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The author established at the beginning of the first volume of this work some rules of transcription for proper names, but neither he nor his publisher follow them consistently. HISTORY OF GREECE. BY GEORGE GROTE, ESQ. VOL. V. REPRINTED FROM THE LONDON EDITION. NEW YORK: HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS 329 AND 331 PEARL STREET. 1857. PREFACE TO VOL. V. VOLUMES V AND VI. FROM THE BATTLE OF MARATHON TO THE PEACE OF NIKIAS. B. C. 490-421. I had reckoned upon carrying my readers in these two volumes down to the commencement of the great Athenian expedition against Syracuse. But the narration of events, now that we are under the positive guidance of ThucydidÃªs,âcoupled with the exposition of some points on which I differ from the views generally taken by my predecessors,â have occupied greater space than I had foreseen: and I have been obliged to enlarge my Sixth Volume beyond the usual size, in order to arrive even at the Peace of Nikias. The interval of disturbance and partial hostility, which ensued between that peace and the Athenian expedition, will therefore be reserved for the beginning of my Seventh Volume, the publication of which will not be long delayed. G. G. Dec. 1848. CONTENTS. VOL. V. PART II. CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE. CHAPTER XXXVIII. FROM THE BATTLE OF MARATHON TO THE MARCH OF XERXES AGAINST GREECE. Resolutions of Darius to invade Greece a second time. His death. â Succeeded by his son Xerxes. â Revolt and reconquest of Egypt by the Persians. â Indifference of Xerxes to the invasion of Greece â persons who advised and instigated him â persuasions which they employed â prophecies produced by Onomakritus. â Xerxes resolves to invade Greece. â Historical manner and conception of Herodotus. â Xerxes announces his project to an assembly of Persian counsellors â Mardonius and Artabanus, the evil and good genius. â Xerxes is induced by Artabanus to renounce his project â his repeated dreams â divine command to invade Greece. â Religious conception of the sequences of history â common both to Persians and Greeks. â Vast preparations of Xerxes â March of Xerxes from the interior of Asia â collection of the invading army at Sardis â his numerous fleet and large magazines of provision beforehand. â He throws a bridge of boats across the Hellespont. â The bridge is destroyed by a storm â Wrath of Xerxes â he puts to death the engineers and punishes the Hellespont. â Remarks on this story of the punishment inflicted on the Hellespont: there is no sufficient reason for disbelieving its reality. â Reconstruction of the bridge â description of it in detail. â Xerxes cuts a ship-canal across the isthmus of Mount Athos. â Superior intelligence of the Phenicians. â Employment of the lash over the workmen engaged on the canal â impression made thereby on the Greeks. â Bridge of boats thrown across the Strymon. â March of Xerxes from Sardis â disposition of his army. â Story of the rich Kappadokian Pythius â his son put to death by order of Xerxes. â March to Abydos â respect shown to Ilium by Xerxes. â Xerxes and his army cross over the Hellespontine bridges. â March to Doriskus in Thrace, near the mouth of the Hebrus â his fleet joins him here. â Review and muster on the plain of Doriskus â immense variety of the nations brought together. â Numbering of the army â method employed. â Immense and incredible totals brought out by Herodotus. â Comments upon the evidence of Herodotus and upon himself as witness and judge. â Other testimonies about the number of the Persians. â Xerxes passes in review the land-force and the fleet at Doriskus â his conversation with the Spartan king Demaratus. â March of Xerxes from Doriskus westward along Thrace. â Contributions levied on the Grecian towns on the coast of Thrace â particularly Thasus and AbdÃªra. â Xerxes crosses the Strymon â marches to Akanthus â zeal of the Akanthians in regard to the canal of Athos. â March of Xerxes to Therma â his fleet join him in the Thermaic Gulf. â Favorable prospects of the invasion â zeal of the Macedonian prince to assist Xerxes. 1-44 CHAPTER XXXIX. PROCEEDINGS IN GREECE FROM THE BATTLE OF MARATHON TO THE TIME OF THE BATTLE OF THERMOPYLÃ. Violent proceedings and death of KleomenÃªs king of Sparta. â Complaint of the Ãginetans at Sparta against KleomenÃªs and LeotychidÃªs, on the subject of the hostages which those two kings had taken from Ãgina. â The Spartans deliver LeotychidÃªs to the Ãginetans, who require him to go with them to Athens, to get back the hostages. â Refusal of the Athenians to give up the hostages â reprisals of the Ãginetans. â The Ãginetan Nikodromus lays a scheme for a democratical revolution in Ãgina, in concert with Athens â the movement fails. â Treatment of the defeated conspirators â sacrilege. â The Athenians land a force in Ãgina â war which ensues. â Effect of this war in inducing the Athenians to enlarge their military force. â ThemistoklÃªs and AristeidÃªs, the chief men at Athens â intense rivalry between them. â Banishment of the latter by ostracism. â Conversion of Athens from a land power into a naval power proposed and urged by ThemistoklÃªs. â Views and long-sighted calculations of ThemistoklÃªs â he was at this time more essential to his country than AristeidÃªs. â Fleet of Athens â the salvation of Greece as well as of herself. â Valuable fund new first available to Athens from the silver mines of Laurium in Attica. â ThemistoklÃªs prevails upon the Athenian people to forego the distribution of this fund, and employ it in building an increased number of ships. â Preparations of Xerxes â known beforehand in Greece. â Heralds from Persia to demand earth and water from the Grecian cities â many of them comply and submit. â Pan-Hellenic congress convened jointly by Athens and Sparta at the Isthmus of Corinth. â Important effect on Grecian mind. â Effects of the congress in healing feuds among the different Greeks â especially between Athens and Ãgina. â Alarm and mistrust