495 F. Supp. 1101 (1980) INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S ASSOCIATION, AFL-CIO, Atlantic Coast District, ILA, AFL-CIO, Local 1233, ILA and Carol Gardner, Plaintiffs, v. The WATERFRONT COMMISSION OF NEW YORK HARBOR, New York Shipping Association, Inc., and Metropolitan Marine Maintenance Contractors Association, Inc., Defendants. No. 79 Civ. 4267. United States District Court, S. D. New York. June 25, 1980. *1102 *1103 *1104 Gleason, Laitman & Mathews, New York City, for plaintiffs, International Longshoremen's Ass'n, AFL-CIO, Atlantic Coast Dist., ILA, AFL-CIO, and Local 1233, ILA, AFL-CIO, by Thomas W. Gleason, Ernest L. Mathews, Gary G. Nicolosi, New York City. Brown & Brown, Jersey City, N. J., for plaintiff, Carol Gardner, by Raymond M. Brown, Jersey City, N. J. *1105 Gerald P. Lally, Gen. Counsel, New York City, for defendant, The Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, by Gerald P. Lally, David B. Greenfield, New York City. Lorenz, Finn, Giardino & Lambos, New York City, for defendant, New York Shipping Association, Inc., by C. P. Lambos, Donato Caruso, New York City. Greene & Bonaguidi, New York City, for defendant, Metropolitan Marine Maintenance Contractors Association, Inc., by James P. Corcoran, New York City. Schulman & Abarbanel, New York City, for intervenor, Local 814, International Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO, by Howard Schulman, David Jaffe, New York City. Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen. of the State of New York, New York City, for intervenor, New York State, by Amy Juviler, Stephen A. Marcus, Asst. Attys. Gen., New York City. OPINION SOFAER, District Judge: This suit was commenced by plaintiffs International Longshoremen's Association ("ILA"), Atlanta Coast District, ILA, AFL-CIO, and Local 1233, ILA, seeking to enjoin enforcement on statutory and constitutional grounds of Section 8 of the New York Waterfront Commission Act ("WCA § 8"), N.Y.Unconsol.Laws (65) § 9933 (McKinney 1974). Defendants are the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor ("Commission"), an instrumentality created to enforce the Waterfront Commission Compact ("Compact"); and the New York Shipping Association, Inc. ("NYSA") and Metropolitan Marine Maintenance Contractors Association, Inc. ("MMCA"), two organizations of employers which, under a collective bargaining agreement with the ILA, collect and pay to the ILA dues from union members. No genuine issues of material fact exist, and all the parties have moved for summary judgment.[1] Judgment is now granted to each of the parties in accordance with the following opinion. In summary, an injunction is denied in all respects, since it is unnecessary. The following declaratory judgment is entered, however: (1) WCA § 8 may lawfully be enforced against individuals whom it disqualifies from service as waterfront union employees; (2) WCA § 8 may not lawfully be enforced against persons other than disqualified union employees for collecting and distributing union dues; and (3) WCA § 8 may lawfully be enforced against the ILA or its officers for knowingly employing a disqualified individual. Numerous challenges have been made in this case to the legality and application of WCA § 8. These challenges have in turn raised jurisdictional questions. A brief review of the Compact, the WCA, and of section 8 in particular, will clarify the parties' respective positions. Some of the matters being disputed relate to whether certain union officials, recently sentenced after trial, should be forced out of their union jobs now rather than after their appeals have been completed. Other issues are of far greater import, pertaining to the standards which govern the States of New York and New Jersey when they regulate unions and employers to achieve the legitimate objective of forcing convicted criminals out of waterfront union employment. *1106 I. THE WATERFRONT COMMISSION ACT AND SECTION 8 Waterfront employment in New York Harbor is governed by the Waterfront and Airport Commission Act ("WCA"), Chap. 1, Title 29, N.Y.Unconsol.Laws (65), §§ 9801 et seq. (McKinney 1974) ("N.Y.Laws"). The Act is divided into three parts. Part I, comprising Sections 9801 to 9873, is a restatement of the Waterfront Commission Compact consented to by Congress on August 12, 1953. 67 U.S.Stat. 541 (1953). Parts II and III of the Act, covering respectively Sections 9901 to 9920, and Sections 9931 to 9937, contain supplementary provisions, including regulations and prohibitions, which have been enacted by New York and New Jersey, with only slight variation, but have not been consented to by Congress. Section 8 of the WCA, the provision challenged in this action, is found in Part III. The Compact's background and objectives have been discussed in several decisions, most notably De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 80 S. Ct. 1146, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1109 (1960); Bradley v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 12 N.Y.2d 276, 239 N.Y.S.2d 97, 189 N.E.2d 601 (1963); and Hazelton