Abstract
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Abstract
University of California Press

when construction began. In the 1930s the agency began to provide "supplemental water" to farms that were already irrigated but needed more water. In the Central Valley all the farms that were to receive bureau water were privately owned and in the majority of cases would get supplemental water. The application of the acreage limitation was especially sensitive and important in the Central Valley, where the bureau was putting public water on private land.3

The second goal-the redistributive principle-was achieved at best imperfectly, but it was of crucial importance because of the heavy subsidies that water users received. Wide distribution of benefits had inhered in reclamation law since the 1902 act. The father of the principle, Representative Francis G. Newlands of Nevada, explained in 1901 that the purpose of acreage limitation was "not only to prevent the creation of monopoly in the lands now belonging to the Government, but to break up existing land monopoly in the West...." Water users at first had to repay construction charges within ten years. When farmers on many early projects had trouble meeting their payments, however, the repayment period was gradually extended to forty years-and with the added bonus that repayment would not begin until after a ten-year "development period" had elapsed. Generous though the repayment period was, water users' greatest benefit was that they were not charged interest. At an interest rate of 3 percent, the subsidy would amount to 57 percent of the cost over forty years; at 5 percent it would equal 74 percent. The Comptroller General of the United States estimated that the interest-free financing alone gave water users on the Central Valley Project a total subsidy of $1.2 billion. Water users received a further subsidy on annual operating costs because an average of about sixtyfive percent of the irrigation expenses were paid by users of reclamation-generated electricity. The device chosen to insure wide distribution of benefits was to restrict an individual landowner to enough water to irrigate 160 acres. The limit applied to water, not land. The distinction was crucial, for water rights were usufructuary rights upon which conditions for beneficial use could more easily be imposed than on fee simple titles in land. The 160-acre limit first found expression in the Reclamation Acts of 1902 and 1912, but these laws lacked enforcement provisions and land speculators often vitiated the social intent. The Reclamation Act of 1914 required landowners to dispose of their excess lands on terms designated by the Secretary of the Interior if they wished to receive project water. Difficulty in enforcing the provisions of the 1914 act after a project had been initiated left it nearly as fruitless as its predecessors. Accordingly the Omnibus Adjustment Act of 1926 required holders of excess lands to sign "recordable contracts" before receiving project water. Under these contracts the landholders agreed to sell their excess lands within ten years at an appraised price that excluded any increased value from irrigation. Recordable contracts proved effective on the Vale, Owyhee, and Deschutes projects, and suggested that the Omnibus Adjustment Act, if it were implemented, could control speculation and realize the distributive intent.5

In an arbitrary mathematical symbol, lawmakers tried to express a bundle of economic and social objectives. The ideal of the family farm reflected the agrarian myth; the 160-acre threshold was derived from the Homestead Act. On early projects a quarter section frequently exceeded the amount a family could fully utilize. As farm sizes grew, 160 acres proved too small for some soil and climatic conditions. But the disputes over 160 acres as a figure too often obscured its importance as a symbol. The debate over what size of farm was economically sound tended to obscure the point that, from a strict market analysis, federal reclamation projects are not economically viable to start with. Farms receiving project water are profitable in large part only because of the heavy federal subsidy. The family farm and a quarter section were vehicles for broader purposes: distributing the benefits of public subsidy widely during the Progressive era, redistributing wealth during the New Deal, and fostering democratic communities.6

