# document

id: 5b7ebf3691f81c8c4ffe9fec7099094a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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"Figure  4.3 shows an increasing share of renewable electricity in \r\nmost countries historically, with further increases projected in many \r\ndecarbonisation pathways. Targets for very high shares of renewable \r\nelectricity generation - up to 100% - are shown for a number of \r\ncountries, with the global share projected to range from 60% to \r\n70% for 1.5degC with no overshoot (C0) to below 2degC (C4) scenarios. \r\nCountries and states that have set 100% renewables targets include \r\nScotland for 2020 (Scottish Government 2021), Austria (2030), \r\nDenmark (2035) and California (2045) (Figure 4.3)."


id: c5a81f9334e4216336b294da70b7d2f6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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"Fourth, CCS and CDR are part of many of the national studies reviewed \r\n(Ashina et al. 2012; Massetti 2012; Jiang et al. 2013; Thepkhun \r\net al. 2013; Herreras Martinez et al. 2015; van der Zwaan et al. \r\n2016; Chilvers et al. 2017; Solano Rodriguez et al. 2017; Xunzhang \r\net al. 2017; Kuramochi et al. 2018; Mittal et al. 2018; Oshiro et al. \r\n2018; Roberts et al. 2018b; Vishwanathan et al. 2018b; Kato and \r\nKurosawa 2019). CCS helps reduce gross emissions but does not \r\nremove CO2 from the atmosphere, unless combined with bioenergy \r\n(BECCS). CO2 removal from sources with no identified mitigation \r\nmeasures is considered necessary to help achieve economy-wide \r\nnet negative emissions (Massetti 2012; Deetman et al. 2013; Solano \r\nRodriguez et al. 2017)."


id: 26516b99385a8b1d7f85185b520efaf9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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"While 100% renewable electricity generation by 2050 is found \r\nto be feasible, it is not without issues. For example, (Jacobson \r\net al. 2017, 2019) find it feasible for 143 countries with only a 9% \r\naverage increase in economic costs (considering all social costs) if \r\nannual electricity demand can be reduced by 57%. Others state that \r\nchallenges exist with speed of expansion, ensuring sufficient supply \r\nat all times or higher costs compared to other alternatives (Clack \r\net al. 2017). In-depth discussion of net zero electricity systems can be \r\nfound in Section 6.6."


id: 69a5348ab69acc6269e54fb53f2c682b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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content_type: text
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vector_id: 15855
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"In South Africa, it is found that long-term mitigation goals could be achieved with accelerated adoption of solar PV and wind \r\ngeneration, if the electricity sector decarbonises by phasing-out coal entirely by 2050, even if CCS is not feasible before 2025 (Altieri \r\net al. 2015; Beck et al. 2013). Abundant solar PV and wind potential, coupled with land availability suggest that more than 75% of \r\npower generation could ultimately originate from solar PV and wind (Oyewo et al. 2019; Wright et al. 2019)."


id: 1ddbdbe4c830e578d01cf7f082bc8b9a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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"For the US, share of renewables in power generation in 2050 in accelerated mitigation scenarios vary widely, 40% in (Hodson et al. \r\n2018; Jayadev et al. 2020), more than half renewable and nuclear in (Victor et al. 2018) to 100% in Jacobson et al. (2017, 2019)."


id: 35666825c5a5ad4b9989ad22415ce58e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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"Under cost optimisation scenarios for Brazil, electricity generation, which is currently dominated by hydropower, could reach 100% \r\nby adding biomass (Koberle et al. 2020). Other studies find that renewable energy, including biomass, could account for more than \r\n30% of total electricity generation (Nogueira de Oliveira et al. 2016; Portugal-Pereira et al. 2016)."


id: 3e231cf08d6f3b57f6d70d97ca836487
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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"In Colombia, where hydropower resources are abundant and potential also exist for solar and wind, a deep decarbonisation pathway \r\nwould require 57% renewable power generation by 2050 (Arango-Aramburo et al. 2019) while others find 80% would be possible \r\n(Delgado et al. 2020)."


id: 4e485bfab33d529baceaa6df487bcb1a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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"In Asia, Japan could have up to 50% variable renewable electricity supply to reduce CO2 emissions by 80% by 2050 in some of \r\nits deep mitigation scenarios ( Kato and Kurosawa 2019; Sugiyama et al. 2019; Ju et al. 2021; Shiraki et al. 2021; Silva Herran and \r\nFujimori 2021). One view of China's 1.5degC pathway includes 59% renewable power generation by 2050 (Jiang et al. 2018). One view \r\nof India's 1.5degC pathway also includes 52% renewable power generation, and would require storage needs for 35% of generation \r\n(Parikh et al. 2018)."


id: dcd81fe14ed1b46aa72f4ad652e018d0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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"Figure 4.3 | Historical and projected levels and targets for the share of renewables in electricity generation. Sources: IEA energy balances for past trends, IPCC \r\nAR6 scenario dataset including national model and regional versions in global models (10th to 90th percentile of 1.5degC with no overshoot (C0) to below 2degC (C4) scenarios), \r\nnational/regional sources."


id: 4416e8de0230da350eaa86f19a518dc5
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"pathways (Capros et al. 2019) but evidence on cost-effectiveness is \r\nscarce and uncertain (European Commission 2013). For France and \r\nSweden, (Millot et al. 2020) include CCS and BECCS to meet net zero \r\nGHG emissions by 2050. For Italy, (Massetti 2012) propose a zero\u0002emission electricity scenario with a combination of renewable and \r\ncoal, natural gas, and BECCS."


id: 4d91181f8dec17fd149d35b9ae584fde
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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"Bioenergy could account for up to 40% of Brazil's total final energy \r\nconsumption, and a  60% share of fuel for light-duty vehicles by \r\n2030 (Lefevre et al. 2018), and is considered most cost-effective \r\nin transport and industrial applications (Lap et al. 2020). BECCS in \r\nthe power sector is also considered cost-effective option for supply\u0002side mitigation (Borba et al. 2012; Herreras Martinez et al. 2015; \r\nLucena et al. 2016)."


id: ee8f9bf70e816a99811168de24cb72a2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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"In China, an analysis concluded that CCS is necessary for remaining \r\ncoal and natural gas generation out to 2050 (Jiang et al. 2018; Energy \r\nTransitions Commission and Rocky Mountain Institute 2019). Seven \r\nto 10 CCS projects with installed capacity of 15 GW by 2020 and \r\ntotal CCS investment of 105 billion RMB (2010 RMB) are projected \r\nto be needed by 2050 under a 2degC compatible pathway according to \r\n(Jiang et al. 2013, 2016; Lee et al. 2018). Under 1.5degC pathway, an \r\nanalysis found China would need full CCS coverage of the remaining \r\n12% of power generation from coal and gas power and 250 GW of \r\nBECCS (Jiang et al. 2018). Combined with expanded renewable and \r\nnuclear development, total estimated investment in this study is 5% \r\nof China's total GDP in 2020,  1.3% in 2030, and  0.6% in 2050 \r\n(Jiang et al. 2016)."


id: 4fa80027334bdb94badccc38ad26ea50
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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"Bioenergy also plays a prominent role in some EU countries' deep \r\ndecarbonisation strategies. Domestic biomass alone can help \r\nGermany meet its 95% CO2 reduction by 2050 goal, and biomass \r\nand CCS together are needed to reduce CO2 by 80% by 2050 in the \r\nNetherlands (Mikova et al. 2019). Studies suggest that mitigation \r\nefforts in France include biofuels and significant increases in biomass \r\nuse, including up to 45% of industry energy by 2050 for its net GHG \r\nneutrality goal (Doumax-Tagliavini and Sarasa 2018; Capros et al. \r\n2019). Increased imports may be needed to meet significant increases \r\nin EU's bioenergy use, which could affect energy security and the \r\nsustainability of bioenergy production outside of the EU (Mandley \r\net al. 2020; Daioglou et al. 2020)."


id: 9a0ec19808332ce559258edc600317bf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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"Views regarding feasibility of CCS can vary greatly for the same \r\ncountry. In the case of India's electricity sector for instance, some \r\nstudies indicate that CCS would be necessary (Vishwanathan et al. \r\n2018a), while others do not - citing concerns around its feasibility \r\ndue to limited potential sites and issues related to socio-political \r\nacceptance  - and rather point to very ambitious increase in \r\nrenewable energy, which in turn could pose significant challenges \r\nin systematically integrating renewable energy into the current \r\nenergy systems (Viebahn et al. 2014; Mathur and Shekhar 2020). \r\nSome limitations of CCS, including uncertain costs, lifecycle and net \r\nemissions, other biophysical resource needs, and social acceptance \r\nare acknowledged in existing studies (Viebahn et al. 2014; Jacobson \r\n2019; Mathur and Shekhar 2020; Sekera and Lichtenberger 2020)."


id: f82d509994e340f98207292d55570621
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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"While BECCS is needed in multiple accelerated mitigation pathways, \r\nlarge-scale land-based biological CDR may not prove as effective as \r\nexpected, and its large-scale deployment may result in ecological \r\nand social impacts, suggesting it may not be a viable carbon removal \r\nstrategy in the next 10-20 years (Vaughan and Gough 2016; Boysen \r\net al. 2017; Dooley and Kartha 2018). The effectiveness of BECCS \r\ncould depend on local contexts, choice of biomass, fate of initial \r\naboveground biomass and fossil-fuel emissions offsets  - carbon \r\nremoved through BECCS could be offset by losses due to land-use \r\nchange (Harper et al. 2018; Butnar et al. 2020; Calvin et al. 2021). \r\nLarge-scale BECCS may push planetary boundaries for freshwater use, \r\nexacerbate land-system change, significantly alter biosphere integrity \r\nand biogeochemical flows (Heck et al. 2018; Fuhrman et al. 2020; \r\nStenzel et al. 2021; Ai et al. 2021). (Sections 7.4 and 12.5)"


id: 90852c7f90636b760f4eefb96c74abc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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"While national mitigation portfolios aiming at net zero emissions \r\nor lower will need to include some level of CDR, the choice of \r\nmethods and the scale and timing of their deployment will depend \r\non the ambition for gross emission reductions, how sustainability and \r\nfeasibility constraints are managed, and how political preferences \r\nand social acceptability evolve (Cross-Chapter Box 8). Furthermore, \r\nmitigation deterrence may create further uncertainty, as anticipated \r\nfuture CDR could dilute incentives to reduce emissions now (Grant \r\net al. 2021), and the political economy of net negative emissions has \r\nimplications for equity (Mohan et al. 2021)."


id: 8ad33c944e48c540b1ee9460b550023e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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"CCS is present in many accelerated mitigation scenarios in the \r\nliterature. In Brazil, (Nogueira de Oliveira et al. 2016) consider \r\nBECCS and CCS in hydrogen generation more feasible than CCS in \r\nthermal power plants, with costs ranging from USD70-100 per tCO2. \r\nOverall, (van der Zwaan et al. 2016) estimate that 33-50% of total \r\nelectricity generation in Latin America could be ultimately covered \r\nby CCS. In Japan, CCS and increased bioenergy adoption plus waste\u0002to-energy and hydrogen-reforming from fossil fuel are all considered \r\nnecessary in the power sector in existing studies, with potential up \r\nto 200 MtCO2 yr-1 (Ashina et al. 2012; Oshiro et al. 2017a; Kato \r\nand Kurosawa 2019; Sugiyama et al. 2021). In parts of the EU, \r\nafter 2030, CCS could become profitable with rising CO2 prices \r\n(Schiffer 2015). CDR is seen as necessary in some net GHG neutrality "


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"Nuclear power generation is developed in many countries, though \r\nlarger-scale national nuclear generation does not tend to associate \r\nwith significantly lower carbon emissions (Sovacool et al. 2020). \r\nUnlike other energy sources such as wind and PV solar, levelised \r\ncosts of nuclear power has been rising in the last decades (Grubler \r\n2010; Gilbert et al. 2017; Portugal-Pereira et al. 2018). This is mainly \r\ndue to overrun of overnight construction costs related to delays in "


id: e9e404ffd5f9f948e98d2e74ac7da67d
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"(Birmingham Energy Institute 2018). Current technology pathways are \r\nnot sufficient to deliver universal access to cooling or meet the 2030 \r\ntargets under the SDGs, but energy efficiency, including in equipment \r\nefficiency like air conditioners, can reduce this demand and help limit \r\nadditional emissions that would further exacerbate climate change \r\n(Biardeau et al. 2020; Dreyfus et al. 2020; UNEP and IEA 2020). Some \r\ncountries (India, South Africa) have started to recognise the need for \r\nmore efficient equipment in their mitigation strategies (Altieri et al. \r\n2016; Ouedraogo 2017; Paladugula et al. 2018)."


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"project approvals and construction, and more stringent passive \r\nsafety measures, which increases the complexity of systems. After \r\nthe Fukushima Daiichi accident in Japan, nuclear programs in several \r\ncountries have been phased out or cancelled (Carrara 2020; Huenteler \r\net al. 2012; Kharecha and Sato 2019; Hoffman and Durlak 2018). \r\nAlso the compatibility of conventional prresurised water reactors and \r\nboiling water reactors with large proportion of renewable energy in \r\nthe grid it is yet to be fully understood."


id: c4c83e146076ced0e62405e7e349cb6e
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"Most accelerated mitigation pathway scenarios include significant \r\nincrease in building energy efficiency. Countries in cold regions, \r\nin particular, often focus more on building sector GHG emissions \r\nmitigation measures such as improving building envelopes and home \r\nappliances, and electrifying space heating and water heating."


id: a57f7e793df0a4fbaf2c1e6d877e9d46
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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"Radically more efficient use of energy than today, including electricity, \r\nis a complementary set of measures, explored in the following."


id: b4eea9cef6799cc662b715c68f8b790f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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"In warmer climate regions undergoing economic transitions, \r\nimproving the energy efficiency of cooling and refrigeration equipment \r\nis often important for managing peak electricity demand and can \r\nhave co-benefits for climate mitigation as well as SLCF reduction, as \r\nexpected in India, Africa, and Southeast Asia in the future."


id: 577519974e33db349bbac86a5e6f5955
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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"Air conditioner adoption is rising significantly in low- and middle\u0002income countries as incomes rise and average temperatures increase, \r\nincluding in Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand, Indonesia, \r\nVietnam, and the Philippines, as well as Brazil, Pakistan, Bangladesh, \r\nand Nigeria (Biardeau et al. 2020). Cooling appliances are expected \r\nto increase from  3.6 billion to  9.5 billion by 2050, though up to \r\n14 billion could be required to provide adequate cooling for all "


id: 713d38ab3083b88eb58f0d31be92ce00
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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"Table 4.8 | Targets by countries, regions, cities and businesses on decarbonising the building sector."


id: 82c88d67af889b3a2c0b7676c1db1731
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"technology and efficiency, including improving building envelopes, \r\nfuel switching for residential buildings, and replacing service-sector \r\ncoal use with gas and renewables according to (Chiodi et al. 2013). \r\nIn South Africa, improving industry and building energy efficiency is \r\nalso considered a key part of mitigation strategies (Altieri et al. 2016; \r\nOuedraogo 2017)."


id: b0f050e062fd007e65b91de6d5bd2bca
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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"transport electrification (excluding feedstock) and 75% electrification \r\nof road transport is needed to reach net carbon neutrality according \r\nto (Duscha et al. 2019). In addition, novel fuels such as hydrogen, \r\nsynthetic hydrocarbons and sustainable biogenic fuels are needed \r\nto decarbonise aviation and water transport to achieve net carbon \r\nneutrality (Duscha et al. 2019)."


id: 709dc139ddb9a55cbfc89ea910c7fe1d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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"In India, electrification, hydrogen, and biofuels are key to \r\ndecarbonising the transport sector (Dhar et al. 2018; Mittal et al. \r\n2018; Vishwanathan et al. 2018b; Mathur and Shekhar 2020). Under \r\na 1.5degC scenario, nearly half of the light-duty passenger vehicle stock \r\nneeds to be electrified according to (Parikh et al. 2018). In China, \r\na  1.5degC-compatible pathway would require electrification of two\u0002fifths of transport (Jiang et al. 2018; China National Renewable \r\nEnergy Centre 2019)."


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"Similarly, in Canada, electrification of 59% of light-duty trucks and \r\n23% of heavy-duty trucks are needed as part of overall strategy \r\nto reduce CO2 emissions by 80% by 2050. In addition, hydrogen is \r\nexpected to play a major role by accounting for nearly one-third of \r\nlight-duty trucks, 68% of heavy-duty trucks, and 33% of rail by 2050 \r\naccording to Hammond et al. (2020)."


id: 36b311d424fa4128e335b8b01850f408
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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"Electrification of transport in tandem with power sector \r\ndecarbonisation is expected to be a  key strategy for deep CO2\r\nmitigation in many countries. Passenger transport and light duty \r\nfreight can already be electrified, but electrifying heavy-duty road \r\ntransport and fuel switching in aviation and shipping are much more \r\ndifficult and have not been addressed in most of the recent research."


id: a8c171b2c7b71f02cb3b7dea4d989c10
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"innovation (Grubler et al. 2018). A  Low Energy Demand scenario \r\nrequires fundamental societal and institutional transformation from \r\ncurrent patterns of consumption, including: decentralised services \r\nand increased granularity (small-scale, low-cost technologies to \r\nprovide decentralised services), increased use value from services \r\n(multi-use vs single use), sharing economies, digitalisation, and \r\nrapid transformation driven by end-user demand. This approach \r\nto transformation differs from the status quo and current climate \r\nchange policies in emphasising energy end-use and services first, \r\nwith downstream effects driving intermediate and upstream \r\nstructural change."


id: 233b01676ca47b3fcd53fa8b7c1250ca
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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"Industrial energy efficiency improvements are considered in nearly \r\nall countries but for countries where industry is expected to continue \r\nto be a  key sector, new and emerging technologies that require \r\nsignificant  R&D investment, such as hydrogen and CCS, make \r\nambitious targets achievable."


id: bbeee05d4d21646d9c61658a06558e6e
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"Radical low-carbon innovation involves systemic, cultural, and policy \r\nchanges and acceptance of uncertainty in the beginning stages. \r\nHowever, the current dominant analytical perspectives are grounded \r\nin neoclassical economics and social psychology, and focus primarily \r\non marginal changes rather than radical transformations (Geels \r\net al. 2018). Some literature is beginning to focus on mitigation \r\nthrough behaviour and lifestyle changes, but specific policy measures \r\nfor supporting such changes and their contribution to emission \r\nreductions remain unclear (Section 4.4.2 and Chapter 5)."


id: ef8f7f6a654784dc2d26b7b8dbc7caa4
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"Recent research shows that temperature increases are likely to \r\nexceed 1.5degC during the 2030s and 2degC by mid-century unless both \r\nCO2 and short-lived climate forcers (SLCFs) are reduced (Shindell et al. \r\n2017; Rogelj et al. 2018a). Because of their short lifetimes (days to \r\na decade and a half), SLCFs can provide fast mitigation, potentially \r\navoiding warming of up to 0.6degC at 2050 and up to 1.2degC at 2100 \r\n(Ramanathan and Xu 2010; Xu and Ramanathan 2017). In Asia \r\nespecially, co-benefits of drastic CO2 and air pollution mitigation \r\nmeasures reduce emissions of methane, black carbon, sulphur dioxide, \r\nnitrogen oxide, and fine particulate matter by approximately 23%, \r\n63%, 73%, 27%, and 65% respectively in 2050 as compared to \r\n2010 levels. Including the co-benefits of reduction of climate forcing \r\nadds significantly to the benefits reducing air pollutants (Hanaoka \r\nand Masui 2018)."


id: 6fae3b36c7f1ce2b2980eaf51a0a7327
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"Aggressive adoption of technology solutions for power sector \r\ndecarbonisation coupled with end-use efficiency improvements \r\nand low-carbon electrification of buildings, industry and transport \r\nprovides a pathway for accelerated mitigation in many key countries, \r\nbut will still be insufficient to meet zero emission/1.5degC goals for all \r\ncountries. Although not included in a majority of the studies related to \r\npathways and national modelling analysis, energy demand reduction \r\nthrough deeper efficiency and other measures such as lifestyle \r\nchanges and system solutions that go beyond components, as well \r\nas the co-benefits of the reduction of short-lived pollutants, needs to \r\nbe evaluated for inclusion in future zero emission/1.5degC pathways."


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"To achieve net zero GHG emissions implies consideration of targets \r\nfor non-CO2 gases. While methane emissions have grown less rapidly \r\nthan CO2 and F-gases since 1990 (Chapter 2), the literature urges \r\naction to bring methane back to a pathway more in line with the Paris \r\ngoals (Nisbet et al. 2020). Measures to reduce methane emissions \r\nfrom anthropogenic sources are considered intractable - where they \r\nsustain livelihoods  - but also becoming more feasible, as studies \r\nreport the options for mitigation in agriculture without undermining \r\nfood security (Wollenberg et al. 2016; Frank et al. 2017; Nisbet et al. \r\n2020). The choice of emission metrics has implications for SLCF (Cain \r\net al. 2019) (Cross-Chapter Box 2 in Chapter 2). Ambitious reductions \r\nof methane are complementary to, rather than substitutes for, \r\nreductions in CO2 (Nisbet et al. 2020)."


id: be57b233a3ce79e5b14a63dabedef0e1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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vector_id: 30750
content:
"Studies have identified socio-technological pathways to help achieve \r\nnet zero CO2 and GHG targets at national scale, that in aggregate are \r\ncrucial to keeping global temperature below agreed limits. However, \r\nmost of the literature focuses on supply-side options, including carbon \r\ndioxide removal mechanisms (BECCS, afforestation, and others) that \r\nare not fully commercialised (Cross-Chapter Box  8  in Chapter  12). \r\nCosts to research, deploy, and scale up these technologies are often \r\nhigh. Recent studies have addressed lowering demand through \r\nenergy conversion efficiency improvements, but few studies have \r\nconsidered demand reduction through efficiency (Grubler et al. 2018) \r\nand the related supply implications and mitigation measures."


id: 8dd450ddbd1fe340b8a32ef499f63aed
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22142
content:
"Five main drivers of long-term energy demand reduction that can \r\nmeet the  1.5degC target include quality of life, urbanisation, novel \r\nenergy services, diversification of end-user roles, and information "


id: 70cb6f321595aa1e4b0a7ad72255def
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17107
content:
"interconnections, synergies, and trade-offs among and within sectors, \r\nwhich is currently not the norm (Section 12.4)."


id: d4713c8ece99b489f6d084ca58df1d9d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"A systems approach is also needed to support technological \r\ninnovation. This includes recognising unintended consequences \r\nof political support mechanisms for technology adoption and \r\nrestructuring current incentives to realise multi-sector benefits. It also \r\nentails assimilating knowledge from multiple sources as a basis for \r\npolicy and decision-making (Hoolohan et al. 2019)."


id: f1a84ae3a5ed0ec67c4c128dcc90f314
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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content:
"Current literature does not explicitly consider systematic, physical \r\ndrivers of inertia, such as capital and infrastructure needed to support \r\naccelerated mitigation (Pfeiffer et al. 2018). This makes it difficult to \r\nunderstand what is needed to successfully shift from current limited \r\nmitigation actions to significant transformations needed to rapidly \r\nachieve deep mitigation."


id: 327c477125a39f77e80e8fe52571cee3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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content:
"This section examines how accelerated mitigation may impact \r\nthe realisation of development objectives in the near- and mid\u0002term. It focuses on three objectives discussed in the literature, \r\nsustaining economic growth (Section 4.2.6.2), providing employment \r\n(Section  4.2.6.3), and alleviating poverty and ensuring equity \r\n(Section 4.2.6.4). It complements similar review performed at global \r\nlevel in Section 3.6. For a comprehensive survey of research on the \r\nimpact of mitigation in other areas (including air quality, health, and \r\nbiodiversity), see Karlsson et al. (2020)."


id: c8ea3fbad03490ed80f3e4e67bea38b4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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vector_id: 32670
content:
"Most models and studies fail to address system impacts of widespread \r\nnew technology deployment, for example: (i) material and resources \r\nneeded for hydrogen production or additional emissions and energy \r\nrequired to transport hydrogen; or (ii) materials, resources, grid \r\nintegration, and generation capacity expansion limits of a  largely \r\ndecarbonised power sector and electrified transport sector. These \r\nimpacts could limit regional and national scale-ups."


id: adc0c0808d541be3389ff39f12624713
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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content:
"Increased bioenergy consumption is considered in many 1.5degC and 2degC \r\nscenarios. System thinking is needed to evaluate bioenergy's viability \r\nbecause increased demand could affect land and water availability, \r\nfood prices, and trade (Sharmina et al. 2016). To adequately address \r\nthe water-energy-food nexus, policies and models must consider "


id: f98b84ac564159f740a933ba6525ff48
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41272
content:
"in 2030 and 2050, relative to the reference (robust evidence, high \r\nagreement), for example (Nong et al. 2017) for Australia, (Chen et al. \r\n2013) for Brazil, (Dai et al. 2016; Li et al. 2017; Dong et al. 2018; Mu \r\net al. 2018a; Zhao et al. 2018; Cui et al. 2019) for China, (Alvarez\u0002Espinosa et al. 2018) for Colombia, (Fragkos et al. 2017) for the EU, \r\n(Mittal et al. 2018) for India, (Fujimori et al. 2019) for Japan, (Veysey \r\net al. 2014) for Mexico, (Pereira et al. 2016) for Portugal, (Alton et al. \r\n2014; van Heerden et al. 2016) for South Africa, (Chunark et al. 2017) \r\nfor Thailand, (Acar and Yeldan 2016) for Turkey, (Roberts et al. 2018b) \r\nfor the UK, (Zhang et al. 2017; Chen and Hafstead 2019) for USA, \r\n(Nong 2018) for Vietnam (Figure  4.4). The downward relationship \r\nbetween mitigation effort and emissions is strong in studies up to "


id: b2c46ddadeaef926bd919109d356c1bc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28692
content:
"2030, much weaker for studies looking farther ahead. In all reviewed \r\nstudies, however, GDP continues to grow even with mitigation. It \r\nmay be noted that none of the studies assessed above integrates the \r\nbenefits of mitigation in terms of reduced impacts of climate change \r\nor lower adaptation costs. This is not surprising since these studies \r\nare at national or regional scale and do not extend beyond 2050, \r\nwhereas the benefits depend on global emissions and primarily occur \r\nafter 2050. Discussion on reduced impacts is provided in Section 3.6.2 \r\nand Cross-Working Group Box 1 in Chapter 3."


id: d1b5679be5179c098c4f3cdad01b2784
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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content:
"Two major mechanisms interplay to explain the impact of \r\nmitigation on GDP. First, the carbon constraint imposes reduced "


id: 4221c80a7d0158ec6a0b23f106e62203
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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content:
"Table 4.9 | Examples of country-level modelling studies finding positive short-term outcome of mitigation on GDP relative to baseline."


id: 65132b721f63d36a8315ed2f814e945d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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vector_id: 15049
content:
"of different carbon pricing instruments, including the auctioning of \r\npermits, see Section 13.6.3)."


id: 341703134e7d57f4b4720e13edee8f35
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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content:
"Figure 4.5 shows that depending on the choice of how to implement \r\na  carbon constraint, the same level of carbon constraint can yield \r\nvery different outcomes for GDP. The potential for mitigating GDP \r\nimplications of mitigation through fiscal reform is discussed in \r\nSection 4.4.1.8."


id: ff6ccff013b5fa69c7fbd31e79fc11c6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
content_type: text
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vector_id: 42340
content:
"More generally, mitigation costs can be reduced by proper policy \r\ndesign if the economy initially is not on the efficiency frontier (Grubb \r\n2014), defined as the set of configurations within which the quality \r\nof the environment and economic activity cannot be simultaneously \r\nimproved given current technologies - such improvements in policy \r\ndesign may include reductions in distortionary taxes. Most of the \r\nstudies which find that GDP increases with mitigation in the near \r\nterm precisely assume that the economy is initially not on the \r\nfrontier. Making the economy more efficient - in other words, lifting \r\nthe constraints that maintain the economy in an interior position - \r\ncreates opportunities to simultaneously improve economic activity \r\nand reduce emissions. Table 4.9 describes the underlying assumptions \r\nin a selection of studies."


id: f11007b2be611c2ae8d356bd0c6fec20
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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content:
"In the near term, presence of long-lived emissions intensive capital \r\nstock, and rigidities in the labour market (Devarajan et al. 2011) and \r\nother areas may increase impacts of mitigation on GDP. In the mid\u0002term, on the other hand, physical and human capital, technology, \r\ninstitutions, skills or location of households and activities are more \r\nflexible. The development of renewable energy may help create more \r\nemployment and demands for new skills, particularly in the high-skill \r\nlabour market  (Helgenberger, S. et al., 2019). In addition, cumulative \r\nmechanisms such as induced technical change or learning by doing \r\non low-emissions technologies and process may reduce the impacts \r\nof mitigation on GDP."


id: 742f100dc73cf64e23ae3649617dab25
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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content:
"Finally, marginal costs of mitigation are not always reported in studies \r\nof national mitigation pathways. Comparing numbers across countries \r\nis not straightforward due to exchange rate fluctuations, differing \r\nassumptions by modellers in individual country studies, etc. The \r\ndatabase of national mitigation pathways assembled for this Report - \r\nwhich covers only a  fraction of available national mitigation \r\nstudies in the literature - shows that marginal costs of mitigation \r\nare positive, with a median value of 101 USD2010 tCO2\r\n-1 in 2030, \r\n244 in 2040 and 733 in 2050 for median mitigation efforts of 21%, \r\n46% and 76% relative to business-as-usual respectively. Marginal \r\ncosts increase over time along accelerated mitigation pathways, as \r\nconstraints become tighter, with a non-linearity as mitigation reaches \r\n80% of reference emissions or more. Dispersion across and within "


id: e2b6607fc72153e510d08da545034830
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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content:
"Country-level studies find that the negative impacts of mitigation \r\non GDP can be reduced if pre-existing economic or institutional \r\nobstacles are removed in complement to the imposition of the \r\ncarbon constraint (robust evidence, high agreement). For example, \r\nif the carbon constraint takes the form of a carbon tax or of permits \r\nthat are auctioned, the way the proceeds from the tax (or the \r\nrevenues from the sales of permits) are used is critical for the overall \r\nmacroeconomic impacts (Chen et al. 2013). (For a detailed discussion "


id: 38525c48bb4e15fa2741565d43476638
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
content_type: text
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vector_id: 7117
content:
"and by reducing labour taxes to boost overall labour demand (Stiglitz \r\net al. 2017) (Section 4.5)."


id: 6a9b3e0e7eadd1d7902f9d5bbacb5339
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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vector_id: 16039
content:
"countries is high, even in the near term but increases notably in the \r\nmid-term (medium evidence, medium agreement)."


id: 30b49615ee52d38672f70796f3b3dbb3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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vector_id: 5822
content:
"Like most of the literature on climate change, the above studies \r\ndo not address gender aspects. These may be significant \r\nsince the employment shares for men and women vary across \r\nsectors and countries."


id: 50e3ee4ad1c0a165983fefaa78e035ca
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11504
content:
"Climate mitigation may exacerbate socio-economic pressures on \r\npoorer households (Jakob et al. 2014). First, the price increase in \r\nenergy-intensive goods and services - including food (Hasegawa et al. \r\n2018)  - associated with mitigation may affect poorer households \r\ndisproportionally (Bento 2013), and increase the number of energy\u0002poor (Berry 2019). Second, the mitigation may disproportionally \r\naffect low-skilled workers (see previous section). Distributional \r\nissues have been identified not only with explicit price measures \r\n(carbon tax, emission permits system, subsidy removal), but also with \r\nsubsidies for renewables (Borenstein and Davis 2016), and efficiency \r\nand emissions standards (Davis and Knittel 2019; Bruegge et al. \r\n2019; Levinson 2019; Fullerton and Muehlegger 2019)."


id: 3276b23e2a9e22aa9f9a2288127a14b9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6134
content:
"Distributional implications, however, are context specific, depending \r\non consumption patterns (initially and ease of adjusting them in \r\nresponse to price changes) and asset ownership (see for example \r\nanalysis of energy prices in Indonesia by Renner et al. 2019). In \r\nan analysis of the distributional impact of carbon pricing based \r\non household expenditure data for 87 low- and middle-income \r\ncountries, Dorband et al. (2019) find that, in countries with a per\u0002capita income of up to USD15,000 per capita (purchasing power parity \r\n(PPP) adjusted), carbon pricing has a progressive impact on income \r\ndistribution and that there may be an inversely U-shaped relationship \r\nbetween energy expenditure shares and per-capita income, rendering \r\ncarbon pricing regressive in high-income countries, in other words, in \r\ncountries where the capacity to pursue compensatory policies tends \r\nto be relatively strong."


id: af2e501816a2ae6aa109e683cfffa9b7
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content:
"The results from country-level studies using CGE models tend be similar \r\nto those at global level. Aggregate employment impacts are small and \r\nmay be positive especially if labour taxes are cut, see for example, \r\nTelaye et al. (2019) for Ethiopia,(Kolsuz and Yeldan (2017) for Turkey, \r\nFragkos et al. (2017) for the EU, and Mu et al. (2018b) for China. On the \r\nother hand, sectoral reallocations away from fossil-dependent sectors \r\nmay be substantial, see for example, Alton et al. (2014) for South Africa \r\nor Huang et al. (2019) for China. Targeting of investment to labour\u0002intensive green sectors may generate the strongest employment gains, \r\nsee, for example, Perrier and Quirion (2018) for France, van Meijl \r\net al. (2018) for the Netherlands, and Patrizio et al. 2(018) for the USA. \r\nChanges in skill requirements between emerging and declining sectors \r\nappear to be quite similar, involving smaller transitions than during the \r\nIT revolution (Bowen et al. 2018)."


id: 12ff63097200093e804bd542398af2d3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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content:
"In sum, the literature suggests that the employment impact of \r\nmitigation policies tends to be limited on aggregate, but can \r\nbe significant at the sectoral level (medium evidence, medium \r\nagreement) and that cutting labour taxes may limit adverse effects on \r\nemployment (limited evidence, medium agreement). Labour market \r\nimpacts, including job losses in certain sectors, can be mitigated \r\nby  equipping workers for job changes via education and training, "


id: 9e5345a7cf5c8b05f372a8c551ab9b45
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25085
content:
"for current climate pledges, and Cross-Chapter Box 4 in this chapter \r\nshows an even larger ambition gap between current pledges and what \r\nwould be needed in the near term to be on pathways consistent with \r\nbelow 2degC, let alone 1.5degC. In other words, while the implementation \r\nof mitigation policies to achieve updated NDC almost doubles the \r\nmitigation efforts, and notwithstanding the widespread availability \r\nof the necessary technologies, this doubling of effort merely narrows \r\nthe gap to pathways consistent with 2degC by at most 20%."


id: 1c9f6c93c3982b223644c47f7d54c28f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"A second set of likely obstacles in the short-term to accelerated \r\nmitigation revolves around undesirable distributional consequences, \r\nwithin and across countries. As discussed in Section  4.2.6.3, the \r\ndistributional implications of climate policies depend strongly on their \r\ndesign, the way they are implemented, and on the context into which \r\nthey are inserted. Distributional implications of climate policies have \r\nboth ethics and equity dimensions, to determine what is desirable/\r\nacceptable by a given society in a given context, notably the relative \r\npower of different winners and losers to have their interests taken \r\ninto account, or not, in the relevant decision-making processes. Like \r\ncosts, distributional implications of accelerated mitigation are rooted \r\nin the underlying socio-political-institutional structures of a society."


id: b80a17c16b2e37f1563c343c7b0c6a17
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content:
"As outlined in Sections 4.2.3, 4.2.4, 4.2.5 and 4.2.6 there is improved \r\nunderstanding since AR5 of what accelerated mitigation would \r\nentail in the coming decades. A  major finding is that accelerated \r\nmitigation pathways in the near to mid-term appear technically and \r\neconomically feasible in most contexts. Chapter 4, however, cannot \r\nstop here. Section  4.2.2 has documented an important policy gap "


id: 116ce573e5c7aaab400b8369680bac1b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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content:
"A third set of obstacles are about technology availability and \r\nadoption. Lack of access even to existing cost-effective mitigation \r\ntechnologies remains an important issue, particularly for many \r\ndeveloping countries, and even in the short-term. Though it relates \r\nmost directly to techno-economic costs, technology availability raises \r\nbroader issues related to the socio-technical systems within which \r\ninnovation and adoption are embedded, and issues of technology \r\navailability are inherently issues of systemic failure (Section  16.3). \r\nThe underlying legal, economic and social structures of the economy \r\nare central to the different stages of socio-transition processes \r\n(Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 16)."


id: 7d85e029d57e794e82378aa82d427520
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"The last set of obstacles revolves around the unsuitability of \r\nexisting structures to accelerated mitigation. We include here all \r\nforms of established structures, material (e.g.,  physical capital) or \r\nnot (institutions, social norms, patterns of individual behaviour), \r\nthat are potentially long-lived and limit the implementation of \r\naccelerated mitigation pathways. Typically, such structures exist for \r\nreasons other than climate change and climate mitigation, including \r\nthe distribution of power among various actors. Modifying them in \r\nthe name of accelerated climate mitigation thus requires to deal with \r\nother non-climate issues as well. For example, resolving the landlord\u0002tenant dilemma, an institutional barrier to the deployment of energy "


id: 1bbc5c54e68d3447e2484acb27c97cb6
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content:
"development plan (Section  4.3.2) is a  representation of a  possible \r\ndevelopment pathway for a given society reflecting its objectives, as \r\nrefracted through its development planning process."


id: 54d2ec49ffa1625815c08d0762c06124
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"One approach for exploring shifts in future development pathways \r\nis through scenarios. Some examples of scenario exercises in the \r\nliterature are provided in Table 4.11."


id: b59b611d224088f658240dbcf2ec4d9d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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"Different narratives of development pathways can have distinct \r\nand even competing focuses such as economic growth, shifts in \r\nindustrial structure, technological determinism, and can embody \r\nalternative framings of development itself (from growth to \r\nwell-being, see Chapter  5), and of sustainable development in \r\nparticular (Sections 1.6 and 17.1). Scenario exercises are structured \r\nundertakings to explore alternative future development pathways, \r\noften drawing on stakeholder input and accepting the deep and \r\nirreducible uncertainty inherent in societal development into the \r\nfuture (Schweizer and Kriegler 2012; Kahane 2012; Raskin and Swart \r\n2020). The results of scenario explorations, including modelling \r\nexercises, thus help clarify the characteristics of a particular future \r\npathway, in light of a  particular set of assumptions and choice of \r\nindicators for assessment. Processes of developing scenarios can \r\ninform choices by decision makers of various kinds."


id: e953573f017ee4bead312fda3bec98cd
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content:
"Scenarios are useful to clarify societal objectives, understand \r\nconstraints, and explore future shifts. Scenario exercises are effective \r\nwhen they enable multi-dimensional assessment, and accommodate \r\ndivergent normative viewpoints (Kowarsch et al. 2017). Such processes \r\nmight take into account participants' explicit and implicit priorities, \r\nvalues, disciplinary backgrounds, and world views. The process of \r\ndefining and describing a society's development pathway contributes \r\nto the ongoing process of understanding, explaining and defining the \r\nhistorical and contemporary meaning and significance of a society. "


id: e249899753c5e41f294f57aeb58a5e3b
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content:
"Development pathways represent societal evolution over time, and \r\ncan be assessed retrospectively and interpreted in a historical light, or \r\nexplored prospectively by anticipating and assessing alternative future \r\npathways. Development pathways, and prospective development \r\npathways in particular, can reflect societal objectives, as in 'low-emission \r\ndevelopment pathways', 'climate-resilient development pathways', \r\n'sustainable development pathways', 'inclusive development pathway', \r\nand as such can embed normative assumptions or preferences, or \r\ncan reflect potential dystopian futures to be avoided. A  national "


