015). Do it yourself (DIY) planning, in which \r stakeholders focus on creating and improving specific urban spaces they \r inhabit, has led to urban greening experiments led by civil society that \r change paradigms of urban and environmental management (Cloutier, \r Papin and Bizier, 2018). Social learning may occur through combinations \r of activism and collaboration with and between informal settlement \r dwellers, as shown in adaptation experiences in informal settlements \r in Hanoi and Bangkok (Daniere et al., 2016).. The adaptation process \r [...]"


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content:
"[...] can benefit from the inclusion of multiple sources of knowledge for \r social learning, including universities but also communities and citizens \r (Chu, Schenk and Patterson, 2018). Citizens assemblies are increasingly \r recognised as spaces for transformative adaptation (Muradova, \r Walker and Colli, 2020), although their potential influence at different \r government levels is still not fully understood."


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"Envisioning development alternatives through adaptation as a first \r step toward transformative adaptation can leverage social learning. \r Experiences of migration, length of residence and the density of local \r social-networks impact social learning opportunities and underscore \r why context-specific social education is vital (Waters and Adger, \r 2017; Karunarathne and Lee, 2020). Learning across and between \r communities can be enhanced when care is taken to understand local \r challenges. Given power relationships, cultural needs and community \r aspirations, a top-down approach to information sharing is generally \r less effective than community partnerships and co-created knowledge \r at surfacing visions and strategies for getting past baked-in, unequal \r and unsustainable development assumptions and practices (medium \r evidence, high agreement) (Clemens et al., 2016; Thi Hong Phuong, \r Biesbroek and Wals, 2017; Fitzgerald and Lenhart, 2016; Fisher and \r [...]"


id: 1bd64012e144f8b1da99804e93fd7947
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"[...] Dodman, 2019). Social learning in formal and informal urban contexts \r is also enhanced when care is taken to ensure multiple stakeholders \r have opportunities to understand a variety of viewpoints, values, \r resources and ideals, and that these viewpoints are clearly identified \r in decision-making (Thi Hong Phuong, Biesbroek and Wals, 2017). \r However much social learning still happens only after a crisis, for \r example in urban water adaptation, and new knowledge is often \r frustrated by the lock in of powerful local institutions and groups \r (Johannessen et  al., 2019). Social learning is, however, only one \r component of the development of climate-resilient pathways. System \r perspectives theorise the possibility of tipping points, leverage points \r or disruptive technologies to challenge the stable regime to create a \r broader reconfiguration (Chapter 17; O'Neill et al., 2018)."


id: a587e2ca762ab5d35bf5dc2cb0418a2d
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"within a decade because of high growth rate. A recent study by \r Maharjan et al. (2018) on migration documented that 39% of rural \r communities have at least one migrant, of whom 80% are internal and \r the remaining 20% are international. Around 10% of the migration \r is reported as environmental displacement. Males account for the \r majority of the migration, which forms an important aspect of gendered \r vulnerability (Sugden et al., 2014; Goodrich, Prakash and Udas, 2019). \r The ever-expanding urban population in the Himalayas generates many \r challenges, especially in the context of climate change adaptation. \r First, unplanned urbanisation is causing significant changes in land \r use and land cover, with recharge areas of springs being reduced. \r Most of the towns in Hindu Kush Himalayan region meet their water \r needs using supplies from springs, ponds and lakes which are largely \r interlinked systems. Water insecurity in hill towns are becoming the \r [...]"


id: 317fb1f1b80d785255d39a8284e8f4db
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"[...] order of the day (Virk et  al., 2019; Bharti et  al., 2019; Singh et  al., \r 2019a; Sharma et al., 2019). Second, climate-induced changes in the \r physical environment include increased rainfall variability. Due to this, \r heavy rains are becoming frequent and are leading to more landslides. \r Third, global warming has increased the average temperature in the \r Himalayas which has caused glacier melt and subsequent change in \r hydrological regimes of the region. One of the contributing factors \r of glacial decline is also the deposition of black carbon (Gautam\r et al., 2020; Gul et al., 2021) which is contributed by burning of crop \r residue in Punjab (Kant et al., 2020). These critical stressors, climatic \r and non-climatic, are adversely affecting the socioecology of urban \r conglomerations in the region (Pervin et  al., 2019). Encroachment \r or degradation of natural water bodies and the disappearance of \r traditional water systems such as springs are evident (Shah and \r [...]"


