START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ONTOLOGY OR THE THEORY OF BEING*** Ontology Or the Theory of Being By Peter Coffey, Ph.D. (Louvain) Professor of Logic and Metaphysics, Waynooth College, Ireland Longmans, Green and Co. London, New York, Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras 1918 CONTENTS Preface. General Introduction. Chapter I. Being And Its Primary Determinations. Chapter II. Becoming And Its Implications. Chapter III. Existence And Essence. Chapter IV. Reality As One And Manifold. Chapter V. Reality And The True. Chapter VI. Reality And The Good. Chapter VII. Reality And The Beautiful. Chapter VIII. The Categories Of Being. Substance And Accident. Chapter IX. Nature And Person. Chapter X. Some Accident-Modes Of Being: Quality. Chapter XI. Quantity, Space And Time. Chapter XII. Relation; The Relative And The Absolute. Chapter XIII. Causality; Classification Of Causes. Chapter XIV. Efficient Causality; Phenomenism And Occasionalism. Chapter XV. Final Causes; Universal Order. Index. Footnotes To The Students Past And Present Of Maynooth College PREFACE. It is hoped that the present volume will supply a want that is really felt by students of philosophy in our universitiesâthe want of an English text-book on General Metaphysics from the Scholastic standpoint. It is the authorâs intention to supplement his _Science of Logic_(1) and the present treatise on Ontology, by a volume on the Theory of Knowledge. Hence no disquisitions on the latter subject will be found in these pages: the Moderate Realism of Aristotle and the Schoolmen is assumed throughout. In the domain of Ontology there are many scholastic theories and discussions which are commonly regarded by non-scholastic writers as possessing nowadays for the student of philosophy an interest that is merely historical. This mistaken notion is probably due to the fact that few if any serious attempts have yet been made to transpose these questions from their medieval setting into the language and context of contemporary philosophy. Perhaps not a single one of these problems is really and in substance alien to present-day speculations. The author has endeavoured, by his treatment of such characteristically âmedievalâ discussions as those on _Potentia_ and _Actus_, Essence and Existence, Individuation, the Theory of Distinctions, Substance and Accident, Nature and Person, Logical and Real Relations, Efficient and Final Causes, to show that the issues involved are in every instance as fully and keenly debatedâin an altered setting and a new terminologyâby recent and living philosophers of every school of thought as they were by St. Thomas and his contemporaries in the golden age of medieval scholasticism. And, as the purposes of a text-book demanded, attention has been devoted to stating the problems clearly, to showing the significance and bearings of discussions and solutions, rather than to detailed analyses of arguments. At the same time it is hoped that the treatment is sufficiently full to be helpful even to advanced students and to all who are interested in the âMetaphysics of the Schoolsâ. For the convenience of the reader the more advanced portions are printed in smaller type. The teaching of St. Thomas and the other great Schoolmen of the Middle Ages forms the groundwork of the book. This _corpus_ of doctrine is scarcely yet accessible outside its Latin sources. As typical of the fuller scholastic text-books the excellent treatise of the Spanish author, Urraburu,(2) has been most frequently consulted. Much assistance has also been derived from Kleutgenâs _Philosophie der Vorzeit_,(3) a monumental work which ought to have been long since translated into English. And finally, the excellent treatise in the Louvain _Cours de Philosophie_, by the present Cardinal Archbishop of Mechlin,(4) has been consulted with profit and largely followed in many places. The writer freely and gratefully acknowledges his indebtedness to these and other authors quoted and referred to in the course of the present volume. GENERAL INTRODUCTION. I. REASON OF INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER.âIt is desirable that at some stage in the course of his investigations the student of philosophy should be invited to take a brief general survey of the work in which he is engaged. This purpose will be served by a chapter on _the general aim and scope of philosophy_, its distinctive characteristics as compared with other lines of human thought, and its relations to these latter. Such considerations will at the same time help to define _Ontology_, thus introducing the reader to the subject-matter of the present volume. II. PHILOSOPHY: THE NAME AND THE THING.âIn the fifth book of Ciceroâs _Tusculan Disputations_ we read that the terms _philosophus_ and _philosophia_ were first employed by Pythagoras who flourished in the sixth century before Christ, that this ancient sage was modest enough to call himself not a âwise manâ but a âlover of wisdomâ (Ïá½·Î»Î¿Ï, ÏÎ¿Ïá½·Î±), and his calling not a profession of wisdom but a search for wisdom. However, despite the disclaimer, the term _philosophy_ soon came to signify _wisdom_ simply, meaning by this the highest and most precious kind of knowledge. Now human knowledge has for its object everything that falls in any way within human experience. It has _extensively_ a great variety in its subject-matter, and _intensively_ a great variety in its degrees of depth and clearness and perfection. _Individual facts_ of the past, communicated by human testimony, form the raw materials of _historical_ knowledge. Then there are all the individual things and events that fall within oneâs own personal experience. Moreover, by the study of human language (or languages), of works of the human mind and products of human genius and skill, we gain a knowledge of _literature_, and of the _arts_âthe fine arts and the mechanical arts. But not merely do we use our senses and memory thus to accumulate an unassorted stock of informations about isolated facts: a miscellaneous mass of mental furniture which constitutes the bulk of human knowledge in its _least developed_ formâ_cognitio ____vulgaris,___ the knowledge of the comparatively uneducated and unreflecting classes of mankind. We also use our reasoning faculty to reflect, compare, classify these informations, to interpret them, to reason about them, to infer from them _general truths_ that embrace individual things and events _beyond our personal experience_; we try to explain them by seeking out