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"The imagination of facilitated stakeholder process combined with the \r\nrigour of modelling helps improve understanding of constraints, trade\u0002offs, and choices. 'Scenario analysis offers a structured approach for \r\nilluminating the vast range of possibilities. A scenario is a story, told \r\nin words and numbers, describing the way events might unfold. If \r\nconstructed with rigor and imagination, scenarios help us to explore \r\nwhere we might be headed, but more, offering guidance on how to \r\nact now to direct the flow of events toward a desirable future'  (Raskin \r\net al. 2002). Scenario processes are valuable for the quantitative and \r\nqualitative insights they can provide, and also for the role they can \r\nplay in providing a forum and process by which diverse institutions \r\nand even antagonistic stakeholders can come together, build trust, \r\nimprove understanding, and ultimately converge in their objectives \r\n(Kane and Boulle 2018; Dubash 2021)."


id: a95bc246cae9dc21fa22bb033d7af6c1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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content:
"emergent dynamics within and between institutions, cultural norms, \r\nsocio-technological systems, and the biogeophysical environment. \r\nSociety can choose to make decisions and take actions with the \r\nshared intention of influencing the future development pathway \r\ntoward specific agreed objectives."


id: c557acf9ff8c0a5f15cf922ccf56286
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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content:
"The SDGs provide a lens on diverse national and local development \r\nobjectives. Humankind currently faces multiple sustainability \r\nchallenges that together present global society with the challenge \r\nof assessing, deliberating, and attempting to bring about a viable, \r\npositive future development pathway. Ecological sustainability \r\nchallenges include reducing GHG emissions, protecting the ozone \r\nlayer, controlling pollutants such as aerosols and persistent organics, \r\nmanaging nitrogen and phosphorous cycles, etc. (Steffen et al. 2015), \r\nwhich are necessary to address the rising risks to biodiversity and \r\necosystem services on which humanity depends (IPBES 2019a). \r\nSocio-economic sustainability challenges include conflict, persistent \r\npoverty and deprivation, various forms of pervasive and systemic \r\ndiscrimination and deprivation, and socially corrosive inequality. "


id: 3b77e6b92ea403466908436ee1e2c03c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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content:
"alone will not achieve the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement \r\n(Mejean et al. 2015; Rogelj et al. 2016; IPCC 2018a; UNEP 2018). \r\nAn approach of shifting development pathways to increased \r\nsustainability (SDPS) broadens the scope for mitigation."


id: 834bca08e40b05837e52be8c3b720b1d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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content:
"The global adoption of the SDGs and their underlying indicators (UN \r\n2017, 2018 and 2019) reflect a  negotiated prioritisation of these \r\ncommon challenges."


id: 927092a85f77f9584e052f3724287dbd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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content:
"Figure 4.7 illustrates the process of shifting development pathways. \r\nThe lines illustrate different possible development pathways through \r\ntime, some of which (shown here toward the top of the figure) \r\nremove obstacles to the adoption and effective implementation of \r\nsustainable development policies, and thus give access to a  rich \r\npolicy toolbox for accelerating mitigation and achieving SDGs. Other \r\ndevelopment pathways (shown here toward the bottom of the \r\nfigure) do not overcome, or even reinforce the obstacles to adopting \r\nand effectively implementing sustainable development policies, \r\nand thus leave decision-makers with more limited policy toolbox \r\n(Section 4.2.7 and Figure 4.6). A richer tool box enables faster, deeper \r\nand broader mitigation."


id: ab30588599fc4000864eaa2b65fcb14f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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content:
"Beyond removing structural obstacles to accelerated mitigation, \r\nbroadening the approach to policies that facilitate shifts in \r\ndevelopment pathways also helps manage the potential trade-offs \r\nbetween mitigation and other development objectives discussed \r\nin Section 4.2.7."


id: 2d38c7949bd6a3db81f0da3b46daea03
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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content:
"The development pathways branch and branch again, signifying \r\nhow a  diversity of decision-makers (policymakers, organisations, \r\ninvestors, voters, consumers, etc.) are continuously making choices \r\nthat influence which of many potential development pathways \r\nsociety follows. Some of these choices fall clearly within the domain \r\nof mitigation policy. For example, what level carbon price, if any, \r\nshould be imposed? Should fossil fuel subsidies be removed? Most \r\ndecisions, of course, fall outside the direct domain of mitigation \r\npolicy. Shifting development pathways toward sustainability involves \r\nthis broader realm of choices beyond mitigation policy per se, and \r\nrequires identifying those choices that are important determinants of \r\nthe existing obstacles to accelerating mitigation and meeting other \r\nSDGs. Addressing these choices coherently shifts the development \r\npathway away from a continuation of existing trends."


id: 8bad268f153c2264d888c2c2eb359443
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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content:
"Shifting development pathways aims to influence the ultimate drivers \r\nof emissions (and development generally), such as the systemic and \r\ncultural determinants of consumption patterns, the political systems \r\nand power structures that govern decision-making, the institutions \r\nand incentives that guide and constrain socio-technical innovation, \r\nand the norms and information platforms that shape knowledge and \r\ndiscourse, and culture, values and needs (Raskin et al. 2002). These \r\nultimate drivers determine the mitigative capacity of a society."


id: 82263e7f79fbffa501d7447e340db2fd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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content:
"Working Group II examines climate resilient development pathways \r\n(CRDP)  - continuous processes that imply deep societal changes \r\nand/or transformation, so as to strengthen sustainable development, \r\nefforts to eradicate poverty and reduce inequalities while promoting \r\nfair and cross-scalar capacities for adaptation to global warming and \r\nreduction of GHG emissions in the atmosphere. Transformative action \r\nin the context of CRDP specifically concerns leveraging change in \r\nthe five dimensions of development (people, prosperity, partnership, \r\npeace, planet) (AR6 WGII, Chapter 18)."


id: 23902b5a4615368a2bec03abd3079ab
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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"Decision-makers might usefully consider a broader palette of policies \r\nand measures as part of an overall strategy to meet climate goals and \r\nother sustainable development goals (Section 4.3.2 and Table 4.12). \r\nThis is consistent with the fact that mitigation is increasingly \r\nunderstood to be inseparable from broader developmental goals, \r\nwhich can be facilitated by policy coherence and integration with \r\nbroader objectives and policies sectorally and societally. This is \r\nsupported by other observations that mitigation measures based \r\non conventional climate policy instruments, such as emissions taxes \r\nor permits, price incentives such as feed-in tariffs for low-carbon \r\nelectricity generation, and fuel economy standards, and building \r\ncodes, which aim to influence the proximate drivers of emissions "


id: 8556e5a4b99aa559ccd2108d2287cedc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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"Section  4.3.2 provides more details on the way development \r\npathways influence emissions and mitigative capacity. Section 4.3.3 \r\nprovides examples of shifts in development pathways, as well as \r\nof policies that might facilitate those. Cross-Chapter Box  5  in this \r\nchapter details the links between SDPS and sustainability."


id: a451b7ca4b73fc74cad6cca9ba4c113e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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content:
"and content of the plans (Chimhowu et al. 2019). development plans \r\nare increasingly focusing on mobilising action across multiple actors \r\nand multiple dimensions to enhance resilience and improve the \r\nability to undertake stronger mitigation actions. Various initiatives \r\nsuch as the World Summit for Children in 1990; the Heavily Indebted \r\nPoor Country initiative that started offering debt relief in exchange \r\nfor commitments by beneficiary states to invest in health, education, \r\nnutrition and poverty reduction in 1996; and push towards \r\nComprehensive Development Frameworks seem to have catalysed \r\nthe development of national actions plans across countries to \r\nestimate, measure and track investments and progress towards SDGs."


id: 1a79ced6b7f7b5ceaab240f1628ccba0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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content:
"At the global level, the SDGs adopted by all the United Nations Member \r\nStates in 2015 are delineated with a view to end poverty, protect the \r\nplanet and ensure that all people enjoy peace and prosperity by 2030. \r\nThe 17 SDGs are integrated and imply that development must balance \r\nsocial, economic and environmental sustainability."


id: 55b999b46387d1442f673d01682e4d5d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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"While all countries share the totality of the SDGs, development \r\npriorities differ across countries and over time. These priorities are \r\nstrongly linked to local contexts, and depend on which dimensions \r\nof improvements in the well-being of people are considered \r\nthe most urgent."


id: a71b6582ce3d1aa98e62e67375379c4d
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"The most recent development plans also tend to differ from the \r\nearlier ones in terms of their approach. Complexity science has over \r\nthe years argued for new forms of planning based on contingency, \r\nbehaviour change, adaptation and constant learning (Colander and \r\nKupers 2016; Ramalingam, 2013), and new plans have increasingly \r\nfocused on increasing resilience of individuals, organisations and \r\nsystems (Hummelbrunner and Jones, 2013). Finally, alongside short\u0002term (typically five year) plans with operational purpose, countries \r\nhave also expressed visions of their development pathways over \r\nlonger time horizons, via, for example, Voluntary National Reviews \r\nsubmitted in the context of the UN High Level Political Forum on \r\nSustainable Development."


id: e55948e9e9a779f1405c6a8cef69d49c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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"National development plans are also increasingly more holistic \r\nin their approach, linking closely with SDGs and incorporating \r\nclimate action in their agendas. For instance, the Low Carbon \r\nDevelopment Initiative (LCDI), launched in 2017 by the Government \r\nof Indonesia, seeks to identify the development policies that can help \r\nIndonesia achieve multiple (social, economic, and environmental) \r\ngoals simultaneously along with preserving and improving the \r\ncountry's  natural resources (Bappenas 2019). Likewise, Nepal's \r\nFifteenth Plan (five-year) recognises the need for climate mitigation \r\nand adaptation and corresponding access to international finance \r\nand technologies. The plan suggests mobilisation of foreign aid in the \r\nclimate change domain in line with Nepal's priorities and its inclusion \r\nin the country's climate-friendly development programs as the key \r\nopportunities in this regard (Nepal 2020)."


id: f104e3cdbb0c2b798b982063565d71a0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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content:
"Governments are increasingly resorting to the development of \r\nnational plans to build institutions, resources, and risk/shock \r\nmanagement capabilities to guide national development. The \r\nnumber of countries with a  national development plan has more \r\nthan doubled, from about 62 in 2006 (World Bank 2007) to 134 \r\nplans published between 2012 and 2018 (Chimhowu et al. 2019). \r\nThe comeback of planning may be linked to increased consideration \r\ngiven to sustainability, which is by construction forward-looking and \r\nfar ranging, and therefore requires state and civil society to prepare \r\nand implement plans at all levels of governance. Governments \r\nare increasingly engaging in the development and formulation of \r\nnational plans in an organised, conscious and continual attempt to \r\nselect the best available alternatives to achieve specific goals."


id: db6941430ace171c252f7d9edc95bb49
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content:
"emissions tend to drop monotonously as incomes increased. Lantz \r\nand Feng (2006) also indicate that per capita GDP is not related \r\nto CO2 emissions in Canada. Other studies point to an emerging \r\nconsensus that the relationship between CO2 emissions and economic \r\nindicators depends on the level of development of countries (Nguyen \r\nand Kakinaka 2019; Sharma 2011). While some literature indicates \r\nthat absolute decoupling of economic growth and GHG emissions \r\nhas occurred in some countries (Le Quere et al. 2019), a  larger \r\nsystematic review found limited evidence of this (Haberl et al. 2020)."


id: 84201279ded00bcfd475f594ce72e28
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Analysis in the mitigation literature often frames mitigation policy \r\nas having development co-benefits, the main objective being climate \r\nstabilisation. This misses the point that development drives emissions, \r\nand not vice versa, and it is the overall development approach and \r\npolicies that determine mitigation pathways (Munasinghe 2007). \r\nA large body of literature supports the fact that development pathways \r\nhave direct and, just as importantly, indirect implications for GHG \r\nemissions (Nakicenovic et al. 2000; Winkler 2017b), through multiple \r\nchannels, such as the nature of economic activity, spatial patterns of \r\ndevelopment, degree of inequality, and population growth."


id: 33a5892026f6dda4eff2963bdcdef494
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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content:
"Looking ahead, choices about the nature of economic activities are \r\nexpected to have significant implications for emissions. For example, \r\na development pathway that focuses on enhancing economic growth \r\nbased on manufacturing is likely to lead to very different challenges \r\nfor mitigation compared to one that focuses on services-led growth. \r\n(Quere et al. 2018) find that choices about whether or not to export \r\noffshore oil in Brazil will have significant implications for the country's \r\nGHG emissions. Similarly, in China, transforming industrial structure \r\ntowards tertiary sectors (Kwok et al. 2018) and restructuring exports \r\ntowards higher value-added products (Wu et al. 2019) are expected \r\nto have significant implications for GHG emissions."


id: 3bc55b51ca5fd7323d094a9f00572cd4
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content:
"Economic structure: Chapter  2  notes that overall, affluence \r\n(GDP per capita), economic growth and population growth have \r\nremained the main upward drivers of CO2 emissions from fossil\u0002fuel combustion in the past decade, with energy efficiency the \r\nmain countervailing force (Lin and Liu 2015; Wang and Feng 2017) \r\n(Section  2.4). A  major component of the development pathway of \r\na country is precisely the nature of the economic activities on which \r\nthe country relies (e.g.,  agriculture and mining, heavy industry, \r\nservices, high-tech products, etc.) as well as the way it articulates its \r\neconomy with the rest of the World (e.g., export-led growth vs import \r\nsubstitution strategies). Hence, the development pathway ultimately \r\ndrives the underlying structure of the economy, and to a large degree \r\nthe relationship between activity and GHG emissions."


id: 7a08d775629f5c08a5b13c924ba7a74a
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content:
"Spatial patterns of development: Chapter  2  notes that rapid \r\nurbanisation in developing and transition countries leads to increased \r\nCO2 emissions, the substantial migration of rural populations to urban \r\nareas in these countries being the main factor leading to increased \r\nlevels of income and expenditure of new urban dwellers which in turn \r\nleads to increased personal carbon footprints and overall emissions \r\n(Section  2.4). Urbanisation, and more broadly spatial patterns of \r\ndevelopment, are in turned driven to a large part by development \r\nchoices, such as, inter alia, spatial provision of infrastructure and \r\nservices, choices regarding the agriculture and forestry sector, \r\nland-use policies, support to regional/local development, among "


id: af430b8ff4684ed6c051314310226dba
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"At country level, however, the picture is more nuanced. Both India \r\nand China show signs of relative decoupling between GDP and \r\nemissions because of structural change (Chen et al. 2018a). Sumabat \r\net al. (2016) indicate that economic growth had a negative impact on \r\nCO2 emissions in Philippines. Baek and Gweisah (2013) find that CO2"


id: 3e57ac32fd38fa159063783e8e399f8d
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content:
"ethnic profiles and could accordingly be associated with the level of \r\nemissions and mitigation prospects (Andrijevic et al. 2020)."


id: 5f177d6d501ce0673472f1656dfbfb4c
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content:
"others (World Bank 2009). For example, Dorin (2017) points out \r\nthat if agriculture sectors in Africa and India follow the same \r\ndevelopment path that developed countries have followed in the \r\npast, namely increased labour productivity through enlargement \r\nand robotisation of farms, then unprecedented emigrations of rural \r\nworkers towards cities or foreign countries will ensue, with large\u0002scale social, economic and environmental consequences. Looking \r\nahead, a development pathway that encourages concentrated influx \r\nof people to large urban centres will lead to very different energy and \r\ninfrastructure consumption patterns than a pathway that prioritises \r\nthe development of smaller, self-contained towns and cities."


id: 13edb4e56c6a4382be79bdf24bf9fce9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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content:
"In sum, development pathways can lead to different emission levels \r\nand different capacities and opportunities to mitigate (medium \r\nevidence, high agreement). Thus, focusing on shifting development \r\npathways can lead to larger systemic sustainability benefits."


id: c77d32c40994a1cbd12ceebac02dd5c1
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content:
"4.3.2.4 Integrating Mitigation Considerations Requires \r\nNon-marginal Shifts in Development Pathways"


id: 936aaea68eac01bccfbaca0e5cab15e0
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"Since reducing inequality, as noted above, is globally one of the \r\nmain development priorities, a  large body of literature focuses on \r\nthe compatibility of climate change mitigation and reduction in \r\neconomic inequality (Baek and Gweisah 2013; Auffhammer and \r\nWolfram 2014; Berthe and Elie 2015; Hao et al. 2016; Grunewald \r\net al. 2017; Wiedenhofer et al. 2017). However, the use of narrow \r\napproaches or simple methods of studying the relationships of \r\nincome inequality and emissions by looking at correlations, may miss \r\nimportant linkages. For example, the influence of inequality on social \r\nvalues such as status and civic mindedness and non-political interests \r\nthat shape environmental policy can influence overall consumption \r\nand its environmental impacts (Berthe and Elie 2015). Moreover, \r\ninequalities may also be reflected in gender, education, racial and "


id: 68e9963d94fae73d69619d4e336cfe18
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content:
"South Africa adopted its first National Development Plan (NDP) in 2011 (NPC 2011), the same year in which the country adopted \r\nclimate policy (RSA 2011) and hosted COP17 in Durban. Chapter 5 of the NDP addresses environmental sustainability in the context \r\nof development planning, and specifically 'an equitable transition to a low-carbon economy' (NPC 2011). The chapter refers explicitly \r\nto the need for a just transition, protecting the poor from impacts and any transitional costs from emissions-intensive to low-carbon. \r\nThe plan proposes several mitigation measures, including a carbon budgeting approach, reference to Treasury's carbon tax, use of \r\nvarious low-carbon options while maintaining energy security, and the integrated resource plan for electricity. The NDP refers to coal \r\nin several chapters, in some places suggesting additional investment (including new rail lines to transport coal and coal to liquids),"


id: 791536206f1e10a2ba44ae8b682ad1ba
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"in others decommissioning coal-fired power 'procuring at least 20,000 MW of renewable electricity by 2030, importing electricity \r\nfrom the region, decommissioning 11,000 MW of ageing coal-fired power stations and stepping up investments in energy-efficiency' \r\n(NPC 2011: p. 46). Reference to environmental sustainability is not limited to Chapter 5 - the introductory vision statement includes \r\nacknowledgement 'that each and every one of us is intimately and inextricably of this earth with its beauty and life-giving sources; \r\nthat our lives on earth are both enriched and complicated by what we have contributed to its condition' (NPC 2011: p. 21); and the \r\noverview of the plan includes a section on climate change, addressing both mitigation and adaptation."


id: aec935470c297793b1d651f381abbca0
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Looking ahead, given that different development pathways can lead \r\nto different levels of GHG emissions and to different capacities and \r\nopportunities to mitigate, there is increasing research on how to make \r\ndevelopment pathways more sustainable. Literature is also focusing \r\non the need for a 'new normal' as a  system capable of achieving \r\nhigher quality growth while addressing multiple development \r\nobjectives by focusing on 'innovative development pathways'."


id: deeb25064487e494b826cc1bfdc3153f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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content:
"most modelling exercises however, development remains treated \r\nas an exogenous input. In addition, models may capture only \r\nsome dimensions of development that are relevant for mitigation \r\noptions, thereby not capturing distributional aspects and not \r\nallowing consistency checks with broader developmental goals \r\n(Valadkhani et al. 2016). Quantitative tools for assessing mitigation \r\npathways could be more helpful if they could provide information \r\non a  broader range of development indicators, and could model \r\nsubstantively different alternative development paths, thereby \r\nproviding information on which levers might shift development in \r\na more sustainable direction."


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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Literature suggests that if development pathways are to be changed \r\nto address the climate change problem, choices that would need to \r\nbe made about development pathways would not be marginal (Stern \r\n2009), and would require a new social contract to address a complex \r\nset of inter-linkages across sectors, classes and the whole economy \r\n(Winkler 2017b). Shifting development pathways necessitates \r\nplanning in a  holistic manner, rather than thinking about discrete \r\nand isolated activities and actions to undertake mitigation. Further, \r\nthe necessary transformational changes can be positive if they are \r\nrooted in the development aspirations of the economy and society in \r\nwhich they take place (Dubash 2012; Jones et al. 2013), but they can \r\nalso lead to carbon colonialism if the transformations are imposed by \r\nNorthern donors or perceived as such."


id: 8c6300d5ab07cb4aaafac8ecb0b6c3ea
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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"Accordingly, influencing a  societies' development pathways draws \r\nupon a  broader range of policies and other efforts than narrowly \r\ninfluencing mitigation pathways, to be able to achieve the multiple \r\nobjectives of reducing poverty, inequality and GHG emissions. The \r\nimplications for employment, education, mobility, housing and many \r\nother development aspects must be integrated and new ways of \r\nlooking at development pathways which are low carbon must be \r\nconsidered (Bataille et al. 2016b; Waisman et al. 2019). For instance, \r\njob creation and education are important elements that could play \r\na key role in reducing inequality and poverty in countries like South \r\nAfrica and India (Winkler et al. 2015; Rao and Min 2018) while these \r\nalso open up broader opportunities for mitigation."


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"Relative to the literature on mitigation pathways described in 4.2.5 \r\nand in  4.3.3, the literature on development pathways is limited. \r\nThe climate research community has developed the Shared Socio\u0002economic Pathways (SSPs) that link several socio-economic drivers \r\nincluding equity in relation to welfare, resources, institutions, \r\ngovernance and climate mitigation policies in order to reflect \r\nmany of the key development directions (O'Neill et al. 2014). In "


id: 5b8d4077ec69e5535bc47b609db9aca0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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content:
"a  comprehensive understanding of the full costs and benefits of \r\nlow-carbon development (often including the costs of adaptation \r\nand impacts from residual climate change). Back-casting modelling \r\nexercises show that aligning development and climate actions could \r\nresult in much lower 'social cost of carbon' (Shukla et al. 2008). \r\nBack-casting does not aim to produce blueprints. Rather, it indicates \r\nthe relative feasibility and the social, environmental, and political \r\nimplications of different development and climate futures on the \r\nassumption of a clear relationship between goal setting and policy \r\nplanning (Dreborg 1996). Accordingly, back-casting exercises are \r\nwell suited for preparing local specific roadmaps like for cities (Gomi \r\net al. 2010, 2011)."


id: 18deaea7f59442bdafb1771cc80e66e2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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content:
"As noted in Section  4.3.1, policy approaches that include \r\na broader range of instruments and initiatives would impact more \r\nfundamentally on the actors, institutions and structures of societies \r\nand the dynamics among them, aiming to alter the underlying drivers \r\nof emissions, opening up a wider range of mitigation opportunities \r\nand potential in the process of achieving societal development goals. \r\nWhile the evolution of these drivers is subject to varied influences \r\nand complex interactions, there are policy measures by which \r\ndecision-makers might influence them. Table  4.12 provides some \r\nexamples of policy measures that can affect key drivers (shown in \r\nthe row headings)."


id: fde9c7f6a2a4c5e83740158e7f13b891
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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content:
"Authors: Franck Lecocq (France), Harald Winkler (Republic of South Africa), Mustafa Babiker (Sudan/Saudi Arabia), Brett Cohen \r\n(Republic of South Africa), Heleen de Coninck (the Netherlands), Dipak Dasgupta (India), Navroz K. Dubash (India), Maria Josefina \r\nFigueroa Meza (Venezuela/Denmark), Michael Grubb (United Kingdom), Kirsten Halsnaes (Denmark), Siir Kilkis (Turkey), William Lamb \r\n(Germany/United Kingdom), Sebastian Mirasgedis (Greece), Sudarmanto Budi Nugroho (Indonesia), Chukwumerije Okereke (Nigeria/\r\nUnited Kingdom), Minal Pathak (India), Joyashree Roy (India/Thailand), Ambuj Sagar (India), Yamina Saheb (France/Algeria), \r\nPriyadarshi  Shukla (India), Jim Skea (United Kingdom), Youba Sokona (Mali), Julia Steinberger (United Kingdom/Switzerland), \r\nMariama Williams (Jamaica/the United States of America)"


id: 46dec39dd6fdfc400709c0013f842755
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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"In the present report, development pathways refer to patterns of development resulting from multiple decisions and choices made \r\nby many actors in the national and global contexts. Each society whether in the Global North or the Global South follows its own \r\npattern of development (Figure 1.6). Development pathways can also be described at smaller scales (e.g., for regions or cities). By \r\nextension, the concept can also be applied to sectors and systems (e.g., the development pathway of the agricultural sector or of \r\nindustrial systems)."


id: 554b616b7e60e3fa1aaadf297a9d28b0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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content:
"2. Why do development pathways matter in a report about mitigation?\r\n2a. Past development pathways determine both today's GHG emissions and the set of opportunities to reduce emissions\r\nDevelopment pathways drive GHG emissions for a large part (Sections 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6). For example, different social choices and \r\npolicy packages with regard to land use and associated rents will result in human settlements with different spatial patterns, different \r\ntypes of housing markets and cultures, and different degrees of inclusiveness, and thus different demand for transport services and \r\nassociated GHG emissions (Sections 8.3.1 and 10.2.1)."


id: 23a4f239e940dd7d69b2daa65d8f6b73
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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"There is compelling evidence to show that continuing along existing development pathways is unlikely to achieve rapid and deep \r\nemission reductions (robust evidence, medium agreement). For example, investments in long-lived infrastructure, including energy \r\nsupply systems, could lock-in high emissions pathways and risk making deep decarbonisation and sustainable policies more \r\ndifficult and expensive."


id: 683ca9e03426def6c0312ebaebf80128
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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vector_id: 15608
content:
"Development pathways also determine the set of tools available to mitigate climate change (Figure 4.7). For example, the capacity \r\nof households to move closer to their workplace, in response to, for example, a price signal on carbon and thus on gasoline, depends \r\non rents, which themselves depend on the spatial patterns of development of human settlements (Section 8.3.1). Said differently, \r\nmitigation costs depend on past development choices. Similarly, development pathways determine the enablers and levers available \r\nfor adaptation (AR6 WGII, Chapter 18) and for achieving other SDGs."


id: 887b5dffcaf38b5c2fe4d5cf74b6f26a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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content:
"In the absence of shifts in development pathways, conventional mitigation policy instruments (e.g., carbon tax, emission quotas, \r\ntechnological norms, etc.) may not be able to limit emissions to a degree sufficient for deep decarbonisation or only at very high \r\neconomic and social costs."


id: a96d17061e9f0902fef21216ceeefe81
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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content:
"Policies to shift development pathways, on the contrary, make mitigation policies more effective. For example, policies that prioritise \r\nnon-car transit, or limit rents close to work places would make it easier for households to relocate in response to a price signal on \r\ntransport, and thus makes the same degree of mitigation achievable at lower economic and social cost."


id: a53bae710367cff9544b1491f1602235
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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content:
"2b. Shifting development pathways broadens the scope for synergies between development objectives and mitigation\r\nSecond, societies pursue a variety of development objectives, of which protecting the Earth's climate is part. The SDGs provide a global \r\nmapping of these goals. Absent climate mitigation, our collective ability to achieve the SDGs in 2030 and to sustain them beyond 2030 \r\nis likely to be compromised, even if adaptation measures are put in place (AR6 WGII)."


id: e5300bd3720cbb8d7e0282e01fbf6d23
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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content:
"There are many instances in which reducing GHG emissions and moving towards the achievement of other development objectives \r\ncan go hand in hand, in the near-, mid- and long-term (Sections 3.7, 6.7.7, 7.6.5, 8.2, 9.8, 10.1.1, 11.5.3 and 17.3, and Figures 3.40 \r\nand 12.1). For example, transitions from coal-based power to lower-emissions electricity generation technologies and from internal \r\ncombustion engine to lower-carbon transport has large mitigation potential and direct benefits for health through reduction in local \r\nair pollution (Box 6.2 and Section 10.4.1). Energy efficiency in buildings and energy poverty alleviation through improved access to \r\nclean fuels also delivers significant health benefits (Sections 9.8.1 and 9.8.2)."


id: 3f3532be49abd4a23fdd7dac35c00309
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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content:
"Careful design of mitigation policies is critical to achieving these synergies (Section 13.8). Integrated policies can support the creation \r\nof synergies between climate change goals and other SDGs. For example, when measures promoting walkable urban areas are \r\ncombined with electrification and clean renewable energy, there are several co-benefits to be attained (Figure SPM.8 and Section 5.2). \r\nThese include reduced pressures on agricultural land from reduced urban growth, health co-benefits from cleaner air and benefits from \r\nenhanced mobility (Sections 8.2, 8.4 and 4.4.1.9)."


id: e9ca38141ac62197007feba18d77f3fe
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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"Prioritising is one way to manage trade-offs, addressing some national development objectives earlier than others. Another way \r\nis to adopt policy packages aimed at shifting development pathways towards sustainability as they expand the range of tools available \r\nto simultaneously achieve multiple development objectives, including mitigation. In the city example of Section 2a, a carbon tax alone \r\nwould run counter to other development objectives if it made suburban households locked into high emissions transport modes poorer \r\nor if it restricted mobility choices, in particular for low- and middle-income households. Policy packages combining affordable housing \r\nand provision of safe low-carbon mobility could both facilitate equitable access to housing (a major development objective in many \r\ncountries) and make it easier to mitigate by shifting the urban development pathway."


id: a22a9052e91f4d06a6645c0f5c8f4580
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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content:
"Similarly, a fundamental shift in the service provision that helps reduce energy demand (Chapter 5), driven by targeted policies, \r\ninvestment and enabling socio-cultural and behavioural change, would reduce pressure on supply side mitigation need, hence limiting \r\npressure on water and food and the achievement of associated SDGs. Some studies assume Western European lifestyle as a reference \r\nfor the Global North and an improvement in the living standard for the Global South to reduce energy demand and emissions (Grubler \r\net al. 2018), while others explore a transformative change in the Global North to achieve a decent living standard for all (Bertram et al. \r\n2018; Millward-Hopkins et al. 2020) (Section 3.7.8). For example, in the UK, interaction between multiple behavioural, socio-cultural, \r\nand corporate drivers including NGO campaigns, social movements and product innovations resulted in an observed decline in meat \r\nconsumption (Sections 5.4 and 5.6.4)."


id: 4c93b3a8a04a7a11413ec757c0572f1e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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content:
"3. What does shifting development pathways towards sustainability entail?\r\nShifting development pathways towards sustainability implies making transformative changes that disrupt existing developmental \r\ntrends. Such choices would not be marginal (Stern 2009), but include technology adoption, infrastructure availability and use, and \r\nsocio-behavioural factors (Chapter 5)."


id: e8059d112a98b16c260198a0ce7ec4fe
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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content:
"These include creating new infrastructure, sustainable supply chains, institutional capacities for evidence-based and integrated \r\ndecision-making, financial alignment towards low-carbon socially responsible investments, just transitions and shifts in behaviour \r\nand norms to support shifts away from fossil-fuel consumption (Green and Denniss 2018). Adopting multi-level governance modes, \r\ntackling corruption where it inhibits shifts to sustainability, and improving social and political trust are also key for aligning and \r\nsupporting long-term environmentally just policies and processes."


id: 3bc015bf4f154d4f5b222c4b7ba7ce2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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content:
"Shifting development pathways entails fundamental changes in energy, urban, building, industrial, transport, and land-based systems. \r\nIt also requires changes in behaviour and social practices. Overcoming inertia and locked-in practices may face considerable opposition \r\n(Geels et al. 2017) (Section  5.4.5). The durability of carbon intensive transport modes and electricity generating infrastructures \r\nincrease the risk of lock-in to high emissions pathways, as these comprise not just consumer practices, but sunk costs in infrastructure, \r\nsupporting institutions and rules (Seto et al. 2016; Mattioli et al. 2020). Shifting investments towards low-GHG solutions requires \r\na combination of conducive public policies, attractive investment opportunities, as well as the availability of financing to enable such \r\na transition (Section 15.3)."


id: 6c62d6d9fd524232ace4a0df3cdfc45f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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content:
"Shifting development paths is complex. If history is any guide, practices that can easily supplant existing systems and are clearly \r\nprofitable move fastest (Griliches 1957). Changes that involve 'dissimilar, unfamiliar and more complex science-based components' \r\ntake more time, acceptance and legitimation and involve complex social learning (Conley and Udry 2010), even when they promise \r\nlarge gains (Pezzoni et al. 2019)."


id: 999a22942264ee239dfae43412610792
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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content:
"Yet despite the complexities of the interactions that result in patterns of development, history also shows that societies can influence \r\nthe direction of development pathways based on choices made by decision-makers, citizens, the private sector and social stakeholders. \r\nFor example, fundamentally different responses to the first oil shock shifted then-comparable economies on to different energy sector \r\ndevelopment and economic pathways in the 1970s and 80s (Sathaye et al. 2009). More recent examples have shown evidence of \r\nvoluntary transitions for example, advanced lighting in Sweden, improved cook-stoves in China, liquefied petroleum gas stoves in \r\nIndonesia or ethanol vehicles in Brazil (Sovacool 2016)."


id: f86219482601908e73c4073a49d1ce61
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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content:
"Shifts in one country may spill over to other countries. Collective action by individuals as part of formal social movements or informal \r\nlifestyle changes underpins system change (Sections 5.2.3, 5.4.1, 5.4.5.3 and 13.5)."


id: edc4b0d6212ac304a47b39baa5ded73f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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"Sectoral transitions that aspire to shift development pathways often have multiple objectives, and deploy a diverse mix or package of \r\npolicies and institutional measures (Figure 13.6). Context specific governance conditions can significantly enable or disable sectoral \r\ntransitions, and play a determinative role in whether a sectoral transition leads to a shift in development pathway. For example, \r\nif implemented policies to tackle fuel poverty target the most socially vulnerable households, this can help address barriers poor \r\nhouseholds face in undertaking building retrofits. In the EU-28, it has been shown that accelerated energy efficiency policies coupled \r\nwith strong social policies targeting the most vulnerable households, can help reduce the energy demand in residential sector, and \r\ndeliver additional co-benefits of avoided premature deaths and reduced health impacts (Section 9.8.2)."


id: 76dc9dc97d54b88fe4f9da83e41bc32a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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content:
"Literature suggests that through equitable resource distribution, high levels of human development can be provided at moderate \r\nenergy and carbon levels by changing consumption patterns and redirecting systems in the direction of more sustainable resource use, \r\nsuggesting that a special effort can be made in the near term for those on higher incomes who account for a disproportionate fraction \r\nof global emissions (Millward-Hopkins et al. 2020; Hickel et al. 2021) (Section 5.2.2 and Figure 5.14)."


id: b628418ee5d82dea310f307efe41112d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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content:
"The necessary transformational changes are likely to be more acceptable if rooted in the development aspirations of the economy and \r\nsociety within which they take place (Dubash 2012; Jones et al. 2013) and may enable a new social contract to address a complex set \r\nof inter-linkages across sectors, classes and the whole economy (Fleurbaey et al. 2018)."


id: 81d959b0d22914e1dcfdee39f315438d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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"Taking advantage of windows of opportunity and disruptions to mindsets and socio-technical systems could advance deeper \r\ntransformations. These might include the globally declining costs of renewables (Figure 1.7, Section 2.2.5 and Box 16.2), emerging \r\nsocial norms for climate mitigation (Green and Denniss 2018), or the COVID-19 pandemic, all of which might be harnessed to centre \r\npolitical action on protecting human and planetary health (Buchs et al. 2020), but if not handled carefully could also risk undermining \r\nthe support for transformation."


id: 5c6d753986591b2793ccb7af3d31e60
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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content:
"5. How can shifts in development pathways be implemented by actors in different contexts?\r\nShifting development pathways to increased sustainability is a  shared aspiration. Yet since countries differ in starting points \r\n(e.g., social, economic, cultural, political) and history, they have different urgent needs in terms of facilitating the economic, social, \r\nand environmental dimensions of sustainable development and, therefore, give different priorities (Sections 4.3.2 and 17.4). The \r\nappropriate set of policies to shift development pathways thus depends on national circumstances and capacities."


id: 5fccc67b4e87daa45624ca4c36c357ee
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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content:
"Shifting development pathways towards sustainability needs to be supported by global partnerships to strengthen suitable capacity, \r\ntechnological innovation (Section  16.6), and financial flows (Sections  14.4.1, 15.2.4). The international community can play \r\na particularly key role by helping ensure the necessary broad participation in climate-mitigation efforts, including by countries at \r\ndifferent development levels, through sustained support for policies and partnerships that support shifting development pathways \r\ntowards sustainability while promoting equity and being mindful of different transition capacities (Sections  4.3.2, 16.5, 16.6, \r\n14.4 and 17.4)."


id: 1a46238e3de7e92c3795689862be8a16
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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content:
"In sum, development pathways unfold over time in response to \r\ncomplex dynamics among various drivers and diverse actors with \r\nvarying interests and motivations (high agreement, robust evidence). \r\nThe way countries develop determines the nature and degree of the \r\nobstacles to accelerating mitigation and achieving other sustainable \r\ndevelopment objectives (medium-robust evidence, medium \r\nagreement). Meeting ambitious mitigation and development goals \r\ncannot be achieved through incremental change (robust evidence,\r\nmedium agreement). Shifting development pathways thus involves \r\ndesigning and implementing policies where possible to intentionally \r\nenhance enabling conditions and reduce obstacles to desired \r\noutcomes (medium evidence, medium agreement)."


id: f124e15bc391b7e893091be6280058e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39807
content:
"What have we learned so far? As highlighted above, despite 30 years \r\nof UNFCCC and growing contributions by non-state actors, the \r\nemissions gap keeps growing (Sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3). Mitigation \r\nconceived as incremental change is not enough. Meeting ambitious \r\nmitigation goals entails rapid, non-marginal changes in production \r\nand consumption patterns (Sections 4.2.4 and 4.2.5). Taking another \r\napproach, we have seen in Section  4.3 that shifting development \r\npathways broadens the scope for mitigation (Sections  4.3.1 \r\nand 4.3.2) and offers more opportunities than mitigation alone to \r\ncombine mitigation with the realisation of other SDGs (Section 4.3.1 \r\nand Cross-Chapter Box 5 in this chapter)."


