Produced by Larry B. Harrison, Charlie Howard, and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive) Uniform with British Orations AMERICAN ORATIONS, to illustrate American Political History, edited, with introductions, by ALEXANDER JOHNSTON, Professor of Jurisprudence and Political Economy in the College of New Jersey. 3 vols., 16 mo, $3.75. PROSE MASTERPIECES FROM MODERN ESSAYISTS, comprising single specimen essays from IRVING, LEIGH HUNT, LAMB, DE QUINCEY, LANDOR, SYDNEY SMITH, THACKERAY, EMERSON, ARNOLD, MORLEY, HELPS, KINGSLEY, RUSKIN, LOWELL, CARLYLE, MACAULAY, FROUDE, FREEMAN, GLADSTONE, NEWMAN, LESLIE STEPHEN. 3 vols., 16 mo, bevelled boards, $3.75 and $4.50. G. P. PUTNAMâS SONS, NEW YORK AND LONDON REPRESENTATIVE BRITISH ORATIONS WITH INTRODUCTIONS AND EXPLANATORY NOTES BY CHARLES KENDALL ADAMS. _Videtisne quantum munus sit oratoris historia?_ âCICERO, _DeOratore_, ii, 15 â©â©â© NEW YORK & LONDON G. P. PUTNAMâS SONS The Knickerbocker Press 1884 COPYRIGHT G. P. PUTNAMâS SONS 1884. Press of G. P. PUTNAMâS SONS New York CONTENTS. PAGE GEORGE CANNING 1 GEORGE CANNING 13 ON THE POLICY OF GRANTING AID TO PORTUGAL WHEN INVADED BY SPAIN; HOUSE OF COMMONS, DECEMBER 12, 1826. LORD MACAULAY 50 LORD MACAULAY 62 ON THE REFORM BILL OF 1832; HOUSE OF COMMONS, MARCH 2, 1831. RICHARD COBDEN 95 RICHARD COBDEN 109 ON THE EFFECTS OF PROTECTION ON THE AGRICULTURAL INTERESTS OF THE COUNTRY; HOUSE OF COMMONS, MARCH 13, 1845. JOHN BRIGHT 155 JOHN BRIGHT 159 ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ENGLAND; DELIVERED AT A BANQUET GIVEN IN HONOR OF MR. BRIGHT, AT BIRMINGHAM, OCTOBER 29, 1858. LORD BEACONSFIELD 204 LORD BEACONSFIELD 216 ON THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY; DELIVERED AT MANCHESTER, APRIL 3, 1872. WILLIAM EWART GLADSTONE 277 WILLIAM EWART GLADSTONE 287 ON DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS; DELIVERED AT WEST CALDER, NOVEMBER 27, 1879. GEORGE CANNING. The subject of this sketch was born in London in 1770. When he was only one year old, the death of his father threw the responsibility of his training and education upon his mother. Dependent upon her own energies for the support of herself and her child, she at first established a small school in London, and a little later fitted herself for the stage, where she achieved considerable success. As soon as George entered school, he began to show remarkable proficiency in the study of Latin and Greek, as well as in English literature. Mr. Stapleton, his biographer, tells us that when still a child, young Canning was incidentally called upon to recite some verses, when he began with one of the poems of Gray, and did not stop or falter till he repeated the contents of the entire volume. At the age of fifteen he went to Eton, where he was at once recognized as a boy of surpassing abilities and attainments. In the following year some of his school-fellows joined him in starting a weekly paper, called the _Microcosm_, to which he acted the part of editor and chief contributor. The brilliancy and wit of the paper were such as to attract even the attention of the leading reviews. He also paid great attention to the art of extemporaneous speaking. A society had been established in the school in which all the forms and methods of the House of Commons were rigidly observed. The Speaker, the Cabinet, and the Opposition played their mimic parts with all the energy and interest so many of the members afterward displayed in Parliament itself. George became âCaptainâ of the school, and, when in 1788 he went up to Oxford, he carried with him a reputation for accuracy and maturity of scholarship which at once drew the eyes of the whole university upon him. Even in his first year he entered the list of competitors for the Chancellorâs Prize offered for the best Latin poem, and was successful over all the upper classmen. Throughout his course his attention was absorbed with the study of literature and the practice of writing and speaking. He left the University at the age of twenty-two, and at once began the study of law. His great reputation, however, had already attracted the attention of Pitt, who now invited him to take a seat in the House of Commons from one of the Government boroughs. With this request Canning complied; and, accordingly, he became a member of the House in 1793 in the twenty-fourth year of his age. His maiden speech, delivered some two months after he entered the House, was brilliant, but was generally thought to be somewhat lacking in the qualities of solidity and good judgment. His tastes were so eminently rhetorical in their nature, that, for some years to come, he was inclined to excess of ornamentation. Joined to this peculiarity was an irresistible inclination to indulge in wit and badinage at the expense of his fellow-members. This tendency was so predominant that for a long time it was said that he never made what he called a successful speech without making an enemy for life. In 1797, in connection with a few friends, Canning projected the journal known as the _Anti-Jacobin Review_. Its object was to counteract those peculiar doctrines of the French Revolution which its contributors thought dangerous. Many of Canningâs articles were satires, and were so admirable in their way as to be worthy of a place among the most noted extravaganzas of English literature. The âKnife Grinder,â and the drama entitled âThe Rovers,â are perhaps the most successful. âThe Roversâ was written to ridicule the German drama then prevailing, and it was regarded as of so much consequence that Niebuhr in one of his gravest works has devoted nearly a page to a refutation of it.[A] A good impression of Canningâs peculiar wit will be conveyed by âRogersâ Song,â taken from âThe Rovers.