# document

id: ac2192441d8734acde68a251b26e8ad8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27528
content:
"Within the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 6 \r\nemissions database, a  range of aviation emissions scenarios for \r\na  range of Shared Socio-economic Pathway (SSP) scenarios are \r\navailable (Figure  10.13). This Figure suggests that by 2050, direct \r\nemissions from aviation could be 1.5 to 6.5 (5-95th percentile) \r\ntimes higher than in the 2020 model year under the scenarios that "


id: 275da9811df883fd9dc785f00805cf03
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4103
content:
"Figure 10.11 | Projections of international aviation emissions of CO2. Data in Mt yr -1, to 2050, showing contributions of improved technology and \r\nair traffic management and infrastructure use to emissions reductions to 2050. Data from Fleming and de Lepinay (2019); projections made pre-COVID-19 \r\nglobal pandemic."


id: 18bc7224a300a8ac78172f8f12e0b699
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1572
content:
"Figure 10.12 | The International Energy Agency's scenario of future aviation fuel consumption for the States Policies Scenario ('STEPS') and composition \r\nof aviation fuel use in the Sustainable Development Scenario. Source: adapted from IEA (2021b)."


id: 73daf0275faf53206bce928a0b86e878
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17637
content:
"exceed warming of 4degC during the 21st century with a likelihood of \r\n50% or greater (C8). In the C1 (which limit warming to 1.5degC (>50%) \r\nduring the 2st century with no or limited overshoot) and C2 (which \r\nreturn warming to 1.5degC (>50%) during the 2st century after a high \r\novershoot) scenarios, aviation emissions could still be up to 2.5 times \r\nhigher in 2050 than in the 2020 model year (95th percentile) but may \r\nneed to decrease by 10% by 2050 (5th percentile)."


id: 473ae1395416a7ec2d68f84f62f09a04
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9733
content:
"countries, especially developing countries, for the progress of the \r\nwork to be presented to the 41st Session of the ICAO Assembly'. \r\nWhat form this goal will take is unclear until work is presented to \r\nthe 41st Assembly (Autumn, 2022). It is likely, however, that new \r\naccountability and governance structures will be needed to support \r\ndecarbonisation of the aviation sector."


id: 9f5e9b3d3f28840b8ba968ab44b149b5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25261
content:
"Dalsoren et  al.  (2009), DNV GL (DNV GL 2019), CAMS-GLOB-SHIP \r\n(Jalkanen et al. 2014; Granier et al. 2019), EDGAR (Crippa et al. 2019), \r\nHoesly et al. (2018), Johansson et al. (2017), ICCT (Olmer et al. 2017), \r\nthe IMO GHG Studies; IMO 2nd (Buhaug et al. 2009), IMO 3rd (Smith \r\net al. 2014), IMO 4th-vessel and IMO 4th-voyage (Faber et al. 2020), \r\nand Kramel et al. (2021)."


id: cac1392369908073632c6e78eaca9876
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33014
content:
"Maritime transport is considered one of the key cornerstones \r\nenabling globalisation (Kumar and Hoffmann 2002). But as for \r\naviation, shipping has its challenges in decarbonisation, with a strong \r\ndependency on fossil fuels without major changes since AR5. At \r\nthe same time, the sector has a  range of opportunities that could \r\nhelp reduce emissions through not only changing fuels, but also by \r\nincreasing energy efficiency, optimising operations and ship design, \r\nreducing demand, improving regulations, as well as other options \r\nthat will be reviewed in this section."


id: c5a4f0e84d2feebee69ddd117d1e6167
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32079
content:
"Like aviation, shipping is also a  source of emissions of SLCFs as \r\ndescribed in Section 10.5, including nitrogen oxides (NOx), sulphur \r\noxides (SOx, such as SO2 and SO4), carbon monoxide (CO), black \r\ncarbon, and non-methane volatile organic compounds (NMVOCs) \r\n(Szopa et  al. 2021). Though SLCF have a  shorter lifetime than the \r\nassociated CO2 emissions, these short-lived forcers can have both \r\na cooling effect (e.g., SOx) or a warming effect (e.g., ozone from NOx). \r\nThe cooling from the SLCF from a pulse emission will decay rapidly \r\nand diminish after a couple of decades, while the warming from the \r\nlong-lived substances lasts for centuries (Szopa et al. 2021)."


id: 43b9ddaaf27820a678a13564cf8990e6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9143
content:
"Emissions of SLCF from shipping not only affect the climate, but \r\nalso the environment, air quality, and human health. Maritime \r\ntransport has been shown to be a major contributor to coastal air \r\nquality degradation (Zhao et  al. 2013; Jalkanen et  al. 2014; Viana \r\net al. 2014; Goldsworthy and Goldsworthy 2015; Goldsworthy 2017). \r\nSulphur emissions may contribute towards acidification of the ocean \r\n(Hassellov et al. 2013). Furthermore, increases in sulphur deposition \r\non the oceans have also been shown to increase the flux of CO2\r\nfrom the oceans to the atmosphere (Hassellov et al. 2013). To address \r\nthe risks of SOx emissions from shipping, there is now a cap on the on \r\nthe sulphur content permissible in marine fuels (IMO 2013). There is \r\nalso significant uncertainty about the impacts of pollutants emitted \r\nfrom ships on the marine environment (Blasco et al. 2014)."


id: 2a15f1a725a4207d5a09348202fb2f92
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4615
content:
"Maritime transport volume has increased by 250% over the past \r\n40 years, reaching an all-time high of 11 billion tonnes of transported \r\ngoods in 2018 (UNCTAD 2019). This growth in transport volumes has \r\nresulted in continued growth in GHG emissions from the shipping \r\nsector, despite an improvement in the carbon intensity of ship \r\noperations, especially since 2014. The estimated total emissions \r\nfrom maritime transport can vary depending on data set and \r\ncalculation method, but range over 600-1100 MtCO2 yr-1 over \r\nthe past decade (Figure  10.14), corresponding to 2-3% of total \r\nanthropogenic emissions. The legend in Figure  10.14 refers to the \r\nfollowing data sources: Endresen et al. (2003), Eyring et al. (2005), "


id: ba9634ca516d4fa654faef9da3786c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30041
content:
"Figure 10.14 | CO2 emissions (Mt yr-1) from shipping 2000-2018. Data from various inventories as shown in the label."


id: 27034998ad85be73c3fab69561148e63
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4029
content:
"Pollution control is implemented to varying degrees in the modelling \r\nof the SSP scenarios (Rao et  al. 2017); for example, SSPs 1 and 5 \r\nassume that increasing concern for health and the environment result \r\nin more stringent air pollution policies than today (Szopa et al. 2021). \r\nThere is a downward trend in SOx and NOx emissions from shipping \r\nin all the SSPs, in compliance with regulations. The SLCF emissions \r\nreduction efforts, within the maritime sector, are also contributing \r\ntowards achieving the UN SDGs. In essence, while long-lived GHGs \r\nare important for long-term mitigation targets, accounting for short\u0002lived climate forcers is important both for current and near-term \r\nforcing levels as well as broader air pollution and SDG implications."


id: 74b2fadc97da5ad394fdb9e782e39c79
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17771
content:
"Winther  et  al.  2014). Emission patterns and quantities, however, \r\nare also likely to change with future regulations from IMO, and \r\ndepend on technology developments, and activity levels which may \r\ndepend upon geopolitics, commodity pricing, trade, natural resource \r\nextraction, insurance costs, taxes, and tourism demand (Johnston \r\net al. 2017). The need to include indigenous peoples' voices when \r\nshaping policies and governance of shipping activities in the high \r\nnorth is increasing (Dawson et al. 2020)."


id: 8a7e3985ee29928d9d3927cd8a6da891
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21537
content:
"The Arctic climate and environment pose unique hazards and \r\nchallenges with regard to safe and efficient shipping operations: low \r\ntemperature challenges, implications for vessel design, evacuation \r\nand rescue systems, communications, oil spills, variable sea ice, and \r\nmeteorological conditions (Buixade Farre et al. 2014). To understand \r\nthe total implications of shipping in the Arctic, including its climate \r\nimpacts, a  holistic view of synergies, trade-offs, and co-benefits is \r\nneeded, with assessments of impacts on not only the physical climate, \r\nbut also the local environment and ecosystems. To further ensure safe \r\noperations in the Arctic waters, close monitoring of activities may \r\nbe valuable."


id: 2da672b75388c270411f4f1bbd4aca50
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5323
content:
"Increased Arctic shipping activity may also pose increased risks to \r\nlocal marine ecosystems and coastal communities from invasive \r\nspecies, underwater noise, and pollution (Halliday et al. 2017; IPCC \r\n2019). Greater levels of Arctic maritime transport and tourism \r\nhave political, as well as socio-economic, implications for trade, \r\nand nations and economies reliant on the traditional shipping \r\ncorridors. There has been an increase in activity from cargo, tankers, \r\nsupply, and fishing vessels in particular (Winther et al. 2014; Zhao \r\net  al. 2015). Projections indicate more navigable Arctic waters in \r\nthe coming decades (Smith and Stephenson 2013; Melia et  al. \r\n2016) and continued increases in transport volumes through the \r\nnorthern sea routes (Corbett et al. 2010; Lasserre and Pelletier 2011; "


id: 5c2028b46a5f9fa58ac0312196ea9e9c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13463
content:
"Low-carbon hydrogen and ammonia are seen to have positive potential \r\nas a  decarbonised shipping fuel. Hydrogen and ammonia, when \r\nproduced from renewables or coupled to CCS as opposed to mainly \r\nby fossil fuels with high lifecycle emissions (Bhandari et  al. 2014), \r\nmay contribute to significant CO2-eq reductions of up to 70-80% \r\ncompared to low-sulphur heavy fuel oil (Bicer and Dincer 2018b; \r\nGilbert et al. 2018). These fuels have their own unique transport and \r\nstorage challenges as ammonia requires a pilot fuel due to difficulty "


id: 642c429320c5783982c84bf71287cc10
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14908
content:
"in combustion, and ammonia combustion could lead to elevated \r\nlevels of NOx, N2O, or NH3 emissions depending on engine technology \r\nused (DNV GL 2020). There is a need for the further development of \r\ntechnology and procedures for safe storage and handling of fuels \r\nsuch as hydrogen and ammonia, both onboard and onshore, for faster \r\nuptake (Hoegh-Guldberg et al. 2019), but they remain an encouraging \r\ndecarbonisation option for shipping in the next decade."


id: 38fdcafb6898e48c7fe720226cd2f58e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7231
content:
"While methanol produced from fossil sources induces an emissions \r\nincrease of +7.5% (+44%), e-methanol (via hydrogen from \r\nelectrolysis based on renewable energy and carbon from direct \r\nair capture) reduces emissions by 80% (82%). In general, several \r\nsynthetic fuels, such as synthetic diesel, methane, methanol, ethanol, \r\nand dimethyl ether could in principle be used for shipping (Horvath \r\net al. 2018). The mitigation potential of these is fully dependent on \r\nthe sourcing of the hydrogen and carbon required for their synthesis."


id: dd3249ff88b2ae436194152670569200
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36185
content:
"Although projections indicate continued increase in freight demand \r\nin the future, demand-side reductions could contribute to mitigation. \r\nThe development of autonomous systems may play a role (Colling \r\nand Hekkenberg 2020; Liu et al. 2021) while 3-D printing can reduce \r\nall forms of freight as parts and products can be printed instead of \r\nshipped (UNCTAD 2018). As more than 40% of transported freight is \r\nfossil fuels, a lessened demand for such products in low-emissions \r\nscenarios should contribute to reducing the overall maritime transport \r\nneeds and hence emissions in the future (Sharmina et  al. 2017). \r\nAn  increase in alternative fuels, on the other hand, may increase \r\nfreight demand (Mander et  al. 2012). Potentials for demand-side \r\nreduction in shipping emissions may arise from improving processes \r\naround logistics and packaging, and further taxes and charges could \r\nserve as leverage for reducing demand and emissions."


id: defea7dc8d19e7128c4f745a9bd30ae6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36488
content:
"Policy choices may enable or hinder changes, and gaps in governance \r\nstructures may, to some degree, hinder the objectives of mechanisms \r\nlike SEEMP to improve energy efficiency and emissions. Policies \r\nmay be developed to incentivise investments in necessary changes \r\nto the global fleet and related infrastructures. The literature argues \r\nthat regulations and incentives that motivate mitigation through \r\nspeed optimisation, ship efficiency improvements, and retrofits with \r\nlower-carbon technologies at a sub-global scale may contribute to \r\nimmediate reductions in CO2 emissions from the sector (Bows-Larkin \r\n2015). The role of the financial sector, through initiatives such as \r\nthe Poseidon Principle, which limit lending to companies that fail \r\nto uphold environmental standards, could also become increasingly \r\nimportant (Sumaila et al. 2021)."


id: 1ad38da3c118c63aa7727d8be19a5d47
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1920
content:
"It has been proposed to make shipping corporations accountable \r\nfor their emissions by making it mandatory to disclose their vessels' \r\nemissions reductions (Rahim et al. 2016). Market-based mechanisms \r\nmay increasingly encourage ship operators to comply with IMO \r\nGHG regulations. Development of policies such as carbon pricing \r\nor taxation to enable a business case for adopting low-carbon fuels \r\ncould be a near-term priority for acceleration of transformation of the \r\nsector (Hoegh-Guldberg et al. 2019). The EU is considering including \r\nshipping in its carbon trading system, with the details still to be \r\nagreed upon but expected to come into force in 2023, along with the \r\nCII. The proposition is that shipowners who conduct voyages within \r\nEurope, or start or end at an EU port, will have to pay for carbon \r\npermits to cover the CO2 emitted by their vessel."


id: d075935c1e13075dc5b5037d1d31463d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34029
content:
"Regulatory frameworks for the shipping sector have been developed \r\nover time and will continue to be through bodies such as the IMO, \r\nwhich was established by the UN to manage international shipping. \r\nThe IMO strategy involves a 50% reduction in GHG emissions from \r\ninternational shipping by 2050 compared to 2008 (IMO 2018). The \r\nstrategy includes a  reduction in carbon intensity of international \r\nshipping by at least 40% by 2030, and 70% by 2050, compared \r\nto 2008. IMO furthermore aims for the sectoral phase-out of GHG \r\nemissions as soon as possible this century."


id: f8a0923b9979d6e54f00dbd642a437d9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41107
content:
"Regulations exist also to limit emissions of air pollution from shipping \r\nwith the aim to improve environment and health impacts from \r\nshipping in ports and coastal communities. In sulphur emission control \r\nareas (SECAs), the maximum permissible sulphur content in marine \r\nfuels is 0.10% mass/mass. These are further tightened by the IMO \r\nlegislation on reducing marine fuel sulphur content to a maximum \r\nof 0.5% in 2020 outside SECAs, compared to 3.5% permissible since \r\n2012 (MARPOL Convention). The MARPOL Annex VI also limits the \r\nemissions of ozone-depleting substances and ozone precursors, \r\nNOx, and volatile organic compounds from tankers (Mertens et  al. \r\n2018). The implementation of the emission control areas have been \r\nshown to reduce the impacts on health and the environment (Viana \r\net al. 2015)."


id: e925d8ed055e788bc99871300563169e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38370
content:
"While there are many governance and regulatory initiatives that help \r\nreduce emissions from the shipping sector, few are transformative \r\non their own, unless zero-carbon fuels can become available at \r\na reasonable cost as suggested in Sections 10.3 and below."


id: 3340927beb4b76c4bdac0d6e585e4378
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6269
content:
"Figure 10.16 shows CO2 emissions from shipping in scenarios from \r\nthe AR6 database and the Fourth GHG study by the IMO (Faber et al. \r\n2020). Panel (a) shows that CO2 emissions from shipping go down by \r\n33-70% (5-95th% percentile) by 2050 in the C1 and C2 scenarios, \r\nwhich limit warming to 1.5degC (>50%) during the 21st century with \r\nno or limited overshoot or return warming to 1.5degC (>50%) during "


id: e7d455b2cbdedf718b66cc75d919b8a0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38094
content:
"the most sustainable way (Rao et al. 2017). Conversely, there are no \r\nemissions reductions in the scenarios presented by the IMO Fourth \r\nGHG study, even though these scenarios incorporate some efficiency \r\nimprovements and a slight increase in the use of LNG."


id: b1313c86d6f178135027ba6fb61f826a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28406
content:
"Options outlined in this chapter suggest a combination of policies \r\nto reduce demand, increase investments by private actors and \r\ngovernments, and develop the technology readiness level of \r\nalternative fuels and related infrastructure (especially synthetic \r\nfuels). Some literature suggests that battery electric-powered short\u0002distance sea shipping could yield emissions reductions given access \r\nto low-carbon electricity. For deep sea shipping, advanced biofuels, \r\nhydrogen, ammonia, and synthetic fuels hold potential for significant \r\nemissions reductions, depending on GHG characteristics of the fuel \r\nchain and resource base. Other options, such as optimisation of \r\nspeed and hull design and wind-assisted ships, could also combine \r\nto make significant contributions by 2050 to further bring emissions \r\ndown. In total a suite of mitigation options exists or is on the horizon \r\nfor the maritime sector."


id: 66e18ba4d65f032da7084323fc160f5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15365
content:
"This section reviews the results of three types of models that \r\nsystemically combine options to assess different approaches to \r\ngenerating decarbonisation pathways for the transport system: \r\n(i) integrated assessment models (IAM); (ii) global transport energy \r\nmodels (GTEM); and (iii) national transport-energy models (NTEM) \r\n(Edelenbosch et  al. 2017; Yeh et  al. 2017). Common assumptions \r\nacross the three model types include trajectories of socioeconomic "


id: f902acb6d57c34df65ae189af72a5f80
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41175
content:
"Combinations of measures are likely to be needed for transformative \r\ntransitioning of the shipping sector to a low-carbon future, particularly \r\nif an expected increase in demand for shipping services is realised \r\n(Smith et al. 2014; Faber et al. 2020). Both GHG and SLCF emissions \r\ndecrease significantly in SSP1-1.9, where mitigation is achieved in "


id: 6022079564ba3f6e464f65729028cc2d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14217
content:
"development, technological development, resource availability, \r\npolicy, and behavioural change. The key differences underlying these \r\nmodels are their depth of technological and behavioural detail versus \r\nscope in terms of sectoral and regional coverage. In very general \r\nterms, the narrower the scope in terms of sectors and regions, the \r\nmore depth on spatial, technological, and behavioural detail. A large \r\nset of scenarios from these models were collected in a joint effort led \r\nby Chapter 3 and supported by Chapter 10 and others. The outcomes \r\nfrom over 100 models have been analysed for this chapter with the \r\nmethodologies set out in Annex III for the whole report."


id: d6529fcf0e0f58491e6a752a339181b0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35019
content:
"A large share of the scenarios was developed prior to 2020. Results \r\nfrom such scenarios are indexed to a  modelled (non-COVID) year \r\n2020, referred to as 2020Mod."


id: cfb4e8217fe39a88f1823b4db5f04be8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33902
content:
"GHG emissions from transport are a  function of travel demand, \r\ntravel mode, transport technology, GHG intensity of fuels, and energy \r\nefficiency. These drivers can be organised around a group of levers \r\nthat can advance the decarbonisation of the transport system. The \r\nlevers thus include reducing travel activity, increasing use of lower\u0002carbon modes, and reducing modal energy intensity and fuel carbon \r\ncontent. This section explores each lever's contributions to the \r\ndecarbonisation of the transport sector by reviewing the results from \r\nthe three model types IAM, GTEM, and NTEM."


id: 30a12413935f0dc658a15b6a9ff59856
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5806
content:
"This section applies the following categorisation of scenarios (see \r\nTable 3.1 for more details):"


id: 70b5f9cb791b1395515d4dc7e2e617aa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17087
content:
"Figure 10.17 | Direct CO2 emissions from transport in 2030, 2050, and 2100 indexed to 2020 modelled year across R6 Regions and World. IAM results are \r\ngrouped by temperature targets. Sectoral studies are grouped by reference and policy categories. Plots show 5-95th percentile, 25-75th percentile, and median. Numbers above \r\nthe bars indicate the number of scenarios. Data from the AR6 scenario database."


id: 8216954e0c32781171d06fe433e9bf1c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20006
content:
"Several GTEMs not included in AR6 scenario database have examined \r\nambitious CO2 mitigation scenarios. For example, a meta-analysis of \r\nscenarios suggests that global transport emissions consistent with\r\nwarming levels of 2degC, would peak in 2020 at around 7-8 GtCO2\r\nand decrease to 2.5-9.2 Gt for 2degC, with an average of 5.4 Gt by \r\n2050 (Gota et  al. 2019). For comparison, the IEA's Sustainable \r\nDevelopment Scenario suggests global transport emissions decrease \r\nto 3.3 Gt (or 55% reduction from 2020 level) by 2050 (IEA 2021f). \r\nThe latest IEA Net Zero by 2050 report proposes transport emissions \r\nto be close to zero by 2050 (IEA 2021e). The latter is lower than \r\nthe interquartile ranges of the C1 group of scenarios from the AR6 \r\ndatabase analysed here."


id: ccfa3d4490e5898117375d838d4d56ad
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33405
content:
"Growth in passenger and freight travel demand is strongly dependent \r\non population growth and GDP. In 2015, transport activities were \r\nestimated at around 35-50 trillion pkm, or 5,000-7,000 pkm \r\nper  person per  year, with significant variations among studies \r\n(IEA 2017b; ITF 2019). The number of passenger cars in use has \r\ngrown 45% globally between 2005-2015, with the most significant \r\ngrowth occurring in the developing countries of Asia and the Middle \r\nEast (119%), Africa (79%), and South and Central America (80%), \r\nwhile growth in Europe and North America is the slowest (21% and \r\n4% respectively) (IOMVM 2021). On the other hand, car ownership "


id: 99c785da4cb8c19cd019230434ef567b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24283
content:
"Low-carbon scenarios are also available from national models (Latin \r\nAmerica, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Indonesia, India, \r\nItaly, Japan, Mexico, South Africa, UK, US) with a good representation \r\nof the transport sector. The low-carbon scenarios are either defined \r\nwith respect to a global climate stabilisation level of, for example, \r\n2degC/1.5degC Scenario (Dhar et al. 2018), or a CO2 target that is more \r\nstringent than what has been considered in the NDCs, such as the \r\nnet-zero emissions pathways (Bataille et al. 2020; IEA 2021e). These "


id: f146d41d7e14ef087caccf1d2936b1b1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39832
content:
"limit or return warming to 1.5degC (>50%) during the 21st  century \r\n(C1-C2) and below 2.5degC scenarios (C3-C4), respectively, compared \r\nto scenarios with warming levels of above 4degC (C8)."


id: 4fc5324d12295d9949ff4757fa2f9efa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11327
content:
"levels in terms of vehicles per  1000 people in 2015 were low in \r\ndeveloping countries of Asia and the Middle East (141), Africa (42), \r\nSouth and Central America (176), while in Europe and North America \r\nthey are relatively high (581 and 670 respectively) (IOMVM 2021). \r\nThe growth rate in commercial vehicles (freight and passenger) was \r\n41% between 2005 and 2015, with a somewhat more even growth \r\nacross developed and developing countries (IOMVM 2021)."


id: c36eb8fd01040c7d569daa15cab3a58b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31658
content:
"Many models find small differences in passenger transport demand \r\nacross temperature goals because IAM models rely on historical \r\nrelationships between population, GDP, and demand for services to \r\nestimate future demand. This assumption poses a limitation to the \r\nmodelling efforts, as mitigation efforts would likely increase travel \r\ncosts that could result in lower transport demand (Zhang et  al. \r\n2018). In most models, demand is typically an exogenous input. \r\nThese models often assume mode shifts of activities from the most \r\ncarbon-intensive modes (driving and flying for passenger travel and \r\ntrucking for freight) to less carbon-intensive modes (public transit \r\nand passenger rail, and freight rail) to reduce emissions."


id: cef318c1acb2c841a4e266f99fddce83
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33749
content:
"Traditionally there is a disconnection between IAM models and bottom\u0002up sectoral or city-based models due to the different scale (both spatial \r\nand temporal) and focus (climate mitigation vs urban pollution, safety \r\n(Creutzig 2016)). The proliferation of shared and on-demand mobility \r\nsolutions is leading to rebound effects for travel demand (Chen and \r\nKockelman 2016; Coulombel et al. 2019) and this is a new challenge \r\nfor modelling. Some IAM studies have recently begun to explore \r\ndemand-side solutions for reducing transport demand to achieve \r\nvery low-carbon scenarios through a combination of culture and low\u0002carbon lifestyle (Creutzig et al. 2018; van Vuuren et al. 2018); urban \r\ndevelopment (Creutzig et  al. 2015a); increased vehicle occupancy \r\n(Grubler et al. 2018); improved logistics and streamlined supply chains \r\nfor the freight sector (Mulholland et  al. 2018); and disruptive low-"


id: d7ffc2e4348064d5d1cc633bc51d3bae
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35305
content:
"carbon innovation, described as technological and  business model \r\ninnovations offering 'novel value propositions to consumers and which \r\ncan reduce GHG emissions if adopted at scale' (Wilson et al. 2019). In \r\nthe literature from national models, demand has been differentiated \r\nbetween conventional and sustainable development scenarios \r\nthrough narratives built around policies, projects, and programmes \r\nenvisaged at the national level (Dhar and Shukla 2015; Shukla et al. \r\n2015) and price elasticities of travel demand (Dhar et  al. 2018). \r\nHowever, a  greater understanding of  the mechanisms underlying \r\nenergy-relevant decisions and behaviours (Brosch et al. 2016), and the \r\nmotivations for sustainable behaviour (Steg et al. 2015), are critically \r\nneeded to realise these solutions."


id: a3539b7d8cc9b91af37a9bf12f66fbc9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25942
content:
"Overall, passenger and freight activity are likely to continue to \r\ngrow rapidly under the C7 (>3.0degC) scenarios, but most growth \r\nwould occur in developing countries. Most models treat travel \r\ndemand exogenously following the growth of population and \r\nGDP, but they have limited representation of responses to price \r\nchanges, policy incentives, behavioural shifts, nor innovative mobility \r\nsolutions that can be expected to occur in more stringent mitigation \r\nscenarios. Chapter  5 provides a  more detailed discussion of the \r\nopportunities for demand changes that may result from social and \r\nbehavioural interventions."


id: ee8b3b0bc8847499a1fa5a9ddf1a4d90
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39345
content:
"Figure  10.19 shows activity trajectories for freight and passenger \r\ntransport through 2100 relative to a  modelled year 2020 across \r\ndifferent modes, based on the AR6 database for IAMs and global \r\ntransport models. Globally, climate scenarios from IAMs, and policy \r\nand reference scenarios from global transport models, indicate \r\nincreasing demand for freight and passenger transport via most modes \r\nthrough 2100 (Yeh et al. 2017; Mulholland et al. 2018; Zhang et al. \r\n2018; Khalili et al. 2019). Road passenger transport exhibits a similar \r\nincrease (roughly tripling) through 2100 across scenarios. For "


id: 60ad25f93825d26aae452a8486cd1374
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14307
content:
"As noted in Section  10.2, commonly explored mitigation options \r\nrelated to mode change include a  shift to public transit, shared \r\nmobility, and demand reductions through various means, including \r\nimproved urban form, teleconferences that replace passenger "


id: 4d33f26a7c4d77a8aea345cc541e936
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10863
content:
"Figure 10.19 | Transport activity trajectories for passenger and freight across different modes. Global passenger (billion pkm per year) and freight (billion tkm \r\nper year) demand projections relative to a modelled year 2020 index. Results for IAM are for selected stabilisation temperatures by 2100. Also included are global transport \r\nmodels Reference and Policy scenarios. Data from the AR6 scenario database. Trajectories span the 5th to 95th percentiles across models, with a solid line indicating the median \r\nvalue across models."


id: a44c623ef1f1deef8c912311a4d0e5a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26102
content:
"Increasing the occupancy rate of passenger transport (Grubler et al. \r\n2018) and reducing empty miles or increasing payload in freight \r\ndeliveries (Gucwa and Schafer 2013; McKinnon 2018) via improved \r\nlogistics efficiency or streamlined supply chains (Mulholland et  al. \r\n2018), can present significant opportunities to effectively improve \r\nenergy efficiency and decrease GHG emissions in transport. However, \r\nthe recent trends of consumer behaviours have shown a  declining \r\noccupancy rate of light-duty vehicles in industrialised countries \r\n(Schafer and Yeh 2020), and the accelerating growing preference for \r\nSUVs challenges emissions reductions in the passenger car market (IEA \r\n2019d). These trends motivate a strong focus on demand-side options."


id: 6783b287557e3082a83a8a3002925abd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15481
content:
"Based on the scenario literature, a 51% reduction in median energy \r\nintensity of passenger transport and a  corresponding 38-50% \r\nreduction in median carbon intensity by 2050 would be aligned \r\nwith transition trajectories yielding warming levels below 1.5degC by \r\nthe end of the century. For comparison, the LCA literature suggests \r\na switch from current ICEs to current BEVs would yield a reduction \r\nin energy intensity well beyond 45% and up to 70%, for a  mid\u0002sized vehicle (Section  10.4). Correspondingly, a  switch from diesel \r\nor gasoline to low-carbon electricity or low-carbon hydrogen would \r\nyield carbon intensity reduction beyond the median scenario value. \r\nThus, the LCA literature suggests technologies exist today that would \r\nalready match and exceed the median energy and carbon intensities \r\nvalues that might be needed by 2050 for low warming levels."


id: a93fd95cd64128335226dd9aa2e1a7c5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26998
content:
"aviation, rail, and shipping - and both passenger and freight transport. \r\nSince the technologies have different conversion efficiencies, these \r\nshares of final energy by fuel are necessarily different from the shares \r\nby service (passenger-km or tonne-km) by fuel and shares of vehicle \r\nstock by fuel. For example, a current battery electric LDV powertrain \r\nis roughly three times more energy-efficient than a comparable ICE \r\npowertrain (Section  10.3, Table  10.9 in Appendix 10.1); thus, fuel "


id: a124367cd8e4bd4fce47b57c1dc84f7b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25573
content:
"Two mechanisms for reducing carbon emissions from the transport \r\nsector are fuel switching for current vehicle technologies and \r\ntransitioning to low-carbon vehicle technologies. Figure  10.21 \r\ncombines data from IAMs and GTEMs on shares of transport final \r\nenergy by fuel. These shares account for fuel uses across modes - road, "


id: 4234fd4c1808a87164ceea93ae816f7c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8848
content:
"shares of 0.25 for electricity and 0.75 for oil could correspond to \r\nvehicle stock shares of 0.5 and 0.5, respectively. In general, while \r\nmodels may project that EVs constitute a greater share of road vehicle \r\nstock, and provide a greater share of road passenger-kilometres, their \r\nshare of transport final energy (Figure 10.21) can still remain lower \r\nthan the final energy share of fuels used in less-efficient (e.g., ICE) \r\nvehicles. Thus, the shares of transport final energy by fuel presented \r\nin Figure 10.21 should be interpreted with care."


id: a470a5aea744c8523465005a8c7ab1f1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26136
content:
"While few IAMs report final energy shares by transport mode or \r\npassenger/freight, several relevant studies provide insights into \r\nfuel share trends in passenger LDVs and freight vehicles. The IEA \r\nsuggests that full LDV electrification would be the most promising \r\nlow-carbon pathway to meet a  1.75degC goal (IEA 2017b). The MIT \r\nEconomic Projection and Policy Analysis model focuses on the \r\nfuture deployment of gasoline versus EV technologies in the global \r\nLDV stock (Ghandi and Paltsev 2019). These authors estimate that \r\nthe global stock of vehicles could increase from 1.1 billion vehicles \r\nin 2015 up to 1.8 billion by 2050, with a growth in EVs from about \r\n1 million vehicles in 2015 up to 500 million in 2050. These changes are \r\ndriven primarily by cost projections (mostly battery cost reductions). \r\nSimilarly, the International Council on Clean Transport (ICCT) indicates \r\nthat EV technology adoption in the light-duty sector can lead to "


id: d0b83761a2c983abfad8426667628cf0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34070
content:
"Section 10.7 presents the full set of scenarios in the AR6 database and highlights the broader trends of how the transport sector may \r\ntransform in order to be compliant with different warming levels. This box elaborates on three illustrative mitigation pathways (IMPs) \r\nto exemplify a few different ways the sector may transform. Seven illustrative pathways are introduced in Section 3.2.5. In this box we \r\nfocus on three of the IMPs: (i) focus on deep renewable energy penetration and electrification (IMP-Ren), (ii) low demand (IMP-LD), \r\nand (iii) pathways that align with both Sustainable Development Goals and climate policies (IMP-SP). In particular, the variants of \r\nthese three scenarios limit warming to 1.5degC with no or limited overshoot (C1)."


id: 15942e6bcadecaac65b61c4f4cd2919c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1010
content:
"All of the three selected pathways reach global net zero CO2 emissions across all sectors between 2060 and 2070, but not all reach \r\nnet zero GHG emissions (Figure 3.4). Panel (a) in Box 10.4, Figure 1 below shows the CO2 trajectories for the transport sector for the \r\nselected IMPs. Please note that the year 2020 is modelled in these scenarios, therefore, the scenarios do not reflect the effects of"


id: 558b0c808fdc6c7ab7b798871684e791
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12319
content:
"the interquartile ranges) reductions in CO2 emissions from transport \r\n(below modelled 2020 levels) by 2050 would be compatible with \r\nwarming levels of 1.5degC (C1-C2 group). While the global scenarios \r\nsuggest emissions reductions in energy supply sectors at large precede \r\nthose in the demand sectors (Section 3.4.1), a subset of the scenarios \r\nalso demonstrate that more stringent emission reductions in the \r\ntransport sector are feasible. For example, the illustrative mitigation \r\npathways IMP-REN and IMP-LD suggest emissions reductions of 80% "


id: 6f0f9a19995e5a2cc325f127c74052af
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16807
content:
"This section provides an updated, detailed assessment of future \r\ntransport scenarios from IAM, GTEMs, and NTEMs given a wide range \r\nof assumptions and under a  set of policy targets and conditions. \r\nThe scenario modelling tools are necessary to aggregate individual \r\noptions and understand how they fit into mitigation pathways from \r\na systems perspective. The scenarios suggest that 43% (30-63% for "


id: 958e854908b99c05d7a392648537ebd3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23514
content:
"and 90% respectively are feasible by 2050 en route to warming levels \r\nof 1.5degC with low or no overshoot by the end of the century."


id: 7fff54f0ffb577a0a9eebf9c9fdb6b4c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19653
content:
"transport mitigation options, as well as a  description of emerging \r\nissues. The section ends by outlining an integrated framework for \r\nenabling the transformative changes that are emerging and required \r\nto meet the potential transformative scenarios from Section 10.7."


id: 1000053f1347e66666774cd2298d3fbd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 0
content:
"The scenarios from the different models project continued growth in \r\ndemand for freight and passenger services, particularly in developing \r\ncountries. The potential for demand reductions is evident, but \r\nthe specifics of demand-reduction measures remain less explored by the \r\nscenario literature. This limitation notwithstanding, the IAM and GTEMs \r\nsuggest that interventions that reduce the energy and fuel carbon \r\nintensity of transport are likely crucial to successful mitigation strategies."


id: 16dcde61e1ed6cfa9a5d088afaab7030
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1239
content:
"Demand and behaviour. While technology options receive \r\nsubstantial attention in this chapter, there are many social and \r\nequity issues that cannot be neglected in any transformative \r\nchange to mitigate climate change. Transport systems are socio\u0002economic systems that include systemic factors that are developing \r\ninto potentially transformative drivers of emissions from the sector. \r\nThese systemic drivers include, for example, changes in urban \r\nform that minimise automobile dependence and reduce stranded \r\nassets; behaviour change programmes that emphasise shared \r\nvalues and economies; smart technologies that enable better and \r\nmore equitable options for transit and active transport as well as \r\nintegrated approaches to using autonomous vehicles; new ways of "


id: 655d0bbdcd698afbcc9beff383c8e1ed
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15105
content:
"positive developments to enable EV technologies for buses, light- and \r\nmedium-duty trucks, and some rail applications (though advanced \r\nbiofuels and hydrogen may also contribute to the decarbonisation \r\nof these vehicles in some contexts). In developing countries, where \r\nmicromobility and public transit account for a large share of travel, \r\nEVs are ideal to support mitigation of emissions. Finally, demand \r\nfor critical materials needed for batteries has become a  focus of \r\nattention, as described in Box 10.6."


id: 1637b9e3235af94fe7266f4d76a8dc9c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1124
content:
"enabling electric charging systems to fit into electricity grids, creating \r\nsynergistic benefits to grids, improving the value of electric transit, \r\nand reducing range anxiety for EV users; and new concepts for the \r\nfuture economy such as circular economy, dematerialisation, and \r\nshared economy that have the potential to affect the structure of \r\nthe transport sector. The efficacy of demand reduction and efficiency \r\nopportunities depends on the degree of prioritisation and focus by \r\ngovernment policy. Figure  10.22 suggests that innovative demand \r\nand efficiency strategies are at the regime scales. While these \r\nstrategies are moving beyond R&D, they are not mainstreamed yet \r\nand have been shown to work much more effectively if combined \r\nwith technology changes, as has been outlined in the transformative \r\nscenarios from Section 10.7 and in Chapter 5."


id: e7ab50df85c8a95005cab82f6df648aa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38065
content:
"Electromobility options are moving from regime to landscape levels. \r\nThis transition is evident in the trend of incumbent automobile \r\nmanufacturers producing an increasing range of EVs in response to \r\ndemand, policy, and regulatory signals. EVs for light-duty passenger \r\ntravel are largely commercial and likely to become competitive with \r\nICE vehicles in the early 2020s (Dia 2019; Bond et al. 2020; Koasidis \r\net al. 2020). As these adopted technologies increase throughout cities \r\nand regions, governments and energy suppliers will have to deploy \r\nnew infrastructure to support them, including reliable low-carbon \r\ngrids and charging stations (Sierzchula et  al. 2014). In addition, \r\nregulatory reviews will be necessary to ensure equitable transition "


id: 9082a1328c43a8a734b8f0b26e3339fc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22629
content:
"Electromobility in land-based transport. Since AR5, there has been \r\na significant breakthrough in the opportunities to reduce transport \r\nGHG emissions in an economically efficient way due to electrification \r\nof land-based vehicle systems, which are now commercially available. \r\nEV technologies are particularly well established for light-duty \r\npassenger vehicles, including micromobility. Furthermore, there are "


id: b8d23a25a710c5298c53cb92dc00f16b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29720
content:
"hydrogen. Biofuels are also of interest for these segments. To move \r\nout of the niche level, there is a need to set deployment targets to \r\nsupport breakthroughs in these fuels. Similarly, there is a need for \r\nregulatory changes to remove barriers in new procurement systems \r\nthat accommodate uncertainty and risks inherent in the early adoption \r\nof new technologies and infrastructure (Boren 2019; Sclar et  al. \r\n2019; Marinaro et  al. 2020). R&D programmes and demonstration \r\ntrials are the best focus for achieving fuels for such systems. Finally, \r\nthere is a need for regulatory changes. Such regulatory changes need \r\nto be coordinated through ICAO and IMO as well as with national \r\nimplementation tools related to the Paris Agreement (see Box 10.5). \r\nLong-term visions, including creative exercises for cities and regions, \r\nwill be required, providing a  protected space for the purpose of \r\ntrialling new technologies (Boren 2019; Geels 2019)."


id: 6448063c2692d5bedda59f737b579889
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14927
content:
"and achievement of SDGs, addressing the multitude of possible \r\nbarriers that may be present due to the incumbency of traditional \r\nautomotive manufacturers and associated supporting elements of \r\nthe socio-technical system (Newman 2020b) (Chapter 6). Similarly, \r\nnew partnerships between government, industry, and communities \r\nwill be needed to support the transition to electromobility. These \r\npartnerships could be particularly effective at supporting engagement \r\nand education programmes (Newman 2020b) (Chapter 8)."


