# document

id: a4658ad9627d0f23d8a4d429e2d8924e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"[...] demonstrates that managing such risks is not easy, and requires \r sufficiently strong and competent institutions (Stiglitz 1998). The \r next section on Just Transition (Section 4.5) addresses this issue."


id: f3c7bc069af9000e619c0d56750e747
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"In the presence of uncertainty and inertia (or irreversibilities), \r hedging strategies may be considered, that include selection of \r risk-hedging strategies and processes to adjust decisions as new \r information becomes available. The notion of hedging against risks \r is also prominent in the adaptation literature, as exemplified by \r the terminology of 'climate resilient development' (Fankhauser and \r McDermott 2016) (AR6 WGII, Chapter18). There is also a  growing \r literature on hedging strategies for individual actors (e.g.,  firms \r or investors) in the face of the uncertainties associated with \r mitigation (e.g.,  policy uncertainty or the associated carbon price \r uncertainty; e.g., Andersson et al. 2016 or Morris et al. 2018). On the \r other hand, there is often limited discussion of uncertainty and of \r its implication for hedging strategies in the accelerated mitigation \r pathway literature. Exceptions include (Capros et al. 2019), who elicit \r [...]"


id: e3595d68b094334571b2ffef9f823286
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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vector_id: 37297
content:
"[...] 'no-regret' and 'disruptive' mitigation options for the EU through \r a detailed sensitivity analysis, and (Watson et al. 2015) who discuss \r flexible strategies for the UK energy sector transition in the face of \r multiple uncertainties."


id: beff156fe4fd0e5776090561e95e0404
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30871
content:
"Equity is an ethical and at times economic imperative, but it is \r also instrumentally an enabler of deeper ambition for accelerated \r mitigation (Hoegh-Guldberg et al. 2019). The literature supports \r a range of estimates of the net benefits - globally or nationally - of \r low-carbon transformation, and it identifies a number of difficulties \r in drawing definitive quantitative conclusions (e.g.,  comparisons \r of costs and benefits among different actors, the existence of non\u0002economic impacts, comparison across time, uncertainty in magnitude) \r (Section 3.6). One of the most important of these dimensions is the \r distributional consequences of mitigation, as well as a range of equity \r considerations arising from the uncertainty in net benefits, as well \r as from the distribution of costs and benefits among winners and \r losers (Rendall 2019; Caney 2016; Lahn and Bradley 2016; Lenferna \r 2018a; Kartha et al. 2018b; Robiou Du Pont et al. 2017). Some equity \r [...]"


id: 589ca0e361f164220ac428b69ccb7679
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12834
content:
"[...] approaches are even just seeking corrective justice including for \r historical emissions (Adler 2007). For an assessment of literature on \r fairness in NDCs, see Section 4.2.2.7."


id: 93af5bbd7d24e5460a7228c89bd9b07
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23189
content:
"As the current COVID-19 crisis demonstrates, events happen that \r can derail the best-laid plans. Unexpected events beyond the range \r of human experience until then are called 'black swans', given the \r expectation that all swans are white. The only point to note here is \r that such events may also provide opportunities. In the COVID-19 \r case, for example, the experience of conducting many activities on\u0002line, which reduces emissions from transport, may leave an imprint \r on how some of these activities are carried out in the post-COVID-19 \r world. Similarly, reduced air pollution seen during the pandemics may \r increase support for mitigation and strengthen the case for climate \r action. However, the emissions implications of recovery packages \r depend on choosing policies that support climate action while \r addressing the socio-economic implications of COVID-19 (Hepburn \r et al. 2020). Governments may be in a  stronger position to do so \r [...]"


id: 37b61ee281e2d1c0f076cbd752a912b9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
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vector_id: 7010
content:
"[...] due to their pivotal role in assuring the survival of many businesses \r during the pandemics. Given the magnitude of recovery packages \r and their implications (Pollitt et al. 2021), choosing the direction of \r recovery packages amounts to choosing a  development pathway \r (Cross-Chapter Box 1 in Chapter 1)."


id: ceb359d5569327310501c8552b54f7f5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"While there is extensive literature on equity frameworks for national \r emissions allocations (CSO Equity Review 2015, 2017, 2018; Holz et al. \r 2018; Kemp-Benedict et al. 2018; Robiou du Pont and Meinshausen \r 2018; Fyson et al. 2020; Pozo et al. 2020; Pye et al. 2020), such \r studies have tended to focus on allocation of a global carbon budget \r among countries based on quantified equity frameworks. The implicit \r normative choices made in these analysis have limitations (Kartha \r et al. 2018a). Moreover, there are many ethical parameters that could \r be introduced to enrich the existing quantitative frameworks, such \r as progressivity (Holz et al. 2018), consumption-based accounting \r (Afionis et al. 2017), prioritarianism (Adler and Treich 2015), and a right \r to development (Moellendorf 2020). Introducing these ethical frames \r into conventional quantification approaches generally implies greater \r allocations for poorer and lower-emitting populations, suggesting that \r [...]"


id: 12a35406a8ccf0c65e94464106f8637b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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"[...] the approaches that are typically highlighted in emissions allocation \r analyses tends to favour wealthier and higher-emitting countries. \r Broader, more inclusive sharing of costs and burdens is seen as a way \r to enhance equity in procedures and outcomes."


id: 8c19a1dc1280e17e8bda9718c6368688
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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"The literature identifies targeted and proactive measures from \r governments, agencies, and authorities to ensure that any negative \r social, environmental or economic impacts of economy-wide transitions \r are minimised, while benefits are maximised for those disproportionally \r affected (Healy and Barry 2017). While the precise definition varies by \r source, core elements tend to include: (i) investments in establishing \r low-emission and labour-intensive technologies and sectors (Mijn \r Cha et al. 2020); (ii) research and early assessment of the social and \r employment impacts of climate policies (Green and Gambhir 2020; \r Mogomotsi et al. 2018); (iii) social dialogue and democratic consultation \r of social partners and stakeholders (Swilling and Annecke 2012; Smith \r 2017); (iv) the creation of decent jobs; active labour markets policies; \r and rights at work (ILO 2015; UNFCCC 2016c); (v) fairness in energy \r access and use (Carley and Konisky 2020); (vi) economic diversification \r [...]"


id: fc4410bed371a3380c55239f6100e203
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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vector_id: 41750
content:
"[...] based on low-carbon investments; (vii) realistic training/retraining \r programs that lead to decent work; (viii) gender specific politics \r that promote equitable outcomes (Allwood 2020); (ix) the  fostering \r of international cooperation and coordinated multilateral actions \r (Lenferna 2018b; Newell and Simms 2020); (x) redressing of past \r harms and perceived injustices (Setzer and Vanhala 2019; UNHRC \r 2020); and (xi) consideration of inter-generational justice concerns, \r such as the impacts of policy decisions on future generations (Newell \r and Mulvaney, 2013)."


id: aed3e7598301a36f81c5c58c812422ec
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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"A just transition could therefore entail that the state intervenes more \r actively in the eradication of poverty, and creates jobs in lower\u0002carbon sectors, in part to compensate for soon-to-be abandoned \r fossil-fuel-based sectors, and that governments, polluting industries, \r corporations and those more able to pay higher associated taxes \r pay for transition costs, provide a welfare safety net and adequate \r compensation for people, communities, places, and regions that \r have been impacted by pollution, marginalised or negatively \r impacted by a transition from a high- to low-carbon economy and \r society (Muttitt and Kartha 2020; Le Billon and Kristoffersen 2020; \r Kartha et al. 2018b). Reducing climate impacts is another important \r dimension of equity, in that the poor who are least responsible \r for climate change are most vulnerable to its impacts (AR6 WGII, \r Chapter 8). Focusing on financial losses alone however can obscure \r [...]"


id: 8846666c07af873c35f22e2fc116b075
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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"[...] an important distinction between losses incurred by corporations \r and states and losses experienced by workers and communities. \r Processes established in the name of a  just transition are also at \r risk of being co-opted by incumbent interests and powerful/wealthy \r agents (Green and Gambhir, 2020). Policy interventions associated \r with good governance, democratic oversight, and legal recourse can \r help overcome attempted co-optation of just transition, or use of \r COVID-19 recovery packages for continued carbon lock-in (Hepburn \r et al. 2020; SEI et al. 2020)."


id: be85bce5245f4ca2a40caaf4337c3dab
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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"A concrete focal point on these issues has been that of 'just transition'. \r Getting broad consensus for the transformational changes entailed \r in moving from a  high- to a  low-carbon economy means 'leaving \r no one behind', in other words, ensuring (sufficiently) equitable \r transition for the relevant affected individuals, workers, communities, \r sectors, regions and countries (Newell and Mulvaney, 2013; Jasanoff \r 2018). The concept of a 'just transition' owes its origin to the USA \r trade union movement of the 1980s. The earliest version of a just \r transition was called the 'Superfund for Workers' modelled on the \r 1980 Superfund program that designed federal funds for the clean\u0002up of toxic substances from chemicals, mining and energy production \r (Stevis and Felli 2015). It was further taken up, for example in the \r collaboration of the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), \r the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the UN Environment \r [...]"


id: 5cc6d18310f230898b99ce53716fb1ef
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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"The just transition concept has thus become an international focal \r point tying together social movements, trade unions, and other key \r stakeholders to ensure equity is better accounted for in low-carbon \r transitions and to seek to protect workers and communities. It also \r forms a central pillar of the growing movement for a 'Green New \r Deal' - a roadmap for a broad spectrum of policies, programs, and \r legislation that aims to rapidly decarbonise the economy while \r significantly reducing economic inequality (Allam et al. 2021; Galvin \r and Healy 2020). The US Green New Deal Resolution (Ocasio-Cortez \r 2019) for example, positions structural inequality, poverty mitigation, \r and a just transition at its centre. The European Green Deal proposed \r in 2019 (European Commission 2019), including a  EUR100  billion \r 'Just Transition Mechanism' to mitigate the social effects of \r transitioning away from jobs in fossil-based industries. National \r [...]"


id: 7ba151fcfd8728e254dce0fd1c721069
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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"[...] level green new deals with strong just transition components have \r been proposed in South Korea, Australia, Spain, UK, Puerto Rico, \r Canada, as well as regional proposals across Latin America and the \r Caribbean (Pollin 2020)."


id: 6bbe914329011351c7de48a5d6b8c5c4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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content:
"Figure 4.9 | Just Transitions around the world, 2020. Panel (a) shows commissions, task forces, dialogues behind a just transition in many countries (Schweitzer and \r Tonn 2003; Thalmann 2004; Harrison 2013; Galgoczi 2014; Mendoza 2014; Adeoti et al. 2016; Ng et al. 2016; Gass and Echeverria 2017; Snell 2018; ILO 2018; Ministry of \r Employment and Labour Relations of Ghana 2018; Szpor, A. and Ziolkowska 2018; van Asselt and Moerenhout 2018; Bankwatch 2019; Commission on Growth Structural \r Change and Employment 2019; European Union 2019, 2020; Galgoczi 2019; Government of Canada 2019; Government of Costa Rica 2019; NPC (National Planning \r Commission) 2019; Ministry of Business Innovation & Employment New Zealand 2019; Piggot et al. 2019; Popp 2019; Strambo et al. 2019; Government of Spain 2019; Finnish \r Government 2020; Scottish Government 2020; White House 2016; Mijn Cha et al. 2020); panel (b) shows the funds related to the Just Transition within the European Union \r [...]"


id: 73c21fa0b6ca4ad82370fe61b45c4b91
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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"[...] Green Deal, and panel (c) shows the European Union's Platform for Coal Regions in Transition."


id: 16c4ffa154b7e079e440454072061936
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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content_type: text
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"Current pledges and efforts under the PA aimed at keeping global warming below 2degC are not enough, falling short by 14 to \r 23 GtCO2-eq (Cross-Chapter Box 4 in this Chapter). There is a further shortfall of about 4 to 7 GtCO2-eq in 2030 if the conditions \r are not fulfilled for those Parties that have made their pledges with conditions for support (Section 4.2.2.3). To cover up for these \r shortfalls will require taking actions across all sectors that can substantially reduce GHG emissions. Examples of such actions \r include shifting to low- or zero-emission power generation, such as renewables; changing food systems, such as diet changes away \r from land-intensive animal products; electrifying transport and developing 'green infrastructure', such as building green roofs, or \r improving energy efficiency by smart urban planning, which will change the layout of many cities. Because these different actions \r [...]"


id: 1b08896884803787d49137b75126c84c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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vector_id: 1953
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"[...] are connected, it means all relevant companies, industries and stakeholders would need to be involved to increase the support \r and chance of successful implementation (Section 4.2.5). The deployment of low-emission technology depends upon economic \r conditions (e.g., employment generation or capacity to mobilise investment), but also on social/cultural conditions (e.g., awareness \r and acceptability) and institutional conditions (e.g., political support and understanding), and the provision of relevant enabling \r conditions (Section  4.4.1). Encouraging stronger and more ambitious climate action by non-government and sub-national \r stakeholders, as well as international cooperative initiatives (ICIs) could make significant contributions to emissions reduction \r (Section 4.2.3)."


id: 6e590bad843c6b91799507bb67dacba5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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vector_id: 16679
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"It is possible to accelerate mitigation while addressing other developmental priorities by implementing measures that simultaneously \r address both climate and development goals. Casting mitigation in the broader context of development pathways provides additional \r opportunities to articulate both (Section 4.3.1.4). Policies such as progressive taxation, investment in public transport, regulatory \r transparency, commitment to multilateral environmental governance, fiscal incentives for private investments, international \r technology development and transfer initiatives, and risk disclosure and efforts to improve underlying enabling conditions (improving \r governance and institutional capacity, fostering behavioural change and technological innovation, and provision of finance) address \r multiple objectives beyond mitigation, such as job creation, macroeconomic stability, economic growth, public health and welfare, \r [...]"


id: 4ddf1af849016206abe6e860a7dad170
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10970
content:
"[...] providing energy access, providing formal housing, and providing mobility. How we manage our land and agriculture, growing cities, \r transport needs, our industries, and the way people are trained and employed all impact on GHG emissions and the options we \r have to reduce them. In turn, reducing GHG emissions can also contribute to reducing poverty, preventing hunger, improving health \r and wellbeing, and providing clean water and clean energy. Implementing right policies and investments can help to address the \r challenges of how to reduce emissions without constraining development. For example, in land use, widespread planting of a single \r tree species or crops for bioenergy (organic matter turned into renewable energy) could affect food and water supplies. Therefore, if \r bioenergy is to be relied upon to offset emissions, the right policies and investments are needed (see also Chapter 17)."


id: cbf625eff149ff7077ca329d9d244765
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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vector_id: 33209
content:
"The indicative potential of demand-side strategies to reduce \r emissions of direct and indirect CO2 and non-CO2 GHG emissions \r in three end-use sectors (buildings, land transport, and food) is \r 40-70% globally by 2050 (high confidence). Technical mitigation \r potentials compared to the 2050 emissions projection of two scenarios \r consistent with policies announced by national governments until 2020 \r amount to 6.8 GtCO2 for building use and construction, 4.6 GtCO2 for \r land transport and 8.0 GtCO2-eq for food demand, and amount to \r 4.4 GtCO2 for industry. Mitigation strategies can be classified as Avoid\u0002Shift-Improve (ASI) options, that reflect opportunities for socio-cultural, \r infrastructural, and technological change. The greatest 'Avoid' potential \r comes from reducing long-haul aviation and providing short-distance \r low-carbon urban infrastructures. The greatest 'Shift' potential would \r come from switching to plant-based diets. The greatest 'Improve' \r [...]"


id: 88571e275b8a06306d9d767496399a9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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content:
"[...] potential comes from within the building sector, and in particular \r increased use of energy-efficient end-use technologies and passive \r housing. {5.3.1, 5.3.2, Figure  5.7, Figure  5.8, Table  5.1, Chapter  5 \r Supplementary Material II, Table 5.SM.2}"


id: f9c288f73813b08396a5b78636c27989
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
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vector_id: 41302
content:
"The Sixth Assessment Report of the IPCC (AR6), for the first time, \r features a  chapter on demand, services, and social aspects of \r mitigation. It builds on the AR4 and AR5, which linked behaviour and \r lifestyle change to mitigating climate change (IPCC 2007; Roy and Pal \r 2009; IPCC 2014a), the Global Energy Assessment (Roy et al. 2012), \r and the AR5, which identified sectoral demand-side mitigation options \r across chapters (IPCC 2014a; IPCC 2014b; Creutzig et al. 2016b). The \r literature on the nature, scale, implementation and implications of \r demand-side solutions, and associated changes in lifestyles, social \r norms, and well-being, has been growing rapidly (Creutzig et  al. \r 2021a) (Box 5.2). Demand-side solutions support near-term climate \r change mitigation (Mejean et al. 2019; Wachsmuth and Duscha 2019) \r and include consumers' technology choices, behaviours, lifestyle \r changes, coupled with production-consumption infrastructures and \r [...]"


id: 7abc2798a6bb661c2431fd1a33f3a45a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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"[...] systems, service provision strategies, and associated socio-technical \r transitions. This chapter's assessment of the social sciences (also see \r Chapter 5 Supplementary Material I) reveals that social dynamics at \r different levels offer diverse entry points for acting on and mitigating \r climate change (Jorgenson et al. 2018)."


id: 3990cbc7201faaf1c4354d688b6b3412
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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vector_id: 7337
content:
"Focusing on demand for services broadens the climate solution space \r beyond technological switches confined to the supply side, to include \r solutions that maintain or improve well-being related to nutrition, \r shelter and mobility while (sometimes radically) reducing energy and \r material input levels (Creutzig et  al. 2018; Cervantes Barron 2020; \r Baltruszewicz et al. 2021; Kikstra et al. 2021b). This also recognises \r that mitigation policies are politically, economically and socially \r more feasible, as well as more effective, when there is a  two-way \r alignment between climate action and well-being (OECD 2019a). \r There is medium evidence and high agreement that well-designed \r demand for services scenarios are consistent with adequate levels \r of well-being for everyone (Rao and Baer 2012; Grubler et al. 2018; \r Rao et al. 2019b; Millward-Hopkins et al. 2020; Kikstra et al. 2021b), \r with high and/or improved quality of life (Max-Neef 1995; Vogel et al. \r [...]"


id: 64bad57f1056ab9fe999f9f02082f998
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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vector_id: 15002
content:
"[...] 2021) and improved levels of happiness (Easterlin et al. 2010) and \r sustainable human development (Gadrey and Jany-Catrice 2006; \r Arrow et al. 2013; Dasgupta and Dasgupta 2017). While demand for \r services is high as development levels increase, and related emissions \r are growing in many countries (Yumashev et al. 2020; Bamisile et al. \r 2021), there is also evidence that provisioning systems delink services \r provided from emissions (Conte Grand 2016; Patra et  al. 2017; \r Kavitha et  al. 2020). Various mitigation strategies, often classified \r into Avoid-Shift-Improve (ASI) options, effectively reduce primary \r energy demand and/or material input (Haas et al. 2015; Haberl et al. \r 2017; Samadi et al. 2017; Hausknost et al. 2018; Haberl et al. 2019; \r Van den Berg et al. 2019; Ivanova et al. 2020). Users' participation in \r decisions about how services are provided, not just their technological \r feasibility, is an important determinant of their effectiveness and \r [...]"


id: 4821bad6f668e0d4c162004d1a945453
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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"Second, demand-side solutions support staying within planetary \r boundaries (Haberl et  al. 2014; Matson et  al. 2016; Hillebrand \r et al. 2018; Andersen and Quinn 2020; UNDESA 2020; Hickel et al. \r 2021; Keysser and Lenzen 2021). Demand side solutions entail \r fewer environmental risks than many supply-side technologies (Von \r Stechow et al. 2016). Additionally they make carbon dioxide removal \r technologies, such as bioenergy with carbon capture and storage \r (BECCS) less relevant (Van Vuuren et al. 2018) but modelling studies \r (Grubler et al. 2018; Hickel et al. 2021; Keysser and Lenzen 2021) still \r require ecosystem-based carbon dioxide removal. In the IPCC's Special \r Report on Global Warming of 1.5degC (SR1.5) (IPCC 2018), four stylised \r scenarios have explored possible pathways towards stabilising global \r warming at 1.5degC (IPCC 2014a, Figure SPM.3a) (Figure 5.1) One of \r these scenarios, LED-19, investigates the scope of demand-side \r [...]"


id: 64318e9556a3281389464fc93f2adcce
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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vector_id: 14914
content:
"[...] solutions (Figure 5.1). The comparison of scenarios reveals that such \r low energy demand pathways eliminate the need for technologies \r with high uncertainty, such as BECCS. Third, interrogating demand \r for services from the well-being perspective also opens new avenues \r for assessing mitigation potentials (Brand-Correa and Steinberger \r 2017; Mastrucci and Rao 2017; Rao and Min 2018a; Mastrucci \r and Rao 2019; Baltruszewicz et  al. 2021). Arguably, demand-side \r interventions often operate institutionally or in terms of restoring \r natural functioning and have so far been politically sidelined but \r COVID-19 revealed interesting perspectives (Box 5.2). Such demand\u0002side solutions also support near-term goals towards climate change \r mitigation and reduce the need for politically challenging high global \r carbon prices (Mejean et al. 2019) (Box 5.11). The well-being focus "


id: 2420e33afb56629703bc9690fecb87a5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
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vector_id: 3536
content:
"show how mitigation potentials, and social groups who can deliver \r them, are much broader than usually considered in traditional sector\u0002specific presentations. ASI originally arose from the need to assess \r the staging and combinations of inter-related mitigation options \r in the provision of transportation services (Hidalgo and Huizenga \r 2013). In the context of transportation services, ASI seeks to mitigate \r emissions through  avoiding as much transport service demand as \r possible (e.g., through telework to eliminate commutes, mixed-use \r urban zoning to shorten commute distances), shifting remaining \r demand to more efficient modes (e.g.,  bus rapid transit replacing \r passenger vehicles), and improving the carbon intensity of modes \r utilised (e.g., electric buses powered by renewables) (Creutzig et al. \r 2016a). This chapter summarises ASI options and potentials across \r sectors and generalises the definitions. 'Avoid' refers to all mitigation \r [...]"


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created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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"[...] options that reduce unnecessary (in the sense of being not required \r to deliver the desired service output) energy consumption by \r redesigning service provisioning systems; 'Shift' refers to the switch \r to already existing competitive efficient technologies and service \r provisioning systems; and 'Improve' refers to improvements in \r efficiency in existing technologies. The Avoid-Shift-Improve framing \r operates in three domains: Socio-cultural, where social norms, \r culture, and individual choices play an important role - a category \r especially, but not only, relevant for 'Avoid' options; Infrastructure, \r which provides the cost and benefit landscape for realising options \r and is particularly relevant for 'Shift' options; and Technologies, \r especially important for the 'Improve' options."


id: e112975bb27c46e881adf147196f060a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36862
content:
"A key concern about climate change mitigation policies is that \r they may reduce quality of life. Based on growing literature, in \r this chapter we adopt the concept of decent living standards (DLS, \r explained further in relation to other individual and collective well\u0002being measures and concepts in the Social Science Primer, Chapter 5 \r Supplementary Material I) as a universal set of service requirements \r essential for achieving basic human well-being. DLS includes the \r dimensions of nutrition, shelter, living condition, clothing, health care, \r education, and mobility (Frye et al. 2018; Rao and Min 2018b). DLS \r provides a fair, direct way to understand the basic low-carbon energy \r needs of society and specifies the underlying minimum material and \r energy requirements. This chapter also comprehensively assesses \r related well-being metrics that result from demand-side action, \r observing overall positive effects (Section 5.3). Similarly, ambitious \r [...]"


id: 32975faff575234053536c342194fe50
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6160
content:
"[...] low-emissions demand-side scenarios suggest that well-being \r could be maintained or improved while reducing global final energy \r demand, and some current literature estimates that it is possible \r to meet decent living standards for all within the 2degC warming \r window (Grubler et al. 2018; Burke 2020; Keysser and Lenzen 2021) \r (Section 5.4). A key concern here is how to blend new technologies "


id: 5766ed96e7cecf3625159dfcb8e981b2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12637
content:
"A large part of the literature is highly repetitive and/or includes no concepts or little quantitative or qualitative data of relevance to \r this chapter. For example, a systematic review on economic growth and decoupling identified more than 11,500 papers treating this \r topic, but only 834 of those, that is, 7%, included relevant data (Wiedenhofer et al. 2020). In another systematic review, assessing \r quantitative estimates of consumption-based solutions (Ivanova et al. 2020), only 0.8% of papers were considered after consistency \r criteria were enforced. Altogether, we relied on systematic reviews wherever possible. Other important papers were not captured by \r systematic reviews but are included in this chapter through expert judgement. Based on topical modelling and relevance coding of \r resulting topics, the full literature body can be mapped into two dimensions, where spatial relationships indicate topical distance \r [...]"


id: ec8a847bff73a14d67b2bf9d2fa05ffe
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38975
content:
"[...] (Box  5.1, Figure  1). The interpretation of topics demonstrates that the literature organises in four clusters of high relevance for \r demand-side solutions (housing, mobility, food, and policy), whereas other clusters (nature, energy supply) are relatively less relevant. "


id: 9e3b8e3ed25a12dd410a2961d747a270
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25067
content:
"COVID-19 led to direct and indirect health, economic, and confinement-induced hardships and suffering, mostly for the poor, and \r reset habits and everyday behaviours of the well-off too, enabling a reflection on the basic needs for a good life. Although COVID-19 \r and climate change pose different kinds of threats and therefore elicit different policies, there are several lessons from COVID-19 for \r advancing climate change mitigation (Klenert et al. 2020; Manzanedo and Manning 2020; Stark 2020). Both crises are global in scale, \r requiring holistic societal response; governments can act rapidly, and delay in action is costly (Bouman et al. 2020a; Klenert et al. 2020). \r The pandemic highlighted the role of individuals in collective action and many people felt morally compelled and responsible to act for \r others (Budd and Ison, 2020). COVID-19 also taught the effectiveness of rapid collective action (physical distancing, wearing masks, \r [...]"


id: a6d2eab8f5b96939c11ee5c4564de88a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26562
content:
"[...] etc.) as contributions to the public good. The messaging about social distancing, wearing masks and handwashing during the pandemic \r called attention to the importance of effective public information (e.g., also about reducing personal carbon footprints), recognising that \r rapid pro-social responses are driven by personal and socio-cultural norms (Bouman et al. 2020a; Sovacool et al. 2020a). In contrast, low \r trust in public authorities impairs the effectiveness of policies and polarises society (Bavel et al. 2020; Hornsey 2020)."


id: 1a2e853a4310b66d1712a14cbaf4e439
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1802
content:
"During the shutdown, emissions declined relatively most in aviation, and absolutely most in car transport (Le Quere et al. 2020, \r Sarkis et al. 2020), and there were disproportionally strong reductions in GHG emissions from coal (Bertram et al. 2021) (Chapter 2). \r At their peak, CO2 emissions in individual countries decreased by 17% on average (Le Quere et al. 2020). Global energy demand was \r projected to drop by 5% in 2020, energy-related CO2 emissions by 7%, and energy investment by 18% (IEA 2020a). COVID-19 shock \r and recovery scenarios project final energy demand reductions of 1-36 EJ yr-1 by 2025 and cumulative CO2 emission reductions of \r 14-45 GtCO2 by 2030 (Kikstra et al. 2021a). Plastics use and waste generation increased during the pandemic (Klemes et al. 2020; \r Prata et al. 2020). Responses to COVID-19 had important connections with energy demand and GHG emissions due to quarantine and \r [...]"


id: 5f30e904e7e6f135b82e31dbf88de336
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14056
content:
"[...] travel restrictions (Sovacool et al. 2020a). Reductions in mobility and economic activity reduced energy use in sectors such as industry \r and transport, but increased energy use in the residential sector (Diffenbaugh et al. 2020). COVID-19 induced behavioural changes \r that may translate into new habits, some beneficial and some harmful for climate change mitigation. New digitally-enabled service \r accessibility patterns (videoconferencing, telecommuting) played an important role in sustaining various service needs while avoiding \r demand for individual mobility. However, public transit lost customers to cars, personalised two wheelers, walking and cycling, while \r suburban and rural living gained popularity, possibly with long-term consequences. Reduced air travel, pressures for more localised"


id: 718a71ebf3baa2cdb54e18ef08a54c3c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17225
content:
"food and manufacturing supply chains (Hobbs 2020; Nandi et al. 2020; Quayson et al. 2020), and governments' revealed willingness \r to make large-scale interventions in the economy also reflect sudden shifts in service provisions and GHG emissions, some likely to be \r lasting (Aldaco et al. 2020; Bilal et al. 2020; Boyer 2020; Hepburn et al. 2020; Norouzi et al. 2020; Prideaux et al. 2020; Sovacool et al. \r 2020a). If changes in some preference behaviours, for example for larger homes and work environments to enable home working and \r online education, lead to sprawling suburbs or gentrification with linked environmental consequences, this could translate into long\u0002term implications for climate change (Beaunoyer et al. 2020; Diffenbaugh et al. 2020). Recovering from the pandemic by adopting low \r energy demand practices - embedded in new travel, work, consumption and production behaviour and patterns - could reduce carbon \r [...]"


id: 118ba9b050825353391c94223bd8691d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 284
content:
"[...] prices for a 1.5degC consistent pathway by 19%, reduce energy supply investments until 2030 by USD1.8 trillion, and lessen pressure on \r the upscaling of low-carbon energy technologies (Kikstra et al. 2021a)."


id: a4ba0802853cb6f4fd0bb033ccccb71e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26200
content:
"Fiscally, the pandemic may have slowed the transition to a sustainable energy world: governments redistributed public funding to combat \r the disease, adopted austerity and reduced capacity. Of nearly 300 policies implemented to counteract the pandemic, the vast majority are \r related to rescue, including worker and business compensation, and only 4% of these focus on green policies with potential to reduce GHG \r emissions in the long term; some rescue policies also assist emissions-intensive business (Hepburn et al. 2020; Leach et al. 2021). However, \r climate investments can double as the basis of the COVID-19 recovery (Stark 2020), with policies focused on both economic multipliers and \r climate impacts, such as clean physical infrastructure, natural capital investment, clean research and development (R&D) and education \r and training (Hepburn et al. 2020). This requires attention to investment priorities, including often-underprioritised social investment, given \r [...]"


id: ecfe4e48fe9c5ae9d61d57587746e0cb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39067
content:
"[...] how inequality intersects with, and is a recognised core driver of, environmental damage and climate change (Millward-Hopkins et al. 2020)."


id: 73f543178218816768235905f9d5871e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17646
content:
"As outlined in section 5.1, mitigation, equity and well-being go hand \r in hand to motivate actions. Global, regional, and national actions \r and policies that advance inclusive well-being and build social trust \r strengthen governance. There is high evidence and high agreement that \r demand-side measures cut across all sectors, and can bring multiple \r benefits (Mundaca et al. 2019; Wachsmuth and Duscha 2019; Geels \r 2020; Niamir et al. 2020b; Garvey et al. 2021; Roy et al. 2021). Since \r effective demand requires affordability, one of the necessary conditions \r for acceleration of mitigation through demand-side measures is wide \r and equitable participation from all sectors of society. Low-cost low\u0002emissions technologies, supported by institutions and government \r policies, can help meet service demand and advance both climate \r and well-being goals (Steffen et  al. 2018a; Khosla et  al. 2019). This \r section introduces metrics of well-being and their relationship to GHG \r [...]"


id: a7b43c3cccc7ecd63aebd73d1ae3de65
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26721
content:
"Current socioeconomic systems are based on high-carbon economic \r growth and resource use (Steffen et  al. 2018b). Several systematic \r reviews confirm that economic growth is tightly coupled with \r increasing CO2 emissions (Ayres and Warr 2005; Tiba and Omri \r 2017; Mardani et  al. 2019; Wiedenhofer et  al. 2020) although the \r level of emissions depends on inequality (Balezentis et al. 2020; Liu \r et al. 2020b), and on geographic and infrastructural constraints that \r force consumers to use fossil fuels (Pottier et  al. 2021). Different \r patterns emerge in the causality of the energy-growth nexus: \r (i) energy consumption causes economic growth; (ii) growth causes \r energy consumption; (iii) bidirectional causality; and (iv) no significant \r causality (Ozturk 2010). In a systematic review, Mardani et al. (2019) \r found that in most cases, energy use and economic growth have \r a  bidirectional causal effect, indicating that as economic growth \r [...]"


id: 2018b207f80e77efbd015b5301b1e8f1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2866
content:
"[...] increases, further CO2 emissions are stimulated at higher levels; in turn, \r measures designed to lower GHG emissions may reduce economic \r growth. However, energy substitution and efficiency gains may offer \r opportunities to break the bidirectional dependency (Komiyama \r 2014; Brockway et  al. 2017; Shuai et  al. 2019). Worldwide trends \r reveal that at best only relative decoupling (resource use grows at "


id: 25bb1dc162274f11ba5dd4eef2a45877
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3821
content:
"and values change during a transition to the low-carbon economy, then \r this overturns conclusions on what count as adequate or even optimal \r policy responses to climate change mitigation in economics (Jacobsen \r et al. 2012; Schumacher 2015; Dasgupta et al. 2016; Daube and Ulph \r 2016; Ulph and Ulph 2021). In particular, if policy instruments, such as \r awareness campaigns, infrastructure development or education, can \r change people's preferences, then policies or infrastructure provision - \r socially constrained by deliberative decision making - which change \r both relative prices and preferences, are more valuable for mitigation \r than previously thought (Creutzig et al. 2016b; Mattauch et al. 2016; \r Mattauch et al. 2018). The provisioning context of human needs is \r participatory, so transformative mitigation potential arises from social \r as well as technological change (Lamb and Steinberger 2017). Many \r [...]"


id: 4c7435566116d22f299fc66f20b195be
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10710
content:
"[...] dimensions of well-being and 'basic needs' are social, not individual, in \r character (Schneider 2016), so extending well-being and DLS analysis \r to emissions also involves understanding individual situations in social \r contexts. This includes building supports for collective strategies to \r reduce emissions (Chan et al. 2019), going beyond individual consumer \r choice. Climate policies that affect collective behaviour fairly are the \r most acceptable policies across political ideologies (Clayton 2018); \r thus collective preferences for mitigation are synergistic with evolving \r policies and norms in governance contexts that reduce risk, ensure \r social justice and build trust (Atkinson et  al. 2017; Cramton et  al. \r 2017; Milkoreit 2017; Tvinnereim et al. 2017; Smith and Reid 2018; \r Carattini et al. 2019)."


id: 91802a9ec3870130511dfe064dfa4d49
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22813
content:
"a slower pace than GDP) was the norm during the twentieth century \r (Jackson 2009; Krausmann et  al. 2009; Ward et  al. 2016; Jackson \r 2016), while absolute decoupling (when material use declines as GDP \r grows) is rare, observed only during recessions or periods of low or \r no economic growth (Heun and Brockway 2019; Hickel and Kallis \r 2019; Vaden et al. 2020; Wiedenhofer et al. 2020). Recent trends in \r OECD countries demonstrate the potential for absolute decoupling of \r economic growth not only from territorial but also from consumption\u0002based emissions (Le Quere et al. 2019), albeit at scales insufficient for \r mitigation pathways (Vaden et al. 2020) (Chapter 2).\r Energy demand and demand for GHG-intensive products increased \r from 2010 until 2020 across all sectors and categories. 2019 witnessed \r a reduction in energy demand growth rate to below 1% and 2020 \r an overall decline in energy demand, with repercussions for energy \r [...]"


id: 2be246b2ddc3f8743ae2f1e3a5f834a8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4970
content:
"[...] supply disproportionally affecting coal via merit order effects (Bertram \r et al. 2021) (Cross-Chapter Box 1 in Chapter 1). There was a slight \r but significant shift from high-carbon beef consumption to medium\u0002carbon intensive poultry consumption. Final energy use in buildings \r grew from 118 EJ in 2010 to around 128 EJ in 2019 (increased about \r 8%). The highest increase was observed in non-residential buildings, \r with a 13% increase against 8% in residential energy demand (IEA \r 2019a). While electricity accounted for one-third of building energy \r use in 2019, fossil fuel use also increased at a marginal annual average \r growth rate of 0.7% since 2010 (IEA 2020a). Energy-related CO2\r emissions from buildings have risen in recent years after flattening \r between 2013 and 2016. Direct and indirect emissions from electricity \r and commercial heat used in buildings rose to 10 GtCO2 in 2019, the \r highest level ever recorded. Several factors have contributed to this \r [...]"


id: 60b7df6d8dbacb30316387942beae6ef
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14311
content:
"[...] rise, including growing energy demand for heating and cooling with \r rising air conditioner ownership and extreme weather events. A critical \r issue remains how comfortable people feel with temperatures \r they will be exposed to in the future and this depends on physical, \r psychological and behavioural factors (Singh et al. 2018; Jacobs et al. \r 2019). Literature now shows high evidence and high agreement\r around the observation that policies and infrastructure interventions \r that lead to change in human preferences are more valuable for \r climate change mitigation. In economics, welfare evaluations are \r predominantly based on the preference approach. Preferences \r are  typically assumed to be fixed, so that only changes in relative \r prices will reduce emissions. However, as decarbonisation is a societal \r transition, individuals' preferences do shift and this can contribute \r to climate change mitigation (Gough 2015). Even if preferences are \r [...]"


id: f1bfa4d577c2e0fdf09982ba205ad712
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39918
content:
"[...] assumed to change in response to policy, it is nevertheless possible \r to evaluate policy, and demand-side solutions, by approaches to well\u0002being and welfare that are based on deeper concepts of preferences \r across disciplines (Roy and Pal 2009; Fleurbaey and Tadenuma 2014; \r Komiyama 2014; Dietrich and  List 2016; Mattauch and Hepburn \r 2016). In cases of past societal transitions, such as smoking reduction, \r there is evidence that societies guided the processes of shifting \r preferences, and values changed along with changing relative prices \r (Nyborg  and  Rege 2003; Stuber et  al. 2008; Brownell and Warner \r 2009). Further evidence on changing preferences in consumption \r choices pertinent to decarbonisation includes Grinblatt et al. (2008) \r and Weinberger and Goetzke (2010) for mobility; Erb et  al. (2016), \r Muller  et  al. (2017),  and Costa and Johnson (2019) for diets; and \r Baranzini etal(2017) for solar panel uptakeIf individuals' preferences "


id: 5d9c79d50ba7d15291ed8202262c343
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13761
content:
"Well-being can be categorised either as 'hedonic' or 'eudaimonic'. \r Hedonic well-being is related to a  subjective state of human \r motivation, balancing pleasure over pain, and has gained influence \r in psychology assessing 'subjective well-being', assuming that the \r individual is motivated to enhance personal freedom, self-preservation \r and enhancement (Sirgy 2012; Brand-Correa and Steinberger 2017; \r Lamb and Steinberger 2017; Ganglmair-Wooliscroft and Wooliscroft \r 2019). Eudaimonic well-being focuses on the individual in the broader \r context, associating happiness with virtue (Sirgy 2012), allowing for \r the creation of social institutions and political systems and considering \r their ability to enable individuals to flourish. Eudaimonic analysis \r supports numerous development approaches (Fanning and O'Neill \r 2019) such as the capabilities (Sen 1985), human needs (Doyal and \r [...]"