â Mr. Hayward[B] informs us that Canning had written the first five stanzas of the song, when Pitt, coming into his room and accidentally seeing it, was so amused that he took up a pen and added the fifth stanza on the spot. The following is the song entire:â [A] âGeschichte des Zeitalters der Revolution,â ii., 242. [B] âBiographical Essays,â i., 211. I. âWhenâer with haggard eyes I view This dungeon that Iâm rotting in, I think of those companions true Who studied with me at the Uâ âniversity of Gottingen, âniversity of Gottingen. II. âSweet kerchief, checked with heavenly blue, Which once my love sat knotting in! Alas! Matilda then was true, At least I thought so at the Uâ âniversity of Gottingen, âniversity of Gottingen. III. âBarbs! Barbs! alas! how swift you flew, Her neat post-wagon trotting in; Ye bore Matilda from my view; Forlorn I languished at the Uâ âniversity of Gottingenâ âniversity of Gottingen. IV. âThis faded form! this pallid hue! This blood my veins is clotting in My years are manyâthey were few When first I entered at the Uâ âniversity of Gottingenâ âniversity of Gottingen. V. âThere first for thee my passion grew, Sweet! sweet Matilda Pottingen! Thou wast the daughter of my tuâ âtor, law professor at the Uâ âniversity of Gottingenâ âniversity of Gottingen. VI. âSun, moon, and thou, vain world, adieu, That kings and priests are plotting in: Here doomed to starve on water-gruâ el, never shall I see the Uâ âniversity of Gottingenâ âniversity of Gottingen.â Unfortunately for his influence, Canning could not limit his wit or his pasquinades to the Germans and French. The _Anti-Jacobin_ contained many ludicrous satires on the personal peculiarities of men like Erskine, Mackintosh, and Coleridge. Some of these made bitter complaints that the Government should lend its influence to and should reward the authors of these atrocious calumnies. There is evidence that the publication was discontinued at the suggestion of the Prime-Minister in consequence of these complaints, and it is very probable that Canningâs advancement was retarded by his utter lack of self-restraint. On the accession of the Duke of Portland, in 1807, Canning became Secretary of Foreign Affairs, an office which he held for two years, till he had a quarrel with Lord Castlereagh, which resulted in a duel, and not only drove them both out of office, but overthrew the Portland Ministry. During the next seven years he was out of power, though he was regular in his parliamentary duties, and it was to him especially that Lord Wellington was indebted for the firm and even enthusiastic support of England during his military career. Canning always regarded himself as the political disciple of Pitt. To his constituents at Liverpool he said: âIn the grave of Mr. Pitt my political allegiance lies buried.â He owned no other master, and all his energies were devoted to carrying out Pittâs policy of foreign affairs. The part of England in the protection of the smaller nationalities against the larger ones,âthat policy which has preserved Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, Portugal, and Turkey,âwas but a continuance of the policy of Pitt, though it took definite form under the influence of Canning, and is quite as often associated with his name. The doctrine was strongly put forward on three important occasions. The first was in his speech urging England to join her fortunes with those of Spain in driving Bonaparte from the Peninsula. This, as Mr. Seeley, in his âLife of Steinâ has shown, was the turning point in Napoleonâs career, and it is the peculiar glory of Canning that England was brought into the alliance by his influence. With pardonable exultation he once said: âIf there is any part of my political conduct in which I _glory_, it is that in the face of every difficulty, discouragement, and prophecy of failure, _mine_ was the hand that committed England to an alliance with Spain.â The second occasion was when, in 1822, he was a second time Minister of Foreign Affairs, and when France was collecting troops to overthrow constitutional government in Spain, and urging the other foreign powers, assembled at Verona, to unite in the same purpose, he despatched Wellington to Verona with so energetic a protest that even France was dissuaded from the course she had intended to pursue. Again, in 1826, Canning took a similar course in giving aid to Portugal when invaded by Spain. His continental policy might be said to consist of two parts: England should insist that the small governments should not be disturbed by the larger, and that each nation should be allowed to regulate its own internal affairs. On the death of Lord Liverpool, in 1827, Canning became Prime-Minister. The great question then before the country was the political emancipation of the Roman Catholics. The Test Act, adopted in the reign of Charles II., had excluded Catholics from political rightsâfrom seats in Parliament and from the privilege of votingâand the act was still in force. With the agitation that was now endeavoring to secure the emancipation of the Catholics from political disabilities, Canning was in hearty sympathy. When he was called into supreme power, therefore, the inference was natural that Catholic emancipation was to be carried through. Wellington, Peel, and nearly all the Tories in the ministry threw up their places. Their purpose was to compel Canning to resign; for knowing his views on the question of emancipation, they were unwilling to hold office under him. Unfortunately, while the struggle involved in their resignation was going on, Canningâs health suddenly gave way, and sinking rapidly, he expired on the 8th of August, 1827, in the fifty-eighth year of his age. It is a singular and an interesting fact that the very men who, in 1827, refused to follow Canning in the work of emancipation, were driven two years later by public opinion to put themselves at the head of the movement. By many excellent judges Canning is regarded as one of the foremost of English orators. Brougham speaks of him in terms of almost the highest praise, and so judicious a critic as Sir James Mackintosh says that âMr. Canning seems to have been the best model among our orators of the adorned style. In some qualities,â he continues, âMr. Canning surpassed Mr. Pitt. His diction was more variousâsometimes more simpleâmore idiomatical, even in its more elevated parts. It sparkled with imagery, and was brightened by illustration, in both of which Mr. Pitt, for so great an orator, was defective. Had he been a dry and meagre speaker, Mr. Canning would have been universally allowed to have been one of the greatest masters of argument; but his hearers were so dazzled by the splendor of his diction that they did not perceive the acuteness and the occasional excessive refinement of his reasoning; a consequence which, as it shows the injurious effects of a seductive fault, can with the less justness be overlooked in the estimate of his understanding.