prevalent throughout Greece. â Terror conveyed in the reply of the Delphian oracle to the Athenian envoys. â Sentence of the oracle frightful, yet obscure: efforts of the Athenians to interpret it: ingenuity and success of ThemistoklÃªs. â Great and genuine Pan-Hellenic patriotism of the Athenians â strongly attested by Herodotus, as his own judgment. â Unwillingness, or inability, on the part of a large proportion of Greeks, to resist the Persians. â Ambiguous neutrality of Argos. â Different stories current in Greece about Argos â opinion of Herodotus. â Refusal or equivocation of the Kretans and KorkyrÃ¦ans. â Mission to Gelon at Syracuse â his reply. â Grecian army sent into Thessaly, to defend the defile of TempÃª against Xerxes. â On arriving, they find that it cannot be successfully held against him, and retire. â Consequences of this retreat â the Thessalians, and nearly all Hellas north of KithÃ¦ron, either submit to Xerxes or waver. 45-70 CHAPTER XL. BATTLES OF THERMOPYLÃ AND ARTEMISIUM. Engagement taken by the Confederate Greeks against such Greeks as joined the Persians. â Resolution taken to defend ThermopylÃ¦ as well as the adjoining strait of EubÅa. â Pass of ThermopylÃ¦ and its neighborhood. â The Greeks take post at ThermopylÃ¦ â Leonidas, king of Sparta, conducts the force thither â the combined fleet under EurybiadÃªs occupy the EubÅan strait. â Numbers and composition of the force of Leonidas. â Phocians and Lokrians. â Olympian and Karneian festivals â the Greeks could not bring themselves to postpone these, even under such imminent danger. â Path over Mount Åta by which ThermopylÃ¦ might be evaded â Leonidas first informed of it on reaching the spot â the Phocians engage to defend it. â Numbers and composition of the Greek fleet at Artemisium. â Three triremes of the Grecian fleet sent forward as scouts â their first encounter with the Persian fleet. â Capture of these three triremes â panic of the general Grecian fleet, who abandon Artemisium, and retire to Chalkis. â Imminent danger of the Greek scheme of defence â they are rescued by a terrific storm. â Movements of Xerxes from Therma. â He arrives with his army in the Malian territory, close upon the pass of ThermopylÃ¦. â Advance of the Persian fleet â it is overtaken by a destructive storm and hurricane on the coast of Magnesia. â Immense damage inflicted upon it by the storm. â Encouragement occasioned to the Greek fleet â they return from Chalkis to Artemisium. â Delay of Xerxes with his land-force near Trachis. â Impressions of Xerxes about the defenders at ThermopylÃ¦ â conversation with Demaratus, whom he will not believe. â Doubts about the motives ascribed by Herodotus to Xerxes. â First attack upon ThermopylÃ¦ â made by the Median troops â repulsed. â Repeated attacks, by the best troops in the Persian army, all repulsed with slaughter. â Embarrassment of Xerxes â he is relieved from it by hearing of the path over the mountain. â A Persian detachment under HydarnÃªs march over the mountain-path, driving away the Phocian guard. â They arrive in the rear of Leonidas. â Debate among the defenders of ThermopylÃ¦, when it became known that the Persians were approaching their rear. â Resolution of Leonidas to stay and die in the pass. â The three hundred Spartans, together with the Thespians, remain with Leonidas: the rest of the detachment retire. â Doubts about the Theban contingent. â Last exploits and death of Leonidas and his band. â Individuals among them distinguished â scorn exhibited towards AristodÃªmus who did not fight. â Fate of the Theban contingent. â Impressions of Xerxes after the combat â advice given to him by Demaratus â he rejects it. â Proceedings of the two fleets, at Artemisium and AphetÃ¦ â alarm among the Grecian fleet â ThemistoklÃªs determines them to stay and fight, at the urgent instance of the EubÅans. â Important service thus rendered by ThemistoklÃªs. â Confident hopes of the Persian fleet â they detach a squadron to sail round EubÅa, and take the Greeks in the rear. â Sea-fight of Artemisium â advantage gained by the Greeks. â Second storm â increased damage to the Persian fleet, and ruin to the detachment sent round EubÅa. â Renewed sea-fight off Artemisium â indecisive â but the Greek fleet resolves to retreat. â They retreat immediately on hearing of the disaster at ThermopylÃ¦ â they go to Salamis. â Advance of the Persian fleet to EubÅa â manÅuvres ascribed to Xerxes in respect of the dead bodies at ThermopylÃ¦ â Numbers of dead on both sides. â Subsequent commemorating inscriptions. â Impressive epigram of Simonides. 70-104 CHAPTER XLI. BATTLE OF SALAMIS. â RETREAT OF XERXES. Surprise and terror of the Greeks immediately after the battle of ThermopylÃ¦. â No ulterior plan of defence formed â no new position to be found, capable of defending Attica â the Peloponnesians crowd to fortify the Isthmus of Corinth. â Hopeless situation of the Athenians â no measures yet taken to remove their families from Attica. â The Athenians abandon Attica, removing their families and property to Salamis, Ãgina, TrÅzen, etc. â Unavoidable hurry and sufferings of the emigrants. â Energy of the Athenians, and unanimity of the leaders â ThemistoklÃªs proposes the restoration of AristeidÃªs from exile. â Numbers and composition of the combined Greek fleet at Salamis. â Xerxes occupies Athens and Attica â the Persian fleet enters the road of PhalÃªrum. â The Persian army ravage the Phocian townships in their march from ThermopylÃ¦ to Attica â pillage of the temple at AbÃ¦. â Persian division detached against the temple of Delphi. â Failure, flight, and ruin of the detachment. â Xerxes with the Peisistratids in Athens â the acropolis holds out â is taken and sacked. â Atoning visit of the Peisistratids to the ruined acropolis. â Xerxes reviews his fleet at PhalÃªrum â debate about the policy of fighting a naval battle at Salamis â prudent counsel of Queen Artemisia. â Resolution taken by Xerxes to fight at Salamis. â Dissensions among the Greeks in the fleet at Salamis. Resolution taken to