id: 6e0eeffba056b7bb363547ac4bfb5b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16624
content:
"[...] Gough 1991; Max-Neef et al. 1991) and models of psychosocial well\u0002being (Ryan and Deci 2001). Measures of well-being differ somewhat \r in developed and developing countries (Sulemana et al. 2016; Ng and \r Diener 2019); for example, food insecurity, associated everywhere "


id: 35fa69cb3096174c6696e06a2299679
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6745
content:
"Decent living standards (DLS) serves as a socio-economic benchmark \r as it views human welfare not in relation to consumption but \r rather in terms of services which together help meet human needs \r (e.g.,  nutrition, shelter, health, etc.), recognising that these service \r needs may be met in many different ways (with different emissions \r implications) depending on local contexts, cultures, geography, \r available technologies, social preferences, and other factors. Therefore, \r one key way of thinking about providing well-being for all with low \r carbon emissions centres around prioritising ways of providing \r services for DLS in a  low-carbon way (including choices of needs \r satisfiers, and how these are provided or made accessible). They may \r be supplied to individuals or groups or communities, both through \r formal markets and/or informally, for example by collaborative \r work, in coordinated ways that are locally appropriate, designed and \r [...]"


id: b02129eed35c4cf19e6d7ad43b683f21
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28222
content:
"Well-being needs are met through services. Provision of services \r associated with low energy demand is a key component of current \r and future efforts to reduce carbon emissions. Services can be \r provided in various culturally-appropriate ways, with diverse \r climate implications. There is high evidence and high agreement\r in the literature that many granular service provision systems can \r make 'demand' more flexible, provide new options for mitigation, \r support access to basic needs, and enhance human well-being. \r Energy services offer an important lens to analyse the relationship \r between energy systems and human well-being (Jackson and \r Papathanasopoulou 2008; Druckman and Jackson 2010; Mattioli \r 2016; Walker et al. 2016; Fell 2017; Brand-Correa et al. 2018; King \r et al. 2019; Pagliano and Erba 2019; Whiting et al. 2020). Direct and \r indirect services provided by energy, rather than energy itself, deliver \r [...]"


id: f5f5fd4f51d4d0fc609a1855768c7a74
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40627
content:
"[...] well-being benefits (Kalt et al. 2019). For example, illumination and \r transport are intermediary services in relation to education, health \r care, meal preparation, sanitation, and so on, which are basic human \r needs. Sustainable consumption and  production revolve around \r 'doing more and better with the same' and thereby increasing well\u0002being from economic activities 'by reducing resource use, degradation \r and pollution along the whole lifecycle, while increasing quality \r of life' (UNEP 2010). Although energy is required for delivering \r human development by supporting access to basic needs (Lamb \r and Rao 2015; Lamb and Steinberger 2017), a reduction in primary \r energy use and/or shift to low-carbon energy, if associated with \r the maintenance or improvement of services, can not only ensure \r better environmental quality but also directly enhance well-being \r (Roy et al. 2012). The correlation between human development and \r [...]"


id: fa1857f2e36c06fc6b76c5af3c46d333
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41372
content:
"[...] emissions is not necessarily coupled in the long term, which implies \r there is a need to prioritise human well-being and the environment \r over economic growth (Steinberger et al. 2020). At the interpersonal \r and community levels, cultural specificities, infrastructure, norms, and \r relational behaviours differ (Box 5.3). For example, demand for space \r heating and cooling depends on building materials and designs, \r urban planning, vegetation, clothing and social norms as well as \r geography, incomes, and outside temperatures (Brand-Correa et al. \r 2018; Campbell et al. 2018; Ivanova et al. 2018; IEA 2019b; Dreyfus \r et al. 2020). In personal mobility, different variable needs satisfiers \r (e.g.,  street space allocated to cars, buses or bicycles) can help \r satisfy human needs, such as accessibility to jobs, health care, and \r education. Social interactions and normative values play a  crucial "


id: 641425aa72d5bb1a4c151c2c692b3923
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14892
content:
"The most pressing DLS service shortfalls, as shown in Figure 5.2, lie \r in the areas of nutrition, mobility, and communication. Gaps in regions \r such as Africa and the Middle East are accompanied by current levels \r of service provision in the highly industrialised countries at much \r higher than DLS levels for the same three service categories. The lowest \r population quartile by income worldwide faces glaring shortfalls \r in housing, mobility, and nutrition. Meeting these service needs \r using low-emissions energy sources is a top priority. Reducing GHG \r emissions associated with high levels of consumption and material \r throughput by those far above DLS levels has potential to address \r both emissions and inequality in energy and emission footprints \r (Otto et al. 2019). This, in turn, has further potential benefits; under \r the conditions of 'fair' income reallocation to public services, this can \r reduce national carbon footprint by up to 30% while allowing the \r [...]"


id: 86eafcc18851890128ae85bf29733f1f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20900
content:
"[...] consumption of those at the bottom to increase (Millward-Hopkins \r and Oswald 2021). The challenge then is to address the upper limits of \r consumption. When consumption only just supports the satisfaction \r of basic needs, any decrease causes deficiencies in human-need \r satisfaction. This is quite unlinke the case of consumption that \r exceeds the limits of basic needs, in which deprivation causes \r a  subjective discomfort (Brand-Correa et  al. 2020). Therefore, to \r collectively remain within environmental limits, the establishment of \r minimum and maximum standards of consumption, or sustainable \r consumption corridors, (Wiedmann et al. 2020) has been suggested, \r depending on the context. In some countries, carbon-intensive ways \r of satisfying human needs have been locked-in, for example via car\u0002dependent infrastructures (Jackson and Papathanasopoulou 2008; \r Druckman and Jackson 2010; Mattioli 2016; King et al. 2019), and \r [...]"


id: b834186b455c93fcdbefda3c9f980cb7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29621
content:
"[...] both infrastructure reconfiguration and adaptation are required to \r organise need satisfaction in low-carbon ways (see also Section 10.2)."


id: 28ae9a98308d3b073d6c6fe6bb82d96b
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"Figure 5.22 | Heterogeneity in access to and availability of services for human well-being within and across countries. Panel (a) Across-country differences \r in panel (a) food (meat and other), (b) housing, (c) mobility, (d) communication (mobile phones and high-speed internet access). Variation in service levels across countries within \r a region is shown as error bars (black). Values proposed as decent standards of living threshold (Rao et al. 2019b) are shown as red dashed lines. Global average values are \r shown as blue dashed lines. Panel (b) Within-country differences in service levels as a function of income differences for the Netherlands (bottom and top 10% of incomes) and \r India (bottom and top 25% of incomes) (Grubler et al. 2012b) (data update 2016). Panel (c) Decent living energy (DLE) scenario using global, regional and DLS dimensions for \r [...]"


id: 4cd4214a96826ff88db98616f74dd8da
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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"[...] final energy consumption at 149 EJ (15.3 GJ cap-1 yr -1) in 2050 (Millward-Hopkins et al. 2020), requiring advanced technologies in all sectors and radical demand-side changes. \r Values are shown for five world regions based on the AR6 WGIII Regional breakdown. We use passenger kilometres per day per capita (km day-1 cap-1) as a metric for mobility \r only as a reference, however, transport and social inclusion research suggest the aim is to maximise accessibility and not travel levels or travelled distance."


id: 9c903d1d856b60d6da4de1ca0f8e279b
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"Keysser and Lenzen 2021). Decent living standards indicators serve as \r tools to clarify this socio-economic benchmark and identify well-being \r for all compatible mitigation potential. Energy services provisioning \r opens up avenues of efficiency and possibilities for decoupling energy \r services demand from primary energy supply, while needs satisfaction \r leads to the analysis of the factors influencing the energy demand \r associated with the achievement of well-being (Brand-Correa and \r Steinberger 2017; Tanikawa et  al. 2021). Vital dimensions of well\u0002being correlate with consumption, but only up to a threshold: decent \r living energy thresholds range from about 13 to 18.4 GJ cap-1 yr-1 of \r final energy consumption but the current consumption ranges from \r under 5 GJ cap-1 yr-1 to over 200 GJ cap-1 yr-1 (Millward-Hopkins \r et  al. 2020), thus a  mitigation strategy that protects minimum \r levels of essential-goods service delivery for DLS, but critically \r [...]"


id: b0dce39d8e09bb08898fe06c87a35ffc
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"[...] views consumption beyond the point of diminishing returns of \r needs satisfaction, is able to sustain well-being while generating \r emissions reductions (Goldemberg et  al. 1988; Jackson and Marks \r 1999; Druckman and Jackson 2010; Girod and De Haan 2010; Vita \r et  al. 2019a; Baltruszewicz et  al. 2021). Such relational dynamics \r are relevant both within and between countries, due to variances \r in income levels, lifestyle choice (see also Section 5.4.4), geography, "


id: 31dd36007a0d7aadfcab4cd879bb6763
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"(Guruswamy 2016; Wester et al. 2019). In Brazil, India and South \r Africa, where inequality is extreme (Alvaredo et al. 2018) mobility \r (51-60%), food production and preparation (21-27%) and housing \r (5-12%) dominate total energy needs (Rao et al. 2019b). Minimum \r requirements of energy use consistent with enabling well-being for \r all is between 20 and 50 GJ cap-1 yr -1 depending on context (Rao \r et al. 2019b). Inequality in access to and availability of services for \r human well-being varies in extreme degree across countries and \r income groups. In developing countries, the bottom 50% receive \r about 10% of the energy used in land transport and less than 5% \r in air transport, while the top 10% use about 45% of the energy \r for land transport and around 75% for air transport (Oswald et al. \r 2020). Within-country analysis shows that particular groups in \r China - women born in the rural West with disadvantaged family \r [...]"


id: 8c18ea3a591bed88e88e958e0162d98
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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"[...] backgrounds - face unequal opportunities for energy consumption \r (Shi 2019). Figure 5.3 shows the wide variation across world regions \r in people's access to some of the basic material prerequisites for \r meeting DLS, and variations in energy consumption, providing \r a starting point for comparative global analysis."


id: 71e08f571ecdf03d127d5c4db938f081
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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"in both access and affordability, that is, more than 2.6 billion \r people have little or no access to energy for clean cooking. About \r 1.2 billion lack energy for cleaning, sanitation and water supply, \r lighting, and basic livelihood tasks (Sovacool and Drupady 2016; \r Rao and Pachauri 2017).The current per capita energy requirement \r to provide a  decent standard of living range from around 5 to \r 200 GJ cap-1 yr -1 (Steckel et al. 2013; Lamb and Steinberger 2017; \r Rao et al. 2019b; Millward-Hopkins et al. 2020), which shows the \r level of inequality that exists; this depends on the context, such \r as geography, culture, infrastructure or how services are provided \r (Brand-Correa et  al. 2018) (Box  5.3). However, through efficient \r technologies and radical demand-side transformations, the final \r energy requirements for providing DLS by 2050 is estimated at \r 15.3  GJ cap-1 yr -1 (Millward-Hopkins et  al. 2020). Recent DLS \r [...]"


id: a09cb154ab5266f8953137d54c854742
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"[...] estimates for Brazil, South Africa, and India are in the range between \r 15 and 25 GJ cap-1 yr -1 (Rao et al. 2019b).The most gravely energy \r poor are often those living in informal settlements, particularly \r women, in sub-Saharan Africa and developing Asia, whose \r socially-determined responsibilities for food, water, and care are \r highly labour-intensive and made more intense by climate change "


id: f7f8b41355957b2969dfe8c94bd50e10
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content:
"Acceleration in mitigation action needs to be understood from a societal perspective. Technologies, access and service equity factors \r sometimes change rapidly. Access to technologies, infrastructures and products, and the services they provide, are essential for raising \r global living standards and improving human well-being (Alkire and Santos 2014; Rao and Min 2018b). Yet access to and levels \r of service delivery are distributed extremely inequitably as of now. How fast such inequities can be reduced by granular end-use \r technologies is illustrated by the cellphone (households with mobiles), comparing the situation between 2000 and 2018. In this \r eighteen-year period, cellphones changed from a very inequitably-distributed technology to one with almost universal access, bringing \r accessibility benefits especially to populations with very low disposable income and to those whose physical mobility is limited (Porter \r [...]"


id: ab5cdd6583c7259f240bae96e7ae4907
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"[...] 2016). Every human has the right to a dignified decent life, to live in good health and to participate in society. This is a daunting \r challenge, requiring that in the next decade governments build out infrastructure to provide billions of people with access to a number \r of services and basic amenities in comfortable homes, nutritious food, and transit options (Rao and Min 2018b). For a long time, this \r challenge was thought to also be an impediment to developing countries' participation in global climate mitigation efforts. However, \r recent research shows that this need not be the case (Millward-Hopkins et al. 2020; Rao et al. 2019b)."


id: 4eddac0bded32e732153a19077f5fd9b
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"footprints between the poor and the rich. As a result of energy use \r inequality, the lowest global emitters (the poorest 10% in developing \r countries) in 2013 emitted about 0.1  tCO2  cap-1  yr-1, whereas the \r highest global emitters (the top 1% in the richest countries) emitted \r about 200-300 tCO2 cap-1 yr-1 (World Bank 2019). The poorest 50% \r of the world's population are responsible for only about 10% of total \r lifetime consumption emissions, in contrast about 50% of the world's \r GHG emissions can be attributed to consumption by the world's richest \r 10%, with the average carbon footprint of the richest being 175 times \r higher than that of the poorest 10% (Chancel and Piketty 2015). This \r richest 10% consumed the global carbon budget by nearly 30% during \r the period 1990-2015 (Kartha et al. 2020; Gore 2020). While mitigation \r efforts often focus on the poorest, the lifestyle and consumption \r patterns of the affluent often influence the growing middle class (Otto \r [...]"


id: f8d931337a4d510bce5f29b0704ec35e
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"[...] et  al. 2019). Across EU countries, only 5% of households are living \r within 1.5degC climate limits and the top 1% emit more than 22 times \r the target on average, with land and air transport being particular \r characteristics of the highest-emitting countries (Ivanova and Wood \r 2020)."


id: 4cc3a049f5b1fc41b29d34f5025bc87c
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"Consumption is energy- and materials-intensive and expands along \r with income. About half of the energy used in the world is consumed \r by the richest 10% of people, most of whom live in developed \r countries, especially when one includes the energy embodied in \r the goods they purchase from other countries and the structure of \r consumption as a function of income level (Arto et al. 2016; Wolfram \r et  al. 2016; Santillan Vera et  al. 2021). International trade plays \r a central role, being responsible for shifting burdens in most cases \r from low-income developing countries producers to high-income \r developed countries as consumers (Wiedmann et  al. 2020). China \r is the largest exporter to the EU and United States, and accounts \r for nearly half and 40% of their imports in energy use respectively \r (Wu et al. 2019). Wealthy countries have exported or outsourced their \r climate and energy crisis to low- and middle-income countries (Baker \r [...]"


id: d79fbdb85f80b30a3c0253f928e5553c
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"[...] 2018), exacerbated by intensive international trade (Steinberger \r et  al. 2012; Scherer et  al. 2018). Therefore, issues of total energy \r consumption are inseparably related to the energy inequity among \r the countries and regions of the world."


id: 2c52277d1463d88057a43d23ebd56ae9
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"In low-income nations - which can exhibit per-capita carbon footprints \r 30 times lower than wealthy nations (Hertwich and Peters 2009) - \r emissions are predominantly domestic and driven by provision of \r essential services (shelter, low-meat diets, clothing). Per capita carbon \r footprints average 1.6 tonnes per year for the lowest income category, \r then quickly increase to 4.9 and 9.8 tonnes for the two middle-income \r categories and finally to an average of 17.9 tonnes for the highest \r income category. Global CO2 emissions remain concentrated: the top \r 10% of emitters contribute about 35-45% of the total, while the \r bottom 50% contribute just 13-15% of global emissions (Chancel and \r Piketty 2015; Hubacek et al. 2017). In wealthy nations, services such as \r private road transport, frequent air travel, private jet ownership, meat\u0002intensive diets, entertainment and leisure add significant emissions, \r while a considerable fraction of the carbon footprint is imported from \r [...]"


id: 52819c419f99f90f12fb4687710de564
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"Well-being improvements are most notable in health, air, and energy \r (high confidence). These categories are also most substantiated \r in the literature, often under the framing of co-benefits. In many \r cases, co-benefits outweigh the mitigation benefits of specific GHG \r emission reduction strategies. Food (medium confidence), mobility \r (high confidence), and water (medium confidence) are further \r categories where well-being is improved. Mobility has entries \r with highest well-being rankings for teleworking, compact cities, \r and urban system approaches. Effects on well-being in water and \r sanitation mostly come from buildings and urban solutions. Social \r dimensions, such as personal security, social cohesion, and especially \r political stability, are less predominantly represented. An exception \r is economic stability, suggesting that demand-side options generate \r stable opportunities to participate in economic activities (high \r [...]"


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"[...] confidence). Although the relation between demand-side mitigation \r strategies and the social aspects of human well-being is important, \r this has been less reflected in the literature so far, and hence the \r assessment finds more neutral/unknown interactions (Figure 5.6)."


id: 78f39881b4ffe571b76e28c6fdb76678
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"livelihood necessities, social provisioning, and other positive steps \r toward climate mitigation and adaptation are all associated with \r more equitable and resilient societies (Okvat and Zautra 2011; Bentley \r 2014; Klinsky et al. 2016; Roy et al. 2018a). At all scales of governance, \r the popularity and sustainability of climate policies requires attention \r to the fairness of their health and economic implications for all, \r and participatory engagement across social groups - a responsible \r development framing (Cazorla and Toman 2001; Dulal et  al. 2009; \r Chuku 2010; Shonkoff et al. 2011; Navroz 2019; Hofstad and Vedeld \r 2020; Muttitt and Kartha 2020; Roy and Schaffartzik 2020; Temper \r et  al. 2020; Waller et  al. 2020). Far from being secondary or even \r a  distraction from climate mitigation priorities, an equity focus is \r intertwined with mitigation goals (Klinsky et al. 2016). Demand-side \r climate mitigation options have pervasive ancillary, equity-enhancing \r [...]"


id: f0d93d7f389de6a73acb19ea654aca72
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"[...] benefits, for example for health, local livelihoods, and community forest \r resources (Chhatre and Agrawal 2009; Garg 2011; Shaw et al. 2014; \r Serrao-Neumann et al. 2015; Klausbruckner et al. 2016; Salas and Jha \r 2019) (Figure  5.6). Limiting climate change risks is fundamental to \r collective well-being (Max-Neef et al. 1989; Yamin et al. 2005; Nelson \r et al. 2013; Gough 2015; Gough 2017; Pecl et al. 2017; Tschakert et al. \r 2017). Section 5.6 discusses well-designed climate policies more fully, \r with examples. Rapid changes in social norms which are underway \r and which underlie socially-acceptable climate policy initiatives are \r discussed in section 5.4."


id: 765e5464896ee851fe958137c1a9d8f6
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"The distinction between necessities and luxuries helps to frame \r a  growing stream of social sciences literature with climate policy \r relevance (Arrow et al. 2004; Ramakrishnan and Creutzig 2021). Given \r growing public support worldwide for strong sustainability, sufficiency, \r and sustainable consumption, changing demand patterns and \r reduced demand are accompanying environmental and social benefits \r (Jackson 2008; Fedrigo et al. 2010; Schroeder 2013; Figge et al. 2014; \r Spangenberg and Germany 2016; Spengler 2016; Burke 2020; Mont \r et al. 2020). Beyond a threshold, increased material consumption is not \r closely correlated with improvements in human progress (Frank 1999; \r Kahneman and Deaton 2010; Steinberger and Roberts 2010; Roy et al. \r 2012; Oishi et al. 2018; Xie et al. 2018; Vita et al. 2019b; Wang et al. 2019; \r Vita et al. 2020). Policies focusing on the 'super-rich', also called the \r 'polluter elite', are gaining attention for moral or norms-based as well \r [...]"


id: 21ee52776132f0e5808f5bac739f22bc
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"[...] as emissions-control reasons (Kenner 2019; Otto et al. 2019; Pascale \r et al. 2020; Stratford 2020) (Section 5.2.2.3). Conspicuous consumption \r by the wealthy is the cause of a large proportion of emissions in all \r countries, related to expenditures on such things as air travel, tourism, \r large private vehicles and large homes (Brand and Boardman 2008; \r Roy and Pal 2009; Roy et al. 2012; Brand and Preston 2010; Gore 2015; \r Hubacek et al. 2017; Jorgenson et al. 2017; Sahakian 2018; Gossling \r 2019; Kenner 2019; Lynch et al. 2019; Osuoka and Haruna 2019)."


id: db9499262e89bf81fa62739a231bea7e
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"Consumption reductions, both voluntary and policy-induced, \r can have positive and double-dividend effects on efficiency as \r well as reductions in energy and materials use (Mulder et al. \r 2006; Harriss and Shui 2010; Figge et  al. 2014; Grinde \r et al. 2018; Spangenberg and Lorek 2019; Vita et al. 2020). Less \r waste, better emissions control and more effective carbon policies lead \r to better governance and stronger democracies. Systems-dynamics \r models linking strong emissions-reducing policies and strong social \r equity policies show that a low-carbon transition in conjunction with \r social sustainability is possible, even without economic growth (Kallis \r et al. 2012; Jackson and Victor 2016; Stuart et al. 2017; Chapman and \r Fraser 2019; D'Alessandro et al. 2019; Gabriel and Bond 2019; Huang \r et al. 2019; Victor 2019). Such degrowth pathways may be crucial in \r combining technical feasibility of mitigation with social development \r [...]"


id: 2b4aaa16acffc7029055ea46d8cbeab5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Participatory governance involves understanding and \r engagement with policies, including climate policies. Greater \r public participation in climate policy processes and governance, by \r increasing the diversity of ideas and stakeholders, builds resilience \r and allows broader societal transformation towards systemic change, \r even in complex, dynamic and contested contexts (Dombrowski 2010; \r Wise et al. 2014; Haque et al. 2015; Jodoin et al. 2015; Mitchell 2015; \r Kaiser 2020; Alegria 2021). This sometimes involves complex policy \r discussions that can lead to governance innovations, also influencing \r social norms (Martinez 2020). A specific example are citizen assemblies, \r deliberating public policy challenges, such as climate change (Devaney \r et al. 2020). Activist climate movements are changing policies as well as \r normative values (Section 5.4 and the Social Science Primer, Chapter 5 \r Supplementary Material I). Environmental justice and climate justice \r [...]"


id: d147c86366c3a17bd82ae0aae51e9a67
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"[...] activists worldwide have called attention to the links between economic \r and environmental inequities, collected and publicised data about \r them, and demanded stronger mitigation (Goodman 2009; Schlosberg \r and Collins 2014; Jafry 2019; Cheon 2020). Youth climate activists, and \r Indigenous leaders, are also exerting growing political influence towards \r mitigation (Helferty and Clarke 2009; White 2011; Powless 2012; \r Petheram et al. 2015; UN 2015; Curnow and Gross 2016; Grady-Benson \r and Sarathy 2016; Claeys and Delgado Pugley 2017; O'Brien et al. 2018; \r Rowlands and Gomez Pena 2019; Bergmann and Ossewaarde 2020; \r Han and Ahn 2020; Nkrumah 2021). Indigenous resurgence (activism \r fuelled by ongoing colonial social and environmental injustices, land \r claims, and deep spiritual and cultural commitment to environmental "


id: 661466eb14bc28bbf3a71e8bc8607407
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15220
content:
"Climate change affects people differently along all measures of difference and identity, which have intersectional impacts linked to \r economic vulnerability and marginalisation (Morello Frosch et al. 2009; Dankelman 2010; Habtezion 2013; Godfrey and Torres 2016; \r Walsh 2016; Flato et al. 2017; Goodrich et al. 2019; Perkins 2019; Gur 2020). Worldwide, racialised and Indigenous people bear the \r brunt of environmental and climate injustices through geographic location in extraction and energy 'sacrifice zones', areas most \r impacted by extreme weather events, and/or through inequitable energy access (Aubrey 2019; Jafry 2019; Gonzalez 2020; Lacey\u0002Barnacle et al. 2020; Porter et al. 2020; Temper et al. 2020) Disparities in climate change vulnerability not only reflect pre-existing \r inequalities, they also reinforce them. For example, inequities in income and in the ownership and control of household assets, \r [...]"


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"[...] familial responsibilities due to male out-migration, declining food and water access, and increased disaster exposure can undermine \r women's ability to achieve economic independence, enhance human capital, and maintain physical and mental health and well-being \r (Chandra et al. 2017; Eastin 2018; Das et al. 2019). Studies during the COVID-19 crisis have found that, in general, women's economic \r and productive lives have been affected disproportionately to men's (Alon et al. 2020; ILO 2020). Women have less access to social \r protections and their capacity to absorb economic shocks is very low, so they face a 'triple burden' during crises - including those"


id: dbb1665c356579942c53e95bacceb3ac
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"Women have a key role in the changing energy economy due to their demand for and end use of energy resources in socially-gendered \r productive roles in food production and processing, health, care, education, clothing purchases and maintenance, commerce, and \r other work, both within and beyond the home (Raty and Carlsson-Kanyama 2009; Oparaocha and Dutta 2011; Bob and Babugura \r 2014; Macgregor 2014; Perez et al. 2015; Bradshaw 2018; Clancy and Feenstra 2019; Clancy et al. 2019; Fortnam et al. 2019; Rao \r et al. 2019a; Quandt 2019; Horen Greenford et al. 2020; Johnson 2020). Women's work and decision-making are central in the food \r chain and agricultural output in most developing countries, and in household management everywhere. Emissions from cooking fuels \r can cause serious health damage, and unsustainable extraction of biofuels can also hurt mitigation (Bailis et al. 2015), so considering \r [...]"


id: fbc50bcf7abda5c6ae8210c154d2fd1f
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content:
"[...] health, biodiversity and climate tradeoffs and co-benefits is important (Rosenthal et al. 2018; Aberilla et al. 2020; Mazorra et al. 2020). \r Policies on energy use and consumption are often focused on technical issues related to energy supply, thereby overlooking demand\u0002side factors such as household decision-making, unpaid work, livelihoods and care (Himmelweit 2002; Perch 2011; Fumo 2014; Hans \r et al. 2019; Huyer and Partey 2020). Such gender-blindness represents the manifestation of wider issues related to political ideology, \r culture and tradition (Carr and Thompson 2014; Thoyre 2020; Perez et al. 2015; Fortnam et al. 2019)."


id: f1527c532b71db136c9a24df8d61f647
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"Women, and all those who are economically and/or politically marginalised, often have less access to energy and use less, not just \r because they may be poorer but case studies show because their consumption choices are more ecologically inclined and their energy \r use is more efficient (Lee et al. 2013; Permana et al. 2015; Li et al. 2019). Women's carbon footprints are about 6-28% lower than \r men's (with high variation across countries), mostly based on their lower meat consumption and lower vehicle use (Isenhour and \r Ardenfors 2009; Raty and Carlsson-Kanyama 2009; Raty and Carlsson-Kanyama 2010; Barnett et al. 2012; Medina and Toledo-Bruno \r 2016; Ahmad et al. 2017; Fernstrom Natby and Ronnerfalk 2018; Li et al. 2019). Gender-based income redistribution in the form of pay \r equity for women could reduce emissions if the redistribution is revenue neutral (Terry 2009; Dengler and Strunk 2018). Also, advances \r [...]"


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content:
"[...] in female education and reproductive health, especially voluntary family planning, can contribute greatly to reducing world population \r growth (Abel et al. 2016; Dodson et al. 2020)."


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"Carbon emissions are lower per capita in countries where women have more political 'voice', controlling for GDP per capita and a range of \r other factors (Ergas and York 2012). While most people recognise that climate change is happening (Lewis et al. 2018; Ballew et al. 2019), \r climate denialism is more prevalent among men (McCright and Dunlap 2011; Anshelm and Hultman 2014; Nagel 2015; Jylha et al. 2016), \r while women are more likely to be environmental activists, and to support stronger environmental and climate policies (Stein 2004; \r McCright and Xiao 2014, Whyte 2014). Racialised groups are more likely to be concerned about climate change and to take political \r action to support climate mitigation policies (Leiserowitz and Akerlof 2010; Godfrey and Torres 2016; Schuldt and Pearson 2016; Pearson \r et al. 2017; Ballew et al. 2020; Johnson 2020). This underscores the important synergies between equity and mitigation. The contributions \r [...]"


id: 8a87ea0afea8918bcb7765f3f4c20f6b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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"[...] of women, racialised people, and indigenous people, who are socially positioned as those first and most affected by climate change - and \r therefore experts on appropriate climate responses - are substantial (Dankelman and Jansen 2010; Wickramasinghe 2015; Black 2016; \r Vinyeta et al. 2016; Pearse 2017). Equitable power, participation, and agency in climate policymaking is hence an effective contribution for \r improving governance and decision-making on climate change mitigation (Reckien et al. 2017; Collins 2019). Indigenous knowledge is an \r important source of guidance for biodiversity conservation, impact assessment, governance, disaster preparedness and resilience (Salick \r and Ross 2009; Green and Raygorodetsky 2010; Speranza et al. 2010; Mekuriaw Bizuneh 2013; Mekuriaw 2017), and women are often \r the local educators, passing on and utilising traditional and indigenous knowledge (Ketlhoilwe 2013; Onyige 2017; Azong et al. 2018)."


id: 1f51c04220b8d45d5f6c9dbd8cb9427c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2714
content:
"In societies where women have more economic equity, their votes push political decision-making in the direction of environmental \r and sustainable development policies, less high-emission militarisation, and more emphasis on equity and social policies such as via \r wealth and capital gains taxes (Ergas and York 2012; Resurreccion 2013; UNEP 2013; Glemarec et al. 2016; Bryan et al. 2018; Crawford \r 2019). Changing social norms on race and climate are linked and policy-relevant (Benegal 2018; Elias et al. 2018; Slocum 2018; Gach \r 2019; Wallace-Wells 2019; Temple 2020; Drolet 2021). For all these reasons, climate policies are strengthened by including more \r differently-situated knowledge and diverse perspectives, such as feminist expertise in the study of power (Bell et al. 2020; Lieu et al. \r 2020); clarifying equity goals (e.g., distinguishing among 'reach, 'benefit', and 'empowerment'; obtaining disaggregated data and \r [...]"


id: b6efec0b9eb3d52844a4638cfe9424fe
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29392
content:
"[...] using clear empirical equity measures; and confronting deeply-ingrained inequities in society (Lau et al. 2021). Inclusivity in climate \r governance spans mitigation-adaptation, supply-demand and formal-informal sector boundaries in its positive effects (Morello \r Frosch et al. 2009; Dankelman 2010; Bryan and Behrman 2013; Habtezion 2013; Godfrey and Torres 2016; Walsh 2016; Flato et al. \r 2017; Wilson et al. 2018; Goodrich et al. 2019; Perkins 2019; Bell et al. 2020; Gur 2020)."


id: 5781c5a3fd0cb84a60b307bdb584027d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12663
content:
"Reducing global energy demand and resource inputs while improving \r well-being for all requires an identification of options, services and \r pathways that do not compromise essentials of a  decent living. To \r identify such a solution space, this section summarises socio-cultural, \r technological and infrastructural interventions through the Avoid\u0002Shift-Improve concept. ASI (Section  5.1) provides a  categorisation \r of options aimed at continuously eliminating waste in the current \r systems of service provision (Section 5.3.1.1). It also concisely presents \r demand-side options to reduce GHG emissions by individual choices \r which can be leveraged by supporting policies, technologies and \r infrastructure. Two key concepts for evaluating the efficiency of service \r provision systems are: resource cascades and exergy. These concepts \r provide powerful analytical lenses through which to identify and \r substantially reduce energy and resource waste in service provision \r [...]"


id: fd1f4605ded0492c59cd3bb666444d15
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41885
content:
"[...] systems, both for decent living standards (Section 5.3.2) and higher \r well-being levels. They typically focus on end-use conversion and \r service delivery improvements as the most influential opportunities \r for system-wide waste reductions. Review of the state of modelling \r low energy and resource demand pathways in long-term climate \r mitigation scenarios (recognising the importance of such scenarios for \r illuminating technology and policy pathways for more efficient service \r provision) and summary of the mitigation potentials estimated from \r relevant scenarios to date are in Section 5.3.3. Finally, it reviews the \r role of three megatrends that are transforming delivery of services \r in innovative ways  - digitalisation, the sharing economy, and the \r circular economy (Section 5.3.4). The review of megatrends makes an \r assessment highlighting the potential risks of rebound effects, and \r even accelerated consumption; it also scopes for proactive and vigilant \r [...]"


id: e780fa3781f45af15a472f19bfd2ff3a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38035
content:
"[...] policies to harness their potential for future energy and resource \r demand reductions, and, conversely, avoiding undesirable outcomes."


id: 93057cf65167503cc700dd6c4321b8d9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23077
content:
"Assessment of service-related mitigation options within the ASI \r framework is aided by decomposition of emissions intensities into \r explanatory contributing factors, which depend on the type of \r service delivered. Table 5.1 shows ASI options in selected sectors and \r services. It summarises resource, energy, and emissions intensities \r commonly used by type of service (Cuenot et  al. 2010; Lucon et  al. \r 2014; Fischedick et al. 2014). Also relevant are the concepts of service \r provision adequacy (Arrow et al. 2004; Samadi et al. 2017), establishing \r the extents to which consumption levels exceed (e.g.,  high-calorie \r diets contributing to health issues (Roy et  al. 2012); excessive food \r waste) or fall short (e.g., malnourishment) of service level sufficiency \r (e.g.,  recommended calories) (Millward-Hopkins et  al. 2020); and \r service level efficiency (e.g., effect of occupancy on the energy intensity \r of public transit passenger-km travelled (Schafer and Yeh 2020). \r [...]"


id: abd052951447f200504681f91e0867a7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27471
content:
"[...] Service-oriented solutions are discussed in Table 5.1. Implementation \r of these solutions requires combinations of institutional, infrastructural, \r behavioural, socio-cultural, and business changes which are mentioned \r in Section 5.2 and discussed in Section 5.4."


id: db69c3b0b848785823e219947fa3a5bd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35876
content:
"Demand-side mitigations are achieved through changing Socio\u0002cultural factors, Infrastructure use and Technology adoption by various \r social actors in urban and other settlements, food choice and waste \r management (high confidence) (Figure  5.7). In all sectors, end-use \r strategies can help reduce the majority of emissions, ranging from \r 28.7% (4.4 GtCO2) emission reductions in the industry sector, to 44.2% \r (8.0 GtCO2-eq)  in the food sector, to 66.75% (4.6 GtCO2) emission \r reductions in the land transport sector, and 66% (6.8  GtCO2) in the \r buildings sector. These numbers are median estimates and represent \r benchmark accounting. Estimates are approximations, as they are \r simple products of individual assessments for each of the three options \r listed above. If interactions were taken into account, the full mitigation \r potentials may be higher or lower, independent of relevant barriers \r to realising the median potential estimates. See more in Chapter  5 \r [...]"


id: 832eaf9c0c4704c23d693da64b5f26ce
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content:
"lifespan products and food waste. Cities and built environments can \r play an additional role. For example, more compact designs and higher \r accessibility reduce travel demand and translate into lower average floor \r space and corresponding heating/cooling and lighting demand, and thus \r reductions of between 5% to 20% of GHG emissions of end-use sectors \r (Creutzig et al. 2021b). Avoidance of food loss and wastage - which \r equalled 8-10% of total anthropogenic GHG emissions from 2010-2016 \r (Mbow et al. 2019), while millions suffer from hunger and malnutrition - \r is a  prime example (Chapter  12). A key challenge in meeting global \r nutrition services is therefore to avoid food loss and waste while \r simultaneously raising nutrition levels to equitable standards globally. \r Literature results indicate that in developed economies, consumers are \r the largest source of food waste, and that behavioural changes such as \r [...]"


id: b1ac6cb5383c4a1084d7184a47cb0fde
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28476
content:
"[...] meal planning, use of leftovers, and avoidance of over-preparation can \r be important service-oriented solutions (Gunders et al. 2017; Schanes \r et al. 2018), while improvements to expiration labels by regulators would \r reduce unnecessary disposal of unexpired items (Wilson et al. 2017) and \r improved preservation in supply chains would reduce spoilage (Duncan \r and Gulbahar 2019). Around 931 million tonnes of food waste was \r generated in 2019 globally, 61% of which came from households, 26% \r from food service and 13% from retail."


id: 2f9d031db86ce272cec483831437c4e4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"protected bike lanes and pedestrian priority streets can reduce \r vehicle kilometres travelled in urban areas (ITF 2021). At the vehicle \r level, lightweighting strategies (Fischedick et al. 2014) and avoiding \r inputs of carbon-intensive materials into vehicle manufacturing can \r also lead to significant emissions savings through improved fuel \r economy (Das et al. 2016; Hertwich et al. 2019; IEA 2019b).\r Figure 5.7 shows socio-cultural factors can contribute up to 15% to land \r transport GHG emissions reduction by 2050, with 5% as our central \r estimate. Active mobility, such as walking and cycling, has 2-10% \r potential in GHG emissions reduction. Well designed teleworking \r policies can reduce transport-related GHG emissions by at least 1%. \r A  systematic review demonstrates that 26 of 39  studies identified \r suggest that teleworking reduces energy use, induced mainly by distance \r travelled, and only eight studies suggest that teleworking increases or \r [...]"


id: 1090b8e3f47e5368e0dbd83c550b5a0b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 100
content:
"[...] has a neutral impact on energy use (Hook et al. 2020). Infrastructure \r use (specifically urban planning and shared pooled mobility) has about \r 20-50% (on average) potential in land transport GHG emissions \r reduction, especially via redirecting the ongoing design of existing \r infrastructures in developing countries, and with 30% as our central \r estimate (Section 5.3.4.2). Technology adoption, particularly banning \r combustion and diesel engines and 100% EV targets (and other zero\u0002carbon fuels, especially in freight) and efficient lightweight cars, can \r contribute to between 30% and 70% of GHG emissions reduction from \r land transport in 2050, with 50% as our central estimate (see Chapter 5 \r Supplementary Material II, Table 5.SM.2 and Chapter 10, Sections 10.4 \r and 10.7), consistent with scenario modelling (Figure  10.27) and \r based on rapid reduction in the GHG emission footprint of vehicle \r [...]"


