787 F. Supp. 2d 458 (2011) Jeffery Lee WOOD, TDCJ No. 999256, Petitioner, v. Rick THALER, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent. Civil No. SA-01-CA-423-OG. United States District Court, W.D. Texas, San Antonio Division. May 10, 2011. *460 J. Scott Sullivan, Law Offices of J. Scott Sullivan, San Antonio, TX, Jared Tyler, Tyler Law Firm, PLLC, Houston, TX, for Petitioner. Eric J.R. Nichols, Beck, Redden, Secrest, LLP, Matthew Dennis Ottoway, Tina J. Miranda, Tomee Morgan Heining, Texas Attorney General's Office, Austin, TX, for Respondent. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING RELIEF ORLANDO L. GARCIA, District Judge. Petitioner filed a motion to stay his execution in August, 2008, alleging therein that he was incompetent to be executed under the Supreme Court's holding in Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 127 S. Ct. 2842, 168 L. Ed. 2d 662 (2007). This Court granted petitioner's motion for stay of execution, appointed counsel and multiple mental health experts to assist petitioner in the preparation of his Panetti claim, and held an evidentiary hearing in November, 2010. Having considered the parties' evidence and the applicable law, this Court finds factually incredible petitioner's claim that he currently suffers from a delusional belief system that renders him incapable of comprehending the true basis for his impending execution. For the reasons set forth at length hereinafter, petitioner's request for federal habeas corpus relief is denied, the stay of execution previously granted is vacated, and petitioner is denied a Certificate of Appealability. I. Statement of the Case A. Petitioner's Offense, Capital Murder Trial, and State Appeal The facts of petitioner's capital offense and subsequent trial, direct appeal, and state habeas corpus proceedings are set forth in detail with record citations in this Court's opinion denying petitioner federal habeas corpus relief. Wood v. Dretke, 386 F. Supp. 2d 820, 825-35 (W.D.Tex.2005), CoA denied, 214 Fed.Appx. 473 (5th Cir. 2007), affirmed, 491 F.3d 196 (5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1151, 128 S. Ct. 1087, 169 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2008). The evidence at petitioner's trial established petitioner participated in a pair of armed robberies of convenience stores which culminated in the fatal shooting of store clerk Kriss Keeran by petitioner's accomplice Danny Reneau on January 22, 1996. To summarize the evidence introduced during petitioner's capital murder trial, petitioner and his accomplice Danny Reneau were engaged in a string of armed robberies. Their last robbery took place at a convenience store where Kriss Keeran, who knew both petitioner and Reneau, worked. Reneau fatally shot Keeran during the course of the robbery.[1] After the robbery, Reneau and petitioner removed the store's safe, cash box, and the videotape of the robbery and fatal shooting from the store's video surveillance system. Petitioner drove the get-away vehicle to and from the robbery/murder. There was testimony at trial that Reneau and petitioner showed the video tape of their robbery and the fatal shooting of Keeran to petitioner's younger brother Jonathan before directing Jonathan to destroy the videotape. After his arrest, petitioner gave two formal tape-recorded statements to law enforcement *461 officers. In both his statements petitioner admitted his role in Keeran's murder. In the first, petitioner attempted to downplay his prior knowledge of Reneau's plan to kill Keeran. In his second statement, however, petitioner admitted he knew Reneau planned to kill Keeran if Keeran resisted during the robbery.[2] In *462 fact, petitioner related that he and Reneau returned to their residence the day of the robbery/murder to obtain a gun that would be less noisy when fired.[3] Both of petitioner's tape-recorded statements were played in their entirety for the jury during the guilt-innocence phase of petitioner's capital murder trial. Petitioner argued he was incompetent to stand trial. Based primarily on the testimony of Dr. Michael Roman (that petitioner made many grandiose statements about himself and was, therefore, delusional), in May, 1997, a jury found petitioner incompetent to stand trial. After spending several weeks at the Vernon State Hospital where petitioner was observed and tested by other mental health professionals, in October, 1997, a second jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner was competent to stand trial. A third jury convicted petitioner of capital murder in February, 1998. At that point, petitioner attempted to discharge his trial counsel. After a series of exchanges with the trial judge, however, petitioner was persuaded to allow his trial counsel to continue to represent him; nonetheless, petitioner insisted that his trial counsel introduce no mitigating evidence, cross-examine none of the prosecution's witnesses, and offer no argument during the punishment phase of trial. Wood v. Dretke, 386 christopher80@example.net. Petitioner's trial counsel adhered to petitioner's directives. Id. The jury deliberated a little more than an hour before returning its verdict at the punishment phase of trial favorable to the prosecution. Based on the jury's unanimous verdict, the state trial court sentenced petitioner to death. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed petitioner's conviction and sentence. Wood v. State, 18 S.W.3d 642 (Tex. Crim.App.2000). Petitioner did not seek further review of his sentence from the United States Supreme Court. Petitioner did file an application for state habeas corpus relief which the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied on May 9, 2001.