Produced by Brian Coe, Graeme Mackreth and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This book was created from images of public domain material made available by the University of Toronto Libraries (http://link.library.utoronto.ca/booksonline/).) THE TRUTH ABOUT PORT ARTHUR First Edition April, 1908. Second Impression May, 1908. Third Impression September, 1908. [Illustration: GENERAL SMIRNOFF.] THE TRUTH ABOUT PORT ARTHUR BY MONSIEUR E.K. NOJINE ACCREDITED RUSSIAN WAR CORRESPONDENT DURING THE SIEGE TRANSLATED AND ABRIDGED BY CAPTAIN A.B. LINDSAY 2ND KING EDWARD'S OWN GURKHA RIFLES TRANSLATOR OF 'THE BATTLE OF TSU-SHIMA,' ETC. EDITED BY MAJOR E.D. SWINTON, D.S.O. ROYAL ENGINEERS AUTHOR OF 'THE DEFENCE OF DUFFER'S DRIFT' WITH MAP AND ILLUSTRATIONS LONDON JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W. 1908 PREFACE The siege of Port Arthur was the event of the late war in the Far East which most attracted the attention and interest of the rest of the world. There were other military operations, it is true, of equal if not of greater importance to the ultimate issue of the struggle; but, owing to their complexity, their slowness, and the absence of definite advance information, their progress and purport were not easily grasped by any save military students. The case of Port Arthur was different. The long drawn-out agony of the siege was continued before the eyes of the world for many months,[1] and, while the imagination was touched by its romantic side, the point at issue was at once apparent. Even so, there was much mystery about the conduct of the defence and the eventual fall of the Fortress; for, owing to its remote position and almost complete isolation by the enemy, the available information almost entirely consisted of that supplied by correspondents with the Japanese, and was, therefore, information from the outside, and more or less a history of _results_ alone. In 1907, or between two and three years after the culmination of the siege, the inevitable disclosures--the aftermath of defeat--which sometimes help to an appreciation of _causes_ began to be made in Russia. More than one book has recently been written by Russians who saw the defence from inside the Fortress, and who therefore claim to be in a position to give the inner history of the tragedy. 'The Truth about Port Arthur' was published in Russia last year. M. Nojine, the author, by whose permission this abridged translation has been made, was the accredited Russian war-correspondent in Port Arthur, and as such went through the greater part of the siege. He had exceptional facilities for collecting material for his work, for he was all through in close contact with the 'fighting' leaders of Port Arthur, and had access to official documents and diaries, and, having been an eye-witness of much, and possessing the trained observation of a journalist, his testimony should carry weight. His book is one long indictment of the then régime in Russia, and of some of the officials connected with the defence of Port Arthur. By the time that the English translation was completed, in the autumn of 1907, it was announced that some of the senior officers who conducted the defence were to be tried by court-martial. In fact, from the copy of the official indictment then published,[2] it seemed as if it might almost have been framed upon material furnished by M. Nojine's book. It was therefore decided to delay publication whilst matters were _sub judice_. The trial is now over, the result is known to the world, and there seems no reason why the English version of the account by an eye-witness of what went on in the ill-fated Fortress should not be given to the public. The translator and editor disclaim all responsibility for the statements made and the opinions expressed, which are the author's own. If he has sometimes been carried beyond the limits of a strictly judicial impartiality, it is, perhaps, in the circumstances, comprehensible. His patriotism must have been again and again outraged by the existing maladministration, while his personal feelings were probably embittered by the treatment which he and those who bore the burden of the defence received. Though the author, as will be seen by a perusal of his book, is not sparing of censure and is distinctly outspoken in his conclusions, yet he is capable of giving praise when he considers it to be due. Indeed, it is a relief, amongst so much that is depressing, to read his opinion of Generals Smirnoff and Kondratenko amongst others, and his whole-hearted championship of the stolid, dogged Russian soldier who, weighed down by the incompetence of many above him, struggled through those weary months of defeat, privation, and suspense. Amongst much in this book which gives food for thought there are two or three matters described by the author which are truly extraordinary. For instance, it is difficult to believe that when, after so much threatening, the storm eventually burst and war broke out, Port Arthur--that outpost of the Russian Empire--was so far from being ready that on January 14, 1904, only eight guns of the allotted armament were mounted on the land defences. And yet there is official authority for this statement (see Appendix II.). It is also remarkable that even before the place was finally cut off by complete investment in July, 1904, the troops had to be put on short rations; this seems to have been caused by the subordination, even in war, of the military to other requirements. General Fock's theory also upon fortress warfare (p. 227) is strangely at variance with the practice of his great countryman Todleben, who defended Sevastopol for 349 days, and his reasoning is difficult to follow. Finally, the action of the senior officer of a beleaguered fortress, in disobeying and concealing the official messages which ordered his recall and appointed his successor, seems inconceivable. Undoubtedly, if a proper organization had existed upon the outbreak of hostilities instead of the inadequate product of a nation's false economy, Port