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created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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"Section  4.4 elaborates mechanisms through which societies can \r\ndevelop and implement policies to substantially shift development \r\npathways toward securing shared societal objectives. Such policies \r\nentail overcoming obstacles (Section 4.2.7) by means of favourable \r\nenabling conditions: governance and institutions, behaviour, \r\ninnovation, policy and finance. These enabling conditions are \r\namenable to intentional change - to greater or lesser degrees and \r\nover longer or shorter time scales - based on a range of possible \r\nmeasures and processes (Section 4.4)."


id: 21ce8d6ce26fe283b449a474853fd0ab
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3164
content:
"A practical way forward is to combine shifting development \r\npathways and accelerating mitigation (medium evidence, high \r\nagreement). This means introducing multi-objective policy packages \r\nand sequences with climate and development components that \r\nboth target mitigation directly and create the conditions for shifts in \r\ndevelopment pathways that will help accelerate further mitigation \r\ndown the line, and meet other development objectives. Since \r\ndevelopment pathways result from myriad decisions from multiple \r\nactors (Section 4.3.1), coordination across countries and with non\u0002state actors is essential."


id: b50959ddf3b47890e19d515c549ecada
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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content:
"argues that near term actions to shift the financial system over the \r\nnext decade (2021-2030) are critically important and feasible, and \r\nthat the immediate post-COVID recovery opens up opportunities \r\nto scale up financing from billions to trillions (Mawdsley 2018) \r\n(Section 15.6.7). As discussed in Section 4.2.5, accelerated mitigation \r\npathways encompass both rapid deployment of new technologies \r\nsuch as CCS or electric vehicles, as well as changes in consumption \r\npatterns: rapid deployment of mitigation technology and behaviour \r\nchange are thus two enabling conditions to accelerated mitigation. \r\nDynamics of deployment of technologies are relatively well known, \r\npointing to specific, short-term action to accelerate innovation and \r\ndeployment (Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 16), whereas dynamics \r\nof collective behaviour change is less well understood. Arguably, the \r\nlatter also facilitates shifting development pathways."


id: 95c16a6bb22e263a5c538815aae5cbe4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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content:
"Individual enabling conditions are discussed at length in \r\nChapter  5  (behaviour change), 13 (policies, governance and \r\ninstitutional capacity), 15 (finance) and 16 (innovation). The purpose \r\nof the discussion below is to draw operational implications from \r\nthese chapters for action, taking into account the focus of the present \r\nChapter on action at the national level in the near- and mid-term, and \r\nits special emphasis on shifting development pathways in addition to \r\naccelerated mitigation."


id: a3208c9ac84dcf4c2fd9789a68fb5171
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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vector_id: 25909
content:
"The present chapter uses the set of enabling conditions identified in \r\nthe IPCC SR1.5 report, namely policy, governance and institutional \r\ncapacity, finance, behaviour and lifestyles and innovation and \r\ntechnology (de Coninck et al. 2018). As Figure  4.8 illustrates, \r\npublic policies are required to foster both accelerating mitigation \r\nand shifting development pathways. They are also vital to guide \r\nand provide the other enabling conditions (compare Table  4.12). \r\nImproved governance and enhanced institutional capacity facilitate \r\nthe adoption of policies that accelerate mitigation and shift \r\ndevelopment pathways, with the potential to achieve multiple \r\nmitigation and development objectives. Finance is required both to \r\naccelerate mitigation and to shift development pathways. Chapter 15 "


id: baa7ac70d877268f3ec4c80701811a4e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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content:
"The rest of the Section is organised as follows. Policy packages \r\nthat combine climate and development policies are first \r\ndiscussed  (Section  4.4.1.2). The next sections are dedicated to \r\nthe conditions that facilitate shifts in development pathways \r\nand accelerated mitigation: governance and institutions \r\n(Section  4.4.1.3), financial resources (Section  4.4.1.4), behaviour \r\nchange (Section  4.4.1.5) and innovation  (Section  4.4.1.6). Four \r\nexamples of how climate and development policies can be combined \r\nto shift pathways and accelerate mitigation are then presented "


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created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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content:
"fuel production (to complement demand-side climate policies) \r\nand (iv) innovation support and strategic investment to encourage \r\nsystemic change (Grubb 2014). These approaches can be mutually \r\nreinforcing. For example, carbon pricing can incentivise low-carbon \r\ninnovation, while targeted support for emerging niche technologies \r\ncan make them more competitive encourage their diffusion and \r\nultimately facilitate a  higher level of carbon pricing. Similarly, the \r\nsuccess of feed-in tariffs in Germany only worked as well as it did \r\nbecause it formed part of a broader policy mix including 'supply-push' \r\nmechanisms such as subsidies for research and 'systemic measures' \r\nsuch as collaborative research projects and systems of knowledge \r\nexchange (Rogge et al. 2015)."


id: 8616f413a5482348a195826fe113f09e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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content:
"(Sections 4.4.1.7, 4.4.1.8, 4.4.1.9 and 4.4.1.10). Section 4.4.2 focuses \r\nspecifically on how shifts in development pathways can deliver both \r\nmitigation and adaptation. Finally, Section  4.4.3 discusses risks \r\nand uncertainties associated with combining shifting development \r\npathways and accelerating mitigation."


id: 4e35f33532e955fcc6da12b033b0817c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11030
content:
"Although many transformations in the past have been driven by \r\nthe emergence and diffusion of an innovative technology, policy \r\nintervention was frequent, especially in the more rapid ones \r\n(Michaelowa et al. 2018; Grubb et al. 2021). Likewise, it is not \r\nexpected that spontaneous behaviour change or market evolution \r\nalone yield the type of transformations outlined in the accelerated \r\nmitigation pathways described in Section  4.2.5, or in the shifts in \r\ndevelopment pathways described in Section 4.3.3. On the contrary, \r\nstringent temperature targets imply bold policies in the short term \r\n(Rockstrom et al. 2017; Kriegler et al. 2018) to enforce effective \r\nexisting policy instruments and regulations, as well as to reform or \r\nremove harmful existing policies and subsidies (Diaz et al. 2019)."


id: 7980dfc7f2e1ddc11dfd10f26184810f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Governance for climate mitigation and shifting development pathways \r\nis enhanced when tailored to national and local contexts. Improved \r\ninstitutions and governance enable ambitious climate action and help \r\nbridge implementation gaps (medium evidence, high agreement). \r\nImproving institutions involve a  broad range of stakeholders and \r\nmultiple regional and temporal scales. It necessitates a  credible \r\nand trusted process for reconciling perspectives and balancing \r\npotential side-effects, managing winners and losers and adopting \r\ncompensatory measures to ensure an inclusive and just transition \r\n(Newell and Mulvaney 2013; Miller and Richter 2014; Gambhir et al. \r\n2018; Diffenbaugh and Burke 2019), managing the risk of inequitable \r\nor non-representative power dynamics and avoiding regulatory \r\ncapture by special interests (Helsinki Design Lab 2011; Boulle et al. \r\n2015; Kahane 2012)."


id: 6deac5ddb7d2a793a9f060f1ce50d33a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Policy integration, addressing multiple objectives, is an essential \r\ncomponent of shifting development pathways and accelerating \r\nmitigation (robust evidence, high agreement). A shift in development \r\npathways that fosters accelerated mitigation may best be achieved \r\nthrough integrated actions that comprise policies in support of \r\nthe broader SDG agenda, based on country-specific priorities \r\n(Sections  4.3.2, 13.8 and 13.9). These may include for example, \r\nfiscal policies, or integrating industrial (Nilsson et al. 2021) and \r\nenergy policies (Fragkos et al. 2021) with climate policies. Similarly, \r\nsectoral transitions that aspire to shifting development pathways \r\ntowards sustainability often have multiple objectives, and deploy \r\na  diverse mix or package of policies and institutional measures \r\n(Cross-Chapter Box 5)."


id: ddf8a848ea8d8da6c6ad59ec6bdac162
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Innovative governance approaches can help meet these challenges \r\n(Clark et al. 2018; Diaz et al. 2019). Enabling multilevel governance - \r\ni.e., better alignment across governance scales - and coordination \r\nof international organisations and national governments can \r\nhelp accelerate a  transition to sustainable development and deep \r\ndecarbonisation (Tait and Euston-Brown 2017; Michaelowa and \r\nMichaelowa 2017; Ringel 2017; Revi 2017; Cheshmehzangi 2016; \r\nIPCC 2018a). Participatory and inclusive governance - partnerships "


id: d7a26025d2abd5f1e790d56829f5d7da
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"financial regulators and central banks, as detailed in Chapter  15. \r\nFinancial systems are an indispensable element of a  systemic \r\ntransition (Fankhauser et al. 2016; Naidoo 2020). Policy frameworks \r\ncan redirect financial resources towards low-emission assets \r\nand services (UNEP 2015), mainstreaming climate finance within \r\nfinancial and banking system regulation, and reducing transaction \r\ncosts for bankable mitigation technology projects (Mundaca et al. \r\n2013; Brunner and Enting 2014; Yeo 2019). Shifts in the financial \r\nsystem to finance climate mitigation and other SDGs can be achieved \r\nby aligning incentives and investments with multiple objectives \r\n(UNEP Inquiry 2016)."


id: ddba0f411a11902858c35baf18ca52a9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36270
content:
"between state and non-state actors, and concerted effort across \r\ndifferent stakeholders are crucial in supporting acceleration (Burch \r\net al. 2014; Hering et al. 2014; Roberts 2016; Figueres et al. 2017; \r\nClark et al. 2018; Leal Filho et al. 2018; Lee et al. 2018). So do \r\npartnerships through transnational climate governance initiatives, \r\nwhich coordinate nation states and non-state actors on an \r\ninternational scale (Hsu et al. 2018). Although they are unlikely \r\nto close the gap of the insufficient mitigation effort of national \r\ngovernments (Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2017) (Section  4.2.3), \r\nthey help building confidence in governments concerning climate \r\npolicy and push for more ambitious national goals (UNEP 2018b)."


id: 489807bf0158dec55470fc4be44d8daf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9988
content:
"The transition from traditional public climate finance interventions \r\nto the market-based support of climate mitigation (Bodnar et al. 2018) \r\ndemands innovative forms of financial cooperation and innovative \r\nfinancing mechanisms to help de-risk low-emission investments \r\nand support new business models. These financial innovations may \r\ninvolve sub-national actors like cities and regional governments \r\nin raising finance to achieve their commitments (Cartwright 2015; \r\nCCFLA 2017). Moreover, public-private partnerships have proved to \r\nbe an important vehicle for financing investments to meet the SDGs, \r\nincluding economic instruments for financing conservation (Sovacool \r\n2013; Diaz et al. 2019)."


id: ab9ddff9a57d022e470408168680ac69
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27431
content:
"Accelerated mitigation and shifting development pathways \r\nnecessitate both redirecting existing financial flows from high- to \r\nlow-emissions technologies and systems and providing additional \r\nresources (robust evidence, high agreement). An example is changes \r\nin investments from fossil fuels to renewable energy, with pressures \r\nto disinvest in the former while increasing levels of 'green finance' \r\n(Sections  6.7.4 and 15.5). While some lower-carbon technologies \r\nhave become competitive (Sections 1.4.3 and 2.5), support remains \r\nneeded for the low-emissions options have higher costs per unit of \r\nservice provided than high-emission ones. Lack of financial resources \r\nis identified as a major barrier to the implementation of accelerated \r\nmitigation and of shifts in development pathways. Overcoming this \r\nobstacle has two major components. One relates to private capital. \r\nThe other to public finance."


id: 9daba7e67a0f6c1791021f1035ce9fe1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24972
content:
"Overall, early action is needed to overcome barriers and to adjust the \r\nexisting incentive system to align national development strategies \r\nwith climate and sustainable development goals in the medium\u0002term. Steckel et al. (2017) conclude that climate finance could \r\nbecome a  central pillar of sustainable development by reconciling \r\nthe global goal of cost-efficient mitigation with national policy \r\npriorities. Without a more rapid, scaled redeployment of financing, "


id: 653349d8c94e30698e44ba00a82fdbf1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15074
content:
"in development trajectories that hinder the realisation of the global \r\ngoals will be locked in (Zadek and Robins 2016). Investment might \r\nbe designed to avoid trading off the Paris goals against other SDGs, \r\nas well as those that simultaneously reduce poverty, inequality, and \r\nemissions (Fuso Nerini et al. 2019)."


id: bf85b1ebad6e3219a6442ae1f9c0ddba
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30959
content:
"Climate actions are related to knowledge but even strongly to \r\nmotivational factors (Hornsey et al. 2016; Bolderdijk et al. 2013; \r\nBoomsma and Steg 2014), which explains the gap between awareness \r\nand action (Unal et al. 2018). Social influences, particularly from peers, \r\naffect people's engagement in climate action (Schelly 2014). Role \r\nmodels appear to have a solid basis in people's everyday preferences \r\n(WBGU 2011). Social norms can reinforce individuals' underlying \r\nmotivations and be effective in encouraging sustainable consumption \r\npatterns, as many examples offered by behavioural science illustrate. \r\nSocial networks also influence and spread behaviours (Service et al. \r\n2014; Clayton et al. 2015; Farrow et al. 2017; Shah et al. 2019). These \r\nsocial influences can be harnessed by climate policy."


id: be2f869d91319f5662cf3fa624170eea
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30728
content:
"Collective action by individuals as part of formal social movements \r\nor informal lifestyle movements underpins system change (robust \r\nevidence, high agreement) (Sections 5.4 and 5.5). Organisations are \r\ncomprised of individuals, but also become actors in their own right. \r\nRecent literature has considered the role of coalitions and social \r\nmovements in energy democracy and energy transitions towards \r\nsustainability (Hess 2018). Other scholars have examined the role of \r\nwomen in redistributing power, both in the sense of energy transition \r\nand in terms of gender relations (Allen et al. 2019; Routledge et al. \r\n2018). Mitigation and broader sustainable development policies that \r\nfacilitate active participation by stakeholders can build trust, forge \r\nnew social contracts, and contribute to a  positive cycle building \r\nclimate governance capacity (Section 5.2.3)."


id: ab9bdf51880980a5764e50620928d7f0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27430
content:
"Changes in behaviour and lifestyles are important to accelerated \r\nmitigation. Most global mitigation pathways that limit warming to \r\n2degC (>67%) or lower assume substantial behavioural and societal \r\nchange and low-carbon lifestyles (de Coninck et al. 2018; IPCC \r\n2018a; Luderer et al. 2018a) (see also Section 3.3.1 in this report; \r\nand Table  4.9 and Figure  4.3 in IPCC SR1.5). Chapter  5  concludes \r\nthat behavioural changes within transition pathways offer Gigaton\u0002scale CO2 savings potential at the global level, an often overlooked \r\nstrategy in traditional mitigation scenarios."


id: 3103b3ce2de6e737f90d53fe699b9200
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5872
content:
"However, behavioural change not embedded in structural change \r\nwill contribute little to climate change mitigation, suggesting that \r\nbehavioural change is not only a  function of individual agency \r\nbut also depends on other enabling factors, such as the provision \r\nof infrastructure and institutions (Section  5.4). Successful shifts \r\ntowards public transport, for example, involve technologies (buses, \r\ntrams), infrastructure (light rail, dedicated bus lanes), regulations \r\n(operational licenses, performance contracts), institutions (new \r\norganisations, responsibilities, oversight), and high-enough density, \r\nwhich in turn depends on such choices as housing or planning \r\npolicies (Section 4.4.1.9)."


id: ac6f73203a894e08b8f9483ae241a839
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27576
content:
"carbon transitions not only involves a shift of system elements but \r\nalso underlying routines and rules, and hence transitions shift the \r\ndirectionality of innovation. They hence concern the development \r\nof a  new paradigm or regime that is more focused on solving \r\nsustainability challenges that cannot be solved within the dominant \r\nregime they substitute (Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 16)."


id: 4e7ad8ba32e38a7f0be2ac8038a82dec
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11083
content:
"Developing countries have experienced a period of rapid economic \r\ngrowth in the past two decades. Patterns of growth have differed \r\nmarkedly across regions, with newly emerging East Asian economies \r\nbuilding on transition to manufacturing - as China has done in the \r\npast - while Latin American countries tend to transition directly from \r\nprimary sector to services (Rodrik 2016), and African countries tend \r\nto rely on productivity improvements in the primary sectors (Diao \r\net al. 2019). Yet many countries still face the challenge of getting out \r\nof the 'middle-income trap' (Agenor and Canuto 2015), as labour\u0002saving technological change and globalisation have limited options \r\nto develop via the manufacturing sector (Altenburg and Rodrik 2017)."


id: 1b8fae80ea1fb1c6e53103068063add6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2035
content:
"The direction of innovation matters (robust evidence, high agreement). \r\nThe research community has called for more 'responsible innovation' \r\n(Pandza and Ellwood 2013), 'open innovation' (Rauter et al. 2019), \r\n'mission-oriented' innovation (Mazzucato and Semieniuk 2017), \r\n'holistic innovation' (Chen et al. 2018b), 'next-generation innovation \r\npolicy' (Kuhlmann and Rip 2018) or 'transformative innovation' (Schot \r\nand Steinmueller 2018) so that innovation patterns and processes \r\nare commensurate to our growing sustainability challenges. There \r\nis a  growing recognition that new forms of innovation can be \r\nharnessed and coupled to climate objectives (Fagerberg et al. 2016; \r\nWang et al. 2018). As such, innovation and socio-technical change \r\ncan be channelled to intensify mitigation via 'deliberate acceleration' \r\n(Roberts et al. 2018a) and 'coalition building' (Hess 2018)."


id: 8099c3abd6bd539d1a39a3d92868ee1f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19752
content:
"Looking ahead, several studies have illustrated how structural \r\nchange towards sustainability could lead to reduced emissions \r\nintensity and higher mitigative capacity. In China, for example, \r\nthe shift away from heavy industry (to light industry and services) \r\nhas already been identified as the most important force limiting \r\nemissions growth (Guan et al. 2018), and as a major factor for future \r\nemissions (Kwok et al. 2018)."


id: d80467798f50271690cb2286f22afd2b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35309
content:
"Innovation goes beyond technology. For example, decarbonisation in \r\nsectors with long lived capital stock (such as heavy industry, buildings, \r\ntransport infrastructure) entail technology, policy and financing \r\ninnovations (Bataille 2020). Similarly, expanding the deployment \r\nof  photovoltaics can draw upon policies that support specific \r\ntechnical innovations (e.g., to improve photovoltaics efficiency), or \r\ninnovations in regulatory and market regimes (e.g.,  net-metering), \r\nto innovations in social organisation (e.g.,  community-ownership). \r\nSystem innovation is a core focus of the transitions literature (Grin \r\net al. 2010; Markard et al. 2012; Geels et al. 2017). Accelerating low\u0002"


id: 4ff021b6deaaa478bf01080fe32592ab
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11355
content:
"Overall, Altenburg et al. (2017) argue that reallocation of capital \r\nand labour from low- to high-productivity sectors - in other words, \r\nstructural change  - remains a  necessity, and that it is possible to \r\ncombine it with reduced environmental footprint (including, but not \r\nlimited to, mitigation). They argue that this dual challenge calls for \r\nstructural transformation policies different from those implemented \r\nin the past, most importantly through a  'systematic steering of \r\ninvestment behaviour in a socially agreed direction' and encompassing \r\npolicy coordination (limited evidence, medium agreement)."


id: 5f8731175be6a4c9215bbc0986957fc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14115
content:
"Mitigation offers an opportunity to create additional fiscal space, and \r\nthus to serve the objectives outlined above, by creating a new source \r\nof revenue for the government via carbon taxation or emissions \r\npermit auctioning and by reducing existing expenditures via reduction \r\nin subsidies to fossil-fuel. The 1991 tax reform in Sweden is an early \r\nexample in which environmental taxation (including, but not limited \r\nto, fossil fuel taxation) was introduced as part of a package primarily \r\naimed at lowering the marginal tax rates (more than 80% at the \r\ntime), at reducing other taxes, while keeping most of the welfare \r\nstate. To do so, the tax base was broadened, including through \r\nenvironmental and carbon taxation (Sterner 2007). Once in place, the \r\ncarbon tax rate was substantially ramped up over time, and its base \r\nbroadened (Criqui et al. 2019)."


id: c8ab9a18f8f4a20ebcfa9edd3aec9f7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"In order to permit progress on their SDG agendas, it is essential \r\nthat countries develop visions of their future decarbonised sectoral \r\nproduction structure, including its ability to generate growth in \r\nincomes, employment and foreign exchange earnings. as well as the \r\nrelated spatial distribution of production, employment, and housing. \r\nTo this extent, governance and institutional capacity matter, such as \r\navailability of tools to support long-term planning. A sectoral structure \r\nthat permits strong growth is essential given strong associations \r\nbetween growth in per-capita incomes and progress on most SDGs \r\n(including those related to poverty; health; education; and access to \r\nwater, sanitation, electricity, and roads; but not income equality), in \r\npart due to the fact that higher incomes provide both households \r\nand governments with resources that at least in part would be used \r\nto promote SDGs (Gable et al. 2015)."


id: 484bb5c17a170444b30f219c3b171b32
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9933
content:
"The future potential for using carbon taxation as a way to provide \r\nspace for fiscal reform has been highlighted in the so-called 'green \r\nfiscal reform' literature (Vogt-Schilb et al. 2019). The potential is \r\nlarge, since only 13% of global GHG emissions were covered by \r\ncarbon pricing schemes in 2019 (Watts et al. 2019) and since many \r\ncountries price carbon negatively by subsidising fossil fuel use, thus \r\ngenerating effects that are the opposite of those that positive carbon \r\nprices hope to promote. In 2018, the global subsidy value amounted \r\nto USD427 billion, some 10 times the payment for carbon use (Watts \r\net al. 2019). However, the size of the potential for creating fiscal \r\nspace varies strongly across countries given differences in terms of \r\ncurrent carbon prices and fuel subsidies."


id: b0cc73fc0564ed60c08ac29183adf514
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28331
content:
"The future viability of sectors will depend on the extent to which \r\nthey can remain profitable while relying on lower-carbon energy. \r\nThe challenge to identify alternative sectors of growth is particularly \r\nacute for countries that today depend on oil and natural gas for \r\nmost of their foreign exchange and government revenues (Mirzoev \r\net al. 2020). Changes in economic structure will also have gender \r\nimplications since the roles of men and women vary across sectors. \r\nFor example, in many developing countries, sectors in which women \r\nplay a  relatively important role, including agriculture and unpaid \r\nhousehold services like collection of water and fuel wood, may be \r\nnegatively affected by climate change (Roy 2018). It may thus be \r\nimportant to take complementary actions to address the gender \r\nimplications of changes in economic structure."


id: 28d36c67f58b2fb5a6d56830bf6336d8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4397
content:
"The limited adoption of and political support for carbon pricing \r\nmay be explained by the fact that most of the gains occur in the \r\nfuture and depend on actions across the globe, making them \r\nseem abstract and unpredictable, whereas the costs in the form of \r\nhigher carbon prices are immediate (Karapin 2016). Furthermore, \r\nthe links between carbon pricing and emissions may not be clear \r\nto the public who, in addition, may not trust that the government \r\nwill use budgetary savings according to stated plans. The latter may \r\nbe due to various factors, including a history of limited government \r\ncommitment and corruption (Withana 2016; Chadwick 2017; \r\nMaestre-Andres et al. 2019)."


id: 61c18161678fb019eca25dd7f88049c6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14489
content:
"Given strong complementarities between policies discussed above, \r\nan integrated policy approach is crucial. For example, as suggested, \r\nthe actions that influence the pace at which GHG emissions can be \r\ncut with political support may depend on taxation (including carbon \r\ntaxes), investments in infrastructure, spending on R&D, changes in \r\nincome distribution (influenced by transfers), and communication. \r\nIn this light, it is important to consider the demands that alternative \r\npolicy packages put on government policy-making efficiency and \r\ncredibility as well as the roles of other enabling conditions. In fact, \r\nplans to undertake major reforms may provide governments with \r\nimpetus to accelerate the enhancement of their capacities as part \r\nof the preparations (Karapin 2016; Withana 2016; Jakob et al. 2019)."


id: 6d9391c4f8647d95859799738f052bf1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16541
content:
"The literature reports limited systematic evidence based on ex post\r\nanalysis of the performance of carbon pricing  - carbon taxes and \r\ngreenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading systems (ETSs) (Haites \r\n2018). Performance assessment is complicated by the effect of other \r\npolicies and exogenous factors. Haites (2018) suggests that since \r\n2008, other policies have probably contributed more to emission \r\nreductions than carbon taxes, and most tax rates are too low to \r\nachieve mitigation objectives. Emissions under ETSs have declined, \r\nwith the exception of four systems without emissions caps (ibid). \r\nEvery jurisdiction with an ETS and/or carbon tax also has other \r\npolicies that affect its GHG emissions."


id: f12454859c836528a225275459debeec
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39806
content:
"In many countries, fiscal systems are currently under stress to provide \r\nresources for the implementation of development priorities, such as, \r\nfor example, providing universal health coverage and other social \r\nservices (Meheus and McIntyre 2017) or sustainably funding pension \r\nsystems in the context of aging populations (Asher and Bali 2017; \r\nCruz-Martinez 2018). Overall, Baum et al. (2017) argue that low\u0002income countries are likely not to have the fiscal space to undertake \r\nthe investment entailed in reaching the SDGs. To create additional \r\nfiscal space, major options include improving tax recovery, reducing \r\nsubsidies and levying additional taxes."


id: 8555ed4d11500aa035fbabd390e95889
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20593
content:
"To help policymakers overcome obstacles, research has reviewed the \r\ninternational experience from carbon pricing reforms. Elimination \r\nof fossil fuel subsidies, equivalent to the elimination of negative \r\ncarbon prices, have been more successful when they have included \r\ncomplementary and transparent measures that enjoy popular "


id: c7fffe5cf975101bd2fd109960ba7607
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:12
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32492
content:
"support, accompanied by a strong communications component that \r\nexplains the measures and stresses their benefits (Withana 2016; \r\nRentschler and Bazilian 2017; Maestre-Andres et al. 2019)."


id: 1116f35af6a5c253e760f2d530a8b06
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 200
content:
"Part of the losses (and related calls for compensation or exemptions) \r\ndue to carbon pricing are related to the fact that it hurts the \r\ncompetitiveness of sectors that face imports from countries with \r\nlower carbon prices, leading to 'carbon leakage' if carbon-intensive \r\nproduction (and related jobs) migrates from countries with relatively \r\nhigh carbon prices. Some research suggests that evidence that \r\na border carbon tax (or adjustment), set on the basis of the carbon \r\ncontent of the import, including a downward adjustment on the basis \r\nof any carbon payments (taxes or other) already made before entry, \r\ncould reduce carbon leakage while also raising additional revenue \r\nand encouraging carbon pricing in the exporting country (Withana \r\n2016; Cosbey et al. 2019)."


id: e86f3597aeb22f469f9d903ef4d32630
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"The spatial distribution of households and firms across urban and rural \r\nareas is a central characteristic of development pathways. Patterns of \r\nurbanisation, territorial development, and regional integration have \r\nwide-ranging implications for economic, social and environmental \r\nobjectives (World Bank 2009). Notably, choices regarding spatial \r\nforms of development have large-scale implications for demand for \r\ntransportation and associated GHG emissions."


id: bdfa84ff2cfb6c305c82a24404c6c7b4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30685
content:
"Exclusionary mechanisms such as decreasing accessibility and \r\naffordability of inner-urban neighbourhoods is a  major cause \r\nof suburbanisation of low- to middle-income households \r\n(e.g., Hochstenbach and Musterd 2018). Suburbanisation, in turn, is \r\nassociated with higher transportation demand (Bento et al. 2005) \r\nand higher carbon footprints for households (Jones and Kammen \r\n2014). Similarly, other studies find a significant positive link between \r\nhousing prices and energy demand (Lampin et al. 2013)."


id: 326754a643081f10238b8d7827bee952
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6123
content:
"Reducing emissions from transport in cities through traditional climate \r\npolicy instruments (e.g., through a carbon tax) is more difficult when \r\ninner-urban neighbourhoods are less accessible and less affordable, \r\nbecause exclusionary mechanisms act as a  countervailing force to \r\nthe rising transportation costs induced by the climate policy, pushing \r\nhouseholds outwards rather than inwards. Said differently, the costs \r\nof mitigating intra-city transportation emissions are higher when \r\ninner-urban housing prices are higher (Lampin et al. 2013)."


id: 9cf46e1c39f22404363cf45a50965579
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24851
content:
"an example of convertible investments - they will be decarbonised \r\nonce electricity production has switched to renewable energies. For \r\ncapital stocks that cannot be decarbonised, countries may face costs \r\nof decommissioning well before the end of their useful lifetimes, \r\nespecially when it is needed to respect country commitments to \r\nfuture full decarbonisation."


id: 958c43b9c1fe771ed603f760b22108b5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23513
content:
"This suggests that policies making inner-urban neighbourhoods more \r\naccessible and more affordable can open up broader opportunities \r\nfor suburban households to relocate in the face of increasing \r\ntransportation costs. This is particularly important for low- and \r\nmiddle-income households, who spend a  greater portion of their \r\nincome on housing and transportation, and are more likely to be \r\nlocked into locations that are distant from their jobs. Making inner\u0002urban neighbourhoods more accessible and more affordable has the \r\npotential to reduce both the social costs (e.g.,  households feeling \r\nhelpless in front of rising fuel prices) and the economic costs of \r\nmitigation policies - as a lower price of carbon is likely to achieve \r\nthe same amount of emission reductions since households have more \r\ncapacities to adjust."


id: 530ba4e84bd3eb9a5b7af322ed55be77
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11872
content:
"Many investments in infrastructure and sectoral capital stocks have \r\nlong lifetimes. Given this, it may be important to make sure that \r\ntoday's investments be fully decarbonised at the start or that they \r\nlater can be converted to zero carbon. Today's investments in electric \r\nvehicles in settings where electricity is produced with fossil fuels is "


id: b93720e8c1de6717eb0842c0a0bf221a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29790
content:
"This section examines how development pathways can build greater \r\nadaptive and mitigative capacity, and then turns to several examples \r\nof mitigation actions with implications for adaptation where there \r\nis a notable link to development pathways and policy choices. These \r\nexamples are in the areas of agriculture, blue carbon and terrestrial \r\necosystem restoration."


id: c3a2639ff43b6c472f252c786a0a99ab
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Brazil's progress in mitigation depended significantly on reduced \r\ndeforestation in the past. If deforestation rates keep on rising, \r\nmitigation efforts would need to shift to the energy sector. However, \r\naccording to Rochedo et al. (2018), mitigation costs in the energy \r\nsector in Brazil are three times the costs of reducing deforestation \r\nand increasing land-based carbon sinks. Further mitigation strategies \r\nmay depend on CCS in Brazil as elsewhere (Herreras Martinez \r\net al. 2015; Nogueira de Oliveira et al. 2016), though the economic \r\nfeasibility of deployment is not yet clear (Section 4.2.5.4)."


id: 519ae7fac4f2c4e96f66ca10f68f312d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11636
content:
"Mitigation actions are strongly linked to adaptation. These \r\nconnections come about because mitigation actions can be adaptive \r\n(e.g.,  some agroforestry projects) but also through policy choices \r\n(e.g.,  climate finance is allocated among adaptation or mitigation \r\nprojects) and even biophysical links (e.g.,  climate trajectories, \r\nthemselves determined by mitigation, can influence the viability of \r\nadaptation projects). As development pathways shape the levers and \r\nenablers available to a society (Section 4.3.1, Figure 4.7), a broader \r\nset of enabling conditions also helps with adaptation (medium \r\nevidence, high agreement)."


id: 1a753d4ec650cb893ac65acdd64a39b9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Previous assessments have consistently recognised this linkage. The \r\nParis Agreement includes mitigation and adaptation as key areas of \r\naction, through NDCs and communicating adaptation actions and \r\nplans. The Agreement explicitly recognises that mitigation co-benefits \r\nresulting from adaptation can count towards NDC targets. The IPCC \r\nFifth Assessment Report (IPCC 2014) emphasised that sustainable \r\ndevelopment is helpful in going beyond a narrow focus on separate \r\nmitigation and adaptation options and their specific co-benefits. \r\nThe IPCC Special Report on climate change and land addresses \r\nGHG emissions from land-based ecosystems with a  focus on the \r\nvulnerability of land-based systems to climate change. The report \r\nidentifies the potential of changes to land use and land management \r\npractices to mitigate and adapt to climate change, and to generate \r\nco-benefits that help meet other SDGs (Jian et al. 2019)."


id: dbc4b148fcb5e74265c14cd2a2535caf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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vector_id: 35953
content:
"Governance and institutional capacity necessary for mitigation \r\nactions also enables effective adaptation actions. Implementation of \r\nmitigation and adaptation actions can, however, encounter different \r\nsets of challenges. Mitigation actions requiring a  shift away from \r\nestablished sectors and resources (e.g., fossil fuels) entail governance \r\nchallenges to overcome vested interests (Piggot et al. 2020; SEI \r\net al. 2020). Mitigation-focused initiatives from non-state actors \r\ntend to attain greater completion than adaptation-focused initiatives \r\n(NewClimate Institute et al. 2019)."


id: 79627cdab4d12aef9a3be566bb066bd0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18552
content:
"Adaptation-focused pathways might reduce inequality, if adequate \r\nsupport is available and well-distributed (Pelling and Garschagen \r\n2019). Some studies suggest that cities might plan for possible \r\nsynergies in adaptation and mitigation strategies, currently done \r\nindependently (Grafakos et al. 2019). The literature suggests that \r\ncities might identify both mitigation and adaptation as co-benefits of \r\ninterventions targeted at developmental goals (Dulal 2017)."


id: 1109692514c2ca4ca1d861bf144854b0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 192
content:
"On the level of individual entities, adaptation is reactive to current \r\nor anticipated environmental changes but mitigation is undertaken \r\ndeliberately. Chapter  5  considers behavioural change, including \r\nthe reconsideration of values and what is meant by well-being, \r\nand reflecting on a range of actors addressing both adaptation and \r\nmitigation. Shifting development pathways may be disruptive (Cross\u0002Chapter Box  5), and there may be limits to propensity to change. \r\nSome studies report that climate change deniers and sceptics can be \r\ninduced to undertake pro-environmental action if those actions are \r\nframed in terms of societal welfare, not climate change (Bain et al. \r\n2012; Hornsey et al. 2016). Concrete initiatives to change behaviour \r\nand lifestyles include the Transition Town movement, which seeks \r\nto implement a just transition - both in relation to adaptation and \r\nmitigation - in specific localities (Roy et al. 2018)."


id: cf8740820364d8ad1a47f0c93f3703cc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33874
content:
"Finance and investment of mitigation actions must be examined in \r\nconjunction with funding of adaptation actions, due to biophysical \r\nlinkages and policy trade-offs (Box  15.1). Most climate funding \r\nsupports mitigation efforts, not adaptation efforts (Buchner et al. \r\n2019) (Halimanjaya and Papyrakis 2012). Mitigation projects are \r\noften more attractive to private capital (Abadie et al. 2013; Buchner \r\net al. 2019). Efforts to integrate adaptation and mitigation in climate \r\nchange finance are limited (Kongsager et al. 2016; Locatelli et al. 2016) \r\nThere is a perception that integration of mitigation and adaptation \r\nprojects would lead to competition for limited finance available for \r\nadaptation (Locatelli et al. 2016). Long-standing debates (Ayers and \r\nHuq 2009; Smith et al. 2011) whether development finance counts \r\nas adaptation funding remain unresolved. See Chapter 15 for more \r\nin-depth discussion relating investment in funding mitigation and \r\nadaptation actions."


id: 625df34da0957564ca11b19459480b34
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14588
content:
"Development is a  key factor leading to land degradation in many \r\nparts of the world (IPBES 2019b). Shifting development pathways to \r\nsustainability can include restoration and protection of ecosystems, \r\nwhich can enhance capacity for both mitigation and adaptation \r\nactions (IPBES 2019b)."


id: 4092e48b9a3519f8bd61ff604997f601
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8549
content:
"In this section, we explore mitigation actions related to sustainable \r\nagriculture, coastal ecosystems ('blue carbon'), and restoration and \r\nprotection of some terrestrial ecosystems. These mitigation actions \r\nare exemplary of trade-offs and synergies with adaptation, sensitivity \r\nto biophysical coupling, and linkages to development pathways. \r\nOther specific examples can be found in Chapters 6 to 11."


id: abf748d67af6f9b1a16b8f7bce7a6356
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27495
content:
"Farming system approaches can be a  significant contributor to \r\nmitigation pathways. These practices (which are not mutually \r\nexclusive) include agroecology, conservation agriculture, \r\nintegrated production systems and organic farming (Box  7.5). \r\nSuch methods have potential to sequester significant amounts of \r\nsoil carbon (Section 7.4.3.1) as well as reduce emissions from on\u0002field practices such as rice cultivation, fertilizer management, and \r\nmanure management (Section 7.4.3) with total mitigation potential \r\nof 3.9 +- 0.2 GtCO2-eq yr-1 (Chapter 7). Critically, these approaches \r\nmay have significant benefits in terms of adaptation and other \r\ndevelopment goals."


id: 73837ec4eeda39f911db66c2d517e53f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17576
content:
"2012; Tokoro et al. 2014) (see Cross-Chapter Box 8 on blue carbon as \r\na storage medium and removal process)."


id: f1f7ac3dfe8d18c27a5a3189b0ee7504
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39958
content:
"Farming system approaches to agricultural mitigation have a wide \r\nvariety of co-benefits and trade-offs. Indeed, there are conceptual \r\nformulations for these practices in which the co-benefits are more of \r\na focus, such as climate-smart agriculture (CSA) which ties mitigation \r\nto adaptation through its three pillars of increased productivity, \r\nmitigation, and adaptation (Lipper et al. 2014). The '4 per 1000' goal \r\nto increase soil carbon by 0.4% per year (Soussana et al. 2019) is \r\ncompatible with the three pillars of CSA. Sustainable intensification, \r\na framework which centers around a need for increased agricultural \r\nproduction within environmental constraints also complements CSA \r\n(Campbell et al. 2014). The literature reports examples of mitigation \r\nco-benefits of adaptation actions, with evidence from various regions \r\n(Thornton and Herrero 2015; Thornton et al. 2018) (Chapter 7)."


id: 21f8320ab3313c49bbcd6afe204cfcd5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3203
content:
"Restoring or protecting coastal ecosystems is a  mitigation action \r\nwith synergies with adaptation and development. Such restoration \r\nhas been described as a 'no regrets' mitigation option in the Special \r\nReport on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate (Bindoff \r\net al. 2019) and advocated as a climate solution at national scales \r\n(Bindoff et al. 2019; Taillardat et al. 2018; Fargione et al. 2018) and \r\nglobal scales (Howard et al. 2017). On a  per-area basis, carbon \r\nstocks in coastal ecosystems can be higher than in terrestrial forests \r\n(Howard et al. 2017), with below-ground carbon storage up to 1000 \r\ntC ha-1 (McLeod et al. 2011; Crooks et al. 2018; Bindoff et al. 2019). \r\nOverall, coastal vegetated systems have a  mitigation potential of \r\naround 0.5% of current global emissions, with an upper limit of less \r\nthan 2% (Bindoff et al. 2019)."


id: 600f5309b49555eb3eadc0c95f1ffac5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14207
content:
"Conservation agriculture, promoted for improving agricultural soils \r\nand crop diversity (Powlson et al. 2016) can help build adaptive \r\ncapacity (Smith et al. 2017; Pradhan et al. 2018a) and yield \r\nmitigation co-benefits through improved fertiliser use or efficient use \r\nof machinery and fossil fuels (Harvey et al. 2014; Cui et al. 2018; \r\nPradhan et al. 2018a)."


id: 9e5d73ae0914025aa92e80dfd0c2c24c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25089
content:
"There is a  complex set of barriers to implementation of farming\u0002system approaches for climate mitigation (Section 7.6.4), suggesting \r\na  need for deliberate shifts in development pathways to achieve \r\nsignificant progress in this sector. The link between NDCs and \r\nmitigation in the land use sector can provide impetus for such policies. \r\nFor example, there are multiple agricultural mitigation options that \r\nsoutheast Asian countries could use to meet NDCs that would have \r\nan important adaptive impact (Amjath-Babu et al. 2019)."


id: 516cfdeb2f6aee75414124dc63fce2ee
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11606
content:
"Some agricultural practices considered sustainable have trade-offs, \r\nand their implementation can have negative effects on adaptation or \r\nother ecosystem services. Fast-growing tree monocultures or biofuel \r\ncrops may enhance carbon stocks but reduce downstream water \r\navailability and decrease availability of agricultural land (Windham\u0002Myers et al. 2018; Kuwae and Hori 2019). In some dry environments \r\nsimilarly, agroforestry can increase competition with crops and \r\npastures, decreasing productivity, and reduce catchment water yield \r\n(Schrobback et al. 2011)."