v. Murray, 21 N.J. 115, 121 A.2d 1 (1956). A central purpose of the "drastic reform" implemented by the Compact was to eliminate the presence of corrupt and irresponsible persons in any waterfront employment. De Veau, supra, 363 U.S. at 147, 80 S. Ct. at 1148. To accomplish this end, the Compact created the Waterfront Commission, granting it extensive administrative, adjudicatory and enforcement powers. Among the Commission's primary tasks is the supervision of a detailed licensing procedure for several employment categories, all of which were found to be "affected with a public interest." N.Y.Laws § 9805. The Commission is authorized to deny, revoke, cancel or suspend certain licenses or registrations if the applicant or licensee has "without subsequent pardon, been convicted" by any state or federal court of certain crimes. N.Y.Laws §§ 9814(b), 9818(c) (pier superintendents and hiring agents); §§ 9821(e), 9824(a) (stevedores); §§ 9829(a), 9831(a) (longshoremen); §§ 9841(b), 9844(a) (port watchmen).[2] To deny, revoke, cancel or suspend a license or registration, however, the Commission must follow certain procedures, designed to protect the rights of the applicant or licensee. See N.Y.Laws §§ 9845, 9846.[3] *1107 The Compact anticipates that this statutory scheme may lead to regulatory efforts that conflict with national labor policy. It provides explicit safeguards against such efforts. Thus, N.Y.Laws § 9868 states that the "compact is not designed and shall not be construed to limit in any way any rights granted or derived from any other statute or any rule of law for employees to organize," to bargain collectively, to strike, and to act in any other way individually, collectively, and through labor organizations "or other representatives of their own choosing." See also N.Y.Laws § 9869. At the same time, N.Y.Laws § 9872 provides that the Compact "shall be liberally construed to eliminate the evils described therein and to effectuate the purposes thereof." The Compact has been supplemented by provisions as extensive and important as those it contains. Many of these were adopted contemporaneously with the Compact in 1953, but have never been approved by Congress.[4] Section 8 of the WCA, the statute challenged in this lawsuit, is one of these supplementary provisions. A slightly different version has been adopted by New Jersey.[5] Section 8 has proved the WCA's most controversial provision. Like the licensing regulations set forth in the Compact, WCA § 8 sets employment qualifications, but for waterfront unions rather than waterfront workers. The statute limits those who may serve as officers, agents or employees of any waterfront union, which in practical effect means the ILA. In contrast to the Compact's regulatory scheme, however, WCA § 8 establishes no licensing or registration mechanism, no hearing procedure, no right to judicial review. In its present form, it simply imposes criminal penalties for violating any of three prohibitions relating directly or indirectly to the employment by a waterfront union of certain "convicted" officers or employees. The first prohibition of WCA § 8, and the only part in the section as adopted in 1953, is its most inclusive and potentially consequential. It prohibits any "person" (defined in the Compact to include virtually any individual or entity imaginable other than a governmental unit, N.Y.Laws § 9806), from soliciting, collecting or receiving any dues or other charges within New York for or on behalf of any labor organization representing the employees regulated by the WCA, "if any officer, agent or employee" of such labor organization or of a fund it administers "has been convicted" of certain crimes by a federal or state court, unless he has been subsequently pardoned or has received an appropriate certificate of good conduct. The convictions presently covered by this section include all felonies, "any misdemeanor involving moral turpitude," and certain other crimes or offenses. See N.Y.Laws § 9918(3)(b). This prohibition *1108 seems clearly to apply to employers and organizations such as NYSA and MMCA that aid in the collection of union dues or other charges. The provision also seems applicable to union officials, or locals, or anyone else participating in dues collection, including those individuals disqualified by the statute from union employment. WCA 8's second prohibition, adopted in 1969, is its most narrow and discriminate. It simply prohibits any person "so convicted" from serving as an officer, agent or employee of a labor organization or fund, unless he has been pardoned or received the requisite certificate of good conduct. It applies only to disqualified individuals. The third prohibition of WCA § 8, also adopted in 1969, is that "no person," including the labor organizations covered by the section, "shall knowingly permit such convicted person to assume or hold any office, agency, or employment in violation of this section." Though the statute's language prohibits employing a disqualified individual in any capacity, the Commission is authorized, in its