Arthur might have held out for a considerably longer time than it did; but speculation upon the possible results of this is beyond the scope of this preface. Without labouring the morals pointed by this siege, it is clear that policy should wait on military preparedness, that now as of old the internal jealousies within an army are as dangerous to it as the enemy, and that it is still the moral factor that counts most. In the translation there has of necessity been some abridgement; but an endeavour has been made all through to convey the writer's meaning and, wherever possible, to use his exact words. The chief interest of the work for British readers seems to be in the picture presented of the general conduct of the defence and of the state of affairs in the Fortress rather than in the more technical accounts of the actual fighting, which are very like each other. To those not engaged, the description of an attack on one point bears much resemblance to the descriptions of attacks on other points. It is with this feeling that the necessary curtailment has been made. Some, also, of the author's picturesque writing, which would probably appeal less to the Briton than it would to the Slav, has been eliminated. All military history must to a certain extent lose in interest for the non-professional reader from the continual occurrence of the names of small places which are only of importance to the military student, and which, even without necessitating a reference to the map, rather break the continuity of the narrative. This is especially so in the case of the recent war, where the majority of the localities referred to are obscure spots, possessing names of Chinese origin which not only are very long and uncouth, but also have a confusing resemblance to each other. Added to this, they have been as a rule spelled differently in every account or on every map. It has, therefore, been decided in this translation to give, wherever possible, the English equivalents of the Russian instead of the Chinese or Japanese names of places, forts, or positions. They are shorter, convey more meaning to the British reader, and therefore so far tend to simplification. This has been thought to outweigh the disadvantages of the fact that they are comparatively unknown, for the Chinese or Japanese names have so far been almost exclusively used in England. To this rule there are three exceptions. Three localities at Port Arthur possess non-Russian names, which are now almost historic in the English tongue, and for which it would be confusing and almost pedantic to use the Russian equivalents. These are 203 Metre Hill, North Fort Chi-kuan-shan, and Fort Erh-lung-shan, which would not be recognized under their Russian names of High Hill,[3] Fort No. 2, Fort No. 3. For these three places the names already so well known have been used, except in Appendix I. and the table of Appendix III. As regards the accounts of the fighting and the numbers engaged, it must be borne in mind that the organization of both the Russian and Japanese infantry is different to that existing in the British army, and that where a regiment is mentioned in the text it means three battalions. Thus a division of the East Siberian Rifles (as well as a Japanese active division) consisted of two brigades of two regiments of three battalions each, or twelve battalions. Finally, a short description of the defences of Port Arthur will, perhaps, elucidate the author's narrative. At the outbreak of war the land defences of the Fortress consisted of the following: The Chinese Wall, which was a continuous earth rampart extending for some distance round the north of the place. Five principal permanent works of large size and great strength, arranged in a rough semicircle from sea to sea. Of these, one, No. 5, was not finished at the outbreak of hostilities. Another, No. 6, which was to have completed the girdle on the west, was not commenced. These works are called in the text 'forts.' Five subsidiary works in the intervals between the principal 'forts.' These were not of such strength as the latter, and were for the most part completed but not armed at the commencement of hostilities. They are called in the text 'fortifications.' Certain of the batteries on the land side, and a few auxiliary works--such as redoubts, etc. After the outbreak of war the existing permanent and semi-permanent works were supplemented by a large number of batteries and closed infantry works, in some of which guns were emplaced. These were sited between the other works, or, in some cases, upon special points, and are called 'redoubts' and 'lunettes.' There were also a few open infantry works constructed for the special purpose of 'flanking' others, or for firing over ground in front of them not covered by their own fire. These are here called 'open caponiers,' and should not be confused with the masonry structures called 'caponiers,' placed at the bottom of the deep ditches of the larger works for the defence of those ditches. Round, between, and behind the forts, fortifications, redoubts, lunettes, etc., a maze of trenches grew up for fire, shelter, and communication, and numerous bomb-proofs, magazines, dressing stations, were also built. In front were wire entanglements, live electric wires, land mines--every obstacle that ingenuity could suggest. To assist in identification a table has been prepared in which the Russian and the other names (where available) of the localities mentioned are given. A chronological table of the principal events of the siege has been also added. London, _March, 1908_. TABLE OF NAMES List of Principal Places mentioned, giving their Russian and in some Cases their Other Names. --------------------------------------+------------------ Russian Names. | Other Names. --------------------------------------+------------------ _Principal Works--'Forts.'_ | | No. 1 Fort (S.E.). | Paiyin-shan Fort; | South Fort. No. 2 " (N.E.). North Fort | Chi-kuan-shan; | Fort Kitohadai. No. 3 " (N.). | Fort Erh-lung-shan; | Fort Nirusan. No. 4 " (N.W.). | I-tzu-shan Fort. No. 5 " (W.). | Tayanko North. No. 6 " (S.W.). | | _Subsidiary Works--'Fortifications.'