id: 2fa6458bbbb04d2e6c013393b6e7b77e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5644
content:
"Coastal ecosystem-based mitigation can be cost-effective, but \r\ninterventions should be designed with care. One concern is to \r\nassure that actions remain effective at higher levels of climate \r\nchange (Alongi 2015; Bindoff et al. 2019). Also, methane emissions \r\nfrom ecosystems may partially reduce the benefit of the carbon \r\nsequestration (Rosentreter et al. 2018) depending on the salinity \r\n(Poffenbarger et al. 2011; Kroeger et al. 2017). As the main driver \r\nof mangrove forest loss is aquaculture/agriculture (Thomas et al. \r\n2017), there may be entrenched interests opposing restoration and \r\nprotection actions."


id: 8046d84c99659dfda6e2a91cfd71a11d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19699
content:
"Agricultural practices can adapt to climate change while decreasing \r\nCO2 emissions on the farm field. However, if such a practice leads \r\nto lower yields, interconnections of the global agricultural system \r\ncan lead to land use change elsewhere and a  net increase in \r\nGHG emissions (Erb et al. 2016). Implementation of sustainable \r\nagriculture can increase or decrease yields depending on context \r\n(Pretty et al. 2006)."


id: 35ad6ef6548ea8b99eb2da1d6f044a15
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6696
content:
"Restoration of terrestrial landscapes can be a  direct outcome of \r\ndevelopment pathways, and can be critical to achieving a variety of \r\nSDGs (especially 1, 2, 6, 8, 13, 15) (Vergara et al. 2016; Lapola et al. \r\n2018) although it also presents risks and can have trade-offs with \r\nother SDGs (Cao et al. 2010; Dooley and Kartha 2018). Landscape \r\nrestoration is nearly always a mitigation action, and can also provide \r\nadaptive capacity. While policy in Brazil has tended to focus on the \r\nAmazon as a carbon sink, the mitigation co-benefits of ecosystem\u0002based adaptation actions have been highlighted in the literature \r\n(Locatelli et al. 2011; Di Gregorio et al. 2016). A study of potential "


id: 352b33ff4d6761c24f460943f60bf68b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6600
content:
"The Paris Agreement recognises that mitigation co-benefits resulting \r\nfrom Parties' adaptation actions and/or economic diversification \r\nplans can contribute to mitigation outcomes (UNFCCC 2015a: \r\nArticle 4.7). Blue carbon refers to biologically-driven carbon flux or \r\nstorage in coastal ecosystems such as seagrasses, salt marshes, and \r\nmangroves (Wylie et al. 2016; Fennessy et al. 2019; Fourqurean et al. "


id: 86ccf5daa8963b2d0999938510f66df0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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vector_id: 20882
content:
"et al. 2017), and especially in major trading partners, the lack of \r\nwhich can result in competitive disadvantage for sectors exposed to \r\ninternational competition (Alton et al. 2014). The international prices \r\nof the key commodities (notably energy), goods and services are \r\nimportant, notably when shifting development pathway is based on \r\nstructural change (e.g., Willenbockel et al. 2017 for Ghana and Kenya)."


id: 9e36b014a625b4427a6c5fa043dd3ae5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25063
content:
"restoration of degraded lands in Latin America (Vergara et al. 2016) \r\nindicates that substantial benefits for mitigation, adaptation, and \r\neconomic development accrue after several years, underscoring \r\na reliance on deliberate development choices. In agricultural contexts, \r\nrestoration is a development choice that can enhance adaptive and \r\nmitigative capacity via impact on farmer livelihoods."


id: c99aa998907d46caeb5a09b6756b6e6d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32793
content:
"Preventing degradation of landscapes can support both mitigation \r\nand adaptation (IPCC 2019). Restoration of ecosystems is associated \r\nwith improved water filtration, groundwater recharge and flood \r\ncontrol and multiple other ecosystem services (Ouyang et al. 2016)."


id: 976ee082276c432ca24a54592a7a479c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23854
content:
"Restoration projects must be designed with care. There can be trade\u0002offs in addition to the synergies noted above (Section  7.6.4.3). \r\nRestorations may be unsuccessful if not considered in their socio\u0002economic context (Lengefeld et al. 2020; Iftekhar et al. 2017; Jellinek \r\net al. 2019). Restoration projects for mitigation purposes can be \r\nmore effective if done with adaptation in mind (Gray et al. 2011) as \r\na changing climate may render some mitigation actions biophysically \r\ninfeasible (Arneth et al. 2021). Landscape restoration projects \r\nintended for CDR may underperform due to future release of stored \r\ncarbon, or deferral of storage until after irreversible climate change \r\neffects (e.g. extinctions) (Dooley and Kartha 2018)."


id: 886834d80c978cf8ea3c4d4d6dbce9f4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21159
content:
"Afforestation plans have received substantial attention as a climate \r\nmitigation action, with ongoing unresolved debate on the feasibility \r\nand trade-offs of such plans. Such afforestation programs can fail \r\nfor biophysical reasons (Fleischman et al. 2020) (Section  7.4.2.2) \r\nbut also lack of consideration of socioeconomic and development \r\ncontexts (Fleischman et al. 2020)."


id: 7e620267d4d40d3f60b189ea432059f1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19397
content:
"Shifting development pathways and accelerating mitigation are \r\ncomplex endeavours that carry risks. Some of these risks can be easily \r\ncaptured by quantitative models. Others are better understood via \r\nqualitative approaches, such as qualitative narrative storylines (told \r\nin words) and methods mixing qualitative and quantitative models \r\n(Kemp-Benedict 2012; Hanger-Kopp et al. 2019). The following \r\noutline key risks and relevant hedging strategies identified in \r\nthe literature."


id: 53183205ee425939fc52a905b4327f16
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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vector_id: 11890
content:
"The science on climate change, its impacts and the opportunities to \r\nmitigate is continuously being updated. Even though decisions are no \r\nlonger made 'in a sea of uncertainty' (Lave 1991), we know that new \r\ninformation will come over time, that may have significant bearing on \r\nthe design and objectives of policies to shift development pathways \r\nand accelerate mitigation. New information may come from climate \r\nsciences (e.g.,  updated GWP values or available carbon budgets) \r\n(Quere et al. 2018), impact sciences (e.g.,  re-evaluation of climate \r\nimpacts associated with given emission pathways) (Ricke et al. 2018) \r\nor mitigation sciences (e.g.,  on availability of given technologies) \r\n(Lenzi et al. 2018; Giannousakis et al. 2020)."


id: 758cfd63dd4e2b702f40b0b98946f028
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17914
content:
"The international context is a major source of uncertainty for national\u0002level planning, especially for small- or medium-sized open economies, \r\nbecause the outcome of domestic choices may significantly depend \r\non decisions made by other countries and actor, over which national \r\ngovernments have limited or no control (Lachapelle and Paterson \r\n2013). Availability of foreign financial resources in countries with \r\nlimited domestic savings (Baum et al. 2017) and availability of \r\ntechnology transfers (Glachant and Dechezlepretre 2017) are some \r\nexamples. Other external decisions with significant bearing on \r\ndomestic action include mitigation policies in other countries (Dai "


id: 1862ebc13f448cf0ed631a4d941535bf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1500
content:
"At the same time, economic and social systems are characterised by \r\nhigh degree of inertia, via long-lived capital stock or urban forms \r\n(Lecocq and Shalizi 2014), or more broadly mutually reinforcing \r\nphysical, economic, and social constraints (Seto et al. 2016) that \r\nmay lead to carbon lock-ins (Erickson et al. 2015). Risks associated \r\nwith long-lasting fossil-fuel power plants have been the object of \r\nparticular attention. For example, Pfeiffer et al. (2018) estimate \r\nthat even if the current pipeline of power plants was cancelled, \r\nabout 20% of the existing capacity might be stranded to remain \r\ncompatible with 1.5degC or 2degC pathways - implying that additional \r\ncapital accumulation would lead to higher sunk costs associated with \r\nstranded assets (Ansar et al. 2013; Johnson et al. 2015; Kriegler et al. \r\n2018; Luderer et al. 2018b)."


id: 29412b7a191bcf75fcea63817a6dbda
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4473
content:
"Equity issues are often discussed in the literature via frameworks that \r\nare well-founded in the ethical literature and that have a strong bearing \r\non effort-sharing, but have not yet been quantitatively modelled \r\nand expressed in the form of an emissions allocation  quantified \r\nframework. These include, for example, ethical perspectives based \r\nin human rights (Johl and Duyck 2012), human capabilities (Klinsky \r\net al. 2017b), environmental justice (Mohai et al. 2009; Schlosberg \r\n2009), ecological debt (Srinivasana et al. 2008; Warlenius et al. 2015), \r\ntransitional justice (Klinsky 2017; Klinsky and Brankovic 2018), and \r\nplanetary boundaries (Hayha et al. 2016)."


id: 440af8fd520513d38a2ac6847567278f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9208
content:
"of a  just transition (ILO 2015; Rosemberg 2010). In recent years \r\nthe concept of a 'just transition' has gained increased traction, for \r\nexample incorporated in the outcome of the Rio+20 Earth Summit \r\nand more recently recognised in the preamble of the Paris Agreement, \r\nwhich states 'the imperative of a just transition of the workforce and \r\nthe creation of decent work and quality jobs in accordance with \r\nnationally defined development priorities' (UNFCCC 2015a). Some \r\nheads of state and government signed a Solidarity and Just Transition \r\nSilesia Declaration first introduced at COP24 in Poland (HoSG 2018)."


id: 4ff52faccafbad7ab91e856ad3b1ec50
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11358
content:
"Ultimately, equity consequences depend on how costs and benefits \r\nare initially incurred and how they are shared as per social contracts \r\n(Combet and Hourcade 2017), national policy, and international \r\nagreements. The literature suggests a  relationship between the \r\neffectiveness of cooperative action and the perception of fairness of \r\nsuch arrangements. Winkler et al. (2018) demonstrate that countries \r\nhave put forward a  wide variety of indicators and approaches for \r\nexplaining the fairness and ambition of their NDCs, reflecting the \r\nbroader range of perspectives found in the moral philosophical \r\nliterature cited above. Mbeva and Pauw (2016) further find that \r\nadaptation and financing issues take on greater salience in the \r\nnational perspectives reflected in the NDCs."


id: fa798734c978cbf9f7d537b23ed79784
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41433
content:
"Topics of equity and fairness have begun to receive a greater amount \r\nof attention within the energy and climate literature, namely through \r\nthe approaches of gender and race (Pearson et al. 2017; Lennon 2017; \r\nAllen et al. 2019), climate justice (Roberts and Parks 2007; Routledge \r\net al. 2018) (Roberts &  Parks, 2006; Routledge et al. 2018), and \r\nenergy justice (Sovacool and Dworkin 2014). While such approaches \r\nfrequently envision justice and equity as an ethical imperative, justice \r\nalso possesses the instrumental value of enabling deeper and more \r\nsocially acceptable mitigation efforts (Klinsky and Winkler 2018)."


id: 5c661caf1c9f4422f0b211becddcc975
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13511
content:
"A just transition at national, regional and local scales can help to \r\nensure that workers, communities, frontline communities and \r\nthe energy-poor are not left behind in the transition. Moreover, \r\na  just transition necessitates that rapid decarbonisation does not \r\nperpetuate asymmetries between richer and poorer states and \r\npeople (UNHRC 2020). Alliances around a just transition in countries \r\nacross the world take many forms (Box 4.6)."


id: dea85efd9c236a4c3a022fc073f44c52
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36433
content:
"As Figure 4.9 shows, no fewer than seven national commissions or task \r\nforces on a just transition existed as of 2020 as well as seven other \r\nsets of national policies and a  multitude of other actors, networks, \r\nand movements. For instance, the German phase-out of coal subsidies \r\ninvolved a  savings package for unemployed miners. Subsidy reform \r\npackages introduced by Iran, Namibia, the Philippines, Turkey, and \r\nUnited Kingdom provide similar compensating measures to affected \r\ngroups (Sovacool 2017). Spain's just transition plan for coal miners \r\nincludes early retirement, redundancy packages, silicosis compensation, \r\nretraining for green jobs, and priority job placement for former miners."


id: cc48b09fc80daaea23c98adc9affa5b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33260
content:
"Increasing speed of implementation, breadth of action across all sectors of the economy, and depth of emission reduction faces \r\nimportant obstacles, that are rooted in the underlying structure of societies (Section 4.2.7). Addressing these obstacles amounts to \r\nshifting away from existing developmental trends (i.e., shifting development pathways, Cross-Chapter Box 5). This can be done by \r\nstrengthening governance and institutional capacity, aligning technology and innovation systems with low-carbon development, \r\nfacilitating behaviour change and providing adequate finance within the context of multi-objective policy packages and sequences \r\n(Section  4.4.1). Shifting development pathways towards sustainability broadens the scope for, and is thus a  complement to, \r\naccelerated mitigation (Section 4.3)."


id: 9194b0c3f7b1932143439ef86c9639ab
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22839
content:
"Julius Partson Daka (Zambia), Sha Fu (China), James S. Gerber (the United States of America), \r\nSivan Kartha (the United States of America/India), Volker Krey (Germany/Austria), Hans Lofgren \r\n(the  United States of America/Sweden), Toshihiko Masui (Japan), Ritu Mathur (India), \r\nJoana  Portugal-Pereira (Brazil), Benjamin  K. Sovacool (Denmark), Maria Virginia Vilarino \r\n(Argentina), Nan Zhou (the United States of America)"


id: 5247eeae96898d996225d10cabc72cd9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11752
content:
"Lecocq, F., H. Winkler, J.P. Daka, S. Fu, J.S. Gerber, S. Kartha, V. Krey, H. Lofgren, T. Masui, R. Mathur, J. Portugal-Pereira, \r\nB.  K.  Sovacool, M. V. Vilarino, N. Zhou, 2022: Mitigation and development pathways in the near- to mid-term \r\nSupplementary Material. In IPCC, 2022: Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working \r\nGroup III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [P.R. Shukla, J. Skea, \r\nR. Slade, A. Al Khourdajie, R. van Diemen, D. McCollum, M. Pathak, S. Some, P. Vyas, R. Fradera, M. Belkacemi, A. Hasija, \r\nG. Lisboa, S. Luz, J. Malley, (eds.)]. Available from https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg3/."


id: 498a659966c6baec69fa2e85f88e4be7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10166
content:
"Table 4.SM.1: Overview of methods used for \r\nprojected emissions of NDCs and/or \r\ncurrent policies "


id: 200fa69ba78c637c99cc19b079f91e23
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2860
content:
"c \r\nCP: Cpolic\r\nNDCaddit\r\nNDCaddit\r\ne minus six \r\nrated Asse\r\n current po\r\nte Action Tr\r\n020)\r\nP 2020)\r\nmilis et al. \r\nmilis et al. \r\na et al. (202\r\net al. (2021\r\n et al. (2021\r\nted Policie\r\nth are bro\r\n on four di\r\not included "


id: 639ff65eef70dd63b9ffd94ec1a1d530
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14820
content:
"Patrick Devine-Wright (United Kingdom/Ireland), Julio Diaz-Jose (Mexico), Frank W. Geels (United \r\nKingdom/the Netherlands), Arnulf Grubler (Austria), Nadia Maizi (France/Algeria), Eric Masanet \r\n(the United States of America), Yacob Mulugetta (Ethiopia/United Kingdom), Chioma Daisy Onyige \r\n(Nigeria), Patricia E. Perkins (Canada), Alessandro Sanches-Pereira (Brazil), Elke Ursula Weber (the \r\nUnited States of America)"


id: 39c9897ae73c765d7c2e0b7e39f0d09c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7382
content:
"Jordana Composto (the United States of America), Anteneh Getnet Dagnachew (the Netherlands/\r\nEthiopia), Nandini Das (India), Robert Frank (the United States of America), Bipashyee Ghosh \r\n(India/United Kingdom), Niko Heeren (Switzerland/Norway), Linus Mattauch (Germany/\r\nUnited Kingdom), Josephine Mylan (United Kingdom), Gregory F. Nemet (the United States of \r\nAmerica/Canada), Mani Nepal (Nepal), Leila Niamir (Iran/Germany), Nick Pidgeon (United \r\nKingdom), Narasimha D. Rao (the United States of America), Lucia A. Reisch (United Kingdom), \r\nJulia Steinberger (Switzerland/United Kingdom), Linda Steg (the Netherlands), Cass R. Sunstein \r\n(the United States of America), Charlie Wilson (United Kingdom), Caroline Zimm (Austria)"


id: 5cdf4916dda1d3fc0557568dba549fbd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13605
content:
"Creutzig, F., J. Roy, P. Devine-Wright, J. Diaz-Jose, F.W. Geels, A. Grubler, N. Maizi, E. Masanet, Y. Mulugetta, C.D. Onyige, \r\nP.E. Perkins, A. Sanches-Pereira, E.U. Weber, 2022: Demand, services and social aspects of mitigation. In IPCC, 2022: Climate \r\nChange 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the \r\nIntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [P.R. Shukla, J. Skea, R. Slade, A. Al Khourdajie, R. van Diemen, D. McCollum, \r\nM. Pathak, S. Some, P. Vyas, R. Fradera, M. Belkacemi, A. Hasija, G. Lisboa, S. Luz, J. Malley, (eds.)]. Cambridge University \r\nPress, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA. doi: 10.1017/9781009157926.007."


id: f6200c4277228dc4e415241f1716bb3e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40662
content:
"the end-user and service-provisioning levels. Realisable service-level \r\nefficiency improvements could reduce upstream energy demand by \r\n45% in 2050. {5.3.2, Figure 5.10}"


id: 931d5655e65176754dadd942eda35b3c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23089
content:
"Assessment of the social science literature and regional case studies \r\nreveals how social norms, culture, and individual choices interact with \r\ninfrastructure and other structural changes over time. This provides \r\nnew insight into climate change mitigation strategies, and how \r\neconomic and social activity might be organised across sectors to \r\nsupport emission reductions. To enhance well-being, people demand \r\nservices and not primary energy and physical resources per  se. \r\nFocusing on demand for services and the different social and political \r\nroles people play broadens the participation in climate action."


id: ee931759fc4a40192c6d5b5fa4526213
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39352
content:
"Alternative service provision systems, for example those \r\nenabled through digitalisation, sharing economy initiatives \r\nand circular economy initiatives, have to date made a limited \r\ncontribution to climate change mitigation (medium confidence). \r\nWhile digitalisation through specific new products and applications \r\nholds potential for improvement in service-level efficiencies, without \r\npublic policies and regulations, it also has the potential to increase \r\nconsumption and energy use. Reducing the energy use of data centres, \r\nnetworks, and connected devices is possible in managing low-carbon \r\ndigitalisation. Claims on the benefits of the circular economy for \r\nsustainability and climate change mitigation have limited evidence. \r\n{5.3.4, 5.3.4.1, 5.3.4.2, Figure 5.12, Figure 5.13}"


id: 62da59fb0164a2b3a213fb5e6c59b78d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14687
content:
"Demand-side mitigation and new ways of providing services \r\ncan help avoid, shift, and improve final service demand. Rapid \r\nand deep changes in demand make it easier for every sector \r\nto reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the short and \r\nmedium term (high confidence). {5.2, 5.3}"


id: e0ec4727b46bb0b4dee75cfcc7e461e4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36836
content:
"Decent living standards and well-being for all are achievable \r\nthrough the implementation of high-efficiency low demand \r\nmitigation pathways (medium confidence). Decent living standards \r\n(DLS) - a benchmark of minimum material conditions for human well\u0002being - overlaps with many Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). \r\nMinimum requirements of energy use consistent with enabling \r\nwell-being for all is between 20 and 50 GJ per person per year (cap-1 yr-1) \r\ndepending on the context. {5.2.2.1, 5.2.2.2, Box 5.3}"


id: 793f7d01ca45ef23673182273bddf41
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18525
content:
"Providing better services with less energy and resource \r\ninput has high technical potential and is consistent with \r\nproviding well-being for all (medium confidence). Assessment \r\nof 19 demand-side mitigation options and 18 different constituents \r\nof well-being show that positive impacts on well-being outweigh \r\nnegative ones by a factor of 11. {5.2, 5.2.3, Figure 5.6}"


id: e1a6b53ffe611a1611dbea287480093e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36971
content:
"Demand-side mitigation options bring multiple interacting \r\nbenefits (high confidence). Energy services to meet human needs \r\nfor nutrition, shelter, health, and so on are met in many different ways, \r\nwith different emissions implications that depend on local contexts, \r\ncultures, geography, available technologies, and social preferences. \r\nIn the near term, many less-developed countries and poor people \r\neverywhere require better access to safe and low-emissions energy \r\nsources to ensure decent living standards and increase energy savings \r\nfrom service improvements by about 20-25%. {5.2, 5.4.5, Figure 5.3, \r\nFigure 5.4, Figure 5.5, Figure 5.6, Box 5.2, Box 5.3}"


id: a77f58248c58461c4d488e18e5d38b01
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26681
content:
"Socio-cultural and lifestyle changes can accelerate climate change \r\nmitigation (medium confidence). Among 60 identified actions that \r\ncould change individual consumption, individual mobility choices have \r\nthe largest potential to reduce carbon footprints. Prioritising car-free \r\nmobility by walking and cycling and adoption of electric mobility could \r\nsave 2 tCO2-eq cap-1 yr-1. Other options with high mitigation potential \r\ninclude reducing air travel, heating and cooling set-point adjustments, \r\nreduced appliance use, shifts to public transit, and shifting consumption \r\ntowards plant-based diets. {5.3.1, 5.3.1.2, Figure 5.8}"


id: 7f81347df28e57411c640a97e341dac8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19577
content:
"Granular technologies and decentralised energy end use, \r\ncharacterised by modularity, small unit sizes and small unit \r\ncosts, diffuse faster into markets and are associated with \r\nfaster technological learning benefits, greater efficiency, more \r\nopportunities to escape technological lock-in, and greater \r\nemployment (high confidence). Examples include solar photovoltaic \r\nsystems, batteries, and thermal heat pumps. {5.3, 5.5, 5.5.3}"


id: 5cf80d3ab6a2de8d2b09cdeb20a80d0a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13622
content:
"Leveraging improvements in end-use service delivery through \r\nbehavioural and technological innovations, and innovations \r\nin market organisation, leads to large reductions in upstream \r\nresource use (high confidence). Analysis of indicative potentials \r\nrange from a factor 10- to 20-fold improvement in the case of available \r\nenergy (exergy) analysis, with the highest improvement potentials at "


id: 75809e44aa53ec2a155d4e807e4ea8b0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17899
content:
"The way choices are presented to consumers is known as 'choice architecture' in the field of behavioural economics."


id: d4ea195b295c4461b65140b87fe4c4e1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34776
content:
"while maintaining decent living standards and well-being \r\n(high confidence). Individuals with high socio-economic status \r\nare capable of reducing their GHG emissions by becoming role \r\nmodels of low-carbon lifestyles, investing in low-carbon businesses, \r\nand advocating for stringent climate policies. {5.4.1, 5.4.3, 5.4.4, \r\nFigure 5.14}"


id: 734c528f538218bfeedbae456cee4346
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17537
content:
"Demand-side solutions require both motivation and capacity \r\nfor change (high confidence). Motivation by individuals or \r\nhouseholds worldwide to change energy consumption behaviour is \r\ngenerally low. Individual behavioural change is insufficient for climate \r\nchange mitigation unless embedded in structural and cultural change. \r\nDifferent factors influence individual motivation and capacity for \r\nchange in different demographics and geographies. These factors go \r\nbeyond traditional socio-demographic and economic predictors and \r\ninclude psychological variables such as awareness, perceived risk, \r\nsubjective and social norms, values, and perceived behavioural control. \r\nBehavioural nudges promote easy behaviour change, for example \r\n'Improve' actions such as making investments in energy efficiency, \r\nbut fail to motivate harder lifestyle changes (high confidence). {5.4}"


id: e3da9633184b9319d5018fca16f945bc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37375
content:
"The current effects of climate change, as well as some mitigation \r\nstrategies, are threatening the viability of existing business \r\npractices, while some corporate efforts also delay mitigation \r\naction (medium confidence). Policy packages that include job \r\ncreation programmes help to preserve social trust, livelihoods, \r\nrespect, and dignity of all workers and employees involved. Business \r\nmodels that protect rent-extracting behaviour may sometimes delay \r\npolitical action. Corporate advertisement and marketing strategies \r\nmay also attempt to deflect corporate responsibility to individuals \r\nor aim to appropriate climate care sentiments in their own brand \r\nbuilding. {5.4.3, 5.6.4}"


id: b68e6b19d5875ee5a6baedb890c72c2c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29323
content:
"Meta-analyses demonstrate that behavioural interventions, \r\nincluding the way choices are presented to consumers,1 work \r\nsynergistically with price signals, making the combination \r\nmore effective (medium confidence). Behavioural interventions \r\nthrough nudges, and alternative ways of redesigning and motivating \r\ndecisions, alone provide small to medium contributions to reduce \r\nenergy consumption and GHG emissions. Green defaults, such as \r\nautomatic enrolment in 'green energy' provision, are highly effective. \r\nJudicious labelling, framing, and communication of social norms can \r\nalso increase the effect of mandates, subsidies, or taxes. {5.4, 5.4.1, \r\nTable 5.3a, Table 5.3b}"


id: b3b09e6a479c4d8f3b0a84bc1c8aafd1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28857
content:
"Middle actors - professionals, experts, and regulators - play \r\na  crucial, albeit underestimated and underutilised, role in \r\nestablishing low-carbon standards and practices (medium \r\nconfidence). Building managers, landlords, energy efficiency \r\nadvisers, technology installers, and car dealers influence patterns \r\nof mobility and energy consumption by acting as middle actors or \r\nintermediaries in the provision of building or mobility services and \r\nneed greater capacity and motivation to play this role. {5.4.3}"


id: ddfa36d0bc5bbcb542f080776dc7b5a1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36318
content:
"Coordinated change in several domains leads to the \r\nemergence of new low-carbon configurations with cascading \r\nmitigation effects (high confidence). Demand-side transitions \r\ninvolve interacting and sometimes antagonistic processes on the \r\nbehavioural, socio-cultural, institutional, business, and technological \r\ndimensions. Individual- or sectoral-level change may be stymied by \r\nreinforcing social, infrastructural, and cultural lock-ins. Coordinating \r\nthe way choices are presented to end users and planners, physical \r\ninfrastructures, new technologies and related business models can \r\nrapidly realise system-level change. {5.4.2, 5.4.3, 5.4.4, 5.4.5, 5.5}"


id: c75d9485804209e162214a15440f3428
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32392
content:
"Social influencers and thought leaders can increase the \r\nadoption of low-carbon technologies, behaviours, and lifestyles \r\n(high confidence). Preferences are malleable and can align with \r\na cultural shift. The modelling of such shifts by salient and respected \r\ncommunity members can help bring about changes in different \r\nservice provisioning systems. Between 10% and 30% of committed \r\nindividuals are required to set new social norms. {5.2.1, 5.4}"


id: f22e222168a60716dcdb93c3e757f7c8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40001
content:
"Cultural change, in combination with new or adapted \r\ninfrastructure, is necessary to enable and realise many 'Avoid' \r\nand 'Shift' options (medium confidence). By drawing support \r\nfrom diverse actors, narratives of change can enable coalitions to \r\nform, providing the basis for social movements to campaign in favour \r\nof (or against) societal transformations. People act and contribute to \r\nclimate change mitigation in their diverse capacities as consumers, \r\ncitizens, professionals, role models, investors, and policymakers. \r\n{5.4, 5.5, 5.6}"


id: ef085ca4b4b8024a963ef6f1b60377da
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39422
content:
"Social equity reinforces capacity and motivation for mitigating \r\nclimate change (medium confidence). Impartial governance "


id: 38afea013cb77473ed06728e747bae3f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7179
content:
"such as fair treatment by law and order institutions, fair treatment \r\nby gender, and income equity, increases social trust, thus enabling \r\ndemand-side climate policies. High status (often high carbon) item \r\nconsumption may be reduced by taxing absolute wealth without \r\ncompromising well-being. {5.2, 5.4.2, 5.6}"


id: fbda0ecfba71efcfb67c1a0f9d9d7c34
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41674
content:
"Policies that increase the political access and participation \r\nof women, racialised, and marginalised groups increase the \r\ndemocratic impetus for climate action (high confidence). \r\nIncluding more differently situated knowledge and diverse perspectives \r\nmakes climate mitigation policies more effective. {5.2, 5.6}"


id: ad1b6895b3a98519d802738ceeb34a47
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27695
content:
"Carbon pricing is most effective if revenues are redistributed \r\nor used impartially (high confidence). A carbon levy earmarked \r\nfor green infrastructures or saliently returned to taxpayers \r\ncorresponding to widely accepted notions of fairness increases the \r\npolitical acceptability of carbon pricing. {5.6, Box 5.11}"


id: cef2fc762925f6056605f99c14e3fc81
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33748
content:
"Greater contextualisation and granularity in policy approaches \r\nbetter addresses the challenges of rapid transitions towards \r\nzero-carbon systems (high confidence). Larger systems take \r\nmore time to evolve, grow, and change compared to smaller ones. \r\nCreating and scaling up entirely new systems takes longer than \r\nreplacing existing technologies and practices. Late adopters tend to \r\nadopt faster than early pioneers. Obstacles and feasibility barriers \r\nare high in the early transition phases. Barriers decrease as a result \r\nof technical and social learning processes, network building, scale \r\neconomies, cultural debates, and institutional adjustments. {5.5, 5.6}"


id: 54a6b5432d8fe40005c0957da203f02
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12166
content:
"The lockdowns implemented in many countries in response \r\nto the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated that behavioural \r\nchange at a massive scale and in a short time is possible (high \r\nconfidence). COVID-19 accelerated some specific trends, such as \r\nincreased uptake of urban cycling. However, the acceptability of \r\ncollective social change over a longer term towards less resource\u0002intensive lifestyles depends on social mandate building through \r\npublic participation, discussion and debate over information provided \r\nby experts, to produce recommendations that inform policymaking. \r\n{Box 5.2}"


id: bf0f8e9e67436f73a3b8684ed1ffec80
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30887
content:
"Mitigation policies that integrate and communicate with the \r\nvalues people hold are more successful (high confidence). Values \r\ndiffer between cultures. Measures that support autonomy, energy \r\nsecurity and safety, equity and environmental protection, and fairness \r\nresonate well in many communities and social groups. Changing from \r\na commercialised, individualised, entrepreneurial training model to an \r\neducation cognisant of planetary health and human well-being can \r\naccelerate climate change awareness and action. {5.4.1, 5.4.2}"


id: fa10ee87b15ad73ad5addd8460c3edbd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41358
content:
"Changes in consumption choices that are supported by \r\nstructural changes and political action enable the uptake of \r\nlow-carbon choices (high confidence). Policy instruments applied \r\nin coordination can help to accelerate change in a consistent desired \r\ndirection. Targeted technological change, regulation, and public \r\npolicy can help in steering digitalisation, the sharing economy, and \r\ncircular economy towards climate change mitigation. {5.3, 5.6}"


id: b94add4a0bc15579479d2b4602cf937
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29809
content:
"emphasises equity and universal need satisfaction, compatible with \r\nprogress towards meeting the Sustainable Development Goals \r\n(SDGs) (Lamb and Steinberger 2017)."


id: 90d4afe2431b79dc58be2096e31fc1c4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22688
content:
"The requisites for well-being include collective and social interactions \r\nas well as consumption-based material inputs. Moreover, rather than \r\nmaterial inputs per se, people need and demand services for dignified \r\nsurvival, sustenance, mobility, communication, comfort and material \r\nwell-being (Nakicenovic et al. 1996b; Johansson et al. 2012; Creutzig \r\net al. 2018). These services may be provided in many different context\u0002specific ways using physical resources (biomass, energy, materials, \r\netc.) and available technologies (e.g.,  cooking tools, appliances). \r\nHere we understand demand as demand for services (often requiring \r\nmaterial input), with particular focus on services that are required for \r\nwell-being (such as lighting, accessibility, shelter, etc.), and that are \r\nshaped by culturally and geographically differentiated social aspects, \r\nchoice architectures and the built environment (infrastructures)."


id: 5dc85a757d645a772417a09b686a025c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13792
content:
"Three entry points are relevant for this chapter. First, well-designed \r\ndemand for services scenarios are consistent with adequate levels \r\nof well-being for everyone (Rao and Baer 2012; Grubler et al. 2018; \r\nMastrucci et al. 2020; Millward-Hopkins et al. 2020), with high and/\r\nor improved quality of life (Max-Neef 1995), improved levels of \r\nhappiness (Easterlin et al. 2010) and sustainable human development \r\n(Arrow et al. 2013; Dasgupta and Dasgupta 2017)."


id: a9331768f921a0ccca207b6ded76259b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26991
content:
"Sector-specific mitigation approaches (Chapters 6-11) emphasise \r\nthe potential of mitigation via improvements in energy- and \r\nmaterials-efficient manufacturing (Gutowski et  al. 2013; Gramkow \r\nand Anger-Kraavi 2019; Olatunji et al. 2019; Wang et al. 2019), new \r\nproduct design (Fischedick et  al. 2014), energy-efficient buildings \r\n(Lucon et al. 2014), shifts in diet (Bajzelj et al. 2014; Smith et al. 2014), \r\ntransport infrastructure design (Sims et al. 2014), and compact urban \r\nforms (Seto et  al. 2014). In this chapter, service-related mitigation \r\nstrategies are categorised as 'Avoid', 'Shift', or 'Improve' options to "


id: 28d6510521bcdc14b82c3d4d427f26b5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4401
content:
"designed by urban planners and building and transport professionals, \r\ncorresponding investments, and a  political culture supportive of \r\nmitigation action. This is particularly true for many 'Avoid' and 'Shift' \r\ndecisions that are difficult because they encounter psychological \r\nbarriers of breaking routines, habits and imagining new lifestyles \r\nand the social costs of not conforming to society (Kaiser 2006). \r\nSimpler 'Improve' decisions like energy efficiency investments, on \r\nthe other hand, can be triggered and sustained by traditional policy \r\ninstruments, complemented by behavioural nudges."


id: d4679de87a93cf4ccb0dec9fc5b1803b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34691
content:
"Figure 5.1 | Low Energy Demand Scenario needs no BECCS and needs less decarbonisation effort. Dependence of the size of the mitigation effort to reach a 1.5degC \r\nclimate target (cumulative GtCO2 emission reduction 2020-2100 by option) as a function of the level of energy demand (average global final energy demand 2020-2100 in \r\nEJ yr-1) in baseline and corresponding 1.5degC scenarios (1.9 W m-2 radiative forcing change) based on the IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5degC (data obtained from \r\nthe Scenario Explorer database, LED baseline emission data obtained from authors). In this figure an example of remaining carbon budget of 400 Gt has been taken from Rogelj \r\net al. (2019) for illustrative purposes. 400 Gt is also the number given in Table SPM.2 (IPCC 2021, p. 29) for a probability of 67% to limit global warming to 1.5degC."


id: bd0c4e2bd2562a1a206bd9a3cbdd78e8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30507
content:
"with social change to integrate Improving ways of living, Shifting \r\nmodalities and Avoiding certain kinds of emissions altogether \r\n(Section 5.6)."


id: fb99c66725da5f265441a13b6699f7ad
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41635
content:
"consumption patterns within the widely recognised constraints of \r\nplanetary boundaries, resource availability, and the need to provide \r\ndecent living standards for all (Langhelle 2000; Toth and Szigeti \r\n2016; O'Neill et  al. 2018). Inversely, reduced poverty and higher \r\nsocial equity offer opportunities for delinking demand for services \r\nfrom emissions, for example via more long-term decision-making \r\nafter having escaped poverty traps and by reduced demand for \r\nnon-well-being-enhancing status consumption (Nabi et  al. 2020; \r\nOrtega-Ruiz et al. 2020; Parker and Bhatti 2020; Teame and Habte \r\n2020) (Section 5.3)."


id: abaaf9ac7a2d36dc4e94a1ec3a0569d0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27441
content:
"Social practice theory emphasises that material stocks and social \r\nrelations are key in forming and maintaining habits (Reckwitz 2002; \r\nHaberl et al. 2021). This chapter reflects these insights by assessing \r\nthe role of infrastructures and social norms in GHG emission-intensive \r\nor low-carbon lifestyles (Section 5.4)."


id: e9ba12ad46bcdcbde66bd6bf8df1b60
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38473
content:
"A core operational principle for sustainable development is equitable \r\naccess to services to provide well-being for all, while minimising \r\nresource inputs and environmental and social externalities/trade\u0002offs, underpinning the Sustainable Development Goals (Princen \r\n2003; Lamb and Steinberger 2017; Dasgupta and Dasgupta 2017). \r\nSustainable development is not possible without changes in "


id: a49646454cbf9b4221cc7a2f709ff748
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26169
content:
"Throughout this chapter we discuss how people can realise various \r\nopportunities to reduce GHG emission-intensive consumption \r\n(Sections 5.2 and 5.3), and act in various roles (Section  5.4), \r\nwithin an enabling environment created by policy instruments and \r\ninfrastructure that build on social dynamics (Section 5.6)."


id: a38e5dc7cf6f05d8cd2d902fb684ad1d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25982
content:
"A bibliometric overview of the literature found 99,065 academic peer-reviewed papers identified with 34 distinct search queries \r\naddressing relevant content of this chapter (Creutzig et al. 2021a). The literature is growing rapidly (15% yr -1) and the literature body \r\nassessed in the AR6 period (2014-2020) is twice as large as all literature published before."


id: c5e8941a183c64f3dcf5881be1fe7a7d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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vector_id: 32129
content:
"Box 5.1, Figure 1 | Map of the literature on demand, services and social aspects of climate change mitigation. Dots show document positions obtained \r\nby reducing the 60-dimensional topic scores to two dimensions aiming to preserve similarity in overall topic score. The two axes therefore have no direct interpretation \r\nbut represent a reduced version of similarities between documents across 60 topics. Documents are coloured by query category. Topic labels of the 24 most relevant \r\ntopics are placed in the centre of each of the large clusters of documents associated with each topic. % value in caption indicates the proportion of studies in each \r\n'relevance' bracket. Source: reused with permission from Creutzig et al. (2021a)."


id: 83937458bb29537e7a2780bbef19f3c5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20291
content:
"Section 5.2 provides evidence on the links among mitigation and well\u0002being, services, equity, trust, and governance. Section 5.3 quantifies \r\nthe demand-side opportunity space for mitigation, relying on the \r\nAvoid-Shift-Improve framework. Section  5.4 assesses the relevant \r\ncontribution of different parts of society to climate change mitigation. \r\nSection  5.5 evaluates the overall dynamics of social transition "


id: c99012449ee347861c598869f3ce8c00
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32786
content:
"processes while Section 5.6 summarises insights on governance and \r\npolicy packages for demand-side mitigation and well-being. A Social \r\nScience Primer (Chapter  5 Supplementary Material I) defines and \r\ndiscusses key terms and social science concepts used in the context \r\nof climate change mitigation."


id: 6ae0c10e6950d2244792e6e2bdf5bc5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16088
content:
"There is now high evidence and high agreement that the COVID-19 pandemic has increased the political feasibility of large-scale \r\ngovernment actions to support the services for provision of public goods, including climate change policies. Many behavioural changes \r\ndue to COVID-19 reinforce sufficiency and emphasis on solidarity, economies built around care, livelihood protection, collective action, \r\nand basic service provision, linked to reduced emissions."


id: d2d4de28238a05427cdc226e820cc5ce
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34443
content:
"COVID-19 drove hundreds of millions of people below poverty thresholds, reversing decades of poverty reduction accomplishments (Krieger \r\n2020; Mahler et al. 2020; Patel et al. 2020; Sumner et al. 2020) and raising the spectre of intersecting health and climate crises that are \r\ndevastating for the most vulnerable (Flyvbjerg 2020; Phillips et al. 2020). Like those of climate change, pandemic impacts fall heavily on \r\ndisadvantaged groups, exacerbate the uneven distribution of future benefits, amplify existing inequities, and introduce new ones (Beaunoyer \r\net al. 2020; Devine-Wright et al. 2020). Addressing such inequities is a positive step towards the social trust that leads to improved climate \r\npolicies as well as individual actions. Increased support for care workers and social infrastructures within a solidarity economy is consistent \r\nwith lower-emission economic transformation (Shelley 2017; Di Chiro 2019; Pichler et al. 2019; Smetschka et al. 2019)."


id: c5b467276feed1ec9e8c99c7ea307971
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32089
content:
"which is inclusive, compatible with sustainable development, and \r\ngenerates multiple ways to mitigate emissions. Development targeted \r\nto basic needs and well-being for all entails less carbon intensity than \r\nGDP-focused growth (Rao et al. 2014; Lamb and Rao 2015)."


id: 51001606cf0e77aa4ec6c2da58adcb82
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11531
content:
"Because of data limitations, which can make cross-country \r\ncomparisons difficult, health-based indicators and in particular life \r\nexpectancy (Lamb et  al. 2014) have sometimes been proposed as \r\nquick and practical ways to compare local or national situations, \r\nclimate impacts, and policy effects (Decancq et al. 2009; Sager 2017; \r\nBurstein et al. 2019). A number of different well-being metrics are \r\nvaluable in emphasising the constituents of what is needed for \r\na  decent life in different dimensions (Lamb and Steinberger 2017; \r\nPorter et al. 2017; Smith and Reid 2018). The SDGs overlap in many \r\nways with such indicators, and the data needed to assess progress \r\nin meeting the SDGs is also useful for quantifying well-being (Gough \r\n2017). For the purposes of this chapter, indicators directly relating \r\nGHG emissions to well-being for all are particularly relevant."


id: ea795c5e84edf3ac8e39a07b9452fe2c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38617
content:
"role in determining energy demand. Hence, demand-side and service\u0002oriented mitigation strategies are most effective if geographically \r\nand culturally differentiated (Niamir et al. 2020a)."


id: f8e01cee129be60ce792fd3684fe1090
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41150
content:
"with lower subjective well-being, is more strongly associated with \r\npoor subjective well-being in more-developed countries (Frongillo \r\net al. 2019); in wealthier countries, the relationship between living in \r\nrural areas is less strongly associated with negative well-being than \r\nin less-developed countries (Requena 2016); and income inequality \r\nis negatively associated with subjective well-being in developed \r\ncountries, but positively so in less-developed countries (Ngamaba \r\net al. 2018). This chapter connects demand-side climate mitigation \r\noptions to multiple dimensions of well-being, going beyond the \r\nsingle dimensional metric of GDP which is at the core of IAMs. Many \r\ndemand side-mitigation solutions generate positive and negative \r\nimpacts on wider dimensions of human well-being which are not \r\nalways quantifiable (medium evidence, medium agreement)."


id: 922d400f8b520c589ef7f0a5f5541cd4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22935
content:
"There is high evidence and high agreement in the literature that vital \r\ndimensions of human well-being correlate with consumption, but \r\nonly up to a threshold. High potential for mitigation lies in using low\u0002carbon energy for new basic needs satisfaction while cutting emissions \r\nof those whose basic needs are already met (Grubler et  al.  2018; \r\nRao and Min 2018b; Rao et al. 2019b; Millward-Hopkins et al. 2020;"


id: 5d005286753a3a0336385af6473ba365
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13630
content:
"2 The countries and areas classification in this figure deviate from the standard classification scheme adopted by WGIII as set out in Annex II, section 1."


id: 524ca711a13527fc173e5c68a45c6d1f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11757
content:
"b. Within country heterogeneity in service levels as a function of income differences for \r\nthe Netherlands (bottom and 10% of incomes) and India (bottom and top 25% of incomes)."


id: dc09aa41776bee11d9c484a00a8a4af2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35991
content:
"c. Globally averaged \"decent living energy\" (DLE) per capita scenario in 2050 by region. \r\nThe major contributors to DLE are nutrition and mobility at ~3 GJ cap-1 yr-1 each.* "


id: f5340784e5cad3936b8ec1a51cec276
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40508
content:
"resource assets and local contexts. Provisioning for human needs \r\nis recognised as participatory and inter-relational; transformative \r\nmitigation potential can be found in social as well as technological \r\nchange (Mazur and Rosa 1974; Goldemberg et al. 1985; Lamb and \r\nSteinberger 2017; O'Neill et al. 2018; Hayward and Roy 2019; Vita \r\net al. 2019a). More equitable societies which provide DLS for all can \r\ndevote attention and resources to mitigation (Richards 2003; Dubash \r\n2013; Rafaty 2018; Oswald et  al. 2021). For further exploration of \r\nthese concepts, see Chapter 5 Supplementary Material I."


id: de9b3da2c5d2845d9e05e7edad7906a2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36425
content:
"There is very high evidence and very high agreement that globally, \r\nthere are differences in the amount of energy that societies require \r\nto provide the basic needs for everyone. At present nearly one\u0002third of the world's population are 'energy poor', facing challenges "


id: a3973691f9b16b14f9d0bf301cfd76d1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25987
content:
"Figure 5.3 | Energy use per capita per year of three groups of countries ranked by socio-economic development and displayed for each country based \r\non four or five different income groups (according to data availability) as well as geographical representation. The final energy use for decent living standards \r\n(20-50 GJ cap-1 yr-1) (Rao et al. 2019b) is indicated in the blue column as a reference for global range, rather than dependent on each country. Source: data based on Oswald \r\net al. (2020)."