their _reasons_ and _causes_. This mental activity gradually converts our knowledge into _scientific_ knowledge, and thus gives rise to those great groups of systematized truths called the _sciences_: as, for example, the physical and mathematical sciences, the elements of which usually form part of our early education. These sciences teach us a great deal about ourselves and the universe in which we live. There is no need to dwell on the precious services conferred upon mankind by discoveries due to the progress of the various _special_ sciences: mathematics as applied to engineering of all sorts; astronomy; the physical sciences of light, heat, sound, electricity, magnetism, etc.; chemistry in all its branches; physiology and anatomy as applied in medicine and surgery. All these undoubtedly contribute much to manâs _bodily_ well-being. But man has a _mind_ as well as a body, and he is moreover a _social_ being: there are, therefore, other special sciencesââhumanâ as distinct from âphysicalâ sciencesâin which man himself is studied in his mental activities and social relations with his fellow-men: the sciences of social and political economy, constitutional and civil law, government, statesmanship, etc. Furthermore, man is a _moral_ being, recognizing distinctions of good and bad, right and wrong, pleasure and happiness, duty and responsibility, in his own conduct; and finally he is a _religious_ being, face to face with the fact that men universally entertain views, beliefs, convictions of some sort or other, regarding manâs subjection to, and dependence on, some higher power or powers dwelling somehow or somewhere within or above the whole universe of his direct and immediate experience: there are therefore also sciences which deal with these domains, morality and religion. Here, however, the domains are so extensive, and the problems raised by their phenomena are of such far-reaching importance, that the sciences which deal with them can hardly be called special sciences, but rather constituent portions of the one wider and deeper _general_ science which is what men commonly understand nowadays by philosophy. The distinction between the special sciences on the one hand and philosophy, the general science, on the other, will help us to realize more clearly the nature and scope of the latter. The special sciences are concerned with discovering the _proximate_ reasons and causes of this, that, and the other definite department in the whole universe of our experience. The subject-matter of some of them is totally different from that of others: physiology studies the functions of living organisms; geology studies the formation of the earthâs crust. Or if two or more of them investigate the same subject-matter they do so from different standpoints, as when the zoologist and the physiologist study the same type or specimen in the animal kingdom. But the common feature of all is this, that each seeks only the reasons, causes, and laws which give a _proximate_ and _partial_ explanation of the facts which it investigates, leaving untouched and unsolved a number of deeper and wider questions which may be raised about the _whence_ and _whither_ and _why_, not only of the facts themselves, but of the reasons, causes and laws assigned by the particular science in explanation of these facts. Now it is those deeper and wider questions, which can be answered only by the discovery of the _more remote_ and _ultimate_ reasons and causes of things, that philosophy undertakes to investigate, andâas far as lies within manâs powerâto answer. No one has ever disputed the supreme importance of such inquiries into the ultimate reasons and causes of thingsâinto such questions as these, for instance: What is the nature of man himself? Has he in him a principle of life which is spiritual and immortal? What was his first origin on the earth? Whence did he come? Has his existence any purpose, and if so, what? Whither does he tend? What is his destiny? Why does he distinguish between a right and a wrong in human conduct? What is the ultimate reason or ground of this distinction? Why have men generally some form or other of religion? Why do men generally believe in God? Is there really a God? What is the origin of the whole universe of manâs experience? Of life in all its manifestations? Has the universe any intelligible or intelligent purpose, and if so, what? Can the human mind give a certain answer to any of these or similar questions? What about the nature and value of human _knowledge_ itself? What is its scope and what are its limitations? And since vast multitudes of men _believe_ that the human race has been specially enlightened by God Himself, by Divine Revelation, to know for certain what manâs destiny is, and is specially aided by God Himself, by Divine Grace, to work out this destinyâthe question immediately arises: What are the real relations between reason alone on the one hand and reason enlightened by such Revelation on the other, in other words between natural knowledge and supernatural faith? Now it will be admitted that the special sciences take us some distance along the road towards an answer to such questions, inasmuch as the truths established by these sciences, and even the wider hypotheses conceived though not strictly verified in them, furnish us with most valuable data in our investigation of those questions. Similarly the alleged fact of a Divine Revelation cannot be ignored by any man desirous of using all the data available as helps towards their solution. The Revelation embodied in Christianity claims not merely to enlighten us in regard to many ultimate questions which mankind would be able to answer without its assistance, but also to tell us about our destiny some truths of supreme import, which of ourselves we should never have been able to discover. It is obvious, then, that whether a man has been brought up from his infancy to believe in the Christian Revelation or not, his whole outlook on life will be determined very largely by his belief or disbelief in its authenticity and its contents. Similarly, if he be a Confucian, or a Buddhist, or a Mohammedan, his outlook will be in part determined by what he believes of their teachings. Manâs conduct in life has undoubtedly many determining influences, but it will hardly be denied that among them the predominant influence is exerted by the views that he holds, the things he believes to be true, concerning his own origin, nature and destiny, as well as the origin, nature and destiny of the universe in