[4]*463 Ex parte Jeffery Lee Wood, App. 45,500-01 (Tex.Crim.App. May 9, 2001). B. Petitioner Attempts to Fairly Present his Panetti Claim Following the Fifth Circuit's affirmation of this Court's denial of petitioner's original federal habeas corpus petition and the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari, petitioner attempted to return to state court and argue that he is incompetent to be executed. The state trial court refused to appoint counsel to represent petitioner, refused to appoint a mental health expert to assist petitioner in presenting his incompetency claim, and refused to grant petitioner an evidentiary hearing. More specifically, on or about August 14, 2008, far less than the 20 days prior to his scheduled execution required by applicable state law to obtain review by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals,[5] petitioner filed a motion in his state trial court requesting appointment of counsel and appointment of a mental health expert to assist petitioner in investigating, developing, and presenting evidence supporting a claim that petitioner is currently incompetent to be executed and, thereby, at least temporarily exempt from the death penalty pursuant to the Supreme Court's then-recent decision in Panetti v. Quarterman, supra, and its prior decision in Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 106 S. Ct. 2595, 91 L. Ed. 2d 335 (1986). On August 17, 2008, the state trial court denied petitioner's motion with the cryptic notation "Motion Denied. Threshold showing required under 46.05 not met." In a per curiam opinion issued August 19, 2008, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed petitioner's appeal from the trial court's denial of petitioner's motion, explaining it lacked both (1) appellate jurisdiction to review same due to the untimeliness of petitioner's motion and (2) direct authority under applicable state law to appoint counsel or experts to assist petitioner in his post-conviction proceeding. Wood v. State, AP-75,970, 2008 WL 3855534 (Tex. Crim.App. August 19, 2008). C. Proceedings in this Court 1. Motion for Stay In support of his motion for stay of execution, filed in this Court on August 19, 2008, docket entry no. 37, petitioner argued (1) his school records demonstrate he was diagnosed as exhibiting emotional difficulties as a child, (2) he was determined to be incompetent to stand trial in May, 1997 (but subsequently found competent only a few months later despite receiving no medical treatment or medication during the intervening period), (3) a diagnostician who examined petitioner in connection with petitioner's competency trials concluded petitioner suffered from delusional thought patterns which interfered with petitioner's ability to communicate effectively with his counsel, (4) a mental health evaluation conducted in connection *464 with petitioner's original state habeas corpus proceeding shortly after petitioner's 1998 conviction, concluded, in part, "the client's understanding of the upcoming legal process is somewhat sophisticated. However, his ability to appreciate the consequences of those options or behave in a self-protective fashion is profoundly impaired and almost delusional," (5) various prison medical staff have noted instances of paranoid comments made by petitioner during his current incarceration, (6) petitioner has been treated for suicidal ideation and multiple suicide attempts during his current incarceration, and (7) petitioner has made numerous patently delusional comments to his federal habeas counsel suggesting petitioner possesses a completely unrealistic view of the manner whereby petitioner might one day obtain relief from his death sentence and release from his current custody. This Court granted petitioner's motion for stay of execution, appointed counsel to represent petitioner herein, and authorized petitioner to retain the services of a mental health professional to help petitioner develop his Panetti claim. Wood v. Quarterman, 572 F. Supp. 2d 814 (W.D.Tex. 2008). 2. The Dueling Diagnosticians a. The Report of Petitioner's Mental Health Expert Petitioner filed his de facto amended petition on March 23, 2009, accompanied by a copy of Dr. Michael A. Roman's 1997 report on petitioner, as well as a 1999 report on petitioner from a Gordon Potter, identified as a "M.Ed." Docket entry no. 65. Respondent subsequently filed a supplement to his amended petition, along with a September 21, 2009 report on petitioner from Dr. Roman in which Dr. Roman concludes (1) petitioner shows strong evidence of narcissistic thinking, (2) manifests paranoid thinking in relation to his legal situation, (3) there is no evidence of any specific neuro-behavioral disorder or major cognitive dysfunction, (4) petitioner nonetheless displays a persecutory delusion regarding his legal situation (because he maintains he is not guilty of the crime for which he has been convicted), (5) petitioner has "embraced a delusional belief system that is well formed, specific, and deeply held" and that "the specificity and intractability of his delusions have intensified" since 1996, and (6) petitioner is, therefore, not capable of clearly thinking about his sentence and pending execution. Docket entry no. 83. More specifically, in pertinent part, Dr. Roman's report contains the following findings, conclusions, and opinions[6]: Delusional Systems: In many respects, Mr. Wood demonstrates more realistic thinking about his legal situation than had been the case when evaluated by this examiner prior to his conviction. His statements and thought processes are less globally self-centered than they appeared to be nearly 14 years ago. He is more grounded in his understanding of the appeal process and how much of a role he can realistically play in influencing the appellate court. The fact that he is more competent in his grasp and appreciation for legal procedures and his role within them appears consistent with the conclusions drawn by this examiner when Mr. Wood was first evaluated prior to his trial. At that time, it was argued that there was a good likelihood that his competence in *465 assisting his attorneys with his defense would improve if he were directly confronted with the reality over a sustained period of time. His conviction and the reality of prison have certainly accomplished this intervention. On the other hand, the specificity and intractability of his delusions have intensified. He seems to have embraced a delusional belief system that is well formed, specific, and deeply held. A brief discourse on the nature of delusional disorder and delusional systems is warranted. A delusion is defined as a fixed false belief. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th Edition (DSM-IV) defines delusions as "A false belief based on incorrect inference about external reality that is firmly sustained despite what almost everyone else believes and despite what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the contrary." Delusions are common in many psychotic conditions such as schizophrenia, schizotypal personality disorder, and schizoaffective disorder. However, normal individuals often manifest delusional beliefs in the absence of disturbed reality testing, indicating that a psychotic disorder is not required for an individual to manifest a delusional belief system. Several studies have demonstrated that normal adults in the general population demonstrate delusional beliefs. For example, studies of normal controls using the Peters Delusions Inventory indicates that adults without diagnosed psychopathology endorse an average of 6 to 8 delusional beliefs, depending on the specific research study cited. However, they typically endorse a low degree of distress, preoccupation, and conviction about these beliefs, particularly compared to patient populations with established delusions. Delusions may be bizarre in their content or may be nonbizarre and involve plausible situations. In either case, delusional beliefs are irrational in that they persist despite evidence that would seem to refute them. Five basic categories of delusional beliefs have been delineated. These include erotomanic (belief that someone is in love with you), grandiose (an inflated belief of self-importance or self-accomplishment), jealous (belief that one's significant other is unfaithful), persecutory (a belief that someone is "out to get you" or someone close to you), and somatic (belief that one has a physical or health problem). In addition, a mixed pattern of delusions is also recognized in which more than one type of delusion is present. The DSM-IV-TR defines a Delusional Disorder as consisting of A) Nonbizarre delusions (... involving situations that occur in real life...) of at least 1 month's duration. B) Absence of other symptoms that would meet the criteria for schizophrenia (i.e., hallucinations, disorganized speech, grossly disorganized or catatonic behavior, and negative symptoms). C) Apart from the impact of the delusions... functioning is not markedly impaired and behavior is not obviously odd or bizarre. D) Delusions have not been primarily related to episodes of disturbed mood. E) Delusions are not directly due to the use of a substance or a medical condition. From this definition, it is clear that there is an appreciation for the existence of a lingering delusional belief system that is not related to a more primary *466 psychotic disorder. Delusional Disorder is one of the psychotic disorders within DSM-IV-TR, but the nature of the psychotic process is confined to the delusional belief system itself. This definition would also exclude delusions that are created as a result of neurological insult or progressive neurological diseases such as dementia. These neurologically linked delusional misidentification syndromes involve interesting disorders such as Capgras delusion (a belief that close friend or family member has been replaced by an imposter), Fregoli delusion (a belief that familiar people are following you in disguise so you cannot recognize them), Cotard delusion (a belief that you are dead), mirrored-self misidentification (a belief that the person you see in the mirror is not you but rather a look alike), reduplicative paramnesia (a belief that a particular location has been duplicated and/or relocated), and somatoparaphrenia (a belief that some part of your body is not yours but belongs to another person  a common delusion in left hemispatial neglect syndromes). In summary, it would appear that the research and clinical literature recognizes three basic types of delusional presentations  psychotic delusions, stereotypic delusions accompanying specific neurological disorders, and nonbizarre delusions that constitute a psychotic spectrum delusional disorder.[7] Dr. Roman then spent seven paragraphs (and almost an entire page of his eight and a half page report) discussing and analyzing petitioner's responses to a variety of items presented to petitioner from the Peters Delusions Inventory.[8] Dr. Roman's report then turns to the petitioner's allegedly delusional belief system: Applying Junginger's methodology of defining the context of a delusion belief via "Who? What? Where? When? How? And Why?" provided evidence of the extent and intractability of Mr. Wood's persecutory delusions. Mr. Wood is very specific about the Who involved in his case. In fact, he presents two people within the framework, the first being the assistant district attorney who prosecuted him and the other being the trial judge. Regarding the What, Mr. Wood states that it is corruption within the system and the existence of a grudge these people hold against him that causes their desire to persecute him. He states that he is unsure about the reasons they would have a grudge but suspects that it is related to the fact that he was never caught for some of the more minor crimes he committed in his youth. He maintains that both the judge and the assistant district attorney know that he is innocent and that, in fact, they prevented information from getting before the jury so that they could obtain a conviction and secure a death penalty sentence. He maintains that this pursuit of a conviction resulted in an unfair trial  a fact that he believes is indisputable because "several" other judges have told him that he did not get a fair trial. The question of Where is perhaps less germane to understanding Mr. Wood's delusional system except to the extent *467 that he declares the Texas judicial system to be specifically corrupt, even citing Supreme Court Justice Ginsburg as being in agreement with him based on comments he believes she has made regarding the unfairness of Texas justice in capital cases. In this respect, he seems to think that this would not be happening to him if he were not a resident of Texas. When also lacks specificity in this case. Interpreted as a point in time, it is Mr. Wood's apparent belief that he became a target as soon as the Kerrville district attorney allowed his female assistant latitude in trying the case. He further maintains that his conviction will be immediately overturned immediately upon presenting "the right amount" of money to the judge, so long as the judge has "no fear that he is being set up." Alternatively, he believes that he could secure a reversal of his conviction via a new trial if the county judge that replaced the prior judge would review the facts in the case. He adds, however, that he worries about being released even with a new trial if he is unable to offer a reasonably large bribe to the judge. This also speaks to the question of How, in terms of how such a persecution could happen. Mr. Wood believes that he became a target because the judge, who he points out works for the State, is biased