discretion, to exempt certain salaried workers, who "perform manual, mechanical or physical work of a routine or clerical nature." N.Y.Laws § 9934. No such discretionary exemption is permitted for union officials or managerial employees. II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND CONTENTIONS On May 23, 1979, Carol Gardner, Assistant General Organizer of the ILA and President of Local 1233, was convicted in this district for violating 29 U.S.C. § 186(b) by receiving four loans totalling $68,000 that were arranged by an officer of an employer of unionized longshoremen. Gardner was sentenced to one year imprisonment and a fine of $40,000. By letter dated August 6, 1979, the Commissioner notified the ILA that it considered "Mr. Gardner's convictions to be misdemeanors involving moral turpitude" within the meaning of WCA § 8. The Commission informed the union that, "unless the said Carol Gardner resigns from each union office or position which he presently holds with the [ILA and its locals], a violation of the provisions of Section 8 . . will occur each and every time union dues, assessments, levies, etc. are collected or received." The letter ended by quoting from the remaining provisions of WCA § 8. Simultaneously, the Commission informed the NYSA and MMCA that continued collection of union dues would violate the statute. These employer groups thereafter notified the ILA and Local 1233 that, as of August 30, 1979, they would cease paying to plaintiffs the funds they collected from union members pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement in force between the employers and the ILA and its locals. Plaintiffs commenced this action on August 14, 1979, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. Shortly thereafter, Carol Gardner was granted leave to intervene as a plaintiff. A preliminary injunction was entered on August 22, 1979, preventing enforcement of WCA § 8 pending final disposition. During January 1980, five additional officers of the ILA were sentenced by federal courts after having been found guilty of violating various federal felony provisions.[6] As in the case of Gardner, the Commission, by letter, warned the ILA, NYSA and MMCA, as well as each of the officers concerned, *1109 some of whom serve outside the Port of New York, that during the incumbency of these officers "a violation of Section 8 will occur each and every time dues, assessments, etc. are collected or received in the States of New York and New Jersey on behalf of any entity covered by Section 8." The Commission's letters referred as well to the parts of WCA § 8 making it a misdemeanor for certain convicted officers to serve in a union position or for any person knowingly to permit such an officer to serve. These letters led the plaintiff unions to move for leave to file an amended and supplemental complaint, and to modify the existing preliminary injunction to cover all cases similar to that of Gardner. Meanwhile, the Commission moved on January 14, 1980, to vacate the preliminary restraints in effect since August 22, 1979. On January 31, 1980, the court denied the Commission's motion to vacate, granted plaintiffs' motion to amend, and modified the preliminary injunction previously in force. The modified preliminary injunction prohibited enforcement against any person of WCA § 8's prohibitions aimed at dues collection and at persons who permit "convicted" individuals to serve in union positions. At the same time, a temporary restraining order was granted against enforcement of that part of WCA § 8 that made it a misdemeanor for persons disqualified by the statute to serve in union positions. After further briefing, however, this temporary restraint was vacated on February 21, in an order leaving the Commission free to enforce WCA § 8 against union employees who continued to serve despite their disqualification as "convicted" individuals, and to seek authority from the court to enforce the other parts of WCA § 8 upon a showing that such enforcement is necessary to achieve the statute's objectives. No such application has been made. Finally, during the course of these proceedings, the Attorney General of New York has been joined as a defendant, and ILA Local 1814 (which employs two "convicted" officers) has been joined as a plaintiff. Plaintiffs' attack on WCA § 8 concerns, first, its threatened enforcement under the circumstances presented in this case. Thus, plaintiffs argue that, as a matter of statutory construction, the union officials covered by the amended complaint have not been "convicted" within the meaning of WCA § 8, since the officials' appeals from the judgments against them have not been exhausted. Furthermore, plaintiffs contend, if "conviction" is interpreted to occur at the time of sentence, as the Commission argues, such an interpretation conflicts with federal labor law and thus violates the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs also contend that Carol Gardner's conviction under 29 U.S.C. § 186(b)(1) is not a conviction of a "misdemeanor involving moral turpitude" within the meaning of