_ | | Fortification No. 1 (S.E.). | South-east | Chi-kuan-shan | Battery. " No. 2 (E.). | Dangerous Mountain. " No. 3 (N.). | Sung-su-shan Fort; | Sho-zu-shan Fort; | Shoju-san. " No. 4 (W.). | South An-tzu-shan Fort. " No. 5 (S.W.). | Cha-kua-tzu. | _Intermediate, Temporary, and | Field Works._ | | Takhe Redoubt (S.E.). | South-east Redoubt. Rear Redoubt (E.). | Kuropatkin Lunette (N.E.). | 'Q' Work. No. 1 Open Caponier (N.E.). | Redoubt No. 1 (N.E.). | East Pan-lun-shan | Redoubt; | East Banru-san. No. 2 Open Caponier (N.E.). |'P' Work. Redoubt No. 2 (N.E.). |West Pan-lun-shan Redoubt; | West Banru-san. No. 3 Open Caponier (N.E.). |'G' Work; Hachi-maki-yama. Water Supply Redoubt (N.) |Fort Kuropatkin. Rocky Redoubt (N.). |Railway Redoubt; Lung-yen. Temple Redoubt (N.). | Pan-lun-shan Redoubt (N.W.). | Flat Hill, No. 1 Redoubt (N.W.). | " No. 2 " (N.W.). | " No. 3 " (N.W.). | " No. 4 " Stone- | broken (N.W.). | Double Angle Lunette (N.W.). | New Lunette (N.W.). | Fougasse Lunette (N.W.). | No. 5 Redoubt (W.). |Quarry Battery. No. 4 " (W.). | Timber Redoubt (S.W.). | Salt Redoubt (S.W.). | Quail Hill (centre). | | _Land Batteries._ | | Cross (S.E.). | Dragon's Back (E.). | Dragon's Head (E.). | 'A' (E.). | 'B' (N.E.). | Zaliterny (N.E.). |'R.' Little Eagle's Nest (N.E.). |'M.' Eagle's Nest (N.E.). |Bodai; Wang-tai. Zaredoubt (N.). |'H.' Howitzer (N.). | Wolf's (N.). |'I.' Tumulus (N.). |Sung-su-shan Auxiliary. Cemetery (N.W.). |Cemetery. 'C' (Sapper) (N.W.). | Jagged Hill (N.W.). | Howitzer (N.W.). | Obelisk Hill (N.W.). | Obelisk Hill. Tea (W.). | Stonebroken. Pigeon (W.). | 'D' (W.). | South Tayanko. Salt, [? Redoubt] (S.W.). | | _Coast Batteries._ | | White Wolf. | No. 1. } | " 2. } | Tiger's Head. " 3. } | " 4. } | " 5. } On | " 6. } } Tiger's | } Chi-kuan-shan. " 7. } } Peninsula. | " 8. } | Man-tzu-ying. " 9. } | " 10. } | Lighthouse.} | No. 12 (S.). | " 13, Golden Hill (S.). | " 14 (S.) | " 15, Electric Cliff (S.). | " 16 (S.E.). | Six-inch Gun. " 17 (S.E.). | " 18 (S.E.). | " 19 (S.E.). | " 20 (S.E.). | " 21, Long Battery (S.E.). | " 22 (S.E.). | | _Other Places._ | | Kuen-san Hill (N.E.). | Ken-san Hill. Sia-gu-shan (E.). | Shokozan; Hsiao-ku-shan. Ta-ku-shan (E.). | Ta-ku-shan. High Hill (N.W.). | 203 Metre Hill; Royusan. Angle Hill (N.W.). | 174 Metre Hill. Long Hill (N.W.). | Namakoyama. Divisional Hill (N.). | Flat Hill (N.). | Akasakayama Wolf's Hills (N.E.). | Feng-huang-shen. FOOTNOTES: [Footnote 1: One hundred and fifty-four days after the close investment.] [Footnote 2: See Conclusion, p. 336.] [Footnote 3: There is another hill called High Hill, on the eastern flank, which has been left as such.] CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF PRINCIPAL EVENTS 1904. Feb. 8. Japanese torpedo Russian Fleet. " 25. Japanese attempt to 'block.' Mar. 10. Japanese bombard the harbour. " 17. General Smirnoff arrives. " 22. Japanese bombard the harbour. " 25. Japanese attempt to 'block.' April 13. The _Petropalovsk_ blown up by a mine. " 14. The Viceroy, Admiral Alexeieff, arrives in Port Arthur. May 2. Japanese attempt to 'block.' " 4. Japanese land at Petsiwo. " 5. The Viceroy leaves Port Arthur. " 15. The _Hatsuse_ sunk by a Russian mine. The _Fuji_ damaged. " 16. Action at Shanshihlipu. " 20. Japanese attack by sea. " 26. Battle of Kinchou. Dalny evacuated. June 18. General Stössel receives a telegram of recall. " 19. Sortie of Russian Fleet. _Sevastopol_ damaged by a mine. Japanese attempt to torpedo Russian Fleet. " 26. } The fight on Green Hills. Russians lose Kuen-san " 27. } Hill. July 3. } " 4. } Russian attempts to recapture Kuen-san fail. " 5. } " 26. } " 27. } Russians driven from Green Hills position. " 28. } July 29. Russians driven from Wolf's Hills position. " 30. } " 31. } Investment commences. Aug. 8. Ta-ku-shan and Sia-gu-shan lost by Russians. " 9. First attempt to recapture Ta-ku-shan Hill fails. " 10. Sortie of the Russian Fleet. " 11. Second attempt to recapture Ta-ku-shan Hill fails. " 16. Japanese suggest surrender of Port Arthur. " 21. } " 22. } Great Japanese assault. Nos. 1 and 2 Redoubts " 23. } captured by Japanese. Sept. 19. Japanese capture Water-supply Redoubt. " 20. Japanese capture Temple Redoubt. Oct. 1. Japanese commence firing from 11-inch howitzers. " 29. } General assault by Japanese. No. 2 Open " 30. } Caponier captured by them. Nov. 20-26. Japanese assaults. Dec. 5. 203 Metre Hill captured. " 6. Japanese commence to shell Russian ships. " 15. General Kondratenko killed. " 18. Chi-kuan-shan Fort captured. " 28. Erh-lung-shan Fort captured. " 31. Fortification No. 3 captured. 1905. Jan. 1. Eagle's Nest captured. " 2. Capitulation signed. CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE I. THE BOMB-SHELL 3 II. SETTLING DOWN TO IT 8 III. DEVELOPMENTS 17 IV. SMIRNOFF ARRIVES 23 V. STÖSSEL STAYS 27 VI. THE WORK OF JAPANESE MINE-LAYERS 32 VII. NEWS FROM THE NORTH 36 VIII. MORE BLOCKERS 41 IX. WHAT WE DID WHILE THE ENEMY WERE ADVANCING 44 X. THE NAVY LOSE A CHANCE 50 XI. PREPARATIONS ON THE KINCHOU POSITION 54 XII. THE BATTLE OF KINCHOU COMMENCES 61 XIII. THE BATTLE CONTINUES 67 XIV. NANGALIN RAILWAY-STATION 75 XV. THE LAST OF DALNY 80 XVI. THE FATE OF THE FORTRESS 84 XVII. THE LOSS OF KUEN-SAN HILL 91 XVIII. THE JUNE SORTIE OF THE FLEET 96 XIX. FORTIFYING OUR LINE 103 XX. THE ATTACK ON GREEN HILLS 110 XXI. THE BATTLE CONTINUES 120 XXII. STÖSSEL HOIST BY HIS OWN PETARD 133 XXIII. THE LOSS OF TA-KU-SHAN HILL 140 XXIV. THE SORTIE OF THE FLEET ON AUGUST 10 150 XXV. OUR SECOND ATTACK ON TA-KU-SHAN--A FLAG OF TRUCE 155 XXVI. DEATH OF PRINCE MACHABELLY--ALL-ROUND FIGHTING 163 XXVII. STÖSSEL DISOBEYS--PROGRESS DURING AUGUST 173 XXVIII. AWARDS--SOME PERSONAL NOTES 186 XXIX. SEPTEMBER PASSES 191 XXX. MOLE WARFARE 206 XXXI. JAPANESE VIEWS-GENERAL FOCK's MEMORANDUM ON FORTRESS DEFENCE 222 XXXII. HINTS OF SURRENDER--MORE ASSAULTS 233 XXXIII. THE FIGHT FOR 203 METRE HILL 243 XXXIV. THE LOSS OF THE HILL 252 XXXV. A RETROSPECT ON THE POSITION AT SEA 259 XXXVI. A COUNCIL MEETING 265 XXXVII. KONDRATENKO'S DEATH AND SOME RESULTS 274 XXXVIII. THE LOSS OF FORT CHI-KUAN-SHAN 284 XXXIX. THE SAPPERS--REWARDS 292 XL. THE FALL OF ERH-LUNG-SHAN AND THE LAST COUNCIL 299 XLI. THE FALL OF FORTIFICATION NO. 3.