against criminals and not judicially impartial. He adds that the fact that they could not prosecute him for previous lesser crimes he committed increased their desire to convict him for this crime which he maintains he did not commit. He also has a firm and unambiguous, albeit convoluted, response to How he can prevail in his case. Mr. Wood maintains that only a bribe of sufficient magnitude or intervention of the fraternal order of the freemasons, will work to extricate him from his situation. He was insistent that his freemason story not be repeated because he fears for his safety in the event they should learn that he has knowledge of their power to intervene. He states that he knows of at least one other death row case that was resolved by the intervention of the freemasons and he fears the potential ramifications of making this known to others. He claims that "he knows for a fact" that the trial judge and district attorney are masons and that only a direct intervention by their brethren (or a sufficiently large and safely delivered bribe) would lead them to be willing to take the risk of exposing their previous wrongdoing in convicting him by reversing his conviction and providing a new trial. This delusion is perhaps the most classic delusional belief that he holds in that it contains both strong paranoid and persecutory features, along with magical thinking. The final question of Why was more difficult for Mr. Wood to answer when asked directly. He stated he did not know why this is happening, adding that he wishes someone could explain it to him. However, in his spontaneous discourse on the subject, he clearly explains the Why. Specifically, he believes that the desire for money and power have driven the conspiracy against him. He argues that the assistant district attorney wanted to make a name for herself by getting convictions on major cases so that she could advance and ultimately earn more money. Her boss, the district attorney, is said to have let her do what she wants to do. This combination of monetarily driven ambition, lack of oversight, and a corrupt judicial system, in Mr. Wood's opinion, is the main cause of his current predicament. He adds that justice has nothing to do with the proceedings. *468 Clinical Impressions: The results of the current evaluation indicate that Mr. Wood scores below average on many cognitive measures, including formal intelligence testing. His ability to use language in service to higher order purposes, such as required on measures of verbal reasoning, was his poorest ability. Overall, there was no evidence of any specific neurobehavioral disorder or major cognitive dysfunction. The results obtained are consistent with prior evaluations which have demonstrated his overall cognitive ability to fall below average for age. These results are also consistent with his history of learning disability. On interview, Mr. Wood continues to give strong evidence of narcissistic thinking. He seems to overvalue his self-worth, particularly regarding his relationship to the opposite sex, considering himself quite a ladies' man and quite capable of evaluating the sexual motives of women. He demonstrates less paranoia than had previously been the case, but still manifests paranoid thinking in relation to his legal situation. Mr. Wood demonstrates clear evidence of a Delusional Disorder as defined by the DSM-IV-TR. His delusions are nonbizarre and are not due to the effects of drugs or another physiological disorder. Of the three types of delusional disorder categories that exists  psychotic delusions, delusional misidentification syndromes, and nonbizarre delusions within the context of a Delusional Disorder  Mr. Wood clearly manifests the last of these. His delusional system is persecutorial in nature and is particularly well formed around his legal situation. It is worth stating once again that neither additional psychotic symptoms  such as other positive symptoms (including hallucinations) or negative symptoms (such as affective flattening) of shizophrenia [sic]  nor neurological impairments are required to be present for a Delusional Disorder to be diagnosed. In fact, the presence of either of these conditions would eliminate consideration of the diagnosis of Delusional Disorder and make his delusional system a simple by-product of a primary pathology. It does not appear that Mr. Wood is capable of rational thinking regarding his sentence and pending execution. He firmly maintains, as he has since his arrest, that he is not guilty of the crimes for which he has been convicted. He maintains that any jury would see this if they were allowed to hear the testimony that he believes was excluded during the trial. He firmly states that he believes his execution has no relationship to the death of the victim in the case, but is rather the product of the aforementioned corrupt system. He added that he believed there was a "99.9% chance that they're going to kill me." Mr. Wood strongly believes that his inability to raise the money to bribe the judge is the main reason that he will not prevail. Because of his strongly entrenched delusional belief system, Mr. Wood appears incapable of linking his execution with the robbery and murder that was committed. Axis I: 297.1 Delusional Disorder, Persecutory Type 314.01 Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, Combined Type 312.8 Conduct Disorder Adolescent-Onset Type Axis II: Narcissistic Personalty Disorder features Paranoid Personality Disorder features Axis III: Noncontributory Axis IV: Problems related to legal system, family, socialization, housing, and access *469 Axis V: Current GAP: 30[9] b. The Report of Respondent's Mental Health Expert Respondent filed his response to petitioner's supplemental amended petition on January 19, 2010, along with a copy of a July 30, 2009 report from Dr. Mary Alice Conroy in which she concluded (1) petitioner fully understands the reason he is to be executed, (2) petitioner's insistence that he should not be held legally responsible for the murder of Keeran despite petitioner's involvement in the robbery (because petitioner did not himself pull the trigger) does not constitute a "delusion" or a form of mental illness, (3) petitioner possesses an anti-social personality but no significant intellectual deficiency, and (4) while petitioner is depressed, his depressive symptoms do not prevent petitioner from understanding the reason he is to be executed. Docket entry no. 86. More specifically, after