id: 1cc3e62c9e309ac7bddcea84cb381349
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2244
content:
"Fuels for aviation and shipping. Despite technology improvements \r\nfor land-based transport, equivalent technologies for long distance \r\naviation and shipping remain elusive. Alternative fuels for use in \r\nlong-range aviation and shipping are restricted to the niche level. \r\nThe aviation sector is increasingly looking towards synthetic fuels \r\nusing low-carbon combined with CO2 from direct air capture, while \r\nshipping is moving towards ammonia produced using low-carbon "


id: e35730e8276534723b31980ec73d2e6f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37295
content:
"Blue bars indicate \r\narriers and enabl\r\nthe option. The s\r\ngion), time (e.g.,\r\nEconomic \r\nCosts in 2030 and long term\r\nEffects on employment and \r\neconomic growth\r\nB E B \r\ngth of enablers and \r\n50 "


id: b46390e5e5373aed52667477b1790d27
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28972
content:
"is likely crucial for the decarbonisation of shipping and aviation, \r\ncould also serve as storage for electricity produced during low\u0002demand periods. Integrated planning of transport and power \r\ninfrastructure would be particularly useful in developing countries \r\nwhere 'greenfield' development doesn't suffer from constraints \r\nimposed by legacy systems."


id: a4092da808d2df40bfa3769df29da338
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26049
content:
"Planning for integration with the power sector: Decarbonising \r\nthe transport sector will require significant growth in low-carbon \r\nelectricity to power EVs, and more so for producing energy\u0002intensive fuels, such as hydrogen, ammonia and synthetic fuels. \r\nHigher electricity demand will necessitate greater expansion \r\nof the power sector and increase land use. The strategic use \r\nof energy-intensive fuels, focused on harder-to-decarbonise \r\ntransport segments, can minimise the increase in electricity \r\ndemand. Additionally, integrated planning of transport and power \r\ninfrastructure could enable sectoral synergies and reduce the \r\nenvironmental, social, and economic impacts of decarbonising \r\ntransport and energy. For example, smart charging of EVs could \r\nsupport more efficient grid operations. Hydrogen production, which "


id: 55ab9489925393535560950360a80dc4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12343
content:
"Shipping and aviation governance: Strategies to deliver \r\nfuels in sufficient quantity for aviation and shipping to achieve \r\ntransformative targets are growing in intensity and often feature the \r\nneed to review international and national governance. Some authors \r\nin the literature have argued that the governance of the international \r\ntransport systems could be included in the Paris Agreement process \r\n(Gencsu and Hino 2015; Lee 2018; Traut et al. 2018). Box 10.6 sets \r\nout these issues."


id: 635b71b21640bad7ec5c260c51dbb02
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14778
content:
"Whenever borders are crossed, the aviation and shipping sector creates international emissions that are not assigned to states' \r\nNationally Declared Contributions under the Paris Agreement. Emissions from these segments are rapidly growing (apart from \r\nCOVID-19 affecting aviation) and are projected to grow between 60% to 220% by 2050 (IPCC 2018; UNEP 2020). Currently, the \r\nInternational Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Marine Organization (IMO), specialised UN Agencies, are \r\nresponsible for accounting and suggesting options for managing these emissions."


id: b5a39db9e931cd4d4dc18d51b0f0f486
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29183
content:
"ICAO has two global aspirational goals for the international aviation sector: 2% annual fuel efficiency improvement through 2050; \r\nand carbon neutral growth from 2020 onwards. To achieve these goals, ICAO has established CORSIA  - Carbon Offsetting and \r\nReduction Scheme for International Aviation, a market-based programme."


id: 9746df7a19ffc1fdc274b04db87c883a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23812
content:
"In 2018, IMO adopted an Initial Strategy on the reduction of GHG emissions from ships. This strategy calls for a reduction of the carbon \r\nintensity of new ships through implementation of further phases of the energy efficiency design index (EEDI). The IMO calls for a 40% \r\nreduction of the carbon intensity of international shipping by 2030, and is striving for a 70% reduction by 2050. Such reductions in \r\ncarbon intensity would result in an overall decline in emissions of 50% in 2050 (relative to 2008)."


id: d23768c73aea5cd19abfafdf83f32066
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34338
content:
"These goals are likely insufficiently transformative for the decarbonisation of aviation or shipping, though they are moving towards \r\na start of decarbonisation at a period in history where the options are still not clear, as set out in Sections 10.5 and 10.6."


id: c48e154a3725d58dc744d9ac21086787
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31892
content:
"The ICAO is not a regulatory agency, but rather produces standards and recommended practices that are adopted in national and \r\ninternational legislation. IMO does publish 'regulations' but does not have powers of enforcement. Non-compliance can be regulated \r\nby nation states if they so desire, as a ship's MARPOL certificate, issued by the flag state of the ship, means there is some responsibility \r\nfor states with global shipping fleets."


id: f10fc99c4994f83cce8f4b9c04858874
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39785
content:
"Some authors in the literature have argued that emissions from international aviation and shipping should be part of the Paris \r\nAgreement (Gencsu and Hino 2015; Lee 2018; Traut et al. 2018; Rayner 2021), arguing that the shipping and aviation industries \r\nwould prefer emissions to be treated under an international regime rather than a national-oriented regime. If international aviation \r\nand shipping emissions were a part of the Paris Agreement, it may remove something of the present ambiguity about responsibilities. \r\nHowever, inclusion in the Paris Agreement is unlikely to fundamentally change emissions trends unless targets and enforcement \r\nmechanisms are developed, by ICAO and IMO or by nation states through global processes."


id: c254d7c0be5903f0e2205497a3a3bb24
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31473
content:
"If international regulations are not made, then the transformation of aviation and shipping will be left to individual nations. In 2020, \r\nSwitzerland approved a new CO2 tax on flights (The Swiss Parliament 2020), with part of its revenues earmarked for the development \r\nof synthetic aviation fuels, to cover up to 80% of their additional costs compared to fossil jet fuel (Energieradar 2020). Appropriate \r\nfinancing frameworks will be a key to the large-scale market adoption of these fuels. Egli et al. (2019) suggest that the successful \r\ndesign of investment policies for solar and wind power over the past 20 years could serve as a model for future synthetic aviation \r\nfuels production projects 'attracting a broad spectrum of investors in order to create competition that drives down financing cost', and \r\nwith state investment banks building 'investor confidence in new technologies.' These national investment policies would provide the \r\nkey enablers for successful deployments."


id: 8d0850e54b7f84a0cc5f7a088eed7f2f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22000
content:
"Managing critical minerals: Critical minerals are required to \r\nmanufacture lithium-ion batteries (LIB) and other renewable power \r\ntechnologies. There has been growing awareness that critical minerals \r\nmay face challenges related to resource availability, labour rights, and \r\ncosts. Box 10.6 sets out the issues, showing how emerging national \r\nstrategies on critical minerals, along with requirements from major \r\nvehicle manufacturers, are addressing the need for rapid development "


id: 837d7dcb618f87df00851b10776b4f1e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20273
content:
"of new mines with a  more balanced geography, less use of cobalt \r\nthrough continuing LIB innovations, and a focus on recycling batteries. \r\nThe standardisation of battery modules and packaging within \r\nand across vehicle platforms, as well as increased focus on design \r\nfor recyclability, are important. Given the high degree of potential \r\nrecyclability of LIBs, a near closed-loop system in the future would be \r\na feasible opportunity to minimise critical mineral issues."


id: 7a6b9bc2c99784563f36ce3c36d86594
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18734
content:
"The critical materials identified by most nations are: REEs neodymium and dysprosium for permanent magnets in wind turbines and \r\nelectric motors; lithium and cobalt, primarily for batteries though many other metals are involved; and, cadmium, tellurium, selenium, \r\ngallium and indium for solar PV manufacture (Valero et al. 2018; Giurco et al. 2019). Predictions are that the transition to a clean \r\nenergy world will be significantly energy intensive (World Bank Group 2017; Sovacool et al. 2020), putting pressure on the supply \r\nchain for many of the metals and materials required."


id: ec1861b266811e049a62d8985b2bc480
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38902
content:
"Governance of the sustainability of mining and processing of many of these materials, in areas generally known for their variable \r\nenvironmental stewardship, remains inadequate and often a source for conflict. Sovacool et al. (2020) propose four holistic recommendations \r\nfor improvement to make these industries more efficient and resilient: diversification of mining enterprises for local ownership and \r\nlivelihood benefit; improved traceability of material sources and transparency of mining enterprises; exploration of alternative resources; \r\nand the incorporation of minerals into climate and energy planning by connecting to the NDCs under the Paris Agreement."


id: 8ae28b6bfa2f212e16778de11398f461
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21605
content:
"Valero et al. (2018) highlight that the demand for many of the REEs and other critical minerals will, at the current rate of renewable energy \r\ninfrastructure growth, increase by 3000 times or more by 2050. Some believe this growth may reach constraints in supply (Giurco et al. \r\n2019). Others suggest that the minerals involved are not likely to physically run out (Sovacool et al. 2020) if well managed, especially \r\nas markets are found in other parts of the world (for example the transition away from lithium from brine lakes to hard rock sources). \r\nLithium hydroxide, more suitable for batteries, now competes well, in terms of cost, when extracted from rock sources (Azevedo et al. \r\n2018) due to the ability to more easily create high quality lithium hydroxide from rock sources, even though brines provide a cheaper"


id: fdcfcd7cb1a4909260a1613345f4129b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42015
content:
"source of lithium (Kavanagh et al. 2018). Australia has proven resources of all the Li-ion battery minerals and has a strategy for their \r\nethical and transparent production (Commonwealth of Australia 2019). Changes in the technology have also been used to reduce need \r\nfor certain critical minerals (Manberger and Stenqvist 2018). Recycling of all the minerals is not yet well developed but is likely to be \r\nincreasingly important (Habib and Wenzel 2014; World Bank Group 2017; Giurco et al. 2019; Golroudbary et al. 2019)."


id: 42b01b3531875fa6220c2f981b26b174
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8927
content:
"A number of critical materials strategies have now been developed by nations developing the manufacturing base of new power \r\nand transport technologies. Some of these strategies pay particular attention to the supply of lithium (Martin et al. 2017; Hache et al. \r\n2019). For example, Horizon 2020, a substantial EU Research and Innovation programme, couples research and innovation in science, \r\nindustry, and society to foster a circular economy in Europe, thus reducing bottlenecks in the EU nations. Similarly CREEN (Canada \r\nRare Earth Elements Network) is supporting the US-EU-Japan resource partnership with Australia (Klossek et al. 2016)."


id: 641866f22f38b44a6fbde0bdf974f3cf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14894
content:
"As renewables and electromobility-based development leapfrog into the developing world it will be important to ensure the critical \r\nminerals issues are managed for local security of supply as well as participation in the mining and processing of such minerals to \r\nenable countries to develop their own employment around renewables and electromobility (Sovacool et al. 2020)."


id: d5a2a6389fe8e5c75acb29cb2bacd567
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34899
content:
"a  broad set of ideas about technologies, urban and infrastructure \r\nplanning (including transport, electricity, and telecommunications \r\ninfrastructure), and human behaviour and at the same time can \r\ncreate opportunities to achieve the SDGs."


id: 6e3a7f32c92b9f82523b4feef915779d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16659
content:
"Enabling creative foresight: Human culture has always had \r\na  creative instinct that enables the future to be better dealt with \r\nthrough imagination (Montgomery 2017). Science and engineering \r\nhave often been preceded by artistic expressions; for example Jules \r\nVerne first dreamed of the hydrogen future in 1874 in his novel \r\nThe Mysterious Island. Autonomous vehicles have regularly occupied \r\nthe minds of science fiction authors and filmmakers (Braun 2019). \r\nSuch narratives, scenario building, and foresighting are increasingly \r\nseen as a part of the climate change mitigation process (Lennon et al. \r\n2015; Muiderman et al. 2020) and can 'liberate oppressed imaginaries' \r\n(Luque-Ayala 2018). Barber (2021) emphasised the important role of \r\npositive images about the future instead of dystopian visions and the \r\nimpossibility of business-as-usual futures."


id: 55e6991f31f608a397eb515ce030fe2e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12383
content:
"Transport visions can be a part of this cultural change as well as the \r\nmore frequently presented visions of renewable energy (Wentland \r\n2016; Breyer et  al. 2017). There are some emerging technologies, \r\nlike Maglev, Hyperloop, and drones that are likely to continue the \r\nelectrification of transport even further (Daim 2021) and which are \r\nonly recently at the imagination stage. Decarbonised visions for \r\nheavy vehicle systems appear to be a core need from the assessment \r\nof technologies in this chapter. Such visioning or foresighting requires \r\ndeliberative processes and the literature contains a growing list of \r\ntransport success stories based on such processes (Weymouth and \r\nHartz-Karp 2015). Ultimately, reducing GHG emissions from the \r\ntransport sector would benefit from creative visions that integrate "


id: fbfbd5a0e736f8cede38893ace76c7eb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41692
content:
"climate action in some cases (Lamb et  al. 2020) but such pledges \r\ncan be calculated at a personal level and applied through every level \r\nof activity from individual, household, neighbourhood, business, \r\ncity, nation or groups of nations (Meyer and Newman 2020) and \r\nare increasingly being demonstrated through shared communities \r\nand local activism (Bloomberg and Pope 2017; Sharp 2018; Figueres \r\nand  Rivett-Carnac 2020). Finally, the world's major financing \r\ninstitutions are also engaging in decarbonisation efforts by requiring \r\ntheir recipients to commit to Net Zero Strategies before they can \r\nreceive their funding (Robins 2018; Newman 2020a) (Chapter  15, \r\nCross-Chapter Box 1 in Chapter 1). As a result, transparent methods \r\nare emerging for calculating what these financing requirements \r\nmean for transport by companies, cities, regions, and infrastructure "


id: e3a418bf760fa56c83e8de1cfcbcf374
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37340
content:
"projects (Chapters 8 and 15). The continued engagement of financial \r\ninstitutions may, like in other sectors, become a  major factor in \r\nenabling transformative futures for transport as long as governance \r\nand communities continue to express the need for such change."


id: e20989d6331e9adbd2f231727e51463a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37050
content:
"Using the right tools and strategies is crucial for the successful \r\ndeployment of mitigation options. Table 10.7 summarises the tools and \r\nstrategies required to enable electromobility, new fuels for aviation \r\nand shipping, and the more social aspects of demand efficiency."


id: b44767d097c76c67cccf17989203c342
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28951
content:
"Electromobility is the biggest change in transport since AR5. When powered with low-carbon electricity, electric vehicles (EVs) \r\nprovide a  mechanism for major GHG emissions reductions from the largest sources in the transport sectors, including cars, \r\nmotorbikes, autorickshaws, buses and trucks. The mitigation potential of EVs depends on the decarbonisation of the power system. \r\nEVs can be charged by home or business renewable power before or in parallel to the transition to grid-based low-carbon power."


id: fe15545a6c6cb09f0defc655f6a20353
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42069
content:
"Electromobility is happening rapidly in micromobility (e-autorickshaws, e-scooters, e-bikes) and in transit systems, especially buses. \r\nEV adoption is also accelerating for personal cars. EVs can be used in grid stabilisation through smart charging applications."


id: 90615c397ce4f8cb13c89a2329bf26cf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22603
content:
"The state-of-the-art lithium-lon batteries (LIBs) available in 2020 are superior to alternative cell technologies in terms of battery life, \r\nenergy density, specific energy, and cost. The expected further improvements in LIBs suggest these chemistries will remain superior \r\nto alternative battery technologies in the medium term, and therefore LIBs will continue to dominate the electric vehicle market."


id: 40e247c16bfe76f4957c2ae26222fd9b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8602
content:
"Dependence on LIB metals will remain, which may be a concern from the perspective of resource availability and costs. However, \r\nthe demand for such metals is much lower than the reserves available, with many new mines starting up in response to the new \r\nmarket, particularly in a diversity of places."


id: 73478d9ef6883a7d2b70cc1df7e2f802
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17534
content:
"Recycling batteries will significantly reduce long-term resource requirements. The standardisation of battery modules and packaging \r\nwithin and across vehicle platforms, as well as increased focus on design for recyclability, are important. Many mobility manufacturers \r\nand governments are considering battery recycling issues to ensure the process is mainstreamed."


id: 608211b8bf918c45c522490f78668b01
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14286
content:
"The most significant enabling condition in electromobility is to provide electric recharging opportunities and an integration strategy \r\nso that vehicles support the grid."


id: 524d3a3a54ddc7b977a6254bec0be899
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11758
content:
"There are few obvious solutions to decarbonising heavy vehicles like international ships and planes. The main focus has been \r\nincreased efficiency, which so far has not prevented these large vehicles from becoming the fastest-growing source of GHG globally. \r\nThese vehicles likely need alternative fuels that can be fitted to the present propulsion systems. Emerging demonstrations suggest \r\nthat ammonia, advanced biofuels, or synthetic fuels could become commercial."


id: d36133133c29d24fd27d7aa595b5aa70
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34533
content:
"Electric propulsion using hydrogen fuel cells or Li-ion batteries could work with short-haul aviation and shipping, but the large \r\nlong-lived vessels and aircraft likely need alternative liquid fuels for most major long-distance functions."


id: 70640f072ea46fd07d5a2e71ff25c5fb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17032
content:
"Advanced biofuels, if sourced from resources with low GHG footprints, offer decarbonisation opportunities. As shown in Chapters 2, \r\n6, and 12, there are multiple issues constraining traditional biofuels. Sustainable land management and feedstocks, as well as R&D \r\nefforts to improve lignocellulosic conversion routes, are key to maximising the mitigation potential from advanced biofuels."


id: 5dd0517808d338d5c8420c99215f9612
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13801
content:
"Synthetic jet and marine fuels can be made using CO2 captured with DAC/BECCS and low-carbon hydrogen. These fuels may also \r\nhave less contrails-based climate impacts and lower emissions of local air pollutants. However, these fuels still require significant \r\nR&D and demonstration."


id: 6a0856dc584ded47e3855ef240662e41
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15924
content:
"The deployment of low-carbon aviation and shipping fuels that support decarbonisation of the transport sector will likely require \r\nchanges to national and international governance structures."


id: ea369421687ad5f3dc2f24dd284112ac
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38559
content:
"Cities can reduce their transport-related fuel consumption by around 25% through combinations of more compact land use and less \r\ncar-dependent transport infrastructure."


id: d7e029f3a88cc71451ff3b8f39cacbdb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35289
content:
"More traditional programmes for reducing unnecessary high-energy travel through behaviour change programmes (e.g., taxes on \r\nfuel, parking, and vehicles, or subsidies for alternative low-carbon modes) continue to be evaluated, with mixed results due to the \r\ndominance of time savings in an individual's decision-making."


id: b9e154551221a9ede5a333246cc4f478
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29922
content:
"The circular economy, the shared economy, and digitalisation trends can support systemic changes that lead to reductions in \r\ndemand for transport services or expand the use of more efficient transport modes."


id: e55b8ce6a85ab351ea05f0c22f30e92a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37652
content:
"COVID-19 lockdowns have confirmed the transformative value of telecommuting, replacing significant numbers of work and \r\npersonal journeys, as well as promoting local active transport. These changes may not last and impacts on productivity and health \r\nare still to be fully evaluated."


id: b81c3b3c3d48d8ba4b60fa3664a4278a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29607
content:
"Solutions for individual households and businesses involving pledges and shared communities that set new cultural means of \r\nreducing fossil fuel consumption, especially in transport, are setting out new approaches for how climate change mitigation can \r\nbe achieved."


id: faa252c4c760764f225a2913029941b5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41468
content:
"In mid-2020, the IPCC, in collaboration with the Norwegian \r\nUniversity of Science and Technology, released a  request for data \r\nfrom the lifecycle assessment (LCA) community, to estimate the \r\nlifecycle greenhouse (GHG) emissions of various passenger and \r\nfreight transport pathways. The data requested included information \r\nabout vehicle and fuel types, vintages, vehicle efficiency, payload, \r\nemissions from vehicle and battery manufacturing, and fuel cycle \r\nemissions factors, among others."


id: cecb487d241dfa137888f6e84161759f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33720
content:
"Data submissions were received from approximately 20 research \r\ngroups, referencing around 30 unique publications. These submissions \r\nwere supplemented by an additional 20 studies from the literature. \r\nWhile much of this literature was focused on LDVs and trucks, \r\nrelatively few studies referenced bus and rail pathways."


id: 2f4b8e75bf51b0b38f6bcb7a0838206d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5588
content:
"First, the datapoints were separated into categories based on the \r\napproximate classification (e.g., heavy-duty vs medium-duty trucks), \r\npowertrain (i.e., internal combustion engines (ICEV), hybrid electric \r\nvehicles (HEV), battery electric vehicles (BEV), fuel cell vehicles \r\n(FCV)), and fuel combination. For each category of vehicle/powertrain/\r\nfuel, a  simplified LCA that harmonises values from across the \r\nreviewed studies was constructed, using the following basic equation:"


id: 759fbb2b9fd01f28015442589fa979b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17924
content:
"Note: for plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEV), the value of FC/P*EF \r\nis a weighted sum of this aggregate term for each of battery and \r\ndiesel/gasoline operation."


id: 933e5e0deb93c970b99708dc6c1d4a3b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23104
content:
"Fuel emissions factors used are presented in Table 10.8. Note that \r\nthe  fuel emissions factors were compiled from several studies \r\nthat used different global warming potential (GWP) values in their \r\nunderlying assumptions, and therefore the numbers reported here "


id: c8c0345204f46508c5e02183cd3dc80a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32640
content:
"For LDVs, the entire distribution of estimated lifecycle emissions is \r\npresented for each vehicle/powertrain/fuel category (as a boxplot) in \r\nFigure 10.4. For trucks, rail and buses, only the low and high estimates \r\nare presented (as solid bars) in Figures 10.6 and 10.8, since the \r\nnumber of datapoints were not sufficient to present as a distribution. \r\nTable 10.9 presents the low and high estimates of fuel efficiency for \r\neach category. The references used are reported in the main text."


id: 99dcb3d0d855ed94a165cc7e363a3704
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24297
content:
"may be slightly different if the 100-year global warming potential \r\n(GWP100) from the AR6 had been used. This difference would be \r\nsmall given the small contribution from non-CO2 gases to the total \r\nlifecycle emissions. For example, methane (CH4) emissions exist in \r\nthe lifecycle of natural gas supply chains or natural gas-dependent \r\nsupply chains such as hydrogen from steam methane reforming \r\n(SMR). Recent data from the US suggests emissions of approximately \r\n0.2-0.3 gCH4 per MJ natural gas (Littlefield et al. 2017, 2019), which \r\nwould range by no more than 1-2 gCO2-eq per MJ natural gas (<3% \r\nof natural gas lifecycle emissions) when converting from a GWP100 \r\nof 25 (AR4) or 36 (AR5) to the current (AR6) GWP100 of 29.8."


id: 22e1097011d0f0994aa463f63214c24e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3341
content:
"For transit and freight, the lifecycle harmonisation exercise allows two \r\naggregate parameters to vary from the low to high among submitted \r\nvalues within each category: FC/P and VC/P. Aggregate parameters \r\nare used to capture internal correlations (e.g., fuel consumption and \r\npayload; both depend heavily on vehicle size) and are presented in \r\nTables 10.10 to 10.14. The references used are reported in the main text."


id: dfbed1e61e5e2e50a601c133924ce007
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36613
content:
"Table 10.9 | Range of fuel efficiencies for light-duty vehicles by fuel and powertrain category, per vehicle kilometre"


id: 334e605bdebb87a8836dd8117fd56c07
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6278
content:
"Table 10.12 | Range of fuel efficiencies for heavy-duty truck by fuel and powertrain category, at 100% payload."


id: a6e9c2121646147cebc646b3ced3ec70
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26575
content:
"a\r\n Ammonia ICEV trucks are assumed to have the same fuel economy as diesel ICEVs due to lack of data."


id: 7e8aa6f68f5a48791c3874d17a181381
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19415
content:
"b\r\n Ammonia FCV trucks are assumed to have the same fuel economy as hydrogen FCVs due to lack of data."


id: 56be0952189ab7ea3d6cb2feb045a9b6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12511
content:
"Table 10.13 | Range of fuel efficiencies for medium-duty truck by fuel and powertrain category, at 100% payl"


id: d3264d9d71a2dca79d81d9c67812e0fe
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34492
content:
"a\r\n Ammonia ICEV trucks are assumed to have the same fuel economy as diesel ICEVs due to lack of data.\r\nb\r\n Ammonia FCV trucks are assumed to have the same fuel economy as Hydrogen FCVs due to lack of data."


id: 10169e723f1d9eab0e59a4cd16a30588
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15
content:
"The range of electricity costs used here is consistent with the range \r\nof levelised cost of electricity estimates presented in Chapter  6 \r\n(USD20-200 MWh-1)."


id: d2cb55e88405967ef61678434e8729d0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34434
content:
"For hydrogen, a range of USD1 to USD13 per kilogram is used. The \r\nupper end of this range corresponds approximately to reported retail \r\ncosts in the US (Eudy and Post 2018b; Argonne National Laboratory \r\n2020; Burnham et al. 2021). Despite the high upper bound, lower costs \r\n(USD6-7 kg-1) are already consistent with recent cost estimates of \r\nhydrogen produced via electrolysis (Chapter 6) and current production \r\ncost estimates from IRENA (IRENA 2020). The lower end of the range \r\n(USD1 kg-1) corresponds to projected future price decreases for \r\nelectrolytic hydrogen (BNEF 2020; Hydrogen Council 2020; IRENA \r\n2020), and is consistent with projections from Chapter 6 for the low \r\nend of long-term future prices for fossil hydrogen with CCS."


id: 601316480600df7fd60fcce8cc83ecab
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14210
content:
"Capital cost ranges vary widely in the literature depending on the \r\nexact truck model, size and other assumptions. For ICEVs in this \r\nanalysis, the lower bound (USD90,000) corresponds to the 2020 \r\nestimate for China from Moultak et al. (2017), and the upper bound \r\n(USD250,000) corresponds to the 2030 projection for the US from \r\nthe same study. These values encompass the full range reported \r\nby Argonne (Burnham et  al. 2021). The lower bound BEV cost \r\n(USD120,000) is taken from 2030 projections for China (Moultak \r\net al. 2017) and the upper bound (USD780,000) is taken from 2020 \r\ncost estimates in the US (class 8 sleeper cab tractor) (Burnham et al. \r\n2021). The lower bound for FCV trucks (USD130,000) corresponds \r\nto the 2050 estimate for class 8 sleeper cab tractors from Argonne \r\nNational Laboratory and the upper bound (USD290,000) corresponds "


id: a55d95ed01630367240c1ba50b6d8daa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26322
content:
"The vehicle efficiencies used in developing the lifecycle cost estimates \r\nwere derived from the harmonised ranges used to develop lifecycle \r\nGHG estimates and are presented in Tables 10.9 to 10.14."


id: b44f38ab17235f52c33a265aa539ec38
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28957
content:
"to the 2020 estimate from the same study (Burnham et  al. 2021). \r\nThese values span the full range reported by Moultak et al. (2017) for \r\nthe US, Europe and China from 2020-2030."


id: 48621ddd5e9e9e19e40ef3baf0adea4c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9948
content:
"The analysis uses a truck lifetime of 10 years and annual distance \r\ntravelled of 140,000 km based on Burnham et al. (2021). An effective \r\npayload of 17 tonnes (80% of maximum payload of 21 tonnes) is \r\nassumed based on reported average effective payload submitted \r\nby Argonne National Laboratory in response to the IPCC LCA data \r\ncollection call. A discount rate of 3% is used, based on Burnham et al. \r\n(2021) and consistent with the social discount rate from Chapter 3. \r\nMaintenance costs are assumed to be USD0.15 km-1 for ICEV trucks \r\nand USD0.09 km-1 for BEV and FCV trucks, as reported in Burnham \r\net al. (2021)."


id: fa36176565b58088c975f37d70a66401
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41391
content:
"Adolf Acquaye (Ghana/United Kingdom), Christopher Bataille (Canada), Jonathan M. Cullen \r\n(New  Zealand/United Kingdom), Stephane de la Rue du Can (the United States of America), \r\nManfred Fischedick (Germany), Yong Geng (China), Kanako Tanaka (Japan)"


id: 37e234965da464b140b9d8c9f97d8aab
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7040
content:
"Bashmakov, I.A., L.J. Nilsson, A. Acquaye, C. Bataille, J.M. Cullen, S. de la Rue du Can, M. Fischedick, Y. Geng, K. Tanaka, \r\n2022: Industry. In IPCC, 2022: Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III \r\nto the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [P.R. Shukla, J. Skea, R. Slade, \r\nA. Al Khourdajie, R. van Diemen, D. McCollum, M. Pathak, S. Some, P. Vyas, R. Fradera, M. Belkacemi, A.  Hasija, \r\nG. Lisboa, S. Luz, J. Malley, (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA. \r\ndoi: 10.1017/9781009157926.013"


id: 55da4df3097d88034a85c359b2dcda91
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12374
content:
"Scenario analyses show that significant cuts in global GHG \r\nemissions and even close to net zero emissions from \r\nGHG  intensive industry (e.g.,  steel, plastics, ammonia, and \r\ncement) can be achieved by 2050 by deploying multiple \r\navailable and emerging options (medium confidence). Cutting \r\nindustry emissions significantly requires a  reorientation from \r\nthe historic focus on important but incremental improvements \r\n(e.g., energy efficiency) to transformational changes in energy and \r\nfeedstock sourcing, materials efficiency, and more circular material \r\nflows. {11.3, 11.4}"


id: 930d803c14fe953ac913f00ab54e19c0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23081
content:
"The Paris Agreement, the Sustainable Development Goals \r\n(SDGs) and the COVID-19 pandemic provide a  new context \r\nfor the evolution of industry and the mitigation of industry \r\ngreenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (high confidence). This chapter \r\nis focused on what is new since AR5. It emphasises the energy and \r\nemissions intensive basic materials industries and key strategies for \r\nreaching net zero emissions. {11.1.1}"


id: b76795326e3f74286450a1437ba33ebc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29479
content:
"Key climate mitigation options such as materials efficiency, \r\ncircular material flows and emerging primary processes, are \r\nnot well represented in climate change scenario modelling and \r\nintegrated assessment models, albeit with some progress in \r\nrecent years (high confidence). The character of these interventions \r\n(e.g., appearing in many forms across complex value chains, making \r\ncost estimates difficult) combined with the limited data on new fossil\u0002free primary processes help explain why they are less represented in \r\nmodels than, for example, CCS. As a result, overall mitigation costs \r\nand the need for CCS may be overestimated. {11.4.2.1}"


id: 10ba7154b68f4ed38eb89e2a5ec2a92a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 123
content:
"Electrification is emerging as a  key mitigation option for \r\nindustry (high confidence). Electricity is a versatile energy carrier, \r\npotentially produced from abundant renewable energy sources or \r\nother low carbon options; regional resources and preferences will vary. \r\nUsing electricity directly, or indirectly via hydrogen from electrolysis \r\nfor high temperature and chemical feedstock requirements, offers \r\nmany options to reduce emissions. It also can provide substantial \r\ngrid balancing services, for example through electrolysis and storage \r\nof hydrogen for chemical process use or demand response. {11.3.5}"


id: e3e12a1558ed9f636c78c82555857cb3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37380
content:
"Whatever metric is used, industrial emissions have been \r\ngrowing faster since 2000 than emissions in any other sector, \r\ndriven by increased basic materials extraction and production \r\n(high confidence). GHG emissions attributed to the industrial \r\nsector originate from fuel combustion, process emissions, product \r\nuse and waste, which jointly accounted for 14.1 GtCO2-eq or 24% of \r\nall direct anthropogenic emissions in 2019, second behind the \r\nenergy transformation sector. Industry is a  leading GHG emitter  - \r\n20 GtCO2-eq or 34% of global emissions in 2019  - if indirect \r\nemissions from power and heat generation are included. The share of \r\nemissions originating from direct fuel combustion is decreasing and \r\nwas 7 GtCO2-eq, 50% of direct industrial emissions in 2019. {11.2.2}"


id: 591bf270860dc75f51bdb0d2607cd4e0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12920
content:
"Carbon is a key building block in organic chemicals, fuels and \r\nmaterials, and will remain important (high confidence). In order \r\nto reach net zero CO2 emissions for the carbon needed in society \r\n(e.g.,  plastics, wood, aviation fuels, solvents, etc.), it is important \r\nto close the use loops for carbon and carbon dioxide through \r\nincreased circularity with mechanical and chemical recycling, more \r\nefficient use of biomass feedstock with the addition of low GHG \r\nhydrogen to increase product yields (e.g.,  for biomethane and \r\nmethanol), and potentially direct air capture of CO2 as a new carbon \r\nsource. {11.3, 11.4.1}"


id: df8cbaf28ea8da7f0a258d39b1ac5187
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36576
content:
"Global material intensity (in-use stock of manufactured capital, \r\nin tonnes per unit of GDP is increasing (high confidence). In\u0002use stock of manufactured capital per capita has been growing \r\nfaster than GDP per capita since 2000. Total global in-use stock \r\nof manufactured capital grew by 3.4% yr-1 in 2000-2019. At the \r\nsame time, per capita material stocks in several developed countries \r\nhave stopped growing, showing a decoupling from GDP per capita. \r\n{11.2.1, 11.3.1}"


id: bbfd76ba8eeb4da07e1911489134c48b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30309
content:
"Production costs for very low to zero emissions basic materials \r\nmay be high but the cost for final consumers and the general \r\neconomy will be low (medium confidence). Costs and emissions \r\nreductions potential in industry, and especially heavy industry, are \r\nhighly contingent on innovation, commercialisation, and market \r\nuptake policy. Technologies exist to take all industry sectors to very \r\nlow or zero emissions but require 5 to 15 years of intensive innovation, \r\ncommercialisation, and policy to ensure uptake. Mitigation costs are \r\nin the rough range of USD50-150 tCO2-eq-1, with wide variation \r\nwithin and outside this band. This affects competitiveness and \r\nrequires supporting policy. Although production cost increases can \r\nbe significant, they translate to very small increases in the costs \r\nfor final products, typically less than a  few percent depending on \r\nproduct, assumptions, and system boundaries. {11.4.1.5}"


id: 8bf3a441ca928e635ff63417aef7d503
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21794
content:
"Plastic is the material for which demand has been growing \r\nthe strongest since 1970 (high confidence). The current \r\n>99%  reliance on fossil feedstock, very low recycling, and high \r\nemissions from petrochemical processes is a challenge for reaching \r\nnet zero emissions. At the same time, plastics are important for \r\nreducing emissions elsewhere, for example, light-weighting vehicles. \r\nThere are as yet no shared visions for fossil-free plastics, but several \r\npossibilities. {11.4.1.3}"


id: fb1130564b88f485a1d844266e553520
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41548
content:
"The pulp and paper industry has significant biogenic carbon \r\nemissions but relatively small fossil carbon emissions. Pulp \r\nmills have access to biomass residues and by-products and \r\nin paper mills the use of process heat at low to medium \r\ntemperatures allows for electrification (high confidence). \r\nCompetition for feedstock will increase if wood substitutes for \r\nbuilding materials and petrochemicals feedstock. The pulp and paper \r\nindustry can also be a source of biogenic carbon dioxide and carbon \r\nfor organic chemicals feedstock and carbon dioxide removal (CDR) \r\nusing CCS. {11.4.1.4}"


id: 2865c45d2ca82217769be0297475a85
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4313
content:
"There are several technological options for very low to zero \r\nemissions steel, but their uptake will require integrated \r\nmaterial efficiency, recycling, and production decarbonisation \r\npolicies (high confidence). Material efficiency can potentially \r\nreduce steel demand by up to 40% based on design for less steel use, \r\nlong life, reuse, constructability, and low contamination recycling. \r\nSecondary production through high quality recycling must be \r\nmaximised. Production decarbonisation will also be required, starting \r\nwith the retrofitting of existing facilities for partial fuel switching \r\n(e.g., to biomass or hydrogen), CCU and CCS, followed by very low \r\nand zero emissions production based on high-capture CCS or direct \r\nhydrogen, or electrolytic iron ore reduction followed by an electric arc \r\nfurnace. {11.3.2, 11.4.1.1}"


id: b5f7e3a6030df6b967b5eedf4d855ced
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29235
content:
"The geographical distribution of renewable resources has \r\nimplications for industry (medium confidence). The potential \r\nfor zero emission electricity and low-cost hydrogen from electrolysis \r\npowered by solar and wind, or hydrogen from other very low emission \r\nsources, may reshape where currently energy and emissions intensive \r\nbasic materials production is located, how value chains are organised, \r\ntrade patterns, and what gets transported in international shipping. \r\nRegions with bountiful solar and wind resources, or low fugitive \r\nmethane co-located with CCS geology, may become exporters of \r\nhydrogen or hydrogen carriers such as methanol and ammonia, or \r\nhome to the production of iron and steel, organic platform chemicals, \r\nand other energy-intensive basic materials. {11.2, 11.4 and Box 11.1}"


id: 6fce2f19cf4c747b30c95b2098ee3cd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16930
content:
"The level of policy maturity and experience varies widely across \r\nthe mitigation options (high confidence). Energy efficiency \r\nis a  well-established policy field with decades of experience from \r\nvoluntary and negotiated agreements, regulations, energy auditing \r\nand demand side-management (DSM) programmes (see AR5). In \r\ncontrast, materials demand management and efficiency are not well \r\nunderstood and addressed from a  policy perspective. Barriers to \r\nrecycling that policy could address are often specific to the different \r\nmaterial loops (e.g.,  copper contamination for steel and lack of \r\ntechnologies or poor economics for plastics) or waste management \r\nsystems. For electrification and fuel switching the focus has so far \r\nbeen mainly on innovation and developing technical supply-side \r\nsolutions rather than creating market demand. {11.5.2, 11.6}"


id: 8a2c01f841bdcc05a845601edf89f8ab
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21484
content:
"While several technological options exist for decarbonising \r\nthe  main industrial feedstock chemicals and their \r\nderivatives, the costs vary widely (high confidence). Fossil fuel\u0002based feedstocks are inexpensive and still without carbon pricing, \r\nand their biomass- and electricity-based replacements will likely \r\nbe more expensive. The chemical industry consumes large amounts \r\nof hydrogen, ammonia, methanol, carbon monoxide, ethylene, \r\npropylene, benzene, toluene, and mixed xylenes and aromatics from \r\nfossil feedstock, and from these basic chemicals produces tens of \r\nthousands of derivative end-use chemicals. Hydrogen, biogenic or air\u0002capture carbon, and collected plastic waste for the primary feedstocks \r\ncan greatly reduce total emissions. Biogenic carbon feedstock is likely \r\nto be limited due to competing land uses. {11.4.1.3}"


id: 528e99f6abb802c0d05c78257daefd87
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11806
content:
"Industry has so far largely been sheltered from the impacts \r\nof climate policy and carbon pricing due to concerns for \r\ncompetitiveness and carbon leakage (high confidence). New \r\nindustrial development policy approaches needed for realising \r\na transition to net zero GHG emissions are emerging. The transition \r\nrequires a clear direction towards net zero, technology development, \r\nmarket demand for low-carbon materials and products, governance \r\ncapacity and learning, socially inclusive phase-out plans, as well as \r\ninternational coordination of climate and trade policies. It requires \r\ncomprehensive and sequential industrial policy strategies leading to \r\nimmediate action as well as preparedness for future decarbonisation, \r\ngovernance at different levels (from international to local), and \r\nintegration with other policy domains. {11.6}"


id: 667aa97a288bc412cb3d2647675c7f3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15291
content:
"Light industry and manufacturing can be largely decarbonised \r\nthrough switching to low GHG fuels (e.g.,  biofuels and\r\nhydrogen) and electricity (e.g.,  for electrothermal heating \r\nand heat pumps) (high confidence). Most of these technologies are \r\nalready mature, for example, for low temperature heat, but a major \r\nchallenge is the current low cost of fossil methane and coal relative \r\nto low and zero GHG electricity, hydrogen, and biofuels. {11.4.1.4}"


id: 6ccc7aaa68753bef508fff0529783b8b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16419
content:
"Factors in Equation 11.1 are interconnected by either positive or \r\nnegative feedbacks: scrap-based production or light-weighing \r\nimproves operational energy efficiency, while growing application of \r\ncarbon capture, use and storage (CCUS) brings it down and increases \r\nmaterial demands (Hertwich et al. 2019; IEA 2020a, 2021a). There are \r\ndifferent ways to disaggregate Equation 11.1: by industrial subsectors \r\n(Bashmakov 2021); by reservoirs of material stock (buildings, \r\ninfrastructure, vehicles, machinery and appliances, packaging, etc.); \r\nby regions and countries (where carbon leakage becomes relevant); \r\nby products and production chains (material extraction, production \r\nof basic materials, basic materials processing, production of final \r\nindustrial products); by traditional and low carbon technologies used; \r\nand by stages of products' lives including recycling."