remove the fleet to the Isthmus. â Ruinous consequences, if that resolution had been executed. â ThemistoklÃªs opposes the resolution, persuades EurybiadÃªs, and prevails upon him to reopen the debate. â Synod of Grecian chiefs again convened â ThemistoklÃªs tries to get the former resolution rescinded â the Peloponnesians adhere to it â angry words. â Menace of ThemistoklÃªs to retire with the Athenian squadron, unless a battle were to be fought at Salamis â EurybiadÃªs takes upon him to adopt this measure. â The Peloponnesian chiefs, silenced for the moment, afterwards refuse obedience. Third synod convened â renewed disputes; the majority opposed to ThemistoklÃªs and determined on retreating to the Isthmus. â Desperate stratagem of ThemistoklÃªs â he sends a private message across to Xerxes, persuading him to surround the Greek fleet in the night, and thus render retirement impossible. â Impatient haste of Xerxes to prevent any of the Greeks from escaping â his fleet incloses the Greeks during the night. â AristeidÃªs comes in the night to the Greek fleet from Ãgina â informs the chiefs that they are inclosed by the Persians, and that escape has become impossible. â Position of Xerxes â order of the fleets, and plan of attack. â Battle of Salamis â confusion and complete defeat of the Persians. â Distinguished gallantry of Queen Artemisia. â Expectations of the Greeks that the conflict would be renewed â fears of Xerxes for his own personal safety â he sends his fleet away to Asia. â Xerxes resolves to go back himself to Asia â advice and recommendation of Mardonius, who is left behind, as general, to finish the conquest of Greece. â The Greeks pursue the Persian fleet as far as Andros â second stratagem of ThemistoklÃªs by secret message to Xerxes. â ThemistoklÃªs with the fleet â levying money in the Cyclades. â Xerxes evacuates Attica and returns home by land, with the larger portion of his army. â Retreating march of Xerxes to the Hellespont â sufferings of his troops. He finds the bridge broken, and crosses the strait on shipboard into Asia. â Joy of the Greeks â distribution of honors and prizes. â Honors rendered to ThemistoklÃªs. 104-147 CHAPTER XLII. BATTLES OF PLATÃA AND MYKALE. â FINAL REPULSE OF THE PERSIANS. The Persian fleet, after retiring from Greece, winters at KymÃª, and collects in the spring at Samos. â The Greek fleet assembles in the spring at Ãgina. â General adherence of the _medizing_ Greeks to Mardonius â revolt of PotidÃ¦a â which is besieged in vain by Artabazus. â Mardonius, after wintering in Thessaly, resumes operations in the spring in BÅotia. He consults the BÅotian oracles. â Mardonius sends Alexander of Macedon to Athens, to offer the most honorable terms of peace. â Temptation to Athens to accept this offer â fear of the LacedÃ¦monians that she would accept it â LacedÃ¦monian envoys sent to Athens to prevent it. â Resolute reply of the Athenians, and determination to carry on the war, in spite of great present suffering. â Selfish indifference displayed by Sparta and the Peloponnesians towards Athens. â The Spartans, having fortified the Isthmus, leave Attica undefended: Mardonius occupies Athens a second time. â Second migration of the Athenians to Salamis â their bitter disappointment and anger against Sparta for deserting them. â Second offer of Mardonius to the Athenians â again refused â intense resolution which they display. â Remonstrance sent by the Athenians to Sparta â ungenerous slackness of the Spartans. â Large Spartan force collected under Pausanias at the Isthmus. â Mardonius, after ravaging Attica, retires into BÅotia. â Discouragement in the army of Mardonius generally: Thersander of Orchomenus at the banquet: jealousies between Mardonius and Artabazus, the second in command â zeal and eagerness of the Thebans. â Numbers of the Greeks collected under Pausanias. â March of Pausanias over KithÃ¦ron into BÅotia. â He is attacked by the Persian cavalry under Masistius, and much harassed â superior efficiency of the Athenians against cavalry â Masistius is slain. â The Greeks quit the protection of the mountain-grounds and take up a position nearer to PlatÃ¦a, along the AsÃ´pus. â Mardonius alters his position, and posts himself nearly opposite to the Greeks on the other side of the AsÃ´pus. â Unwillingness of both armies to begin the attack â the prophets on both sides discourage first aggression. â Mardonius annoys the Greeks with his cavalry, and cuts off their supplies in the rear. â Impatience of Mardonius â in spite of the reluctance of Artabazus and other officers he determines on a general attack: he tries to show that the prophecies are favorable to him. â His intention communicated to the Athenians in the night by Alexander of Macedon. â Pausanias changes places in the line between the Spartans and Athenians. â Mardonius again attacks them with his cavalry. â In consequence of the annoyance of the Persian cavalry, Pausanias determines to move in the night into the Island. â Confusion of the Grecian army in executing this night-movement. â Refusal of the Spartan lochage Amompharetus to obey the order for the night-march. â Mistrust of Pausanias and the Spartans, exhibited by the Athenians. â Pausanias moves without Amompharetus, who speedily follows him. â Astonishment of Mardonius on discovering that the Greeks had retreated during the night â he pursues and attacks them with disorderly impatience. â Battle of PlatÃ¦a. â Great personal bravery of the Persians â they are totally defeated, and Mardonius slain. â The Athenians on the left wing defeat the Thebans. â Artabazus, with a large Persian corps, abandons the contest and retires out of Greece â the rest of the Persian army take up their position in the fortified camp. â Small proportion of the armies on each side which really fought. â The Greeks attack and carry the fortified camp. â Loss on both sides. â Funeral obsequies by the Greeks â monuments â dead body of Mardonius â distribution of booty. â Pausanias summons Thebes, requiring the surrender of the leaders â these