After 1926 Congress dealt with the excess land issue on an ad hoc basis. The redistributive principle was extended in two instances. The Columbia Basin Project Act of 1937 gave the Secretary of the Interior authority to reduce the maximum to as little as 40 acres; revision of the act in 1943 permitted him to vary the size from 40 to 160 acres depending on the acreage needed to establish a viable farm unit. The Secretary also received authority to purchase excess lands in order to facilitate their redistribution. The most serious drawback to realization of the redistributive intent had been lax administration. When Ickes inquired about the acreage limitation in 1934, the bureau told him it had been "a dead letter for years" and that it was better to "let sleeping dogs lie."9 Little enforcement was attempted until the late 1930s for three major reasons. First, legal interpretations were clouded. Regulations in force in the 1930s were derived in part from a 1914 ruling by Bureau Chief Counsel Will R. King which allowed landowners to receive water for more than 160 acres if construction charges were paid in full on the excess lands. King's opinion was based on a dubious reading of the 1912 act, as would become clear when family-farm adherents examined it closely; meanwhile, however, his opinion opened an important escape hatch for larger landholders. Another legal diversion arose when early in its history the bureau allowed a husband and wife to receive water on 160 acres each. This informal practice received recognition as a fait accompli in a solicitor's decision in 1945. Second, it was often difficult to find buyers for excess lands, especially in the 1930s, when 8Seriously embarrassed by his subordinates' actions, Ickes had little choice but to recommend that the President sign the bill; the Secretary phrased the recommendation as weakly as possible, however. He passed off the department's position as being "neither favorable nor unfavorable," but simply a lack of objection because the Nevada conditions were similar to those on many farms had been foreclosed. A program of federal purchase or government credit for purchasers would have promoted the breakup of excess holdings. Third, the bureau gave priority to "practical engineering"-the construction and operation of the physical works-over reclamation's social objectives.'0 As a result of this weak enforcement, the bureau had at best a mixed record in redistribution. A survey of land ownership on bureau projects in 1946 revealed that small and mediumsized ownerships predominated but on some projects there were serious violations of the excess land law. The agency provided water to 4,030,167 acres divided among 106,338 ownerships. The holders of 160 acres or less numbered 102,853 or 96.6 percent of the total; their farms embraced 2,802,245 acres or 69.5 percent of the total. In the mediumsized category (161 to 640 acres) 3,255 owners held 21.2 percent of the total. The .3 percent who enjoyed a square mile or more held 9.3 percent of the total; these barons owned 50.3 percent of the excess lands. Overall, 30.5 percent of the acres were in holdings which exceeded the limit. In many cases the landholding pattern probably reflected the conditions that existed before reclamation projects were initiated rather than the effects of enforcement. Nevertheless, the bureau, in part fortuitously, had avoided large-scale subsidies to large farms and agribusiness corporations which would have solidified a skewed landholding pattern."

The Central Valley Project (CVP) encountered, however, the very land tenure problem Representative Newlands had The Downey bill caught the Interior Department searching for an acreage limitation policy. The bureau had begun to slide back toward the position it had assumed before the Ickes secretariat championed the acreage limitation. The bureau continued to argue that some policy changes were desirable and, in any case, politically necessary. Its committee on compromise legislation professed adherence to the family farm ideal but proposed various adjustments upward. The most significant allowed holders of any amount of excess land to pay a surcharge and continue receiving supplemental water if the Secretary determined it was necessary "to prevent the deterioration of established communities." Krug, however, disliked the proposals because they were too vague and did not eliminate all subsidies to large landowners. He doubted the 160-acre limit would harm established communities. Rather, "a breakup of the large holdings might in time improve rather than deteriorate the community," he said. He seemed particularly impressed by the arguments made for a firm stand by Richard Boke, a veteran New Deal publicist and bureaucrat whom Ickes had appointed in 1945 to head reclamation Region II, which supervised the CVP. "Frankly, no suggestion has yet been made that is more in keeping with the principles of Reclamation than the acreage limitation in the present law," the Secretary pointed out in January 1947. He told the bureau to hold the line at 160 acres.24