id: ee7a50f027d11d627e3c6d18549cea7
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vector_id: 39330
content:
"[...] production. These numbers are consistent with the end of fossil fuel\u0002based new cars in 2035 in major economies and of 100% of vehicles \r being zero-emission vehicles in 2050. Other economies that display \r vehicles obtained on second hand markets may phase out fossil fuel \r cars only after 2050, hence limiting the overall mitigation potential of \r electric vehicles to well below 100% in 2050. Higher energy use and \r CO2-footprint in BEV production compared to ICE production are to \r be met with more rapid decarbonisation of the industry sector and by \r the reduced need for overall vehicle stock, due to socio-cultural and \r infrastructure measures. Ehrenberger et  al. (2021) shows that the \r development of technologies, fleets, and their use are decisive factors in \r reducing the use of fossil energies, resulting in 26-65% CO2 emissions \r reduction potential until 2040 for the case of Germany. Electric vehicles \r [...]"


id: 4f23462314f079ad2cf670cf4cfd52cf
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content:
"[...] can be used to provide new shared services. In this case, reductions of \r CO2 emissions of close to 20% can be obtained in a scenario where \r 20% of car trips and all bus feeder trips are replaced, but considerably \r higher reductions are possible when shared pooled mobility replaces \r private vehicle trips in urban areas (ITF 2017b, ITF 2017d). A study \r shows that ICE vehicles reduce CO2 emissions to 60% or 80% of \r current emissions levels by 2050 (Hill et al. 2019). Similarly, the power \r grid decarbonisation is assumed to improve to either 50% or 80% over \r current rates, with 80% being the expected decarbonisation and 50% \r a  more conservative estimate. Each possibility for EV adoption rate, \r ICE efficiency improvement, and power decarbonisation is combined \r (Hill et al. 2019). Beyond consuming less energy, EVs enable greater \r use of low-carbon and renewable energy sources than is possible for \r conventional petroleum-based fuels. These technical advantages lead \r [...]"


id: 93d0decea1e63d2f140984d3969b073e
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23216
content:
"[...] to the potential for greatly reducing petroleum use, air pollution and \r carbon emissions. International collaboration could better leverage "


id: fa53c8fb8f541352e64e2d13275559db
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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content:
"Reduced food waste and dietary shifts have highly relevant \r repercussions in the land-use sector that underpin the high GHG \r emission reduction potential. Demand-side measures lead to \r changes in consumption of land-based resources and can save GHG \r emissions by reducing or improving management of residues  or \r making land areas available for other uses such as afforestation \r or bioenergy production (Smith et  al. 2013; Hoegh-Guldberg et  al. \r 2019). Deforestation is the second-largest source of anthropogenic \r greenhouse gas emissions, caused mainly by expanding forestry and \r agriculture, and in many cases this agricultural expansion is driven \r by trade demand for food. For example, across the tropics, cattle and \r oilseed products account for half the deforestation carbon emissions, \r embodied in international trade to China and Europe (Creutzig \r et al. 2019a; Pendrill et al. 2019). Benefits from shifts in diets and \r [...]"


id: 252cc82a4c79ff9424f8c62b3fb57aff
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content:
"[...] resulting lowered land pressure are also reflected in reductions of \r land degradation and emissions."


id: 10d6119cd82e59c0fbff96fc2656a036
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 150
content:
"In the transport sector, ASI opportunities exist at multiple levels, \r comprehensively summarised in Bongardt et  al. (2013), Sims \r et  al. (2014), and Roy et  al. (2021) (Chapter  10). Modelling based \r on a  plethora of bottom-up insights and options reveals that \r a  balanced portfolio of ASI policies brings global transport sector \r emissions in line with global warming of not more than 1.5degC (Gota \r et  al. 2019). For example, telework may be a  significant lever for \r avoiding road transport associated with daily commutes, achievable \r through digitalisation, but its savings depend heavily on the modes, \r distances, and types of office use avoided (Hook et  al. 2020) and \r whether additional travel is induced due to greater available time \r (Mokhtarian 2002) or vehicle use by other household members (Kim \r et al. 2015; de Abreu e Silva and Melo 2018). More robustly, avoiding \r kilometres travelled through improved urban planning and smart \r [...]"


id: 24f5a91d13676a5cfdf697fbe398dc8c
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vector_id: 3697
content:
"[...] logistical systems can lead to fuel, and, hence, emissions savings \r (Creutzig et  al. 2015a; IEA 2016; IEA 2017a; Wiedenhofer et  al. \r 2018), or through avoiding long-haul flights (IEA 2021). For example, \r reallocating road and parking space to exclusive public transit lanes, "


id: fd2df8e9fbddbc5599a9780ff5f4f92d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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vector_id: 41891
content:
"Figure 5.7 | Demand-side mitigation options and indicative potentials. Demand-side mitigation response options related to demand for services have been categorised \r into three broad domains: 'socio-cultural factors', associated with individual choices, behaviour and lifestyle change, social norms and culture; 'infrastructure use', related to \r the design and use of supporting hard and soft infrastructure that enables changes in individual choices and behaviour; and 'end-use technology adoption', which refers to the \r uptake of technologies by end users. Demand-side mitigation is a central element of the IMP-LD and IMP-SP scenarios (Section 3.3). Food (nutrition) demand-side potentials \r in 2050 assessment is based on bottom-up studies and estimated following the 2050 baseline for the food sector presented in peer-reviewed literature (more information in \r [...]"


id: e9653080367c556e81d77c5c8682268f
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content:
"[...] Chapter 5 Supplementary Material II and Chapter 7, Section 7.4.5). Industry (manufactured products), land transport, aviation and shipping (mobility), and buildings (shelter) \r assessment of potentials for total emissions in 2050 are estimated based on approximately 500 bottom-up studies representing all global regions (detailed list is in Table 5.\r SM.2). Baseline is provided by the sectoral mean GHG emissions in 2050 of the two scenarios consistent with policies announced by national governments until 2020. The \r heights of the coloured columns represent the potentials represented by the median value. These are based on a range of values available in the case studies from literature \r shown in Chapter 5 Supplementary Material II. The range is shown by the dots connected by dotted lines representing the highest and the lowest potentials reported in the \r [...]"


id: 8d9a9056e9a7947f9ed844d698e0bb38
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22104
content:
"[...] literature. The demand-side potential of socio-cultural factors in food has two parts.The median value of direct emissions (mostly non-CO2) reduction through socio-cultural \r factors is 1.9 GtCO2-eq without considering land-use change through reforestation of freed up land. If changes in land-use patterns enabled by this change in food demand \r are considered, the indicative potential could reach 7 GtCO2-eq. The 'electricity' panel presents how sectoral demand-side mitigation options (industry, transport and buildings) \r can change demand on the electricity distribution system. Electricity accounts for an increasing proportion of final energy demand in 2050 ('additional electrification' bar) \r in line with multiple bottom-up studies (detailed list is in Table 5.SM.3) and Chapter 6 (Section 6.6). These studies are used to compute the impact of end-use electrification \r [...]"


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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"[...] which increases overall electricity demand. Some of the projected increase in electricity demand can be avoided through demand-side mitigation options in the domains of \r socio-cultural factors and infrastructure use strategies in end-use electricity use in buildings, industry and land transport found in literature based on bottom-up assessments \r (Section 5.3 and Chapter 5 Supplementary Material II)."


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content:
"In the buildings sector, avoidance strategies can occur at the end \r use or individual building operation level. End-use technologies and \r strategies such as the use of daylighting (Bodart and De Herde 2002) \r and lighting sensors can avoid demand for lumens from artificial \r light, while passive houses, thermal mass, and smart controllers can \r avoid demand for space conditioning services. Eliminating standby \r power losses can avoid energy wasted for no useful service in many \r appliances and devices, which may reduce household electricity use \r by up to 10% (Roy et al. 2012). At the building level, smaller dwellings \r can reduce overall demand for lighting and space conditioning \r services, while smaller dwellings, shared housing, and building lifespan \r extension can all reduce the overall demand for carbon-intensive \r building materials such as concrete and steel (Material Economics \r 2018; Hertwich et al. 2019; IEA 2019b; Pauliuk et al. 2021). Emerging \r [...]"


id: cb6951342e187cafbf84c9d497fea14d
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vector_id: 33116
content:
"[...] strategies for materials efficiency, such as 3D printing to optimise the \r geometries and minimise the materials content of structural elements, \r may also play a key role if thermal performance and circularity can be \r improved (Mahadevan et al. 2020; Adaloudis and Bonnin Roca 2021). \r Several scenarios estimate an 'Avoid' potential in the building sector, \r which includes reducing waste in superfluous floor space, heating and \r IT equipment, and energy use, of between 10% and 30%, in one case \r even by 50% (Nadel and Ungar 2019) (Chapter 9)."


id: f014dea7d03d97b7d6b0cd13c90ff2ef
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content:
"A substantial part of losses happens at the end-use point and in final \r service delivery (where losses account for 47% to 60% of aggregate \r systems losses for steel and energy respectively, and 23% in the case \r of water embodied in food). The efficiency of service delivery (Brand\u0002Correa and Steinberger 2017) has usually both a  technological \r component (efficiency of end-use devices such as cars, light bulbs) \r and a behavioural component (i.e., how efficiently end-use devices \r are used, e.g.,  load factors) (Dietz et  al. 2009; Laitner et  al. 2009; \r Norton 2012; Kane and Srinivas 2014; Ehrhardt-Martinez 2015; \r Thaler 2015; Lopes et al. 2017). Using the example of mobility, where \r service levels are usually expressed by passenger-km, service delivery \r efficiency is thus a function of the fuel efficiency of the vehicle and \r its drivetrain (typically only about 20%-25% for internal combustion \r engines, but close to 100% for electric motors) plus how many \r [...]"


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vector_id: 25488
content:
"[...] passengers the vehicle actually transports (load factor, typically as \r low as 20-25%, i.e. one passenger per vehicle that could seat four \r to five), that is, an aggregate end-use efficiency of between 4-6% \r only. Aggregated energy end-use efficiencies at the global level are \r estimated as low as 20% (De Stercke 2014), 13% for steel (recovered \r post-use scrap) (Allwood and Cullen 2012), and some 70% for \r food (including distribution losses and food waste of some 30%) \r (Lundqvist et al. 2008)."


id: b23079bae33e1504e3939ce3ad31ddd5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28578
content:
"To harness additional gains in efficiency by shifting the focus in service \r delivery systems to the end user can translate into large upstream \r resource reductions. For each unit of improvement at the end-use point \r of the service delivery system (examples shown in Figure 5.9), primary \r resource inputs are reduced between a factor of 6 to 7 units (water, \r steel, energy) (TWI2050 2018). For example, reducing energy needs \r for final service delivery equivalent to 1 EJ, reduces primary energy \r needs by some 7 EJ. There is thus high evidence and high agreement\r in the literature that the leverage effect for improvements in end\u0002use service delivery efficiency through behavioural, technological, \r and market organisational innovations is very large, ranging from \r a factor 6 to 7 (resource cascades) to up to a factor 10 to 20 (exergy \r analysis), with the highest improvement potentials at the end-user \r and service provisioning levels (for systemic reviews see Nakicenovic \r [...]"


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vector_id: 10137
content:
"[...] et al. (1996a), Grubler et al. (2012b), and Sousa et al. (2017)). Also, the \r literature shows high agreement that current conversion efficiencies \r are invariably low, particularly for those components at the end\u0002use and service-delivery back end of service provisioning systems. \r It also suggests that efficiencies might actually be even lower \r than those revealed by direct input-output resource accounting, \r as discussed above (Figure  5.9). Illustrative exergy efficiencies of \r entire national or global service delivery systems range from 2.5% \r (USA (Ayres 1989)) to 5% (OECD average (Grubler  et  al. 2012b)) "


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"Figure  5.10 | Realisable energy efficiency improvements by region and \r by end-use type between 2020 and 2050 in an illustrative Low Energy \r Demand scenario (in EJ). Efficiency improvements are decomposed by respective \r steps in the conversion chain from primary energy to final, and useful, energy, and to \r service delivery, and disaggregated by region (developed and developing countries) \r and end-use type (buildings, transport, materials). Improvements are dominated by \r improved efficiency in service delivery (153 EJ) and by more efficient end-use energy \r conversion (134 EJ). Improvements in service efficiency in transport shown here are \r conservative in this scenario but could be substantially higher with the full adoption \r of integrated urban shared mobility schemes. Increases in energy use due to increases \r in service levels and system effects of transport electrification (grey bars on top of first \r [...]"


id: 7d4f8d15455fda8e16af55637bc1afcf
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"[...] pair in the bar charts) that counterbalance some of the efficiency improvements are \r also shown. Examples of options for efficiency improvements and decision involved \r (grey text in the chart), the relative weight of generic demand-side strategies (Avoid\u0002Shift-Improve blue arrows), as well as prototype actors involved, are also illustrated. \r Data source: Figure 5.9 and Grubler et al. (2018)."


id: 18b7158ff97fff773b7003101a631c2
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"showers, reduced appliance use, shifts to public transit, less meat\u0002intensive diets, and improved recycling can deliver an additional \r 1.7 Gt and 3 GtCO2 savings in 2050, beyond the savings achieved \r in traditional technology-centric mitigation scenarios for the 2degC \r and 1.5deg\r C ambitions, respectively (van Sluisveld et  al. 2016; Van \r Vuuren et al. 2018). In its Sustainable Development Scenario, the \r IEA's behavioural change and resource efficiency wedges deliver \r around 3 GtCO2-eq reduction in 2050, combined savings, roughly \r equivalent to those of solar PV that same year (IEA 2019a). In \r Europe, a  Global Change Assessment Model (GCAM) scenario \r evaluating combined lifestyle changes such as teleworking, travel \r avoidance, dietary shifts, food waste reductions, and recycling \r reduced cumulative EU  27 CO2 emissions 2011-2050 by up \r to 16% compared to an SSP2 baseline (van de Ven et  al. 2018). \r Also in Europe, a  multi-regional input-output analysis suggested \r [...]"


id: f4021ef688ab7d36c3b23bbbb8f65ccb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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"[...] that adoption of low-carbon consumption practices could reduce \r carbon footprints by 25%, or 1.4 Gt (Moran et al. 2020). A global \r transport scenario suggests that transport sector emissions can \r decline from business-as-usual 18 GtCO2-eq to 2 GtCO2-eq if ASI \r strategies are deployed (Gota et  al. 2019), a  value considerably \r below the estimates provided in IAM scenarios that have limited or \r no resolution in ASI strategies (Chapter 10)."


id: bbe20bfe5c2b2f9b25bd786e39840244
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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"Long-term mitigation scenarios play a crucial role in climate policy \r design in the near term, by illuminating transition pathways, \r interactions between supply-side and demand-side interventions, \r their timing, and the scales of required investments needed to \r achieve mitigation goals (Chapter  3). Historically, most long-term \r mitigation scenarios have taken technology-centric approaches \r with heavy reliance on supply-side solutions and the use of carbon \r dioxide removal, particularly in 1.5degC scenarios (Rogelj et al. 2018). \r Comparatively less attention has been paid to deep demand-side \r reductions incorporating socio-cultural change and the cascade \r effects (Section 5.3.2) associated with ASI strategies, primarily due to \r limited past representation of such service-oriented interventions in \r long-term integrated assessment models (IAMs) and energy systems \r models (ESMs) (Grubler et  al. 2018; van de Ven et  al. 2018; Napp \r [...]"


id: 1a782f3dbcae53bae009853dc92331ec
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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"[...] et al. 2019). There is ample evidence of savings from sector- or issue\u0002specific bottom-up studies (Section 5.3.1.2). However, these savings \r typically get lost in the dominant narrative provided by IAMs and \r ESMs and in their aggregate-level evaluations of combinations of ASI \r and efficiency strategies. As a result, their interaction effects do not \r typically get equal focus alongside supply-side and carbon dioxide \r removal options (Samadi et al. 2017; Van Vuuren et al. 2018; Van den \r Berg et al. 2019)."


id: d70dd7c253331ba70525c29238477fbf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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content:
"Second, pursuant to the ASI principle, deep demand reductions \r require parallel pursuit of behavioural change and advanced energy\u0002efficient technology deployment; neither is sufficient on its own. The \r LED scenario (Figure 5.10) combines behavioural and technological \r change consistent with numerous ASI strategies that leverage \r digitalisation, sharing, and circular economy megatrends to deliver \r decent living standards while reducing global final energy demand \r in 2050 to 245 EJ (Grubler et  al. 2018). This value is 40% lower \r than final energy demand in 2018 (IEA 2019a), and a lower 2050 \r outcome than other IAM/ESM scenarios with primarily technology\u0002centric mitigation approaches (Teske et al. 2015; IEA 2017b). In the \r IEA's B2DS scenario, Avoid/Shift in the transport sector accounts \r for around 2 GtCO2-eq yr -1 in 2060, whereas parallel vehicle \r efficiency improvements increase the overall mitigation wedge to \r [...]"


id: aa19ace653e069055c379cccbcf6a311
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"[...] 5.5 GtCO2-eq yr -1 in 2060 (IEA 2017b). Through a combination of \r behavioural change and energy-efficient technology adoption, the \r IEA's NZE requires only 340 EJ of global final energy demand with \r universal energy access in 2050, which is among the lowest of IPCC \r net zero SR1.5 scenarios (IEA 2021)."


id: 66cf081df7265a132bf62cf40543f7e8
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"Fourth, the costs of reaching mitigation targets may be lower when \r incorporating ASI strategies for deep energy and resource demand \r reductions. The TIAM-Grantham low demand scenarios displayed \r reduction in mitigation costs (0.87-2.4% of GDP), while achieving \r even lower cumulative emissions to 2100 (228 to ~475 GtCO2) \r than its central demand scenario (741 to 1066 GtCO2), which had \r a cost range of (2.4-4.1% of GDP) (Napp et al. 2019). The GCAM \r behavioural change scenario concluded that domestic emission \r savings would contribute to reducing the costs of achieving the \r internationally agreed climate goal of the EU by 13.5% to 30% (van \r de Ven et al. 2018). The AIMS lifestyle case indicated that mitigation \r costs, expressed as global GDP loss, would be 14% lower than the \r SSP2 reference scenario in 2100, for both 2deg\r C and 1.5degC mitigation \r targets (Liu et  al. 2018). These findings mirror earlier AIM results, \r [...]"


id: db2e5a98bee50c98bd5be675402a20cc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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content:
"[...] which indicated lower overall mitigation costs for scenarios focused \r on energy service demand reductions (Fujimori et al. 2014). In the \r IEA's NZE, behavioural changes that avoid energy and resource \r demand save USD4 trillion (cumulatively 2021-2050) compared to \r if those emissions reductions were achieved through low-carbon \r electricity and hydrogen deployment (IEA 2021)."


id: c219a87a1f0aeb465ba0c51085d7f91
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"The sharing economy, the circular economy, and digitalisation have \r all received much attention from the research, advocacy, business \r models and policy communities as potentially transformative trends \r for climate change mitigation (IEA 2017a; Material Economics 2018; \r TWI2050 2019). All are essentially emerging and contested concepts \r (Gallie 1955) that have the common goal of increasing convenience \r for users and rendering economic systems more resource efficient, \r but which exhibit variability in the literature on their definitions and \r system boundaries. Historically, both sharing and circular economies \r have been commonplace in developing countries, where reuse, repair, \r and waste scavenging and recycling comprise the core of informal \r economies facilitated by human interventions (Wilson et  al. 2006; \r Asim et al. 2012; Pacheco et al. 2012). Digitalisation is now propelling \r sharing and circular economy concepts in developed and developing \r [...]"


id: cc1c0912daa525db8a0655ea5722da5e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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content:
"[...] countries alike (Roy et al. 2021), and the three megatrends are highly \r interrelated, as seen in Figure  5.11. For example, many sharing \r economy concepts rely on corporate or, to lesser degree, non-profit \r digital platforms that enable efficient information and opportunity \r sharing, thus making it part of the digitalisation trend. Parts of \r the sharing economy are also included in some circular economy \r approaches, as shared resource use renders utilisation of material \r more efficient. Digital approaches to material management also \r support the circular economy, such as through waste exchanges \r and industrial symbiosis. Digitalisation aims more broadly to deliver \r services in more efficient, timely, intelligent, and less resource\u0002intensive ways (i.e., by moving bits and not atoms), through the use \r of increasingly interconnected physical and digital systems in many \r facets of economies. With rising digitalisation also comes the risk of \r [...]"


id: aa9ad5b0f8a69ac8e4278c034d74496b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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content:
"[...] increased electricity use to power billions of devices and the internet \r infrastructure that connects them, as well as growing quantities of \r e-waste, presenting an important policy agenda for monitoring and \r balancing the carbon and resource costs and benefits of digitalisation \r (Malmodin and Lunden 2018; TWI2050 2019). Rebound effects \r and instigated consumption of digitalisation are risking to lead to \r a  net increase in GHG emissions (Belkhir and Elmeligi 2018). The \r determinants and possible scales of mitigation potentials associated \r with each megatrend are discussed below."


id: 22e2ad43887dda3d155cbc22b5900c18
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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content:
"If the limitations within most IAMs and ESMs regarding non-inclusion \r of granular ASI strategy analysis can be addressed, it will expand \r and improve long-term mitigation scenarios (Van den Berg et  al. \r 2019). These include broader inclusion of mitigation costs for \r behavioural interventions (van Sluisveld et al. 2016), much greater \r incorporation of rebound effects (Krey et al. 2019), including from \r improved efficiencies (Brockway et al. 2021) and avoided spending \r (van de Ven et al. 2018), improved representation of materials cycles \r to assess resource cascades (Pauliuk et al. 2017), broader coverage \r of behavioural change (Samadi et  al. 2017; Saujot et  al. 2020), \r improved consideration of how economic development affects \r service demand (Semieniuk et al. 2021), explicit representation of \r intersectoral linkages related to digitalisation, sharing economy, \r and circular economy strategies (Section  5.3.4), and institutional, \r [...]"


id: 9ff83e9584254c63a64f08141da17963
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content:
"[...] political, social, entrepreneurial, and cultural factors (van Sluisveld \r et al. 2018). Addressing the current significant modelling limitations "


id: 2d9ecc6105fe3e2927efbab4958c9e81
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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content:
"In the context of service provision, there are numerous opportunities \r for consumers to buy, subscribe to, adopt, access, install or use \r digital goods and services (Wilson et al. 2020b). Digitalisation has \r opened up new possibilities across all domains of consumer activity, \r from travel and retail to domestic living and energy use. Digital \r platforms allow surplus resources to be identified, offered, shared, \r transacted and exchanged (Frenken 2017). Real-time information \r flows on consumers' preferences and needs mean service provision \r can be personalised, differentiated, automated, and optimised \r (TWI2050 2019). Rapid innovation cycles and software upgrades \r drive continual improvements in performance and responsiveness \r to consumer behaviour. These characteristics of digitalisation enable \r new business models and services that affect both service demand, \r from shared ride-hailing (ITF 2017a) to smart heating (IEA 2017a), \r [...]"


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content:
"[...] and how services are provisioned, from online farmers' markets \r (Richards and Hamilton 2018) to peer-to-peer electricity trading to \r enable distributed power systems (Morstyn et al. 2018)."


id: 140e0ec48a69772bdee296dfe7dd1b31
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content:
"vehicles inducing more frequent and longer journeys due to \r reduced travel costs (Wadud et al. 2016). Estimating digitalisation's \r direct energy demand has historically been hampered by lack of \r consistent global data on IT device stocks, their power consumption \r characteristics, and usage patterns, for both consumer devices and the \r data centres and communication networks behind them. As a result, \r quantitative estimates vary widely, with literature values suggesting \r that consumer devices, data centres, and data networks account for \r anywhere from 6% to 12% of global electricity use (Gelenbe and \r Caseau 2015; Cook et  al. 2017; Malmodin and Lunden 2018). For \r example, within the literature on data centres, top-down models that \r project energy use on the basis of increasing demand for internet \r services tend to predict rapid global energy use growth, (Andrae and \r Edler 2015; Belkhir and Elmeligi 2018; Liu et  al. 2020a), whereas \r [...]"


id: 49657fc29f5f02480cf1bd86b1a9a06f
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content:
"[...] bottom-up models that consider data centre technology stocks and \r their energy efficiency trends tend to predict slower but still positive \r growth (Shehabi et  al. 2018; Hintemann and Hinterholzer 2019; "


id: 427c4858baa167f9da105b981942531e
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content:
"Maximising the mitigation potential of digitalisation trends \r involves diligent monitoring and proactive management of both \r direct and indirect demand effects, to ensure that a proper balance \r is maintained. Direct energy demand can be managed through \r continued investments in, and incentives for, energy-efficient data \r centres, networks, and end-use devices (Masanet et  al. 2011; \r Avgerinou et al. 2017; IEA 2017a; Koronen et al. 2020). Shifts to low\u0002carbon power are a particularly important strategy being undertaken \r by data centre and network operators (Cook et al. 2014; Huang et al. \r 2020), which might be adopted across the digital device spectrum \r as a  proactive mitigation strategy where data demands outpace \r hardware efficiency gains, which may be approaching limits in the \r near future (Koomey et  al. 2011). Most recently, data centres are \r being investigated as a  potential resource for demand response \r [...]"


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content:
"[...] and load balancing in renewable power grids (Koronen et al. 2020; \r Zheng et al. 2020), while a large bandwidth for improving software \r efficiency has been suggested for overcoming slowing hardware \r efficiency gains (Leiserson et al. 2020). Ensuring efficiency benefits of \r digital services while avoiding potential rebound effects and demand \r surges will require early and proactive public policies to avoid excess \r energy use (TWI2050 2019; WBGU 2019), which will also necessitate \r investments in data collection and monitoring systems to ensure that \r net mitigation benefits are realised and that unintended consequences \r can be identified early and properly managed (IEA 2017a)."


id: 6963b84d39013454d9aa85a629411835
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content:
"However, the net systems-level energy and resource efficiencies \r gained through the provision of digital services could play \r an important role in dealing with climate change and other \r environmental challenges (Masanet and Matthews 2010; Melville \r 2010; Elliot 2011; Watson et  al. 2012; Gholami et  al. 2013; Anon \r Higon et  al. 2017). As shown in Figure  5.12, assessments of \r numerous digital service opportunities for mobility, nutrition, \r shelter, and education and entertainment suggest that net emissions \r benefits can be delivered at the systems level, although these effects \r are highly context dependent. Importantly, evidence of potential \r negative outcomes due to rebound effects, induced demand, or life\u0002cycle trade-offs can also be observed. For example, telework has \r been shown to reduce emissions where long and/or energy-intensive \r commutes are avoided, but can lead to net emissions increases in \r [...]"


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content:
"[...] cases where greater non-work vehicle use occurs or only short, low\u0002emissions commutes (e.g., via public transit) are avoided (Hook et al. \r 2020; IEA 2020a; Viana Cerqueira et al. 2020). Similarly, substitution \r of physical media by digital alternatives may lead to emissions \r increases where greater consumption is fuelled, whereas a  shift \r to 3D printed structures may require more emissions-intensive \r concrete formulations or result in reduced thermal energy efficiency, \r leading to life-cycle emissions increases (Mahadevan et  al. 2020; \r Yao et al. 2020)."


id: 2ea556ebd656306496296ba91145d209
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content:
"Furthermore, digitalisation, automation and artificial intelligence, \r as general-purpose technologies, may lead to a  plethora of new \r products and applications that are likely to be efficient on their own \r but that may also lead to undesirable changes or absolute increases \r in demand for products (Figure 5.12). For example, last-mile delivery \r in logistics is both expensive and cumbersome. Battery-powered \r drones enable a delivery of goods at similar lifecycle emissions to \r delivery vans (Stolaroff et al. 2018). At the same time, drone delivery \r is cheaper in terms of time (immediate delivery) and monetary costs \r (automation saves the highest-cost component: personnel) (Sudbury \r and Hutchinson 2016). As a  result, demand for package delivery \r may increase rapidly. Similarly, automated vehicles reduce the costs \r of time, parking, and personnel, and therefore may dramatically \r increase vehicle mileage (Wadud et al. 2016; Cohen and Cavoli 2019). \r [...]"


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content:
"[...] On-demand electric scooters offer mobility access preferable to \r passenger cars, but can replace trips otherwise taken on public transit \r (de Bortoli and Christoforou 2020) and can come with significant \r additional energy requirements for night-time system rebalancing \r (Hollingsworth et  al. 2019; ITF 2020). The energy requirements of \r cryptocurrencies is also a  growing concern, although considerable \r uncertainty exists surrounding the energy use of their underlying \r blockchain infrastructure (Vranken 2017; de Vries 2018; Stoll et al. \r 2019). For example, while it is clear that the energy requirements \r of global Bitcoin mining have grown significantly since 2017, recent \r literature indicates a wide range of estimates for 2020 (47 TWh to \r 125 TWh) due to data gaps and differences in modelling approaches \r (Lei et al. 2021). Initial estimates of the computational intensity of \r artificial intelligence algorithms suggest that energy requirements \r [...]"


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content:
"[...] may be enormous without concerted effort to improve efficiencies, \r especially on the computational side (Strubell et al. 2020). Efficiency \r gains enabled by digitalisation, in terms of reduced GHG emissions \r or energy use per service unit, may be overcompensated by activity/\r scale effects."


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content:
"Opportunities to increase service per  product include peer-to-peer \r based sharing of goods and services such as housing, mobility, and \r tools. Hence, consumable products become durable goods delivering \r a 'product service', which potentially could provide the same level \r of service with fewer products (Fischedick et al. 2014).The sharing \r economy is an old practice of sharing assets between many without \r transferring ownership, which has been made new through focuses \r on sharing underutilised products and assets in ways that promote \r flexibility and convenience, often in a highly developed context via \r gig economy or online platforms. However, the sharing economy \r offers the potential to shift from 'asset-heavy' ownership to 'asset\u0002light' access, especially in developing countries (Retamal 2019). \r General conclusions on the sharing economy as a  framework for \r climate change mitigation are challenging and are better broken \r [...]"


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vector_id: 7854
content:
"[...] down to specific subsystems (Mi and Coffman 2019) (Chapter  5 \r Supplementary Material I, 5.SM.4.3)."


id: 8a10a94a6c5f0a942b5a5e3422d28a4b
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content:
"free-floating car sharing instead of public transit, rather than to \r replace their private car (Herrmann et al. 2014); while in the United \r States, ride-hailing and sharing data indicate that these services \r have increased road congestion and lowered transit ridership, with \r an insignificant change in vehicle ownership, and may further lead to \r net increases in energy use and CO2 emissions due to deadheading \r (Diao et  al. 2021; Ward et  al. 2021). If substitution effects and \r deadheading, which is the practice of allowing employees of \r a common carrier to use a vehicle as a non-revenue passenger, are \r accounted for, flexible motor-cycle sharing in Djakarta, Indonesia, \r is at best neutral to overall GHG emissions (Suatmadi et al. 2019). \r Passenger surveys conducted in Denver, Colorado, US, indicated \r that around 22% of all trips travelled with Uber and Lyft would \r have been travelled by transit, 12% would have walked or biked, \r [...]"


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"Shared mobility using private vehicle assets is categorised into four \r models (Santos 2018): peer-to-peer platforms where individuals can \r rent the vehicle when not in use (Ballus-Armet et al. 2014); short\u0002term rental managed and owned by a  provider (Enoch and Taylor \r 2006; Schaefers et  al. 2016; Bardhi and Eckhardt 2012); Uber-like \r ridehailing services (Wallsten 2015; Angrist et  al. 2017); and ride \r pooling using private vehicles shared by passengers to a common \r destination (Liyanage et  al. 2019; Shaheen and Cohen 2019). The \r latest model  - ride pooling  - is promising in terms of congestion \r and per capita CO2 emissions reductions and is a common practice \r in developing countries, however it is challenging in terms of waiting \r and travel time, comfort, and convenience, relative to private cars \r (Santos 2018; Shaheen and Cohen 2019). The other three models \r often yield profits to private parties, but remain mostly unrelated \r [...]"


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content:
"[...] to reduction in CO2 emissions (Santos 2018). Shared travel models, \r especially Uber-like models, are criticised because of the flexibilisation \r of labour, especially in developing countries, in which unemployment \r rates and unregulated labour markets lay a foundation of precarity \r that lead many workers to seek out wide-ranging means towards \r patching together a  living (Ettlinger 2017; Wells et  al. 2020). \r Despite the advantages of shared mobility, such as convenience and \r affordability, consumers may also perceive risk formed by possible \r physical injury from strangers or unexpected poor service quality \r (Hong et al. 2019)."


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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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content:
"Shared mobility scenarios demonstrate that GHG emission reduction \r can be substantial when mobility systems and digitalisation are \r regulated. One study modelled that ride pooling with electric cars \r (6 to 16 seats), which shifts the service to a more efficient transport \r mode, improves its carbon intensity by cutting GHG emissions by \r one-third (International Transport Forum 2016). Another study found \r that shared autonomous taxis had the potential to reduce per-mile \r GHG emissions to 63-82% below those of projected hybrid vehicles \r in 2030, 87% to 94% lower than a  privately owned, gasoline\u0002powered vehicle in 2014 (Greenblatt and Saxena 2015). This also \r realises 95% reduction in space required for public parking; and \r total vehicle kilometres travelled would be 37% lower than the \r present day, although each vehicle would travel ten times the total \r distance of current vehicles (International Transport Forum 2016). \r [...]"


