Produced by Ed Brandon as part of the on-line Grote Project PLATO, AND THE OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES. PLATO, AND THE OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES. BY GEORGE GROTE AUTHOR OF THE 'HISTORY OF GREECE'. _A NEW EDITION._ IN FOUR VOLUMES. VOL. III. LONDON: JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET. 1888. _The right of Translation is reserved._ CONTENTS. CHAPTER XXVI. PHÆDRUS--SYMPOSION. These two are the two erotic dialogues of Plato. Phædrus is the originator of both 1 Eros as conceived by Plato. Different sentiment prevalent in Hellenic antiquity and in modern times. Position of women in Greece _ib._ Eros, considered as the great stimulus to improving philosophical communion. Personal Beauty, the great point of approximation between the world of sense and the world of Ideas. Gradual generalisation of the sentiment 4 All men love Good, as the means of Happiness, but they pursue it by various means. The name _Eros_ is confined to one special case of this large variety 5 Desire of mental copulation and procreation, as the only attainable likeness of immortality, requires the sight of personal beauty as an originating stimulus 6 Highest exaltation of the erotic impulse in a few privileged minds, when it ascends gradually to the love of Beauty in general. This is the most absorbing sentiment of all 7 Purpose of the Symposion, to contrast this Platonic view of Eros with several different views of it previously enunciated by the other speakers; closing with a panegyric on Sokrates, by the drunken Alkibiades 8 Views of Eros presented by Phædrus, Pausanias, Eryximachus, Aristophanes, Agathon 9 Discourse of Sokrates from revelation of Diotima. He describes Eros as not a God, but an intermediate Dæmon between Gods and men, constantly aspiring to divinity, but not attaining it 9 Analogy of the erotic aspiration with that of the philosopher, who knows his own ignorance and thirsts for knowledge 10 Eros as presented in the Phædrus--Discourse of Lysias, and counter-discourse of Sokrates, adverse to Eros--Sokrates is seized with remorse, and recants in a high-flown panegyric on Eros 11 Panegyric--Sokrates admits that the influence of Eros is a variety of madness, but distinguishes good and bad varieties of madness, both coming from the Gods. Good madness is far better than sobriety _ib._ Poetical mythe delivered by Sokrates, describing the immortality and pre-existence of the soul, and its pre-natal condition of partial companionship with Gods and eternal Ideas 12 Operation of such pre-natal experience upon the Intellectual faculties of man--Comparison and combination of particular sensations indispensable--Reminiscence 13 Reminiscence is kindled up in the soul of the philosopher by the aspect of visible Beauty, which is the great link between the world of sense and the world of Ideas 14 Elevating influence ascribed, both in Phædrus and Symposion, to Eros Philosophus. Mixture in the mind of Plato, of poetical fancy and religious mysticism, with dialectic theory 15 Differences between Symposion and Phædrus. In-dwelling conceptions assumed by the former, pre-natal experiences by the latter 17 Nothing but metaphorical immortality recognised in Symposion _ib._ Form or Idea of Beauty presented singly and exclusively in Symposion 18 Eros recognised, both in Phædrus and Symposion, as affording the initiatory stimulus to philosophy--Not so recognised in Phædon, Theætêtus, and elsewhere _ib._ Concluding scene and speech of Alkibiades in the Symposion--Behaviour of Sokrates to Alkibiades and other handsome youths 19 Perfect self-command of Sokrates--proof against every sort of trial 20 Drunkenness of others at the close of the Symposion--Sokrates is not affected by it, but continues his dialectic process 21 Symposion and Phædon--each is the antithesis and complement of the other 22 Symposion of Plato compared with that of Xenophon _ib._ Small proportion of the serious, in the Xenophontic Symposion 24 Platonic Symposion more ideal and transcendental than the Xenophontic 25 Second half of the Phædrus--passes into a debate on Rhetoric. Eros is considered as a subject for rhetorical exercise 26 Lysias is called a logographer by active politicians. Contempt conveyed by the word. Sokrates declares that the only question is, Whether a man writes well or ill 27 Question about teaching the art of writing well or speaking well. Can it be taught upon system or principle? Or does the successful Rhetor succeed only by unsystematic knack? 28 Theory of Sokrates--that all art of persuasion must be founded upon a knowledge of the truth, and of gradations of resemblance to the truth _ib._ Comparison made by Sokrates between the discourse of Lysias and his own. Eros is differently understood: Sokrates defined what he meant by it: Lysias did not define 29 Logical processes--Definition and Division--both of them exemplified in the two discourses of Sokrates _ib._ View of Sokrates--that there is no real Art of Rhetoric, except what is already comprised in Dialectic--The rhetorical teaching is empty and useless 30 What the Art of Rhetoric ought to be--Analogy of Hippokrates and the medical Art 31 Art of Rhetoric ought to include a systematic classification of minds with all their varieties, and of discourses with all their varieties. The Rhetor must know how to apply the one to the other, suitably to each particular case 32 The Rhetorical Artist must farther become possessed of real truth, as well as that which his auditors believe to be truth. He is not sufficiently rewarded for this labour 33 Question about Writing--As an Art, for the purpose of instruction, it can do little--Reasons why. Writing may remind the reader of what he already knows _ib._ Neither written words, nor continuous speech, will produce any serious effect in teaching. Dialectic and cross-examination are necessary 34 The Dialectician and Cross-Examiner is the only man who can really teach. If the writer can do this, he is more than a writer 37 Lysias is only a logographer: Isokrates promises to become a philosopher 38 Date of the Phædrus--not an early dialogue _ib._ Criticism given by Plato on the three discourses--His theory of Rhetoric is more Platonic than Sokratic _ib._ His theory postulates, in the Rhetor, knowledge already assured--it assumes that all the doubts have been already removed 39 The Expositor, with knowledge and logical process, teaches minds unoccupied and willing to learn _ib._ The Rhetor does not teach, but persuades persons with minds pre-occupied--guiding them methodically from error to truth 