# document

id: c7f33f91f14fbb68660e48d5460547c0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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"[...] 2020). Research focused on developed economies also indicates towards a positive relation between ESG criteria and disclosure, and \r economic sustainability of a firm (Giese et al. 2019; Alsayegh et al. 2020) and allays investor fears by showing that sustainable finance \r initiatives, such as divestment, do not adversely impact investment portfolio performance (Henriques and Sadorsky 2018; Trinks et al. \r 2018). It should be reiterated that this research assesses the co-relation between ESG criteria and corporate financial performance, \r with the researchers in some cases, such as Friede et al. (2015), including disclaimers of the results being inconclusive and highlighting \r the need for a deeper assessment for linking ESG criteria with impact on financial performance."


id: c59f063a2bfe91fa0da547d4e5e3f786
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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"While there is a lack of research on the impact of sustainable finance products, divestment impact has been assessed in more detail. \r Although the research here also points towards the ambiguous direct impact of divestment on reducing GHG emissions or on the \r financial performance of fossil fuel companies, its indirect impact on framing the narrative around sustainable finance decisions \r (Bergman 2018), and the inherent potential of the divestment movement for building awareness and mobilising broader public support \r for effective climate policies, have been better researched and could be considered to be the more relevant outcomes (Braungardt \r et al. 2019). Arguments against divestment point to its largely symbolic nature, but Braungardt et al. (2019) elaborate on the broader \r positive impacts of divestment, which include its ability to spur climate action as a moral imperative and stigmatise and reduce the \r [...]"


id: 4adb6c6ce26ff1a80ec8c5277e19740a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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"[...] power of the fossil fuel lobby, and the potential of the approach to mitigate systemic financial risks arising due to climate change and \r address the legal responsibilities of investors merging in this regard."


id: 377f8dec70a160f959dc19f6684c96bf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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"International situational context. Developing countries make \r up two-thirds of the world's population and carry carbon-intensive \r economies where 70% of investments (see Chapter  3) need to be \r conducted to limit warming to 2degC. The focus for climate investments \r has been on China, USA, Europe, India and the G20 (UNEP 2019) \r but studies highlight Paris and SDG attention should be devoted to \r Africa, LDCs and SIDS (African Union Commission 2015; Feindouno et al. \r 2020; GCA-AAI 2020; Warner 2020; AOSIS 2021). The 'special needs, \r circumstances and vulnerability' of African, LDC and SIDS nations are \r recognised under UNFCCC and UN agreements (UN 2009, 2015a,b,c; \r UNFCCC 2010, 2015; Pauw et  al. 2019). These nations currently \r contribute very little to global emissions. Developing countries with their \r growing economies, including the vast African continent roughly the \r size of China, Europe, USA, and India combined (IEA 2014b, p. 20) with \r [...]"


id: a5508bfad358611438daebaa1e52553b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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"[...] a 1 billion population expected to double by 2050, growing reliance on \r fossil fuels and 'cheap' biomass (charcoal use and deforestation) amid \r rising urbanisation and industrialisation ambitions - collectively these \r nations hold large leap-frog potential for the energy transition as well \r as risks of infrastructure lock-in. Accelerated international cooperation \r is a critical enabler (IPCC 2018) in recognising this potential. This could \r mobilise global savings, scale up development of local capital markets \r for accelerated low-carbon investment and adaptation in low- and \r lower-middle-income countries as well as tackle illicit finance including \r tax avoidance leakages that deprive developing countries of valuable \r resources (US DoJ 2009; Hearson 2014; Hanlon 2017; US DoJ 2019; \r IATFD 2021). Diversifying funding sources is important at a time hard\u0002currency Eurobond issuances reach records (Panizza and Taddei 2020; \r [...]"


id: 560416ebf79bd19bcdd8fef65e391a15
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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"[...] Moody's Investors Service 2021). Otherwise, the structure of voluntary, \r nationally oriented, and financially fragmented arrangements under \r the Paris Agreement (Chapter 17) could lead to 'regional rivalry' (SSP 3) \r pathways (IPCC 2018; Gazzotti et al. 2021). The benefits are many times \r greater than apparent costs in terms of expected decline in global GHG \r emissions and attaining SDGs. These could even generate large 'win\u0002win' opportunities back in capital source countries which will benefit \r from a flow back in import demand (Hourcade et al. 2021a)."


id: fe1814231740dee395e5cfc15b376717
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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"Whole-of-society approach to mobilising diverse capital. There's \r no shortage of money globally: it is simply that it has yet to travel \r to where it's most needed. One challenge is unlocking unencumbered \r endowments to contribute to Paris and SDGs (high confidence).\r The aggregate global wealth figures exceed USD200 trillion (Davies \r et al. 2016; UBS 2017; Credit Suisse 2020; Heredia et al. 2020). Some \r developing countries have run pilots for investing in government \r bonds capitalising on fintech growth discussed (The Economist 2017; \r Akwagyiram and Ohuocha 2021) (Section 15.6.6). Others are developing \r green products to encourage uptake by middle class retail investors \r (Eurosif 2018; UK DMO 2021). Millennial-aged inheritors expected to \r receive intergenerational transfers mobilised by global citizen activism \r (Chapter 2) invest in green retail and tech products (Morgan Stanley \r [...]"


id: 2ce151d5f90b49a38fde30f7aa01ea46
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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"[...] 2017; UBS 2017; Capgemini 2021). Historic inequity and diaspora\u0002related private and public resources pledged and debated during \r the COVID-19 pandemic might have potential to contribute towards \r Paris and SDGs (Olusoga 2015; Glueck and Friedman 2020; Hall 2020; \r Piketty 2020; Timsit 2020; Goldman Sachs 2021; Guthrie 2021; Mieu \r 2021; Wagner 2021). Philanthropic institutions use grants, debt, equity, \r guarantees and issue investment grade bonds in using unencumbered \r endowments (Manilla 2018; Covington 2020; Moody's Investors \r Service 2020) but only about 2% of their resources are dedicated to \r climate action (Williams T., 2015; Kramer 2017; Morena 2018; Delanoe \r et al. 2021). The pandemic exemplified the unprecedented collaboration \r and mobilisation of multilateral and scientific communities supported \r by the COVAX risk sharing mechanism for COVID-19 vaccines with \r pooling of financial and scientific resources (OECD 2021d). This \r [...]"


id: e503424d88f6cba6d0b34435bb88d48b
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"[...] momentum in international cooperation can be harnessed to galvanise \r resources, including for teaching of sciences in developing countries \r important in tackling society challenges, alleviating poverty (TWAS \r 2021) and inequity legacies compounded by climate impacts debated \r by many (Henochsberg 2016; Obregon 2018; Fernandez et al. 2021; \r The Economist 2021). Suggestions towards equitable models include \r 'global adaptation funding approaches' (Chancel and Piketty 2015), \r a 'world climate bank' to finance climate investments through long\u0002term bonds (Foley 2009; Broome 2012; Broome and Foley 2016), \r a 'cities development bank' (Alexander et al. 2019), and 'public debt \r financing models' (Rendall 2021) for generations to share the burden \r which has precedence in history (Draper 2007; Fowler 2015)."


id: bfae228a19aa0f905269428bc502cad1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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"of examples: in the women of colour-led arena, a Chicago pension \r fund invested in a developing country using a private equity fund; \r (Langhorne 2021, USAID 2021). Institutional BlackRock's blended \r finance vehicle with OECD MDB partners focuses on developing \r countries (BlackRock 2021). In regional AAA MDB partnerships, the \r African Development Bank (AfDB) collaborates with African nations \r through a  regional infrastructure fund (Africa50 2019); the Asian \r Development Bank (ADB) collaborates with a  Philippines state\u0002owned pension fund and Dutch pension fund in using a private equity \r fund to catalyse private sector investment (ADB 2012). A UN entity \r with several pooled public-private investment platforms includes an \r SDG blended finance vehicle (UN CDF 2020a; 2020b). A multilateral \r International Finance Corporation (IFC) blended finance fund, \r supported by a  sovereign guarantee from Sweden's SIDA, and \r separately a  USD1 billion green bond fund by IFC and Europe's \r [...]"


id: 8f8d8ac8575c3033f532967e92850e3c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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"[...] Amundi asset manager buy green securities issued by developing \r country banks financing local currency climate investments (IFC 2018, \r 2021; Amundi and IFC 2019). The key parameter is the investment \r multiplier, the ratio of private investment mobilised by a  given \r amount of public funds which varies by product type. IFC's portfolio \r of blended finance investments point to a self-reported range of 3 to \r 15 times for project debt and even higher levels (10 to 30) for debt \r finance provided on concessional terms (IFC 2021a). Although an \r AAA-rated IFC blended finance fund was established in 2013, most \r investors joined in 2017 with insurers AXA and Swiss Re investing \r USD500 million each to bring the fund to USD7 billion raised \r from eight global investors (Attridge and Gouett 2021). Critics of \r blended finance mechanisms point to lack of data transparency \r hampering independent assessment on (i) value for public money \r [...]"


id: 4347633b50103f04eace7ceab3455e8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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"[...] and costs of blending versus other financial mechanisms, (ii) risks \r and benefits of de-risking private capital to collateralising climate\u0002vulnerable Global South populations, (iii) lack of partnership with \r local players, and (iv) complex structures (Akyuz 2017; Mawdsley \r 2018; Convergence 2020; Attridge and Gouett 2021; Gabor 2021). \r Whilst blended finance transactions (BFTF 2018) are quite common \r in mature regulated markets with mandatory reporting requirements \r (Morse 2015; ICAEW 2021), the additional finance mobilised and \r their developmental impact remain unknown due to poor reporting \r that hammpers evidence-based policy making (Attridge and Gouett \r 2021). Projects that are aligned with blended finance principles in \r the UN Addis Agenda (UN 2015a), and take account of local contexts \r by partnering with local actors, are much more likely to have \r sustainable impacts."


id: 2e6355471012b607dde5d184f5ae6c11
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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"Local financial institutions with local markets knowledge \r could benefit from technical assistance and partnership to \r scale up their potential with institutional investors better \r mobilised (high confidence). The Global South has some 260 public \r development banks/PDBs representing USD5 trillion in assets with \r a worldwide PDB capacity to provide more than USD400 billion yr-1\r of climate finance (IDFC and GCF 2020). Case studies discuss the \r potential for diaspora bond issuance being deployed for climate \r investments including securitisation of remittances as collateral \r for infrastructure bonds (Ketkar and Ratha 2010; Akkoyunlu and \r Stern 2012; Gelb et al. 2021). Such instruments could help harness \r diaspora remittances, whose flows rose from under USD 100 billion \r to USD530 billion during 1990-2018 (World Bank 2019c). PDBs could \r benefit from technical partnership with multilaterals and other local \r banks (Torres and Zeidan 2016). Their knowledge of local markets, can \r [...]"


id: 3a6165f50a6211bd3538e716ce9c8a8f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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"[...] help build project pipelines (Figure 15.7) to channel local, domestic \r and international capital (Griffith-Jones et  al. 2020). Institutional \r domestic and international investors have growing assets estimated \r to exceed USD100 trillion (high confidence) (Willis Towers Watson \r 2020; UN PRI 2020; Halland et al. 2021; Heredia et al. 2021; Inderst \r 2021) and could be better mobilised. Some 36% of total assets under \r management (AUM) by the 100 largest asset owners come from \r pensions and sovereign wealth funds in the Asia Pacific region, with \r the remainder split almost evenly across Europe, the Middle East, \r Africa and North America. The largest pension fund in South Africa \r held about USD130 billion AUM in 2019 and African institutional \r investors held USD1.8 trillion in 2020 (PwC 2015; GEPF 2019; Bagus \r et al. 2020; GCA 2021a). UK NGO War on Want's (2016) analysis of \r 101 fossil fuel and mining companies on the London Stock Exchange \r [...]"


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"[...] estimates these as holding USD1 trillion assets inside Africa. The \r Latin America and Caribbean region holds just about USD1 trillion \r AUM (Curtis 2016; Serebrisky et al. 2015; Cavallo and Powell 2019)."


id: ba9ade0d329b3178053e417fc7838f03
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"Investors with accumulated private capital are reported as \r looking for climate investments to ensure Just Transition, \r alignment with Paris and SDGs. However, progress remains \r pilot, slow and piecemeal (high confidence). Global investors \r have published statements on their possible contribution, with \r recommendations to governments on de-risking to accelerate private \r sector investment to support Paris-aligned NDCs in developing \r countries (IIGCC 2015; IIGCC 2017; Global Investor Statement \r 2018; IIGCC 2018; Global Investor Statement 2019; IIGCC 2020). \r In March 2020, the UN Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI), \r had 3038 members representing USD103 trillion (UN PRI 2020); \r another coalition of investors published COVID-19 recovery plans \r (Investor Agenda 2020) and the Net Zero Asset Managers initiative \r was launched in December 2020 (NZAM 2020). However, it is still \r unclear how these pronouncements will be transformed to adequate \r [...]"


id: 8abaa911b0fbb34952613bac227cd898
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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"[...] financial flows and volumes of investment pipelines (IEA 2021d) \r (Chapter  3). Rempel and Gupta (2020) posit that a  proportion of \r institutional holding is in fossil fuels. Clean energy transition minerals \r raise ESG questions around inclusive development for indigenous \r populations and require changes to supply chains exploiting child \r labour (Herrington 2021; IEA 2021a; IEA 2021f)."


id: 99b8e4b12696ac738793603a915ae691
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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"women and children (IEA 2014b; IRENA 2020b,c; IEA et  al. 2021; \r ESMAP 2020; Zhang 2021) (Box  6.1). These dire statistics remind \r of compounding tensions: historical inequities and the associated \r 'first comer' exploiting African resources for development elsewhere, \r the local climate change, 'latecomer' capacity development and \r technology transfer challenges, illicit mining finance and stranded \r assets (Curtis 2016; Bos and Gupta 2019; UNU-INRA 2019; Arezki \r 2021). The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbates this tension with \r more people pushed below the poverty line (Sumner et  al. 2020) \r (section 15.6.4, Box 15.6 on post-COVID). Recent analysis points to \r the 60 largest banks providing USD3.8 trillion to fossil fuel companies \r since 2016, including inside Africa (Rainforest Action Network et al. \r 2021). IMF estimated fossil fuel subsidies totalling USD5.2 trillion or \r 6.5% of global GDP in 2017 (Coady et al. 2019) to be compared with \r [...]"


id: be44dadb628b6ec1c3dcaad54a829e37
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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"[...] the USD2.4 trillion yr-1 energy investments over the next decade to \r limit global warming to 1.5degC (IPCC 2018). Analysts point to models \r in improvements to resources husbandry that include (i) developing \r strong minerals sector governance through sovereign wealth funds \r for domestic development (Wills et al. 2016) and (ii) compensation for \r Africa (Walsh et al. 2021) leaving fossil fuels underground (McGlade \r and Ekins 2015) in the Just Transition (Section  15.2.4) and Right \r to Develop debates as assets continue to be mined (IEA 2019c). In \r many developing regions, some of the world's best renewable energy \r sources remain out of reach due to high costs which can be up to \r seven times those in developed countries (IEA 2021d). Shifting some \r risks through financial de-risking approaches could be instrumental "


id: 9bcc82552ebf22bbd79efa9c4f892ddf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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"(vii) ASEAN and African multi-sovereign regional local currency bond \r guarantee funds and a co-guarantee platform (GGGI 2019; Garbacz \r et al. 2021). Fossil fuels currently benefit from de-risking tools from \r export credit agencies (Lawrence and Archer 2021), with questions \r around sustainable development (Wright 2011); Gupta et al. (2020) \r argue that these could be deployed for renewable energy. Sample \r project facilities reflecting the diverse project types across developing \r country regions can include i) UNEP Seed Capital ii) C40 Cities Facility \r iii) Blue Natural Capital Facility (IUCN 2021); iv) Clean Cooking Fund \r (ESMAP 2021) v) opportunities for guarantees in LDCs (Garbacz et al. \r 2021) vi) World Bank's Renewables Risk Mitigation (GCF 2021) and \r World Bank's Global Infrastructure Facility (GGGI 2019).. Multilaterals \r offer credit enhancement to manage both actual and perceived risks: \r in India's corporate sector, renewable energy SPV project bonds \r [...]"


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created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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"[...] have been guaranteed jointly by ADB and an infrastructure company \r raising the credit rating from sub-investment grade to investment \r grade to lower borrowing costs (ADB 2018; Agarwal and Singh 2018; \r Carrasco 2018)."


id: ecae97f6f14b6cff69635e516fce8e1d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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"complete construction enabled by concession finance. Bank loans are \r paid back by issuing bonds once the construction phase is completed. \r Such bond refinancing over say, 15-25 years, in the low-risk mature \r project phase can provide a lower cost of capital. Market-making to \r develop a pipeline of investment opportunities uses a complimentary \r mix of high-risk capital options in the form of grants, guarantees, \r equity, and mezzanine financing that can help (Attridge and Gouett \r 2021): (i) reduce up-front risks in the early phases, (ii) allow banks to \r recycle loans to new projects, and (iii) galvanise multilateral technical \r assistance for building bond yield curve benchmarks and de-risking \r local currency bond issuance of long tenors such as green bonds/\r resilience bonds (Berensmann et al. 2015; CBI 2015; Mercer 2018; \r Dasgupta et al. 2019; PIDG 2019; Braga et al. 2021; CBI et al. 2021; \r Hourcade et al. 2021a,b). Convergence (2019) points to investment \r [...]"


id: eda8338872eb1424878d4ddf0e3e0acb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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"[...] from commercial banks with commercial debt of 11-15 years \r maturity being covered by guarantees. To achieve scale, some have \r issued special purpose vehicle (SPV) green infrastructure project \r bonds combining tenors up to 15 years with credit ratings assigned \r to mobilise investors with community trusts for local participation \r (Kaminker and Stewart 2012; Mathews and Kidney 2012; Mbeng \r Mezui and Hundal 2013; Essers et al. 2016; Moody's Investors Service \r 2016; Ng and Tao 2016; Harber 2017). Bond refinancing could be \r facilitated through standardised national infrastructure style bonds, \r national infrastructure funds (Amonya 2009; Ketterer and Powell \r 2018) and country SPV infrastructure funds issuing bonds (Cavallo \r and Powell 2019) embedding MDBs."


id: 7e9786d2ed7704bc2c39db208e74ecff
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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"Investment vehicles into green infrastructure come in various forms \r (high confidence) and can include indirect corporate investment such \r as bonds; semi-direct investment funds via pooled vehicles such as \r infrastructure funds and private equity funds and project investment \r (direct) in green projects through equity and debt including loans, \r project bonds and green bonds. For pension funds in Australia and \r Canada, direct investment in infrastructure is about 5% of total AUM \r (Inderst and Della Croce 2013) whilst less than 1% for OECD pension \r funds goes to green infrastructure (Kaminker et  al. 2013). Some \r regional developing country institutional investors use a variety of \r investment vehicles that span SPVs, private equity, domestic and \r regional local currency bond markets with statutory level mandates \r to address historic inequities (GEPF 2019). Cross-border collaboration \r in regional power markets such as Europe's Nordpool; for developing \r [...]"


id: 99408e5032c85cfa07a1db32ba0bfbdd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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"[...] countries could be led by repository of technical partnership from \r infrastructure funds and multilaterals (Oseni and Pollitt 2016; Juvonen \r et al. 2019; Chen et al. 2020; Nordpool 2021). Barriers to investments \r include non-standardised investment vehicles of scale and lack \r of national infrastructure road maps to give investor confidence \r in government commitment. Some have set up infrastructure \r coordinating entities embedding local science and engineering R&D \r (IPA 2021; National Infrastructure Commission 2021). Arezki et  al. \r (2016) argue that coordination within existing platforms could create \r a  global infrastructure investment platform for de-risking through \r guarantees and securitisation; Matthaus and (Mehling (2020) point \r to a global guarantee mechanism. Such AAA multilateral approaches \r create credibility-enhancing effects in developing capital markets. \r Hourcade et al. (2021a) suggest that the overall economic efficiency \r [...]"


id: f42580a777b3a660d20aa2de602e7a0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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"[...] could be higher with guarantees calibrated per tonne on an agreed \r 'social, economic, and environmental value of mitigation actions \r [and] their co-benefits' (Article 108, Paris Agreement) basis, which \r would operate as a notional carbon price (High-Level Commission on \r Carbon Prices 2017). The grant equivalent of guarantees and induced \r equity inflows could be far beyond the USD100 billion promise. \r Such cooperative solutions in adopting development of local capital \r markets would end the drawbacks of the current plethora of low\u0002scale fragmented project-by-project and 'special-purpose' pilots \r and programmes"


id: e7d8493e474d48f4f93e24cf4c26fdc5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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"Existing project risk facilities including guarantees could \r benefit from coordination, scaling and better reporting \r frameworks (high confidence). Individual and clubs of developed \r and developing countries currently provide public guarantees \r (ADB 2015, 2018; IIGCC 2015; Pereira Dos Santos 2018; GGGI \r 2019; Garbacz et al. 2021). However MDB business models impose \r limitations on use of guarantees and collaboration with other MDBs \r (Gropp et al. 2014; Schiff and Dithrich 2017; Lee et al. 2018; Pereira \r dos Santos and Kearney 2018). Loans continue to dominate as the \r financial instrument of choice by MDBs and DFIs, with guarantees \r mobilising the most private finance for OECD reported data, even \r if their use remains limited (IATFD 2020; OECD 2020c; Attridge \r and Gouett 2021). Ramping up the use of guarantees to mobilise \r private investment raises questions around understanding efficacy \r in the design as there is no one size that fits all and more research \r [...]"


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created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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"[...] is required to better understand this aspect (Convergence 2019). \r Sample guarantee forms in literature: (i) single-country Sweden and \r USA DFI forms (SIDA 2016, DCA 2018), (ii) multilateral institution \r offerings (Pereira Dos Santos 2018; IRENA 2020e), (iii) multi\u0002sovereign guarantees one-stop platforms such as those on the \r PIDG/GuarantCo (PIDG 2019) and Africa Guarantee Fund owned \r by DFIs, including the African Development Bank (AfDB), the French \r Development Agency (AFD), the Nordic Development Fund (NDF), \r and the KfW Development Bank (AGF 2020), (iv) MIGA, established \r to provide political risk guarantees (enhanced green MIGA) (Deau \r and Touati 2018), (v) multilateral partnerships with developing \r nations via infrastructure funds (Section  15.6.7.2) and green \r infrastructure options (de Gouvello and Zelenko 2010; Studart and \r Gallagher 2015), (vi) guarantees embedded in project risk facilities \r such as currency fund TCX established by 22 DFIs (TCX 2020), and "


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"UNFCCC 2021). LDCs supported by humanitarian entities are \r least likely to have active capital markets (ICRC 2020; IDFC 2020; \r Cao et al. 2021b). Clubs of LDCs are partnering with AAA MDBs in \r aggregation approaches (AfDB 2020; GCF 2020b). Some UN entities \r provide technical assistance on municipal aggregation of projects \r (UN CDF 2021a), with Africa, LDC, SIDS nations and cities accessing \r green technical facilities and listings for labelled bonds (C40 Cities \r Climate Leadership Group 2016; Gorelick 2018; Jackson 2019; FSD \r Africa and CBI 2020; Gorelick and Walmsley 2020; MoE Fiji 2020; IFC \r 2021c). Elevated climate risks imperil developing country ability to \r repay debts (Schmidt 2014; Buhr et al. 2018; Volz et al. 2020; Dibley \r et al. 2021). To lower overall costs and achieve more, entities have \r accessed technical assistance, listed local currency labelled bonds, \r and used credit enhancing bond guarantees, regulatory treatments \r [...]"


id: 3428e29595d4f3113505f62823a2253b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6415
content:
"[...] and philanthropy schemes (Europe 2020 Project Bond Initiative 2012; \r SBN 2018; Agliardi and Agliardi 2019; Banga 2019). In the regions, \r China issued guidelines for stock exchanges and regulatory support \r for green bonds (Cao and Ma 2021), India issued regulations for \r local issuance of green bonds (CBI 2019a), while in the Latin America \r and Caribbean region, both plain vanilla and labelled bonds use the \r same authority (Ketterer et al. 2019). African, LDC and SIDS nations \r are reviewing ways to harness local exchanges (SSE 2018; GCF \r 2019; World Bank et al. 2021b; UN CDF 2021b). For taxonomies, the \r differences reflect the multitude of local Just Transition pathways, \r some with a  purely environmental focus and others incorporating \r livelihood improvements (ICMA 2021). The sustainable bond market \r has been expanding as transition bonds become listed in anticipation \r of future developments (Roos 2021)."


id: 9904094778a2558ef75a1251632b76d8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24138
content:
"Harnessing existing bond markets and securities exchanges \r in nascent markets. The G20 has an action plan to support \r strengthening local currency bond markets and development of local \r capital markets is also part of the option for financing UN SDGs in \r developing countries (UN 2015a, 2019, 2020; IATFD 2016, 2021). \r Primers are available on bond market development to support policy \r choices (World Bank and IMF 2001; Silva et  al. 2020; World Bank \r 2020; Adrian et al 2021; IMF and World Bank 2021). Developing \r government bond yield curves with different maturities can be an \r important policy objective (high confidence). This can support pricing \r discovery, liquidity (Wooldridge 2001) and can be achieved through \r step by step tranches from shorter to longer maturities to boost \r confidence and encourage municipals and other quasi-sovereigns. \r Money market instruments (such as, green commercial paper) anchor \r [...]"


id: 8913f85844e88d0ea10ceb0f5f4eb47
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21284
content:
"[...] the short end of the yield curve with bonds of varying maturity issued \r by sovereign/quasi-sovereign entities (national treasuries, SOEs, \r municipalities) to mobilise investors (Goodfriend 2011; LSEG 2018; \r Tolliver et al. 2019). A variety of bonds are being used for developing \r countries including green (Ketterer et  al. 2019), blue-water (Roth \r et  al. 2019), transition, SDG/social, biodiversity bonds (Aglionby \r 2019), green/resilience bonds (AAC 2021); gender bonds (Andrade \r and Prado 2020) diaspora (LSEG 2017) and infrastructure project \r bonds (CBK 2021). Local policymakers would gain from technical \r and financial assistance in building green yield curves, for example \r with support from multilaterals (EIB 2012; IATFD 2016; Shi 2017; EIB \r 2018; Impact Investing Institute 2021). Green bonds are one of the \r most readily accessible to help fund Paris goals (Tolliver et al. 2019; \r Tuhkanen and Vulturius 2020). Section 15.3.2 refers to the growth in \r [...]"


id: 213d0c290a506540d294bf4b8dd2f3a4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3064
content:
"[...] labelled bond markets (CBI 2021a), low borrowing costs and yield \r curve building in Europe (Bahceli 2020; Serenelli 2021; Stubbington \r 2021; UK DMO 2021). For developing countries, labelled bonds have \r mostly been in hard currency (e.g. Smith 2021) despite local currency \r markets making up more than 80% total debt stock (IMF and World \r Bank 2016; Silva et al. 2020; Adrian et al 2021; Inderst 2021). The \r labelled bonds issuance by multilaterals do not currently mobilise \r the trillion levels needed. Research studies show that participating \r in green bond markets in part depends on a country having credible \r NDCs (Tolliver et  al. 2020a; Tolliver et  al. 2020b) and highlights \r diverse approaches working together to support local bond market \r development (Amacker and Donovan 2021; ICMA 2021; IMF and \r World Bank 2021)."


id: be92705f2501e6f356afe58edd819b62
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30790
content:
"Progress towards transparency using scientific-based methods \r to build trust and accountability. After 60 years of development \r finance, critics underline limits coming from i) multilaterals model, \r lack of transparency around aid and debt (Mkandawire 2010; Lee \r 2017; PWYF 2019; Bradlow 2021; Gianfagna et  al. 2021) ii) illicit \r finance (Plank 1993; Sachs and Warner 2001; Hanlon 2016; US DoJ \r 2019) ) iii) lack of developed country commitment to pledges (Nhamo \r and Nhamo 2016) iv) unregulated players as financial intermediaries \r in blended finance (Pereira 2017; Donaldson and Hawkes 2018; \r Attridge and Engen 2019; Tan 2019) v) weak accountability reflected \r in soft SDG data and vi) burden of responsibility in mobilising Paris \r and SDG resources to countries with historically soft institutional \r capacity (Hickel 2015; Donald and Way 2016; Scheyvens et al. 2016; \r Liverman 2018). Literature around trust in blended finance pinpoints \r [...]"


id: cdcb06bfab02332ad40ef6b80f1fdc74
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33532
content:
"[...] four progress areas in accountability. First, debt transparency through \r public debt registries, centralised UN legacy debt restructuring and \r science-centred UN national statistical systems (Donaldson and \r Hawkes 2018; Jubilee Debt Campaign 2019; Stiglitz and Rashid 2020). \r Second, international reporting bell-weathers could be called upon to \r produce harmonised mandatory reporting frameworks that capitalise \r on TCFD to capture climate, debt sustainability (Section 15.6.7.3), SDG \r and fossil fuels (GISD 2020). Third, standardisation of assessment by \r third parties of the quantity and values of carbon saved by green \r projects (Hourcade et al. 2012) and of their contribution to quantified \r performance biodiversity targets (Finance for Biodiversity Initiative \r 2021) to facilitate their bundling, securitisation and repackaging in \r standardised liquid products and bonds (Arezki et al. 2016; Blended \r Finance Taskforce 2018a)."


id: 966534d583fa13e333ec0b85d3e37cae
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23661
content:
"Financial technology applications to climate change. Financial \r technology, abbreviated as 'fintech', applies to data-driven \r technological solutions that aim to improve financial services \r (Dorfleitner et al. 2017; Lee and Shin 2018; Schueffel 2018). Fintech \r can enhance climate investment in innovative financial products and \r build trust through data, but also presents some challenges including \r potentially significant emissions from increased energy use with \r distributed transactions (Lei et al. 2021). Blockchain is a key fintech \r that secures individual transactions in a  distributed system, which \r can have many applications with high impact potential but is also \r associated with uncertainty (OECD 2019c; World Energy Council \r 2019). Fintech applications with climate change mitigation potential \r have been growing recently, including tracking payment or asset \r history for credit scoring in AFOLU activities (Nassiry 2018; Davidovic \r [...]"


id: f70d309d2493eceaee566e50ae035ed0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40835
content:
"[...] et al. 2019), blockchain supported grid transactions (Livingston et al. \r 2018), carbon accounting throughout value chains (World Bank \r 2018b), or transparency and verification mechanisms for green \r financial instrument investors (Kyriakou et al. 2017; Stockholm Green \r Digital Finance 2017). Generally, blockchain and digital currency \r applications are not well covered by governance systems (Tapscott \r and Kirkland 2016; Nassiry 2018), which could lead to problems with \r security (Davidovic et al. 2019), and some licensing and prudential \r supervision frameworks are in flux."


id: e4efb54fa3b7aad4c21e7342f7f0d940
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37570
content:
"Current main challenges of REDD+ finance include the uncertainty of \r compliance carbon markets (which allow regulated entities to obtain \r and surrender emissions allowances or offsets to meet regulatory \r emissions reduction targets) (Maguire et al. 2021), as well as limited \r engagement of the private sector in REDD+ finance (high confidence). \r With regard to the compliance carbon markets, at the international \r level, integrating climate cooperation through carbon markets into \r Article 6 of the Paris Agreement and including REDD+ has potential \r to enable emission reduction in more cost-effective ways, while the \r links between carbon markets and REDD+ under Article 6 is under \r discussion at the UNFCCC (Environmental Defense Fund 2019; \r Maguire et al. 2021) (Chapter 14). At the national and subnational \r levels, although compliance carbon markets such as in New Zealand, \r Australia and Colombia allow forest carbon units, how REDD+ will \r [...]"


id: 21339f6b69b91fb6475b0c3d9cef4f0e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3057
content:
"[...] be dealt in the national and subnational government-led compliance \r carbon markets is uncertain (Streck 2020; Maguire et al. 2021). As \r for limited engagement of the private sector in REDD+ finance, there \r are various reasons why mobilising more private finance in REDD+ is \r difficult (Dixon and Challies 2015; Laing et al. 2016; Golub et al. 2018; \r Ehara et al. 2019; Streck 2020). The challenges include the needs of \r a  clear understanding of carbon rights and transparent regulation \r on who can benefit from national REDD+ (Streck 2020); a  clear \r regulatory framework and market certainty (Dixon and Challies 2015; \r Laing et al. 2016; Golub et al. 2018; Ehara et al. 2019); strong forest \r governance (Streck 2020), and implementation of REDD+ activities \r at national and subnational levels. Other challenges are associated \r with the nature of forest-based mitigation activities, the costs and \r complexity of monitoring, reporting and verification of REDD+ \r [...]"


id: bfc92715125fa9f70b39729a02e1c44c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31025
content:
"[...] activities, because of the need to consider the risks of permanence, \r carbon leakage, and precisely determine and monitor the forest \r carbon sinks (van der Gaast et al. 2018; Yanai et al. 2020). Although \r REDD+ has many challenges to mobilise more private finance, there \r is discussion on exploring other finance opportunities for the forest \r sector, such as building new blended finance models combining \r different funding sources like public and private finance (Streck 2016; \r Rode et al. 2019), and developing enhanced bonds for forest-based \r mitigation activities (World Bank 2017)."


id: e86ccfbb6854777463b3e1657f49e7d3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38227
content:
"REDD+. REDD+ can significantly contribute to climate change \r mitigation and also produce other co-benefits like climate \r change adaptation, biodiversity conservation, and poverty reduction, \r if well-implemented (high confidence) (Milbank et al. 2018; Morita \r and Matsumoto 2018). We use the term REDD+ broadly, not limited \r to REDD+ implemented under the UNFCCC decisions, including \r Warsaw Framework for REDD+ (Chapter 14), but include voluntary \r REDD+ projects, such as projects which utilise voluntary carbon \r markets. Finance is a core element that incentivises and implements \r REDD+ activities. Various financial sources are financing REDD+ \r activities, including bilateral and multilateral, public and private, \r and international and domestic sources, with linking with several \r finance approaches/mechanisms including results-based finance \r and voluntary carbon markets (FAO 2018). However, there is lack \r of sufficient finance for REDD+ (Lujan and Silva-Chavez 2018; \r [...]"


id: 3d9a84e17b9de345deb95c19422b99d6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8008
content:
"[...] Maguire et  al. 2021). REDD+ under the UNFCCC is implemented \r in three phases: readiness, implementation, and results-based \r payment phases. The Ecosystem Marketplace identified that at least \r USD5.4 billion in REDD+ in three phases funding has been committed \r through multiple development finance institutions so far (Maguire \r et al. 2021), and public funds are main sources that are supporting \r three phases, and most of the REDD+ finance was spent on the \r readiness phase (Atmadja et al. 2018; Lujan and Silva-Chavez 2018; \r Watson and Schalatek 2021). There is a significant gap between the \r existing finance and finance needs of REDD+ in each phase (Lujan \r and Silva-Chavez 2018). Furthermore, private sector contributions to \r REDD+ are currently limited mostly to the project-scale payments for \r carbon offsets/units through voluntary carbon markets (McFarland \r 2015; Lujan and Silva-Chavez 2018)."


id: d027ee2915a8a7d6013ab78e76840045
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33981
content:
"Private finance opportunities for nature-based solutions. The \r development of nature-based solutions faces barriers that relate to \r the value proposition, value delivery and value capture of nature\u0002based solutions business models and sustainable sources of public/\r private finance to tap into (high confidence) (Toxopeus and Polzin \r 2017; Mok et al. 2021). However, the demand for establishing new \r finance and business models to attract both public and private \r finance to nature-based solutions is increasing in a wide range of \r topics such as urban areas, forestry and agriculture sectors, and blue \r natural capital including mangroves and coral reefs (Toxopeus and \r Polzin 2017; EIB 2019; Cziesielski et al. 2021; Mok et al. 2021; Thiele \r et al. 2021; UNEP et al. 2021). Furthermore, the recognition of the \r needs of financial institutions to identify the physical, transition and \r reputational risks resulting from not only climate change but also loss \r [...]"


id: 49008306eaf3818b9197f19bf865890
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10068
content:
"[...] of biodiversity is gradually increasing (De Nederlandsche Bank and \r PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency 2020; Dasgupta \r 2021; TNFD 2021). Development of finance and business models for \r nature-based solutions needs to be explored, for example through \r utilising a  wide range of financial instruments (e.g.,  equity, loans, "


id: 33819be0962c0aa7bbfeca2b358344f2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6311
content:
"15.6.8.3 Exploring Gender-responsive Climate Finance\r Global and national recognition of the lack of finance for women has \r led to increasing emphasis on financial inclusion for women (high \r confidence). Currently, it is estimated that 980 million women are \r excluded from formal financial system (Miles and Wiedmaier-Pfister \r 2018); and there is a  9% gender gap in financial access across \r developing countries (Demirguc-Kunt et al. 2018). This gender gap \r is the percentage difference between men and women with bank \r accounts as measured and reported in the Global Financial Inclusion \r (Global Findex) database. Policies and frameworks to expand and \r enhance financial inclusion also extend to the area of climate \r finance (high confidence). Since AR5, there remain many questions \r and not enough evidence on the gender, distribution and allocative \r effectiveness of climate finance in the context of gender equality and \r [...]"