WCA § 8. They argue, moreover, that WCA § 8's inclusion of "misdemeanors involving moral turpitude" as a basis for disqualifying a union official conflicts with, and is pre-empted by, standards established by the federal labor laws. Plaintiffs also challenge the validity of WCA § 8 on broad federal grounds. In addition to the supremacy arguments noted above, they contend that, despite the Supreme Court's decision in De Veau v. Braisted, supra, WCA § 8 conflicts with federal labor policy as reflected by Sections 1 and 7 of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157; Section 504 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act ("LMRDA"), 29 U.S.C. § 504(c); and Section 411(c)(1) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1111(c)(1). Plaintiffs further claim that aspects of WCA § 8 violate due process and equal protection as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the First Amendment right of union members freely to associate. Defendants controvert all these contentions. III. ABSTENTION The threshold questions presented are whether, as the State of New York argues, an injunction should be denied because of pending state proceedings, Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S. Ct. 746, 27 L. Ed. 2d 669 (1971); and, alternatively, *1110 whether the state courts ought to be permitted to construe WCA § 8 before a federal court reaches federal statutory or constitutional issues, Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496, 61 S. Ct. 643, 85 L. Ed. 971 (1941). Younger requires the federal courts ordinarily to abstain from interfering with state criminal proceedings, once initiated. 401 U.S. at 46, 49, 91 S. Ct. at 751, 753. This doctrine, based on considerations of federalism, has also been held to govern the issuance of injunctions against enforcement of a state court judgment in a nuisance case, Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 603, 95 S. Ct. 1200, 1207, 43 L. Ed. 2d 482 (1975) ("more akin to a criminal prosecution than are most civil cases"); of contempt proceedings, Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 338, 97 S. Ct. 1211, 1218, 51 L. Ed. 2d 376 (1977); and of "civil proceedings in which important state interests are involved," Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423, 99 S. Ct. 2371, 2377, 60 L. Ed. 2d 994 (1979) (custody proceeding for child abuse; interest in family relations and child welfare); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 444, 97 S. Ct. 1911, 1918, 52 L. Ed. 2d 486 (1977) (civil enforcement and attachment proceeding; interest in protecting integrity of public assistance program). Proper respect for important state interests has in fact led the Supreme Court to condemn injunctions against state officers even where no particular criminal or civil proceeding is pending. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 500, 94 S. Ct. 669, 678, 38 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1974) ("anticipatory interference in the state criminal processes"); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378-80, 96 S. Ct. 598, 607-08, 46 L. Ed. 2d 561 (1976) (extensive interference with state law enforcement officials in management of police). No criminal or civil proceeding was pending when the present action began, and none has been commenced despite this court's refusal to enjoin preliminarily the enforcement of WCA § 8 directly against union officials who have been found guilty and sentenced. New York's Attorney General contends that "the mailing of notice by the Commission . . . was a significant step in the State proceedings to enforce the State statute, whether criminally or civilly. So any injunction by this Court is an improper interference with State ongoing administrative enforcement proceedings." Brief for N. Y. State, p. 5. The State essentially argues that the Commission's letters gave notice of "incipient state proceedings," interference with which "will create an unnecessary frustration to valid state policy." The Commission's warning letters were significant. Without them, plaintiffs might have failed to demonstrate a need for immediate relief.[7] But the letters no more commenced a proceeding than the policeman's warnings did in Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 94 S. Ct. 1209, 39 L. Ed. 2d 505 (1974). Even where a plaintiff has been restrained on a prosecutor's information, making a preliminary hearing imminent, no proceeding is deemed underway to make Younger applicable. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 108, 95 S. Ct. 854, 860, 43 L. Ed. 2d 54 (1975). While the Commission has broad power to institute proceedings in implementing its licensing responsibilities under the WCA, N.Y.Laws § 9849, it has no such responsibility or authority under WCA § 8. *1111 Authority to enforce WCA § 8 is vested directly in local prosecutors. The Commission's warning letter is in fact unnecessary to the statute's enforcement; it is at most a signal that, unless the perceived violation ceases, the Commission will refer the matter for prosecution. Finally, at no time prior to actual prosecution will plaintiffs in this case have "had an opportunity to present their federal claims in the state proceedings." Juidice v. Vail, supra, 430 U.S. at 337, 97 S. Ct. at 1218. To abstain in this context would force plaintiffs (and the employer defendants) to await prosecution before raising their defenses, or to avoid criminal liability by surrendering their claims,[8] some of which are based on the First Amendment.