40 He must then classify the minds to be persuaded, and the means of persuasion or varieties of discourse. He must know how to fit on the one to the other in each particular case 41 Plato's _Idéal_ of the Rhetorical Art--involves in part incompatible conditions--the Wise man or philosopher will never be listened to by the public _ib._ The other part of the Platonic _Idéal_ is grand but unattainable--breadth of psychological data and classified modes of discourse 42 Plato's ideal grandeur compared with the rhetorical teachers--Usefulness of these teachers for the wants of an accomplished man 44 The Rhetorical teachers conceived the Art too narrowly: Plato conceived it too widely. The principles of an Art are not required to be explained to all learners 45 Plato includes in his conception of Art, the application thereof to new particular cases. This can never be taught by rule 46 Plato's charge against the Rhetorical teachers is not made out 47 Plato has not treated Lysias fairly, in neglecting his greater works, and selecting for criticism an erotic exercise for a private circle 47 No fair comparison can be taken between this exercise of Lysias and the discourses delivered by Sokrates in the Phædrus 48 Continuous discourse, either written or spoken, inefficacious as a means of instruction to the ignorant 49 Written matter is useful as a memorandum for persons who know--or as an elegant pastime 50 Plato's didactic theories are pitched too high to be realised 51 No one has ever been found competent to solve the difficulties raised by Sokrates, Arkesilaus, Karneades, and the negative vein of philosophy _ib._ Plato's _idéal_ philosopher can only be realised under the hypothesis of a pre-existent and omniscient soul, stimulated into full reminiscence here 52 Different proceeding of Plato in the Timæus 53 Opposite tendencies co-existent in Plato's mind--Extreme of the Transcendental or Absolute--Extreme of specialising adaptation to individuals and occasions 54 CHAPTER XXVII. PARMENIDES. Character of dialogues immediately preceding--much transcendental assertion. Opposite character of the Parmenides 56 Sokrates is the juvenile defendant--Parmenides the veteran censor and cross-examiner. Parmenides gives a specimen of exercises to be performed by the philosophical aspirant _ib._ Circumstances and persons of the Parmenides 57 Manner in which the doctrine of Parmenides was impugned. Manner in which his partisan Zeno defended him 58 Sokrates here impugns the doctrine of Zeno. He affirms the Platonic theory of ideas separate from sensible objects, yet participable by them 60 Parmenides and Zeno admire the philosophical ardour of Sokrates. Parmenides advances objections against the Platonic theory of Ideas 60 What Ideas does Sokrates recognise? Of the Just and Good? Yes. Of Man, Horse, &c.? Doubtful. Of Hair, Mud, &c.? No _ib._ Parmenides declares that no object in nature is mean to the philosopher 61 Remarks upon this--Contrast between emotional and scientific classification _ib._ Objections of Parmenides--How can objects participate in the Ideas. Each cannot have the whole Idea, nor a part thereof 62 Comparing the Idea with the sensible objects partaking in the Idea, there is a likeness between them which must be represented by a higher Idea--and so on _ad infinitum_ 63 Are the Ideas conceptions of the mind, and nothing more? Impossible 64 The Ideas are types or exemplars, and objects partake of them by being likened to them. Impossible 65 If Ideas exist, they cannot be knowable by us. We can know only what is relative to ourselves. Individuals are relative to individuals: Ideas relative to Ideas _ib._ Forms can be known only through the Form of Cognition, which we do not possess 66 Form of cognition, superior to our Cognition, belongs to the Gods. We cannot know them, nor can they know us _ib._ Sum total of objections against the Ideas is grave. But if we do not admit that Ideas exist, and that they are knowable, there can be no dialectic discussion 67 Dilemma put by Parmenides--Acuteness of his objections 68 The doctrine which Parmenides attacks is the genuine Platonic theory of Ideas. His objections are never answered in any part of the Platonic dialogues _ib._ Views of Stallbaum and Socher. The latter maintains that Plato would never make such objections against his own theory, and denies the authenticity of the Parmenidês 69 Philosophers are usually advocates, each of a positive system of his own 70 Different spirit of Plato in his Dialogues of Search _ib._ The Parmenidês is the extreme manifestation of the negative element. That Plato should employ one dialogue in setting forth the negative case against the Theory of Ideas is not unnatural 71 Force of the negative case in the Parmenidês. Difficulties about participation of sensible objects in the world of Ideas _ib._ Difficulties about the Cognizability of Ideas. If Ideas are absolute, they cannot be cognizable: if they are cognizable, they must be relative. Doctrine of Homo Mensura 72 Answer of Sokrates--That Ideas are mere conceptions of the mind. Objection of Parmenides correct, though undeveloped 73 Meaning of Abstract and General Terms, debated from ancient times to the present day--Different views of Plato and Aristotle upon it 76 Plato never expected to make his Ideas fit on to the facts of sense: Aristotle tried to do it and partly succeeded 78 Continuation of the Dialogue--Parmenides admonishes Sokrates that he has been premature in delivering a doctrine, without sufficient preliminary exercise 79 What sort of exercise? Parmenides describes: To assume provisionally both the affirmative and the negative of many hypotheses about the most general terms, and to trace the consequences of each _ib._ Impossible to do this before a numerous audience--Parmenides is entreated to give a specimen--After much solicitation he agrees 80 Parmenides elects his own theory of the _Unum_, as the topic for exhibition--Aristoteles becomes respondent _ib._ Exhibition of Parmenides--Nine distinct deductions or Demonstrations, first from _Unum Est_--next from _Unum non Est_ 81 The Demonstrations in antagonising pairs, or Antinomies. Perplexing entanglement of conclusions given without any explanation _ib._ Different judgments of Platonic critics respecting the Antinomies and the dialogue generally 82 No dogmatical solution or purpose is wrapped up in the dialogue. The purpose is negative, to make a theorist keenly feel all the difficulties of theorising 85 This negative purpose is expressly announced by Plato himself. All dogmatical purpose, extending farther, is purely