id: aa045569088c9671ad27ade76c6c3f4b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27137
content:
"[...] women's empowerment (Williams M., 2015; Chan et al. 2018; Wong \r et al. 2019). Nonetheless, the existing global policy framework (entry \r points, policy priorities, etc.) of climate funds is gradually improving \r in order to support women's financial inclusion in both the public \r and the private dimensions of climate finance/investment (Schalatek \r 2015; Chan et  al. 2018; Schalatek 2020). At the level of public \r multilateral climate funds, there have been significant improvements \r in integrating gender equality and women's empowerment \r issues in the governance structures, policies, project approval and \r implementation processes of existing multilateral climate funds such \r as the UNFCCC's funds managed by the Global Environment Facility, \r the Green Climate Fund and the World Bank's CIFs (high confidence) \r (Schalatek 2015; Williams M., 2015; Sellers 2016; GCF 2017). But \r according to a  recent evaluation report, the integration of gender \r [...]"


id: 4e0319b163675c942b8f66554cefb845
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10985
content:
"[...] into operational policies and programmes is fragmented and there is \r lack of an 'adequate, systematic and comprehensive gender equality \r approach for the allocation and distribution of funds for projects \r and programmes on the ground' (GEF Independent Evaluation \r Office 2017; Schalatek 2018). The review found that 'almost half \r of the analysed sample of 70 climate projects were judged to be \r largely gender-blind, and only 5% considered to have successfully \r mainstreamed gender, including in two Least Developed Countries \r Fund adaptation projects' (GEF Independent Evaluation Office \r 2017; Schalatek 2018). While the GCF requires funding proposals \r to consider gender impact as part of their investment framework,16\r the fund does not have its own funding stream targeted to women's \r project on the ground, nor is there as yet an evaluation as to how \r entities are actually implementing gender action plan in the projects. \r [...]"


id: 8696438879222fa1f6bea15ff1b8471b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20843
content:
"[...] In the case of the CIFs, as noted by Schalatek (2018), 'gender is not \r included in the operational principles of the Pilot Program on Climate \r Resilience (PPCR), which funds programmatic adaptation portfolios \r in a  few developing countries, although most pilot countries have "


id: 1bfd97eee806fc5b85c06ac5bfe7f552
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2111
content:
"Overall, efforts to promote gender responsive/sensitive climate \r finance, at national and local levels, both in the public and private \r dimensions and more specifically in mitigation-oriented sectors such \r as clean and renewable energy, remain deficient (high confidence). \r Recent developments in the capital markets in the areas of social \r bond are focused around gender bonds - debt instruments targeted \r to activities and behaviours that are relevant to gender equality and \r women's empowerment. These bonds are aligned with Sustainability\u0002linked Bonds as well as Social Bonds Principles of the International \r Capital Market Association. Issuances of gender-labelled bonds \r are increasing in the Asia Pacific region (the most comprehensive \r initiative is the Impact Investment Exchange's (IIX) multi-country \r USD150 million Women's Livelihood Bond17) and in Latin America, \r Colombia, Mexico and Panama each have gender bond issuances). \r [...]"


id: 746c09f63ea2460f2077db6fe34c1610
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17714
content:
"[...] Additionally, a few developing countries, such as Pakistan (May 2021) \r and Morocco (March 2021) have issued gender bond guidelines for \r financial market participants."


id: c3d0d69a48de243eee0d47979f3f8dd6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31723
content:
"Linkage to sectoral climate change issues and gender and \r climate finance. Subsets of actions designed to enhance women's \r more formal integration into climate policies, programmes and \r actions by the global private sector include: investment in clean \r energy, redirecting funds to support women and vulnerable regions \r as a component of social and green bonds as well as insurance for \r climate risk management. In the latter context, insurance providers \r are arguing that 'given the fact that women are disproportionately \r affected by climate change, there could be new finance innovations \r to address this gap'.(Miles and Wiedmaier-Pfister 2018). AXA \r and IFC estimate that the global women's insurance market \r has the opportunity to grow to three times its current size, to \r UDS1.7  trillion by 2030 (AXA Group et  al. 2015; GIZ et  al. 2017). \r However, across the board, and in particular with regard to public \r funds, despite improvements in the substantive gender sensitisation \r [...]"


id: 74f91381ef8c9e1a1ab3bc90010bf76f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17815
content:
"[...] and operational gender responsiveness of multilateral and bilateral \r climate finance funds operations, current flows of public and climate \r finance do not seem to be going to women and local communities \r in significant amounts (Chan et  al. 2018; Schalatek 2020). At the \r same time, evaluations of the effectiveness of climate finance show \r that equitable flow of climate finance can play an important role \r in levelling the playing field and in enabling women and men to \r successfully respond to climate change and to enable the success and \r sustainability of local response in ensuring effective and sustainable "


id: 8d0dac13007b0ac915790fb1cb24c5d5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22008
content:
"The Paris Agreement has widened the scope of all financial flows from climate finance only to the full alignment of finance flows \r with the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement. While climate finance relates historically to the financial support of developed \r countries to developing countries, the Paris Agreement and its Article 2.1(c) have developed a new narrative that goes much beyond \r traditional flows and relates to all sectors and actors. Finance flows are consistent when the effects are either neutral with or \r without positive climate co-benefits to climate objectives; or explicitly targeted to climate benefits in adaptation and/or mitigation \r result areas. Climate-related financial risk is still massively underestimated by financial institutions, financial decision-makers more \r generally and also among public sector stakeholders, limiting the sector's potential of being an enabler of the transition. The private \r [...]"


id: a355c219a3e88159fab72be782510b9f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25945
content:
"[...] sector has started to recognise climate-related risks and consequently redirect investment flows. Dynamics vary across sectors and \r regions with the financial sector being an enabler of transitions in only some selected (sub-)sectors and regions. Consistent, credible, \r timely and forward-looking political leadership remains central to strengthen the financial sector as enabler."


id: 9cf1271fcb9d14784fed57e3a147ff3c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24845
content:
"Progress on the alignment of financial flows with low GHG emissions pathways remains slow. Annual global climate finance \r flows are on an upward trend since the Fifth Assessment Report, according to the Climate Policy Initiative reaching more than \r USD630 billion in 2019/2020, however, growth has likely slowed down and flows remain significantly below needs. This is driven \r by barriers within and outside the financial sector. More than 90% of financing is allocated to mitigation activities despite the \r strong economic rationale of adaptation action. Adjusting for higher estimates on current flows for energy efficiency based on \r International Energy Agency data, the dominance of mitigation becomes even stronger. Persistently high levels of both public and \r private fossil-fuel related financing as well as other misaligned flows continue to be of major concern despite recent commitments. \r [...]"


id: d3500945460662dc15646a150ed8f5e8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34522
content:
"[...] Significant progress has been made in the commercial finance sector with regard to the awareness of climate risks resulting from \r inadequate financial flows and climate action. However, a more consequent investment and policy decision-making that enables \r a rapid redirection of financial flows is needed. Regulatory support as a catalyser is an essential driver of such redirections. Dynamics \r across sectors and regions vary, with some being better positioned to close financing gaps and to benefit from an enabling role of \r finance in the short-term."


id: 32dc1d0afd5fc73805febfb477f1cd89
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6214
content:
"Maarten van Aalst (the Netherlands), Lara Aleluia Reis (Portugal), Mustafa Babiker (Sudan/Saudi \r Arabia), Xuemei Bai (Australia), Rudi Bekkers (the Netherlands), Paolo Bertoldi (Italy), Sara Burch \r (Canada), Luisa F. Cabeza (Spain), Clara Caiafa (Brazil/the Netherlands), Brett Cohen (South Africa), \r Felix Creutzig (Germany), Renee van Diemen (the Netherlands/United Kingdom), Maria Josefina \r Figueroa Meza (Venezuela/Denmark), Clara Galeazzi (Argentina), Frank Geels (United Kingdom/\r the Netherlands), Michael Grubb (United Kingdom), Kirsten Halsnaes (Denmark), Joni Jupesta \r (Indonesia/Japan), Siir Kilkis (Turkey), Michael Konig (Germany), Jonathan Kohler (Germany), \r Abhishek Malhotra (India), Eric Masanet (the United States of America), William McDowall \r (United Kingdom), Nikola Milojevic-Dupont (France), Catherine Mitchell (United Kingdom), \r Gregory F. Nemet (the United States of America/Canada), Lars J. Nilsson (Sweden), Anthony Patt \r [...]"


id: bd16e95b24a1f02654b409019098c133
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30516
content:
"[...] (Switzerland), Patricia Perkins (Canada), Joyashree Roy (India/Thailand), Karolina  Safarzynska \r (Poland), Yamina Saheb (France/Algeria), Ayyoob Sharifi (Iran/Japan), Kavita  Surana (India), \r Harald Winkler (South Africa)"


id: a3fb99c593451ed0a54130a89014df44
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26039
content:
"innovation policy instruments would nonetheless have to be tailored \r to local development priorities, to the specific context of different \r countries, and to the technology being supported. The timing of \r interventions and any trade-offs with sustainable development \r also need to be addressed. Public R&D funding and support, as \r well as innovation procurement, have proven valuable for fostering \r innovation in small to medium cleantech firms. Innovation outcomes \r of policy instruments not necessarily aimed at innovation, such \r as feed-in tariffs, auctions, emissions trading schemes, taxes and \r renewable portfolio standards, vary from negligible to positive for \r climate change mitigation. Some specific designs of environmental \r taxation can also result in negative distributional outcomes. Most \r of the available literature and evidence on innovation systems \r come from industrialised countries and larger developing countries. \r [...]"


id: 72cd239f770cb73864f333358b1c5cd1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
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vector_id: 17442
content:
"[...] However, there is a  growing body of evidence from developing \r countries and Small Island Developing States (SIDS). {16.4, 16.4.4.3, \r 16.4.4.4, 16.5, 16.7}"


id: 27b361dbfeda41aba3f21dd545f1431c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4168
content:
"Innovation in climate mitigation technologies has seen \r enormous activity and significant progress in recent years. \r Innovation has also led to, and exacerbated, trade-offs \r in relation to sustainable development (high confidence). \r Innovation can leverage action to mitigate climate change by \r reinforcing other interventions. In conjunction with other enabling \r conditions, innovation can support system transitions to limit \r warming and help shift development pathways. The currently \r widespread implementation of solar photovoltaic (solar PV) and \r light-emitting diodes (LEDs), for instance, could not have happened \r without technological innovation (high confidence). Technological \r innovation can also bring about new and improved ways of delivering \r services that are essential to human well-being. At the same time \r as delivering benefits, innovation can result in trade-offs that \r undermine both progress on mitigation and progress towards other \r [...]"


id: 4e186138dc75af15a1e45dcaacefd5e0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"[...] Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Trade-offs include negative \r externalities  - for instance, greater environmental pollution and \r social inequalities - rebound effects leading to lower net emission \r reductions or even increases in emissions, and increased dependency \r on foreign knowledge and providers (high confidence). Effective \r governance and policy has the potential to avoid and minimise such \r misalignments (medium evidence, high agreement). {16.1, 16.2, \r 16.3, 16.4, 16.5.1, 16.6}"


id: 18100f5dbb9451362e1970bbadcce82e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1442
content:
"Experience and analyses show that technological change is \r inhibited if technological innovation system functions are \r not adequately fulfilled. This inhibition occurs more often \r in developing countries (high confidence). Examples of such \r functions are knowledge development, resource mobilisation, and \r activities that shape the needs, requirements and expectations \r of actors within the innovation system (guidance of the search). \r Capabilities play a key role in these functions, the build-up of which \r can be enhanced by domestic measures, but also by international \r cooperation (high confidence). For instance, innovation cooperation \r on wind energy has contributed to the accelerated global spread \r of this technology. As another example, the policy guidance by the \r Indian government, which also promoted development of data, \r testing capabilities and knowledge within the private sector, has been \r a key determinant of the success of an energy-efficiency programme \r [...]"


id: a88a3d1b8ee47bb5d3f2015026cc4aa5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26864
content:
"[...] for air conditioners and refrigerators in India. {16.3, 16.5, 16.6, Cross\u0002Chapter Box 12 in this chapter, Box 16.2}"


id: fd29604a7e473b7c6ac8168e9a7787f6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41889
content:
"A systemic view of innovation to direct and organise the \r processes has grown over the last decade. This systemic view \r of innovation takes into account the role of actors, institutions \r and their interactions, and can inform how innovation systems \r that vary across technologies, sectors and countries, can \r be strengthened (high confidence). Where a systemic view of \r innovation has been taken, it has enabled the development and \r implementation of indicators that are better able to provide insights \r into innovation processes. This, in turn, has enabled the analysis \r and strengthening of innovation systems. Traditional quantitative \r innovation indicators mainly include research and development \r (R&D) investments and patents. Systemic indicators of innovation, \r however, go well beyond these approaches. They include structural \r innovation system elements including actors and networks, as well \r as indicators for how innovation systems function, such as access to \r [...]"


id: 97524705d1428448486c070a90cb7fa0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23824
content:
"[...] finance, employment in relevant sectors, and lobbying activities. For \r example, in Latin America, monitoring systemic innovation indicators \r for the effectiveness of agroecological mitigation approaches has \r provided insights on the appropriateness and social alignment of \r new technologies and practices. Climate-energy-economy models, \r including integrated assessment models, generally employ a stylised \r and necessarily incomplete view of innovation, and have yet to \r incorporate a systemic representation of innovation systems. {16.2, \r 16.2.4, 16.3, 16.3.4, 16.5, Table 16.7, Box 16.1, Box 16.3, Box 16.10}"


id: c0d9cb5b9d4c87b27079b648a0373488
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31225
content:
"Although some initiatives have mobilised investments in \r developing countries, gaps in innovation cooperation remain, \r including in the Paris Agreement instruments. These gaps \r could be filled by enhancing financial support for international \r technology cooperation, by strengthening cooperative \r approaches, and by helping build suitable capacity in developing \r countries across all technological innovation system functions \r (high confidence). The implementation of current arrangements of \r international cooperation for technology development and transfer, \r as well as capacity building, are insufficient to meet climate objectives \r and contribute to sustainable development. For example, despite \r building a  large market for mitigation technologies in developing \r countries, the lack of a systemic perspective in the implementation \r of the Clean Development Mechanism, operational since the mid\u00022000s, has only led to some technology transfer, especially to larger \r [...]"


id: d9be8c4e4c14b34863d770fb1953764
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35605
content:
"[...] developing countries, but limited capacity building and minimal \r technology development (medium confidence). In the current \r climate regime, a more systemic approach to innovation cooperation \r could be introduced by linking technology institutions, such as the \r Technology Mechanism, and financial actors, such as the financial \r mechanism. {16.5.3}"


id: caad195c7230484efa853029404457e9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32998
content:
"Better and more comprehensive data on innovation indicators \r can provide timely insights for policymakers and policy design \r locally, nationally and internationally, especially for developing \r countries, where such insights are missing more often. Data \r needed include those that can show the strength of technological, \r sectoral and national innovation systems. It is also necessary to \r validate current results and generate insights from theoretical \r frameworks and empirical studies for developing countries contexts. \r Innovation studies on adaptation and mitigation other than energy \r and ex-post assessments of the effectiveness of various innovation\u0002related policies and interventions, including R&D, would also provide \r benefits. Furthermore, methodological developments to improve the \r ability of integrated assessment models (IAMs) to capture energy \r innovation system dynamics, and the relevant institutions and \r [...]"


id: a1dd5eefde0e13395e46d15c53b21cbc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25702
content:
"[...] policies (including design and implementation), would allow for more \r realistic assessment. {16.2, 16.3, 16.7}"


id: f1688da3ccd5e3636ca538e8113abff1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39857
content:
"Countries are exposed to sustainable development challenges \r in parallel with the challenges that relate to climate change. \r Addressing both sets of challenges simultaneously presents \r multiple and recurrent obstacles that systemic approaches \r to technological change could help resolve, provided they \r are well managed (high confidence). Obstacles include both \r entrenched power relations dominated by vested interests that \r control and benefit from existing technologies, and governance \r structures that continue to reproduce unsustainable patterns of \r production and consumption (medium confidence). Studies also \r highlight the potential for cultural factors to strongly influence the \r pace and direction of technological change. Sustainable solutions \r require adoption and mainstreaming of locally novel technologies \r that can meet local needs, and simultaneously address the SDGs. \r Acknowledging the systemic nature of technological innovation, \r [...]"


id: d3e8a59b155a898ce15c48c2cad748f2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34617
content:
"[...] which involves many levels of actors, stages of innovation and \r scales, can lead to new opportunities to shift development pathways \r towards sustainability. {16.4, 16.5, 16.6}"


id: 685b909f48ed4008757bae720a4bff20
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15631
content:
"The literature refers to the terms 'technology push', 'market pull', \r 'regulatory push-pull', and 'firm specific factors' as drivers for \r innovation, mostly to inform policymakers (Zubeltzu-Jaka et al. 2018). \r There has also been growing interest in social drivers, motivated by the \r recognition of social issues, such as unemployment and public health, \r linked to the deployment of innovative low-carbon technologies \r (Altantsetseg et al. 2020). Policy and social factors and the diverse \r trajectories of innovation are influenced by regional and national \r conditions (Tariq et al. 2017), and such local needs and purposes need \r to be considered in crafting international policies aimed at fostering \r the global transition towards increased sustainability (Caravella and \r Crespi 2020). From this standpoint, a multidimensional, multi-actor, \r systemic innovation approach would be needed to enhance global \r innovation diffusion (de Jesus and Mendonca 2018), especially if this \r [...]"


id: 6a7704f905db7346b75294834a1e4530
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16010
content:
"[...] is to lead to overall sustainability improvements rather than result in \r new sustainability challenges."


id: 379ced26ec57f6f3c9546d988108175a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6993
content:
"Policies to mitigate climate change do not always take into account \r the effects of mitigation technologies on other environmental \r and social challenges (Arvesen et al. 2011). Policies also often \r disregard the strong linkages between technological innovation \r and social innovation; the latter is understood to be the use of soft \r technologies that brings about transformation through establishing \r new institutions, new practices, and new models to create a positive \r societal impact, characterised by collaboration that crosses traditional \r roles and boundaries, between citizens, civil society, the state, and \r the private sector (Reynolds et al. 2017). Market forces do not provide \r sufficient incentives for investment in development or diffusion of \r technologies, leaving a role for public policy to create the conditions \r to assure a  systemic innovation approach (Popp 2010; Popp and \r Newell 2012). Moreover, public action is more than just addressing \r [...]"


id: fc3d852089999ea0479c60e99c9b186
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41743
content:
"This phase of the innovation process focuses on generating \r knowledge or solving particular problems by creating a combination \r of artefacts to perform a particular function, or to achieve a specific \r goal. R&D activities comprise basic research, applied research \r and technology development. Basic research is experimental or \r theoretical work undertaken primarily to acquire new knowledge \r of the underlying foundations of phenomena and observable facts, \r without any particular application or use in view. Applied research is \r original investigation undertaken in order to acquire new knowledge, \r primarily directed towards a  specific, practical aim or objective \r (OECD 2015a). Importantly, R&D activities can be incremental - that \r is, focused on addressing a  specific need by marginally improving \r an existing technology  - or radical, representing a  paradigm shift, \r promoted by new opportunities arising with the accumulation of new \r [...]"


id: 6e7ebc48bafc4127faa19e1c5f041346
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16705
content:
"[...] knowledge (Mendonca et al. 2018). Technology development, often \r leading to prototyping, consists of generating a  working model of \r the technology that is usable in the real world, proving the usability \r and customer desirability of the technology, and giving an idea of \r its design, features and function (OECD 2015a). These early stages "


id: 4a9cb5da5a54213f686b33727741d597
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10369
content:
"The outcomes of R&D are uncertain: the amount of knowledge that \r will result from any given research project or investment is unknown \r ex ante (Rosenberg 1998). This risk to funders (Goldstein and \r Kearney 2020) translates into underinvestment in R&D due to low \r appropriability (Weyant 2011; Sagar and Majumdar 2014). In the case \r of climate mitigation technologies, low innovation incentives for the \r private sector also result from a negative environmental externality \r (Jaffe et al. 2005). Furthermore, in the absence of stringent climate \r policies and targets, incumbent fossil-based energy technologies are \r characterised by lower financing risk, are heavily subsidised (Davis \r 2014; Kotchen 2021), and depreciate slowly (Arrow 1962a; Nanda \r et al. 2016; Semieniuk et al. 2021) (Section 16.2.3). In this context, \r public research funding plays a  key role in supporting high-risk \r R&D, both in developed and developing economies: it can provide \r [...]"


id: ba6fe80d76f9471b0bb69d8b21f0aae0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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content:
"[...] patient and steady funding not tied to short-term investment returns \r (Kammen and Nemet 2007; Anadon et al. 2014; Mazzucato 2015a; \r Chan and Diaz Anadon 2016; Anadon et al. 2017; Howell 2017; \r Zhang et al. 2019) (Section 16.4). Public policies also play a role in \r increasing private incentives in energy research and development \r funding (Nemet 2013). R&D statistics are an important indicator \r of innovation and are collected following the rules of the Frascati \r Manual (OECD 2015a) (Section 16.3.3, Box 16.3 and Table 16.7)."


id: 5b96753645488cc923d389ce06d46d17
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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vector_id: 13362
content:
"Demonstration is carried out through pilot projects or large-scale \r testing in the real world. Successfully demonstrating a  technology \r shows its utility and that it is able to achieve its intended purpose and, \r consequently, that the risk of failure is reduced (i.e., that it has market \r potential) (Hellsmark et al. 2016). Demonstration projects are an \r important step to promote the deployment of low-carbon energy and \r industrial technologies in the context of the transition. Government \r funding often plays a large role in energy technology demonstration \r projects because scaling up hardware energy technologies is \r expensive and risky (Brown and Hendry 2009; Hellsmark et al. 2016). \r Governments' engagement in low-carbon technology demonstration \r also signals support for businesses willing to take the investment \r risk (Mazzucato 2016). Venture capital, traditionally not tailored \r for energy investment, can also play an increasingly important role, \r [...]"


id: abddb26fd4a72877291f46d6d5d3121b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27477
content:
"[...] thanks to the incentives (e.g., through de-risking) provided by public \r funding and policies (Gaddy et al. 2017; IEA 2017a)."


id: aab0d2e69967a56efb3c82eeed63d145
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27254
content:
"Technology readiness levels (TRLs) are a categorisation that enables \r consistent, uniform discussions of technical maturity across different \r types of technology. They were developed by the National Aeronautics \r and Space Administration (NASA) in the 1970s (Mankins 1995, 2009) \r and originally used to describe the readiness of components forming \r part of a technological system. Over time, more classifications of TRLs \r have been introduced, notably the one used by the European Union \r (EU). Most recently, the International Energy Agency (IEA) extended \r previous classifications to include the later stages of the innovation \r process (IEA 2020b) and applied it to compare the market readiness \r of clean energy technologies and their components (OECD 2015a; \r IEA 2020b). TRLs are currently widely used by engineers, business \r people, research funders and investors, often to assess the readiness \r of whole technologies rather than single components. To determine \r [...]"


id: 9a55a9c5e58d6fcc4b2a868ad5ee7a4d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24398
content:
"[...] a TRL for a  given technology, a  technology readiness assessment \r (TRA) is carried out to examine programme concepts, technology \r requirements, and demonstrated technology capabilities. In the most \r recent version of the IEA (IEA 2020b), TRLs range from 1 to 11, with \r 11 indicating the most mature (Table 16.2)."


id: fec787ca1f102f4ea3b59c620dfe7e69
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42215
content:
"The benefits of R&D and learning by doing are larger at the economy \r level than at the firm level (Arrow 1962b; Romer 1990;). As a result, \r when left to its own, the market tends to generate less investment \r than socially optimal. For instance, if the cost of a  technology is \r too high before a large amount of learning by doing has occurred, \r there is a risk that it will not be adopted by the market, even if it \r is economically advantageous for the society. Indeed, initially new \r technologies are often expensive and cannot compete with the \r incumbent technologies (Cowan 1990). Large numbers of adopters \r could lower this cost via learning by doing to a  level sufficient to \r beat the incumbent technology (Gruebler et al. 2012). However, firms \r could hesitate to be the first adopter and bear the high cost (Isoard \r and Soria 2001). If this disadvantage overwhelms the advantages of \r being a first mover1\r  and if adopters are not able to coordinate, it will \r [...]"


id: 9f27e2cc4e561e1c24832302037cc3a0
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content:
"By allowing for experimenting with existing knowledge and combining \r different technologies, knowledge spillovers can result in the \r emergence of novel technological solutions, which has been referred \r to as 'recombinant innovation' (Weitzman 1998; Fleming and Sorenson \r 2001; Olsson and Frey 2002; Tsur and Zemel 2007; Arthur 2009). \r Recombinant innovations speed up technological change by combining \r different technological solutions, and make things happen that would \r be impossible with only incremental innovations (van den Bergh 2008; \r Safarzynska and van den Bergh 2010; Frenken et al. 2012). It has been \r shown that 77% of all patents granted between 1790 and 2010 in \r the USA are coded by a  combination of at least two technology \r codes (Youn et al. 2015). Spillovers related to energy and low-carbon \r technologies have been documented by a number of empirical studies \r (high confidence) (Popp 2002; Verdolini and Galeotti 2011; Aghion et al. \r [...]"


id: a024dfd95f982b9b8bf8ca3b472d2f50
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25389
content:
"[...] 2016; Witajewski-Baltvilks et al. 2017; Conti et al. 2018). The presence \r of spillovers can have both positive and negative impacts on climate \r change mitigation (high confidence)."


id: cf42727f6747b69945560bbff9070802
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33814
content:
"The negative relation between costs and experience is a reason to invest \r in a narrow set of technologies; the uncertainty regarding the parameters \r of this relation is the reason to invest in wider ranges of technologies \r (Fleming and Sorenson 2001; Way et al. 2019). Concentrating \r investment in narrow sets of technologies (specialisation) enables \r fast accumulation of experience for these technologies and large cost \r reductions. However, when the potency of technology is uncertain, one \r does not know which technology is truly optimal in the long run. The \r narrower the set, the higher the risk that the optimal technology will \r not be supported, and hence will not benefit from learning by doing. \r Widening the set of supported technologies would reduce this risk \r (Way et al. 2019). Uncertainty is present because noise in historical data \r hides the true value of learning rates, and due to unanticipated future \r [...]"


id: 3b0154971698cf76a50898d0418f95f8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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vector_id: 7572
content:
"[...] shocks to technology costs (Lafond et al. 2018). Ignoring uncertainty \r in integrated assessment models implies that these model results are \r biased towards supporting a  narrow set of technologies, neglecting \r the benefits of decreasing risk through diversification (Sawulski and \r Witajewski-Baltvilks 2020)."


id: a0dc1ecfbcc905cd6391d194c70fe63a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25522
content:
"Digital technologies require energy, but increase efficiency, potentially \r offering technology-specific greenhouse gas (GHG) emission savings; \r they also have larger system-wide impacts (Kaack et  al. 2021). In \r industrial sectors, robotisation, smart manufacturing (SM), internet \r of things (IoT), artificial intelligence (AI), and additive manufacturing \r (AM or 3D printing) have the potential to reduce material demand \r and promote energy management (Section 11.3.4.2). Smart mobility \r is changing transport demand and efficiency (Section 10.2.3). Smart \r devices in buildings, the deployment of smart grids and the provision \r of renewable energy increase the role of demand-side management \r (Serrenho and Bertoldi 2019) (Sections 9.4 and 9.5), and support the \r shift away from asset redundancy (Section 6.4.3). Digital solutions \r are equally important on the supply side, for example, by accelerating \r innovation with simulations and deep learning (Rolnick et  al. \r [...]"


id: f1fba9fcd59136565d45c9f5fc448b87
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
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vector_id: 39964
content:
"[...] 2021) or realising flexible and decentralised opportunities through \r energy-as-a-service concepts and particularly with pay-as-you-go \r (Section 15.6.8)."


id: ec4b0dbd7b5d1e27af774b3c310a30d4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38938
content:
"Direct impacts emerge because digital technologies consume large amounts of energy, but also have the potential to \r steeply increase energy efficiency in all end-use sectors through material input savings and increased coordination \r (medium evidence, medium agreement) (Horner et al. 2016; Huang et al. 2016; IEA 2017b; Jones 2018). Global energy demand \r from digital appliances reached 7.14 EJ in 2018 (Chapter 9, Box 9.5), implying higher related carbon emissions. However, a small \r smartphone offers services previously requiring many different devices (Grubler et al. 2018). Demand for data services is increasing \r rapidly; quantitative estimates of the growth of associated energy demand range from slow and marginal to rapid and sizeable, \r depending the efficiency trends of digital technologies (Avgerinou et al. 2017; Vranken 2017; Stoll et al. 2019; Masanet et al. 2020) \r [...]"


id: 7b8472a163f56c47f5d81f1a4bac6731
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18939
content:
"[...] (Section 5.3.4.1). Renewable energy can serve as a low-carbon energy provider for the operation of a data centre, which in turn can \r provide waste heat for other purposes. Digital technologies can markedly increase the energy efficiency of mobility and residential \r and public buildings, especially in the context of systems integration (IEA 2020a). Reduction in energy demand and associated \r GHG emissions from buildings and industry, while maintaining service levels is estimated at 5 to 10%, with larger savings possible. \r Approaches include building energy management systems (BEMS), home energy management system (HEMS), demand response "


id: 7dd3867fd9442ca3807c1e4be5a43e67
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19309
content:
"However, system-wide effects may endanger energy and GHG emission savings (high evidence, high agreement). Economic \r growth resulting from higher energy and labour productivities can increase energy demand (Lange et al. 2020) and associated GHG \r emissions. Importantly, digitalisation can also benefit carbon-intensive technologies (Victor 2018). Impacts on GHG emissions are \r varied in smart and shared mobility systems, as ride hailing increases GHG emissions due to deadheading, whereas shared pooled \r mobility and shared cycling reduce GHG emissions, as occupancy levels and/or weight per person km transported improve (Section 5.3). \r Energy and GHG emission impacts from the ubiquitous deployment of smart sensors and service optimisation applications in smart \r cities are insufficiently assessed in the literature (Milojevic-Dupont and Creutzig 2021). Systemic effects have wider boundaries of \r [...]"


id: 972c9cc54fd57205b4f2c03bd711755a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23791
content:
"[...] analysis, including broader environmental impacts (e.g., demand for rare materials, disposal of digital devices). These need to be "


id: 4e31d860ca968113ca6ab07effeacf73
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11025
content:
"Broader societal impacts of digitalisation can also influence climate mitigation because of induced demand for \r consumption goods, impacts on firms' competitiveness, changes the demand for skills and labour, worsening of \r inequality - including reduced access to services due to the digital divide - and governance aspects (low evidence,\r medium agreement) (Sections 4.4, 5.3 and 5.6). Digital technologies expand production possibilities in sectors other than ICTs \r through robotics, smart manufacturing, and 3D printing, and have major implications on consumption patterns (Matthess and Kunkel \r 2020). Initial evidence suggests that robots displace routine jobs and certain skills, change the demand for high-skilled and low-skilled \r workers, and suppress wages (Acemoglu and Restrepo 2019). Digitalisation can thus reduce consumers' liquidity and consumption \r [...]"


id: 68e68c310d273da0bcbde225b70337bf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15724
content:
"[...] (Mian et al. 2020) and contribute to global inequality, including across the gender dimension, raising fairness concerns (Kerras et al. \r 2020; Vassilakopoulou and Hustad 2021). Digital technologies can lead to additional concentration in economic power (e.g., Rikap \r 2020) and lower competition; however, open source digital technologies can counter this tendency (e.g., Rotz et al. 2019). Digital \r technologies play a role in mobilising citizens for climate and sustainability actions (Segerberg 2017; Westerhoff et al. 2018)."


id: f3fc39dba3a038f1f0a5573f021dad29
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40298
content:
"Whether the digital revolution will be an enabler or a  barrier for decarbonisation will ultimately depend on the \r governance of both digital decarbonisation pathways and digitalisation in general (medium evidence, high agreement). \r The understanding of the disruptive potential of the wide range of digital technologies is limited due to their ground-breaking \r nature, which makes it hard to extrapolate from previous history/experience. Municipal and national entities can make use of digital \r technologies to manage and govern energy use and GHG emissions in their jurisdiction (Bibri 2019a,b) and break down solution \r strategies to specific infrastructures, building, and places, relying on remote sensing and mapping data, and contextual machine \r learning about their use (Milojevic-Dupont and Creutzig 2021). Mobility apps can provide mobility-as-a-service access to cities, ensuring \r [...]"


id: ce75a72b0d8435d2ced460cc50ad108d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33666
content:
"[...] due preference to active and healthy modes (Section 9.9 for the example of the Finnish city of Lahti). Trusted data governance can \r promote the implementation of local climate solutions, supported by available big data on infrastructures and environmental quality \r (Hansen and Porter 2017; Hughes et al. 2020). Governance decisions, such as taxing data, prohibiting surveillance technologies, or \r releasing data that enable accountability, can change digitalisation pathways, and thus underlying GHG emission (Hughes et al. 2020)."


id: 8814751062fef67384a0091c467cab45
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21090
content:
"Appropriate mechanisms also need to be designed to govern digitalisation as a megatrend (medium evidence, high \r agreement). Digitalisation is expected to be a  fast process, but this transformation takes place against entrenched individual \r behaviours, existing infrastructure, the legacy of time frames, vested interest and slow institutional processes, and requires trust from \r consumers, producers and institutions. A core question relates to who controls and manages data created by everyday operations (calls, \r shopping, weather data, service use, and so on). Regulations that limit or ban the expropriation and exploitation of behavioural data, \r sourced via smartphones, represent crucial aspects in digitalisation pathways, alongside the possibility to create climate movements \r and political pressure from the civil society. Governance mechanisms need to be developed to ensure that digital technologies such \r [...]"


id: f2bfa8c48d02a71482981da04cefe2a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40110
content:
"[...] as AI take over ethical choices (Craglia et al. 2018; Rahwan et al. 2019). Appropriate governance is necessary for digitalisation to \r effectively work in tandem with established mitigation technologies and choice architectures. Consideration of system-wide effects \r and overall management is essential to avoid runaway effects. Overall governance of digitalisation remains a challenge, and will have \r large-scale repercussions on energy demand and GHG emissions."


id: a707b9bd890a900f716c2eed1af9755e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26594
content:
"Recent studies attempt to separate the influence of learning by doing \r (which is a basis of Wright's law) versus other factors in explaining \r cost reductions, specifically in energy technologies. Some studies \r explain cost reductions with two factors: cumulative deployment \r (as proxy for experience); and R&D investment - see the 'two factor' \r learning curve (Klaassen et al. 2005). However, reliable information \r on public energy R&D investments for developing countries is not \r systematically collected. Available data for OECD countries cannot be \r precisely assigned to specific industrial sectors or sub-technologies \r (Verdolini et al. 2018). Some learning-curve studies take into account \r that historical variation in technology costs could be explained by \r variation in key materials and fuel costs - for example, steel costs \r for wind turbines (Qiu and Anadon 2012), silicon costs (Nemet 2006; \r Kavlak et al. 2018) as well as coal and coal plant construction costs \r [...]"


id: 7aa6116f0cf986850e73969552a0ed19
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18775
content:
"[...] (McNerney et al. 2011). Economies of scale played a significant role in \r the PV cost reductions since the early 2000s (Yu et al. 2011) (Box 16.4), \r which can also become the case in organic PV technologies (Gambhir \r et al. 2016; Kavlak et al. 2018)."


id: 9b6dc2d0e8a0ca8be7d97f187befa98d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24598
content:
"The impact of energy prices on the size of low-carbon technological \r change is supported by large number of empirical studies (Popp \r 2019; Grubb and Wieners 2020). Studies document that higher \r energy prices are associated with a  higher number of low-carbon \r energy or energy efficiency patents (Newell et al. 1999; Popp 2002; \r Verdolini and Galeotti 2011; Noailly and Smeets 2015; Ley et al. 2016; \r Witajewski-Baltvilks et al. 2017; Lin and Chen 2019). Sue Wing (2008) \r finds that innovation induced by energy prices had a minor impact \r on the decline in US energy intensity in the last decades of the 20th \r century, and that autonomous technological change played a more \r important role. Several studies explore the impact of a carbon tax on \r green innovation (Section 16.4). However, disentangling the effect of \r policy tools is complex because the presence of some policies could \r distort the functioning of other policies (Bohringer and Rosendahl \r [...]"