--THE FAILURE OF THE DEFENCE AND MEDICAL ORGANIZATIONS 310 XLII. THE LAST DAY BUT ONE 322 XLIII. THE END 330 CONCLUSION 336 APPENDIX I. 347 APPENDIX II. 364 APPENDIX III. 381 APPENDIX IV. 385 INDEX 389 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS GENERAL SMIRNOFF FRONTISPIECE ADMIRAL LOSCHINSKY TO FACE PAGE 20 COLONEL KHVOSTOFF " 23 ADMIRAL MAKHAROFF " 35 MAJOR-GENERAL TRETIAKOFF " 69 COLONEL LAPEROFF " 73 A WOMAN DRESSED AS A SOLDIER WHO WENT THROUGH SEVERAL FIGHTS " 87 A BOMBPROOF " 105 REAR-ADMIRAL GRIGOROVITCH " 151 INSIDE A TRENCH ON THE EASTERN FRONT " 166 GENERAL GORBATOVSKY " 171 ON THE ATTACKED FRONT " 174 THE ASSAULT REPULSED " 182 BURIAL-PARTIES AT WORK " 185 COLONEL RASCHEVSKY " 188 PANORAMA OF NORTH-EAST FRONT " 193 A CANET GUN MOUNTED ON FORT V., SEPTEMBER 22 " 197 A COMPANY IN THE TRENCHES " 200 BOMBARDMENT: JAPANESE SHELLS BURSTING ON HILL " 208 RESULTS OF A BOMBARDMENT " 210 GENERAL SMIRNOFF FIRING THE CAMOUFLET " 217 KUROPATKIN LUNETTE AFTER THE ASSAULT IN OCTOBER " 221 B BATTERY " 231 RESERVES WAITING UNDER 203 METRE HILL " 246 GENERAL BIELY " 256 GENERAL KONDRATENKO " 276 NORTH FORT, CHI-KUAN-SHAN, SHOWING GREEN HILLS IN THE DISTANCE " 285 ADMIRAL WIREN " 330 THE TRUTH ABOUT PORT ARTHUR '_Culpam pæna premit comes._' Port Arthur has fallen.... The bare fact is now a matter of history; but at last the time has come to reckon up in detail all that happened during the blockade by land and sea. As late war correspondent in the theatre of operations in Kwantun, as a close witness of all that took place, and as one who voluntarily went through that terrible time, I look upon it as my sacred duty to narrate what this defence cost the garrison and inhabitants of the unhappy town--to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. All who went through that heartrending siege, and who reflected at all on what was passing before their eyes, became gradually aware of--and finally, I might almost say, resigned to--two great facts. First, that the Fortress Commandant, Lieutenant-General Smirnoff, had two enemies to fight--one inside the Fortress and one out; second, that it was the internal enemy which proved too strong. The immense efforts of General Smirnoff and of his immediate assistants--the late General Kondratenko, Admirals Grigorovitch, Loschinsky, and Wiren, and Generals Biely and Gorbatovsky--were in vain. Why? To this question the following pages will, I hope, supply the answer; but, before commencing my narrative, I should explain that I shall only recount facts either confirmed by documentary evidence or witnessed by myself. CHAPTER I THE BOMB-SHELL When, one hour before midnight on February 8, 1904, our warships began to belch fire from their many steel mouths, and the seaward batteries suddenly thundered forth their angry death-dealing tidings, no one dreamed that the noise was War, for no one had taken the constant rumours of the rupture of diplomatic relations and of approaching hostilities at all seriously. Those who heard the increasing cannonade buoyed themselves up with the vague hope that some surprise combined manoeuvres were taking place between the fleet and the coast defences. When three rockets, however, snaked up into the inky night from Golden Hill and burst on high, they told their message, and finally when the gun-fire from Electric Cliff and the adjacent batteries changed to salvos, those who understood the message of the rockets doubted no longer. Thus was all hope of a peaceful issue to the negotiations with Japan shattered. Our incapable, idle, and utterly short-sighted diplomacy, which had so long and so stupidly exhausted the patience of the Mikado's Government, was now at an end. It was to enjoy a dishonourable repose, whilst others reaped the harvest of its handiwork. The hour had struck for the cold, impartial judgment of history. Although the sky in the East had for weeks been blood-red with the menace of immediate war, yet when it came the surprise was absolute, its horror intensified by our complete unreadiness. Regiments hearing the alarm fell in. Officers, surprised in bed, at a ball, at the theatre, or in restaurants, hurried off to march their units to the alarm posts: hurried, but went without speed--for, alas! no one had hitherto taken the trouble to become acquainted with the geography of the Fortress, and the consequence was that most of the troops wandered about unknown roads and hill-tracks, in vain searching for the posts assigned to them. The confusion which ensued was incredible--a fitting prelude to the fall of Port Arthur. Finally, when the troops did arrive at their posts, to their amazement they found in them either no small-arm ammunition at all or else only the ordinary quantity for the guards. To the men it was at first a huge joke; they naturally thought they were only doing a 'sham fight.' But the jest wore off as they sat on through the night, and through the next day, hungry, and chilled to the bone by the pitiless icy wind which was howling down the hill-sides. It was possibly good training for the hardships to follow? It was not until the morning that it struck some bright staff-officer to send up ammunition. This reached the frozen detachments on the following evening, together with the means of cooking. Yes, certainly Luck did favour us sometimes in Port Arthur; she did that night, in that the Japanese did not press a land attack. While this cheerful state of chaos reigned in the Fortress, on the sea the prologue to the war was already over. One Russian ship alone--the _Novik_--could be heard, hull down on the horizon, firing at Japanese destroyers. In the town itself a doleful rumour spread apace, that some of our ships had been blown up. It was not believed. We