which he finds himself. The Germans have an expressive term for that which, in the absence of a more appropriate term, we may translate as a manâs _world-outlook_; they call it his _Weltanschauung_. Now this world-outlook is formed by each individual for himself from his interpretation of _his experience as a whole_. It is not unusual to call this world-outlook a manâs _philosophy of life_. If we use the term _philosophy_ in this wide sense it obviously includes whatever light a man may gather from the _special sciences_, and whatever light he may gather from a divinely revealed _religion_ if he believes in such, as well as the light his own reason may shed upon a special and direct study of those ultimate questions themselves, to which we have just referred. But we mention this wide sense of the term _philosophy_ merely to put it aside; and to state that we use the term in the sense more commonly accepted nowadays, the sense in which it is understood to be distinct from the _special sciences_ on the one side and from _supernatural theology_ or the systematic study of divinely revealed religion on the other. Philosophy is distinct from the special sciences because while the latter seek the proximate, the former seeks the ultimate grounds, reasons and causes of all the facts of human experience. Philosophy is distinct from supernatural theology because while the former uses _the unaided power of human reason_ to study the ultimate questions raised by human experience, the latter uses _reason enlightened by Divine Revelation_ to study the contents of this Revelation in all their bearings on manâs life and destiny. Hence we arrive at this simple and widely accepted definition of philosophy: _the science of all things through their ultimate reasons and causes as discovered by the unaided light of human reason_.(5) The first part of this definition marks off philosophy from the special sciences, the second part marks it off from supernatural theology. We must remember, however, that these three departments of knowledgeâscientific, philosophical, and revealedâare not isolated from one another in any manâs mind; they overlap in their subject-matter, and though differing in their respective standpoints they permeate one another through and through. The separation of the special sciences from philosophy, though adumbrated in the speculations of ancient times and made more definite in the middle ages, was completed only in modern times through the growth and progress of the special sciences themselves. The line of demarcation between philosophy and supernatural theology must be determined by the proper relations between Reason and Faith: and naturally these relations are a subject of debate between philosophers who believe in the existence of an authentic Divine Revelation and philosophers who do not. It is the duty of the philosopher as such to determine by the light of reason whether a Supreme Being exists and whether a Divine Revelation to man is possible. If he convinces himself of the existence of God he will have little difficulty in inferring the _possibility_ of a Divine Revelation. The _fact_ of a Divine Revelation is a matter not for philosophical but for historical research. Now when a man has convinced himself of the existence of God and the fact of a Divine Revelationâthe _preambula fidei_ or prerequisite conditions of Faith, as they are calledâhe must see that it is eminently reasonable for him to believe in the contents of such Divine Revelation; he must see that the truths revealed by God cannot possibly trammel the freedom of his own reason in its philosophical inquiries into ultimate problems concerning man and the universe; he must see that these truths may possibly act as beacons which will keep him from going astray in his own investigations: knowing that truth cannot contradict truth he knows that if he reaches a conclusion really incompatible with any certainly revealed truth, such conclusion must be erroneous; and so he is obliged to reconsider the reasoning processes that led him to such a conclusion.(6) Thus, the position of the Christian philosopher, aided in this negative way by the truths of an authentic Divine Revelation, has a distinct advantage over that of the philosopher who does not believe in such revelation and who tries to solve all ultimate questions independently of any light such revelation may shed upon them. Yet the latter philosopher as a rule not only regards the âindependentâ position, which he himself takes up in the name of âfreedom of thoughtâ and âfreedom of research,â as the superior position, but as the only one consistent with the dignity of human reason; and he commonly accuses the Christian philosopher of allowing reason to be âenslavedâ in âthe shackles of dogmaâ. We can see at once the unfairness of such a charge when we remember that the Christian philosopher has convinced himself _on grounds of reason alone_ that God exists and has made a revelation to man. His belief in a Divine Revelation is a _reasoned_ belief, a _rationabile obsequium_ (Rom. XII. 1); and only if it were a blind belief, unjustifiable on grounds of reason, would the accusation referred to be a fair one. The Christian philosopher might retort that it is the unbelieving philosopher himself who really destroys âfreedom of thought and research,â by claiming for the latter what is really an abuse of freedom, namely _license_ to believe what reason shows to be erroneous. But this counter-charge would be equally unfair, for the unbelieving philosopher does not claim any such undue license to believe what he knows to be false or to disbelieve what he knows to be true. If he denies the fact or the possibility of a Divine Revelation, and therefore pursues his philosophical investigations without any regard to the contents of such revelation, it is because he has convinced himself on grounds of reason that such revelation is neither a fact nor a possibility. He and the Christian philosopher cannot both be right; one of them must be wrong; but as reasonable men they should agree to differ rather than hurl unjustifiable charges and counter-charges at each other. All philosophers who believe in the Christian Revelation and allow its authentic teachings to guide and supplement their own rational investigation into ultimate questions, are keenly conscious of the consequent superior depth and fulness and certitude of Christian philosophy as compared with all the other conflicting and fragmentary philosophies that mark the progress of human speculation