id: a19c547a35d2784e2d8cb14ba728eea
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25650
content:
"[...] 2010; Fischer et al. 2017) and because the impact of policies could be \r lagged in time (Antosiewicz and Witajewski-Baltvilks 2021)."


id: ca8a13bcb8559a5c5944ac6206729e8a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32975
content:
"The model in Hemous (2016) predicts that such a coalition could \r induce acceleration of clean technological change through a mix \r of carbon taxation, clean R&D subsidies and trade policies in that \r region leading to reduction of cost of clean production inside the \r coalition. Export of goods produced with clean technologies to \r a region outside the coalition reduces demand for dirty goods in that \r region. In the model by van den Bijgaart (2017) local advancements \r of clean technologies by a coalition with strong R&D potential are \r imitated outside the coalition. Furthermore, advancements of clean \r technologies will incentivise future clean R&D outside the coalition \r due to intertemporal knowledge spillovers. In Golombek and \r Hoel (2004) an increase in environmental concern in one region \r increases abatement R&D in that region. Part of this knowledge \r spills over to other regions, increasing their incentive to increase \r [...]"


id: 8a235a9b04e3400500beb9d05dd7b74f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21477
content:
"Market forces alone cannot deliver Pareto optimal (i.e., social) \r efficiency due to at least two types of externalities: GHG emissions \r that cause climate damage; and knowledge spillovers that benefit \r firms other than the inventor. Nordhaus (2011) argues that these two \r problems would have to be tackled separately: once the favourable \r intellectual property right regimes (i.e., the laws or rules or regulation \r on protection and enforcement) are in place, a price on carbon that \r corrects the emission externality is sufficient to induce optimal level of \r green technological change. Acemoglu et al. (2012) demonstrates that \r subsidising clean technologies (and not dirty ones) is also necessary \r to break the lock-in of dirty technological change. Recommendations \r for technical changes are often based on climate considerations \r only and neglect secondary externalities and environmental costs of \r technology choices (such as loss of biodiversity due to inappropriate \r [...]"


id: ed183b4f649e40814f14bc7eaa2ed9be
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39089
content:
"[...] scale-up of bioenergy use). The scale of adverse side effects and \r co-benefits varies considerably between low-carbon technologies in \r the energy sector (Luderer et al. 2019)."


id: 1c58b8445e02155d812d9105872e3cb0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2174
content:
"One factor in this 'learning by researching' is applied to a wide range of \r energy technologies but also to model improvements in the efficiency \r of energy use (Goulder and Schneider 1999; Popp 2004). More complex \r formulations include two-factor learning processes (Criqui et al. 2015; \r Emmerling et al. 2016; Paroussos et al. 2020) (Section  16.2.2.1), \r multifactor learning curves (Kahouli 2011; Yu et al. 2011), or other drivers \r of cost reduction such as economies of scale and markets (Elia et al. \r 2021). The application of two-factor learning curves to model energy \r technology costs is often constrained by the lack of information on \r public and/or private energy R&D investments in many fast-developing \r and developing countries (Verdolini et al. 2018). The approach used to \r model energy technology cost reductions varies across technologies, \r even within the same model, depending on the availability of data and/\r [...]"


id: 1d54b185e729d3a80b1f10552f8c798e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2343
content:
"[...] or the level of maturity. Less mature technologies generally depend \r highly on learning by research, whereas learning by doing dominates \r in more mature technologies (Jamasb 2007)."


id: 84fcf1c20c99dd4159840de23d898ec6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20537
content:
"In addition to learning, knowledge spillover effects are also \r integrated in climate-energy-economy models to reflect the fact that \r innovation in a given country depends also on knowledge generated \r elsewhere (Emmerling et al. 2016; Fragkiadakis et al. 2020). Models \r with a more detailed representation of sectors (Paroussos et al. 2020) \r can use spillover matrices to include bilateral spillovers and compute \r learning rates that depend on the human capital stock and the \r regional and/or sectoral absorption rates (Fragkiadakis et al. \r 2020). Accounting for knowledge spillovers in the EU for PV, wind \r turbines, electric vehicles, biofuels, industry materials, batteries and \r advanced heating and cooking appliances can lead to the following \r results in a  decarbonisation scenario over the period 2020-2050 \r as compared to the reference scenario: an increase of 1.0-1.4% in \r GDP, 2.1-2.3% in investment, and 0.2-0.4% in employment by clean \r [...]"


id: 9d8a78d1af093c3d3f9e3767395a64ab
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24955
content:
"[...] energy technologies (Paroussos et al. 2017). When comparing two \r possible EU transition strategies - being a first-mover with strong \r unilateral emission reduction strategy until 2030 versus postponing \r action for the period after 2030  - endogenous technical progress \r in the green technologies sector can alleviate most of the negative \r effects of pioneering low-carbon transformation associated with loss \r of competitiveness and carbon leakage (Karkatsoulis et al. 2016)."


id: 138c5459f86db8d50738299131a62217
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 651
content:
"Technology diffusion may also be strongly influenced, either positively \r or negatively, by a number of non-cost, non-technological barriers or \r enablers regarding behaviours, society and institutions (Knobloch and \r Mercure 2016). These include network or infrastructure externalities, the \r co-evolution of technology clusters over time ('path dependence'), the \r risk-aversion of users, personal preferences and perceptions and lack \r of adequate institutional framework which may negatively influence \r the speed of (low-carbon) technological innovation and diffusion, \r heterogeneous agents with different preferences or expectations, multi\u0002objectives and/or competitiveness advantages and uncertainty around \r the presence and the level of environmental policies and institutional \r and administrative barriers (Marangoni and Tavoni 2014; Baker et al. \r 2015; Iyer et al. 2015; Napp et al. 2017; Biresselioglu et al. 2020; van \r [...]"


id: f8f5d5e67579bbf85f1b09c58fe5b9e1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41164
content:
"[...] Sluisveld et al. 2020). These types of barriers to technology diffusion are \r currently not explicitly detailed in most of the climate-energy-economy \r models. Rather, they are accounted for in models through scenario \r narratives, such as the ones in the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways \r (Riahi et al. 2017), in which assumptions about technology adoption \r are spanned over a plausible range of values. Complementary methods \r are increasingly used to explore their importance in future scenarios \r (Turnheim et al. 2015; Geels et al. 2016; Doukas et al. 2018; Gambhir \r et al. 2019; Trutnevyte et al. 2019). It takes a very complex modelling \r framework to include all aspects affecting technology cost reductions \r and technology diffusion, such as heterogeneous agents (Lamperti \r et al. 2020), regional labour costs (Skelton et al. 2020), materials \r cost and trade and perfect foresight multi-objective optimisation \r [...]"


id: d2a7a7c63e725a5fd644f33b2e6e41d5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34409
content:
"[...] (Aleluia Reis et al. 2021). So far, no model can account for all these \r interactions simultaneously."


id: 3cfdbc86915288621fe2c1091b5351e8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7907
content:
"Median values of renewables installed capacity increase with respect to 2020 capacity in scenarios that limit warming to 3degC (>50%) \r and in scenarios that limit warming to 4degC (>50%) (Box 16.1 Figure 1b), where energy and climate policies are implemented in \r line with NDCs announced prior to COP26. More stringent targets (2degC) are achieved through a higher deployment of renewable \r technologies: by 2050 solar (wind) capacity is estimated to increase by a factor of 15 (10) (Box 16.1, Figure 1c). This is accompanied by \r an almost complete phase-out of coal (-87%). The percentage of median changes in installed capacity in scenarios that limit warming \r to 3degC (>50%) and in scenarios that limit warming to 4degC (>50%)is within comparable ranges of that observed in the last decade. In \r the case of scenarios that limit warming to 2degC (>67%) or lower, capacity installed is higher for renewable technologies and nuclear, \r [...]"


id: b5fd3ef8ea1b3807d44359510c65b895
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29241
content:
"Systemic analyses of innovation have predominantly focused on \r industrialised countries There have been some efforts to use the \r innovation systems lens for the developing country context (Jacobsson \r and Bergek 2006; Altenburg 2009; Lundvall et al. 2009; Tigabu et al. \r 2015; Tigabu 2018; Choi and Zo 2019) and specific suggestions on \r ways for developing countries to strengthening their innovation \r systems (e.g.,  by universities taking on a  'developmental' role \r (Arocena et al. 2015), or industry associations acting as intermediaries \r to build institutional capacities (Watkins et al. 2015; Khan et al. 2020), \r including specifically for addressing climate challenges (Sagar et al. \r 2009; Ockwell and Byrne 2016). But the conditions in developing \r countries are quite different, leading to suggestions that different \r theoretical conceptualisations of the innovation systems approach \r may be needed for these countries (Arocena and Sutz 2020), although \r [...]"


id: 11ca7f8be9675000fb3c4ee2376f5176
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 319
content:
"Traditional perspectives on innovation policy were mostly science\u0002driven, and focused on strengthening invention and its translation \r into application in a narrow sense. Also, a second main traditional \r perspective on innovation policy was focused on correcting for \r 'market failures' (Weber and Truffer 2017) (Section 16.2). The more \r recent understanding of, and shift of focus to, the systemic nature \r on the innovation and diffusion of technologies has implications \r for innovation policy, since innovation outcomes depend not just \r on inputs such as R&D, but much more on the functioning of the \r overall innovation system (see Sections  16.3.1 and 16.4). Policies \r can therefore be directed at innovation systems components and \r processes that need the greatest attention or support. This may \r include, for example, strengthening the capabilities of weak actors \r and improving interactions between actors (Jacobsson et al. 2017; \r [...]"


id: a79ae16f9eb1401ea8f51e3b33c6ec6c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26700
content:
"[...] Weber and Truffer 2017). At the same time, a systemic perspective \r also brings into sharp relief the notion of 'system failures' (Weber \r and Truffer 2017)."


id: 498fe5d78d70f53e7343bbee4f3993ac
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10170
content:
"A much-used, complementary systemic framework is the Multi-Level \r Perspective (MLP) (Geels 2002), which focuses mainly on the diffusion \r of technologies in relation to incumbent technologies in their sector \r and the overall economy. A key point of MLP is that new technologies \r need to establish themselves in a stable 'socio-technical regime' and \r are therefore generally at a disadvantage, not just because of their \r low technological maturity, but also because of an unwelcoming \r system. The MLP highlights that the uptake of technologies in \r society is an evolutionary process, which can be best understood \r as a  combination of 'variation, selection and retention' as well as \r 'unfolding and reconfiguration' (Geels 2002). Thus, new technologies \r in their early stages need to be selected and supported at the micro\u0002level by niche markets, possibly through a directed process that has \r been termed 'strategic niche management' (Kemp et al. 1998). As, \r [...]"


id: 180524bbc0d1954d3b748208d42ceeee
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1431
content:
"[...] at the landscape level, pressures on incumbent regimes mount, and \r those regimes destabilise, the niche technologies get a  chance to \r get established in a  new socio-technical regime. This allows these \r technologies to grow and stabilise, shaping a changed or sometimes \r radically renewed socio-technical regime. The MLP takes a systematic \r and comprehensive view about how to nurture and shape \r technological transitions by understanding them as evolutionary, \r multidirectional and cumulative socio-technical processes playing \r out at multiple levels over time, with a concomitant expansion in the \r scale and scope of the transition (Elzen et al. 2004; Geels 2005). There \r have been numerous studies that draw on the MLP to understand \r different aspects of climate technology innovation and diffusion \r (van Bree et al. 2010; Geels 2012; Geels et al. 2017)."


id: 6cf1e22589319e404d667d580b5ca28b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16446
content:
"In Table  16.7, both quantitative and qualitative indicators for \r systemic innovation are outlined, using clean energy innovation \r as an illustrative example, and drawing on a broad literature base, \r taking into account both the input-output-outcome classification and \r its variations (Freeman and Soete 1997; Sagar and Holdren 2002; Hu \r et al. 2018), combined with the functions of technological innovation \r systems (Miremadi et al. 2018), while also being cognisant of the \r specific role of key actors and institutions (Gallagher et al. 2012). \r A specific assessment of innovation may focus on part of such a list of \r indicators, depending on what aspect of innovation is being studied, \r whether the analysis takes a  more or less systemic perspective, \r and the specific technology and geography considered. Similarly, \r innovation policies may be designed to specifically boost only some \r of these aspects, depending on whether a  given country/region is \r [...]"


id: 2e38e21ff1b578a5d399a7f9397290d3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5404
content:
"The systemic approach to innovation and transition dynamics (Cross\u0002Chapter Box 12 in this chapter) has advanced our understanding of \r the complexity of the innovation process, pointing to the importance \r of assessing the efficiency and effectiveness in producing, diffusing \r and exploiting knowledge  (Lundvall 1992), including how the \r existing stock of knowledge may be recombined and used for new \r applications (David and  Foray 1995). There remains a  crucial need \r for more relevant and comprehensive approaches of assessing \r innovation (Freeman and Soete 2009; Dziallas and Blind 2019). \r In the context of climate mitigation, innovation is a means to an end; \r therefore, there is the need to consider the processes by which the \r output of innovation (e.g.,  patents) are translated into real-world \r outcomes (e.g.,  deployment of low-carbon technologies) (Freeman \r and Soete 1997; Sagar and Holdren 2002). Currently, there is no \r [...]"


id: da5695c005d7f78eecde898faf45f1d0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35711
content:
"[...] available set of quantitative metrics that, collectively, can help get \r a  picture of innovation in a  particular energy technology or set \r of energy technologies. Also we are still lacking an understanding of \r how to systematically use qualitative indicators to characterise the \r more intangible aspects of the energy innovation system and to \r improve front-end innovation decisions (Dziallas and Blind 2019)."


id: c29493540a8fb308ebb2ed9a4cb51fbc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31521
content:
"Because of the multiple market, government, system, and other \r failures that are associated with the energy system, a range of policy \r interventions are usually required to enable the development and \r introduction of new technologies in the market (Jaffe et  al. 2005; \r Burer and Wustenhagen 2009; Negro et  al. 2012; Twomey 2012; \r Veugelers 2012; Weber and Rohracher 2012) used in what is termed \r as 'policy mixes' (Rogge and Reichardt 2016; Edmondson et al. 2019, \r 2020; Rogge et al. 2020). Empirical research shows that, in the energy \r and environment space, when new technologies were developed and \r introduced in the market, it was usually at least partly as a  result \r of a  range of policies that shaped the socio-technical system \r (robust evidence, high agreement) (Bunn et al. 2014; Bergek et al. \r 2015; Rogge and Reichardt 2016; Nemet 2019). An example of this \r systemic and dynamic nature of policies is the 70-year innovation \r [...]"


id: 51521b67994df78a873d14f91b686ed5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11585
content:
"[...] journey of solar photovoltaic (PV), covering multiple countries, which \r is reviewed in Box 16.4."


id: 1c1bce3cf6c02335c3106883864f349e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2124
content:
"As this evolution makes clear, no individual country persisted in leading the technology, and every world-leading firm lost its lead \r within a few years (Green 2019). Solar followed an overlapping but sequential process of technology creation, market creation and \r cost reduction (comparable to emergence, early adoption, diffusion and stabilisation in Cross-Chapter Box 12 in this chapter). In the \r technology creation phase, examples of central processes include flows of knowledge from one person to another, between firms, \r and between countries as well as US and Japanese R&D funding in the 1970s and early 1980s. During market creation, PVs modular \r scale allowed it to serve a variety of niche markets from satellites in the 1950s to toys in the 1980s, when Germany transformed \r the industry from niche to mass market with its subsidy programme that began in 2000 and became important for PV in 2004. The \r [...]"


id: 3ea38ea54a974fcc2a30b554b952dfe6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"[...] dramatic increase in size combined with its 20-year guaranteed contracts reduced risk for investors and created confidence in PV's \r long-term growth. Supportive policies also emerged outside Germany, in Spain, Italy, California, and China, which spread the risk, \r even as national policy support was more volatile. Rapid and deep cost reductions were made possible by: learning by doing in the \r process of operating, optimising, and combining production equipment; investing and improving each manufacturing line to gradually \r scale up to massive sizes; and incremental improvements in the PV devices themselves."


id: 125d0ae7fe5baac3616e31641b910268
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 436
content:
"Central to PV development has been its modularity, which provided two distinct advantages: access to niche markets, and iterative \r improvement. Solar has been deployed as a commercial technology across nine orders of magnitude: from a 1W cell in a calculator to \r a 1GW plant in the Egyptian desert, and almost every scale in between. This modular scale enabled PV to serve a sequence of policy\u0002independent niche markets (such as satellites and telecoms applications), which generally increased in size and decreased in willingness \r to pay, in line with the technology cost reductions. This modular scale also enabled a large number of iterations, such that in 2020 \r over three billion solar panels had been produced. Compared to, for instance, approximately 1000 nuclear reactors that were ever \r constructed, a million times more opportunities for learning by doing were available to solar PV: to make incremental improvements, \r [...]"


id: 96865c81f0e4fcb8e3cf8bbbe71fd0bd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23683
content:
"[...] to introduce new manufacturing equipment, to optimise that equipment, and to learn from failures. More generally, recent work has \r pointed to the benefits of modularity in the speed of adoption (Wilson et al. 2020) and learning rates (Sweerts et al. 2020)."


id: dd1c8d5ce3371217249f25443edbd7d2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36166
content:
"There are many definitions of policy mixes from various disciplines \r (Rogge et al. 2017), including environmental economics (Lehmann \r 2012), policy studies (Kern and Howlett 2009) and innovation \r studies. Generally speaking, a  policy mix can be characterised by \r a combination of building blocks, namely elements, processes and \r characteristics, which can be specified using different dimensions \r (Rogge and Reichardt 2016). Elements include: (i) the policy \r strategy with its objectives and principal plans; (ii) the mix of \r policy instruments; and (iii) instrument design. The content of \r these elements is the result of policy processes. Both elements and \r processes can be described by their characteristics in terms of the \r consistency of the elements, the coherence of the processes, and \r the credibility and comprehensiveness of the policy mix in different \r policy, governance, geography and temporal context (Rogge and \r [...]"


id: 25a8e75481093d9467c206946399d7c1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3811
content:
"[...] Reichardt 2016). Other aspects in the evaluation of policy mixes \r include framework conditions, the type of policy instrument and the \r lower level of policy granularity, namely design elements or design \r features (del Rio 2014; del Rio and Cerda 2017). In addition, many \r have argued for the need to craft policies that affect different actors \r in the transition, some supporting and some 'destabilising' (Geels \r 2002; Kivimaa and Kern 2016)."


id: d5d0877b30217919ea9104a2fd4c0d8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34926
content:
"Building on the frameworks for identifying market failures \r (Section 16.2) and systemic failures (Section 16.3) in the innovation \r system for climate-related technologies, Section  16.4 proceeds as \r follows. First, it considers some of the policy instruments introduced \r in Chapter 13 that are particularly relevant for the pace and direction \r of innovation in technologies for climate change mitigation and \r adaptation. Second, it explains why governments put in place \r policies to promote innovation in climate-related technologies. \r Third, it takes stock of the overall empirical and theoretical evidence \r regarding the relationship between policy instruments with a direct \r and an indirect impact on innovation outcomes (including intellectual \r property regimes) and also other outcomes (competitiveness and \r distributional outcomes). Fourth, it assesses the evidence on the \r impact of trade-related policies and of sub-national policies aiming \r [...]"


id: d7a23da09dd4f8ef56c19786109b48ab
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"The second column of Table  16.8 summarises the set of policies \r shaping broader climate outcomes over the past few decades in many \r countries outlined in Chapter 13, Section 13.6, which groups them \r into economic and financial, regulatory, and soft instruments. Other \r policies, such as monetary, banking and trade policies, for instance, can \r also shape innovation, but most government action to shape energy \r has not focused on them. As Table 16.8 shows, this section discusses \r the set of policy instruments on innovation outcomes, or a  subset \r of the 'Transformative Potential' criterion presented in Chapter 13, \r and thus complements the more general discussion presented there. \r Table 16.8 specifically prioritises the impact of the subset of policy \r instruments on innovation outcomes for which evidence is available. \r This focus is complemented by a  discussion of the impact of the \r same policy instruments on competitiveness (a subcomponent of the \r [...]"


id: 5b0bf2294a6b54a3d76b74834c5c7d85
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13269
content:
"[...] economic effectiveness evaluation criterion) and on distributional \r outcomes. Many of the policy instrument types listed in Table 16.8 \r have been implemented or proposed to address the different types of \r market or systemic failures or bottlenecks described in Sections 16.2 \r and 16.3 (OECD 2011a)."


id: 263d4de308aa9d7086f14d94def40fe0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3897
content:
"Governments around the world implement innovation policies in the \r energy and climate space with the aim of simultaneously advancing \r environmental, industrial policy (or competitiveness), and security \r goals (Anadon 2012; Surana and Anadon 2015; Meckling et al. \r 2017; Matsuo and Schmidt 2019; Penasco et al. 2021) (medium \r evidence, medium agreement). Co-benefits of policies shaping \r technological innovation in climate-related technologies, including \r competitiveness, health, and improved distributional impacts can \r be drivers of climate mitigation policy in the innovation sphere \r (Stokes and Warshaw 2017; Deng et al. 2018; Probst et al. 2020). \r For instance, this was the case for climate and air pollution policies \r with local content requirements for different types of renewable \r energy projects in places including China (Qiu and Anadon 2012; \r Lewis 2014), India (Behuria 2020), South Africa (Kuntze and \r Moerenhout 2012), and Canada (Genest 2014) (robust evidence,\r [...]"


id: d31595faa23717007a78ef00ebf2c831
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34478
content:
"Three phases of politics in the development of policies to meet climate \r and industrial objectives can be identified, at the top, the middle \r and the bottom of the experience curve (Breetz et al. 2018) (see \r also Figure 16.1, and Geels 2002). In the first phase of 'niche market \r diffusion', the politics of more sustained support for a technology or \r set of technologies become possible after a group of economic winners \r and 'clean energy constituencies' are created (Meckling et al. 2015). \r When technologies grow out of the niche (second phase), they pose \r a  more serious competition to incumbents who may become more \r vocal opponents of additional support for innovation in the competing \r technologies (Geels 2014; Stokes 2016). In a  third phase, path\u0002dependence in policymaking and lock-in in institutions need to change \r to accommodate new infrastructure, the integration of technologies, \r the emergence of complementary technologies and of new regulatory \r [...]"


id: 35893d11d5ca306ae461cafbb31067c2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6673
content:
"Public research, development and demonstration (RD&D) \r investments have been found to have a positive impact on different \r innovation in energy- and climate-related technologies (robust \r evidence, high agreement), but the assessment relies almost entirely \r on evidence from industrialised countries. Out of 17 publications \r focusing on this assessment, only three found no relationship \r between R&D funding and innovation metrics (Doblinger et al. 2019; \r Goldstein et al. 2020; Penasco et al. 2021). Sixteen of them used ex \r post quantitative methods, and one relied on theoretical ex ante \r assessment; only two of them included some non-industrialised \r countries, with one being the theoretical analysis. The evidence \r available does not point to public R&D funding for climate-related \r technologies crowding out private R&D (an important driver of \r innovation) but instead crowding it in. Box  16.6 summarises the \r evidence available of the impact of ARPA-E (a public institution \r [...]"


id: 5d6744e1651d1fe82744280d46280673
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13721
content:
"[...] created in the USA in 2009 to allocate public R&D funding in energy) \r on innovation and competitiveness outcomes. Another institution \r supporting energy R&D that is the subject of much interest is the \r institutions of the Fraunhofer Society."


id: f24c2592ec5bf9002371d4becfd16a4f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40023
content:
"If policy instruments are created to (at least partly) shape innovation \r for systemic transitions to a zero-carbon future, they also need to \r be evaluated on their impact on the whole socio-technical system \r (Neij and Astrand 2006) and a  wide range of goals, including \r distributional impacts and competitiveness and jobs (Stern 2007; \r Penasco et  al. 2021). Given this and the current policy focus on \r green recovery and green industrial policy, we assess impacts \r on competitiveness and equity, although we primarily focus on \r innovation outcomes. Table 16.9 lists the selected set of indicators \r used to assess the impact of the policy instrument types covered \r in the right-hand column in Table 16.8. The table does not include \r technology diffusion or deployment because these are covered in \r the technological effectiveness evaluation criterion in Chapter 13. \r As noted in section  16.2, it is very difficult to measure or fully \r [...]"


id: 3d72fc6a53677dbee82182b7a8a6e2e4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7985
content:
"[...] understand innovation with one or even several indicators. In \r addition, all indicators have strengths and weaknesses, and may \r be more relevant in some countries and sectors than in others. The \r literature assessing the impact of different policy instruments on \r innovation often covers just one of the various indicators listed in \r the second column of Table 16.9."


id: b6eecd8a253134dd57901ef0c1f9ec43
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29391
content:
"No evidence has been found regarding the specific impact of R&D \r tax credits on climate mitigation or adaptation technologies, but it \r is worth noting that, generally speaking, R&D tax credits are found \r to incentivise innovation in firms, with a greater impact on small and \r medium firms (OECD 2020). This is consistent with the fact that most \r of the evidence on the positive impact of public R&D support schemes \r covers small and medium firms (Howell 2017; Doblinger et al. 2019; \r Goldstein et al. 2020). Although there is a high level of agreement in \r the literature regarding the impact of R&D investments on innovation \r outcomes in climate-related technologies, it is important to note that \r this evidence comes from industrialised countries. This does not mean \r that public R&D investments in energy have been found to have \r no impact on developing countries innovation or competitiveness \r outcomes, but rather that we were not able to find such studies \r [...]"


id: 2e32221e2d7db1fcc68de7c4dbfbdd11
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5400
content:
"The Green Public Procurement (GPP) policy is targeted at minimising the negative impacts of production and consumption on the nature \r environment (Melissen and Reinders 2012; Cerutti et al. 2016). It includes a wide range of environmental criteria for different product \r groups that public organisations frequently procure, such as office equipment, uniforms, road works and catering. There are 45 product \r groups (Melissen and Reinders, 2012) and six product clusters as part of the government's purchasing in terms of sustainability \r (PIANOo Expertisecentrum 2020). The six product clusters are: i) automation and telecommunications; ii) energy; iii) ground, road and \r hydraulic engineering; iv) office facilities and services; v) office buildings; and vi) transport (PIANOo Expertisecentrum 2020).The GPP \r 2020 Tender Implementation Plan spells out the terms and conditions for green public procurement. Some of these are confidential \r [...]"


id: 1281a10b3e9447685bd0b821e908e37f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 454
content:
"[...] documents and are not shared online. Others are available for download. The tender implementation plan for The Netherlands is \r available on https://gpp2020.eu/low-carbon-tenders/open-tenders/. One of the important scenarios is that the public procurers need \r the details of Life Cycle Analysis (LCA) carried out in a tool called DuboCalc, which calculates the environmental impacts of the \r materials and methods of an infrastructural projects. GPP 2020 has reported that three million tonnes of CO2 would be saved in \r The Netherlands alone if all Dutch public authorities applied the national Sustainable Public Procurement Criteria."


id: 45cb9104eb9a47d4ac35ab05f836abc0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9498
content:
"Research has been carried out to determine the prime mover for implementing Green Public Procurement. An online survey was \r administered among public procurement officers who subscribed to the newsletters of two Dutch associations that provide advice and \r training to public procurers. This yielded a sample size of more than 200 (Grandia and Voncken 2019). The first association is called \r Nevi which is the only organisation in The Netherlands that offers certified procurement training programmes. The second association \r is called PIANOo which is a public procurement expertise centre paid by the Dutch national government to bring together relevant \r information regarding public procurement and provide public procurers with useful tools through their websites, workshops, meetings \r and annual conferences. The data from the survey was then analysed using structural equations modelling (SEM) and the results \r [...]"


id: 952a1d10a67a81bd347dca4ea88c749
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23448
content:
"[...] show that ability, motivation and opportunities affect the implementation of GPP. Particularly, opportunity was found to affect GPP, \r innovation-oriented public procurement and the circular economy, but not the other types of public procurement."


id: 4086ea2051f9ded9b8d5c8a1b1a54e73
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8544
content:
"emerging and developing economies (Baron 2016). Its main goal \r is to acquire products or services to improve public services, \r infrastructures and facilities and, in some cases, to also incentivise \r innovation. It is important to implement several steps in the public \r procurement procedure to improve transparency, minimise waste, \r fraud and corruption of public fund. These steps range from the \r assessment of a  need, issuance of a  tender, to the monitoring \r of delivery of the good or service. Box  16.5 outlines a  public \r procurement programme that was implemented in The Netherlands \r in 2005 with a focus on green technologies. In spite of the fact that \r green procurement policies have been implemented, the literature \r assessing the innovation impact of public procurement programmes \r is relatively limited, and suggests either a  positive impact or no \r impact (Alvarez and Rubio 2015; Baron 2016; Fernandez-Sastre \r [...]"


id: c5a31e8a7bc0d65206c5041b0ea7dd5f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32075
content:
"[...] and Montalvo-Quizhpi 2019; Penasco et al. 2021). The majority of \r cases where the impact is positive are analyses of industrialised \r countries, while no impact emerges in the case of a  developing \r country (Ecuador). More empirical research in both developing and \r developed countries is needed to understand the impact of public \r procurement, which has the potential to support the achievement \r of other societal challenges (Edler and Georghiou 2007; Henderson \r and Newell 2011; Baron 2016; ICLEI 2018)."


id: 63e54e7eb9941f7d45639c44732780cc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14862
content:
"One approach for allocating public R&D funds in energy involves relying on active programme managers and having clear technology \r development missions that focus on high-risk high-reward areas and projects. This approach can be exemplified by a relatively new \r energy R&D funding agency in the USA, the Advanced Research Projects Agency for Energy (ARPA-E). This agency was created in \r 2009 and it was modelled on the experience of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) - a US government agency \r funding high-risk, high-reward research in defence-related areas (Bonvillian and Van Atta 2011; US National Academies of Sciences \r Engineering and Medicine 2017; Bonvillian 2018). DARPA programme managers had a lot of discretion for making decisions about \r funding projects, but since energy R&D funding is usually more politically vulnerable than defence R&D funding, the ARPA-E model \r [...]"


id: 3e6285e8ab9d83f131f4d74f8d336d2f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8156
content:
"[...] involved programme managers requesting external review as an informational input (Azoulay et al. 2019)."


id: 143fdd8ef737be7fcb98663e7703bd27
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 780
content:
"Penasco et al. (2021) review 20 evaluations: eight identified a positive \r impact (although in at least two cases, the paper indicated that the \r impact was small or negligible); 11 no impact; and one was associated \r with a negative impact on innovation indicators. The studies that found \r no impact and the studies that found some impact covered all three \r methods (quantitative ex post, qualitative and theoretical and ex ante\r analysis). Another review focused only on empirical studies (mainly \r quantitative but also qualitative), covered a slightly longer period and \r identified 19 studies (15 using quantitative methods) (Lilliestam et al. \r 2021). With a narrower set of indicators of innovation, they concluded \r that there was very little empirical evidence linking innovation with \r the emissions trading schemes studied to date (Lilliestam et al. 2021). \r This review focused mainly on papers evaluating the earlier stages \r [...]"


id: 9c46b094f00995bb605981a3b79f9225
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24749
content:
"[...] of the European Emissions Trading Scheme, which featured relatively \r low carbon dioxide prices, and covered a small set of firms, showing \r that carbon pricing policy design is an important determinant of \r innovation outcomes. Combining both reviews, there are a  total \r of 27  individual studies, some of them providing mixed evidence \r of impact, and 23 of them suggest there was no impact or that (in \r a  couple of cases) it was small. It is important to note that some \r researchers note that, for particular subsectors and actors, emissions \r trading schemes have had an impact on patenting trends (Calel and \r Dechezlepretre 2016). Overall the expectation is that higher prices \r and coverage would result in higher impacts and that, over time, the \r impact on innovation would grow."


id: 979abcea23b2932a7a9c01dcf1dd64fd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23889
content:
"instruments in industrialised countries and emerging economies \r can also lead to positive (or at least not negative) competitiveness \r outcomes and distributional outcomes (medium evidence, medium \r agreement) (Section 16.3). Prioritising low-cost energy generation in \r the design of FIT schemes can result in a lower focus of innovation \r efforts on more novel technologies and greater barriers to incumbents \r in less mature technologies (Hoppmann et al. 2013). Similarly, case \r study research from Mexico and South Africa indicates that focusing \r on low-cost renewable energy generation can only result in a greater \r reliance on existing foreign value chains and capital, and thus in lower \r or negative impacts on domestic competitiveness. In other words, \r some approaches can hinder the development of the local capabilities \r that could result in greater long-term benefits domestically (Matsuo \r and Schmidt 2019). Evidence for developing countries indicates that \r [...]"


id: cc89811117e5f16ea7248f0f8182abd7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33307
content:
"[...] local and absorptive capacity also play an important role, in particular, \r on the ability of policies to contribute to competitiveness or industrial \r policy goals (Binz and Anadon 2018). Research comparing China's \r and India's policies and outcomes on wind energy also suggest \r that policy durability and systemic approaches can affect industrial \r outcomes (Surana and Anadon 2015)."


id: 2d12cd301e2b652620c3b28f0428f83c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5206
content:
"Depending on the design (including the value and coverage of the \r tax), carbon taxes can either have positive, negative or null impact \r on competitiveness and distributional outcomes (medium evidence,\r medium agreement). The evidence on the impact of carbon taxes on \r competitiveness is significant (a total of 27 evaluations) and mixed, \r with six of them reporting some positive impacts, 10  reporting \r no impact, and 11 reporting negative impacts (so 59% were \r not associated with negative impacts). Most of the evaluations \r reporting negative impacts were theoretical assessments, and only \r three ex post quantitative analysis (Penasco et al. 2021). Twenty\u0002four evaluations covered distributional impacts of carbon taxes and \r other environmental taxes, the majority (15) found the existence of \r some negative distributional impacts, six found positive impacts, \r and three  found no distributional impacts. Differences in the \r [...]"


id: 27b674bad2602935ea1d8ae131489a7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4171
content:
"[...] assessment results stem from the design of the taxes (Penasco et al. \r 2021). It is important to note that, once again, the evidence comes \r from industrialised countries and emerging economies."


id: b8469253fbcf932ba1cc3bc08c330bd7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29632
content:
"The evidence of the impact of renewable energy auctions on \r innovation outcomes is very small and provides mixed results \r (limited evidence, low agreement). Out of six evaluations, three \r identify positive impacts, two no impacts, and one negative impacts. \r All of the evaluations but one were qualitative or theoretical, \r and the quantitative assessment indicated no impact (Penasco \r et al. 2021). There is more evidence covering emerging economies \r analysing the impacts of auctions when compared to other policy \r instrument types. For example, there is work comparing the \r approaches to renewable energy auctions in South Africa and \r Denmark (Toke 2015) finding a positive impact on the latter stages \r of innovation (mainly deployment), and broader work on auctions \r covering OECD countries as well as Brazil, South Africa and China \r not finding a significant impact on innovation (Wigand et al. 2016). \r Work comparing renewable energy auctions in different countries \r [...]"


id: e7e87aec0be80aa218d6e0fc257fa3d9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38113
content:
"[...] in South America generally finds a  positive impact on innovation \r outcomes (Mastropietro et al. 2014). The body of evidence \r on the impact of auctions on competitiveness is also limited \r (six  evaluations) and indicates negative outcomes of renewable \r auctions of competitiveness (limited evidence, low agreement). As \r with other policies, the design of the auctions can affect innovation \r outcomes (del Rio and Kiefer 2021). Only two studies investigated \r distributional outcomes, and both were negative."


id: e81385ba52c1a9355a06cb1f9a9445f1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38147
content:
"Many factors affect the impacts of feed-in tariffs (FITs) on outcomes \r other than innovation (robust evidence, high agreement). While \r FITs have been generally associated with positive innovation \r outcomes, some of the differences found in the literature may arise \r from differences in the evaluation method (Penasco et al. 2021) or \r differences in policy design (e.g., the level and the rate of decrease \r of the tariff) (Hoppmann et al. 2014), the policy mixes (Rogge et al. \r 2017), the technologies targeted and their stage of development \r (Huenteler et al. 2016b), and the geographical and temporal context \r of where the policy was put in place (Section 16.3). Research has \r also found that, particularly for less mature technologies, a higher \r technology specificity in the design of FITs is associated with more \r innovation (Del Rio 2012). FITs yield better results if they account \r for the specificities of the country; or else, the technology and the \r [...]"


id: 461884262a96cc904034f0b9c30bd59a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
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vector_id: 9546
content:
"[...] policy could result in negative distributional and (to a lesser extent) \r competitiveness impacts. Meckling et al. (2017) indicate that an \r 'enduring challenge' of technology-specific industrial policy such as \r some FITs is to avoid locking in suboptimal clean technologies - \r a challenge which, among other options, could be overcome with \r targeted niche procurement for next-generation technologies. \r Other authors have cautioned that the move from renewable FITs \r to auctions may favour existing PVs (e.g.,  polysilicon) over more \r novel solar power technologies (Sivaram 2018b) such as thin-film \r PV, amorphous PV, and perovskites."