â GEORGE CANNING. ON THE POLICY OF GRANTING AID TO PORTUGAL WHEN INVADED BY SPAIN; HOUSE OF COMMONS, DECEMBER 12, 1826. When Mr. Canning was Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1826, a body of Absolutists attempted to destroy the existing Portuguese Government, which had been founded on the basis of a liberal constitution, and had been acknowledged by England, France, Austria, and Russia. This government was obnoxious to Ferdinand, King of Spain; and, accordingly, supported by the sympathy of Austria and Russia, as well as by the active assistance of Spain, the Portuguese Absolutists organized a military expedition on Spanish soil for the overthrow of the Portuguese Government. Portugal asked for the protection of England. Five thousand troops were instantly ordered to Lisbon. This action was in strict accordance with what is sometimes known as âMr. Canningâs Foreign Policy,ââthat of allowing every nation to manage its own internal affairs, and of allowing no interference with the smaller nations by the larger. The following speech in explanation of his reasons for prompt action is the masterpiece of his eloquence. MR. SPEAKER: In proposing to the House of Commons to acknowledge, by an humble and dutiful address, his Majestyâs most gracious message, and to reply to it in terms which will be, in effect, an echo of the sentiments and a fulfilment of the anticipations of that message, I feel that, however confident I may be in the justice, and however clear as to the policy of the measures therein announced, it becomes me, as a British minister, recommending to Parliament any step which may approximate this country even to the hazard of a war, while I explain the grounds of that proposal, to accompany my explanation with expressions of regret. I can assure the House, that there is not within its walls any set of men more deeply convinced than his Majestyâs ministersânor any individual more intimately persuaded than he who has now the honor of addressing youâof the vital importance of the continuance of peace to this country and to the world. So strongly am I impressed with this opinionâand for reasons of which I will put the House more fully in possession before I sit downâthat I declare there is no question of doubtful or controverted policyâno opportunity of present national advantageâno precaution against remote difficultyâwhich I would not gladly compromise, pass over, or adjourn, rather than call on Parliament to sanction, at this moment, any measure which had a tendency to involve the country in war. But, at the same time, sir, I feel that which has been felt, in the best times of English history, by the best statesmen of this country, and by the Parliaments by whom those statesmen were supportedâI feel that there are two causes, and but two causes, which can not be either compromised, passed over, or adjourned. These causes are: adherence to the national faith, and regard for the national honor. Sir, if I did not consider both these causes as involved in the proposition which I have this day to make to you, I should not address the House, as I now do, in the full and entire confidence that the gracious communication of his Majesty will be met by the House with the concurrence of which his Majesty has declared his expectation. In order to bring the matter which I have to submit to you, under the cognizance of the House, in the shortest and clearest manner, I beg leave to state it, in the first instance, divested of any collateral considerations. It is a case of law and of fact: of national law on the one hand, and of notorious fact on the other; such as it must be, in my opinion as impossible for Parliament, as it was for the government, to regard in any but one light, or to come to any but one conclusion upon it. Among the alliances by which, at different periods of our history, this country has been connected with the other nations of Europe, none is so ancient in origin, and so precise in obligationânone has continued so long, and been observed so faithfullyâof none is the memory so intimately interwoven with the most brilliant records of our triumphs, as that by which Great Britain is connected with Portugal. It dates back to distant centuries; it has survived an endless variety of fortunes. Anterior in existence to the accession of the House of Braganza to the throne of Portugalâit derived, however, fresh vigor from that event; and never from that epoch to the present hour, has the independent monarchy of Portugal ceased to be nurtured by the friendship of Great Britain. This alliance has never been seriously interrupted; but it has been renewed by repeated sanctions. It has been maintained under difficulties by which the fidelity of other alliances was shaken, and has been vindicated in fields of blood and of glory. That the alliance with Portugal has been always unqualifiedly advantageous to this countryâthat it has not been sometimes inconvenient and sometimes burdensomeâI am not bound nor prepared to maintain. But no British statesman, so far as I know, has ever suggested the expediency of shaking it off; and it is assuredly not at a moment of need that honor and what I may be allowed to call national sympathy would permit us to weigh, with an over-scrupulous exactness, the amount of difficulties and dangers attendant upon its faithful and steadfast observance. What feelings of national honor would forbid, is forbidden alike by the plain dictates of national faith. It is not at