id: 172bbfc5e2022ed45525ecf70bd95a8c
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"[...] Badiger, 2018; Sharma et al., 2019). While water availability in these \r towns has been adversely affected by the climatic and socioeconomic \r changes, demand for water has increased greatly (Molden, Khanal and \r Pradhan, 2018). Some of the towns are major tourist attractions that \r create a floating population in peak tourist seasons, challenging the "


id: b6fa8f5a106f8b525bea4a189bfae82b
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"The Hindu Kush Himalayan region extends over roughly 3500 km \r covering eight countries: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nepal, China, India, \r Bhutan, Bangladesh and Myanmar. Projections show that by 2050, \r more than 50% of the population in Hindu Kush countries will live \r in cities (UNDESA, 2014). The region is home to 10 major river basins \r that feed south and south-east Asia. In 2017, the total population in \r the 10 major river basins with their headwaters in the region was \r around 1.9 billion, including 240 million in the mountain and hills of \r the Hindu Kush (Wester et al., 2019). The region is characterised by \r unique mountain topography, climate, hydrology and hydrogeology. \r Each one of these factors plays an important role in determining \r the availability of water for people living in the Himalayas (Nepal, \r Flugel and Shrestha, 2014; Scott et  al., 2019; Prakash and Molden, \r 2020). The total landmass that can support physical infrastructure for \r [...]"


id: d711dfef80b3d8d1f4f3423fc406c053
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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content:
"[...] towns to develop is much less in the Hindu Kush Himalayan region as \r compared with the plains. Due to this physical constraint, the process \r of urbanisation is slow in the region. Only 3% of the total population \r in the region live in larger cities and 8% in smaller towns (Singh et al., \r 2019b). However, there has been an increase in urbanisation, largely \r due to regional imbalances in providing economic opportunities for \r the poor. People from rural areas are flocking to the nearest urban \r centres in search of employment and other economic opportunities \r (Singh and Pandey, 2019). As a result, the share of urban population is \r increasing in the region, while that of the rural population is declining."


id: bd017e6be8d9cb32710ddf558c99262a
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"The City Team was first established within the City Environment Agency \r (BLH) but was then transferred to the Development and Planning \r Agency (BAPPEDA) (Lassa, 2019). This corresponded to a shift in framing \r of climate change from an environmental priority to encompassing \r broader development issues such as economic development, housing \r and infrastructure delivery. By asserting that climate change affects \r the operations of every critical sector across the city, the number of \r municipal agencies involved in climate change programming increased \r significantly (Setiadi, 2015). Most notably, this approach helped the \r municipal health agency to recognise the relationship between climate \r change and health (Setiadi, 2015), and helped to shift the emphasis of \r dengue fever management toward a more proactive community-based \r health early warning system (Pratama et  al., 2017). In 2017, these \r measures helped to reduced dengue fever infection rates by 56% \r [...]"


id: fb448fd686beb3b7b05205359e8f1d49
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"[...] compared with 2011-2016 levels (Indonesia Ministry of Health, 2020). \r ACCCRN also supported policy experimentation through implementing \r rainwater harvesting facilities and a community-based flood early \r warning system (Archer and Dodman, 2015; Yuniartanti, Handayani \r and Waskitaningsih, 2016; Sari and Prayoga, 2018). These projects \r were designed in conjunction with national government investments \r in flood management infrastructure, which led to a reduction in the \r city's inundated area by 24% or approximately 1% of the total urban \r area (Semarang City Government, 2016)."


id: 2945d2bd6e5bbd4d0bc299a425d35e83
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"The City of Semarang, on the northern coast of Central Java in \r Indonesia, has a population of nearly 1.8 million (CBS, 2019). The city \r has experienced rapid urbanisation over last three decades, with the \r population almost doubling and density reaching 4650 people per \r square kilometre (Handayani and Rudiarto, 2014; Handayani et al., \r 2020b). Semarang is vulnerable to sea level rise, tidal flooding and \r inundation (Suhelmi and Triwibowo, 2018; Yuniartanti, Handayani and \r Waskitaningsih, 2016), risks which are worsened by land subsidence \r along the coast (Abidin et  al., 2013). Globally, land subsidence is \r a notable compounder of climate change-induced sea level rise \r and coastal flooding (Bagheri et  al., 2021). In Semarang, the land \r subsidence rate is projected to be up to 60 mm yr-1 (Abidin et al., \r 2013; Bott et  al., 2021). Approximately 20% of the city's coastline \r is characterised as extremely vulnerable because of sea level rise \r [...]"