id: 2365e64d46cdfaf7fcdc03f0cab58c55
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3425
content:
"The impact of renewable portfolio standards without tradeable \r credits on innovation outcomes is negligible or very small (medium \r evidence, medium agreement). Out of the nine studies, seven \r reported no impact on innovation outcomes and two a  positive \r impact (Penasco et al. 2021). Most of these papers focused on \r patenting and private R&D innovation indicators and not cost \r reductions. Impact on competitiveness is found to be negligible \r or positive (limited evidence, medium agreement). Out of eight \r evaluations, five  report a  positive impact and three a  negligible \r impact; only two  are quantitative studies (Penasco et al. 2021). \r Negative distributional impacts from renewable portfolio standards \r can emerge in some cases (limited evidence, low agreement). Out \r of eight evaluations, four identified positive impacts, and four \r negative impacts; all of the studies identifying a  positive impact \r were theoretical. There are efforts focused on clean energy portfolio \r [...]"


id: 1fbc932467e18fde82b1c72581fd8eb2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2790
content:
"The literature specifically focusing on the impacts of labels is very \r limited and indicates positive outcomes (limited evidence, high \r agreement). Energy labels may accompany a  minimum energy \r performance standard, and the outcomes of these policies are often \r combined in literature (IEA 2015). But again, given the limited \r evidence, more research is needed. Although there are many studies \r on energy efficiency more broadly and for both standards and labels, \r only eight studies specifically focus on labels. Furthermore, seven of \r them report positive outcomes and one negative outcomes. Six of the \r studies used qualitative methods mentioning the impacts of labelling \r on the development of new products (Wiel et al. 2006). Research \r specifically comparing voluntary labels with other mechanisms found \r a significant and positive relationship between labels and the number \r of energy-efficient inventions (Girod et al. 2017). More research is \r [...]"


id: ce122cb45b69445da8db984f2fb19bd6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33585
content:
"[...] needed, especially in developing countries, that have extensive \r labelling programmes in place, and also with quantitative methods, to \r develop evidence on the impacts of labelling on innovation. Box 16.7 \r discusses an example of a combination of policy instruments in China \r including labelling, sale bans and financial support."


id: 7434d2fc09a6fc21bf6c8117868ec052
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17682
content:
"Voluntary approaches have a largely positive impact on innovation \r for those that choose to participate (robust evidence, medium \r agreement). Research on voluntary approaches focuses on firms \r adopting voluntary environmental management systems that can \r be certified based on standards of the widely adopted International \r Organization for Standardization (ISO 14001  - standard for \r environmental management) or the European Union's Eco\u0002Management and Auditing Scheme (EMAS), which is partly mandatory. \r Out of 16 analyses: 70% report positive innovation outcomes in terms \r of patents, products or processes; 17% report negligible impacts; and \r 13% report negative impacts. Positive innovation outcomes have \r been linked to firms' internal resource management practices and \r were found to be strengthened in firms with mature environmental \r management systems and in the presence of other environmental \r regulations (Inoue et al. 2013; He and Shen 2019; Li et al. 2019a). \r [...]"


id: 4f2f303505ff13b3aacc5e980f6c111f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11218
content:
"[...] Overall, studies are concentrated in a  few countries that do not \r fully capture where environmental management systems have been \r actually adopted (Boiral et al. 2018). There is a need for research in \r analyses of such instruments in emerging economies, including China \r and India, and methodologically in qualitative and longitudinal \r analyses (Boiral et al. 2018)."


id: db8a2f08fe6f7c627478f18d74289828
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35908
content:
"science and useful arts'. Patent systems aim to reach their goals by \r trying to strike a balance between the creation of new knowledge and \r diffusion of that knowledge (Scotchmer and Green 1990; Devlin 2010; \r Anadon et al. 2016b). They promote the creation of new knowledge \r (e.g., technological inventions) by providing a temporary, exclusive \r right to the holder of the patent, thus providing incentives to develop \r such new knowledge and helping parties to justify investments in \r R&D.  They promote the diffusion of this new knowledge via the \r detailed disclosure of the invention in the patent publication, \r and by enabling a 'market for knowledge' via trading patents and \r issuing licences (Arora et al. 2004). Although IP protections provide \r incentives to invest in innovation, they can also restrict the use of \r new knowledge by raising prices or blocking follow-on innovation \r (Wallerstein et al. 1993; Stiglitz 2008). As institutions, national patent \r [...]"


id: 8f0e321818741f9417a1924e293fd2c3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22367
content:
"[...] systems feature prominently in models and theories of national \r innovation systems (Edquist 1997; Klein Woolthuis et al. 2005)."


id: b1e2a798694e220b7760df292d2e8efc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28522
content:
"Overall, research indicates that trade can facilitate the entrance \r of new technologies, but the impact on innovation is less clear \r (limited evidence, low agreement). A recent study indicates that, for \r countries with high environmental performance, FDI has a negligible \r impact on environmental performance, while countries with a lower \r environmental performance may benefit from FDI in terms of their \r environmental performance (Li et al. 2019b). One analysis on China \r links FDI with improved environmental performance and energy \r efficiency and also innovation outcomes in general (Gao and Zhang \r 2013). Other work links FDI with increased productivity across firms \r (not just those engaged in climate-related technologies) through \r spillovers (Newman et al. 2015). In addition, Brandao and Ehrl \r (2019) indicate that productivity of the electric power industry is \r more influenced by the transfer of embodied technology from other \r [...]"


id: afeef7d8a588744b7c5db07fb026b252
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28191
content:
"[...] industries than by investments of the power industry. Also, they \r find that countries with high R&D stocks are the main sources of \r international technology spillovers and the source countries may also \r benefit from the spillover."


id: 4948e3c41d2d7019b291e934f3be93b8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10112
content:
"The degree to which patent systems actually promote innovation \r is subject to debate. Patent protection has been found to have \r a positive impact on R&D activities in patent-intensive industries, but \r this effect was found to be conditional on access to finance (Maskus \r et al. 2019). Patents are believed to be especially important to \r facilitate innovation in selected areas such as pharmaceuticals, where \r investments in developments and clinical trials are high, imitation \r costs are low, and there is often a one-to-one relationship between \r a patent and a product, referred to as a 'discrete' product industry \r (Cohen et al. 2000). At the same time, an increasing body of theoretical \r and empirical literature suggests that the proliferation of patents \r also discourages innovation (medium evidence, low agreement). \r Theoretical contributions note that a appropriability regime that is too \r stringent may greatly limit the diffusion of advanced technological \r [...]"


id: 4f7d65fcc21f07fcda38db40ddce7759
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11270
content:
"[...] knowledge and eventually block the development of differentiated \r technological capabilities within an industry, in what is called an \r 'appropriability trap' (Edquist 1997; Klein Woolthuis et al. 2005). \r There has been a long-standing debate on the impact of patents and \r other IP rights on innovation and economic development (Machlup \r 1958; Hall and Helmers 2019). Jaffe and Lerner (2004) and Bessen \r and Meurer (2009) highlight how IP rights also hamper innovation \r in a variety of ways. Other contributions in the literature focus on \r more specific factors. For example, Shapiro (2001) discusses 'patent \r thickets', where overlapping sets of patent rights mean that those \r seeking to commercialise new technology need to obtain licences \r from multiple patentees. Heller and Eisenberg (1998) argue that \r a 'tragedy of the anticommons' is likely to emerge when too many \r parties obtain the right to exclude others from using fragmented \r [...]"


id: 4508b607e363a6afb40901f1390ad43c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9372
content:
"[...] and overlapping pieces of knowledge  - ultimately leading to no \r one having the privilege of using the results of biomedical research. \r Reitzig et al. (2007) describe the damaging effects of extreme \r business strategies employing patents, such as 'patent trolling'."


id: 1c5cf91b8652de9c780bfee3d09f2277
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2179
content:
"sets down minimum standards for the regulation by national \r governments of many forms of IP as applied to nationals of other \r WTO member nations (WTO 1994). Developing countries successfully \r managed to include some flexibilities into TRIPS, both in terms of \r timing of legislative reform, and the content of the reforms. In an \r attempt to understand the  effects of the introduction of TRIPS, \r Falvey et al. (2006) find that the effect of IP protection on growth \r is positively and significantly related to growth for low- and high\u0002income countries, but not for middle-income countries. They argue \r that low-income countries benefit from increased technology flows, \r but middle-income countries may have offsetting losses from the \r reduced scope for imitation. Note that Falvey et al. (2006) do not \r break down their results in different technological areas, and they \r do not focus on innovation, but instead on growth. It has been \r [...]"


id: 8b495e25ab0f966978213fead6035f2b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21666
content:
"[...] argued that the increasingly globalised IP regime through initiatives \r such as the TRIPS agreement will diminish prospects for technology \r transfer and competition in developing countries, particularly for \r several important technology areas related to meeting sustainable \r development needs (Maskus and Reichman 2017)."


id: 35d7fa2b3f8f58b81b3c2e92dcea665c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6722
content:
"In principle, patent holders are not required to take their protected \r invention into use, and neither have the obligation to allow \r (i.e., license) others to use the inventions in question (high evidence,\r high agreement). Studies have shown that the way patent holders \r use their patent differs considerably across industrial sectors: \r in pharmaceutics, patents are typically used to enable exclusive \r production of a certain good (and obtain monopoly rents), while in \r industries such as computers, semiconductors, and communications, \r patents are often used to strengthen positions in cross-licensing \r negotiations and to generate licensing income (Cohen et al. 2000; \r Foray 2004). There are also companies that predominantly obtain \r patents for defensive reasons: they seek freedom to design and \r manufacture, and by owning a  patent portfolio themselves, they \r hope to prevent becoming the target of litigation by other patent \r [...]"


id: b169ad0457ec8d92c3e74a79ab83a3cb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28437
content:
"[...] holders (Hall and Ziedonis 2001). Patents are often used strategically \r to impede the development and diffusion of competing, alternative \r products, processes or services, by employing strategies known as \r 'blanketing' and 'fencing' (Grandstrand 2000), although the research \r is not specific to the climate space."


id: 8fd2347de620546871e1f88c8f93f9f3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22512
content:
"Research examining the impacts of sub-national policies on \r innovation and competitiveness is sporadic - regional variations have \r been quantitatively assessed in the USA or China, or with case studies \r in these and other countries. Research on wind energy in the USA, \r distributed PV balance of systems in China, and renewable energy \r technologies in Italy have found that policies that incentivised local \r demand were associated with inducing innovation, measured with \r patents (Corsatea 2016; Fu et al. 2018; Gao and Rai 2019). Different \r policies may have different impacts - for example, in the USA, state\u0002level tax incentives and subsidies induced innovation within the \r state; but for renewable portfolio standards, policies in other states \r were associated with innovation because of impact on demand, but \r own-state policies were not (Fu et al. 2018). Research has also noted \r that the outcomes of policy and regulation on innovation are spatially \r [...]"


id: ffca8fde7b0bc2a464fa843f41b830da
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42392
content:
"[...] heterogenous, because of differences in local planning authorities \r and capabilities (Corsatea 2016; Song et al. 2019)."


id: 9fc5d22eae6ad7046cddd62d7191ab0c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25316
content:
"There are notable but specific exceptions to the general principle that \r patent holders are not obliged to license their patent to others. These \r exceptions include the compulsory licence, fair, reasonable and non\u0002discriminatory (FRAND) policies, and statement on licences of right \r (high evidence, high agreement). While patent holders are, in principle, \r free to choose not to license their innovation, there are three important \r exceptions to this. First, most national patent laws have provisions for \r compulsory licensing, meaning that a government allows someone \r else to produce a patented product or process without the consent of \r the patent holder, or plans to use the patent-protected invention itself \r (WTO 2020). Compulsory licences may be issued in cases of public \r interest or events of abuse of the patent (WIPO 2008; Biadgleng \r 2009). Compulsory licensing is explicitly allowed in the WTO TRIPS \r agreement, and its use in context of medicine (for instance, to control \r [...]"


id: 123770156a2462b54d16e949b3a2e388
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 399
content:
"[...] diseases of public health importance, including HIV, tuberculosis and \r malaria) is further clarified in the 'DOHA Declaration' from 2001 \r (Reichman 2009; WHO 2020). Second, standard-setting organisations "


id: c8127e1412ec22809010797f54e806ea
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32509
content:
"Although previous sections summarised the research disentangling \r the role of individual policies in advancing or hindering innovation \r (as well as impacts on other objectives), other research has tried \r to characterise the impact of a policy mix on a particular outcome. \r Although the outcome studied was not innovation, but diffusion \r (technology effectiveness is in the set of criteria outlined in \r Chapter 13), it seems relevant to discuss overall findings. Research \r reviewing renewable energy policies in nine OECD countries \r concludes that, over time, a  broad set of policies characterised by \r a 'balance' metric has been put in place. This research also identifies \r a  significant negative association between the balance of policies \r in renewable energy and the diffusion of total renewable energy \r capacity, but no significant effect of the overall intensity (coded as \r the 46 weighted average of six indicators) on renewable capacity \r [...]"


id: 8354ac1bb877d8081b7c3b79f918533e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20238
content:
"[...] (Schmidt and Sewerin 2019). This indicates that a neutral conception \r of balance across all possible policies may not be desirable, and that \r policy mix intensity by itself does not explain technology diffusion."


id: 93ac837f980f4a8dcf3ec75b0c890135
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23188
content:
"With the submission of their Nationally Determined Contributions \r (NDCs) as part of the Paris Agreement, most developing countries are \r now engaged in climate mitigation and adaptation. While technology \r is seen as one of the 'means of implementation' of climate action, \r developing countries often have relatively limited technology \r innovation capabilities, which requires them to access technologies \r developed in higher-income countries with stronger innovation \r systems (Popp 2011; Binz et al. 2012; Urban 2018). In many cases, \r these technologies require adaptation for the local context and needs \r (Sagar 2009; Anadon et al. 2016b), and innovation capabilities are \r required to suitably adapt these technologies for local use and also \r to create new markets and business models that are required for \r successful deployment (Sagar 2009; Ockwell et al. 2015; Ockwell and \r Byrne 2016). This can lead to dependencies on foreign knowledge \r [...]"


id: 5e51c8e8b1ba07452c89c66a6d4b7d19
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13886
content:
"[...] and providers (Ockwell and Byrne 2016), negative impacts in terms of \r higher costs (Huenteler et al. 2016a), balance of payments constraints, \r and vulnerability to external shocks (Ebeling 2020)."


id: bb075ed3a9ab57cbe129936b775a31b0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30125
content:
"Such globalisation of production and supply chains opens up \r economic development opportunities for developing countries \r (Lema et al. 2020). At the same time, not all countries benefit from \r the globalisation of innovation - barriers remain related to finance, \r environmental performance, human capabilities and cost (Weiss and \r Bonvillian 2013; Egli et al. 2018), with developing countries being \r particularly disadvantaged at leveraging these opportunities. The gap \r in low-carbon technology innovation between countries appears to \r have reduced only among OECD countries (Yan et al. 2017; Du and \r Li 2019; Du et al. 2019) and the lower-income countries are not \r able to benefit as much from low-carbon technologies. For instance, \r in the case of agriculture, Fuglie (2018) notes that international \r R&D spillovers seem to have benefitted developed countries more \r than developing countries. Gross et al. (2018) also argue that the \r [...]"


id: 6021cb4ddc87a29c019dd00d99b43cd2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14216
content:
"[...] development timescales for new energy technologies can extend \r up to 70 years, even within one country. They recommend that \r innovation efforts be balanced between early-stage R&D spending, \r and commercialising already low-emission technologies in the \r demonstration phase and diffusing them globally."


id: e8ef0d01aa686e5b8abde2f293296e13
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38330
content:
"Thus international cooperation on technology development and \r transfer can enable developing countries to achieve their climate \r goals more effectively, while also addressing other SDGs  - taking \r advantage, where possible, of the globalisation of innovation and \r production (Lema et al. 2020). Earlier assessments in AR5 and SR1.5 \r have made it clear that international technology transfer and \r cooperation could play a role in climate policy at both the international \r and the domestic policy level (Somanathan et al. 2014; Stavins et al. \r 2014; IPCC 2018b) and for low-carbon development at the regional \r level (Agrawala et al. 2014). The Paris Agreement also reflects this \r view by noting that countries shall strengthen cooperative action on \r technology development and transfer regarding two main aspects: \r (i) promoting collaborative approaches to R&D; and (ii) facilitating \r access to technology to developing country Parties (UNFCCC 2015). \r [...]"


id: cc3af1978b85804483ef4c790a6891d5
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33254
content:
"[...] Furthermore, both in literature and in UNFCCC deliberations, South\u0002South technology transfer is highlighted (Khosla et al. 2017) as \r a complement to the transfer of technology and know-how from the \r North to the South."


id: 4764e380968b81cc453a7f8bceba5c6d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9770
content:
"Real-world outcomes in terms of low-emission technology \r deployment in developing countries may vary significantly, depending \r on the nature of the international engagement and the domestic \r context. While there has been some success in the enhancement \r of technology deployment through technology transfer in some \r developing countries (de la Tour et al. 2011; Zhang and Gallagher \r 2016), many others, and particularly least-developed countries, \r are lagging behind (Glachant and Dechezlepretre 2017). Glachant \r and Dechezlepretre (2017) indicate that this is due to the lack of \r participation in economic globalisation and that climate negotiations \r could facilitate technology transfer to those countries through the \r creation of global demand for low-emission technologies through \r stronger mitigation targets that will result in lowering of costs and \r therefore enhanced technology diffusion. A  broader perspective \r [...]"


id: e841d78a88c417d5a0e2f6940909bec6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38196
content:
"[...] presents a host of other factors that govern technology diffusion and \r commercialisation in developing countries, including: investment; "


id: 1d132f686202ebf6e74b078e1ecc2267
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2295
content:
"social, cultural and behavioural, marketing and market building; \r macroeconomics; and support policy (Bakhtiar et al. 2020). Ramos \r Mejia et al. (2018) indicate that the governance of low-emission \r technology transfer and deployment in developing countries is \r frequently negatively affected by a mixture of well- and ill-functioning \r institutions  - for instance, in a  context of market imperfection, \r clientelist and social exclusive communities and patrimonial and/\r or marketised states. Furthermore, existing interests, such as fossil \r fuel production, may also impede the deployment of low-emission \r technologies, as highlighted in case studies of Vietnam and Indonesia \r (Dorband et al. 2020; Ordonez et al. 2021). It is for such reasons that \r both domestic efforts and international engagement are seen as \r necessary to facilitate technology transfer as well as deployment in \r developing countries (Boyd 2012). The same has been seen as true \r [...]"


id: 8a16ad92ded4356e304017ad445cda60
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21469
content:
"[...] in the case of agriculture, where the very successful international \r research efforts of the CGIAR - with remarkably favourable benefit\u0002cost ratios (Alston et al. 2021) - were complemented by the national \r agricultural research systems for effective uptake of high-yielding \r varieties of crops (Evenson and Gollin 2003)."


id: edadaf4e30fa9fe6fe3b2f58d09a5631
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39178
content:
"As mentioned earlier, RD&D can aid the development of new \r technologies as well as their adoption for new use contexts. \r Therefore, it is not surprising that international cooperation on RD&D \r is identified as a  mechanism to promote low-carbon innovation \r (Suzuki 2015; Mission Innovation 2019; TEC 2021). This has resulted \r in a  variety of international initiatives to cooperate on technology \r in order to create knowledge spillovers and develop capacity. For \r example, the UNFCCC Technology Mechanism, among other things, \r aims to facilitate finance for RD&D of climate technologies by helping \r with readiness activities for developing country actors. In particular \r preparing early-stage technologies for a  smoother transition to \r deployment and commercialisation has been emphasised in the \r context of the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) (TEC 2017). \r There are numerous multilateral, bilateral and private programmes that \r [...]"


id: b02ce643fae37f05aa46c2f6777262c9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28232
content:
"[...] have facilitated RD&D, biased mostly towards mitigation (as opposed \r to adaptation) activities. Many programmes that seemed to be \r about RD&D were in reality dialogues about research coordination \r (Ockwell et al. 2015). There are also a  variety of possible bilateral \r and multilateral models and approaches for engaging in joint R&D \r (Mission Innovation 2019). An update by the TEC (2021) reviewing \r good practices in international cooperation of technology confirmed \r the conclusions of Ockwell et al. (2015), and moreover highlighted \r that most initiatives are led by the public sector, and that the private \r sector tended to get involved only in incubation, commercialisation \r and diffusion phases. It also concluded that, although participation of \r larger, higher-income developing countries seems to have increased, \r participation of least-developed countries is still very low."


id: 716ff22cf8123472562c3d9f61272cf3
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"One key area for underpinning effective technology uptake in \r developing countries relates to capabilities for managing technological \r change. This includes the capabilities to innovate, implement, and \r undertake integrated planning. There is much research to indicate \r that the ability of a  country's firms to adopt new technologies is \r determined by its absorptive capacity, which includes its own R&D \r activities, human capacity (e.g.,  technical personnel), government \r involvement (including institutional capacity), the infrastructure in the \r country (Kumar et al. 1999), and knowledge and capacity as part of its \r 'intangible assets' or the 'software' (Ockwell et al. 2015; da Silva et al. \r 2019; Corsi et al. 2020). For sustainable development, the capacity \r to plan in an integrated way and implement the SDGs (Khalili et al. \r 2015; Elder et al. 2016), including using participatory approaches \r (Disterheft et al. 2015), is a  conditional means of implementation. \r [...]"


id: ca1ebeac64db92784e1bcb545bd33635
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"[...] It also is argued that, if human capital were the focus of international \r climate negotiations as well as national climate policy, it could \r change the political economy in favour of climate mitigation, which \r is needed for developing such capabilities in advance to keep up with \r the required speed of transformation (Ockwell et al. 2015; Hsu 2017; \r IPCC 2018b; Upadhyaya et al. 2020). In a  global analysis of wind \r energy using econometric analysis, Halleck-Vega et al. (2018) lend \r quantitative credibility to the claim that a  technology skill base is \r a  key determinant of technological diffusion. Activities to enhance \r capabilities include informational contacts, research activities, \r consulting, education and training, and activities related to technical \r facilities (Huh and Kim 2018; Khan et al. 2020)."


id: 81b3155f7f295e96a1e3f43415644a1
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"In recent years, deliberate international climate finance investments have focused on ensuring that developing countries (and especially \r SIDS and least-developed countries) have access to improvements in hydrometeorological observations, modelling, and prediction \r capacity, sometimes with a particular focus on the people intended to benefit from the information produced (CREWS 2016). For \r instance, on the Eastern Caribbean SIDS of Dominica, researchers took a community-based approach to identify the mediating factors \r affecting the challenges to coastal fishing communities in the aftermath of two extreme weather events (in particular hurricane Maria \r in 2017) (Turner et al. 2020). Adopting an adaptive capacity framework (Cinner et al. 2018), they identified 'intangible resources' that \r people relied on in their post-disaster response as important for starting up fishery, but also went beyond that framework to conclude \r [...]"


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"[...] that the response ability on the part of governmental organisations as well as other actors (e.g., fish vendors) in the supply chain is also \r a requirement for rebuilding and restarting income-generating activity (Turner et al. 2020). Numerous other studies have highlighted \r capacity-building as adaptation priorities (Basel et al. 2020; Kuhl et al. 2020; Sarker et al. 2020; Vogel et al. 2020; Williams et al. 2020)."


id: eaa072f98d4e5d9034cb309b3e89ae11
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"(Nygaard and Hansen 2015; Hofman and van der Gaast 2019). \r Since 2009, the UNFCCC discussions on technology development \r and transfer have focused on the Technology Mechanism under the \r Cancun Agreements of 2010, which can be seen as the global climate \r governance answer to redistributive claims by developing countries \r (McGee and Wenta 2014). The Technology Mechanism consists \r of the TEC and the Climate Technology Centre & Network (CTCN). \r An independent review of CTCN, evaluated it on five dimensions - \r relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impacts and sustainability - and \r indicated that the organisation is achieving its mandate in all these \r dimensions, although there are some possible areas of improvement. \r The review also specifically noted that 'the lack of predictability \r and security over financial resources significantly affected \r the CTCN's ability to deliver services at the expected level, as did the \r [...]"


id: aea535b9eb0a977a58eb58480578fcbb
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"[...] CTCN's lack of human and organizational resources and the capacity \r of NDEs [National Designated Entities].' (TEC 2017). The CTCN has \r overcome some of the limitations imposed by resource constraints \r by acting as a  matchmaker from an open-innovation perspective \r (Lee and Mwebaza 2020). The CTCN's lack of financial sustainability \r has been a  recurring issue, which may potentially be resolved by \r deepening the linkage between the CTCN and Green Climate Fund \r (Oh 2020). In the meanwhile, the Green Climate Fund is planning to "


id: b21261b7b1921a32e5cfdf42b1d16946
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"that around 40% of projects feature hardware or other types of \r international transfer of technology (Seres et al. 2009; Murphy et al. \r 2015), depending on the nature of technology, the host country and \r region (Cui et al. 2020) and the project type (Karakosta et al. 2012). \r The CDM was generally positively evaluated on its contribution to \r technology transfer. However, it was also regarded critically as the \r market-responsiveness and following of export implies a bias to larger, \r more advanced economies rather than those countries most in need \r of technology transfer (Gandenberger et al. 2016), although some \r countries have managed to correct that by directing the projects, sub\u0002nationally, to provinces with the greatest need (Bayer et al. 2016). \r Also, the focus on hardware in evaluations of technology transfer \r under the CDM has been criticised (Haselip et al. 2015; Michaelowa \r et al. 2019). Indeed, although many studies do go beyond hardware \r [...]"


id: f76a59bd6af7f090f02f3661e3ea21ee
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"[...] in their evaluations (e.g., Murphy et al. 2015), the degree to which \r the project leads to a change in the national system of innovation or \r institutional capacity development is not commonly assessed, or has \r been assessed as limited (de Coninck and Puig 2015)."


id: dae1c885908996ba78f589007d511cfd
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"From the broader assessment above, despite limitations of available \r information, it is clear that the number of initiatives and activities \r on international cooperation and technology transfer and capacity \r building seem to have been enhanced since the Cancun Agreements \r and the Paris Agreement (TEC 2021). However, much more can be \r done, given the complexity and magnitude of the requirements in \r terms of coverage of activities, the amount of committed funding, \r and its effectiveness. Some assessments of UNFCCC instruments \r specifically for technology transfer to developing countries have \r indicated that functions such as knowledge development, market \r formation and legitimacy in developing countries' low-emission \r technological innovation systems would need much more support to \r fulfil the Paris Agreement goals (de Coninck and Puig 2015; Ockwell \r et al. 2015); such areas would benefit from continued attention, \r [...]"


id: 12ed670c02efbb499ca5c8ba4c56f0df
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"There is significantly less literature on capacity building under \r the UNFCCC, especially as it relates to managing the technology \r transition. In a  legal analysis, D'Auvergne and Nummelin (2017) \r indicate the nature, scope and principles of Article 11 on capacity \r building of the Paris Agreement as being demand- and country\u0002driven, following a needs approach, fostering national, subnational \r and local ownership, and being iterative, incorporating the lessons \r learnt, as well as participatory, cross-cutting and gender-response. \r They also highlight that it is novel that least-developed countries \r and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) are called out as the most \r vulnerable and most in need of capacity building, and that it raises \r a 'legal expectation' that all parties 'should' cooperate to enhance the \r capacity in developing countries to implement the Paris Agreement. \r These aspects are reflected in the terms of reference of the Paris \r [...]"


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"[...] Committee on Capacity-building (PCCB) that was established in 2015 \r at the 21st Conference of the Parties (UNFCCC 2016; D'Auvergne \r and Nummelin 2017), and was extended by five years at the 25th \r Conference of the Parties in 2019 (UNFCCC 2020a, b). In its work \r plan for 2020-2024, its aims include 'identifying capacity gaps and \r needs, both current and emerging, and recommending ways to \r address them'."


id: af28a337a44199f1a9bfff171d4e3cad
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"There is also literature suggesting that weak IPR regimes have a 'strong and negative impact on the international diffusion of \r patented knowledge' (Dechezlepretre et al. 2013; Glachant and Dechezlepretre 2017). Also, patents may support market transactions \r in technology, including international technology transfer, especially to middle-income countries and larger developing countries \r (Maskus 2010; Hall and Helmers 2019) but least-developed countries may be better served by building capacity to absorb and \r implement technology (Hall and Helmers 2010; Maskus 2010; Sanni et al. 2016; Glachant and Dechezlepretre 2017). It is also argued \r that it is not even clear that the patent system as it exists today is the most appropriate vehicle for encouraging international access \r (Hall and Helmers 2010; Maskus 2010; Sanni et al. 2016; Glachant and Dechezlepretre 2017). Given the large variation in perspectives \r [...]"


id: aab982d600744ed2601e48cbd2ceb020
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"[...] on the role of IPRs in technology transfer, there is a need for more evidence and analysis to better understand if, and under what \r conditions, IPR may hinder or promote technology transfer (TEC 2012)."


id: 627c019cf7135571bed4500c3a8dd5d7
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"(Gibbons 1999; Jasanoff 2003), to the extent that the two can be \r separated. From a science, technology and innovation perspective, Fu \r et al. (2019) distinguish three categories of SDGs. The first category \r comprises those SDGs representing essential human needs for which \r inputs that put pressure on sustainable development would need \r to be minimised. These include Zero hunger (SDG 2), Clear water \r and sanitation (SDG 6) and Affordable and clean energy (SDG 7) \r resources, which continue to rely on production technologies and \r practices that are eroding ecosystem services, potentially hampering \r the realisation of SDGs 15 (Life on land) and 14 (Life below water) \r (Diaz et al. 2019). The second category includes those related to \r governance and which compete with each other for scarce resources, \r such as Industry, innovation and infrastructure (SDG 9) and Climate \r action (SDG 13), which require an interdisciplinary perspective. The \r [...]"


id: 503f046ba9a0b1557d5260836dcb0e1
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"[...] third category are those that require maximum realisation, include \r No poverty (SDG 1), Quality education (SDG 4) and Gender equality \r (SDG 5) (Fu et al. 2019)."


id: 69acab84e2f5202f9f587264ca480bc0
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"Resolving tensions between the SDGs requires adoption and \r mainstreaming of novel technologies that can meet needs while \r reducing resource waste and improving resource-use efficiency, and \r acknowledging the systemic nature of technological innovation, \r which involves many levels of actors, stages of innovation and scales \r (Anadon et al. 2016b). Changes in production technology have been \r found effective to overcome trade-offs between food and water \r goals (Gao and Bryan 2017). Innovative technologies at the food, \r water and energy nexus are transforming production processes \r in industrialised and developing countries, such as developments in \r agrivoltaics, which is co-development of land for agriculture and solar \r with water conservation benefits (Barron-Gafford et al. 2019; Lytle \r et al. 2020; Schindele et al. 2020), and other renewably powered \r low- to zero-carbon food, water and energy systems (He et al. 2019). \r [...]"


id: dc85d126b95b413823e0cb7b6e6dc938
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"factors often keeps society 'locked in' to those technologies already in widespread use, rather than allowing a shift to new ones - \r even those that offer benefits (David 1985; Arthur 1994). Exceptions often follow consistent patterns (Geels 2002; Unruh 2002); since \r AR5 a growing number of scholars have suggested using these insights to design more effective climate policies and actions (Geels \r et al. 2017). Chapter 1 (Section 1.7 and Figure 1.6) represents technology diffusion and a corresponding shift in policy emphasis \r as a continuous process; it is also useful to identify a sequence of distinct stages that typically occur, associating each stage with \r a distinct set of processes, challenges, and effective policies (Patt and Lilliestam 2018; Victor et al. 2019). Consistent with elsewhere \r in this report (Section 5.5.2 and Supplementary Material 5.5.3 in Chapter 5, and Section 16.3 in Chapter 16), Cross-Chapter Box 12 \r [...]"


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"[...] Figure 1 elaborates on four distinct stages: it portrays these as occurring in a cycle, recognising that even transformative technologies \r will eventually be replaced with newer ones."


id: 2b400545421623a591ead38be9364950
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"for these new market entrants is too low for them to appear viable to investors (Murphy and Edwards 2003). A key process in the early \r adoption phase is induced innovation, a result of incremental improvements in both design and production processes, and of mass\u0002production of a growing share of key components (Nemet 2006; Grubb et al. 2021). There is diversity across classes of technologies, \r and learning tends to occur faster for technologies that are modular (Wilson et al. 2020) - such as photovoltaics - and slower for \r those that require site- or context-specific engineering, such as in the shift to low-carbon materials production (Malhotra and Schmidt \r 2020). Public policies that create a secure return on investment for project developers can lead to learning associated with industry \r expansion (Chapter 16, Figure 16.1); typically these are economically and politically viable when they promote growth within a market \r [...]"


id: 938082c5c94c1735134684b596fcc90e
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"[...] niche, causing little disruption to the mainstream market (Roberts et al. 2018). Direct support mechanisms are effective, including \r cross-subsidies (such as feed-in tariffs) and market quotas (such as renewable portfolio standards) (Geels et al. 2017b; Patt and \r Lilliestam 2018; and Chapter 9 for assessment of early adoption policies in the building sector). The value of these policies is less in \r their immediate emissions reductions, but more in generating the conditions for self-sustaining transformational change to take place \r as technologies later move from niche to mainstream (Hanna and Victor 2021)."


id: 6ac4d79965790cce582dc3424f848756
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"The third stage, diffusion, is where niche technologies become mainstream, with accelerating diffusion rates (Sections  1.7 and \r 16.4), and is marked by changes to the socio-technical 'regime', including infrastructure networks, value chains, user practices, \r and institutions. This stage is often the most visible and turbulent, because more widespread adoption of a new technology gives \r rise to structural changes in institutions and actors' behaviour (e.g., increased adoption of smartphones to new payment systems \r and social media), and because when incumbent market actors become threatened, they often contest policies promoting the new \r technologies (Kohler et al. 2019). In the diffusion stage, policy emphasis is shifted from financial support during the early adoption \r stage, towards supporting regime-level factors needed to sustain, or cope with, rapid and widespread diffusion (Markard 2018). \r [...]"


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"[...] These factors and policies are context specific. For example, Patt et al. (2019) document that the policies needed to expand residential \r charging networks for electric vehicles depend on the local structure of the housing market."


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"Because different sectors are at different stages of low-carbon transitions, and because the barriers that policies need to address are \r stage- and often context-specific, effective policies stimulating socio-technical transitions operate primarily at the sectoral level (Victor \r et al. 2019). This is particularly the case during early adoption, where economic barriers predominate; during diffusion, policies that address \r regime-level factors often need to deal with cross-sectoral linkages and coupling, such as those between power generation, transportation, \r and heating (Patt 2015; Bloess 2019; Fridgen et al. 2020). The entire cycle can take multiple decades. However, later stages can go faster by \r building on the earlier stages that have taken place elsewhere. For example, early RD&D into wind energy took place primarily in Denmark, \r was followed by early adoption in Denmark, Germany, and Spain, before other countries, including the USA, India, and China, leapfrogged \r [...]"


id: 8c76a7f58abc7f9b73e7c42dc8390906
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"[...] directly to the diffusion stage (Chaudhary et al. 2015; Dai and Xue 2015; Lacal-Arantegui 2019). A similar pattern played out for solar \r power (Nemet 2019). International cooperation, geared towards technology transfer, capacity and institution-building, and finance, can \r help ensure that developing countries leapfrog to low-carbon technologies that have undergone commercialisation elsewhere (Adenle et al. \r 2015; Fankhauser and Jotzo 2018) (see also Chapter 5, Box 5.9, Chapter 15, Section 15.5, and Section 16.5 in this chapter)."


id: e7a703029d484790fdd666065200fc75
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"This report contains numerous examples of the positive feedbacks in the centre of Cross-Chapter Box 12, Figure 1, predominantly \r arising during the early adoption and diffusion stages, and leading to rapid or unexpected acceleration of change. For example, public \r acceptance of meat alternatives leads to firms improving the products, increasing political and economic feedbacks (Section 5.4 \r and Box 5.5). Declining costs in solar and wind cause new investment in the power-generation sector being dominated by those \r technologies, leading to increased political support and further cost reductions (Chapter 6). In buildings (Chapter 9) and personal mobility \r (Chapter 10), low-carbon heating systems and electric vehicles are gaining public acceptance, leading to improved infrastructure and \r human resources, more employment in those sectors, and behavioural contagion. Some have argued that technologies cross societal \r [...]"


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"In the urban context, the concept of sustainability experiments has been used to examine innovative policies and practices adopted \r by cities that have significant impact on transition towards low-carbon and sustainable futures (Bai et al. 2010; Castan Broto and \r Bulkeley 2013). Individual innovative practices can potentially be upscaled to achieve low-carbon transition in cities (Peng and Bai \r 2018), leading to a  process of broadening and scaling innovative practices in other cities (Peng et al. 2019).  Such sustainability \r experiments give rise to new actor networks, which in some cases may accelerate change, and in others may lead to conflict (Bulkeley \r et al. 2014). As in the diffusion phase in Cross-Chapter Box 12, Figure 1, contextual factors play a strong role. Examining historical \r transitions to cycling across European cities, Oldenziel et al. (2016) found that contextual factors, including specific configurations of \r [...]"