hypothetical, and even inconsistent with what is declared 87 The Demonstrations or Antinomies considered. They include much unwarranted assumption and subtlety. Collection of unexplained perplexities or [Greek: a)pori/ai] 88 Even if Plato himself saw through these subtleties, he might still choose to impose and to heap up difficulties in the way of a forward affirmative aspirant 89 The exercises exhibited by Parmenides are exhibited only as illustrative specimens of a method enjoined to be applied to many other Antinomies 91 These Platonic Antinomies are more formidable than any of the sophisms or subtleties broached by the Megaric philosophers _ib._ In order to understand fully the Platonic Antinomies, we ought to have before us the problems of the Megarics and others. Uselessness of searching for a positive result 93 Assumptions of Parmenides in his Demonstrations convey the minimum of determinate meaning. Views of Aristotle upon these indeterminate predicates, Ens, Unum, &c. 94 In the Platonic Demonstrations the same proposition in words is made to bear very different meanings 95 First demonstration ends in an assemblage of negative conclusions. _Reductio ad Absurdum_, of the assumption--Unum non Multa 96 Second Demonstration 97 It ends in demonstrating _Both_, of that which the first Demonstration had demonstrated _Neither_ 98 Startling paradox--Open offence against logical canon--No logical canon had then been laid down 99 Demonstration third--Attempt to reconcile the contradiction of Demonstrations I. and II. 100 Plato's imagination of the Sudden or Instantaneous--Breaches or momentary stoppages in the course of time _ib._ Review of the successive pairs of Demonstrations or Antinomies in each, the first proves the Neither, the second proves the Both 101 The third Demonstration is mediatorial but not satisfactory--The hypothesis of the Sudden or Instantaneous found no favour 102 Review of the two last Antinomies. Demonstrations VI. and VII. 103 Demonstration VII. is founded upon the genuine doctrine of Parmenides 104 Demonstrations VI. and VII. considered--Unwarrantable steps in the reasoning--The fundamental premiss differently interpreted, though the same in words 105 Demonstrations VIII. and IX.--Analysis of Demonstration VIII. 106 Demonstration VIII. is very subtle and Zenonian 107 Demonstration IX. _Neither_ following _Both_ _ib._ Concluding words of the Parmenides--Declaration that he has demonstrated the Both and the Neither of many different propositions 108 Comparison of the conclusion of the Parmenides to an enigma of the Republic. Difference. The constructor of the enigma adapted its conditions to a foreknown solution. Plato did not _ib._ CHAPTER XXVIII. THEÆTETUS. Subjects and personages in the Theætêtus 110 Question raised by Sokrates--What is knowledge or Cognition? First answer of Theætêtus, enumerating many different cognitions. Corrected by Sokrates 111 Preliminary conversation before the second answer is given. Sokrates describes his own peculiar efficacy--mental obstetric--He cannot teach, but he can evolve knowledge out of pregnant minds 112 Ethical basis of the cross-examination of Sokrates--He is forbidden to pass by falsehood without challenge 113 Answer of Theætêtus--Cognition is sensible perception: Sokrates says that this is the same doctrine as the _Homo Mensura_ laid down by Protagoras, and that both are in close affinity with the doctrines of Homer, Herakleitus, Empedoklês, &c., all except Parmenides _ib._ Plato here blends together three distinct theories for the purpose of confuting them; yet he also professes to urge what can be said in favour of them. Difficulty of following his exposition 114 The doctrine of Protagoras is completely distinct from the other doctrines. The identification of them as one and the same is only constructive--the interpretation of Plato himself 115 Explanation of the doctrine of Protagoras--_Homo Mensura_ 116 Perpetual implication of Subject with Object--Relate and Correlate 118 Such relativity is no less true in regard to the ratiocinative combinations of each individual, than in regard to his percipient capacities _ib._ Evidence from Plato proving implication of Subject and Object, in regard to the intelligible world 121 The Protagorean measure is even more easily shown in reference to the intelligible world than in reference to sense 122 Object always relative to Subject--Either without the other, impossible. Plato admits this in Sophistes 126 Plato's representation of the Protagorean doctrine in intimate conjunction with the Herakleitean 126 Relativity of sensible facts, as described by him _ib._ Relations are nothing in the object purely and simply without a comparing subject 127 Relativity twofold--to the comparing Subject--to another object, besides the one directly described _ib._ Statement of the doctrine of Herakleitus--yet so as to implicate it with that of Protagoras 128 Agent and Patient--No absolute Ens 129 Arguments derived from dreams, fevers, &c., may be answered 130 Exposition of the Protagorean doctrine, as given here by Sokrates is to a great degree just. You cannot explain the facts of consciousness by independent Subject and Object 131 Plato's attempt to get behind the phenomena. Reference to a double potentiality--Subjective and Objective 133 Arguments advanced by the Platonic Sokrates against the Protagorean doctrine. He says that it puts the wise and foolish on a par--that it contradicts the common consciousness. Not every one, but the wise man only, is a measure 135 In matters of present sentiment every man can judge for himself. Where future consequences are involved special knowledge is required 136 Plato, when he impugns the doctrine of Protagoras, states that doctrine without the qualification properly belonging to it. All belief relative to the condition of the believing mind 137 All exposition and discussion is an assemblage of individual judgments and affirmations. This fact is disguised by elliptical forms of language 139 Argument--That the Protagorean doctrine equalises all men and animals. How far true. Not true in the sense requisite to sustain Plato's objection 141 Belief on authority is true to the believer himself--The efficacy of authority resides in the believer's own mind 142 Protagorean formula--is false, to those who dissent from it 143 Plato's argument that the wise man alone is a measure--Reply to it _ib._ Plato's argument as to the distinction between present sensation and anticipation of the future 145 The formula of Relativity does not imply that every man believes himself to be infallible _ib._ Plato's