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"[...] Studies of Berlin, Germany, and Lisbon, Portugal, demonstrate that \r sharing strategies could reduce the number of cars by more than \r 90%, also saving valuable street space for human-scale activity \r (Bischoff and Maciejewski 2016; Martinez and Viegas 2017; \r Creutzig et al. 2019b). The impacts will depend on sharing levels - \r concurrent or sequential - and the future modal split among public \r transit, automated electric vehicles fleets, and shared or pooled \r rides. Evidence from attributional lifecycle assessments (LCAs) of \r ride-hailing, whether Uber-like or by taxi, suggests that the key \r determinants of net emissions effects are average vehicle occupancy \r and vehicle powertrain, with high-occupancy and electric drivetrain \r cars delivering the greatest emissions benefits, even rivalling \r traditional metro/urban rail and bus options (Figure  5.13b). It is \r possible that shared automated electric vehicle fleets could become \r [...]"


id: 4edf94457f42e9cd2f65c3e3cb57b7eb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"[...] widely used without many shared rides, and single- or even zero\u0002occupant vehicles will continue to be the majority of vehicle trips. \r It is also feasible that shared rides could become more common, "


id: 9ecb444dba9911892bdd445b25785de1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Altogether, travel behaviour, business models, and especially public \r policy will be key components in determining how impacts of \r pooling and shared automated electric vehicles unfold (Shaheen \r and Cohen 2019). Urban-scale governance of smart mobility holds \r potential for prioritising public transit and the use of public spaces \r for human activities, managing the data as a  digital sustainable \r commons (e.g., via the installation of a Central Information Officer, \r as in Tel Aviv, Israel), and managing the social and environmental \r risks of smart mobility to realise its benefits (Creutzig et al. 2019b). \r Pricing of energy use and GHG emissions will be helpful to achieve \r these goals. The governance of shared mobility is complicated, as \r it involves many actors, and is key to realising wider benefits of \r shared mobility (Akyelken et al. 2018). New actors, networks and \r technologies enabling shared mobility are already fundamentally \r [...]"


id: d9ca347efa93b7b51dad76f81aedf8fe
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"[...] challenging how transport is governed worldwide. This is not \r a debate about state versus non-state actors but instead about the \r role the state takes within these new networks to steer, facilitate, \r and also reject different elements of the mobility system (Docherty \r et al. 2018)."


id: bac856df1eb60e90bc20a304aec6922c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30077
content:
"Sharing economy initiatives play a  central role in enabling \r individuals to share underutilised products. While the literature on \r the net effects of sharing economy strategies is still limited, available \r studies have presented different mitigation potentials to date, as \r shown in Figure 5.13. For many sharing economy strategies, there is \r a risk of negative rebound and induced demand effects, which may \r occur by changing consuming patterns, for example if savings from \r sharing housing are used to finance air travel. Thus, the mitigation \r potentials of sharing economy strategies will depend on stringent \r public policy and consumer awareness that reins in runaway \r consumption effects. Shared economy solutions generally relate to \r the 'Avoid' and 'Shift' strategies (Sections 5.1 and 5.3.2). On the one \r hand, they hold potential for providing similar or improved services \r for well-being (mobility, shelter) at reduced energy and resource \r [...]"


id: d5bc976118ce0cf584d9e3e3e0308716
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34915
content:
"[...] input, with the proper policy signals and consumer responses. On \r the other hand, shared economy strategies may increase emissions, \r for example shared mobility may shift activity away from public \r transit and lead to lower vehicle occupancy, deadheading, and use \r of inefficient shared vehicles (Jones and Leibowicz 2019; Merlin \r 2019; Bonilla-Alicea et  al. 2020; Ward et  al. 2021). Similarly to \r digitalisation, there is medium evidence that the sharing economy \r can reduce overall emissions, energy use, and activity levels, with \r medium agreement on the scale of potential savings if induced \r demand and rebound effects can be carefully managed to avoid \r negative outcomes."


id: d4adf74074edfa24e5caa45a16bc6612
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34736
content:
"Figure 5.13 | (a) Published estimates from 72 studies with 185 observations (indicated by vertical bars) of the relative mitigation potential of different \r shared and circular economy strategies, demonstrating limited observations for many emerging strategies, a wide variance in estimated benefits for \r most strategies, and within the sharing economy, risk of increased emissions due to inefficient substitutions, induced demand, and rebound effects.\r Mitigation potentials are conditional on corresponding public policy and/or regulation. (b) Attributional LCA comparisons of ridesharing mobility options, which highlight the \r large effects of vehicle occupancy and vehicle technology on total CO2 emissions per passenger-km and the preferability of high-occupancy and non-ICE configurations for \r emissions reductions compared to private cars. Also indicated are possible emissions increases associated with shared car mobility when it substitutes for non-motorised and \r [...]"


id: c383ae1ed643dcb0a973ec147f8167cc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31673
content:
"[...] public transit options. BEV = battery electric vehicle; FCEV = fuel cell electric vehicle; HEV = hybrid electric vehicle; ICE = internal combustion engine; PHEV = plug-in hybrid \r electric vehicle. Sources: data from Jacobson and King (2009); Firnkorn and Muller (2011); Baptista et al. (2014); Liu et al. (2014); Namazu and Dowlatabadi (2015); Nijland \r et al. (2015); IEA (2016); Koh (2016); Martin and Shaheen (2016); Rabbitt and Ghosh (2016); Bruck et al. (2017); Bullock et al. (2017); Clewlow and Mishra (2017); Fremstad \r (2017); ITF (2017a,b,c); Nasir et al. (2017); Nijland and van Meerkerk (2017); Rademaekers et al. (2017); Skjelvik et al. (2017); Yin et al. (2017); Campbell (2018); Favier et al. \r (2018); Ghisellini et al. (2018); Hopkinson et al. (2018); IEA (2018); ITF (2018); Lokhandwala and Cai (2018); Makov and Font Vivanco (2018); Malmqvist et al. (2018); Material \r [...]"


id: 2e190939fe530e0996a76191075fae98
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5385
content:
"[...] Economics (2018); Nasr et al. (2018); Yu et al. (2018); Zhang and Mi (2018); Brambilla et al. (2019); Brutting et al. (2019); Buyle et al. (2019); Castro and Pasanen (2019); \r Coulombel et al. (2019); Eberhardt et al. (2019); IEA (2019b); ITF (2019); Jones and Leibowicz (2019); Ludmann (2019); Merlin (2019); Nussholz et al. (2019); Bonilla-Alicea \r et al. (2020); Cantzler et al. (2020); Churkina et al. (2020); Gallego-Schmid et al. (2020); Hertwich et al. (2020); ITF (2020a,b); Liang et al. (2020); Miller (2020); Wilson et al. \r (2020c); Yan et al. (2020); Cordella et al. (2021); Diao et al. (2021); Pauliuk et al. (2021); Ward et al. (2021); Wolfram et al. (2021)."


id: fe562adcaf2a2f2ceaae86da4c5a011e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42120
content:
"to grow, strategies targeting end-of-pipe materials cannot keep \r pace with primary materials demand (Krausmann et  al. 2017; \r Haas et al. 2020). Instead, a significant reduction of societal stock \r growth, and decisive eco-design, are suggested to advance the CE \r (Haas et al. 2015). Third, cost-effectiveness underlying CE activities \r may concurrently also increase energy intensity and reduce labour \r intensity, causing systematically undesirable effects. To a  large \r extent, the distribution of costs and benefits of material and \r energy use depend on institutions in order to include demand-side \r solutions. Thus, institutional conditions have an essential role to \r play in setting rules differentiating profitable from nonprofitable \r activities in CE (Moreau et al. 2017). Moreover, the prevalence of \r CE practices such as reuse, refurbishment, and recycling can differ \r substantially between developed and developing economies, \r [...]"


id: 1cb5271f301f05db93a3c614eda80a93
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2230
content:
"[...] leading to highly context-specific mitigation potentials and policy \r approaches (McDowall et al. 2017)."


id: 6949c24eca6a068ff2a8cc046c890f9c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15790
content:
"value as possible from products and components when they reach \r the end of their useful life in a  given application (Lewandowski \r 2016; Lieder and Rashid 2016; Stahel 2016; Linder and Williander \r 2017). This requires an integrated approach during the design \r phase that, for example, extends product usage and ensures \r recyclability after use (de Coninck et  al. 2018). While traditional \r 'Improve' strategies tend to focus on direct energy and carbon \r efficiency, service-oriented strategies focus on reducing lifecycle \r emissions through harnessing the leverage effect (Creutzig et  al. \r 2018). The development of closed-loop models in service-oriented \r businesses can increase resource and energy efficiency, reducing \r emissions and contributing to climate change mitigation goals at \r national, regional, and global levels (Johannsdottir 2014; Korhonen \r et  al. 2018). Key examples include remanufacturing of consumer \r [...]"


id: f3511484ede69f1ee2aba22282db1dad
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40184
content:
"[...] products to extend lifespans while maintaining adequate service \r levels (Klausner et  al. 1998), reuse of building components to \r reduce demand for primary materials and construction processes \r (Shanks et al. 2019), and improved recycling to reduce upstream \r resource pressures (IEA 2019b; IEA 2017b)."


id: eec94476d0b1a81eca1aba198e3a59fc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39386
content:
"Among the many schools of thought on the CE and climate change \r mitigation, two different trends can be distinguished from the \r literature to date. First, there are publications, many of them not peer\u0002reviewed, that eulogise the perceived benefits of the CE, but in many \r cases stop short of providing a quantitative assessment. Promotion \r of CE from this perspective has been criticised as a greenwashing \r attempt by industry to avoid serious regulation (Isenhour 2019). \r Second, there are more methodologically rigorous publications, \r mostly originating in the industrial ecology field, but sometimes \r investigating only limited aspects of the CE (Bocken et al. 2017; Cullen \r 2017; Goldberg 2017). Conclusions on CE's mitigation potential \r also differ, with diverging definitions of the CE. A systematic review \r identified 3,244 peer-reviewed articles addressing CE and climate \r change, but only 10% of those provide insights on how the CE can \r [...]"


id: 10f5a1c8baff7436c0e558b605a58d3d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 175
content:
"[...] support mitigation, and most of them found only small potentials \r to reduce GHG emissions (Cantzler et al. 2020). Recycling is the CE \r category most investigated, while reuse and reduce strategies have \r seen comparatively less attention (Cantzler et  al. 2020). However, \r mitigation potentials were also context- and material-specific, as \r illustrated by the ranges shown in Figure 5.13a."


id: 209fd51dfff183f8234feae06cece0bb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2966
content:
"There are three key concerns relating to the effectiveness of the \r CE concept. First, many proposals on the CE insufficiently reflect \r on thermodynamic constraints that limit the potential of recycling \r from both mass conservation and material quality perspectives or \r ignore the considerable amount of energy needed to reuse materials \r (Cullen 2017). Second, demand for materials and resources will likely \r outpace efficiency gains in supply chains, becoming a key driver of \r GHG emissions and other environmental problems, rendering the \r CE alone an insufficient strategy to reduce emissions (Bengtsson \r et  al. 2018). In fact, the empirical literature points out that only \r 6.5% of all processed materials (4 Gt yr -1) globally originate from \r recycled sources (Haas et  al. 2015). The low degree of circularity \r is explained by the high proportion of processed materials (44%) \r used to provide energy, thus not available for recycling; and the \r [...]"


id: a1ad3410d396892b084fa1293c972c04
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25662
content:
"[...] high rate of net additions to stocks of 17 Gt yr -1. As long as long\u0002lived material stocks (e.g., in buildings and infrastructure) continue "


id: 80af7734d7678bcc3afb76fb838a1fe6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19769
content:
"energy-services, well-being, and equity-oriented economy (Jackson \r 2016; Cassiers et  al. 2018; Yuana et  al. 2020; Nielsen et al. 2021) \r (Figure 5.14). Each driver has novel implications for the design and \r implementation of demand-side mitigation policies. They show \r important synergies, making energy demand mitigation a  dynamic \r problem where the packaging and/or sequencing of different policies \r play a role in their effectiveness, demonstrated in Sections 5.5 and \r 5.6. The Social Science Primer (Chapter 5 Supplementary Material I) \r describes theory and empirical insights about the interplay between \r individual agency, the social and physical context of demand-side \r decisions in the form of social  roles and norms, infrastructure and \r technological constraints and affordances, and other formal and \r informal institutions. Incremental interventions on all five fronts \r [...]"


id: accaa6dacf530d032fd89c74772d58e6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27643
content:
"[...] change social practices, affecting simultaneously energy and well\u0002being (Schot and Kanger 2018). Transformative change will require \r coordinated use of all five drivers, as described in Figure 5.14 and, \r using novel insights about behaviour change for policy design and \r implementation (high evidence, high agreement). In particular, socio\u0002economic factors, such as equity, public service quality, electricity \r access and democracy are found to be highly significant in enabling \r need satisfaction at low energy use, whereas economic growth beyond \r moderate incomes and extractive economic activities are observed to \r be prohibiting factors (Vogel et al. 2021)."


id: 848ed921def823ae4e23cfd46f3436d0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20465
content:
"Relevant contributions to climate change mitigation at gigatonne scale \r by the CE will remain out of scope if decision-makers and industry fail \r to reduce primary inputs (high confidence). Systemic (consequential) \r analysis is required to avoid the risk that scaling effects negate \r efficiency gains; such analysis is however rarely applied to date. For \r example, material substitution or refurbishment of buildings brings \r risk of increasing emissions despite improving or avoiding current \r materials (Castro and Pasanen 2019; Eberhardt et al. 2019). Besides, \r CE concepts that extend the lifetime of products and increase the \r fraction of recycling are useful but are both thermodynamically \r limited and will remain relatively small in scale as long as demand \r for primary materials continues to grow, and scale effects dominate. \r In spite of presenting a large body of literature on CE in general, only \r a small but growing body of literature exists on the net effects of its \r [...]"


id: b9bdf0e1fe930e519e89bda0abb15d4a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29890
content:
"[...] strategies from a quantitative perspective, with key knowledge gaps \r remaining on specific CE strategies. There is medium evidence that \r the CE can reduce overall emissions, energy use, and activity levels, \r with medium evidence that the sharing economy can reduce overall \r emissions, energy use, and activity levels, with medium agreement on \r the scale of potential savings."


id: c0ec69668626c9d44ffc5e0b1c16f078
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31245
content:
"As individuals pursue a  broad set of goals and use calculation-, \r emotion-, and rule-based processes when they make energy decisions, \r demand-side policies can use a  broad range of behavioural tools \r that complement subsidies, taxes, and regulations (Chakravarty and \r Roy 2016; Mattauch et  al. 2016; Niamir 2019) (high evidence, high \r agreement). The provision of targeted information, social advertisements, \r and influence of trusted in-group members and/role models or admired \r role models like celebrities can be used to create better climate change \r knowledge and awareness (Niamir 2019; Niamir et al. 2020b; Niamir \r et  al. 2020c). Behavioural interventions like communicating changes \r in social norms can accelerate behaviour change by creating tipping \r points (Nyborg et al. 2016). When changes in energy-demand decisions \r (such as switching to a plant-based diet, (Box 5.5)) are motivated by the \r creation and activation of a social identity consistent with this and other \r [...]"


id: 9414da1efa731192a6cc11b189f8624f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23256
content:
"[...] behaviours, positive spillover can accelerate behaviour change (Truelove \r et al. 2014), both within a domain or across settings, for example from \r work to home (Maki and Rothman 2017)."


id: 42366fb0d8afddbd54e63d8701bbdb28
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8849
content:
"Meat eating is declining in the UK, alongside a shift from carbon-intensive red meat towards poultry. This is due to the interaction of \r behavioural, socio-cultural and organisational drivers (Vinnari and Vinnari 2014). Reduced meat consumption is primarily driven by \r issues of personal health and animal welfare, instead of climate or environment concerns (Latvala et al. 2012; Dibb and Fitzpatrick \r 2014; Hartmann and Siegrist 2017; Graca et al. 2019). Social movements have promoted shifts to a vegan diet (Morris et al. 2014; \r Laestadius et al. 2016) yet their impact on actual behaviour is the subject of debate (Taufik et al. 2019; Harguess et al. 2020; Sahakian \r et al. 2020). Companies have expanded new markets in non-meat products (MINTEL 2019). Both corporate food actors and new \r entrants offering more innovative 'meat alternatives' view consumer preferences as an economic opportunity, and are responding \r [...]"


id: 7cfde32b9deb8c418e5e804648025a6c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19177
content:
"[...] by increasing the availability of meat replacement products. No significant policy change has taken place in the UK to enable dietary \r shift (Wellesley and Froggatt 2015); however the Climate Change Committee has recommended dietary shift in the Sixth Carbon \r Budget (Climate Change Committee 2020), involving reduced consumption of high-carbon meat and dairy products by 20% by \r 2030, with further reductions in later years in order to reach net zero GHG emissions by 2050. Agricultural policies serve to support \r meat production with large subsidies that lower production cost and effectively increase the meat intensity of diets at a population \r level (Simon 2003; Godfray et al. 2018). Deeper, population-wide reductions in meat consumption are hampered by these lock-in \r mechanisms which continue to stabilise the existing meat production-consumption system. The extent to which policymakers are \r [...]"


id: 6395b250d4d3809f445c04c8610102c3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14811
content:
"[...] willing to actively stimulate reduced meat consumption thus remains an open question (Godfray et al. 2018). See more in Chapter 5 \r Supplementary Material I, Section 5.SM.6.4."


id: 81bd252c21a2fd6a9f00ed1be86f3135
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19955
content:
"People's general perceptions of climate risks, first covered in AR5, \r motivate behaviour change; more proximate and personal feelings of \r being at risk triggered by extreme weather and climate-linked natural \r disasters will increase concern and willingness to act (Bergquist et al. \r 2019), though the window of increased support is short (Sisco \r et al. 2017). 67% of individuals in 26 countries see climate change as \r a major threat to their country, an increase from 53% in 2013, though \r 29% also consider it a minor or no threat (Fagan and Huang 2019). \r Concern that the COVID-19 crisis may derail this momentum due \r to a finite pool of worry (Weber 2006) appears to be unwarranted: \r Americans' positions on climate change in 2020 matched high levels \r of concern measured in 2019 (Leiserowitz et al. 2020). Younger, female, \r and more educated individuals perceive climate risks to be larger \r (Weber 2016; Fagan and Huang 2019). Moral values and political \r [...]"


id: 3d44af40e3dc7ecd5db7dd43c1a9dabf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7960
content:
"[...] ideology influence climate risk perception and beliefs about the \r outcomes and effectiveness of climate action (Maibach et al. 2011). "


id: 2936a877e6646807c049d4175d66a976
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4464
content:
"Universal access to clean and modern cooking energy could cut premature deaths from household air pollution by two-thirds, while \r reducing forest degradation and deforestation and contributinh to the reduction of up to 50% of CO2 emissions from cooking (relative \r to baseline by 2030) (IEA 2017c; Dagnachew et al. 2019). However, in the absence of policy reform and substantial energy investments, \r 2.3 billion people will have no access to clean cooking fuels such as biogas, LPG, natural gas or electricity in 2030 (IEA 2017c). \r Studies reveal that a combination of drivers influence adoption of new cookstove appliances, including affordability, behavioural and \r cultural aspects (lifestyles, social norms around cooking and dietary practices), information provision, availability, aesthetic qualities \r of the technology, perceived health benefits, and infrastructure (spatial design of households and cooking areas). The increasing \r [...]"


id: 3f56184ea3b62b5e13e55e922666ee8d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8335
content:
"[...] efficiency improvements in electric cooking technologies could enable households to shift to electrical cooking at mass scale. The use \r of pressure cookers and rice cookers is now widespread in South Asia and beginning to penetrate the African market as consumer \r attitudes are changing towards household appliances with higher energy efficiencies (Batchelor et al. 2019). There are shifts towards \r electric and LPG stoves in Bhutan (Dendup and Arimura 2019), India (Pattanayak et al. 2019), Ecuador (Martinez et al. 2017; Gould \r et al. 2018) and Ethiopia (Tesfamichael et al. 2021); and improved biomass stoves in China (Smith et al. 1993). Significant subsidy, \r information (Dendup and Arimura 2019), social marketing and availability of technology in the local markets are some of the key \r policy instruments helping to adopt improved cookstoves (Pattanayak et al. 2019). There is no one-size-fits-all solution to household \r [...]"


id: 2737270aaa1afe67e3304c4383ae7940
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4065
content:
"[...] air pollution - different levels of shift and improvement occur in different cultural contexts, indicating the importance of socio-cultural \r and behavioural aspects in shifts in cooking practices. See more in Chapter 5 Supplementary Material I, Section 5.SM.6.2."


id: 1de5b0f48f471e28a8cf99352b93a6ea
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2451
content:
"good; facilitating accurate assessment of risks, costs, and benefits; \r and making complex information more accessible (Yoeli et al. 2017; \r Zangheri et  al. 2019). Climate-friendly choice architecture includes \r the setting of proper defaults, the salient positioning of green options \r (in stores and online), forms of framing, and communication of social \r norms (Johnson et al. 2012). Simplifying access to greener options (and \r hence lowering effort) can promote ASI changes (Mani et al. 2013). \r Setting effective 'green' defaults may be the most effective policy to \r mainstream low-carbon energy choices (Sunstein and Reisch 2014), \r adopted in many contexts (Jachimowicz et  al. 2019) and deemed \r acceptable in many countries (Sunstein et al. 2019). Table 5.3a lists \r how often different choice-architecture tools were used in many \r countries over the past 10 years to change ASI behaviours, and how \r often each tool was used to enhance an economic incentive. These \r [...]"


id: 6ec74862ccbcaa81f78bf17b0917c6f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16760
content:
"[...] tools have been tested mostly in developed countries. Reduction \r in energy use (typically electricity consumption) is the most widely \r studied behaviour (because metering is easily observable). All \r but one tool was applied to increase this 'Avoid' behaviour, with \r demand-side reductions from 0% to up to 20%, with most values \r below 3% (see also meta-analyses by Hummel and Maedche (2019); \r Nisa et al. (2019); van der Linden and Goldberg (2020); Stankuniene \r et al. (2020); and Khanna et al. (2021). Behavioural, economic, and \r legal instruments are most effective when applied as an internally \r consistent ensemble where they can reinforce each other, a concept "


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"Note: Papers in this review of behavioural interventions to reduce household energy demand were collected through a systemic literature search up to August 2021. Studies \r are included in the reported counts if they are (i) experimental, (ii) peer-reviewed or highly cited reports, (iii) the intervention is behavioural, and (iv) the targeted behaviour is \r household energy demand. 559 papers are included in the review. Each paper was coded for: type of behavioural intervention, country of study, energy demand behaviour \r targeted, whether the target is an 'Avoid', 'Shift', or 'Improve' behaviour, and whether the intervention includes an economic incentive. Some papers do not report all elements. \r The energy demand behaviour column provides the count of papers that focus on each behaviour type (in parentheses after the behaviour). The citations that follow are not \r [...]"


id: 6ff1b054512a0d44f3302388959562b4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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content:
"[...] exhaustive but exemplify papers in the category, selected for impact, range, and recency. The asterisk (*) indicates references that are meta-analyses or systematic reviews. \r Papers within meta-analyses and systematic reviews that meet the inclusion criteria are counted individually in the total counts. The full reference list is available at https://osf.\r io/9463u/."


id: db3c92826fb804a09f936e29075af582
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35844
content:
"Power and agency shape which climate narratives are told and how \r prevalent they are (O'Neill and Smith 2014; Schneider-Mayerson \r et al. 2020). For example, narratives have been used by indigenous \r communities to imagine climate futures divergent from top-down, \r government-led narratives (Streeby 2018). The uptake of new climate \r narratives is influenced by political beliefs and trust. Policymakers can \r enable emissions reduction by employing narratives that have broad \r societal appeal, encourage behavioural change and complement \r regulatory and fiscal measures (Terzi 2020). Justice narratives may \r not have universal appeal: in a  UK study, justice narratives \r polarised individuals along ideological lines, with lower support \r amongst individuals with right-wing beliefs; by contrast, narratives \r centred on saving energy, avoiding waste and patriotic values were \r more widely supported across society (Whitmarsh and Corner 2017). \r [...]"


id: 2512fd9a173bd377c71ca902d03c0f26
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3715
content:
"[...] More research is needed to assess if these findings are prevalent in \r diverse socio-cultural contexts, as well as the role played by social \r media platforms to influence emerging narratives of climate change \r (Pearce et al. 2019)."


id: 24c03e60265b597ec27eb4d97bce5bca
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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vector_id: 3660
content:
"In terms of cultural processes, we can distinguish two levels of \r analysis: specific meanings associated with particular technologies \r or practices, and general narratives about climate change mitigation. \r Specific meanings (e.g.,  comfort, status, identity and agency) are \r associated with many technologies and everyday social practices that \r deliver energy services, from driving a car to using a cookstove (high \r evidence, high agreement) (Section 5.5). Meanings are symbolic and \r influence the willingness of individuals to use existing technologies \r or shift to new ones (Wilhite and Ling 1995; Wilhite 2009; Sorrell \r 2015). Symbolic motives are more important predictors of technology \r adoption than instrumental motives (Steg 2005; Noppers et al. 2014; \r Noppers et  al. 2015; Noppers et  al. 2016) (see case study on app \r cabs in Kolkata, India (Box 5.8)). If an individual's pro-environmental \r behaviour is associated with personal meaning than it also increases \r [...]"


id: 4703aeb9a758ba31230bb48caf5c7783
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"[...] subjective well-being (Zawadzki et al. 2020). Status consciousness is \r highly relevant in GHG emission-intensive consumption choices (cars, \r houses). However, inversely framing energy-saving behaviour as high \r status is a promising strategy for emission reduction (Ramakrishnan \r and Creutzig 2021)."


id: c99ecd6c230a1cf4186d0080c6c18c4b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32798
content:
"Trust in organisations is a key predictor of the take-up of novel energy \r services (Lutzenhiser 1993), particularly when financial incentives \r are high (Stern et al. 1985; Joskow 1995). Research has shown that \r if there is low public trust in utility companies, service delivery by \r community-based non-profit organisations in the US (Stern et  al. \r 1985) or public/private partnerships in Mexico (Friedmann and \r Sheinbaum 1998), offer more effective solutions, yet only if public \r trust is higher in these types of organisations. UK research shows \r that acceptance of shifts to less resource-intensive service provision \r (e.g., more resource-efficient products, extending product lifetimes, \r community schemes for sharing products) varies depending on factors \r including trust in suppliers and manufacturers, affordability, quality \r and hygiene of shared products, and fair allocation of responsibilities \r (Cherry et  al. 2018). Trust in other people plays an important role \r [...]"


id: 2c31a7ca1289667181af00d8b8650500
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5035
content:
"[...] in the sharing economy (Li and Wang 2020), for example predicting \r shifts in transport mode, specifically car sharing involving rides with \r strangers (Acheampong and Siiba 2019) (Section 5.3.4.2)."


id: ceeffc4bd6d43c077e2e88674907df13
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:09
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33746
content:
"At a broader level, narratives about climate mitigation circulate within \r and across societies, as recognised in SR1.5, and are broader than the \r meanings associated with specific technologies (high evidence, high \r agreement). Narratives enable people to imagine and make sense \r of the future through processes of interpretation, understanding, \r communication and social interaction (Smith et  al. 2017). Stories \r about climate change are relevant for mitigation in numerous ways. \r They can be utopian or dystopian (e.g., The great derangement by \r Amitav Ghosh) (Ghosh 2016), for example presenting apocalyptic \r stories and imagery to capture people's attention and evoke emotional \r and behavioural response (O'Neill and Smith 2014). Reading climate \r stories has been shown to cause short-term influences on attitudes \r towards climate change, increasing the belief that climate change is \r human caused and increasing its issue priority (Schneider-Mayerson \r [...]"


id: 2e977a5059778811ab83fc8e609123be
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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vector_id: 5475
content:
"[...] et al. 2020). Climate narratives can also be used to justify scepticism \r of science, drawing together coalitions of diverse actors into social \r movements that aim to prevent climate action (Lejano and Nero \r 2020). Narratives are also used in integrated assessment and energy \r system models that construct climate stabilisation scenarios, for \r example in the choice of parameters, their interpretation and model \r structure (Ellenbeck and Lilliestam 2019). One important narrative \r choice of many models involves framing climate change as market \r failure (which leads to the result that carbon pricing is required). "


id: 1f70645304cc1ae61c606724fa003b96
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2736
content:
"Action on climate mitigation is influenced by our perception of \r what other people commonly do, think or expect, known as social \r norms (high evidence, high agreement) (Cialdini 2006) (Table 5.3), \r even though people often do not acknowledge this (Nolan et  al. \r 2008; Noppers et al. 2014). Changing social norms can encourage \r societal transformation and social tipping points to address climate \r mitigation (Nyborg et al. 2016; Otto et al. 2020). Providing feedback \r to people about how their own actions compare to others' can \r encourage mitigation (Delmas et  al. 2013), although the overall \r effect size is not strong (Abrahamse and Steg 2013). Trending \r norms are behaviours that are becoming more popular, even if \r currently practised by a minority. Communicating messages that the \r number of people engaging in a mitigation behaviour (e.g., giving \r a financial donation to an environmental conservation organisation) \r [...]"


id: b26a68b4e125ad4352b131a7a6577a89
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28627
content:
"[...] is increasing - a simple low-cost policy intervention - can encourage \r shifts to the targeted behaviour, even if the effect size is relatively \r small (Mortensen et al. 2019)."


id: bef5ba0aa6964139224c1f5cdae20137
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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content:
"are proposed (Devine-Wright  2009) and enabling fairness in how \r decisions are taken and costs and benefits distributed (Wolsink \r 2007). This is important for achieving the goal of SDG 7 (increased \r use of renewable energy resources) in developing countries while \r achieving energy justice (Calzadilla and Mauger 2017). 'Top-down' \r imposition of climate policies by governments can translate into local \r opposition when perceived to be unjust and lacking transparency \r (high evidence, high agreement). Policymakers can build trust and \r increase the legitimacy of new policies by implementing early \r and extensive public and stakeholder participation, avoiding 'Nimby' \r (Not In My Back Yard) assumptions about objectors and adopting \r 'Just Transition' principles (Owens 2000; Wolsink 2007; Wustenhagen \r et al. 2007; Dietz and Stern 2008; Devine-Wright 2011; Heffron and \r McCauley 2018). Participatory mechanisms that enable deliberation \r [...]"


id: 94da5d55c9929849bbb0bea05124c626
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"[...] by a representative sample of the public (Climate Assembly UK 2020) \r can inform policymaking and increase the legitimacy of new and \r difficult policy actions (Dryzek et al. 2019)."


id: 171daf46441dfbba360dc237daae5826
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1285
content:
"Socially comparative feedback seems to be more effective when \r people strongly identify with the reference group (De Dominicis \r et al. 2019). Descriptive norms (perceptions of behaviours common \r in others) are more strongly related to mitigation actions when \r injunctive norms (perceptions of whether certain behaviours are \r commonly approved or disapproved) are also strong, when people \r are not strongly personally involved with mitigation topics (Gockeritz \r et  al. 2010), when people are currently acting inconsistently with \r their preferences, when norm-based interventions are supported by \r other interventions and when the context supports norm-congruent \r actions (Miller and Prentice 2016). A descriptive norm prime ('most \r other people try to reduce energy consumption') together with \r injunctive norm feedback ('you are very good at saving energy') \r is a  very effective combination to motivate further energy savings \r [...]"


id: 13d06601d476544c8148f52e2f8e9b2d
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content:
"[...] (Bonan et al. 2020). Second-order beliefs (perceptions of what others \r in the community believe) are particularly important for leveraging \r descriptive norms (Jachimowicz et al. 2018)."


id: d48ac75eaa2b77c172fded413b57a318
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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content:
"Collective action by civil society groups and social movements can \r work to enable or constrain climate mitigation. Civil society groups \r can advocate policy change, provide policy research and open up \r opportunities for new political reforms (high evidence, high agreement) \r as recognised in previous IPCC reports (IPCC 2007). Grassroots \r environmental initiatives, including community energy groups, are \r collective responses to, and critiques of, normative ways that everyday \r material needs (e.g., food, energy, making) are produced, supplied and \r circulated (Schlosberg and Coles 2016). Such initiatives can reconcile \r lower carbon footprints with higher life satisfaction and higher \r incomes (Vita et al. 2020). Local initiatives such as Transition Towns \r and community energy projects can lead to improvements in energy \r efficiency, ensure a decent standard of living and increase renewable \r energy uptake, while building on existing social trust, and, in turn, \r [...]"


id: 2b936e7d05a32606320114d6b9c7a293
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content:
"[...] building social trust and initiating engagement, capacity building, and \r social capital formation (Hicks and Ison 2018). Another example are \r grassroot initiatives that aim to reduce food loss and waste, even as \r overall evidence on their effectiveness remains limited (Mariam et al. \r 2020). However, community energy initiatives are not always inclusive \r and require policy support for widespread implementation across all \r socio-economic groups (Aiken et al. 2017). In addition, more evidence \r is required of the impacts of community energy initiatives (Creamer \r et al. 2018; Bardsley et al. 2019)."


id: 1ece1a2b0666ec5c6345c87c6d9ab9ee
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2622
content:
"Civil society social movements are a  primary driver of social and \r institutional change (high evidence, high agreement) and can be \r differently positioned as, on the one hand, 'insider' social movements \r (e.g., World Wildlife Fund) that seek to influence existing state \r institutions through lobbying, advice and research and, on the \r other hand, 'outsider' social movements (e.g., Rising Tide, Extinction \r Rebellion) that advocate radical reform through protests and \r demonstrations (Newell 2005; Caniglia et al. 2015). Civil society social \r movements frame grievances that resonate with society, mobilise \r resources to coordinate and sustain mass collective action, and \r operate within  - and seek to influence  - external conditions that \r enable or constrain political change (Caniglia et  al. 2015). When \r successful, social movements open up windows of opportunity \r (so called 'Overton Windows') to unlock structural change (high \r [...]"


id: de245154d1ca63ba6ed72e500448c08b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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vector_id: 36342
content:
"Climate social movements advocate new narratives or framings \r for climate mitigation (e.g.,  'climate emergency') (della Porta \r and Parks 2014); criticise positive meanings associated with high \r emission technologies or practices (see case studies on diet and \r solar PV, (Boxes 5.5 and 5.7)); show disapproval for high-emission \r behaviours (e.g., through 'flight shaming'); model behaviour change \r (e.g., shifting to veganism or public transport - see case study on \r mobility in Kolkata, India (Box 5.8)); demonstrate against extraction \r and use of fossil fuels (Cheon and Urpelainen 2018); and aim to \r increase a sense of agency amongst certain social groups (e.g., young \r people or indigenous communities) that structural change is possible. \r Climate strikes have become internationally prevalent, for example \r the September 2019 strikes involved participants in more than \r 180 countries (Rosane 2019; Fisher and Nasrin 2020; Martiskainen \r [...]"


id: af6d81c40e69a438ed00c120f6035c3c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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vector_id: 28095
content:
"[...] et  al. 2020). Enabled by digitalisation, these have given voice to \r youth on climate (Lee et al. 2020) and created a new cohort of active \r citizens engaged in climate demonstrations (Fisher 2019). Research \r on bystanders shows that marches increase positive beliefs about \r marchers and collective efficacy (Swim et al. 2019)."


id: 84014c6ac511f1e8becd0e3ac8591fbd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20377
content:
"As an innovative technology, solar PV was strongly taken up by consumers (Nemet 2019). Several key factors explain its success. First, \r modular design made it applicable to different scales of deployment in different geographical contexts (e.g., large-scale grid-connected \r projects and smaller-scale off-grid projects) and allowed its application by companies taking advantage of emerging markets (Shum \r and Watanabe 2009). Second, culturally, solar PV symbolised an environmentally progressive technology that was valued by users \r (Morris and Jungjohann 2016). Large-scale adoption led to policy change (i.e., the introduction of feed-in tariffs that guaranteed \r a financial return) that in turn enabled improvements to the technology by companies. Over time, this has driven large-scale reductions \r in cost and increase in deployment worldwide. The relative importance of drivers varied across contexts. In Japan, state subsidies were \r [...]"


id: 3613c17211333919e055b1e1c23e4271
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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vector_id: 6767
content:
"[...] lower yet did not hinder take-up because consumer behaviour was motivated by non-cost symbolic aspects. In Germany, policy change \r arose from social movements that campaigned for environmental conservation and opposed nuclear power, making solar PV policies \r politically acceptable. In summary, the seven-decade evolution of solar PV shows an evolution in which the agency of consumers has \r consistently played a key role in multiple countries, such that deriving 30-50% of global electricity supply from solar is now a realistic \r possibility (Creutzig et al. 2017). See more in Chapter 5 Supplementary Material I, 5.SM.6.1."


id: af9ba5dfafaceafc26b51670732f7d0d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28131
content:
"The allocation of political power to incumbent actors and coalitions \r has contributed to lock-in of particular institutions, stabilising the \r interests of incumbents through networks that include policymakers, \r bureaucracies, advocacy groups and knowledge institutions \r (high agreement, high evidence). There is high evidence and high \r agreement that institutions are central in addressing climate change \r mitigation. Indeed, social provisioning contexts, including equity, \r democracy, public services and high quality infrastructure, are \r found to facilitate high levels of need satisfaction at lower energy \r use, whereas economic growth beyond moderate incomes and \r dependence on extractive industries inhibit it (Vogel et  al. 2021). \r They shape and interact with technological systems (Unruh 2000; \r Foxon et  al. 2004; Seto et  al. 2014) and represent rules, norms \r and conventions that organise and structure actions (Vatn 2015) \r [...]"


id: 6373435a98c70e88e9bb6b4908cffec9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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vector_id: 14790
content:
"[...] and help create new path dependency or strengthen existing path \r dependency (Mattioli et al. 2020) (see case studies in Boxes 5.5 to \r 5.8 and Chapter 5 Supplementary Material I). These drive behaviour \r of actors through formal (e.g.,  laws, regulations, and standards) \r or informal (e.g.,  norms, habits, and customs) processes, and can \r create constraints on policy options (Breukers and Wolsink 2007). \r For example, the car-dependent transport system is maintained by \r interlocking elements and institutions, consisting of (i) the automotive \r industry; (ii) the provision of car infrastructure; (iii)  the political \r economy of urban sprawl; (iv)  the provision of public transport; \r (v) cultures of car consumption (Mattioli et al. 2020). The behaviour \r of actors, their processes and implications on policy options and \r decisions are discussed further in Section 5.6."


id: ae997f04adcbf6c199252fca9ade4b67
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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vector_id: 27951
content:
"A key role is played by the state government, in collaboration with other stakeholders, to improve the system as whole and formalise \r certain semi-formal modes of transport. An important policy consideration has been to make Kolkata's mobility system more efficient \r (in terms of speed, reliability and avoidance of congestion) and sustainable through strengthening coordination between different \r mode-based regimes (Ghosh 2019) and more comfortable with air conditioned space in a hot and humid climate (Roy et al. 2018b). \r Policymakers have introduced multiple technological, behavioural and socio-cultural measures to tackle this challenge. New buses \r have been purchased by public authorities (Ghosh and Schot 2019). These have been promoted to middle class workers in terms of \r modernity, efficiency and comfort, and implemented using premium fares. Digitalisation and the sharing economy have encouraged \r [...]"


id: fbd6047f4a4f9b5d42caed655001c908
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41673
content:
"[...] take-up of shared taxi rides ('app cabs'), being low cost and fast, but also influenced by levels of social trust involved in rides with \r strangers (Acheampong and Siiba 2019; Ghosh and Schot 2019). Rickshaws have been improved through use of LNG and cycling \r has been banned from busy roads. These measures contributed positively to halving greenhouse gas emissions per unit of GDP tin \r one decade within the Kolkata metropolitan area, with potential for further reduction (Colenbrander et al. 2016). However, social \r movements have opposed some changes due to concerns about social equity, since many of the new policies cater to middle class \r aspirations and preferences, at the cost of low-income and less privileged communities."


id: ac7854e3bdfdb44e4c9f36e6dd9a66e0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27585
content:
"To conclude, urban mobility transitions in Kolkata show interconnected policy, institutional and socio-cultural drivers for socio\u0002technical change. Change has unfolded in complex interactions between multiple actors, sustainability values and megatrends, where \r direct causalities are hard to identify. However, the prominence of policy actors as change agents is clear as they are changing \r multiple regimes from within. The state government initiated infrastructural change in public bus systems, coordinated with private \r and non-governmental actors such as auto-rickshaw operators and app cab owners, who hold crucial agency in offering public \r transport services in the city. The latter can directly be attributed to the global momentum of mobility-as-a-service platforms, at the \r intersection of digitalisation and sharing economy trends. More thoughtful action at a policy level is required to sustain and coordinate \r [...]"


id: f89c6c83b977678381bc8e69c1a0de11
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41105
content:
"[...] the diversity of public transport modes through infrastructure design and reflect on the overall direction of change (Roy et al. 2018b; \r Schot and Steinmueller 2018). See more in Chapter 5 Supplementary Material I, Section 5.SM.6.3."


id: 9bd6f507b3056911af5a77eedd1d9afb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24671
content:
"Technologies and infrastructures shape social practices and their \r design matters for effective mitigation measures (high evidence,\r high agreement). There are systemic interconnections between \r infrastructures and practices (Cass et al. 2018; Haberl et al. 2021), \r and their intersection explains their relevance (Thacker et al. 2019). \r The design of a new electricity system to meet new emerging demand \r based on intermittent renewable sources can lead to a  change \r in consumption habits and the adaption of lifestyles compliant \r with more power supply interruption (Maizi et al. 2017; Maizi and \r Mazauric 2019). The quality of the service delivery impacts directly \r the potential user uptake of low-carbon technologies among rural \r households. In the state of Himachal Pradesh in India, a shift from \r LPG to electricity among rural households, with induction stoves, \r has been successful due to the availability of stable and continuous \r [...]"


id: 40a2f5b6d1266f67d04b88f7b0c03845
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8556
content:
"[...] electricity, which has been difficult to achieve in any other Indian \r state (Banerjee et al. 2016). In contrast, in South Africa, people who \r were using electricity earlier are now adopting LPG to diversify the \r energy source for cooking due to high electricity tariffs and frequent \r blackouts (Kimemia and Annegarn 2016) (Box  5.5 and Chapter  5 \r Supplementary Material I)."


id: 16ea260d8cb70ab0bb05761b99018839
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1254
content:
"In the first phase, radical innovations emerge in peripheral niches, \r where researchers, inventors, social movement organisations or \r community activists dedicate time and effort to their development (high \r confidence) (Kemp et al. 1998; Schot and Geels 2008). Radical social, \r technical and business model innovations are initially characterised by \r many uncertainties about technical performance, consumer interest, \r institutions and cultural meanings. Learning processes are therefore \r essential and can be stimulated through R&D, demonstration projects, \r local community initiatives or grassroots projects (Borghei and \r Magnusson 2016; Hossain 2016; Rosenbloom et al. 2018b; van Mierlo \r and Beers 2020). Typical challenges are fragmentation and high rates \r of project failure (den Hartog et al. 2018; Dana et al. 2021), limited \r funding (Auerswald and Branscomb 2003), limited consumer interest, \r and socio-cultural acceptance problems due to being perceived as \r [...]"


id: 4b1525c4086482605e782a5b76a665a9
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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vector_id: 10454
content:
"In the second phase, social or technical innovations are appropriated \r or purchased by early adopters, which increases visibility and may \r provide a small but steady flow of financial resources (high evidence,\r high agreement) (Zimmerman and Zeitz 2002; Dewald and Truffer \r 2011). Learning processes, knowledge sharing and codification \r activities help stabilise the innovation, leading to best practice \r guidelines, standards, and formalised knowledge (high evidence, high \r agreement) (Raven et al. 2008; Borghei and Magnusson 2018). User \r innovation may lead to the articulation of new routines and social \r practices, often in tandem with the integration of new technologies \r into people's daily lives (Nielsen et  al. 2016; Schot et  al. 2016). \r Radical innovations remain confined to niches in the second phase \r because adoption is limited to small, dedicated groups (Schot et al. \r 2016), innovations are expensive or do not appeal to wider groups, \r [...]"