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"[...] actors, can lead to very different outcomes. Kraus and Koch (2021) found a short-term social shock - such as the COVID-19 crisis - to \r lead to differential increases in cycling behaviour, contingent on other enabling conditions."


id: bc91fd5e4cb686d732351f6e717041e1
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"Linking system dynamics to development pathways and broader societal goals\r Transition dynamics insights can be broadened to shifting development pathways. Development paths are characterised by particular \r sets of interlinking regime rules and behaviours, including inertia and cascading effects over time, and are reinforced at multiple levels, \r with varied capacities and constraints on local agency occurring at each level (Burch et al. 2014) (Cross-Chapter Box 5 in Chapter 4). \r This is also observed by Schot and Kanger (2018), who identify a needed change in a 'meta-regime', crossing sectoral lines in linking \r value chains or infrastructure and overall development objectives. In the context of the UN climate change regime, international \r cooperation can bring together such best practices and lessons learnt (Adenle et al. 2015; Pandey et al. 2021). This is especially \r [...]"


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"[...] relevant for developing countries, which often depend on technologies and financial resources from abroad, witnessing their pace \r and direction influenced by transnational actors (Marquardt et al. 2016; Bhamidipati et al. 2019), and benefitting little in terms of \r participating in high value-added activities (Whittaker et al. 2020)."


id: bdbc067f49024ca37c1aca8171042241
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content:
"System transitions differ according to context, such as across industrialised and developing countries (Ramos-Mejia et al. 2018), \r and within countries. Lower levels of social capital and trust negatively impact niche commercialisation (Lepoutre and Oguntoye \r 2018). In contexts of poverty and inequality, stakeholders' - including users' - capabilities for meaningful participation are limited, \r and transition outcomes can end up marginalising or further excluding social groups (Osongo and Schot 2017; Hansen et al. 2018). \r Many studies of transitions in developing countries make note of the importance of innovation in the informal sector (Charmes 2016) \r (Box 5.10 in Chapter 5). Facilitating informal sector access to renewable energy sources, safe and sustainable buildings, and finance \r can advance low-carbon transitions (McCauley et al. 2019; Masuku and Nzewi 2021). On the contrary, disregarding its importance can \r [...]"


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content:
"[...] result in misleading or ineffective innovation and climate strategies (Maharajh and Kraemer-Mbula 2010; Mazhar and Ummad 2014; \r de Beer et al. 2016; Masuku and Nzewi 2021)."


id: 58446c79ce227d36ede2f40d48a85caf
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
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content:
"Policies that shift innovation in climate compatible directions \r can promote other development benefits, for instance, better \r health, increased energy access, poverty alleviation and economic \r competitiveness (Deng et al. 2018) (Cross-Chapter Box 12). Economic \r competitiveness co-benefits can emerge as climate mitigation \r policies trigger innovation that can be leveraged for promoting \r industrial development, job creation and economic growth, both \r in terms of localising low-emission energy technologies value \r chains as well as increased energy efficiency and avoided carbon \r lock-ins (Section  16.4). However, without adequate capabilities, \r co-benefits at the local level would be minimal, and they would \r probably materialise far from where activities take place (Ockwell \r and Byrne 2016; Vasconcellos and Caiado Couto 2021). Innovation \r and technological change can also empower citizens. Grass-roots \r innovation promotes the participation of grass-roots actors, such \r [...]"


id: 6494b4bc2cf2489ef185f4ee4bfd82f0
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"[...] as social movements and networks of academics, activists and \r practitioners, and facilitate experimenting with alternative forms \r of knowledge creation (Seyfang and Smith 2007; UNCTAD 2019). \r Examples of ordinary people and entrepreneurs adopting and \r adapting technologies to local needs to address locally defined needs \r have been documented in the development literature (van Welie and \r Romijn 2018) (Box 16.10). Digital technologies can empower citizens \r and communities in decentralised energy systems, contributing not \r only to a more sustainable but also to a more democratic and fairer \r energy system (Van Summeren et al. 2021) (Section 5.4 in Chapter 5, \r and Cross-Chapter Box 11 in this chapter)."


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"Innovation and climate mitigation policies can also have negative \r socio-economic impacts, and not all countries, actors and regions \r around the world benefit equally from rapid technological change \r (Deng et al. 2018; McCauley and Heffron 2018; Eisenberg 2019; \r UNCTAD 2019; Henry et al. 2020). In fact, socio-technical transitions \r often create winners and losers (Roberts et al. 2018). Technological \r change can reinforce existing divides between women and men, rural \r and urban populations, and rich and poor communities: older workers \r displaced by technological change will not qualify for jobs if they \r were unable to acquire new skills; weak educational systems may not \r prepare young people for emerging employment opportunities; and \r disadvantaged social groups, including women in many countries, \r often have fewer opportunities for formal education (McCauley and \r Heffron 2018; UNCTAD 2019). That is a risk regarding technological \r [...]"


id: 98fd2d856ccd4bc6bb07b4d52b0fb9f9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24132
content:
"[...] change for climate change mitigation, as emerging evidence \r suggests that the energy transition can create jobs and productivity \r opportunities in the renewable energy sector, but will also lead to \r job losses in fossil fuel and exposed sectors (Le Treut et al. 2021). At \r the same time, these new jobs may use more intensively high-level \r cognitive and interpersonal skills compared to regular, traditional \r jobs, requiring higher levels of human capital dimensions such as \r formal education, work experience and on-the-job training (Consoli \r et al. 2016). Despite the empowerment potentials of decentralised \r energy systems, not all societal groups are equally positioned to \r benefit from energy community policies, with issues of energy \r justice taking place within initiatives, between initiatives and related \r actors, as well as beyond initiatives (Calzadilla and Mauger 2018; \r van Bommel and Hoffken 2021)."


id: ebe0bc59d0c7a8d69654e80c965eb029
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38864
content:
"Technological innovation may bring significant synergy in pursuing \r SDGs, but it may also create challenges to the economy, human \r well-being, and the environment (Schillo and Robinson 2017; \r Thacker et al. 2019; Walsh et al. 2020). The degree of potential \r synergies and trade-offs among SDGs differs from country to country \r and over time (Section  16.6.1.1). These potentials will depend on \r available resources, geographical conditions, development stage \r and policy measures. Even though synergies and trade-offs related \r to technological innovation have received the least attention from \r researchers (Deng et al. 2018), literature show that higher synergy \r was found where countries' policies take into account the linkages \r between sectors (Mainali et al. 2018). For technology innovation to be \r effective in enhancing synergies and reducing trade-offs, its role and \r nature in production and consumption patterns, as well as in value \r [...]"


id: 6011c9fa7d2e0521e06d8e61d91ff7ec
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14209
content:
"[...] chains and in the wider economy, requires clarification. Technology \r ownership and control together with its current orientation and \r focus towards productivity, needs to be revised if a  meaningful \r contribution to the implementation of the SDGs is to be achieved \r in a transformative way (Walsh et al. 2020). Responsible innovation, \r combining anticipation, reflexivity, inclusion and responsiveness, has \r been suggested as a framework for conducting innovation (Stilgoe \r et al. 2013). Also inclusive innovation (Hoffecker 2021) could make \r sure that unheard voices and interests are included in decision\u0002making, and that methods for this have been implemented in practice \r (Douthwaite and Hoffecker 2017)."


id: 4defc870d7c6b87084c3bee0ec241854
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10977
content:
"importance of the link between technological innovation and \r community action and its contribution to sustainable development \r is usually underestimated. Further research is needed on this and, \r most importantly, its inclusion in the political agenda on sustainable \r development (Seyfang and Smith 2007). On the other hand, when \r technological innovation occurs far from where is implemented and \r participation in the production, and hence training activities of local \r actors is minimal, co-benefits and synergies among SDGs are limited \r and usually far below expectations (Bhamidipati and Hansen 2021; \r Vasconcellos and Caiado Couto 2021). Actions by policymakers that \r safeguard environmental and social aspects can boost synergies \r and maximise those co-benefits (Lema et al. 2021). Given that \r technological change impacts countries, regions and social groups \r differently, transition policies can be designed to ensure that all \r [...]"


id: a419b3bc811401d0e8f7baf721ae2c1a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26065
content:
"[...] regions and communities are able to take advantage of the energy \r and other transitions (McCauley and Heffron 2018; Henry et al. 2020)."


id: 120b5df19d17071643e94cd8a2f64fff
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 363
content:
"There are several examples of how to maximise synergies and avoid \r or minimise trade-offs when bringing technological innovation to the \r ground. When implementing off-grid solar energy in Rwanda, synergies \r were found between 80 of the 169 SDG targets, demonstrating \r how mainstreaming off-grid policies and prioritising investment in \r the off-grid sector can realise human development and well-being, \r build physical and social infrastructures, and achieve sustainable \r management of environmental resources (Bisaga et al. 2021). Another \r example is related to wind power in Northeast of Brazil where the \r creation of direct and indirect jobs has been demonstrated in areas \r where capabilities are high, as well as associated improvements \r in wholesale and retail trade and real estate activities, though this \r also emphasises the need for capacity development along with \r international collaboration projects (Vasconcellos and Caiado \r [...]"


id: 8c42320727ad1db165986c33f1dcaf8d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21849
content:
"[...] Couto 2021). Other examples include studies raising awareness on \r solar energy and women's empowerment (Winther et al. 2018) and \r recycling and waste (Cross and Murray 2018)."


id: c1687087ef705e511cbfb26982a0db49
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31331
content:
"One of knowledge gaps identified when assessing the literature \r is on the representation of developing countries in studies on \r innovation and technology development and transfer. This includes \r the conceptual core disciplines of the economics of innovation, \r innovation systems and sustainability transitions. This is true for \r studies on developing countries, and for authors originating from, or \r active in, developing country contexts. The evidence of the impact of \r decarbonisation policy instruments applied to developing countries \r or Small Island Developing States (SIDS) is limited. Expanding the \r knowledge base with studies that focus on developing countries \r would not only allow for testing whether the theories (developed \r by predominantly by developed-country researchers for industrialised \r countries) hold in developing country contexts, but also yield policy \r insights that could help both domestic and international policymakers \r [...]"


id: 27fc6c313d94d17b79c6b6625c73e98b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4234
content:
"Accelerating climate actions and progress towards a  just \r transition is essential to reducing climate risks and addressing \r sustainable development priorities, including water, food and \r human security (robust evidence, high agreement). Accelerating \r action in the context of sustainable development involves not only \r expediting the pace of change (speed) but also addressing  the \r underlying drivers of vulnerability and high emissions (quality \r and depth of change) and enabling diverse communities, sectors, \r stakeholders, regions and cultures (scale and breadth of change) to \r participate in just, equitable and inclusive processes that improve the \r health and well-being of people and the planet. Looking at climate \r change from a justice perspective means placing the emphasis on \r (i) the protection of vulnerable populations and low-income countries \r from the impacts of climate change, (ii) mitigating the  effects of \r [...]"


id: 413d8d8221769fe269d0fd4803e4cb23
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8660
content:
"be taken into consideration (medium evidence, medium agreement). \r The agriculture, forestry, and other land uses (AFOLU) sector offers \r many low-cost mitigation options, but actions aimed at producing \r bioenergy, extending food access and protecting biodiversity can \r also create trade-offs between different land uses (robust evidence,\r high agreement). Some options can help to minimise these trade\u0002offs, for example, integrated land management, cross-sectoral \r policies and efficiency improvements. Lifestyle changes, including \r dietary changes and reduced food waste, have several synergies \r with climate mitigation and the SDGs (medium evidence, medium \r agreement). Cross-sectoral policies are important in avoiding trade\u0002offs, to ensure that synergies between mitigation and SDGs are \r captured, and to ensure local people are involved in the development \r of new products, as well as production and consumption practices. \r [...]"


id: 274a0f75cbfc437d42c05543aab709b7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4083
content:
"[...] There can be many synergies in urban areas between mitigation \r policies and the SDGs, but capturing these depends on the overall \r planning of urban structures and on local integrated policies, where, \r for example, affordable housing and spatial planning as a  climate \r mitigation measure are combined with walkable urban areas, green \r electrification and clean renewable energy. Such integrated options \r can also reduce the pressures on agricultural land by reducing urban \r growth, thus improving food security. Access to green electricity \r can also support quality education (medium evidence, medium \r agreement). {17.3.3, 17.3.3.1, 17.3.3.3}"


id: a8ee2bdc87c116a945af22155cd4b9ef
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26931
content:
"Countries with assets that are at risk of becoming stranded \r may lack the relevant resources, knowledge, autonomy \r or agency to reorientate, or to decide on the speed, scale \r and quality of the transition (limited evidence, medium \r agreement). The urgency of mitigation might overshadow some \r of the other priorities related to the transition, like climate change \r adaptation and its  inherent vulnerabilities. Consequently, the \r transition imperative could reduce the scope and autonomy for local \r priority-setting and could ignore the additional risks in countries \r with a low capacity to adapt. A just transition will depend on local \r contexts, regional priorities, the starting points of different countries \r in the transition and the speed at which they want to travel. Both \r mitigation and adaptation warrant urgent and prompt action \r given current and continuing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and \r associated negative impacts on humanity and ecosystems (limited \r [...]"


id: d019a9d06e323cdd0632eb67857e0393
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33965
content:
"A wide range of factors have been found to enable sustainability \r transitions, ranging from technological innovations to shifts in \r markets, and from policies and governance arrangements to \r shifts in belief systems and market forces (robust evidence,\r high agreement). Many of these factors come together in \r a co-evolutionary process that has unfolded globally, internationally \r and locally over several decades (low evidence, high agreement). \r Those same conditions that may serve to impede the transition \r (i.e.,  organisational structure, behaviour, technological lock-in) \r can also 'flip' to enable both it and the framing of sustainable \r development policies to create a stronger basis and policy support \r (robust evidence, high agreement). It is important to note that \r strong shocks to these systems, including accelerating climate \r change impacts, economic crises and political changes, may provide \r crucial openings for accelerated transitions to sustainable systems. \r [...]"


id: 9b633553188152737c43238cd5a35416
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24592
content:
"[...] For example, rebuilding more sustainably after an extreme event, \r or renewed public debate about the drivers of social and economic \r vulnerability to multiple stressors (medium evidence, medium \r agreement). {17.4}"


id: 90702a8abbb40f3330fb73e7e15111c7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22615
content:
"This chapter focuses on the opportunities and challenges for \r 'accelerating the transition in the context of sustainable development'. \r The chapter suggests that accelerating transitions in the context \r of sustainable development requires more than concentrating on \r speed. Rather, it involves expediting the pace of change (speed) \r while also removing the underlying drivers of vulnerability and high \r emissions (quality and depth), and aligning the interests of different \r communities, regions, sectors, stakeholders and cultures (scale \r and breadth). One key to enabling deep and broad transitions is \r integrating the views of different government agencies, businesses \r and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in transition processes. \r Another critical driver of deep and broad transitions is engaging \r and empowering workers, youth, women, the poor, minorities and \r marginalised stakeholders in just, equitable and inclusive processes. \r [...]"


id: d3189e5c7f246371ccba49204ed06ca4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34481
content:
"[...] The result of such processes will be the transformation of large-scale \r socio-economic systems to restore the health and well-being of the \r planet and the people on it.  "


id: 41d0c47a00bba8c48231e646fc9db40d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8774
content:
"Climate change not only poses a profound challenge to sustainable \r development, it is inexorably linked to it. From the early stages of \r the IPCC assessment process, this challenge and the inherent link \r between climate change and sustainable development have been \r well recognised. For example, the First Assessment Report (FAR) \r highlighted the relevance of sustainable development for climate \r policy. The Second Assessment Report (SAR) went further to include \r equity issues in its presentation of sustainable development. The \r Third Assessment Report (TAR) (Banuri et al. 2001) made the link \r even stronger, noting that 'parties have a right to and should promote \r sustainable development' (as stated in the text of the UNFCCC 2015 \r (Article 3.4)), and offering an early review of studies integrating \r sustainable development and climate change. The Fourth Assessment \r Report (AR4) (Sathaye et al. 2007) added an additional perspective \r [...]"


id: b659cee8728bdd895dec4e792bbbe9ed
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29299
content:
"[...] to these interconnections, acknowledging the existence of a two-way \r relationship between sustainable development and climate change."


id: 2765df697528e90434e9096cacc5b979
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4108
content:
"Due in part to the shifting orientation of these international \r processes, there is growing evidence of action on climate change \r and sustainable development at other levels of decision-making. \r National policies often aim to implement climate change policies \r in the context of sustainable development (Chimhowu et al. 2019; \r Chirambo 2018; ECLAC 2017; Fuseini and Kemp 2015; Galli et al. \r 2018; Haywood et al. 2019; Ministry of Environment of Jordan 2016; \r McKenzie and Abdulkadri 2018; UNDESA 2016, 2017, 2018; UN \r Women 2017). Some countries are adjusting their existing policies \r to build on themes familiar to sustainable development (Lucas et al. \r 2016), including renewable energy and energy efficiency (Fastenrath \r and Braun 2018; Kousksou et al. 2015), urban planning (Gorissen \r et al. 2018; Loorbach et al. 2016; Mendizabal et al. 2018), health \r systems (Pencheon 2018; Roschnik et al. 2017) and agricultural \r [...]"


id: 570daa1d4bc672ab8652918ecacab378
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12572
content:
"[...] systems (Lipper and Zilberman 2018; Shaw and Roberts 2017). Cross\u0002cutting and integrated approaches, such as the circular economy, \r have also been gaining traction in some European countries (EESC \r 2015) and G20 countries (Noura et al. 2020). Many of these efforts \r have also extended up to the regional and down to the local level \r (Gorissen et al. 2018; Hess 2014; Shaw and Roberts 2017)."


id: cfc844fb05402c42044be5a07d2bc3f0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33916
content:
"found that collective action against climate change by businesses, \r governments and civil society, reinforced through partnerships and \r coalitions across departments, industries and supply chains, can \r deliver significant development impacts. In order for this diverse \r collection of stakeholders to take action, a  fundamental paradigm \r shift is needed from a  linear model of knowledge-generation to \r an interdisciplinary model that co-produces knowledge (Liu et al. \r 2019). In fact, some have argued that accelerating just transitions \r for purposes of sustainable development requires the involvement of \r several actors, institutions and disciplines (Delina and Sovacool 2018). \r Not only do these roles need to be discussed more thoroughly (Kern \r and Rogge 2016); (den Elzen et al. 2019), but it is also important to \r survey different views on transitions and transformations. A variety \r of theories that are useful for explaining the causes and constraints \r [...]"


id: 391833babbbe7405c8e85a3377c70ce7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7250
content:
"A related line of thought common to economic explanations \r involves the principles of 'weak sustainability'. These principles \r suggest that the substitution of exhaustible resources is, to some \r extent, feasible (Arrow et al. 2004). One way to capitalise on this \r substitution is to target investments at technological change, green \r growth, and research and development. Targeted investments in the \r form of subsidies can encourage the substitution of exhaustible by \r non-exhaustible resources. To illustrate with a  concrete example, \r investments in renewable energy can not only mitigate climate \r change but also offset the use of exhaustible fossil fuels and \r boost energy security (Heal 2020). It is nonetheless important \r to note that the principle of 'weak sustainability' contrasts with \r 'strong sustainability' or 'integrated sustainability' principles. These \r stronger principles suggest that constraints on resources restrict \r [...]"


id: e5917ac02e0e0e670a9f86e8a26b2b53
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37698
content:
"[...] such substitutions (Rockstrom et al. 2009). These constraints \r merit attention because some scarce non-substitutable forms of \r natural capital can be exhausted (Bateman and Mace 2020). There \r is hence a  need to capitalise on possible synergies such as those \r with other development priorities and trade-offs, for example, the \r exhaustion of non-substitutable resources. Capturing these synergies \r and managing these trade-offs is consistent with sustainable \r development, a state where the needs of the present generation do \r not compromise the ability of future generations to meet their own \r needs (Bruntland, WCED 1987)."


id: 8e1b8a6e1f3cb22e702cb1de09ccf60
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22197
content:
"The outcome of sustainable transitions is a sustainable transformation. \r While transitions involve 'processes that shift development pathways \r and reorient energy, transport, urban and other subsystems' (Loorbach \r et al. 2017) (Chapter 16), transformation is the resulting 'fundamental \r reorganisation of large-scale socio-economic systems' (Holscher et al. \r 2018). Such a  fundamental reorganisation often requires dynamic \r multi-stage transition processes that change everything from public \r policies and prevailing technologies to individual lifestyles, and social \r norms to governance arrangements and institutions of political \r economy. This set of factors can lock-in development pathways \r and prevent transitions from gathering the momentum needed for \r transformations. Chapter  16 provides an overview of the multi\u0002stage transition dynamics involved in moving from experimentation \r to commercialisation to integration to stabilisation. That overview \r [...]"


id: bfb4939fb7ee431a6d1588ff3b76f3a1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31009
content:
"recovery packages have increased government-led investments \r (Section 1.3.3), which could potentially be aligned with sustainable \r development. Technological change and innovation are considered \r key drivers of economic growth and of many aspects of social \r progress (Section 16.1), but if technological innovation policies are \r coordinated with the shift to sustainable development pathways, \r then the economic benefits of technological change could come at \r the cost of increasing climate risks (Gossart 2015) Alarcon and Vos \r 2015). The environmental impacts of social and economic activities, \r including emissions of GHGs, are greatly influenced by the rate and \r direction of technological changes. Innovation and technological \r transformations present trade-offs that create externalities and \r rebound effects. This suggests that a sustainable future for people \r and nature requires rapid, radical and transformative societal change \r [...]"


id: c891c4e7cf8e64e2f8d0208e270fa98c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32601
content:
"[...] by integrating the technical, governance, financial and societal \r aspects (Portner et al. 2021) (Section 16.1)."


id: cdf1979820dda38c4bddd7607e4e0acd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33567
content:
"One area that is pertinent to transitions and has received \r considerable attention in economic modelling involving climate \r change is innovation. In particular, some studies have shown how \r low-cost innovations and improvements in end-use technologies \r have significant potential for emissions reductions as well as \r sustainable development (Wilson et al. 2019). Currently information \r technologies are improving rapidly, and the internet of things (IoT), \r AI and Big Data can all contribute to other development needs. This \r is often the case in end-use sectors, as the benefits accrue directly \r to the individuals who use the new innovations. The achievement \r and widespread deployment of fully autonomous cars, for example, \r will bring about broader car- and ride-sharing with negative or low \r additional costs compared to more conventional approaches to car \r ownership, with their typically very low load factors. (Grubler et al. \r [...]"


id: e50c865516f717dbc9ae6b45563da6d2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37595
content:
"[...] 2018) estimate that the Low Energy Demand (LED) scenario which \r assumes information technology innovations and induced social \r changes, including a sharing economy, have considerable potential \r for harmonising the multiple achievements of SDGs with low marginal \r abatement costs compared with other scenarios (IPCC 2018)."


id: f433c21bec967ebc3beaedd3b1c79c38
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40334
content:
"resources and can provide the technical support that can spread \r innovative solutions (Bowman et al. 2017; Corfee-Morlot et al. 2009; \r Gordon 2015). Such support has become increasingly important during \r the pandemic, as national governments transfer funds for investments \r in climate-friendly infrastructure, transport systems and energy \r systems. This line of thinking is supported by calls to strengthen vertical \r and horizontal integration within and across government agencies and \r stakeholders in ways that can enhance policy coherence (Amanuma \r et al. 2018; OECD 2018, 2019). The incoherence or misalignment \r between national and local fiscal institutions and policies can restrict \r the ability of local governments to secure resources for climate-friendly \r investments. Such investments are particularly likely to flow, as more \r local governments have adopted net-zero targets, climate emergency \r declarations and action plans that can stimulate innovations (Davidson \r [...]"


id: 30cdb769ec1cf99229337665ecf1314a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5844
content:
"[...] et al. 2020). Others have seen greater potential for collaboration and \r innovation, with more multi-centred or polycentric forms of governance \r that lead to the formulation and dissemination of transformative \r solutions to climate and other environmental challenges (Ostrom \r 2008). Though much of the above governance research has focused \r on western countries, there are some applications in other regions and \r countries such as China (Gu et al. 2020)."


id: 9469d78998f65e796bb675b7ea85b248
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23319
content:
"Though the above work tends to downplay politics and business, \r others suggest that political economy should feature prominently in \r transitions. Some branches of political-economy research underline \r how resource-intensive and fossil-fuel industries leverage their \r resources and positions to undermine transitions (Jones, C.A. and \r Levy 2009; Newell and Paterson 2010; Zhao et al. 2013; Geels 2014; \r Moe 2014) (Chapter 1). These vested interests can lock-in status quo \r policies in countries where political systems offer interest groups \r more opportunities to veto or overturn climate- or eco-friendly \r proposals (Madden 2014). Companies with a  strong interest in \r earning profits and building competitiveness from conventional \r fossil fuel-based energy systems have particularly strong incentives \r to capture politicians and agencies (Meckling and Nahm 2018). \r Such strategies can be particularly powerful when combined with \r [...]"


id: ae50de4b80441f6ad753a06e4ad35953
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27898
content:
"[...] concerns over job losses and dislocation, preventing transitions \r from gaining traction (Haas 2021; Mattioli et al. 2020; Newell and \r Mulvaney 2013; Power 2016)."


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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
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vector_id: 21886
content:
"One of the more direct channels through which transitions spread \r are climate change education and action-oriented research (Fazey \r et al. 2018; Ives et al. 2019; Scharmer 2018; Schapke et al. 2018; \r Schneidewind et al. 2016). For instance, research using 'social \r experiments' or 'real-world labs' has helped give rise to shifts in \r mindsets on energy, food, transport and other systems that can \r benefit the climate (Bernstein and Hoffmann 2018; Berkhout et al. \r 2010; Bulkeley et al. 2015; Hoffmann 2010). In much the same way, \r the acquisition of transformational knowledge and transformative \r learning (Lange 2018; O'Neil and Boyce 2018; Pomeroy and Oliver \r 2018; Walsh et al. 2020; Williams 2013) contributes to thinking and \r acting that open climate-friendly development pathways (Berkhout \r et al. 2010; Lo and Castan Broto 2019; Roberts et al. 2018; Turnheim \r and Nykvist 2019)) (Section 1.7.2). First-person and action research \r [...]"


id: 436ce161a3b88272aec0b5cfc0aabee5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9082
content:
"[...] can also facilitate similar changes that bring about climate actions \r (see e.g., Dick 2007; Streck 2007; Hutchison and Walton 2015; \r Bradbury et al. 2019)."


id: d90484489627bbc07f290ddff20d3865
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35478
content:
"The starting point for this virtuous circle are inner transitions. Inner \r transitions occur within individuals, organisations and even larger \r jurisdictions that alter beliefs and actions involving climate change \r (Woiwode et al. 2021). An inner transition within an individual (see \r e.g.,  Parodi and Tamm 2018) typically involves a  person gaining \r a deepening sense of peace and a willingness to help others, as well \r as protecting the climate and the planet (see e.g., Banks 2007; Power \r 2016). Inner transition can imply that individuals become sympathetic \r to concerns that include climate issues and values connected to \r nature. For instance, they may include a desire to become a steward \r of nature (Buijs et al. 2018); 'live according to the principles of \r integrated sustainability' (Schweizer-Ries 2018); 'achieve the good \r life' (Asara et al. 2015; Escobar 2015; Kallis 2017; Latouche 2018) \r (Chapter  5 and Section  1.6.2); or protect the well-being of other \r [...]"


id: 7b71c4a3ec145539af7b320da2cd69c5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18921
content:
"It is increasingly being recognised that sustainable development \r policy goals and meeting short- and long-term climate policy goals \r are closely linked (IPCC 2018). It is also being realised that, under \r the Paris Agreement, climate change policies should be integrated \r into sustainable development agendas, while the UN 2030 Agenda \r as well includes SDG 13 on climate actions. In this way, both UN \r agreements provide joint opportunities for systematic transitions \r in support of both climate change and sustainable development. \r Achievement of the Paris Agreement's goals will require a rapid and \r deep worldwide transition in all GHG emissions sectors, including \r land use, energy, industry, buildings, transport and cities, as well as in \r consumption and behaviour (UNEP 2019). Meeting the goals of such \r a transformation requires that the long-term targets and pathways to \r fulfil the stabilisation scenarios play an important role in guiding the \r [...]"


id: 6d4552e80b1a6b2b59edbfa051e03d9e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16504
content:
"In the context of the Paris Agreement, countries have submitted \r their initial plans for the decarbonisation of their economies to \r the UNFCCC in the form of their so-called National Determined \r Contributions (NDCs). The ambitions of the NDCs are closely related \r to the ongoing UNFCCC negotiations over the financial measures and \r forms of compensation. Although the Paris Agreement emphasises \r the links between climate policies and sustainable development, the \r UN's 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the SDGs are \r not very well represented at present in the NDCs, according to Fuso \r Nerini et al. (2019). Very few of the NDCs include any reference to \r the SDGs, which (Fuso Nerini et al. 2019) highlight as a barrier to the \r successful implementation of the Paris Agreement, which induces \r them to call for a more holistic policy approach. Campagnolo and \r Davide (2019) have assessed the impacts of the submitted NDCs on \r [...]"


id: 55a33883eb1da481b7b60eb039a17ec8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12338
content:
"[...] poverty eradication and inequalities of income based on empirical \r research and a  global Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) \r model. One conclusion is that the NDCs of less developed countries \r would tend to reduce poverty alleviation, but this can be offset if \r international financial support is provided for the mitigation actions."


id: 8428dff8add256efc791d236e521c2a3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20410
content:
"A key barrier to the development of national plans and policies to \r meet the UN 2030 SDGs is the lack of finance. (Sachs et al. 2019) \r conclude that meeting the SDGs to achieve social transformations \r worldwide would require 2-3% of global GDP and that it would \r be a  huge challenge to ensure that finance is targeted to the \r world's poorest countries and people. The UN Secretary-General \r has called for the allocation of finance to meet the UN's 2030 \r Agenda with a strong emphasis on the private sector, but to date \r no governance frameworks or associated financial modalities have \r been established in the UN or the UNFCCC context for the formal \r alignment of sustainable development and transitions to take place \r in accordance with the low global temperature-stabilisation targets \r in the Paris Agreement. Accelerating investments, particularly in \r low-income countries, will be required to meet both the Paris goals \r [...]"


id: c63429a497cc91466b1a94e8de472d32
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32182
content:
"[...] and the SDGs (Section 15.6.7). The mismatch between capital and \r investment needs, home-bias considerations and differences in risk \r perceptions between rich and poor represent major challenges for \r private finance. Green bond markets and markets for sustainable \r financal products have increased significantly, and the landscape has \r continued to evolve since AR5 (Executive Summary in Chapter 15). \r Special efforts and activities are particularly required for raising \r finance in developing countries."


id: 86daa798949ab8ecfc78e7a64d3d288e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20890
content:
"The alignment of climate-policy targets in the NDCs with sustainable \r development has been assessed by means of integrated assessment \r models (IAMs), macroeconomic and sectoral modelling. (Iyer et al. \r 2018) based on IAM-based studies, the implications of framing NDCs \r being placed more narrowly on mitigation targets rather than on \r a  framing in which the impacts on sustainable development were \r explicitly taken into consideration. It was thus concluded that some \r SDGs would be directly supported as a side benefit of the climate \r policy targets included in the NDCs, while other SDGs needed \r a special policy design going beyond narrow climate policy objectives. \r (Iyer et al. 2018) also assessed the regional distribution of efforts in \r terms of domestic mitigation costs and SDG impacts and concluded \r that the geographical distribution of mitigation costs and  SDG \r benefits were not similar, so a  special effort would be needed to \r [...]"


id: eb90b79560efdacfc9b986b11dc6286b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38813
content:
"[...] match climate policies and policies to meet the SDGs. Accordingly, \r a national decision-making perspective suggests that SDGs should \r be integrated into national climate policies."


id: aab03175d5d0b1e61d1a7554c1a34a40
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27253
content:
"The NDCs submitted to the Paris Agreement have demonstrated \r a lack of progress in meeting the long-term temperature goals. In \r the context of the UN's 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, \r the UN Sustainable Development Report 2019 (Sachs et al. 2019) \r also concluded that there is a particular lack of progress in achieving \r SDG 13 (climate action), SDG 14 (life below water) and SDG 15 (life \r on land). Given the close link between the SDGs and climate change \r policies, the current obstacles in meeting the former could also be \r a barrier to realising transitions to low-carbon societies. Conversely, \r opportunities to leverage the SDGs could in many cases involve \r climate actions, since policies enabling climate adaptation and \r mitigation could also support food and energy security and water \r conservation if they were well designed (see the detailed discussion \r in the section on synergies and trade-offs between climate policies \r [...]"


id: bafaf330d1c4d1c7f68824570f13edda
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30111
content:
"[...] and meeting the SDGs in Section 17.3.3.7, Chapter 3, and IPCC 2018).\r These findings point to a specific need to align economic and social "


id: 2eec1e5a4cc5a909d760cf7aa3d2ec20
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5528
content:
"on other sustainable development benefits (Wilson et al. 2019). \r Similarly, IAM models have been applied to model the potential for \r Low Energy Demand (LED) scenarios associated with demand-side \r innovations in the service sector. (Grubler et al. 2018) have developed \r a climate-friendly LED scenario which assumes information technology \r innovations such as the internet of things (IoT) and induced social \r changes such as the sharing economy. Nonetheless there are still \r very important limits on the degree to which highly aggregated IAM \r models and macroeconomic models can integrate ethics, equity and \r several other key policy-relevant aspects of sustainable development \r (Easterlin et al. 2010; Koch 2020). A key limitation in this context is \r that, while all countries share the totality of the SDGs, development \r priorities differ across countries and over time. Moreover, these \r priorities are strongly linked to local contexts, and this can only be \r [...]"


id: 998db56741f31cade40f54a625ac5070
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24246
content:
"Development pathways that focus narrowly on climate mitigation or \r economic growth will not lead to the SDGs and long-term climate\u0002stabilisation objectives being achieved. The best chances of doing \r this lie in development pathways that can maximise the synergies \r between climate mitigation and sustainable development more \r broadly (Section  1.3.2). Areas of focal modelling include green \r investments, technological change, employment generation and the \r performance of policy instruments, such as green taxes, subsidies, \r emission permits, investments and finance. Short- and long-term \r macroeconomic models have been used to assess the impacts of \r such policy instruments. Jaumotte et al. (2021) analyse the economic \r impacts on net zero emissions by 2050 with a focus on short-term \r economic policies and the integration of climate policies such as \r CO2 taxes with green reform policies. This may imply the co-creation \r [...]"


id: 166565feffc782282d2bfb2c361de57c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1154
content:
"[...] of benefits between climate policy objectives, and macroeconomic \r policy goals such as employment creation."


id: 7013d1495d9fa54ef5bb73230d64c20
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16971
content:
"Climate change has negative impacts on agricultural productivity in \r general, including unequal geographical distribution (Chapter 3). On \r top of that, there is also a risk that climate change mitigation aimed \r at achieving stringent climate goals could negatively affect food \r access and food security (Akimoto et al. 2012; Fujimori et al. 2019; \r Hasegawa et al. 2018). If not managed properly, the risk of hunger \r due to climate policies such as large-scale bioenergy production \r increases remarkably if the 2degC and 1.5degC targets are implemented \r (Section 3.7.1). Taking the highest median values from different IAMs \r for given classes of scenarios, up to 14.9 GtCO2 yr-1 carbon dioxide \r removal (CDR) from BECCS is required in 2100, and 2.4 GtCO2 yr-1 for \r afforestation. Across the different scenarios, median changes in global \r forest area throughout the 21st century reach the required 7.2 Mkm2\r increases between 2010 and 2100, and agricultural land used for \r [...]"


id: 7e45543a8f2a7aa6787ad2d0f8fa0b06
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19381
content:
"[...] second-generation bioenergy crop production may require up to \r 6.6 Mkm2\r  in 2100, increasing the competition for land and potentially \r affecting sustainable development (AR6 scenarios database)."


id: 3e9a3da5038218d3ecd036c18fb16ee1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8200
content:
"Energy scenarios for sustainable development were included in \r The World Energy Outlook of the IEA (IEA 2019, 2020) in terms of \r a Sustainable Development Scenario (SDS), which assessed not only \r SDG 13 (climate action) but also SDG 7 (affordable and clean energy) \r and SDG 3.9 (air pollution). This scenario takes as its starting point \r the policy goal of meeting these SDGs and then assesses the costs \r of meeting an emissions reduction target of 70% of CO2 from the \r energy system by 2030. The scenario concludes that retrofitting coal\u0002fired power plants with pollution controls is the cheapest option for \r dealing with local pollution in the short term, but that this is not \r consistent with meeting the long-term emissions goals of the Paris \r Agreement. The SDS scenario combines the goal of reducing the \r amount of CO2 in the energy system by 70%, with large decreases \r in energy-related emissions of NOX, SO2 and PM2.5, leading to a fall \r [...]"