argument is untenable--That if the Protagorean formula be admitted, dialectic discussion would be annulled--The reverse is true--Dialectic recognises the autonomy of the Individual mind 146 Contrast with the Treatise De Legibus--Plato assumes infallible authority--sets aside dialectic 148 Plato in denying the Protagorean formula, constitutes himself the measure for all. Counter proposition to the formula _ib._ Import of the Protagorean formula is best seen when we state explicitly the counter-proposition 150 Unpopularity of the Protagorean formula--Most believers insist upon making themselves a measure for others, as well as for themselves. Appeal to Abstractions 150 Aristotle failed in his attempts to refute the Protagorean formula--Every reader of Aristotle will claim the right of examining for himself Aristotle's canons of truth 152 Plato's examination of the other doctrine--That knowledge is Sensible Perception. He adverts to sensible facts which are different with different Percipients 153 Such is not the case with all the facts of sense. The conditions of unanimity are best found among select facts of sense--weighing, measuring, &c. 154 Arguments of Sokrates in examining this question. Divergence between one man and another arises, not merely from different sensual impressibility, but from mental and associative difference 155 Argument--That sensible Perception does not include memory--Probability that those who held the doctrine meant to include memory 157 Argument from the analogy of seeing and not seeing at the same time _ib._ Sokrates maintains that we do not see _with_ our eyes, but that the mind sees _through_ the eyes: that the mind often conceives and judges by itself without the aid of any bodily organ 159 Indication of several judgments which the mind makes by itself--It perceives Existence, Difference, &c. 160 Sokrates maintains that knowledge is to be found, not in the Sensible Perceptions themselves, but in the comparisons add computations of the mind respecting them 161 Examination of this view--Distinction from the views of modern philosophers 162 Different views given by Plato in other dialogues 163 Plato's discussion of this question here exhibits a remarkable advance in analytical psychology. The mind rises from Sensation, first to Opinion, then to Cognition 164 Plato did not recognise Verification from experience, or from facts of sense, as either necessary or possible 168 Second definition given by Theætêtus--That Cognition consists in right or true opinion _ib._ Objection by Sokrates--This definition assumes that there are false opinions. But how can false opinions be possible? How can we conceive Non-Ens: or confound together two distinct realities? _ib._ Waxen memorial tablet in the mind, on which past impressions are engraved. False opinion consists in wrongly identifying present sensations with past impressions 169 Sokrates refutes this assumption. Dilemma. Either false opinion is impossible, or else a man may know what he does not know 170 He draws distinction between possessing knowledge, and having it actually in hand. Simile of the pigeon-cage with caught pigeons turned into it and flying about _ib._ Sokrates refutes this. Suggestion of Theætêtus--That there may be non-cognitions in the mind as well as cognitions, and that false opinion may consist in confounding one with the other. Sokrates rejects this 171 He brings another argument to prove that Cognition is not the same as true opinion. Rhetors persuade or communicate true opinion; but they do not teach or communicate knowledge 172 New answer of Theætêtus--Cognition is true opinion, coupled with rational explanation 173 Criticism on the answer by Sokrates. Analogy of letters and words, primordial elements and compounds. Elements cannot be explained: compounds alone can be explained _ib._ Sokrates refutes this criticism. If the elements are unknowable, the compound must be unknowable also 174 Rational explanation may have one of three different meanings. 1. Description in appropriate language. 2. Enumeration of all the component elements in the compound. In neither of these meanings will the definition of Cognition hold _ib._ Third meaning. To assign some mark, whereby the thing to be explained differs from everything else. The definition will not hold. For rational explanation, in this sense, is already included in true opinion 175 Conclusion of the dialogue--Summing up by Sokrates--Value of the result, although purely negative 176 Remarks on the dialogue. View of Plato. False persuasion of knowledge removed. Importance of such removal _ib._ Formation of the testing or verifying power in men's minds, value of the Theætêtus, as it exhibits Sokrates demolishing his own suggestions 177 Comparison of the Philosopher with the Rhetor. The Rhetor is enslaved to the opinions of auditors 178 The Philosopher is master of his own debates 179 Purpose of dialogue to qualify for a life of philosophical Search _ib._ Difficulties of the Theætêtus are not solved in any other Dialogue 180 Plato considered that the search for Truth was the noblest occupation of life 182 Contrast between the philosopher and the practical statesman--between Knowledge and Opinion 183 CHAPTER XXIX. SOPHISTES--POLITIKUS. Persons and circumstances of the two dialogues 185 Relation of the two dialogues to the Theætêtus 187 Plato declares that his first purpose is to administer a lesson in logical method: the special question chosen, being subordinate to that purpose 188 Method of logical Definition and Division _ib._ Sokrates tries the application of this method, first, upon a vulgar subject. To find the logical place and deduction of the Angler. Superior classes above him. Bisecting division 189 Such a lesson in logical classification was at that time both novel and instructive. No logical manuals then existed 190 Plato describes the Sophist as analogous to an angler. He traces the Sophist by descending subdivision from the acquisitive genus of art 191 The Sophist traced down from the same, by a second and different descending subdivision 192 Also, by a third 193 The Sophist is traced down, from the genus of separating or discriminating art 194 In a logical classification, low and vulgar items deserve as much attention as grand ones. Conflict between emotional and scientific classification 195 The purifier--a species under the genus discriminator--separates good from evil. Evil is of two sorts; the worst sort is, Ignorance, mistaking itself for knowledge 197 Exhortation is useless against this worst mode of evil. Cross-examination, the shock of the Elenchus, must be brought to bear upon it. This is the sovereign purifier _ib._ The application of this Elenchus is the work of the Sophist, looked at on its best side. But looked at as he really is, he is a juggler who teaches pupils to dispute about every thing--who palms off falsehood for truth 198 Doubt started by the Eleate. How can it be possible either to think or to speak falsely? 