men give themselves up, and are put to death. â Honors and distinctions among the Greek warriors. â Reverential tribute to PlatÃ¦a, as the scene of the victory, and to the PlatÃ¦ans: solemnities decreed to be periodically celebrated by the latter, in honor of the slain. â Permanent Grecian confederacy decreed by the victors, to hold meetings at PlatÃ¦a. â Proceedings of the Grecian fleet: it moves to the rescue of Samos from the Persians. â The Persian fleet abandons Samos and retires to MykalÃª in Ionia. â Mistrust of the fidelity of the Ionians entertained by the Persian generals. â The Greeks land to attack the Persians ashore â revelation of the victory of PlatÃ¦a, gained by their countrymen on the same morning, springs up in their minds before the battle. â Battle of MykalÃª â revolt of the Ionians in the Persian camp â complete defeat of the Persians. â Retirement of the defeated Persian army to Sardis. â Reluctance of the Spartans to adopt the continental Ionians into their alliance â proposition to transport them across the Ãgean into Western Greece â rejected by the Athenians. â The Grecian fleet sails to the Hellespont: the Spartans return home, but the Athenians remain to attack the Chersonese. â Siege of Sestos â antipathy of the Chersonesites against ArtayktÃªs. â Capture of Sestos â crucifixion of ArtayktÃªs. â Return of the fleet to Athens. 147-203 CHAPTER XLIII. EVENTS IN SICILY DOWN TO THE EXPULSION OF THE GELONIAN DYNASTY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF POPULAR GOVERNMENTS THROUGHOUT THE ISLAND. Agrigentum and Gela superior to Syracuse before 500 B. C. â Phalaris despot of Agrigentum. â Syracuse in 500 B. C. â oligarchical government under the Gamori, or privileged descendants of the original proprietary colonists â the Demos â the Kyllyrii, or Serfs. â Early governments of the Greek cities in Sicily â original oligarchies subverted in many places by despots â attempted colony of the Spartan prince Dorieus. â Kleander despot of Gela, B. C. about 500. â First rise of Gelo and ÃnesidÃªmus in his service. TÃªlinÃªs, the first marked ancestor of Gelo. â Gelo â in high command among the mercenaries of HippokratÃªs despot of Gela. â Fate of the Ionic town of ZanklÃª, afterwards Messina â it is seized by the Samians â conduct of HippokratÃªs. â HippokratÃªs is victorious over the Syracusans â takes Kamarina â dies. â Gelo becomes in his place despot of Gela. â Greatness of Gelo â he gets possession of Syracuse, and transfers the seat of his power from Gela to Syracuse. â Conquest of various Sicilian towns by Gelo â he transports the oligarchy to Syracuse and sells the Demos for slaves. â Increased power and population of Syracuse under Gelo â it becomes the first city in Sicily. â Power of Gelo when the envoys from Sparta and Athens came to entreat his aid, B. C. 481. â Plans of Gelo for strengthening Sicilian Hellenism against the barbaric interests in the islands. â Spartan and Athenian envoys apply to Gelo â his answer. â Carthaginian invasion of Sicily, simultaneous with the invasion of Greece by Xerxes. â The Carthaginian army under Hamilkar besiege Himera â battle of Himera â complete victory gained over them by Gelo. â Supremacy of Gelo in Sicily â he grants peace to the Carthaginians. â Conduct of Gelo towards the confederate Greeks who were contending against Xerxes. â Number of prisoners taken at the battle of Himera and distributed among the Carthaginian cities â their prosperity, especially that of Agrigentum. â Death and obsequies of Gelo. â Number of new citizens whom Gelo had introduced at Syracuse. â Hiero, brother and successor of Gelo at Syracuse â jealous of his brother PolyzÃªlus â harsh as a ruler â quarrel between Hiero of Syracuse and ThÃªro of Agrigentum â appeased by the poet Simonides. â Severe treatment of the inhabitants of Himera by ThÃªro. â Power and exploits of Hiero â against the Carthaginians and Tyrrhenians â against Anaxilaus â he founds the city of Ãtna â new wholesale transplantation of inhabitants â compliments of Pindar. â Death of Anaxilaus of Rhegium, and of ThÃªro of Agrigentum. ThrasydÃ¦us, son of ThÃªro, rules Agrigentum and Himera. His cruel government â he is defeated by Hiero and expelled. â Great power of Hiero, after the defeat of ThrasydÃ¦us â his death. â Thrasybulus, brother and successor of Hiero â disputes among the members of the Gelonian family. â Cruelties and unpopularity of Thrasybulus â mutiny against him at Syracuse. â Expulsion of Thrasybulus, and extinction of the Gelonian dynasty. â Popular governments established in all the Sicilian cities â confusion and disputes arising out of the number of new citizens and mercenaries domiciliated by the Gelonian princes. â Internal dissensions and combat in Syracuse. â Defeat of the Gelonians â Syracuse made into one popular government, one city, one fortification. â Disorders in other Sicilian cities, arising from the return of exiles who had been dispossessed under the Gelonian dynasty. Katana and Ãtna. â General congress and compromise â the exiles are provided for â Kamarina again restored as a separate autonomous city. â Reactionary feelings against the previous despotism, and in favor of popular government, at Syracuse and in the other cities. â Italiot Greeks â destructive defeat of the inhabitants of Tarentum and of Rhegium. 