id: 98d0248f00422a22f624e854586f8e75
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24100
content:
"[...] of 40-60% by 2030, and to 2.5 million fewer premature deaths from \r air pollution in 2030 than in the Stated Policies Scenario (STEPS), \r which represent a  continuation of current trends in the energy \r system (IEA 2020)."


id: 1f8e7e35004d54ecbd2217276cc6b902
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2763
content:
"Reducing climate change can reduce the share of the global \r population exposed to increased stress from reductions in water \r resources (Arnell and Lloyd-Hughes 2014) and therefore to \r water  scarcity as defined by a  cumulative abstraction-to-demand \r ratio (Hanasaki et al. 2013). (Byers et al. 2018), show that 8-14% of \r the population will be exposed to severe reductions in water \r supply if average temperatures increase between 1.5degC and 2degC \r (Section 3.7.2). (Hayashi et al. 2018) assess the water availability for \r different emission pathways, including the 2degC and 1.5degC targets, \r in light of the various factors governing availability. There are very \r different impacts among nations. In Afghanistan, Pakistan and South \r Africa, water stress is estimated to increase by 2050 mainly due to \r increases in irrigation water associated with the rising demand for \r food, and climate change will already increase water stress within \r [...]"


id: 7a0f3e92bcc0008c3c281e72fefbd905
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18671
content:
"[...] the next decades. Other factors, such as changes in the demand for \r municipal water, water for electricity generation, other industrial \r water, and water for livestock due to climate change mitigation, are \r of limited importance."


id: 2c365a73b3cb11c891cb702fdc785c36
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5040
content:
"(Grubler et al. 2018) models a pathway leading to global temperature \r change of less than 1.5degC without carbon capture and storage \r (CCS), taking end-use changes into account, including innovations in \r information technologies and changes to consumer behaviour apart \r from passive consumption. The pathway estimates global final-energy \r demand of 245 EJ yr-1 in 2050, which is much lower than in existing \r studies (Section  5.3.3). It also shows the possibilities of creating \r synergies between multiple SDGs, including hunger, health, energy \r access and land use. Integrated technological and social innovations \r will increase the opportunity to achieve sustainable development. \r (Millward-Hopkins et al. 2020) estimate global final energy at 149 EJ yr-1\r in 2050 as required to provide decent material living standards, which \r is much lower than the 1.5degC scenario ranges (330-480 EJ yr-1 in \r 2050) of IAMs (IPCC 2018) and the 390 EJ yr-1 in the IEA SDS (IEA \r [...]"


id: 236883cd1c2ad2a228addf197e2caadc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3427
content:
"[...] 2019), and also lower than (Grubler et al. 2018). The conclusion is that, \r although providing material living standards does not guarantee that \r every person will live a good life, there are large potentials in achieving \r low energy demand with sustainable development."


id: db66bb42f3ed6c93528610a5a6b845a8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35872
content:
"An overview of the co-benefits and trade-offs of several SDGs based \r on modelling results is provided in Figure 3.39 (Section 3.7). Selected \r mitigation co-benefits and trade-offs are provided in relation to meeting \r the 1.5degC temperature goal based on a subset of models and scenarios, \r despite many IAMs so far not having comprehensive coverage of the \r Sustainable Development Goals (Rao et al. 2017; van  Soest et al. \r 2019). There are several co-benefits of mitigation policies, including \r increased forest cover (SDG 15) and reduced mortality from ambient \r PM2.5 pollution (SDG 3) compared to reference scenarios. However, \r mitigation policies can also cause higher food prices and thus increase \r the share of the global population at risk from hunger (SDG 2), while \r also relying on solid fuels (SDGs 7 and 3) as side effects. It is then \r concluded in Section 3.7 that these trade-offs can be balanced through \r [...]"


id: 48ef56a752ac59b24316ff1c8314adf4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10053
content:
"[...] targeted support measures and/or additional SD policies (Bertram et al. \r 2018; Cameron et al. 2016; Fujimori et al. 2019)."


id: 38dafeaac42f5a0d84a24922dedccf42
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7206
content:
"The transition to low-emission pathways will require policy efforts \r that also address the emissions that are locked-in to existing \r infrastructure such as power plants, factories, cargo ships and other \r infrastructure already in use: for example, today coal-fired power \r plants account for 30% of all energy-related emissions (IEA 2019). \r Over the past twenty years, Asia has accounted for 90% of all coal\u0002fired capacity built worldwide, and these plants have potentially long \r operational lifetimes ahead of them. In developing economies in Asia, \r existing coal-fired plants are just twelve years old on average. There \r are three options for bringing down emissions from the existing stock \r of plants: to retrofit them with carbon capture and storage (CCS) or \r biomass co-firing equipment; to repurpose them to focus on providing \r system adequacy and flexibility while reducing operations; and to \r retire them early. In the IEA Sustainable Development Scenario, most \r [...]"


id: 570185421618f458197a4144975bd66b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12557
content:
"[...] of the 2080 GW of existing coal-fired capacity would be affected by \r one of these three options."


id: c0b51b3a2775b571fb4040c063607347
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31200
content:
"The coal transition will pose challenges not only to the power sector, but even more importantly to coal mining. A less diversified \r local economy, low labour mobility and heavy dependence on coal revenues will make closing down coal production particularly \r challenging from a political economy perspective. Policy is needed to support and invest in impacted areas to smooth the transition, \r absorb the impact and incentivise new opportunities. A supportive policy for the transition could include both short-term support \r and long-term investment. Short-term compensation could be helpful for local workers, communities, companies and governments to \r manage the consequences of coal closures. Earlier involvement with local stakeholders using a structured approach is crucial and will \r make the transition policy more targeted and better administered. The long-term policy should target support to the local economy \r [...]"


id: 2baa9ed6033fc037a2704adee4019060
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4943
content:
"[...] and workers to move beyond coal, including a  strategic plan to transform the impacted area, investment in local infrastructure \r and education, and preference policies to incentivise emerging businesses. Most importantly, ex ante policy implementation is far \r better than ex post compensation. Even without the climate imperative, historical evidence shows that coal closures can happen \r surprisingly fast."


id: 7ebcff192747fd44d0bb455551295383
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19453
content:
"Presently, coal-fired power plants play a key role in the German energy system, providing almost 46% of the electricity consumed \r in Germany. These coal power plants play a crucial role in balancing fluctuations in producing electricity form renewables (Parra \r et al. 2019). Political and economic considerations, at least regionally, are also of great importance in the coal sector due to the \r approximately 35,000 people employed within it (including coal mining and the power stations themselves). For a long time, coal\u0002fired power plants were able to protect their position in Germany, but against the background of decreasing public acceptance, \r economic problems resulting from the growing use of renewables and ambitious GHG reduction targets, the sector cannot resist \r the political pressure against it any longer. The governing parties have agreed to establish a commission called 'Growth, structural \r [...]"


id: b8a40b3b7308483177c7ce63cb02a2de
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29697
content:
"[...] change and employment' to develop a strategy for phasing out coal-fired power plants (E3G Annual Review 2018). This Commission \r consists of experts and stakeholders from industry, associations, unions, the scientific community, pressure groups and politicians. Its \r establishment shows that the phasing-out process deserves close attention and that management policies must be implemented to \r ensure a soft landing for the electricity sector."


id: 26f5b0ba3699832c50537f6638697e93
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4016
content:
"Indeed, pressure is mounting on fossil fuel industries to remove their \r capital from heavy carbon industries. As the former Governor of the \r Bank of England, Mark Carney, remarked, a wholesale reassessment \r of prospects, especially if it were to occur suddenly, could potentially \r destabilise markets, sparking a pro-cyclical crystallisation of losses \r and a persistent tightening of financial conditions. In other words, \r an abrupt resolution to the tragedy of horizons itself poses a  risk \r to financial stability (OECD 2015). The divestment narrative is also \r based on the view that a shift away from intensive carbon resources \r will be significant, as the 'less value will be destroyed, [...] the \r more can be re-invested in low carbon infrastructure' (OECD 2015). \r Social movements are critical to triggering rapid transformational \r change and moving away from dangerous levels of climate change \r (Mckibben 2012). Although divestment is hailed as a  necessary \r [...]"


id: 7c1b9c1d8afe9f52cd870d1c016edfde
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19044
content:
"[...] action to decouple fossil fuel from growth and force carbon\u0002intensive industries to go out of business, there is the sense that \r there is no shortage of investors who are willing to buy shares, so \r that such resources are not stranded, but simply relocated. Criticism \r has been levelled at the divestment movement for not having \r a significant impact on funding fossil fuels and not being sufficiently \r in tune with other wide-ranging complexities that go beyond the \r moral dimensions (Bergman 2018). Despite being labelled a 'moral \r entrepreneur', the divestment movement has the potential to disrupt "


id: d232fe09d86eea75a709fb2c5ef66cdc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34335
content:
"Despite their efforts in deploying renewable energies, many \r developing countries are still contending with problems related to \r the immaturity of the current technologies and the challenges of \r battery storage. In short, the transition to low-carbon development \r must consider the challenges of renewable-energy penetration and \r existing energy-related vulnerabilities and inequalities. There are \r power asymmetries between first-comers and latecomers, especially \r in cases where mature technologies can be located in countries with \r less stringent laws and standards. Carbon leakage has implications \r for just transitions, as carbon-intensive industries can move their \r dirty industries to developing countries as a  way of outsourcing \r the production of carbon (Bos and Gupta 2019; UNU-INRA 2020). \r When the challenge of climate mitigation is transferred to developing \r countries in the form of carbon leakage, the risks of carbon lock-in for \r [...]"


id: b39ba894183e1ccdc46b34bbfa6651f5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
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vector_id: 28838
content:
"The risks attached to the stranding of fossil fuel assets have increased \r with the recent and sustained plunge in oil prices because of the \r global health pandemic (COVID-19) and the concomitant economic \r downturn, forcing demand to plummet to unprecedentedly low levels. \r (Oil prices have recently increased.) Many economies in transition \r and countries dependent on fossil fuels are going through turbulent \r times where asset and transition management will be critical (UNEP/\r SEI 2020). However, COVID-19 provides a foretaste of what a low\u0002carbon transition could look like, especially if assets become stranded \r in an effort to respond to the call for action in 'building back better' \r and putting clean energy jobs and the just transition at the heart \r of the post-COVID-19 recovery (IEA 2020; United Nations General \r Assembly 2021). COVID-19 provides a useful proxy for issuing two \r alerts. First, it is a  reminder of the urgency of addressing climate \r [...]"


id: c4537e73efa27aa74bcd6085b081d15
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
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content:
"[...] change, given that delaying the move away from stranded assets \r will further worsen climate change. Second, failure to recognise \r the threat from stranded assets will result in new assets becoming \r stranded (Rempel and Gupta 2021). Hence, the momentum towards \r a transformational push is resting on a new opportunity ushered in \r by COVID-19 to emphasise the urgency for a new departure towards \r rapid emissions reductions (Cronin et al. 2021)."


id: 96449055ba9459728b98947a569cbada
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23631
content:
"The shrinking carbon budget has raised questions over whether to \r meet our commitment to 2degC if fossil fuel resources were to be mined \r or left stranded, as McGlade and Ekins argue: '... [a] large portion \r of the reserve base and an even more significant proportion of the \r resource base should not be produced if the temperature rise is to \r remain below 2 degrees C' (McGlade and Ekins 2015). This logic \r means that developing countries that rely on fossil fuel extraction \r will need to replace their hydrocarbon revenues with other income\u0002generating activities. Stranded assets remind most oil-producing \r governments that fossil fuel assets do not have a durable value and \r are vulnerable to politico-economic forces and fluctuations. The goal \r of staying within the 1.5degC temperature goal, in line with the Paris \r Agreement, is already part of the policy vision and planning of large \r fossil fuel-consuming economies. For early fossil-fuel producers, \r [...]"


id: 4f42d1335948ea64513033c481aef94f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11232
content:
"[...] however, the reality that their resources may not yield the desired \r returns is often perceived as bad news, particularly in the context of \r the increasing depreciation of fossil fuel products."


id: ea830c55a787430de9013e3f8e0bb25
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38622
content:
"Transitions are broad-based and complex, involving governance \r structures, institutions and climate vulnerabilities, and there is a need \r to include historical responsibility, resource intensity and capacity \r differentials, thus relegating the debate across simplistic binary lines \r of developed versus developing countries (Carney 2016). Hence, \r transition processes will have to respond to several preconditions \r and structural inequalities related to climate finance, energy \r poverty, vulnerabilities and the broader macroeconomic implications \r associated with managing the debt burden, fiscal deficits and \r uneven terms of development in developing countries. In addition \r to structural inequalities, the COVID-19 pandemic has severely \r disrupted energy and food systems, and reduced the speed at which \r developing countries can procure new low-carbon technologies and \r decouple economic growth from fossil fuels (Winkler 2020). For \r [...]"


id: 5dc75d75476f1e3124c9f77b17d95d4e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
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content:
"[...] instance, global supply-chain transition costs might be lower when \r compared to in-country supply chains, as became evident when \r COVID-19 created further disruption to renewable-energy projects \r (Cronin et al. 2021). Moreover, developing countries can experience \r difficulties in phasing out old technologies, especially if the latter has \r a  cost disadvantage, has not benefitted from an established track \r record and its performance is uncertain (Bos and Gupta 2019). There "


id: b35f211634c05921f9c80fdb5e3926cb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28799
content:
"Other disruptions are linked to redundant contracts and postponed or \r cancelled explorations, as many oil companies are diversifying their \r production in the wake of the pandemic and are cutting back on \r planned hydrocarbon investments (Denton et al. 2021). These failed \r concessions and disruptions have implications for the just transition, \r especially in developing countries without the financial ability to \r pull out of fossil fuels and to diversify with the same urgency as the \r industrialised nations (Peszko et al. 2020). For instance, in South Africa, \r which is seeking to divest away from coal and decarbonise its energy \r sector, if the transition is not properly managed, this could lead to \r a loss in revenue of R1.8 trillion (USD125 billion), thus compromising \r the government's ability to support social spending (Huxham et al. \r 2019). Emerging oil producers like Uganda are having to postpone \r the start of production. Eni and Total, two of the largest international \r [...]"


id: c6731404097b569f15ba64bb128c02c2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32224
content:
"[...] oil and gas majors in Africa, have already signalled they are making \r 25% cuts to their investment in exploration and production projects in \r 2020, representing a EUR4 billion reduction in foreign direct investment \r for Total and a USD2 billion reduction for Eni (Le Bec 2020)."


id: 3e15af2de47dd6cae87b8b3ec460663c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8088
content:
"Nonetheless, the production of fossil fuels is central to many \r economies with numerous development implications related to \r rents associated with export revenues, energy security and poverty \r alleviation (Lazarus and van Asselt 2018). The central question is: who \r decides which types of carbon should be burnable or non-burnable? \r Hence, social equality is at the heart of the transition process, but it \r falls short of a response on how to chart a new road map towards \r carbon neutrality, especially given that fossil fuel producers and \r investors tend to belong to large, powerful companies and wield \r a great deal of influence and power, especially when their entrenched \r interests are at stake (Lazarus and van Asselt 2018). The question of \r whether developing countries should be compensated for foregoing \r their resources in light of their current development needs has not \r yielded many results and had only limited success in mobilising \r [...]"


id: a5b5577baaf88b4d13df7ea23e84c397
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26382
content:
"[...] international finance, as demonstrated by the case of Yasuni-ITT in \r Ecuador (Sovacool and Scarpaci 2016). According to (Sovacool et al. \r 2021), affected communities and their views may be discounted and \r excluded from planning, which can neglect important matters such \r as rights, recognition and representation (Sovacool 2021)."


id: 92d033567d8d8914ecc4e297ba32d0df
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23047
content:
"The economic implications of the transition will be felt by developing \r countries with high degrees of dependence on hydrocarbon products \r as a revenue stream, as they are exposed to reduced fiscal incomes, \r given the low demand for oil and low oil prices, and the associated \r economic fallout of the pandemic. This link with stranded assets is \r important, but it may be overlooked, as countries whose assets are \r becoming stranded may not have the relevant resources, knowledge, \r autonomy or agency to design a fresh orientation or decide on the \r transition. In addition, some developing countries are dependent not \r only on fossil fuel revenues, but also on foreign exchange earnings \r from exports. This dependence comes into sharp focus when one \r considers that 30% of the Malaysian government's revenues are \r linked to petroleum products, and that Mozambique, by exploiting \r its newly discovered natural-gas reserves, can earn seven times \r [...]"


id: 5851f5831d8f8c545a8372ee5826c9a6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12797
content:
"[...] the country's current GDP over a  period of 25 years (Cronin et al. \r 2021). Thus, any attempt to accelerate the transition to low-carbon \r development must take into account foreign exchange, domestic \r revenue and employment generation, which are precisely what ensure \r the attractiveness of fossil fuel industries (Addison and Roe 2018)."


id: eb83f3b5c008fd2d1f02a746f9d47224
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38794
content:
"Energy use and its deployment are sovereign matters. State \r responsibilities over the control and use of natural resources \r concern both current and future generations (Carney 2016). Climate \r change impacts will disable the food, water and energy systems \r of the most vulnerable. Therefore, the resources required to enable \r a just transition are predicated on good leadership and governance \r institutions that will support quality and justice-based transitions. \r Beyond energy systems, changes to land systems can benefit from \r sustainable land management in ways that will reduce the pressure \r on land for food and at the same time support carbon storage. With \r land coming under increased pressure, land and forest management \r are critical for carbon sequestration, as well as other ecosystem \r benefits. Extractive processes have impacts on land, and often there \r are few if any redistributive benefits for communities in regions \r [...]"


id: b2fb4cc094a5188ef3325115f9d7ec60
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28731
content:
"[...] where extraction takes place. In addition, extraction of strategic \r minerals such as cobalt, copper and lithium have been linked to \r violence, human rights abuses and conflict (Cronin et al. 2021)."


id: 66f7ad87487a933b36d9f9a8e4399ad
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15382
content:
"However, in the race to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050, some of the \r other priorities of the transition, like climate change adaptation and \r its inherent vulnerabilities, might become muted, given the urgency \r to mitigate at all costs. Consequently, the transition imperative \r reduces the scope for local priority-setting and ignores the additional \r risks faced by countries with the least capacity to adapt. Equally, the \r 'just transition' is often seen through the prism of job losses and \r the attendant retooling and reskilling imperatives necessary to re\u0002dynamise local businesses, especially those that may fail as a result \r of mine closures. It is equally important to consider current disparities \r in knowledge and capacity which could maintain the existing \r inequalities in the global regional distribution of costs and benefits. \r One striking example is the manufacturing of PV in India when \r compared to manufacturing PV in China. In China, manufacturing \r [...]"


id: a857e2735ef37bd7ede3fd2b84ac1a3f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26834
content:
"[...] costs are lower than in India, as are import tariffs (Behuria 2020). \r Similarly, a solar industry might have greater development prospects "


id: e4b8b94555d9339969ba77823148cb9c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37523
content:
"The 'Just Transition' concept has evolved over the years (Sweeney \r and Treat 2018) and is still undergoing further evolution. It \r emphasises the key principles of respect and dignity for vulnerable \r groups, the creation of decent jobs, social protection, employment \r rights, fairness in energy access and use, and social dialogue and \r democratic consultation with relevant stakeholders, whilst coping \r with the effects of asset-stranding or the transition to green and \r clean economies. The concept has come under increased scrutiny, \r with its protagonists emphasising the need to focus on the equality \r of the transition, not simply on its speed (Forsyth 2014). The \r emphasis on justice is also gaining in momentum, with a growing \r recognition that the sustainability transition is about justice in the \r transition and not simply about economics (Newell and Mulvaney \r 2013; Swilling, M. Annecke 2010; Williams and Doyon 2020). \r [...]"


id: 40d67f975544fa691dde2799c596081f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8593
content:
"The determination of a  just transition is complex and not simply \r dependent on the allocation of perceived risks or solutions, but rather \r on how risks and solutions are defined (Forsyth 2014). Acting urgently \r to achieve environmental solutions or meet transition imperatives has \r certain risks given the need to go beyond commonplace definitions \r of the just transition by emphasising the distributive or procedural \r aspects. The framing of policies to align with fast and low-cost \r mitigation without paying sufficient attention to social and economic \r resilience creates its own potential risks and can enhance social \r vulnerability rather than address it. The need to distribute climate \r change solutions must not delegitimise appropriate economic growth \r strategies, nor indeed create the additional risks of policy imposition. \r Perceptions of justice with regard to environmental problems and \r solutions matter equally. Hence, the types of transition pathway that \r [...]"


id: ad861d489b59ce74d1fe91a264f4bb88
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27771
content:
"[...] are chosen may have equality implications. Mitigation at all costs, if \r done 'cheaply and crudely', can create additional problems for social \r justice and inclusive development (Forsyth 2014)."


id: b27f3995a6abd6ee4c3291ac60528bad
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28641
content:
"The assumption that the benefits of mitigation are enough to \r offset trade-offs with other policy objectives can be questioned. \r If one accepts the argument that not all adaptation addresses \r vulnerability concerns (Kjellen 2006), and that some adaptation \r strategies can heighten vulnerabilities if there are flaws in their \r design and implementation, then the same logic applies, namely \r that not all mitigation is necessarily beneficial. Hence the emphasis \r on the transition resulting from mitigation should be placed not \r only on speed or cost-effectiveness, but also on the legitimacy of \r the actions, and whether the transition is well designed or not. In \r short, justice is not always a shorthand for acting ethically, but rather \r a point of reasoning on what is considered legitimate. Planning for \r the transition often discounts human rights and social inclusivity that \r can occur as the result of a rapid transition. The emphasis should be \r [...]"


id: 62b89951a6f4d63e15f47ddb493288d9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14661
content:
"[...] placed on the management of the transition rather than the speed - \r for instance, if in the rush to build new hydropower energy sources \r implies that populations are displaced, then this constitutes a human \r rights violation (Castro et al. 2016; Piggot et al. 2019)."


id: 9060581d4ccffb251f887905cf2e25d6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22601
content:
"The Global Assessment on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services \r Report (IPBES 2019, Chapter 5) assessed the relationship between \r meeting the goals of the Paris Agreement and SDGs 2 (zero hunger), \r 7 (affordable and clean energy) and 15 (life on land). It concluded \r that a  large expansion of the amount of land used for bioenergy \r production would not be compatible with these SDGs. However, \r combining bioenergy options with other mitigation options, like \r more efficient land management and the restoration of nature, could \r contribute to welfare improvements and to accessing food and water. \r Demand-side climate-mitigation measures, like energy-efficiency \r improvements, reduced meat consumption and reduced food waste, \r were considered to be the most economically attractive and efficient \r options in order to support low GHG emissions, food security and \r biodiversity objectives. Implementing such options, however, can \r [...]"


id: 5e2931d40af615f7212cd3827d6499dc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13857
content:
"(Springmann et al. 2018) conclude that reductions in food waste could \r be a very important option for reducing agricultural GHG emissions, the \r demand for agricultural land and water, and nitrogen and phosphorous \r applications. In addition to the possibility to reduce food waste, their \r study analysed several other options for reducing the environmental \r effects of the food system, including dietary changes in the direction \r of healthier, more plant-based diets and improvements in technologies \r and management. It was concluded that, relative to a baseline scenario \r for 2050, dietary changes in the direction of healthier diets could reduce \r GHG emissions by 29% and 5-9% respectively in a dietary-guideline \r scenario, and by 56% and 6-22% respectively in a more plant-based \r diet scenario. Demand-side, service-oriented solutions vary between \r and within countries and regions, according to living conditions and \r [...]"


id: c81236afff649bfef36ef75bd365cc3d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32508
content:
"[...] context. Avoiding food waste reduces GHG emissions substantially. \r Dietary shifts to plant-based nutrition lead to healthier lives and reduce \r GHG emissions (Section 5.3)."


id: 3962c33a1c75feec594dbb57d6175a2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7307
content:
"(FAO 2019). The basis of this initiative was the 'Love Food, Hate \r Waste' radio, TV, print and online media campaign run by a  non\u0002profit organisation, the Waste and Resources Action Programme \r (WRAP). The campaign raised awareness among consumers about \r how much food they waste, how it affects their household budgets \r and what they can do about it. This initiative collaborated with \r food manufacturers and retailers to stimulate innovation, such as \r resealable packaging, shared meal-planning and food-storage tips. \r The total implementation costs during the five-year period were \r estimated at GBP26 million, from which it was households that \r derived the most benefit, estimated to be worth GBP6.5 billion. Local \r authorities also realised a substantial GBP86 million worth of savings \r in food-waste disposal costs. As for the private sector, the benefits \r took the form of increased product shelf lives and reduced product \r [...]"


id: 2b8feea4526a7414b41cebe938da6dfe
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4920
content:
"[...] loss. While households started to consume more efficiently and \r companies may have experienced a decline in food sales, the latter \r also stated that the non-financial benefits, such as strengthened \r consumer relationships, had offset the costs."


id: d2b7e4b70e777d1f2b73832d4a943c49
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34419
content:
"In conclusion, the AFOLU sector offers many low-cost mitigation \r options, which, however, can also create trade-offs between land use \r for food, energy, forest and biodiversity. Some options can help to \r mitigate such trade-offs, like agricultural practices (e.g., improved yields, \r agroforestry), forest conservation (e.g., afforestation, reforestation), soil \r carbon sequestration (e.g., biochar addition to soils) and the removal \r of carbon dioxide (e.g.,  BECCS), which could contribute to climate \r change mitigation. Lifestyle changes, including dietary changes and \r reduced food waste, are tightly embedded in modes of behaviour that \r are influenced by the immediate environment (e.g., household, farm), \r the indirect environment (e.g., community) and macro-environmental \r factors (e.g., political, financial and economic contexts). Achieving zero \r food waste could reduce the demands for land (SDG 15), water use \r [...]"


id: 43e9d0602343f93384a3447e215d8343
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9181
content:
"[...] (SDG 6) and chemical fertilisers (SDG 9), leading to GHG emissions \r reductions (SDG 13) by encouraging sustainable consumption and \r production practices (SDG 12)."


id: 7c82e79e6f0f988199e609214442fed9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19104
content:
"In the ongoing transition towards renewable sources of energy (see \r also Chapters 3, 4 and 6), the impact of the hydro-climate on energy \r production continues to be highly relevant (Jones and Warner 2016). \r As the shares of thermoelectric energy production in the energy \r grid go down along with the introduction of thermoelectric cooling \r technologies using smaller amounts of water, new energy sources \r and technologies are being introduced, and existing sources scaled \r up. Of these, hydropower, wind and solar energy are the key energy \r sources currently and will be in the near future, making up 2.5% and \r 1.8% of the total global primary energy supply in 2017 respectively \r (IEA 2019). Wind and solar energy are directly independent of water \r in themselves, but are dependent on atmospheric conditions related \r to processes that also drive the water balance and circulation. \r Hydropower, on the other hand, is directly influenced by and \r [...]"


id: b0e13ae364d733281a1dfbbf410c0788
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28348
content:
"[...] dependent on the supply of water, while at the same time being \r an essential counter-component to seasonality and climatological \r variation, as well as to current and future demand curves and diurnal \r variations, as against wind and solar energy (De Barbosa et al. 2017)."


id: 9b1d07db0fac895d1fa2f27d36a619f9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24541
content:
"The renewable-energy conversion technologies that are currently \r dominant globally and are projected to remain so are less vulnerable \r to water deficiencies than fossil-based technologies, since no cooling is \r used. These renewable-energy conversion sources include, for example, \r wind, solar PV and wave energy. The implementation of such sources \r will, in the longer run, have the potential to reduce water usage by the \r energy sector substantially (Lohrmann et al. 2019). Also, an increasing \r share of renewables within desalination, as well as improved irrigation \r efficiencies, have been shown to potentially improve the inter-sectorial \r WEFN water balance (Lohrmann et al. 2019; Caldera and Breyer 2020). \r Some less dominant renewable-energy technologies do use water for \r cooling, such as geothermal energy and concentrating solar power \r (CSP), if wet cooling is employed. Despite the general detachment from \r [...]"


id: e3a5a1d35ef1a8eae74172fd88a85c2c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37343
content:
"[...] water resources, wind and solar PV, for example, are highly dependent \r on climate change patterns, including variability depending on future \r energy-storage capacities and on-/off-grid solutions (Schlott et al. \r 2018). Furthermore, regardless of whether or not they are based on \r renewables, climate change will affect energy usage across sectors, \r such as heating and cooling in the building stock. The energy systems \r in question need to be able to handle variations and extremes in \r demand (Larsen et al. 2020)."


id: 152c8489ba03d1488800ccb0eb1c3cfd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 939
content:
"water conservation, indicating that additional coherence in policies \r affecting the water, energy and food sectors (among others) will \r be critical in achieving the SDGs (Chapter 7). Subsidised fertilisers, \r energy and crops can drive unsustainable levels of water usage \r and pollution in agriculture. More than half the world's population, \r roughly 4.3 billion people in 2016, live in areas where the demand for \r water resources outstrips sustainable supplies for at least part of the \r year. Irrigated agriculture is already using around 70% of the available \r freshwater, and the large seasonal variations in water supply and the \r needs of different crops can create conflicts between water needs \r across sectors at different time scales (Wada et al. 2016). However, as \r there is little potential for increasing irrigation or expanding cropland \r (Steffen et al. 2015), gaps in food production gaps must be closed by \r [...]"


id: ab584b3add6a51323f56391d08b34943
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27374
content:
"[...] increasing productivity and cropping densities on currently harvested \r land by increasing either rain-fed yields or water-use efficiency \r (Alexandratos and Bruinsma 2012)."


id: ac5e06ada4d3603c11a7fb75b8269733
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27564
content:
"The extraction, distribution and wastewater processes of \r anthropogenic water-management systems similarly use vast \r amounts of energy, making the proper management of water \r essential to reduce energy usage and GHG emissions (Nair et al. \r 2014)Chapter 11). One study reports that the water sector accounts \r for 5% of total US GHG emissions (Rothausen and Conway 2011). \r Within the WEFN, there is an obvious trade-off between water \r availability and food production, competing demands that pose a risk \r to the supply of the basic commodities of food, energy and water in \r line with the SDGs (Bleischwitz et al. 2018; Gao et al. 2019), all of \r which have the potential for inter-sectorial or inter-regional conflicts \r (Froese and Schilling 2019). Currently, 24% of the global population \r live in regions with constant water-scarce food production, and \r 19% experience occasional water scarcities (Kummu et al. 2014). \r To counterbalance the demand for food and comestibles in regions \r [...]"


id: d1c54468cf8d2313371e1ee31814cbb6
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
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vector_id: 34257
content:
"[...] that experience constant or intermittent supplies, transportation \r is needed, which in itself requires suitable infrastructure, energy \r supplies, a well-functioning trading environment and support policies. \r Of the 2.6  billion people who experience constant or occasional \r water scarcities in food production, 55% rely on international \r trade, 21% on domestic trade and the remainder on water stocks \r (Kummu et al. 2014)."


id: d25e5ef9e35eaaabf9658977c7e6481b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34365
content:
"It has been argued that applying an integrated approach to water\u0002energy-climate-food resource management and policymaking is \r highly beneficial in properly addressing the co-benefits and trade\u0002offs (Brouwer et al. 2018; Howells et al. 2013), accommodating the \r SDGs (Rasul 2016) and, in general, assessing enabling strategies \r to improve resource efficiency (Dai et al. 2018). For an integrated \r approach to analysing the WEFN, a number of modelling approaches, \r tools and frameworks have been proposed (Brouwer et al. 2018; \r de Strasser et al. 2016; Gao et al. 2019; Larsen et al. 2019; Smajgl \r et al. 2016), often involving multi-objective calibration. Such tools \r enable decision-makers to evaluate the optimal water-allocation and \r energy-saving solutions for the specific geography in question. As an \r example, (Scott 2011) found the higher transportability of electricity, \r compared to water, pivotal in water-energy adaptation solutions in \r [...]"


id: 243698494e5d4cac65865e1d4102b1cf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3560
content:
"[...] the USA, while arguing for the additional coordination of water and \r energy policies as a key instrument in balancing the trade-offs."


id: 31b3514aac84782e037ea1565f055a5b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5988
content:
"Common to all these integrated efforts is the challenge involved in \r making comparisons across studies due to the combined complexities \r of assumptions, model codes, regions, variables, forcings, and so \r on. To accommodate these challenges, (Larsen et al. 2019) suggest \r employing shared criteria and forcing data to enable cross-model \r comparisons and uncertainty estimates, as also highlighted by \r (Brouwer et al. 2018). Other limitations in current WEFN research \r are partial system descriptions, the failure to address uncertainties, \r system boundaries, and evaluation methods and metrics (Zhang \r et al. 2018). The lack of proper access to WEFN data and data \r quality has been highlighted by (D'Odorico et al. 2018; Larsen et al. \r 2019). Furthermore, gaps have been identified between theory and \r end-user applications in the lack of any focus on food nutritional \r values as opposed to calories alone, in the understanding of water \r [...]"


id: b9890941571d67e6db31aa1b041d1eb0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29852
content:
"[...] availability in relation to management practices, in integrating \r new energy technologies and in the resulting environmental issues \r (D'Odorico et al. 2018)."


id: 1d75813c17985955481d7125c28b65c7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2362
content:
"The co-benefits of energy-saving measures described by \r 146  signatories to a  city climate network due to improved air \r quality have been quantified as 6596 avoided premature deaths \r (with a 95% confidence interval of 4356 to 8572 avoided premature \r deaths) and 68,476 years of life saved (with a  95% confidence \r interval of 45,403 and 89,358 years of life saved) (Monforti-Ferrario \r et al. 2019). Better air quality further reinforces the health co-benefits \r of climate-mitigation measures based on walking and cycling, since \r the evidence suggests that increased physical activity in urban \r outdoor settings with low levels of black carbon improves lung \r function (Laeremans et al. 2018). Chapter 9 shows that mitigation \r actions in buildings have multiple co-benefits resulting in substantial \r social and economic value beyond their direct impacts on reducing \r energy consumption and GHG emissions, thus contributing to the \r [...]"


id: 47b43813a8227637473d50c46f4a6af3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9829
content:
"[...] achievement of almost all the UN's SDGs. Most studies agree that \r the value of these multiple benefits is greater than the value of the \r energy savings, while their quantification and inclusion in decision\u0002making processes will strengthen the adoption of ambitious reduction \r targets and improve coordination across policy areas."


id: 9252c11b203b565720315affe582cb5e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22964
content:
"For many cities, a key to reorienting development paths will be investing \r in sustainable, low-carbon infrastructure. Because infrastructure has \r a  long lifetime and influences everything from lifestyle choices to \r consumption patterns, decisions over an estimated USD90 trillion of \r infrastructure investment (from now to 2030) will be critical in order \r to avoid becoming locked-in to unsustainable paths (WRI 2016). This \r is particularly true in developing countries, where demands for new \r buildings, roads, energy and waste-management systems are already \r surging. To some extent, policies that accelerate building renovation \r rates, including voluntary programmes (Van der Heijden 2018), can \r support transitions down more sustainable paths (Kuramochi et al. \r 2018). Factoring climate and sustainable development considerations \r into policy tools that facilitate the quantitative emission performance \r standard (EPS) and the inclusion of climate and sustainable \r [...]"


id: 6932d62895a9600df618ca4ca83098c9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15772
content:
"[...] development benefits and risks in infrastructure assessments or \r risk-adjusted returns on investments in development banks could \r also prove useful (Rydge et al. 2015). Strong policy signals from the \r UNFCCC and from national climate policies and strategies (including \r NDCs) could facilitate uptake of the relevant policies and the use \r of these tools."


id: 47f5fdfe860426be0ff0a7e0d0c332c8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9878
content:
"There are several examples of cities that have developed plans for \r meeting both the SDGs and mitigation, which demonstrates the \r feasibility of meeting these objectives jointly. Quito, Ecuador, a city \r with large carbon footprints (Global Opportunity Explorer 2019) and \r climate vulnerabilities, has adopted low-carbon plans that aim to \r achieve the climate goals while introducing net-zero energy buildings \r and reducing water stress (Ordonez et al. 2019; Marcotullio et al. \r 2018). Several cities in China, Indonesia and Japan have invested in \r green-city initiatives by means of green infrastructural investments, \r which is claimed to be a  form of smart investment. Through this \r type of investment, economic growth and greenhouse gas (GHG) \r emissions reductions can be achieved in cities (Jupesta et al. 2016). \r Multi-level governance arrangements, public-private cooperation \r and robust urban-data platforms are among the factors enabling \r [...]"