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"[...] and enhanced land subsidence (Husnayen et  al., 2018), with the \r north-eastern portions of the city experiencing larger subsidence than \r the rest (Yastika, Shimizu and Abidin, 2019). Associated public health \r and sanitation risks are also evident, including increasing outbreaks \r of dengue fever and diarrhoea (Pratama et  al., 2017; Indonesia \r Ministry of Health, 2020)."


id: 5bdd5976c1df754264384b0028f15486
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"Building on Semarang's ACCCRN experience, the city then became a \r member of the Rockefeller Foundation's 100 Resilient Cities (100RC) \r programme between 2016 and 2018. As in ACCCRN, this new process \r emphasised stakeholder involvement, with the previous City Team \r recast as a team of City Resilience Officers (CRO), which was in turn led \r by the City Mayor and received strategic advisory support from the City \r Secretary. Semarang synthesised its experiences in climate adaptation \r planning through the Resilient Semarang Strategy published in May \r 2016 (Semarang City Government, 2016). The Resilient Semarang \r Strategy (2016) acknowledged that urban resilience must be pursued \r in a comprehensive and inclusive manner and highlighted 18 strategies \r across 6 themes: water and new energy, new economy, disaster and \r disease, integrated mobility, transparency of public information and \r competitive human resource, to be mainstreamed into the revision of the \r [...]"


id: 4ab4bb47ba2f85c300c3419eefd26573
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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"[...] Mid-Term Regional Development Plan (RPJMD, Rencana Pembangunan \r Jangka Menengah Daerah) of 2016-2021. City Resilience Officers were \r formally appointed to serve on the RPJMD team, thereby formalising \r climate resilience as a critical item on the RPJMD programme list."


id: bed351c4a9d3a9095ae3d5a2c3ce837b
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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content:
"The City of Semarang first engaged with climate change in 2009, \r when the Rockefeller Foundation launched the Asian Cities Climate \r Change Resilience Network (ACCCRN), an initiative to develop \r resilience capacity across secondary and rapidly growing cities in \r South and Southeast Asia (Reed et al., 2015). Semarang was a pilot \r city for ACCCRN from 2009 to 2016, when it introduced a participatory \r approach to planning and decision making that challenged the \r government-dominated tradition in the city, and in turn played a \r key role in Semarang's climate adaptation and resilience planning \r process (Orleans Reed et  al., 2013; Moench, 2014; Kernaghan and \r Da Silva, 2014). A City Team was formed in 2010 consisting of City \r Environmental Agency (BLH; Badan Lingkungan Hidup), Regional \r Disaster Management Agency (BPBD; Badan Penanggulangan Bencana \r Daerah), Water Resources Management Office (PSDA; Kantor Dinas \r Pengelolaan Sumber Daya Air), Regional Planning and Development \r [...]"


id: f1cae50a2fb173cb72917b79d196e8f4
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"[...] Agency (BAPPEDA; Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah), local \r universities and NGOs such as the Bintari Foundation, with technical \r support from Mercy Corps Indonesia (Nugraha and Lassa, 2018)."


id: 2adbf6b232a5391e4ff638392734b5b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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content:
"development of dry wells and swales in upstream areas, as well as \r promoting cross-region dialogue (Global Resilience Partnership, 2018). \r Other collaborations focused on developing resilience indicators (ARUP, \r 2018; Rangwala et al., 2018). For example, the Zurich Flood Resilience \r Program implemented resilience measurement tools in 16 sub-districts \r along the East Flood Canal. Results of the assessment were then used \r to develop local disaster contingency plans (Rangwala et al., 2018).\r The conclusion of the Rockefeller Foundation's formal engagement in \r Semarang in 2018 has brought forth questions about continued financial \r and institutional support for climate adaptation action in the city. \r Increasing land subsidence will also likely overwhelm current efforts to \r incrementally adapt to sea level rise and coastal flooding (Abidin et al., \r 2013). Still, the Semarang case study does highlight several key lessons \r [...]"