were afraid to believe what we did hear, but did not want to hear the truth, which we dreaded still more. Next morning Port Arthur woke earlier than usual. Every one wanted to know what had actually happened during the night. Alas! the reports as to Japanese torpedo attacks were only too well founded, and the _Cesarevitch_, _Pallada_, and _Retvisan_ were _hors de combat_. Despite the completeness of the night attack, and the calculating thoroughness with which the enemy had done their work--clearest proof that man could want of the outbreak of war--in the absence of any official communication from the Commandant, the population still hoped against hope. The more impressionable prepared to leave, but otherwise things went on much as usual. At the wharf a crowd collected to look at the _Retvisan_ lying in the entrance to the harbour; from her appearance it was difficult to believe that she had sustained any damage, and the reports were pronounced untrue. The printing office of the _Novy Kry_ was another centre of attraction, every one hustling round to buy a paper with some account of the night's work. But in the paper was no word of war. Although outwardly the current of life in Port Arthur seemed to flow unruffled, this calm did not extend to those in authority. The staffs, which up to the preceding evening had been peacefully slumbering for six years, were now extraordinarily busy; their activity was proved by the utter confusion which reigned. The disorganization of the Fortress Staff particularly was almost ludicrous: officers hurried hither and thither, contradictory and impossible orders were being issued and countermanded, and above and through all this confusion resounded the ceaseless chattering of the telephone-bells. It was not a sight to inspire confidence. It seemed as if the staff momentarily anticipated some fatal and sudden blow, but did not know what to do in order to ward it off. Colonel Khvostoff, the Chief of the Fortress Staff, and his immediate assistants alone kept their heads. He knew that the time was approaching when every one would see the real state of things, and to what extent the 'stronghold'--Port Arthur--was impregnable. [Several alarmists had already been punished by the Commandant for spreading rumours that many of the batteries were gunless, and many of the guns without ammunition.] He and his predecessor, General Flug, had done all that was in their power, but they might as well have knocked their heads against a wall. Meanwhile the Viceroy's staff wrote orders, which ended up in the Viceroy's own words: 'You must all keep calm, in order to be able to perform your duty in the most efficient manner possible, trusting to the help of God that every man will do his work, remembering that neither prayers to God nor service for the Tsar are in vain.' In the outer harbour the Pacific Ocean squadron was lying, steam up and cleared for action, waiting the order to go out and engage the enemy. When, at 10 a.m., the _Boyarin_, having returned to harbour, signalled that the Japanese fleet was approaching in force, the Viceroy and General Stössel, escorted by a troop of Cossacks, and followed by a numerous suite, went up on to Golden Hill. It certainly was to be hoped that General Stössel, to whom the Emperor had entrusted the Fortress, and who had recently reported to him that it was ready, would 'keep calm' and do his duty 'in the most efficient manner'; but those who were privileged to see him on that historic morning saw no traces of calmness in his demeanour. After about an hour the presence of the whole Japanese fleet on the horizon was signalled, but the majority of the people knew nothing, and all was quiet in the town. A little later and Port Arthur was paralysed with fear, for the very ground quivered with the shock as the guns of both fleets and of the coast batteries suddenly opened fire. The battle had begun, and the fleet of young Japan, a nation which had only begun to take lessons in Western culture thirty-two years ago, was pitted against that of Russia--founded two hundred years ago by Peter the Great. In twenty minutes' time 12-inch shells were detonating in the streets of the town, and the population began to flee in panic to the hills. The battle waxed, but there was curious silence on Liao-tieh-shan and Quail Hills--two peaks which commanded the ground all round Port Arthur. The first was armed with a lighthouse and the second with a fire observation-tower! In spite of the fire, but little damage was done on either side--the enemy could not hurt Electric Cliff and Golden Hill, and the bark of our shore batteries was worse than their bite, owing to the short range of their guns. Indeed, owing to lack of guns and ammunition, some of our batteries were actually firing blank, whilst others maintained a haughty silence. Though Russia did not then know of this, the Japanese did, but, with their natural cunning, held their tongues. The British knew of it, and chuckled whilst they kept silence for their allies. Just before noon the bombardment ceased, and the Japanese fleet steamed off. The first wild panic subsided and the little railway-station was soon crowded with fugitives, all anxious to depart. What the Viceroy, Alexeieff, said to Stössel that day is hidden by a veil of obscurity, but that he decided to remove him from the post of General admits of not the slightest doubt, for Lieutenant-General Konstantine Nikolaevitch Smirnoff was chosen by the War Minister to supersede Stössel as Commandant, and left Warsaw for Port Arthur on February 25. CHAPTER II SETTLING DOWN TO IT From that day onwards Port Arthur was, after dusk, plunged in complete darkness, the screened windows and deserted streets giving an ominous impression of desolation. The town became noticeably empty, though numerous families, anxious to share the fate of husbands and fathers, were still allowed to remain. In spite of the Viceroy's order (No. 49) that all families should be sent out of the besieged Fortress, General Stössel made no effort to enforce