id: 419082f96ced86aefddb2c9a2cac67ab
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8725
content:
"[...] the pursuit of these objectives within countries (Corfee-Morlot et al. \r 2009; Gordon 2015; Creutzig et al. 2019; Yarime 2017)."


id: 86069b4786fe662eabbb30efdd21c7b6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20721
content:
"Climate actions, including climate change mitigation and adaptation, \r are highly scale-dependent, and solutions are very context-specific. \r Especially in developing countries, a  strong link exists between \r sustainable development, vulnerability and climate risks, as limited \r economic, social and institutional resources often result in low \r adaptive capacities and high vulnerability. Similarly, the limitations \r in resources also constitute key elements weakening the capacity \r for climate change mitigation (Jakob et al. 2014). The change to \r climate-resilient societies requires transformational or systemic \r changes, which also have important implications for the suite of \r available sustainable-development pathways (Kates et al. 2012; \r Lemos et al. 2013). Thornton and Comberti (2017) point to the \r need for social-ecological transformations to take place if synergies \r between mitigation and adaptation are to be captured, based on \r [...]"


id: 95318a0c05cf902a9edf3318e54f26eb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23452
content:
"[...] the argument that incremental adaptation will not be sufficient \r when climate change impacts can be extreme or rapid and when \r deep decarbonisation simultaneously involves social change \r (Chapter 18 in AR6 WGII)."


id: 2f82bec1e0f05741dbac778643193309
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5620
content:
"As discussed in AR6 WGII, Section  18.4, there are synergies and \r trade-offs between adaptation and sustainable development, as \r well as between mitigation and sustainable development, which \r is supported by comprehensive assessments such as that by Dovie \r (2019) and Sharifi (2020). Links between mitigation and adaptation \r options are identified in Chapter 18 in AR6 WGII, such as expected \r changes in energy demand due to climate change interacting with \r energy-system development and mitigation options, changes to \r agricultural production practices to manage the risks of potential \r changes in weather patterns affecting land-based emissions and \r mitigation strategies, or mitigation strategies that place additional \r demands on resources and markets. This increases the pressures on \r and costs of adaptation or ecosystem restoration linked to carbon \r sequestration and the benefits in terms of the resilience of natural \r [...]"


id: 63119758f7726cea98502bd941e049d4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14720
content:
"[...] and managed ecosystems, but it also could restrict mitigation options \r and increase costs. Chapter 3 of AR6 WGIII similarly concludes that \r the connectedness and coherence of actions to mitigate climate \r change could support the conservation and adaptation of ecosystems \r and meet the Sustainable Development Goals more widely."


id: 7bc7052011aa9b6c25e0ee70502dfd32
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18988
content:
"around the world. (Grafakos et al. 2019; Sanchez Rodriguez et al. \r 2018) concluded that cities are an obvious place for the development \r of plans that can capture several synergies between sustainable \r development and climate-resilient pathways. (Kim and Grafakos \r 2019; Landauer et al. 2019) similarly concluded that cities are an \r obvious platform for the development of integrated planning efforts \r because of the scale of policies and actions, which could potentially \r match the different policy domains. (Kim and Grafakos 2019) \r assessed the level of integration of mitigation and adaptation in \r urban climate change plans across 44 major Latin American cities, \r concluding that the integration of climate change mitigation and \r adaption plans was very weak in about half the cities and that \r limited donor finance was a main barrier. The authors also mention \r barriers in relation to governance and the weakness or lack of legal \r [...]"


id: 48949cea276ffcf5d0cd3d7e44cda8e6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9986
content:
"[...] frameworks. The integration of SDGs with adaptation could help \r increase the willingness of politicians to implement climate actions, \r as well as provide stronger arguments for investing the required \r resources (Sanchez Rodriguez et al. 2018)."


id: 92247acd318f0b45dd8e4849dabf10ae
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22925
content:
"were asked about their willingness to change this balance and \r to commit more resources to projects that address both climate \r change mitigation and adaptation. More than two thirds of those \r interviewed, however, raised concerns that integrated projects \r could be too complicated and that a greater alignment of financial \r models across different policy domains could entail greater \r financial risks. Another barrier mentioned in respect of finance was \r that mitigation projects were primarily aimed at GHG emissions \r reductions, while adaptation projects had more national benefits \r and were also more suitable for community development and \r promoting equality and fairness. In an assessment of 201 projects \r in the forestry and agricultural sectors in the tropics, (Kongsager \r et al. 2016), found that a majority of the projects contributed to \r both adaptation and mitigation or at least had the potential \r to do so, despite the separation between these two objectives by \r [...]"


id: d832698f41ceaa5e475144e8bb5cd7a0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35335
content:
"building materials sectors, as it could make the existing building \r stock more climate-resilient (Hallegatte 2009; de Wilde and Coley \r 2012; Pyke et al. 2012) and thus also support implementation of \r the Sendai Framework on Disaster Risk Reduction (United Nations \r 2015b). Climate change in the form of extremely high temperatures, \r intense rainfall leading to flooding, more intense winds and/or \r storms and sea level rises (SLRs) can seriously impact transport \r infrastructure, including the operations and mobility of road, rail, \r shipping and aviation; Chapter 10 assesses the impacts on subsectors \r within transportation. At the same time, these sectors are major \r targets for GHG mitigation options, and many countries are currently \r examining what to do in terms of combined mitigation-adaptation \r efforts, using the need to mitigate climate change through transport\u0002related GHG emissions reductions and pollutants as the basis for \r [...]"


id: 77ab3b705004d44a8dd1169acd0e7c59
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18260
content:
"[...] adaptation action (Thornbush et al. 2013; Wang and Chen 2019). For \r example, urban sprawl indirectly affects climate processes, increasing \r emissions and vulnerability, which worsens the ability to adapt \r (Congedo and Munafo 2014). Hence greater use of rail by passengers \r and freight will reduce the pressures on the roads, while having less \r urban sprawl will reduce the impacts on new infrastructure, often in \r more vulnerable areas (IPCC 2019; Newman et al. 2017)."


id: 5fb7b669809e0d21b90cfe01ecb9b470
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14144
content:
"The TWI2050 2019 report (IIASA 2019) assessed both the positive \r and negative impacts of digitalisation in the context of sustainable \r development. It found that efficiency improvements, reduced \r resource consumption and new services can support the SDGs, but \r also that there were challenges, including in relation to equality, \r facing the least-developed and developing countries because of their \r low level of access to technologies. The necessary preconditions for \r successful digital transformation include prosperity, social inclusion, \r environmental sustainability, protection of jobs and good governance \r of sustainability transitions. One negative impact of digitalisation \r could be the rebound effects, where easier access to services could \r increase demand and with it GHG emissions. Digitalisation in the \r manufacturing sector could also provide a comparative advantage \r to developed countries due to the falling importance of labour costs, \r [...]"


id: 3370382625d82410a5397ad96ca97188
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6304
content:
"[...] while the barriers to emerging economies seeking to enter global \r markets could accordingly be increased."


id: b71ef7068f68443104e5db5a676bc72a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29427
content:
"well managed. Nuclear power is assessed as having synergies with \r SDG 3 (good health and well-being) due to reduced air pollution, but \r potential trade-offs in relation to SDG 6 (clean water and sanitation) \r due to high water consumption, and water consumption issues are \r also possible in relation to many of the other mitigation options \r in the energy sector. Synergies are identified in relation to SDG 12 \r (responsible production and consumption) for nuclear power due \r to low material consumption. CCUS has been assessed as having \r trade-offs in relation to SDG 1 (no poverty) due to high costs and \r SDG 6 (clean water and sanitation) due to high water consumption. \r Synergies are related to SDG 3 (good health and well-being), and to \r SDG 9 (industry, innovation and infrastructure) due to the facilitation \r of decarbonisation of industrial processes. Both synergies and trade\u0002offs could arrive in relation to SDG 12 (responsible production and \r [...]"


id: f92f7a0c9e2ea7a344a07cc4b8df859f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41205
content:
"[...] consumption), since some rare chemicals and other inputs could in \r some cases be used with large-scale applications."


id: bb2bed2eaf2f3fdfd1155f7d4e3be14
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30147
content:
"In conclusion, in most cases digitalisation options may have both \r positive synergistic impacts on mitigation and the SDGs and some \r negative trade-offs. Energy-sector options are assessed primarily as \r having synergies, while some digitalisation options in transport could \r increase the demand for emission-intensive modes of transport. \r Digital platforms for the sharing economy could have both positive \r and negative impacts depending on the goods and services that are \r actually exchanged (Cross-Chapter Box 6 in Chapter 7). Options related \r to agriculture and the water-energy-food nexus (WEFN) could help \r manage resources more efficiently across sectors, which could create \r synergies. Digitalisation can also raise a number of ethical challenges \r according to (Clark et al. 2019). Wider public discussion of internet\u0002based activities was accordingly recommended, including topics such \r as the negotiation of online consent and the use of data for which \r [...]"


id: a50e766790ed12ce70c50e8526e379f0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26264
content:
"SDG 3 (good health and well-being) can be supported by many \r mitigation options in the agriculture, forestry and food sectors, \r primarily due to the reduced environmental impacts, and the same \r is the case with SDG 14 (life below water) due to decreased nutrient \r loads, and SDG 15 (life on land) due to increased biodiversity, \r with the caveat however, that SDGs 14 and 15 could have both \r synergies and trade-offs dependent on land use. It is considered that \r there could be both synergies and trade-offs in relation to SDG 8 \r (decent work and economic growth) due to competition over land \r use related to the mitigation options reducing deforestation and \r reforestation and restoration, and the same is the case in relation \r to SDG 7 (affordable and clean energy) depending on the economic \r outcome of the mitigation options. Similarly, the mitigation option \r of reduced CH4 and N2O emissions from agriculture are assessed as \r [...]"


id: 261a32a97cb2a873e9aeabb5ba6ab9e2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3872
content:
"[...] having mixed impacts on SDG 8 (decent work and economic growth), \r and SDG 9 (industry, innovation and infrastructure) depending on \r innovative food production. The mitigation options of reforestation \r and forest management are assessed as having mixed impacts on "


id: 1286941706ddb3544564361816d31a4c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 459
content:
"The mitigation options in the transportation sector are assessed as \r having synergies with SDG 1 (no poverty) and SDG 3 (good health and \r well-being) due to reduced environmental pollution, with exceptions \r in relation to pollution from biofuels and the risks of traffic accidents. \r Trade-offs are also mentioned in relation SDG 2 (zero hunger) where \r the production of biofuels takes land away from food production. \r Synergies are assessed in relation to SDG 7 (affordable and clean \r energy), SDG 8 (decent work and economic growth) and SDG 9 \r (industry, innovation and infrastructure). It is emphasised that some \r mitigation options, like the increased penetration of electric vehicles, \r require innovative business models, and that digitalisation and \r automatic vehicles will support the socio-economic structures that \r impede adoption of EVs and the urban structures that enable reduced \r car dependence. In conclusion, there is a  need for investments in \r [...]"


id: 19d2ce6ca488bb7d0f1cddeaa912167d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1739
content:
"[...] infrastructure that can support alternative fuels for light-duty vehicles \r (LDVs). The large-scale electrification of LDVs requires the expansion \r of low-carbon power systems, while charging or battery-swapping \r infrastructure is needed for some segments."


id: 485bee24a0c31865eaf86b8d28137d81
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9941
content:
"The mitigation options in the industrial sector have been assessed \r primarily as having synergies with meeting the SDGs. Several options, \r including energy efficiency, material recycling and electrification, are \r assessed has being able to create increased employment and business \r opportunities related to SDG 8 (decent work and economic growth), \r but material-efficiency improvements could reduce tax revenues. \r Electrification is assessed as having many synergies with SDGs, such \r as supporting SDG 1 (no poverty), SDG 2 (zero hunger), and SDG 3 \r (good health and well-being). CCS applied in industry is assessed as \r having synergies in terms of the control of non-CO2 pollutants (such \r as sulphur dioxide), but increases in non-CO2 pollutants (such as \r particulate matter, nitrogen oxide and ammonia). The conclusion is \r that 15-25% additional energy will be required by CCS technologies \r compared with conventional plants, implying that production costs \r [...]"


id: 734e04a59f93f69c7eb33f50c42ed64c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17539
content:
"[...] could increase significantly. For the industrial sector in general, it is \r concluded that the balance between synergies and trade-offs between \r mitigation options and SDGs in industry depends on technology and \r the scale of the sharing of co-benefits across regions, as well as on the \r sharing of benefits in business models over whole value chains."


id: 5fcab38223eda707b8f1efbc5660a5ac
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14155
content:
"As for the urban mitigation options, the reviewed building-sector \r studies reveal a lot of links between mitigation and the SDGs. Highly \r efficient building envelopes are expected to have synergies with the \r SDGs in all cases except those with potential trade-offs in relation to \r SDG 10 (reduced inequalities). Many SDG synergies are also identified \r for the building design and performance, heating, ventilation and air \r conditioning, and efficient appliances mitigation options. However, \r some trade-offs could appear in relation to SDG 8 (decent work and \r economic growth) due to macroeconomic impacts of reduced energy \r consumption, decreasing prices and stranded investments. Similar \r issues related to the economic impacts of reduced energy demand \r are also highlighted for all the other mitigation options, including \r for the building sector. In relation to construction materials and the \r circular economy, some trade-offs have been identified in relation to \r [...]"


id: 1f58b95cb63c7f6a92adf4c0c86823bb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2718
content:
"[...] SDG 6 (clean water and sanitation) and SDG 15 (life on land) related \r to the use of bio-based materials."


id: ddb3d94647e16c6c4c765ee47aa52e7c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36266
content:
"and constituent materials (Garcia-Olivares et al. 2018). Transitions \r away from fossil fuels and toward renewable energy-based systems, \r for instance, will require significant land-use decisions to avoid \r negative trade-offs with biodiversity and food security (Capellan\u0002Perez et al. 2017). Previous sections underline a related need to move \r beyond focusing on 'rational' assessments of the costs and benefits \r of policies and technologies to involve people at all levels in order \r to overcome these multiple barriers. A transition to a lower carbon \r system is unlikely to happen even if models find it technically feasible \r and cost-effective. Rather, achieving a  transition requires breaking \r locked-in high-carbon technological trajectories, path dependencies \r and resistance to change from the industries and actors that are \r benefiting from the current system (Rogge et al. 2017). Lock-in effects \r may be weaker in sectors and policy areas where fewer technologies \r [...]"


id: 2d3e6842829ec8190d2af6d6b0aa7de
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5247
content:
"[...] exist, potentially opening the door to innovations that embed the \r climate in broader sustainability objectives (e.g.,  technologies and \r innovations that support the integration of food, water and energy \r goals). Such effects may still happen when there are significant \r information asymmetries and high-cost barriers to action, as can \r occur when working across multiple climate and development\u0002related sectors (Kemp and Never 2017)."


id: 25fc65f8fc70fb17ffd1df75e7df7e52
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3861
content:
"However, the same conditions that may serve to impede a transition \r (i.e.,  organisational structure, behaviour, technological lock-in) can \r also be 'flipped' to enable it (Burch 2010; Lee et al. 2017), while the \r framing of policies that are relevant to the sustainable development \r agenda can also create a stronger basis and stronger policy support. \r The technological developments and broader cultural changes that \r may generate new social demands on infrastructure to contribute to \r sustainable development will involve a process of social learning and \r awareness building (Naber et al. 2017; Sengers et al. 2019). However, \r it is also important to note that strong shocks to these systems, \r including accelerated climate change impacts, economic crises and \r political changes, may provide crucial openings for accelerated \r transitions to sustainable systems through fundamental institutional \r changes (Broto et al. 2014). The global COVID-19 pandemic is \r [...]"


id: 6beb3e00d0a6d211db71b40f4ea887cd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16283
content:
"[...] one such shock that has sparked widespread conversations about \r recovery that is fundamentally more sustainable, equitable and \r resilient (McNeely and Munasinghe 2021). Key enabling conditions \r appear to be individual and collective actions, including leadership \r and education; financial, material, social and technical drivers that \r foster innovation; robust national and regional innovation systems \r that enhance technological diffusion (Wieczorek 2018); supportive \r policy and governance dynamics at multiple levels that permit both \r agility and coherence (Gopel et al. 2016); measures to recognise and \r address the challenges to equality inherent in the transition; and long\u0002range, holistic planning that explicitly seeks synergies between \r climate change and sustainable development while avoiding trade\u0002offs. The sections that follow seek to assess and integrate these key \r categories of the barriers to and enablers of an accelerated transition \r [...]"


id: ab23684d7dd504541d7ebe52383bd876
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27337
content:
"The results from these research communities reveal how \r experiential learning takes place and how it encourages bonding \r between people, society and nature. This can be achieved by going \r jointly and consciously into nature (Gioacchino 2019), by creating \r spaces for intensive-dialogue sessions with colleagues (Goldman\u0002Schuyler et al. 2017) and forming, for example, a very practical u.lab \r hub, which involves following the MIT-u.lab course with a  local \r community and is accompanied scientifically (Pomeroy and Oliver \r 2018). Others have pointed to social networks such as the 'transition \r initiative' (Hopkins 2010), eco-village networks (Barani et al. 2018), \r civil-society movements (Seyfang and Smith 2007) and intentional \r communities (Grinde et al. 2018; Veciana and Ottmar 2018) as ways \r of generating the shared understandings that are central to inner \r and outer transitions, as well as the broader development of social \r [...]"


id: ed88dcd4e2c1986cd95c87d3e6b91f40
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39149
content:
"[...] movements. In some cases, these networks build on principles \r like permaculture to encourage people to 'observe and interact', \r 'produce no waste' and 'design from patterns to details', not only \r in agriculture and gardening, but also in sustainable businesses \r and technologies to reduce CO2 emissions (Ferguson and Lovell \r 2014; Lessem 2018)."


id: 9c0195687ed7087114c293dd7ecd12bf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24699
content:
"Sustainable development and deep decarbonisation will involve \r people and communities being connected locally through various \r means - including globally via the internet and digital technologies \r (Bradbury 2015; Scharmer 2018; Scharmer, C, Kaufer 2015) - in ways \r that form social fields that allow sustainability to unfold (Gillard \r et al. 2016), and that prompt other shifts in thinking and behaviour \r that are consistent with the 1.5degC goal (O'Brien 2018; Veciana and \r Ottmar 2018). Indeed, social movements serve to develop collective \r identities, foster collective learning and accelerate collective action \r ranging from energy justice (Campos and Marin-Gonzalez 2020) \r (Section 17.4.5) to restricting fossil fuel extraction and supply (Piggot \r 2018). This does not apply only to adults: as seen in the 'Fridays for \r Future' marches, the young are also involving themselves politically \r (Peterson et al. 2019). Many initiatives have started with these \r [...]"


id: c63ac42c27845d6c78451fb3508565c5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32185
content:
"[...] marches, including 'science for future' and new forms of sustainability \r science (Shrivastava et al. 2020)."


id: ec79b1aba3cf91235e25f8fb4f745bbf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38966
content:
"Private-sector entrepreneurs also play an important role in fostering \r and accelerating transitions to sustainable development (Burch et al. \r 2016; Ehnert et al. 2018a; Dale et al. 2017). Sustainable entrepreneurs \r (SEs), for instance, are described as those who participate in the \r development of an innovation while simultaneously being rooted \r in the incumbent energy-intensive system. SE actors who have \r developed longer-term relationships, both formal and informal, with \r the public authorities can have considerable influence on developing \r novel renewable-energy technologies (Gasbarro et al. 2017). \r Institutions and policies that nurture the activities of sustainable \r entrepreneurs, in particular small- and medium-sized enterprises \r (Burch et al. 2016), can facilitate and strengthen transitions toward \r more sustainable development pathways, as can more fundamental \r adjustments to underlying business models, rather than relying only \r [...]"


id: d0dc9a07b3b551593537ba90f9f2fae0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34093
content:
"[...] on incremental adjustments in the efficiency with which resources \r are used (Burch and Di Bella 2021)."


id: 9fc82abd3ac4b0b14bc6f9c316c3d31b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25317
content:
"In Norway, many incumbent energy firms have already expanded \r their operations into the alternative-energy sector as both \r producers and suppliers (who often follow the lead of producers). \r Producers are responding to perceptions of larger-scale changes \r in the energy landscape (e.g.,  the green shift), along with \r uncertainties in their own sectors, and innovation can spill across \r actors in multiple sectors (Koasidis et al. 2020). While these firms \r are expanding out of self-interest, the expansion provides more \r legitimacy to new forms of technology and enables transfers of \r knowledge and resources to be introduced within this developing \r niche (Steen and Weaver 2017). Many large, well-established firms \r are pursuing sustainability agendas and opting for transparency \r with regard to their greenhouse gas emissions (Kolk et al. 2008; \r Guenther et al. 2016), supply-chain management (Formentini and \r Taticchi 2016) and sustainable technology or service development \r [...]"


id: 7bc683fc365284bdb10b5bffd797852f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18986
content:
"Many forms of transformational change to energy systems are \r not possible when financial systems still privilege investing in \r unsustainable, carbon-intensive sectors. One of the root causes of the \r failure of traditional financial systems is the undervaluation of natural \r capital and unsettled property-right issues that are associated with \r it. The exclusion of proper rents for scarcities or for global and local \r externalities, including climate change, can undermine larger-scale \r changes to energy systems (Clark et al. 2018). But even smaller\u0002scale low-carbon energy and infrastructure projects can fail to get \r off the ground if uncertainty and investment risk discourage project \r planning and bank-lending programmes (Bolton et al. 2016). The EU's \r previous actions regarding the 'shareholder maximisation norm' and \r non-binding measures have created path dependencies, limiting its \r flexibility in creating sustainable financial legislation. However, the \r [...]"


id: ef17a42c22a3aae7c9d963ce4c8ccbfa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39435
content:
"[...] Sustainable Finance Initiative and the Single Market may prove to be \r 'policy hotspots' in encouraging sustainable finance (Ahlstrom 2019). \r Taking advantage of these hotspots may be crucial in overcoming \r path dependencies and setting new ones in motion."


id: 220df608754e197f7e24e8e975551f58
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3217
content:
"Some studies have focused on factors that can break institutional \r and ideational lock-ins (Arranz 2017), while others have found \r that intentional higher-level (or, in the language of socio-technical \r transitions, 'landscape') pressures can be the destabilising force \r needed to move transitions forward (Falcone and Sica 2015). Often \r the state or national government (as the sovereign that determines \r how resources are used and allocated) can play a  key role in \r destabilising incumbent energy regimes, a role that is significantly \r strengthened by public support (Arranz 2017; Avelino et al. 2016). \r However, this role is not limited to government insiders. In some \r contexts, regime outsiders have also played a  pivotal role in \r destabilising regimes by combining persuasive narratives that gain \r market influence (Arranz 2017). Carbon-intensive luxury goods and \r services for wealthy consumers, for instance, especially if applied \r [...]"


id: b6171a9a3e1181fb3cf52dd130caf7c4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29258
content:
"[...] at the 'acceleration' phase of a transition, can help transform long\u0002term social practices and behaviour and dissolve the 'structural \r imperative for growth' (Wiedmann et al. 2020). In a similar fashion, \r environmental taxes can remove 'locked-in' technology and place \r pressure on dominant regimes to become more sustainable (Bachus \r and Vanswijgenhoven 2018)."


id: 62b7d7f66912bed35ca1d459508ea409
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14660
content:
"Various strategies and processes have been explored that might \r facilitate the translation of barriers into enablers, thus accelerating \r transitions to sustainable development. Common themes include \r frequent monitoring and system evaluation to reveal the barriers \r in the first place, the collaborative co-creation and envisioning of \r pathways toward sustainable development, ambitious goal-setting, \r the strategic tackling of sources of path dependence or inertia, \r iterative evaluations of progress and risk management, adaptive \r management and building in opportunities for agile course-correction \r at multiple levels of governance (Burch et al. 2014; Halbe et al. \r 2015). Given the political infeasibility of stable, long-term climate \r policies, the better choice may be to embrace uncertainty in specific \r policies but entrench the low-carbon transition as the overarching \r goal. Framing climate policy too narrowly, rather than taking a more \r [...]"


id: ed4bde131c20ab86bdbcee2a36a43863
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39123
content:
"[...] holistic, sustainable development-oriented approach, may tie success \r to single policies, rather than allowing for system-wide change."


id: 2f575a54b1595c051ce5528a91361202
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5594
content:
"Even with this diversity, prominent lines of economic, institutional, \r psychological and systems thinking have reflected on interventions \r that can enable transitions. Because these disciplines often focus on \r different levels of analysis and draw upon diverse analytical methods \r and empirical evidence, the recommended interventions also tend \r to vary. For instance, economic arguments often point to the need \r for targeted regulation or investments, institutional claims centre \r on multi-level governance reforms, and psychology encourages \r participation to change mindsets and social norms. Systems-level \r perspectives offer a useful frame for bringing together these views, but \r may not capture the richness and details of them treated separately. \r Greater inter- and transdisciplinary research is needed to integrate \r the more focused interventions and show how they work together in \r a system. Such research will be particularly important for working on \r [...]"


id: c400074ea41ebd298761d52c23856f6b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31765
content:
"[...] the concern running through these studies: strengthening synergies \r between climate and the broader sustainable development agenda."


id: 222d3411ed98fba7e4abfedd7bb10a0d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3233
content:
"From a cross-sectoral perspective, it can be concluded that the AFOLU \r sector offers many low-cost mitigation options with synergetic SDG \r impacts, which, however, can also create trade-offs between land use \r for food, energy, forest and biodiversity. Some options can help to \r mitigate such trade-offs, like agricultural practices, forest conservation \r and soil carbon sequestration. Lifestyle changes, including dietary \r changes and reduced food waste, could jointly support the SDGs and \r mitigation. Industry also offers several mitigation options with SDG \r synergies, for example, related to energy efficiency and the circular \r economy. Some of the renewable-energy options in industry could \r indicate some trade-offs in relation to land use, with implications \r for food- and water security and costs. Cities provide a  promising \r basis for implementing mitigation with SDG synergies, particularly \r if urban planning, transportation, infrastructure and settlements are \r [...]"


id: aeafbce6ef906916b49a2e2daf16c199
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27969
content:
"[...] coordinated jointly. Similarly, studies of the building sector have \r identified many synergies between the SDGs and mitigation, but \r there are issues related to the costs of new technologies. Also, in \r relation to households and buildings, important equity issues emerge \r due to the ability of low-income groups to afford the introduction of \r new technologies. Altogether these cross-sectoral conclusions create \r a need for policies to address both synergies and trade-offs, as well as \r for coordination between different sectoral domains. Context-specific \r assessments of synergies and trade-offs are here important, as is \r sharing the benefits and costs associated with mitigation policies."


id: 270f23d81618c55820034eaaeb2c9af9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4037
content:
"Several opportunities for creating SDG synergies and avoiding trade\u0002offs have also been identified in relation to integrated adaptation \r and mitigation policies. The AFOLU sector has a  large potential for \r integrating adaptation and mitigation policies related to agriculture, \r bioenergy crops, forestry and water use. As was concluded for \r mitigation options, integrated adaptation and mitigation policies also \r entail the risks of creating trade-offs in relation to food, water, energy \r access and biodiversity. There are several potentially strong links \r between climate change adaptation in industry and climate change \r adaptation more generally. Various supply chains can be affected by \r climate change, and mitigation options related to energy and water \r supply can be disrupted by climate events, implying that great benefits \r may come from integrating adaptation in industrial planning efforts. \r Adaptation options in industry can imply increasing the demand for \r [...]"


id: 32a664dd21dc6443b0212122f799e318
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6172
content:
"[...] packaging materials such as plastics and for access to refrigeration, \r which are also major sources of GHG emissions, which then would \r require further mitigation options. Mitigation and the co-benefits \r of adaptation in urban areas in relation to air quality, health, green \r jobs and equality issues can in most cases be synergetic and can also \r support the SDGs. One exception are compact cities, with their trade\u0002offs between mitigation and adaptation because decreasing urban \r sprawl can increase the risks of flooding and heat stress. Detailed \r mapping of mitigation and adaptation in urban areas shows that there \r are many, very close interactions between the two policy domains and \r that coordinated governance across sectors is therefore called for."


id: b56ba04bfb21e6307ab51448fc9ea4b6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29148
content:
"Meeting the ambitions of the Paris Agreement will require phasing \r out fossil fuels from energy systems, which is technically possible and \r is estimated to be relatively low in cost. However, studies also show \r that replacing fossil fuels with renewables can have major synergies \r and trade-offs with a  broader agenda of sustainable development \r if a balance is established in relation to land use, food security and \r job creation (McCollum et al. 2018). Furthermore, the transition to \r low-emission pathways will require policy efforts that also address \r the emissions locked-in to existing infrastructure, like power plants, \r factories, cargo ships and other infrastructure already in use: for \r example, today coal-fired power plants account for 30% of all energy\u0002related emissions. Thus, even though the transition away from fossil \r fuels is desirable and technically feasible, it is still largely constrained \r by existing fossil fuel-based infrastructure and the existence of \r [...]"


id: b520157cc1b243a2cefd95e95e5a5a85
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29102
content:
"[...] stranded investments. The 'committed' emissions from existing fossil \r fuel infrastructure may consume all the remaining carbon budget in the \r 1.5degC scenario or two thirds of the carbon budget in the 2degC scenario."


id: 5afac03ef42efb70de4ed2b3cb9f60ef
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13260
content:
"Ultimately, the evidence demonstrates that there is rarely any one \r single factor promoting or preventing transitions. A  constellation \r of elements come into play, including technological innovations, \r shifts in markets, social and behavioural dynamics, and governance \r arrangements. Indeed, transitions require an examination of the role \r of values, attitudes, beliefs and the structures that shape behaviour, as \r well as the dynamics of social movements and education at multiple \r levels. Likewise, technological and social innovation both play an \r important role in enabling transitions, highlighting the importance of \r multi-institutional and multi-stakeholder actors building institutional \r support networks, facilitating collaboration between sectors and \r actors, and promoting learning and social change. Financial tools \r and economic instruments are crucial enablers, since many forms \r of transformational change to energy systems are not possible \r [...]"


id: 31d76fe34fea24824ec5fcd381da1511
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6019
content:
"[...] when financial systems still privilege investing in unsustainable, \r carbon-intensive sectors. These instruments are deployed within \r the context of the multi-level governance of climate change, which \r suggests the importance of complementary policies and institutions \r that simultaneously integrate across multiple sectors and scales to \r address the multiple sources of lock-in that are shaping the current \r carbon-intensive energy system. Systems-oriented approaches, \r which holistically address the intersections among climate, water \r and energy (for instance), have significant potential to reveal and \r help avoid trade-offs, foster experimentation, and deliver a range of \r co-benefits on the path towards sustainable development."


id: f094af47ec2881ee55c4e20daf6322ff
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39702
content:
"Negative economic and social impacts in some regions could emerge as a consequence of ambitious climate change mitigation \r policies if these are not aligned with key sustainable development aspirations such as those represented by the Sustainable \r Development Goals (SDGs) on 'no poverty, energy-, water- and food access', and so on, which could in turn slow down the transition \r process. Nonetheless, many climate change mitigation policies could generate incomes, new jobs and other benefits. Capturing \r these benefits could require specific policies and investments to be targeted directly towards including all parts of society in the \r new activities and industries created by the climate change mitigation policies, and that activities that are reduced in the context of \r transitions to a low-carbon future, including industries and geographical areas, are seeing new opportunities. Poor understanding \r [...]"


id: 1c06efb4d3f91eeb9edf81c7a2694667
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2115
content:
"[...] of how governance at multiple levels can meet these challenges to the transition may fail to make significant progress in relation \r to national policies and a  global climate agreement. It may therefore either support or weaken the climate architecture, thus \r constituting a limiting factor."


id: 4dbadc936632d3a90ddb23941d53174b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10949
content:
"Institutions are critical in accelerating the transition towards sustainable development: they can help to shape climate change \r response strategies in terms of both adaptation and mitigation. Local institutions are the custodians of critical adaptation services, \r ranging from the mobilisation of resources, skills development and capacity-building to the dissemination of critical strategies. \r Transitions towards sustainable development are mediated by actors within particular institutions, the governance mechanisms they \r use as implementing tools and the political coalitions they form to enable action. Patterns of production and consumption have \r implications for a low-carbon development, and many of these patterns can act as barriers or opportunities towards sustainable \r development. Trade policies, international economic issues and international financial flows can positively support the speed and \r [...]"


id: cd7f2478e8269a73413fb4d67a66787
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33485
content:
"[...] scale of the transition; alternatively, they can have negative impacts on policies that may inhibit the process. Nonetheless, contextual \r factors are a fundamental part of the change process, and institutions and their governance systems provide pathways that can \r influence contextual realities on the ground. For instance, politically vested interests may lead powerful lobby groups or coalition \r networks to influence the direction of the transition, or they could put pressure on a given political elite through the imposition of \r regulatory standards, taxation, incentives and policies that may speed or delay the transition process. Civil-society institutions, such \r as NGOs or research centres, can act as effective governance 'watchdogs' in the transition process, particularly when they exercise \r a challenge function and question government actions in respect of transitions related to sustainable development."


id: 88f612934c780318d7f6622d5885baad
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21260
content:
"[...] particulate matter or formed within the atmosphere from gaseous \r precursors (secondary production). Aerosols may be composed of \r sea salt, organic carbon, black carbon (BC), mineral species (mainly \r desert dust), sulphate, nitrate and ammonium or their mixtures. See \r also Short-lived climate forcers (SLCFs)."


id: 7d76271874a20c0ed3206b4618a47662
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19242
content:
"Developed/developing countries (Industrialised/developed/\r developing countries) There is a  diversity of approaches for \r categorising countries on the basis of their level of development, \r and for defining terms such as 'industrialised', 'developed', or \r 'developing'. Several categorisations are used in this report: (i) In \r the United Nations (UN) system, there is no established convention \r for the designation of developed and developing countries or areas. \r (ii) The UN Statistics Division specifies developed and developing \r regions based on common practice. In addition, specific countries \r are designated as least developed countries, landlocked developing \r countries, Small Island Developing States (SIDS), and transition \r economies. Many countries appear in more than one of these \r categories. (iii) The World Bank uses income as the main criterion for \r classifying countries as low, lower middle, upper middle, and high \r [...]"


id: e88100dc5931d9f58bb81a22606ea2be
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38241
content:
"[...] income. (iv) The UN Development Programme (UNDP) aggregates \r indicators for life expectancy, educational attainment, and income \r into a single composite Human Development Index (HDI) to classify \r countries as low, medium, high, or very high human development."


id: 4f7f18a3aa12a688a1d4e5fac62e2cb8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11271
content:
"Greenhouse gas emission metric A simplified relationship used \r to quantify the effect of emitting a unit mass of a given greenhouse \r gas (GHG) on a specified key measure of climate change. A relative \r GHG emission metric expresses the effect from one gas relative to \r the effect of emitting a unit mass of a reference GHG on the same \r measure of climate change. There are multiple emission metrics, \r and the most appropriate metric depends on the application. GHG \r emission metrics may differ with respect to: (i) the key measure of \r climate change they consider; (ii) whether they consider climate \r outcomes for a specified point in time or integrated over a specified \r time horizon; (iii) the time horizon over which the metric is applied; \r (iv) whether they apply to a  single emission pulse, emissions \r sustained over a period of time, or a combination of both; and (v) \r whether they consider the climate effect from an emission compared \r [...]"


id: 7a01be794d4177cb1e210808927505a9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18663
content:
"[...] to the absence of that emission or compared to a reference emissions \r level or climate state."


id: 82df5a75ac594d08361b52033b0ceaa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20155
content:
"[...] been used to estimate the social cost of carbon. See also Integrated \r Assessment Scenario Ensemble."


id: 184338c671ef14e85aae434f7aaa6591
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1472
content:
"Just transitions A set of principles, processes and practices that \r aim to ensure that no people, workers, places, sectors, countries or \r regions are left behind in the transition from a high-carbon to a low\u0002carbon economy. It stresses the need for targeted and proactive \r measures from governments, agencies, and authorities to ensure that \r any negative social, environmental or economic impacts of economy\u0002wide transitions are minimised, whilst benefits are maximised for \r those disproportionally affected. Key principles of just transitions \r include: respect and dignity for vulnerable groups; fairness in energy \r access and use, social dialogue and democratic consultation with \r relevant stakeholders; the creation of decent jobs; social protection; \r and rights at work. Just transitions could include fairness in energy, \r land use and climate planning and decision-making processes; \r economic diversification based on low-carbon investments; realistic \r [...]"


id: 532607e9fddbff456ba128b17e5d64bb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11899
content:
"[...] training/retraining programmes that lead to decent work; gender\u0002specific policies that promote equitable outcomes; the fostering \r of international cooperation and coordinated multilateral actions; \r and the eradication of poverty. Lastly, just transitions may embody \r the redressing of past harms and perceived injustices (ILO 2015; \r UNFCCC 2016)."