distant periods of history, and in by-gone ages only, that the traces of the union between Great Britain and Portugal are to be found. In the last compact of modern Europe, the compact which forms the basis of its present international lawâI mean the treaty of Vienna of 1815,âthis country, with its eyes open to the possible inconveniences of the connection, but with a memory awake to its past benefits, solemnly renewed the previously existing obligations of alliance and amity with Portugal. I will take leave to read to the House the third article of the treaty concluded at Vienna, in 1815, between Great Britain on the one hand and Portugal on the other. It is couched in the following terms: âThe treaty of Alliance, concluded at Rio de Janeiro, on the 19th of February, 1810, being founded on circumstances of a temporary nature, which have happily ceased to exist, the said treaty is hereby declared to be void in all its parts, and of no effect; _without prejudice, however, to the ancient treaties of alliance, friendship, and guarantee, which have so long and so happily subsisted between the two Crowns, and which are hereby renewed by the high contracting parties, and acknowledged to be of full force and effect_.â In order to appreciate the force of this stipulationârecent in point of time, recent, also, in the sanction of Parliamentâthe House will, perhaps, allow me to explain shortly the circumstances in reference to which it was contracted. In the year 1807, when, upon the declaration of Bonaparte, that the House of Braganza had ceased to reign, the King of Portugal, by the advice of Great Britain, was induced to set sail for the Brazils; almost at the very moment of his most faithful Majestyâs embarkation, a secret convention was signed between his Majesty and the King of Portugal, stipulating that, in the event of his most faithful Majestyâs establishing the seat of his government in Brazil, Great Britain would never acknowledge any other dynasty than that of the House of Braganza on the throne of Portugal. That convention, I say, was contemporaneous with the migration to the Brazils; a step of great importance at the time, as removing from the grasp of Bonaparte the sovereign family of Braganza. Afterward, in the year 1810, when the seat of the King of Portugalâs government was established at Rio de Janeiro, and when it seemed probable, in the then apparently hopeless condition of the affairs of Europe, that it was likely long to continue there, the secret convention of 1807, of which the main object was accomplished by the fact of the emigration to Brazil, was abrogated, and a new and public treaty was concluded, into which was transferred the stipulation of 1807, binding Great Britain, so long as his faithful Majesty should be compelled to reside in Brazil, not to acknowledge any other sovereign of Portugal than a member of the House of Braganza. That stipulation, which had hitherto been _secret_, thus became _patent_, and part of the known law of nations. In the year 1814, in consequence of the happy conclusion of the war, the option was afforded to the King of Portugal of returning to his European dominions. It was then felt that, as the necessity of his most faithful Majestyâs absence from Portugal had ceased, the ground for the obligation originally contracted in the secret convention of 1807, and afterward transferred to the patent treaty of 1810, was removed. The treaty of 1810 was, therefore, annulled at the Congress of Vienna; and in lieu of the stipulation not to acknowledge any other sovereign of Portugal than a member of the House of Braganza, was substituted that which I have just read to the House. Annulling the treaty of 1810, the treaty of Vienna renews and confirms (as the House will have seen) all _former_ treaties between Great Britain and Portugal, describing them as âancient treaties of alliance, friendship, and guaranteeâ; as having âlong and happily subsisted between the two Crownsâ; and as being allowed, by the two high contracting parties, to remain âin full force and effect.â What, then, is the forceâwhat is the effect of those ancient treaties? I am prepared to show to the House what it is. But before I do so, I must say, that if all the treaties to which this article of the treaty of Vienna refers, had perished by some convulsion of nature, or had by some extraordinary accident been consigned to total oblivion, still it would be impossible not to admit, as an incontestable inference from this article of the treaty of Vienna alone, that, in a moral point of view, there is incumbent on Great Britain a decided obligation to act as the effectual defender of Portugal. If I could not show the letter of a single antecedent stipulation, I should still contend that a solemn admission, only ten years old, of the existence at that time of âtreaties of alliance, friendship, and guarantee,â held Great Britain to the discharge of the obligations which that very description implies. But fortunately there is no such difficulty in specifying the nature of those obligations. All of the preceding treaties existâall of them are of easy referenceâall of them are known to this country, to Spain, to every nation of the civilized world. They are so numerous, and their general result is so uniform, that it may be sufficient to select only two of them to show the nature of all. The first to which I shall advert is the treaty of 1661, which was concluded at the time of the marriage of Charles the Second with the Infanta of Portugal. After reciting the marriage, and making over to Great Britain, in consequence of that marriage, first, a considerable sum of money, and, secondly, several important places, some of which, as Tangier, we no longer possess, but others of which, as Bombay, still belong to this country, the treaty runs thus: âIn consideration of all which grants, so much to the benefit of the King of Great Britain and his subjects in general, and of the delivery of those important places to his said Majesty and his heirs forever, etc., the King of Great Britain does profess and