204-239 CHAPTER XLIV. FROM THE BATTLE OF PLATÃA AND MYKALE DOWN TO THE DEATHS OF THEMISTOKLES AND ARISTEIDES. Causes of the disgraceful repulse of Xerxes from Greece â his own defects â inferior quality and slackness of most of his army. â Tendency to exaggerate the heroism of the Greeks. â Comparison of the invasion of Greece by Xerxes with the invasion of Persia afterwards by Alexander the Great. â No improvement in warfare among the Persians during that interval of one hundred and fifty years â great improvement among the Greeks. â Progressive spirit in Greece â operating through Athenian initiative. â Conduct of Athens in the repulse of the Persians â her position, temper, and influence, after that event. â Proceedings of the Athenians to restore their city â jealous obstructions caused by the Peloponnesians. â Stratagem of ThemistoklÃªs to procure for the Athenians the opportunity of fortifying their city. â Athens fortified â confusion of the Spartans â disappointment of the allies. â Effect of this intended, but baffled, intervention upon Athenian feelings. â Enlargement of the walls of Athens. â Large plans of ThemistoklÃªs for the naval aggrandizement of the city â fortified town and harbor provided at PeirÃ¦us â vast height and thickness projected for the walls. â Advantages of the enlarged and fortified harbor â increase of metics and of commerce at Athens. â Resolution to build twenty new triremes annually. â Expedition of the united Greek fleet against Asia, under the Spartan Pausanias â capture of Byzantium. â Misconduct of Pausanias â refusal of the allies to obey him â his treasonable correspondence with Xerxes. â Pausanias, having assurances of aid from Xerxes, becomes more intolerable in his behavior. He is recalled to Sparta. â The allies transfer the headship from Sparta to Athens. â Importance of this change in the relations of the Grecian states. â Tendency of the Spartan kings to become corrupted on foreign service â LeotychidÃªs. â Momentary Pan-Hellenic union under Sparta, immediately after the repulse of Xerxes â now broken up and passing into a schism, with two distinct parties and chiefs, Sparta and Athens. â Proceedings of Athens in her capacity of leader â good conduct of AristeidÃªs. â Formation of the confederacy of Delos, under Athens as president â general meetings of allies held in that island. â Assessment of the confederacy and all its members, made by AristeidÃªs â definite obligation in ships and money â money total â HellÃªnotamiÃ¦. â Rapid growth, early magnitude, of the confederacy of Delos: willing adhesion of the members. â State and power of Persia at the time when the confederacy of Delos was first formed. â Conduct of Pausanias after being removed from the command â he prosecutes his treasonable designs in conjunction with Persia. â He is recalled to Sparta â imprisoned â put on his trial â tries to provoke the Helots to revolt. â He is detected by the revelation of a slave â incredulity or fear of the Ephors. â His arrest and death â atonement made for offended sanctuary. â ThemistoklÃªs is compromised in the detected treason of Pausanias. â Position of ThemistoklÃªs at Athens â tendency of Athenian parties and politics. â Effect of the events of the Persian war upon Athenian political sentiment â stimulus to democracy. â Alteration of the Kleisthenean constitution â all citizens without exception are rendered politically admissible to office: first, universal eligibility and election of magistrates â next, sortition, or drawing by lot. â Increase of the power of the StratÃªgi â alteration in the functions and diminution of the importance of the archons. â Administration of Athens enlarged â new functionaries appointed â distribution between Athens and PeirÃ¦us. â Political career and precarious tenor of ThemistoklÃªs â bitter rivals against him â Kimon, AlkmÃ¦on, etc. â His liability to charges of corruption. â ThemistoklÃªs is charged with accepting bribes from Persia â acquitted at Athens. â Increased bitterness of feud between him and his political rivals, after this acquittal. He is ostracized. â While in banishment under ostracism, the LacedÃ¦monians prefer a charge of treason against him. â Flight and adventures of ThemistoklÃªs. â ThemistoklÃªs gets over to Asia, and seeks refuge with the Persian king. â Stories about the relations between the Persian king and ThemistoklÃªs. â Real treatment of ThemistoklÃªs in Persia. â Influence which he acquires with the Persian king. â Large reward which he receives â His death at Magnesia. â Death of AristeidÃªs â his poverty. 239-289 CHAPTER XLV. PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFEDERACY UNDER ATHENS AS HEAD. â FIRST FORMATION AND RAPID EXPANSION OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE. Consequence of the formation of the confederacy of Delos. â Bifurcation of Grecian politics between Sparta and Athens. â Distinction between the confederacy of Delos, with Athens as president â and the Athenian empire which grew out of it. â Tendency to confuse these two, and to impute to Athens long-sighted plans of ambition. â The early years, after the formation of the confederacy of Delos, were years of active exertion on the part of Athens. â Our imperfect knowledge of them. â Necessity of continued action against the Persians, even after the battles of PlatÃ¦a and MykalÃª. This necessity was the cause, both of the willing organization of the confederacy of Delos and of the maritime improvement of Athens. â Confederacy of Delos â sworn to by all the members â perpetual and peremptory â not allowing retirement nor evasion. â Enforcing sanction of Athens, strictly exercised, in harmony with the general synod. â Gradual alteration in the relations of the allies â substitution of money-payment for personal service, demanded by the allies themselves, suitable to the interests and feelings of Athens. â Change in the position as well as in the feelings of Athens. â Growing unpopularity of Athens throughout Greece â causes of it. â Synod of Delos â gradually declines in importance and vanishes. â Superior qualities and merit of the Athenians as compared with the confederates of Delos generally. â Tribute first raised by the synod of Delos â assessment of AristeidÃªs. â Events between B. C. 476-466. â Eion â Skyros â Karystus. â Athens as guardian of the Ãgean sea against piracy. â The Hero Theseus. â First revolt among the members of the confederacy of Delos â Naxos revolts and is reconquered. â Operations of Athens and the confederacy against Persia. â Defeat of the Persians by Kimon at the river Eurymedon. â Revolt of Thasos from the confederacy of Delos. â Siege of Thasos by the Athenians under Kimon. â Mines in Thrace. â First attempt of Athens to found a city at Ennea Hodoi on the