on the ultimate problems of man and the universe down through the centuries. They feel secure in the possession of a _philosophia __ perennis_,(7) and none more secure than those of them who complete and confirm that philosophy by the only full and authentic deposit of Divinely Revealed Truth, which is to be found in the teaching of the Catholic Church. The history of philosophical investigation yields no one universally received conception of what philosophy is, nor would the definition given above be unreservedly accepted. Windelband, in his _History of Philosophy_(8) instances the following predominant conceptions of philosophy according to the chronological order in which they prevailed: (_a_) the systematic investigation of the problems raised by man and the universe (early Grecian philosophy: absence of differentiation of philosophy from the special sciences); (_b_) the practical art of human conduct, based on rational speculation (later Grecian philosophy: distrust in the value of knowledge, and emphasis on practical guidance of conduct); (_c_) the helper and handmaid of the Science of Revealed Truth, _i.e._ supernatural theology, in the solution of ultimate problems (the Christian philosophy of the Fathers of the Church and of the Medieval Schools down to the sixteenth century: universal recognition of the value of the Christian Revelation as an aid to rational investigation); (_d_) a purely rational investigation of those problems, going beyond the investigations of the special sciences, and either abstracting from, or denying the value of, any light or aid from Revelation (differentiation of the domains of science, philosophy and theology; modern philosophies from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century; excessive individualism and rationalism of these as unnaturally divorced from recognition of, and belief in, Divine Revelation, and unduly isolated from the progressing positive sciences); (_e_) a critical analysis of the significance and scope and limitations of human knowledge itself (recent philosophies, mainly concerned with theories of knowledge and speculations on the nature of the cognitive process and the reliability of its products). These various conceptions are interesting and suggestive; much might be said about them, but not to any useful purpose in a brief introductory chapter. Let us rather, adopting the definition already set forth, try next to map out into its leading departments the whole philosophical domain. III. DIVISIONS OF PHILOSOPHY: SPECULATIVE AND PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY.âThe general problem of classifying all the sciences built up by human thought is a logical problem of no little complexity when one tries to work it out in detail. We refer to this general problem only to mention a widely accepted principle on which it is usually approached, and because the division of philosophy itself is a section of the general problem. The principle in question is that sciences may be distinguished indeed by partial or total _diversity of subject-matter_, but that such diversity is not essential, that _diversity of standpoint_ is necessary and sufficient to constitute distinct sciences even when these deal with one and the same subject-matter. Now applying this principle to philosophy we see firstly that it has the same subject-matter as all the special sciences taken collectively, but that it is distinct from all of them inasmuch as it studies their data not from the standpoint of the proximate causes, but from the higher standpoint of the ultimate causes of these data. And we see secondly that philosophy, having this one higher standpoint throughout all its departments, is _one_ science; that its divisions are only material divisions; that there is not a plurality of philosophies as there is a plurality of sciences, though there is a plurality of departments in philosophy.(9) Let us now see what these departments are. If we ask why people seek knowledge at all, in any department, we shall detect two main impelling motives. The first of these is simply the desire to know: _trahimur omnes cupiditate sciendi_. The natural feeling of wonder, astonishment, â_admiratio_,â which accompanies our perception of things and events, prompts us to seek their causes, to discover the reasons which will make them _intelligible_ to us and enable us to _understand_ them. But while the possession of knowledge for its own sake is thus a motive of research it is not the only motive. We seek knowledge _in order to use it_ for the guidance of our conduct in life, for the orientation of our activities, for the improvement of our condition; knowing that knowledge is power, we seek it in order to make it minister to our needs. Now in the degree in which it fulfils such ulterior purposes, or is sought for these purposes, knowledge may be described as _practical_; in the degree in which it serves no ulterior end, or is sought for no ulterior end, other than that of perfecting our minds, it may be described as _speculative_. Of course this latter purpose is in itself a highly practical purpose; nor indeed is there any knowledge, however speculative, but has, or at least is capable of having, some influence or bearing on the actual tenor and conduct of our lives; and in this sense all knowledge is practical. Still we can distinguish broadly between knowledge which has no direct, immediate bearing on our acts, and knowledge that has.(10) Hence the possibility of distinguishing between two great domains of philosophical knowledgeâ_Theoretical_ or _Speculative Philosophy_, and _Practical Philosophy_. There are, in fact, two great domains into which the data of all human experience may be divided; and for each distinct domain submitted to philosophical investigation there will be a distinct department of philosophy. A first domain is the order _realized_ in the universe independently of man; a second is the order which man himself _realizes_: _things_, therefore, and _acts_. The order of the external universe, the order of nature as it is called, exists independently of us: we merely study it (_speculari_, Î¸ÎµÏÏá½³Ï), we do not create it. The other or _practical_ order is established by our acts of _intelligence_ and _will_, and by our _bodily action_ on external things under the direction of those faculties in the arts. Hence we have a _speculative_ or _theoretical_ philosophy and a _practical_ philosophy.(11) IV. DEPARTMENTS OF PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY: LOGIC, ETHICS AND ESTHETICS.