noting that petitioner (1) had been diagnosed with Antisocial Personality Disorder, (2) was not diagnosed by Dr. Roman or any other mental health professional in the 1996-97 time frame as suffering from any mental illness that could be linked to Dr. Roman's contemporaneous finding that petitioner was then experiencing "delusional thinking," and (3) had never been diagnosed with a mental illness, Dr. Conroy found, concluded, and opined as follows: Case Formulation: Mr. Wood experiences periods of depression which he describes as "feeling down". He is also quite christopher80@example.net. Mr. Wood understand he is facing execution by the state of Texas. At one point, Mr. Wood was four hours away from being executed when he received a stay of execution. He feels persecuted by the state of Texas. He feels, accurately, that the state of Texas wants to kill him. Mr. Wood expresses extreme frustration regarding certain matters of his case and his appeals that he discusses in great detail. Depressive symptoms are not surprising under such circumstances. There is no evidence the defendant has ever experience [sic] a major depressive episode. Mr. Wood mentioned his lack of intelligence several times in the evaluation. One test of cognitive functioning administered at age twelve yielded an IQ score falling in the upper limits of the Low Average range of intelligence. A separate test of cognitive functioning at age 15 yielded an IQ score of 85 (also in the Low Average range). Mr. Wood was administered a complete battery of neuropsychological tests following his arrest. This testing once again confirms low average intelligence. During the current evaluation, Mr. Wood evidence an ability to discuss complex legal aspects of his case, trials, and appeals. Overall, there is no evidence the defendant is a person with mental retardation or any other severe intellectual impairment. Mr. Wood has used a variety of illegal substances. His first time to drink alcohol was in grade school. During high school, he used and experimented with several drugs including: marijuana, PCP, methamphetamine and cocaine. Records indicate that he has described a history of significant substance abuse prior to his incarceration to numerous evaluators. In reviewing Jeffery Wood's history, it appears that the only area of concern regarding his competence has been that he has some type of delusion about his current offense. However, he has never been given a psychotic diagnosis by anyone, *470 nor has any previous diagnosis been one that includes delusional thinking. At various times evaluators have said that he believes he is completely innocent, that he can do no wrong, that he will surely be exonerated. However, during the current evaluation, he said quite clearly that he is "no saint" and that he had been involved in criminal activity over the years. He did not claim complete innocence for the current offense. Rather, he argued that he was outside at the time of the robbery and was not the trigger man (apparently accurate). Therefore, he believes he should not be held responsible for the murder. He added that the Texas legislature should amend the law accordingly. He also proffered several other arguments as to why he is less culpable (e.g., his co-defendants had talked about the robbery scheme, but he really didn't believe them; his co-defendants had threatened his family if he did not go along with them). Although there is no way to assess the accuracy of these statements, they are not delusional. As opposed to a certainty that he will be exonerated, during the current evaluation, he said he had little hope for a reversal. Rather, he expressed the sobering idea that, unless there were to be something very favorable in a mental health evaluation, he would likely "get a date." Overall, there was no evidence that this defendant has delusions and no evidence of a serious mental illness for which delusions would be a symptom. Mr. Wood's history also indicates the presence of a personality disorder. Unlike a mental illness, a personality disorder is a chronic constellation of traits that tend to be maladaptive. Records indicate a general disregard for the rules and mores of the larger society. There is a strong tendency to externalize blame for his difficulties (e.g., his parents were abusive and neglectful, his lawyers did not present a strong enough case, the medical staff at North Texas State Hospital failed to treat him appropriately). He tends to be emotionally labile and engages in self harm behaviors when frustrated. Diagnosis: Axis I: 304.80 Polysubstance Abuse 311 Depressive Disorder NOS Axis II: 301.9 Personality Disorder NOS Areas of Competency: Understanding that he is to be executed and that the execution is imminent: Mr. Wood discussed in great detail his thoughts and beliefs regarding death. He also stated, "If y'all say nothing is wrong with me, I'll get a date" for execution. Mr. Wood stated "I don't want to die". He also expressed a desire to have his sentenced [sic] changed to life (even though he described that as bad also because he would like to start a new life with his wife in Norway). Mr. Wood described himself as a "Christian" and stated he has forgiven the DA and the evaluators. When asked to describe what happens after death, Mr. Wood replied, "Some people say you still face judgment [but] no one knows. When you're dead, you're dead". He stated that "I only fear the Lord, not death". He told evaluators that on his first trip to be executed (prior to receiving his stay of execution) he was singing and joking with the guards. He explained that he wasn't going to become violent and hurt anyone and that, instead, he wanted to walk to his death with his "head held high like a man" so that the state could not say "I told you so". When asked if the state wanted him to look crazy, he replied, "the state wants me to look smart". Mr. Wood also explained *471 how the state couldn't execute someone who was mentally retarded (with an IQ of "70 or so") and described himself as "dumber than hell". Understanding of the reason he is to be executed: Mr. Wood understands that he is to be executed because of his involvement in a robbery/murder. He stated that he did not feel that he should be held responsible since he did not personally shoot anyone and was forced at gunpoint and under threat to his family members to participate. In his description of his opinion of his innocence, Mr. Wood demonstrated a detailed understanding of the proceedings against him and the specific incident that brought about his impending punishment. He expressed a strong desire for his lawyer to make it known that the victim's own family had stated they do not wish Mr. Wood to be executed. He reported the state of Texas thinks he was the "mastermind" behind the crime. Opinion on Competence for Execution: Based on the information provided, it is our professional opinion that Jeffery Lee Wood is currently competent to be executed. He is aware that he is to be executed by the state of Texas, that the execution is imminent, and he possesses an accurate understanding of the reason for his execution.