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vector_id: 23818
content:
"Several of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (UN 2015) deal with providing access to technologies and service infrastructures \r\nto the share of population so far excluded, showing that the UN 2030 Agenda has adopted a multidimensional perspective on poverty. \r\nMultidimensional poverty indices, such as the Social Progress Indicator and the Individual Deprivation Measure, go beyond income \r\nand focus on tracking the delivery of access to basic services by the poorest population groups, both in developing countries (Fulton \r\net al. 2009; Alkire and Santos 2014; Alkire and Robles 2017; Rao and Min 2018b), and in developed countries (Townsend 1979; \r\nAaberge and Brandolini 2015; Eurostat 2018). At the same time, the SDGs, primarily SDG 10 on reducing inequalities within and \r\namong countries, promote a more equitable world, both in terms of inter- as well as intra-national equality."


id: cbbb12e6692d31af45c56655ed6e5bea
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Access to various end-use technologies and infrastructure services features directly in the SDG targets and among the indicators \r\nused to track their progress (UN 2015; UNESC 2017): Basic services in households (SDG 1.4.1), Improved water sources (SDG 6.1.1); \r\nImproved sanitation (SDG 6.1.2); Electricity (SDG 7.1.1); Internet - fixed broadband subscriptions (SDG 17.6.2); Internet - proportion \r\nof population using (SDG 17.8.1). Transport (public transit, cars, mopeds or bicycles) and media technologies (mobile phones, TVs, \r\nradios, PCs, Internet) can be seen as proxies for access to mobility and communication, crucial for participation in society and the \r\neconomy (Smith et al. 2015). In addition, SDG 10 is a more conventional income-based inequality goal, referring to income inequality \r\n(SDG 10.1), social, economic and political inclusion of all (SDG 10.2.), and equal opportunities and reduced inequalities of outcome \r\n(SDG 10.3)."


id: 420117c3480ee1acd679dcbb0aa02e5b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Box 5.3, Figure 1 | International inequality in access and use of goods and services. Upper panel: International Lorenz curves and Gini coefficients \r\naccounting for the share of population living in households without access (origin of the curves on the y-axis), multiple ownership not considered. Lower panel: Gini, \r\nnumber of people without access, access rates and coverage in terms of share of global population and number of countries included. *Reduced samples lead to \r\nunderestimation of inequality. A sample, for example, of around 80% of world population (taking the same 43 countries as for mobiles and cars) led to a lower Gini \r\nof around 0.48 (-0.04) for electricity. The reduced sample was kept for mobiles in 2018 to allow for comparability with 2000. Source: Zimm (2019)."


id: fd4519d279a7915bac06e4fcca5afac5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41913
content:
"in the US was 63% higher than in Germany (Arto et al. 2016); those \r\npatterns are explained by context in terms of various climate, cultural \r\nand historical factors influencing consumption. Context matters even \r\nin within-country analysis, for example, electricity consumption in \r\nthe US shows that efficiency innovations do exert positive influence \r\non savings of residential energy consumption, but the relationship \r\nis mixed; on the contrary, affluence (household income and home \r\nsize) and context (geographical location) drive resource utilisation \r\nsignificantly (Adua and Clark 2019); affluence is central to any future \r\nprospect in terms of environmental conditions (Wiedmann et  al. \r\n2020). In China, inequality of energy consumption and expenditure "


id: f6410e978207758f88fbbec1fb9ffb89
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40683
content:
"There is high evidence and high agreement in the literature that \r\nthrough equitable distribution, well-being for all can be assured at \r\nthe lowest-possible energy consumption levels (Steinberger and \r\nRoberts 2010; Oswald et al. 2020) by reducing emissions related to \r\nconsumption as much as possible, while assuring DLS for everyone \r\n(Annecke 2002; de Zoysa 2011; Ehrlich and Ehrlich 2013; Spangenberg \r\n2014; Toroitich and Kerber 2014; Kenner 2015; Toth and Szigeti 2016; \r\nSmil 2017; Otto et al. 2019; Baltruszewicz et al. 2021). For example, \r\nat similar levels of human development, per capita energy demand "


id: ba99b23c4bfbd66696447e814dcb042e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30044
content:
"varies highly depending on the energy type, end-use demand and \r\nclimatic region (Wu et al. 2017)."


id: 9dd1aae06d6c00273666229875c351ae
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25003
content:
"Within the energy use induced by global consumer products, \r\nhousehold consumption is the biggest contributor, contributing to \r\naround three-quarters of the global total (Wu et al. 2019). A more \r\ngranular analysis of household energy consumption reveals that \r\nthe lowest two quintiles in countries with average annual income \r\nbelow USD15,000 cap-1 yr-1 consume less energy than the \r\ninternational energy requirements for DLS (20-50 GJ cap-1); 77% of \r\npeople consume less than 30 GJ cap-1 yr-1 and 38% consume less \r\nthan 10 GJ cap-1 yr-1 (Oswald et al. 2020). Many energy-intensive \r\ngoods have high price elasticity (>1.0), implying that growing \r\nincomes lead to over-proportional growth of energy footprints in \r\nthese consumption categories. Highly unequally distributed energy \r\nconsumption is concentrated in the transport sector, ranging from \r\nvehicle purchase to fuels, and most unequally in package holidays \r\nand aviation (Gossling 2019; Oswald et al. 2020)."


id: cf2be4b9f977ec5345ad39d1ffdc26db
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33793
content:
"High-income households consume and demand energy at an order of \r\nmagnitude greater than what is necessary for DLS (Oswald et al. 2020). \r\nEnergy-intensive goods, such as package holidays, have a  higher \r\nincome elasticity of demand than less energy-intensive goods like \r\nfood, water supply and housing maintenance, which results in high\u0002income individuals having much higher energy footprints (Oswald et al. \r\n2020). Evidence highlights highly unequal GHG emissions in aviation: \r\nonly 2-4% of the global population flew internationally in 2018, with \r\n1% of the world population emitting 50% of CO2 from commercial \r\naviation (Gossling and Humpe 2020). Some individuals may add more \r\nthan 1600 tCO2 yr-1 individually by air travel (Gossling 2019)."


id: 53201c1906a2f2bd435e7be78a7acd8b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11894
content:
"Socio-economic dynamics and outcomes affect whether provisioning \r\nof goods and services is achieved at low energy demand levels \r\n(Figure  5.4). Specifically, multivariate regression shows that public \r\nservice quality, income equality, democracy, and electricity access \r\nenable higher need satisfaction at lower energy demand, whereas \r\nextractivism and economic growth beyond moderate levels of \r\naffluence reduce need satisfaction at higher energy demand (Vogel \r\net  al. 2021). Altogether, this demonstrates that at a  given level of \r\nenergy provided, there is large scope to improve service levels for \r\nwell-being by modifying socio-economic context without increasing \r\nenergy supply (Figure 5.4)."


id: 14d787ffb6c193d1ed496df8780acca2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 896
content:
"The food sector dominates in all income groups, comprising 28% \r\nof households' carbon footprint, with cattle and rice the major \r\ncontributors (Scherer et al. 2018); food also accounts for 48% and \r\n70% of household impacts on land and water resources respectively, \r\nand consumption of meat, dairy, and processed food rise fast \r\nasincomes increase (Ivanova et al. 2016). Roughly 20-40% of food \r\nproduced worldwide is lost to waste before it reaches the market, \r\nor is wasted by households, the energy embodied in wasted food was \r\nestimated at around 36 EJ yr -1, and during the period 2010-2016 "


id: 2ac81b3677c8618f6f9ca4a48cf1cacc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4753
content:
"The carbon footprint of a  nation is equal to the direct emissions \r\noccurring due to households' transport, heating and cooking, as well \r\nas the impact embodied in the production of all consumed goods \r\nand services (Wiedmann and Minx 2008; Davis and Caldeira 2010; \r\nHubler 2017; Vita et al. 2019a). There are large differences in carbon "


id: f3838a3fede189fb43fd7d27fea11f8e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40219
content:
"governance and mitigation are parts of a  continuous interactive \r\nand self-reinforcing process (Figure 5.5). Chapter 5 Supplementary \r\nMaterial I (Section  5.SM.1) contains more detail on these links, \r\ndrawing from social science literature."


id: e263bc260c3f2f369816f035404c8e7d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37120
content:
"global food loss and waste equalled 8-10% of total GHG emissions \r\n(Godfray and Garnett 2014; Springmann et  al. 2018; Mbow et  al. \r\n2019). Global agri-food supply chains are crucial in the variation \r\nof per  capita food consumption-related-GHG footprints, mainly in \r\nthe case of red meat and dairy (Kim et al. 2020) since the highest \r\nper capita food-consumption-related GHG emissions do not correlate \r\nperfectly with the income status of countries. Thus, it is also crucial \r\nto focus on high-emitting individuals and groups within countries, \r\nrather than only those who live in high-emitting countries, since the \r\ntop 10% of emitters live on all continents and one-third of them are \r\nfrom the developing world (Chakravarty et al. 2009; Pan et al. 2019)."


id: b27bb0a4351f31a855bfbde6654eec7c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28637
content:
"Economic growth in equitable societies is associated with lower \r\nemissions than in inequitable societies (McGee and Greiner 2018), \r\nand income inequality is associated with higher global emissions \r\n(Ravallion et al. 1997; McGee and Greiner 2018; Rao and Min 2018c; \r\nDiffenbaugh and Burke 2019; Fremstad and Paul 2019; Liu and Hao \r\n2020). Relatively slight increases in energy consumption and carbon \r\nemissions produce great increases in human development and well\u0002being in less-developed countries, and the amount of energy needed \r\nfor a high global level of human development is dropping (Steinberger \r\nand Roberts 2010). Equitable and democratic societies which provide \r\nhigh quality public services to their population have high well-being \r\noutcomes at lower energy use than those which do not, whereas \r\nthose which prioritise economic growth beyond moderate incomes \r\nand extractive sectors display a reversed effect (Vogel et al. 2021)."


id: 9aa16e9465c5c2bbd36670610c5d8c32
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24445
content:
"The environmental impact of increasing equity across income \r\ngroups can be either positive or negative (Hubacek et al. 2017; Rao \r\nand Min 2018a; Scherer et al. 2018; Millward-Hopkins et al. 2020). \r\nProjections for achieving equitable levels of service provision globally \r\npredict large increases in global GHG emissions and demand for key \r\nresources (Blomsma and Brennan 2017), especially in passenger \r\ntransport, which is predicted to increase nearly three-fold between \r\n2015 and 2050, from 44 trillion to 122 trillion passenger-kilometres \r\n(OECD 2019a), and associated infrastructure needs, increasing freight \r\n(Murray et al. 2017), increasing demand for cooling (IEA 2018), and \r\nshifts to carbon-intensive high-meat diets (OECD/FAO 2018)."


id: 86de6a0b249d31bbfd67235466c46e1a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20891
content:
"Well-designed climate mitigation policies ameliorate constituents of \r\nwell-being (Creutzig et al. 2021b). The study shows that of all demand\u0002side option effects on well-being, 79% are positive, 18% are neutral (or \r\nnot relevant or specified), and only 3% are negative (high confidence) \r\n(Creutzig et al. 2021b) (Figure 5.6). Figure 5.6 illustrates that active \r\nmobility (cycling and walking), efficient buildings and prosumer \r\nchoices of renewable technologies have the most encompassing \r\nbeneficial effects on well-being, with no negative outcomes detected. \r\nUrban and industry strategies are highly positive overall for well\u0002being, but they will also reshape supply-side businesses with transient \r\nintermediate negative effects. Shared mobility, like all the others, \r\nhas overall highly beneficial effects on well-being, but also displays \r\na few negative consequences, depending on implementation, such as \r\na minor decrease in personal security for patrons of ride-sourcing."


id: d163578d0b132e69f073d40f455a7be5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34190
content:
"Increasing incomes for all to attain DLS raises emissions and energy \r\nfootprints, but only slightly (Chakravarty et  al. 2009; Jorgenson \r\net al. 2016; Scherer et al. 2018; Millward-Hopkins et al. 2020; Oswald \r\net  al. 2020; Oswald et  al. 2021). The amount of energy needed for \r\na high global level of human development is dropping (Steinberger and \r\nRoberts 2010) and could by 2050 be reduced to 1950 levels (Millward\u0002Hopkins et al. 2020) requiring a massive deployment of technologies \r\nacross the different sectors as well as demand-side reduction \r\nconsumption. The consumption share of the bottom half of the world's \r\npopulation represents less than 20% of all energy footprints, which is \r\nless than what the top 5% of people consume (Oswald et al. 2020)."


id: b81c89d1489bcb104f90cffabf51fbd3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29608
content:
"Income inequality itself also raises carbon emissions (Hao et al. 2016; \r\nSinha 2016; Uzar and Eyuboglu 2019; Baloch et  al. 2020; Oswald \r\net al. 2020; Wiedmann et al. 2020; Vogel et al. 2021). Wide inequality \r\ncan increase status-based consumption patterns, where individuals \r\nspend more to emulate the standards of the high-income group (the \r\nVeblen effect); inequality also diminishes environmental efforts by \r\nreducing social cohesion and cooperation (Jorgenson et al. 2017) and \r\nfinally, inequality also operates by inducing an increase in working \r\nhours that leads to higher economic growth and, consequently, \r\nhigher emissions and ecological footprint, so working time reduction \r\nis key for policy to both reduce emissions and protect employment \r\n(Fitzgerald et al. 2015; Fitzgerald et al. 2018)."


id: bb9b295fab9c6fa2a993a814e0220043
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30231
content:
"There is high evidence and high agreement in literature that socio\u0002economic equity builds not only well-being for all, but also trust and \r\neffective participatory governance, which in turn strengthen demand\u0002side climate mitigation. Equity, participation, social trust, well-being, "


id: b228cd3a96ff9bdafc37551e33dd3891
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28573
content:
"and including social trust, greater equity, and informal-sector support \r\nas integral parts of climate policies. Public participation facilitates \r\nsocial learning and people's support of and engagement with climate \r\nchange priorities; improved governance is closely tied to effective \r\nclimate policies (Phuong et al. 2017). Better education, health care, \r\nvaluing of social diversity, and reduced poverty - characteristics of \r\nmore equal societies - all lead to resilience, innovation, and readiness \r\nto adopt progressive and locally-appropriate mitigation policies, \r\nwhether high-tech or low-tech, centralised or decentralised (Tanner \r\net al. 2009; Lorenz 2013; Chu 2015; Cloutier et al. 2015; Mitchell 2015; \r\nMartin and Shaheen 2016; Vandeweerdt et al. 2016; Turnheim et al. \r\n2018). Moreover, these factors are the ones identified as enablers of \r\nhigh need satisfaction at lower energy use (Vogel et al. 2021)."


id: 6a5937cecf69378f822496c209377ba4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15990
content:
"There is less policy lock-in in more equitable societies (Seto et al. 2016). \r\nInternational communication, networking, and global connections \r\namong citizens are more prevalent in more equitable societies, and \r\nthese help spread promising mitigation approaches (Scheffran et al. \r\n2012). Climate-related injustices are addressed where equity is \r\nprioritised (Klinsky and Winkler 2014). Thus, there is high confidence \r\nin the literature that addressing inequities in income, wealth, and \r\nDLS not only raises overall well-being and furthers the SDGs but also \r\nimproves the effectiveness of climate change mitigation policies. For \r\nexample, job creation, retraining for new jobs, local production of "


id: b9065095c1574412b915ac31b887d9fa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29755
content:
"Soliev and Theesfeld 2020). Leadership is also important in fostering \r\nenvironmentally-responsible group behaviours (Liu and Hao 2020)."


id: 78613208bb7a1b031947edf438b212aa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18384
content:
"In some less-developed countries, higher income inequality may in \r\nfact be associated with lower per capita emissions, but this is because \r\npeople who are excluded by poverty from access to fossil fuels must \r\nrely on biomass (Klasen 2018). Such energy poverty - the fact that \r\nmillions of people do not have access to energy sources to help meet \r\nhuman needs  - implies the opposite of development (Guruswamy \r\n2010; Guruswamy 2020). In developing countries, livelihood \r\nimprovements do not necessarily cause increases in emissions (Peters \r\net al. 2012; Reusser et al. 2013; Creutzig et al. 2015a; Chhatre and \r\nAgrawal 2009; Baltruszewicz et  al. 2021) and poverty alleviation \r\ncauses negligible emissions (Chakravarty et  al. 2009). Greater \r\nequity is an important step towards sustainable service provisioning \r\n(Godfray et al. 2018; Dorling 2019; Timko 2019)."


id: 2fa1b5efcdc2f5f50cf31a14d3b9f24c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5641
content:
"As discussed in Section 5.6, policies to assist the low-carbon energy \r\ntransition can be designed to include additional benefits for income \r\nequality, besides contributing to greater energy access for the poor \r\n(Burke and Stephens 2017; Frank 2017; Healy and Barry 2017; \r\nSen 2017; Chapman et  al. 2018; La Vina et  al. 2018; Chapman \r\nand Fraser 2019; Piggot et al. 2019; Sunderland et al. 2020). Global \r\nand intergenerational climate inequities impact people's well-being, \r\nwhich affects their consumption patterns and political actions \r\n(Albrecht et al. 2007; Fritze et al. 2008; Gori-Maia 2013; Clayton et al. \r\n2015; Pizzigati 2018) (Box 5.4)."


id: ef68bb3a2e77546d1e0de4fc399f9583
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39490
content:
"Since no country now meets its citizens' basic needs at a  level of \r\nresource use that is globally sustainable, while high levels of life \r\nsatisfaction for those just escaping extreme poverty require even \r\nmore resources, the need for transformative shifts in governance and \r\npolicies is large (O'Neill et al. 2018; Vogel et al. 2021)."


id: 29e394618e6cdb682368fe053592426a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4594
content:
"Inequitable societies use energy and resources less efficiently.\r\nHigher income inequality is associated with higher carbon emissions, \r\nat least in developed countries (Grunewald et al. 2011; Golley and \r\nMeng 2012; Chancel et al. 2015; Grunewald et al. 2017; Jorgenson \r\net  al. 2017; Sager 2017; Klasen 2018; Liu et  al. 2019); reducing \r\ninequality in high-income countries helps to reduce emissions (Klasen \r\n2018). There is high agreement in the literature that alienation or \r\ndistrust weakens collective governance and fragments political \r\napproaches towards climate action (Smit and Pilifosova 2001; Adger \r\net al. 2003; Hammar and Jagers 2007; Van Vossole 2012; Bulkeley \r\nand Newell 2015; Smith and Howe 2015; ISSC et al. 2016; Alvaredo \r\net al. 2018; Smith and Mayer 2018; Fairbrother et al. 2019; Hayward \r\nand Roy 2019; Kulin and Johansson Seva 2019; Liao et al. 2019)."


id: 1e1d69f6fbc7272e51144daa50fe5803
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2498
content:
"Populism and politics of fear are less prevalent under conditions of \r\nmore income equality (Chevigny 2003; Bryson and Rauwolf 2016; \r\nO'Connor 2017; Fraune and Knodt 2018; Myrick and Evans Comfort \r\n2019). Ideology and other social factors also play a role in populist \r\nclimate scepticism, but many of these also relate to resentment of \r\nelites and desire for engagement (Swyngedouw 2011; Lockwood \r\n2018; Huber et al. 2020). 'Climate populism' movements are driven by \r\nan impetus for justice (Beeson 2019; Hilson 2019). When people feel \r\npowerless and/or that climate change is too big a problem to solve \r\nbecause others are not acting, they may take less action themselves \r\n(Williams and Jaftha 2020). However, systems for benefit-sharing \r\ncan build trust and address large-scale 'commons dilemmas', in the \r\ncontext of strong civil society (Barnett 2003; Mearns and Norton 2009; \r\nInderberg et al. 2015; Sovacool et al. 2015; Hunsberger et al. 2017; "


id: 3889c4cb534f3640c5af12cc895ed5cc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7156
content:
"Multi-level or polycentric governance can enhance well-being and \r\nimprove climate governance and social resilience, due to varying \r\nadaptive, flexible policy interventions at different times and scales \r\n(Kern and Bulkeley 2009; Lidskog and Elander 2009; Amundsen \r\net al. 2010; Keskitalo 2010; Lee and Koski 2015; Jokinen et al. 2016; \r\nLepeley 2017; Marquardt 2017; Di Gregorio et al. 2019). Institutional \r\ntransformation may also result from socio-ecological stresses that \r\naccompany climate change, leading to more effective governance \r\nstructures (David Tabara et  al. 2018; Patterson and Huitema 2019; \r\nBarnes et  al. 2020). An appropriate, context-specific mix of options \r\nfacilitated by policies can deliver both higher well-being and reduced \r\ndisparity in access to basic needs for services concurrently with climate \r\nmitigation (Thomas and Twyman 2005; Mearns and Norton 2009; "


id: 6ef3ad284b950fde1254b590a5a9c941
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16793
content:
"protection) not only strengthens climate leadership in many countries, \r\nbut also changes broad social norms by raising knowledge of \r\nIndigenous governance systems which supported sustainable lifeways \r\nover thousands of years (Wildcat 2014; Chanza and De Wit 2016; \r\nWhyte 2017; Whyte 2018, Temper et al. 2020). Related trends include \r\nrecognition of the value of traditional ecological knowledge, Indigenous \r\ngovernance principles, decentralisation, and appropriate technologies \r\n(Lange et al. 2007; Goldthau 2014; Whyte 2017)."


id: 289cf2e0a0482260cee22b8e5f1947af
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4357
content:
"Klinsky and Winkler 2014; Lamb et  al. 2014; Lamb and  Steinberger \r\n2017). Hence, nurturing equitable human well-being through provision \r\nof decent living standards for all goes hand in hand with climate change \r\nmitigation (ISSC et al. 2016; OECD 2019a). There is high confidence in \r\nthe literature that addressing inequities in income, wealth, and DLS not \r\nonly raises overall well-being and furthers the SDGs but also improves \r\nthe effectiveness of climate change mitigation policies."


id: 5f60adfb2eacf5ed9cbbf211b992b4ba
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14090
content:
"Social trust aids policy implementation. More equal societies display \r\nhigher trust, which is a key requirement for successful implementation \r\nof climate policies (Rothstein and Teorell 2008; Carattini et al. 2015; \r\nKlenert et al. 2018; Patterson et al. 2018). Inter-personal trust among \r\ncitizens often promotes pro-environment behaviour by influencing \r\nperceptions (Harring and Jagers 2013), enhancing cooperation, and \r\nreducing free-riding and opportunistic behaviour (Gur 2020). Individual \r\nsupport for carbon taxes and energy innovations falls when collective \r\ncommunity support is lacking (Bolsen et al. 2014; Smith and Mayer \r\n2018; Simon 2020). Social trust has a  positive influence on civic \r\nengagement among local communities, NGOs, and self-help groups for \r\nlocal clean cooking fuel installation (Nayak et al. 2015)."


id: ec22cd6f1d3dcabb81f47e5a50483e5f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38912
content:
"Section  5.6 includes examples of climate mitigation policies and \r\npolicy packages which address the interrelationships shown in \r\nFigure 5.5. Improving well-being for all through climate mitigation \r\nincludes emissions-reduction goals in policy packages that ensure \r\nequitable outcomes, prioritise social trust-building, support wide \r\npublic participation in climate action including within the informal \r\nsector, and facilitate institutional change for effective multi-level \r\ngovernance, as integral components of climate strategies. This \r\nstrategic approach, and its feasibility of success, rely on complex \r\ncontextual factors that may differ widely, especially between the \r\nGlobal North and Global South (Atteridge et al. 2012; Patterson et al. \r\n2018; Jewell and Cherp 2020; Singh et al. 2020; Singh et al. 2021)."


id: 9670810c483bcbd41e22c66186190e61
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23670
content:
"There is high evidence and high agreement that empowering women benefits both mitigation and adaptation, because women \r\nprioritise climate change in their voting, purchasing, community leadership, and work, both professionally and at home (high evidence,\r\nhigh agreement). Increasing voice and agency for those marginalised in intersectional ways by indigeneity, race, ethnicity, dis/ability, \r\nand other factors has positive effects for climate policy (high evidence, high agreement)."


id: dc85d86049e73c4aaade323c44441224
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36063
content:
"resulting from climate change - and this is heightened for women in the less-developed countries and for those who are intersectionally \r\nvulnerable (Coates et al. 2020; McLaren et al. 2020; Wenham et al. 2020; Azong and Kelso 2021; Erwin et al. 2021; Maobe and Atela \r\n2021; Nicoson 2021; Sultana 2021; Versey 2021). Because men currently hold the majority of energy-sector jobs, energy transition \r\nwill impact them economically and psychologically; benefits, burdens and opportunities on both the demand and supply sides of the \r\nmitigation transition have a range of equity implications (Pearl-Martinez and Stephens 2017; Standal et al. 2020; Mang-Benza 2021). \r\nMitigating gendered climate impacts requires addressing inequitable power relations throughout society (Wester and Lama 2019)."


id: 9fed41c2279ecd1f4ae55a3c29756b4c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25347
content:
"Women's well-being and gender-responsive climate policy have been emphasised in international agreements including the Paris Agreement \r\n(UNFCCC 2015), Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women General Recommendation 37 (Vijeyarasa \r\n2021), and the 2016 Decision 21/CP.22 on Gender and Climate Change (UNFCCC 2016; Larson et al. 2018). Increasing the participation \r\nof women and marginalised social groups, and addressing their special needs, helps to meet a range of SDGs, improve disaster and crisis \r\nresponse, increase social trust, and improve climate mitigation policy development and implementation (Alber 2009; Whyte 2014; Elnakat \r\nand Gomez 2015; Salehi et al. 2015; Buckingham and Kulcur 2017; Cohen 2017; Kronsell 2017; Lee and Zusman 2019)."


id: 175981ab42c2e23e4cf188be320eff84
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1327
content:
"Higher female political participation, controlled for other factors, leads to higher stringency in climate policies, and results in lower \r\nGHG emissions (Cook et al. 2019). Gender equity is also correlated with lower per capita CO2-eq emissions (Ergas and York 2012)."


id: 6aef1e47d6630e7826ee46a10774cc14
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16101
content:
"to ASI strategies, with the circular economy tentatively more on the \r\nsupply side, and the sharing economy and digitalisation tentatively \r\nmore on the demand side (Section 5.3.4). These new service delivery \r\nmodels go beyond sectoral boundaries (IPCC sector chapter boundaries \r\nare explained in Chapter  12) and take advantage of technological \r\ninnovations, design concepts, and innovative forms of  cooperation, \r\ncutting across sectors to contribute to systemic changes worldwide. \r\nSome of these changes can be realised in the short term, such as \r\nenergy access, while others may take a longer period, such as radical \r\nand systemic eco-innovations like shared electric autonomous vehicles. \r\nIt is important to understand benefits and distributional impacts of \r\nthese systemic changes."


id: 326c7bce6119d9e59c456a9a864554b7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6126
content:
"Opportunities for avoiding waste associated with the provision of \r\nservices, or avoiding overprovision of or excess demand for services, \r\nexist across multiple service categories. 'Avoid' options are relevant \r\nin all end-use sectors, namely, teleworking and avoiding long-haul \r\nflights, adjusting dwelling size to household size, and avoiding short\u0002"


id: bea941cee1763f59142262be8809d088
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30805
content:
"This section organises demand reductions under the ASI framework. \r\nIt presents service-oriented demand-side solutions consistent with \r\ndecent living standards (Creutzig et al. 2018) (Table 5.1). The sharing \r\neconomy, digitalisation, and the circular economy can all contribute "


id: c53d43c77d849223d3eeaeaac03bc475
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32005
content:
"Table 5.1 | Avoid-Shift-Improve options in selected sectors and services. Many options, such as urban form and infrastructures, are systemic, and influence several \r\nsectors simultaneously. Linkages to concepts presented in sectoral chapters are indicated in parentheses in the first column. Source: adapted from Creutzig at al. (2018)."


id: 314058a81b7c590d347ecb237a23b299
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5916
content:
"The technical mitigation potential of food loss and waste reductions \r\nglobally has been estimated at 0.1-5.8 GtCO2-eq (high confidence) \r\n(Poore and Nemecek 2018; Smith, et al. 2019) (Section 7.4.5, Figure 5.7 \r\nand Table 12.3). Coupling food waste reductions with dietary shifts \r\ncan further reduce energy, land, and resource demand in upstream "


id: 43170a23c0c4462678352041a46a3af3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9008
content:
"food provision systems, leading to substantial GHG emissions benefits. \r\nThe estimated technical potential for GHG emissions reductions \r\nassociated with shifts to sustainable healthy diets is 0.5-8 GtCO2-eq \r\n(high confidence) (Smith et al. 2013; Jarmul et al. 2020; Creutzig et al. \r\n2021b) (Figure 5.7, Table 12.2). Current literature on health, diets, and \r\nemissions indicates that sustainable food systems providing healthy \r\ndiets for all are within reach but require significant cross-sectoral \r\naction, including improved agricultural practices, dietary shifts among \r\nconsumers, and food waste reductions in production, distribution, \r\nretail, and consumption (Erb et al. 2016; Muller et al. 2017; Graca et al. \r\n2019; Willett and al. 2019) (Table 12.9)."


id: 1f5c026f75fb49c15c69eeafe13e7f15
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2721
content:
"Increased demand for biomass can increase the pressure on forest \r\nand conservation areas (Cowie et al. 2013) and poses a heightened \r\nrisk for biodiversity, livelihoods, and intertemporal carbon balances \r\n(Lamb et  al. 2016; Creutzig et  al. 2021c), requiring policy and \r\nregulations to ensure sustainable forest management, which \r\ndepends on forest type, region, climate, and ownership. This suggests \r\nthat demand-side actions hold sustainability advantages over the \r\nintensive use of bioenergy and BECCS, but also enable land use for \r\nbioenergy by saving agricultural land for food."


id: 7b71bed97ce27f7162b1fa6c84c5f5d7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18920
content:
"sold and tonnes of materials needed to provide the same service to \r\nconsumers, consistent with circular economy and materials efficiency \r\nprinciples (Chapter 11). Successful examples of this approach have \r\nbeen documented for carpets (Stubbs and Cocklin 2008), copiers \r\n(Roy 2000), kitchens (Liedtke et al. 1998), vehicles (Williams 2006; \r\nCeschin and Vezzoli 2010) and more (Roy 2000)."


id: fd67f492914a6e8fd8f573b8544cd8f0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41937
content:
"existing efforts to promote zero-emission vehicles. The establishment \r\nof a zero-emission vehicle deployment target and an electric mobility \r\ntarget for 2035 would help in establishing a common long-term global \r\nelectric-drive vision (Lutsey 2015)."


id: 3e6d948e62f09f0bd37802e90b191251
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8163
content:
"Socio-cultural factors such as avoiding long-haul flights and shifting \r\nto train wherever possible can contribute between 10% and 40% \r\nto aviation GHG emissions reduction by 2050 (Figure 5.7). Maritime \r\ntransport (shipping) emits around 940 MtCO2 annually and is \r\nresponsible for about 2.5% of global GHG emissions (IMO 2020). \r\nTechnology measures and management measures, such as slow \r\nsteaming, weather routing, contra-rotating propellers, and propulsion \r\nefficiency devices can deliver more fuel savings between 1% and \r\n40% than the investment required (Bouman et al. 2017) (Chapter 5, \r\nSupplementary Material II, Table 5.SM.2)."


id: 551a0d5083dc905fa21e92814fa5bfe3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12246
content:
"'Shift' strategies unique to the service-oriented perspective generally \r\ninvolve meeting service demands at much lower lifecycle energy, \r\nemissions, and resource intensities (Roy and Pal 2009), through such \r\nstrategies as shifting from single-family to multi-family dwellings \r\n(reducing the materials intensity per unit floor area (Ochsendorf et al. \r\n2011)), shifting from passenger cars to rail or bus (reducing fuel, \r\nvehicle manufacturing, and infrastructure requirements (Chester and \r\nHorvath 2009)), shifting materials to reduce resource and emissions \r\nintensities (e.g., low-carbon concrete blends (Scrivener and Gartner \r\n2018)) and shifting from conventional to additive manufacturing \r\nprocesses to reduce materials requirements and improve end-use \r\nproduct performance (Huang et al. 2016, 2017)."


id: 5045d2e5dfc57afbabf04c6e7ff216c0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11407
content:
"An important consideration in all ASI strategies is the potential for \r\nunintended rebound effects (Sorrell et al. 2009; Brockway et al. 2021) \r\nas indicated in Figures 5.8, 5.12, and 5.13a, which must be carefully \r\navoided through various regulatory and behavioural measures \r\n(Santarius et  al. 2016). In many developing country contexts, \r\nrebound effects can help in accelerated provision of  affordable \r\naccess to modern energy and a minimum level of per capita energy \r\nconsumption (Saunders et  al. 2021; Chakravarty and Roy 2021). \r\nExtending the lifespan of energy inefficient products may lead to net \r\nincreases in emissions (Gutowski et al. 2011), whereas automated \r\ncar sharing may reduce the number of cars manufactured at the \r\nexpense of increased demand for passenger kilometres due to lower \r\ntravel opportunity cost (Wadud et al. 2016) (Section 5.3.2)."


id: 7bb108db60051c954701b297571f0446
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18971
content:
"Avoiding short lifespan products in favour of products with longer \r\nlifespan as a socio-cultural factor; and infrastructure use measures such \r\nas increasing the re-usability and recyclability of products' components \r\nand materials, and adopting materials-efficient services and CO2-\r\nneutral materials, have about 29% indicative potential by 2050. \r\n(Chapter 11 and Chapter 5 Supplementary Material II, Table 5.SM.2)."


id: 9cb81c7b4bfdb6d33ecd07a638698252
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24809
content:
"Socio-cultural factors and behavioural and social practices in energy \r\nsaving, like adaptive heating and cooling by changing temperature, \r\ncan contribute about 15% to GHG emissions reduction in the buildings \r\nsector by 2050 (Figure 5.7). Infrastructure use such as compact city \r\nand  urban planning interventions, living floor space rationalisation, \r\nand access to low-carbon architectural design has about 20% potential \r\nin building sector GHG emissions reduction. Technology adoption, \r\nparticularly access to energy efficient technologies, and installation of \r\nrenewable energy technologies can contribute between 30% and 70% \r\nto GHG emissions reduction in the buildings sector (Chapters 8 and 9 \r\nand Chapter 5 Supplementary Material II, Table 5.SM.2)."