this. In vain it was pointed out that women--except nurses--and children are a most undesirable element in a fortress: he took no action. About this time much valuable time and labour was wasted by Stössel on the construction of an inner wall[4] with a ditch round the Old Town. The futility of this as a defence would have struck a first year's cadet, for it ran all along the hollow in which the town was situated, and would therefore be absolutely useless should the Japanese seize the hills in rear of the line of forts. Whilst he thus squandered time, labour, and money on this 'folly,' Stössel delayed the work on the forts, and paid no attention to the fortification of that most important position--Kinchou. Another curious point about the conduct of affairs was that officers were strictly forbidden to make themselves acquainted with the topography of the Fortress. In fact, the object seemed to be to handicap our forces as much as possible by ignorance of the ground, for practice manoeuvres were only held once, and the troops which had taken part in these manoeuvres and were the only ones that knew the ground--the 3rd Siberian Rifle Division--were sent away to the Yalu. Their places were taken by corps fresh from Siberia. Though Russian officers were not allowed to learn their way about the Fortress, numbers of officers of the Japanese General Staff, disguised as washermen, coolies, etc., were permitted to move about the batteries without hindrance. No one watched them. Not only were they able to learn all they desired and to make maps, but they drew up accurate range-tables for the siege-guns which afterwards did such brilliant service. When Smirnoff arrived and organized a fortress gendarmerie this was put a stop to. The supply question was another branch of the organization that was shockingly mismanaged. Slaughter cattle, etc., were largely requisitioned from the surrounding district, but, owing to the disgraceful system of accounts and to the fact that the civil authorities in charge of the work were much under-staffed, only about one-half of what was available was obtained. In spite of the advice and protests of Colonel Vershinin, the Chief Commissary for the civil population, Stössel went his own way and quite serenely left the Fortress under-supplied. After the departure of the Viceroy to Mukden he assumed complete control of the commissariat, and, in addition to the failure of the system as far as supplies went, earned the resentment of all the civilians by the severity of his regulations. The Chinese naturally tried to drive away their cattle into Manchuria, as the requisitioning price was not a large one, and after a proclamation issued by Stössel on February 21, by which requisitioning was still more restricted, they were largely successful. Thus, with a close blockade looming in the near future, the district round the Fortress was being denuded of live-stock. Stössel's influence was not confined to the question of slaughter cattle. As the armies in the north gradually concentrated, a horde of officers turned up in Port Arthur trying to purchase supplies of every sort, and whole vans of sugar, flour, salt, tinned milk, green foods, preserved fish and meat, etc., were actually allowed to be taken from this important fortress--a fortress separated by many thousands of miles from Russia, blockaded by sea, and expecting, according to the natural course of events, to be blockaded also by land. General Stössel, who wrote in his order No. 126, of February 27, that there could be no retirement, since the sea was on three sides and the enemy on the fourth, allowed--nay, encouraged--the export of articles of vital importance. There was, consequently, in October, November, and December a shortage, which brought on an epidemic of scurvy. To all protests he replied that Kuropatkin would never allow us to be cut off, and, if we were cut off, it would only be for a very brief period. When the protests were repeated he 'came the senior officer,' and said that, as Commandant of the besieged Fortress, he would stand no interference. The civil authorities, who were under him, watched with silent indifference the melting away of our reserves. Several of the shopkeepers, indeed, hearing that supplies of every kind were badly wanted by the army in the north, themselves began to despatch truckloads. The state of affairs was almost a burlesque. Port Arthur, instead of being a fortress preparing itself for a siege, might have been a sort of general market, a principal supply depôt for the main army, to which every one came to do business, or to gamble, and dissipate, for although Stössel allowed only three restaurants for general use and closed the gambling hells, rowdyism was rampant and money flowed like water. Never in my life have I witnessed such orgies as I saw that February in Arthur before the arrival of General Smirnoff, and this in spite of the most severe efforts at prevention. Whenever I passed by the fire-brigade station in the morning I heard the swish of whips and the heartrending shrieks of men being flogged for drunkenness, for permission had been given to the Chief of the Police to correct drunkards with some 'homely treatment.' The usual procedure was as follows: The men to be corrected--workmen, cab-drivers, Chinamen--were drawn up in the prison courtyard. The inspector presented the charge-sheet, and the police-officer stopped in front of each prisoner. 'What have you to say?' 'Sir, yesterday----' 'One hundred lashes, two weeks' cells. Next. What have you to say?' 