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"Demand-side transitions involve interactions between radical social \r or technical innovations (such as the Avoid-Shift-Improve options \r discussed in Section  5.3) and existing socio-technical systems, \r energy cultures, and social practices (high evidence, high agreement) \r (Stephenson et al. 2015; Geels et al. 2017). Radical innovations such \r as teleworking, plant-based burgers, car sharing, vegetarianism, or \r electric vehicles initially emerge in small, peripheral niches (Kemp \r et  al. 1998; Schot and Geels 2008), constituted by R&D projects, \r technological demonstration projects (Borghei and Magnusson 2016; \r Rosenbloom et al. 2018b), local community initiatives or grassroots \r projects by environmental activists (Hargreaves et al. 2013a; Hossain \r 2016). Such niches offer protection from mainstream selection \r pressures and nurture the development of radical innovations (Smith \r and Raven 2012). Many low-carbon niche innovations, such as \r [...]"


id: bdf0632a22bb1565b258a0b626b7bf95
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"[...] those described in Section 5.3, face uphill struggles against existing \r socio-technical systems, energy cultures, and social practices that \r are stabilised by multiple lock-in mechanisms (high evidence, high \r agreement) (Klitkou et  al. 2015; Seto et  al. 2016; Clausen et  al. \r 2017; Ivanova et al. 2018). Demand-side transitions therefore do not \r happen easily and involve interacting processes and struggles on the \r behavioural, socio-cultural, institutional, business and technological \r dimensions (Nikas et al. 2020) (Section 5.4)."


id: d2e55acab3dbee2c21427db18dd06a32
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34451
content:
"Despite differences, the literature offers three robust conclusions \r on acceleration (high evidence, high agreement): First, size matters. \r Acceleration of transitions is more difficult for social, economic, or \r technological systems of larger size (in terms of number of users, \r financial investments, infrastructure, powerful industries) (Wilson \r 2009; Wilson 2012). Size also matters at the level of the systems \r component involved in a  transition. Components with smaller \r unit-scale ('granular' and thus relatively cheap), such as light \r bulbs or household appliances, turn over much faster (often within \r a decade) than large-scale, capital-intensive lumpy technologies and \r infrastructures (such as transport systems) where rates of change \r typically involve several decades, even up to a century (Grubler 1991; \r Leibowicz 2018). Also, the creation of entirely new systems (diffusion) \r takes longer time than replacements of existing technologies or \r [...]"


id: c7a60d2d8f0128e4d20e3baf5328189a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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content:
"[...] practices (substitution) (Grubler et al. 1999); and late adopters tend \r to adopt faster than early pioneers (Wilson 2012; Grubler 1996)."


id: 8c3d22623ffd15272205c42b7d958947
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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content:
"'Avoid', 'Shift' and 'Improve' options vary with regard to the four \r transition phases. Incremental 'Improve' options, such as energy\u0002efficient appliances or stand-alone insulation measures, are not \r transitions but upgrades of existing technologies. They have \r progressed furthest since they build on existing knowledge and do \r not require wider changes (Geels et al. 2018). Some radical 'Improve' \r options, which have a different technological knowledge base, are \r beginning to diffuse, moving from phase two to three in multiple \r countries. Examples are electric vehicles, light-emitting diodes (LED), \r or passive house designs (Franceschini and Alkemade 2016; Berkeley \r et al. 2017). Many 'Shift' and 'Avoid/Reduce' options like heat pumps, \r district heating, passive house designs, compact cities, less meat \r initiatives, flight and car use reduction have low momentum in most \r countries, and are mostly in the first phase of isolated initiatives \r [...]"


id: 1c11de2be061ed0d72e704184d615f07
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"[...] and projects (Bergman 2013; Morris et al. 2014; Bows-Larkin 2015; \r Bush et al. 2016; Kivimaa and Martiskainen 2018; Hoolohan et al. \r 2018). Structural transitions in Dutch cities, Copenhagen, and \r more recently Paris, however, demonstrate that transitions towards \r low-carbon lifestyles, developed around cycling, are possible \r (Colville-Andersen  2018). Low-carbon demand-side transitions are \r often still in early phases (high evidence, high agreement)."


id: 935e35abf3cdfd12dbd82aa78aed6782
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23134
content:
"Arguments about scale in the energy system date back at least to \r the 1970s when Schumacher, Lovins and others argued the case for \r smaller-scale, distributed technologies (Schumacher 1974; Lovins \r 1976; Lovins 1979). In Small is Profitable Lovins and colleagues \r evidenced over 200 reasons why decentralised energy resources, from \r distributed generation to end-use efficiency, made good business \r sense in addition to their social, human-centred benefits (Lovins et al. \r 2003). More recent advances in digital, solar and energy storage \r technologies have renewed technical and economic arguments in \r favour of adopting decentralised approaches to decarbonisation \r (Cook et al. 2016; Jain et al. 2017; Lovins et al. 2018). Smaller-scale \r technologies from microprocessors to solar panels show dramatically \r faster cost and performance improvement trajectories than large-scale \r energy supply facilities (Trancik 2014; Sweerts et al. 2020, Creutzig \r [...]"


id: 5fccf0429e6c698844fb7c81638ba4a8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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content:
"[...] et al. 2021) (Figure 5.15). Analysing the performance of over 80 energy \r technologies historically, Wilson et al. (2020a) found that smaller scale, \r more 'granular' technologies are empirically associated with faster \r diffusion, lower investment risk, faster learning, more opportunities to \r escape lock-in, more equitable access, more job creation, and higher \r social returns on innovation investment. These advantages of more \r granular technologies are consistent with accelerated low-carbon \r transformation (Wilson et al. 2020a)."


id: 67ba175386ac04d9c8db197ebd9470ae
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15516
content:
"The concept of leapfrogging emerged in development economics (Soete 1985), energy policy (Goldemberg 1991) and environmental \r regulation (Perkins 2003, which provides a  first critical review of the concept), and refers to a  development strategy that skips \r traditional and polluting development in favour of the most advanced concepts. For instance, in rural areas without telephone \r landlines or electricity access (cables), a direct shift to mobile telephony or distributed, locally-sourced energy systems is promoted, or \r economic development policies for pre-industrial economies forego the traditional initial emphasis on heavy industry industrialisation, \r instead focusing on services like finance or tourism. Often leapfrogging is enabled by learning and innovation externalities where \r improved knowledge and technologies become available for late adopters at low costs. The literature highlights many cases of \r [...]"


id: 935294b856d76e21df93001c93fd2946
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"[...] successful leapfrogging but also highlights limitations (Watson and Sauter 2011); with example case studies for China (Gallagher \r 2006; Chen and Li-Hua 2011); Mexico (Gallagher and Zarsky 2007); and Japan and Korea (Cho et al. 1998). Increasingly the concept \r is being integrated into the literature of low-carbon development, including innovation and technology transfer policies (Pigato et al. \r 2020), highlighting in particular the importance of contextual factors of successful technology transfer and leapfrogging including: \r domestic absorptive capacity and technological capabilities (Cirera and Maloney 2017); human capital, skills, and relevant technical \r know-how (Nelson and Phelps 1966); the size of the market (Keller 2004); greater openness to trade (Sachs and Warner 1995; Keller \r 2004); geographical proximity to investors and financing (Comin et al. 2012); environmental regulatory proximity (Dechezlepretre \r [...]"


id: 4bf7469e91b86f2dad334b0dc4b6e724
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"[...] et al. 2015); and stronger protection of intellectual property rights (Dechezlepretre et al. 2013; Dussaux et al. 2017). The existence \r of a technological potential for leapfrogging therefore needs to be considered within a wider context of social, institutional, and \r economic factors that influence whether leapfrogging potentials can be realised (high evidence, high agreement)."


id: 8c8d0bc4ac43568ceb0cd2261e8199a4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21910
content:
"In demand-side mitigation, governance is key to drive the \r multidimensional changes needed to meet service needs within \r a society that provide people with a decent living while increasingly \r reducing resource and energy input levels (Rojas-Rueda et al. 2012; \r Batchelor et al. 2018; OECD 2019a). Impartial governance, understood \r as equal treatment of everyone by the rule of law, creates social trust \r and is thus a  key enabler of inclusive and participatory demand\u0002side climate policies (Rothstein 2011). Inclusive and broad-based \r participation itself also leads to greater social trust and thus is also \r a key enabler of demand-side climate mitigation (Section 5.2). Higher \r social trust and inclusive participatory processes also reduce inequality, \r restrain opportunistic behaviour and enhance cooperation (Drews and \r van den Bergh 2016; Gur 2020) (Section 5.2). Altogether, broad-based \r participatory processes are central to the successful implementation of \r [...]"


id: 2a1f59346aa2e32230956371f4ee42ad
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"[...] climate policies (Rothstein and Teorell 2008; Klenert et al. 2018) (high \r evidence, medium agreement). A culture of cooperation feeds back to \r increase social trust and enables action that reduce GHG emissions \r (Carattini et al. 2015; Jo and Carattini 2021), and requires including \r explicit consideration of the informal sector (Box 5.10). More equitable \r societies also have the institutional flexibility to allow for mitigation \r to advance faster, given their readiness to adopt locally-appropriate \r mitigation policies; they also suffer less from policy lock-in (Tanner \r et al. 2009; Lorenz 2013; Chu 2015; Cloutier et al. 2015; Martin 2016; \r Seto et al. 2016; Vandeweerdt et al. 2016; Turnheim et al. 2018)."


id: 408ec2688dd6cb0da234a4f810124ffc
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content:
"The last contentious issue is if policies can or should substitute for \r lack of economic or social appeal of change or for technological risks. \r Many large-scale supply-side climate mitigation options, such as CCS \r or nuclear power, involve high technological risks, critically depend \r on a stable carbon price, and are controversial in terms of social and \r environmental impacts (Sovacool et al. 2014; Smith et al. 2016; Wilson \r et al. 2020a) (high evidence, medium agreement). There is continuing \r debate if and how policies could counterbalance these impacts in \r order to accelerate transitions (Nordhaus 2019; Lovins 2015). Some \r demand-side options like large-scale public transport infrastructures \r such as 'Hyperloop' (Decker et al. 2017) or concepts such as the Asian \r Super Grid (maglev fast train coupled with superconducting electricity \r transmission networks) (AIGC 2017) may face similar challenges, which \r adds weight and robustness to those demand-side options that are \r [...]"


id: 77c3e9f9c0ae54254e6073c6edc702a9
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vector_id: 18278
content:
"[...] more decentralised, granular in scale, and provide potential tangible \r consumer benefits besides being low-carbon (like more efficient \r buildings and appliances, 'soft' urban mobility options (walking and \r cycling), digitalisation, among others (Grubler et al. 2018))."


id: 7b4134e1251bb3be90e639e1b447db21
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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vector_id: 18888
content:
"The informal economy represents a large and growing portion of socio-economic activities (Charmes 2016; Muchie et al. 2016; Mbaye \r and Gueye 2018), including much of the work done by women worldwide. It accounts for an estimated 61% of global employment \r in the world; 90% in developing countries, 67% in emerging countries, and 18% in developed countries (Berik 2018), representing \r roughly 30% of GDP across a range of countries (Duran Heras 2012; Narayan 2017). Due to its importance, policies which support \r informal-sector climate mitigation activities may be extremely efficient (Garland 2015). For example, environmental and energy taxes \r may have negative gross costs when the informal sector dominates economic activity since these taxes indirectly tax the informal \r sector; informal production may substitute for energy-intensive goods, with strong welfare-enhancing effects (Bento et al. 2018a). The \r [...]"


id: e5092c8d43765d3cb5988ecce80b5ce0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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content:
"[...] informal sector can assemble social and financial capital, create jobs, and build low-carbon local economies (Ruzek 2015). Constraints \r on small and informal-sector firms' ability to build climate resilience include financial and data barriers, limited access to information \r technology, and policy exclusion (Kraemer-Mbula and Wunsch-Vincent 2016; Crick et al. 2018a; Crick et al. 2018b)."


id: db54fbe6770167c2f5b2c8f6ce600574
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35857
content:
"There is high untapped potential of demand-side mitigation options \r if considered holistically within the domains of Avoid-Shift-Improve \r (Sections 5.3 and 5.4, Tables 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3a,b). Within the demand\u0002side mitigation options opportunity space, policies currently focus \r more on efficiency and 'Improve' options and relatively less on \r 'Shift' and 'Avoid' options (Dubois et al. 2019; Moberg et al. 2019). \r Current demand-side policies are fragmented, piecemeal and too \r weak to drive demand-side transitions commensurate with 1.5degC or \r 2degC climate goals (Wilson et al. 2012; Fawcett et al. 2019; Mundaca \r et  al. 2019; Moberg et  al. 2019) (high evidence, high agreement). \r However, increasingly policy mix in a number of countries has seen \r a rise in prohibitions on fossil fuel use as a way to weaken lock-ins, \r for example, on fossil fuel heating in favour of low-carbon alternatives \r (Rosenbloom et al. 2020). Policies that are aimed at behaviour and \r [...]"


id: 401c509a6ea853352bf1cc8c7bae6ea5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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content:
"[...] lifestyle changes carry a perception of political risks for policymakers, \r which may explain why policy instruments focus more on information \r provision and adoption of incentives than on regulation and investment \r (Rosenow et al. 2017; Moberg et al. 2019). Acceleration of demand\u0002side transitions would thus require both a broadening of demand-side \r options and the creation of comprehensive and targeted policy mixes \r (Kern et al. 2017; Rosenow et al. 2017; IPCC 2018) that strengthen the \r five drivers of decision and action identified in Section 5.4, Table 5.4 \r and in Tables 5.5-5.7 (high evidence, high agreement). Demand-side \r transitions in developing and emerging economies would also require \r stronger administrative capacity as well as technical and financial \r support (UN-Habitat 2013; Creutzig et al. 2016b)."


id: 6b58fbac0f1d5808ad2c554f31743ddf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16185
content:
"Mobility services is one of the key areas where a  combination of \r market-based and command-and-control measures have been \r implemented to persuade large numbers of people to get out \r of their automobiles and take up public transport and cycling \r alternatives (Gehl et  al. 2011). Congestion charges are often \r complemented by other measures, such as company subsidies for \r bicycles, to incentivise the shift to public mobility services. Attracting \r people to public transport requires sufficient spatial coverage of \r transport with adequate level of provision, and good quality service \r at affordable fares (Sims et  al. 2014; Moberg et  al. 2019) (high \r evidence, high agreement). Cities such as Bogota, Colombia, Buenos \r Aires, Argentina, and Santiago, Chile, have seen rapid growth \r of cycling, resulting in a  six-fold increase in cyclists (Pucher and \r Buehler 2017). Broadly, the history and type of city determines how \r [...]"


id: b968159255dab708e7b002ad30615ad1
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29833
content:
"[...] quickly the transition to public modes of transport can be achieved. \r For example, cities in developed countries enjoy an advantage in \r that there is a network of high-quality public transport predating the \r advent of automobiles, whereas cities in less developed countries \r are latecomers to large-scale network infrastructure (UN-Habitat \r 2013; Gota et al. 2019)."


id: 47843a9191e1005455b04ae4d06e0439
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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vector_id: 9796
content:
"et  al. 2019). In the first phase, which is characterised by the \r emergence or introduction of radical innovations in small niches, \r policies focus on: (i) supporting R&D and demonstration projects \r to enable learning and capability developments, (ii) nurturing \r the building of networks and  multi-stakeholder interactions, and \r (iii)  providing future orientation through visions or targets (Brown \r et  al. 2003; Lopez-Garcia et  al. 2019; Roesler and Hassler 2019). \r In the second phase, the policy emphasis shifts towards upscaling \r of experiments, standardisation, cost reduction, and the creation \r of early market niches (Borghei and Magnusson 2018; Ruggiero et al. \r 2018). In  the third and later phases, comprehensive policy mixes \r are used to stimulate mass adoption, infrastructure creation, social \r acceptance and business investment (Fichter and Clausen 2016; \r Geels et al. 2018; Strauch 2020). In the fourth phase, transitions can \r [...]"


id: 67ab545a2944e63cd444bc7f803aa05f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15504
content:
"[...] also be stimulated through policies that weaken or phase out existing \r regimes, such as removing inefficient subsidies (for cheap petrol or \r fuel oil) that encourage wasteful consumption, increasing taxes on \r carbon-intensive products and practices (Box 5.11), or substantially \r tightening regulations and standards (Kivimaa and Kern 2016; David \r 2017; Rogge and Johnstone 2017)."


id: bb189cbbcfb0ba1be3add14675a4f652
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30140
content:
"Citizens tend to ignore or doubt the idea that pricing carbon emissions reduces GHG emissions (Kallbekken et al. 2011; Douenne \r and Fabre 2019; Maestre-Andres et  al. 2019). Further, citizens have fairness concerns about carbon pricing (Buchs and Schnepf \r 2013; Douenne and Fabre 2019; Maestre-Andres et al. 2019), even if higher carbon prices can be made progressive by suitable use \r of revenues (Rausch et al. 2011; Williams et al. 2015; Klenert and Mattauch 2016). There are also non-economic properties of policy \r instruments that matter for public support: Calling a carbon price a 'CO2 levy' alleviates solution aversion (Kallbekken et al. 2011; \r Carattini et al. 2017). It may be that the word 'tax' evokes a feeling of distrust in government and fears of high costs, low benefits \r and distributional effects (Strand 2020). Trust in politicians is negatively correlated with higher carbon prices (Hammar and Jagers \r [...]"


id: 3120164bcb6f0e72908ea28b9f8830b6
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5896
content:
"[...] 2006; Rafaty 2018) and political campaigns for a carbon tax can lower public support for them (Anderson et al. 2019). Few developing \r countries have adopted carbon taxes, probably due to high costs, relatively low benefits, and distributional effects (Strand 2020)."


id: 2419bb5edca8bbb540cb4c3094c1a23f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3532
content:
"The effectiveness of a policy package is determined by design decisions \r as well as the wider governance context that include the political \r environment, institutions for coordination across scales, bureaucratic \r traditions, and judicial functioning (high evidence, high agreement) \r (Howlett and Rayner 2013; Rogge and Reichardt 2013; Rosenow et al. \r 2016). Policy packages often emerge through interactions between \r different policy instruments as they operate in either complementary \r or contradictory ways, resulting from conflicting policy goals \r (Cunningham et al. 2013; Givoni et al. 2013). An example includes the \r acceleration in shift from traditional biomass to the adoption of modern \r cooking fuel for 80 million households in rural India over a very short \r period of four years (2016-2020), which employed a comprehensive \r policy package including financial incentives, infrastructural support \r and strengthening of the supply chain to induce households to shift \r [...]"


id: ace6109e1234670f16ac01394ede348f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27663
content:
"[...] towards a clean cooking fuel from the use of biomass (Kumar 2019). \r This was operationalised by creating a LPG supply chain by linking \r oil and gas companies with distributors to assure availability, and \r create infrastructure for local storage along with an improvement of \r the rural road network, especially in the rural context (Sankhyayan \r and Dasgupta 2019). State governments initiated separate policies to \r increase the distributorship of LPG in their states (Kumar et al. 2016). \r Similarly, policy actions for scaling up electric vehicles need to be \r well designed and coordinated where EV policy, transport policy and \r climate policy are used together, working on different decision points \r and different aspects of human behaviour (Barton and Schutte 2017). \r The coordination of the multiple policy actions enables co-evolution \r of multiple outcomes that involve shifting towards renewable energy \r production, improving access to charging infrastructure, carbon \r [...]"


id: 858842e6082b77bfdab4ea33d00539bd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20634
content:
"Sequencing policies appropriately is a  success factor for climate \r policy regimes (high evidence, high agreement). In most situations \r policy measures require a preparatory phase that prepares the ground \r by lowering the costs of policies, communicating the costs and \r benefits to citizens, and building coalitions for policies, thus reducing \r political resistance (Meckling et  al. 2017). This policy sequencing \r aims to incrementally relax or remove barriers over time to enable \r significant cumulative increases in policy stringency and create \r coalitions that support future policy development (Pahle et al. 2018). \r German policies on renewables began with funding for research, \r design and development (RD&D), then subsidies for demonstration \r projects during the 1970s and 1980s, and continued to larger-scale \r projects such as 'Solar Roofs' programmes in the 1990s, including \r scaled-up feed-in tariffs for solar power (Jacobsson and Lauber 2006). \r [...]"


id: 49f28e7c37d2c3c0323b6d2d906c53a5
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10252
content:
"[...] These policies led to industrial expansion in wind and solar energy \r systems, giving rise to powerful renewables interest coalitions that \r defend existing measures and lend political support for further action. \r Policy sequencing has also been deployed to introduce technology \r bans and strict performance standards with a  view to eliminating \r emissions as the end goal, and may involve simultaneous support \r for low-carbon options while deliberately phasing out established \r technological regimes (Rogge and Johnstone 2017)."


id: f79477d22a601278510891ed358427a5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40929
content:
"Design of policy packages should consider not only policies that \r support low-carbon transitions but also those that challenge existing \r carbon-intensive regimes, generating not just policy 'winners' but \r also 'losers' (high evidence, high agreement) (Carley and Konisky \r 2020). The winners include low-carbon innovators and entrepreneurs, \r while the potential losers include incumbents with vested interests \r in sustaining the status quo (Mundaca et al. 2018; Monasterolo and \r Raberto 2019). Low-carbon policy packages would benefit from \r looking beyond climate benefits to include non-climate benefits \r such as health benefits, fuel poverty reductions and environmental \r co-benefits (Urge-Vorsatz et  al. 2014; Sovacool et  al. 2020b). The \r uptake of decentralised energy services using solar PV in rural \r areas in developing countries is one such example where successful \r initiatives are linked to the convergence of multiple policies that \r [...]"


id: 8f0c95b20048573aca314b5be9d97938
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22366
content:
"[...] include import tariffs, research incentives for R&D, job creation \r programmes, policies to widen health and education services, and \r strategies for increased safety for women and children (Kattumuri \r and Kruse 2019; Gebreslassie 2020)."


id: 6a3dbeb3360de423d2c1d14e33595485
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15970
content:
"The energy-efficient lighting transition in Europe represents a good \r case of the formation of policy coalitions that led to the development of \r policy packages. As attention to energy efficiency in Europe increased \r in the 1990s, policymakers attempted to stimulate energy-saving \r lamp diffusion through voluntary measures. But policies stimulated \r only limited adoption. Consumers perceived compact fluorescent \r lamps (CFLs) as giving 'cold' light, being unattractively shaped, taking \r too long to achieve full brightness, unsuitable for many fixtures, and \r unreliable (Wall and Crosbie 2009). Still, innovations by major CFL \r and LED multinationals continued. Increasing political attention to \r climate change and criticisms from environmental NGOs (e.g. WWF, \r Greenpeace) strengthened awareness about the inefficiency of \r incandescent light bulbs (ILBs), which led to negative socio-cultural \r framings that associated ILBs  with energy waste (Franceschini and \r [...]"


id: 38f9b094db9eecc96cdf72e721e50d32
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"[...] Alkemade 2016). The combined pressures from the lighting industry, \r NGOs and member states led the European Commission to introduce \r the 2009 ban of ILBs of more than 80W, progressing to lower-wattage \r bans in successive years. While the ILB ban initially mainly boosted \r CFL diffusion, it also stimulated LED uptake. LED prices decreased \r quickly by more than 85% between 2008 and 2012 (Sanderson \r and Simons 2014), because of scale economies, standardisation \r and commoditisation of LED chip technology, and improved \r manufacturing techniques. Because of further rapid developments to \r meet consumer tastes, LEDs came to be seen as the future of domestic \r lighting (Franceschini et  al. 2018). Acknowledging these changing \r views, the 2016 and 2018 European bans on directional and non\u0002directional halogen bulbs explicitly intended to further accelerate the \r LED transition and reduce energy consumption for residential lighting."


id: edf293c83b050ed12b78b9928d8d528d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Scenarios start within parameter-rich models carrying more than \r a  decade-long legacy of supply-side technologies that are not \r always gauged in recent technological developments. Service \r provisioning systems are not explicitly modelled, and diversity in \r concepts and patterns of lifestyles rarely considered. A new class of \r flexible and  modular models with focus on services and activities, \r based on a variety of data sources including big data collected and \r compiled, is needed. There is scope for more sensitivity analysis \r on two aspects to better guide further detailed studies on societal \r response to policy. These aspects need to explore which socio\u0002behavioural aspects and/or organisation changes has the biggest \r impact on energy/emissions reductions, and on the scale for take\u0002back effects, due to interdependence on inclusion or exclusion \r of groups of people. Models mostly consider behavioural change \r free, and don't account for how savings due to 'Avoid' measures \r [...]"


id: 57e336f152d5d46dbc1c71ee6f6b3aec
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12726
content:
"[...] may be re-spent. Most quantitatively measurable service indicators, \r for example passenger-kilometres travelled or tonne-kilometres \r of freight transport are also inadequate to measure services in the \r sense of well-being contributions. More research is needed on how \r to measure, for example, accessibility, social inclusion etc. Otherwise, \r services will also be poorly represented in scenarios."


id: f2e193a2729573ef32442c3c77d565ad
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40125
content:
"is, what is their relative importance in different transition phases; \r (ii) how narratives associated with specific technologies, group \r identities, and climate change influence each other and interact over \r time to enable and constrain mitigation outcomes; (iii) how social \r media influences the development and impacts of narratives about \r low-carbon transitions; (iv) the effects of social movements (for \r climate justice, youth climate activism, fossil fuel divestment, and \r climate action more generally) on social norms and political change, \r especially in less developed countries; (v) how existing provisioning \r systems and social practices destabilise through the weakening of \r various lock-in mechanisms, and resulting deliberate strategies for \r accelerating demand-side transitions; (vi) a dynamic understanding \r of feasibility, which addresses the dynamic mechanisms that lower \r barriers or drive mitigation options over the barriers; (vii) how \r [...]"


id: 325a87668217d30717265b5e084264cf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6116
content:
"[...] shocks like prolonged pandemic impact willingness and capacity to \r change and their permanency for various social actors and country \r contexts. The debate on the most powerful leverage points and \r policies for speeding up change in social and technological systems \r need to be resolved with more evidence. Discussion on the policy \r interdependence and implications of end-user and efficiency focused \r strategies have only just started suggesting an important area for \r future research."


id: 9f868f3ac9d4f504adcb47bc0166b90e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25283
content:
"The Supplementary Material for Chapter  5 (Social Science Primer) \r aims to present multiple fundamental frameworks and concepts that \r help explain the variety in social aspects of demand-side responses \r to climate mitigation. It does not aim to resolve any debates about \r the diversity in perspectives and approaches on this topic in the \r literature. Instead, its goal is to describe more fully some common \r concepts and terminologies that are mentioned in this first-ever \r full chapter (Chapter 5) in an IPCC report on demand-side, energy\u0002service, and social aspects of mitigation. Chapter  5 uses social \r science perspectives to examine societal level challenges and \r opportunities for mitigation options that involve end users, with \r an eye on policy relevant insights about the drivers, processes, and \r potential of demand-side solutions. Glossary definitions provide \r insufficient background information for new concepts used in this \r [...]"


id: 298c19cd850bf85d3ddbc9bf813c0ed
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4531
content:
"[...] IPCC report to present social science perspectives. The Social Science \r Primer provides the theoretical underpinnings for these concepts, \r drawing from various social sciences (see also Creutzig et al. 2018; \r Jorgenson et al. 2018; Hayward and Roy 2019; Hess and Sovacool \r 2020). This primer is not meant to be complete and comprehensive \r but is an easily accessible short handbook and a living document in \r the IPCC process."


id: a25c6209a493ccf2535cf5ca7c7b304c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25787
content:
"There has been continuous advancement in the way demand-side \r choice processes have been viewed and modelled in the IPCC and \r energy and carbon mitigation policy community. From the First to \r Fourth Assessment Reports (AR1 to AR4), rational decision-making \r as defined by microeconomics was the implicit assumption, where \r homogeneous individual agents maximise self-focused utility or \r expected utility, with the only consequential variations of this \r homo economicus relating to income, wealth, risk attitude, and \r time discount rate (Persky 1995). The Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) \r (Kunreuther et al. 2014) introduced a broader range of goals that are \r held by homo sapiens (material goals like those of homo economicus, \r but also self- and other-regarding social goals, and psychological \r goals such as confidence and feeling in control). It also considered \r a broader range of decision processes (calculation-based, but also \r [...]"


id: 5f628504b74cdb809cbaab11b1b7aa8a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14091
content:
"[...] affect-based, and role- and rule-based processes) designed to allow \r timely decisions within a context of bounded rationality as the result \r of attentional and processing limitations. AR5's perspective on \r decisions and action, like the rational choice perspective, remained \r individual- and agency-focused and thus did not explicitly address \r the role of structural, cultural, and institutional constraints and the \r pervasive influence of physical and social context, beyond simple \r choice-architecture interventions that modify the context or format in \r which choice alternatives are presented (Thaler and Sunstein 2003)."


id: 50d38bd2811bd505d739d362930677c4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11496
content:
"Figure 5.SM.1 on demand-side literature summarises key results of \r papers in the social science literature with the highest topic score (the \r topic score measures how well any given paper matches a topic model, \r vectors of 10 co-occurring keywords, highest amount of references to \r key social science topics) and/or highest citation count, organised \r by mitigation sector. It builds on 34 search queries on demand-side \r climate change mitigation and 99,065 unique papers, which were \r fed into a machine learning algorithm to identify 60 topic models \r (vectors of 10 co-occurring keywords) (Creutzig et al. 2021a). Expert \r judgement identified the 24 topic models most relevant to demand\u0002side climate change mitigation (see also Box 5.1, Figure 1). In the \r next step, the key papers from the topic models were summarised, \r selected from the ten most cited of each topic model with topic score \r >0.1, and the 10 with highest topic score. This resulted in a wide \r [...]"


id: 48ebeab1b9a21f7a66fbd4bb7b8a1b4d
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10051
content:
"[...] array of insights, ranging from the importance of consumption-based \r carbon footprints, to sectoral interventions, to policy instruments, \r and the key insight that demand and supply are interdependent and \r require joint consideration. Figure  5.SM.1 further condenses these \r insights into headline statements in a clustered summary."


id: 4257557bcf2cb1b5fa54af9bf55dfb47
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8870
content:
"From an economics perspective, for example, expanding concepts of \r value to include nonmarketed social and ecological factors, unpaid \r work, care, and informal-sector production makes possible a broader \r understanding of economic participation and a more inclusive view \r of economic activity along with its total benefits and costs. Individual \r and collective choices, including not only what to consume but how \r best to foster local contexts for well-being, are reflected in new \r literatures on relative provisioning, sufficiency, decent standards of \r living for all, and the costs of socio-economic inequality. Sufficiency in \r economics (also discussed in Chapter 9 of this report, and Chapter 21 \r in Johansson et al. (2012)) expresses the idea that ecological limits \r necessitate restraint to prevent overconsumption; short- and long\u0002term risks including those related to climate change can only be \r mitigated by going beyond cooperation and efficiency to sufficiency \r [...]"


id: e77a227208a2eb1001717a27e797e732
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"[...] (Princen 2003; Mongsawad 2012; Bierwirth and Thomas 2019; \r Fawcett and Darby 2019; Hayward and Roy 2019; Monyei et  al. \r 2019). Depending on policy contexts, and with wide variations in the \r literature on methods, assumptions, and data, behavioural changes \r that reduce energy consumption can lead to rebound and spillover \r effects that can partially counter the benefits, reinforce them, or \r enhance welfare (Chakravarty et  al. 2013; Brockway et  al. 2017; \r Rogelj et al. 2018; Van Lange et al. 2018; Shao et al. 2019; Vita et al. \r 2019b; Yan et al. 2019; Court and Sorrell 2020; Sorrell et al. 2020; \r Saunders et al. 2021). For example, policies are more successful in \r minimising rebounds, reducing emissions and increasing welfare \r when they consider the step-wise interactions among invention and \r diffusion of energy-efficient low-carbon technologies, changing social \r norms, infrastructures, and institutional transformation (van  den \r [...]"


id: 80fd21953cf9ecaf83834f0ec060be96
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19833
content:
"Provision of services associated with low-energy demand is a key \r component of current and future efforts to reduce carbon emissions. \r Services can be provided in various culturally-appropriate ways, with \r diverse climate implications. People demand services for dignified \r survival, sustenance, mobility, communication, comfort and material \r well-being (Nakicenovic et al. 1996; Johansson et al. 2012; Creutzig \r et  al. 2018). Access to services is fundamental, rather than only \r physical resources (biomass, energy, materials, etc.) and technologies \r (e.g.,  cars, appliances). Three key concepts for evaluating the \r efficiency of service provision systems are: resource cascades and \r exergy (Grubler et al. 2012) as well as energy (Ulgiati et al. 1995). \r These concepts provide powerful analytical lenses through which to \r identify and substantially reduce energy and resource waste in service \r provision systems both for decent living standards (see Section 5.3.3 \r [...]"


id: 6adb09e6672e17c82b360641a6cdcf29
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"et al. 2020). Like the early footprint indicators, DLS omits intermediate \r service provision and some important components of well-being such \r as collective, land-based cultural values (Ikuenobe 2016; Bullock \r et al. 2018; Choy 2018; Raymond et al. 2019; Richardson et al. 2019) \r in its focus on material prerequisites of well-being (Rao and Min \r 2018). Socially-determined and contextual measures of value and \r individual/collective well-being also interrelate with social norms \r regarding acceptable or expected consumption levels, as shown in \r Figure 5.SM.2. This has implications for emissions, since appropriate \r modes of service provision within different cultural contexts, and in \r situations of changing social norms and preferences, can facilitate the \r effective decoupling of service provision from energy use (Jackson \r 2005; Akenji 2014; Komiyama 2014; Brand-Correa and Steinberger \r 2017; Mastrucci and Rao 2017; O'Neill et  al. 2018; Rao and Min \r [...]"


id: 3b91cb3b124fc408ee1f745d48adcf5d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7664
content:
"2018; Pigato et  al. 2020; Safarzadeh et  al. 2020; Freire-Gonzalez \r 2021). Intersectional inequities related to geography, gender, race, \r Indigeneity, ethnicity and other factors interrupt the fair distribution of \r income, resources, energy access and emissions, restricting the margin \r of manoeuvre for climate action and the urgency of operationalising \r sufficiency norms. One way to foster this is through multi-dimensional \r affordability, which includes not only economic affordability but also \r social, motivational, and institutional/environmental affordability, \r as part of consumption choice processes - all influenced by \r policies (Spangenberg and Lorek 2019). Information for consumers, \r communities and policymakers about the equity and emissions \r implications of their decisions, such as that provided by the Ecological \r Footprint (Kopp and Dorn 2018; Lin et al. 2018; Yunani et al. 2020) \r and the Carbon Footprint (Wiedmann and Minx 2008), can facilitate \r [...]"


id: 14910b9fa6812e610e9ce77b95eb6d82
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 842
content:
"[...] multi-dimensional choice processes (Gonzalez-Garcia et  al. 2018; \r Beattie and Sale 2009; Wood et al. 2020)."


id: c92d2f5c8547a0f285ec331c33dc338f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32719
content:
"of infrastructures as an entry point; and studies in technological \r innovation consider socio-technical transitions and the norms, rules \r and pace of adoption that support dominant technologies. Political \r scientists consider the roles of ideology, democracy, institutions, and \r politics in shaping societal transformation. Generally, social sciences \r share a focus on interpersonal and collective outcomes - how \r people shape their cultures and livelihoods together across gender \r and intersectional markers of identity and difference (Woodward \r and Woodward 2015; Buchanan et  al. 2020; Sawer et  al. 2020). \r Social practice theory emphasises interactions between artefacts, \r competences, and cultural meanings (Ropke 2009; Shove and \r Walker 2014). The energy cultures framework highlights feedbacks \r between materials, norms, and behavioural practices (Stephenson \r et  al. 2015; Jurisoo et  al. 2019). Socio-technical transitions theory \r [...]"


id: 71cb4b027a7d81e492c968118e8aa9e0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17262
content:
"[...] addresses interactions between technologies, user practices, cultural \r meanings, business, infrastructures, and public policies (McMeekin \r and Southerton 2012; Geels et al. 2017) and thus accommodates the \r five drivers of change and stability discussed in Sections 5.4 and 5.5 \r in Chapter 5 of the contribution of Working Group III to AR6."


id: 83522f6eccb85a1b97eeba2933f023f7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20236
content:
"collectively in driving institutional change (agency), the redesign of \r infrastructures and technologies to foster low-carbon consumption \r patterns (structure), and the (re)establishment of cultures and \r social norms in alignment with consumption patterns that have few \r associated GHG emissions (meaning). Even a broad set of individual\u0002based decision factors accounts at best for 30-40% of the variance \r in climate action, suggesting that behavioural change is not only \r a function of individual agency but also depends on other enabling \r factors, such as infrastructures, social norms, and professional roles \r (Bamberg et  al. 2007b; Whitmarsh et  al. 2017). Chapter  5 reflects \r this more inclusive view of different disciplinary and philosophical \r perspectives on individual and collective energy decisions (Grubb \r 2014; Riahi et al. 2015; Creutzig et al. 2016, 2018; Grubler et al. 2018; \r Mundaca et al. 2019). It broadens the individually focused agency \r [...]"


id: 1155494181ceda7dfa4e7f187d38ceab
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 247
content:
"[...] framework of micro- and behavioural economics and psychology by \r also including considerations of structure and meaning, that is, the \r hardware and software of the social, cultural, and physical context \r studied by disciplines like geography, ecology, sociology, urban \r planning, and anthropology."