Straus and the bureau found themselves in a dilemma. They did not want to fight for the 160-acre law, but they dared not abandon it outright. Several political inducements encouraged the bureau to weaken the 160-acre law. Some of the projects the agency wanted to undertake were not feasible if ownership were limited to 160 acres. Public power generation, which was controversial in itself, might be retarded if controversy swirled Yet Straus could not abandon the excess land law openly, even if Krug was willing. Straus knew, as his predecessor had observed, that the 160-acre law was indispensable to reclamation appropriations, particularly among liberals, who were the most receptive to federal spending. Nonwesterners in Congress looked askance at reclamation until they learned it was "a settlement and homesteading program," said Bashore. "As long as reclamation projects fulfill that purpose, public endorsements and public funds can be secured for reclamation projects...." To a large extent the bureau's political dilemma distilled into a question of constituency. A powerful, well organized constituency stood to benefit directly from abandonment of the excess land law, but there was no group at the time which stood to benefit directly from the law's enforcement. While such a group could perhaps have been created, as occurred for legislation supporting industrial unions in the 1930s, it remained a potential rather than an active force. Meanwhile, the preservation of the redistributive principle relied on a generalized group for which the 160-acre law was but one of many social welfare goals.26

To escape from this political dilemma Straus devised a subtle strategy that called for rhetorical adherence to the acreage limitation but which, through a program limited to "technical compliance" with the law, eschewed actual enforcement. Testi- fying in 1947, Straus defended the land limitation, but he restricted his remarks mainly to those laws aimed at curbing speculation and keeping the time-honored limit on the statute books. Straus exhibited little of the ideological fervor that had characterized the defense in 1944; the bureau's contribution to correcting the land pattern and to building community was conspicuously absent. The commissioner's rhetorical defense mollified supporters of the law. But at the same time he explained to opponents how to avoid its substance through technical compliance. Straus volunteered that if a corporation had ten stockholders, it would be entitled to water for 160 acres per partner. He also suggested that a landowner could deed out 320-acre parcels to his married relatives and children and remain in technical compliance. The commissioner raised laughter when he acknowledged that such devices would not constitute "spiritual compliance," but he hastened to say that technical compliance was good enough for him. A dismayed Downey termed Straus's recitation "blithe." Downey continued to insist that the law was harsh and unworkable. Straus cajoled: do not worry, we are flexible. Perhaps because the commissioner's virtuoso performance took the sting out of acreage limitation, the Downey bill died in committee.27

Quietly and apparently without informing Krug, Straus had already begun to implement the technical compliance program. Thwarted in its attempt to change the law legislatively, the bureau altered the law administratively. Technical compliance entailed two problems-bringing older projects with long-standing violations into compliance and devising escape hatches for new projects. The agency struck first at projects already in operation, particularly those authorized before the 1926 act introduced recordable contracts. Although the 1946 landownership survey claimed that enforcement had reduced violations to a minimal 3.7 percent, Straus acknowledged privately that many "serious violations" had to be corrected. Regional directors stressed that compliance would be obtained only when excess landowners realized enforcement would excess land law. In addition, a "lawyer's paradise" of legal technicalities, ranging from deeding excess lands to family members to apportioning 160 acres per person in investment trusts, has produced a paradox: The bureau had attained almost perfect paper compliance on its projects in California, but a subsidy to the largest interests was perpetuated. Of the 1,287,000 excess acres on reclamation projects in 1970, some 1,097,000 acres were found in the bureau's Mid-Pacific region, which included the Central Valley.45

The 1976 ruling by the Ninth Circuit triggered the most intensive review of the acreage limitation principle since the Truman period. What the outcome will be remains unclear. Secretary of the Interior Cecil D. Andrus proposed in 1978 that the limit be raised to 320 acres per individual landowner or 640 acres for husband and wife, with the possibility of leasing an additional 160 acres apiece, for a maximum of 960 acres. If this proposal were adopted, the heavy subsidies to the largest farmers and corporations would stop, but mediumsized farmers would continue to benefit. The Andrus compromise seems destined to satisfy neither the large landowners, who would prefer to see the present situation perpetuated, nor agrarian reform groups such as National Land for People, which call for strict enforcement of the 160-acre standard. Nevertheless, if 160 acres as a figure seems doomed, the acreage limitation as a symbol retains power and relevance. For in putting public water on private land the federal reclamation program has always raised one of the key challenges of public policy: Which groups should benefit from subsidies contributed by the entire public? The current controversy, like that in the period 1933 to 1953, may offer some insights into whether the federal government will use subsidies to reinforce or to alter the distribution of power in society.46

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