'Yesterday, sir----' 'One hundred lashes, to-day and to-morrow.' And so on to the end. And then these God's creatures, some of them future heroes who died for the honour and glory of Russia, were removed and flogged. Later, owing to the protests of the Chief of the Fire Brigade, the flogging was carried out in the prison-house, where it was still more cruel. I know that men are flogged in Russia, but there it is only after trial. With us in Arthur things were more simple, more patriarchal. During that time laws did not exist in Arthur. Once when Colonel Vershinin, the Civil Commissary, remarked with regard to an order that it was illegal, a staff-officer replied: 'How can you have laws on service? General Stössel's orders are law for us.' And this was the state of affairs right up to the capitulation, more especially after Stössel's appointment as aide-de-camp to the Tsar. After he had left the garrison and the sick and wounded to their fate and departed to Russia, Japanese military law came into force. It was strict, but it did not prevent freedom. On February 22 we perused the following order by the Commandant with fear and trembling: 'Colonel Petrusha will ride round the Old and New Towns and the New Chinese Town, and will make prisoners of all men who are drunk or disorderly, and anyone else whom he may consider it necessary to arrest.' This was alarming. Colonel Petrusha authorized to arrest 'anyone'? Several people went to the military Procurator to find out what it meant. It would be dangerous to go out in the streets, for if Colonel Petrusha thought it 'necessary' he would arrest you. The following day you would be up under the cold grey eye of the Chief of the Police. He would ask, 'What have you to say?' and you would be flogged. The only advice that the Procurator could give us was to be careful and retiring. As February passed guards were placed along the whole of the railway-line from Tashihchiao to Arthur, and guns were mounted near the longer bridges, for bands of Hunhuses were now on the prowl. Train-loads of soldiers from the reserve battalions arrived every day, and the confusion and lack of system shown in their distribution were hopeless. Though all concerned strove to appear busy, it was mainly in the direction of writing orders that their energy was expended. The general mental attitude towards the enemy was at this time remarkable, for from Stössel down to the last-joined recruit all professed the greatest contempt for the Japanese. The whole nation was judged by the specimens seen in Port Arthur. 'A Japanese? Pooh! he's a mosquito. Why, I'll stick a pin through him and send him home in a letter,' was a favourite remark of the moment. The General commanding the 4th Rifle Division, who led Stössel by the nose, absolutely, assured all and sundry that the Japanese were 'fools.' 'The Japanese are fools, because in their field regulations it is laid down, that in the attack, the firing-line should extend at wide intervals.' Sitting on his horse in front of the regiments under his command, he would explain this, and then say: 'Front rank, tell me why the Japanese are fools.' The soldiers would shout in chorus: 'Because, when attacking, their firing-line extends widely.' Is it to be wondered that our men thought the Japanese fools--till their first engagement, and that after systematically retiring before the 'fools' and suffering heavy losses they lost confidence in their General? Having spent more than a year in Japan, I knew of the enemy's energetic preparations for war. But our people would neither pay attention to the serious articles in the newspapers nor to the warnings of their own keen officers who had been through the Chinese campaign. The majority, especially those who had recently come from European Russia, preferred to accept Fock's estimate, for, thanks to the inferiority of our professional military literature, the army had no idea of what modern Japan was like, and in particular of her military strength. This stupidity and ignorance was shameful and sad. Whose fault was it? On the whole, the daily life in the town little resembled that in a besieged fortress, for there was a false sense of security, and people did not seem to realize the position. Because, since bombarding us on February 9, the enemy's fleet had disappeared and made no sign, people almost believed we were not at war, and things went on as before. The population, especially the garrison, believed that everything was 'all right,' and, together with their commanders, carelessly passed the time without worrying about the future. 'Why, if there was a chance of our being cut off, do you suppose for a minute that Stössel would let supplies be sent out? Do you really imagine that the Japanese can wage war on two fronts? They are concentrating against the main army on the Yalu, and Stössel says the more that land in Kwantun the better. He will take them all prisoners,' were remarks made. Nearly all talked similar nonsense, and, what's more, believed it, and beyond mining the shores, carried out by Admiral Loschinsky, no precautions were taken to prevent a landing. A certain amount of activity was visible within the Fortress. We commenced laying a fortress telegraph, but the system was overhead. Both the telephone and telegraph systems worked very badly when they were installed, and their faults were intensified when falling shells cut the wires. It was usually quicker to send an orderly than to attempt to get a telephone message through the exchange. Not only was the system unreliable, it was also unsafe, for the private and military lines were all together, so that, owing to the induction, anyone could overhear the most secret military message. Such a state of affairs in a besieged fortress was a monstrosity. One might have thought that at a place like Port Arthur a proper telephone system would have been organized in peace-time. But no! A system had been worked out by a certain captain of artillery, and the money had been allotted; but when the time came this officer was sent to the north, and the scheme was not carried out. The question of what happened to this money would form an excellent subject for an inquiry. In addition to his intense activity in writing profuse orders, Stössel developed a mania about 'signalling.' He was convinced that the enemy were being continually signalled to from the hills, and the strictest orders were issued to watch day and night for the culprits. The hills were always being patrolled, and 'signaller-catching' became a kind