âIn the domain of human activities, to the right regulation of which practical philosophy is directed, we may distinguish two departments of mental activity, namely _intellectual_ and _volitional_, and besides these the whole department of _external_, executive or bodily activity. In general the right regulation of acts may be said to consist in directing them to the realization of some ideal; for all cognitive acts this ideal is the _true_, for all appetitive or volitional acts it is the _good_, while for all external operations it may be either the _beautiful_ or the _useful_âthe respective objects of the fine arts and the mechanical arts or crafts. _Logic_, as a practical science, studies the mental acts and processes involved in discovering and proving truths and systematizing these into sciences, with a view to directing these acts and processes aright in the accomplishment of this complex task. Hence it has for its subject-matter, in a certain sense, _all_ the data of human experience, or whatever can be an object of human thought. But it studies these data not directly or in themselves or for their own sake, but only in so far as our acts of reason, which form its direct object, are brought to bear upon them. In all the other sciences we employ thought to study the various objects of thought as things, events, realities; and hence these may be called ârealâ sciences, _scientiae reales_; while in Logic we study thought itself, and even here not speculatively for its own sake or as a reality (as we study it for instance in Psychology), but practically, as a process capable of being directed towards the discovery and proof of truth; and hence in contradistinction to the other sciences as âreal,â we call Logic _the_ ârationalâ science, _scientia rationalis_. Scholastic philosophers express this distinction by saying that while Speculative Philosophy studies _real_ being (_Ens Reale_), or the objects of direct thought (_objecta primae intentionis mentis_), Logic studies the being which is the _product of thought_ (_Ens Rationis_), or objects of reflex thought (_objecta secundae intentionis mentis_).(12) The mental processes involved in the attainment of scientific truth are conception, judgment and inference; moreover these processes have to be exercised methodically by the combined application of analysis and synthesis, or induction and deduction, to the various domains of human experience. All these processes, therefore, and the methods of their application, constitute the proper subject-matter of Logic. It has been more or less a matter of debate since the days of Aristotle whether Logic should be regarded as a department of philosophical science proper, or rather as a preparatory discipline, an instrument or _organon_ of reasoningâas the collection of Aristotleâs own logical treatises was called,âand so as a vestibule or introduction to philosophy. And there is a similar difference of opinion as to whether or not it is advisable to set down Logic as the first department to be studied in the philosophical curriculum. Such doubts arise from differences of view as to the questions to be investigated in Logic, and the point to which such investigations should be carried therein. It is possible to distinguish between a more elementary treatment of thought-processes with the avowedly practical aim of setting forth canons of inference and method which would help and train the mind to reason and investigate correctly; and a more philosophical treatment of those processes with the speculative aim of determining their ultimate significance and validity as factors of knowledge, as attaining to truth, as productive of science and certitude. It is only the former field of investigation that is usually accorded to Logic nowadays; and thus understood Logic ought to come first in the curriculum as a preparatory training for philosophical studies, accompanied, however, by certain elementary truths from Psychology regarding the nature and functions of the human mind. The other domain of deeper and more speculative investigation was formerly explored in what was regarded as a second portion of logical science, under the title of âCriticalâ Logicâ_Logica Critica_. In modern times this is regarded as a distinct department of Speculative Philosophy, under the various titles of _Epistemology_, _Criteriology_, or the _Theory of Knowledge_. _Ethics or Moral Philosophy_ (á¼¤Î¸Î¿Ï, _mos_, _mores_, morals, conduct) is that department of practical philosophy which has for its subject-matter all human acts, _i.e._ all acts elicited or commanded by the will of man considered as a free, rational and responsible agent. And it studies human conduct with the practical purpose of discovering the ultimate end or object of this conduct, and the principles whereby it must be regulated in order to attain to this end. Ethics must therefore analyse and account for the distinction of _right_ and _wrong_ or _good_ and _bad_ in human conduct, for its feature of _morality_. It must examine the motives that influence conduct: pleasure, well-being, happiness, duty, obligation, moral law, etc. The supreme determining factor in all such considerations will obviously be _the ultimate end of man_, whatever this may be: his destiny as revealed by a study of his nature and place in the universe. Now the nature of man is studied in Psychology, as are also the nature, conditions and effects of his free acts, and the facilities, dispositions and forms of character consequent on these. Furthermore, not only from the study of man in Psychology, but from the study of the external universe in Cosmology, we amass data from which in Natural Theology we establish the existence of a Supreme Being. We then prove in Ethics that the last end of man, his highest perfection, consists in knowing, loving, serving, and thus glorifying God, both in this life and in the next. Hence we can see how these branches of speculative philosophy subserve the practical science of morals. And since a manâs interpretation of the moral distinctionsâas of right or wrong, meritorious or blameworthy, autonomous or of obligationâwhich he recognizes as pertaining to his own actionsâsince his interpretation of these distinctions is so intimately bound up with his religious outlook and beliefs, it is at once apparent that the science of Ethics will be largely influenced and determined by the system of speculative philosophy which inspires it, whether this be Theism, Monism, Agnosticism, etc. No doubt the science of Ethics must take