199 He pursues the investigation of this problem by a series of questions _ib._ The Sophist will reject our definition and escape, by affirming that to speak falsely is impossible. He will require us to make out a rational theory, explaining Non-Ens 200 The Eleate turns from Non-Ens to Ens. Theories of various philosophers about Ens _ib._ Difficulties about Ens are as great as those about Non-Ens 201 Whether Ens is Many or One? If Many, how Many? Difficulties about One and the Whole. Theorists about Ens cannot solve them 201 Theories of those who do not recognise a definite number of Entia or elements. Two classes thereof 202 1. The Materialist Philosophers. 2. The Friends of Forms or Idealists, who recognise such Forms as the only real Entia _ib._ Argument against the Materialists--Justice must be something, since it may be either present or absent, making sensible difference--But Justice is not a body 203 At least many of them will concede this point, though not all Ens is common to the corporeal and the incorporeal. Ens is equivalent to potentiality 204 Argument against the Idealists--who distinguish Ens from the generated, and say that we hold communion with the former through our minds, with the latter through our bodies and senses _ib._ Holding communion--What? Implies Relativity. Ens is known by the mind. It therefore suffers or undergoes change. Ens includes both the unchangeable and the changeable 205 Motion and rest are both of them Entia or realities. Both agree in Ens. Ens is a _tertium quid_--distinct from both. But how can anything be distinct from both? 206 Here the Eleate breaks off without solution. He declares his purpose to show, That Ens is as full of puzzle as Non-Ens _ib._ Argument against those who admit no predication to be legitimate, except identical. How far Forms admit of intercommunion with each other _ib._ No intercommunion between any distinct forms. Refuted. Common speech is inconsistent with this hypothesis 207 Reciprocal intercommunion of all Forms--inadmissible _ib._ Some Forms admit of intercommunion, others not. This is the only admissible doctrine. Analogy of letters and syllables _ib._ Art and skill are required to distinguish what Forms admit of intercommunion, and what Forms do not. This is the special intelligence of the Philosopher, who lives in the bright region of Ens: the Sophist lives in the darkness of Non-Ens 208 He comes to enquire what Non-Ens is. He takes for examination five principal Forms--Motion--Rest--Ens--Same--Different _ib._ Form of Diversum pervades all the others 209 Motion is different from Diversum, or is not Diversum. Motion is different from Ens--in other words, it is Non-Ens. Each of these Forms is both Ens and Non-Ens 210 By Non-Ens, we do not mean anything contrary to Ens--we mean only something different from Ens. Non-Ens is a real Form, as well as Ens _ib._ The Eleate claims to have refuted Parmenides, and to have shown both that Non-Ens is a real Form, and also what it is 211 The theory now stated is the only one, yet given, which justifies predication as a legitimate process, with a predicate different from the subject 212 Enquiry, whether the Form of Non-Ens can come into intercommunion with the Forms of Proposition, Opinion, Judgment 213 Analysis of a Proposition. Every Proposition must have a noun and a verb--it must be proposition of _Something_. False propositions, involve the Form of Non-Ens, in relation to the particular subject _ib._ Opinion, Judgment, Fancy, &c., are akin to Proposition, and may be also false, by coming into partnership with the Form Non-Ens 214 It thus appears that Falsehood, imitating Truth, is theoretically possible, and that there may be a profession, like that of the Sophist, engaged in producing it _ib._ Logical distribution of Imitators--those who imitate what they know, or what they do not know--of these last, some sincerely believe themselves to know, others are conscious that they do not know, and designedly impose upon others 215 Last class divided--Those who impose on numerous auditors by long discourse, the Rhetor--Those who impose on select auditors, by short question and answer, making the respondent contradict himself--the Sophist 215 Dialogue closed. Remarks upon it. Characteristics ascribed to a Sophist 216 These characteristics may have belonged to other persons, but they belonged in an especial manner to Sokrates himself _ib._ The conditions enumerated in the dialogue (except the taking of a fee) fit Sokrates better than any other known person 217 The art which Plato calls "the thoroughbred and noble Sophistical Art" belongs to Sokrates and to no one else. The Elenchus was peculiar to him. Protagoras and Prodikus were not Sophists in this sense 218 Universal knowledge--was professed at that time by all Philosophers--Plato, Aristotle, &c. 219 Inconsistency of Plato's argument in the Sophistês. He says that the Sophist is a disputatious man who challenges every one for speaking falsehood. He says also that the Sophist is one who maintains false propositions to be impossible 220 Reasoning of Plato about Non-Ens--No predications except identical 221 Misconception of the function of the copula in predication _ib._ No formal Grammar or Logic existed at that time. No analysis or classification of propositions before the works of Aristotle 222 Plato's declared purpose in the Sophistês--To confute the various schools of thinkers--Antisthenes, Parmenides, the Materialists, &c. 223 Plato's refutation throws light upon the doctrine of Antisthenes _ib._ Plato's argument against the Materialists 224 Reply open to the Materialists _ib._ Plato's argument against the Idealists or Friends of Forms. Their point of view against him 225 Plato argues--That to know, and be known, is action and passion, a mode of relativity 226 Plato's reasoning--compared with the points of view of both _ib._ The argument of Plato goes to an entire denial of the Absolute, and a full establishment of the Relative 227 Coincidence of his argument with the doctrine of Protagoras in the Theætêtus _ib._ The Idealists maintained that Ideas or Forms were entirely unchangeable and eternal. Plato here denies this, and maintains that ideas were partly changeable, partly