id: 1d922a32b245393ba4b5007471e52c5b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2386
content:
"An industrial transition to net zero emissions is possible when the \r\nthree last multipliers in Equation 11.1 (in square parentheses) are \r\napproaching zero. Contributions from different drivers (energy \r\nefficiency, low carbon electricity and heat, material efficiency, \r\nswitching to low carbon feedstock and CCUS) to this evolution vary \r\nwith time. Energy efficiency dominates in the short- and medium \r\nterm and potentially long term (in the range of 10-40% by 2050) \r\n(IPCC 2018a; Crijns-Graus et al. 2020; IEA 2020a), but for deep \r\ndecarbonisation trajectories, contributions from the other drivers \r\nsteadily grow, as the share of non-energy sources in industrial \r\nemissions rises and new technologies to address mitigation from \r\nthese sources mature (Material Economics 2019; CEMBUREAU 2020; \r\nBP 2020; Hertwich et al. 2020, 2019; IEA 2021a, 2020a; Saygin and \r\nGielen 2021) (Figure 11.1)."


id: 8ee7d4dac79598f3f03e76d3df558b86
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22331
content:
"*Dm=1, when territorial emission is considered, and Dm equals the ratio of \r\ndomestically used materials to total material production for the consumption-based \r\nemission accounting). CBAM - carbon border adjustment mechanism."


id: 965d578f01b2f68eca6cb6c33af72989
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23656
content:
"Key factors driving up industrial GHG emissions since 1900 include \r\npopulation and per capita GDP,2\r\n while energy efficiency and non\u0002combustion GHG emissions intensity (from industrial processes \r\nand waste) has been pushing it down. Material efficiency factors - \r\nmaterial stock intensity of GDP and ratio of extraction, processing \r\nand recycling of materials per unit of built capital along with \r\ncombustion-related emissions intensity factors and electrification - \r\nwere cyclically switching their contributions with relatively limited \r\noverall impact. Growing recycling allowed for replacement of \r\nsome energy-intensive virgin materials and thus contributed to \r\nmitigation. In 2014-2019, a combination of these drivers allowed \r\nfor a  slowdown in the growth of industrial GHG emissions to \r\nbelow 1% (Figure 11.2 and Table 11.1), while to match a net zero \r\nemissions trajectory it should decline by 2% yr-1 in 2020-2030 and \r\nby 8.9% yr-1 in 2030-2050 (IEA 2021a)."


id: bc2050ec6cb3fdecfa1e973714a5cd0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30337
content:
"The use of materials is deeply coupled with economic development \r\nand growth. For centuries, humanity has been producing and using \r\nhundreds of materials (Ashby 2012), the diversity of which skyrocketed \r\nin the recent half-century to achieve the desired performance and \r\nfunctionality of multiple products (density; hardness; compressive \r\nstrength; melting point, resistance to mechanical and thermal shocks \r\nand to corrosion; transparency; heat- or electricity conductivity; \r\nchemical neutrality or activity, to name a  few). New functions \r\ndrive the growth of material complexity of products; for example, \r\na  modern computer chip embodies over 60 different elements \r\n(Graedel et al. 2015)."


id: 1feeb9e331225ce42fa963257b2cc324
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2829
content:
"Figure 11.2 | Average annual growth rates of industrial sector GHG emissions and drivers (1900-2019). Before 1970, GHG emission (other) is limited to \r\nthat from cement production. Waste emission is excluded. Primary material extraction excludes fuels and biomass. Presented factors correspond directly \r\nto Equation 11.1. Sources: population before 1950 and GDP before 1960: Maddison Project (2018); population from 1950 to 1970: UN (2015); population and GDP for \r\n1960-2020: World Bank (2021); data on material stock, extraction, and use of secondary materials: Wiedenhofer et al. (2019); data on material extraction: UNEP and IRP \r\n(2020); industrial energy use for 1900-1970: IIASA (2018), for 1971-2019: IEA (2021b); data on industrial GHG emissions for 1900-1970: CDIAC (2017), for 1970-2019: \r\ndata from Crippa et al. (2021) and Minx et al. (2021)."


id: 31dd98d42d045c56384a355519db67d9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6026
content:
"Total extraction of all basic materials (including biomass and \r\nfuels) in 2017 reached 92 Gt yr-1, which is 13 times above the \r\n1900 level (Figure 11.3).5\r\n When recycled resources are added, total \r\nmaterial inputs exceed 100 Gt (Circle Economy 2020). In Equation \r\n11.1 MPR represents only material inputs to the stock, excluding \r\ndissipative use - biomass (food and feed) and combusted fuels. Total \r\nextraction of stock building materials (metal ores and non-metallic \r\nminerals) in 2017 reached 55 Gt yr-1.\r\n6\r\n In 1970-2018, it grew 4.3-fold \r\nand the ratio of MPR to accumulated in-use capital has nearly been \r\nconstant since 1990 along with ratio to GDP (Figure 11.3)."


id: 6b8a5bc9b201f361f25e9cd53d69a1d3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16222
content:
"For a  subset of materials, such as solid wood, paper, plastics, \r\niron/steel, aluminium, copper, other metals/minerals, concrete, \r\nasphalt, bricks, aggregate, and glass, total in-use stock escalated \r\nfrom 36 Gt back in 1900 to 186 Gt in 1970, 572 Gt in 2000, and \r\n960 Gt in 2015, and by 2020 it exceeded 1,100 Gt, or 145 tonnes \r\nper capita (Krausmann et al. 2018, 2020; Wiedenhofer et al. 2019). \r\nIn 1900-2019, the stock grew 31-fold, which is strongly coupled \r\nwith GDP growth (36-fold). As the UK experience shows, material \r\nstock intensity of GDP may ultimately decline after services \r\nfully dominate GDP, and this allows for material productivity "


id: 94e7c61b50bb27938423449f45f036ac
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23402
content:
"End-of-life waste from accumulated stocks along with \r\n(re)-manufacturing and construction waste is assessed at 16 Gt yr-1 in \r\n2014 and can be extrapolated in 2018 to 19 Gt yr-1 (Krausmann et al. \r\n2018; Wiedenhofer et al. 2019), or 1.8% from stock of manufactured "


id: acb0b82e3f295f4bd8982b02b1d7fd6e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27627
content:
"Figure  11.3 |  Raw natural materials extraction since 1970. In windows: left  - growth of population, GDP and basic materials production (1990 =  100) in \r\n1990-2020; right - in-use stock per capita vs income level (1900-2018; brown dots are for 2000-2018). The regressions provided show that for more recent years \r\nelasticity of material stock to GDP was greater than unity, comparing with the lower unity in preceding years. Source: developed based on Maddison Project (2018); \r\nWiedenhofer et al. (2019); IEA (2020b); UNEP and IRP (2020); International Aluminium Institute (2021a); Statista (2021a,b); U.S. Geological Survey (2021); World Bank \r\n(2021); World Steel Association (2021)."


id: b4044473eeba8e9bedf4659f5cb89901
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28914
content:
"capital. Less than 6 Gt yr-1 was recycled and used to build the stock \r\n(about 10% of inputs).7\r\n While the circularity gap is still large, and \r\nlimited circularity was engineered into accumulated stocks,8 material \r\nrecycling mitigated some GHG emissions by replacing energy\u0002intensive virgin materials.9\r\n When the stock saturates, in closed material "


id: a1e2c1ce8ecc4de1d2a127a54536b07a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25711
content:
"loops the end-of-life materials waste has to be equal to material input, \r\nand primary production therefore has to be equal to end-of-life waste \r\nmultiplied by unity minus recycling rate. When the latter grows, as \r\nthe linear metabolism is replaced with the circular one, the share of \r\nprimary materials production in total material input declines."


id: b7d7f8fd2a1b57320bb89338e6974a2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29567
content:
"Recycling rates for metals are higher than for other materials: the \r\nend-of-life scrap input ratio for 13 metals is over 50%, and stays in \r\nthe range of 25-50% for another ten, but even for metals recycling \r\nflows fail to match the required inputs (Graedel et al. 2011). Globally, \r\ndespite overall recycling rates being at 85%, the all-scrap ratio for \r\nsteel production in recent years stays close to 35-38% (Gielen et al. \r\n2020; IEA 2021b) ranging from 22% in China (only 10% in 2015) to \r\n69% in the US and to 83% in Turkey (BIR 2020). For end-of-life scrap \r\nthis ratio declined from 30% in 1995-2010 to 21-25% after 2010 \r\n(Gielen et al. 2020; Wang et al. 2021)."


id: fea6f747ccd34405c6e60402bb46d160
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42187
content:
"For aluminium, the share of scrap-based production grew from 17% \r\nin 1962 to 34% in 2010 and stabilised at this level until 2019, while \r\nthe share of end-of-life scrap grew from 1.5% in 1962 to nearly \r\n20% in 2019 (International Aluminium Institute 2021a). The global \r\nrecycling (mostly mechanical) rate for plastics is only 9-10%10\r\n(Geyer et al. 2017; Saygin and Gielen 2021), and that for paper \r\nprogressed from 34% in 1990 to 44% in 2000 and to over 50% in \r\n2014-2018 (IEA 2020b)."


id: ca7bb187b5db80a8abe5c80aca4e447d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32962
content:
"Physical energy intensity for the production of materials typically \r\ndeclines and then stabilises at the BAT level once the market is \r\nsaturated, unless a transformative new technology enters the market \r\n(Gutowski et al. 2013; Crijns-Graus et al. 2020; IEA 2021a). Thus, the \r\nenergy saving effect of switching to secondary used material comes \r\nto the forefront, as energy consumption per tonne for many basic \r\nprimary materials approach the BATs. This highlights the need to push \r\ntowards circular economy, materials efficiency, reduced demand, and "


id: 3a883dff5fb2518cbc08d1b20662bfb8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7501
content:
"In 2014-2019, the average annual growth rate (AAGR) of global \r\nindustrial energy use was 0.4% compared to 3.2% in 2000-2014, \r\nfollowing new policies and trends, particularly demonstrated by "


id: efa010184cb9af72ef1492e7893103d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39536
content:
"the dynamics shown by basic materials extraction and production. \r\nIndustry contributed nearly half (45%) of overall incremental global \r\nGHG emissions in the 21st century."


id: 9ac1e771cf354ad7967e52aa5a1b48f8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24468
content:
"Industrial sector GHG emissions accounting is complicated by carbon \r\nstorage in products (Levi and Cullen 2018). About 35% of chemicals' \r\nmass is CO2, which is emitted at use stage  - decomposition of \r\nfertilisers, or plastic waste incineration (Saygin and Gielen 2021), \r\nand sinks. Recarbonation and mineralisation of alkaline industrial \r\nmaterials and wastes (also known as the 'sponge effect') provide \r\n0.6-1 GtCO2 yr-1 uptake by cement-containing products19 (Cao et al. \r\n2020; Guo et al. 2021); see Section 11.3.6 for further discussion in \r\ndecarbonisation context."


id: bff3a4ee2e42563eb80030d95019ccb1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31059
content:
"In 1970-1990, industrial direct combustion-related emissions were \r\ngrowing modestly, and in 1990-2000 even switched to a  slowly \r\ndeclining trend, steadily losing their share in overall industrial \r\nemissions. Electrification was the major driver behind both indirect \r\nand total industrial emissions in those years. This quiet evolution was \r\ninterrupted in the beginning of the 21st century, when total emissions \r\nincreased by 60-68% depending on the metric applied (the fastest \r\ngrowth ever seen). In 2000-2019 iron, steel and cement absolute \r\nGHGs increased more than any other period in history (Bashmakov \r\n2021). Emissions froze temporarily in 2014-2016, partly in the wake \r\nof the financial crisis, but returned to their growth trajectory in \r\n2017-2019 (Figure 11.4a)."


id: 6c2dfe1d362925483c7662929c97b1be
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16330
content:
"The largest incremental contributors to industrial emissions in \r\n2010-2019 were industrial processes at 40%, then indirect emissions \r\n(25%), and only then direct combustion (21%), followed by waste \r\n(14%; Figure 11.4). Therefore, to stop emission growth and to switch \r\nto a zero-carbon pathway more mitigation efforts should be focused \r\non industrial processes, product use and waste decarbonisation, along \r\nwith the transition to low-carbon electrification (Hertwich et al. 2020)."


id: 9f7e7b15cc3e55217fc0f7b7ebe8e8f4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25279
content:
"Basic materials production dominates both direct industrial GHG \r\nemissions (about 62%, waste excluded)20 as well as direct industrial \r\nCO2 emissions (70%), led by iron and steel, cement, chemicals, and \r\nnon-ferrous metals (Figure  11.4e). Basic materials also contribute \r\n60% to indirect emissions. In a  zero-carbon power world, with \r\nindustry lagging behind in the decarbonisation of high-temperature \r\nprocesses and feedstock, it may replace the energy sector as the \r\nlargest generator of indirect emissions embodied in capital stock.21\r\nAccording to Circle Economy (2020) and Hertwich et al. (2020), GHG "


id: 4b780e2044ad3aea18e0db6467bc6591
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10528
content:
"(a) Industrial emissions by source (left scale) and emissions structure (right scale). Comb - indicates direct emissions from fuel \r\ncombustion. IPPU - indicates emissions from industrial processes and product use. Indirect emissions from electricity and heat generation \r\nare shown on the top. Shares on the right are shown for direct emissions"


id: 397fb193e8214cef6ff6abbb96b74c9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7328
content:
"The carbon intensity of cement-making since 2010 is down by only \r\n4%. In 1990-2019 it fell by 19.5%, mostly due to energy efficiency \r\nimprovements (by 18.5%) as the carbon intensity of the fuel mix \r\ndeclined only by 3% (GCCA 2021b). Historical analysis shows the \r\ncarbon intensity of steel production has declined with 'stop and \r\ngo' patterns in 50-60-year cycles, reflective of the major jumps in \r\nbest available technology (BAT). From 1900 to 1935 and from 1960 \r\nto 1990 specific scope 1 + 2 + 3 emissions fell by 1.5-2.5 tCO2\r\nper tonne, or as much as needed now to achieve net zero. While \r\nhistorical declines were mostly due to commissioning large \r\ncapacities with new technologies, with total emissions growing, by \r\n2050 and beyond the decline will likely materialise via new ultra\u0002low emission capacity replacements pushing absolute emissions to \r\nnet zero (Bataille et al. 2021b)."


id: 99303a6bad57074ab1e9c280363130b7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24166
content:
"emissions embodied in buildings and infrastructure, machinery and \r\ntransport equipment exceed 50% of their present carbon footprint."


id: 660cbe4d1f06945cfb89d0c236b971a8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15212
content:
"In 1970-2000, direct GHG emissions per unit of energy showed \r\na  steady decline interrupted by noticeable growth in 2001-2018 \r\ndriven by the fast expansion of steel and cement production \r\n(Figure  11.5; IEA 2021a). Non-energy-related GHG emissions per \r\nunit of extracted materials decline continuously, as the share of not \r\ncarbon intensive building materials (aggregates and sand) grows."


id: 130cf1f82f07ac1cbedd50d4e0b78c46
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 565
content:
"|Iron and steel carbon intensity stagnated in 1995-2015 due to \r\nrapid growth in carbon-intensive production in some countries \r\n(Wang et al. 2021). For aluminium carbon intensity declined in \r\n2010-2019 by only 2% (International Aluminium Institute 2021a). "


id: 2e28f2ba5d3c5211ed2eed3e302968f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5395
content:
"The dramatic increase in industrial emissions after 2000 is clearly \r\nassociated with economic growth in Asia, which dominated both \r\nabsolute and incremental emissions (Figure 11.5a,b)."


id: 241050cee0dc4be80a84641d47735646
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3525
content:
"More recent 2010 to 2019 trends show that regional contributions to \r\nadditional emissions are distributed more evenly, while a large part \r\nstill comes from Asian countries, where both rates of economic growth \r\nand the share of industrial emissions much exceed the global average. \r\nAll other regions also contributed to total industrial GHG emissions. \r\nStructural shifts towards emissions from industrial processes and \r\nproducts use are common for many regions (Figure 11.5a)."


id: acb538b1eb73a2943cb64021d0f81138
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27631
content:
"Economic development. Regional differences in emission \r\ntrends are determined by the differences observed in economic \r\ndevelopment, trade and supply chain patterns. The major source "


id: 16a09507372e56e1e19faf508a502c93
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1195
content:
"The following overview of technical developments and mitigation \r\noptions which relate to the industrial sector is organised in six \r\nequally important strategies: (i) demand for materials, (ii) materials \r\nefficiency, (iii) circular economy and industrial waste, (iv) energy \r\nefficiency, (v) electrification and fuel switching, and (vi) CCUS, \r\nfeedstock and biogenic carbon. Each strategy is described in detail, \r\nfollowed by a  discussion of possible overlaps and interactions \r\nbetween strategies and how conflicts and synergies can be addressed \r\nthrough integration of the approaches."


id: 4bc596df6dd1d7d67c5276462eb6368c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10594
content:
"International trade and supply chain. In Equation 11.1 the share \r\nof allocated emissions (Dm) equals unity when territorial emission is \r\nconsidered, and to the ratio of domestically used materials to total \r\nmaterial production for consumption-based emission accounting. \r\nTracking consumption-based emissions provides additional insights \r\nin the global effectiveness of national climate policies. Carbon \r\nemissions embodied in international trade are estimated to account \r\nfor 20-30% of global carbon emissions (Meng et al. 2018; OECD.Stat \r\n2019) and are the reason for different emissions patterns of OECD \r\nversus non-OECD countries (Chapter 2)."


id: a224b2776aca5e76ebbde047508794b5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25761
content:
"Demand for materials is a  key driver of energy consumption and \r\nCO2 emissions in the industrial sector. Rapid growth in material \r\ndemand over the last quarter century has seen demand for key \r\nenergy-intensive materials increase 2.5- to 3.5-fold (Figure  11.6), \r\nwith growth linked to, and often exceeding, population growth \r\nand economic development. The International Energy Agency (IEA) \r\nexplains, 'as economies develop, urbanise, consume more goods and \r\nbuild up their infrastructure, material demand per capita tends to \r\nincrease considerably. Once industrialised, an economy's material \r\ndemand may level off and perhaps even begin to decline' (IEA 2019b)."


id: c51b63cd7bae4e2baa36509d1195c00b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31988
content:
"Based on OECD.Stat (2019) datasets, 2015 CO2 emissions embodied \r\nin internationally traded industrial products (manufacturing and \r\nmining, excluding fuels) by all countries are assessed at 3  GtCO2, \r\nor 30% of direct CO2 emissions in the industrial sector as reported \r\nby Crippa et al. (2021). OECD countries collectively have reduced \r\nterritorial emissions (shares of basic materials in direct emissions in \r\nthose regions decline (Figure 11.5b), but demonstrated no progress \r\nin reducing outsourced emissions embedded in imported industrial \r\nproducts (Arto and Dietzenbacher 2014; OECD.Stat 2019). Accounting \r\nfor net carbon emissions embodied in international trade of only \r\nindustrial products (1283 million tCO2 in 2015) escalates direct OECD \r\nindustrial CO2 emissions (1333 million tCO2 of energy-related and \r\n502 million tCO2 of industrial processes) 1.7 fold, 2.3-fold for the US, \r\n1.5-fold for the EU, and more than triples it for the UK, while cutting "


id: 6e277795901b37bff8aee435748b42d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16643
content:
"The Kaya-like identity presented earlier in the chapter (Equation \r\n11.1) suggests that material demand can be decoupled from \r\npopulation and economic development by two means: (i) reducing \r\nthe accumulated material stock (MStock) used to deliver material "


id: 7e0a14ae8f1c1a86584e3592d2a11297
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19351
content:
"for replacing old stocks and maintenance. Saturation allows material \r\nefficiency strategies (such as light-weight design, longer lifetimes, and \r\nmore intense use) to reduce the required per capita level of material \r\nstocks, and material circularity strategies (closing material loops \r\nthrough remanufacture, reuse and recycling) to lessen the energy and \r\ncarbon impacts required to maintain the material stock. However, \r\nit should be noted that some materials still show little evidence of \r\nsaturation (i.e., plastics, see Box 11.2). Furthermore, meeting climate \r\nchange targets in developed countries will require the construction \r\nof new low-carbon infrastructures (i.e., renewable energy generation, \r\nnew energy distribution and storage systems, electric vehicles and \r\nbuilding heating systems) which may increase demand for emissions \r\nintensive materials (i.e., steel, concrete and glass)."


id: 278bdb45dddc90069ae8f6b2e8639fc3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4136
content:
"services; and (ii) reducing the material (MPR +  MSE) required to \r\nmaintain material stocks (MStock). Such material demand reduction \r\nstrategies are linked upstream to material efficiency strategies (the \r\ndelivery of goods and services with less material demand, and thus \r\nenergy and emissions) and to demand reduction behaviours, through \r\nconcepts such as sufficiency, sustainable consumption and social \r\npractice theory (Spangenberg and Lorek 2019). Materials demand \r\ncan also be influenced through urban planning, building codes \r\nand related socio-cultural norms that shape the overall demand \r\nfor square metres per capita of floor space, mobility and transport \r\ninfrastructures (Chapter 5)."


id: 98537857cca60e9f403a3292f6599f2e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24006
content:
"Modelling suggests that per capita material stocks saturate (level \r\noff) in developed countries and decouple from GDP.  Pauliuk et al. \r\n(2013b) demonstrated this saturation effect in an analysis of in-use \r\nsteel stocks in 200 countries, showing that per capita steel in stocks \r\nin countries with a long industrial history (e.g., USA, UK, Germany) \r\nhad saturation levels between 11 and 16 tonnes. More recently, \r\nBleischwitz et al. (2018) confirmed the occurrence of a  saturation \r\neffect for four materials (steel, cement, aluminium and copper) in \r\nfour industrialised countries (Germany, Japan, UK and USA) together \r\nwith China. These findings have led to the revision of some material \r\ndemand forecasts, which previously had been based solely on \r\npopulation and economic trends."


id: 7118ce2365f6d914bbb88851b4965588
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17157
content:
"For developing countries, who are still far from saturation levels, \r\nstrong growth for new products and the creation of new infrastructure \r\ncapacity may still drive global material demand. However, there is an \r\nexpectation that economic development can be achieved at lower \r\nper capita material stock levels, based on the careful deployment of \r\nmaterial efficiency and circularity by design (Grubler et al. 2018)."


id: 6e3f01d54feca35981dff4a549fedc23
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16665
content:
"Material efficiency (ME) - the delivery of goods and services with \r\nless material  - is increasingly seen as an important strategy for \r\nreducing GHG emissions in industry (IEA 2017, 2019b). Options to \r\nimprove ME exist at every stage in the lifecycle of materials and \r\nproducts, as shown in Figure 11.7. This includes: designing products \r\nwhich are lighter, optimising to maintain the end-use service while "


id: b2da3305f3b58b0edc947e3977da6913
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28702
content:
"The saturation effect for material stocks is critical for managing \r\nmaterial demand in developed countries. Materials are required \r\nto meet demand for the creation of new stocks and the maintenance \r\nof existing stocks (Gutowski et al. 2017). Once saturation is attained \r\nthe need for new stocks is minimised, and materials are only required "


id: 49ccbd802e700c9110ac01b8264d8066
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10218
content:
"Hertwich et al. (2019) makes the link between ME strategies and \r\nreducing GHG emissions in buildings, vehicles and electronics, while \r\nGonzalez Hernandez et al. (2018a) examines leveraging ME as \r\na climate strategy in European Union (EU) policy. Research to explore \r\nthe combined analysis of materials and energy, using exergy analysis \r\n(for steel: Gonzalez Hernandez et al. 2018b) allows promising \r\ncomparisons across industrial sectors."


id: 114e17fe4ee3cc1ec7ff34993480f813
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 240
content:
"minimising material use, designing for circular principles (i.e., longer \r\nlife, reusability, repairability, and ease of high-quality recycling); \r\npushing manufacturing and fabrication process to use materials and \r\nenergy more efficiently and recover material wastes; increasing the \r\ncapacity, intensity of use, and lifetimes of product in use; improving \r\nthe recovery of materials at the end of life, through improved \r\nremanufacturing, reuse and recycling processes. For more specific \r\nexamples see Allwood et al. (2012); Lovins (2018); Hertwich et al. \r\n(2019); Scott et al. (2019); and Rissman et al. (2020)."


id: f43e353b9cfaa30189b2daf1a403ac3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40339
content:
"ME provides plentiful options to reduce emissions, yet because \r\ninterventions are dispersed across supply chains and span many \r\ndifferent stakeholders, this makes assessing mitigation potentials \r\nand costs more challenging. For this reason, ME interventions have \r\ntraditionally been under-represented in climate change scenario \r\nmodelling and integrated assessment models (IAMs) (Grubler et al. \r\n2018; Allwood 2018). However, two advances in the modelling of \r\nmaterials flows have underpinned the recent emergence of ME\r\noptions being included in climate scenario modelling."


id: 27362a8f8ed656ceec99f0b6524ee7e3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4063
content:
"Firstly, over many years, the academic community has built up \r\ndetailed global material-flow maps of the processing steps involved \r\nin making energy-intensive materials. Some prominent recent \r\nexamples include: steel (Gonzalez Hernandez et al. 2018b), pulp \r\nand paper (Van Ewijk et al. 2018), petrochemicals (Levi and Cullen \r\n2018). In addition, material-flow maps at the regional and sectoral \r\nlevels have flourished, for example: steel (Serrenho et al. 2016) and \r\ncement (Shanks et al. 2019) in the UK; automotive sheet-metal \r\n(Horton et al. 2019); and steel-powder applications (Azevedo et al. \r\n2018). The detailed and transparent physical mapping of material \r\nsupply chains in this manner enables ME interventions to be traced \r\nback to where emissions are released, and allows these options to be \r\ncompared against decarbonisation and traditional energy efficiency \r\nmeasures (Levi and Cullen 2018). For example, a recent analysis by "


id: c123413fcfd36afae9837dcee18b271b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31280
content:
"may be energy- and emission-intensive, for example, the chemical \r\nrecycling of plastics (Section 11.4.1.3)."


id: c9fdbd474dd328e249202faefcc483e5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32868
content:
"As one systemic approach, CE can be seen as conducted at different \r\nlevels, namely, at the micro level (within a single company, such as \r\nprocess integration and cleaner production), meso level (between \r\nthree or more companies, such as industrial symbiosis or eco\u0002industrial parks) and macro level (cross-sectoral cooperation, such \r\nas urban symbiosis or a regional eco-industrial network). Each level \r\nrequires different tools and policies, such as CE-oriented incentive \r\nand tax policies (macro level), and eco-design regulations (micro \r\nlevel). This section is focused on industry and a broader discussion of \r\nthe CE concept is found in Box 12.2 and Section 5.3.4.2."


id: ecbaad83be73888081945ba2a8c4b2c3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39010
content:
"Clearly, more work is required to fully integrate ME strategies into \r\nmainstream climate change models and future scenarios. Efforts \r\nare focused on endogenising ME strategies within climate change \r\nmodelling, assessing the synergies and trade-offs which exist \r\nbetween energy efficiency and ME interventions, and building up \r\ndata for the assessment of emissions saved and the cost of mitigation \r\nfrom real ME actions. This requires analysts to work in cross\u0002disciplinary teams and to engage with stakeholders from across the \r\nfull breadth of material supply chains. Efforts should be prioritised to \r\nfoster engagement between the IAM community and emerging ME\r\nmodels based in the Life Cycle Assessment, Resource Efficiency, and \r\nIndustrial Ecology communities (see also Sharmina et al. 2021)."


id: 2e82534bb0fc77c1256be0b761d3efce
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5461
content:
"Meso level: Industrial parks first appeared in Manchester, UK, \r\nat the end of the 19th century and they have been implemented \r\nin industrialised countries for maximising energy and material \r\nefficiency, which also has merit for CO2-emissions reduction, as stated \r\nin AR5. Industrial parks reduce the cost of infrastructure and utilities \r\nby concentrating industrial activities in planned areas, and \r\nare typically founded around large, long-term anchor companies. \r\nComplementary industries and services provided by industrial parks \r\ncan entail diversified effects on the surrounding region and stimulate \r\nregional development (Huang et al. 2019a). This is crucial for small \r\nand medium enterprises (SMEs) because they often lack access to \r\ninformation and funds for sophisticated technologies."


id: c102ca3384e327bc8c72c46e54556c32
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31260
content:
"Typical CE tools and policies at this level include sustainable \r\nsupply chains and industrial symbiosis. A  common platform \r\nfor sharing information and enhancing communication among \r\nindustrial stakeholders through the application of information and \r\ntelecommunication technologies is helpful for facilitating the creation \r\nof industrial symbiosis. The main benefit of industrial symbiosis is \r\nthe overall reduction of both virgin materials and final wastes, as \r\nwell as reduced/avoided transportation costs from by-product "


id: 1b05b939b47037a103751d8bec733cf1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1952
content:
"Energy efficiency in industry is an important mitigation option and \r\ncentral in keeping 1.5degC within reach (IPCC SR1.5). It has long been \r\nrecognised as the first mitigation option in industry (Yeen Chan and \r\nKantamaneni 2016; Nadel and Ungar 2019; IEA 2021a). It allows \r\nreduction of the necessary scale of deployment for low-carbon \r\nenergy supplies and associated mitigation costs (Energy Transitions \r\nCommission 2018). The efficiency potentials are greatest in the non\u0002energy-intensive industries and are often relatively limited in energy\u0002intensive ones, such as steel (Pardo and Moya 2013; Kuramochi 2016; \r\nArens et al. 2017). Deep decarbonisation in these subsectors requires \r\nfundamental process changes but energy efficiency remains important \r\nto reduce costs and the need for low-carbon energy supplies."


id: 85ac986c684dff49c92f94494b584a9c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20661
content:
"Below, we focus mainly on the technical progress and on new \r\noptions that are reflected in the literature since AR5 and refer the \r\nreader there for a broader and deeper treatment of energy efficiency. \r\nDigitalisation and the development of industrial high-temperature \r\nheat pumps are two notable technology developments that can \r\nfacilitate energy efficiency improvements."


id: 3858e6cb4fd2800fb334d2cadfcf29ca
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7122
content:
"Industrial energy efficiency can be improved through multiple \r\ntechnologies and practices (Tanaka 2011; Fawkes et al. 2016; Lovins \r\n2018; Crijns-Graus et al. 2020; IEA 2020a). There are two parallel \r\nprocesses in improvement of specific energy consumption (SEC): \r\nprogress in energy-efficient BAT and moving the SEC of industrial \r\nplants towards BAT. Both slow down as theoretical thermodynamic \r\nminimums are approached (Gutowski et al. 2013). For the last \r\nseveral decades the focus has been on effective spreading of BAT \r\ntechnologies through application of policies for worldwide diffusion \r\nof energy-saving technologies (Section 11.6). As a result the SEC for "


id: cd23b11d61871a2f834200aeb83a8a94
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33425
content:
"many basic primary materials is approaching BAT and there are signs \r\nthat energy efficiency improvements have been slowing down over \r\nrecent decades (IEA 2019d, 2020a, 2021a) (Figure 11.8)."


id: 42d1ffec12fc585fa66e0db1fec8ddfc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8947
content:
"3.0 GJ t-1 using an alternative heat exchange that recovers energy \r\nfrom hot steel. High-temperature industrial heat pumps represent \r\na  new and important development for upgrading waste heat and \r\nat the same time they facilitate electrification. One recent example \r\nis a high-temperature heat pump that can raise temperatures up to \r\n165degC at a  coefficient of performance (COP) of 3.5 by recovering \r\nheat from unused hot water (35degC-65degC) (Arpagaus et al. 2018). \r\nCommercially available heat pumps can deliver 100degC-150degC but \r\nat least up to 280degC is feasible (Zuhlsdorf et al. 2019). Mechanical \r\nvapour recompression avoids the loss of latent heat by condensation, \r\nthen it acts as a  highly efficient heat pump with a  5-10 COP \r\n(Philibert 2017a)."


id: c1ea8e79e638602fab601f22fa4a9dbf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31417
content:
"While about 10% of global GHG emissions originate from combustion \r\nto produce high-temperature heat for basic material production \r\nprocesses (Sandalow et al. 2019), limited efforts have been made \r\nto decarbonise heat production. There is still a  large potential for \r\nusing various grades of waste heat and the development of high\u0002temperature heat pumps facilitates its use. NEDO (2019) applies \r\na 'Reduce, Reuse, and Recycle' concept for improved energy efficiency, \r\nand we use this frame our discussion of heat efficiency."


id: 7b09d0ba4593d52060929c07b2f7e809
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18851
content:
"generation it would take a leakage rate of about 2.7% from natural \r\ngas production to undo the direct fuel switching from coal mitigation \r\neffect, and the value is likely higher in most cases (Alvarez et al. 2012; \r\nHausfather 2015). Coal mine methane emissions are also estimated \r\nto be substantially higher than previously assessed (Kholod et al. \r\n2020). Alvarez et al. (2018) estimated US fugitive emissions (not \r\nincluding the Permian) at 2.3% of supply, 60% more than previously \r\nestimated, while recent Canadian papers indicate fugitive emissions \r\nare at least 50% more than reported (Chan et al. 2020; MacKay et al. \r\n2021). However, given the potential for energy supply infrastructure \r\nlock-in effects (Tong et al. 2019), purely fossil fuel to fossil fuel \r\nswitching is a limited and potentially dangerous strategy unless it is \r\nused very carefully and in a limited way."


id: ad30176a1dd4c025c0bb9d43db06260a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27710
content:
"Smart energy systems with real-time monitoring allow for \r\noptimisation of innovative technologies, energy demand response, \r\nbalancing of energy supply and demand including that on real\u0002time pricing, and product quality management, and prediction and \r\nreduction of idle time for workers and robots (ERIA 2016; Pusnik \r\net al. 2016; ISO 2018; Legorburu and Smith 2018; Ferrero et al. 2020; \r\nNimbalkar et al. 2020). The IEA estimated that smart manufacturing \r\ncould deliver 15 EJ in energy savings between 2014 and 2030 (IEA \r\n2019d). Smart manufacturing systems that integrate manufacturing \r\nintelligence in real time through the entire production operation \r\nhave not been yet widely spread in the industry. Examples have \r\nbeen demonstrated and integrated in real operation in the electrical \r\nappliance assembly industry (Yoshimoto 2016). Combining process \r\ncontrols and automation allows cost optimisation and improved \r\nproductivity (Edgar and Pistikopoulos 2018)."


id: 1eb390fcb869516a304672049ea47842
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2606
content:
"The principle of electrification and fuel switching as a GHG mitigation \r\nstrategy is that industries, to the extent possible, switch their end uses \r\nof energy from a high GHG intensity energy carrier to a lower or zero \r\nintensity one, including both its direct and indirect production and \r\nend-use GHG emissions. In general, and non-exclusively, this implies \r\na transition from coal (about 0.09 tCO2 GJ-1 on combustion), refined \r\npetroleum products (about 0.07 tCO2 GJ-1), and natural gas (about \r\n0.05 tCO2 GJ-1) to biofuels, direct solar heating, electricity, hydrogen, \r\nammonia, or net zero synthetic hydrocarbon fuels. Switching to these \r\nenergy carriers is not necessarily lower emitting, however; how they \r\nare made matters."


id: 74841c1aa312e28a600742b6907fc14a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17735
content:
"There is a  large identified potential for direct solar heating in \r\nindustry, especially in regions with strong solar insolation and sectors \r\nwith lower heat needs (<180degC), for example, food and beverage \r\nprocessing, textiles, and pulp and paper (Schoeneberger et al. \r\n2020). The key challenges to adoption are site and use specificity, \r\ncapital intensity, and a lack of standardised mass manufacturing for \r\nequipment and a supply chain to provide them."


id: 8736a933195a27ec272aa0978936e0ee
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20951
content:
"Fuel switching has already been observed to reduce direct combustion \r\nCO2 emissions in many jurisdictions. There are significant debates \r\nabout the net effect of upstream fossil fuel production and fugitive \r\nemissions, but observers have noted that in the case of US power "


id: e794689cdfcf434db49c99fc656ff9d7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38051
content:
"While most chemical production of feedstock chemicals (e.g.,  H2, \r\nNH3, CO, CH3OH, C2H4, C2H6 and C2H5OH) is done thermo-catalytically \r\ntoday, it is feasible to use direct electrocatalytic production, by itself \r\nor in combination with utilisation of previously captured carbon \r\nsources if a fossil fuel feedstock is used, or well-known bio-catalytic \r\n(e.g., fermentation) and thermo-catalytic processes (Bazzanella and \r\nAusfelder 2017; De Luna et al. 2019; Katelhon et al. 2019). It may even \r\nbe commercially possible to electrify cement sintering and calcination \r\nthrough plasma or microwave options (Material Economics 2019)."


id: 16844e81a479c13bb2e1bcc985f13d29
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1177
content:
"The long-term potential for full-process electrification is a  very \r\nsector-by-sector and process-by-process phenomenon, with differing \r\nenergy and capacity needs, load profiles, stock turnover, capacity for \r\ndemand response, and characteristics of decision-makers. Industrial \r\nelectrification is most viable in the near term in cases with: minimal \r\nretrofitting and rebuild in processes; with relatively low local \r\nelectricity costs; where the degree of process complexity and process \r\nintegration is more limited and extensive process re-engineering \r\nwould not be required; where combined heat and power is not used; \r\nwhere induction heating technologies are viable; and where process \r\nheating temperatures are lower (Deason et al. 2018)."


id: d4e1bc4d39891ff6e7dc9db1996568b6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34765
content:
"While it has been demonstrated that almost any heating end use \r\ncan be directly electrified, this would imply very high instantaneous \r\nthermal loads for blast furnace-basic oxygen furnace (BF-BOF) steel \r\nproduction, limestone calcination for cement and lime production, and \r\nother end uses where flame-front (1000degC-1700degC) temperatures are \r\ncurrently needed. This indicates a possible need for another energy \r\ncarrier to minimise instantaneous generation and transmission needs. \r\nThese needs can be met at varying current and potential future costs \r\nusing: bioliquids or gases hydrogen, ammonia, or net zero synthetic \r\nhydrocarbons or alcohols."


id: c13e4bdc072e97ad83318768f909dd0e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31296
content:
"Broadly speaking, hydrogen can contribute to a  cleaner energy \r\nsystem in two ways: (i) existing applications of hydrogen \r\n(e.g.,  nitrogen fertiliser production, refinery upgrading) can use \r\nhydrogen produced using alternative, cleaner production methods; \r\n(ii) new applications can use low-GHG hydrogen as an alternative \r\nto current fuels and inputs, or as a complement to the greater use \r\nof electricity in these applications. In these cases - for example, in "


id: 9bb91490b10902f686fbf759d53e8999
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24656
content:
"transport, heating, industry (e.g., hydrogen-direct reduced iron and \r\nsteel production) and electricity - hydrogen can be used in its pure \r\nform, or be converted to hydrogen-based fuels, including ammonia, \r\nor synthetic net zero hydrocarbons and alcohols such as methane \r\nor methanol (IEA 2019f). The IEA states that hydrogen could be \r\nused to help integrate more renewables, including by enhancing \r\nstorage options and 'exporting sunshine and wind' from places \r\nwith abundant resources; decarbonise steel, chemicals, trucks, ships \r\nand planes; and boost energy security by diversifying the fuel mix and \r\nproviding flexibility to balance grids (IEA 2019f)."