id: 104f2cfd7adeb8a8ad16e02bb782ba68
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 58
content:
"Decent Living Standards (DLS) is a tool for assessing well-being for all \r in terms of needs satisfiers. It is defined as the minimum set of inputs \r required for a decent human livelihood, anywhere in the world (Doyal \r and Gough 1991; Neri 2002; Adema 2006; Antony and Visweswara \r Rao 2007; Saramet 2007; Acs and Turner 2008; Saramet et al. 2009; \r Rao and Baer 2012; Frye 2013; Brand-Correa and Steinberger 2017; \r Rao and Min 2018b) (Chapter 9, Section 9.1). Services which make \r up DLS include adequate nutrition, shelter, hygiene, clothing, health \r care, mobility, education, communication, and information access. \r DLS goes beyond existing multidimensional poverty indicators, \r which set a floor for human needs, by addressing living conditions \r and social participation - thus including social as well as individual \r components of well-being. It also offers a normative basis to assess \r environmental impacts and climate change (Rao and Min 2018b). \r [...]"


id: ccdfc945a4eb4dd92cb9203cbf197b1a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33382
content:
"[...] DLS is based on human needs theory, which argues that material \r dimensions of well-being correlate with needs satisfaction, but only \r up to a threshold, after which additional use of needs satisfiers does \r not result in significant improvements in needs satisfaction (Doyal \r and Gough 1991; Wilkinson and Pickett 2009; Frank 2010; Stiglitz \r 2012; Oishi et al. 2018; Xie et al. 2018; Wilkinson and Pickett 2019a). \r It is also closely related to eudaimonic well-being approaches focused \r on realising human potential, not just seeking pleasure and avoiding \r pain (Lamb and Steinberger 2017)."


id: fcd40cc2075c15cc4b586804e31bb9de
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41847
content:
"5.SM.1 Well-being, Decent Living Standards, \r Equity, and the SDGs\r Well-being for all is a cornerstone of sustainable development \r (Princen 2003; Dasgupta and Dasgupta 2017) and directly underpins \r the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). A focus on human well\u0002being improves upon GDP, which is an inadequate and incomplete \r goal for socio-economic activities (Faber et al. 2012; Zimmerer 2012; \r Arrow et al. 2013; Dasgupta 2013; Griggs et al. 2013; Hobson 2013; \r Dasgupta 2014; McGregor and Pouw 2017; Sekulova et  al. 2017; \r Fioramonti et  al. 2019; Gabriel and Bond 2019; Hayward and Roy \r 2019; Perkins 2019; Pollin 2019; Women's Budget Group 2020). All \r of this literature shows that above a certain income threshold, further \r increases do not produce greater well-being; it is well-being that \r should be pursued, rather than economic growth. Human well-being \r is a description of the state of individuals' life situations in multiple \r [...]"


id: 6127b9508e93a8861f500a939a6c4f5c
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14390
content:
"[...] dimensions that captures their life circumstances (McGillivray and \r Clarke 2006). Constituents of well-being include health, happiness, \r meaningful work and social relationships, freedom and liberty, while \r determinants are the inputs that enable well-being such as food, \r shelter, water, access to knowledge and information (Dasgupta 2001). \r A well-being focus emphasises equity and universal needs satisfaction \r within planetary boundaries, compatible with SDG progress (Lamb \r and Steinberger 2017). GDP growth still dominates the current \r economic development literature, including the assumptions that \r ecosystem limits can always be overcome via production technologies \r and that welfare is predominantly associated with increased levels of \r consumption of products and services (Roy et  al. 2012). However, \r GDP only measures economic activity, with no reference to material \r limits, neglecting inequality and services delivered by current capital \r [...]"


id: 8a8506744dc8bd151efea6dcc637512d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21542
content:
"[...] stocks (Haberl et al. 2019); it is therefore, a poor proxy for societal \r well-being (Ward et  al. 2016). Instead, several new indices have \r emerged to measure well-being (e.g., Human Development Index, \r OECD Better Life Initiative, QoL Index, Gallup Health, Well-Being \r Index, Gross National Happiness, Happy Planet Index). Applying \r a  single measure represents a challenge due to the lack of data \r on many components of well-being (Sugiawan and Managi 2019). \r Measures such as inclusive wealth (the sum of capital assets that \r form the productive base of an economy) have been proposed as \r economic indicators to replace GDP for measuring well-being (Arrow \r et al. 2013; Dasgupta et al. 2015; UNEP 2018; Sugiawan and Managi \r 2019). Another measure for considering aspects of social progress \r beyond economic activity is the social progress index, a composite \r index based on a dashboard of outcome-oriented indicators of \r [...]"


id: 738173ff29147c20a73cd13fc08dd7b8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17573
content:
"[...] fulfilment of basic human needs and foundations of well-being \r (Haberl et  al. 2019), considering opportunities such as nutrition, \r shelter, water, safety, access to knowledge and information, health, \r education, freedom, rights and environmental quality.\r All of these considerations have been fully or partially reflected in \r the United Nation's Sustainable Development Goals - politically "


id: c70f96399581a3be8af4278acce758ad
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32339
content:
"A transition to a low-carbon economy will require a significant shift \r in incentives. This understanding of consumer behaviour has clear \r implications for policy - suggesting, for example, that appropriate \r taxes or subsidies can lead to major reductions in greenhouse gas \r emissions. But focusing solely on material incentives misses important \r features of human judgment and decision-making (Kahneman 2011; \r Thaler 2015), with relevant implications for environmental policy \r (Sunstein and Reisch 2014; Creutzig et al. 2016). For example, people \r may show 'status quo bias,' which means that they might continue \r to do what they have been doing, even if it would be in their interest \r to change (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988). Consumers may \r show 'present bias,' in the sense that they might focus on the short \r term, even if it would be in their interest to consider the long term \r (O'Donoghue and Rabin 2015). Whether consumers are responsive to \r [...]"


id: 4aefc68756b680fa015e97c85d0530a3
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10423
content:
"[...] material incentives depends on whether those incentives are made \r salient (Gabaix and Laibson 2018). Some characteristics of activities \r and products are 'shrouded', even though they matter to consumers' \r well-being, and consumers may not pay a great deal of attention to \r them. In addition, norms matter, and can greatly affect behaviour \r (Lessig 1995)."


id: 1fc1de07052a6f2b3462fa1bf3ccf866
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2793
content:
"To influence consumer demand, policymakers have an assortment \r of tools, including prohibitions, mandates, taxes, fees, subsidies, and \r 'nudges' (Thaler and Sunstein 2009), defined to include such choice\u0002preserving interventions as information, warnings, reminders, uses of \r social norms, and default rules such as automatic enrolment in 'green \r energy' in the form of wind or solar (Ebeling and Lotz 2015). It would \r make little sense to say, in the abstract, that one tool is better than \r another; the choice of tool depends on its effects on well-being in the \r relevant context. In principle, a carbon tax has many advantages over \r any other approach, because it forces consumers to bear the cost of \r their activities (Nordhaus 2013). But automatic enrolment in green \r energy might be a useful complement to a carbon tax, especially \r if that tax is too low. Responses and actions by relevant actors \r interact in complex ways that differ from the more linear integration \r [...]"


id: 3600decdd10a6d50d6dfd50309412ffd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6750
content:
"On a global scale, households influence, directly and indirectly, \r 72% of GHG emissions (Hertwich and Peters 2009; Roy et al. 2012). \r Energy use is disproportionally dominated by electricity in developed \r countries, and most cities in the developing countries, whereas \r non-electric cooking fuels constitute the largest share of energy \r use in rural areas of developing countries; energy use for mobility \r is significant and rising most rapidly (Ahmad et al. 2015). Demand\u0002side solutions require both the motivation to change and the \r capacity for change, in the form of availability and knowledge about \r change options and the resources to consider, initiate and maintain \r change. Existing willingness to change (to lower carbon sources of \r energy ('Shift') or energy-efficient devices ('Improve') or to reduce \r energy use ('Avoid')) is motivated by different factors in different \r demographics and geographies. For some, perceptions of climate \r [...]"


id: 2b344da9c4e42a5ae3045caa9c9ff995
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"[...] risks and concerns about the environment and future generations \r trigger action. For others, prices drive energy decisions and subsidies \r of carbon energy can be problematic, as they set up cultural norms \r and individual habits, a path-dependence of sorts that requires \r additional interventions to be overcome. Individuals' perceptions of \r climate risks, first covered in AR5, continue to be studied as a perhaps \r necessary if not sufficient condition for behaviour change."


id: 860b313e4acbaf6e6bc6bdeda7051709
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Measuring lifestyles is useful for different reasons. First, lifestyles can \r be tested as predictors or explanations of an outcome of interest \r such as risk of dementia (Lourida et al. 2019), food preferences (Nie \r and Zepeda 2011), or propensity to buy an electric vehicle (Axsen \r et al. 2012). The outcome of interest varies widely across research \r fields. Second, lifestyles can descriptively characterise common \r patterns of behaviour in specific domains or 'sites of practice' like \r shopping, food, domestic living, or energy and water consumption \r (Barr and Gilg 2006). This allows the relationship between lifestyles \r and situational factors to be explored in more depth. Third, lifestyles \r can explain variation between households in a population. This \r captures an important dimension of heterogeneity which can then \r be applied in modelling and scenario studies of how lifestyles may \r change into the future (Le Gallic et al. 2018; Van den Berg et al. 2019). \r [...]"


id: d9ed5b66337d3a187d2acf509864032a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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"[...] Fourth, lifestyles can also explain variation between populations in \r different countries or cultures. Data from the periodic World Values \r Survey reveals systematic differences in lifestyles between regions \r with certain cultural characteristics such as pragmatism or respect \r for tradition. Variation can also be situational. For example, housing\u0002related lifestyles were found to be similar across different European \r countries whereas food-related lifestyles were not (Thogersen \r 2017a, 2018)."


id: 6b6ea74f2fb5f7be0eebcf9e9b6e5980
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"Lifestyles can be identified and measured using both qualitative \r and quantitative methods. Qualitative methods explore self-identity, \r situational influences, and the dynamics of how lifestyles are \r expressed. Common qualitative methods used to research lifestyles \r include interviews (Barr et  al. 2011) and narratives (Hagbert and \r Bradley 2017). Quantitative methods link lifestyles to outcomes \r and impacts, and identify segments and variation in a population. \r Common quantitative methods include cluster analysis, factor \r analysis (Kuan et  al. 2019), hierarchical tree analysis (Baiocchi \r et al. 2015), and decision tree analysis (Le Gallic et al. 2018). These \r methods identify groups of individuals who share similar sets of \r cognitions and behaviours in certain contexts. Quantitative methods \r are commonly applied to survey datasets, which combine information \r on behaviours with self-reported cognitions. Examples of datasets \r [...]"


id: 300a97b86135d0cbd58c4770da507b39
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"[...] include national social surveys, household expenditure surveys, and \r time use surveys. These allow lifestyle groups or types to be identified \r in a population, and linked to socio-demographic, geographic or \r other widely-available indicators. For example, a recent study in \r France used census, housing, travel and household budget surveys \r to identify lifestyles grouped along eight dimensions: cohabitation, \r relationship with technology, mobility practices, attitude to work, "


id: 54a91c5bee8e5f585e20392c8313b5e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"lifestyles and technologies in France up to the year 2072 showed that \r an individualistic lifestyle with high take-up of digital technologies led \r to increased GDP but not carbon neutrality, in contrast to a society \r characterised by more collective lifestyles that resulted in less growth \r but greater emissions reductions (Millot et  al. 2018). Voluntary \r lifestyle change typically focuses on relatively low impact behaviours \r (e.g., switching off lights at home, recycling) in a piecemeal manner \r instead of high impact behaviours (e.g., adopting a low meat diet \r or reducing long-haul flights (Dubois et al. 2019; Nash et al. 2019). \r Changes in social, technological or demographic factors can also be \r enshrined in scenario narratives of future lifestyle change. Examples \r include a shift in consumption culture from owning goods to using \r services including through sharing economies (Vita et  al. 2019b), \r and a demographic shift from rural to urban, from physical to virtual \r [...]"


id: b225f815826c47d4eaf99716abcd4dd9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"[...] work, and from analogue to digital (Le Gallic et al. 2018; Millot et al. \r 2018). Such studies in the controlled environment of a simulation \r model show significant emission reduction potentials from low\u0002carbon lifestyle change. This is not just limited to the direct impact \r of lifestyle change on emissions, but also to the indirect impact of \r reducing the speed of required transformation upstream in energy \r and land-use systems (Grubler et al. 2018)."


id: f45a63573d853cb2eab7caa6d1832212
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"across the population as a whole is more widely applicable but is \r also more uncertain and contingent in terms of its emissions impact \r (Vita et al. 2019b). Low-carbon lifestyles can be defined broadly or \r situationally. Studies taking a broad view seek to generalise low\u0002carbon lifestyles that are consistent across multiple domains of \r everyday life. Such studies inform social marketing and educational \r campaigns to encourage more sustainable lifestyles (Darnton et al. \r 2011; DEFRA 2011). Other studies test whether low-carbon lifestyles \r are generalisable explanations for technology adoption decisions in \r multiple domains, such as electric vehicles, solar panels and green \r electricity tariffs (Axsen et al. 2012). Recognising the importance of \r situational factors, many studies focus on low-carbon lifestyles in \r a specific domain of resource-intensive activity. This includes domestic \r energy use and waste generation (Tudor et al. 2016), dwelling location \r [...]"


id: 400857a536704a2d09e5aa5adfcf4035
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"[...] and type (Frenkel et al. 2013; Thogersen 2017b), mobility and travel \r (Lanzendorf 2002; Thogersen 2018), leisure and tourism (Barr et al. \r 2011), and food (Hur et al. 2010; Thogersen 2017a). Some studies \r find that much of the variation in energy or resource consumption \r can be explained by domain-specific lifestyle factors (Sanquist et al. \r 2012). However, it is hard to generalise insights across domains as \r relationships between low-carbon lifestyles and emissions tend to be \r heterogeneous as well as situational or context-dependent."


id: 86deea4c320653c6732c125d36529800
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20892
content:
"Turning scenarios into reality is inevitably more complex and \r contingent. There is good evidence that interventions targeting \r specific behaviours can be effective, particularly if they combine \r different mechanisms such as price, norms, information, competences, \r and infrastructure (Stern et al. 2016). Robust principles for designing \r effective interventions for low-carbon behaviour change also \r benefit from a large body of evidence from public health (Michie \r et  al. 2011). However interventions targeting low-carbon lifestyles \r in general rather than specific low-carbon behaviours are harder to \r define beyond general informational, educational, and marketing \r strategies (Haq et al. 2008). The signal of low-carbon lifestyle change \r is also difficult to detect amidst the noise of a continually changing \r technological, social and demographic landscape. This is particularly \r the case in emerging economies with rapidly changing income \r [...]"


id: 5f9925a9fd2c0865e23a5061faf83a74
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14130
content:
"[...] distributions, urban settlements, and living standards (Hubacek et al. \r 2007; Chen et al. 2019)."


id: d62f1cc9dbf4ba087370dc921ca9ef1b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34999
content:
"forms of consumption they choose. Collectively, the same values \r and social norms affect voting, politics, private sector and informal \r sector decision-making and policy, with the potential to induce \r even faster change (Adger 2003). Since people are both consumers \r and producers in economic terms, their collective decisions depend \r on many factors, which also affect various individuals and groups \r differently (Johnson et al. 2020; Siciliano et al. 2021). For example, \r 'just transition' movements advance climate-related politics and \r policies by linking people's interests as workers (e.g., for jobs and \r workplace safety) to their concerns as consumers (e.g., for healthy \r products, well-being, and reduced climate risk). 'Just transition' is an \r interdisciplinary frame for inclusive climate and energy policy that \r is synergistic with changing social norms (Healy and Barry 2017; \r McCauley and Heffron 2018; Harrahill and Douglas 2019; Cha 2020; \r [...]"


id: abf50c561eefb0068b5ec2eb3b47ec21
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27491
content:
"As a central component of many cultures, religion interacts with \r climate change in numerous and diverse ways (Jenkins et  al. \r 2018). Some religious identities are associated with the denial of \r climate change, notably White US Evangelical Christians (Smith and \r Leiserowitz 2013), even though the situation may differ in other \r countries, for example in Sweden, where Evangelic Christians rather \r support progressive climate policies (Bjornberg et al. 2017). Different \r religions interpret climate change in different ways, but nearly all \r contain elements related to the protection of divine creation, including \r the environment. Faith groups are both social institutions and sites \r of collection action on climate change (Haluza-DeLay 2014). They \r can draw on shared symbols, identities and narratives to promote \r collective action on climate change (Roy et al. 2012; Bomberg and \r Hague 2018). For example Pope Francis' encyclical (2015) reframes \r [...]"


id: 3304223d6916336d33ba9fa2abceb64d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6240
content:
"[...] climate action from being an economic and technological issue to \r one of moral stewardship of public goods. Understanding religion \r helps in understanding attitudes towards climate change across \r communities and traditions (Jenkins et  al. 2018). However, further \r research is required to capture the heterogeneous practices of \r diverse faith groups globally in relation to climate mitigation \r (Haluza-DeLay 2014)."


id: 10e242924fceb7de381fcd49a84a2b23
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 159
content:
"household energy savings (Nolan et al. 2008), car use (Gardner and \r Abraham 2008), energy use (Farrow et  al., 2019), the adoption of \r electric vehicles and participation in smart energy systems (Noppers \r et al. 2019), and recycling (Geiger et al. 2019). Similarly, descriptive \r norm information or socially comparative feedback (in which one's \r own performance is compared to the performance of others) can \r encourage mitigation actions, although the overall effect size is not \r strong (Abrahamse and Steg 2013). A study in Uganda suggests \r that peer effects mostly affect attitudes towards cookstoves, but not \r the actual purchase of cookstoves (Beltramo et  al. 2015). Socially \r comparative feedback seems more effective when people more \r strongly identify with the reference group (De Dominicis et al. 2019). \r Descriptive norms are more strongly related to mitigation actions \r when injunctive norms are strong too, when people are not strongly \r [...]"


id: df889303c5dbd359b75beb2c20387ad7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36572
content:
"[...] personally involved with mitigation topics (Gockeritz et  al. 2010), \r when people are currently acting inconsistently with their preferences, \r when norm-based interventions are supported by other interventions, \r and when the context supports norm-congruent actions (Miller and \r Prentice 2016). Weak descriptive norms, in which people think others \r do not act on climate change, may inhibit mitigation actions (Schultz \r et al. 2007). Yet, trending norms that communicate that the number \r of people engaging in a behaviour is increasing, even if this concerns \r only a minority of people, can encourage the targeted behaviour, \r although the effect size is relatively small (Mortensen et al. 2019)."


id: 11536ae45166cc872494e26ea0952674
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 243
content:
"Human behaviour and choices are a function of personal and social \r norms and the content of norms depends on the context (Sunstein \r 1996; Thaler and Sunstein 2009; Niamir 2019). Climate change \r challenges pose major collective action problems, where a group \r benefits from a certain action, but no individual has sufficient \r incentive to act alone (Nyborg et  al. 2016; Niamir 2019). Here, \r formal institutions (e.g., laws and regulations) are not always \r able to impose collectively desirable outcomes. Instead, informal \r institutions, such as social norms, can play a crucial role. If conditions \r are right, policy can support social norm changes, helping address \r global problems (Nyborg et al. 2016; Niamir 2019). Sunstein (=1996) \r appraised people's choices and preferences in terms of intrinsic \r value, reputational effects, and effects on self-conception. Law and \r regulations potentially play an important role, by which the function \r [...]"


id: fd3d6b1f0a366202e588ad6ecc000fe0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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content:
"[...] of law in expressing social values with the goal of shifting social \r norms. There can be a serious obstacle to freedom in the fact that \r individual choices are a function of social norms, social meanings, \r and social roles, which individuals may deplore, and over which \r individuals have little or no control (Sunstein 1996). Here collective \r action and movements may be necessary to enable people to change \r norms that they do not like (Sunstein and Reisch 2014; Bamberg \r et al. 2015; Niamir et al. 2020a). Some norms are obstacles to human \r well-being and autonomy. It is appropriate for laws to alter norms if \r they diminish well-being and autonomy (Sunstein 1996; Thaler and \r Sunstein 2009)."


id: a74927bc111a3133f9de04f264448415
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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vector_id: 26649
content:
"Disciplines identify different drivers of technology adoption. Using \r rational choice models, mainstream economists propose relative \r costs and performance of new technologies compared to existing \r ones as the main driver of adoption (Nelson et  al. 2004). Adding \r to this, evolutionary economists and innovation scholars suggest \r that technological development experiences positive feedbacks \r and increasing returns to adoption (like scale economies, learning\u0002by-using, network externalities, informational increasing returns, \r and technological interrelatedness) that improve a technology's \r price/performance characteristics as more people adopt (Arthur \r 1989; Creutzig et  al. 2017). Psychologists argue that adoption \r decisions are shaped by people's attitudes and beliefs with regard \r to instrumental considerations (perceived usefulness and ease of \r use) and wider norms and values (Davis 1989; Ajzen 1991). These \r [...]"


id: 4905e310b796eb0cb77104d5c14ffbfb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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content:
"[...] disciplines conceptualise adoption as one-off purchase decisions, \r which is particularly useful with regard to 'improve' options that do \r not require wider changes in lifestyles and user routines."


id: 9dbe9e099ac0e16ee7dfcf7f473fe9cf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24987
content:
"Sociological and historical analyses of energy demand (Royston \r et al. 2018) deduce that patterns and dynamics of consumption are \r shaped by shifting configurations of infrastructures, technologies \r and collective conventions (Frantzeskaki and Loorbach 2008). When \r the aim is to reverse the current growing trend in demand, it is \r imperative to effectively activate and combine the three leverage \r points underlying structures (rules, organisations and infrastructures) \r to trigger social change consistent with mitigation targets. If these \r leverage points are activated separately there is a high probability \r that path dependencies and behavioural lock-ins cannot be \r overcome; if they are activated together but independently, they can \r cause unwanted bounce effects or induce unexpected trends. There is \r a high probability that the ex ante design of a relevant combination \r of infrastructures, organisations and rules, together with collective \r [...]"


id: d5dde6cd23bd82a042317bfc3dcabb80
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34943
content:
"[...] change of behaviours and adapted governance, will enable a real \r change in demand-side mitigation. Past lessons are helpful to fine\u0002tune the required combination."


id: 908a49cd85217c5289251761f28b00b8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22638
content:
"Offering a broader and more longitudinal view, sociologists of \r innovation and social practice theorists focus on the co-evolution \r of technologies with lifestyles, social practices and user routines \r (Hand et  al. 2005; Gram-Hanssen 2008; McMeekin and Southerton \r 2012; Hyysalo et  al. 2013; Shove et  al. 2014), which is particularly \r relevant for 'shift' and 'avoid/reduce' options. On the one hand, new \r technologies are not just purchased, but also integrated into daily life \r routines and user practices, which involves several activities (Shove \r and Southerton 2000; Monreal et  al. 2016): (i) cognitive activities \r involve the learning of new skills and competencies, (ii) interpretive \r and sense-making activities imbue new technologies with meanings, \r (iii) practical activities involve adjustments in everyday routines and \r material contexts. On the other hand, users do not just adopt new \r technologies, but can also actively contribute to development and \r [...]"


id: 4faf6e467b36e447edab2d6486f71fe5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11310
content:
"[...] innovation processes by: (i) providing feedback to engineers about how \r technologies function in real-world user contexts (Heiskanen and Lovio \r 2010; Schot et al. 2016; Sopjani et al. 2019), (ii) tinkering themselves \r with the technology (Hyysalo et  al. 2013; Nielsen et  al. 2016), and \r (iii)  developing new organisational templates and business models \r (Truffer 2003; Ornetzeder and Rohracher 2013; De Vries et al. 2016)."


id: becb302cc4d40c07262df176921a29d0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30836
content:
"Infrastructures, defined in relation to organised practices (Star and \r Ruhleder 1996), should not be treated as independent systems, levers \r and drivers of change as it is often the case, but rather as systemic \r interconnections between infrastructures and practices (Cass et al. \r 2018). Indeed, the ways in which infrastructures intersect explain \r their potential influence (Thacker et  al. 2019). For instance, the \r introduction of cycling lanes is embedded within multiple systems \r in flux, including the staged societal transformations with specific \r forms of governance and intervention associated with each phase \r of cycling lane history (Oldenziel et  al. 2016). Similar results can \r be derived from an analysis of district heating systems (Hawkey \r 2012) or at urban level (Bulkeley et al. 2014). In the power sector, \r huge investments in electricity generation are foreseen, due to \r both the strong growth in emerging countries and a shift in usage \r [...]"


id: 3ef1f0f454da93d31fd85a3d9a514438
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8261
content:
"[...] towards 'decarbonable' sources. Therefore, there is a need for the \r transformation of networks because of urban concentration and \r more dispersed electricity generation resulting from the rise of \r renewables. It implies that a compromise has to be found between \r two transition options: the design of a new electricity system to \r maintain its qualities of supply and sustain its current levels of \r reliability; and a change in consumption habits and the adaption \r of lifestyles compliant with more power supply interruption (Maizi \r et al. 2017; Maizi and Mazauric 2019). This illustrates the multiple\u0002level relationships between infrastructures, technology choices, \r economic development and individual choices."


id: ac2b6a25ba3a3e80f147b1e061204f29
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27536
content:
"The motivation to participate in the sharing economy differs \r among  socio-demographic groups, between users and providers \r and among different types of shared goods (e.g., cars, rides, \r accommodation, and tools). For example, empirical data analysis \r shows that sharing expensive goods (e.g., accommodation) is \r economically motivated since most room-sharing hosts pay their \r rent and utility bills by sharing their living spaces. Environmental \r motivations are important particularly for mobility, such as ride \r sharing, in which a passenger travels in a private vehicle driven by \r its owner, for free or for a fee, and ride hailing, which uses a third \r party that connects riders with taxi services in the area (Bocker and \r Meelen 2017). Food sharing, which is a practice where individuals \r or groups of people make a commitment to ensure that food is \r shared instead of wasted, involves highly personal interactions, \r [...]"


id: 4c5b35b8e1f0b5258e1f26db822fab69
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"[...] especially for meal sharing, often motivated by social desires (Bocker \r and Meelen 2017). However, not all food sharing initiatives are \r based on social motivations. In fact, there are companies enjoying \r remarkably rapid growth and initiatives driven by economic benefits \r such as businesses seeking to match farmers and/or distributors \r to consumers for fresh produce that is still edible but has defects \r in size, colour, shape and size; the so-called market for 'ugly food' \r (Richards and Hamilton 2018). Other popular meal-sharing initiatives \r are EatWith, Meal Sharing, and Traveling Spoon, in which hosts offer \r affordable food and a closer look into local life to tourists. Although \r younger and low-income groups are more economically motivated to \r use and provide shared assets; younger, higher-income and higher\u0002educated groups are less socially motivated; and women are more \r environmentally motivated (Bocker and Meelen 2017)."


id: a9723be5464eca04bac0f4c7436ea51d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27038
content:
"The function of institutions in shaping policies and the interaction of \r various policy instruments is critical for the transition to a low-carbon \r economy (O'Riordan and Jordan 1999). One important characteristic \r of institutions, understood as 'rules of the game in society', consists \r of formal rules such as laws and regulations and informal norms \r or conventions that set the incentive structure for decision making \r (Vatn 2015). For example, feed-in tariffs and similar regulations \r set rules that enable citizens to participate in energy transitions as \r energy prosumers (Inderberg et al. 2018) (Chapter 5, Section 5.4.5). \r The literature around policy processes and implementation with \r respect to demand and services relates that timing and policy choice \r are dynamic. At certain times there may be 'policy windows' for \r ambitious climate change policies, but such windows may also close \r unpredictably (Carter and Jacobs 2014). Another way to understand \r [...]"


id: 90cd71d9aef4369a87be6d54fa2a5767
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22683
content:
"[...] institutions is that they shape the political context for decision\u0002making, empowering some interests and reducing the influence of \r others (Steinmo et al. 1992; Hall 1993; Moser 2009). An example of \r this is the fossil fuel subsidy that advantages incumbent actors in \r this sector over those from the renewable sector, leaving individuals \r or businesses who wish to invest in green energy receiving much \r less support (Lockwood 2015; Healy and Barry 2017; Rentschler and \r Bazilian 2017)."


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"quo protection or incremental reform rather than more radical policy \r change (Walker 2000; Knox-Hayes 2012; Geels 2014; Normann 2017; \r Roberts and Geels 2019); (ii) existing policy paradigms shape how \r policymakers frame problems and think about solutions (Kern et al. \r 2014; Rosenbloom 2018; Buschmann and Oels 2019; Schmidt et al. \r 2019), often leading to a focus on upstream technologies, market\u0002based instruments, and hands-off policy styles (Whittle et al. 2019), \r and (iii) incumbent firms use corporate political strategies and \r resistance tactics to delay or water down strong climate policies \r (Kolk and Pinkse 2007; Geels 2014; Smink et al. 2015; Ferguson et al. \r 2016; Supran and Oreskes 2017). Technological lock-in mechanisms \r such as core competencies and sunk investments in factories and \r employees generate vested interests and technological regimes that \r incumbent firms will try to protect through incremental innovation \r [...]"


id: 9769dcb8c60cdfaa127386b51cca8409
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"[...] (Berkhout 2002; Raven and Verbong 2004; Vanloqueren and Baret \r 2009). Infrastructural lock-in mechanisms such as capital-intensity, \r asset durability, obduracy, and systemic interrelatedness (van der \r Vleuten 2004; Markard 2011) mean that infrastructure-related \r technologies and practices are difficult to change. Existing roads, \r petrol stations and land-use patterns stabilise car-based mobility \r patterns (Seto et al. 2016), while gas infrastructures stabilise home\u0002based boiler heating practices (Gross and Hanna 2019)."


id: 9e3cb69807fdc7edcd7a6d5efd372968
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25069
content:
"Although there are many demand-side mitigation options, low\u0002carbon transitions do not happen easily because multiple lock-in \r mechanisms stabilise existing systems of service provision and social \r practices and thus hinder major change (Klitkou et al. 2015; Seto et al. \r 2016; Clausen et  al. 2017; Ivanova et  al. 2018). Existing activities \r and demand patterns are often stabilised by behavioural lock-in \r mechanisms identified by psychological and economic literature: \r (i)  routines and habits tend to be repeated over time as 'normal' \r dietary, heating or travel patterns (Barnes et  al. 2004; Marechal \r 2010; Kurz et  al. 2015; Hoolohan et  al. 2018); (ii) preferences and \r attitudes can orient people positively towards existing practices over \r alternatives, for example private car travel over public transport \r (Sheller 2004); and (iii) cost-benefit calculations make people \r purchase technologies that are more practical or cheaper than \r [...]"


id: a7b215ebc5361f148a24098396ec85fa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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vector_id: 26719
content:
"[...] alternatives (e.g., cars over public transport in rural areas; petrol cars \r over electric cars)."


id: c723a5c7653641683694d06a50be409c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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content:
"Rates of change are usually slow in the first and second transition \r phases, because experimentation, social and technological learning, \r the creation of standards, and the reduction of uncertainty take a long \r time, often decades (Wilson 2012; Bento 2013; Bento et al. 2018). \r Rates of change increase in the third phase, as radical innovations \r diffuse from initial niches into mainstream markets, propelled by the \r self-reinforcing mechanisms discussed above. The rate of adoption \r (diffusion) of new practices, processes, artefacts, and behaviours \r is determined by a wide range of factors at the macro and micro \r scales, which have been identified by several decades of diffusion \r research in multiple disciplines (for comprehensive reviews see, e.g., \r Mansfield 1968; Martino et al. 1978; Davis 1979; Tornatzky and Klein, \r 1982; Mahajan et  al. 1990; Ausubel 1991; Grubler 1991; Feder & \r Umali, 1993. Bayus 1994; Comin and Hobijn 2003; Rogers 2003; Van \r [...]"


id: ba0246f68d624b8007fe37331b961d52
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29947
content:
"[...] den Bulte and Stremersch 2004; Meade and Islam 2006; Comin and \r Hobijn 2010; Peres et al. 2010)."


id: b011c5bbb9f9cc23ea3b1100c6e1c679
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"The literature on systems or macro-determinants of diffusion \r (technology growth and behavioural change) rates comprises \r three streams: historical energy transition research (e.g., Geels \r 2002; Fouquet 2008), systems theories of technological change \r (Grubler et al. 1999), as well as the recent literature on scaling(-up) \r dynamics of technologies (Wilson 2009) which has also been applied \r for validation of climate mitigation scenarios (Wilson et  al. 2013). \r Common to them all is the recognition of the importance of scale, \r or market size, as well as time and place as determinants of rates of \r change. Three main conclusions emerge from this literature. Ceteris \r paribus (with other things remaining same), (i) larger systems take \r more time to evolve, grow, and change compared to smaller ones; \r (ii) the creation of entirely new systems (diffusion) takes a longer time \r than replacements of existing technologies or practices (substitution); \r [...]"


id: 5fc7f973552456e92b4360df8e928130
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14151
content:
"The EEG adopted the policy innovation of guaranteed long-term \r contracts that California regulators had designed to provide grid \r access to small energy producers in the 1980s (CPUC 1983; Hirsch \r 1999). It also adopted the Japanese innovations of a declining \r subsidy and the first national rooftop solar programme in 1995 \r (Kimura and Suzuki 2006). The adoption behaviour of the 200,000 \r Japanese households who installed PV in the next ten years showed \r the world that consumer demand for PV energy services was strong \r (Shimamoto 2014). The Japanese subsidy was far less generous \r than the subsequent German programme and surveys of adopters \r indicate that environmental values were a stronger driver than \r economics (Kimura and Suzuki 2006). Corporate actors, in the form \r of Japanese electronic conglomerates, became the world's largest \r PV producers, using experience incorporating PV's unique attributes, \r scale and mobility into consumer products like watches, calculators, \r [...]"


id: e9223d08e6ed713f71b528425dd5d80f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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content:
"issues a barrier to using it. Studies from Senegal and Mexico show \r that even though households are complaining of smoke and itchy \r and watery eyes during cooking with solid fuels, and are aware of \r the health benefits of using LPG or other efficient technology, they \r still find traditional cooking practices using solid fuels more desirable \r (Pine et al. 2011; Hooper et al. 2018). Many country-specific studies \r have also shown that the types of diet, modes of cooking and types \r of utensils and vessels used have an impact on the choice of cooking \r fuel and technology (Ravindranath and Ramakrishna 1997; Atanassov \r 2010; Mukhopadhyay et  al. 2012; Bielecki and Wingenbach 2014; \r Troncoso et al. 2019); the perception of food tastes (Wiedinmyer et al. \r 2017; Mukhopadhyay et al. 2012; Hooper et al. 2018), and differences \r in housing style and whether the cooking area is indoors or outdoors \r (Chattopadhyay et al. 2017) delay transition to a cleaner fuel or new \r [...]"


id: 925af2fae2656cf8ace6a6962532f5ba
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22972
content:
"[...] technology. In Mozambique the dissemination of solar cookstoves \r has seen limited success as their design failed to capture end users' \r need for cooking processes like boiling, steaming or frying and how \r the food is prepared, for example standing versus sitting (Otte 2014)."


id: 3ae769c7f78af789ba524a75d465982a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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content:
"each other's car or bicycle for urgent or day trips. However, there \r are also formal efforts by several actors and initiatives to transform \r the existing systems in sustainable directions. Many factors have \r contributed to transformative changes in Kolkata's public transport \r regimes, including socio-cultural awareness generated through \r mass media like television and newspaper reports, research and \r communication by NGOs on the detrimental effects of existing \r standards of fuel and equipment, and environmental campaigns by \r civil society organisations involving school children, students and the \r elderly. There were efforts to improve efficiency in managing fleets \r and service provision through smart, real time and integrated display \r and fare collection systems and so on. A crucial driver of this policy \r has been to discourage users to shift their demand from public to \r private mobility and new meaning to buses, autorickshaws were \r [...]"


id: b9999149febb57355359b19b6a0b5cab
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29860
content:
"[...] getting added continuously. Many of these changes were driven by \r new policy at national and urban levels, for instance the National \r Urban Renewal Mission (2005) (Ministry of Housing and Urban \r Affairs 2005), National Urban Transport Policy (2006) (Ministry Of \r Urban Transport 2006) and Kolkata's comprehensive urban mobility \r plan (2008) (IDFC 2008)."


id: 98d49f492d0ac986ce75e56f702d367b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24105
content:
"Auto-rickshaws and new meanings: While the transformation of \r the public bus was triggered by social pressures like affordability, \r safety and reliability, transformation in the auto-rickshaw regime \r started off in response to the environmental challenges from the \r unsustainable fuel used in these vehicles. Emissions from auto\u0002rickshaws operated with a cheap toxic mixture of petrol, kerosene \r and naphtha accounted for 60% of the city's air pollution. Since \r 2009, new legislation has mandated the use of single mode liquified \r petroleum gas (LPG). This improvement in fuel infrastructure, \r coupled with consequent initiatives by the state government to \r formally recognise and integrate auto-rickshaws as part of the public \r transport portfolio of the city, resulted in a transformation of the \r socio-cultural meaning of auto-rickshaws from one considered to be \r a noisy, polluting, unregulated and informal paratransit mode into \r [...]"


id: 2e96c4236d5eedf95ada551d825a3c5d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"A key role is played by the state government to improve the system \r as a whole and formalise certain semi-formal modes of transport. An \r important policy consideration has been to make Kolkata's mobility \r system more efficient (in terms of speed, reliability and avoidance \r of congestion) and sustainable through strengthening coordination \r between different mode-based regimes as each of these regimes \r have been transformed individually and collectively over the past \r 10 years (Ghosh 2019). Such transformations within the regimes \r arose from a broad range of drivers such as the need for new \r infrastructure, increased fuel efficiency, digitalisation of operation, \r and pollution mitigation. Many of these interventions were to \r address wider sustainability challenges such as increasing demand \r for individual mobility, high concentration of pollutants in the air, \r lack of affordability, and so on. Each of Kolkata's diverse public \r [...]"


id: aab655d98fcf0e847b0e8ad090b8a44c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27259
content:
"[...] transport regimes has changed along different pathways in the past \r decade, owing partly to new standards and regulations, but also to \r new values, beliefs and expectations, and cognitive and normative \r meanings. Four distinctive regime-level change processes are: \r (i) improvements and new meaning to public buses, (ii) greening and \r formalisation of auto-rickshaws, (iii) institutional and socio-cultural \r support for the emergence of the 'app-cab' service, and (iv) a cycling \r ban policy on major arterial roads of Kolkata."