id: 57aacd18f81493484a876ab47f9e32f5
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content:
"[...] for urban climate governance in secondary rapidly urbanising cities in \r the Global South. First, transnational institutions and partnerships are \r critical enablers (Aisya, 2019; Setiadi, 2015; Chu, Hughes and Mason, \r 2018; Handayani et  al., 2020a). Institutions such as the Rockefeller \r Foundation foster programmes and investment in the city, leverage \r access to adaptation funding, accelerate climate mainstreaming into \r wider urban sectors, and promote better knowledge management \r (Setiadi, 2016). However, such opportunities are also supported by the \r city's ability to further mobilise its own resources in the long term and \r remove its dependency on the national government and transnational \r supporters (Handayani et al., 2020a). Second, scaling up of programmes \r and replication of adaptation actions are increasingly important to \r close the gap between planning and implementation (Setiadi, 2016). \r It is evident that increased community empowerment and participation \r [...]"


id: aeade11e516c0357f23fca1d64dfee47
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"[...] can help fill this gap (Hadi, 2018; Miladan, 2016), but this must also \r be evidence-based to ensure its applicability and effectiveness (Suarma\r et al., 2018). Questions remain around how to determine and assess \r evidence-based participatory adaptation at the local level. Third, \r sustainable financing (from both external and internal sources) to \r support proposed adaptation strategies is essential as it allows for more \r capacity building, technology transfer and programme implementation \r in the long run (Handayani et al., 2020a; Laeni et al., 2021; Hadi, 2017). \r An example is the development of a water retention on the eastern \r coast of Semarang using a collaborative financing model, which helped \r further adaptation by protecting water resources for local industries as \r well as promote the idea of land value capture for community residents."


id: b378dfbcc6081054b3ee15021616a7a6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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content:
"In practice, building ecological cities in China has primarily focused \r on hard measures (Li et al., 2020). Key areas of development include \r stakeholder engagement and horizontal coordination (Li et al., 2016). \r Among one of 19 national-level New Areas in China, Xi'xian enjoys \r special preferential policies in the fields of fiscal autonomy, investment \r and tax policy, and permission in land utility for industrial development \r purpose. These policy freedoms allow Xi'Xian to explore adaptation \r options. This has opened engagement with business through an urban \r construction investment group sponsored and invested in jointly by \r Xi'Xian Management Committee (administrative authority) and local \r enterprises (Wei and Zhao, 2018). Second, the municipal government \r has simplified administrative systems to reduce the project waiting \r period from evaluation to approval to 50 d. Third, a green financial \r mechanism creates a leverage effect for national funding, including the \r [...]"


id: f723c2bfd828a73cced840e7a4501c85
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content:
"[...] first provincial Green Sponge Development Fund (RMB 1.2 billion) and \r in Shaanxi, special funding from the Urbanization Development Fund \r (RMB 2.64 billion). Furthermore, a public-private partnership model \r with a whole-lifecycle-management approach has been introduced, \r raising funding of RMB 1.24 billion with a packaged project including \r public pipelines and sewage water treatment facilities."


id: 3ca72fa8668a63ee56f68ae9ac17784d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7859
content:
"Puerto Rico has a strong science base that produced extensive \r knowledge on climate change and sustainability long before Hurricane \r Maria. The Puerto Rico Climate Change Council has collected and \r synthesised scientific information for Puerto Rico since before its \r formation in 2009. Many Puerto Rican scientists were also editors \r and authors on Chapter 20: US Caribbean Region for 4th US National \r Climate Assessment (Gould et  al., 2018). The National Institute of \r Island Energy and Sustainability (INESI in Spanish) recently published \r a catalogue with more than 60 scientists and experts working on \r energy and sustainability innovations in the University of Puerto \r Rico (UPR) system. The scientific community became very active after \r the hurricane in efforts to empower local groups and communities \r to build more sustainable and resilient futures. UPR environmental \r health scientists worked with communities to design and implement \r [...]"