declare, with the consent and advice of his council, that he will take the interest of Portugal and all its dominions to heart, defending the same with his utmost power by sea and land, _even as England itself_â; and it then proceeds to specify the succors to be sent, and the manner of sending them. I come next to the treaty of 1703, a treaty of alliance contemporaneous with the Methuen treaty, which has regulated, for upward of a century, the commercial relations of the two countries. The treaty of 1703 was a tripartite engagement between the States-General of Holland, England, and Portugal. The second article of that treaty sets forth, that, âIf ever it shall happen that the Kings of Spain and France, either the present or the future, that both of them together, or either of them separately, shall make war, or give occasion to suspect that they intend to make war, upon the kingdom of Portugal, either on the continent of Europe, or on its dominions beyond the seas, her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain, and the Lords the States-General, shall use their friendly offices with the said Kings, or either of them, in order to persuade them to observe the terms of peace toward Portugal, and not to make war upon it.â The third article declares, âThat in the event of these good offices not proving successful, but altogether ineffectual, so that war should be made by the aforesaid Kings, or by either of them, upon Portugal, the above-mentioned powers of Great Britain and Holland shall make war with all their force upon the aforesaid Kings or King who shall carry hostile arms into Portugal; and toward that war, which shall be carried on in Europe, they shall supply twelve thousand men, whom they shall arm and pay, as well when in quarters as in action; and the said high allies shall be obliged to keep that number of men complete, by recruiting it from time to time at their own expense.â I am aware, indeed, that with respect to either of the treaties which I have quoted, it is possible to raise a questionâwhether variation of circumstances or change of times may not have somewhat relaxed its obligations. The treaty of 1661, it might be said, was so loose and prodigal in the wordingâit is so unreasonable, so wholly out of nature, that any one country should be expected to defend another, â_even as itself_â; such stipulations are of so exaggerated a character, as to resemble effusions of feeling, rather than enunciations of deliberate compact. Again, with respect to the treaty of 1703, if the case rested on that treaty alone, a question might be raised, whether or not, when one of the contracting partiesâHollandâhad since so changed her relations with Portugal, as to consider her obligations under the treaty of 1703 as obsoleteâwhether or not, I say, under such circumstances, the obligation on the remaining party be not likewise void. I should not hesitate to answer both these objections in the negative. But without entering into such a controversy, it is sufficient for me to say that the time and place for taking such objections was at the Congress at Vienna. Then and there it was that if you, indeed, considered these treaties as obsolete, you ought frankly and fearlessly to have declared them to be so. But then and there, with your eyes open, and in the face of all modern Europe, you proclaimed anew the ancient treaties of alliance, friendship, and guarantee, âso long subsisting between the Crowns of Great Britain and Portugal,â as still âacknowledged by Great Britain,â and still âof full force and effect.â It is not, however, on specific articles aloneâit is not so much, perhaps, on either of these ancient treaties, taken separately, as it is on the spirit and understanding of the whole body of treaties, of which the essence is concentrated and preserved in the treaty of Vienna, that we acknowledge in Portugal a right to look to Great Britain as her ally and defender. This, sir, being the state, morally and politically, of our obligations toward Portugal, it is obvious that when Portugal, in apprehension of the coming storm, called on Great Britain for assistance, the only hesitation on our part could beânot whether that assistance was due, supposing the occasion for demanding it to arise, but simply whether that occasionâin other words, whether the _casus fÅderis_ had arisen. I understand, indeed, that in some quarters it has been imputed to his Majestyâs ministers that an extraordinary delay intervened between the taking of the determination to give assistance to Portugal and the carrying of that determination into effect. But how stands the fact? On Sunday, the third of this month, we received from the Portuguese embassador a direct and formal demand of assistance against a hostile aggression from Spain. Our answer was, that although rumors had reached us through France, his Majestyâs Government had not that accurate informationâthat official and precise intelligence of factsâon which they could properly found an application to Parliament. It was only on last Friday night that this precise information arrived. On Saturday his Majestyâs confidential servants came to a decision. On Sunday that decision received the sanction of his Majesty. On Monday it was communicated to both Houses of Parliament; and this day, sir, at the hour in which I have the honor of addressing you, the troops are on their march for embarkation. I trust, then, sir, that no unseemly delay is imputable to government. But undoubtedly, on the other hand, when the claim of Portugal for assistanceâa claim clear, indeed, in justice, but at the same time fearfully spreading in its possible consequences, came before us, it was the duty of his Majestyâs Government to do nothing on hearsay. The eventual force of the claim was admitted; but a thorough knowledge of facts was necessary before the compliance with that claim could be granted. The government here labored under some disadvantage. The rumors which reached us through Madrid were obviously distorted, to answer partial political purposes; and the intelligence