id: 4e87b3db9683ec86cd868f072f3253a5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11091
content:
"All these processes would in turn need to be run using very low or \r\nzero GHG energy carriers for the resulting hydrogen to also be low \r\nin GHG emissions."


id: 4b9466a6f9709dab8b45318f3cef445e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10559
content:
"Ammonia production, made from hydrogen and nitrogen using \r\nthe Haber-Bosch process, is the most voluminous chemical produced \r\nfrom fossil fuels, being used as feedstock for nitrogen fertilisers and \r\nexplosives, as well as a cleanser, a refrigerant, and for other uses. \r\nMost ammonia is made today using methane as the hydrogen \r\nfeedstock and heat source but has been made using electrolysis\u0002based hydrogen in the past, and there are several announced \r\ninvestments to resume doing so. If ammonia is used as a combustion \r\nfuel, care must be taken to avoid N2O as a GHG and NOx in general \r\nas a local air pollutant."


id: 2765e843183d987b3d2cd4d08dc2ef9b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4109
content:
"Hydrogen can also be combined with low-to-zero net GHG carbon \r\n(Section  11.3.6) and oxygen and made into methane, methanol\r\nand other potential net zero synthetic hydrocarbons and alcohol \r\nenergy carriers using methanation, steam reforming and Fischer\u0002Tropsch processes, all of which can provide higher degrees of storable \r\nand shippable high-temperature energy using known industrial \r\nprocesses in novel combinations (Bataille et al. 2018a; Davis et al. \r\n2018). If the hydrogen and oxygen is accessed via electrolysis, the \r\nterms 'power-to-fuel' or 'e-fuels' are often used (Ueckerdt et al. \r\n2021). Given their carbon content, if used as fuels, their carbon will \r\neventually be oxidised and emitted as CO2 to the atmosphere. This \r\nmakes their net-GHG intensity dependent on the carbon source \r\n(Hepburn et al. 2019), with recycled fossil fuels, biocarbon and direct \r\nair capture carbon all having very different net-CO2 impacts - see \r\nsection 11.3.6 on CCS and CCU for elaboration."


id: 7c0a944c907cc29d9d4595dcfdb48d20
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19030
content:
"The 'hydrogen economy' is a long-touted vision for the energy and transport sectors, and one that has gone through hype-cycles \r\nsince the energy crises in the 1970s (Melton et al. 2016). The widely varying visions of hydrogen futures have mainly been associated \r\nwith fuel cells in vehicles, small-scale decentralised cogeneration of heat and electricity, and to a  certain extent energy storage \r\nfor electricity (Eames et al. 2006; Syniak and Petrov 2008). However, nearly all hydrogen currently produced is used in industry, mainly for \r\nhydrotreating in oil refineries, to produce ammonia, and in other chemical processes, and it is mostly made using fossil fuels."


id: c57247ccc2879542cf5631fa6bc7edfb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32046
content:
"In the context of net zero emissions, new visions are emerging in which hydrogen has a central role to play in decarbonising industry. \r\nNear-term industrial applications for hydrogen include feeding it into ammonia production for fertilisers, while a more novel application \r\nwould be as a replacement for coal as the reductant in steel-making, being piloted by the HYBRIT project in Sweden 2020-2021, \r\nand many companies have initiated hydrogen steel-making projects. As shown in Sections 11.3.5 and 11.3.6, there are many other \r\npotential applications of hydrogen, some of which are still relatively unexplored. Hydrogen can also be used to produce various lower\u0002GHG hydrocarbons and alcohols for fuels and chemical feedstocks using carbon from biogenic sources or direct air capture of CO2\r\n(Ericsson 2017; Huang et al. 2020)."


id: 27ee5d60258ded56d217b992ef30a46b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4218
content:
"The geographical distribution of the potential for hydrogen from electrolysis powered by renewables like solar and wind, nuclear \r\nelectrothermally produced hydrogen, and hydrogen from fossil gas with CCS may reshape where heavy industry is located, how \r\nvalue chains are organised, and what gets transported in international shipping (Bataille 2020a; Gielen et al. 2020; Bataille et al. \r\n2021a; Saygin and Gielen 2021). Regions with bountiful renewables resources, nuclear, or methane co-located with CCS geology may \r\nbecome exporters of hydrogen or hydrogen carriers such as methanol and ammonia, or home to the production of iron and steel, \r\norganic platform chemicals, and other energy-intensive basic materials. This in turn may generate new trade patterns and needs for \r\nbulk transport."


id: 2eda7c92075ecaa7f84bfaf4a7dc400c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5516
content:
"the CO2 disposal upon injection if sealed properly (Mac Dowell et al. \r\n2017). There are several industrial CCS strategies and pilot projects \r\nworking to take advantage of the relative ease of concentrated CO2 \r\ndisposal (e.g.,  LEILAC for limestone calcination process emissions \r\nfrom cement production, HISARNA direct oxycombustion smelting \r\nfor steel) (Bataille 2020a). An emerging option for storing carbon is \r\nmethane pyrolysis by which methane is split into hydrogen and solid \r\ncarbon that may subsequently be stored (Schneider et al. 2020)."


id: 462a4e82be41881b81a266be3e5bb6b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9565
content:
"There are several post-combustion CCS projects underway globally \r\n(IEA 2019g), generally focused on energy production and processing \r\nrather than industry. Their costs are higher but evolving downward - \r\nGiannaris et al. (2020) suggest USD47 tCO2\r\n-1 for a  follow-up \r\n90% capture power generation plant based on learnings from the \r\nSaskpower Boundary Dam pilot - but crucially these costs are higher \r\nthan implicit and explicit carbon prices almost everywhere, resulting \r\nin limited investment and learning in these technologies. A  key \r\nchallenge with all CCS strategies, however, is building a gathering \r\nand transport network for CO2, especially from dispersed existing \r\nsites; hence most pilot projects are built near EOR/geological storage \r\nsites, and the movement towards industrial clustering in the EU and \r\nUK (UKCCC 2019b), and as suggested in IEA (2019f)."


id: b84fe4d98064d3bb635e133baf6d39bd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29639
content:
"just on GHG mitigation but multi-attribute improvements to chemical \r\nprocesses from reutilisation of CO2, suggests the largest reduction \r\nin the absolute amount of GHGs from CO2 reutilisation could be \r\nachieved by the coupling of highly concentrated CO2 sources with \r\ncarbon-free hydrogen or electrons from low GHG power in so called \r\n'power-to-fuel' scenarios. From the point of view of maximising \r\nGHG mitigation using surplus 'curtailed' renewable power, however, \r\nDaggash et al. (2018) instead indicates the best use would be for \r\ndirect air capture and CCS. These results depend on what system is \r\nbeing measured, and what the objective is."


id: 9cb4a34e35e7e1c59ae34e49544c3ccd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24806
content:
"The above CCU literature has identified that there may be a highly \r\nunpredictable competition between fossil, biogenic and direct air \r\ncapture carbon to provide highly uncertain chemical feedstock, \r\nmaterial and fuel needs. Fossil waste carbon will likely initially be \r\nplentiful but will add to net atmospheric CO2 when released. Biogenic \r\ncarbon is variably, partially net-negative, but the available stock will \r\nbe finite and compete with biodiversity and agriculture needs for \r\nland. Direct air capture carbon will require significant amounts of \r\nlow-GHG electricity or methane with high-capture rate CCS (Keith \r\net al. 2018). There are clearly strong interactive effects between low\u0002carbon electrification, switching to biomass, hydrogen, ammonia, \r\nsynthetic hydrocarbons via CCU, and CCS. "


id: 8810d7841ebb4bcbe1ef5ed7195ce26f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21088
content:
"In this section we conceptually address interactions between service \r\ndemand, service product intensity, product material efficiency, energy \r\nefficiency, electrication and fuel switching, CCU and CCS, and what \r\nconflicts and synergies may exist. Post AR5 a substantial literature \r\nhas emerged, see Rissman et al. (2020), that addresses integrated "


id: b36576cd58557cd0ed5950aef351edd0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28802
content:
"There are widely varying estimates of the capacity of CCU to reduce \r\nGHG emissions and meet the net zero objective. According to Hepburn \r\net al. (2019), the estimated potential for the scale of CO2 utilisation in \r\nfuels varies widely, from 1 to 4.2 GtCO2 yr-1, reflecting uncertainties \r\nin potential market penetration, requiring carbon prices of around "


id: 893f38b502ff2009aa605163fe42d349
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21316
content:
"are the steel beams clearly tagged with their content? The answers to \r\nthese questions will be very regionally and site specific, and require \r\nrevision of educational curricula for the entire supply chain, as well \r\nas revision of building codes."


id: aa9d6258f7aa7a9c89001c8f8bb660f0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27240
content:
"Energy efficiency is a  critical strategy for net zero transitions and \r\nenabling clean electrification (IEA 2021a). Improving the efficiency \r\nof energy services provision reduces the need for material intensive \r\nenergy supply, energy storage, CCU and CCS infrastructure, and \r\nlimits generation and transmission expansion to reduce an ever\u0002higherdemand, with associated generation, transmission, and \r\ndistribution losses. Using electricity efficiently can help reduces peak \r\ndemand and the need for peaking plants (currently often powered by \r\nfossil fuels), and energy storage systems."


id: c2791fc4321fb7d56627922f98c1039f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31497
content:
"Electrification and final energy efficiency are deeply entangled, \r\nbecause switching to electricity from fossil fuels in most cases \r\nimproves GJ for GJ end-use energy efficiency: resistance heaters \r\nare almost 100% efficient, heat pumps can be 300-400% efficient, \r\ninduction melting can improve mixing and temperature control, and \r\nelectric vehicle motors typically translate 90-95% of input electricity \r\nto motor drive in contrast to 35-45% for a large, modern internal \r\ncombustion engine. Overall, the combined effect could be 40% lower \r\nglobal final energy demand assuming renewable electricity is \r\nused (Eyre 2021)."


id: 4b568a72abd1ea0f1ab7e6b8675a9604
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10503
content:
"While the strategies are not sequential and interact strongly, we \r\ndiscuss them in the order given. Reduced demand through reduced \r\nservice demand and product intensity per service unit (Grubler \r\net al. 2018; van Vuuren et al. 2018) reduces the need for the next six \r\nstrategies. Greater material efficiency (see earlier sections) reduces \r\nthe need for the next five, and so on - see Figure 11.9 above."


id: ad0fb9b274384f6632355c8cde9212da
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27684
content:
"There are potentially complicated physical and market fuel switching \r\nrelationships between low-GHG electricity, bioliquids and gases, \r\nhydrogen, ammonia, and synthetic hydrocarbons constructed \r\nusing CCU, with remaining CO2 potentially being disposed of \r\nusing CCS. Whether or not they compete for a  wide range of end \r\nuses and primary demand needs will be regional and whether or \r\nnot infrastructure is available to supply them. Regions with less \r\nthan optimal renewable energy resources, or not sufficient to meet \r\ngrowing needs, could potentially indirectly import them as liquid or \r\ncompressed hydrogen, ammonia or synthetic hydrocarbon feedstocks \r\nmade in regions with abundant resources (Armijo and Philibert 2020; \r\nBataille 2020a). Large-scale CCU and CCS applications need additional \r\nbasic materials to build corresponding infrastructure and energy to \r\noperate it, thus reducing overall material and energy efficiencies."


id: 6dc3d4f687c570d19f4db115ec8a3c9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16571
content:
"There are different roles for different actors in relation to the different \r\nmitigation strategies (exemplified in Table 11.2), with institutions and \r\nsupply chains developed to widely varying levels, for example, while \r\nenergy efficiency is a relatively mature strategy with an established \r\nsupply chain, material efficiency is not."


id: a56377e190d10af8f0f09e9277075a04
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26326
content:
"Table 11.2 | Examples of the potential roles of different actors in relation to different mitigation strategies indicating the importance of engaging a wide \r\nset of actors across all mitigation strategies."


id: 3c76e383b2af4b294bf6f66afe367a9b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7830
content:
"scenarios selected from chapters  3 and 4, representing different \r\nGHG mitigation ambitions and different pathways to achieve \r\ncertain mitigation targets. Comparing technology-focused sector\u0002based scenarios with more top-down-oriented scenario approaches \r\nallows for a  reciprocal assessment of both perspectives and helps \r\nto identify robust elements for the transformation of the sector. \r\nComparison of real-world conditions within the sector (e.g., industry \r\nstructure and logics, investment cycles, market behaviour, power, and \r\ninstitutional capacity) and the transformative pathways described \r\nin the scenarios helps researchers, analysts, governments, and all \r\nstakeholders understand the need not only for technological change, \r\nbut for structural (e.g.,  new value chains, markets, infrastructures, \r\nand sectoral couplings) and behavioural (e.g., design practices and \r\nbusiness models) change at multiple levels."


id: e8c34b1a9840016aec101024c39ad852
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38301
content:
"This section continues the discussion of the various mitigation \r\noptions and strategy elements introduced in Section 11.3 and makes \r\nthem explicit for the most relevant industry sectors. For the various \r\nsectors, Section  11.4.1 concludes with a  tabular overview of key \r\ntechnologies and processes, their technology readiness level (TRL), \r\npotential timing of market penetration, mitigation potential and \r\nassessment of associated mitigation costs."


id: 80fdeaabde4df5a78a2aba542954773c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19834
content:
"An integrated sequencing of mature short-term actions and less \r\nmature longer-term actions is crucial to avoid lock-in effects. Temporal \r\nimplementation and discussion of the general quantitative role of \r\nthe different options to achieve net zero emissions in the industrial \r\nsectors is core to the second part of the section (Section 11.4.2), where \r\nindustry-wide mitigation pathways are analysed. This comprises \r\nthe collection and discussion of mitigation scenarios available in the \r\nliterature with a high technological resolution for the industry sector \r\nin addition to a set of illustrative global and national GHG mitigation "


id: 2da43b27dcb0cf29fda182e2e82ba9fb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5322
content:
"When undergoing a  transformative process, it is obvious that \r\ninteractions occur within the sector but also on a  cross-sectoral \r\nbasis. Relevant interactions are identified and discussed in the third \r\nand fourth part of the subsection. Changes are induced along the \r\nwhole value chain, i.e., switching to an alternative (climate-friendly, "


id: 40469d4ce2cfe1abbd780a30b3e753be
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8498
content:
"e.g., low-GHG hydrogen-based) steel-making process has substantial \r\nimpacts on the value chain, associated sub-suppliers, and electricity \r\nand coal outputs. In addition, cross-sectoral interactions are \r\ndiscussed. This includes feedback loops with other end-use chapters, \r\nfor example, higher material demand through market penetration \r\nof some GHG mitigation technologies or measures (e.g., insulation \r\nmaterials for buildings, steel for windmills) and lower demand \r\nthrough others (e.g., less steel for fossil fuel extraction, transport and \r\nprocessing), or substantial additional demand of critical materials \r\n(e.g., the widely varying demands for copper, lithium, nickel, cobalt \r\nand rare earths for producing windmills, solar panels, and batteries). \r\nGenerally, if consumption- (or behaviour-) driven additional material \r\ndemand creates scarcity it becomes important to increase efforts \r\non material efficiency, substitution, recycling/reuse, and sustainable \r\nconsumption patterns."


id: 6477e58e329efc10742b3a85fc722e85
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14951
content:
"Based on the general discussion of strategies across industry \r\nin Section 11.3, this subsection focuses on the sector perspective and\r\nprovides insights into the sector-specific mitigation technologies \r\nand potentials. As industry is comprised of many different subsectors, \r\nthe discussion here has its focus on the most important sources \r\nof GHG emissions, that is, steel, cement and concrete, as well as \r\nchemicals, before other sectors are discussed."


id: 22e35be4c3942e703b021d97a46b9c25
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3343
content:
"An estimated 15% energy efficiency improvement is possible within \r\nthe BF-BOF process (Figure  11.8). Several options exist for deep\u0002GHG emissions reductions in steel-production processes (Fischedick \r\net al. 2014b; Leeson et al. 2017; Axelson et al. 2018; Vogl et al. \r\n2018; Bataille 2020a; Holappa 2020; Rissman et al. 2020; Fan and \r\nFriedmann 2021; Wang et al. 2021).Each could reduce specific CO2"


id: 622df65c03e21f24208c18df5015fa9c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14548
content:
"increases are significant, the effect on final end uses is typically \r\nvery small (Rootzen and Johnsson 2016), with significant policy \r\nconsequences (see Section 11.6 on public and private lead markets \r\nfor cleaner materials)."


id: 8414d9c59e47b4d3a8333998b6c8f36a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20396
content:
"a significant increase in energy efficiency compared with the direct \r\nreduced iron (DRI) and blast furnace routes (Cavaliere 2019). If \r\nthe electricity used is based on carbon-free sources, this steel\u0002production process can be nearly CO2 neutral. Both processes \r\nwould require supplemental carbon, but this is typically only up \r\nto 0.05% per tonne steel, with a  maximum of 2.1%. Aqueous \r\nelectrolysis is possible with today's electrode technologies, \r\nwhile molten oxide electrolysis would require advances in high\u0002temperature electrodes."


id: 6dad65a460a01b362e1bb7f53b6808ee
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16553
content:
"Reflecting the different conditions at existing and potential future \r\nplant sites, when choosing one of the above options a combination \r\nof different measures and structural changes (including electricity, \r\nhydrogen and CCU or CCS infrastructure needs) will likely be \r\nnecessary in the future to achieve deep reductions in CO2 emissions \r\nof steel production."


id: cf269532b764857878f23c625317a8fe
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33792
content:
"One of the simplest and most effective ways to reduce cement and \r\nconcrete emissions is to make stronger concrete through better \r\nmixing and aggregate sizing and dispersal; poorly and well-made \r\nconcrete can vary in strength by a factor of four for a given volume \r\n(Fechner and Kray 2012; Habert et al. 2020). This argues for a refocus \r\nof the market away from 'one size fits all', often bagged cements to \r\nprofessionally mixed clinker, cementitious material and filler mixtures \r\nappropriate to the needs of the end use."


id: 9003ffa8cc619d9c5bbbaa1aee097bd1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22542
content:
"Architects, engineers and contractors also tend to overbuild with \r\ncement because it is cheap as well as corrosion- and water-resistant. \r\nBuildings and infrastructure can be purposefully designed to \r\nminimise cement use to its essential uses (e.g., compression strength \r\nand corrosion-resistance), and replace its use with other materials \r\n(e.g., wood, stone and other fibres) for non-essential uses. This could \r\nreduce cement use by 20-30% (Imbabi et al. 2012; Brinkerhoff and \r\nGLDNV 2015; D'Alessandro et al. 2016; Lehne and Preston 2018; IEA \r\n2019b; Shanks et al. 2019; Habert et al. 2020)."


id: 3a98dde772ba3731c6d43d11af4dc543
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7513
content:
"Abatement costs for these strategies vary considerably from case \r\nto case and for each a plausible cost range is difficult to establish; \r\ncompare this with Table  11.3 (Fischedick et al. 2014b; Leeson \r\net al. 2017; Axelson et al. 2018; Vogl et al. 2018; Fan and Friedmann \r\n2021; Wang et al. 2021). A key point is that while cost of production "


id: 2afd61ccbf5d18e4902d46373e3ab757
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4797
content:
"Because so much of the emissions from concrete come from the \r\nlimestone calcination to make clinker, anything that reduces use of \r\nclinker for a  given amount of concrete reduces its GHG intensity. "


id: 6cdbabaafa6f495a494620c105f85497
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16429
content:
"While 95% Portland cement is common in some markets, it is typically \r\nnot necessary for all end-use applications, and many markets will add \r\nblast furnace slag, coal fly ash, or natural pozzolanic materials to \r\nreplace cement as supplementary cementitious materials; 71% was \r\nthe global average clinker content of cement in 2019 (IEA 2020a). \r\nAll these materials are limited in volume, but a  combination of \r\nroughly two to three parts ground limestone and one part specially \r\nselected, calcined clays can also be used to replace clinker (Fechner \r\nand Kray 2012; Lehne and Preston 2018; Habert et al. 2020). Local \r\nbuilding codes determine what mixes of cementitious materials are \r\nallowed for given uses and would need to be modified to allow these \r\nalternative mixtures where appropriate."


id: 1715cfa067728da669dbaaee107d640a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1282
content:
"are several highly regional alternative chemistries in use that provide \r\npartial reductions (Fechner and Kray 2012; Lehne and Preston 2018; \r\nHabert et al. 2020), for example, carbonatable calcium silicate clinkers, \r\nand there have been pilot projects with magnesium-oxide-based \r\ncements, which could be negative emissions. Lower carbon cement \r\nchemistries are not nearly as widely available as limestone deposits \r\n(Material Economics 2019), and would require new materials testing \r\nprotocols, codes, pilots and demonstrations."


id: dc112561e324968132ad6666a3405f7e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35994
content:
"Any substantial changes in cement and concrete material efficiency \r\nor production decarbonisation, however, will require comprehensive \r\neducation and continuing re-education for cement producers, \r\narchitects, engineers, contractors and small, non-professional users \r\nof cements. It will also require changes to building codes, standards, \r\ncertification, labeling, procurement, incentives, and a  range of \r\npolices to help create the market will be needed, as well as those \r\nfor information disclosure, and certification for quality. Even an end\u0002of-pipe solution like CCS will require infrastructure for transport and \r\ndisposal. Abatement costs for these strategies vary considerably \r\nfrom case to case and for each a plausible cost range is difficult to \r\nestablish, but they are summarised in Table 11.3 from the following \r\nliterature and other sources (Wilson et al. 2003; Fechner and Kray \r\n2012; Leeson et al. 2017; Moore 2017; Lehne and Preston 2018; IEA \r\n2019f; Habert et al. 2020)."


id: d4860f41ed79fae9b5cd6caee58f5be0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34710
content:
"The chemical industry produces a broad range of products that are \r\nused in a  wide variety of applications. The products range from \r\nplastics and rubbers to fertilisers, solvents, and specialty chemicals \r\nsuch as food additives and pharmaceuticals. The industry is the \r\nlargest industrial energy user and its direct emissions were about \r\n1.1-1.7 GtCO2-eq or about 10% of total global direct industrial \r\nemissions in 2019 (Olivier and Peters 2018; IEA 2019f; Crippa et al. \r\n2021; Lamb et al. 2021; Minx et al. 2021) (Figure 11.4 and Table 11.1). \r\nWith regard to energy requirements and CO2 emissions, ammonia, \r\nmethanol, olefins, and chlorine production are of great importance \r\n(Boulamanti and Moya Rivera 2017). Ammonia is primarily used for \r\nnitrogen fertilisers, methanol for adhesives, resins, and fuels, whereas \r\nolefins and chlorine are mainly used for the production of polymers, \r\nwhich are the main components of plastics."


id: 480eb2876fd9e88b411bca4e21a005a3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9897
content:
"Technologies and process changes that enable the decarbonisation \r\nof chemicals production are specific to individual processes. Although \r\nenergy efficiency in the sector has steadily improved over the past \r\ndecades (Boulamanti and Moya Rivera 2017; IEA 2018a) (Figure 11.8), \r\na significant share of the emissions is caused by the need for heat \r\nand steam in the production of primary chemicals (Bazzanella and \r\nAusfelder 2017) (Box 11.2). This energy is currently supplied almost \r\nexclusively through fossil fuels which could be substituted with \r\nbioenergy, hydrogen, or low or zero carbon electricity, for example, \r\nusing electric boilers or high-temperature heat pumps (Bazzanella \r\nand Ausfelder 2017; Thunman et al. 2019; Saygin and Gielen 2021). \r\nThe chemical industry has among the largest potentials for industrial \r\nenergy demand to be electrified with existing technologies, indicating \r\nthe possibility for a  rapid reduction of energy-related emissions \r\n(Madeddu et al. 2020)."


id: 416439e23fef3e66b246c52c522806bf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8691
content:
"In the long run, if some combination of material efficiency, better \r\nmixing and aggregate sizing, cementitious material substitution and \r\n90%+ capture CCS with supplemental bioenergy are not feasible in \r\nsome regions or at all to achieve near-zero emissions, alternatives \r\nto limestone-based ordinary Portland cement may be needed. There "


id: 376c0a829ed877e4ab3045bd771c0f92
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6965
content:
"the emissions from the subsector (IEA 2018a). Future lower-carbon \r\noptions include electrifying the heat supply in the steam cracker as \r\ndescribed above, although this will not remove the associated process \r\nemissions from the cracking reaction itself or from the combustion \r\nof the by-products. Further in the future, electrocatalysis of carbon \r\nmonoxide, methanol, ethanol, ethylene and formic acid could allow \r\ndirect electric recombination of waste chemical products into new \r\nintermediate products (De Luna et al. 2019)."


id: a794d59da09f471ff37473b57d31e60
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26697
content:
"A ranking of key emerging technologies with likely deployment dates \r\nfrom the present to 2025 relevant for the chemical industry identified \r\ndifferent carbon capture processes together with electrolytic hydrogen \r\nproduction as being of very high importance to reach net zero \r\nemissions (IEA 2020a). Methane pyrolysis, electrified steam cracking, \r\nand the biomass-based routes for ethanol-to-ethylene and lignin-to\u0002BTX were ranked as being of medium importance. While macro-level \r\nanalyses show that large-scale use of carbon circulation through CCU \r\nis possible in the chemical industry as primary strategy, it would be \r\nvery energy intensive and the climate impact depends significantly \r\non the source of and process for capturing the CO2 (Artz et al. 2018; \r\nKatelhon et al. 2019; Muller et al. 2020). Significant synergies can be \r\nfound when combining circular CCU approaches with virgin carbon \r\nfeedstocks from biomass (Bachmann et al. 2021; Meys et al. 2021)."


id: 513f4305f6ba894b909ef581b6fe3fbe
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11575
content:
"Biomass feedstocks: Substituting fossil carbon at the inception of \r\na product lifecycle for carbon from renewable sources processed in \r\ndesignated biotechnological processes (Lee et al. 2019; Hatti-Kaul \r\net al. 2020) using specific biomass resources (Isikgor and Becer 2015) \r\nor residual streams already available (Abdelaziz et al. 2016). Routes \r\nwith thermochemical and catalytic processes, such as pyrolysis and \r\nsubsequent catalytic upgrading, are also available (Jing et al. 2019)."


id: 2ab35c64b8d5cdab7dcd9ede2460758d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4737
content:
"Synthetic feedstocks: Carbon captured with direct air capture \r\nor from point sources (bioenergy, chemical recycling, or during \r\na  transition period from industrial-processes-emitting fossil CO2) \r\ncan be combined with low-GHG hydrogen into a syngas for further \r\nvalorisation (Katelhon et al. 2019). Thus, low-carbon methanol can \r\nbe produced and used in methanol-to-olefins/aromatics (MTO/MTA) \r\nprocesses, substituting the steam cracker (Gogate 2019) or Fischer\u0002Tropsch processes could produce synthetic hydrocarbons."


id: fd4e0af3692e6d7d0554fd615279c778
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41917
content:
"Reducing emissions involves demand-side measures, for example, \r\nefficient end use, materials efficiency and slowing demand growth, \r\nas well as recycling where possible to reduce the need for primary \r\nproduction. The following strategies for primary production of \r\norganic chemicals which will continue to need a carbon source are \r\nkey in avoiding the GHG emissions of chemical products throughout \r\ntheir lifecycles:"


id: de19774b0a5713a91e5692fd3ba9ad73
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36338
content:
"Recycled feedstocks: Chemical recycling of plastics unsuitable \r\nfor mechanical recycling was already mentioned. Through pyrolysis\r\nof old plastics, both gas and a  naphtha-like pyrolysis oil can \r\nbe generated, a  share of which could replace fossil naphtha as \r\na feedstock in the steam cracker (Honus et al. 2018a,b). Alternatively, \r\nwaste plastics could be gasified and combined with low-carbon \r\nhydrogen to a  syngas, for example, the production and methanol \r\nand derivatives (Lopez et al. 2018; Stork et al. 2018). Other chemical \r\nrecycling options include polymer selective chemolysis, catalytic \r\ncracking, and hydrocracking (Ragaert et al. 2017). Carbon losses and \r\nprocess emissions must be minimised and it may thus be necessary \r\nto combine chemical recycling with CCS to reach near-zero emissions \r\n(Thunman et al. 2019; Smet and Linder 2019; Meys et al. 2021)."


id: 434e32d20b133aadcf576be1427c0e96
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9053
content:
"possible for low temperature needs (<100degC) and concentrating solar \r\nfor higher temperatures. Commercially available heat pumps can \r\ndeliver 100degC-150degC but at least up to 280degC is feasible (Zuhlsdorf \r\net al. 2019). Plasma torches using electricity can be used where high \r\ntemperatures (>1000degC) are required, but hydrogen, biogenic or \r\nsynthetic combustible hydrocarbons (methane, methanol, ethanol, \r\nLPG, etc.) can also be used (Bataille et al. 2018a)."


id: 5296036d595f7cdf6b600d7d0d14756e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11813
content:
"The other big sources of direct global industrial combustion and \r\nprocess CO2 emissions are light manufacturing and industry (9.7% \r\nin 2016), non-ferrous metals like aluminium (3.1%), pulp and paper \r\n(1.1%), and food and tobacco (1.9%) (Bataille 2020a; Crippa et al. \r\n2021; Lamb et al. 2021)."


id: d578929733b68f6fb39b8712ad611a06
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34872
content:
"There is also a large potential for energy savings through cascading \r\nin industrial clusters similar to the one at Kalundborg, Denmark. \r\nWaste heat can be passed at lower and lower temperatures from \r\nfacility to facility or circulated as low-grade steam or hot water, and \r\nboosted as necessary using heat pumps and direct heating. Such \r\ngeographic clusters would also enable lower-cost infrastructure for \r\nhydrogen production and storage as well as CO2 gathering, transport \r\nand disposal (IEA 2019f)."


id: 290561ef50273c1fe3a66ddd40dc0ff0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4427
content:
"Light manufacturing and industry represent a very diverse sector in \r\nterms of energy service needs (e.g., motive power, ventilation, drying, \r\nheating, compressed air, etc.) and it comprises both small and large \r\nplants in different geographical contexts. Most of the direct fossil \r\nfuel use is for heating and drying, and it can be replaced with low\u0002GHG electricity through direct resistance, high-temperature heat \r\npumps and mechanical vapour recompression, induction, infrared, \r\nor other electrothermal processes (Lechtenbohmer et al. 2016; \r\nBamigbetan et al. 2017). Madeddu et al. (2020) argue up to 78% \r\nof Europe's industrial energy requirements are electrifiable through \r\nexisting commercial technologies and 99% with the addition of new \r\ntechnologies currently under development. Direct solar heating is "


id: d24bead4f6aad9e8e79718f498260d9c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34353
content:
"Demand for aluminium comes from a  variety of end uses where \r\na reasonable cost, light-weight metal is desirable. It has historically \r\nbeen used in aircraft, window frames, strollers, and beverage "


id: 74666472a19f48d556a10f4e7bb6c44e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17711
content:
"(Bataille and Stiebert 2018): (i) Increase material efficiency; \r\n(ii)  Increase recycling of existing stock; (iii) Pursue ore-extraction \r\nprocesses (e.g., hydro- and electro-metallurgy) that allow more use \r\nof low-carbon electricity as opposed to pyrometallurgy, which uses \r\nheat to melt and separate the ore after it has been crushed. These \r\nprocesses have been used occasionally in the past but have generally \r\nnot been used due to the relatively inexpensive nature of fossil fuels."


id: 39edd303ef24809e64d45231c3817660
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7399
content:
"A larger and more challenging issue is how the forestry industry \r\ncan contribute to the decarbonisation of other sectors and how \r\nbiogenic carbon will be used in a  fossil-free society, for example, \r\nthrough developing the forest-based bioeconomy (Pulzl et al. 2014; \r\nBauer 2018). In recent years the concept of biorefineries has gained \r\nincreasing traction. Most examples involve innovations for taking by\u0002products or diverting small streams to produce fuels, chemicals and \r\nbio-composites that can replace fossil-based products, but there is \r\nlittle common vision on what really constitutes a biorefinery (Bauer \r\net al. 2017). Some of these options have limited scalability and the \r\ncellulose fibre remains the core product even in the relatively large \r\nshift from paper production to textiles fibre production."


id: e26c16fbbbaa00e4529193684fa5229e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37131
content:
"The use of low- and zero-GHG electricity (e.g.,  historically from \r\nhydropower) can reduce the indirect emissions associated with \r\nmaking aluminium. A  public-private partnership with financial \r\nsupport from the province of Quebec and the Canadian federal \r\ngovernment has recently announced a  fundamental modification \r\nto the Hall-Heroult process by which the graphite electrode process \r\nemissions can be eliminated by substitution of inert electrodes. \r\nThis technology is slated to be available in 2024 and is potentially \r\nretrofittable to existing facilities (Saevarsdottir et al. 2020)."


id: eeb66d4998e65f7f3bb60b02572d5f04
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39381
content:
"Pulp mills have been identified as promising candidates for post\u0002combustion capture and CCS (Onarheim et al. 2017), which could allow \r\nsome degree of net-negative emissions. For deep decarbonisation \r\nacross all sectors, notably switching to biomass feedstock for fuels, \r\norganic chemicals and plastics, the availability of biogenic carbon (in \r\nbiomass or as biogenic CO2; Chapter 7) becomes an issue. A scenario \r\nwhere biogenic carbon is CCU as feedstock implies large demands "


id: 9a04d94ecefe9e53af6939a9e6fe77fd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24335
content:
"for hydrogen, completely new value chains and more closed carbon \r\nloops, all areas which are as yet largely unexplored (Ericsson 2017; \r\nMeys et al. 2021)."


id: 535864944f2004ce0af14df5efb6c970
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11934
content:
"(e.g.,  90% emissions reduction via widespread deployment of \r\nhydrogen, electrification or bioenergy for stationary industrial heat/\r\ncombustion). Finally, costs range from 33-299 GBP tCO2-eq-1 when \r\nenergy and material efficiency are limited."


id: 9ac2b5f3b0ae718b1397223f5334e63e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24470
content:
"Table 11.3, modified from Bataille (2020a) and built from McMillan \r\net al. (2016); Bazzanella and Ausfelder (2017); Philibert (2017a); \r\nWesseling et al. (2017); Axelson et al. (2018); Bataille et al. (2018a) \r\nDavis et al. (2018); Energy Transitions Commission (2018); IEA \r\n(2019f, 2020c); Material Economics (2019); and UKCCC (2019b), \r\npresents carbon intensities that could be achieved by implementing \r\nmitigation options in major basic material industries, mitigation \r\npotential, estimates for mitigation costs, TRL and potential year of \r\nmarket introduction (Figure 11.13)."


id: c915b417d9a971871adc66ae384c3a18
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32698
content:
"Table  11.3 acknowledges that for many carbon-intensive products \r\na large variety of novel processes, inputs and practices capable of \r\nproviding very deep emission reductions are already available and \r\nemerging. However, their application is subject to different economic \r\nand structural limitations, therefore in the scenarios assuming deep \r\ndecarbonisation by 2050-2060 different technological mixes can be \r\nobserved (Section 11.4.2)."


id: 8ed1c25a814c861cf3db9f7a5640babc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22313
content:
"While deep GHG emissions reduction potential is assessed for \r\nvarious regions, assessment of associated costs is limited to only \r\na few regions; nevertheless those analyses may be illustrative at the \r\nglobal scale. UKCCC (2019b) provides costs assessments for different \r\nindustrial subsectors (Table  11.3) for the UK.  They provide three \r\nranges: core, more ambitious, and when energy and material efficiency \r\nare limited. The core options range from 2-85 GBP2019 tCO2-eq-1\r\n(e.g., reduction in GHG emissions by about 50% by 2050 applying \r\nenergy efficiency (EE), ME, CCS, biomass and electrification). The \r\nmore ambitious options are estimated at 32-119 GBP2019 tCO2-eq-1"


id: 7797c28fe0bd050550ed8cdf7007de0d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18243
content:
"Thus, the price impact scales down going across the value chain and \r\nmight be acceptable for a significant share of customers. However, \r\nit has to be reflected that the cumulative price increase could be \r\nmore significant if several different zero-carbon materials (e.g., steel, \r\nplastics and aluminium) in the production process of a certain product "


id: dc114b0ede036d13b6f91320e6dc3c0b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35995
content:
"Table 11.3 | Technological potentials and costs for deep decarbonisation of basic industries. Percentages of maximum reduction are multiplicative, not additive."


id: 728c1ac850750f349984570fbeb254bd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17395
content:
"a\r\n Data for CCS costs for steel-making: Birat (2012); Leeson et al. (2017); and Axelson et al. (2018)."


id: 2990a9b0b922745ea1fb05828e508553
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4539
content:
"e\r\n Data for Molten Oxide Electrolysis (also known as SIDERWIN): Fischedick et al. 2014b and Axelson et al. 2018. The TRLs differ by source, the value provided is from Axelson \r\net al. (2018), based on UCLOS SIDERWIN."


id: 80c226c38f58be36e84378c595f1de65
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19789
content:
"f\r\n Data for making hydrogen from SMR and ATR with CCUS: Leeson et al. (2017); Moore (2017); and IEA (2019f). The cost of CCS disposal of concentrated sources of CO2 at \r\nUSD15-40 tCO2-eq-1 is well established as commercial for direct or EOR purposes and is based on the long-standing practice of disposing of hydrogen sulphide and oil brines \r\nunderground: Wilson et al. (2003) and Leeson et al. (2017). There is a wide variance, however, in estimated tCO2-eq-1 break-even prices for industrial post-combustion capture \r\nof CO2 from sources highly diluted in nitrogen (e.g., Leeson et al. (2017) at USD60-170 tCO2-eq-1), but most fall under USD120 tCO2-eq-1."


id: 8fbf39049390eb4739447817697a605c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22500
content:
"h\r\n Rio Tinto, Alcoa and Apple have partnered with the governments of Quebec and Canada to form a coalition to commercialise inert as opposed to sacrificial graphite electrodes \r\nby 2024, thereby making the standard Hall-Heroult process very low emissions if low-carbon electricity is used."


id: 492e8e68351a322e39626d3e81225a59
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10099
content:
"results of IAM-based scenarios followed by specific studies which \r\nprovide much higher technological resolution and allow a  much \r\ndeeper look into the interplay of different mitigation strategies. The \r\ncomparison of more technology-focused sector-based scenarios \r\nwith top-down-oriented scenarios provides the opportunity for \r\na reciprocal assessment across different modelling philosophies and \r\nhelps to identify robust elements for the transformation of the sector. \r\nOnly some of the scenarios available in the literature allow for at \r\nleast rough estimates of the necessary investments and give direction "


id: ab23452ab9476a6d38cdb670be968417
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27335
content:
"have to be combined, indicating the importance of material efficiency \r\nbeing applied along with production decarbonisation."


id: c53bcf82309642c43420fa25fa752517
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32004
content:
"To discuss the general role and temporal implementation of the \r\ndifferent options for achieving a net zero GHG emissions industry, \r\nmitigation pathways will be analysed. This starts with showing the "


id: 669507fca179b89cde7f8c94a66449fc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15301
content:
"about relevant investment cycles and potential risks of stranded or \r\ndepreciated assets. In some specific cases cost comparisons can be \r\ntranslated into expected difference costs not only for the overall \r\nsector, but also for relevant materials or even consumer products."