[10] 3. Voluminous Record Submissions In advance of the evidentiary hearing held November 16-17, 2010, the parties furnished this Court with voluminous records, including more than seven hours of unindexed recordings of conversations between petitioner and his family members in August, 2008, more than six hundred pages of petitioner's medical and mental health records from the TDCJ and UTMB, more than eleven hundred pages of petitioner's correspondence, and more than six hundred pages of records from petitioner's state trial court proceedings, including copies of petitioner's school and medical and mental health records. A brief summary of those voluminous documents will furnish some context for the testimony this Court heard on November 16-17, 2010. a. Petitioner's August, 2008 Conversations Respondent presented this Court with recordings of more than seven hours of unlabeled, unindexed, conversations between petitioner and his family members apparently recorded in August, 2008, on the eve of petitioner's previously scheduled execution. This Court reviewed those recordings (most of which consisted of largely aimless conversations about mundane topics such as the choices of snack foods petitioner and his family members wished to make from the TDCJ commissary and vending machines) in their entirety and furnished the parties with a detailed summary of the contents of same in an Order issued September 30, 2010, docket entry no. 118. In pertinent part, this Court summarized those recordings for the benefit of the parties and their experts as follows: (1) Disc # 40 (Sides A & B) Respondent's exhibits 5(a) and 5(b) [both marked as "Disc # 40"] consist of a slightly duplicitous pair of recordings of conversations petitioner and his wife had on August 11, 2008. Side A of this recording runs approximately 80 minutes. Side B runs approximately 63 minutes. Because of the duplication of *472 the final portion of "Side A" at the beginning of "Side B," it is difficult to determine the total running time of this recording. There is very little in these banal conversations that even touches on the issues properly before this Court. At approximately the 23 minute mark of Side A, there is about a three-minute conversation regarding then-upcoming-executions of other TDCJ inmates which clearly demonstrates petitioner was oriented to both time and space, as well as events going on around him. At approximately the 38 minute mark of Side A, there are a series of conversations over the following twelve minutes which once again show petitioner had a comprehensive understanding of the clemency proceedings then-underway on his behalf. At approximately the 64 minute mark of Side A of Disc # 40, i.e., respondent's exhibit 5(a), the petitioner and his wife discuss for approximately five minutes the fact petitioner was offered a life sentence prior to his capital murder trial. This last conversation of relevance is repeated verbatim as the first five minutes of Side B of Disc # 40, i.e., respondent's exhibit 5(b). This Disc # 40 (both Sides A & B) contains approximately twenty minutes of conversation arguably relevant to the issues in this cause. (2) Disc # 79 (Sides A & B) Respondent's exhibits 6(a) and 6(b) [marked as "Disc # 79 Side A" and "Disc # 78 Side B"] contain petitioner's conversations with various members of his family on August 18, 2008. Side A, i.e., respondent's exhibit 6(a), runs approximately 63 minutes. At approximately the 38 minute mark of Side A, an eleven minute segment appears wherein petitioner furnishes an elucidating explanation of the case of Kenneth Foster, a convicted capital murderer who, like petitioner was the get-away driver in a series of armed robberies and who received a commutation of his death sentence from the current Texas Governor, Side B, i.e., respondent's exhibit 6(b), runs approximately 63 minutes in length. Side B contains a five minute segment two minutes into the recording in which petitioner again discusses the fact he was not the mastermind of the armed robbery that left Kriss Keeran dead. The final three minutes of Side B contains a brief exchange concerning the Vienna Convention and the possible legal implications of international law on petitioner's case. There is less then seventeen minutes of conversation on Disc 79, both Sides A and Side B, which is even arguably relevant to any issue in this cause. (3) Disc 67 Respondent's exhibit 7 [marked as "Disc # 67"] contains approximately 62 minutes of conversation between petitioner and various members of his family on August 18, 2008. Other than very brief comments of less than thirty seconds each made at the 1 minute and 39 minute marks by petitioner acknowledging that he understood the nature of the clemency proceedings then underway on his behalf, there is nothing on this recording arguably relevant to the issues in this cause. Thus, there is less than a minute of recordings on this disc relevant to any issue in this cause. (4) Disc # 37 (Sides A & B) Respondent's exhibits 8(a) and 8(b) [marked as "Disc # 37 Side A" and "Disc # 37 Side B"] consist of recordings of petitioner's conversations with petitioner's wife on August 4, 2008. These recordings contain only a single three-minute segment beginning at approximately *473 the 35 minute mark of Side A, i.e., respondent's exhibit 8(a), in which petitioner argues he was not the mastermind of the armed robbery that left Kriss Keeran fatally shot. Otherwise, these recordings contain absolutely nothing relevant to any issue in this cause. Thus, the two sides of this Disc contain only three minutes of conversation relevant to any issue before this Court in this cause. At no point in the more than seven hours of recorded conversations with his family members in August, 2008 did petitioner ever mention or allude to any conspiracy between his prosecutor and trial judge to convict petitioner or sentence petitioner to death.