unchangeable 228 Plato's reasoning against the Materialists _ib._ Difference between Concrete and Abstract, not then made conspicuous. Large meaning here given by Plato to Ens--comprehending not only objects of Perception, but objects of Conception besides 229 Narrower meaning given by Materialists to Ens--they included only Objects of Perception. Their reasoning as opposed to Plato _ib._ Different definitions of Ens--by Plato--the Materialists, the Idealists 231 Plato's views about Non-Ens examined _ib._ His review of the select Five Forms 233 Plato's doctrine--That Non-Ens is nothing more than different from Ens _ib._ Communion of Non-Ens with proposition--possible and explicable 235 Imperfect analysis of a proposition--Plato does not recognise the predicate _ib._ Plato's explanation of Non-Ens is not satisfactory--Objections to it 236 Plato's view of the negative is erroneous. Logical maxim of contradiction 239 Examination of the illustrative propositions chosen by Plato--How do we know that one is true, the other false? _ib._ Necessity of accepting the evidence of sense 240 Errors of Antisthenes--depended partly on the imperfect formal logic of that day 241 Doctrine of the Sophistês--contradicts that of other Platonic dialogues 242 The persons whom Plato here attacks as Friends of Forms are those who held the same doctrine as Plato himself espouses in Phædon, Republic, &c. 246 The Sophistês recedes from the Platonic point of view, and approaches the Aristotelian 247 Aristotle assumes without proof, that there are some propositions true, others false 249 Plato in the Sophistês has undertaken an impossible task--He could not have proved, against his supposed adversary, that there _are_ false propositions _ib._ What must be assumed in all dialectic discussion 251 Discussion and theorising presuppose belief and disbelief, expressed in set forms of words. They imply predication, which Antisthenes discarded 252 Precepts and examples of logical partition, illustrated in the Sophistês 253 Recommendation of logical bipartition 254 Precepts illustrated by the Philêbus _ib._ Importance of founding logical Partition on resemblances perceived by sense 255 Province of sensible perception--is not so much narrowed by Plato here as it is in the Theætêtus 256 Comparison of the Sophistês with the Phædrus 257 Comparison of the Politikus with the Parmenidês 258 Variety of method in dialectic research--Diversity of Plato 259 CHAPTER XXX. POLITIKUS. The Politikus by itself, apart from the Sophistês 260 Views of Plato on mensuration. Objects measured against each other. Objects compared with a common standard. In each Art, the purpose to be attained is the standard _ib._ Purpose in the Sophistês and Politikus is--To attain dialectic aptitude. This is the standard of comparison whereby to judge whether the means employed are suitable 261 Plato's defence of the Politikus against critics. Necessity that the critic shall declare explicitly what his standard of comparison is 262 Comparison of Politikus with Protagoras, Phædon, Philêbus, &c. _ib._ Definition of the statesman, or Governor. Scientific competence. Sokratic point of departure. Procedure of Plato in subdividing 263 King during the Saturnian period, was of a breed superior to the people--not so any longer 264 Distinction of causes Principal and Causes Auxiliary. The King is the only Principal Cause, but his auxiliaries pretend to be principal also 266 Plato does not admit the received classification of government. It does not touch the point upon which all true distinction ought to be founded--Scientific or Unscientific 267 Unscientific governments are counterfeits. Government by any numerous body must be counterfeit. Government by the one scientific man is the true government 268 Fixed laws, limiting the scientific Governor, are mischievous, as they would be for the physician and the steersman. Absurdity of determining medical practice by laws, and presuming every one to know it 269 Government by fixed laws is better than lawless government by unscientific men, but worse than lawless government by scientific men. It is a second-best _ib._ Comparison of unscientific governments. The one despot is the worse. Democracy is the least bad, because it is least of a government 270 The true governor distinguished from the General, the Rhetor, &c. They are all properly his subordinates and auxiliaries 271 What the scientific Governor will do. He will aim at the formation of virtuous citizens. He will weave together the energetic virtues with the gentle virtues. Natural dissidence between them 272 If a man sins by excess of the energetic element, he is to be killed or banished: if of the gentle, he is to be made a slave. The Governor must keep up in the minds of the citizens an unanimous standard of ethical orthodoxy 272 Remarks--Sokratic Ideal--Title to govern mankind derived exclusively from scientific superiority in an individual person 273 Different ways in which this ideal is worked out by Plato and Xenophon. The man of speculation and the man of action _ib._ The theory in the Politikus is the contradiction to that theory which is assigned to Protagoras in the Protagoras 274 Points of the Protagorean theory--rests upon common sentiment 275 Counter-Theory in the Politikus. The exigencies of the Eleate in the Politikus go much farther than those of Protagoras 276 The Eleate complains that under the Protagorean theory no adverse criticism is allowed. The dissenter is either condemned to silence or punished _ib._ Intolerance at Athens, not so great as elsewhere. Plato complains of the assumption of infallibility in existing societies, but exacts it severely in that which he himself constructs 277 Theory of the Politikus--distinguished three gradations of polity. Gigantic individual force the worst 278 Comparison of the Politikus with the Republic. Points of analogy and difference 279 Comparison of the Politikus with the Kratylus. Dictatorial, constructive, science or art, common to both: applied in the former to social administration--in the latter to the formation and modification of names 281 Courage and Temperance are assumed in the Politikus. No notice taken of the doubts and difficulties raised in Lachês and Charmidês 282 Purpose of the difficulties in Plato's Dialogues of Search--To stimulate the intellect of the hearer. His exposition does not give solutions 284 CHAPTER XXXI. KRATYLUS. Persons and subjects of the dialogue Kratylus--Sokrates has no formed opinion, but is only a Searcher with the others 285 Argument of Sokrates against Hermogenes--all proceedings of nature