id: a1ae0ff068696c1aaef3ca8a81c74210
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25664
content:
"but increasing demand in 2100, driven by growing material use \r\nthroughout the 21st century. While carbon intensity shrinks over \r\ntime, energy related CO2-emissions decline after 2030 even in \r\nless ambitious scenarios, but particularly in those pursuing \r\na temperature increase below 2degC. Reduction of CO2 emissions \r\nin the sector are achieved through a combination of technologies \r\nwhich includes nearly all options that have been discussed in \r\nthis chapter (Sections 11.3 and 11.4.1). However, there are big \r\ndifferences with regard to the intensity by which the various \r\noptions are implemented in the scenarios.  This is particularly \r\ntrue for CCS for industrial applications and material efficiency \r\nand material demand management (i.e., service demand, service \r\nproduct intensity). The latter options are still under-represented \r\nin many global IAMs."


id: 13a3336573c99dfead021196ae55a47f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 672
content:
"Chapter 3 conducted a comprehensive analysis of scenarios based \r\non IAMs. The resulting database comprises more than 1000 model\u0002based scenarios published in the literature. The scenarios span \r\na broad range along temperature categories from rather baseline-like \r\nscenarios to the description of pathways that are compatible with \r\nthe 1.5degC target. Comparative discussion of scenarios allows some \r\ninsights with regard to the relevance of mitigation strategies for the \r\nindustry sector (Figure 11.11)."


id: 9d5a0cd363d16c3b8b690bbf97305d5b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24914
content:
"Figure 11.11 Industrial final energy (top left), CO2 emissions (top middle), energy intensity (bottom left), carbon intensity (top right), share of electricity \r\n(bottom middle), and share of gases (bottom right). Energy intensity is final energy per unit of GDP. Carbon intensity is CO2 emissions per EJ of final energy. The first \r\nfour indicators are indexed to 2019, where values less than 1 indicate a reduction. Industrial-sector CO2 emissions include fuel-combustion emissions only. Boxes indicate the \r\ninterquartile range, the median is shown with a horizontal black line, while vertical lines show the 5 to 95% interval. Source: data are from the AR6 database; only scenarios \r\nthat pass the vetting criteria are included (Section 3.2)."


id: 2030e119c35b7f060e893e93aab077d4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2874
content:
"detailed. Due to their top-down perspective IAMs to date have not \r\nbeen able to represent the high complexity of industries in terms \r\nof the broad variety of technologies and processes (particularly \r\ncircularity aspects) and to fully reflect the dynamics of the sector. \r\nIn addition, as energy and carbon price elasticities are still not \r\ncompletely understood, primarily cost-driven models have their \r\nlimitations. However, there are several ongoing activities to bring \r\nmore engineering knowledge and technological details into the \r\nIAM models (Kermeli et al. 2021)."


id: b7df7aa45546811e3ca1e4044ecc23d2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29570
content:
"In addition to the more aggregated discussion, the IAMs illustrative \r\nmitigation pathways (IMPs) allow a deeper look into the transformation \r\npathways related to the scenarios. For the illustrative mitigation \r\npathways (IMPs) approach, sets of scenarios have been selected which \r\nrepresent different levels of GHG mitigation ambitions, scenarios \r\nwhich rely on different key strategies or even exclude some mitigation \r\noptions, represent delayed actions or SDG-oriented pathways. For more \r\ndetailed information about the selection see Section 3.3.2. Figure 11.12 \r\ncompares for a selected number of key variables the results of IMPs \r\nand puts them in the context of the whole sample of IAMs scenario \r\nresults for three temperature categories."


id: 8f1c89965cc873584582b1cda0c5ad86
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22377
content:
"show a broad variety of contributions, with the GS scenario (where \r\nhydrogen is not relevant as a mitigation option) representing the upper \r\nbound to 2050, with almost 2 GtCO2 yr-1 captured and stored by 2050. \r\nBeyond 2050 the upper bound is associated with scenario IMP-Neg \r\nassociated with extensive use of CDR in the industry and energy \r\nsectors to achieve net-negative emissions in the second half of the \r\ncentury - more than 6 GtCO2 yr-1 is captured and stored in 2100 (this \r\nrepresents roughly 60% of 2018 direct CO2 emissions of the sector)."


id: 87dbd618e3d53d319311fff98c176205
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21058
content:
"a\r\n Based on bottom-up technology modelling of five energy-intensive industry subsectors (cement, iron and steel, chemicals and petrochemicals, aluminium, and pulp and paper).\r\nb\r\n Industrial direct CO2 emissions reached 8.3 GtCO2 in 2014, 24% of global CO2 emissions."


id: c647c45558c056867ab7e90539a0826c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32196
content:
"A comparison of the different mitigation scenarios shows that they \r\ndepend on how individual mitigation strategies in the industry sector \r\n(Figure 11.13) are assessed. The use of CCS, for example, is in many \r\nscenarios assessed as very important, while other scenarios indicate \r\nthat ambitious mitigation levels can be achieved without CCS in the \r\nindustry sector. CCS plays a major role in the B2DS scenario (3.2 GtCO2\r\nin 2050), the ETC Supply Side scenario (5.4 GtCO2 in 2050) and the \r\nIEA (2020a, 2021a) scenarios (e.g., 2.8 Gt CO2 in NZE2050 in 2050, \r\nroughly one half of the captured CO2 is related to cement production), "


id: 487edbac74ea5cd34953be0999e1cdf8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9968
content:
"Two studies complement the discussion of the IEA scenarios and \r\nare related to the IEA database.26 The ETC Supply Side scenario \r\nbuilds on the ETP 2017 study, investigating additional emission \r\nreduction potentials in the emissions-intensive sectors such as \r\nheavy industry and heavy-duty transport so as to be able to reach \r\nnet zero emissions by the middle of the century. The LED scenario \r\n(Grubler et al. 2018) also builds on the ETP 2017 study, but focuses \r\non the possible potential of very far-reaching efforts to reduce \r\nfuture material demand."


id: 59e1f8fb8046a32ca4cb5ac1e8cf6e8e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13056
content:
"(42%), innovative processes and CCS (37%), switching to lower \r\ncarbon fuels and feedstocks (13%), and material efficiency strategies \r\nin manufacturing processes (8%). Energy efficiency improvements \r\nare particularly important in the first time period."


id: bafa6ed00e73946fea62d9289e4c5551
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30110
content:
"The IEA World Energy Outlook indicates energy efficiency improvement \r\nin the 2020 to 2030 period as a major basis to switch from STEPS \r\n(stated policies) to the SDS (net zero emissions by 2070) pathway \r\n(IEA 2020i, 2021c). For many energy-intensive industries annual \r\nefficiency gains have to be almost doubled (e.g., from 0.6% yr-1 to \r\n1.0% yr-1 for cement production) to contribute sufficiently to the \r\noverall goal. If net zero CO2 emissions should be achieved already \r\nby 2050 as pursued in the NZE2050 scenario (IEA 2020i, 2021c) \r\nfurther accelerating energy efficiency improvements are necessary \r\n(e.g., for cement, annual efficiency gains of 1.75%), leading to the \r\neffect that in 2030 many processes are implemented closely to their \r\ntechnological limits. In total, sector final energy demand can be \r\nheld nearly constant at 2018 levels until 2050 and decoupled from \r\nproduct demand growth."


id: 279fcc07b030cf4003734fe2a9c85f5e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4150
content:
"Assessment of the scenario literature allows to conclude that under \r\nspecific conditions strong CO2-emission reductions in the industry \r\nsector by 2050-2070 and even net-zero-emission pathways are \r\npossible. However, there is no consensus on the most plausible or \r\nmost desirable mix of key mitigation strategies to be pursued. In \r\naddition it has to be stressed that suitable pathways are very country\u0002specific and depend on the economic structure, resource potentials, \r\ntechnological competences, and political preferences and processes \r\nof the country or region in question (Bataille 2020a)."


id: 679978dd0c39eaa9c09fcacf3e5a1594
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15491
content:
"There is a  consensus among the scenarios that a  significant shift \r\nis needed from a  transition process in the past mainly based on \r\nmarginal (incremental) changes (with a  strong focus on energy \r\nefficiency efforts) to one based on transformational change. To limit \r\nthe barriers that are associated with transformational change, besides \r\novercoming the valley of death for technologies or processes with \r\nbreakthrough character, it is required to carefully identify structural \r\nchange processes which are connected with substantial changes of \r\nthe existing system (including the whole process chain). This has to \r\nbe done at an early stage and has to be linked with considerations "


id: 2c769db5b2b3476f219247418b60fe4d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5088
content:
"27 Note: In the described scenarios CCS was not taken into consideration as a mitigation option by the authors."


id: 6c66539afc4d79a01d0f8a0b05079495
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16364
content:
"mostly long operation times, investment cycles have to be used so \r\nas not to miss opportunities) and to gain experience. In the case \r\nof steel, companies can start with the integration of a natural gas\u0002based direct reduced iron furnace feeding the reduced iron to an \r\nexisting blast furnace, blending and later replacing the natural gas by \r\nhydrogen in a second stage, and later transitioning to a full hydrogen \r\nDRI EAF or molten oxide electrolysis EAF, all without disturbing the \r\nlocal upstream and downstream supply chains."


id: fa5d6486bac80307e53c7cd4a667f59e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41413
content:
"In general, early adoption of new technologies plays a major role. \r\nConsidering the long operation time (lifetime) of industrial facilities \r\n(e.g., steel mills and cement kilns) early adoption of new technologies \r\nis needed to avoid lock-in. For the SDS 2020 scenario, the IEA (2020h) \r\ncalculated the potential cumulative reduction of CO2 emissions from \r\nthe steel, cement and chemicals sector to be around 57 GtCO2 if "


id: 413ef62c3d30cf39802f2432373044b5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8662
content:
"Table 11.5 | Contribution to emission reduction of different mitigation strategies for net zero emissions pathways (range represents three different \r\npathways for the industry sector in Europe; each related scenario focuses on different key strategies).27"


id: 1af624cd24218f7099538cb3e378becb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1940
content:
"materials to regions with large and inexpensive renewable energy \r\npotential or CCS geology (Bataille 2020a; Gielen et al. 2020; Bataille \r\net al. 2021a; Saygin and Gielen 2021)."


id: 710ff32434dc2ec29459849e274a881b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17152
content:
"production technology is changed at its first mandatory retrofit, \r\ntypically 25 years, rather than at 40 years (typical retrofitted lifetime) \r\n(Figure 11.14). Net zero pathways require that the new facilities \r\nare based on zero- or near-zero emissions technologies from 2030 \r\nonwards (IEA 2021c)."


id: 7c98a5b919a0dd3d126e91e362a6cd26
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19116
content:
"In a  sequence of sectoral- and industry-wide figures above \r\n(Figure 11.13), it is shown - starting in the present on the left and \r\nmoving through 2050 to 2070 on the right, how much separate \r\nmitigation strategies can contribute and how they are integrated \r\nin the literature to reach near-zero emissions. For cement, steel \r\nand primary chemicals GHG intensities are presented, and for \r\nall industry absolute GHG emissions are displayed. Effects of the \r\nfollowing mitigation strategies are reflected: energy efficiency, \r\nmaterial efficiency, circularity/recycling, feedstock carbon intensity, \r\nfuel switching, CCU and CCS. Contributions of technologies split by \r\ntheir readiness for 2050 and 2070 are provided along with ranges of \r\nmitigation costs for achieving near-zero emissions for each strategy, \r\naccompanied by ranges of associated basic materials cost escalations \r\nand driven by these final products' prices increments."


id: e49b8024ade76e819f202b3556b3edff
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37507
content:
"Another important finding is that material efficiency and demand \r\nmanagement are still not well represented in the scenario literature. \r\nBesides IEA (2020a) two of the few exceptions are Material \r\nEconomics (2019) for the EU and Zhou et al. (2019) for China. Zhou \r\net al. (2019) describe a consistent mitigation pathway (Reinventing \r\nFire scenario) for China where in 2050 CO2 emissions are at a level \r\n42% below 2010 emissions. Around 13% of the reduction is related \r\nto less material demand, mainly based on extension of building and \r\ninfrastructure lifetime, as well as reduction of material losses in \r\nthe production process and application of higher quality materials \r\nparticularly high-quality cement (Zhou et al. 2019). For buildings \r\nand cars, Pauliuk et al. (2021) analysed the potential role of material \r\nefficiency and demand management strategies on material demand \r\nto be covered by the industry sector."


id: b3a4e56a89f2025840b8e7eb9f375a4a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28847
content:
"For the four subsectors in industry with high emissions, Table 11.5 \r\nshows results from Material Economics (2019) for the EU.  The \r\ncombination of circularity, material and energy efficiency, fossil and \r\nwaste fuels mix, electrification, hydrogen, CCS and biomass use \r\nvaries from scenario to scenario with none of these options ignored, \r\nbut trade-offs are required."


id: 2b477d2885d39bc098ccf7c79827822b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4859
content:
"The analysis of net zero emission pathways requires significantly \r\nhigher investments compared to business as usual (BAU): 25-65% for \r\nsteel, 6-26% for ammonia, 22-49% for cement, and with 122-199% \r\nthe highest number for plastics (Material Economics 2019)."


id: 7da698cdcbb9057c2f16cf0ffb7feb74
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19277
content:
"Using industrial waste heat for space heating, via district heating, \r\nis an established practice that still has a large potential with large \r\nquantities of low-grade heat being wasted (Fang et al. 2015). For \r\nDenmark it is estimated that 5.1% of district heating demand could \r\nbe met with waste heat (Buhler et al. 2017) and for four towns \r\nstudied in Austria 3-35% of total heat demand could be met (Karner \r\net al. 2016). A  European study shows that temporal heat demand \r\nflexibility could allow for up to 100% utilisation of excess heat \r\nfrom industry (Karner et al. 2018). A study of a Swedish chemicals "


id: 65e4ec09750a880b070e19aa47fd1288
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15189
content:
"For example, Japan's Keidanren promotes a  scheme by different \r\nindustries to reduce GHG through the global value chain, including \r\nmaterial procurement, product-use stages, and disposal, regardless \r\nof geographical origin, with provided quantitative visualisation \r\n(Keidanren (Japan Business Federation) 2018). The EU adopted \r\na non-financial disclosure directive in 2014 (Kinderman 2020) and \r\na Taxonomy for Sustainable Finance in 2019 (Section 15.6.1)."


id: e9008b16c196650b456da1ed788f72ce
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38344
content:
"complex estimated that 30-50% of excess heat generated on\u0002site could be recovered with payback periods below three years \r\n(Eriksson et al. 2018)."


id: afa263eb1f6b984e3d7502e461bfeb02
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28139
content:
"A European study found that most of the industrial symbiosis or \r\nclustering synergies today are in the chemicals sector with shared \r\nstreams of energy, water, and carbon dioxide (Mendez-Alva et al. \r\n2021). For future mitigation, the UKCCC (2019b) finds that industrial \r\nclustering may be essential for achieving the necessary efficiencies \r\nof scale and to build the infrastructure needed for industrial \r\nelectrification; carbon capture, transport and disposal; hydrogen \r\nproduction and storage; heat cascading between industries and to \r\nother potential heat users (e.g., residential and commercial buildings)."


id: ca115ddff5a7ab0e706528c0c87c9500
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32877
content:
"Emissions are typically categorised by the territory, subsector or \r\ngroup of technologies from which they emanate. An alternative \r\nsubdivision is that between existing sources that will continue to "


id: f52f799d92906f96147cf948fb1d4c10
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40501
content:
"generate emissions in the future, and those that are yet to be built \r\n(Erickson et al. 2015). The rate of emissions from existing assets will \r\neventually tend to zero, but in a timeframe that is relevant to existing \r\nclimate and energy goals, the cumulative contribution to emissions \r\nfrom existing infrastructure and equipment is likely to be substantial. \r\nAside from the magnitude of the contribution, the distinction between \r\nemissions from existing and forthcoming assets is instructive because \r\nof the difference in approach to mitigation that may be necessary or \r\ndesirable in each instance to avoid getting locked into decades of \r\nhighly carbon-intensive operations (Lecocq and Shalizi 2014)."


id: bc204fceb9e6e19cd99c054d78542550
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30336
content:
"Data on the current age profile and typical lifetimes of emissions\u0002intensive industrial equipment are difficult to procure and verify and \r\nmost of the studies conducted in this area contain little detail on \r\nthe global industrial sector. Two recent studies are exceptions, both \r\nof which cover the global energy system, but contain detailed and \r\nnovel analysis on the industrial sector (Tong et al. 2019; IEA 2020a). \r\nTong et al. (2019) use unit-level data from China's Ministry of Ecology \r\nand Environment to obtain a more robust estimate of the age profile \r\nof existing capacity in the cement and iron and steel sectors in the \r\ncountry. The IEA (2020a) uses proprietary global capacity datasets for \r\nthe iron and steel, cement and chemicals sectors, and historic energy \r\nconsumption data for the remaining industry sectors as a proxy for \r\nthe rate of historic capacity build-up."


id: 8262c136f5685aac3a5e33ab4a6e258e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20066
content:
"As this review was being finalised several papers were released that \r\nsomewhat contradict the Tong et al. (2010) results (Bataille et al. 2021b; \r\nVogl et al. 2021b). Broadly speaking, these papers argue that while "


id: 415e1bf89548de0b71031f65e137945c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8686
content:
"vertical or horizontal depending on whether singular sectors or \r\ntechnologies are targeted (e.g., through R&D, tariffs and subsidies) \r\nor the whole economy (e.g., education, infrastructure, and general \r\ntax policies). The horizontal policies are not always thought of as \r\nindustrial policy, although taking a  broad view, including policy \r\ncoordination and institution building, is important for industrial \r\npolicy to be effective (see e.g., Andreoni and Chang 2019)."


id: 7c4248a874c49cd7c69cb41d0612ce67
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19073
content:
"high-emitting facilities may last for a  long time, be difficult to shut \r\ndown early, and are inherent to local boarder supply chains, individual \r\nmajor processes that are currently highly GHG intense, such as blast \r\nfurnaces and basic oxygen smelters, could be retired and replaced \r\nduring major retrofits on much shorter time cycles of 15 to 25 years."


id: 9fa06e919ae0a11c3132293a4514c7aa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25294
content:
"The cost of retrofitting or retiring a plant before the end of its lifetime \r\ndepends on plant-specific conditions as well as a range of economic, \r\ntechnology and policy developments. For industrial decarbonisation \r\nit may be a  greater challenge to accelerate the development and \r\ndeployment of zero-emission technologies and systems than to \r\nhandle the economic costs of retiring existing assets before end of \r\nlife. The 'lock-in' also goes beyond the lifetime of key process units, \r\nsuch as blast furnaces and crackers, since they are typically part \r\nof large integrated plants or clusters with industrial symbiosis, as \r\nwell as infrastructures with feedstock storage, ports, and pipelines. \r\nIndividual industrial plants are often just a small part of a complex \r\nnetwork of many facilities in an industrial supply chain. In that sense, \r\ncurrent assessments of 'carbon lock-in' rely on simplifications due to \r\nthe high the complexity of industry."


id: a7145ef5c3d2996202147ca719551cc4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26610
content:
"Conditions are also subsector and context specific in terms of \r\nmitigation options, industry structures, markets, value chains and \r\ngeographical location. For example, the hydrogen steel-making joint \r\nventure in Sweden involves three different companies headquartered \r\nin Sweden (in mining, electricity and steel-making, respectively), two \r\nof which are state-owned, with a shared vision and access to iron ore, \r\nfossil-free electricity and high-end steel markets (Kushnir et al. 2020). \r\nIn contrast, chemical clusters may consist of several organisations \r\nthat are subsidiaries to large multinational corporations with \r\nheadquarters across the world, that also compete in different \r\nmarkets. Even in the presence of a local vision for sustainability this \r\nmakes it difficult to engage in formalised collaboration or get support \r\nfrom headquarters (Bauer and Fuenfschilling 2019)."


id: 5776ae315fc53ac5c61ff570bb7b8224
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12654
content:
"Furthermore, it is relevant to consider also institutional and behavioural \r\nlock-in (Seto et al. 2016). On one side, existing high-emitting \r\npractices may be favoured through formal and informal institutions \r\n(e.g., regulations and social norms or expectations, respectively), for \r\nexample, around building construction and food packaging. On the \r\nother side, mitigation options may face corresponding institutional \r\nbarriers. Examples include how cars are conventionally scrapped \r\n(i.e.,  crushed, leading to copper contamination of steel) rather \r\nthan being dismantled, or slow permitting procedures for new \r\ninfrastructure and industrial installations for reducing emissions."


id: 39915cf4c8ea72a4a40575272641dfcf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7339
content:
"In the context of climate change policy, it is fair to say that industry has \r\nso far been sheltered from the increasing costs that decarbonisation \r\nmay entail. This is particularly true for the energy- and emissions\u0002intensive industries where cost increases and lost competitiveness \r\nmay lead to carbon leakage (i.e., that industry relocates to regions \r\nwith less stringent climate policies). Heavy industries typically pay no \r\nor very low energy taxes and where carbon pricing exists (e.g., in the \r\nEuropean Trading Scheme) they are sheltered through free allocation \r\nof emission permits and potentially compensated for resulting \r\nelectricity price increases. For example, Okereke and McDaniels "


id: b46bdcd8917e612d778e490e5471c5ee
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28981
content:
"The basic motivation for industrial policy historically has been \r\neconomic development and wealth creation. Industrial policy can be \r\nprogressive and promote new developments or be protective to help \r\ninfant or declining industries. It may also involve the phase-out of \r\nindustries, including efforts to retrain workers and create new jobs. \r\nIndustrial policy is not one policy intervention but rather the combined \r\neffects of many policy instruments that are coordinated towards an \r\nindustrial goal. Industrial policies can be classified as being either "


id: f6aad68ca6bb1e9948cd7de51a8d208b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40770
content:
"show that sustainable consumption is positively related to life \r\nsatisfaction and subjective well-being (SDG 3), and Guillen-Royo \r\n(2019) adds positive associations with happiness and life satisfaction."


id: 63787c16f1a5828878348ac27cb322ab
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14793
content:
"(2012) show how the European steel industry was successful in \r\navoiding cost increases and how information asymmetry in the policy \r\nprocess was important for that purpose."


id: bf05e554c76f48e70b6edf105642ecd4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30878
content:
"The reduction in excessive consumption and demand for products \r\nand services generates a  reduction in post-consumption waste \r\nand so enhances clear water and sanitation (SDG 6) (Govindan \r\n2018; Minelgaite and Liobikiene 2019), and reduces waste along \r\nproduct supply chains and lifecycles (SDG 12) (Genovese et al. \r\n2017; UNSD 2020). At the risk side there are possible reductions of \r\nemployment, incomes, sales taxes from the material extraction \r\nand processing activities, considered as excessive for sustainable \r\nconsumption (Thomas 2003)."


id: 5a1899a51b89b0bb572e70f8187e7a9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13100
content:
"The deployment of climate change mitigation strategies is \r\nprimarily influenced by its costs and potential, but also by other \r\nbroader sustainable development factors such as the Sustainable \r\nDevelopment Goals (SDGs). Mitigation actions therefore are to \r\nbe considered through the prism of impacts on achieving other \r\neconomic, social  and  environmental goals. Those impacts are \r\nclassified as co-benefits when they are positive or as risk when they \r\nare negative. Co-benefits can serve as additional drivers, while risks \r\ncan inhibit the deployment of available mitigation options. Actions \r\ntaken to mitigate climate change have direct and indirect interactions \r\nwith SDGs, both positive (synergies) or negative (trade-offs) (Fuso \r\nNerini et al. 2019)."


id: b21c127242471220baaad0a96d78939
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28565
content:
"While the circular economy concept first emerged in the context of \r\nwaste avoidance, resource depletion, closed-loop recycling, etc., it \r\nhas now evolved as a  tool for a  broader systemic national policy \r\ndue to its potential wider benefits (Geng et al. 2013). It represents \r\nnew circular business models that encourage design for reuse \r\nand to improve material recovery and recycling, and so represents \r\na departure from the traditional linear production and consumption \r\nsystems (with landfilling at the end), with a wide range of potential \r\nco-benefits to a wide range of SDGs (Guo et al. 2016; Genovese et al. \r\n2017; Schroeder et al. 2019; UNSD 2020)."


id: b40d394ffae47797e865df36be06cd00
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28922
content:
"Given the wide range of stakeholders involved in climate actions \r\nand their (often contradictory) interests and priorities, the nature of \r\nco-benefits and risk can affect decision-making processes and the \r\nbehaviour of stakeholders (Labella et al. 2020). Co-benefits form an \r\nimportant driver supporting the adoption of mitigation strategies, \r\nyet are commonly overlooked in policymaking. Karlsson et al. (2020), \r\nbased on a  review of 239 peer-reviewed articles concluded that \r\ndiverse co-benefit categories, including air, soil and water quality, \r\ndiet, physical activity, biodiversity, economic performance, and \r\nenergy security, are prevalent in the literature."


id: eb2f29ff1bdba17b61b51c939b839ad7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38732
content:
"Genovese et al. (2017) articulates the advantages from an \r\nenvironmental and responsible consumption and production point \r\nof view (SDG 12). Many studies have outlined new business models \r\nbased on the circular economy that foster sustainable economic \r\ngrowth and the generation of new jobs (SDG 8) (Antikainen and \r\nValkokari 2016), as well as global competitiveness and innovation \r\nin business and the industrial sector (Pieroni et al. 2019), such as its \r\npotential synergies with industry 4.0 (Garcia-Muina et al. 2018)."


id: 3bd9e9d9225759181b1ab95eaeb3816e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7721
content:
"Material efficiency, an important mitigation option (SDG 13, climate \r\naction) for heavy industries, is yet to be fully acknowledged and \r\nleveraged (Gonzalez Hernandez et al. 2018a; Sudmant et al. 2018; \r\nDawkins et al. 2019). Material efficiency directly addresses SDG \r\n12 (responsible production and consumption) but also provides \r\nopportunities to reduce the pressures and impacts on environmental \r\nsystems (SDG 6, clean water and sanitation) (Olivetti and Cullen 2018). \r\nExploiting material efficiency usually requires new business models \r\nand provides potential co-benefits of increased employment and \r\neconomic opportunities (SDG 8, decent work and economic growth)."


id: ed42fa2c59cb6f68e69543957c7f1f16
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39120
content:
"Following a review of the literature, Schroeder et al. (2019) identified \r\nlinkages between circular economy practices and SDGs based on \r\na relationship scoring system, and highlighted that such SDGs as SDG \r\n6 (clean water and sanitation), SDG 7 (affordable and clean energy), \r\nSDG 8  (decent work and economic growth), SDG 12 (responsible \r\nconsumption and production), and SDG 15 (life on land) all strongly \r\nbenefit from circular economy practices. With the potential to impact \r\non all stages of the value chain (micro, meso and macro level of \r\nthe economy), circular economy has also been identified as a  key \r\nindustrial strategy to managing waste across sectors."


id: 3cf19ae4af8a6deee782fbb5ffe525a0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7901
content:
"Material efficiency also provides co-benefits through infrastructural \r\ndevelopment (SDG 9, industry, innovation and infrastructure) \r\n(Mathews et al. 2018) to support the wide range of potential \r\nmaterial efficiency strategies including light-weighting, reusing, \r\nremanufacturing, recycling, diverting scrap, extending product \r\nlives, using products more intensely, improving process yields, and \r\nsubstituting materials (Allwood et al. 2011). Worrell et al. (2016) \r\nalso emphasises how material efficiency improvements, in addition \r\nto limiting the impacts of climate change help deliver sustainable \r\nproduction and consumption co-benefits through environmental \r\nstewardship. Binder and Blankenberg (2017) and Dhandra (2019) "


id: 2d0957103dc50ffdc1a4ca6625ad6c31
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5195
content:
"Chatziaras et al. (2016) highlights the co-benefit to SDG 7 (affordable \r\nand clean energy) resulting from waste-derived fuel for the cement \r\nindustry. Through the management of industrial waste using circular \r\neconomy practices, studies such as Geng et al. (2012) and Bonato \r\nand Orsini (2017) have pointed out co-benefits to SDGs beyond \r\nclear environmental and economic benefits, highlighting how it \r\nalso benefits SDG 3  and 11 through improved social relations \r\nbetween industrial sectors and local societies, and improved public \r\nenvironmental awareness and public health levels."


id: 8cafaa0c3e2dbce823b28ea1fa140972
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21936
content:
"CCU and CCS have been identified as playing key roles in the \r\ntransition of industry to net zero. Advancements in the development \r\nand deployment of both CCS and CCU foster climate action (SDG 13). \r\nOther co-benefits for CCS include control of non-CO2 pollutants \r\n(SDG 3), direct foreign investment and know-how (SDG 9), enhanced \r\noil recovery from existing resources, and diversified employment \r\nprospects and skills (SDG 8) (Bonner 2017). For CCU, the main \r\nco-benefit related contributions are expected within the context of \r\nenergy transition processes, and in societal advancements that are \r\nlinked to technological progress (Olfe-Krautlein 2020). Therefore, the \r\nexpectations are that the deployment of CCU technologies would \r\nhave least potential for meeting the SDG targets relating to society/\r\npeople, compared with the anticipated contributions to the pillars of \r\necology and economy."


id: 21a71887584faed3245fa7b0d3a724e7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3128
content:
"These mitigation options carry a  large number of risks as well. \r\nThe high cost of the capture and storage process not only limit \r\nthe technology penetration, but also make energy and products \r\nmore expensive (risk to SDG 7), potential leaks from undersea or \r\nunderground CO2 storages carries risks for achieving SDGs 6, 14 and \r\n15. While there are economic costs involved with the deployment \r\nof CCS and  CCU (Bataille et al. 2018a), there are also significant \r\neconomic and developmental costs associated with taking no action, \r\nbecause of the potential negative impact of climate change. CCS and \r\nCCU have been argued as providing public good (Bergstrom and Ty \r\n2017) and co-benefits to key SDGs (Schipper et al. 2011). On the \r\nother hand, Fan et al. (2018) among others have noted the potential \r\nlock-in of existing energy structures due to CCS. Refer to Table 17.1 \r\nfor CCS and CCU co-benefits with respect to other sector chapters."


id: 34b9f742861395320eab99efd0fb0270
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6516
content:
"Many studies report that energy efficiency improvements are \r\nessential for supporting overall economic growth, contributing \r\nto positive changes in multi-factor productivity (SDGs 8  and 9  - \r\ndecent work and economic growth and industry, innovation, and \r\ninfrastructure)  (Lambert et al. 2014; Bataille and Melton 2017; \r\nRajbhandari and Zhang 2018; Bashmakov 2019; Stern 2019) \r\nthrough industrial innovation (SDG 9) (Kang and Lee 2016), with \r\nsome dissent (e.g., Mahmood and Ahmad 2018). Improved energy \r\nefficiency against a  background of growing energy prices helps \r\nindustrial plants stay competitive (Bashmakov and Myshak 2018). \r\nEnergy efficiency allows continued economic growth under strong \r\nenvironmental regulation. Given that energy efficiency measures \r\nreduce the combustion of fossil fuels it leads to reduced air pollution \r\nat industrial sites (Williams et al. 2012) and better indoor comfort at \r\nworking places."


id: 894bfee0de89f3748cad3f8ad8491d35
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21326
content:
"Since less energy supply infrastructure is needed in cities and less \r\nenergy is needed to produce materials such as cement and concrete, \r\nand metals, energy efficiency indirectly supports 'sustainable cities \r\nand communities' (SDG 11) (Di Foggia 2018). In addition, energy \r\nefficiency in industry reflects achievements in meeting SDG 12 \r\n(responsible consumption and production)."


id: 42240f4e1bd340ebc6983fa98ba90f55
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8840
content:
"A key, generally underappreciated SDG benefit of electrification is \r\nimproved urban and indoor air quality (at working places as well) \r\nand associated health benefits (SDG 3) from clean electrification \r\n(SDG 7) of industrial facilities (IEA 2016). With energy being such \r\nan important cross-cutting issue to sustainable development, \r\nsome SDGs, such as SDGs 1, 3, 4  and 5  (Harmelink et al. 2018) \r\nare co-beneficiaries to using electrification and fuel switching as \r\na climate action mitigation option."


id: e333bfea79d4846e128247e953f98437
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37273
content:
"et al. 2013; Rogge and Reichardt 2016). Industrial decarbonisation \r\npolicies need to be innovative and definitive about net zero CO2\r\nemissions to trigger the level of investment needed for the profound \r\nchanges in production, use and recycling of basic materials needed \r\n(Nilsson et al. 2021). Inclusive and transparent governance that \r\nassesses industry decarbonisation progress, monitors innovation \r\nand accountability, and provides regular recommendations for \r\npolicy adjustments is also important for progressing (Mathy et al. \r\n2016; Bataille 2020a)."


id: e72839fc091508a0d6d724dd1b064d5c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37967
content:
"Deployment of the mitigation options presented in this chapter \r\n(Sections  11.3 and 11.4) needs support from a  mix of policy \r\ninstruments including: GHG pricing coupled with border adjustments \r\nor other economic signals for trade-exposed industries; robust \r\ngovernment support for research, development, and deployment; \r\nenergy, material and emissions standards; recycling policies; \r\nsectoral technology roadmaps; market pull policies; and support for \r\nnew infrastructure (Figure 11.15) ( Flanagan et al. 2011; Rogge et al. \r\n2017; Bataille et al. 2018a; Tvinnereim and Mehling 2018; Creutzig \r\n2019; Bataille 2020a; Rissman et al. 2020). The combination of the \r\nabove will depend on specific sectoral market barriers, technology \r\nmaturity, and local political and social acceptance (Hoppmann "


id: 78fe2316435eceb3f8f915b7b9323bb1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18476
content:
"The level of policy experience and institutional capacity needed \r\nvaries widely across the mitigation options. In many countries, "


id: f7256b52450a82ebd9cd0af72b95679f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40853
content:
"et al. 2019). The section describes how the need to focus on long\u0002term transitions rather than incremental changes can be managed \r\nthrough the planning and strategising of transition pathways; \r\ndiscusses the role of research, development, and innovation policy; \r\nhighlights the need for enabling low-carbon demand and market \r\ncreation; reflects on the necessity of establishing and maintaining \r\na level of knowledge and capacity in the policy domain about the \r\nindustrial transition challenge; and points to the critical importance \r\nof coherence across geographical and policy contexts. The section \r\nconcludes with a reflection on how different groups of actors needs \r\nto take up different parts of the responsibility for mitigating climate \r\nchange in the industrial sector."


id: 2035cb9589ea387e7a5d34fd986c82e5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2879
content:
"energy efficiency is a well-established policy field with decades of \r\nexperience from voluntary and negotiated agreements, regulations, \r\nstandards, energy audits, and demand-side management (DSM) \r\nprogrammes (see AR5), but there are also many countries where \r\nthe application of energy efficiency policy is absent or nascent (see \r\nAR5) (Tanaka 2011; Fischedick et al. 2014a; Garcia-Quevedo and \r\nJove-Llopis 2021; Saunders et al. 2021). The application of DSM \r\nand load flexibility will also need to grow with electrification and \r\nrenewable energy integration."


id: 8651cfd93c5ed940b73ca9f3d2c2a6c3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20788
content:
"Internalising the cost of GHG emissions in consumer choices \r\nand producer investment decisions has been a  major strategy \r\npromoted by economists and considered by policymakers to mitigate \r\nemissions cost-effectively and to incentivise low-GHG innovations \r\nin a purportedly technology neutral way (Stiglitz et al. 2017; Boyce \r\n2018). In the absence of a coordinated effort, individual countries, \r\nregions and cities have implemented carbon-pricing schemes. As of \r\n23 August 2021, 64 carbon schemes have been implemented or are \r\nscheduled by law for implementation, covering 22.5% of global GHG \r\nemissions (World Bank 2020), 35 of which are carbon taxes, primarily \r\nimplemented on a national level and 29 of which are emissions trading \r\nschemes, spread across national and sub-national jurisdictions."


id: d65e5e5459778b2e46d7e018121be263
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35024
content:
"There is also a growing interest from policymakers in electrification \r\nand fuel switching but the focus has been mainly on innovation \r\nand on developing technical production-side solutions rather than \r\non creating markets for enabling demand for low-carbon products, \r\nalthough the concept of green public procurement is gaining traction. \r\nThe situation is similar for CCU and CCS. Low-carbon technologies \r\nadoption represents an additional cost to producers, and this must be \r\nhandled through fiscal incentives like tax benefits, GHG pricing, green \r\nsubsidies, regulation and permit procedures. For example, the 45Q tax \r\ncredit provides some incentives to reduce investor risk for CCS and \r\nattract private investment in the USA (Ochu and Friedmann 2021)."


id: d4a983ffb6380fccd3e153ced0fe9b2e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34735
content:
"Since industrial decarbonisation is only recently emerging as a policy \r\nfield there is little international collaboration on facilitation (Oberthur \r\net al. 2021). Given that most key materials markets are global and \r\ncompetitive, unless there is much greater global governance to \r\ncontribute to the decarbonisation of GHG-intensive industry through \r\nintergovernmental and transnational institutions it is questionable \r\nthat the world will achieve industry decarbonisation by 2050."


id: 9cb843590d3ffc9c67fbae5ac322af96
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24810
content:
"As GHG pricing, through GHG taxes or cap and trade schemes, has \r\nremained a  central avenue for climate policy, this section begins \r\nwith a review of how the industrial sector has been concerned with \r\nthese instruments. The rest of the section is then structured into \r\nfive key topics, following insights on key failures that policy must \r\naddress to enable and support large-scale transformations as well \r\nas the need for complementary mixes of policies to achieve this goal \r\n(Weber and Rohracher 2012; Rogge and Reichardt 2016; Grillitsch "


id: 6c8607502fa6a51cda90859d15da842
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16383
content:
"Legal challenges arise because CBAM can be perceived as \r\na protectionist measure violating the principle of non-discrimination \r\nunder the regulations of the World Trade Organization (WTO). However \r\nthe absence of GHG prices can also been perceived as a  subsidy \r\nfor fossil fuel-based production (Stiglitz 2006; Al Khourdajie and \r\nFinus 2020; Kuusi et al. 2020). Another argument supporting CBAM \r\nimplementation is the possibility to induce low-GHG investment in \r\nnon-regulated regions (Cosbey et al. 2019)."


id: e53d73e875e8eda9e81072dac02c3fb1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37633
content:
"Thus far, California is the only jurisdiction that has implemented CBA \r\ntariffs applied on electricity imports from neighbouring states and \r\nprovides insights on how a CBA can work in practice by using 'default' \r\nGHG emissions intensity benchmarks (Fowlie et al. 2021). CBAM is an \r\napproach likely to be applied first to a few selected energy-intensive \r\nindustries that are at risk of carbon leakage, as the EU is considering. \r\nThe implementation of CBA needs to balance applicability versus \r\nfairness of treatment. An option recently proposed is an individual \r\nadjustment mechanism to give companies exporting to the EU the \r\noption to demonstrate their actual carbon intensity (Mehling and Ritz \r\n2020). Any CBAMs will have to comply with multilaterally agreed \r\nrules under the WTO Agreements to be implemented."


id: e816094042517dc77cb884a4e7a340ab
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38149
content:
"Clear and firm emission reduction caps towards 2050 are essential \r\nfor sending strong signals to businesses. However, many researchers \r\nrecognise that complementary policies must be developed to \r\nset current production and consumption patterns toward a  path \r\nconsistent with achieving the Paris Agreement goals as cap-and\u0002trade or carbon taxes are not enough (Schmalensee and Stavins \r\n2017; Vogt-Schilb and Hallegatte 2017; Bataille et al. 2018b; Kirchner \r\net al. 2019). In this broader policy context, proceeds from pricing \r\nschemes can be used to support the deployment of options with \r\nnear-term abatement costs that are too high to be incentivised by the \r\nprevailing carbon price, but which show substantial cost-reduction \r\npotential with scale and learning, and to ensure a  just transition \r\n(Wang and Lo 2021)."