through the press of France, though substantially correct, was, in particulars, vague and contradictory. A measure of grave and serious moment could never be founded on such authority; nor could the ministers come down to Parliament until they had a confident assurance that the case which they had to lay before the Legislature was true in all its parts. But there was another reason which induced a necessary caution. In former instances, when Portugal applied to this country for assistance, the whole power of the state in Portugal was vested in the person of the monarch. The expression of his wish, the manifestation of his desire, the putting forth of his claim, was sufficient ground for immediate and decisive action on the part of Great Britain, supposing the _casus fÅderis_ to be made out. But, on this occasion, inquiry was in the first place to be made whether, according to the new constitution of Portugal, the call upon Great Britain was made with the consent of all the powers and authorities competent to make it, so as to carry with it an assurance of that reception in Portugal for our army, which the army of a friend and ally had a right to expect. Before a British soldier should put his foot on Portuguese ground, nay, before he should leave the shores of England, it was our duty to ascertain that the step taken by the Regency of Portugal was taken with the cordial concurrence of the Legislature of that country. It was but this morning that we received intelligence of the proceedings of the Chambers at Lisbon, which establishes the fact of such concurrence. This intelligence is contained in a dispatch from Sir W. AâCourt, dated 29th of November, of which I will read an extract to the House. âThe day after the news arrived of the entry of the rebels into Portugal, the ministers demanded from the Chambers an extension of power for the executive government, and the permission to apply for foreign succors, in virtue of ancient treaties, in the event of their being deemed necessary. The deputies gave the requisite authority by acclamation; and an equally good spirit was manifested by the peers, who granted every power that the ministers could possibly require. They even went further, and, rising in a body from their seats, declared their devotion to their country, and their readiness to give their personal services, if necessary, to repel any hostile invasion. The Duke de Cadaval, president of the Chamber, was the first to make this declaration; and the minister who described this proceeding to me, said it was a movement worthy of the good days of Portugal!â I have thus incidentally disposed of the supposed imputation of delay in complying with the requisition of the Portuguese Government. The main question, however, is this: Was it obligatory upon us to comply with that requisition? In other words, had the _casus fÅderis_ arisen? In our opinion it had. Bands of Portuguese rebels, armed, equipped, and trained in Spain, had crossed the Spanish frontier, carrying terror and devastation into their own country, and proclaiming sometimes the brother of the reigning sovereign of Portugal, sometimes a Spanish princess, and sometimes even Ferdinand of Spain, as the rightful occupant of the Portuguese throne. These rebels crossed the frontier, not at one point only, but at several points; for it is remarkable that the aggression, on which the original application to Great Britain for succor was founded, is not the aggression with reference to which that application has been complied with. The attack announced by the French newspapers was on the north of Portugal, in the province of Tras-os-Montes; an official account of which has been received by his Majestyâs Government only this day. But on Friday an account was received of an invasion in the south of Portugal, and of the capture of Villa Vicosa, a town lying on the road from the southern frontier to Lisbon. This new fact established even more satisfactorily than a mere confirmation of the attack first complained of would have done, the systematic nature of the aggression of Spain against Portugal. One hostile irruption might have been made by some single corps escaping from their quartersâby some body of stragglers, who might have evaded the vigilance of Spanish authorities; and one such accidental and unconnected act of violence might not have been conclusive evidence of cognizance and design on the part of those authorities; but when a series of attacks are made along the whole line of a frontier, it is difficult to deny that such multiplied instances of hostility are evidence of concerted aggression. If a single company of _Spanish_ soldiers had crossed the frontier in hostile array, there could not, it is presumed, be a doubt as to the character of that invasion. Shall bodies of men, armed, clothed, and regimented by Spain, carry fire and sword into the bosom of her unoffending neighbor, and shall it be pretended that no attack, no invasion has taken place, because, forsooth, these outrages are committed against Portugal by men to whom Portugal had given birth and nurture? What petty quibbling would it be to say, that an invasion of Portugal from Spain was not a _Spanish_ invasion, because Spain did not employ her own troops, but hired mercenaries to effect her purpose? And what difference is it, except as an aggravation, that the mercenaries in this instance were natives of Portugal. I have already stated, and I now repeat, that it never has been the wish or the pretension of the British Government to interfere in the internal concerns of the Portuguese nation. Questions of that kind the Portuguese nation must settle among themselves. But if we were to admit that hordes of traitorous refugees from Portugal, with Spanish arms, or arms furnished or restored to them by Spanish authorities, in their hands, might put off their country for one purpose, and put it on again for anotherâput it off for the purpose of attack, and put it on again for the purpose of impunityâif, I say, we were to admit this juggle, and either pretend to be deceived