are conducted according to fixed laws--speaking and naming among the rest 286 The name is a didactic instrument; fabricated by the law-giver upon the type of the Name-Form, and employed as well as appreciated, by the philosopher 287 Names have an intrinsic aptitude for signifying one thing and not another 289 Forms of Names, as well as Forms of things nameable--essence of the Nomen, to signify the Essence of its Nominatum _ib._ Exclusive competence of a privileged lawgiver, to discern these essences, and to apportion names rightly 290 Counter-Theory, which Sokrates here sets forth and impugns--the Protagorean doctrine--Homo Mensura 291 Objection by Sokrates--That Protagoras puts all men on a level as to wisdom and folly, knowledge and ignorance 292 Objection unfounded--What the Protagorean theory really affirms--Belief always relative to the believer's mind _ib._ Each man believes others to be wiser on various points than himself--Belief on authority--not inconsistent with the affirmation of Protagoras 293 Analogy of physical processes (cutting and burning) appealed to by Sokrates--does not sustain his inference against Protagoras 294 Reply of Protagoras to the Platonic objections 295 Sentiments of Belief and Disbelief, common to all men--Grounds of belief and disbelief, different with different men and different ages 295 Protagoras did not affirm, that Belief depended upon the will or inclination of each individual but that it was relative to the circumstances of each individual mind 297 Facts of sense--some are the same to all sentient subjects, others are different to different subjects. Grounds of unanimity 298 Sokrates exemplifies his theory of the Absolute Name or the Name-Form. He attempts to show the inherent rectitude of many existing names. His etymological transitions 299 These transitions appear violent to a modern reader. They did not appear so to readers of Plato until this century. Modern discovery, that they are intended as caricatures to deride the Sophists 302 Dissent from this theory--No proof that the Sophists ever proposed etymologies 304 Plato did not intend to propose mock-etymologies, or to deride any one. Protagoras could not be ridiculed here. Neither Hermogenes nor Kratylus understand the etymologies as caricature 306 Plato intended his theory as serious, but his exemplifications as admissible** guesses. He does not cite particular cases as proofs of a theory, but only as illustrating what he means 308 Sokrates announces himself as Searcher. Other etymologists of ancient times admitted etymologies as rash as those of Plato 310 Continuance of the dialogue--Sokrates endeavours to explain how it is that the Names originally right have become so disguised and spoiled 312 Letters, as well as things, must be distinguished with their essential properties, each must be adapted to each 313 Essential significant aptitude consists in resemblance _ib._ Sokrates assumes that the Name-giving Lawgiver was a believer in the Herakleitean theory 314 But the Name-Giver may be mistaken or incompetent--the rectitude of the name depends upon his knowledge 315 Changes and transpositions introduced in the name--hard to follow 315 Sokrates qualifies and attenuates his original thesis 316 Conversation of Sokrates with Kratylus; who upholds that original thesis without any qualification _ib._ Sokrates goes still farther towards retracting it 317 There are names better and worse--more like, or less like to the things named: Natural Names are the best, but they cannot always be had. Names may be significant by habit, though in an inferior way 318 All names are not consistent with the theory of Herakleitus: some are opposed to it 319 It is not true to say, That Things can only be known through their names 320 Unchangeable Platonic Forms--opposed to the Herakleitean flux, which is true only respecting sensible particulars _ib._ Herakleitean theory must not be assumed as certain. We must not put implicit faith in names 321 Remarks upon the dialogue. Dissent from the opinion of Stallbaum and others, that it is intended to deride Protagoras and other Sophists _ib._ Theory laid down by Sokrates _à priori_, in the first part--Great difficulty, and ingenuity necessary, to bring it into harmony with facts 322 Opposite tendencies of Sokrates in the last half of the dialogue--he disconnects his theory of Naming from the Herakleitean doctrine 324 Ideal of the best system of naming--the Name-Giver ought to be familiar with the Platonic Ideas or Essences, and apportion his names according to resemblances among them 325 Comparison of Plato's views about naming with those upon social institutions. Artistic, systematic construction--contrasted with unpremeditated unsystematic growth 327 Politikus compared with Kratylus 328 Ideal of Plato--Postulate of the One Wise Man--Badness of all reality 329 Comparison of Kratylus, Theætêtus, and Sophistês, in treatment of the question respecting Non-Ens, and the possibility of false propositions 331 Discrepancies and inconsistencies of Plato, in his manner of handling the same subject 332 No common didactic purpose pervading the Dialogues--each is a distinct composition, working out its own peculiar argument _ib._ CHAPTER XXXII. PHILEBUS. Character, Personages, and Subject of the Philêbus 334 Protest against the Sokratic Elenchus, and the purely negative procedure 335 Enquiry--What mental condition will ensure to all men a happy life? Good and Happiness--correlative and co-extensive. Philêbus declares for Pleasure, Sokrates for Intelligence _ib._ Good--object of universal choice and attachment by men, animals, and plants--all-sufficient--satisfies all desires _ib._ Pleasures are unlike to each other, and even opposite cognitions are so likewise 336 Whether Pleasure, or Wisdom, corresponds to this description? Appeal to individual choice 337 First Question submitted to Protarchus--Intense Pleasure, without any intelligence--He declines to accept it 338 Second Question--Whether he will accept a life of Intelligence purely without any pleasure or pain? Answer--_No_ _ib._ It is agreed on both sides, That the Good must be a Tertium Quid. But Sokrates undertakes to show, That Intelligence is more cognate with it than Pleasure 339 Difficulties about Unum et Multa. How can the One be Many? How can the Many be One? The difficulties are greatest about Generic Unity--how it is distributed among species and individuals _ib._ Active disputes upon this question at the time 340 Order of Nature--Coalescence of the Finite with the Infinite. The One--The Finite Many--The Infinite Many _ib._ Mistake commonly made--To look only for the One, and the Infinite Many, without looking for the intermediate subdivisions 341 Illustration from Speech and Music 342 Plato's explanation does not touch the difficulties which he had himself recognised as existing 343 It is nevertheless instructive, in regard to logical division and classification 344 At that time little thought had been bestowed upon classification as a logical process _ib._ Classification--unconscious and conscious 345 Plato's doctrine about classification is not necessarily connected with his Theory of Ideas _ib._ Quadruple distribution of Existences. 