id: 703d6a6ab1ac5277e0ada19b30d7b92b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17000
content:
"The adoption of CBAM by different countries may evolve into \r\nthe formation of a  climate club where countries would align on \r\nspecific elements of climate regulation (e.g., primary iron or clinker \r\nintensity) to facilitate implementation and incentivise countries to \r\njoin (Nordhaus 2015; Hagen and Schneider 2021; Tagliapietra and \r\nWolff 2021a,b). However, not all countries have the same abilities \r\nto report, adapt and transition to low-carbon production. The \r\nimplications of CBAMs on trade relationships should be considered \r\nto avoid country divide and separation from a  common goal of \r\nglobal decarbonisation (Michaelowa et al. 2019; Kuusi et al. 2020; \r\nBanerjee 2021; Eicke et al. 2021; Bashmakov 2021). The globalisation \r\nof markets and the fragmentation of supply chains complicates the \r\nassignment of responsibility for GHG emissions mitigations related \r\nto trade (Jakob et al. 2021). Production-based carbon-price schemes "


id: 2e4e197f9ee7f5d332f8bf22e09cd700
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5419
content:
"Decarbonising the industry sector requires transitioning how material \r\nand products are produced and used today to development pathways \r\nthat include the strategies outlined in Sections 11.3 and 11.4 and \r\nFigure  11.15. Such broad approaches require the development \r\nof transition planning that assesses the impacts of the different \r\nstrategies and considers local conditions and social challenges that \r\nmay result from conflicts with established practices and interests, \r\nwith planning and strategies directly linked to these challenges."


id: 62bf78cd621d39ac51debd9b10ea5de6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14668
content:
"Detailed sectoral roadmaps that assess the technical, economic, \r\nsocial and political opportunities and provide a clear path to low\u0002GHG development are needed to guide policy designs. For example, \r\nthe German state of North Rhine Westphalia passed a Climate Process \r\nLaw that resulted in the adoption of a Climate Protection Plan that \r\nset subsector targets through a transparent stakeholder engagement \r\nprocess based on scenario development and identification of low\u0002GHG options (Lechtenbohmer et al. 2015), see Box  11.3. Another \r\nexample is the UK set of Industrial Decarbonisation and Energy \r\nEfficiency Roadmaps to 2050 as well as the UK Strategic Growth \r\nPlan, which are accompanied by Action Plans for each energy\u0002intensive subsector."


id: 1808dfec0169bcb802d3b9a5ab6003b5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1436
content:
"Several studies (Ahman et al. 2017; Bataille et al. 2018a; Material \r\nEconomics 2019; Wyns et al. 2019) offer detailed transition plans using \r\nroughly the same five overarching strategies: (i) policies to encourage \r\nmaterial efficiency and high quality circularity; (ii) 'supply push' R&D \r\nand early commercialisation as well as 'demand pull' to develop niche \r\nmarkets and help emerging technologies cross 'the valley of death'; "


id: 1849e4df3c84d518693cf6726490024f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1476
content:
"IN4Climate NRW (www.in4climate.nrw) was launched in September 2019 by the state government of North Rhine-Westphalia \r\n(IN4climate.NRW 2019) as a platform for collaboration between representatives from industry, science and politics. IN4climate.NRW \r\noffers a common space to develop innovative strategies for a carbon-neutral industrial sector, bringing together different perspectives \r\nand competencies."


id: ab3bb877fe3262be4a90f4dea068b557
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27355
content:
"North Rhine-Westphalia is Germany's industrial heartland. Around 19% of North Rhine-Westphalia's GHGs have their origin in the \r\nindustry sector. Consequently, the sector bears a particular responsibility when it comes to climate protection, but the state is also \r\na source of high-quality jobs and export value. The NRW government understands that the state's current competitive advantage can \r\nonly be maintained if the regional industry positions itself as a front runner for becoming GHG-neutral."


id: 705d18e37eeaa45d83fbad5c1bb2aa1a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17025
content:
"In working together across different branches (more than 30 companies representing mainly steel, cement, chemical, aluminium \r\nindustry, refineries and energy utilities) and enabling a direct interaction between industry and government officials, IN4Climate \r\nprovides a benefit to the participating companies. People from the different areas are working together in so-called innovation teams \r\nand underlying working groups with a self-organised process of setting their milestones and working schedule while reflecting long\u0002term needs as well as short-term requirements based on political or societal discussions."


id: ea2930ec6e028bc506886690f159ee8a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38549
content:
"The innovation teams aim to identify and set concrete impulses for development and implementation of breakthrough technologies, \r\nspecify necessary infrastructures (e.g., for hydrogen production, storage and transport) and appropriate policy settings (i.e., integrated \r\nstate, national and European policy mix). They also include an attempt to create a discourse between the public and the industry \r\nsectors as a kind of sounding board for the early detection of barriers and obstacles."


id: 6cc55622a8822fe7144d3f4dd4f014ae
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16415
content:
"The initiative has been successful so far, for example, having developed a clear vision for a hydrogen strategy and an associated policy \r\nframework as well as a broader decarbonisation strategy for the whole sector. It is present at the national level as well as at the \r\nEuropean level. Being successful and unique, IN4Climate is useful as a blueprint for other regions and is often visited by companies \r\nand administration staff from other German states."


id: e54856fd89a0c898aeca3382b65502f7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37641
content:
"It is particularly the so far missing intensive and dedicated cooperation across industrial subsectors that can be seen as a success \r\nfactor. Facing substantial transformation needs associated with structural changes and infrastructure challenges, very often solutions \r\ncan't be provided and realised by a single sector but need cooperation and coordination. Even more, chicken-and-egg problems like \r\nthe construction of new infrastructures (e.g., for hydrogen and CO2 disposal) require cooperation and new modes of collaboration. \r\nIN4Climate provides the necessary link for this."


id: 7fe9bdaf143b3422fa465e7b4da8686a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19643
content:
"Fostering collaborative innovation across sectors through the \r\nsupport of knowledge sharing and capabilities building is important \r\nas mitigation options involve new or stronger sectoral couplings \r\n(Tonjes et al. 2020). One example is linking chemicals to forestry in \r\nthe upscaling of forest bio-refineries, although it has proven to be \r\ndifficult to engage a diverse group of actors in such collaborations \r\n(Karltorp and Sanden 2012; Bauer et al. 2018). Heterogeneous \r\ncollaboration and knowledge exchange can be encouraged through \r\nconscious design of RDI programs and by supporting network \r\ninitiatives involving diverse actor groups (Van Rijnsoever et al. 2015; \r\nSoderholm et al. 2019)."


id: 60a4df93ec6b91f2363ea71ab67a51a1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14300
content:
"Policies for research, development, and innovation (RDI) for industry \r\nare present in most countries but it is only recently, and mainly in \r\ndeveloped countries, that decarbonisation of emissions-intensive \r\nindustries has been prioritised (Ahman et al. 2017; Nilsson et al. 2021). \r\nEmission-intensive industries are characterised by large dominant \r\nactors and mature process technologies with high fixed cost, long \r\npayback times and low profit margins on the primary production \r\nside of the value chain. Investments in RDI are commonly low and \r\naimed at incremental improvements to processes and products \r\n(Wesseling et al. 2017)."


id: 9b59d65d1293c99a8399c889385bd6bd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24582
content:
"The perception of an increasing durable demand for low-GHG \r\nproducts induces manufacturers to invest in decarbonisation \r\nstrategies (Olatunji et al. 2019). Policies can support and accelerate \r\nthis process by creating niche markets,  stimulating demand for \r\nlow-carbon products through procurement and financing and by \r\naddressing informational and other market barriers."


id: bcec09f619e2fd533a8dafc5a3d60f71
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30479
content:
"Once a technology has been demonstrated with scale-up potential, \r\nthe next stage is commercialisation. This is a very expensive stage, \r\nwhere costs are not yet compensated by revenue (see, e.g., Ahman \r\net al. 2018 and Nemet et al. 2018). The H-DRI, SIDERWIN and \r\nLEILAC examples are all at the stage of scaling up. Given the \r\nresource requirement, a  diversified portfolio of investors and \r\nsupport is required to share the risk. LEILAC includes several firms, \r\nas did the UK Offshore Wind Accelerator. Government funds are \r\nalso required and could be refunded in the future through an \r\nequity position, royalty or tax. Fast-growing economies, which are \r\nadding new industrial capacity, can provide opportunities to pilot, \r\ndemonstrate and scale up new technologies, as shown by the rapid \r\nexpansion of electric vehicle and solar panel production in China, \r\nwhich contributed to driving down costs (Nemet 2019; Hsieh et al. \r\n2020; Jackson et al. 2021)."


id: 885a909e9722d5c4e9f353338126518
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21153
content:
"Finally, large capital flows towards deployment of low-GHG solutions \r\nwill not materialise without a  growing demand for low-carbon \r\nmaterials and products that allows business opportunities. Policy will \r\nthus be needed to support the first niche markets which are essential \r\nfor refining new decarbonised technologies, troubleshooting, and for \r\nbuilding manufacturing economies of scale. Market creation does \r\nhowever go beyond the nurturing, shielding, and empowerment of \r\nearly niches (Smith and Raven 2012; Raven et al. 2016) and must \r\nalso consider how to significantly reshape existing markets to create \r\nspace for decarbonised solutions and crowd out fossil-based ones \r\n(Mazzucato 2016)."


id: 15128db05786a2a26a842958e36b17e0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 921
content:
"In October 2017, California passed Assembly Bill (AB) 262, the Buy Clean California Act, a new law requiring state-funded building \r\nprojects to consider the global warming potential (GWP) of certain construction materials during procurement. The goal of AB 262 is \r\nto use California's substantial purchasing power to buy low-carbon products. Such low-carbon public procurement will directly reduce \r\nemissions by using lower-carbon products, and indirectly by sending a market signal to manufacturers to reduce their emissions in \r\norder to stay competitive in California."


id: a411a3a815f76adef478e0c9a86afca0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26055
content:
"The bill requirements are two-pronged: as of January 2020, manufacturers of eligible materials must submit a  facility-specific \r\nenvironmental product declaration (EPD), and the eligible materials must demonstrate (through submitted EPDs) GWP below \r\nthe product-specific compliance limits defined by the state Department of General Services (DGS), which will regulate policy \r\nimplementation. The eligible materials include structural steel, carbon steel rebar, flat glass, and mineral wool insulation. In January \r\n2021, the DGS published maximum acceptable GWP limits for each product category set at the industry average of facility-specific \r\nGWP for each material. Beginning 1 July 2021, awarding authorities were required to verify GWP compliance for all eligible materials \r\n(USGBC-LA 2018; DGS 2020)."


id: c67c867640904d12632b523947bde411
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32228
content:
"Prior to adoption of the Buy Clean California Act, the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) had been evaluating the use of \r\nlifecycle assessment and EPDs in evaluating materials. In addition to the materials specified in Buy Clean California Act (noted above), \r\nthe Caltrans project includes materials used extensively in transportation (concrete, asphalt, and aggregate). Also, the California High\u0002Speed Rail project had begun using EPDs as part of its procurement process. The High-Speed Rail Sustainability Report states that the \r\nconstruction projects will: (i) require EPDs for construction materials including steel products and concrete mix designs, and (ii) require \r\n'optimized lifecycle scores for major materials' and include additional strategies to reduce impacts across the life cycle of the project \r\n(Simonen et al. 2019)."


id: fcb587ac707455931092eb4a32b4de18
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41821
content:
"Several other states such as Washington, Minnesota, Oregon, Colorado, New York and New Jersey are developing similar types of Buy \r\nClean regulations (Simonen et al. 2019; BGA 2020)."


id: 2c8a4673932047d52aeb3e3ee8e3a053
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5103
content:
"between 2015 and 2019 (SBTi 2021). As of August  2021, \r\n858  companies had set SBT and over 2000 companies across the \r\nworld currently use internal carbon pricing with a median internal \r\ncarbon price of USD25 per metric tonne of CO2-eq (Bartlett et al. \r\n2021). The most determined companies have developed internal GHG \r\nabatement strategies that incorporate their supply chains' emissions \r\n(Marti et al. 2015; Gillingham et al. 2017; Tost et al. 2020) and design \r\nprocurement contracts that encourage or require their suppliers \r\nto also improve their product GHG footprint (Liu et al. 2019a). For \r\nmany corporations, the emissions impact within their supply chain \r\nfar exceeds their operations direct emissions (CDP 2019). Therefore, \r\nthe opportunities to reduce emissions through purchasing goods \r\nand services from the supply chain (Scope 3) have much greater \r\npotentials than from direct emissions."


id: fa7a856ba9b1fab0cc4e671510659052
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41434
content:
"However, these trends have to be approached with caution as some \r\nof the emissions reductions are not direct emissions reductions \r\nfrom companies' operations, instead often from offset projects of \r\nvarying quality (Chrobak 2021). There is a lack of consistency and \r\ncomparability in the way firms are reporting emissions, which limits \r\nthe possibilities to assess companies' actual ambition and progress \r\n(Sullivan and Gouldson 2012; Burritt and Schaltegger 2014; Liu et al. \r\n2015; Rietbergen et al. 2015; Blanco et al. 2016). More research \r\nis needed to assess the current impacts of corporate voluntary \r\nclimate actions and if these efforts meet the Paris Agreement's goals \r\n(Rietbergen et al. 2015; Wang and Sueyoshi 2018). It will be critically \r\nimportant that the international corporate accounting frameworks, "


id: c2e7d58dcccf0d9fd5eb5dbdbc4ba39c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31568
content:
"The most common climate mitigation strategies used by corporates \r\nare to set emissions reduction targets in line with the Paris Agreement \r\ngoals through science-based targets (SBTs) and to develop internal \r\ncarbon pricing (Kuo and Chang 2021). The SBT initiative records \r\nthat 338 SBT companies reduced their emissions by 302 MtCO2-eq"


id: 65f999f2f968ad4ab29be826e44316cd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15202
content:
"standards, and related guidance (e.g., GHG Protocol) be maintained \r\nand improved to reflect evolving needs in the global market and to \r\nallow for comparison of objectives and progress."


id: 5336cdff4a82d0027a28c42e85c59d17
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11909
content:
"Governments are also turning their attention to developing standards \r\nto increase the durability of products and materials by requiring \r\noptions for maintenance, reparability, reusability, upgradability, \r\nrecyclability and waste handling. For example, the EU Ecodesign \r\nDirective includes new requirements for manufacturers to make \r\navailable for a minimum of seven to 10 years spare parts to repair \r\nhousehold equipment (Talens Peiro et al. 2020; Calisto Friant et al. \r\n2021; Nikolaou and Tsagarakis 2021). The European Commission \r\nplans to widen the resource efficiency requirements beyond energy\u0002related products to cover products such as textiles and furniture as \r\nwell as high-impact intermediary products such as steel, cement and \r\nchemicals in a new sustainable product policy legislative initiative. \r\n(Domenech and Bahn-Walkowiak 2019; Llorente-Gonzalez and \r\nVence 2019; European Commission 2020; Polverini 2021)."


id: afc609df0f183e0cc731acffb9f59570
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28160
content:
"Within the context of GHG content certifications and EPD \r\ndevelopment, more transparency is needed to increase international \r\ncomparability and to validate claims to meet consumers demand \r\nfor low-GHG material and products (Rangelov et al. 2021). Greater \r\nautomation, publicly available reference databases, benchmarking \r\nsystems and increased stakeholder collaboration can also support the \r\nimportant role of conveying credible emissions information between \r\nproducers, traders and consumers."


id: 1b310896fc1eeb7847230ec9906aed0a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1974
content:
"Further research is needed to understand how different international \r\nand national frameworks, codes, and standards that focus on \r\nemissions can work in unison to amplify their mutually desired \r\noutcomes. Building performance and market instrument trading \r\nframeworks recognised globally do not always incentivise the same \r\noutcomes due to the differences in market approach. LCA metrics are \r\na  useful tool to help assess optimal options for ultimate emission \r\nreduction objectives (Rock et al. 2020; Shadram et al. 2020)."


id: dff5566490911e6a121b23b8890c2927
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36643
content:
"Policymakers can set minimum performance standards or maximum \r\nemission content specifications through legislation to increase the \r\nuse of low-GHG materials and products by mandating the adoption \r\nof low-GHG production and construction processes while requiring \r\nmaterial and resource efficiency aspects."


id: a02baeb5d8b7682907ffec3d21b65f1a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25391
content:
"Fossil-free basic materials production will often lead to higher \r\ncosts of production, for example, 20-40% more for steel, 70-115% \r\nmore for cement, and potentially 15-60% for chemicals (Material \r\nEconomics 2019). There is a nascent literature on what are effectively "


id: 858aee7b9f24946b73b905041803d706
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20635
content:
"GHG production already exist in countries where hydroelectric power \r\nis a common power source. Market developments will allow for low\u0002GHG aluminium to trade at a premium rate as demand develops. For \r\nexample, Harbor Aluminium has launched a green aluminium spot \r\npremium at the end of October 2019 and the London Metal Exchange \r\nhas introduced a 'green aluminium' spot exchange contract. (LME \r\n2020; Das 2021)."


id: 2adb10e0fa24fe2b7d87e6b9633c124c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4772
content:
"material 'feed-in-tariffs' to bridge the commercialisation 'valley of \r\ndeath' (Wilson and Grubler 2011) of early development of low-GHG \r\nmaterials (Bataille et al. 2018a; Neuhoff et al. 2018; Sartor and Bataille \r\n2019; Wyns et al. 2019). Renewable electricity support schemes have \r\ntypically been price-based (e.g.,  production subsidies and feed\u0002in-tariffs) or volume-based (e.g.,  quota obligations and certificate \r\nschemes) and both principles can be applied when thinking about \r\nlow-GHG materials. Auction schemes are typically used for larger\u0002scale projects, for example, offshore wind parks."


id: 7c979b91ad9b5286fab2e28041eacf58
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19115
content:
"Extended producer responsibility (EPR) systems are increasingly \r\nused by policymakers to require producers to take responsibility for \r\nthe end life of their outputs and to cover the cost of recycling of \r\nmaterials or otherwise responsibly managing problematic wastes \r\n(Kaza et al. 2018). According to the OECD, there are about 400 EPR \r\nsystems in operation worldwide, three quarters of which have been \r\nestablished over the last two decades. One third of EPR systems cover \r\nsmall consumer electronic equipment, followed by packaging and \r\ntyres (each 17%), vehicles, lead-acid batteries and a range of other \r\nproducts (OECD 2016)."


id: 57a6c880d906f7327a4298ecdceec593
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12689
content:
"New and innovative financial market contracts for basic materials \r\nthat represent low-carbon varieties of conventional materials are \r\nemerging. This is the case of aluminium for which quantity of low\u0002"


id: fa12ce37bf0bb6b03c2e336de381717e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41361
content:
"The implementation of a circular economy relies on the operationalisation of the R-imperatives or strategies which extend from \r\nthe original 3Rs: Reduce, Reuse and Recycle, with the addition of Refuse, Reduce, Resell/Reuse, Repair, Refurbish, Remanufacture, \r\nRepurpose, Recycle, Recover (energy), Re-mine and more (Reike et al. 2018). The R  implementation strategies are diverse across \r\ncountries (Ghisellini et al. 2016; Kalmykova et al. 2018) but, in practice, the lower forms of retention of materials, such as recycling \r\nand recover (energy), often dominate. The lack of policies for higher retention of material use such as Reduce, Reuse, Repair and \r\nRemanufacture is due to institutional failures, lack of coordination and lack of strong advocates (Gonzalez Hernandez et al. 2018a)."


id: 925d37ff1e1fa7d4ff6d0b434c36401
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22973
content:
"Policies addressing market barriers to circular business development need to demonstrate that circular products meet quality \r\nperformance standards, ensure that the full environmental costs are reflected in market prices and foster market opportunities for \r\ncircular products exchange, notably through industrial symbiosis clusters and trading platforms (Kirchherr et al. 2018; OECD 2019a; \r\nHartley et al. 2020; Hertwich 2020). Policy levels span from micro (such as consumer or company) to meso (eco-industrial parks) and \r\nmacro (provinces, regions and cities) (Geng et al. 2019). The creation of eco-industry parks ('industrial clusters') has been encouraged \r\nby governments to facilitate waste exchanges between facilities, where by-products from one industry are used as a feedstock to"


id: 3fba207f31abcc607a506e9f5b7c42f5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8405
content:
"another (Ding and Hua 2012; Jiao and Boons 2014; Shi and Yu 2014; Tian et al. 2014; Winans et al. 2017). Systematic assessment \r\nof wastes and resources is carried out to assess possible exchange between different supply chains and identify synergies of waste \r\nstreams that include metal scraps, waste plastics, water heat, bagasse, paper, wood scraps, ash, sludge and others (Ding and Hua \r\n2012; Shi and Yu 2014)."


id: e49a7b1e178b64fb2710f26f32e0cc43
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37505
content:
"The development of data collection and indicators is nascent and need to ramp up to quantify the impacts and provide evidence to \r\nimprove circular economy and materials efficiency policies. Policymakers need to leverage the potential socio-economic opportunities \r\nof transitioning to circular economies (Llorente-Gonzalez and Vence 2020), which shows positive GDP growth and job creation by \r\nshifting to more labour-intensive recycling plants and repair services than resource-extraction activities (WRAP and Alliance Green \r\n2015; Cambridge Econometrics et al. 2018). The International Labour Organization estimates that worldwide employment would grow \r\nby 0.1% by 2030 under a circular economy scenario (ILO 2018). However questions remain if the type of jobs created are concentrated \r\nin low-wage labour-intensive circular activities which may need targeted policy instruments to improve working conditions (Llorente\u0002Gonzalez and Vence 2020)."


id: 342d5ac84006b715cd36323ebb7f41e6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6417
content:
"ex post evaluations of outcomes. Such organisational routines for \r\nlearning have been identified as a key aspect of policy capacity to \r\ngovern evolutionary processes (Karo and Kattel 2018; Kattel and \r\nMazzucato 2018). Although many governments have adopted ideas \r\nof focusing resources on the mission or challenge of climate change \r\nmitigation, comparisons between Western and East Asian contexts \r\nshow significant differences in the implementation of governance \r\nstructures (Karo 2018; Mazzucato et al. 2020; Wanzenbock \r\net al. 2020). Overall, improved knowledge and stronger expertise is \r\nimportant also to handle information asymmetries and the risk of \r\nregulatory capture."


id: 1e653b096b23b842f6cff9758469c39a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2549
content:
"Industrial net zero transitions, while technically feasible, involve not \r\njust a  shift in production technology but major shifts in demand, \r\nmaterial efficiency, circularity, supply chain structure and geographic \r\nlocation, labour training and adaptation, finance, and industrial policy. \r\nThis transition must also link decarbonisation to larger environmental \r\nand social goals (e.g,. air and water quality, low-GHG growth, poverty \r\nalleviation, sustainable development goals) (OECD 2019b)."


id: 1f09d799185b9faf02b8a661a2c83f1a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2665
content:
"Although there is little evidence of carbon leakage so far it will \r\nbe ever more important to strive for coherence in climate and \r\ntrade policies as some countries take the lead in decarbonising \r\ninternationally traded basic materials (Jakob 2021b). At the time \r\nof writing the previously academic debate on this issue is shifting \r\nto real policymaking through debates and negotiations around \r\ncarbon border adjustment (Section 11.6.1) and sectoral agreements \r\nor climate clubs (Nordhaus 2015; Ahman et al. 2017; Jakob 2021a; \r\nNilsson et al. 2021). The climate and trade policy integration should \r\nalso consider what is sometimes called positive leakage, that is that \r\nheavy industry production moves to where it is easier to reach zero \r\nemissions. As a  result, policy should go beyond border measures \r\nto include, for example, international technology cooperation and \r\ntransfer and development of shared lead markets."


id: 66c5780257d18c060bf54513e0760b23
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15346
content:
"All this argues for active co-oversight, management and assessment \r\nby government, firms, sector associations and other actors, in \r\neffect the formation of an active industrial policy that includes \r\ndecarbonisation in its broader mandate of economic and social \r\ndevelopment (OECD 2019b; Bataille 2020a). This could draw from \r\nthe quadruple helix innovation model, which considers the role of \r\ngovernment, universities, the private sector, the natural environment \r\nand social systems to foster collaboration in innovation (Carayannis \r\nand Campbell 2019; Duran-Romero et al. 2020). Important aspects of \r\ngovernance include mechanisms for monitoring, transparency, and \r\naccountability. It may involve the development of new evaluation \r\napproaches, including a  greater focus on ex ante evaluations and \r\nassessment of, for example, readiness and capacities, rather than "


id: 106dd659863d02e84849cf94e18f9ebe
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 79
content:
"Energy-intensive production steps may move where clean resources \r\nare most abundant and relatively inexpensive (Gielen et al. 2020; \r\nBataille et al. 2021a). For example, steel-making has historically \r\nlocated itself near iron ore and coal resources whereas in the future \r\nit may be located near iron ore and zero-GHG electricity or close \r\nto carbon storage sites (Fischedick et al. 2014b; Vogl et al. 2018; \r\nBataille 2020a). This indicates large changes in industrial and supply \r\nchain structure, with directly associated needs for employment and \r\nskills. Some sectors will grow, and some will shrink, with differing \r\nskill needs. Each new workforce cohort needs the general specific \r\nskill to provide the employment that is needed at each stage in \r\nthe transition, implicating a need for coordination with policies for \r\neducation and retraining."


id: 3b31fc8a3d83b15fc09af53e76dadb59
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7600
content:
"investment in industrial decarbonisation and the minimum 10 or \r\nmore years horizon before there are significant new commercially \r\navailable processes."


id: 3c91a017ea26a0160a296463aeab770f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7849
content:
"All the above indicate the need for general industrial policy as part of \r\na coherent general economic, taxation, investment, employment and \r\nsocial policy for climate change mitigation (Wesseling et al. 2017; \r\nBataille et al. 2018a; Wyns et al. 2019; Nilsson et al. 2021)."


id: 8f7cec6a36f05eb513e9322242fd595d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22452
content:
"Different types of actors thus have to play different but coordinated \r\nroles and responsibilities in developing, supporting, and implementing \r\npolicies for an industrial transition. Table  11.6 below shows how \r\nthe different core parts of integrated policymaking for an industrial \r\ntransition may depend on efforts from different actors groups and \r\nhighlights the responsibility of these actor groups in developing \r\na  progressive and enabling policy context for the transition. \r\nThis  includes policymakers at local, national, and international \r\narenas as well as civil society organisations, industry firms, and \r\ninterest organisations."


id: 64e32fbfd16e5cdaea372e8d5ed5f3ce
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15023
content:
"Table 11.6 | Examples of the potential roles of different actors in key policy and governance areas for a low-GHG transition to indicate the importance \r\nof agency and wide stakeholder engagement in the governance of industrial decarbonisation."


id: dc2ca2fa5db9c34345eaaa861079d7ff
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36009
content:
"of industrial processes, the volume and purity of carbon dioxide \r\nflows, the energy requirements, the lifetime of utilisation products \r\nand the production route."


id: 4f166259e84e4c6a74b1a2cd0e8547c0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 11199
content:
"An increasing body of research proposes deep decarbonisation \r\npathways for energy-intensive industries including mitigation \r\noptions such as materials efficiency, circular economy and new \r\nprimary processes. These options are under-represented in climate \r\nchange scenario modelling and integrated assessment models, some \r\nof which do not even reflect evolution of demand for basic materials, \r\nwhich is a key driver behind energy consumption and GHG emissions \r\nin the industrial sector. As a result, no agreement is reached so far \r\nbetween bottom-up and top-down studies on the effectiveness and \r\ncosts for many promising mitigation options, their respective roles, \r\nsequencing and packaging within various mitigation pathways."


id: 6b20e5c0fffa756eb9f4ff13c79634f7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16142
content:
"The effectiveness of mitigation policies in industry is poorly known, \r\nas so far the sector has largely been sheltered from the impacts of \r\nclimate policy due to the concerns of competitiveness and carbon \r\nleakage. There is a  lack of integration of material efficiency and \r\ncircularity with energy and climate policies which partly results from \r\nthe inadequacy of monitored indicators to inform policy debates \r\nand set targets, a  lack of high-level political focus, a  history of \r\nstrong industrial lobbying, uncoordinated policy across subsectors \r\nand institutions, and the sequential nature of decision-making \r\nalong supply chains."


id: 48fca36ed7767eef332318766fc084c1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10061
content:
"A significant shift is needed from the transition process of the past \r\nmainly based on marginal and incremental changes, with a strong \r\nfocus on energy efficiency efforts, to one grounded in transformational \r\nchange where there is limited knowledge of how to implement such \r\nchange effectively."


id: b4d30bd4591bd4b4da4b34c317a70b9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29063
content:
"Industry as a whole is a very complex web of sectors, subsectors and \r\ninter-sectoral interactions and dependence, with diverse associated \r\nmitigation opportunities and co-benefits and costs. Additional \r\nknowledge is needed to understand sectoral interactions in the \r\ntransformation processes."


id: e3087fc53922a156d293009efa5b788a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37237
content:
"There is a  knowledge gap on comparable, comprehensive, and \r\ndetailed quantitative information on costs and potentials associated \r\nwith the mitigation options for deep decarbonisation in industry, \r\nas cost estimates are not often comparable due to the regional or \r\ncountry focus, differences in costs metrics, currencies, discount rates, \r\nand energy prices across studies and regions."


id: 3f3b3160cfb3b2a6b694009b0e79b502
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8314
content:
"Industrial climate mitigation policy is supplemental to many other \r\npolicy instruments developed to reach multiple industrial goals, for \r\nthe range of stakeholders with their interest and priorities reflecting \r\nthe assessment of co-benefits and risk and affecting decision-making \r\nprocesses and behaviour of stakeholders. Better knowledge is \r\nneeded to identify the co-benefits for the adoption of climate change \r\nmitigation strategies."


id: ecbe4fb7577ffb33c70edd7408e78218
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39014
content:
"A very large and important uncertainty is the availability of biomass \r\nfor deep decarbonisation pathways due to competition for biomass \r\nfeedstock with other priorities and the extent to which electrification \r\ncan reduce the demand for bioenergy in the industry, transport and \r\nenergy sectors."


id: a6648109bca0b2c2d1c4df55a78ef246
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26494
content:
"Babiker, M., G. Berndes, K. Blok, B. Cohen, A. Cowie, O. Geden, V. Ginzburg, A. Leip, P. Smith, M. Sugiyama, F. Yamba, \r\n2022: Cross-sectoral perspectives. In IPCC, 2022: Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution \r\nof Working Group III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [P.R. Shukla, \r\nJ. Skea, R. Slade, A. Al Khourdajie, R. van Diemen, D. McCollum, M. Pathak, S. Some, P. Vyas, R. Fradera, M. Belkacemi, \r\nA.  Hasija, G.  Lisboa, S.  Luz, J.  Malley, (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA.\r\ndoi: 10.1017/9781009157926.005"


id: 94cfa51c9f10599d4c03157e245f06de
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 23388
content:
"and demand-side measures are important to reduce the GHG \r\nintensity of food systems. Integrated food policy packages based \r\non a combination of market-based, administrative, informative, and \r\nbehavioural policies  can reduce cost compared to uncoordinated \r\ninterventions, address multiple sustainability goals, and increase \r\nacceptance across stakeholders and civil society (limited evidence, \r\nmedium agreement). {7.2, 7.4, 12.4}"


id: ab80f0272ff171fdb38362d662142333
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27405
content:
"The total emission mitigation potential achievable by the year \r\n2030, calculated based on sectoral assessments, is sufficient \r\nto reduce global greenhouse gas emissions to half of the \r\ncurrent (2019) level or less (robust evidence, high agreement). \r\nThis potential (32-44 GtCO2-eq) requires implementation of a wide \r\nrange of mitigation options. Options with mitigation costs lower \r\nthan USD20 tCO2\r\n-1 make up more than half of this potential and are \r\navailable for all sectors. {12.2, Table 12.3}"


id: be89e22f4a32b13d98561fc25e090429
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30785
content:
"Emerging food technologies such as cellular fermentation, \r\ncultured meat, plant-based alternatives to animal-based \r\nfood products, and controlled-environment agriculture, can \r\nbring substantial reductions in direct GHG emissions from \r\nfood production (limited evidence, high agreement). These \r\ntechnologies have lower land, water, and nutrient footprints, and \r\naddress concerns over animal welfare. Access to low-carbon energy \r\nis needed to realise the full mitigation potential, as some emerging \r\ntechnologies are relatively more energy intensive. This also holds for \r\ndeployment of cold chain and packaging technologies, which can help \r\nreduce food loss and waste, but increase energy and materials use in \r\nthe food system. (limited evidence, high agreement). {11.4.1.3, 12.4}"


id: 23412cd8528ee38cc049e42b26a6aee0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3404
content:
"Despite limited current deployment, moderate to large future \r\nmitigation potentials are estimated for direct air carbon \r\ncapture and sequestration (DACCS), enhanced weathering \r\n(EW) and ocean-based CDR methods (including ocean alkalinity \r\nenhancement and ocean  fertilisation) (medium evidence,\r\nmedium agreement). The potential for DACCS (5-40 GtCO2 yr-1) \r\nis limited mainly by requirements for low-carbon energy and by cost \r\n(USD100-300 (full range: USD84-386) tCO2\r\n-1). DACCS is currently \r\nat a  medium technology readiness level. EW has the potential to \r\nremove 2-4 (full range: <1 to about 100) GtCO2 yr-1, at costs ranging \r\nfrom USD50 to 200 (full range: USD24-578) tCO2\r\n-1.  Ocean-based \r\nmethods have a combined potential to remove 1-100 GtCO2 yr-1 at \r\ncosts of USD40-500 tCO2\r\n-1, but their feasibility is uncertain due to \r\npossible side effects on the marine environment. EW and ocean-based \r\nmethods are currently at a low technology readiness level. {12.3}"


id: 5ca25313052ed3ac4df36af779dd5f6c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13558
content:
"Realising the full mitigation potential from the food system \r\nrequires change at all stages from producer to consumer \r\nand waste management, which can be facilitated through \r\nintegrated policy packages (robust evidence, high agreement). \r\nSome 23-42% of global GHG emissions are associated with \r\nfood systems, while there is still widespread food insecurity and \r\nmalnutrition. Absolute GHG emissions from food systems increased \r\nfrom 14 to 17 GtCO2-eq yr-1 in the period 1990-2018. Both supply "


id: 3c18e02954d4699ff3ca4bf4feaeada
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7763
content:
"Bio-based products as part of a  circular bioeconomy have \r\npotential to support adaptation and mitigation. Key to \r\nmaximising benefits and managing trade-offs are sectoral \r\nintegration, transparent governance, and stakeholder \r\ninvolvement (high confidence). A sustainable bioeconomy relying \r\non biomass resources will need to be supported by technology \r\ninnovation and international cooperation and governance of global \r\ntrade to disincentivise environmental and social externalities (medium \r\nconfidence). {12.5, Cross-Working Group Box 3 in this chapter}"


id: 84e0cc95c7dea4c9faec799dbcebe7a0
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20514
content:
"Carbon leakage is a critical cross-sectoral and cross-country \r\nconsequence of differentiated climate policy (robust \r\nevidence, medium agreement). Carbon leakage occurs when \r\nmitigation measures implemented in one country/sector lead to \r\nincreased emissions in other countries/sectors. Global commodity \r\nvalue chains and associated international transport are important \r\nmechanisms of carbon leakage. Reducing emissions from the value \r\nchain and transportation can offer opportunities to mitigate three \r\nelements of cross-sectoral spillovers and related leakage: (i) domestic \r\ncross-sectoral spillovers within the same country; (ii) international \r\nspillovers within a  single sector resulting from substitution of \r\ndomestic production of carbon-intensive goods with their imports \r\nfrom abroad; and (iii) international cross-sectoral spillovers among \r\nsectors in different countries. {12.6.3}"


id: 2929479210392d3e1022b87dbb1a03ae
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4453
content:
"Cross-sectoral considerations in mitigation finance are critical \r\nfor the effectiveness of mitigation action as well as for balancing \r\nthe often conflicting social, developmental, and environmental \r\npolicy goals at the sectoral level (medium evidence, medium \r\nagreement). True resource mobilisation plans that properly address \r\nmitigation costs and benefits at sectoral level cannot be developed \r\nin isolation from their cross-sectoral implications. There is an urgent \r\nneed for multilateral financing institutions to align their frameworks \r\nand delivery mechanisms including the use of blended financing to \r\nfacilitate cross-sectoral solutions as opposed to causing competition \r\nfor resources among sectors. {12.6.4}"


id: 663c5f17487408ec9aa5c060f1e4be87
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15251
content:
"synergies and trade-offs as well as the implications of measures that \r\nhave application in more than one sector and measures \r\nwhose  implementation in one sector impacts implementation in \r\nother sectors."


id: 1a4b699097946f845d256d6624e5222a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1822
content:
"Taking stock of the sectoral mitigation assessments, Chapter  12 \r\nprovides a  summary synthesis of sectoral mitigation costs and \r\npotentials in the short and long term along with comparison to the \r\ntop-down integrated assessment model (IAM) assessment literature \r\nof Chapter  3  and the national/regional assessment  literature of \r\nChapter 4."


id: c00bcb6d43f260097950b7996cf8c5f7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31079
content:
"Chapters  5  to 11 assess outcomes from mitigation measures that \r\nare applicable in individual sectors, and potential co-benefits and \r\nadverse side effects of these individual measures. Chapter 12 brings \r\ntogether the cross-sectoral aspects of these assessments including "


id: 2f365f63db525bd859d51124ead64beb
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5574
content:
"(AFOLU) and energy sectors are dealt with in Chapters 6 and 7 and \r\nsynthesised in Section 12.3. Other methods, not dealt with elsewhere, \r\nare covered in more detail. A comparative assessment is provided for \r\nthe different CDR options in terms of costs, potentials, governance, \r\nimpacts and risks, and synergies and trade-offs."


id: fe0ce514295c388371d0f9e2e92f3fdf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42062
content:
"digitalisation, and hydrogen. Examples include the use of hydrogen as \r\nan energy carrier, which, when coupled with low-carbon energy, has \r\npotential for driving mitigation in energy, industry, transport, and \r\nbuildings (Box 12.5), and digitalisation has the potential for reducing \r\nGHG emissions through energy savings across multiple sectors."


id: c54e57758669c1a5c7e81a98a7d43030
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32019
content:
"The efficient realisation of the above examples of cross-sectoral \r\nmitigation would require careful design of government interventions \r\nacross planning, policy, finance, governance, and capacity \r\nbuilding  fronts. In this respect, Chapter  12 assesses literature on \r\ncross-sectoral integrated policies, cross-sectoral financing solutions, \r\ncross-sectoral spillovers and competitiveness effects, and on cross\u0002sectoral governance for climate change mitigation."


id: 43d113f0ee08357441eef69e3c23ba05
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9160
content:
"Section  12.4 assesses the literature on food systems and GHG \r\nemissions. The term 'food system' refers to a composite of elements \r\n(environment, people, inputs, processes, infrastructures, institutions, \r\netc.) and activities that relate to the production, processing, \r\ndistribution, preparation and consumption of food, and the outputs \r\nof these activities, including socio-economic and environmental \r\noutcomes. Climate change mitigation opportunities and related \r\nimplications for sustainable development and adaptation are \r\nassessed, including those arising from food production, landscape \r\nimpacts, supply chain and distribution, and diet shifts."


id: fb95d10785b5c7c29b45c024832f69a5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41633
content:
"Finally, in the context of cross-sectoral synergies and trade-offs, the \r\nchapter assesses the non-climate mitigation co-benefits and adverse \r\neffects in relation to SDGs, building on the fast-growing literature on \r\nthe non-climate impacts of mitigation."


id: cde6567e5ffee9d9c65fcb49b5b53356
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33556
content:
"Section 12.5 provides a cross-sectoral perspective on land occupation \r\nand related impacts, risks and opportunities associated with land\u0002based mitigation options as well as mitigation options that are not \r\ndesignated land based, yet occupy land. It builds on SRCCL and \r\nChapter 7 in this report, which covers mitigation in AFOLU, including \r\nbiomass production for mitigation in other sectors. In addition to an \r\nassessment of biophysical and socio-economic risks, impacts and \r\nopportunities, this section includes a Cross-Working Group Box (WGII \r\nand WGIII) on Mitigation and Adaptation via the Bioeconomy, and \r\na Box on Land Degradation Neutrality as a framework to manage \r\ntrade-offs in land-based mitigation."