as its data all sorts of moral beliefs, customs and practices prevalent at any time among men; but it is not a speculative science which would merely aim at _a posteriori_ inferences or inductive generalizations from these data; it is a practical, _normative_ science which aims at discovering the truth as to what is the right and the wrong in human conduct, and at pointing out the right application of the principles arising out of this truth. Hence it is of supreme importance for the philosopher of morals to determine whether the human race has really been vouchsafed a Divine Revelation, and, convincing himself that Christianity contains such a revelation, to recognize the possibility of supplementing and perfecting what his own natural reason can discover by what the Christian religion teaches about the end of man as the supreme determining principle of human conduct. Not that he is to take the revealed truths of Christianity as principles of moral _philosophy_; for these are the principles of the _supernatural __ Christian Theology_ of human morals; but that as a Christian philosopher, _i.e._ a philosopher who recognizes the truth of the Christian Revelation, he should reason out philosophically a science of Ethics which, so far as it goes, will be in harmony with the moral teachings of the Christian Religion, and will admit of being perfected by these. This recognition, as already remarked, will not be a hindrance but a help to him in exploring the wide domains of the individual, domestic, social and religious conduct of man; in determining, on the basis of theism established by natural reason, the right moral conditions and relations of manâs conduct as an individual, as a member of the family, as a member of the state, and as a creature of God. The nature, source and sanction of authority, domestic, social and religious; of the dictate of conscience; of the natural moral law and of all positive law; of the moral virtues and vicesâthese are all questions which the philosopher of Ethics has to explore by the use of natural reason, and for the investigation of which the Christian philosopher of Ethics is incomparably better equipped than the philosopher who, though possessing the compass of natural reason, ignores the beacon lights of Divinely Revealed Truths. _Esthetics_, or the _Philosophy of the Fine Arts_, is that department of philosophy which studies the conception of the _beautiful_ and its external expression in the works of nature and of man. The arts themselves, of course, whether concerned with the realization of the useful or of the beautiful, are distinct from sciences, even from practical sciences.(13) The _technique_ itself consists in a skill acquired by practiceâby practice guided, however, by a set of practical canons or rules which are the ripe fruit of experience.(14) But behind every art there is always some background of more or less speculative truth. The conception of the _useful_, however which underlies the mechanical arts and crafts, is not an ultimate conception calling for any further analysis than it receives in the various special sciences and in metaphysics. But the conception of the _beautiful_ does seem to demand a special philosophical consideration. On the subjective or mental side the esthetic sense, artistic taste, the sentiment of the beautiful, the complex emotions accompanying such experience; on the objective side the elements or factors requisite to produce this experience; the relation of the esthetic to the moral, of the beautiful to the good and the trueâthese are all distinctly philosophical questions. Up to the present time, however, their treatment has been divided between the other departments of philosophyâpsychology, cosmology, natural theology, general metaphysics, ethicsârather than grouped together to form an additional distinct department. V. DEPARTMENTS OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY: METAPHYSICS.âThe philosophy which studies the order realized in things apart from our activity, speculative philosophy, has been variously divided up into separate departments from the first origins of philosophical speculation. When we remember that all intellectual knowledge of things involves the apprehension of _general_ truths or laws about these things, and that this apprehension of intelligible aspects common to a more or less extensive group of things involves the exercise of _abstraction_, we can understand how the whole domain of speculative knowledge, whether scientific or philosophical, can be differentiated into certain layers or levels, so to speak, according to various degrees of abstractness and universality in the intelligible aspects under which the data of our experience may be considered. On this principle Aristotle and the scholastics divided all speculative knowledge into three great domains, _Physics_, _Mathematics_ and _Metaphysics_, with their respective proper objects, _Change_, _Quantity_ and _Being_, objects which are successively apprehended in three great stages of abstraction traversed by the human mind in its effort to understand and explain the Universal Order of things. And as a matter of fact perhaps the first great common and most obvious feature which strikes the mind reflecting on the visible universe is the feature of all-pervading change (Îºá½·Î½Î·ÏÎ¹Ï), movement, evolution, progress and regress, growth and decay; we see it everywhere in a variety of forms, mechanical or local change, quantitative change, qualitative change, vital change. Now the knowledge acquired by the study of things under this common aspect is called _Physics_. Here the mind abstracts merely from the individualizing differences of this change in individual things, and fixes its attention on the great, common, sensible aspect itself of visible change. But the mind can abstract even from the sensible changes that take place in the physical universe and fix its attention on a _static_ feature in the changing things. This static element (Ïá½¸ á¼Îºá½·Î½Î·ÏÎ¿Î½), which the intellect apprehends in _material_ things as naturally inseparable from them (á¼Îºá½·Î½Î·ÏÎ¿Î½ á¼Î»Î»á¾½ Î¿á½ ÏÏÏÎ¹ÏÏá½¹Î½), is their _quantity_, their extension in space. When the mind strips a material object of all its visible, sensible propertiesâon which its mechanical, physical and chemical changes dependâthere still remains as an object of thought a something formed of parts outside parts in three dimensions of space. This _abstract_ quantity, _quantitas intelligibilis_âwhether as continuous or discontinuous, as _magnitude_ or _multitude_âis the proper object of _Mathematics_. But the mind can penetrate farther still into the reality of the material data which it finds endowed with the attributes of change and quantity: it can eliminate from the object of its thought even this latter or mathematical attribute, and seize on something still more fundamental. The very essence, substance, nature, being itself, of the thing, the underlying subject and root principle of all the thingâs operations and attributes, is something deeper than any of these attributes, something at least mentally distinct from these latter (Ïá½¸ á¼Îºá½·Î½Î·ÏÎ¿Î½ ÎºÎ±Î¹ ÏÏÏÎ¹ÏÏá½¹Î½): and this something is the proper object of manâs highest speculative knowledge, which Aristotle called á¼¡ ÏÏá½½ÏÎ· ÏÎ¹Î»Î¿ÏÎ¿Ïá½·Î±, _philosophia prima_, the _first_ or _fundamental_ or _deepest_ philosophy.