id: 485d6c30591f1aa55badaf519f362a44
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9943
content:
"In summary, sector-specific demand-side mitigation options reflect the \r\nimportant role of socio-cultural, technological and infrastructural factors \r\nand the interdependence among them (Figure 5.7). The assessment in \r\nFigure 5.7 shows that by 2050 high emission reduction potential can be \r\nrealised with demand-side actions alone, which can be complementary \r\nto supply-side interventions, with considerable impact by reducing the \r\nneed for capacity addition on the electricity supply system. Integrated \r\ncross-sectoral actions shown through sector coupling is also important \r\nfor investment decision-making and policy framing going beyond \r\nsector boundaries (high evidence and high agreement)."


id: 907237b2725b5410d81307beb5359837
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22616
content:
"6,990 peer-reviewed journal papers, with 771 options that were \r\naggregated into 61  consumption option categories (Ivanova et  al. \r\n2020) (Figure 5.8). Consistently with previous research (Herendeen \r\nand Tanaka 1976; Pachauri and Spreng 2002; Pachauri 2007; Ivanova \r\net  al. 2016), a  hierarchical list of mitigation options emerges. \r\nChoosing low-carbon options, such as car-free living, plant-based "


id: fa6587970bee1066fe6309de55a703f8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41422
content:
"diets with no or very little animal products, low-carbon sources of \r\nelectricity and heating at home, as well as local holiday plans, can \r\nreduce an individual's carbon footprint by up to 9 tCO2-eq. Realising \r\nthese options requires substantial policy support to overcome \r\ninfrastructural, institutional and socio-cultural lock-in (Sections 5.4 \r\nand 5.6)."


id: 8a700a957b10b6b54c0790fca1c51229
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21523
content:
"into useable products (e.g.,  electricity, copper wires, lamps, light \r\nbulbs). It is useful to differentiate between conversion and processing \r\nsteps 'upstream' of end users (mines, power plants, manufacturing \r\nfacilities) and 'downstream', that is, those associated with end-users, \r\nincluding service levels, and direct well-being benefits for people (Kalt \r\net al. 2019). Illustrative examples of such resource processing systems "


id: 3a6f7dffe0367a904795921e75b056d3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7480
content:
"Service delivery systems to satisfy a  variety of service needs \r\n(e.g., mobility, nutrition, thermal comfort, etc.) comprise a series of \r\ninterlinked processes to convert primary resources (e.g., coal, minerals) "


id: 8aee11e35eed2489669f637e520e302c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21613
content:
"Figure 5.9 | Resource processing steps and efficiency cascades (in percentage of primary resource inputs [vertical axis] remaining at respective steps \r\nuntil ultimate service delivery) for illustrative global service delivery systems for energy (panel (a), disaggregated into three sectoral service types \r\nand the aggregate total), food (panel (b), water use in agriculture and food processing, delivery and use), and materials (panel (c), example steel). The \r\naggregate efficiencies of service delivery chains is with 13-17% low. Source: TWI2050 (2018)."


id: d1d4b5a4c780eb9f216e80519ba1b1a4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34267
content:
"Examples of conversion losses on the supply side of resource processing \r\nsystems include, for instance: for energy, electricity generation (global \r\noutput/input conversion efficiency of electric plants of 45% as shown \r\nin energy balance statistics (IEA 2020b)); for water embodied in food, \r\nirrigation water use efficiency (some 40% (Sadras et al. 2011)) and \r\ncalorific conversion efficiency (food calories in to food calories out) \r\nin meat production of 60% (Lundqvist et al. 2008), or for materials, \r\nglobally only 47% of primary iron ore extracted and recovered steel \r\nscrap end up as steel in purchased products, (i.e.,  a  loss of 57%) \r\n(Allwood and Cullen 2012)."


id: 8e4f6568862f3b83ddd923a045fc07ca
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22226
content:
"and associated conversion losses drawn from the literature are \r\nshown in Figure 5.9, in the form of resource processing cascades for \r\nenergy (direct energy conversion efficiencies (Nakicenovic et al. 1993; \r\nDe Stercke 2014)), water use in food production systems (water use \r\nefficiency and embodied water losses in food delivery and consumption \r\n(Lundqvist et al. 2008; Sadras et al. 2011)), and materials (Ayres and \r\nSimonis 1994; Fischer-Kowalski et al. 2011), using the example of steel \r\nmanufacturing, use and recycling at the global level (Allwood and \r\nCullen 2012). Invariably, conversion losses along the entire service \r\ndelivery systems are substantial, ranging from 83% (water) to 86% \r\n(energy) and 87% (steel) of primary resource inputs (TWI2050 2018). \r\nIn other words, only between 14 to 17% of the harnessed primary \r\nresources remain at the level of ultimate service delivery."


id: bfab2623073e29482b10a2fd3d7f89e0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31001
content:
"and 10% (global (Nakicenovic et al., 1996)). Studies that adopt more \r\nrestricted systems boundaries, either leaving out upstream resource \r\nprocessing/conversion or conversely end-use and service provision, \r\nshow typical exergetic efficiencies between 15% (city of Geneva \r\n(Grubler et al. 2012a)) to below 25% (Japan, Italy, and Brazil, albeit \r\nwith incomplete systems coverage that miss important conversion \r\nlosses (Nakicenovic et al. 1996b)). These findings are confirmed by \r\nmore recent exergy efficiency studies that also include longitudinal \r\ntime trend analysis (Cullen and Allwood 2010; Brockway et al. 2014; \r\nSerrenho et  al. 2014; Brockway et  al. 2015; Guevara et  al. 2016). \r\nFigure 5.10 illustrates how energy demand reductions can be realised \r\nby improving the resource efficiency cascades shown in Figure 5.9."


id: e70fd0c239e9ebc8a935dccb1b2ec35d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37948
content:
"The IEA's Net-Zero Emissions by 2050 (NZE) scenario, in which \r\nbehavioural changes lead to 1.7 GtCO2 savings in 2030, expresses the \r\nsubstantial mitigation opportunity in terms of low-carbon technology \r\nequivalencies: to achieve the same emissions reductions, the global \r\nshare of EVs in the NZE would have to increase from 20% to 45% by \r\n2030 or the number of installed heat pumps in homes would have to \r\nincrease from 440 to 660 million by 2030 (IEA 2021)."


id: c36a71a77e2beb2e33a234dc8d7e0d32
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31653
content:
"In light of the limited number of mitigation scenarios that represent \r\nsocio-behavioural changes explicitly, there is medium evidence in the \r\nliterature that such changes can reduce emissions at regional and global \r\nlevels, but high agreement within that literature that such changes \r\nhold up to gigatonne-scale CO2 emissions reduction potentials."


id: fef42fec710e79d3e5a000a7b6c8815c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42253
content:
"In response to 1.5degC ambitions, and a  growing desire to identify \r\nparticipatory pathways with less reliance on carbon dioxide removal \r\nwhich has high uncertainty, some recent IAM and ESM mitigation \r\nscenarios have explored the role of deep demand-side energy and \r\nresource use reduction potentials at global and regional levels. \r\nTable 5.2 summarises long-term scenarios that aimed to: minimise \r\nservice-level energy and resource demand as a  central mitigation \r\ntenet; specifically evaluate the role of behavioural change and ASI \r\nstrategies; and/or achieve a carbon budget with limited or no carbon \r\ndioxide removal. From assessment of this emerging body of literature, \r\nseveral general observations arise and are presented below."


id: 376166a2b20b8c3540c0abc76f8ec8fe
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6956
content:
"First, socio-cultural changes within transition pathways can offer \r\ngigatonne-scale CO2 savings potential at the global level, and \r\ntherefore represent a substantial overlooked strategy in traditional \r\nmitigation scenarios. Two lifestyle change scenarios conducted \r\nwith the IMAGE IAM suggested that behaviour and cultural \r\nchanges such as heating and cooling set-point adjustments, shorter "


id: 536ec943a8300edff2f35a7ade950855
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11953
content:
"will require increased investments in data generation and \r\ncollection, model development, and inter-model comparisons, with \r\na  particular focus on socio-behavioural research, which has been \r\nunderrepresented in mitigation research funding to date (Overland \r\nand Sovacool 2020)."


id: fd02b79bd31ed01b3228ceedbf34cb8c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41873
content:
"Third, low demand scenarios can reduce both supply-side capacity \r\nadditions and the need for carbon capture and removal technologies \r\nto reach emissions targets. Of the scenarios listed in Table 5.2, one \r\n(LED-MESSAGE) reaches 2050 emissions targets with no carbon \r\ncapture or removal technologies (Grubler et  al. 2018), whereas \r\nothers report significant reductions in reliance on bioenergy with \r\ncarbon capture and storage (BECCS) compared to traditional \r\ntechnology-centric mitigation pathways (Liu et al. 2018; Van Vuuren \r\net al. 2018; Napp et al. 2019), with the IEA's NZE notably requiring \r\nthe least carbon dioxide removal (1.8 Gt in 2050) and primary \r\nbioenergy (100  EJ in 2050) compared to IPCC net zero SR1.5 \r\nscenarios (IEA 2021)."


id: 91a04b2fd6a22869751d5478c52b0b8a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22848
content:
"COVID-19 interacts with demand-side scenarios (Box  5.2). Energy \r\ndemand will mostly likely be reduced between 2020 and 2030 \r\ncompared to the default pathway, and if recovery is steered \r\ntowards low energy demand, carbon prices for a 1.5degC-consistent \r\npathway will be reduced by 19%, energy supply investments until \r\n2030 will be reduced by USD1.8 trillion, and the pressure to rapidly \r\nupscale renewable energy technologies will be softened (Kikstra \r\net al. 2021a)."


id: aa00b87ea76910b11b56fc46fb804ec4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27133
content:
"Based on the limited number of long-term mitigation scenarios that \r\nexplicitly represent demand reductions enabled by ASI strategies, \r\nthere is medium evidence but with high agreement within the \r\nliterature that such scenarios can reduce dependence on supply-side \r\ncapacity additions and carbon capture and removal technologies, \r\nwith opportunites for lower overall mitigation costs."


id: b585c59963b660317be041823596e7b8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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content:
"Reviewing over 30 digital goods and services for mobility, food \r\nbuying and domestic living, Wilson et al. (2020b) also found shared \r\nelements of appeal across multiple innovations including (i) making \r\nuse of surplus, (ii) using not owning, (iii) being part of wider \r\nnetworks, and (iv) exerting greater control over service provisioning \r\nsystems. Digitalisation thus creates a  strong value proposition \r\nfor certain consumer niches. Concurrent diffusion of many digital \r\ninnovations amplifies their disruptive potential (Schuelke-Leech \r\n2018; Wilson et al. 2019b). Besides basic mobile telephone service \r\nfor communication, digital innovations have been primarily geared to \r\npopulation groups with high purchasing power, and too little to the \r\nneeds of poor and vulnerable people."


id: 3fae3febd9330db60aac77e0e40e1717
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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content:
"The long-term sustainability implications of digitalised services hinge \r\non four factors: (i) the direct energy demands of connected devices \r\nand the digital infrastructures (i.e., data centres and communication \r\nnetworks) that provide necessary computing, storage, and \r\ncommunication services (Section 9.4.6); (ii) the systems-level energy \r\nand resource efficiencies that may be gained through the provision \r\nof digital services (Wilson et al. 2020b); (iii) the resource, material, \r\nand waste management requirements of the billions of ICT devices \r\nthat comprise the world's digital systems (Belkhir and Elmeligi 2018; \r\nMalmodin and Lunden 2018) and (iv) the magnitude of potential \r\nrebound effects or induced energy demands that might unleash \r\nunintended and unsustainable demand growth, such as autonomous "


id: 49ad7ce1c1de4eddbd94fbc20a8b830e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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vector_id: 10193
content:
"In many cases, digitalisation provides a 'radical functionality' that \r\nenables users to do or accomplish something that they could not \r\ndo before (Nagy et al. 2016). Indeed the consumer appeal of digital \r\ninnovations varies widely, from choice, convenience, flexibility and \r\ncontrol to relational and social benefits (Pettifor and Wilson 2020). "


id: f12650a296f25dca6cf6650a3b7a0809
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39808
content:
"Malmodin 2020; Masanet et al. 2020). Yet there is growing concern \r\nthat remaining energy efficiency improvements might be outpaced \r\nby rising demand for digital services, particularly as data-intensive \r\ntechnologies such as artificial intelligence, smart and connected \r\nenergy systems, distributed manufacturing systems, and autonomous \r\nvehicles promise to increase demand for data services even further in \r\nthe future (TWI2050 2019; Masanet et al. 2020; Strubell et al. 2020). \r\nRapid digitalisation is also contributing to an expanding e-waste \r\nproblem, estimated to be the fastest growing domestic waste stream \r\nglobally (Forti et al. 2020)."


id: bd15b6f4be6775a83eefc38597416da0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30515
content:
"As digitalisation proliferates, an important policy objective is \r\ntherefore to invest in data collection and monitoring systems and \r\nenergy demand models of digitalised systems to guide technology \r\nand policy investment decisions for addressing potential direct \r\nenergy demand growth (IEA 2017a) and potentially concomitant \r\ngrowth in e-waste."


id: 8f56eb57d9bac51106fd4e30f2d0a8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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vector_id: 22431
content:
"Figure 5.12 | Studies assessing net changes in CO2 emissions, energy use, and activity levels indicate mitigation potentials for numerous end-user\u0002oriented digitalisation solutions, but also risk of increased emissions due to inefficient substitutions, induced demand, and rebound effects. 90 studies \r\nwere assessed with 207 observations (indicated by vertical bars) including those based on empirical research, attributional and consequential lifecycle assessments, and techno\u0002economic analyses and scenarios at different scales, which are not directly comparable but are useful for indicating the directionality and determinants of net emissions, energy, \r\nand activity effects. Sources: Erdmann and Hilty (2010); Gebler et al. (2014); Huang et al. (2016); Verhoef et al. (2018); Alhumayani et al. (2020); Court and Sorrell (2020); Hook \r\net al. (2020); IEA (2020a); Saade et al. (2020); Torres-Carrillo et al. (2020); Wilson et al. (2020c); Yao et al. (2020); Munoz et al. (2021)."


id: 2ca75f8c2f82cc5012e0469cd47b5a88
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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content:
"Within a small but growing body of literature on the net effects of \r\ndigitalisation, there is medium evidence that digitalised consumer \r\nservices can reduce overall emissions, energy use, and activity levels, \r\nwith medium agreement on the scale of potential savings, with the \r\nimportant caveat that induced demand and rebound effects must be \r\nmanaged carefully to avoid negative outcomes."


id: 1f0ed0424ef314a3cbfb2a17800d754d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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content:
"Shared mobility is characterised by the sharing of an asset \r\n(e.g.,  a  bicycle, e-scooter, vehicle), and the use of technology \r\n(i.e.,  apps and the Internet) to connect users and providers. It \r\nsucceeded by identifying market inefficiencies and transferring "


id: 904c7a925dda8525240c4f76d3b3ac33
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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content:
"control over transactions to consumers. Even though most \r\nshared mobility providers operate privately, their services can be \r\nconsidered as part of a  public transport system in so far as it is \r\naccessible to most transport users and does not require private \r\nasset ownership. Shared mobility reduces GHG emissions if it \r\nsubstitutes for more GHG-intensive travel (usually private car \r\ntravel) (Martin and Shaheen 2011; Shaheen and Chan 2016; Santos \r\n2018; Axsen  and Sovacool 2019; Shaheen and  Cohen 2019), and \r\nespecially if it changes consumer behaviour in the long run 'by \r\nshifting personal transportation choices from ownership to demand\u0002fulfilment' (Mi and Coffman 2019)."


id: aaf037f57cfe2b90bd018787d06a4193
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27299
content:
"Demand is an important driver for energy use and emissions because \r\ndecreased cost of travel time by sharing an asset (e.g., a vehicle) could \r\nlead to an increase in emissions, but a high level of vehicle sharing \r\ncould reduce negative impacts associated with this (Brown and \r\nDodder 2019). One example is the megacity Kolkata, India, which \r\nhas as many as twelve different modes of public transportation \r\nthat co-exist and offer means of mobility to its 14 million citizens \r\n(Box 5.8). Most public transport modes are shared mobility options \r\nranging from sharing between two people in a rickshaw or between \r\na  few hundred in metro or suburban trains. Sharing also happens \r\ninformally as daily commuters avail shared taxis and neighbours \r\nborrow each other's car or bicycle for urgent or day trips."


id: 2357bf7bdbfd04103abfdccbc1589320
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3417
content:
"Positive effects can be realised directly in bike sharing due to its \r\nvery low marginal transport emissions. For example, in 2016, bike \r\nsharing in Shanghai, China, reduced CO2 emissions by 25 ktCO2, with \r\nadditional benefits to air quality (Zhang and Mi 2018). However, \r\nbike-sharing can also increase emissions from motor vehicle usage \r\nwhen inventory management is not optimised during maintenance, \r\ncollection, and redistribution of dock-less bikes (Fishman et al. 2014; \r\nZhang et al. 2019; Mi and Coffman 2019)."


id: b27334f03ae79a55590b65b6087d41f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28630
content:
"From a mitigation perspective, the current state of shared mobility \r\nlooks at best questionable (Fishman et al. 2014; Ricci 2015; Martin \r\n2016; Zhang and Mi 2018; Creutzig et al. 2019b; Mi and Coffman \r\n2019; Zhang et al. 2019). Transport entrepreneurs and government \r\nofficials often conflate 'smart' and 'shared' vehicles with \r\n'sustainable' mobility, a conflation not withstanding scrutiny (Noy \r\nand Givoni 2018). Surveys demonstrate that many users take "


id: 5753876884780573cb950ca23bca2eac
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12621
content:
"an instrument to 'commercialize small housing production, while \r\nhousing affordability and accessibility are threatened' (Uyttebrouck \r\net al. 2020)."


id: 778c130373b458aad0777d764ad1f314
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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vector_id: 18236
content:
"if automation makes route deviation more efficient, more cost \r\neffective, and more convenient, increasing total travel substantially \r\n(Wadud et  al. 2016). Car sharing with automated vehicles could \r\neven worsen congestion and emissions by generating additional \r\ntravel demand (Rubin et  al. 2016). Travel time in autonomous \r\nvehicles can be used for other activities but driving and travel costs \r\nare expected to decrease, which most likely will induce additional \r\ndemand for auto travel (Moeckel and Lewis 2017) and could even \r\ncreate incentives for further urban sprawl. More generally, increased \r\nefficiency generated by big data and smart algorithms may generate \r\nrebound effects in demand and potentially compromise the public \r\nbenefits of their efficiency promise (Gossart 2015)."


id: 8ac58a1c3dd9a29ea55444a7544122c0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21588
content:
"With respect to travel accommodation, several models are emerging \r\nin which accommodation is offered to, or shared with, travellers \r\nby private individuals organised by business-driven or non-profit \r\nonline platforms. Accommodation sharing includes peer-to-peer, \r\nICT-enabled, short-term renting, swapping, borrowing or lending \r\nof existing privately-owned lodging facilities (Mohlmann 2015; \r\nVoytenko Palgan et al. 2017)."


id: ffbd542e3e72d63ac78f40b7081558ac
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42382
content:
"With shared accommodation services via the platform economy, \r\nthere may be risks of negative sustainability effects, such as rebound \r\neffects caused by increased travel frequency (Tussyadiah and Pesonen \r\n2016). This is particularly a problem if apartments are removed from \r\nlong-term rental markets, thus indirectly inducing construction \r\nactivities, with substantial GHG emissions of their own. However, if \r\na host shares their accommodation with a guest, the use of some \r\nresources, such as heating and lighting, is shared, thereby leading to \r\nmore efficient resource use per capita (Chenoweth 2009; Voytenko \r\nPalgan et al. 2017). Given the nascence of shared accommodation \r\nvia the platform economy, quantifications of its systems-level energy \r\nand emissions impacts are lacking in the literature, representing an \r\nimportant area for future study."


id: ef13cb5e708e2e8b02157e9f25df576d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39432
content:
"In many countries, shared mobility and ride pooling are often the \r\nnorm. Here the challenge is to improve service quality to keep users \r\nin shared mobility and public transport (Box  5.8). A key barrier in \r\ncities like Nairobi, Kenya, is the lack of public involvement of users \r\nand sustainability experts in designing transport systems, leaving \r\nplanning to transport engineers, and thus preventing inclusive shared \r\nmobility system design (Klopp 2012)."


id: a91fb6d83157534c46664302a3794cf7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26975
content:
"In developing countries and in many student accommodations \r\nglobally, shared accommodation allows affordable housing for \r\na large part of the population. For example, living arrangements are \r\nbuilt expressly around the practice of sharing toilets, bathrooms and \r\nkitchens. While the sharing of such facilities does connote a lower \r\nlevel of service provision and quality of life, it provides access \r\nfor a  consumer base with very low and unreliable incomes. Thus, \r\nsharing key facilities can help guarantee the provision of affordable \r\nhousing (Gulyani et  al. 2018). In developed countries, large-scale \r\ndevelopments are targeting students and 'young professionals' \r\nby offering shared accommodation and services. Historically \r\nshared accommodation has been part of the student life due to its \r\nflexible and affordable characteristics. However, the expansion of \r\nhousing supply through densification can use shared facilities as "


id: fdd88f1a768f80dfa29ff08391a3f5d5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42021
content:
"there are also many definitions of CE: a systematic literature review \r\nidentified 114 different definitions (Kirchherr et  al. 2017). One of \r\nthe most comprehensive models is suggested by the Netherlands \r\nEnvironmental Assessment Agency (Potting et al. 2018), which defines \r\nten strategies for circularity: Refuse (R0), Rethink (R1), Reduce (R2), \r\nReuse (R3), Repair (R4), Refurbish (R5), Remanufacture  (R6), \r\nRepurpose (R7), Recycle (R8), and Recover energy (R9). Overall, \r\nthe definition of CE is contested, with varying boundary conditions \r\nchosen. As illustrated in Figure 5.11, the CE overlaps with both the \r\nsharing economy and digitalisation megatrends."


id: 5d9154685009ecfdee268aa07798f048
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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content:
"While the demand for energy and materials will increase until 2060 \r\nfollowing the traditional linear model of production and consumption, \r\nresulting in serious environmental consequences (OECD 2019b), the \r\ncircular economy (CE) provides strategies for reducing societal needs \r\nfor energy and primary materials to deliver the same level of service \r\nwith lower environmental impacts. The CE framework embodies \r\nmultiple schools of thought with roots in a number of related concepts \r\n(Blomsma and Brennan 2017; Murray et al. 2017), including cradle \r\nto cradle (McDonough and Braungart 2002), performance economy \r\n(Stahel 2016), biomimicry (Benyus 1997), green economy (Loiseau \r\net al. 2016) and industrial ecology (Saavedra et al. 2018). As a result, "


id: c80290dcfac3145464d22e6151b99bb2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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vector_id: 32496
content:
"One report estimates that the CE can contribute to more than \r\n6 GtCO2 emission reductions in 2030, including strategies such as \r\nmaterial substitution in buildings (Blok et al. 2016). Reform of the tax \r\nsystem towards GHG emissions and the extraction of raw materials \r\nsubstituting taxes on labour is a key precondition to achieve such \r\na  potential. Otherwise, rebound effects tend to take back a  high \r\nshare of marginal CE efforts. A 50% reduction of GHG emissions \r\nin industrial processes, including the production of goods in steel, \r\ncement, plastic, paper, and aluminium, from 2010 until 2050, is \r\nimpossible to attain only with reuse and radical product innovation \r\nstrategies, but will need to also rely on the reduction of primary input \r\n(Allwood et al. 2010)."


id: 151a8fb340682ed5d961bd00ecbfa936
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 925
content:
"CE strategies generally correspond to the 'Avoid' strategy for \r\nprimary materials (Sections 5.1 and 5.3.2). CE strategies in industrial \r\nsettings improve well-being mostly indirectly, via the reduction of \r\nenvironmental harm and climate impact. They can also save monetary \r\nresources of consumers by reducing the need for consumption. It may \r\nseem counterintuitive, but reducing consumers' need to consume \r\na particular product or service (e.g., reducing energy consumption) \r\nmay increase consumption of another product or service (e.g., travel) \r\nassociated with some type of energy use, or lead to greater \r\nconsumption if additional secondary markets are created. Hence, \r\ncarbon emissions could rise if the rebound effect is not considered \r\n(Chitnis et al. 2013; Zink and Geyer 2017)."


id: 4843e28437cc9f524270ef767f47423a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9928
content:
"Looking at 'Shift' strategies (Sections 5.1 and 5.3.2), the role of \r\nindividuals as consumers and users has received less attention than \r\nother aspects of the CE (e.g., technological interventions as 'Improve' \r\nstrategies and waste minimisation as 'Avoid' strategies) within \r\nmainstream debates to date. One explanation is that CE has roots \r\nin the field of industrial ecology, which has historically emphasised \r\nmaterials systems more than the end user. By shifting this perspective \r\nfrom the supply side to the demand side in the CE, users are, for \r\nthe most part, discussed as social entities that now must form new \r\nrelations with businesses to meet their needs. That is, the demand\u0002side approach largely replaces the concept of a consumer with that \r\nof a user, who must either accept or reject new business models for \r\nservice provision, stimulated by the pushes and pulls of prices and \r\nperformance (Hobson 2019)."


id: 1a0f39a117164a8878cfc7c6de907784
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1785
content:
"Demand-side mitigation involves individuals (e.g.,  consumption \r\nchoices), culture (e.g.,  social norms, values), corporate \r\n(e.g.,  investments), institutions (e.g.,  political agency), and \r\ninfrastructure change (high evidence, high agreement). These five \r\ndrivers of human behaviour either contribute to the status quo \r\nof a  global high-carbon, consumption- and GDP growth-oriented \r\neconomy or help generate the desired change to a  low-carbon "


id: 6cdd0ec8298e48db264534a8dba4a3be
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16431
content:
"Behaviour change by individuals and households requires both \r\nmotivation to change and capacity for change (option availability/\r\nknowledge; material/cognitive resources to initiate and maintain \r\nchange) (Moser and Ekstrom 2010; Michie et al. 2011) and is best \r\nseen as part of more encompassing collective action. Motivation for "


id: 1b60249697e515c6c003e9f06cd9526f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1994
content:
"change for collective good comes from economic, legal, and social \r\nincentives, and regard for deeper intrinsic value of concern for others \r\nover extrinsic values. Capacity for change varies; people in informal \r\nsettlements or rural areas are incapacitated by socio-political realities \r\nand have limited access to new energy-service options."


id: e2049c2361d10711d65e3eded3aa6106
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37044
content:
"Motivation and effort required for behaviour change increase from \r\n'Improve' to 'Shift' to 'Avoid' decisions. 'Improve' requires changes in \r\npersonal purchase decisions, 'Shift' involves changes in behavioural \r\nroutines, 'Avoid' also involves changes in deeper values or mindsets. \r\nPeople set easy goals for themselves and more difficult ones for \r\nothers (Attari et al. 2016) and underestimate the energy savings of \r\nbehaviour changes that make a large difference (Attari et al. 2010). \r\nMost personal actions taken so far have small mitigation potential \r\n(recycling, ecodriving), and people refrain from options advocated \r\nmore recently with high impact (less flying, living car free) (Dubois \r\net al. 2019)."


id: ac06a2f615e384d41ce015dcdc04fdd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27506
content:
"Motivation for demand-side solutions can be increased by focusing \r\non personal health or financial risks and benefits that clearly matter \r\nto people (Petrovic et al. 2014). Consistent with climate change as \r\na normally distant, non-threatening, statistical issue (Gifford 2011; \r\nFox-Glassman and Weber 2016), personal experience with climate\u0002linked flooding or other extreme weather events increases perceptions \r\nof risk and willingness to act (Weber 2013; Atreya and Ferreira 2015; \r\nSisco et  al. 2017) when plausible mediators and moderators are \r\nconsidered Brugger et al. (2021), confirmed in all 24 countries studied \r\nby Broomell et al. (2015). Discounting the future matters (Hershfield \r\net al. 2014): across multiple countries, individuals more focused on \r\nfuture outcomes are more likely to engage in environmental actions \r\n(Milfont et al. 2012)."


id: bde06377a892922a90ddda2bab371e5c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30664
content:
"ASI behaviours, in the Netherlands and Spain (Abrahamse and Steg \r\n2009; Niamir 2019; Niamir et al. 2020b), the OECD (Ameli and Brandt \r\n2015), and 11 European countries (Mills and Schleich 2012; Roy et al. \r\n2012). Education and income increase 'Shift' and 'Improve' behaviour, \r\nwhereas personal norms help to increase the more difficult 'Avoid' \r\nbehaviours (Mills and Schleich 2012). Socio-demographic variables \r\n(household size and income) predict energy use, but psychological \r\nvariables (perceived behavioural control, perceived responsibility) \r\npredict changes in energy use; younger households are more likely \r\nto adopt 'Improve' decisions, whereas education increases 'Avoid' "


id: af73ab5dc54f30978dbd4e88496bb6fc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28097
content:
"decisions (Ahmad et  al. 2015). In India and developing countries, \r\n'Avoid' decisions are made by individuals championing a  cause, \r\nwhile 'Improve' and 'Shift' behaviour are increased by awareness \r\nprogrammes and promotional materials highlighting environmental \r\nand financial benefits (Chakravarty and Roy 2016; Roy et al. 2018a). \r\nCleaner cookstove adoption Box  5.6), a  widely studied 'Improve' \r\nsolution in developing countries (Nepal et al. 2010; Pant et al. 2014), \r\ngoes up with income, education, and urban location. Female education \r\nand investments in reproductive health are evident measures to \r\nreduce world population growth (Abel et al. 2016)."


id: 6d9b460516b7253d2b118cc138180765
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16544
content:
"Core values also influence which costs and benefits are considered \r\n(Hahnel et al. 2015; Golz and Hahnel 2016; Steg 2016). Information \r\nprovision and appeals are thus more effective when tailored to those \r\nvalues (Bolderdijk et al. 2013; Boomsma and Steg 2014), as implemented \r\nby the energy cultures framework (Stephenson et al. 2015; Klaniecki \r\net  al. 2020). Awareness, personal norms, and perceived behavioural \r\ncontrol predict willingness to change energy-related behaviour above \r\nand beyond traditional socio-demographic and economic predictors \r\n(Schwartz 1977; Ajzen 1985; Stern 2000), as do perceptions of self\u0002efficacy (Bostrom et al. 2019). However, such motivation for change \r\nis often not enough, as actors also need capacity for change and help \r\nto overcome individual, institutional and market barriers (Young et al. \r\n2010; Bray et al. 2011; Carrington et al. 2014)."


id: 8584c2217baad64bd595e2df74edbf2b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20630
content:
"There is high agreement in the literature that the updating of educational \r\nsystems from a commercialised, individualised, entrepreneurial training \r\nmodel to an education cognisant of planetary health and human well\u0002being can accelerate climate change awareness and action (Mendoza \r\nand Roa 2014; Dombrowski et  al. 2016) (Supplementary Material I \r\nChapter 5)."


id: f3acfc406a30abd7a3a6696112a8ec44
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40244
content:
"There is high evidence and high agreement that people's core values \r\naffect climate-related decisions and climate policy support by shaping \r\nbeliefs and identities (Dietz 2014; Steg 2016; Hayward and Roy \r\n2019). People with altruistic and biospheric values are more likely to \r\nact on climate change and support climate policies than those with \r\nhedonic or egoistic values (Taylor et al. 2014), because these values \r\nare associated with higher awareness and concern about climate \r\nchange, stronger belief that personal actions can help mitigate \r\nclimate change, and stronger feelings of responsibility for taking \r\nclimate action (Dietz 2014; Steg 2016). Research also suggest that \r\negalitarian, individualistic, and hierarchical worldviews (Wildavsky \r\nand Dake 1990) have their role, and that successful solutions \r\nrequire policy-makers of all three worldviews to come together and \r\ncommunicate with each other (Chuang et al. 2020)."


id: e63188f693999941bb05d2576dfc20b4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37803
content:
"Table  5.4 describes common obstacles to demand-side energy \r\nbehaviour change, from loss aversion to present bias (for more detail \r\nsee Chapter 5 Supplementary Material I). Choice architecture refers \r\nto interventions ('nudges') that shape the choice context and how \r\nchoices are presented, with seemingly-irrelevant details (e.g., option \r\norder or labels) often more important than option price (Thaler and \r\nSunstein 2009). There is high evidence and high agreement that \r\nchoice architecture nudges shape energy decisions by capturing \r\ndeciders' attention; engaging their desire to contribute to the social "


id: b6e1bb5c5c0b14cd6a9a7b23d5469ae8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29376
content:
"referred to as 'policy packaging' in transport policy research (Givoni \r\n2014). A meta-analysis, combining evidence of psychological and \r\neconomic studies, demonstrates that feedback, monetary incentives \r\nand social comparison operate synergistically and are together more \r\neffective than the sum of individual interventions (Khanna et al. 2021). \r\nThe same meta-analysis also shows that combined with monetary \r\nincentives, nudges and choice architecture can reduce global GHG \r\nemissions from household energy use by 5-6% (Khanna et al. 2021)."


id: f1f6e8e2efa58480549bcb5270912584
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39957
content:
"Choice architecture has been depicted as an anti-democratic attempt \r\nat manipulating the behaviour of actors without their awareness or \r\napproval (Gumbert 2019). Such critiques ignore the fact that there \r\nis no neutral way to present energy-use-related decisions, as every \r\npresentation format and choice environment influences choice, \r\nwhether intentionally or not. Educating households and policy makers \r\nabout the effectiveness of choice architecture and adding these \r\nbehavioural tools to existing market- and regulation-based tools in \r\na  transparent and consultative way can provide desired outcomes \r\nwith increased effectiveness, while avoiding charges of manipulation \r\nor deception. People consent to choice-architecture tools if their \r\nuse is welfare-enhancing, policymakers are transparent about \r\ntheir goals and processes, public deliberation and participation are \r\nencouraged, and the choice architect is trusted (Sunstein et al. 2019)."


id: 27cc6dede34f363f7c13437ad38c2928
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4193
content:
"unless \r\nd variab\r\nohen's d \r\ncentives \r\nyou-go \r\nng eco-i\r\nperating \r\ned to sh\r\ninforma\r\n2014; An\r\ned with \r\nnna et a\r\nenergy re\r\n2019*). \r\n]). When \r\n8). Self-s\r\n89; McCa\r\ner than u\r\nmse et a\r\nommitm\r\non and \r\n tools. T\r\nhen's d \r\nral inte\r\n and va\r\nsis or re\r\nn multip"


id: 34cc2441a19659ec218bcd5a8b6b92f2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6532
content:
"sults \r\nsavings, u\r\ns a small an\r\nequences (C\r\nmonetary in\r\nr US pay-as\r\n of purchasi\r\n (10-year) o\r\nncy compar\r\n. Monetary \r\nd Siikamaki \r\nhen combin\r\n = .42) (Kha\r\n significant e\r\n Nisa et al. \r\n [0.11-0.66\r\nnd Fels 2018\r\nan Raaij 198\r\nerform bett\r\n989; Abraha\r\ne when the c\r\nth informat\r\nbehavioura\r\nured as Coh\r\nt behaviou\r\nern (2020) \r\nmeta-analy\r\new.\r\npplies whe"


id: 1cb36dce208adc5d628f8e5419483f21
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2227
content:
"Res\r\nrgy \r\nfind\r\nonse\r\nwith m\r\ngs fo\r\nhood \r\nterm \r\nficie\r\n012)\r\nl and \r\nve w\r\nck (d \r\nlt in \r\n018; \r\n0.34, \r\nor a\r\nnd va\r\nals p\r\naij 19\r\nctive \r\nd w"


id: fb517516c4fcf55c8af243eaa79b10aa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41591
content:
"While such a choice can be justified, other model framings can be \r\nequally justified (Ellenbeck and Lilliestam 2019)."


id: 422b755a8cb9e7487130fb398656165b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8845
content:
"Collective behaviours and social organisation are part of everyday \r\nlife, and feeling part of active collective action renders mitigation \r\nmeasures efficient and pervasive (Climact 2018). Social and cultural \r\nprocesses play an important role in shaping what actions people \r\ntake on climate mitigation, interacting with individual, structural, \r\ninstitutional and economic drivers (Barr and Prillwitz 2014). Just like \r\ninfrastructure, social and cultural processes can 'lock in' societies to \r\ncarbon-intensive patterns of service delivery. They also offer potential \r\nlevers to change normative ideas and social practices in order to \r\nachieve extensive emissions cuts (high confidence) (Table 5.4)."


id: 75027eb78b1960525e83c24e1e9e80ae
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17823
content:
"Behavioural contagion, which describes how ideas and behaviours \r\noften spread like infectious diseases, is a  major contributor to the \r\nclimate crisis (Sunstein 2019). But harnessing contagion can also \r\nmitigate warming. Carbon-heavy consumption patterns have become \r\nthe norm only in part because we're not charged for environmental \r\ndamage we cause (Pigou 1920). The deeper source of these patterns \r\nhas been peer influence (Frank 1999), because what we do influences \r\nothers. A rooftop solar installation early in the adoption cycle, for \r\nexample, spawns a copycat installation in the same neighbourhood \r\nwithin four months, on average. With such installations thus doubling \r\nevery four months, a  single new order results in 32 additional \r\ninstallations in just two years. And contagion doesn't stop there, since \r\neach family also influences friends and relatives in distant locations."


id: e595de25acb243b520db3262180bf85f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37699
content:
"Harnessing contagion can also underwrite the investment necessary \r\nfor climate stability. If taxed more heavily, top earners would spend \r\nless, shifting the frames of reference that shape spending of those just \r\nbelow, and so on - each step simultaneously reducing emissions and \r\nliberating resources for additional green investment (Frank  2020). \r\nMany resist, believing that higher taxes would make it harder to \r\nbuy life's special extras. But that belief is a cognitive illusion (Frank \r\n2020). Acquiring special things, which are inherently in short supply, \r\nrequires outbidding others who also want them. When top tax rates \r\nrise in tandem, relative bidding power is completely unchanged, so \r\nthe same penthouse apartments would end up in the same hands \r\nas before. More generally, behavioural contagion is important to \r\nleverage all relevant social tipping points for stabilising Earth's \r\nclimate (Otto et al. 2020)."


id: ca4ef19b0366222ea33c6e79ad32bc75
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32938
content:
"For new climate policies and mitigation technologies to be rapidly \r\nand extensively implemented, they must be socially acceptable to \r\nthose who are directly impacted by those policies and technologies \r\n(medium evidence, high agreement). Policies that run counter to \r\nsocial norms or cultural meanings are less likely to be effective in \r\nreducing emissions (Demski et  al. 2015; Perlaviciute et  al. 2018; \r\nRoy et  al. 2018b). More just and acceptable implementation of \r\nrenewable energy technologies requires taking account of the \r\ncultural meanings, emotional attachments and identities linked \r\nto particular landscapes and places where those technologies "


id: 2f18163797b5671f87239307654d0251
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5556
content:
"and electrical utility sectors (Brulle 2019). There is evidence that \r\nUS opposition to climate action by carbon-connected industries is \r\nbroad-based, highly organised, and matched with extensive lobbying \r\n(Cory et al., 2021). Social movements can also work to prevent policy \r\nchanges, for example in France the Gilet Jaunes objected to increases \r\nin fuel costs on the grounds that they unfairly distributed the costs \r\nand benefits of price rises across social groups, for example between \r\nurban, peri-urban and rural areas (Copland 2019)."