id: 73cdc301dc676b76854b0d4281a82cf5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17629
content:
"The chapter is mapped into seven sections. Cost and potentials \r\nof mitigation technologies are discussed in Section  12.2, where \r\na  comparative assessment and a  summary of sectoral mitigation \r\ncost and potentials is provided in coordination with the sectoral \r\nChapters 5 to 11, along with a comparison to aggregate cost and \r\npotentials based on IAM outputs presented in Chapter 3."


id: d926bf50ceb935cc97c762b4a304e57a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35500
content:
"Section  12.6 provides a  cross-sectoral perspective on mitigation, \r\nco-benefits, and trade-offs, including those related to sustainable \r\ndevelopment and adaptation. The synthesised sectoral mitigation "


id: c8666f50e7e425ac5af93a0d72b814e2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32563
content:
"Section  12.3 provides a  synthesis of the state and potential \r\ncontribution of CDR methods for addressing climate change. CDR \r\noptions associated with the agriculture, forestry and other land use "


id: 29b477f25d5a271b9dbd741c7a49f125
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4561
content:
"emissions. Other potentials, such as market potentials, could also be \r\nconsidered, but they are not included in this section."


id: 40b6657654e837c3ebe46dc328cbaa7d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8568
content:
"synergies and trade-offs are mapped into options/technologies, \r\npolicies, international trade, and finance domains. Cross-sectoral \r\nmitigation technologies fall into three categories in which the \r\nimplementation of the technology: (i) occurs in parallel in more than \r\none sector; (ii) could involve interaction between sectors, and/or \r\n(iii) could create resource competition among sectors. Policies that \r\nhave direct sectoral effects include specific policies for reducing \r\nGHG emissions and non-climate policies that yield GHG emissions \r\nreductions as co-benefits. Policies may also have indirect cross\u0002sectoral effects, including synergies and trade-offs that may, in \r\naddition, spill over to other countries."


id: 21bebdc54213e101a6df187cd5f0df4a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3152
content:
"Section 12.7 provides an overview of knowledge gaps, which could \r\nbe used to inform further research."


id: 8543f28c9b8de5431646ee503b1c14a6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20585
content:
"Costs of mitigation options will change over time. For many \r\ntechnologies, costs will reduce as a result of technological learning. \r\nAn attempt has been made to take into account the average, \r\nimplementation-weighted costs until 2030. However, the underlying \r\nliterature did not always allow such costs to be presented. For the year \r\n2030, the results are presented similarly to AR4, with a breakdown \r\nof the potential in 'cost bins'. For the year 2050, a more qualitative \r\napproach is provided. The origins of the cost data in this section are \r\nmostly based on studies carried out in the period 2015-2020. Given \r\nthe wide range of the cost bins that are used in this section it is \r\nnot meaningful (and often not possible) to convert to USD values for \r\none specific year. This may lead to some extra uncertainty, but this is \r\nexpected to be relatively small."


id: e8db86069a2db898aeb55ebd24e71d41
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38322
content:
"Table 12.2 | Key characteristics of the scenarios used as a reference for determining costs and potentials. The values are for the year 2030."


id: 1528963e06c0362625f33c597ee213ea
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 935
content:
"a\r\n The difference between WEO-2020 and WEO-2019 is partly explained by the fact that WEO-2019 had two different reference scenarios: Current Policies and Stated Policies. \r\nWEO-2020 has only one reference: the Stated Policies Scenario, which 'is based on today's policy settings'. The Stated Policies Scenario in WEO-2019 had energy-related \r\nemissions of 34.9 GtCO2. EJ, exajoules (1 x 1018 joules); p.a., per annum."


id: 61391c7011f10cfcce6bb6d8ad29b43a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14404
content:
"For the energy sector the potentials are determined using the World \r\nEnergy Outlook 2019 Current Policies Scenario as a reference (IEA \r\n2019). However, for the economic assessment, more recent Levelised \r\nCosts of Electricity (LCOEs) for different electricity generating \r\ntechnologies were used (IEA 2020a). For the AFOLU sector, the \r\npotentials were derived from a variety of studies. It may be expected \r\nthat the best estimates, as averages, match with the reference in \r\na middle-of-the-road scenario. For the buildings sector, the Current \r\nPolicies scenario of World Energy Outlook 2019 (IEA 2019) was \r\nused as a reference. For the transport sector, the references of the \r\nunderlying sources were used. For the industry sector, the scenarios \r\nused have emissions that are slightly higher than in the Current \r\nPolicies scenario from the World Energy Outlook 2019 (IEA 2019)."


id: 86ed54df4489f1077511120706e2b024
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20903
content:
"In this section, we present an overview of mitigation options per \r\nsector. An overview of net emissions reduction potentials for different \r\nmitigation options is presented in Table 12.3."


id: c1d2db33b1faf44d1cc9794947f4cb38
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31402
content:
"For the AFOLU sector, assessments of global net emissions reduction \r\nstudies were provided in Table 7.3. The number of studies depends \r\non the type of mitigation action, but ranges from five to nine. Each \r\nof these studies relies on a much larger number of underlying data \r\nsources. From these studies, emissions reduction ranges and best \r\nestimates were derived. The studies presented refer to different years \r\nin the period 2020 to 2050, and the mitigation potential presented \r\nfor AFOLU primarily refers to the average over the period 2020 to \r\n2050. However, because most of the activities involve storage of \r\ncarbon in stocks that accumulate carbon, or conversely decay over "


id: 5d89f0ab2c4579d454a3eb535c94a0bc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13741
content:
"Firstly, a brief overview of the process of data collection is presented, \r\nwith a  more detailed overview being found in Supplementary \r\nMaterial 12.SM.1.2. For the energy sector, the starting point for \r\nthe determination of the emissions reduction potentials was the \r\nEmissions Gap Report (UNEP 2017), but new literature was also \r\nassessed, and a  few studies that provide updated estimates of \r\nthe mitigation potentials were included. It was found that higher \r\nmitigation potentials than in the UNEP report are now reported for \r\nsolar and wind energy, but at the same time electricity production "


id: ea3c010c4a95ba27826b3645d8816d29
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38563
content:
"discussed previously (such as DACCS and enhanced weathering) \r\nwere taken from Section 12.3. For more details about data sources \r\nand data processing, see Supplementary Material 12.SM.1.2."


id: e5c29125760d7a1b20ad849bcbacba1f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37730
content:
"time (e.g., forests, mangroves, peatland soils, agricultural soils, wood \r\nproducts), the 2020 to 2050 average provides a good approximation \r\nof the amount of permanent atmospheric CO2 mitigation that \r\ncould be available at a given price in 2030. The exception is BECCS, \r\nwhich is in an early upscaling phase, so the potential estimated by \r\nChapter 7 as an average for the 2020 to 2050 period is not included \r\nin Table 12.3. Note that for the energy sector a mitigation potential \r\nfor BECCS is provided in Table 12.3."


id: 3492e56f78deb02805bffde6bdffe8aa
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6487
content:
"In Table  12.4 mitigation potentials for all gases are presented \r\nin  GtCO2-eq. For most sectors the mitigation potentials (notably \r\nfor methane emissions reductions from coal, oil and gas, waste and \r\nwastewater) have been converted to CO2-eq using global warming \r\npotential (GWP) values as presented in AR6 WGIII (Cross-Chapter \r\nBox 2 in Chapter 2). However, the underlying literature did not always \r\naccommodate this, in which cases older GWP values apply. Given \r\nthe uncertainty ranges in the mitigation potentials in Table 12.3, the \r\nimpact on the results of using different GWP values is considered \r\nto be very small."


id: 2d2a65c9a2e3e57b66e57b9da32f84f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5227
content:
"For all options, uncertainty ranges of the mitigation potentials are \r\ngiven in Table  12.3. As far as possible, the ranges represent the \r\nvariation in assessments found in the literature. This is the case \r\nfor wind and solar energy, for the AFOLU options, for the methane \r\nmitigation options (coal, oil and gas, waste and wastewater) and for \r\nfluorinated gas mitigation. For the latter options, some variability \r\nexists for each cost bin, but aggregated over cost ranges the variation \r\nis much smaller, typically +-50%. For the buildings sector and the \r\nindustrial sector options, the uncertainty in the mitigation potential \r\nis estimated by the lead authors of those chapters. For options for \r\nwhich only limited sources were available, an uncertainty range of \r\n+-50% was used. Overall, the uncertainty range per option is typically \r\nin the range of +-20% to +-60%."


id: 47a201a6729d4ab37f8776d212e61cc2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9824
content:
"Despite these uncertainties, clearly a number of options with high \r\npotentials can be identified, including solar energy, wind energy, \r\nreducing conversion of forests and other natural ecosystems, and \r\nrestoration of forests and other natural ecosystems. As mid-range \r\nvalues, they each represent 4 to 7% of total reference emissions for \r\n2030. Soil carbon sequestration in agriculture and fuel switching \r\nin industry can also be considered as options with high potential, \r\nalthough it should be noted that these options consist of a number \r\nof discernible sub-options, see Table  12.3. It can be observed that \r\nfor each sector, a variety of options is available. Many of the smaller \r\noptions each make up 1 to 2% of the reference emissions for 2030. \r\nWithin this group of smaller options there are some categories that, \r\nsummed together, stand out as substantial: the energy efficiency \r\noptions and the methane mitigations options."


id: 85ddce4e9e2f6c0f9fa89fff5e48798a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20696
content:
"For the transport sector, Chapter 10 provided data on the emissions \r\nreduction potential for shipping. For the other transportation modes, \r\nadditional sources were used to achieve a  complete overview of \r\nemissions reduction potentials (for further details, see Supplementary \r\nMaterial 12.SM.1.2). A  limited number of estimates for global \r\nemissions reduction potential is available: the total number of \r\nsources is about 10, and some estimates rely on just one source. The \r\ndata have been coordinated with Chapter 10 authors."


id: 101dcb33f2919608a48a7e14f6b530c1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22
content:
"For the industrial sector, global emissions reduction potentials per \r\ntechnology class per sector were derived by Chapter  11 authors, \r\nusing primarily sectoral or technology-oriented literature. The \r\nanalysis is based on about 75 studies, including sectoral assessments \r\n(Sections 11.4.1 and 11.4.2 and Figure 11.13)."


id: c4fbc59b8f1cbe54a9b4ccba16902fad
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31966
content:
"Costs are highly variable across the options. All sectors have several \r\noptions for which at least part of the potential has mitigation costs \r\nbelow USD20 tCO2\r\n-1. The only exception is the industrial sector, in \r\nwhich only energy efficiency is available below this cost level. At the \r\nsame time, a  substantial part of the emissions reduction potential \r\ncomes at higher cost, much being in the USD20 to 100 tCO2\r\n-1 cost \r\nranges. All sectors have substantial additional potential in these \r\ncost ranges; only for transportation is this limited. Aggregation \r\nof the potentials per cost bin shows that the potential in these \r\ncost bins is marginally smaller than in the two cheapest cost \r\nbins. For  some options, potential was identified in the 100 to \r\n200 tCO2\r\n-1 cost bin. The mitigation potentials identified in this cost \r\nrange make up only a small part of the total mitigation potential. "


id: 76b65000814cc3edefb211219202ae78
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18099
content:
"For methane emissions reduction from oil and gas operations, coal \r\nmining, waste treatment and wastewater, an analysis was done, \r\nbased on three major data sources in this area (Harmsen et al. \r\n2019; US EPA 2019; Hoglund-Isaksson et al. 2020); for oil and gas \r\noperations this was complemented by IEA (2021a). A similar analysis \r\nfor reductions of emissions of fluorinated gases was carried out based \r\non analysis by the same institutes (Purohit and Hoglund-Isaksson \r\n2017; Harmsen et al. 2019; US EPA 2019). Data for CDR options not "


id: fdaf6efc86657c46c028a84c0b2db116
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41991
content:
"Table 12.3 | Detailed overview of global net GHG emissions reduction potentials (GtCO2-eq) in the various cost categories for the year 2030. Note that \r\npotentials within and across sectors cannot be summed, as the adoption of some options may affect the mitigation potentials of other options. Only monetary costs and \r\nbenefits of options are taken into account. Negative costs occur when the benefits are higher than the costs. For wind energy, for example, this is the case if production costs \r\nare lower than those of the fossil alternatives. Ranges are indicated for each option separately, or indicated for the sector as a whole (see Notes column); they reflect full ranges. \r\nCost ranges are not cumulative, e.g., to obtain the full potential below USD50 tCO2-eq-1, the potentials in the cost bins <USD0, USD0-20 and USD20-50 tCO2-eq-1 need to \r\nbe summed together."


id: 26fb1c0b28b9b1fa207c6a13ac8c4dca
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4020
content:
"It could be that there is limited potential in this range; however, \r\na  more plausible explanation, supported by several authors of \r\nsectoral chapters, is that this cost range is relatively unexplored."


id: 350152f3e9ec250a8ca488ab36ee3554
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6569
content:
"In this section, the mitigation potentials are aggregated per sector, \r\nand then to the global economy. These potentials, which are based \r\non sectoral analysis, are then compared to the results from earlier \r\nassessments and the results from IAMs. Given the incompleteness \r\nof data on the mitigation potential at mitigation costs larger than \r\nUSD100 tCO2\r\n-1, the focus will be on options with mitigation costs \r\nbelow USD100 tCO2\r\n-1."


id: e01bc260658aa27a683d093e8baab588
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36679
content:
"In this assessment, the emphasis is on the specific mitigation costs of \r\nthe various options, and these are often considered as an indicator \r\nto prioritise options. However, in such a prioritisation, other elements \r\nwill also play a  role, like the development of technology for the \r\nlonger term (Section 12.2.4) and the need to optimise investments \r\nover longer time periods, see for example Vogt-Schilb et al. (2018) \r\nwho argue that sometimes it makes sense to start with implementing \r\nthe most expensive option."


id: 311f06b28477a5b79e21496c1ab408e1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5893
content:
"As suggested previously, the overview presented in Table 12.3 should \r\nbe interpreted with care, as the implementation of one option may \r\naffect the mitigation potential of another option. Most sectoral chapters \r\nhave supplied mitigation potentials that were already adjusted for \r\noverlap and mutual influences (industry, buildings, AFOLU). For the \r\nenergy sector, interactions between the options will occur, but parallel \r\nimplementation of all the options seems to be possible; if all options \r\nat costs levels below USD100 tCO2\r\n-1 were implemented, this would \r\nlead to an additional power generation with no direct CO2 emissions \r\nof 41% of the total projected generation in 2030. This seems to be \r\npossible, but as higher penetrations are relatively unexplored, we "


id: 1c145174a5c401340d0874f1236a6230
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2121
content:
"In this section, an overview of emissions mitigation options for the \r\nyear 2030 was presented. The overview of the mitigation potential \r\nis based on a variety of approaches, relying on a large number of \r\nsources, and the number of sources varied strongly from sector to \r\nsector. The main conclusions from this section are: (i) there is a variety \r\nof options per sector, (ii) per sector the options combined show \r\nsignificant mitigation potential, (iii) there are a  few major options \r\nand a lot of smaller ones, and (iv) more than half of the potential \r\ncomes at costs below USD20 tCO2\r\n-1 (between sectors: medium to\r\nrobust evidence, high agreement)."


id: 1d2ce0f225bb2f077c746ec0d0411642
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2307
content:
"with a  decreased carbon intensity of the power sector. For other \r\nenergy sector options, such as methane emissions reduction from \r\ncoal, oil and natural gas operations, the situation is more complex. \r\nThe total emissions reduction potential for fossil fuels in the other \r\nsectors is high. Should this potential be realised, this would lead to \r\na reduction of the potential reported here. However, reducing fossil \r\nfuel use also leads to a  reduction in the upstream CH4 (methane) \r\nemissions, so in the case of reducing fossil fuel use, these upstream \r\nemissions will also be avoided, so no overestimate of the aggregate \r\nemissions reduction potential occurs."


id: 14b505ef6e78e287a51205ad89e726ff
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 870
content:
"apply a smaller uncertainty range at the high end. For the calculation \r\nof the aggregate potentials in the energy sector, error propagation \r\nrules were applied. For the transport sector, there will be interaction \r\nbetween the technical measures on the one hand and the modal shift \r\nmeasures on the other hand. Given the small mitigation contribution \r\nof the modal shift options, these interactions will be negligible. The \r\nresulting aggregate mitigation potentials and their uncertainty ranges \r\nper (sub)sector are given in Table 12.4 (columns indicated 'AR6'). This \r\noverview confirms the large potentials per sector, even when taking \r\nthe uncertainty ranges into account."


id: 276d78ad3d9cc9b29e72ed9466125da7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4116
content:
"The total potential, given these corrections for overlap, leads to \r\na mid-range value for the total mitigation potential at costs below \r\nUSD100 tCO2-eq-1 of 38 GtCO2-eq. Given the fact that it is not to \r\nbe expected that mitigation potentials of the various sectors are \r\nmutually correlated, that is, it is not to be expected that mitigation \r\npotentials are all on the high side or all on the low side, the ranges \r\nare aggregated using error propagation rules, which leads to a range \r\nfor the mitigation potential of 32 to 44 GtCO2-eq."


id: 4227ca5a2c01e71507c52e459fbe3149
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8842
content:
"Calculating aggregated mitigation potentials for the global economy \r\nrequires that interactions between sectors also need to be taken into \r\naccount (Section  12.6). First of all, there may be overlap between \r\nthe electricity supply sector and the electricity demand sectors: if the \r\nelectricity sector is extensively decarbonised, the avoided emissions \r\ndue to electricity efficiency measures and local electricity production \r\nwill be significantly reduced. Therefore, this demand-side mitigation \r\npotential is only taken into account for 25% (reflecting the degree \r\nof further decarbonisation of the power sector) in the cross-sectoral \r\naggregation. For the other demand sectors, this problem does not \r\narise. The industry sector did not provide estimates for electricity \r\nefficiency improvement and in the transport sector the utilisation of \r\nelectricity to date is very low. Electrification options may occur in all \r\nsectors, but this enhances the mitigation potential in combination "


id: 6f6a4085bddccbadcc8fd2ea505d7693
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16867
content:
"Mitigation costs and potentials for 2030 have been presented \r\npreviously, notably in AR4 Chapter 11 on Mitigation from a Cross\u0002sectoral Perspective (Barker et al. 2007) and the Emissions Gap \r\nReport (UNEP 2017). Note that AR5 did not provide emissions \r\nreduction potentials in this form. The aggregated potentials reported "


id: 5884cd107549b4bfc16479faf13ef193
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12817
content:
"Note: Dir = reduction of direct emissions, Ind = reduction of indirect emissions (related to electricity production), Tot = reduction of total emissions, NE = not estimated, \r\nAR4: Table 11.3, UNEP-2017: Chapter 4."


id: 10ed6df1804b30c1fe083dfb8dc7fd8d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 165
content:
"here are higher than those estimated in AR4. Note, however, that AR4 \r\nsuggested the potentials were underestimated by 10 to 15%, but \r\na higher potential still remains in the current assessment. In a sector\u0002by-sector comparison, higher potentials than in AR4 can be observed \r\nespecially for the energy sector and the forestry sector, and to a more \r\nlimited extent for the industry sector and the transport sector. For \r\nthe energy sector, the change can largely be explained by the higher \r\nestimates for wind and solar energy and the improved understanding \r\nof how to integrate high shares of intermittent renewable energy \r\nsources into power systems. For industry and transport, the higher \r\npotentials can be partly explained by the inclusion of more options, \r\nlike recycling and material efficiency (for industry) and electric \r\ntransportation and modal shifts for transport. For buildings, a lower "


id: 8a9fe3631386535ae21c75feb243fbb5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21561
content:
"potential can be observed compared to AR4, one reason is that the \r\n2030 reference direct and indirect emissions were estimated as \r\n45% and 11% higher in AR4 than they were in AR6 (signalling a much \r\nquicker actual switch to electricity than was thought 15 to 20 years \r\nago, among other reasons). The other reason for a difference is that \r\nthe scenarios considered in AR4 had 25 to 30 years between their \r\nstart year until the target year of 2030 and the scenarios reviewed \r\nin AR6 have only 10 to 15 years before 2030. The current retrofitting \r\nrates of existing buildings and penetration rates of nearly zero\u0002energy buildings do not allow for decarbonisation of the sector over \r\n10 to 15 years, but they do over a longer time period. A much larger \r\npotential than reported here for 2030 can still be realised in the \r\ntimeframe up to 2050 (Section 9.6.2)."


id: 41ba0f877ef0064376d20a79b11f808c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8759
content:
"the term IAMs is used as shorthand in the text that follows. All \r\nscenarios that limit warming to 2degC (>67%) or lower are included \r\nfor the comparison (i.e., the categories of scenarios C1 to C3 in \r\nChapter 3). A comparison per sector is provided in Figure 12.1. It \r\nis important to note that two different things are compared in this \r\nfigure: on the one hand emissions reduction potentials and on the \r\nother hand realisations of (part of) the potential within the context \r\nof a certain scenario. Having said that, a number of lessons can be \r\nlearned from the comparison of both."


id: 8038d6dc59be4d33367e021848220acf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 19690
content:
"Another global analysis was done by McKinsey (2009), which \r\npresents a  marginal abatement cost curve for 2030, suggesting \r\na  total potential of 38  GtCO2-eq (note that the reference for that \r\nstudy is 70 GtCO2-eq, which is at the high end of the reference range \r\nused in this assessment)."


id: 5b431d48f08a9f90cb77ffdc200e91ff
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13304
content:
"The potentials reported here are comparable with UNEP (2017). Note \r\nthat material for the energy sector from the UNEP report was partly \r\nreused in this analysis. Furthermore, some options for the transport \r\nsector (aviation and biofuels) were identical to the estimates in the \r\nUNEP report. The remaining mitigation potentials are all based on \r\nnew - and much more extended - assessment. There are some notable \r\nchanges. The AR6 mitigation potential for forestry is substantially \r\nlarger. For buildings the potential is smaller, mainly related to the \r\nsmaller mitigation potential for electric appliances than in the UNEP \r\nreport. But overall, the estimates of the total mitigation potential are \r\nwell aligned, which confirms there is substantial consistency across \r\nvarious emissions reduction estimates."


id: 683578b0fdcdd9f4273cd069eab3a7a1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15602
content:
"For the energy supply sector, the emissions reductions projected by \r\nthe IAMs are for the higher cost levels comparable with the potentials \r\nfound in the sectoral analysis. But at lower cost levels, the emissions \r\nreductions as projected by IAMs are smaller than for the sectoral \r\nanalysis. This is likely due to the fact that high costs for solar energy \r\nand wind energy are assumed in IAM models (Krey et al. 2019; Shiraki \r\nand Sugiyama 2020). This is not surprising, as the scenario database \r\ncomprises studies dating back to 2015. A more detailed comparison \r\nfor the power sector is given in Figure 12.2. Both the sectoral analysis \r\nand the IAMs find that both solar and wind energy in particular show \r\nstrong growth potential, although there is a continuing role for other \r\nlow-carbon technologies, like nuclear energy and hydropower."


id: 33be5687c92823fab2262a91314cacc9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6348
content:
"For the AFOLU sector, the sectoral studies provide net emissions \r\nreduction potentials comparable with projections from the IAMs at \r\ncosts levels up to USD50 tCO2-eq-1. However, beyond that level the \r\nmitigation potential found in the sectoral analysis is larger than in \r\nthe IAMs. For agriculture, it can be explained by the fact that carbon \r\nsequestration options, like soil carbon, biochar and agroforestry, \r\nhave little to no representation in IAMs. Similarly, for forestry and \r\nother land use-related options, the protection and restoration of \r\nother ecosystems than forests (peatland, coastal wetlands and \r\nsavannas) are not represented in IAMs. Also note that some IAM \r\nbaselines already have small carbon prices, which induce land-based \r\nmitigation, while in others, mitigation, particularly from reduced \r\ndeforestation, is part of the storyline even without an implemented "


id: 19c70f92d91ce4ef0cf492e7aa5ac4d3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1732
content:
"Figure 12.2 | Electricity production in 2030 as calculated by IAMs (dark blue), compared with electricity production potentials found in the sectoral \r\nanalysis (yellow). Cost cut-offs at USD100 tCO2\r\n-1 are applied to both electricity production in 2030 as calculated by IAMs and electricity production potentials found in the \r\nsectoral analyses. Hinges in the dark-blue box plots represent the interquartile ranges and whiskers extend to the 5th and 95th percentiles, while the hinges in the yellow box \r\nplots describe the full range."


id: 841ba08317d9b3e53d2f84c717261959
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20401
content:
"carbon price. Both of these effects dampen the mitigation potential \r\navailable in the USD100 tCO2-eq-1 carbon price scenario from IAMs. \r\nFurthermore, estimates of mitigation through forestry and other land \r\nuse-related options from the AR6 IAM scenario database represent \r\nthe net emissions from A/R and deforestation, thus are likely to be \r\nlower than the sectoral estimates of A/R potential expressed as \r\ngross removals."


id: a0c0f7eea2c01ef086f3a271a0b39625
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25487
content:
"In this section, the information on individual options reported  in \r\nSection  12.2.2 to sectoral and economy-wide totals has been \r\naggregated. It is concluded that, based on the sectoral analysis, the \r\nglobal mitigation potential is in the range of 32 to 44  GtCO2-eq. \r\nThis mitigation potential is substantially higher than that reported \r\nin AR4, but it is comparable to the more recent estimate by UNEP \r\n(2017). Differences exist with the results of IAMs, but most of these \r\ncan be well explained. The conclusion that the global potential is in \r\nthis range can be drawn with high agreement and robust evidence."


id: 22a44cee6583c4a5fb48908ac7584d7e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 3313
content:
"For the buildings and transport sectors, the sectoral mitigation \r\npotentials are higher than those projected by the IAMs. The \r\ndifference in the transport sector is particularly significant. One \r\npossible explanation is that options with negative costs are already \r\nincluded in the reference. In addition, some options, like avoiding \r\ndemand for energy services in the building sector and model shift in \r\ntransportation, are less well represented in IAMs."


id: c66e80941f4c16d80cd82e224da059d4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 32220
content:
"Given the median projection of the reference emissions of \r\n60 GtCO2-eq in 2030, the range of mitigation potentials presented \r\nhere is sufficient to bring down global emissions in the year 2030 \r\nto a level of 16 to 28 GtCO2-eq. Taking into account that there is \r\na range in reference projections for 2030 of 54 to 68 GtCO2-eq, the \r\nresulting emissions level shows a wider range: 12 to 31 GtCO2-eq. \r\nThis is about, or below half, the most recent (2019) emissions value \r\nof 59 +- 6.6 GtCO2-eq (high confidence)."


id: ea53f503a26ee25ad9670fcd182760c2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38582
content:
"For the industry sector, the sectoral emissions reduction potentials \r\nare somewhat higher than those reported on average by IAMs. The \r\ndifference can well be explained by the fact that most IAMs do not \r\ninclude circularity options like material efficiency and recycling; \r\nthese options together account for 1.5 GtCO2-eq at costs levels from \r\nUSD20 tCO2-eq-1 onwards."


id: 3b4663f01af352b988580da0a113ae93
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7615
content:
"As noted previously, a more qualitative approach is followed and less \r\nquantitative information is presented for 2050. The sectoral results are \r\nsummarised in Table 12.5. In addition to the many technologies that \r\nalready play a  role by 2030 (Table  12.3) additional technologies \r\nmay be needed for deep decarbonisation, for example for managing \r\npower systems with high shares of intermittent renewable sources \r\nand for providing new fuels and associated infrastructure for sectors \r\nthat are hard to decarbonise. New processes also play an important \r\nrole, notably for industrial processes. In general, stronger sector \r\ncoupling is needed, particularly increased integration of energy end \r\nuse and supply sectors."


id: e3925cc126a95254cfcf1013d7636cc1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37333
content:
"For mitigation of emissions of methane and fluorinated gases, the \r\ncomparability between the sectoral results and IAMs is good."


id: 40fa2d2cd08cd510e55077de4df4ac16
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8617
content:
"Overall, it is concluded that there are differences between the \r\nsectoral analyses and the IAM outcomes, but most of the differences \r\ncan be explained by the exclusion of specific options in most IAMs. \r\nThis comparability confirms the reliability of the sectoral analysis of \r\nemissions reduction potential. It also demonstrates the added value \r\nof sectoral analyses of mitigation potentials: they can more rapidly \r\nadapt to changes in price levels of technologies and adopt new \r\noptions for emissions mitigation."


id: 10b7800354167cd9bac614adaf1fe108
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 122
content:
"soil carbon sequestration (SCS), biochar, wetland/peatland \r\nrestoration and coastal restoration) are dealt with elsewhere in \r\nthis report (Chapters  6  and 7). These methods are synthesised \r\nin Section  12.3.2. Others, not dealt with elsewhere,  - direct air \r\ncarbon capture and storage (DACCS), enhanced weathering (EW) of \r\nminerals and ocean-based approaches including ocean fertilisation \r\n(OF) and ocean alkalinity enhancement (OAE)  - are discussed in \r\nSections  12.3.1.1 to 12.3.1.3 below (see also IPCC 2019b and \r\nAR6 WGI, Section 5.6). Some methods, such as BECCS and DACCS, \r\ninvolve carbon storage in geological formations, which is discussed \r\nin Chapter 6. The climate system and the carbon cycle responses to \r\nCDR deployment and each method's physical and biogeochemical \r\ncharacteristics such as storage form and duration are assessed in \r\nChapters 4 and 5 of the AR6 WGI report."


id: 56cc9d79fc9c9310dc243a675fa9f889
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12522
content:
"Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) refers to a  cluster of technologies, \r\npractices, and approaches that remove and sequester carbon dioxide \r\nfrom the atmosphere and durably store the carbon in geological, \r\nterrestrial, or ocean reservoirs, or in products. Despite the common \r\nfeature of removing carbon dioxide, CDR methods can be very \r\ndifferent (Smith et al. 2017). There are proposed methods for removal \r\nof non-CO2 greenhouse gases such as methane (Jackson et al. 2019; \r\nJackson et al. 2021) but scarcity of literature on these methods \r\nprevents assessment here."


id: 791a5d9f5bee3622fc0b6ff3c6d73cdc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18495
content:
"A number of CDR methods (e.g.,  afforestation/reforestation \r\n(A/R), bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS), "


id: 78b9fc24a09d4fa2a57ab166ec24a06e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 18432
content:
"Authors: Oliver Geden (Germany), Alaa Al Khourdajie (United Kingdom/Syria), Christopher Bataille (Canada), Goran Berndes \r\n(Sweden), Holly Jean Buck (the United States of America), Katherine Calvin (the United States of America), Annette Cowie (Australia), \r\nKiane  de  Kleijne (the Netherlands), Jan Christoph Minx (Germany), Gert-Jan Nabuurs (the Netherlands), Glen P.  Peters (Norway/\r\nAustralia), Andy Reisinger (New Zealand), Pete Smith (United Kingdom), Masahiro Sugiyama (Japan)"


id: e3fdb4c74475eb5dc56e0086c42f45f7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37403
content:
"CDR refers to anthropogenic activities that remove CO2 from the atmosphere and store it durably in geological, terrestrial, or ocean\r\nreservoirs, or in products. It includes anthropogenic enhancement of biological, geochemical or chemical CO2 sinks, but excludes \r\nnatural CO2 uptake not directly caused by human activities. Increases in land carbon sink strength due to CO2 fertilisation or other \r\nindirect effects of human activities are not considered CDR (see Glossary). Carbon capture and storage (CCS) and carbon capture and \r\nutilisation (CCU) applied to CO2 from fossil fuel use are not CDR methods as they do not remove CO2 from the atmosphere. CCS and \r\nCCU can, however, be part of CDR methods if the CO2 has been captured from the atmosphere, either indirectly in the form of biomass \r\nor directly from ambient air, and stored durably in geological reservoirs or products (Sections 11.3.6 and 12.3)."


id: f64363e13673e442af03c1b245bc53b3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40686
content:
"Cross-Chapter Box 8, Figure 1 | Carbon dioxide removal taxonomy. Methods are categorised based on removal process (grey shades) and \r\nstorage medium (for which timescales of storage are given, yellow/brown shades). Main implementation options are included for each CDR method. \r\nNote that specific land-based implementation options can be associated with several CDR methods, for example, agroforestry can support soil carbon sequestration \r\nand provide biomass for biochar or BECCS. Source: adapted from Minx et al. (2018)."


id: aac33126591d737513f90ebc560ba852
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27267
content:
"shorter storage times and is more vulnerable than carbon stored in buildings as wood products; as biochar in soils, cement and other \r\nmaterials; or in chemical products made from biomass or potentially through direct air (Fuss et al. 2018; Minx et al. 2018; NASEM \r\n2019) capture (Section 11.3.6; AR6 WGI, Figure 5.36). Within the same category (e.g., land-based biological CDR) options often differ \r\nwith respect to other dynamic or context-specific dimensions, such as mitigation potential, cost, potential for co-benefits and adverse \r\nside effects, and technology readiness level (Table 12.6)."


id: e890386bc72798a97ff4c40ae32b367d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38253
content:
"Within ambitious mitigation strategies at global or national levels, CDR cannot serve as a substitute for deep emissions reductions but \r\ncan fulfil multiple complementary roles: it can (i) further reduce net CO2 or GHG emission levels in the near-term; (ii) counterbalance \r\nresidual emissions from hard-to-transition sectors, such as CO2 from industrial activities and long-distance transport (e.g., aviation, \r\nshipping), or methane and nitrous oxide from agriculture, in order to help reach net zero CO2 or GHG emissions in the mid-term; \r\n(iii) achieve and sustain net-negative CO2 or GHG emissions in the long-term, by deploying CDR at levels exceeding annual residual \r\ngross CO2 or GHG emissions (Sections 2.7.3 and 3.5)."


id: 634e2bd082d0e9f2709febc252d28abf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14769
content:
"In general, these roles of CDR are not mutually exclusive and can exist in parallel. For example, achieving net zero CO2 or GHG \r\nemissions globally might involve some countries already reaching net-negative levels at the time of global net zero, allowing \r\nother countries more time to achieve this. Equally, achieving net-negative CO2 emissions globally, which could address a potential \r\ntemperature overshoot by lowering atmospheric CO2 concentrations, does not necessarily involve all countries reaching net-negative \r\nlevels (Rajamani et al. 2021; Rogelj et al. 2021) (Cross-Chapter Box 3 in Chapter 3)."


id: dfef74fcb0c61ebfd82a28356a8ea474
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36640
content:
"Cross-Chapter Box 8, Figure 2 shows these multiple roles of CDR in a stylised ambitious mitigation pathway that can be applied to \r\nglobal and national levels. While such mitigation pathways will differ in their shape and exact composition, they include the same \r\nbasic components: CO2 emissions from fossil sources, CO2 emissions from managed land, non-CO2 emissions, and various forms of \r\nCDR. Cross-Chapter Box 8, Figure 2 also illustrates the importance of distinguishing between gross CO2 removals from the atmosphere \r\nthrough deployment of CDR methods and the net emissions outcome (i.e., gross emissions minus gross removals)."


id: 3c4230b1ab9301bdc1dc7e80c10d5b42
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7793
content:
"CDR methods currently deployed on managed land, such as afforestation or reforestation and improved forest management, lead to CO2\r\nremovals already today, even when net emissions from land use are still positive, for example, when gross emissions from deforestation \r\nand draining peatlands exceed gross removals from afforestation or reforestation and ecosystem conservation (Sections 2.2 and 7.2; "


id: eea19b7a6f13cc230722050177d65c61
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 39364
content:
"Cross-Chapter Box  6  in Chapter  7). As there are currently no removal methods for non-CO2 gases that have progressed beyond \r\nconceptual discussions (Jackson et al. 2021), achieving net zero GHG implies gross CO2 removals to counterbalance residual emissions \r\nof both CO2 and non-CO2 gases, applying 100-year global warming potential (GWP100) as the metric for reporting CO2-equivalent \r\nemissions, as required for emissions reporting under the Rulebook of the Paris Agreement (Cross-Chapter Box 2 in Chapter 2)."


id: 1c5fd460f5d6298490153d9f13b673c3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 2182
content:
"Net zero CO2 emissions will be achieved earlier than net zero GHG emissions. As volumes of residual non-CO2 emissions are expected \r\nto be significant, this time-lag could reach one to several decades, depending on the respective size and composition of residual GHG \r\nemissions at the time of net zero CO2 emissions. Furthermore, counterbalancing residual non-CO2 emissions by CO2 removals will lead \r\nto net-negative CO2 emissions at the time of net zero GHG emissions (Cross-Chapter Box 3 in Chapter 3)."


id: 4d1bdec855fa061ca04bda16abb95e0e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10837
content:
"Figure 12.3 | Sequestration through three predominant CDR methods: BECCS, CO2 removal from AFOLU (mainly A/R), and DACCS (upper panels) annual \r\nsequestration and (lower panels) cumulative sequestration. The IAM scenarios described in the figure correspond to those that limit warming to 2degC (>67%) or lower. \r\nThe black line in each of the upper panels indicates the median of all the scenarios in categories C1 to C3. Hinges in the lower panels represent the interquartile ranges while \r\nwhiskers extend to 5th and 95th percentiles. The IMPs are highlighted with colours, as shown in the key. The number of scenarios is indicated in the header of each panel. \r\nThe number of scenarios with a non-zero DACCS value is 146."


id: 10ace5c265a6263d35ddb59e313597ac
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 117
content:
"of deployment, which presents a challenge since rapid and sustained \r\nupscaling from a small base is particularly difficult (de Coninck et al. \r\n2018; Nemet et al. 2018; Hanna et al. 2021). All Illustrative Mitigation \r\nPathways (IMPs) that limit warming to 2degC (>67%) or lower use \r\nsome form of CDR.  Across the full range of similarly ambitious \r\nIAM scenarios (scenario categories C1 to C3; see Section 3.3), the "


id: b5f9575509234613adeb38fe08a649cc
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29236
content:
"and deployment scenario, CDR methods could bring about various \r\nco-benefits and adverse side effects (see below). All this highlights the \r\nneed for appropriate CDR governance and policies (Section 12.3.3)."


id: 1b5ad669ec197914c5b7ed370edea65d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1989
content:
"Bistline and Blanford 2021; Garcia-Freites et al. 2021; Jackson et al. \r\n2021; Kato and Kurosawa 2021; Negri et al. 2021) while the literature \r\noutside developed countries is limited (Alatiq et al. 2021; Fuhrman \r\net al. 2021b; Weng et al. 2021)."


id: 30d6b56b2ea5505afdc3d09151464284
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5849
content:
"In IAMs, CDR is contributed mainly by the energy sector (through \r\nBECCS) and AFOLU (through A/R) (Figure 12.3). IAMs are starting to \r\ninclude other CDR methods, such as DACCS and enhanced weathering \r\n(Section 12.3.1), which are yet to be attributed to specific sectors in \r\nIAMs. Following IPCC guidance for UNFCCC inventories, A/R and SCS \r\nare reported in land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF), while \r\nBECCS would be reported in the sector where the carbon capture occurs, \r\nthat is, the energy sector in the case of electricity and heat production, \r\nand the industry sector for BECCS linked to manufacturing (e.g., steel \r\nor hydrogen) (Tanzer et al. 2020; Bui et al. 2021; Tanzer et al. 2021)."


id: 550717adf1b1f99645a522f54c064d6f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12229
content:
"This section assesses the CDR methods that are not carried out solely \r\nwithin conventional sectors and so are not covered in other parts of the \r\nreport: direct air carbon capture and storage, enhanced weathering, \r\nand ocean-based approaches. It provides an overview of each CDR \r\nmethod: their costs, potentials, risks and impacts, co-benefits, and \r\ntheir role in mitigation pathways. Since these processes, approaches \r\nand technologies have medium to low technology readiness levels, \r\nthey are subject to significant uncertainty."