Strymon above Eion. The attempt fails and the settlers are slain. â Reduction of Thasos after a blockade of two years â it is disarmed and dismantled. â Application of the Thasians to Sparta for aid â granted, but not carried into effect â glimpse of hostilities between Sparta and Athens. â Trial and acquittal of Kimon at Athens. â Great increase of the Athenian power. â Proceedings in Central Greece between 470-464 B. C. Thebes and the BÅotian towns. Discredit of Thebes. â Sparta restores and upholds the supremacy of Thebes over the lesser BÅotian towns. â Events in Peloponnesus â Arcadia â Elis, etc. â Terrible earthquake at Sparta, 464 B. C. â Revolt of the Helots. â The LacedÃ¦monians invoke the aid of their allies against the revolted Helots. â March of the Athenians under Kimon into Laconia, to aid them. â Mistrust conceived by the LacedÃ¦monians of their Athenian auxiliaries, who are dismissed from Laconia. Displeasure and change of policy at Athens. â The Athenians renounce the alliance of Sparta, and contract alliance with Argos. Position of Argos â her conquest of MykÃªnÃ¦ and other towns. â Megara becomes allied with Athens. Growing hatred of Corinth and the neighboring Peloponnesian states towards Athens. â Energetic simultaneous action of the Athenians â in Cyprus, Phenicia, Egypt, and Greece â they build the first âLong Wallâ from Megara to NisÃ¦a. â War of Athens against Corinth, Ãgina, etc. Total defeat of the Ãginetans at sea. â The Athenians besiege Ãgina â the Corinthians, Epidaurians, etc. are defeated by the Athenians under MyrÃ´nidÃªs. â The Long Walls between Athens and PeirÃ¦us are projected â espoused by PeriklÃªs, opposed by Kimon â political contentions at Athens â importance of the Long Wall. â Expedition of the LacedÃ¦monians into BÅotia â they restore the ascendancy of Thebes. â Intention of the Spartan army in BÅotia to threaten Athens and sustain the Athenian oligarchical party opposed to the Long Walls. â Battle of Tanagra â defeat of the Athenians. â Effects of the battle â generous behavior of Kimon â he is recalled from ostracism. â Compromise and reconciliation between the rival leaders and parties at Athens. â Victory of Ånophyta gained by the Athenians â they acquire ascendency over all BÅotia, Phocis, and Lokris. â Completion of the Long Walls. â Conquest of Ãgina, which is disarmed, dismantled, and rendered tributary. â The Athenians first sail round Peloponnesus â their operations in the gulf of Corinth. â Defeat and losses of the Athenians in Egypt. â The revolted Helots in Laconia capitulate and leave the country. â Truce for five years concluded between Athens and LacedÃ¦monians, through the influence of Kimon. â Fresh expeditions of Kimon against Persia. â Death of Kimon at Cyprus â victories of the Athenian fleet â it returns home. â No farther expeditions of the Athenians against Persia â convention concluded between them. â Mistakes and exaggerations respecting this convention â doubts raised as to its historical reality. Discussion of those doubts â confirmatory hints of ThucydidÃªs. â ThucydidÃªs, son of MelÃªsias, succeeds Kimon as leading opponent of PeriklÃªs. â Transfer of the common fund of the confederacy from Delos to Athens. â Gradual passage of the confederacy into an Athenian empire. â Transfer of the fund was proposed by the Samians. â Position of Athens with a numerous alliance both of inland and maritime states. â Commencement of reverses and decline of power to Athens. â Revolt of BÅotia from Athens â defeat of the Athenians at KorÃ´neia â they evacuate BÅotia. â Revolt of Phocis, Lokris, EubÅa, and Megara: invasion of Attica by the Peloponnesians under the LacedÃ¦monian king Pleistoanax. â EubÅa reconquered by PeriklÃªs. â Humiliation and despondency of Athens. â Conclusion of the Thirty yearsâ truce. â Diminution of Athenian power. â Feud between Athens and Megara. 290-352 CHAPTER XLVI. CONSTITUTIONAL AND JUDICIAL CHANGES AT ATHENS UNDER PERIKLES. First establishment of the democratical judicial system at Athens. â Union, in the same hands, of functions both administrative and judicial in early Athens â great powers of the magistrates, as well as of the senate of Areopagus. â Magistrates generally wealthy men â oligarchical tendencies of the senate of Areopagus â increase of democratical sentiment among the bulk of the citizens. â Political parties in Athens. â PeriklÃªs and EphialtÃªs democratical: Kimon, oligarchical or conservative. â Democratical Dikasteries, or Jury-courts, constituted by PeriklÃªs and EphialtÃªs. â How these dikasteries were arranged. â Pay to the dikasts introduced and made regular. â The magistrates are deprived of their judicial and confined to administrative functions. â Senate of Areopagus â its antiquity â semi-religious character â large and undefined controlling power. â Large powers of the senate of Areopagus, in part abused, became inconsistent with the feelings of the people after the Persian invasion. â New interests and tendencies then growing up at Athens. â Senate of Areopagus â a centre of action for the conservative party and Kimon. â Opposition between Kimon and PeriklÃªs â inherited from their fathers. â Character and working of PeriklÃªs. â Reserved, philosophical, and business-like habits of PeriklÃªs â his little pains to court popularity â less of the demagogue than Kimon. â EphialtÃªs belonging to the democratical party, and originally equal to PeriklÃªs in influence. â Efforts of EphialtÃªs against magisterial abuse. â Kimon and his party, more powerful than EphialtÃªs and PeriklÃªs, until the time when the Athenian troops were dismissed from Laconia. â Ostracism of Kimon. â Measures carried by EphialtÃªs and PeriklÃªs to abridge the power of the senate of Areopagus as well as of individual magistrates. â Institution of the paid dikasteries. â Separation of judicial from administrative functions. â Assassination of EphialtÃªs by the conservative party. â Commencement of the great ascendency of PeriklÃªs, after the death of EphialtÃªs. Compromise between him and Kimon. â