[11] Likewise, none of the conversations in question shed any light on the issues before this Court except insofar as the few snippets of conversation identified above suggested petitioner possessed a knowledge of (1) Texas criminal, appellate, and state habeas corpus procedure, (2) several then-recent judicial decisions by the state and federal courts, as well as (3) then-recent developments on a variety of political topics, including the Texas Governor's willingness to commute the death sentence of another Texas death row inmate (Kenneth Eugene Foster) who, like petitioner, drove the get-away vehicle during an armed robbery that turned into a capital murder.[12] b. Petitioner's TDCJ Medical & Mental Health Records Petitioner's TDCJ medical and mental health records, submitted months in advance of the hearing in this cause and admitted into evidence during the evidentiary hearing bearing UTMB page stamps, contain numerous findings and conclusions suggesting petitioner possesses an antisocial personality, is impulsive, manipulative, and refuses to take responsibility for his own actions.[13] At numerous points during his incarceration in the TDCJ, petitioner *474 has been accused by medical and mental health staff of deliberately feigning mental health issues to gain something he wanted.[14] Petitioner has expressed suicidal ideation and even reported making suicide attempts in June and July, 2000, February, 2001, April, 2003, August, 2004, and January, 2009; although most of these were deemed by mental health staff to be efforts by petitioner to obtain something he wanted rather than sincere expressions of a desire to harm himself.[15] In November, 2010, on the eve of the evidentiary hearing in this cause, respondent also furnished this Court with an additional 80 pages of petitioner's medical records reflecting petitioner's brief psychiatric hospitalization following an incident on or about August 29 or 30, 2010, in which petitioner placed a homemade noose around his neck, laid on the floor, declared "I'm trying to kill myself," and refused to remove the noose. Docket entry no. 131. Petitioner's TDCJ medical records concerning the incident in question reflect that (1) petitioner was sprayed with chemical agents when he refused to remove the noose, (2) when questioned later, petitioner stated "I had to do it. I had nothing to lose," (3) examination of petitioner immediately after the incident found "no ligature marks, redness or bruising of neck," (4) petitioner also explained his actions as follows: "I came here [to the TDCJ's psychiatric facility] to get some help. I been going around and round with those officers. They keep on screwing me around. They keep trying to push me over the edge," (5) petitioner explained his dispute with the guards at his facility originated when petitioner had difficulty or refused to "get into single cuffs" and a guard verbally abused petitioner, (6) petitioner's thought processes when interviewed on September 2, 2010 revealed no evidence of delusions, paranoia, or suicidal/homicidal ideation, (7) petitioner was diagnosed on September 2, 2010 with Polysubstance Dependence and Antisocial Personality Disorder, (8) when examined on September 3, 2010, petitioner's thought processes were considered "negative for delusions," (9) petitioner's MMPI-2 RF responses suggested "there were an excessive number of infrequent responses, that a considerably larger than average number of symptoms rarely described by individuals with genuine, severe psychopathology were endorsed, that a much larger than average number of somatic symptoms rarely described by individuals with genuine medical problems were endorsed, and that a[sic] unusual combination of responses that is associated with non-credible reporting of somatic and/or cognitive symptoms" were present, (10) when interviewed on September 8, 2010, petitioner reported a pattern of agitation he attributed to his family "not following through on their promises," i.e., not visiting him and not sending him letters, birthday cards, and money they had promised to do so, and (11) petitioner's distrust of corrections staff is "quite normal in a *475 correctional setting."[16] c. Petitioner's TDCJ Correspondence This Court has likewise been compelled by the parties to review more than eleven hundred pages of petitioner's correspondence in which petitioner engages in rambling discourses on (1) the efforts of citizens to change Texas law relating to the death penalty,[17] (2) trial errors which allegedly took place during his trial and which he wishes to see pursued in possible future appellate or habeas corpus proceedings,[18] (3) the Texas law of parties and its impact on his trial,[19] (4) the fact Keeran's family is currently supporting his efforts to avoid the death penalty,[20] and (5) what he perceives to be his "innocence" of the offense of capital murder.[21] Petitioner's correspondence also indicates (1) petitioner believed the State wished to test him for "IQ and mental issues,"[22] (2) petitioner has a web site to which he has referred those with whom he has corresponded,[23] and (3) petitioner has protested that he is not the monster the State of Texas says he is.[24] Nothing in any of petitioner's voluminous correspondence suggests petitioner has ever communicated to any of those with whom he has corresponded the beliefs that (1) he is the victim of a malevolent conspiracy between his prosecutor and state trial judge or (2) the Freemasons could help him gain his release from prison or a new trial. 4. Evidentiary Hearing On November 16-17, 2010, this Court heard testimony and received documentary evidence addressing petitioner's Panetti claim.[25] a. Initial Testimony of Dr. Michael Roman Petitioner's mental health expert, Dr. Michael A. Roman, testified on direct examination that he believed petitioner suffers from a delusional belief system which interferes with petitioner's ability to rationally link his crime with the reason he is scheduled to be executed and, therefore, renders petitioner incompetent to be executed.