id: 353c2a7c4d1f8f0bb7ca822752da57b0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6611
content:
"Religion could play an important role in enabling collective action \r\non climate mitigation by providing cultural interpretations of change \r\nand institutional responses that provide resources and infrastructure \r\nto sustain collective actions (Roy et  al. 2012; Haluza-DeLay 2014; \r\nCaniglia et  al. 2015; Hulme 2015). Religion can be an important \r\ncultural resource towards sustainability at individual, community and \r\ninstitutional levels (Ives and Kidwell 2019), providing leverage points \r\nfor inner transformation towards sustainability (Woiwode et  al. \r\n2021). Normative interpretations of climate change for and from \r\nreligious communities are found in nearly every geography, and often \r\nobserve popular movements for climate action drawing on religious \r\nsymbols or metaphors (Jenkins et al. 2018). This suggests the value for \r\npolicymakers of involving religious constituencies as significant civil \r\nsociety organisations in devising and delivering climate responses."


id: ca3a4b8d342ad006cacfe1bb11a5b8d6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32920
content:
"Countermovement coalitions work to oppose climate mitigation (high \r\nconfidence). Examples include efforts in the US to oppose mandatory \r\nlimits on carbon emissions supported by organisations from the coal "


id: 282e7d0ef80a77ec629f60867b27add7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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vector_id: 4268
content:
"implementation of new and cleaner renewable energy technologies \r\n(Kariuki 2018). A good number of corporate agents have attempted \r\nto derail climate change mitigation by targeted lobbying and doubt\u0002inducing media strategies (Oreskes and Conway 2011). A number of \r\ncorporations that are involved in both upstream and downstream \r\nsupply chains of fossil fuel companies make up the majority of \r\norganisations opposed to climate action (Dunlap and McCright \r\n2015; Brulle 2019; Cory et  al. 2021). Corporate advertisement \r\nand brand-building strategies also attempt to deflect corporate \r\nresponsibility to individuals, and/or to appropriate climate care \r\nsentiments in their own brand building; climate change mitigation \r\nis uniquely framed through choice of products and consumption, \r\navoiding the notion of the political collective action sphere (Doyle \r\n2011; Doyle et al. 2019)."


id: 4dfed357786d15cb8ed87d80542fc611
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10981
content:
"Businesses and corporate organisations play a  key role in the \r\nmitigation of global warming, through their own commitments \r\nto zero-carbon footprints (Mendiluce 2021), decisions to invest \r\nin researching and implementing new energy technologies and \r\nenergy-efficient measures, and the supply-side interaction with \r\nchanging consumer preferences and behaviours, such as via \r\nmarketing. Business models and strategies work both as a barrier \r\nto and an accelerator of decarbonisation. Still existing locked\u0002in infrastructures and business models advantages fossil fuel \r\nindustry over renewable and energy efficient end use industry \r\n(Klitkou et al. 2015). The fossil fuel energy generation and delivery \r\nsystem therefore epitomises a  barrier to the acceptance and "


id: 8f7d90c72c0db7426d7cda6e55426f24
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22453
content:
"(Grandclement et al. 2015; De Rubens et al. 2018). Middle actors can \r\nbring about change in several different directions, be it, upstream, \r\ndownstream or sideways. They can redefine professional ethics \r\naround sustainability issues, and, as influencers on the process of \r\ndiffusion of innovations (Rogers 2003), professionals can enable or \r\nobstruct improvements in efficient service provision or shifts towards \r\nlow-carbon technologies (e.g.,  air and ground source heat pumps, \r\nsolar hot water, underfloor heating, programmable thermostats, and \r\nmechanical ventilation with heat recovery) and mobility technologies \r\n(e.g., electric vehicles)."


id: 195003449b2f3098582ef5269c881806
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1669
content:
"Business and corporations are also agents of change towards \r\ndecarbonisation, as demonstrated in the case of PV and battery \r\nelectric cars (Teece 2018). Beyond new low-carbon technologies, \r\nstrong sustainability business models are characterised by identifying \r\nnature as the primary stakeholder, strong local anchorage, the creation \r\nof diversified income sources, and deliberate limitations on economic \r\ngrowth (Brozovic 2019). However, such business models are difficult \r\nto maintain if generally traditional business models, which require \r\nshort-term accounting, prevail."


id: 79af873b70e899eeaa2e41104f2f5b21
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18611
content:
"Liability of fossil fuel business models and insurance against climate \r\ndamages are key concerns of corporations and business. Limitations \r\nand regulation on GHG emissions will compel reductions in demand for \r\nfossil fuel companies' products (Porter and Kramer 2006). According \r\nto a  report by the Advisory Scientific Committee of the European \r\nSystemic Risk Board, insurance industries are very likely to incur losses \r\ndue to liability risks (ESRB 2016). The divestment movement adds \r\nadditional pressure on fossil fuel related investments (Braungardt \r\net al. 2019), even though fossil fuel financing remains resilient (Curran \r\n2020). Companies, businesses and organisations, especially those \r\nin the carbon-intensive energy sector, might face liability claims for \r\ntheir contribution to climate change. A late transition to a low-carbon \r\neconomy would exacerbate the physical costs of climate change on \r\ngovernments, businesses and corporations (ESRB 2016)."


id: 601370309d8a57ce0f0d0bb2504ec1f1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Despite the seemingly positive roles that businesses and corporate \r\norganisations tend to play towards sustainable transitions, there is \r\na need to highlight the dynamic relationship between sustainable and \r\nunsustainable trends (Antal et al. 2020), or example, the production \r\nof sport utility vehicles (SUVs) in the automobile market at the \r\nsame time that car manufacturers are producing electric vehicles. \r\nAn analysis of the role of consumers as drivers of unsustainability \r\nfor businesses and corporate organisations is very important here as \r\nthis trend will offset the sustainability progress being made by these \r\nbusinesses and organisations (Antal et al. 2020)."


id: cf76fabf98542dda9100b6212672e293
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"In densely populated, fast-growing megacities, policymakers face the difficult challenge of preventing widespread adoption of petrol \r\nor diesel fuelled private cars as a mode of transport. The megacity of Kolkata in India provides a useful case study. As many as twelve \r\ndifferent modes of public transportation, each with its own system structure, actors and meanings, co-exist and offer means of \r\nmobility to its 14 million citizens. Most of the public transport modes are shared mobility options, ranging from sharing between two \r\npeople in a rickshaw or a few hundred in metro or sub-urban trains. Sharing also happens informally as daily commuters avail shared \r\ntaxis and neighbours borrow each other's car or bicycle for urgent or day trips."


id: 3eaebb9736c5219037edebdcc5f70546
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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content:
"objective measures, such as public health and climate change \r\nmitigation, not only given preferences (high agreement, high \r\nevidence). Specifically, there is a case for more investment in low\u0002carbon transport infrastructure than assumed in environmental \r\neconomics as it induces low-carbon preferences (Creutzig et  al. \r\n2016a; Mattauch et  al. 2016; Mattauch et  al. 2018). Changes in \r\ninfrastructure provision for active travel may contribute to uptake \r\nof more walking and cycling (Frank et  al. 2019). These effects \r\ncontribute to higher uptake of low-carbon travel options, albeit \r\nthe magnitude of effects depends on design choices and context \r\n(Goodman et  al. 2013; Goodman et  al. 2014; Song et  al. 2017; \r\nJavaid et  al. 2020; Abraham et  al. 2021). Infrastructure is thus \r\nnot only required to make low-carbon travel possible but can \r\nalso be a  pre-condition for the formation of low-carbon mobility \r\npreferences (see case study in Box 5.8)."


id: 18f3d7d93ae2dd6a11c890b52b17f5b7
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content:
"The dynamic interaction of habits and infrastructures also predict \r\nCO2-intensive choices. When people move from a  city with good \r\npublic transport to a  car-dependent city, they are more likely to \r\nown fewer vehicles due to learned preferences for lower levels of \r\ncar ownership (Weinberger and Goetzke 2010). When individuals \r\nmoving to a  new city with extensive public transport were given \r\ntargeted material about public transport options, the modal share \r\nof public transport increased significantly (Bamberg et  al. 2003). \r\nSimilarly, an exogenous change to route choice in public transport \r\nmakes commuters change their habitual routes (Larcom et al. 2017)."


id: 9c16f8b3a1a07599890fce53708b1c8f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24715
content:
"From a  welfare point of view, infrastructure investments are not \r\nconstrained by revealed or stated preferences (high evidence, \r\nhigh agreement). Preferences change with social and physical \r\nenvironment, and infrastructure interventions can be justified by "


id: b7d0dcdc24051c2b2298428a7398256
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29559
content:
"Table 5.4 | Main features, insights, and policy implications of five drivers of decision and action. Entries in each column are independent lists, not intended to \r\nline up with each other."


id: a12400de8a43b6ce9ee7e5d892dd4cbf
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"between technologies, user practices, cultural meanings, business, \r\ninfrastructures, and public policies (McMeekin and Southerton 2012; \r\nGeels et  al. 2017) and can thus accommodate the five drivers of \r\nchange and stability discussed in Section 5.4."


id: 5317a2c70d0a52896fbd7bcaf1c2ce2a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Several integrative frameworks including social practice theory \r\n(Ropke 2009; Shove and Walker 2014), the energy cultures framework \r\n(Stephenson et  al. 2015; Jurisoo et  al. 2019) and socio-technical \r\ntransitions theory (McMeekin and Southerton 2012; Geels et al. 2017) \r\nconceptualise demand-side transitions as multi-dimensional and \r\ninteracting processes (high evidence, high agreement). Social practice \r\ntheory emphasises interactions between artefacts, competences, \r\nand cultural meanings (Ropke 2009; Shove and Walker 2014). The \r\nenergy cultures framework highlights feedbacks between materials, \r\nnorms, and behavioural practices (Stephenson et  al. 2015; Jurisoo \r\net al. 2019). Socio-technical transitions theory addresses interactions "


id: b2a0e7a69ea5043ae73bb8fb86092e6a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28666
content:
"Section  5.4 shows with high evidence and high agreement that \r\nthe relative influence of different drivers varies between demand\u0002side solutions. The deployment of 'Improve' options like LEDs and \r\nclean cookstoves mostly involves technological change, adoption by \r\nconsumers who integrate new technologies in their daily life practices \r\n(Smith et  al. 1993; Sanderson and Simons 2014; Franceschini and \r\nAlkemade 2016), and some policy change. Changes in meanings \r\nare less pertinent for those 'Improve' options that are primarily \r\nabout technological substitution. Other 'Improve' options, like clean \r\ncookstoves, involve both technological substitution and changes in \r\ncultural meanings and traditions."


id: ad706300913b03d7dbb48e07a4a738e8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"and countries, the transitions literature distinguishes four phases, \r\ncharacterised by generic core processes and challenges: (i) emergence, \r\n(ii) early adaptation, (i) diffusion, (iv) stabilisation (high confidence) \r\n(Rotmans et  al. 2001; Markard et  al. 2012; Geels et  al. 2017) \r\n(Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 16). These four phases do not imply \r\nthat transitions are linear, teleological processes, because set-backs \r\nor reversals may occur as a result of learning processes, conflicts, or \r\nchanging coalitions (very high confidence) (Geels and Raven 2006; \r\nMessner 2015; Davidescu et al. 2018). There is also no guarantee that \r\ntechnological, social, or business model innovations progress beyond \r\nthe first phase."


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vector_id: 41322
content:
"Deployment of 'Shift' options like enhanced public transport involves \r\nsubstantial behavioural change and transitions to new or expanded \r\nprovisioning systems, which may include new technologies (buses, \r\ntrams), infrastructures (light rail, dedicated bus lanes), institutions \r\n(operational licences, performance contracts), financial arrangements, \r\nand new organisations (with particular responsibilities and oversight) \r\n(high evidence, high agreement) (Deng and Nelson 2011; Turnheim \r\nand Geels 2019). Changes in cultural meanings can facilitate 'Shift' \r\noptions. Shifts towards low-meat diets, for instance, are motivated \r\nby costs and by beliefs about the undesirability of meat that relate \r\nmore to issues like health, nutrition and animal welfare than climate \r\nchange (De Boer et al. 2014; Mylan 2018)."


id: 690f9ee3ca1573c08adaafc8ec6fd073
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15752
content:
"'Avoid' options that reduce service levels (e.g.,  sufficiency or \r\ndownshifting) imply very substantial behavioural and cultural \r\nchanges that may not resonate with mainstream consumers (Dubois \r\net  al. 2019). Other 'Avoid' options like teleworking also require \r\nchanges in cultural meanings and beliefs (about the importance \r\nof supervision, coaching, social contacts, or office politics), as well \r\nas changes in behaviour, institutions, business, and technology \r\n(including good internet connections and office space at home). \r\nBecause these interconnected changes were not widespread, \r\nteleworking remained stuck in small niches and did not diffuse widely \r\nbefore the COVID-19 crisis (Hynes 2014; Hynes 2016; Belzunegui\u0002Eraso and Erro-Garces 2020; Stiles 2020). As preferences change, \r\nnew infrastructures and social settings can also elicit new desires \r\nassociated with emerging low-energy demand service provisioning \r\nsystems (Section 5.4.5)."


id: ccc6310fbe5e6c54298a777ebe5f3200
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33363
content:
"In the third phase, radical innovations diffuse into wider communities \r\nand mainstream markets. Typical drivers are performance \r\nimprovements, cost reductions, widespread consumer interest, \r\ninvestments in infrastructure and complementary technologies, \r\ninstitutional support and strong cultural appeal (high evidence, high \r\nagreement) (Wilson 2012; Markard and Hoffmann 2016; Malone \r\net al. 2017; Raven et al. 2017; Kanger et al. 2019). The latter may \r\nbe related to wider cultural shifts such as increased public attention \r\nto climate change and new framings like 'climate emergency' which \r\ngained traction before the Covid-19 pandemic (Bouman et al. 2020b). \r\nThese concerns may not last, however, since public attention typically \r\nfollows cycles (Downs 1972; Djerf-Pierre 2012)."


id: fa14f61f695acb41cf43894961f6d7cf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41366
content:
"Transitions often take several decades, unfolding through several \r\nphases. Although there is variability across innovations, sectors, "


id: 433c6d1381384d5f57b0cc19d7a19f69
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9042
content:
"This phase often involves multiple struggles: economic competition \r\nbetween low-carbon innovations and existing technologies and \r\npractices, business struggles between incumbents and new entrants \r\n(Hockerts and Wustenhagen 2010), cultural and framing struggles in \r\npublic opinion arenas (Kammermann and Dermont 2018; Rosenbloom \r\n2018; Hess 2019a), and political struggles over adjustments in policies \r\nand institutions, which shape markets and innovations (Meadowcroft \r\n2011; Roberts and Geels 2019). The lock-in mechanisms of existing \r\npractices and systems tend to weaken in the third phase, either \r\nbecause competing innovations erode their economic viability, \r\ncultural legitimacy or institutional support (Turnheim and Geels 2012; \r\nRoberts 2017; Kuokkanen et  al. 2018; Leipprand and Flachsland \r\n2018) or because exogenous shocks and pressures disrupt the status \r\nquo (Kungl and Geels 2018; Simpson 2019)."


id: fabc1045aa3f3fdbb16ec413f2a1c89d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41491
content:
"processes, artefacts, and behaviours is determined by a wide range \r\nof factors at the macro- and micro-scales, which have been identified \r\nby several decades of diffusion research in multiple disciplines \r\n(Mansfield 1968; Martino et  al. 1978; Davis 1979; Mahajan et  al. \r\n1990; Ausubel 1991; Grubler 1991; Feder and Umali 1993; Bayus \r\n1994; Comin and Hobijn 2003; Rogers 2003; Van den Bulte and \r\nStremersch 2004; Meade and Islam 2006; Peres et al. 2010)."


id: 4de8819ab3a8bd8203bcda81946a08a0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10973
content:
"Diffusion rates are determined by two broad categories of variables: \r\nthose intrinsic to the technology, product or practice under consideration \r\n(typically performance, costs, benefits), and those intrinsic to the \r\nadoption environment (e.g., socio-economic and market characteristics)."


id: 272aa99e1fdc7c5483dcfda9520d380e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4052
content:
"In the fourth phase, the diffusing innovations replace or substantially \r\nreconfigure existing practices and systems, which may lead to the \r\ndownfall or reorientation of incumbent firms (Bergek et  al. 2013; \r\nMcMeekin et  al. 2019). The new system becomes institutionalised \r\nand anchored in professional standards, technical capabilities, \r\ninfrastructures, educational programmes, regulations and institutional \r\nlogics, user habits, and views of normality, which create new lock-ins \r\n(Galaskiewicz 1985; Shove and Southerton 2000; Barnes et al. 2018)."


id: b4e1c8aac8079d8fa757ffdd14aa707f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29070
content:
"Transitional change is usually slow in the first and second transition \r\nphases, because experimentation, social and technological learning, \r\nand stabilisation processes take a  long time, often decades, and \r\nremain restricted to small niches (high confidence) (Wilson 2012; \r\nBento 2013; Bento et al. 2018b). Transitional change accelerates in \r\nthe third phase, as radical innovations diffuse from initial niches into \r\nmainstream markets, propelled by the self-reinforcing mechanisms \r\ndiscussed above. The rate of adoption (diffusion) of new practices, "


id: fd54ef6a075d5abe4afa6c98698df036
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41923
content:
"Second, complexity matters, which is often related to unit scale (Ma et al. \r\n2008). Acceleration is more difficult for options with higher degrees of \r\ncomplexity (e.g., carbon capture, transport and storage, or a hydrogen \r\neconomy) representing higher technological and investment risks that "


id: 48ccefab6fe55c5a01cebda56ac4f7d8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10020
content:
"can slow down change. Options with lower complexity are easier to \r\naccelerate because they involve less experimentation and debugging \r\nand require less adoption efforts and risk."


id: e36e5ffd431581a0f81e84bec5d6411c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37310
content:
"policies and institutions can also accelerate transitions, especially if \r\nthese create stable and attractive financial incentives or introduce \r\ntechnology-forcing standards or regulations (Brand et al. 2013; Kester \r\net al. 2018; Roberts et al. 2018). Changes in meanings and cultural \r\nnorms can also accelerate transitions, especially when they affect \r\nconsumer practices, enhance social acceptance, and create legitimacy \r\nfor stronger policy support (Lounsbury and Glynn 2001; Rogers 2003; \r\nBuschmann and Oels 2019). Adoption of most advanced practices \r\ncan support leapfrogging of polluting technologies (Box 5.9)."


id: 8ca5ab27c623481cc9becd88d4826792
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21931
content:
"Third, agency, structure and meaning can accelerate transitions. \r\nThe creation and mobilisation of actor coalitions is widely seen as \r\nimportant for acceleration, especially if these involve actors with \r\ntechnical skills, financial resources and political capital (Kern and \r\nRogge 2016; Hess 2019b; Roberts and Geels 2019). Changes in "


id: c25a2181e5b98cbdba9999389a4ed827
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31475
content:
"A robust conclusion from this review is that there are no generic \r\nacceleration policies that are independent from the nature of \r\nwhat changes, by whom and how. Greater contextualisation and \r\ngranularity in policy approaches is therefore important to address \r\nthe challenges of rapid transitions towards zero-carbon systems \r\n(high evidence, high agreement)."


id: 3ef9817683d950314227ed7163b92c8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8268
content:
"There are also some contentious topics in the debate on accelerated \r\nlow-carbon transitions. First, while acceleration is desirable to \r\nmitigate climate change, there is a  risk that accelerating change \r\ntoo much may short-cut crucial experimentation and social and \r\ntechnological learning in 'formative phases' (Bento 2013; Bento et al. \r\n2018b) and potentially lead to a pre-mature lock-in of solutions that \r\nlater turn out to have negative impacts (Cowan 1990; Cowan 1991) \r\n(high evidence, medium agreement)."


id: 2a4fd6e767fc9b72f16d9ec50bf50f1a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4666
content:
"Second, there is an ongoing debate about the most powerful leverage \r\npoints and policies for speeding up change in social and technological \r\nsystems. Farmer et  al. (2019) suggested 'sensitive intervention \r\npoints' for low-carbon transitions, but do not quantify the impacts \r\non transformations. Grubler et al. (2018) proposed an end-user and \r\nefficiency-focused strategy to achieve rapid emission reductions \r\nand quantified their scenario with a leading IAM. However, discussion \r\nof the policy implications of such a  strategy have only just started \r\n(Wilson et al. 2019a), suggesting an important area for future research."


id: 65d8cae9c1b4df7366bdc9df86f0a3ae
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15179
content:
"Informal-sector innovation is often underrated. It gives marginalised people access to welfare-enhancing innovations, building on \r\nalternative knowledge and socially-embedded reciprocal exchange (Jaffe and Koster 2019; Sheikh 2019; Sheikh and Bhaduri 2020). \r\nLarge improvements in low-emission, locally-appropriate service provision are possible by facilitating informal-sector service providers'"


id: ccae648dc0841afa6eade68e0af5b2ce
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33336
content:
"access to low-energy technologies (while taking care not to additionally burden the unpaid and marginalised), through such means \r\nas education, participatory governance, government policies to assist the informal sector, social services, health care, credit provision, \r\nand removing harmful policies and regulatory silos. The importance of the informal economy, especially in low-income countries, \r\nopens many possibilities for new approaches to decent living standards service provision along with climate resilience (Rynikiewicz \r\nand Chetaille 2006; Backstrand et al. 2010; Porio 2011; Kriegler et al. 2014; Taylor and Peter 2014; Brown and McGranahan 2016; \r\nChu 2016; Satterthwaite et al. 2018; Boran 2019; Hugo and du Plessis 2019; Schroder et al. 2019; Javaid et al. 2020)."


id: e69374c269b6eccf929a22d12427cba5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37861
content:
"Public information and understanding of the CO2-eq emissions implied by consumption patterns can unleash great creativity for meeting \r\nservice needs fairly and with lower emissions (Darier and Schule 1999; Sterman and Sweeney 2002; Lorenzoni et al. 2007; Billett 2010; \r\nMarres 2011; Zapico Lamela et al. 2011; Polonsky et al. 2012; Williams et al. 2019). Community-based mapping, social learning, green \r\ninfrastructure development, and participatory governance facilitate such information-sharing (Tauhid and Zawani 2018; Mazeka et al. \r\n2019; Sharifi 2020), strengthening mitigation policies (Loiter and Norberg-Bohm 1999; Stokes and Warshaw 2017; Zhou et al. 2019)."


id: 9d91001d4d289ca77f3bd8973dc72b8c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24960
content:
"Since informal settlements are usually dense, upgrading them supports low-carbon development pathways which leapfrog less-efficient \r\nhousing, transport and other service provision, using locally-appropriate innovations (Satterthwaite et al. 2018). Examples of informal\u0002sector mitigation include digital banking in Africa; mobility in India using collective transport; food production, meal provision, and \r\nreduction of food waste in Latin America (e.g., soup kitchens in Brazil, community kitchens in Lima, Peru); informal materials recycling, \r\nspace heating and cooling, and illumination (Hordijk 2000; Baldez 2003; Maumbe 2006; Gutberlet 2008; Chaturvedi and Gidwani \r\n2011; Nandy et al. 2015; Rouse and Verhoef 2016; Ackah 2017)."


id: fd340f858593354159fe33c665e7f242
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41897
content:
"There is high evidence and high agreement that 'Avoid' policies \r\nthat affect lifestyle changes offer opportunities for cost-effective \r\nreductions in energy use and emissions, but would need to overcome \r\npolitical sensitivities around government efforts to shape and modify \r\nindividual-level behaviour (Rosenow et al. 2017; Grubb et al. 2020) \r\n(Table 5.5). These policies include ways to help avoid travel growth \r\nthrough integrated city planning or building retrofits to help avoid \r\ndemand for transport, heating or cooling (Bakker et al. 2014; Lucon \r\net  al. 2014; de Feijter et  al. 2019), which interact with existing \r\ninfrastructure. Dense pedestrianised cities and towns and medium\u0002density transit corridors are better placed to implement policies for \r\ncar reductions than 'sprawled' cities characterised by low-density, \r\nauto-dependent and separated land uses (Seto et al. 2014; Newman \r\nand Kenworthy 2015; Newman et al. 2017; Bakker et al. 2014)."


id: b909274712301350ed375f0ccbbc1fb9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29758
content:
"Cities face pressing priorities like poverty reduction, meeting basic \r\nservices and building human and institutional capacity. These are met \r\nwith highly accessible walkable and cyclable cities, connected with \r\npublic transit corridors, enabling equal accessibility for all citizens, \r\nand enabling a high level of service provisioning (UN-Habitat 2013; \r\nCreutzig et al. 2016b). Infrastructure development costs less than for \r\ncar dependent cities. However, it requires a mindset shift for urban \r\nand transport planners (medium evidence, high agreement)."


id: 6df10f2a579c68ab0bea74fcf39adeb3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16607
content:
"Policies that support the avoidance of higher-emission lifestyles \r\nand improve well-being are facilitated by the introduction of smart \r\ntechnologies, infrastructures and practices (Amini et al. 2019). They "


id: fc7ae8b5ce6d83b7e2ed03b5d9273962
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41786
content:
"Bonacini et al. 2021). In the absence of distributive or other equity\u0002based measures, the potential gains in terms of emissions reduction \r\nmay therefore be counteracted by the cost of increasing inequality. \r\nThis potential growth in inequality is likely to be more severe in poorer \r\ncountries that will additionally suffer from a  lack of international \r\nfunding for achieving the SDGs (high evidence, medium agreement) \r\n(Barbier and Burgess 2020; UN 2020)."


id: fed508358c0f3e9ca7223558b75ab906
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42229
content:
"include regulations and measures for investment in high-quality ICT \r\ninfrastructure and regulations to restrict number plates, as well as \r\ncompany policy around flexible working conditions (Lachapelle et al. \r\n2018; Shabanpour et  al. 2018). Working-from-home arrangements \r\nmay advantage certain segments of society such as male, older, \r\nhigher-educated and highly-paid employees, potentially exacerbating \r\nexisting inequalities in the labour market (Lambert et  al. 2020; "


id: c0488463e1f80c9e349b143b530cb8fa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31134
content:
"Ritchie et al. 2018; Willett et al. 2019). Governments also play a direct \r\nrole beyond nudging citizens with information about health and well\u0002being. While the effectiveness of these policies on behaviour change \r\noverall may be limited (Pearson-Stuttard et al. 2017; Shangguan et al. \r\n2019), there is some room for policy to influence actors upstream, \r\nsuch as industry and supermarkets, which may give rise to longer\u0002term, structural change."


id: 3181ff3193578723025fb520c7df7246
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5955
content:
"As indicated in Table  5.6, 'Shift' policies have various forms \r\nsuch as the demand for low-carbon materials for buildings and \r\ninfrastructure in manufacturing and services and shift from meat\u0002based protein, mainly beef, to plant-based diets of other protein \r\nsources (high evidence, high agreement) (Springmann et al. 2016a; "


id: affde96bea65bee1a9264c77bb495232
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28204
content:
"'Improve' policies aim at improving vehicles, comfort, fuels, transport \r\noperations and management technologies; and in buildings, they \r\ninclude policies for improving efficiency of heating systems and \r\nretrofitting existing buildings. Efficiency improvements in electric \r\ncooking appliances, together with the ongoing decrease in prices of \r\nrenewable energy technologies, are opening policy opportunities to \r\nsupport households to adopt electrical cooking at mass scale (medium \r\nevidence, medium agreement) (IEA 2017c; Puzzolo et  al. 2019). \r\nThese actions towards cleaner energy for cooking often come with \r\ncooking-related reduction of GHG emissions, even though the extent \r\nof the reductions is highly dependent on context and technology and \r\nfuel pathways (high evidence, high agreement) (Martinez et al. 2017; \r\nMondal et  al. 2018; Rosenthal et  al. 2018; Serrano-Medrano et  al. \r\n2018; Dagnachew et al. 2019) (Box 5.6)."


id: 46b472f2983f56d5ba65023c6e806d00
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9644
content:
"Table  5.7 highlights the significant progress made in the uptake of \r\nthe electrical vehicle (EV) in Europe, driven by a  suite of incentives \r\nand policies. Increased activity in widening electric vehicle use is also \r\noccurring in developing countries. The Indian Government's proposal to \r\nreach the target of a 100% electric vehicle fleet by 2030 has stimulated \r\ninvestment in charging infrastructure that can facilitate diffusion of \r\nlarger EVs (Dhar et al. 2017). Although the proposal was not converted \r\ninto a  policy, India's large and growing two-wheeler market has \r\nbenefitted from the policy attention on EVs, showing a  significant \r\npotential for increasing the share of electric two- and three-wheelers "


id: 8fbe1d700a5afbe6321c53c33412aa79
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22498
content:
"'Improve' policies focus on the efficiency and enhancement of \r\ntechnological performance of services (Table 5.7). In mobility services, "


id: fd94d914e3102c71a45399c0e7f1c27
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41964
content:
"in the short term (Ahmad and Creutzig 2019). Similar opportunities \r\nexist for China, where e-bikes have replaced car trips and are reported \r\nto act as intermediate links in multimodal mobility (Cherry et al. 2016)."


id: ee06d55d3ba5252223abfa06419e03ca
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39255
content:
"In recent years, policy interest has arisen to address the energy access \r\nchallenge in Africa using low-carbon energy technologies to meet \r\nenergy for poverty reduction and climate action simultaneously \r\n(Rolffs et al. 2015; Fuso Nerini et al. 2018; Mulugetta et al. 2019). This \r\naspiration has been bolstered on the technical front by significant \r\nadvances in appliance efficiency such as light-emitting diode (LED) \r\ntechnology, complemented by the sharp reduction in the cost of \r\nrenewable energy technologies, and largely driven by market\u0002stimulating policies and public R&D to mitigate risks (high evidence, \r\nhigh agreement) (Alstone et al. 2015; Zubi et al. 2019)."


id: ffe9bc548fec71383fa812829cad384e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42418
content:
"Whether the public supports specific policy instruments for reducing greenhouse gas emissions is determined by cultural and political \r\nworld views (Cherry et al. 2017; Kotchen et al. 2017; Alberini et al. 2018) and national positions in international climate negotiations, \r\nwith major implications for policy design. For example, policy proposals need to circumvent 'solution aversion': that is, individuals are \r\nmore doubtful about the urgency of climate change mitigation if the proposed policy contradicts their political worldviews (Campbell \r\nand Kay 2014). While there are reasons to believe that carbon pricing is the most efficient way to reduce emissions, a recent literature - \r\nfocusing on populations in Western Europe and North America and carbon taxes - documents that efficiency features alone is not \r\nwhat makes citizens like or dislike carbon pricing schemes (Kallbekken et al. 2011; Carattini et al. 2017; Klenert et al. 2018)."


id: eddc804f4e32ee625d8f1169d1a415e0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39213
content:
"To address these realities regarding support for carbon pricing, some studies have examined whether specific uses of the revenue \r\ncan increase public support for higher carbon prices (Carattini et al. 2017; Beiser-McGrath and Bernauer 2019). Doubt about the \r\nenvironmental effectiveness of carbon pricing may be alleviated if revenue from carbon pricing is earmarked for specific uses \r\n(Kallbekken et al. 2011; Carattini et al. 2017) and higher carbon prices may then be supported (Beiser-McGrath and Bernauer 2019). \r\nThis is especially the case for using the proceeds on 'green investment' in infrastructure or energy efficiency programmes (Kotchen \r\net al. 2017). Further, returning the revenues to individuals in a salient manner may increase public support and alleviate fairness \r\nproposals, given sufficient information (Carattini et al. 2017; Klenert et al. 2018). Perceived fairness is one of the strongest predictors \r\nof policy support (Jagers et al. 2010; Whittle et al. 2019)."


id: f04911d4bc9bcdb51ea1575f5d42f7d6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39659
content:
"2017; Tesfamichael et al. 2021). This makes it important to precede \r\ncarbon pricing with investments in renewable energy and low\u0002carbon transport modes (Biber et al. 2017; Tvinnereim and Mehling \r\n2018), and especially support for developing countries by building up \r\nlow-carbon energy and mobility infrastructures and technologies, thus \r\nreducing resistance to carbon pricing (Creutzig 2019). Additionally, \r\ncarbon pricing receives higher acceptance if fairness and distributive \r\nconsiderations are made explicit in revenue distribution (Box 5.11)."


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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28512
content:
"Policy coordination is critical to manage infrastructure interdependence \r\nacross sectors, and to avoid trade-off effects (Raven and Verbong 2007; \r\nHiteva and Watson 2019), specifically requiring the consideration of \r\ninteractions among supply-side and demand-side measures (high \r\nevidence, high agreement) (Kivimaa and Virkamaki 2014; Rogge and \r\nReichardt 2016; de Coninck et al. 2018; Edmondson et al. 2019). For \r\nexample, the amount of electricity required for cooking can overwhelm \r\nthe grid which can lead to failure, causing end-users to shift back to \r\ntraditional biomass or fossil fuels (Ateba et al. 2018; Israel-Akinbo et al. \r\n2018); thus grid stability policies need to be undertaken in conjunction."


id: 5b786c2d7b74fb6e61793e91d8ae4249
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13334
content:
"Policymakers operate in a  politically dynamic national and \r\ninternational environment, and their policies often reflect their \r\ncontextual situations and constraints with regards to climate-related \r\nreforms (Levin et al. 2012; Copland 2019), including differentiation \r\nbetween developed and developing countries (high evidence, high \r\nagreement) (Beer and Beer 2014; Roy et al. 2018c). Variables such \r\nas internal political stability, equity, informality (Box 5.10), macro\u0002economic conditions, public debt, governance of policies, global \r\noil prices, quality of public services, and the maturity of green \r\ntechnologies play important roles in determining policy directions."


id: e30eec78411dbb8e793c439c20c44072
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37242
content:
"As a key contending policy instrument, carbon pricing also requires \r\nembedding into policy packages (high evidence, medium agreement).\r\nPricing may be regressive and perceived as additional costs by \r\nhouseholds and industry, making investments in green infrastructure \r\npolitically unfeasible, as examples from France and Australia show \r\n(Copland 2019; Douenne and Fabre 2020). Reforms that would \r\npush up household energy expenses are often left aside for fear of \r\nhow citizens, especially the poor, would react or cope with higher \r\nbills (high evidence, medium agreement) (Martinez and Viegas "


id: 8c3b44e7d601042ef7c1875a7b0f40b0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21845
content:
"end use. Literature on how gender, informal economies mostly in \r\ndeveloping countries, and solidarity and care frameworks translate \r\ninto climate action, but also how climate action can improve the life \r\nof marginalised groups, remains scarce. The working of economic \r\nsystems under a well-being-driven rather than GDP-driven paradigm \r\nrequires better understanding."


id: 94a279e79d909b2219761055af50db3a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23355
content:
"The digital economy, as well as shared and circular economy, is \r\nemerging as a  template for great narratives, hopes and fears. Yet, \r\nthere are few systematic evaluations of what is already happening \r\nand what can govern it towards a better narrative. Research needs \r\nto better gauge energy trends for rapidly evolving systems like data \r\ncentres, increased use of social media and influence of consumption \r\nand choices, AI, blockchain; and implications of digital divides among \r\nsocial groups and countries on well-being. Governance decisions on \r\nAI, indirectly fostering either climate harming or climate mitigating \r\nactivities remain unexplored. Better integration of mitigation models \r\nand consequential lifecycle analysis is needed for assessing how \r\ndigitalisation, shared economy and circular economy change material \r\nand energy demand."


id: 44801eabe61b3daf8f1131086c7285ec
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9281
content:
"In summary, more equitable societies are associated with high levels \r\nof social trust and enable actions that reduce GHG emissions. To this \r\nend, people play an important role in the delivery of demand-side \r\nmitigation options within which efficiency and 'Improve' options \r\ndominate. Policies that are aimed at behaviour and lifestyle changes \r\ncome with political risks for policymakers. However, the potential \r\nexists for broadening demand-side interventions to include 'Avoid' \r\nand 'Shift' policies. Longer term thinking and implementation that \r\ninvolves careful sequencing of policies as well as designing policy \r\npackages that address multiple co-benefits would be critical to \r\nmanage interactions among supply-side and demand-side options \r\nto accelerate mitigation."


id: dc7cbbbe1f8c03ec07934441c4461a40
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36058
content:
"Knowledge on climate action that starts with the social practices \r\nand how people live in various environments, cultures, contexts and \r\nattempts to improve their well-being, is still in its infancy. In models, \r\nclimate solutions remain supply-side oriented, and evaluated against \r\nGDP, without acknowledging the reduction in  well-being  due \r\nto  climate impacts. GDP is a  poor metric of human well-being, \r\nand climate policy evaluation requires better grounding in relation \r\nto decent living standards and/or similar benchmarks. Actual \r\nsolutions will invariably include demand, service provisioning and "


id: d71d1891534310cda17a00c2bed651ae
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35154
content:
"People can be educated through knowledge transfer so they can act in different roles, and in each role everyone can contribute to \r\nlimit global warming to 1.5degC. Citizens with enough knowledge can organise and put political pressure on the system. Role models \r\ncan set examples to others. Professionals (e.g., engineers, urban planners, teachers, researchers) can change professional standards \r\nin consistency with decarbonisation; for example urban planners and architects can design physical infrastructures to facilitate low\u0002carbon mobility and energy use by making walking and cycling safe for children. Rich investors can make strategic plans to divest \r\nfrom fossils and invest in carbon-neutral technologies. Consumers, especially those in the top 10% of the world population in terms \r\nof income, can limit consumption, especially in mobility, and explore the good life consistent with sustainable consumption."


id: b559d81ef4243bf2e08ea9030bf69fc7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29137
content:
"Policymakers support individual actions in certain contexts, not only by economic incentives, such as carbon pricing, but also by \r\ninterventions that understand complex decision-making processes, habits, and routines. Examples of such interventions include, \r\nbut are not limited to, choice architectures and nudges that set green options as default, shift away from cheap petrol or gasoline, \r\nincreasing taxes on carbon-intensive products, or substantially tightening regulations and standards to support shifts in social \r\nnorms, and thus can be effective beyond the direct economic incentive."


id: 5cf3ea66e30f999255fb4e3a8eb6f20f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13620
content:
"Humaninduced global warming, together with other global trends and events, such as digitalisation and automation, and the \r\nCOVID-19 pandemic, induce changes in labour markets, and bring large uncertainty and ambiguity. History and psychology reveal \r\nthat societies can thrive in these circumstances if they openly embrace uncertainty on the future and try out ways to improve life. \r\nTolerating ambiguity can be learned, for example by interacting with history, poetry and the arts. Sometimes religion and philosophy \r\nalso help."


id: 5c6a736024f305bb129d2d18d0fd7eb9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13512
content:
"As a key enabler, novel narratives created in a variety of ways, such as by advertising, images and the entertainment industry, \r\nhelp to break away from the established meanings, values and discourses and the status quo. For example, discourses that frame \r\ncomfortable public transport services to avoid stress from driving cars on busy, congested roads help avoid car driving as a status \r\nsymbol and create a  new social norm to shift to public transport. Discourses that portray plant-based protein as healthy and \r\nnatural promote and stabilise particular diets. Novel narratives and inclusive processes help strategies to overcome multiple barriers. \r\nCase studies demonstrate that citizens support transformative changes if participatory processes enable a design that meets local \r\ninterests and culture. Promising narratives specify that even as speed and capabilities differ, humanity embarks on a joint journey \r\ntowards well-being for all and a healthy planet."


id: c701bcdf912ac756eb1dbcee8245e46
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32321
content:
"There is a growing realisation that mere monetary value of income growth is insufficient to measure national welfare and individual \r\nwell-being. Hence, any action towards climate change mitigation is best evaluated against a set of indicators that represent a broader \r\nvariety of needs to define individual well-being, macroeconomic stability, and planetary health. Many solutions that reduce primary \r\nmaterial and fossil energy demand, and thus reduce GHG emissions, provide better services to help achieve well-being for all."