by it ourselves, or attempt to deceive Portugal, into a belief that there was nothing of external attack, nothing of foreign hostility, in such a system of aggressionâsuch pretence and attempt would, perhaps, be only ridiculous and contemptible; if they did not require a much more serious character from being employed as an excuse for infidelity to ancient friendship, and as a pretext for getting rid of the positive stipulations of treaties. This, then, is the case which I lay before the House of Commons. Here is, on the one hand, an undoubted pledge of national faithânot taken in a cornerânot kept secret between the parties, but publicly recorded among the annals of history, in the face of the world. Here are, on the other hand, undeniable acts of foreign aggression, perpetrated, indeed, principally through the instrumentality of domestic traitors, but supported with foreign means, instigated by foreign councils, and directed to foreign ends. Putting these facts and this pledge together, it is impossible that his Majesty should refuse the call that has been made upon him; nor can Parliament, I am convinced, refuse to enable his Majesty to fulfil his undoubted obligations. I am willing to rest the whole question of to-night, and to call for the vote of the House of Commons upon this simple case, divested altogether of collateral circumstances; from which I especially wish to separate it, in the minds of those who hear me, and also in the minds of others, to whom what I now say will find its way. If I were to sit down this moment, without adding another word, I have no doubt but that I should have the concurrence of the House in the address which I mean to propose. When I state this, it will be obvious to the House, that the vote for which I am about to call upon them is a vote for the defence of Portugal, not a vote for war against Spain. I beg the House to keep these two points entirely distinct in their consideration. For the former I think I have said enough. If, in what I have now further to say, I should bear hard upon the Spanish Government, I beg that it may be observed that, unjustifiable as I shall show their conduct to have beenâcontrary to the law of nations, contrary to the law of good neighborhood, contrary, I might say, to the laws of God and manâwith respect to Portugalâstill I do not mean to preclude a _locus pÅnitentiÃ¦_, a possibility of redress and reparation. It is our duty to fly to the defence of Portugal, be the assailant who he may. And, be it remembered, that, in thus fulfilling the stipulation of ancient treaties, of the existence and obligation of which all the world are aware, we, according to the universally admitted construction of the law of nations, neither make war upon that assailant, nor give to that assailant, much less to any other power, just cause of war against ourselves. Sir, the present situation of Portugal is so anomalous, and the recent years of her history are crowded with events so unusual, that the House will, perhaps, not think that I am unprofitably wasting its time, if I take the liberty of calling its attention, shortly and succinctly, to those events, and to their influence on the political relations of Europe. It is known that the consequence of the residence of the King of Portugal in Brazil was to raise the latter country from a colonial to a metropolitan condition; and that, from the time when the King began to contemplate his return to Portugal, there grew up in Brazil a desire of independence that threatened dissension, if not something like civil contest, between the European and American dominions of the House of Braganza. It is known, also, that Great Britain undertook a mediation between Portugal and Brazil, and induced the King to consent to a separation of the two crownsâconfirming that of Brazil on the head of his eldest son. The ink with which this agreement was written was scarcely dry, when the unexpected death of the King of Portugal produced a new state of things, which reunited on the same head the two crowns which it had been the policy of England, as well as of Portugal and of Brazil, to separate. On that occasion, Great Britain, and another European court, closely connected with Brazil, tendered advice to the Emperor of Brazil, now become King of Portugal, which advice it can not be accurately said that his Imperial Majesty followed, because he had decided for himself before it reached Rio de Janeiro; but in conformity with which advice, though not in consequence of it, his Imperial Majesty determined to abdicate the crown of Portugal in favor of his eldest daughter. But the Emperor of Brazil had done more. What had not been foreseenâwhat would have been beyond the province of any foreign power to adviseâhis Imperial Majesty had accompanied his abdication of the crown of Portugal with the grant of a free constitutional charter for that kingdom. It has been surmised that this measure, as well as the abdication which it accompanied, was the offspring of our advice. No such thingâGreat Britain did not suggest this measure. It is not her duty nor her practice to offer suggestions for the internal regulation of foreign states. She neither approved nor disapproved of the grant of a constitutional charter to Portugal; her opinion upon that grant was never required. True it is, that the instrument of the constitutional charter was brought to Europe by a gentleman of high trust in the service of the British Government. Sir C. Stuart had gone to Brazil to negotiate the separation between that country and Portugal. In addition to his character of Plenipotentiary of Great Britain, as the mediating power, he had also been invested by the King of Portugal with the character of his most faithful Majestyâs Plenipotentiary for the negotiation with Brazil. That negotiation had been brought to a happy conclusion; and therewith the British part of Sir C. Stuartâs commission had terminated. But Sir C. Stuart was still resident at Rio de Janeiro, as the Plenipotentiary of the King of Portugal, for negotiating commercial arrangements