id: 4223d5f9945e32324cb91370f62cc5cd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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content:
"[...] risk reduction action plans, including NBS , through the Community \r Climate Actions Plans and the Puerto Rico Community Resiliency \r Initiative sponsored by Fundacion Comunitaria de Puerto Rico and \r Education Development Center-Regional Education Laboratories, \r Northeast and Islands. A successful example of these alliances is the \r development of the first solar power community in Toro Negro, Puerto \r Rico. These initiatives were inspired by principles of human-centred \r design, a problem-solving approach that starts with the people \r impacted the most by the problem to be solved. In San Juan, the \r capital and major urban centre of the island, scientists from UPR and \r the US Forest Service International Institute of Tropical Forestry worked \r with local stakeholders and communities to develop sustainable and \r transformative urban futures with the support of the Urban Resilience \r to Extreme Events Sustainability Research Network (UREx SRN). The \r [...]"


id: 21b5c05d374ba4eb9e708f3dbce02fbb
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"[...] UREx SRN is a knowledge network of 10 cities in the USA and Latin \r America and 20 other institutions building scientific knowledge, \r models and participatory tools to build resilience and transformative \r capacities for cities."


id: 4c8353d4b7f3a4bdd3c30a87c0685cae
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10718
content:
"In two weeks in 2017, Puerto Rico experienced two powerful \r hurricanes, Irma (category 5) and Maria (category 4). The compound \r effects decimated the island's power, water, communications and \r transportation infrastructure, and an estimated 2975 people lost \r their lives (Irvin-Barnwell et  al., 2020; Santos-Burgoa et  al., 2018). \r Soon after, while many homes still had no electricity or roofs and the \r tree canopy was still bare, Puerto Ricans were faced with cascading \r effects including environmental health impacts from air pollution, \r extreme heat and mosquitoes (Ortiz et al., 2020). In 2020, while still \r recovering, Puerto Ricans experienced earthquakes, extreme African \r dust events, intense coastal and urban floods, and the COVID-19 \r pandemic (Keck, 2020; NASA Explore Earth, 2020; NASA/JPL-Caltech, \r 2020). These events continue to unveil unresolved conditions of social \r vulnerability and its root causes in economic poverty, social inequities, \r [...]"


id: 66a609eb6c1dda9b5f73e46337a80982
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content:
"[...] aged and deteriorating infrastructure, and population loss (Bonilla \r and LeBron, 2019). Combined with limited past investment in climate \r change adaptation and underlying governance challenges including \r corruption, bankruptcy and political crisis (Holladay et al., 2019), this \r has constrained a more CRD for Puerto Rico."


id: ca60f79b8530a7ff24aa5eb011b3b31d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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content:
"It is in this context that government, academic institutions and local \r civil society have taken important steps and often joint action toward \r mitigation and adaptation. Federal funding included USD 20 billion of \r disaster recovery funding with USD 8 billion allocated for adaptation \r and resilience projects, such as flood risk mitigation. During the year \r 2020, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) approved \r USD 13 billion to rebuild the power grid and education system (Delgado, \r 2020). These programmes allow communities and local governments \r to plan and implement strategies and build new infrastructure that \r reduces risks and builds long-term adaptive capacities. The Government \r of Puerto Rico also approved two key climate adaptation policies in \r 2019. The Puerto Rico Mitigation, Adaptation and Resilience to Climate \r Change Law (Law 33, Senate Bill PS 773) established, for the first time \r in the island's history, a legal framework that acknowledges that the \r [...]"


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created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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content:
"[...] climate is changing and threatens the quality of life. The law recognises \r important scientific projections for the island, including an increase of \r 0.5 to 1 m in sea levels by 2015, maximum temperatures of up 2.5degC \r and precipitation decrease of up to 50% by 2100 (Gould et al., 2018). \r The law generated the formation of an Expert and Advisory Committee \r on Climate Change to develop the plan with specific recommendations \r and present it to the Legislature within a year of the passing of the \r law in 2020. Along with strategies to specifically protect and build \r the resilience of urban and rural communities to future climate \r disasters, the law establishes SDGs, including water and food security, \r urban planning and densification, and transition to renewable and \r alternative forms of energy. The energy target is reinforced by another \r key state policy approved in 2019 in response to the failed energy \r [...]"


id: a160cf0d6229b4a2da6c228227fcdc03
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:55
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25610
content:
"[...] infrastructure during Hurricane Maria, the Puerto Rico Energy Public \r Policy Act (Senate Bill PS 1121). This law calls for a transition to 100% \r renewable and alternative energy by 2050."