Brilliant success of Athens, and era of the maximum of her power. â Other constitutional changes. â The Nomophylakes. â The NomothetÃ¦ â distinction between laws and psephisms, or special decrees â process by which laws were enacted and repealed. â Procedure in making or repealing of laws assimilated to the procedure in judicial trials. â GraphÃª ParanomÃ´n â indictment against the mover of illegal or unconstitutional propositions. â Working of the GraphÃª ParanomÃ´n. â Conservative spirit in which it is framed. â Restraint upon new propositions, and upon the unlimited initiative belonging to every citizen. â Abusive extension of the GraphÃª ParanomÃ´n afterwards. â It was often used as a simple way of procuring the repeal of an existing law â without personal aim against the author of the law. â Numbers and pay of the dikasts, as provided by PeriklÃªs. â The Athenian democracy, as constituted by PeriklÃªs, remained substantially unaltered afterwards down to the loss of Athenian independence â excepting the temporary interruptions of the Four Hundred and the Thirty. â Working of the numerous dikasteries â their large numbers essential to exclude corruption or intimidation â liability of individual magistrates to corruption. â The Athenian dikasteries are jury-trial applied on the broadest scale â exhibiting both its excellences and its defects in an exaggerated form. â The encomiums usually pronounced upon the theory of jury-trial would apply yet more strongly to the Athenian dikasteries. â Imperfections of jury-trial â exaggerated in the procedure of the dikasteries. â Powerful effects of the dikasteries in exercising and stimulating the intellect and feelings of individual citizens. â Necessity of learning to speak â growth of professional teachers of rhetoric â professional composers of speeches for others. â Rhetors and Sophists. â Polemics of SokratÃªs, himself a sophist, against the sophists generally. â Sophists and rhetors were the natural product of the age and of the democracy. â The dikasteries were composed, not exclusively of poor men, but of middling and poorer citizens indiscriminately. 352-407 HISTORY OF GREECE. PART II. CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE. CHAPTER XXXVIII. FROM THE BATTLE OF MARATHON TO THE MARCH OF XERXES AGAINST GREECE. In the last chapter but one of the preceding volume, I described the Athenian victory at Marathon, the repulse of the Persian general Datis, and the return of his armament across the Ãgean to the Asiatic coast. He had been directed to conquer both Eretria and Athens: an order which he had indeed executed in part with success, as the string of Eretrian prisoners brought to Susa attested,âbut which remained still unfulfilled in regard to the city principally obnoxious to Darius. Far from satiating his revenge upon Athens, the Persian monarch was compelled to listen to the tale of an ignominious defeat. His wrath against the Athenians rose to a higher pitch than ever, and he commenced vigorous preparations for a renewed attack upon them, as well as upon Greece generally. Resolved upon assembling the entire force of his empire, he directed the various satraps and sub-governors throughout all Asia to provide troops, horses, and ships, both of war and burden. For no less than three years the empire was agitated by this immense levy, which Darius determined to conduct in person against Greece.[1] Nor was his determination abated by a revolt of the Egyptians, which broke out about the time when his preparations were completed. He was on the point of undertaking simultaneously the two enterprises,âthe conquest of Greece and the reconquest of Egypt,âwhen he was surprised by death, after a reign of thirty-six years. As a precaution previous to this intended march, he had nominated as successor Xerxes, his son by Atossa; for the ascendency of that queen insured to Xerxes the preference over his elder brother Artabazanes, son of Darius by a former wife, and born before the latter became king. The choice of the reigning monarch passed unquestioned, and Xerxes succeeded without opposition.[2] It deserves to be remarked, that though we shall meet with several acts of cruelty and atrocity perpetrated in the Persian regal family, there is nothing like that systematic fratricide which has been considered necessary to guarantee succession in Turkey and other Oriental empires. [1] Herodot. vii, 3, 4. [2] Herodot. vii, 1-4. He mentionsâsimply as a report, and seemingly without believing it himselfâthat Demaratus the exiled king of Sparta was at Susa at the moment when Darius was about to choose a successor among his sons (this cannot consist with Ktesias, Persic. c. 23): and that he suggested to Xerxes a convincing argument by which to determine the mind of his father, urging the analogy of the law of regal succession at Sparta, whereby the son of a king, born after his father became king, was preferred to an elder son born before that event. The existence of such a custom at Sparta may well be doubted. Some other anecdotes, not less difficult of belief than this, and alike calculated to bestow a factitious importance on Demaratus, will be noticed in the subsequent pages. The latter received from the Persian king the grant of Pergamus and Teuthrania, with their land-revenues, which his descendants long afterwards continued to occupy (Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 1-6): and perhaps these descendants may have been among the persons from whom Herodotus derived his information respecting the expedition of Xerxes. See vii, 239. Plutarch (De Fraterno Amore, p. 488) gives an account in many respects different concerning the circumstances which determined the succession of Xerxes to the throne, in preference to his elder brother. The intense wrath against Athens, which had become the predominant sentiment in the mind of Darius, was yet unappeased at the time of his death, and it was fortunate for the Athenians that his crown now passed to a prince less obstinately hostile as well as in every respect inferior. Xerxes, personally