id: 2cc34cee25f2c46b1ab7cf568b9122d3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5141
content:
"lifetimes (from hours to about two decades) but characterised by \r different physiochemical properties and environmental effects. Their \r emission or formation has a  significant effect on radiative forcing \r over a period determined by their respective atmospheric lifetimes. \r Changes in their emissions can also induce long-term climate effects \r via, in particular, their interactions with some biogeochemical cycles. \r SLCFs are classified as direct or indirect, with direct SLCFs exerting \r climate effects through their radiative forcing and indirect SLCFs being \r the precursors of other direct climate forcers. Direct SLCFs include \r methane (CH4 ), ozone (O3 ), primary aerosols and some halogenated \r species. Indirect SLCFs are precursors of ozone or secondary aerosols. \r SLCFs can be cooling or warming through interactions with radiation \r and clouds. They are also referred to as near-term climate forcers. \r Many SLCFs are also air pollutants. A subset of exclusively warming \r [...]"


id: d39e8ce5b6608030ea370046b7c96994
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34565
content:
"[...] SLCFs is also referred to as short-lived climate pollutants (SLCPs), \r including methane, ozone, and black carbon (BC)."


id: 877321a80e34511e9bec05dd55638437
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20988
content:
"Urban The categorisation of areas as 'urban' by government \r statistical departments is generally based either on population \r size, population density, economic base, provision of services, or \r some combination of the above. Urban systems are networks and \r nodes of intensive interaction and exchange including capital, \r culture, and material objects. Urban areas exist on a continuum with \r rural areas and tend to exhibit higher levels of complexity, higher \r populations and population density, intensity of capital investment, \r and a preponderance of secondary (processing) and tertiary (service) \r sector industries. The extent and intensity of these features varies \r significantly within and between urban areas. Urban places and \r systems are open with much movement and exchange between \r more rural areas as well as other urban regions. Urban areas can \r be globally interconnected facilitating rapid flows between them - \r [...]"


id: 8520602b228d02cb04f62c0d4990ea2b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20564
content:
"[...] of capital investment, of ideas and culture, human migration, and \r disease. See also Cities, Peri-urban areas, and Urbanisation."


id: 3a1f070634c8d8c1a92984c869020a88
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7435
content:
"Across this report, a number of different metrics to characterise cost \r of climate change mitigation are employed. To facilitate a meaningful \r economic comparison across diverse options at the technology level, \r the metric of 'levelised costs' is used throughout several chapters of \r this report in various forms. The most used metrics are the levelised \r cost of energy (LCOE), the levelised cost of conserved energy (LCCE), \r and the levelised cost of conserved carbon (LCCC). These metrics are \r used throughout the AR6 WGIII to provide a benchmark for comparing \r different technologies or practices of achieving the respective output. \r Each comes with a set of context-specific caveats that need to be \r taken into account for correct interpretation. Various literature \r sources caution against drawing too strong conclusions from these \r metrics. Annex II in AR5, namely Section A.II.3.1, includes a detailed \r discussion on interpretations and caveats. Below is an introduction to \r [...]"


id: 8b39490fbc7ad3404e0d4c6898edcbb9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21657
content:
"Wherever emissions, removals and mitigation potentials are \r expressed as CO2-eq in this report, efforts have been made to \r recalculate those values consistently in terms of GWP100 values from \r AR6 WGI. However, in some cases it was not possible or feasible to \r disentangle conclusions from the existing literature into individual \r gases and then re-aggregate those emissions using updated GWP100 \r values. The existing literature assessed by WGIII uses a range of \r GWP100 values from previous IPCC reports; for CH4, these values \r vary between 21 (based on the IPCC Second Assessment Report) \r to 28 or even 34 (based on the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report and \r depending on whether the study included or excluded climate-carbon \r cycle feedbacks). Consistent application of any metric is challenging \r as individual GHG emission species are not always provided in the \r literature assessed by WGIII. Where a full recalculation of CO2-eq \r [...]"


id: 6b2d2ea5ec1e0667573e4d63f2e4e056
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16154
content:
"[...] emissions or mitigation potentials into GWP100 AR6 values was not \r possible or feasible, and especially if non-CO2 emissions constitute \r only a minor fraction of total emissions or abatement, individual \r chapters note this inconsistency and provide an indication of the \r potential magnitude of inconsistency."


id: e8339637a65dad0e2b23209cb5c585bc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38181
content:
"In order to estimate the indirect emissions of sectors and subsectors, \r the CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion dataset of the International \r Energy Agency (IEA 2020a) is used. This database reports direct and \r indirect CO2 emissions for IEA sectors, which are related to the IPCC \r (IPCC 2019) classification of emissions sources. The IEA adopted \r a new methodology in 2020 that is in line with the methodology used \r in Annex II of the WGIII contribution to AR5 (Krey et al. 2014), namely \r Section A.II.4. The IEA now estimates individual electricity and heat \r specific emission factors and allocates indirect emissions related \r to electricity and heat in the sectors where these forms of energy \r are used respectively (IEA 2020b). In order to estimate the share of \r energy input that results in the production of heat from the share that \r results in the production of electricity in Combined heat and Power \r plants, the IEA fixes the efficiency for heat production equal to 90%, \r [...]"


id: e22ac62ca5a8ffa708732d378d5ac18a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37070
content:
"[...] which is the typical efficiency of a heat boiler and then allocates the \r remaining inputs to electricity production (IEA 2020b). "


id: 66e0fe7d668b3c0457c36198ff2c965d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15364
content:
"Adopting climate mitigation options can generate multiple positive \r (synergies) and negative (trade-offs) interactions with sustainable \r development. Understanding these are crucial for selecting \r mitigation options and policy choices that maximise the synergies, \r minimise trade-offs, and potentially offset trade-offs (Roy et  al. \r 2018). Chapter  5 in the IPCC's Special Report on Global Warming \r of 1.5degC examines the synergies and trade-offs of adaptation and \r mitigation measures with sustainable development and UN's \r Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Building on this, the sectoral \r chapters in the WGIII contribution to the AR6 include a qualitative \r assessment of the synergies and trade-offs between mitigation \r options in different sectors and the SDGs based on existing literature. \r All these assessments are collated and presented in Chapter  17 \r with a supplementary table including the details of the synergies \r [...]"


id: 8012522a7f64a7fb65b4af3b46b602fe
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19665
content:
"[...] and trade-offs with a line of sight (Section  17.3.3.7, Figure  17.1 \r and Supplementary Material Table  17.1). The assessment also \r recognises that interactions of mitigation options with the SDGs are "


id: d3a2f5cdfdce4304fade9c6ce1b1b03a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34569
content:
"One of the most basic aspects of a  modelling tool is how it \r approaches the system modelled from a  solution perspective. \r A broad interpretation of mathematical algorithm concepts classifies \r models as simulation and optimisation models. Simulation models\r are based on the evaluation of the dynamic behaviour of a system \r (Lund et al. 2017). They can be used to determine the performance of \r a system under alternative options of key parameters in a plausible \r manner. Most often, simulation models require comprehensive \r knowledge of each parameter, in order to choose a  specific path \r under several alternatives. On the other hand, optimisation models\r seek to maximise or minimise a  mathematical objective function \r under a set of constraints (Banos et al. 2011; Iqbal et al. 2014). Most \r often, the objective function represents the total cost or revenue of \r a  given system or the total welfare of a  given society. One major \r [...]"


id: a4c8bce7e8bb3c54013aeadd7cfd5168
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26219
content:
"[...] aspect of optimisation models is that the solution is achieved by \r simultaneously binding a  set of constraints, which can be used to \r represent real-life limitations on the system, such as: constraints \r on flows, resource and technology availability, labour and financial \r limitations, environmental aspects, and many other characteristics \r that the model may require (Fazlollahi et al. 2012; Pfenninger et al. \r 2014; Cedillos Alvarado et al. 2016). Specifically, when modelling \r climate mitigation responses, limiting carbon budgets is often used \r to represent future temperature level pathways (Rogelj et al. 2016; \r Millar et al. 2017; Peters 2018; Gidden et al. 2019)."


id: c38d2c47b8d5c345e9a22e974b5160cb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31681
content:
"Another major distinction among modelling tools is related to the \r solution methodology from a  temporal perspective. They can have \r a perfect foresight intertemporal assumption or a recursive-dynamic \r assumption. Intertemporal optimisation with perfect foresight is \r an optimisation method for achieving an overall optimal solution \r over time. It is based on perfect information on all future states of \r a system and assumptions (such as technology availability and prices) \r and, as such, today's and future decisions are made simultaneously, \r resulting in a single path of optimal actions that lead to the overall \r optimal solution (Keppo and Strubegger 2010; Gerbaulet et al. 2019). \r Such a modelling approach can present an optimal trajectory of the \r set of actions and policies that would lead to the overall first-best \r solution. However, real-life decisions are not always based on optimal \r solutions (Ellenbeck and Lilliestam 2019) and, therefore, solutions \r [...]"


id: 4c3217d88d32674f2293ec3b8da72a4c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10664
content:
"[...] from perfect foresight models can be challenging to be implemented \r by policymakers (Pindyck 2013, 2017). For instance, perfect foresight \r implies perfect knowledge of the future states of the system, such as \r future demand for goods and products and availability of production \r factors and technology."


id: 701b229987aaaf3a37256e9dca1bacb0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16973
content:
"Commonly climate mitigation models are referred to as bottom-up \r and top-down depending upon their degree of detail (van Vuuren \r et al. 2009). Generally, bottom-up approaches present more \r systematic individual technological details about a reduced number \r of mitigation strategies of a specific sector or sub-sector. These models \r tend to disregard relations between specific sectors/technologies and \r miss evaluating interactions with the whole system. On the other \r hand, top-down approaches present a more aggregated and global \r analysis, in detriment of less detailed technological heterogeneity. \r They tend to focus on interactions within the whole system, such as \r market and policy instrument interactions within the global economy \r systems. Studies using top-down models are more capable of \r representing economic structural change than adopting technology\u0002explicit decarbonisation strategies (van Vuuren et al. 2009; Kriegler \r [...]"


id: 4a7a4dc88fd6ab4fc16152e0ed11f411
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10345
content:
"[...] et al. 2015a). Integrated assessment models (IAMs) typically use \r a top-down approach to model sectoral mitigation strategies."


id: 1f74b3d441e302d836597d34671cd3bd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2741
content:
"itself, its utilisation, and end-life, either via reuse, recycling or \r final disposal (Rebitzer et al. 2004; Finnveden et al. 2009; Guinee \r et al. 2011; Curran 2013; Hellweg and Mila i Canals 2014). \r The  environmental impacts covered include all types of loads \r on  the environment through the extraction of natural resources \r and emission of hazardous substances. For this reason, LCA has \r the flexibility to evaluate an entire product system, hence avoiding \r sub-optimisation in a  single process and identifying the products \r and processes that result in the least environmental impact. Thus, \r it allows for the quantification of possible trade-offs between \r different environmental impacts (e.g.,  eliminating air emissions by \r increasing non-renewable energy resources) (Hawkins et al. 2013; \r Nordelof et al. 2014; Gibon et al. 2017) and/or from one stage to \r other (e.g.,  reuse or recycling a  product to bring it back in at the \r [...]"


id: 398b75d7caa994cfcaed79cf9491cd04
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7335
content:
"[...] raw material acquisition phase) (Hertwich and Hammitt 2001a,b). It \r gives a holistic view of complex systems and reduces the number of \r parameters for which decisions have to be taken, while not glossing \r over technical and economical details. In recent years, LCA has been \r widely used in both retrospective and prospective analysis of product \r chains in various climate mitigation fields, namely comparing existing \r energy technologies with planned alternatives (Cetinkaya et al. 2012; \r Portugal-Pereira et al. 2015), product innovation and development \r (Wender et al. 2014; Portugal-Pereira et al. 2015; Sharp and Miller \r 2016), certification schemes (Prussi et al. 2021), or supply chain \r management (Hagelaar 2001; Blass and Corbett 2018)."


id: 6dad70f60f36f4f66b131dd1d52f6116
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16554
content:
"time steps. Therefore, the solution path is a series of solutions in short \r trajectories that, ultimately, is very unlikely to achieve the overall \r optimal solution over the whole time period considered (Fuso Nerini \r et al. 2017). Nonetheless, the solution represents a set of possible and \r plausible policies and behavioural choices of the agents that could be \r taken in short-term cycles, without perfect information (Heuberger \r et al. 2018; Hanna and Gross 2020). In between, some models \r consider imperfect or adaptive expectations, where economic \r decisions are based on past, current and imperfectly anticipated \r future information (Keppo and Strubegger 2010; Kriegler et al. 2015a; \r Loffler et al. 2019). Modelling tools can also be differentiated by \r their level of representation of economic agents and sectors: they \r can have a  full representation of all agents of the economy and \r their interactions with each other (general equilibrium) or focus \r [...]"


id: 6bbf24754bc59a6fbfb3bbae9b655683
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16263
content:
"[...] on a more detailed representation of a subset of economic sectors \r and  agents (partial equilibrium) (Cheng et al. 2015; Babatunde \r et al. 2017; Hanes and Carpenter 2017; Sanchez et al. 2018; \r Guedes et al. 2019; Pastor et al. 2019) (Annex III.I.2)."


id: a01cd372839c26c5dfb068e833d9402
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25383
content:
"Modelling exercises vary considerably in terms of key characteristics, \r including geographical scales, time coverage, environmental \r variables, technologies portfolios, and socio-economic assumptions. \r A detailed comparison of key characteristics of global and national \r models used in this report is presented in Annex III.I.9. Geographical \r coverage ranges from sub-national (Cheng et al. 2015; Feijoo et al. \r 2018; Rajao et al. 2020), national (Li et al. 2019; Sugiyama et al. 2019; \r Vishwanathan et al. 2019; Schaeffer et al. 2020), regional (Vrontisi \r et al. 2016; Hanaoka and Masui 2020) and global (Gidden et al. \r 2018; Kriegler et al. 2018a; McCollum et al. 2018; Rogelj et al. 2019b; \r Drouet et al. 2021) models. Even models with the same geographical \r coverage can still be significantly different from each other, for \r instance, due to the number of regions within the model. Models \r can also have spatially implicit and explicit formulations, which in \r [...]"


id: eb124d924d1a85039f330f63f1afe7b5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38712
content:
"[...] turn can have different spatial resolution. This distinction is especially \r important for land-use models, which account for changes in land \r use and agricultural practices (Annex III.I.7: Land-use modelling). \r The time horizon, time steps and time resolution are major aspects \r that differ across models. Model horizon can range from short- to \r long-term, typically reaching from a few years to up until the end \r of the century (Fujimori et al. 2019b; Gidden et al. 2019; Rogelj \r et al. 2019a; Ringkjob et al. 2020). Time resolution is particularly \r relevant for specific applications, such as power sector models, which \r have detailed representation of power technologies dispatch and \r operation (Soria et al. 2016; Abujarad et al. 2017; Guan et al. 2020)."


id: 9a9e115d80987d2de792a20b89ac2390
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24442
content:
"The disaggregation of economic actors and sectors and the \r representation of their interaction differ across full-economy \r frameworks. A  main distinction is between models based on full \r Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) and aggregated growth approaches. \r On the one hand, SAM-based frameworks - CGE and macro\u0002econometric - follow a  multi-sectoral approach distinguishing \r from several to a hundred different economic sectors or production \r goods and represent sector-specific value-added, final consumption \r and interindustry intermediary consumption (Robinson 1989). \r They also represent economic agents (firms, households, public \r administration, etc.) with specific behaviours and budget constraints. \r On the other hand, macro-economic growth frameworks are reduced \r to a single macro-economic agent producing, consuming and investing \r a  single macroeconomic good without considering interindustry \r relationships. In some detailed process IAMs, the aggregated growth \r [...]"


id: 3bca9936acf4c07f0ae08c0ef02043b0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7706
content:
"[...] approach is combined with a detailed representation of energy supply \r and  demand systems that surmises different economic actors and \r subsectors. However, the energy system is driven by an aggregated \r growth engine (Bauer et al. 2008)."


id: f754c2414205b08ef542fa986fb8fe42
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40893
content:
"Several types of 'full-economy' frameworks are used in integrated \r assessment models. The general equilibrium framework - often \r referred to as Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) - represents the \r economic interdependencies between multiple sectors and agents, \r and the interaction between supply and demand on multiple markets \r (Robinson et al. 1999). It captures the full circularity of economic \r flows through income and demand relationships and feedbacks \r including the overall balance of payments. Most CGE approaches \r used are neoclassical supply-led models with market clearing \r based on price adjustment. Representative agents usually minimise \r production costs or maximise utility under given production and \r utility function, although optimal behaviours are not a precondition \r per se. Most CGE models also include assumptions of perfect markets \r with full employment of factors although market imperfections and \r [...]"


id: 5f92bc36d85ce38d48f3a9c612bbc262
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14120
content:
"[...] underemployment of factors (e.g., unemployment) can be assumed \r (Babiker and Eckaus 2007; Guivarch et al. 2011). CGE frameworks can \r either be static or dynamic and represent pathways as a sequence of \r equilibria in the second case."


id: 1a6918a845277bb073973ae5b202c09d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1847
content:
"In most models the treatment of economic growth follows Solow \r or Ramsey growth approach based on the evolution through time \r of production factors, endowment and productivity. Classically, \r labour endowment and demography are exogenous, and capital \r accumulates through investment. Partial equilibrium frameworks do \r not model economic growth but use exogenous growth assumptions \r derived from growth models. Factors' productivity evolution \r is assumed exogenous in most cases that is, general technical \r progress is assumed to be an autonomous process. A few models \r feature endogenous growth aspects where factor productivity \r increases with cumulated macroeconomic investment. Models \r also differ in the content of technical progress and alternatively \r consider unbiased total factor productivity improvement or \r labour-specific factor-augmenting productivity. In multi-sectoral \r macroeconomic models, economic growth comes with endogenous \r [...]"


id: 46ea13cb8edadab15e071f6a35c922c6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9678
content:
"[...] changes of the sectoral composition of GDP known as structural \r change. Structural change results from the interplay between \r differentiated changes of productivity between sectors and of \r the structure of final demand as income grows (Herrendorf et al. \r 2014). If general technical progress is mostly assumed exogenous \r and autonomous at an aggregated level, innovation in relation \r to energy demand and technical systems follow more detailed \r specifications in models. Energy efficiency can be assumed an \r autonomous process at different levels - macroeconomic, sector \r or technology - or energy technical change can be endogenous "


id: 15bf2e46557476b8408a678317b1f3c7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1046
content:
"Multi-regional models consider interactions between regions through \r trade in energy goods, non-energy goods and services - depending on \r model scope - and emission permits in the context of climate policy. \r For each type of goods, trade is usually represented as a  common \r pool where regions interact with the pool through supply (exports) or \r demand (imports). A few models consider bilateral trade flows between \r regions. Traded goods can be assumed as perfectly substitutable \r between regions of origin (Heckscher-Ohlin assumption), such as is \r often the case for energy commodities, or as imperfectly substitutable \r (e.g., Armington goods) for non-energy goods. The representation of \r trade and capital imbalances at the regional level and their evolution \r through time vary across models and imbalances are either not \r considered (regional current accounts are balanced at each point in \r time), or a constraint for intertemporal balance is included (an export \r [...]"


id: 9f3e1b298004a9fefbe47bda1a2b0203
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25239
content:
"[...] surplus today will be balanced by an import surplus in the future), \r or else trade imbalances follow other rules such as a  convergence \r towards zero in the long run (Foure et al. 2020)."


id: d57b57a5cf04526ecf9e91c4430856e6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34874
content:
"where  is the consumption discount rate (also known as the social \r discount rate),  is the utility discount rate (also known as the \r pure time discount rate, or time preferences rate) which is a value \r judgement that determines the present value of a  change in the \r utility experienced in the future and hence it is an ethical parameter, \r gg! is the growth rate of consumption per capita over time, and  is \r the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption, which is also a value \r judgement and hence an ethical parameter. The parameter  is also \r a  measure of risk aversion and of society's aversion to inequality \r within and across generations. The pure time preference rate is an \r exogenous parameter, but the social discount rate is endogenously \r computed by the model itself and depends on the growth rate \r of consumption per capita over time. Note that more complex \r frameworks disentangle inequality aversion from risk aversion, and \r [...]"


id: bd12721b4178695e9fc74c2365360e07
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30514
content:
"[...] introduce uncertainty, leading to extensions of the social discount \r rate equation (see, for instance, Gollier 2013)."


id: e90219fccc48544b84299a188dc333fe
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38346
content:
"Furthermore, advanced modelling tools have been developed for the \r purpose of providing estimations of system-wide inertial frequency \r response that would assist system operators in maintaining adequate \r system inertia (Sharma et al. 2011; Teng and Strbac 2017). These \r innovative models also provide fundamental evidence regarding \r the role and value of advanced technologies and control systems in \r supporting cost-effective operation of future electricity systems \r with very high penetration of renewable generation. In particular, \r the importance of enhancing the control capabilities of renewable \r generation and applying flexible technologies, such as energy \r storage (Hall and Bain 2008; Obi et al. 2017; Arbabzadeh et al. 2019), \r demand-side response, interconnection (Aghajani et al. 2017) and \r transmission grid extensions (Schaber et al. 2012) to provide system \r stability control, is demonstrated through novel system integration \r [...]"


id: 57081baf14c71fce335a423b1f0d5d89
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12564
content:
"Outside social discounting for intertemporal optimisation, \r discounting is used in simulation models to compute the life cycle \r costs of investment decisions (e.g., energy efficiency choices, choices \r between different types of technologies based on their levelised \r costs). In this case, the discount rate can be interpreted as the \r cost of capital faced by investors. The cost of capital influences the \r merit order of technologies and lower capital cost favours capital\u0002intensive technologies over technologies with higher variable costs. \r Models can reflect regional, sectoral or technology-specific cost of \r capital - through heterogeneous discount rates for life cycle cost \r estimates in simulation models (Iyer et al. 2015) or as hurdle rates \r in energy optimisation models (Ameli et al. 2021). In some cases, \r simulation models may also produce mitigation pathways following \r the Hotelling principle and assuming that the carbon price rises at the \r [...]"


id: 3e0c437285277fc15fa1e2a061896e48
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8084
content:
"[...] social discount rate (e.g., Global Change Assessment Model (GCAM) \r scenarios in the Shared Socio-economic Pathways (SSP) study with \r carbon prices increasing at 5% yearly (Guivarch and Rogelj 2017))."


id: 225bc9f08eab04e6ac43a1881f366383
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3264
content:
"A novel modelling framework is proposed to deliver inertia and \r support primary frequency control through variable-speed wind \r turbines (Morren et al. 2006) and PVs (Waffenschmidt and Hui 2016; \r Liu et al. 2017), including quantification of the value of this technology \r in future renewable generation-dominated power grids (Chu et al. \r 2020). Advanced models for controlling distributed energy storage \r systems to provide an effective virtual inertia have been developed, \r demonstrating the provision of virtual synchronous machine \r capabilities for storage devices with power electronic converters, \r which can support system frequency management following \r disturbances (Hammad et al. 2019; Markovic et al. 2019). Regarding \r the application of interconnection for exchange of balancing services \r between neighbouring power grids, alternative control schemes for \r high-voltage direct current (HVDC) converters have been proposed, \r [...]"


id: d789f49fb0ed0171609d8d32765c757b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35226
content:
"[...] in order to demonstrate that this would reduce the cost of balancing \r (Tosatto et al. 2020)."


id: 4b02de52a81a8e1e4ab30264facc4734
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10438
content:
"GHG emissions from buildings are usually modelled on the basis of \r the estimated energy demand per energy carrier and appropriate \r emissions factors. The purpose of most building models is to assess \r the impact of mitigation measures on energy demand in the use phase \r of buildings and for a given assumption on the per-capita floor area \r and technological improvement (IEA 2021; Pauliuk et al. 2021b). After \r decades of ignoring material cycles and embodied emissions (Pauliuk \r et al. 2017), a few IAMs are now including material stocks and flows \r (Deetman et al. 2020; IEA 2021; Zhong et al. 2021). However, the \r top-down nature of these models and the modelling methodology of \r embodied emissions, which are added onto the emissions estimated \r in the use phase, questions the policy relevance of these estimates. As \r of today, the resource efficiency and climate change (RECC) scenario \r (IRP 2020; Fishman et al. 2021; Pauliuk and Heeren 2021; Pauliuk et al. \r [...]"


id: fd4934e7b9df6a0286c7978b86b9f283
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41915
content:
"[...] 2021b; ) is the only global scenario identified which includes measures \r to limit, in the first place, embodied emissions from buildings. The \r scenario is modelled using the bottom-up ODYM-RECC model."


id: fe9dc5742afce27fdff14d21145d708f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42176
content:
"how much movement occurs, or the travel demand associated \r with each mode. Models commonly quantify demand through \r transportation mode (e.g.,  active transit, passenger vehicles, \r trucks, boats, planes, etc.) or how movement occurs (e.g., passenger \r travel distance pkm and freight distance tkm). Higher fidelity models \r provide more nuanced breakdowns of demand by trips of various \r lengths such as short-, medium-, and long-distance trips or by \r region (e.g., kilometres or tkm per region). The scope of the model \r often determines how much information it provides on where and \r when movement occurs. While larger scale models typically provide \r aggregate travel demand, higher resolution travel demand models \r can be integrated into transportation system models and provide \r much more information on origin and destination of trips, when and \r where trips occur, and the route of travel taken. This level of detail \r [...]"


id: a1366a95e64d94b052e565db7ba55deb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25585
content:
"[...] is not often characterised in the output of system models but can be \r employed as a 'base' model to determine how travel occurs before \r aggregation (Edelenbosch et al. 2017a; Yeh et al. 2017)."


id: eddebfaeb448816bc4116649116f0d3c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39217
content:
"IAMs (Krey et al. 2016; Edelenbosch et al. 2017a) are typically \r global  in scope and seek to solve for feasible pathways meeting \r a  global temperature target (Annex III.I.9). This implies finding \r least-cost mitigation options within and across sectors. In contrast, \r global and national transport energy system models (GTEMs/NTEMs) \r typically only assess feasible pathways within the transport sector \r (Yeh et al. 2017). The range of feasible pathways can be determined \r through optimisation, simulation, accounting and exploratory \r methods, as outlined in Table 2. Some GTEMs are linked to an IAMs \r model (Krey et al. 2016; Edelenbosch et al. 2017a; Roelfsema et al. \r 2020). The key difference between IAMs and GTEMs or NTEMs is \r whether the transportation system is integrated with the rest of the \r energy systems, specifically regarding energy and fuel production and \r use, fuel prices, economic drivers such as GDP, and mitigation options \r [...]"


id: af01aa2fb1f7813ff6013cf3ca109797
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28035
content:
"[...] given a policy goal. IAMs can endogenously determine these factors \r because the transport sector is just one of many sectors captured by \r the IAM. While this gives IAMs certain advantages, IAMs sacrifice \r resolution and complexity for this broader scope. For example, \r most IAMs lack a sophisticated travel demand model that reflects \r the heterogeneity of demands and consumer preferences, whereas \r GTEM/NTEMs can incorporate greater levels of details regarding \r travel demands, consumer choices, and the details of transport \r policies. Consequently, what GTEMs/NTEMs lack in integration with \r other sectors they make up through more detailed analyses of travel \r patterns, policies, and impacts (Yeh et al. 2017)."


id: aa53533ce81a8c19be2c82cdeb6a8fda
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27196
content:
"Several noteworthy recent active research areas in long-term \r transportation energy systems modelling involves the consideration \r of infrastructure investment and consumer acceptance for non-fossil \r fuel vehicles including charging for electric vehicles (Jochem et al. \r 2019; Statharas et al. 2021) and refuelling stations for hydrogen \r vehicles (Rose and Neumann 2020); and the greater integration \r of the electric, transport, residential, and industrial sectors in fuel \r production, storage, and utilisation (Bellocchi et al. 2020; Lester et al. \r 2020; Olovsson et al. 2021; Rottoli et al. 2021). While national and \r regional transport energy models have the advantage of exploring \r these relationships in greater spatial, temporal, and policy details for \r specific countries or regions (Jochem et al. 2019; Bellocchi et al. 2020; \r Lester et al. 2020; Rottoli et al. 2021; Statharas et al. 2021), the IAMs \r have the advantage of examining these interactions across the entire \r [...]"


id: 28c09e12d5cc66587099d01e938b1523
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4384
content:
"LUMs represent different land use activities for managed land \r (agriculture including cropland and pastures, managed forests, and \r dedicated energy crops) while natural lands (primary forests, natural \r grasslands, shrubland, savannahs, etc.) act as land reserves that \r can be converted to management depending on other constraints \r (Popp et al. 2014a; Schmitz et al. 2014). Typically, the agricultural \r sector has the greatest level of detail across land use sectors. LUMs \r include different crop and livestock production activities, some even \r at the spatially explicit level and differentiated by production system \r (Havlik et al. 2014; Weindl et al. 2015). Forestry is covered with varying \r degrees of complexity across LUMs. While some models represent only \r afforestation/deforestation activities dynamically, others have detailed \r representation of forest management activities and/or forest industries \r (Lauri et al. 2017). The models endogenously determine the land \r [...]"


id: ced8127f2155c441e80ad272ebdfa9fe
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33733
content:
"[...] allocation of different land use activities as well as land-use changes \r according to different economic principles (land rent, substitution \r elasticities, etc.) and/or considering biophysical characteristics such as \r land suitability (Schmitz et al. 2014; Weindl et al. 2017)."


id: 78027256aec002997848063d8d1b1c85
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18324
content:
"Two broad categories of land-based mitigation options are represented \r in LUMs: (i) reduction of GHG (CO2, CH4 and N2O) emissions from \r land use, and (ii) carbon sink enhancement options including biomass \r supply for bioenergy. Each of these categories is underpinned by \r a portfolio of mitigation options with varying degrees of complexity \r and parameterisation across LUMs. The representation of mitigation \r measures is influenced on the one hand by the availability of data \r for its techno-economic characteristics and future prospects as well \r as the computational challenge, for example in terms of spatial and \r process detail, to represent the measure, and on the other hand, by \r structural differences and general focus of the different LUMs, and \r prioritisation of different mitigation options by the modelling teams. \r While GHG emission reduction and CO2 sequestration options such as \r afforestation are typically covered directly in LUMs (Hasegawa et al. \r [...]"


id: 999d247fd23983fef3b88504fa36f66
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24261
content:
"[...] 2021), carbon sequestration from biomass supplied for bioenergy \r with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) is usually not accounted for \r in LUMs but in the energy sector and hence is taken care of directly \r in the IAMs. Yet, LUMs provide estimates of available biomass for \r energy production and the impacts of its production."


id: 631c0dc24c75c62cd0c0e00336e73290
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14730
content:
"Agricultural non-CO2 emissions covered in LUMs include CH4 from \r enteric fermentation, manure management and cultivation of \r rice paddies, and N2O emissions from soils (fertiliser and manure \r application, crop residues) and manure management and are based \r on IPCC accounting guidelines (IPCC 2019a). For each of those \r sources, LUMs typically represent a (sub)set of technical, structural \r and demand-side mitigation options. Technical options refer to \r technologies such as anaerobic digesters, feed supplements or \r nitrogen inhibitors that are either explicitly represented (Frank et al. \r 2018) or implicitly via the use of marginal abatement cost curves \r (MACC) (Lucas et al. 2007; Beach et al. 2015; Harmsen et al. 2019). \r Emission savings from structural changes refer to more fundamental \r changes in the agricultural sector, for example through international \r trade, production system changes or reallocation and substitution \r [...]"


id: 2d6dd1d443752347b7130547eea60f21
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5280
content:
"[...] effects (Havlik et al. 2014). Demand-side options include dietary \r changes and reduction of food waste (Springmann et al. 2016; \r Creutzig et al. 2018; Ritchie et al. 2018; Frank et al. 2019; Mbow \r et al. 2019; Clark et al. 2020; Ivanova et al. 2020; Popp et al. 2010; \r Rosenzweig et al. 2020). For the forest sector, emission reduction \r options are mainly targeting CO2 from deforestation (Overmars et al. \r 2014; Hasegawa et al. 2017; Rochedo et al. 2018; Bos et al. 2020; \r Doelman et al. 2020; Eriksson 2020). Mitigation/restoration options \r for wetlands to reduce emissions from drained organic soils are \r typically not represented in LUMs (Humpenoder et al. 2020)."


id: c622530b35e81bcf0db8c9ad1c52d48f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32168
content:
"Typically, IAMs consider multi-level systems of global, regional, national \r and local constraints and balance equations for different categories \r such as emissions, material and energy flows, financial flows, and \r land availability that are solved simultaneously. Intertemporal IAMs \r can fully incorporate not only flow constraints that are satisfied in \r each period, but also stock constraints that are aggregated over time \r and require to balance activities over time. Changes of activities, for \r example induced by policies to reduce emissions, are connected to \r a  variety of balance equations and constraints and therefore such \r policies lead to system-wide changes that can be analysed with \r IAMs. Many IAMs also contain gridded components to capture, for \r example, land-use and climate change processes where the spatial \r distribution matters greatly for the dynamics of the system. Processes \r that operate on smaller spatial and temporal scales than resolved \r [...]"


id: 9acec5716811bb5d9a972659e05f8f93
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24479
content:
"[...] by IAMs, such as temporal variability of renewables, are included by \r parameterisation and statistical modelling approaches that capture \r the impact of these subscale processes on the system dynamics at \r the macro level (Pietzcker et al. 2017)."


id: e94072f993c1c6eb0fba568267fa8d39
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38396
content:
"Previous IPCC Assessment Reports relied either on the climate \r output from each individual IAM (IPCC 2000) or a more streamlined \r approach, where one consistent emulator set-up was used to assess \r all scenarios. For instance, in AR5 and the Special Report on Global \r Warming of 1.5degC (SR1.5), MAGICC was used for scenario classification \r (Clarke et al. 2014; Rogelj et al. 2018a). In recent years, numerous \r other emulators have been developed and increased confidence \r and understanding can thus be gained by combining insights from \r more than one emulator. For example, SR1.5 used MAGICC for its \r scenario classification, with additional insights provided by the FaIR \r model (Smith et al. 2018). The SR1.5 experience highlighted that \r the veracity of emulators 'is a  substantial knowledge gap in the \r overall assessment of pathways and their temperature thresholds' \r (Rogelj et al. 2018a). Since SR1.5, international research efforts have \r [...]"


id: f512109c5c5b7df7df94f81cdefc2661
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40480
content:
"[...] demonstrated tractable ways to compare emulator performance \r (Nicholls et al. 2020b), as well as their ability to accurately represent \r a  set of uncertainty ranges in physical parameters (Nicholls et al. \r 2021b), such as those reported by AR6 WGI (Forster et al. 2021)."


id: d7db58c97de7eedaf161fb152c06164f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35283
content:
"IAMs include a variety of model types that can be distinguished into \r two broad classes (Weyant 2017). The first class comprises cost\u0002benefit IAMs that fully integrate a  stylised socio-economic model \r with a  reduced-form climate model to simultaneously account for \r the costs of mitigation and the damages of global warming using \r highly aggregate cost functions derived from more detailed models. \r In the model context, these functions do not explicitly represent the \r underlying processes, but map mitigation efforts and temperature to \r costs. This closed-loop approach between climate and socio-economic \r systems enables cost-benefit analysis by balancing the cost of \r mitigation and the benefits of avoided climate damages. This can be \r done in a globally cooperative setting to derive the globally optimal \r climate policy where no region can further improve its welfare without \r reducing the welfare of another region (Pareto optimum). Alternatively, \r [...]"


id: f073bd9d706899c99ab9784c7c101190
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39683
content:
"[...] it can be assumed that nations do not engage in emission mitigation at \r all or mitigate in a non-cooperative way, only considering the marginal \r benefit of their own action (Nash equilibrium). Also, differing degrees \r of partial cooperation are possible."


id: 5935f7727d9f7669543560944963bb6c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12937
content:
"Typically, IAMs comprise a  model of energy flows, emissions and \r the associated costs (Krey 2014). The demand for exploring the \r Paris Agreement climate goals led to model developments to make \r the challenges and opportunities of the associated transformation \r pathways more transparent. Since AR5 much progress has been \r achieved to improve the representation of mitigation options in the \r energy supply sector (e.g., renewable energy integration (Pietzcker \r et al. 2017), energy trade (Bauer et al. 2016; McCollum et al. 2016; \r Bauer et al. 2017; Jewell et al. 2018), capacity inertia, carbon \r removals, and decarbonisation bottlenecks (Luderer et al. 2018)) and \r technological and behavioural change measures in energy demand \r sectors such as transport (van Sluisveld et al. 2016; Edelenbosch et al. \r 2017a; McCollum et al. 2017). An energy sector model can be run as \r a partial equilibrium model using exogenous demand drivers for final \r [...]"


id: cbd6a43a444540460894c787e95ec736
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33186
content:
"[...] energy and energy services. These models derive mitigation policy \r costs in terms of additional energy sector costs and area under the \r marginal abatement costs curve."