id: 2c0dc1736c7a87878901795882c54c85
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5009
content:
"At the national and regional levels, the role of land-based biological \r\nCDR methods has long been analysed, but there is little detailed \r\ntechno-economic assessment of the role of other CDR methods. There \r\nis a  small but emerging literature providing such assessments for \r\ndeveloped countries (Kraxner et al. 2014; Baik et al. 2018; Daggash \r\net al. 2018; Patrizio et al. 2018; Sanchez et al. 2018; Breyer et al. 2019; \r\nKato and Kurosawa 2019; Larsen et al. 2019; McQueen et al. 2020; "


id: 8f67b46373a62df56f5507d7cac9468a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22442
content:
"using mineral carbonation) (Hepburn et al. 2019). The efficiency and \r\nenvironmental impacts of DACCS and DACCU options depend on \r\nthe carbon intensity of the energy input (electricity and heat) and \r\nother lifecycle assessment (LCA) considerations (Zimmerman 2018; \r\nJacobson 2019). See Chapters 6 and 11 for further details regarding \r\ncarbon capture and utilisation. Another key consideration is the net \r\ncarbon CO2 removal of DACCS over its lifecycle (Madhu et al. 2021). \r\nDeutz and Bardow (2021) and Terlouw et al. (2021) demonstrated \r\nthat the life-cycle net emissions of DACCS systems can be negative, \r\neven for existing supply chains and some current energy mixes. They \r\nfound that the GHG intensity of energy sources is a key factor."


id: 895970cb05bbe5698d012c4c3d4b8906
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21339
content:
"vs nth plant) (Lackner et al. 2012), different configurations, and \r\ndisparate system boundaries. Estimates of industrial origin are often \r\non the lower side (Ishimoto et al. 2017). Fuss et al. (2018) suggest \r\na cost range of USD600-1000 tCO2\r\n-1 for first-of-a-kind plants, and \r\nUSD100-300 tCO2\r\n-1 as experience accumulates. An expert elicitation \r\nstudy found a similar cost level for 2050 with a median of around \r\nUSD200 tCO2\r\n-1 (Shayegh et al. 2021) (medium evidence, medium \r\nagreement). NASEM (2019) systematically evaluated the costs of \r\ndifferent designs and found a range of 84-386 USD2015 tCO2\r\n-1 for \r\nthe designs currently considered by active technology developers. This \r\ncost range excludes the site-specific costs of transportation or storage."


id: 2acc704091d8e2d0f18de7ed32b8cb63
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4759
content:
"DAC options can be differentiated by the specific chemical processes \r\nused to capture ambient CO2 from the air and recover it from the \r\nsorbent (Fasihi et al. 2019). The main categories are (i) liquid solvents \r\nwith high-temperature regeneration, (ii) solid sorbents with low\u0002temperature regeneration and (iii) regenerating by moisturising of \r\nsolid sorbents. Other approaches such as electro-swing (Voskian and \r\nHatton 2019) have been proposed but are less developed. Compared \r\nto other CDR methods, the primary barrier to upscaling DAC is its high \r\ncost and large energy requirement (high confidence) (Nemet et al. \r\n2018), which can be reduced through innovation. It has therefore \r\nattracted entrepreneurs and private investments (IEA 2020b)."


id: ec9e5dccafe347913488d2ed77bd3114
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 38989
content:
"Costs: As the process captures dilute CO2 (~0.04%) from the \r\nambient air, it is less efficient and more costly than conventional \r\ncarbon capture applied to power plants and industrial installations \r\n(with a  CO2 concentration of ~10%) (high confidence). The cost \r\nof a liquid solvent system is dominated by the energy cost (because \r\nof the much higher energy demand for CO2 regeneration, which \r\nreduces the efficiency) while capital costs account for a significant \r\nshare of the cost of solid sorbent systems (Fasihi et al. 2019). The \r\nrange of the DAC cost estimates found in the literature is wide \r\n(USD60-1000 tCO2\r\n-1) (Fuss et al. 2018) partly because different \r\nstudies assume different use cases, differing phases (first plant "


id: 5d87c645330be9298a524239ead7e8c
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 13738
content:
"Co-benefits: While Wohland et al. (2018) proposed solid sorbent\u0002based DAC plants as a Power-to-X technology that could use excess \r\nrenewable power (at times of low or even negative prices), such \r\noperation would add additional costs. Installations would need to \r\nbe designed for intermittent operations (i.e., at low load factors) \r\nwhich would negatively affect capital and operation costs (Daggash \r\net al. 2018; Sandalow et al. 2018) as a high time-resolution model \r\nsuggests a  high utilisation rate (Breyer et al. 2020). Solid sorbent \r\nDAC designs can potentially remove more water from the ambient \r\nair than needed for regeneration, thereby delivering surplus water \r\nthat would contribute to SDG 6 (clean water and sanitation) in arid \r\nregions (Sandalow et al. 2018; Fasihi et al. 2019)."


id: 703a0cd377b4d9502e858b069955b5fd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 16996
content:
"Status, costs, potentials, risk and impacts, co-benefits, trade-offs and \r\nspillover effects and the role in mitigation pathways of DACCS are \r\nsummarised in Table 12.6."


id: e65b5056d2db479d016f33a6ebffafe5
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37831
content:
"Trade-offs and spillover effects: Liquid solvent DACCS systems \r\nneed substantial amounts of water (Fasihi et al. 2019), although \r\nmuch less than BECCS systems (Smith et al. 2016), which could \r\nnegatively affect SDG 6 (clean water and sanitation). Although the \r\nhigh energy demand of DACCS could affect SDG 7 (affordable and \r\nclean energy) negatively through potential competition or positively \r\nthrough learning effects (Beuttler et al. 2019), its impact has not been \r\nthoroughly assessed yet."


id: 15caab117a7e5623f0413ee596461488
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 1052
content:
"Role in mitigation pathways: There are a few IAM studies that \r\nhave explicitly incorporated DACCS. Stringent emissions constraints \r\nin these studies lead to high carbon prices, allowing DACCS to \r\nplay an important role in mitigation. Chen and Tavoni (2013) \r\nexamined the role of DACCS in an IAM (WITCH) and found that \r\nincorporating DACCS reduces the overall cost of mitigation and tends \r\nto postpone the timing of mitigation. The scale of capture goes up \r\nto 37 GtCO2 yr-1 in 2100. Akimoto et al. (2021) introduced DACCS \r\nin the IAM DNE21+, and also found the long-term marginal cost of \r\nabatement is significantly reduced by DACCS. Marcucci et al. (2017) \r\nran MERGE-ETL, an integrated model with endogenous learning, and \r\nshowed that DACCS allows for a model solution for the 1.5degC target, "


id: 5f2a8c69e0c094e1ece4897e2b3c2fd2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14046
content:
"Status: Enhanced weathering has been demonstrated in the \r\nlaboratory and in small-scale field trials (TRL 3-4) but has yet to \r\nbe demonstrated at scale (Beerling et al. 2018; Amann et al. 2020). "


id: 2ddf7433664f5f5acd06d029a3f5772e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5351
content:
"Risks and impacts: Mining of rocks for enhanced weathering will \r\nhave local impacts and carries risks similar to those associated with \r\nthe mining of mineral construction aggregates, with the possible \r\nadditional risk of greater dust generation from fine comminution \r\nand land application. In addition to direct habitat destruction and \r\nincreased traffic to access mining sites, there could be adverse \r\nimpacts on local water quality (Younger and Wolkersdorfer 2004)."


id: cfbe433914e58112e7d6ecd786b32365
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33910
content:
"Trade-offs and spillover effects: Air quality could be adversely \r\naffected by the spreading of rock dust (Edwards et al. 2017), though this \r\ncan partly be ameliorated by water-spraying (Grundnig et al. 2006). As \r\nnoted above, any significant expansion of the mining industry would \r\nrequire careful assessment to avoid possible detrimental effects on \r\nbiodiversity (Amundson et al. 2015). The processing of an additional \r\n10 billion tonnes of rock would require up to 3000 Terawatt-hours \r\nof energy, which could represent approximately 0.1-6 % of global \r\nelectricity use in 2100. The emissions associated with this additional \r\nenergy generation may reduce the net carbon dioxide removal by up \r\nto 30% with present-day grid average emissions, but this efficiency \r\nloss would decrease with low-carbon power (Beerling et al. 2020)."


id: 9e5e196512edc070824293280750a9b3
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 25090
content:
"Role in mitigation pathways: Only one study to date has included \r\nenhanced weathering in an integrated assessment model to explore \r\nmitigation pathways (Strefler et al. 2021)."


id: dd2b871b664e170e87a56f0fb408edd8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 36177
content:
"Status, costs, potentials, risk and impacts, co-benefits, trade-offs and \r\nspillover effects and the role in mitigation pathways of enhanced \r\nweathering are summarised in Table 12.6."


id: b2df5ecb25e58247f0e1b952e165943
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28707
content:
"The ocean, which covers over 70% of the Earth's surface, contains \r\nabout 38,000 gigatonnes of carbon, some 45 times more than the \r\npresent atmosphere, and oceanic uptake has already consumed \r\nclose to 30-40% of anthropogenic carbon emissions (Sabine \r\net al. 2004; Gruber et al. 2019). The ocean is characterised by diverse \r\nbiogeochemical cycles involving carbon, and ocean circulation has \r\nmuch longer timescales than the atmosphere, meaning that additional "


id: 630298f05c96abb651dde4b43f3a8e50
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14714
content:
"storage (Blain et al. 2008; Williamson et al. 2012; Trull et al. 2015). \r\nThe efficiency of OF also depends on the region and experimental \r\nconditions, especially in relation to the availability of other nutrients, \r\nlight and temperature (Aumont and Bopp 2006). In the case of \r\nmacronutrients, very large quantities are needed and the proposed \r\nscaling of this technique has been viewed as unrealistic (Williamson \r\nand Bodle 2016)."


id: af1bca391a0fa621f3fee463989c6b85
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 28053
content:
"Costs: Ocean fertilisation costs depend on nutrient production \r\nand its delivery to the application area (Jones 2014). The costs \r\nrange from USD2 tCO2\r\n-1 for fertilisation with iron (Boyd 2008) to \r\nUSD457 tCO2\r\n-1 for nitrate (Harrison 2013). Reported costs for \r\nmacronutrient application at USD20 tCO2\r\n-1 (Jones 2014) contrast \r\nwith higher estimates by (Harrison 2013) reporting that low costs are \r\ndue to overestimation of sequestration capacity and underestimation \r\nof logistical costs. The median of OF cost estimates, USD230 tCO2\r\n-1 \r\n(Gattuso et al., 2021) indicates low cost-effectiveness, albeit \r\nuncertainties are large."


id: f7164b0231b3e48347e6f04e9664e6d7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 40842
content:
"Risks and impacts: Several of the mesoscale iron enrichment \r\nexperiments have seen the emergence of potentially toxic species \r\nof diatoms (Silver et al. 2010; Trick et al. 2010). There is also (limited) \r\nevidence of increased concentrations of other GHGs such as methane \r\nand nitrous oxide during the subsurface decomposition of the sinking \r\nparticles from iron-stimulated blooms (Law 2008). Impacts on \r\nmarine biology and food web structure are not well known, however \r\nOF at large scale could cause changes in nutrient distributions or \r\nanoxia in subsurface water (Fuhrman and Capone 1991; DFO \r\n2010). Other potential risks are perturbation to marine ecosystems \r\nvia reorganisation of community structure, enhanced deep ocean \r\nacidification (Oschlies et al. 2010) and effects on human food supply."


id: 864217d0c4b7fc2af2255dcb6a0cc3a1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20776
content:
"Status: OF has a  natural analogue: periods of glaciation in the \r\ngeological past are associated with changes in deposition of dust \r\ncontaining iron into the ocean. Increased formation of phytoplankton \r\nhas also been observed during seasonal deposition of dust from the \r\nArabian Peninsula and ash deposition on the ocean surface after \r\nvolcanic eruptions (Achterberg et al. 2013; Jaccard et al., 2013; Olgun \r\net al. 2013; Martinez-Garcia et al. 2014). OF options may appear \r\ntechnologically feasible, and enhancement of photosynthesis and \r\nCO2 uptake from surface waters is confirmed by a number of field \r\nexperiments conducted in different areas of the ocean, but there is \r\nscientific uncertainty about the proportion of newly-formed organic \r\ncarbon that is transferred to deep ocean, and the longevity of "


id: 272f5ab7fedd1572a11fc05755b72f87
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4057
content:
"Co-benefits: Co-benefits of OF include a potential increase in fish \r\nbiomass through enhanced biological production (Minx et al. 2018) \r\nand reduced ocean acidification in the short term in the upper \r\nocean (by CO2 removal), though it could be enhanced in the long \r\nterm in the ocean interior (by CO2 release) (Oschlies et al., 2010; \r\nGattuso et al. 2018)."


id: b9e46bf6057c4679112d211457b03c57
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 29927
content:
"Trade-offs and spillover effects: Potential drawbacks include \r\nsubsurface ocean acidification and deoxygenation (Cao and Caldeira \r\n2010; Oschlies et al., 2010; Williamson et al. 2012); altered regional \r\nmeridional nutrient supply and fundamental alteration of food webs \r\n(GESAMP 2019); and increased production of N2O and CH4 (Jin and \r\nGruber 2003; Lampitt et al. 2008). Ocean fertilisation is considered \r\nto have negative consequences for eight SDGs, and a combination \r\nof both positive and negative consequences for seven SDGs \r\n(Honegger et al. 2020)."


id: 8936f07aa5b01e00b0e9406fc1317511
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21308
content:
"2017). Some authors suggest use of maritime transport to discharge \r\ncalcium hydroxide (slaked lime) (Caserini et al. 2021)."


id: f94ea1a7913bdf89b64248c71042527b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 41225
content:
"Costs: Techno-economic assessments of OAE largely focus on \r\nquantifying overall energy and carbon balances. Cost ranges are \r\nUSD40-260 tCO2\r\n-1 (Fuss et al. 2018). Considering life-cycle carbon \r\nand energy balances for various OAE options, adding lime (or other \r\nreactive calcium or magnesium oxide/hydroxides) to the ocean would \r\ncost USD64-260 tCO2\r\n-1 (Renforth et al. 2013; Renforth &  Kruger \r\n2013; Caserini et al. 2019). Rau (2008) and Rau et al. (2018) estimate \r\nthat electrochemical processes for increasing ocean alkalinity may \r\nhave a net cost of USD3-160 tCO2\r\n-1, largely depending on energy \r\ncost and co-product (H2) market value. In the case of direct addition \r\nof alkaline minerals to the ocean (i.e., without calcination), the cost \r\nis estimated to be USD20-50 tCO2\r\n-1 (Harvey 2008; Kohler et al. 2013; \r\nRenforth and Henderson 2017)."


id: abcd08e9ac8ece4d1e4d76ad77011476
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27470
content:
"sequestration in shallow coastal ecosystems (Duarte, 2017). About \r\n20% of the countries that are signatories to the Paris Agreement \r\nrefer to blue carbon approaches for climate change mitigation \r\nin their NDCs and are moving toward measuring blue carbon in \r\ninventories. About 40% of those same countries have pledged to \r\nmanage shallow coastal ecosystems for climate change adaptation \r\n(Kuwae and Hori 2019)."


id: 303a2b789accf3e26c9fbac000d6a884
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5740
content:
"Co-benefits: Intentional addition of alkalinity to the oceans \r\nthrough OAE would decrease the risk to ocean ecosystems caused \r\nby the  CO2-induced impact of ocean acidification on marine biota \r\nand the global carbon cycle (Doney et al. 2009; Kohler et al. 2010; Rau \r\net al. 2012; Williamson and Turley 2012; Albright et al. 2016; Bach et al. \r\n2019). OAE could be jointly implemented with enhanced weathering \r\n(Section  12.3.1.2), spreading the finely crushed rock in the ocean \r\nrather than on land. Regional alkalinisation could be effective in \r\nprotecting coral reefs against acidification (Feng et al. 2016; Mongin \r\net al., 2021) and coastal OAE could be part of a broader strategy for \r\ngeochemical management of the coastal zone, safeguarding specific \r\ncoastal ecosystems, such as important shellfisheries, from the adverse \r\nimpact of ocean acidification (Meysman and Montserrat 2017)."


id: 9b56c6f8ef8bcb7136c2e6923438bcab
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 24578
content:
"Costs: There are large differences in the cost of CDR applying blue \r\ncarbon management methods between different ecosystems (and at \r\nthe local level). Median values are estimated as USD240, 30,000, and \r\n7800 tCO2\r\n-1, respectively for mangroves, salt marsh and seagrass \r\nhabitats (Gattuso et al. 2021). Currently estimated cost effectiveness \r\n(for climate change mitigation) is very low (Siikamaki et al. 2012; \r\nBayraktarov et al. 2016; Narayan et al. 2016)."


id: 3ef441f245822e57b6adfdde875324b2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 8263
content:
"Potentials: Globally, the total potential carbon sequestration \r\nrate through blue carbon CDR is estimated in the range \r\n0.02-0.08  GtCO2 yr-1 (Wilcox et al. 2017; National Academies \r\nof Sciences 2019). Gattuso et al. (2021) estimate the theoretical \r\ncumulative potential of coastal blue carbon management by 2100 \r\nto be 95 GtCO2, taking into account the maximum area that can be \r\noccupied by these habitats and historic losses of mangroves, seagrass \r\nand salt marsh ecosystems."


id: 2d0ffd08b763113086a59dd01a327c86
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5203
content:
"Risks and impacts: For blue carbon management, potential risks \r\nrelate to the high sensitivity of coastal ecosystems to external impacts \r\nassociated with both degradation and attempts to increase carbon \r\nsequestration. Under expected future warming, sea level rise and \r\nchanges in coastal management, blue carbon ecosystems are at risk, \r\nand their stored carbon is at risk of being lost (Bindoff et al. 2019)."


id: c061f42b64511aa62f8f30a104a6bec4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31146
content:
"Co-benefits: Blue carbon management provides many non-climatic \r\nbenefits and can contribute to ecosystem-based adaptation, also \r\nreducing emissions associated with habitat degradation and loss \r\n(Howard et al. 2017; Hamilton and Friess 2018). Shallow coastal \r\necosystems have been severely affected by human activity; significant \r\nareas have already been deforested or degraded and continue to be \r\ndenuded. These processes are accompanied by carbon emissions. The \r\nconservation and restoration of coastal ecosystems, which will lead to \r\nincreased carbon sequestration, is also essential for the preservation \r\nof basic ecosystem services, and healthy ecosystems tend to be more \r\nresilient to the effects of climate change."


id: 5fa92148c8ae3f7b006f4f04769dd169
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14140
content:
"Trade-offs and spillover effects: Blue carbon management \r\nschemes should consist of a  mix of restoration, conservation and \r\nareal increase, including complex engineering interventions that \r\nenhance natural capital, safeguard their resilience and the ecosystem \r\nservices they provide, and decrease the sensitivity of such ecosystems \r\nto further disturbances."


id: bb2d30cb97cd35ced7702c48c40e7721
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 30149
content:
"The term 'blue carbon' was used originally to refer to biological carbon \r\nsequestration in all marine ecosystems, but it is increasingly applied \r\nto CDR associated with rooted vegetation in the coastal zone, such \r\nas tidal marshes, mangroves and seagrasses. Potential for carbon \r\nsequestration in other coastal and non-coastal ecosystems, such as \r\nmacroalgae (e.g., kelp), is debated (Krause-Jensen and Duarte, 2016; \r\nKrause-Jensen et al., 2018). In this report, blue carbon refers to CDR \r\nthrough coastal blue carbon management."


id: 36e0827b59395cf5cc03138d099edd5e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6881
content:
"Artificial upwelling: This concept uses pipes or other methods to \r\npump nutrient-rich deep ocean water to the surface where it has \r\na fertilising effect (see OF section). To achieve CO2 removal at a Gt \r\nmagnitude, modelling studies have shown that artificial upwelling "


id: 2cbb1fd555c3a7d32dcccd9aab42650b
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 5134
content:
"thods DACCS, \r\na barrier (B) to t\r\nat there is no or \r\nn overview of th\r\nsed. The assessm\r\nEconomic \r\nCosts in 2030 and long term\r\nEffects on employment and \r\neconomic growth\r\nB E B \r\nrs and barriers \r\n100"


id: bfd9b1872c5fe2c7ad0ff67dd5d4947
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31038
content:
"the atmosphere into the ocean to restore equilibrium. Electrochemical \r\nseawater CO2 extraction has been modelled, prototyped, and \r\nanalysed from a techno-economic perspective (Eisaman et al., 2012; \r\nWillauer et al., 2017; de Lannoy et al., 2018; Eisaman et al., 2018a; \r\nEisaman et al., 2018b)."


id: a6173b760541498a60acc1f02840041e
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26441
content:
"would have to be implemented on a  massive scale (over 50% of \r\nthe ocean to deliver maximum rate of 10GtCO2 yr-1 under RCP8.5) \r\n(Oschlies et al., 2010, Keller et al. 2014). Because the deep water \r\nis much colder than surface water, at massive scale this could cool \r\nthe Earth's surface by several degrees, but the cooling effect would \r\ncease as the deeper ocean warms, and would reverse, leading \r\nto rapid warming, if the pumping ceased (Oschlies et al., 2010, \r\nKeller et al. 2014)."


id: 752082cd26ce51c31a07c13410b982f8
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 17842
content:
"Status, costs, potentials, risk and impacts, co-benefits, trade-offs and \r\nspillover effects and the role in mitigation pathways of ocean-based \r\napproaches are summarised in Table 12.6."


id: 679e3f1e65865f002a9fb86b53e22928
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15494
content:
"Furthermore, the cooling would also severely alter atmospheric \r\ncirculation and precipitation patterns (Kwiatkowski et al. 2015). \r\nSeveral upwelling approaches have been developed and tested (Pan \r\net al., 2016) and more R&D is underway."


id: a3e27d1e8bb8be73490181dfc2d121d1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26025
content:
"Following the framework presented in Section  6.4 and Annex II, \r\nPart  IV, Section  11, a  multi-dimensional feasibility assessment of \r\nthe CDR methods covered here is provided in Figure  12.4, taking \r\ninto account the assessment presented in this section. Both DACCS \r\nand EW perform positively on the geophysical and technological \r\ndimensions while for ocean-based approaches performance is mixed. \r\nThere is limited evidence to assess social-cultural, environmental/\r\necological, and institutional dimensions as the literature is still \r\nnascent for DACCS and EW, while these aspects are positive for blue \r\ncarbon and mixed or negative for ocean fertilisation. On the economic \r\ndimension, the cost is assessed negatively for all CDR methods."


id: e1ea328bd5917922b2022e1a05e055c6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37029
content:
"Terrestrial biomass dumping: There are proposals to sink terrestrial \r\nbiomass (crop residues or logs) into the deep ocean as a means of \r\nsequestering carbon (Strand and Benford 2009). Sinking biochar \r\nhas also been proposed (Miller and Orton, 2021). Decomposition \r\nwould be inhibited by the cold and sometimes hypoxic/anoxic \r\nenvironment on the ocean floor, and absence of bacteria that \r\ndecompose terrestrial lignocellulosic biomass, so storage timescale \r\nis estimated at hundreds to thousands of years (Strand and Benford \r\n2009) (Burdige 2005). Potential side effects on marine ecosystems, \r\nchemistry, or circulation have not been thoroughly assessed. Neither \r\nhave these concepts been evaluated with respect to the impacts on \r\nland from enhanced transfer of nutrients and organic matter to the \r\nocean, nor the relative merits of alternative applications of residues \r\nand biochar as an energy source or soil amendment (Chapter 7)."


id: ace177cf03b6920ba8a320193420c10a
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 27655
content:
"Status: BECCS, afforestation/reforestation (A/R), soil carbon \r\nsequestration (SCS) and biochar are land-based biological CDR \r\nmethods (Smith et al. 2016). BECCS combines biomass use for energy \r\nwith CCS to capture and store the biogenic carbon geologically \r\n(Section  6.4.2.6); A/R and SCS involve fixing atmospheric carbon \r\nin biomass and soils, and biochar involves converting biomass to \r\nbiochar and using it as a soil amendment. These CDR methods can \r\nbe associated with both co-benefits and adverse side effects (Smith \r\net al. 2016; Hurlbert et al. 2019; Mbow et al. 2019; Olsson et al. 2019; \r\nSchleicher et al. 2019; Smith et al. 2019b; Babin et al. 2021; Dooley \r\net al. 2021) (Sections 7.4 and 12.5)."


id: 2b8fe28d09ff4ec2e6be1853b1b226c6
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 4919
content:
"Among CDR methods, BECCS and A/R are most commonly selected by \r\nIAMs to meet the requirements of scenarios that limit warming to 2degC \r\n(>67%) or lower. This is partially because of the long lead time required \r\nto refine IAMs to include additional methods and update techno\u0002economic parameters. Currently, few IAMs represent SCS or biochar \r\n(Frank et al. 2017). Given the removal potential of SCS and biochar and \r\nsome potential co-benefits, more efforts should be made to include \r\nthese methods within IAMs, so that their mitigation potential can be \r\ncompared to other CDR methods, along with possible co-benefits and \r\nadverse side effects (Smith et al. 2016; Rogelj et al. 2018) (Section 12.5)."


id: 66fd921c6019be3018737f05a1ebce93
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15388
content:
"Extraction of CO2 from seawater (with storage): CO2 can be \r\nextracted by applying a  vacuum, or by purging with a  gas low in \r\nCO2 (Koweek et al., 2016). CO2 stripping can also be accomplished \r\nby acidifying seawater with a mineral acid, or through electrodialysis \r\nand electrolysis, to convert bicarbonate ions (HCO3\r\n-\r\n) to CO2 (Willauer \r\net al., 2017; Eisaman et al., 2018; Digdaya et al., 2020; Eisaman 2020; \r\nSharifian et al., 2021). The removal of CO2 from the ocean surface \r\nleads to undersaturation in the water, thus forcing CO2 to move from "


id: 6719d5701dbe7ceeba0fbc6093421997
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 15412
content:
"Potential: The technical potential for BECCS by 2050 is estimated at \r\n0.5-11.3 GtCO2-eq yr-1 (Table 7.3). These potentials do not include \r\navoided emissions resulting from the use of heat, electricity and/or \r\nfuels provided by the BECCS system, which depend on substitution \r\npatterns, conversion efficiencies, and supply chain emissions for the "


id: 348427a8a79e6dc42dae75aa2635f674
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 6476
content:
"BECCS and substituted energy systems (Box  7.7). The mitigation \r\neffect of BECCS also depends on how deployment affects land carbon \r\nstocks and sink strength (Section 7.4.4)."


id: c0d5a0bb3e220b8d58c65ddcbec04140
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 31222
content:
"employment and local livelihoods, economic diversification, energy \r\nsecurity, and technology development and transfer (medium evidence,\r\nhigh agreement) (Fuss et al. 2018) (Chapter  7). It may contribute \r\nto reduction of other air pollutants, health benefits, and reduced \r\ndependency on imported fossil fuels. A/R can improve biodiversity \r\nif native and diverse species are used (Fuss et al. 2018). For biochar, \r\nadditional co-benefits include increased crop yields, reduced drought \r\nimpacts, and reduced CH4 and N2O emissions from soils (Joseph et al., \r\n2021) (Section 7.4.5.2). SCS can improve soil quality and resilience \r\nand improve agricultural productivity and food security (Frank et al. \r\n2017; Smith et al. 2019b)."


id: cb8dd600dd614a74a2cede4c2799e4cf
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33141
content:
"As detailed in Chapter 7, the technical potential for gross removals \r\nrealised through A/R in 2050 is 0.5-10.1  GtCO2-eq yr-1, and for \r\nimproved forest management the potential is 1-2.1 GtCO2-eq yr-1\r\n(including both CDR and emissions reduction). Technical potential for \r\nSCS in 2050 is estimated to be 0.6-9.4 GtCO2-eq yr-1, for agroforestry \r\nit is 0.3-9.4 GtCO2-eq yr-1, and for biochar it is 0.2-6.6 GtCO2-eq yr-1. \r\nPeatland and coastal wetland restoration have a technical potential \r\nof 0.5-2.1  GtCO2-eq yr-1 in 2050, with an estimated 80% of the \r\npotential being CDR.  Note that these potentials reflect only \r\nbiophysical and technological conditions and become reduced when \r\nfactoring in economic, environmental, socio-cultural and institutional \r\nconstraints (Table 12.6)."


id: cca651413e607336c14be9b49c4f561
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 33330
content:
"Role in mitigation pathways: Biomass use for BECCS in 2050 is \r\n61  EJ yr-1 (13-208  EJ yr-1, 5-95th percentile range) in scenarios \r\nlimiting warming to 1.5degC (>50%) with no or limited overshoot (C1, \r\nexcluding traditional energy). This corresponds to 5.3  GtCO2 yr-1\r\n(1.1-18 GtCO2 yr-1) CDR, if assuming 28 kg C GJ-1 biomass carbon \r\ncontent and 85% capture rate in BECCS systems. In scenarios that \r\nlimit warming to 2degC (>67%) (C3), biomass use for BECCS in 2050 \r\nis 28 EJ yr-1 (0-96 EJ yr-1, 5-95th percentile range), corresponding \r\nto 2.4 GtCO2 yr-1 (0-8.3 GtCO2 yr-1) CDR. Cumulative CO2 removal \r\nfrom AFOLU (mainly through A/R), as reported from models, \r\nin the period 2020 to 2100 is 262  GtCO2 (17-397  GtCO2) and \r\n209  GtCO2 (20-415  GtCO2) in C1 and C3 scenarios, respectively \r\n(5-95th percentile range)."


id: ff61c7c372b9bacbb71b6aef3109b487
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 42332
content:
"Costs: Costs across technologies vary substantially (Smith \r\net al. 2016) and were estimated to be USD15-400 tCO2\r\n-1 for \r\nBECSS, USD0-240 tCO2\r\n-1 for A/R, -USD45 to +USD100 tCO2-1 \r\nfor SCS and USD10-345 tCO2\r\n-1 for biochar. Fuss et al. (2018) \r\nestimated abatement cost ranges for BECCS, A/R, SCS and biochar \r\nto be 100-200, 5-50, 0-100, and 30-120 tCO2-eq-1 respectively, \r\ncorresponding to 2100  potentials. Ranges for economic potential \r\n(<USD100 tCO2\r\n-1) reported in Chapter 7 are 0.5-3.0 GtCO2 yr-1 (A/R); \r\n0.6-1.9 GtCO2 yr-1 (improved forest management); 0.7-2.5 GtCO2 yr-1\r\n(SCS); 0.4-1.1 GtCO2 yr-1 (agroforestry); 0.3-1.8 GtCO2 yr-1 (biochar); \r\nand 0.2-0.8 GtCO2 yr-1 (peatland and coastal wetland restoration)."


id: 6268ff9b90b109fba1e92ada4137a025
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14596
content:
"Uncertainties remain in two main areas: the availability of land and \r\nbiomass, which is affected by many factors (Anandarajah et al. 2018) \r\n(Chapter 7), and the role of other mitigation measures including CDR \r\nmethods other than A/R and BECCS. Strong near-term climate change \r\nmitigation to limit overshoot, and deployment of CDR methods other \r\nthan A/R and BECCS, may significantly reduce the contribution of \r\nthese CDR methods in scenarios limiting warming to 1.5degC or 2degC \r\n(Koberle 2019; Hasegawa et al. 2021)."


id: d24b4f99acf22d7aa86e8eeb5719d4a9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34352
content:
"Risks, impacts, and co-benefits: a brief summary of risks, impacts \r\nand co-benefits is provided here and more detail is provided \r\nin Chapter  7  and Section  12.5. A/R and biomass production for \r\nBECCS and biochar potentially compete for land, water and other \r\nresources, implying possible adverse outcomes for ecosystem health, \r\nbiodiversity, livelihoods and food security (medium evidence, high \r\nagreement) (Smith et al. 2016; Heck et al. 2018; Hurlbert et al. 2019; \r\nMbow et al. 2019) (Chapter 7). SCS requires the addition of nitrogen \r\nand phosphorus to maintain stoichiometry of soil organic matter, \r\nleading to a potential risk of eutrophication (Fuss et al. 2018). Apart \r\nfrom possible negative effects associated with biomass supply, \r\nadverse side effects from biochar are relatively low if the biomass is \r\nuncontaminated (Tisserant and Cherubini 2019)."


id: 5683168473738303b0cc9c5774bdefa9
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12478
content:
"Possible climate risks relate to direct and/or indirect land carbon \r\nlosses (A/R, BECCS, biochar), increased N2O emissions (BECCS, SCS), \r\nsaturation and non-permanence of carbon storage (A/R, SCS) (Jia et al. \r\n2019; Smith et al. 2019b) (Chapter 7), and potential CO2 leakage from \r\ndeep geological reservoirs (BECCS) (Chapter 6). Land cover change \r\nassociated with A/R and biomass supply for BECCS and biochar may \r\ncause albedo changes that reduce mitigation effectiveness (Fuss \r\net al. 2018; Jia et al. 2019). Potentially unfavourable albedo change \r\nresulting from biochar use can be minimised by incorporating biochar \r\ninto the soil (Fuss et al. 2018) (Chapter 7)."


id: a6494d25f151d9b2bf0337f3a6cd58d7
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 26473
content:
"mitigate biodiversity impacts and even improve ecosystem capacity \r\nto support biodiversity while mitigating climate change (Portner \r\net al. 2021) (Section 12.5). Systematic land-use planning could help \r\nto deliver land-based mitigation options that also limit trade-offs \r\nwith biodiversity (Longva et al. 2017) (Cross-Working Group Box 3: \r\nMitigation and Adaptation via the Bioeconomy, in this chapter)."


id: 8e932fa9b77dff30dc513a3ca8c87cfd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 22264
content:
"CO2 or GHG emissions in the long term has been assumed in most \r\nglobal mitigation scenarios that limit warming to 1.5degC, net-negative \r\nemissions trajectories and BECCS as the main CDR method modelled \r\nto achieve these have not been mirrored by corresponding UNFCCC \r\ndecisions so far (Fridahl 2017; Mohan et al. 2021). Likewise, only \r\na few national long-term mitigation plans or legal acts entail a vision \r\nfor net-negative GHG emissions (Buylova et al. 2021), for example \r\nFinland, Sweden, Germany and Fiji."


id: d1f4f9f34ece101ec97b0a640b805b69
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 34286
content:
"Status, costs, potentials, risk and impacts, co-benefits, trade\u0002offs and spillover effects and the role in mitigation pathways of \r\nA/R, biochar, SCS, peatland and coastal wetland restoration, \r\nagroforestry and forest management are summarised in Table 12.6. \r\nSee also Section 12.5."


id: d8f427ecfa3b13d69979fdf09d1a5f48
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 35462
content:
"Climate change mitigation policies in the UK have been motivated since 2008 by a  domestic, legally-binding framework. This \r\nframework includes a 2050 target for net zero greenhouse gas emissions, interim targets and an independent advisory body called the \r\nClimate Change Committee (Muinzer 2019). It has led successive UK governments to publish mitigation plans to 2050, causing policy \r\nto be more forward looking (Averchenkova et al. 2021)."


id: 6286edee428f995f464d9ad57650a0cd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 14625
content:
"The UK's targets include emissions and removals from LULUCF. In 2008 the target for 2050 was an economy-wide net emissions \r\nreduction of at least 80% below 1990 levels. Even the first government plans to achieve this target proposed deployment of removal \r\nmethods, specifically afforestation and wood in construction, increased soil carbon and BECCS (HM Government 2011)."


id: e2a569ac42a42b3edb786a714c024b7f
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 37176
content:
"Adoption of the Paris Agreement in 2015 caused the government to change the legislated 2050 target to a reduction of at least 100% \r\n(i.e., net zero). Since then, removal of CO2 and other greenhouse gases has received greater prominence as a distinct topic. The most \r\nrecent national plan (published October 2021) proposes deployment not only of the methods mentioned above, but also DACCS, \r\nbiochar and enhanced weathering. The government has committed to amend accounting of UK targets to include a wider range of \r\nremoval methods beyond LULUCF, and set a target of 5 MtCO2 yr-1 from methods such as BECCS, DACCS and enhanced weathering \r\nby 2030. It is consulting on markets and incentives for deployment, and exploring new requirements for MRV (HM Government 2021)."


id: 563022346e4431a74974dc8315a10258
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12435
content:
"In parallel to these policy developments, the UK funds research into technical, environmental and social aspects of removal (Lezaun \r\net al. 2021). Research on some elements (e.g., forestry, CCS, soils, bioenergy) have been funded for well over a decade, but the first \r\nprogramme dedicated to greenhouse gas removal ran during 2017-2021. This has been followed by two new programmes with \r\ngreater focus on demonstration, totalling GBP100 million over four years (HM Government 2021). A  wide variety of methods is \r\nsupported in these programmes, covering approaches such as CO2 capture from seawater and capture of methane from cattle, in \r\naddition to those included already in national mitigation scenarios."


id: 82727a6d182d713c280e633b665359e4
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 20072
content:
"Deployment of removal methods has lagged behind expectations, as national targets for tree planting are not being met and \r\ninfrastructure for CO2 transport and storage is not yet in place (Climate Change Committee 2021). While public awareness around \r\ncarbon removal is low, studies indicate support in general, provided it is perceived as enhancing rather than impeding action to reduce \r\nemissions (Cox et al. 2020a)."


id: 5499d3c1dcc664cccd14b60761c1641d
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 12162
content:
"biological CDR methods such as SCS, biochar, A/R and blue carbon \r\nmanagement (robust evidence, high agreement) (VonHedemann \r\net al. 2020; Macreadie et al. 2021)."


id: 384367bce69111f77ac7898381afa3dd
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 7105
content:
"IPCC guidance on quantifying removals is available for land-based \r\nbiological CDR methods (IPCC 2006, 2019), but has yet to be \r\ndeveloped for other CDR methods (Royal Society and Royal Academy \r\nof Engineering 2018). Challenges with development of estimation \r\nalgorithms, data collection, and attribution between sectors and \r\ncountries will need to be overcome (Luisetti et al. 2020; Wedding \r\net al. 2021). Trusted methodologies for MRV, required to enable \r\nprivate sector participation. will need to address the permanence, \r\nleakage, and saturation challenges with land- and ocean-based \r\nbiological methods (Mace et al. 2021). Protocols that also capture \r\nsocial and ecological co-benefits could encourage the adoption of "


id: 884946331e966d2118e40a2139656be1
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 21137
content:
"International governance considerations include global technology \r\ntransfer around CDR implementation options (Batres et al. 2021); \r\nland use change that could affect food production and land condition \r\nand cause conflict around land tenure and access (Dooley and Kartha \r\n2018; Hurlbert et al. 2019; Milne et al. 2019); and efforts to create \r\nsustainable and just supply chains for CDR (Fajardy and Mac Dowell \r\n2020; Tan et al. 2021), such as resources used for BECCS, enhanced \r\nweathering, or ocean alkalinisation. International governance would \r\nbe particularly important for methods posing transboundary risks, \r\nespecially for ocean-based methods. Specific regulations have so \r\nfar only been developed in the context of the London Protocol, an "


id: 4a757dd2e1da4c2b6da228682ee464d2
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 10342
content:
"international treaty that explicitly regulates ocean fertilisation and \r\nallows parties to govern other marine CDR methods like ocean \r\nalkalinity enhancement (GESAMP 2019; Burns and Corbett 2020; \r\nBoettcher et al. 2021) (Section 14.4.5)."


id: 458832539285b34a2c38904f68833b04
created_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
updated_at: 2023-04-19 13:22:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_v2
vector_id: 9450
content:
"Sufficient food and adequate nutrition are fundamental human needs \r\n(HLPE 2020; Ingram 2020). Food needs to be grown and processed, \r\ntransported and distributed, and finally prepared and consumed. Food \r\nsystems range from traditional, involving only few people and short \r\nsupply chains, to modern food systems, comprising complex webs \r\ninvolving large numbers of stakeholders and processes that grow and \r\ntransform food commodities into food products and distribute them "