(15) But he gave this latter order of knowledge another very significant title: he called it _theology_ or _theological science_, á¼ÏÎ¹ÏÏá½µÎ¼Î· Î¸ÎµÎ¿Î»Î¿Î³á½·Îºá½µ, by a denomination derived _a potiori parte_, from its nobler part, its culmination in the knowledge of God. Let us see how. For Aristotle _first philosophy_ is the science of _being and its essential attributes_.(16) Here the mind apprehends its object as _static_ or abstracted from change, and as _immaterial_ or abstracted from quantity, the fundamental attribute of material realityâas á¼Îºá½·Î½Î·ÏÎ¿Î½ ÎºÎ±á½¶ ÏÏÏÎ¹ÏÏá½¹Î½. Now it is the substance, nature, or essence of _the things of our direct and immediate experience_, that forms the proper object of this highest science. But in these things the substance, nature, or essence, is not found in _real and actual_ separation from the material attributes of change and quantity; it is _considered_ separately from these only by an effort of mental abstraction. Even the nature of man himself is not wholly immaterial; nor is the spiritual principle in man, his soul, entirely exempt from material conditions. Hence in so far as first philosophy studies the being of the things of our direct experience, its object is immaterial only _negatively_ or _by mental abstraction_. But does this study bring within the scope of our experience any being or reality that is _positively and actually_ exempt from all change and all material conditions? If so the study of this being, the Divine Being, will be the highest effort, the crowning perfection, of _first philosophy_; which we may therefore call the _theological_ science. âIf,â writes Aristotle,(17) âthere really exists a substance absolutely immutable and immaterial, in a word, a Divine Beingâas we hope to proveâthen such Being must be the absolutely first and supreme principle, and the science that attains to such Being will be theological.â In this triple division of speculative philosophy into Physics, Mathematics, and Metaphysics, it will naturally occur to one to ask: Did Aristotle distinguish between what he called Physics and what we nowadays call the special physical sciences? He did. These special _analytic_ studies of the various departments of the physical universe, animate and inanimate, Aristotle described indiscriminately as âpartialâ sciences: Î±á¼± á¼Î½ Î¼á½³ÏÎµÎ¹ á¼ÏÎ¹ÏÏÎ·Î¼á½±Î¹âá¼ÏÎ¹ÏÏÎ·Î¼Î±á½¶ á¼Î½ Î¼á½³ÏÎµÎ¹ Î»ÎµÎ³á½¹Î¼ÎµÎ½Î±Î¹. These descriptive, inductive, comparative studies, proceeding _a posteriori_ from effects to causes, he conceived rather as a preparation for scientific knowledge proper; this latter he conceived to be a _synthetic_, deductive explanation of things, in the light of some common aspect detected in them as principle or cause of all their concrete characteristics.(18) Such synthetic knowledge of things, in the light of some such common aspect as change, is what he regarded as scientific knowledge, meaning thereby what we mean by philosophical knowledge.(19) What he called _Physics_, therefore, is what we nowadays understand as _Cosmology_ and _Psychology_.(20) Mathematical science Aristotle likewise regarded as science in the full and perfect sense, _i.e._ as philosophical. But just as we distinguish nowadays between the special physical and human sciences on the one hand, and the philosophy of external nature and man on the other, so we may distinguish between the special mathematical sciences and a Philosophy of Mathematics: with this difference, that while the former groups of special sciences are mainly inductive the mathematical group is mainly deductive. Furthermore, the Philosophy of Mathematicsâwhich investigates questions regarding the ultimate significance of mathematical concepts, axioms and assumptions: unity, multitude, magnitude, quantity, space, time, etc.âdoes not usually form a separate department in the philosophical curriculum: its problems are dealt with as they arise in the other departments of Metaphysics. Before outlining the modern divisions of Metaphysics we may note that this latter term was not used by Aristotle. We owe it probably to Andronicus of Rhodes (â 40 B.C.), who, when arranging a complete edition of Aristotleâs works, placed next in order after the _Physics_, or physical treatises, all the parts and fragments of the masterâs works bearing upon the immutable and immaterial object of the _philosophia prima_; these he labelled Ïá½° Î¼ÎµÏá½° Ïá½° (Î²Î¹Î²Î»á½·Î±) ÏÏ ÏÎ¹ÎºÎ±, _post physica_, the books _after the physics_: hence the name _metaphysics_,(21) applied to this highest section of speculative philosophy. It was soon noticed that the term, thus fortuitously applied to such investigations, conveyed a very appropriate description of their scope and character if interpreted in the sense of â_supra_-physica,â or â_trans_-physicaâ: inasmuch as the object of these investigations is a _hyperphysical_ object, an object that is either positively and really, or negatively and by abstraction, beyond the material conditions of quantity and change. St. Thomas combines both meanings of the term when he says that the study of its subject-matter comes naturally _after_ the study of physics, and that we naturally pass from the study of the sensible to that of the suprasensible.(22) The term _philosophia prima_ has now only an historical interest; and the term _theology_, used without qualification, is now generally understood to signify _supernatural_ theology. VI. DEPARTMENTS OF METAPHYSICS: COSMOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND NATURAL THEOLOGY.