between Portugal and Brazil. In this latter character it was that Sir C. Stuart, on his return to Europe, was requested by the Emperor of Brazil to be the bearer to Portugal of the new constitutional charter. His Majestyâs government found no fault with Sir C. Stuart for executing this commission; but it was immediately felt that if Sir C. Stuart were allowed to remain at Lisbon, it might appear, in the eyes of Europe, that England was the contriver and imposer of the Portuguese constitution. Sir C. Stuart was, therefore, directed to return home forthwith, in order that the constitution, if carried into effect there, might plainly appear to be adopted by the Portuguese nation itself, not forced upon them by English interference. As to the merits, sir, of the new constitution of Portugal, I have neither the intention nor the right to offer any opinion. Personally, I may have formed one; but as an English minister, all I have to say is: May God prosper this attempt at the establishment of constitutional liberty in Portugal! and may that nation be found as fit to enjoy and to cherish its new-born privileges, as it has often proved itself capable of discharging its duties among the nations of the world! I, sir, am neither the champion nor the critic of the Portuguese constitution. But it is admitted on all hands to have proceeded from a legitimate sourceâa consideration which has mainly reconciled continental Europe to its establishment; and to us, as Englishmen, it is recommended by the ready acceptance which it has met with from all orders of the Portuguese people. To that constitution, therefore, thus unquestioned in its origin, even by those who are most jealous of new institutionsâto that constitution, thus sanctioned in its outset by the glad and grateful acclamations of those who are destined to live under itâto that constitution, founded on principles, in a great degree, similar to those of our own, though differently modified,âit is impossible that Englishmen should not wish well. But it would not be for us to force that constitution on the people of Portugal, if they were unwilling to receive it, or if any schism should exist among the Portuguese themselves, as to its fitness and congenialty to the wants and wishes of the nation. It is no business of ours to fight its battles. We go to Portugal in the discharge of a sacred obligation, contracted under ancient and modern treaties. When there, nothing shall be done by us to enforce the establishment of the constitution; but we must take care that nothing shall be done by others to prevent it from being fairly carried into effect. Internally, let the Portuguese settle their own affairs; but with respect to external force, while Great Britain has an arm to raise, it must be raised against the efforts of any power that should attempt forcibly to control the choice and fetter the independence of Portugal. Has such been the intention of Spain? Whether the proceedings which have lately been practised or permitted in Spain were acts of a government exercising the usual power of prudence and foresight (without which a government is, for the good of the people which live under it, no government at all), or whether they were the acts of some secret illegitimate powerâof some furious fanatical faction, over-riding the counsels of the ostensible government, defying it in the capital, and disobeying it on the frontiers,âI will not stop to inquire. It is indifferent to Portugal, smarting under her wrongsâit is indifferent to England, who is called upon to avenge them,âwhether the present state of things be the result of the intrigues of a faction, over which, if the Spanish Government has no control, it ought to assume one as soon as possible; or of local authorities, over whom it has control, and for whose acts it must, therefore, be held responsible. It matters not, I say, from which of these sources the evil has arisen. In either case, Portugal must be protected; and from England that protection is due. It would be unjust, however, to the Spanish Government, to say that it is only among the members of that government that an unconquerable hatred of liberal institutions exists in Spain. However incredible the phenomena may appear in this country, I am persuaded that a vast majority of the Spanish nation entertain a decided attachment to arbitrary power, and a predilection for absolute government. The more liberal institutions of countries in the neighborhood have not yet extended their influence into Spain, nor awakened any sympathy in the mass of the Spanish people. Whether the public authorities of Spain did or did not partake of the national sentiment, there would almost necessarily grow up between Portugal and Spain, under present circumstances, an opposition of feelings which it would not require the authority or the suggestions of the government to excite and stimulate into action. Without blame, therefore, to the government of Spainâout of the natural antipathy between the two neighboring nationsâthe one prizing its recent freedom, the other hugging its traditionary servitude,âthere might arise mutual provocations and reciprocal injuries, which, perhaps, even the most active and vigilant ministry could not altogether restrain. I am inclined to believe that such has been, in part at least, the origin of the differences between Spain and Portugal. That in their progress they have been adopted, matured, methodized, combined, and brought into more perfect action, by some authority more united and more efficient than the mere feeling disseminated through the mass of the community, is certain; but I do believe their origin to have been as much in the real sentiment of the Spanish population, as in the opinion or contrivance of the government itself. Whether this be or be not the case, is precisely the question between us and Spain. If, though partaking in the general feelings of the Spanish nation, the Spanish Government
{'title': 'Representative British Orations Volume 3 (of 4) by Charles Kendall Adams', 'source': 'Project Gutenberg', 'lang': 'en'}