of amusement. Even the civilians joined in, although anyone who gave the matter a thought knew that the Japanese would not require to have messages sent them when they already knew every inch of the place; but owing to this practice many an innocent human being was wafted to a better world. An order on the subject--No. 120, of February 26--ran as follows: 'Although twenty men were caught yesterday in the act of making some kind of signals, about 3 a.m. this morning some one was seen signalling with a lantern between my house and the commissariat depôt. It was impossible to catch him, as he ran off to the New Chinese Town. Pickets detailed for this work will in future fire on any men seen signalling, if they run.' Though in the majority of cases, of course, the military procurator was unable to produce any proof of guilt against the Chinamen arrested, after this order they were shot like partridges. Though many were lulled into a false security by the absence of any military operations by the enemy since their first attack, yet to every one the complete state of unpreparedness of the Fortress, as well as the chaos reigning in every corner of it, was patent. _In vino veritas_, and in the restaurants and clubs the strongest opinions were expressed about Stössel and his actions by those who had exceeded. So much of this criticism went on that a special order upon the subject was issued: 'It has come to my knowledge that in the garrison club officers busy themselves over matters which do not concern them, criticize the course of the military operations, and repeat various stupid stories, picked up from God knows where. An officer's duty is to think how best to carry out his orders, and not to judge the actions of his seniors. Those who cavil do much harm, and I, of course, will punish them to the utmost of my power.' After this tongues ceased to wag, for it was known that the Commandant had wonderful ears. Officers even began to suspect each other of espionage and tale-bearing. FOOTNOTES: [Footnote 4: The Central Wall.] CHAPTER III DEVELOPMENTS At 1 a.m. on February 25 some destroyers, which were covering the advance of a blocker[5] towards the narrows into the harbour, attempted to torpedo the _Retvisan_. The battleship sank one destroyer, while the blocker was set on fire, and ran on the rocks of Tiger Peninsula. Here she lay blazing close to the _Retvisan_, a source of extreme danger, as she might at any moment blow up. Later on the enemy's fleet appeared on the horizon. The _Bayan_, _Novik_, and _Askold_, lying in the outer Roads, at once moved out and engaged it. From the hill I was on, I watched that rare picture, a fight at sea; but it did not last long. In face of a force four times their own strength, our ships were finally forced to seek shelter under the guns of the Fortress. Just at the end of this fight one of two of our destroyers, returning from night reconnaissance, was forced by the enemy's cruisers to beach herself. This was entirely due to the unfortified state of Liao-tieh-shan. On February 28 a remarkable order by Stössel was published in the _Novy Kry_. It was also telegraphed all over the whole world, and presumably redounded to the credit of its author: 'The troops know well, and I now make known to the civilians, that there will be no retirement; in the first place, the Fortress must fight to the last, and I, as its Commandant, will never give the order to retreat; in the second, there is no place to which to retreat....' As a matter of fact, Stössel, _quâ_ Commandant of the Fortress, never did give an order to retreat, because the question did not arise; but, as Officer Commanding the Kwantun District, which district he abandoned within two months, he surrendered the Fortress, despite the protests of the then Commandant, General Smirnoff, and the whole of the Council of Defence. In spite of the extensive range of subjects touched upon in the literature issued in the shape of orders, it was astonishing how little was said about the defences proper of the Fortress, which were still in the most incomplete state, or of the Kinchou position, where practically nothing had been done. It was only in an order of March 7 that the works were mentioned for the first time, and then it was the Central Wall--already mentioned as a monumental folly--which called for attention! The cost of this folly in cash was £20,000; its cost in work left undone elsewhere cannot be estimated. As we were not disturbed by the enemy from February 25 to March 10, we had time in Port Arthur to attend to home affairs. About March 4 Stössel received a wire from a certain General Bogdanovitch. In this the sender congratulated him on his victories, and expressed the hope that Arthur would give birth to new Nakhimoffs, Korniloffs, and Istomins. The telegram was quite genuine. It was thought that such a siege would certainly produce some heroes. Smirnoff and Kondratenko were not then known, and Bogdanovitch's kind wishes evidently referred to Stössel and his assistants, whose names had been well before the public since the Boxer campaign. Lieutenant Prince Karseladse of the 25th Regiment, who knew very well what was really going on, sent a reply wire to Bogdanovitch, to the effect that: 'There are no Nakhimoffs here; there is nothing but miserable incompetence.' This wire was not despatched, but was handed over to Stössel. As a result, a District Order upon the subject of official telegrams was issued, and the sender of this message was placed under arrest and tried by court-martial. He was sentenced to some days' arrest. For reporting well on the prisoner, the report being made at the request of the court, Colonel Selinen, who commanded his regiment, was deprived of his command by Stössel, and immediately left for Russia. One morning towards the end of February, I was informed by an aide-de-camp that Stössel wanted to see me. He received me very affably, but at once gave me to
{'title': 'The Truth About Port Arthur by E. K. Nozhin', 'source': 'Project Gutenberg', 'lang': 'en'}