âNowadays the term _Metaphysics_ is understood as synonymous with speculative philosophy: the investigation of the being, nature, or essence, and essential attributes of the realities which are also studied in the various special sciences: the search for the _ultimate_ grounds, reasons and causes of these realities, of which the proximate explanations are sought in the special sciences. We have seen that it has for its special object that most abstract aspect of reality whereby the latter is conceived as changeless and immaterial; and we have seen that a being may have these attributes either by mental abstraction merely, or in actual reality. In other words the philosophical study of things that are really material not only suggests the possibility, but establishes the actual existence, of a Being that is really changeless and immaterial: so that metaphysics in all its amplitude would be _the philosophical science of things that are negatively_ (by abstraction) _or positively_ (in reality) _immaterial_. This distinction suggests a division of metaphysics into _general_ and _special_ metaphysics. The former would be the philosophical study of _all_ being, considered by mental abstraction as immaterial; the latter would be the philosophical study of the really and positively changeless and immaterial Being,âGod. The former would naturally fall into two great branches: the study of _inanimate_ nature and the study of _living_ things, _Cosmology_ and _Psychology_; while special metaphysics, the philosophical study of the _Divine_ Being, would constitute _Natural Theology_. These three departments, one of special metaphysics and two of general metaphysics, would not be three distinct philosophical sciences, but three departments of the one speculative philosophical science. The standpoint would be the same in all three sections, _viz._ _being_ considered as _static and immaterial_ by _mental abstraction_: for whatever _positive_ knowledge we can reach about being that is really immaterial can be reached only through concepts derived from material being and applied analogically to immaterial being. _Cosmology_ and _Psychology_ divide between them the whole domain of manâs immediate experience. Cosmology, utilizing not only the data of direct experience, but also the conclusions established by the analytic study of these data in the physical sciences, explores the origin, nature, and destiny of the material universe. Some philosophers include among the data of Cosmology all the phenomena of vegetative life, reserving sentient and rational life for Psychology; others include even sentient life in Cosmology, reserving the study of human life for Psychology, or, as they would call it, Anthropology.(23) The mere matter of location is of secondary importance. Seeing, however, that man embodies in himself all three forms of life, vegetative, sentient, and rational, all three would perhaps more naturally belong to Psychology, which would be the philosophical study of life in all its manifestations (ÏÏ Ïá½µ, the vital principle, the soul). Just as the conclusions of the physical sciences are the data of Cosmology, so the conclusions of the natural or biological sciencesâZoology, Botany, Physiology, Morphology, Cellular Biology, etc.âare the data of Psychology. Indeed in Psychology itselfâespecially in more recent yearsâit is possible to distinguish a positive, analytic, empirical study of the phenomena of consciousness, a study which would rank rather as a special than as an ultimate or philosophical science; and a synthetic, rational study of the results of this analysis, a study which would be strictly philosophical in character. This would have for its object to determine the origin, nature and destiny of living things in general and of man himself in particular. It would inquire into the nature and essential properties of living matter, into the nature of the subject of conscious states, into the operations and faculties of the human mind, into the nature of the human soul and its mode of union with the body, into the rationality of the human intellect and the freedom of the human will, the spirituality and immortality of the human soul, etc. But since the human mind itself is the natural instrument whereby man acquires _all_ his knowledge, it will be at once apparent that the study of the phenomenon of _knowledge_ itself, of the _cognitive_ activity of the mind, can be studied, and must be studied, not merely as a natural phenomenon of the mind, but from the point of view of _its special significance as representative_ of objects other than itself, from the point of view of _its validity or invalidity_, _its truth or falsity_, and with the special aim of determining the scope and limitations and conditions of its objective validity. We have already referred to the study of human knowledge from this standpoint, in connexion with what was said above concerning Logic. It has a close kinship with Logic on the one hand, and with Psychology on the other; and nowadays it forms a distinct branch of speculative Philosophy under the title of _Criteriology_, _Epistemology_, or the _Theory of Knowledge_. Arising out of the data of our direct experience, external and internal, as studied in the philosophical departments just outlined, we find a variety of evidences all pointing beyond the domain of this direct experience to the supreme conclusion that there exists of necessity, distinct from this directly experienced universe, as its Creator, Conserver, and Ruler, its First Beginning and its Last End, its _Alpha_ and _Omega_, One Divine and Infinite Being, the Deity. The existence and attributes of the Deity, and the relations of man and the universe to the Deity, form the subject-matter of _Natural Theology_. VII. DEPARTMENTS OF METAPHYSICS: ONTOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY.âAccording to the Aristotelian and scholastic conception speculative philosophy would utilize as data the conclusions of the special sciencesâphysical, biological, and human. It would try to reach a deeper explanation of their data by synthesizing these under the wider aspects of change, quantity, and being, thus bringing to light the ultimate causes, reasons, and explanatory principles of things. This whole study would naturally fall into two great branches: General Metaphysics (_Cosmology_ and _Psychology_), which would study things exempt from quantity and change not really but only by mental abstraction; and Special Metaphysics (_Natural Theology_), which would study the positively immaterial and
{'title': 'Ontology, or the Theory of Being by P. Coffey', 'source': 'Project Gutenberg', 'lang': 'en'}