id: e309aeb7698e714bfe736d1f19b5e0b0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37238
content:
"Economic growth measured by total or individual income growth is a main driver of GHG emissions. Only a few countries with low \r\neconomic growth rates have reduced both territorial and consumption-based GHG emissions, typically by switching from fossil fuels \r\nto renewable energy and by reduction in energy use and switching to low/zero carbon fuels, but until now at insufficient rates and \r\nlevels for stabilising global warming at 1.5degC. High deployment of low/zero carbon fuels and associated rapid reduction in demand \r\nfor and use of coal, gas, and oil can further reduce the interdependence between economic growth and GHG emissions."


id: 729093d8c600a90af5ed95baf564753
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17398
content:
"Creutzig, F., J. Roy, P. Devine-Wright, J. Diaz-Jose, F.W. Geels, A. Grubler, N. Maizi, E. Masanet, Y. Mulugetta, C.D. Onyige, \r\nP.E. Perkins, A. Sanches-Pereira, E.U. Weber, 2022: Demand, services and social aspects of mitigation Supplementary \r\nMaterial. In IPCC, 2022: Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III \r\nto the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [P.R. Shukla, J. Skea, R. Slade, \r\nA. Al Khourdajie, R. van Diemen, D. McCollum, M. Pathak, S. Some, P. Vyas, R. Fradera, M. Belkacemi, A. Hasija, G. Lisboa, \r\nS. Luz, J. Malley, (eds.)]. Available from https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg3/."


id: de5f2632931a0a79ab137baef4348e55
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36384
content:
"climate change (e.g., temperature increases or extreme weather) on \r\nhuman behaviour and hence future greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions \r\n(Beckage et al. 2018). At the same time, an agency-based framework \r\nthat includes the many influences on individual decisions that go \r\nbeyond rational choice and rational expectations (e.g., responses \r\nto extreme events, perceived behavioural control, perceived social \r\nnorms, and social role-based constraints) explains many anomalies \r\nobserved by social ecologists (Schluter et  al. 2017; Beckage et  al. \r\n2018) and generates a broader set of demand-side policy options \r\nand more effective ways of implementing them."


id: 27bc654fbe8e85d2c9f97935ad772a96
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4177
content:
"This Social Science Primer provides frameworks for understanding \r\nthe challenges of systemic change, emergent transition phases and \r\npatterns, and the drivers of technological choice in light of some \r\nof the themes of the Sixth Assessment Report (AR6): assessing \r\ngrowing social inequity, the need for participation in managing \r\nthe global common good, and the need for increased use of energy \r\nand materials to bridge the gap in well-being in some parts of the \r\nworld while reducing wasteful consumption and production systems \r\nin other parts. The societal perspective in Chapter  5 of AR6 very \r\nbroadly focuses on human society and human agency, where political \r\npower structures, infrastructure, and technology interact to deliver \r\nservices that provide dignified living for all, irrespective of geographic \r\nlocation, which is compatible with cosmopolitan justice theories."


id: 18690ed69c5e32501a6a37f2c6aeda1d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1506
content:
"AR5 (Kunreuther et. al 2014) reviewed how experts and the \r\ngeneral population differ in their responses to risk and uncertain \r\nclimate information and the importance for experts, scientists and \r\npolicymakers to understand and predict the public's reaction in \r\norder to communicate climate risks and uncertainties effectively. \r\nIts introduction of a broader range of goals and decision processes \r\nthan those of homo economicus has important implications for IPCC \r\nscenarios by introducing additional uncertainty about the effects of "


id: d028c0ef4e228827b9c9a24ff36f9e36
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33984
content:
"Services are activities that help satisfy human wants or needs. \r\nWhile they usually involve interactions between producers and \r\nconsumers, services are less tangible and less storable than goods, \r\nand may involve personal relationships (Arent et al. 2015; Millonig \r\nand Haustein 2020). Well-being needs are met through services. "


id: 15d6cf9b60fc92d39402fdeae0465f0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1060
content:
"Low-carbon ways of producing the services that are necessary \r\nfor everyone's well-being are the foundation of the post-carbon \r\nsocietal transition. Advancing this transition depends not just \r\non progress indicators that measure well-being, equity, and \r\nsufficiency in relation to emissions and ecological health, but also \r\non technological innovations and access to them, evolving social \r\nnorms, policy frameworks, and global networking to share successful \r\nways of building global socio-economic equity while reducing global \r\nemissions. The tight links between equity, well-being for all, and \r\nemissions reductions are demonstrated in growing interdisciplinary \r\nliteratures (also outlined in AR6 Chapter 5, Section 5.2)."


id: 319b3a3eb27e7ca884b2dee60aa15116
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5976
content:
"Empirical social sciences research is addressing earlier discrepancies \r\nin methods and challenges in estimating these indicators across \r\nglobal supply chains, income levels, energy technologies, time frames, \r\nand systems boundaries (Matthews et  al. 2008; Chen et  al. 2016; \r\nKanemoto et al. 2016; Bello et al. 2018; Fenner et al. 2018; Lenzen \r\net al. 2018; Pichler et al. 2019; Zheng and Suh 2019)."


id: ff316233ab33bc87b63a98f5ae5f458d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42302
content:
"Demand-side contributions to mitigation allow consumers/users to \r\nselect the best way to further their own well-being, making trade\u0002offs across sectors and technologies as best suits their needs and \r\ncontexts (Creutzig et al. 2021b)."


id: 6c19fd7fe4931137ecabe04ff1e33c6b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16318
content:
"There are multiple components of systemic change, and one way \r\nto dynamically represent change in the demand for GHG-emission\u0002intensive products and services is to map it across the key concepts \r\nof agency, structure, meaning, relations, and norms (Sovacool and \r\nHess 2017, Hess and Sovacool 2020). This involves the potential \r\nof individuals to change their consumption patterns and to act "


id: baa7fe9f7887fabdf94d95dee2e64996
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30056
content:
"Decent Living Standards (DLS), as described further below, is another \r\nway to express the socio-political goal of prioritising necessities over \r\nluxuries while limiting emissions (Darby 2007; Gorge et al. 2014; Rao \r\nand Pachauri 2017; Otto et al. 2019; Rao et al. 2019; Millward-Hopkins "


id: 8784aba14a710ff2593f9d6130fc40ad
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20999
content:
"This primer provides additional information about key concepts and \r\nprocesses described in AR6 Chapter  5. Section  5.SM.1 elaborates \r\non key concepts from Section 5.2 of Chapter 5: well-being, equity, \r\nand decent living standards and their relation to equity, social trust, \r\nand governance. Sections 5.SM2 to 5.SM.4 then provide background \r\ninformation on the five drivers of change introduced in Section 5.4 \r\nof Chapter 5, divided into the three categories shown in Figure 5.\r\nSM.3: individual concepts and processes provide background on \r\nthe behavioural drivers of change; social concepts and processes \r\nelaborate on the socio-cultural drivers of change; and structure \r\nelaborates on the business, technology, and institutional drivers \r\nof change (see UNEP 2020). Section  5.SM.5 provides additional "


id: 3bb4fc255cfc019857a1e4e2c20b8e7f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7688
content:
"Disciplines vary in their approaches and research questions on \r\ndemand-side issues. For example, psychologists and behavioural \r\neconomists focus on emotional factors and cognitive biases in \r\ndecision-making (Bamberg et  al. 2007a; Mills and Schleich 2012; \r\nPoortinga et al. 2019; Niamir et al. 2020a); economists elaborate on \r\nhow, under rational decision-making, carbon pricing and other fiscal \r\ninstruments can trigger change in demand (Ameli and Brandt 2015) \r\nand help transitions to low carbon futures (Roy et al. 2013b); normative \r\neconomics focuses on enabling conditions for sustainable human \r\ndevelopment; sociologists emphasise everyday practices, structural \r\nissues, and socio-economic inequality; anthropologists address the \r\nrole of culture in energy consumption; urban planners take the role "


id: efa72b27bfe86b5ba7e04ab42622c532
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39546
content:
"background on transitions and Section  5.SM.6 provides several \r\ncase studies drawn from both developed and developing countries \r\nas illustrative examples of social processes in various contexts of \r\ntechnology uptake, service provisioning and shifts in choices."


id: df7a8edd8933f8498bad074c3b5be3b2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36566
content:
"Equal, 'impartial' treatment does not always produce equitable \r\noutcomes, since different members of society face diverse barriers \r\nthat influence their opportunities, choices, responsibilities, political \r\nagency and access to justice, among other factors. These variances \r\nare particularly important for climate mitigation, especially demand\u0002side, social, and service-oriented mitigation approaches (Estrada\u0002Oyuela 2000)."


id: 999a1872e5df6ebb0c9acb26617514ba
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24259
content:
"Mitigation, equity and well-being go hand in hand (Box  5.3 and \r\nFigure  5.5 in Chapter  5) Both distributive justice and procedural \r\njustice are important in mitigation action (Roy et  al. 2018a). As \r\noutlined in AR6 Chapter 5, Section 5.2, the social science literature \r\nincludes strong consensus about a number of mutually-reinforcing \r\nrelationships among well-being, social equity, social trust, and \r\neffective governance for managing energy transition and rapid \r\nemissions reductions."


id: da0b3ed397831dbcdf2a4695814dc8db
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35662
content:
"Well-being is reinforced in equitable societies. Human well-being \r\nis socially based and has a large relational component (Yellowfly 1992; \r\nBall and Chernova 2008; Easterlin et al. 2010; D'Ambrosio and Frick \r\n2012; Diener et al. 2013; McCubbin et al. 2013; Schneider 2016; Shields \r\n2016; Lamb and Steinberger 2017; White 2017; Stone et al. 2018; Tu \r\nand Hsee 2018; Wang et al. 2019). Once subsistence needs are met, \r\nrelative well-being is much more significant for human happiness than \r\nabsolute consumption levels (Frank 1999; Wilkinson and Pickett 2009; \r\nStiglitz 2012; Reyes-Garcia et al. 2016; Oishi et al. 2018; Xie et al. 2018; \r\nWilkinson and Pickett 2019), and the higher the income inequality, \r\nthe more people compare themselves with their neighbours (Luttmer \r\n2005; Cheung and Lucas 2016). Income inequality is associated with \r\nlower well-being, not only of the poor, but of everyone (Wilkinson "


id: 55bab25bd16392ab9f52279ad85bcd9f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12354
content:
"and goals, and in their capacities for change as shaped by different \r\nphysical, social, historical, and cultural contexts."


id: d20a8c17c62f0d7131e3960d8364370c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34306
content:
"2005; Wilkinson et al. 2010; Cooper et al. 2014; Reyes-Garcia et al. \r\n2016; Schroder 2018). Some social components of well-being, such \r\nas community cohesion, social capital, and trust, are higher in more \r\nequitable societies (Delhey and Dragolov 2014; Schneider 2016; Roser \r\net al. 2019). While differences in study indicators and methodologies \r\ncomplicate conclusions about the link between well-being and income, \r\nthis shifts emphasis onto contextual social factors such as people's \r\nknowledge, values, norms and beliefs (Schneider 2016; Kragten and \r\nRozer 2017; Ngamaba et al. 2018). More equitable societies are also \r\nmore economically efficient societies (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009; \r\nStiglitz 2012; Singer 2018)."


id: a04f58bd9f1df0c0a7786a8c11600c64
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25412
content:
"Decisions or action that directly or indirectly reduce energy demand \r\ncan be motivated by market and non-market forces, and can be \r\nlegally, socially or ethically binding. It has long been thought useful \r\nto conceive of consumers as 'rational actors', attentive to incentives, \r\nincluding all relevant costs and benefits (Becker 2013). If the price \r\nof certain goods increases, people will buy less of them. Under this \r\nframework, moral commitments and social norms, may or may not \r\nmatter (Becker and Murphy 2000). If they do, it is because violations \r\nof a social norm operate as a kind of 'tax', leading consumers to take \r\nsteps to avoid such violations. The large point is that demand-side \r\nbehaviour is above all a reflection of what consumers perceive as \r\ncosts and benefits. If, for example, consumers believe that it is in \r\ntheir interest to engage in consumption patterns that lead to a high\u0002carbon economy, then a high-carbon economy is much more likely."


id: 194dd4b413d6ac0335fa58fb3e8e0840
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1663
content:
"More social trust leads to equity and vice versa. There is a well \r\ndocumented correlation between social trust and income equality \r\n(Rothstein and Uslaner 2005; Phan 2008; Jordahl 2007; You 2012; \r\nIvarsflaten and Stromsnes 2013; Bergh and Bjornskov 2014). Trust is \r\nassociated with greater human development (Ozcan and Bjornskov \r\n2011) and with individual and country-level happiness (Tokuda \r\net al. 2017) and life satisfaction (Mikucka et al. 2017). Social trust \r\nand trust in government institutions reduce well-being inequality \r\nand foster resilience, especially for those at lower levels of well-being \r\n(Nannestad et al. 2014; Helliwell et al. 2016)."


id: c3a51079ff8fe2a3e70bc31d39b8d044
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31695
content:
"Equity strengthens governance. Institutions work more fairly, \r\nwith more public trust. Equitable income, wealth distribution, and \r\ntax policies make democracies stronger and more flexible (Sturm \r\n2007; Jordahl 2007; Steijn and Lancee 2011; Levin-Waldman 2012; \r\nStiglitz 2012; You 2012; Yamamura 2014; Lazarus and van Asselt \r\n2018; Okereke 2018; Di Gregorio et al. 2019)."


id: caae7c01ac09acc07b7fbba87fefcb51
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33000
content:
"Effective governance fosters well-being for all. There is strong \r\nevidence across many countries that government quality indicated \r\nby quality of service delivery and quality of democracy is linked to \r\nnational happiness, mainly because effective governance implies \r\nbetter service delivery (Helliwell and Huang 2008; Ott 2011; Helliwell \r\net  al. 2018). Democratic satisfaction and social trust embedded in \r\nimpartial, fair, and efficient institutions are also linked directly with \r\nwell-being (Rothstein and Stolle 2008; Orviska et al. 2014). Democratic \r\ngovernance alone, however, does not always lead to reduced wealth \r\ninequality or vice versa; voter preferences, social cleavages, and/or \r\ndemocratic capture by the rich can perpetuate inequalities even in \r\ndemocracies (Acemoglu et al. 2013; Scheve and Stasavage 2017)."


id: 9d19d689cb3e57554596adc7a033cb06
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24876
content:
"Agency is defined as the capacity to act, both individually and \r\ncollectively, as shaped by different physical, social, historical, cultural, \r\nand other contexts. Using their agency, people engage in existing \r\nsocial practices, and also may step outside routines and engage in \r\nnew behaviours. Agency is realised through different social roles for \r\naction, which include as citizen, role model, community member, \r\nworker, investor, professional, household member, consumer, and so \r\non. In the demand-side mitigation options space, agency is expressed \r\nby actors (individuals and households) who differ in motivations "


id: f8d0e4d6467acce0e850619708b3e6dd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41139
content:
"issued by the US Environmental Protection Agency in 2013 displays \r\na car's energy requirements in monetary terms for buyers interested \r\nin financial savings, in technical terms for buyers interested in car \r\nperformance, or in GHG ratings for buyers interested in climate \r\nimpacts. These multiple ratings are almost perfectly correlated \r\nand their high-density display on a single label could be seen as \r\nconfusing. However, consumers selectively attend to the information \r\nthat conforms to their motivation (Ungemach et al. 2017). The full \r\nEPA fuel-economy label resulted in the highest willingness-to-pay for \r\nfuel economy, suggesting that duplication of information in slightly \r\ndifferent formats is a communication asset rather than a liability \r\n(Kormos and Sussman 2018)."


id: 98733b665f5a3cbdc51919b79b01104f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24033
content:
"computable general equilibrium models. Novel ways of capturing \r\nthese influences and feedback processes (Stern 2016; Niamir et al. \r\n2018, 2020b; Constantino et al. 2021) that include complex adaptive \r\nsystems models (Levin et al. 2013) or agent-based models (Lamperti \r\net al. 2018) allow for emergence of tipping points or other nonlinear \r\nchange dynamics that may be necessary to bring about behaviour \r\nchange on energy at the speed and scale required (Nyborg et  al. \r\n2016). Correctly understanding the roles, goals, and needs of these \r\ndifferent actors, their perceptions and decision processes (Kunreuther \r\net al. 2014), and the feedback between their actions, is imperative \r\nin designing effective policies and decision support systems (Roelich \r\nand Giesekam 2019)."


id: 452dc1fa835715875caf912117e4b586
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9399
content:
"Professional actors play important roles in climate mitigation. \r\nWorking as building managers, landlords, energy efficiency advisers, \r\ntechnology installers and car dealers, they influence patterns \r\nof mobility and energy consumption (Shove 2003) by acting as \r\n'middle actors' (Janda and Parag 2013; Parag and Janda 2014) or \r\n'intermediaries' in the provision of building or mobility services \r\n(Grandclement et al. 2015; De Rubens et al. 2018). As influencers on \r\nthe process of diffusion of innovations (Rogers 2003), professionals \r\ncan enable or obstruct improvements in efficient service provision or \r\nshifts towards low-carbon technologies (e.g., air and ground source \r\nheat pumps, solar hot water, underfloor heating, programmable \r\nthermostats, and mechanical ventilation with heat recovery) and \r\nmobility (e.g., electric vehicles) technologies."


id: d992c2c79396bc1d68cb08976da6154
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35578
content:
"'Lifestyle' means a coherent pattern of behaviours and cognitions \r\nconsistent with certain situational factors (Axsen et  al. 2012; \r\nHedlund-de Witt 2012). Behaviours include actions, activities, \r\ntechnology adoption, and consumption choices. Cognitions include \r\nvalues, worldviews, concerns and beliefs. Lifestyles typically apply to \r\nindividuals, but can also be used to describe households. Lifestyles \r\nalso depend on situational factors, which shape the accessibility \r\nof certain behaviours or the achievability of certain cognitive \r\ngoals. Geography, infrastructure, and culture are all examples of \r\nsituational factors relevant to lifestyles. Behaviours, cognitions \r\nand situational factors are common elements of lifestyle, but are \r\nemphasised differently depending on the perspective taken. Three \r\ncommon perspectives emphasise patterned behaviour, cognitive \r\ndirection, or reflexive identity."


id: b828141dff93622d1bcab89ce7c7d0d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29614
content:
"Core human values. Social change is a complex process that tries \r\nto integrate people's values and interests. Much of human behaviour \r\nis goal directed and core values reflect the general goals that people \r\nstrive for. Four classes of values are most relevant to understand \r\nclimate actions, and people differ in the extent to which they hold \r\nthese values and goals: hedonic values (with the goal to seek \r\npleasure, convenience and comfort), egoistic values (with the goal \r\nto safeguard personal resources), altruistic values (with the goal to \r\nprotect the well-being of other people) and biospheric values (with \r\nthe goal to protect nature and the environment) (Steg et al. 2014)."


id: e52c7142cd60a1f03bff1dec6cd7d16f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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vector_id: 37620
content:
"A patterned view sees lifestyle as manifest in routine, habitual \r\npatterns of behaviour (Darnton et  al. 2011). These behavioural \r\npatterns are situational, in that they may vary between home, work, \r\ntravel, leisure and other domains of everyday life (Barr et al. 2011). \r\nThis patterned view lends itself to the identification of lifestyles \r\nthrough consumption activity and other observable behaviours \r\n(Schipper 1989). Put simply, lifestyle describes 'how people spend \r\ntheir money and their time' (Mowen and Minor 1998)."


id: 4e62eaebd8d26b4d3a4fc71306b4ae0a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11062
content:
"Group differences in climate risk perception and motivation to act \r\nsuggest the need for segmentation in information or climate action \r\ncampaigns, with age, education, core values, political ideology, \r\nand personal experience being important segmentation variables. \r\nSuch segmentation is not always easily accomplished; however, \r\ninformation relevant for different segments (e.g., metrics that allow \r\nindividuals to reduce their energy consumption for different reasons) \r\ncan be provided in the same display. The fuel-economy sticker "


id: f6c547167e0aa9e2f02b9cb028770953
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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content:
"A cognitive view similarly sees lifestyle as a regular pattern of \r\nbehaviour, but rather than being primarily situational, it is led by \r\nintentions and so is directed towards an overarching goal (Jensen \r\n2009). Intentions can be antecedent to specific choices, such as where \r\nto live (Frenkel et  al. 2013), or can be linked to broader cognitive \r\nconstructs such as values or worldviews (Hedlund-de Witt 2012). This \r\ncognitive view is consistent with the idea of individuals pursuing \r\na 'low-carbon lifestyle' to reduce their impact on climate change."


id: b922b8288dc6c1feee95ed37ddc1d467
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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content:
"A reflexive view sees lifestyle as a way for individuals to organise \r\nand express their self-identity through their behaviour, while the \r\nbehaviours then reflexively help constitute an individual's identity. \r\nThis reflexive view is associated with the work of the sociologist, \r\nAnthony Giddens, who defined lifestyles as 'routines that include \r\nthe presentation of self, consumption, interaction and setting' \r\n(Giddens 1991)."


id: 2a7f92a875dcc7a2b63c268bdee924c9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4705
content:
"Despite differences in emphasis, all three of these views recognise \r\nthat lifestyle is shaped by context and so is both dynamic and \r\nplural. As examples, lifestyles change when people migrate from \r\nthe countryside into cities (Chen et  al. 2019), or when there is \r\neasier access to certain infrastructures like bike lanes or bus routes \r\n(Etminani-Ghasrodashti et al. 2018)."


id: a4638a9b2523ec90b2cbbc0ff265889
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26127
content:
"In the context of climate change, lifestyle is used both descriptively\r\nto identify clusters of low-carbon behaviours and quantify their \r\nemissions impact, and normatively to explore individuals' efforts to \r\nreduce their carbon footprint. As lifestyles are situational as well as \r\nbehavioural and cognitive, these efforts can be strongly shaped by \r\npublic policy and infrastructure. In all these applications, lifestyle \r\ncan sometimes be used interchangeably with behaviour. This is not \r\nappropriate as behaviours are discrete actions, whereas lifestyles \r\ncomprise coherent sets of actions linked in a consistent way to \r\ncognitions and identity (Lawson and Todd 2002)."


id: 9543e279e241b39054696918966d8e3e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23460
content:
"Pro-environmental, green, sustainable, or 'low-carbon' lifestyles have \r\ntwo different interpretations, one defined by intention and the other \r\nby impact (Van den Berg et al. 2019). Emphasising intentions, a green \r\nlifestyle has been defined as 'a collection of practices by which \r\npeople today try to address an interrelated set of environmental \r\nproblems' (Lorenzen 2012). Applied to climate change, 'low-carbon' \r\nlifestyles can be identified by the values, intentions or goals of \r\nindividuals seeking to reduce their carbon footprint. In their second \r\ninterpretation, low-carbon lifestyles can also refer to low levels of use \r\nof energy and other materials or other consumption-based reductions \r\nin greenhouse gas emissions (Le Gallic et al. 2018), which may not \r\nreflect choices but constraints."


id: 1d19eeae2c975af55fb012dc3953bc40
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2299
content:
"These two interpretations of low-carbon lifestyles can be in tension \r\nas low-carbon intentions do not always translate into low-carbon \r\nimpacts (e.g., a globetrotting IPCC scientist), and low-carbon impacts \r\nmay not be the result of low-carbon intentions (e.g., a low-income \r\nhousehold living in fuel poverty). Such tensions between cognitions, \r\nbehaviours and impacts on emissions are almost always evident in \r\npopulation-level analyses of low-carbon lifestyles. This reinforces \r\nthat lifestyles are situational as well as cognitive and behavioural, \r\nand that lifestyles are multiple and reflexively constructed so can \r\nnever offer a single unifying explanation for an individual's impact \r\non emissions."


id: 26564a6f9481656cfa948aecd1584604
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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vector_id: 3913
content:
"Research focused on very specific low-carbon lifestyle groups \r\ncharacterised by self-sufficiency, frugality or voluntary simplicity \r\ncan avoid these tensions between intention and impact (Lorenzen \r\n2012; Hagbert and Bradley 2017). Here the challenge is in scaling or \r\nreplicating this type of intentional low-carbon lifestyle more widely. \r\nConversely, research focused on resource-efficient consumption "


id: 4b1a2f37b5a780cf58a0de0073108e3d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10458
content:
"In addition to heterogeneity and the tension between intention \r\nand impact, a third limitation of low-carbon lifestyles research is \r\nits concentration in technophile and/or environmentally-conscious \r\npopulation segments in the Global North. Available studies in \r\nemerging economies tend to place less emphasis on intentions, \r\nand more emphasis on demographic, social or institutional factors \r\nwhich shape emissions-intensive lifestyles such as migration from \r\ncountryside to cities (Chen et al. 2019) or literacy, theft and corruption \r\n(George-Ufot et al. 2017)."


id: 308cbee31eb9f3fdc1f5d81efd384572
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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vector_id: 5797
content:
"The 'consumer lifestyle approach' assigns upstream or indirect \r\nemissions to the final consumption of energy, materials, food or \r\nother resources by individuals and households (Ding et al. 2017; Chen \r\net al. 2019). Similar to consumption-based accounting, this approach \r\ntypically finds that over three quarters of emissions are attributable \r\nto the consumption activities which constitute lifestyles (Bin and \r\nDowlatabadi 2005). Lifestyle change is therefore a potential means \r\nof delivering significant emission reductions."


id: 6a749f49950ea3045b09604220c5657b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16008
content:
"Scenario and modelling studies confirm this potential by taking \r\nexamples of low-carbon behaviours and scaling them up to the \r\npopulation level to determine aggregate system outcomes (van \r\nSluisveld et  al. 2016; Van Vuuren et  al. 2018). Common examples \r\nof low-carbon behaviours amenable to modelling analysis include \r\nreducing meat in diets, substituting driving for active travel modes or \r\npublic transport, and turning thermostats down. Scenario narratives \r\nthat describe why such behaviours become more common tend to \r\nemphasise the spread of green values, environmental consciousness, \r\nor awareness of climate risks. This implies an intentional \r\nunderstanding of lifestyle change, and de-emphasises the influence \r\nof situational factors."


id: e352aa3efa18c8704f6436e6fe3a8220
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37293
content:
"Modifying climate change awareness and perception help the \r\ndynamics of this radical shift (Halady and Rao 2010; Odjugo and \r\nOvuyovwiroye 2013; Dombrowski et al. 2016; Niamir et al. 2020a). \r\nThis requires a complete remodelling of educational methods, where \r\nthe barriers to be tackled include not only a lack of funding, but the \r\nconservative environment of the educational system itself (Velazquez \r\net al. 2006; Ferrer-Balas et al. 2009; Fisher and McAdams 2015; Leal \r\nFilho et al. 2018)."


id: 9af109ef004da092b8914e0e85240c85
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24503
content:
"Traditional education is still structured on mercantilist and neoliberal \r\nideologies and delivered in politicised educational institutions where \r\nenvironmental issues are invisible most of the time (Mendoza and \r\nRoa 2014). This situation calls for a move away from this commercial, \r\nindividualised and entrepreneurial training model towards the \r\ncommitment to education for solidarity and care that was highlighted "


id: 601896c2ded62dae68a4332559bf84e2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14213
content:
"Differences underlying lifestyle choices influence efforts to meet \r\ntargets for emissions reduction. A combined assessment of costs, "


id: 102b415eccc12729515271d5818a59b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31
content:
"by Anderson et  al. (2019) in the specific context of food, but that \r\ncan be applied to the climate crisis. Even if the role of universities \r\nin climate change education has been acknowledged as extremely \r\nimportant there is little investment to embed climate change \r\neducation in a higher education context. When achieved, there is \r\na variety of approaches and it is difficult to identify a clear pattern at \r\nthe country or even university level (Molthan-Hill et al. 2019). This is \r\nwhy there is a need to achieve and/or reinforce a culture of climate \r\nawareness through new educational forms based on a convergence \r\nbetween education and communication ('educommunication') \r\n(Rodrigo-Cano et al. 2019) that could be used as a base for action \r\nand social and environmental intervention, unlike communication \r\nand disinformation campaigns that use the environment to convey \r\na commercial message (Delmas and Burbano 2011; Megias-Delagado \r\net al. 2018)."


id: ead5a09dcf82141da47214714a4df9af
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38678
content:
"Collective action by individuals as part of formal social movements or \r\ninformal 'lifestyle movements' (Haenfler et al. 2012) can significantly \r\nimpact climate mitigation. Both AR5 and the IPCC Special Report on \r\nGlobal Warming of 1.5oC (SR1.5) recognised the role of collective \r\naction as part of cultural shifts in consumption patterns and dietary \r\nchange. Collective action has the potential to both enable and \r\nconstrain societal shifts in emissions reduction. Movements that \r\nshift social norms can produce 'tipping points' towards lifestyles \r\nwith reduced emissions, for example veganism (Cherry 2006). On \r\nthe other hand, landscape conservation groups have opposed the \r\ndeployment of onshore wind turbines in several European countries \r\n(McLaren Loring 2007; Toke et al. 2008)."


id: 1cfed81441ca0f9925fc47290756d889
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2286
content:
"A people-centred view of mitigation recognises that individuals \r\nand groups make sense of climate change through meanings, not \r\njust information processing (Jerome 1990). Meanings associated \r\nwith climate mitigation are not neutral, but part of an active \r\nprocess of constructing possible futures in which some actors have \r\nmore influence over shared narratives than others. Meanings are \r\nassociated with climate mitigation at different levels - from an \r\nindividual person's values or identity (e.g., choosing to describe \r\noneself to others as a vegan), to the symbolism associated with low\u0002carbon technologies (e.g., how cookstoves or solar panels confer \r\nstatus on their owners), to the level of collective imaginary futures \r\nat community, city, national or global levels (e.g., stories about smart \r\nurban futures or environmental catastrophes)."


id: 6f131df32658616dc8c22b1de846f360
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16810
content:
"Religious groups can communicate with social groups not \r\nnecessarily involved in climate change action. However, most \r\neducational programmes that train clergy remain silent on \r\nclimate change or ecological issues; in North America only 24% \r\nof programmes included instructions (Heistein et  al. 2017). Joint \r\nprogrammes between academia and clergy have potential to bring \r\nclimate action to communities that otherwise lack resources to \r\ninteract with non-subsistence issues and to connect climate change \r\nmitigation with local contexts."


id: b186f844f65d7ad3b9af3f1a3fa1adf4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28457
content:
"SR1.5 recognised that narratives and storytelling can enable the \r\nimagining of novel visions of place-based 1.5degC futures, creating space \r\nfor agency, deliberation and the co-construction of meaning around \r\ndesirable pathways of transition (Veland et al. 2018). Stories about \r\nclimate change are ways of collectively making sense of uncertain \r\nfutures, involving processes of interpretation and understanding \r\nthrough communication and social interaction (Smith et  al. 2017). \r\nCulture - including religious beliefs - is central to climate mitigation, \r\ninfluencing how individuals perceive demand for services in relation \r\nto emissions and their expectations about what is both possible and \r\ndesirable (Moezzi et al. 2017; Batel 2018)."


id: 7a8df26182f780ec9bc9b76205722744
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18758
content:
"Climate policies need to go beyond an emphasis upon the rational \r\nprovision of information and the functional attributes of new services, \r\nto place greater emphasis on symbolic meanings and emotions as \r\na means to encourage social change. Presenting narrative meanings \r\ninstead of factual information can lead to greater public engagement \r\nand pro-environmental action on climate change through arousing \r\nemotional responses (Morris et al. 2019)."


id: 15672107c585adf0582737d2e66bd1d8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 980
content:
"Collective narratives about climate change refer to imaginary \r\nfutures that can be either utopian or dystopian (e.g., Ghosh 2016), \r\noften presenting apocalyptic stories and imagery in an effort to \r\ncapture attention and evoke emotional and behavioural response \r\n(O'Neill and Smith 2014). The idea of the Anthropocene has gained \r\ntraction as a way of imagining a new era of human-environment \r\nrelations characterised by unprecedented human influence over \r\nnatural ecosystems, and to mobilise a sense of grief at the potential \r\nfor mass extinction of species, including humanity (Lovelock 2007; \r\nHead 2016; Heise 2017). In turn, epistemic evolution, the increasing \r\ndependency of global society on further developments in knowledge \r\nand technology to continue surviving in the Anthropocene, mirrors \r\na narrative of opportunity (Renn 2018)."


id: 3bc38706aa7bdbcfe54b677c1b5d496e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7699
content:
"At the design stage, expectations of potential users of energy \r\ntechnologies and services (e.g., cookstoves, meters, thermostats) \r\nare often scripted into the appearance and functionalities of those \r\ndevices. Experts and designers may hold common assumptions that \r\npublic users are characterised by deficits of knowledge, competence \r\nand interest in energy systems (Burningham et al. 2015; Skjolsvold \r\nand Lindkvist 2015; Owens and Driffill 2008). These assumptions \r\nshape pathways of technology development and deployment \r\n(Marvin et al. 1999) leading to smart technologies with passive roles \r\nfor users rather than smart users playing more active roles in systems \r\nof provision, distribution, storage and consumption (Goulden \r\net al. 2014)."


id: 8258566e3fbe35e1fa1296871a59cb58
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20059
content:
"While climate stories themselves do not have agency in driving \r\nsocietal transformations, they can open up new ways of involving \r\npeople in conversations about systemic changes that can provide \r\nmotivation and confidence for people to participate in more inclusive \r\nways (Smith et  al. 2017). Science fiction has afforded indigenous \r\ncommunities a creative means to imagine climate futures divergent \r\nfrom conventional top-down narratives (Streeby 2018), signalling \r\nthe role of power in shaping which climate stories are told and how \r\nprevalent they are (O'Neill and Smith 2014). Further research is \r\nrequired to study the impact of social media platforms on emerging \r\nnarratives of climate change within societies and local communities \r\n(Pearce et al. 2019)."


id: f377259b55b426ffc45e0f01b27a76f0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40209
content:
"Contrasting meanings signal more active roles, including 'prosumers' \r\nwho act as producers as well as consumers in decentralised energy \r\nsystems (Espe et al. 2018), 'energy citizens' who are motivated by \r\naltruistic and environmental concerns, not only self-interest (Devine\u0002Wright 2007; Ryghaug et  al. 2018) and collectives such as 'clean \r\nenergy communities' (Gui and MacGill 2018) engaged in peer\u0002to-peer trading of energy services (Fell et  al. 2019). Policy has an \r\nimportant role to play in communicating which of these expectations \r\nare preferred pathways of the low carbon transition."


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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2621
content:
"Meanings play a number of roles, both enabling and constraining \r\naction on mitigation (Buschmann and Oels 2019). At the societal \r\nlevel, imaginaries about the cities or homes of the future play \r\nimportant roles in enabling innovation by attracting attention, \r\nlegitimating certain technology choices, rejecting or undermining \r\nothers and attracting investment (Tozer and Klenk 2019). These \r\nimaginaries have been shown to be important in the innovation of \r\nwind and solar energy, biopower, nuclear energy and smart meters \r\n(Sovacool et al. 2018). Analysis of shifts in discourse over time has \r\nrevealed 'turning points' that facilitate change in systems of energy \r\nprovision, providing the basis for new narratives to emerge and to \r\nbecome legitimate (Buschmann and Oels 2019)."


id: bfe5fb8efa1ebaa795bac1bf49c8cc69
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31051
content:
"Meanings shape the willingness of individuals to use existing \r\ntechnologies or adopt new ones. Individuals develop attachments \r\nto material possessions (Belk 1988), which symbolise consumer\u0002related identities (Dittmar 2008). Use of private cars for commuting \r\nis influenced by emotional and symbolic assumptions about \r\ndriving (e.g., ideas of status, freedom and independence) as much \r\nas instrumental motives (Steg 2005). When new technologies \r\nare installed (e.g., feedback displays, smart meters), they become \r\n'domesticated' into pre-existing daily routines (Monreal et al. 2016; \r\nShove and Southerton 2000) that can involve negotiation and \r\nsometimes conflict within households (Hargreaves et al. 2013). Smart \r\nmeters raise concerns about reduced autonomy and independence \r\n(Wilson et al. 2017). Failure of policy to recognise these emotional \r\nand symbolic processes can lead to overestimates of technology \r\npotentials, including emissions reduction."


id: 2e44bd123c6e78f6a2f87e2a4f4f76c2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5413
content:
"One aspect of current unsustainable societies is the prevalence \r\nof common sense assumptions about systems of provision that \r\neffectively lock in (Unruh 2002) social actors to certain patterns of \r\nthinking or behaviour, limiting awareness and take up of alternatives \r\n(e.g., assuming that domestic heating must come from household \r\nboilers instead of district heating systems) (Owens and Driffill 2008). \r\nPolitical beliefs play an important role in influencing the uptake of \r\nnarratives. 'Climate justice' narratives polarise individuals along \r\nideological lines, while narratives that centre on saving energy, \r\navoiding waste and embedding the uptake of low-carbon energy \r\nin patriotic values were more widely supported (Whitmarsh and \r\nCorner 2017)."


id: f1b896bc0834699af080ff0117fffdb0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39912
content:
"When energy technologies are resisted by the public, meanings \r\nabout objectors influence the responses of policymakers and \r\nenergy companies. Adopting alternative meanings of communities, \r\nfor example viewing them as repositories of expertise and local \r\nknowledge, and enabling genuine participation and benefit sharing, \r\ncan reduce conflict and increase acceptance (Bell et al. 2013; Walker \r\nand Baxter 2017). 'NIMBY' (Not In My Back Yard) is both a label used "


id: 2c382925557dd60615a53e434e2229a8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5042
content:
"to describe objectors and an explanation for why protests over the \r\nsiting of low-carbon energy technologies take place (Burningham \r\n2000). The concept suggests that objectors are characterised by \r\nignorance, irrationality and selfishness (Devine-Wright 2005; Wolsink \r\n2007; Burningham et al. 2015). When developers hold these views, \r\nit leads to strategies of community engagement that prioritise the \r\nprovision of factual information and financial incentives as well as \r\nthe avoidance of 'angry' crowds (Walker et al. 2010; Barnett et al. \r\n2012). Engagement that overlooks technology meanings can produce \r\nunintended consequences, prolonging social conflict and reducing \r\ntrust (Devine-Wright 2011; Wolsink 2007)."


id: 91a7f55496df948aa2e586b179080530
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22854
content:
"Renewable energy resources are widely dispersed across geographical \r\nareas, leading to consequences for patterns of development in rural \r\nareas (Pasqualetti 2000). 'Energy landscapes' refers to ways that \r\nmeanings associated with rural areas evolve as land use changes \r\nfrom conventional agriculture to technological systems of heat and \r\npower generation and new 'energy crops' (Pasqualetti and Stremke \r\n2018). Since landscapes are important symbols of cultural and \r\nsocial identity (Short 2002; Woods 2003), changes to their meaning \r\ninfluence the acceptability of technology siting (Devine-Wright 2009)."


id: 8ad09036024492deb39c66007fbaabe8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:13
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21592
content:
"Locations perceived as pristine and natural are considered less \r\nsuitable for the siting of large-scale energy infrastructures such as \r\nwind turbines and power lines (Wolsink 2010). Objections are often \r\nbased on fears that technologies will 'industrialise' or 'urbanise' \r\nrural areas and are opposed by individuals with strong emotional \r\nattachments to those places (Devine-Wright and Howes 2010). Novel \r\nwave and tidal energy technologies have been positively associated \r\nwith place attachments and public support, in part due to the ways \r\nthey enhance a sense of local distinctiveness (Devine-Wright 2011)."