id: f44b74d607123f6827856d9b073493cd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40351
content:
"Emergence of 'app-cab' niche: Public buses started attracting \r middle class passengers, autorickshaws gained new meaning and \r with digitalisation, taxi services were transformed. The existing social \r norm of sharing public transport modes coupled with a rapid uptake \r of smartphones facilitated the emergence of 'app-cabs' in Kolkata \r (Ghosh 2019). Since 2014, the global mobility platform Uber and the \r Indian app-cab company Ola started operating services in Kolkata, \r gaining quick momentum in shifting the demand of users from \r yellow taxis to app-based taxi services. Both Uber and Ola have 'pool' \r (ride-sharing) options which are considerably cheaper than booking \r the entire car. Commuters could even buy a monthly pass for cheaper \r daily access. Owing to these facilities, transparency of payment and \r safety promises, shifts have taken place in the expectations and \r routines of commuters from 'car is the only comfortable way of \r [...]"


id: 5a7a3f0f1ce83c98125a88fb6d7b3ce9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13174
content:
"[...] travelling' to 'sharing a cab is much faster and efficient (Ghosh and \r Schot 2019). Such deeper shifts in the beliefs of the more affluent \r urban population are crucial for transitioning towards sustainable \r mobility in coherence with emerging lifestyle preferences in \r megacities like Kolkata. However, there is also a change in behaviour \r of the urban middle class, who are willing to replace their bus, metro \r or auto-rickshaw rides with app-cabs because of additional benefits \r like door-to-door service."


id: b326ba6b1358b3135208046b806181a1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28762
content:
"multiple actors, sustainability values and megatrends, where direct \r causalities are hard to identify. However, the prominence of policy \r actors as change agents is clear as they are changing multiple regimes \r from within. The state government initiated infrastructural change in \r public bus systems, coordinated with private and non-governmental \r actors such as auto-rickshaw operators and app-cab owners who \r hold crucial agency in offering public transport services in the city. The \r latter can directly be attributed to the global momentum of mobility\u0002as-a-service platforms, at the intersection of digitalisation and \r sharing economy trends. However, sensitivity of the policy actors in \r the developing countries to local needs and capabilities is important, \r instead of chasing global trends, especially if such trends increase \r inequality at the cost of an improved standard of living for a selected \r section of people. It is a fact that many of these above-mentioned \r [...]"


id: 930637c1f0e2ff1189e907541e4195df
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23078
content:
"[...] policy changes cater to middle class aspirations and preferences, at \r the cost of lower income and less privileged communities. Complexity \r of governance and risk of increasing inequalities are also discussed \r in the literature (Sheller 2018; Nikolaeva et al. 2019), along with new \r approaches for collective governance and accessibility in the mobility \r transition. (Figure 5.SM.5b)."


id: 834b1d38ea5918a9f1b0267426fb41eb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20225
content:
"Hossein Ameli (Germany), Nils Angliviel de La Beaumelle (France/the United States of America), \r John Bistline (the United States of America), Edward Byers (Austria/Ireland), Katherine Calvin (the \r United States of America), Kiran Chawla (India), Yiyun Ryna Cui (China), Steven J. Davis \r (the United States of America), Julianne DeAngelo (the United States of America), Subash Dhar \r (India/Denmark), Jacqueline Sophie Edge (South Africa/United Kingdom), Robert Germeshausen \r (Germany), Mohamad Hejazi (Syria/United States of America), Gokul Iyer (India), Louise Jeffery \r (United Kingdom), Matti Juhani Koivisto (Finland/Denmark), Gunnar Luderer (Germany), David \r McCollum (the United States of America), Matteo Muratori (Italy), Gregory F. Nemet (the United \r States of America/Canada), Omkar Patange (India), Monica Santillan Vera (Mexico), Udayan \r Singh (India), Benjamin Kenneth Sovacool (Denmark/United Kingdom), Loreta Stankeviciute \r [...]"


id: c15f09eb5826532fb7dc7fce6d9ca668
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31323
content:
"[...] (Lithuania), Falko  Ueckerdt (Germany), Cintia B. Uvo (Brazil/Sweden/Italy), Heleen van Soest \r (the Netherlands), Janet Veldstra (the Netherlands)"


id: ad9c6f7d3b4f0123af2c2b035e515745
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27785
content:
"Within this context, this chapter has two main objectives. First, \r it aims to assess specific, individual mitigation options in energy \r supply, energy transformation, and energy transportation and \r transmission. This assessment is complementary to a set of chapters \r that explore mitigation options in agriculture, forestry, and other land \r uses (Chapter 7), urban systems and other settlements (Chapter 8), \r buildings (Chapter 9), transport (Chapter 10), industry (Chapter 11), \r and cross-sectoral perspectives (Chapter  12). Second, this chapter \r aims to assess system-level mitigation opportunities and challenges \r across the entirety of energy systems. These systems include energy \r supply, transformation, transmission, storage, transportation, and \r end uses. They also include the societal systems that interact with \r the physical energy system. As energy systems become increasingly \r integrated and interconnected, a  system-wide perspective is \r [...]"


id: d5a76a083af42ec2d021bf4c8dad0085
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34903
content:
"For this chapter, energy systems are defined broadly to include both \r physical and societal elements. The physical infrastructure includes \r all the infrastructure and equipment used to extract, transform, \r transport, transmit, and convert energy to provide energy services. \r In addition to the physical system, a broad range of societal systems \r and dynamics are relevant to the energy system. Human societies \r use energy to transport themselves and the goods that they use and \r consume, to heat, cool, and light their homes, to cook their food, \r and to produce goods and services. Energy systems are therefore \r tied to the systems involved in the provision of these various goods \r and services. All energy users engage in the operation of energy \r systems by demanding energy at particular times and in particular \r forms. They can adjust their behaviour and demands, for example, by \r using less energy or by changing when they use energy. Consumers \r [...]"


id: 24fce57d03520bf7acbd7cc6bde404f4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3706
content:
"[...] can invest in equipment that reduces their energy needs, and they \r can invest in technologies that transform energy (e.g., rooftop solar) \r or store energy (e.g.,  batteries). Firms and governments invest in \r equipment to produce, transform, and transport energy such as \r power plants, refineries, electric transmission lines, and oil tankers. \r All aspects of energy systems are governed by laws, regulations, and "


id: 13e1a71d5cd953ec67e8c3043f3c6e1d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 715
content:
"Despite the declining energy intensity, global energy system CO2\r emissions have closely tracked GDP per capita (Figure 6.4). This is \r especially true in the Asian economies, which have experienced \r rapid GDP per  capita growth in the past decades and a  massive \r rise in energy demand. Similarly, emissions have declined in times \r of economic downturns - for example, in Eurasia in the 1990s and \r globally in 2009 and 2020. Population growth has also contributed to \r emissions growth globally and in most regions, particularly Africa, but \r the effect of population growth has been less than that of economic \r growth. Since 2015, energy intensity has been declining (IEA 2020b), \r limiting the impact of economic and population growth. However, \r there is no region where this factor alone would have been sufficient \r to decrease CO2 emissions from the energy system. In Europe and \r North America, the only two regions where emissions decreased \r [...]"


id: fbe17d0861d679b6fe4dd884f428667b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41679
content:
"[...] meaningfully since 2010, a steady decrease in the carbon intensity \r of energy was a significant downward driver. The reduction in carbon \r intensity in the EU is due primarily to the increase of renewable \r electricity production coupled with the low levels of fossil fuel-based \r production in the energy mix (Dyrstad et al. 2019)."


id: 5a73d7c2822ef97537c36c8f612157f3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13169
content:
"The total final energy consumption (TFC) grew by 6.6% (1.6% yr-1) \r from 2015 to 2019, rising from 392 EJ yr-1 to 418 EJ yr-1. This \r is a  slower growth rate than the previous decade (2.8% yr-1) \r (Figure 6.5). In 2019, oil products used for transportation accounted \r for 41% of TFC. The penetration of non-fossil fuels is still marginal \r despite the significant growth of electric vehicles in recent years. \r Coal still accounted for 9.5% of TFC in 2019, dropping from 11.7% in \r 2015. Coal is mainly used as a primary energy source in industry and, \r to a lesser extent, in the residential sector. The share of electricity \r increased modestly, from 18.6% in 2015 to 20.2% in 2019, reflecting \r increasing access in developing countries and increasing use of \r electricity for a  wide variety of end uses in the residential sector \r (Box 6.1). Heat accounts for approximately 3% of TFC, used mainly in \r industry and the residential sector. Biofuels and waste accounted for \r [...]"


id: 7d6d675f68f5c890bcb75416499fd7b8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19234
content:
"Limiting global warming to 2degC or below requires a rapid shift away from unabated coal consumption - coal without CCS - in the \r energy system by 2050 (IPCC 2018a; Section 6.7; Chapter 3). This will require cancellation of new coal power projects and accelerated \r retirement of existing coal plants (Edenhofer et al. 2018; Kriegler et al. 2018; Pfeiffer et al. 2018; Smith et al. 2019; Tong et al. 2019). \r To limit warming to 2degC or lower, and without new builds, existing coal plants will need to retire 10 to 25 years earlier than the \r historical average operating lifetime. Completing all planned projects will further reduce the viable lifetime of all plants by 5 to \r 10 years if warming is to be limited to 2degC or lower (Cui et al. 2019). Phasing-out coal in the next few decades will present economic, \r social, and security challenges. These will vary across regions based on the characteristics of existing coal infrastructure, the availability \r [...]"


id: 666887cbba9d9be738614bd9552c822d
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vector_id: 15280
content:
"[...] of alternatives, economic development, and technological and institutional lock-in (Jakob et al. 2020)."


id: 7494e2e105506a01909ff0596fe1cb8f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17746
content:
"Between 2015 and 2019, global coal power capacity grew by 146 GW, or 7.6%, as new builds offset retirements in some countries \r (Global Energy Monitor et al. 2021). Meanwhile, an increasing number of countries and regions have committed to or operationalised \r coal phase-outs (Jewell et al. 2019; Watts et al. 2019; Littlecott et al. 2021). Actions are being taken by various international and \r sub-national actors, including national and sub-national governments, public and private power companies, and financial institutions \r and pension funds that have committed not to fund new coal or coal-based infrastructure (yan Nie et al. 2016; Buckley 2019; Auger \r et al. 2021). Although these initial efforts are not yet sufficient in limiting warming to 1.5degC, and most have occurred in regions with \r older coal fleets, these examples provide insight into possible coal phase-out strategies (Spencer et al. 2018) and help identify the \r [...]"


id: c9ae7b404bc7ac3ae705440d30b92b6d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32806
content:
"[...] mechanisms driving the move away from coal, such as market, technology, policy, or other societal objectives. They also enable better \r understanding of the possible character of oil and gas phase-downs that would ultimately be needed to limit warming two well below \r 2degC (Section 6.7.4) (Raimi et al. 2019)."


id: 971ccbcebfe4538587b63b44b1cde0ff
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23779
content:
"Europe. Several European countries are part of the Powering Past Coal Alliance (PPCA) and have committed to phase out unabated \r coal on or before 2030 (Jewell et al. 2019). Because these countries represent a small share of global coal generation capacity and \r have mostly ageing coal plants, they tend to face fewer changes in phasing out coal. The effectiveness of PPCA in countries with \r younger coal fleets has thus been questioned (Jewell et al. 2019; Blondeel et al. 2020). Germany recently joined the PPCA and has \r committed to phase out unabated coal by 2038. As part of its commitment to phase out coal, Germany is implementing a set of \r measures that include compensation for power plant closures, labour market measures for coal workers, and substantial support \r of structural change in coal-mining regions. Poland, another coal-heavy country in Europe, has not indicated a coal phase-out target \r [...]"


id: 56f12fa0d7201224791cd6c9c8927a40
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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"[...] and faces substantial challenges (Whitley et  al. 2017; Antosiewicz et  al. 2020). European efforts to phase out coal indicate that \r appropriate financial instruments are needed (Rentier et al. 2019), and a just transition for workers are important to gain broad public \r support and help those most affected by the phase-out (Johnstone and Hielscher 2017; Osicka et al. 2020)."


id: 7a40d81b66dfcfae1111fd2ccfb71f52
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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"North America. Coal use has been declining in North America. In the USA, the primary driver has been the availability of cheap \r shale gas and ageing coal fleets. Coal use in the USA has dropped by over 50% since 2008 (EIA 2019). The recently announced \r Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) by the Biden Administration sets a 100% carbon-free electricity goal by 2035 (The White \r House 2021), indicating a phase-out not only of unabated coal electricity generation, but also of natural gas generation. As one of the \r two founding countries of the PPCA, Canada has committed to phasing out unabated coal power by 2030 (Government of Canada \r 2018). Declining coal use in both the USA and Canada has decreased GHG emissions, local air pollutants, and cooling water use \r (Harris et al. 2015; Kondash et al. 2019). However, there have been concerns about social and economic consequences, particularly at \r [...]"


id: b69b9af79c1bb31c3a25e587241de87c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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"[...] the local level. For instance, the USA has lost about 50,000 coal mining jobs between 2011 and 2021 (US Bureau of Labor Statistics, \r 2021), with significant regional and economic inequities (Bodenhamer 2016; Abraham 2017; Greenberg 2018). Comprehensive social \r programmes, such as retirement compensation, training for reemployment, and business support for economic diversification, have \r been suggested as means to support a just transition (Homagain et al. 2015; Patrizio et al. 2018; Grubert 2020)."


id: ad4873dd45001926d48c49f5ead7d11b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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"Asia. After a period of rapid growth, coal expansion has slowed in Asia, but it still the primary driver of the global increase in coal \r demand (IEA 2020e). China's coal consumption reached a plateau under policy efforts during the 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020), \r and new coal plants are being built at a slower rate than previously. Both China and India have suspended and cancelled many new \r coal power projects and retired a small set of old, dirty, inefficient coal plants (CEA 2019; Global Energy Monitor et al. 2021). These \r efforts are largely due to non-climate reasons, such air pollution and health (Singh and Rao 2015; Gass et al. 2016; Peng et al. 2018; \r Malik et al. 2020), overcapacity (Blondeel and Van de Graaf 2018), and rural electrification and renewable investments (Aklin et al. \r 2017; Thapar et al. 2018). However, as new builds offset retirements, coal generation capacity has continued to grow in both countries \r [...]"


id: fa3569bcca2f1850097ef5cb4309a6cf
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"[...] since 2015 (Global Energy Monitor et al. 2021). Other fast-growing Southeast Asian countries, such as Indonesia, Vietnam, and the \r Philippines have experienced strong growth in coal use (IEA 2020b), but an increasing number of new coal power projects are being \r cancelled (Littlecott et al. 2021). Coal projects in these countries are decreasingly likely to proceed because they rely on international \r financing, and China, Japan, USA, and other G7 countries have pledged to end overseas coal financing (Schiermeier 2021)."


id: 47c5facfe22a53f1580379de52b3fb46
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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"and storage (CCUS) have continued to grow since 2015 (IEA 2017, \r 2021a). Hydroelectric power grew from 3890 TWh yr -1 (14.0 EJ yr -1) \r in 2015 to 4290 TWh yr -1 (15.5 EJ yr -1) in 2019, or 10.3%; nuclear \r power grew from 2570 TWh yr -1 (9.3 EJ yr -1) to 2790 TWh yr -1\r (10.1 EJ yr -1), or 8.6%. Hydroelectric and nuclear shares in global \r total electricity generation remained around 16% and 10%, \r respectively (IEA 2017, 2021a). Global biofuels production grew \r from 3.2 EJ yr -1 to 4.0 EJ yr -1 from 2015 to 2019 (IEA 2017, 2021a). \r Bioenergy accounted for 2.4% of electricity generation in 2019. \r Geothermal energy sources produced 92 TWh  yr -1 (0.33  EJ  yr -1) \r of electricity in 2019, up from 80 TWh yr -1 (0.28 EJ yr -1) in 2015 \r (IEA 2017, 2021a). At present, there are 28 commercially operating \r CCUS facilities with a CO2 removal capacity of around 40 million \r tonnes yr -1 (Mtpa). Only two of these are associated with \r [...]"


id: e23b17558a9d6bbba1961588e05d8195
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"[...] electricity production: the majority are in industrial applications - \r 37  commercial projects, accounting for about 75 Mtpa, are in \r various stages of development and construction (Global CCS \r Institute 2020). The share of marine energy in global electricity \r generation has remained at approximately 1 TWh yr -1 since 2015. \r In total, low- and zero-carbon electricity generation technologies \r produced 37% of global electricity in 2019."


id: 305b034c52f4e5376e156f636937acd3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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"Global PV and wind electric capacities grew 170% and 70%, respectively, \r between 2015 and 2019. Total solar and wind capacities in 2019 were \r 609 GW and 623 GW (Figure 6.6) and generation was 680 TWh yr-1 \r and 1420 TWh yr-1. The combined share of solar and wind in the total \r global electricity generation in 2019 was around 8% (5.5% wind, 2.5% \r solar), up from around 5% in 2015 (IEA 2021a). Since 2015, the cost \r of solar PVs has declined by over 60%. Offshore wind costs have fallen \r by 32%, and onshore wind costs have fallen by 23% (Section 6.4). PV \r was around 99% of total solar capacity in 2019; onshore wind was \r about 95% of total wind capacity. Concentrating solar power (CSP) \r deployment has also continued to grow, but it remains far below PV. \r Prior to 2010, 50% of all wind capacity was in Europe, but since then, \r capacity growth in Asia (led by China), has surpassed the growth in \r Europe. As a consequence, Europe's share in global solar capacity has \r [...]"


id: c23902a575d72d4225c48bb2fd253020
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"[...] declined from 74% in 2010 to 24% in 2019. Asia's share in wind and \r solar capacity in 2019 was 41% and 56%, followed by Europe (31% \r and 24%) and North America (20% and 12%) (IRENA 2020a, 2021a)."


id: df71b72652c74e7be412d864ded4d8e8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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"The role of carbon pricing is still limited though increasing. Different \r measures have been suggested to improve the performance of \r the ETS, such as 'price floors and caps' and other carbon pricing \r schemes (Campiglio 2016; Bataille et  al. 2018; Goulder and \r Morgenstern 2018). In 2020, 61 regional, national and sub-national \r carbon pricing instruments, representing 22% of the global GHG \r emissions, were in action or scheduled for implementation (World \r Bank 2019). Over 51% of emissions covered are priced at less than \r USD10  per  tCO2-eq. At present, however, only 5% of the global \r emissions covered under carbon pricing initiatives are consistent \r with the range of carbon prices that have been suggested as \r needed to limit warming to well below 2degC (Stiglitz and Stern 2017). \r Most of the carbon pricing schemes have taken place in the OECD \r countries. The limited application of carbon pricing instruments \r in developing, and emerging economies may be due to political \r [...]"


id: 6a41eb18419b2d8f0545b8824b358aeb
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"[...] economy constraints (Campiglio 2016; Finon 2019). Carbon pricing \r had a  sizeable impact on emissions  - for example, the EU ETS \r impacts emissions from electricity in Germany (Schafer 2019) and \r manufacturing in France (Colmer et al. 2020), respectively. Emissions \r reductions could be increased with higher carbon prices and without \r free allocation of allowances."


id: e35f331f3aaeb9f3c677ac568222a710
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"Governments have chosen a  mix of policies and institutional \r mechanisms that consists of regulatory instruments, like efficiency \r and technology standards, economic instruments (e.g.,  carbon \r pricing, subsidies) (Bertram et al. 2015; Martin and Saikawa 2017) \r and other policies, such as government interventions to provide \r infrastructure, information policies, and voluntary actions by non\u0002government actors (Somanathan et  al. 2014). In recent years, \r regulatory instruments to promote low-carbon infrastructure have \r gained traction in developing countries (Finon 2019). The choice \r of policies has depended on institutional capacities, technological \r maturity and other developmental priorities of governments. For \r example, governments have favoured regulatory instruments over \r economic instruments when there has been sufficient institutional \r capacity to implement and monitor the regulations and standards \r (Hughes and Urpelainen 2015). Furthermore, institutional capacity \r [...]"


id: e257b58e64923b3c77c040c0bc230c96
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"[...] has also determined the extent of implemented measures (Adenle \r et al. 2017). Market conditions and technological maturity are other \r important determinants of policy mixes being deployed in the energy \r sector. For example, subsidies for mitigation like feed-in-tariffs \r have worked best when the technologies are in nascent stages of \r development (Gupta et al. 2019a)."


id: 621391d8a25c6d2d6bf75e679d4b4669
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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"In the absence of a  global comprehensive carbon price, regional \r regulatory policies for fossil fuels supply and key demand sectors \r like transport, industry and buildings (Chapters 9-11), coupled with \r regional carbon pricing instruments, were implemented to help \r initiate the climate actions consistent with the Paris Agreement \r (Kriegler et  al. 2018). However, differences in the stringency of \r climate regulation have triggered fear that regulation reduces the \r competitiveness of industries in regulated countries and leads to \r industry relocation and 'carbon leakage' (Schenker et  al. 2018). \r In recent years, however, there is little evidence of carbon leakage \r (Naegele and Zaklan 2019; Schafer 2019), and even positive effects \r of carbon pricing on efficiency have been observed (e.g., Loschel et al. \r 2019, for German manufacturing firms, and Germeshausen 2020 \r for German power plants). However, with asymmetric rising carbon \r [...]"


id: f7e4dfdd87b929449508a4877975dc27
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"[...] prices, discussions about specific policy mechanisms to address \r carbon leakage like carbon border adjustments (Cosbey et al. 2019) \r were amplified. Furthermore, multiple policies - often implemented \r by different governmental levels (national vs sub-national)  - \r interacted with each other and thereby affected their environmental "


id: f5954be1fdb5db514e15d23d7dd1e5eb
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content:
"Energy subsidies can be defined as policy measures in the energy sector to lower the prices for consumers, raise the prices for producers, \r or reduce energy production costs (IEA 1999). There are subsidies for fossil fuels, renewables, and energy efficiency measures. The \r majority of the renewable subsidies are generation-based incentives for solar, wind or biomass in the form of feed-in-tariffs (Chapter 13), \r with total annual renewable subsidy estimates of about USD150 billion yr-1 globally (IEA 2018b). Estimates of fossil fuel subsidies \r can vary by an order of magnitude. For the year 2017, the IEA estimated fossil fuel subsidies of USD300 billion using IEA's pre-tax, \r price-gap method (IEA 2018b), while the International Monetary Fund (IMF) included unpriced externalities in calculating subsidies of \r USD5.2 trillion or 6.5% of global GDP (Coady et al. 2017, 2019; World Bank 2019). It has been estimated that the amount spent on \r [...]"


id: 907c860b59f02331efea40963fea5845
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"[...] fossil fuel subsidies was around double the amount of subsidies spent on renewables (IEA 2018b). There are adverse environmental, \r economic and social consequences of fossil fuel subsidies (Rentschler and Bazilian 2017). More than 75% of the distortions created by \r fossil fuel subsidies are domestic, and studies indicate that reforming them can have substantial in-country benefits (Coady et al. 2017, \r 2019). Some of the G20 countries have implemented subsidy reforms based on low oil prices (Jewell et al. 2018)."


id: 859b6cdeb0b1b3a59998160c01db3243
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"Fossil fuel subsidies most commonly pursue non-climate objectives, for example, enhanced access to energy sources (high confidence). \r In some cases, these energy access subsidies have helped extend modern energy sources to the poor (Kimemia and Annegarn 2016) \r and thereby contribute to SDG 7. However, the subsidies have proven to be regressive in most cases, with little benefit reaching the \r poor (Lockwood 2015). For example, Indonesia has introduced LPG subsidies for cooking. The kerosene-to-LPG conversion programme \r ('Zero Kero') was launched in 2007 and provided mainly households with free initial LPG equipment and LPG at a low subsidised price \r (Imelda et al. 2018b; Thoday et al. 2018). Besides the national government, provincial governments and industry played a crucial role \r in implementation. Overall, the LPG conversion programme in Indonesia reduced cooking kerosene use (Andadari et al. 2014; Imelda \r [...]"


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"[...] et al. 2018b) and GHG emissions (Permadi et al. 2017) with positive health effects (Imelda et al. 2018b; Thoday et al. 2018). However, \r the programme is generally viewed as regressive and has failed to reduce traditional solid fuel use (Andadari et al. 2014; Toft 2016; \r Thoday et al. 2018). Furthermore, even if the programme decreased GHG emissions relative to continued kerosene use, these subsidies \r are still targeted at fossil fuels and contribute to GHG emissions."


id: e7fdcb3077661b42aba00c52c9020e47
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content:
"below  the operating costs of electricity generated from fossil fuels \r (high confidence). The weighted average cost of PV in 2019 was \r USD68 MWh-1, near the bottom of the range of fossil fuel prices (IRENA \r 2019b). The cost of electricity from PV has fallen by 89% since 2000 and \r 69% since AR5, at a rate of -16% per year. The 5:95 percentile range \r for PV in 2019 was USD52-190 MWh-1 (IRENA 2021b). Differences \r in solar insolation, financing costs, equipment acquisition, installation \r labour, and other sources of price dispersion explain this range (Nemet \r et  al. 2016; Vartiainen et  al. 2020) and scale. For example, in India, \r rooftop installations cost 41% more than utility-scale installations, and \r commercial-scale costs are 39% higher than utility-scale. Significant \r differences in regional cost persist (Kazhamiaka et al. 2017; Vartiainen \r et al. 2020), with particularly low prices in China, India, and parts of \r [...]"


id: a602ea6e85b52e44e6265b10fd3159ae
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"[...] Europe. Globally, the range of global PV costs is quite similar to the \r range of coal and natural gas prices."


id: d2828db5f4a6140f4893d8327b176b95
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vector_id: 34389
content:
"The global technical potential of direct solar energy far exceeds that of any \r other renewable energy resource and is well beyond the total amount of \r energy needed to support ambitious mitigation over the current century \r (high confidence). Estimates of global solar resources have not changed \r since the IPCC's Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) (Lewis 2007; Besharat \r et al. 2013) even as precision and near-term forecasting have improved \r (Diagne et al. 2013; Abreu et al. 2018). Approximately 120,000 TW of \r sunlight reaches the Earth's surface continuously, almost 10,000 times \r average world energy consumption; factoring in competition for land \r use leaves a technical potential of about 300 PWh yr-1 (1080 EJ yr-1) \r for solar PV, roughly double current consumption (Dupont et al. 2020). \r The technical potential for concentrating solar power (CSP) is estimated \r to be 45-82 PWh yr-1 (162-295 EJ yr-1) (Dupont et al. 2020). Areas \r [...]"


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content:
"[...] with the highest solar irradiation are: western South America; northern, \r eastern and southwestern Africa; and the Middle East and Australia \r (Figure 6.7) (Pravalie et al. 2019)."


id: 13e08c4b0384202149ba797fef7097b
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"The share of total costs of PV-intensive electricity systems attributed \r to integration costs has been increasing but can be reduced by \r enhancing grid flexibility (high confidence) (Sections 6.4.3 and 6.6, \r and Box 6.8). The total costs of PV include grid integration, which \r varies tremendously depending on PV's share of electricity, other \r supply sources like wind, availability of storage, transmission capacity, \r and demand flexibility (Heptonstall and Gross 2020). Transmission \r costs can add USD1-10 MWh-1 or 3-33% to the cost of utility-scale \r PV (Gorman et al. 2019). Distributed (rooftop) PV involves a broader \r set of grid integration costs - including grid reinforcement, voltage \r balancing and control, and impacts on other generations - and has \r a larger range of integration costs from USD2-25 MWh-1, which is \r -3% to +37% (Hirth et al. 2015; Wu et al. 2015; Gorman et al. 2019). \r Other meta-analyses put the range at USD1-7 MWh-1 in the USA \r [...]"


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"[...] (Luckow et al. 2015.; Wiser et al. 2017), while a comprehensive study \r put the range at USD12-18 MWh-1 for up to 35% renewables and \r USD25-46 MWh-1 above 35% renewables (Heptonstall and Gross \r 2020). Increased system flexibility can reduce integration costs of \r solar energy (Wu et al. 2015) including storage, demand response, \r sector-coupling (Brown et  al. 2018; Bogdanov et  al. 2019), and \r increase complementarity between wind and solar (Heide et al. 2010) \r (Sections 6.4.3 and 6.4.4)."


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"Another environmental concern with large PV power plants is the \r conversion of land to collect solar energy (Hernandez et al. 2015). \r Approximately 2 hectares of land are needed for 1 MW of solar \r electricity capacity (Perpina Castillo et al. 2016; Kabir et al. 2018); \r at 20% efficiency, a  square of PV panels of 550  km by 550  km, \r comprising 0.2% of Earth's land area, could meet global energy \r demand. Land conversion can have local impacts, especially near \r cities and where land used for solar competes with alternative \r uses, such as agriculture. Large installations can also adversely \r impact biodiversity (Hernandez et  al. 2014), especially where the \r above-ground vegetation is cleared and soils are typically graded. \r Landscape fragmentation creates barriers to the movement of \r species. However, a  variety of means have emerged to mitigate \r land use issues. Substitution among renewables can reduce land \r [...]"


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"[...] conversion (Trondle 2020). Solar can be integrated with other uses \r through 'agrivoltaics' (the use of land for both agriculture and solar \r production) (Dupraz et al. 2011) by, for example, using shade-tolerant \r crops (Dinesh and Pearce 2016). Combining solar and agriculture can \r also create income diversification, reduced drought stress, higher \r solar output due to radiative cooling, and other benefits (Elamri et al. \r 2018; Hassanpour Adeh et al. 2018; Barron-Gafford et al. 2019). PV \r installations floating on water also avoid land-use conflicts (Sahu \r et al. 2016; Lee et al. 2020), as does dual-use infrastructure, such as \r landfills (Jager-Waldau 2020) and reservoirs where evaporation can \r also be reduced (Farfan and Breyer 2018)."


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"The most important ways to minimise PV's impact on the environment \r lie in recycling materials at end of life and making smart land-use \r decisions (medium confidence). A comprehensive assessment of PV's \r environmental impacts requires lifecycle analysis (LCA) of resource \r depletion, land-use, ecotoxicity, eutrophication, acidification, ozone, \r and particulates, among other things (Mahmud et  al. 2018). LCA \r studies show that solar PVs produce far less CO2 per unit of electricity \r than fossil generation, but PV CO2 emissions vary due to the carbon \r intensity of manufacturing energy and offset electricity (Grant and \r Hicks 2020). Concerns about systemic impacts, such as reducing the \r Earth's albedo by covering surfaces with dark panels, have shown \r to be trivial compared to the mitigation benefits (Nemet 2009) \r (Box  6.7). Even though GHG LCA estimates span a  considerable \r range of 9-250 gCO2 kWh-1 (de Wild-Scholten 2013; Kommalapati \r [...]"


id: b22df438828ce6b0248e50f15db432e7
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content:
"[...] et  al. 2017), recent studies that reflect higher efficiencies and \r manufacturing improvements find lower lifecycle emissions, \r including a  range of 18-60 gCO2 kWh-1 (Wetzel and Borchers \r 2015) and central estimates of 80 gCO2 kWh-1 (Hou et  al. 2016), \r 50 gCO2 kWh-1 (Nugent and Sovacool 2014), and 20 gCO2 kWh-1"


id: 28fdc3004450d1fec2cdab70a0c2fc78
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"Besides PV, alternative solar technologies exist, including CSP, \r which can provide special services in high-temperature heat and \r diurnal storage, even if it is more costly than PV and its potential for \r deployment is limited. CSP uses reflective surfaces, such as parabolic \r mirrors, to focus sunlight on a receiver to heat a working fluid, which \r is subsequently transformed into electricity (Islam et al. 2018). Solar \r heating and cooling are also well established technologies, and \r solar  energy can be utilised directly for domestic or commercial \r applications such as drying, heating, cooling, and cooking (Ge et al. \r 2018). Solar chimneys, (still purely conceptual), heat air using large \r transparent greenhouse-like structures and channel the warm air \r to turbines in tall chimneys (Kasaeian et  al. 2017). Solar energy \r can also be used to produce solar fuels, for example, hydrogen or \r synthetic gas (syngas) (Montoya et  al. 2016; Nocera 2017; Detz \r [...]"


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"[...] et al. 2018). In addition, research proceeds on space-based solar PV, \r which takes advantage of high insolation and a  continuous solar \r resource (Kelzenberg et al. 2018), but faces the formidable obstacle \r of developing safe, efficient, and inexpensive microwave or laser \r transmission to the Earth's surface (Yang et al. 2016). CSP is the most \r widely adopted of these alternative solar technologies."


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"Many alternative PV materials are improving in efficiency and stability, \r providing longer-term pathways for continued PV costs reductions \r and better performance (high confidence). While solar PV based on \r semi-conductors constructed from wafers of silicon still captures \r 90% of the market, new designs and materials have the potential to \r reduce costs further, increase efficiency, reduce resource use, and open \r new applications. The most significant technological advance within \r silicon PV in the past 10 years has been the widespread adoption \r of the passivated emitter and rear cell (PERC) design (Green 2015), \r which now accounts for the majority of production. This advance \r boosts efficiency over traditional aluminium backing by increasing \r reflectivity within the cell and reducing electron-hole recombination \r (Blakers 2019). Bifacial modules increase efficiency by using reflected \r [...]"