[26] More specifically, Dr. Roman testified, in pertinent part, that (1) petitioner is delusional,[27] (2) a delusion is "a fixed belief system that persists and is fairly robust even though most people would agree that it's erroneous and there seems to be credible evidence to suggest that there's no reason to believe what you believe. And it's a false belief that persists despite evidence that you shouldn't believe *476 that,"[28] (3) "at the time that you believe it, if there is a preponderance of evidence that you should not believe it, it would still be a delusion at that time even if subsequently it were demonstrated that perhaps there was a reason to believe it,"[29] (4) petitioner has realistic perceptions of his execution, i.e., he "certainly understands very clearly that he has been sentenced to death,"[30] (5) petitioner understands that he has received an execution date and will receive another date,[31] (6) petitioner has a fully formed delusional belief system surrounding his impending execution,[32] (7) a Delusional Disorder falls in the category of psychotic disorders,[33] (8) petitioner's is a non-bizarre delusional belief system that appears rational on its face and is unrelated to a mental disorder or substance abuse,[34] (9) a true Delusional Disorder requires the absence of most of the tenets of psychosis,[35] (10) petitioner suffers from a persecutorial delusional disorder,[36] (11) petitioner's delusional belief system focuses on the assistant district attorney who prosecuted his case and the trial judge who presided over petitioner's trial,[37] (12) there is no credible evidence petitioner has ever expressed to anyone other than his own counsel and mental health expert in this case the belief that he is being persecuted by the Freemasons,[38] (13) petitioner had a delusional belief system in 1996,[39] (14) petitioner is incompetent to be executed because he has irrational beliefs regarding why he is to receive the death penalty, i.e., he believes he is receiving the death penalty because his prosecutor and the trial judge, for the purpose of furthering their own careers, conspired to find petitioner guilty of the crime of capital murder because they could not prosecute petitioner for other, minor crimes  as a way of getting even with petitioner,[40] (14) the Freemasons are not part of petitioner's delusional belief system  rather, petitioner believes they could intervene to help him avoid the death penalty,[41] (15) if petitioner were simply unwilling to accept the reasons for his fate, it would not meet the criteria for the diagnosis Dr. Roman has made,[42] (16) it is difficult for lay people to understand the nature of a closely-held delusional belief system because "it defies common sense,"[43] (17) petitioner's delusions should appear to others to be "absurd," "outrageous," and to defy common sense, i.e., to be "totally ridiculous and unworthy of belief,"[44] (18) to the extent petitioner cannot elucidate the tenets of his delusion, it becomes much more questionable whether it's truly a delusion,[45] (19) petitioner has *477 an antisocial personality,[46] (20) neither that fact nor petitioner's depressive disorder nor petitioner's narcissistic personality disorder nor petitioner's long-standing diagnosis of over-anxious disorder rules out a diagnosis of Delusional Disorder,[47] and (21) paranoid personality disorder is more extreme than petitioner's persecutory delusional disorder.[48] On cross-examination, Dr. Roman testified (1) petitioner's delusions are non-bizarre,[49] (2) Dr. Roman evaluated petitioner in 1996-97 in connection with petitioner's two competency trials and did not diagnose petitioner with a delusional disorder at that time but, rather, diagnosed petitioner at that time with paranoid personality disorder,[50] (3) Dr. Roman formed his diagnosis of petitioner's delusional disorder in September, 2009,[51] (4) in 1997 petitioner was quite well versed in the legal system and petitioner's thinking about the legal system has become "more realistic" since then,[52] (5) in 1997, Dr. Roman testified petitioner understood (a) the crime with which he was charged, (b) that it included the death of the store clerk, and (c) that, if found guilty, petitioner could get life imprisonment or the death penalty,[53] (6) petitioner told Dr. Roman around the time of trial that petitioner preferred to get the death penalty, as opposed to a sentence of life in prison,[54] (7) petitioner comprehends the concept of getting the death penalty,[55] (8) what petitioner does not appreciate is how he can be put to death when he was not the triggerman,[56] (9) petitioner understands the law of parties but is not appreciative of the fact he was convicted of capital murder under the law of parties,[57] (10) petitioner acknowledges his involvement in the robbery,[58] (11) one of the distinguishing features of a delusion is that the person holds on to a belief despite clear contradictory evidence presented to them,[59] (12) Dr. Roman believes others have told petitioner his beliefs about a conspiracy against him are not rational,[60] (13) Dr. Roman sincerely believes petitioner will go to his grave believing petitioner will die because of the delusional belief system, i.e., the conspiracy, and not because of what petitioner did,[61] (14) petitioner places the blame for Keeran's death on Reneau,[62] (15) petitioner's TDCJ medical records include numerous entries suggesting petitioner deliberately was exaggerating his symptoms,[63] and (16) between the date of petitioner's offense in January, 1996 and September, 2009 no one had ever diagnosed petitioner with a psychotic disorder.[64] *478 b. Testimony of Dr. Shelia Bailey A clinical psychologist employed at the TDCJ's mental health unit, Jester 4, who interviewed petitioner in September, 2010, following petitioner's suicidal gesture[65] testified, in pertinent part, that (1) she interacted with petitioner four times during petitioner's stay at the Jester 4 unit and performed a psychosocial evaluation of petitioner,[66] (2) she attempted to administer the MMPI on petitioner but petitioner's responses resulted in four of the six validity scores being elevated, suggesting petitioner was over-reporting symptomology and rendering the profile invalid,[67] (3) one possible explanation of those elevated validity scores is that petitioner was malingering, i.e., exaggerating his symptoms,[68] (4) she found no symptoms of psychosis,[69] (5) petitioner communicated to her on his third day at the Jester 4 facility that (a) he was innocent, (b) he was not the person who committed the murder, and (c) the family of the victim did not want petitioner to be executed,[70] (6) petitioner never mentioned the Freemasons or bribing a judge to her,[71] (7) prisoners often express the view that they are being persecuted by the guards,[72] (8) initially, on September