the handsomest[3] and most stately man amid the immense crowd which he led against Greece, was in character timid and faint-hearted, over and above those defects of vanity, childish self-conceit, and blindness of appreciation, which he shared more or less with all the Persian kings. Yet we shall see that, even under his conduct, the invasion of Greece was very near proving successful: and it well might have succeeded altogether, had he been either endued with the courageous temperament, or inflamed with the fierce animosity, of his father. [3] Herod. vii, 187. The like personal beauty is ascribed to Darius Codomannus, the last of the Persian kings (Plutarch, Alexand. c. 21). On succeeding to the throne, Xerxes found the forces of the empire in active preparation, pursuant to the orders of Darius; except Egypt, which was in a state of revolt. His first necessity was to reconquer this country; a purpose for which the great military power now in readiness was found amply sufficient. Egypt was subdued and reduced to a state of much harder dependence than before: we may presume that the tribute was increased, as well as the numbers of the Persian occupying force maintained, by contributions levied on the natives. AchÃ¦menes, brother of Xerxes, was installed there as satrap. But Xerxes was not at first equally willing to prosecute the schemes of his deceased father against Greece. At least such is the statement of Herodotus; who represents Mardonius as the grand instigator of the invasion, partly through thirst for warlike enterprise, partly from a desire to obtain the intended conquest as a satrapy for himself. Nor were there wanting Grecian counsellors to enforce his recommendation, both by the promise of help and by the color of religion. The great family of the AleuadÃ¦, belonging to Larissa, and perhaps to other towns in Thessaly, were so eager in the cause, that their principal members came to Susa to offer an easy occupation of that frontier territory of Hellas: while the exiled Peisistratids from Athens still persevered in striving to procure their own restoration at the tail of a Persian army. On the present occasion, they brought with them to Susa a new instrument, the holy mystic Onomakritus,âa man who had acquired much reputation, not by prophesying himself, but by collecting, arranging, interpreting, and delivering out, prophetic verses passing under the name of the ancient seer or poet MusÃ¦us. Thirty years before, in the flourishing days of the Peisistratids, he had lived at Athens, enjoying the confidence of Hipparchus, and consulted by him as the expositor of these venerated documents. But having been detected by the poet Lasus of Hermione, in the very act of interpolating them with new matter of his own, Hipparchus banished him with indignation. The Peisistratids, however, now in banishment themselves, forgot or forgave this offence, and carried Onomakritus with his prophecies to Susa, announcing him as a person of oracular authority, to assist in working on the mind of Xerxes. To this purpose his interpolations, or his omissions, were now directed: for when introduced to the Persian monarch, he recited emphatically various encouraging predictions wherein the bridging of the Hellespont and the triumphant march of a barbaric host into Greece, appeared as predestined; while he carefully kept back all those of a contrary tenor, which portended calamity and disgrace. So at least Herodotus,[4] strenuous in upholding the credit of Bakis, MusÃ¦us, and other Grecian prophets whose verses were in circulation, expressly assures us. The religious encouragements of Onomakritus, and the political cooperation proffered by the AleuadÃ¦, enabled Mardonius effectually to overcome the reluctance of his master. Nor indeed was it difficult to show, according to the feelings then prevalent, that a new king of Persia was in honor obliged to enlarge the boundaries of the empire.[5] The conquering impulse springing from the first founder was as yet unexhausted; the insults offered by the Athenians remained still unavenged: and in addition to this double stimulus to action, Mardonius drew a captivating picture of Europe as an acquisition;ââit was the finest land in the world, produced every variety of fruit-bearing trees, and was too good a possession for any mortal man except the Persian kings.â[6] Fifteen years before, the Milesian Aristagoras,[7] when entreating the Spartans to assist the Ionic revolt, had exaggerated the wealth and productiveness of Asia in contrast with the poverty of Greece,âa contrast less widely removed from the truth, at that time, than the picture presented by Mardonius. [4] Herodot. vii, 6; viii, 20, 96, 77. á½Î½Î¿Î¼á½±ÎºÏÎ¹ÏÎ¿ÏâÎºÎ±Ïá½³Î»ÎµÎ³Îµ Ïá¿¶Î½ ÏÏÎ·ÏÎ¼á¿¶Î½Î Îµá¼° Î¼á½³Î½ ÏÎ¹ á¼Î½á½³Î¿Î¹ ÏÏá½±Î»Î¼Î± Ïá½³ÏÎ¿Î½ Ïá¿· Î á½³ÏÏá¿, Ïá¿¶Î½ Î¼á½²Î½ á¼Î»ÎµÎ³Îµ Î¿á½Î´á½³Î½Î á½ Î´á½² Ïá½° Îµá½ÏÏ Ïá½³ÏÏÎ±ÏÎ± á¼ÎºÎ»ÎµÎ³á½¹Î¼ÎµÎ½Î¿Ï, á¼Î»ÎµÎ³Îµ Ïá½¹Î½ ÏÎµ á¼Î»Î»á½µÏÏÎ¿Î½ÏÎ¿Î½ á½¡Ï Î¶ÎµÏ ÏÎ¸á¿Î½Î±Î¹ ÏÏá½³Î¿Î½ Îµá¼´Î· á½Ïâ á¼Î½Î´Ïá½¸Ï Î á½³ÏÏÎµÏ, Ïá½µÎ½ ÏÎµ á¼Î»Î±ÏÎ¹Î½ á¼Î¾Î·Î³Îµá½¹Î¼ÎµÎ½Î¿Ï, etc. An intimation somewhat curious respecting this collection of prophecies; it was of an extremely varied character, and contained promises or threats to meet any emergency which might arise. [5] Ãschylus, Pers. 761. [6] Herodot. vii, 5. á½¡Ï á¼¡ Îá½Ïá½½ÏÎ· ÏÎµÏÎ¹ÎºÎ±Î»Î»á½´Ï Ïá½½ÏÎ·, ÎºÎ±á½¶ Î´á½³Î½Î´ÏÎµÎ± ÏÎ±Î½ÏÎ¿á¿Î± Ïá½³ÏÎµÎ¹ Ïá½° á¼¥Î¼ÎµÏÎ±, Î²Î±ÏÎ¹Î»á½³Ï ÏÎµ Î¼Î¿á½»Î½á¿³ Î¸Î½Î·Ïá¿¶Î½ á¼Î¾á½·Î· á¼ÎºÏá¿ÏÎ¸Î±Î¹âÏá½½ÏÎ·Î½ ÏÎ±Î¼ÏÎ¿ÏÏÏá½³ÏÎ·Î½ (vii, 8). [7] Herodot. v, 49. Having thus been persuaded to alter his original views, Xerxes convoked a meeting of the principal Persian counsellors, and announced to them his resolution to invade Greece, setting forth the mingled motives of revenge and aggrandizement which impelled him, and representing the conquest of Greece as carrying with it that of all Europe, so that the Persian empire would become coextensive with the Ã¦ther
{'title': 'History of Greece, Volume 05 (of 12) by George Grote', 'source': 'Project Gutenberg', 'lang': 'en'}