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"[...] light from the ground or roof on the backside of modules (Guerrero\u0002Lemus et al. 2016). Integrating PV into buildings can reduce overall \r costs and improve building energy performance (Shukla et al. 2016). \r Concentrating PV uses lenses or mirrors that collect and concentrate \r light onto high efficiency PV cells (Li et al. 2020a). Beyond crystalline \r silicon, thin films of amorphous silicon, cadmium telluride, and \r copper indium gallium selenide (among others) have the potential \r for much lower costs while their efficiencies have increased (Green \r et al. 2019). Perovskites, inexpensive and easy to produce crystalline \r structures, have increased in efficiency by a factor of six in the past \r decade; the biggest challenge is light-induced degradation as well as \r finding lead-free efficient compounds, or establishing lead recycling \r at the end of the lifecycle of the device (Petrus et al. 2017; Chang \r et al. 2018; Wang et al. 2019b; Zhu et al. 2020). Organic solar cells \r [...]"


id: 39208d7097ffb8e60bf4c636f702adfc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7259
content:
"[...] are made of carbon-based semiconductors like the ones found in the \r displays made from organic light emitting diodes (OLEDs) and can be \r processed in thin films on large areas with scalable and fast coating \r processes on plastic substrates. The main challenges are raising the \r efficiency and improving their lifetime (Ma et al. 2020; Riede et al. \r 2021). Quantum dots, spherical semi-conductor nanocrystals, can be \r tuned to absorb specific wavelengths of sunlight, giving them the \r potential for high efficiency with very little material use (Kramer et al. \r 2015). A common challenge for all emerging solar cell technologies \r is developing the corresponding production equipment. Hybrids \r of silicon with layers of quantum dots and perovskites have the \r potential to take advantage of the benefits of all three, although \r those designs require that these new technologies have stability and \r scale that match those of silicon (Chang et al. 2017; Palmstrom et al. \r [...]"


id: d1f124e2c08d82c607f46d6c18f2a708
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34282
content:
"Like PV, CSP facilities can deliver large amounts of power (up to \r 200 MW per unit) and maintain substantial thermal storage, which \r is valuable for load balancing over the diurnal cycle (McPherson \r et al. 2020). However, unlike PV, CSP can only use direct sunlight, \r constraining its cost-effectiveness to North Africa, the Middle East, \r Southern Africa, Australia, the Western USA, parts of South America \r (Peru, Chile), and the Western part of China (Deng et  al. 2015; \r Dupont et al. 2020). Parabolic troughs, central towers and parabolic \r dishes are the three leading solar thermal technologies (Wang et al. \r 2017d). Parabolic troughs represented approximately 70% of new \r capacity in 2018 with the balance made up by central tower plants \r (Islam et al. 2018). Especially promising research directions are on \r tower-based designs that can achieve high temperatures, useful \r for industrial heat and energy storage (Mehos et  al. 2017), and \r [...]"


id: 6a151807a2645d26c610f79cc2bbb081
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"[...] direct steam generation designs (Islam et  al. 2018). Costs of CSP \r have fallen by nearly half since AR5 (Figure 6.8) albeit at a slower \r rate than PV. Since AR5, almost all new CSP plants have storage \r (Figure 6.9) (Thonig 2020)."


id: e125e1d480c28ee83372f0d02f406dc0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36877
content:
"in 2010 to 120 m in 2020) (IRENA 2021b), and average power \r ratings (from 1.9 MW in 2010 to 3 MW in 2020). The generation \r capacity of offshore wind turbines grew by a  factor of 3.7 in less \r than two decades, from 1.6 MW in 2000 to 6 MW in 2020 (Wiser \r et  al. 2021). Floating foundations could revolutionise offshore \r wind power by tapping into the abundant wind potential in deeper \r waters. This technology is particularly important for regions where \r coastal waters are too deep for fixed-bottom wind turbines. Floating \r wind farms potentially offer economic and environmental benefits \r compared with fixed-bottom designs due to less-invasive activity on \r the seabed during installation, but the long-term ecological effects \r are unknown and meteorological conditions further offshore and \r in deeper waters are harsher on wind turbine components (IRENA \r 2019c). A radical new class of wind energy converters has also been \r [...]"


id: b76a379b7dff1dfb7d44dac34576d8ce
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"[...] conceived under the name of airborne wind energy systems that can \r harvest strong, high-altitude winds (typically between 200-800m), \r which are inaccessible by traditional wind turbines (Cherubini et al. \r 2015). This technology has seen development and testing of small \r devices (Watson et al. 2019)."


id: 8705b1d4f5e78a7040274bed2e542c0c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
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content:
"mitigation from wind energy by 2100 ranges from 0.3degC-0.8degC \r depending on the precise socio-economic pathway and wind energy \r expansion scenario followed (Barthelmie and Pryor 2021). Wind \r resources are unevenly distributed over the globe and by time of \r the year (Petersen and Troen 2012), but potential hotspots exist on \r every continent (Figure 6.10) as expressed by the wind power density \r (a quantitative measure of wind energy available at any location). \r Technical potentials for onshore wind power vary considerably, often \r because of inconsistent assessments of suitability factors (McKenna \r et al. 2020). The potential for offshore wind power is larger than for \r onshore because offshore wind is stronger and less variable (Bosch \r et  al. 2018). Offshore wind is more expensive, however, because \r of higher costs for construction, maintenance, and transmission. \r [...]"


id: e89dadabd62bb26cb3f5d59964a884cf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38266
content:
"[...] Wind power varies at a range of time scales, from annual to sub\u0002seconds; the effects of local short-term variability can be offset by \r power plant control, flexible grid integration, and storage (Barra \r et al. 2021) (Section 6.4.3). In some regions, interannual variations in \r wind energy resources could be important for optimal power system \r design (Wohland et al. 2019a; Coker et al. 2020)."


id: 22a48e044ef8ffb910d60314a8424b60
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3314
content:
"Public support for onshore and particularly offshore wind energy \r is generally high, although people may oppose specific wind farm \r projects (high confidence) (e.g.,  Bell et  al. 2005; Batel and Devine\u0002Wright 2015; Rand and Hoen 2017; Steg 2018). People generally \r believe that wind energy is associated with environmental benefits \r and that it is relatively cheap. Yet, some people believe wind turbines \r can cause noise and visual aesthetic pollution, threaten places of \r symbolic value (Devine-Wright and Wiersma 2020; Russell et al. 2020), \r and have adverse effects on wildlife (Bates and Firestone 2015), which \r challenges public acceptability (Rand and Hoen 2017). Support for \r local wind projects is higher when people believe fair decision-making \r procedures have been implemented (Dietz and  Stern  2008; Aitken \r 2010a). Evidence is mixed whether distance from wind turbines or \r financial compensation increases public acceptability of wind turbines \r [...]"


id: 834d5fdf6496c02174ae30cdeb86bd51
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20228
content:
"[...] (Cass et al. 2010; Rand and Hoen 2017; Rudolph et al. 2018; Hoen \r et al. 2019). Offshore wind farms projects have higher public support, \r but can also face resistance (Bidwell 2017; Rudolph et al. 2018)."


id: 16fbeb9b09fd2c0f5e368a8b381f69af
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1262
content:
"support for hydro seems to differ for existing and new projects (high \r confidence). Public support is generally high for small- and medium\u0002scale hydropower in regions where hydropower was historically used \r (Gormally et al. 2014). Additionally, there is high support for existing \r large hydropower projects in Switzerland (Rudolf et al. 2014; Plum \r et al. 2019), Canada (Boyd et al. 2019), and Norway (Karlstrom and \r Ryghaug 2014), where it is a  trusted and common energy source. \r Public support seems lower for new hydropower projects (Hazboun \r and Boudet 2020), and the construction of new large hydropower \r plants has been met with strong resistance in some areas (Vince \r 2010; Bronfman et al. 2015). People generally perceive hydroelectric \r energy as clean and a  non-contributor to climate change and \r environmental pollution (Kaldellis et  al. 2013). For example, in \r Sweden, people believed that existing hydropower projects have as \r [...]"


id: 5168b7d2e0758352251733010770e07d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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vector_id: 11602
content:
"[...] few negative environmental impacts as solar, and even less than wind \r (Ek 2005). However, in areas where the construction of new large\u0002scale hydroelectric energy is met with resistance, people believe that \r electricity generation from hydro can cause environmental, social, \r and personal risks (Bronfman et al. 2012; Kaldellis et al. 2013)."


id: 8937166d5bc5345f3b5b5b23487193c8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21309
content:
"The construction time of hydroelectric power plants is longer than \r many other renewable technologies, and that construction time \r may be extended by the additional time it takes to fill the reservoir. \r This extended timeline can create uncertainty in the completion \r of the project. The uncertainty is due to insecurity in year-to-year \r variations in precipitation and the water inflows required to fill \r reservoirs. This is especially critical in the case of trans-boundary \r hydroelectric power plants, where filling up the reservoirs can have \r large implications on downstream users in other nations. As a result \r of social and environmental constraints, only a  small fraction of \r potential economic hydropower projects can be developed, especially \r in developed countries. Many developing countries have major \r undeveloped hydropower potential, and there are opportunities to \r develop hydropower combined with other economic activities such as \r [...]"


id: 4454f3b65f9923f565df046bcd7b7022
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9260
content:
"[...] irrigation (Lacombe et al. 2014). Competition for hydropower across \r country borders can lead to conflict, which could be exacerbated if \r climate alters rainfall and streamflow (Ito et al. 2016)."


id: a3675a054beb702de2216ebdf3fdfa6b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25957
content:
"Hydroelectric power plants may pose serious environmental and \r societal impacts (high confidence) (McCartney 2009). Dams may lead \r to fragmentation of ecological habitats because they act as barriers \r for migration of fish and other land and water-borne fauna, sediments, \r and water flow. These barriers can be mitigated by sediment passes \r and fish migration aids, and with provision of environmental flows. \r Below dams, there can be considerable alterations to vegetation, \r natural river flows, retention of sediments and nutrients, and water \r quality and temperature. Construction of large reservoirs leads to loss \r of land, which may result in social and environmental consequences. \r Minimising societal and environmental impacts requires taking \r into account local physical, environmental, climatological, social, \r economic, and political aspects during the planning stage (Killingtveit \r 2020). Moreover, when large areas of land are flooded by dam \r [...]"


id: fcce30b373397298f238279b42175c7e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41841
content:
"[...] construction, they generate GHGs (Prairie et al. 2018; Phyoe and Wang \r 2019; Maavara et al. 2020). On the other hand, hydropower provides \r flexible, competitive low-emission electricity, local economic benefits \r (e.g., by increasing irrigation and electricity production in developing \r countries), and ancillary services such as municipal water supply, \r irrigation and drought management, navigation and recreation, \r and flood control (IRENA 2021b). However, the long-term economic \r benefits to communities affected by reservoirs are a subject of debate \r (de Faria et al. 2017; Catolico et al. 2021)."


id: 2767731cc58dae44265804f298cb0af4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4111
content:
"Nuclear energy is found to be favourable regarding land occupation \r (Cheng and Hammond 2017; Luderer et  al. 2019) and ecological \r impacts (Brook and Bradshaw 2015; Gibon et  al. 2017). Similarly, \r bulk material requirements per  unit of energy produced are low \r (e.g., aluminum, copper, iron, rare earth metals) (Vidal et al. 2013; \r Luderer et  al. 2019). Water-intensive inland nuclear power plants \r may contribute to localised water stress and competition for water \r uses. The choice of cooling systems (closed-loop instead of once\u0002through) can significantly moderate withdrawal rates of freshwater \r (Meldrum et al. 2013; Fricko et al. 2016; Mouratiadou et al. 2016; Jin \r et al. 2019). Reactors situated on the seashore are not affected by \r water scarcity issues (Abousahl et al. 2021). Lifecycle analysis (LCA) \r studies suggest that the overall impacts on human health (in terms \r of disability adjusted life years (DALYs)) from the normal operation \r [...]"


id: d5beb376b355c85dcc098b8d8be38999
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34916
content:
"[...] of nuclear power plants are substantially lower than those caused \r by fossil fuel technologies and are comparable to renewable energy \r sources (Treyer et al. 2014; Gibon et al. 2017)."


id: ee9e032886985b48ecd63f9a6f2114f0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39359
content:
"Nuclear power costs vary substantially across countries (high \r confidence). First-of-a-kind projects under construction in Northern \r America and Europe have been marked by delays and costs overruns \r (Berthelemy and Rangel 2015). Construction times have exceeded \r 13-15 years and cost has surpassed three to four times initial budget \r estimates (IEA 2020j). In contrast, most of the recent projects in \r Eastern Asia (with construction starts from 2012) were implemented \r within five to six years (IAEA 2021). In addition to region-specific \r factors, future nuclear costs will depend on the ability to benefit from \r the accumulated experience in controlling the main drivers of cost. \r These cost drivers fall into four categories: design maturity; project \r management; regulatory stability and predictability; and multi-unit \r and series effects (NEA 2020). With lessons learned from first-of-a-kind \r projects, the cost of electricity for new builds are expected to be in the \r [...]"


id: 5d9c34108408057550922a997a657033
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13760
content:
"The theoretical global geologic storage potential is about \r 10,000 GtCO2, with more than 80% of this capacity existing in saline \r aquifers (medium confidence). Not all the storage capacity is usable \r because geologic and engineering factors limit the actual storage \r capacity to an order of magnitude below the theoretical potential, \r which is still more than the CO2 storage requirement through 2100 \r to limit temperature change to 1.5degC (Martin-Roberts et  al. 2021) \r (high confidence). One of the key limiting factors associated with \r geologic CO2 storage is the global distribution of storage capacity \r (Table  6.2). Most of the available storage capacity exists in saline \r aquifers. Capacity in oil and gas reservoirs and coalbed methane \r fields is limited. Storage potential in the USA alone is >1000 GtCO2, \r which is more than 10% of the world total (NETL 2015). The Middle \r East has more than 50% of global enhanced oil recovery potential \r [...]"


id: a6c9782d915f571494e13588cc891343
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26558
content:
"[...] (Selosse and Ricci 2017). It is likely that oil and gas reservoirs will \r be developed as geologic sinks before saline aquifers because of \r existing infrastructure and extensive subsurface data (Alcalde et al. \r 2019; Hastings and Smith 2020). Notably, not all geologic storage is \r utilisable. In places with limited geologic storage, international CCS \r chains are being considered, where sources and sinks of CO2 are \r located in two or more countries (Sharma and Xu 2021). For economic \r long-term storage, the desirable conditions are a depth of 800-3000 \r m, thickness of greater than 50 m and permeability greater than \r 500 mD (Chadwick et al. 2008; Singh et al. 2021). Even in reservoirs \r with large storage potential, the rate of injection might be limited \r by the subsurface pressure of the reservoir (Baik et al. 2018). It is \r estimated that geologic sequestration is reliable with overall leakage \r rates at <0.001% yr -1 (Alcalde et al. 2018). In many cases, geological \r [...]"


id: 51ae2a0af3d46d589d34bdd03630f566
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11653
content:
"[...] storage resources are not located close to CO2 sources, increasing \r costs and reducing viability (Garg et al. 2017a)."


id: b7b1db68a2205f8653869a7bbdabf520
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29534
content:
"Nuclear power's long-term viability may hinge on demonstrating to \r the public and investors that there is a long-term solution to spent \r nuclear fuel. Evidence from countries steadily progressing towards \r first final disposals - Finland, Sweden and France - suggests that \r broad political support, coherent nuclear waste policies, and a well\u0002managed, consensus-based decision-making process are critical \r for accelerating this process (Metlay 2016). Proliferation concerns \r surrounding nuclear power are related to fuel cycle (i.e., uranium \r enrichment and spent fuel processing). These processes are \r implemented in a  very limited number of countries following \r strict national and internationals norms and rules, such as the \r International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) guidelines, treaties and \r conventions. Most of the countries that might introduce nuclear \r power in the future for their climate change mitigation benefits \r [...]"


id: c48368074eec549149da52f8838d2145
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31880
content:
"[...] do not envision developing their own full fuel cycle, significantly \r reducing any risks that might be linked to proliferation (IAEA \r 2014, 2019)."


id: 91a7801bfc64af7171253a9c4ebd0b8a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22853
content:
"In addition to reductions in capture costs, other approaches to reduce \r CCS costs rely on utilising the revenues from co-products such as oil, \r gas, or methanol, and on clustering of large-point sources to reduce \r infrastructure costs. The potential for such reductions is limited in \r several regions due to low sink availability, but it could jump-start initial \r investments (medium confidence). Injecting CO2 into hydrocarbon \r formations for enhanced oil or gas recovery can produce revenues and \r lower costs (Edwards and Celia 2018). While enhanced oil recovery \r potential is <5% of the actual CCS needs, they can enable early pilot \r and demonstration projects (Nunez-Lopez and Moskal 2019; Nunez\u0002Lopez et al. 2019). Substantial portions of CO2 are effectively stored \r during enhanced oil recovery (Menefee and Ellis 2020; Sminchak et al. \r 2020). By clustering together of several CO2 sources, overall costs may \r be reduced by USD10 tCO2\r [...]"


id: 88509618c547a0debc2895ff4c19668f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21141
content:
"[...] -1 (Abotalib et al. 2016; Garg et al. 2017a), \r but geographical circumstances determine the prospects of these \r cost reductions via economies of scale. The major pathways for CO2\r utilisation via methanol, methane, liquid fuel production, and cement \r curing have costs greater than USD500 tCO2\r -1 (Hepburn et al. 2019). \r The success of these pathways therefore depends on the value of such \r fuels and on the values of other alternatives."


id: ea2a9c7603f6b10c58d99c1af586ba58
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38550
content:
"Existing post-combustion approaches relying on absorption are \r technologically ready for full-scale deployment (high confidence). \r More novel approaches using membranes and chemical looping that \r might reduce the energy penalty associated with absorption are in \r different stages of development - ranging from laboratory phase to \r prototype phase (Abanades et al. 2015) (high confidence). There has \r been significant progress in post-combustion capture technologies \r that used absorption in solvents such as monoethanolamine (MEA). \r There are commercial-scale application of solvent-based absorption \r at two electricity generating facilities - Boundary Dam since 2015 \r and Petra Nova (temporarily suspended) since 2017, with capacities \r of 1 and 1.6  MtCO2 yr-1 respectively (Mantripragada et  al. 2019; \r Giannaris et al. 2020a). Several second- and third-generation capture \r technologies are being developed with the aim of not just lowering \r [...]"


id: 64a4e97ce11497557961905c05567708
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14991
content:
"[...] costs but also enhancing other performance characteristics such \r as improved ramp-up and lower water consumption. These include \r processes such as chemical looping, which also has the advantage \r of being capable of co-firing with biomass with a better efficiency \r (Bhave et al. 2017; Yang et al. 2019). Another important technological \r development is the Allam cycle, which utilises CO2 as a working fluid "


id: 904881ac963b4ddf99ed011a60990dd4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22585
content:
"An important feature of bioenergy is that it can be used to remove \r carbon from the atmosphere by capturing CO2 in different parts of \r the conversion process and then permanently storing the CO2 (BECCS \r or biochar) (Smith et al. 2016; Fuss et al. 2018) (Chapters 3 and 7, \r and Section 12.5). Some early opportunities for low-cost BECCS are \r being utilised in the ethanol sector but these are applicable only in \r the near-term at the scale of <=100 MtCO2 yr-1 (Sanchez et al. 2018). \r Several technological and institutional barriers exist for large-scale \r BECCS implementation, including large energy requirements for \r CCS, limit and cost of biomass supply and geologic sinks for CO2\r in several regions, and cost of CO2 capture technologies (high \r confidence). Besides BECCS, biofuels production through pyrolysis \r and hydrothermal liquefaction creates biochar, which could also be \r used to store carbon as 80% of the carbon sequestered in biochar \r [...]"


id: 5f116f57419f6aaa3d3653fe3b318060
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updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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vector_id: 14025
content:
"[...] will remain in the biochar permanently (Chapter 7). In addition to its \r ability to sequester carbon, biochar can be used as a soil amendment \r (Wang et al. 2014b)."


id: d211b7edc506ee38182a45bb194f1667
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34315
content:
"First-generation bioenergy is currently competitive in some markets \r though, on average, its costs are higher than other forms of final energy. \r Bioenergy from waste and residues from forestry and agriculture is \r also currently competitive, but the supply is limited (Aguilar et  al. \r 2020). These costs are context-dependent, and regions having large \r waste resources are already producing low-cost bioenergy (Jin and \r Sutherland 2018). In the future, technology costs are anticipated \r to decrease, but bioenergy produced through cellulosic feedstocks \r may remain more expensive than fossil alternatives. Large-scale \r deployment of early opportunities, especially in the liquid fuel \r sector, may reduce the technological costs associated with biomass \r conversion (IEA 2020g). At the same time, the cost of feedstocks \r may rise as bioenergy requirements increase, especially in scenarios \r with large bioenergy deployment (Muratori et al. 2020). The costs of \r [...]"


id: 1460ff29564f67c14d62ce73fb9f649e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 805
content:
"Acceptability of bioenergy is relatively low compared to other \r renewable energy sources like solar and wind (Poortinga et al. 2013; \r Ma et al. 2015; Peterson et al. 2015; EPCC 2017) and comparable \r to natural gas (Scheer et al. 2013). People also know relatively little \r about bioenergy compared to other energy sources (Whitmarsh \r et al. 2011a; EPCC 2017) and tend be be more ambivalent towards \r bioenergy compared to other mitigation options (Allen and \r Chatterton 2013). People evaluate biomass from waste products \r (e.g., food waste) more favourably than grown-for-purpose energy \r crops, which are more controversial (Plate et al. 2010; Demski et al. \r 2015). The most pressing concerns for use of woody biomass are air \r pollution and loss of local forests (Plate et al. 2010). Various types \r of bioenergy additionally raise concerns about landscape impacts \r (Whitmarsh et  al. 2011a) and biodiversity (Immerzeel et  al. 2014). \r [...]"


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vector_id: 17125
content:
"[...] Moreover, many people do not see biomass as a renewable energy \r source, possibly because it involves burning of material."


id: 3a73ca4eee5e3e4a850460b35cfc10ab
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7482
content:
"Methane emissions mainly from coal, oil, and gas currently represent in 2019 about 18% of energy supply sector greenhouse gas \r (GHG) emissions and 90% of global energy supply non-CO2 emissions in 2019 (Minx et al. 2021b). While approximately 80% of \r the lifecycle methane emissions in the coal sector occur during underground mining, oil and gas emissions are spread throughout \r upstream, midstream, and downstream stages (Alvarez et al. 2018; IPCC 2019). For this reason, methane reductions from coal mining \r can be accomplished through coal mine methane recovery (where methane and coal are recovered simultaneously) and from the \r ventilation air, which can cumulatively reduce methane emissions by 50-75% (Zhou et al. 2016; Singh and Hajra 2018). Governments \r incentivise such operations through a number of emissions trading and offset programmes (Haya et al. 2020). Methane emissions in \r [...]"


id: 6fc375988d785235d71f24a218afe956
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16922
content:
"[...] the oil and gas sector can be reduced by leak detection and repair, relevant across varying time scales (hours to decades) and regional \r scopes (component/facility level to continental) (Fox et al. 2019). Around 50% of the methane emitted from oil and gas infrastructure \r can be mitigated at net-negative costs; that is, the market price of the recovered methane is higher than the mitigation costs (IEA \r 2021e). As CO2 emissions are reduced and fossil fuel consumption decreases, methane emissions associated with these supply chains \r are anticipated to decline (Section 6.7). That said, substantial 'legacy' methane emissions - methane leaks after abandonment - will \r remain, even if a complete fossil fuel phase-out takes place. These legacy emissions are estimated to be less than 1-4% of overall \r methane emissions across all fossil fuel sources (Kholod et al. 2020; Williams et al. 2021b). Even without a complete phase-out, 50-80% \r [...]"


id: 8e106965de79d16592a1d6b128e91c61
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22189
content:
"[...] of methane emissions from coal, oil and gas could be avoided with currently available technologies at less than USD50 tCO2-eq-1\r (Harmsen et al. 2019; Hoglund-Isaksson et al. 2020). Methane recovery from abandoned coal mines could offset most project costs \r (Singh and Sahu 2018). For abandoned oil and gas wells, low plugging costs could be offset through methane recovery, while high \r plugging costs would likely require some market or policy support (Kang et al. 2019)."


id: 1ac48913de7bfc078893807f94afc12e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1910
content:
"Technological changes have continued to drive down fossil fuel \r extraction costs. Significant decarbonisation potential also exists \r via diversification of the fossil fuel uses beyond combustion (high \r evidence). The costs of extracting oil and gas globally have gone \r down by utilising hydraulic fracturing and directional drilling for \r resources in unconventional reservoirs (Wachtmeister and Hook \r 2020). Although the extraction of these resources is still more \r expensive than those derived from conventional reservoirs, the large \r availability of unconventional resources has significantly reduced \r global prices. The emergence of liquefied natural gas (LNG) markets \r has also provided opportunities to export natural gas significant \r distances from the place of production (Avraam et  al. 2020). The \r increase in availability of natural gas has been accompanied by an \r increase in the production of natural gas liquids as a co-product to oil \r [...]"


id: 645e9360cc05131d8346d496e22b246a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14937
content:
"[...] and gas. Over the period from 2014 to 2019, exports of natural gas \r liquids increased by 160%. Natural gas liquids could potentially be \r a lower-carbon alternative to liquid fuels and hydrocarbons. On the \r demand side, natural gas can be used to produce hydrogen using \r steam methane reforming, which is a technologically mature process \r (Sections 6.4.4 and 6.4.5). When combined with 90% CO2 capture, \r the costs of producing hydrogen are around USD1.5-2 kg(H2)\r -1\r (Collodi et al. 2017; Newborough and Cooley 2020), considerably less \r than hydrogen produced via electrolysis."


id: 252282ebd25a222247dc8c6c3ec8e1f2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3726
content:
"Oil and coal consistently rank among the least preferred energy \r sources in many countries (high confidence). The main perceived \r advantage of fossil energy is the relatively low costs, and emphasising \r these costs might increase acceptability somewhat (Pohjolainen et al. \r 2018; Boyd et al. 2019; Hazboun and Boudet 2020). Acceptability of \r fossil fuels is, on average, similar to acceptability of nuclear energy, \r although evaluations are less polarised. People evaluate natural \r gas as somewhat more acceptable than other fossil fuels, although \r they generally oppose hydraulic fracturing (Clarke et al. 2016). Yet, \r natural gas is evaluated as less acceptable than renewable energy \r sources, although evaluations of natural gas and biogas are similar \r (Liebe and Dobers 2019; Plum et  al. 2019). Acceptability of fossil \r energy tends to be higher in countries and regions that strongly \r rely on them for their energy production (Pohjolainen et  al. 2018; \r [...]"


id: 8b761a1f4d219f545126d77bc4cf9e18
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
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index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21700
content:
"[...] Boyd et al. 2019). Combining fossil fuels with CCS can increase their \r acceptability (Van Rijnsoever et al. 2015; Bessette and Arvai 2018). \r Some people seem ambivalent about natural gas, as they perceive \r both benefits (e.g., affordability, less carbon emissions than coal) and \r disadvantages (e.g., finite resource, contributing to climate change) \r (Blumer et al. 2018)."


id: 541ef9f975315825e2db2f8c4b6c5b1a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12077
content:
"Suitable aquifers underlay 16% of the Earth's land surface and store \r an estimated 110,000-1,400,000 PWh (400,000-1,450,000 EJ) that \r could theoretically be used for direct heat applications. For electricity \r generation, the technical potential of geothermal energy is estimated \r to be between 30 PWh yr -1 (108 EJ yr -1) (to 3  km depth) and \r 300 PWh yr -1 (1080 EJ yr -1) (to 10 km depth). For direct thermal uses, \r the technical potential is estimated to range from 2.7-86 PWh yr -1\r (9.7-310 EJ yr -1) (IPCC 2011). Despite the potential, geothermal \r direct heat supplies only 0.15% of the annual global final energy \r consumption. The technical potential for electricity generation, \r depending on the depth, can meet one third to almost three times \r the global final consumption  - based on International Energy \r Agency (IEA) database for IPCC. The mismatch between potential \r and developed geothermal resources is caused by high upfront costs, \r [...]"


id: e84b812fa5c82c7f4dc08922d28a13a6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38205
content:
"[...] decentralised geothermal heat production, lack of uniformity among \r geothermal projects, geological uncertainties, and geotechnical risks \r (IRENA 2017a; Limberger et al. 2018). A limited number of countries \r have a long history in geothermal. At least in two countries (Iceland \r and New Zealand), geothermal accounts for 20-25% of electricity \r generation (Pan et  al. 2019; Spittler et  al. 2020). Furthermore, in \r Iceland approximately 90% of the households are heated with "


id: 2c299abf944a33e9e07820c400ad364d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5026
content:
"The ocean is a vast source of energy (Hoegh-Guldberg et al. 2019). \r Ocean energy can be extracted from tides, waves, ocean thermal \r energy conversion (OTEC), currents, and salinity gradients (Bindoff \r et al. 2019). Their technical potentials, without considering possible \r exclusion zones, are explored below. Tidal energy, which uses \r elevation differences between high and low tides, appears in two \r forms: potential energy (rise and fall of the tide); and current energy \r (from tidal currents). The global technically harvestable tidal power \r from areas close to the coast is estimated as about 1.2 PWh yr -1\r (4.3 EJ yr -1) (IRENA 2020b). The potential for tidal current energy is \r estimated to be larger than that for tidal range or barrage (Melikoglu \r 2018). Ocean wave energy is abundant and predictable and can \r be extracted directly from surface waves or pressure fluctuations \r below the surface (Melikoglu 2018). Its global theoretical potential \r [...]"


id: 6750f9483320c608b91a20b0d311f730
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15448
content:
"[...] is 29.5 PWh yr-1 (106 EJ yr-1),which means that wave energy alone \r could meet  all global energy demand (Mork et  al. 2010; IRENA \r 2020b). The temperature gradients in the ocean can be exploited to \r produce energy, and its total estimated available resource could be \r up to 44.0 PWh yr -1 (158 EJ yr -1) (Rajagopalan and Nihous 2013). \r Salinity gradient energy, also known as osmotic power, has a global \r theoretical potential of over 1.6 PWh yr -1 (6.0 EJ yr -1) (IRENA \r 2020b). The greatest advantage of most marine energy, excluding \r wave energy, is that their sources are highly regular and predictable, \r and energy can be furthermore generated both day and  night. \r An  additional use of sea water is to develop lower-cost district \r cooling systems near the sea (Hunt et al. 2019). The greatest barrier \r to most marine technology advances is the relatively high upfront \r costs, uncertainty on environmental regulation and impact, need for \r [...]"


id: 1f7d93e2bd9d8c86098620398675b85c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2750
content:
"[...] investments and insufficient infrastructure (Kempener and Neumann \r 2014a, b). There are also concerns about technology maturity and \r performance; thus, not all have the potential to become economically \r viable (IRENA 2020b)."


id: f2d42c59c2f2bb95960890faf6ce103f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40119
content:
"can reduce the mass of waste by 70-80% and the volume of waste by \r 80-90% (Haraguchi et al. 2019). Incineration technology can reduce \r water and soil pollution (Gu et  al. 2019). However, if not properly \r handled, dust, and gases such as SO2, HCL, HF, NO2, and dioxins in the \r flue gases can harm the environment (Mutz et al. 2017). Anaerobic \r digestion technology has a  positive environmental impact and the \r ability to reduce GHG emissions (Ayodele et  al. 2018; Cudjoe et  al. \r 2020). The by-product of the anaerobic digestion process could be used \r as a nutrient-rich fertiliser for enhancing soil richness for agricultural \r purposes (Wainaina et  al. 2020). Due to the potential negative \r impacts on domestic environment and residents' health, WTE projects \r such as incineration encounter substantial opposition from the local \r communities in which they are located (Baxter et al. 2016; Ren et al. \r 2016). Therefore, for WTE to be deployed more widely, policies would \r [...]"


id: 6dee97d14ab6bde302c99cf422a7508a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16604
content:
"[...] need to be tailored with specific guidelines focused on mitigating \r emissions, which may have an adverse effect on the environment."


id: de2e8b79e8408d6e2f31fc5fc4e9df41
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36354
content:
"Rather than incremental planning, strategic energy system planning \r can help minimise long-term mitigation costs (high confidence). \r With a whole-system perspective, integrated planning can consider \r both short-term operation and long-term investment decisions, \r covering infrastructure from local to national and international, \r while meeting security of supply requirements and incorporating \r the flexibility provided by different technologies and advanced \r control strategies (Zhang et  al. 2018; O'Malley et  al. 2020; Strbac \r et al. 2020). Management of conflicts and synergies between local \r district and national level energy system objectives, including \r strategic investment in local hydrogen and heat infrastructure, can \r drive significant whole-system cost savings (Zhang et al. 2019b; Fu \r et  al. 2020). For example, long-term planning of the offshore grid \r infrastructure to support offshore wind development, including \r [...]"


id: b49e2cab517d0d5c5c6bdab77ce37551
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29027
content:
"[...] interconnection between different countries and regions, can provide \r significant savings compared to a short-term incremental approach \r in which every offshore wind farm is individually connected to the \r onshore grid (E3G 2021)."


id: 7abeeeec515aef430ac5f4c4d4e21812
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18793
content:
"A digitalised energy system can significantly reduce energy \r infrastructure investments while enhancing supply security and \r resilience (high confidence) (Andoni et  al. 2019; Strbac et  al. \r 2020). Significant progress has been made in the development of \r technologies essential for the transition to a digitalised energy control \r paradigm, although the full implementation is still under development. \r Electrification and the increased integration of the electricity system \r with other systems will fundamentally transform the operational and \r planning paradigm of future energy infrastructure. A fully intelligent \r and sophisticated coordination of the multiple systems through \r smart control will support this paradigm shift. This shift will provide \r significant savings through better utilisation of existing infrastructure \r locally, regionally, nationally, and internationally. Supply system \r reliability will be enhanced through advanced control of local \r [...]"


id: aef768b9c2ad2044738752eca2f2494a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28027
content:
"[...] infrastructure (Strbac et  al. 2015a). Furthermore, this paradigm \r shift offers the potential to increase energy efficiency through \r a  combination of technologies that gather and analyse data and \r consequently optimise energy use in real-time."


id: ed1fdbb9535b21ce2e7d40faefc47fbe
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39094
content:
"Batteries. There are many types of batteries, all having unique \r features and suitability, but their key feature is their rapid response \r time. A rechargeable battery cell is charged by using electricity to \r drive ions from one electrode to another, with the reverse occurring \r on discharge, producing a  usable electric current (Crabtree et  al. \r 2015). While lead-acid batteries (LABs) have been widely used for \r automotive and grid applications for decades (May et al. 2018), LIBs \r are increasingly being used in grid-scale projects (Crabtree et  al. \r 2015), displacing LABs. The rapid response time of batteries makes \r them suitable for enhanced frequency regulation and voltage support, \r enabling the integration of variable renewables into electricity grids \r (Strbac and Aunedi 2016). Batteries can provide almost all electricity \r services, except for seasonal storage. LIBs, in particular, can store \r energy and power in small volumes and with low weight, making \r [...]"


id: 45f5118195d0a1ce346cefe1fa3740c3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9531
content:
"[...] them the default choice for EVs (Placke et al. 2017). EV batteries are \r expected to form a distributed storage resource as this market grows, \r both impacting and supporting the grid (Staffell and Rustomji 2016)."


id: c1058603756977d7a72bdaccfe69ff73
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31264
content:
"The superior characteristics of LIBs will keep them the dominant choice \r for EV and grid applications in the medium term (high confidence). \r There are, however, several next-generation battery chemistries \r (Placke et  al. 2017), which show promise (high  confidence). \r Cost reductions through economies of scale are a  key area for \r development. Extending the life of the battery can bring down overall \r costs and mitigate the environmental impacts (Peters et al. 2017). \r Understanding and controlling battery degradation is therefore \r important. The liquid, air-reactive electrolytes of conventional LIBs \r are the main source of their safety issues (Janek and Zeier 2016; Gur \r 2018), so all-solid-state batteries, in which the electrolyte is a solid, \r stable material, are being developed. They are expected to be safe, \r be durable, and have higher energy densities (Janek and Zeier 2016). \r [...]"


id: 97c59aa2ec1d6b92c21d1920ecc63fef
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23918
content:
"[...] New chemistries and concepts are being explored, such as lithium\u0002sulphur batteries to achieve even higher energy densities (Van \r Noorden 2014; Blomgren 2017) and sodium chemistries because \r sodium is more abundant than lithium (Hwang et  al. 2017). Cost\u0002effective recycling of batteries will address many sustainability issues \r and prevent hazardous and wasteful disposal of used batteries \r (Harper et  al. 2019). Post-LIB chemistries include metal sulphur, \r metal-air, metal ion (besides lithium) and all-solid-state batteries."


id: 3a819ca85307fa77e056856134e61400
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7496
content:
"Thermal energy storage (TES). TES refers to a  range of \r technologies exploiting the ability of materials to absorb and store \r heat or cold, either within the same phase (sensible TES), through \r phase changes (latent TES), or through reversible chemical reactions \r (thermochemical TES). Pumped Thermal Energy Storage (PTES), \r a hybrid form of TES, is an air-driven electricity storage technology \r storing both heat and cold in gravel beds, using a reversible heat\u0002pump system to maintain the temperature difference between the \r two beds and gas compression to generate and transfer heat (Regen \r 2017). TES technologies can store both heat and cold energy for long \r periods, for example, in underground water reservoirs for balancing \r between seasons (Dahash et al. 2019; Tian et al. 2019), storing heat \r and cold to balance daily and seasonal temperatures in buildings and \r reducing heat build-up in applications generating excessive waste \r [...]"


id: 758c07ceceb012cf68a7e077491fe1dd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17912
content:
"Hydrogen and reversible hydrogen fuel cells (H/RHFC). Hydrogen \r is a flexible fuel with diverse uses, capable of providing electricity, \r heat, and long-term energy storage for grids, industry, and transport, \r and has been widely used industrially for decades (Section 6.4.5.1). \r Hydrogen can be produced in various ways and stored in significant \r quantities in geological formations at moderate pressures, often \r for long periods, providing seasonal storage (Gabrielli et al. 2020). \r A core and emerging implementation of PtX is hydrogen production \r through electrolysers. Hydrogen is a carbon-free fuel holding three \r times the energy of an equivalent mass of gasoline but occupying \r a larger volume. An electrolyser uses excess electricity to split water \r into hydrogen and oxygen through the process of electrolysis. A fuel \r cell performs the reverse process of recombining hydrogen and \r oxygen back into water, converting chemical energy into electricity \r [...]"


id: f818f7e0d2bcf7cdae89bf8aa8a12dcb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41023
content:
"[...] (Elzinga et  al. 2014). Reversible hydrogen fuel cells (RHFCs) can \r perform both functions in a single device, however, they are still in \r the pre-commercial stage, due to prohibitive production costs."


id: 7d3737312b75323ec2fc1b1feb625828
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19207
content:
"Hydrogen production. Low- or zero-carbon hydrogen can be \r produced from multiple sources. While there is no consensus on \r the hydrogen production spectrum, 'blue' hydrogen (Goldmann and \r Dinkelacker 2018) generally refers to hydrogen produced from natural \r gas combined with CCS through processes such as steam methane \r reforming (SMR) (Sanusi and Mokheimer 2019) and advanced gas \r reforming (Zhou et  al. 2020). Low-carbon hydrogen could also be \r produced from coal coupled with CCS (Hu et al. 2020) (Table 6.7). \r Current estimates are that adding CCS to produce hydrogen from \r SMR will add on average 50% on the capital cost, 10% to fuel, and \r 100% to operating costs. For coal gasification, CCS will add 5% \r to the capital and fuel costs and 130% to operating costs (Staffell \r et al. 2018; IEA 2019d). Further, biomass gasification could produce \r renewable hydrogen, and when joined with CCS could provide \r negative carbon emissions. 'Green' hydrogen (Jaszczur et al. 2016) \r [...]"


id: 2b47ab52503caef2e08dca6bf24614d3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4860
content:
"[...] is most often referred to as hydrogen produced from zero-carbon \r electricity sources such as solar power and wind power (Schmidt et al. \r 2017) (Table 6.8). Nuclear power could also provide clean hydrogen, \r via electrolysis or thermochemical water splitting (EERE 2020). "


id: d01a0825142841b99717d38c34f2dc06
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33966
content:
"Hydrogen is a  promising energy carrier for a  decarbonised world \r (Box 6.9). It can be utilised for electricity, heat, transport, industrial \r demand, and energy storage (Abdin et  al. 2020). In low-carbon \r energy systems, hydrogen is expected to be utilised in applications \r that are not as amenable to electrification, such as a  fuel for \r heavy-duty road transport and shipping, or as a chemical feedstock \r (Schemme et  al. 2017; Griffiths et  al. 2021). Hydrogen could also \r provide low-carbon heat for industrial processes or be utilised for \r direct reduction of iron ore (Vogl et al. 2018). Hydrogen could replace \r natural gas-based electricity generation (do Sacramento et al. 2013) \r in certain regions and support the integration of variable renewables \r into electricity systems by providing a means of long-term electricity \r storage. Hydrogen-based carriers, such as ammonia and synthetic \r hydrocarbons, can likewise be used in energy-intensive industries \r [...]"


id: cd5e8660ddf89ba29f3443e2406e385c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33470
content:
"[...] and the transport sector (Schemme et  al. 2017; IRENA 2019b) \r (e.g.,  synthetic fuels for aviation). These hydrogen-based energy \r carriers are easier to store than hydrogen. At present hydrogen has \r limited applications - mainly being produced onsite for the creation \r of methanol and ammonia (IEA 2019c), as well as in refineries."


id: 6909848af085f01616a4bfe5b46fa23d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15750
content:
"In general, challenges around hydrogen-based energy carriers  - \r including safety issues around flammability, toxicity, storage, and \r consumption - require new devices and techniques to facilitate their \r large-scale use. Relatively high capital costs and large electricity \r requirements are also challenges for technologies that produce \r hydrogen energy carriers. Yet, these energy carriers could become \r economically viable through the availability of low-cost electricity \r generation and excess of renewable energy production (Daiyan et al. \r 2020). A key challenge in use of ammonia is related to the significant \r amount of NOx emissions, which is released from nitrogen and \r oxygen combustion, and unburned ammonia. Both have substantial \r air pollution risks, which can result in lung and other injuries, and \r can reduce visibility (EPA 2001). Due to the low flammability of \r hydrogen energy carriers such as liquefied hydrogen (Nilsson et al. \r [...]"


id: 95cc3949bcd41d0239450689dde3e1d4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23547
content:
"[...] 2016) and ammonia (Li et al. 2018), a stable combustion (Lamas and \r Rodriguez 2019; Zengel et al. 2020) in the existing gas turbines is not \r currently feasible. In recent developments, however, the proportion of \r hydrogen in gas turbines has been successfully increased, and further \r development of gas turbines may enable them to operate on 100% \r hydrogen by 2030 (Pflug et al. 2019)."


id: b3469ae1c115510e5f64734f55435e5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:23:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28782
content:
"Hydrogen energy carriers. Hydrogen can be both an energy \r carrier itself, be converted further into other energy carriers (such \r as synthetic fuels) and be a  means of transporting other sources \r of energy. For example, hydrogen could be transported in its native \r gaseous form or liquefied. Hydrogen can also be combined with \r carbon and transported as a synthetic hydrocarbons (Gumber and \r Gurumoorthy 2018) (IRENA 2019d) as well as be transported via \r liquid organic hydrogen carriers (LOHCs) or ammonia (IRENA \r 2019d). For synthetic hydrocarbons such as methane or methanol \r to be considered zero carbon, the CO2 used to produce them would \r need to come from the atmosphere either directly through DACCS \r or indirectly through BECCS (IRENA 2019b). LOHCs are organic \r substances in liquid or semi-solid states, which store hydrogen \r based on reversible catalytic hydrogenation and de-hydrogenation \r of carbon double bounds (Niermann et  al. 2019; Rao and Yoon \r [...]"