1. The Infinite. 2. The Finient 3. Product of the two former. 4. Combining Cause or Agency 346 Pleasure and Pain belong to the first of these four Classes--Cognition or Intelligence belongs to the fourth 347 In the combination, essential to Good, of Intelligence with Pleasure, Intelligence is the more important of the two constituents _ib._ Intelligence is the regulating principle--Pleasure is the Indeterminate, requiring to be regulated 348 Pleasure and Pain must be explained together--Pain arises from the disturbance of the fundamental harmony of the system--Pleasure from the restoration of it _ib._ Pleasure presupposes Pain 349 Derivative pleasures of memory and expectation belonging to mind alone. Here you may find pleasure without pain _ib._ A life of Intelligence alone, without pain and without pleasure, is conceivable. Some may prefer it: at any rate it is second-best _ib._ Desire belongs to the mind, presupposes both a bodily want, and the memory of satisfaction previously had for it. The mind and body are here opposed. No true or pure pleasure therein 350 Can pleasures be true or false? Sokrates maintains that they are so 351 Reasons given by Sokrates. Pleasures attached to true opinions, are true pleasures. The just man is favoured by the Gods, and will have true visions sent to him _ib._ Protarchus disputes this--He thinks that there are some pleasures bad, but none false--Sokrates does not admit this, but reserves the question 352 No means of truly estimating pleasures and pains--False estimate habitual--These are the false pleasures _ib._ Much of what is called pleasure is false. Gentle and gradual changes do not force themselves upon our notice either as pleasure or pain. Absence of pain not the same as pleasure 353 Opinion of the pleasure-hating philosophers--That pleasure is no reality, but a mere juggle. There is no reality except pain, and the relief from pain 354 Sokrates agrees with them in part, but not wholly _ib._ Theory of the pleasure-haters--We must learn what pleasure is by looking at the intense pleasures--These are connected with distempered body and mind 355 The intense pleasures belong to a state of sickness; but there is more pleasure, on the whole, enjoyed in a state of health 356 Sokrates acknowledges some pleasures to be true. Pleasures of beautiful colours, odours, sounds, smells, &c. Pleasures of acquiring knowledge _ib._ Pure and moderate pleasures admit of measure and proportion 357 Pleasure is generation, not substance or essence: it cannot therefore be an End, because all generation is only a means towards substance--Pleasure therefore cannot be the Good _ib._ Other reasons why pleasure is not the Good 358 Distinction and classification of the varieties of Knowledge or Intelligence. Some are more true and exact than others, according as they admit more or less of measuring and computation _ib._ Arithmetic and Geometry are twofold: As studied by the philosopher and teacher: As applied by the artisan 359 Dialectic is the truest and purest of all Cognitions. Analogy between Cognition and Pleasure: in each, there are gradations of truth and purity 360 Difference with Gorgias, who claims superiority for Rhetoric. Sokrates admits that Rhetoric is superior in usefulness and celebrity: but he claims superiority for Dialectic, as satisfying the lover of truth _ib._ Most men look to opinions only, or study the phenomenal manifestations of the Kosmos. They neglect the unchangeable essences, respecting which alone pure truth can be obtained 361 Application. Neither Intelligence nor Pleasure separately, is the Good, but a mixture of the two--Intelligence being the most important. How are they to be mixed? _ib._ We must include all Cognitions--not merely the truest, but the others also. Life cannot be carried on without both 362 But we must include no pleasures except the true, pure, and necessary. The others are not compatible with Cognition or Intelligence--especially the intense sexual pleasures _ib._ What causes the excellence of this mixture? It is Measure, Proportion, Symmetry. To these Reason is more akin than Pleasure 363 Quintuple gradation in the Constituents of the Good. 1. Measure. 2. Symmetry. 3. Intelligence. 4. Practical Arts and Right Opinions. 5. True and Pure Pleasures 364 Remarks. Sokrates does not claim for Good the unity of an Idea, but a quasi-unity of analogy 365 Discussions of the time about Bonum. Extreme absolute view, maintained by Eukleides: extreme relative by the Xenophontic Sokrates. Plato here blends the two in part; an Eclectic doctrine _ib._ Inconvenience of his method, blending Ontology with Ethics 366 Comparison of Man to the Kosmos (which has reason, but no emotion) is unnecessary and confusing 367 Plato borrows from the Pythagoreans, but enlarges their doctrine. Importance of his views in dwelling upon systematic classification 368 Classification broadly enunciated, and strongly recommended--yet feebly applied--in this dialogue 369 What is the Good? Discussed both in Philêbus and in Republic. Comparison 370 Mistake of talking about Bonum confidently, as if it were known, while it is subject of constant dispute. Plato himself wavers about it; gives different explanations, and sometimes professes ignorance, sometimes talks about it confidently _ib._ Plato lays down tests by which Bonum may be determined: but the answer in the Philêbus does not satisfy those tests 371 Inconsistency of Plato in his way of putting the question--The alternative which he tenders has no fair application 372 Intelligence and Pleasure cannot be fairly compared--Pleasure is an End, Intelligence a Means. Nothing can be compared with Pleasure, except some other End 373 The Hedonists, while they laid down attainment of pleasure and diminution of pain, postulated Intelligence as the governing agency 374 Pleasures of Intelligence may be compared,
{'title': 'Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 3 by George Grote', 'source': 'Project Gutenberg', 'lang': 'en'}