[9] Nor does this case involve so great an interference with important state administrative functions that abstention is necessary despite the absence of any specific state proceeding. Unlike the judicial and prosecutorial functions impinged upon in O'Shea and Rizzo, supra, the Commission is a specialized agency, representing two states and approved by the federal government. Enforcement of WCA § 8 is undoubtedly an important and valid state objective. But, as several of the parties note, although the statute and the Compact are regarded as state legislation for many purposes,[10] they regulate conduct in an area of substantial federal interest.[11] Furthermore, this suit challenges only one, limited aspect of the Commission's responsibilities; it seeks no relief that would disrupt to any extent the Commission's primary function of regulating licensed or registered waterfront employees. Finally, because no state proceeding has been commenced, a declaratory judgment, which is a less harsh remedy than an injunction, entailing less federal intrusion, appears sufficient in this case. See generally Steffel v. Thompson, supra, 415 U.S. at 462-74, 94 S. Ct. at 1217-23.[12]*1112 Abstention on the basis of Younger v. Harris and its progeny is therefore inappropriate. An argument for abstention is also possible for the reasons identified in Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman, supra. Abstention is normally required "where the challenged state statute is susceptible of a construction by the state judiciary that would avoid or modify the necessity of reaching a federal constitutional question." Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 54, 94 S. Ct. 303, 306, 38 L. Ed. 2d 260 (1973). No party argues in favor of abstention on this ground, but it is sufficiently related to Younger abstention to merit discussion. See Moore v. Sims, supra, 442 U.S. at 427-28, 99 S. Ct. at 2379-80. Abstention may be required, moreover, even if no party requests it, see Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437, 91 S. Ct. 507, 510, 27 L. Ed. 2d 515 (1971), although the parties' desire to avoid the delay abstention frequently entails is a factor to consider in determining whether to abstain, see Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 329, 84 S. Ct. 1293, 1296, 12 L. Ed. 2d 350 (1964). The Supreme Court has mandated essentially "a two-step approach [in Pullman abstention] . . . (1) whether the state law is unclear and, if it is, whether state court resolution of the unclear state issue will obviate or modify the federal constitutional issue, and (2) whether the costs of abstention are too great in a particular case or there is some other aspect of the case which weighs in favor of or against abstention." 1A J. Moore, W. Taggart, A. Vestal & J. Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 0.203[1], p. 2115 (2d ed. 1979). The process is more easily described than applied. How "unclear" or "unsettled" must an issue of state law be to warrant abstention? "The answer does not emerge easily from analysis of the decisions, since the Court frequently states only its conclusion on the point with little elaboration of its reasons." P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro & H. Wechsler, Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 991 (2d ed. 1973). A test suggested in Pullman itself would find most questions unsettled, since any federal judge's decision of an issue not authoritatively determined is "a forecast rather than a determination." Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., supra, 312 U.S. at 499, 61 S. Ct. at 645. But the Court has more recently said that abstention is inappropriate merely because a state law issue is "doubtful." Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375, 84 S. Ct. 1316, 1324, 12 L. Ed. 2d 377 (1964). Even a question on which the state courts have not passed may be decided by federal courts under proper circumstances. E. g., Doud v. Hodge, 350 U.S. 485, 487, 76 S. Ct. 491, 492, 100 L. Ed. 577 (1956). Thus, although a two-step analysis seems desirable and orderly, the ultimate question may depend as much upon where the second step leads as the first. Several state-law issues are presented, each of which must be separately considered. See, e. g., Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 305-12, 99 S. Ct. 2301, 2312-16, 60 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1979). The issues are described in detail below. It suffices here to note that, while the clarity of New York law differs on each of the issues presented, no substantial doubts exist as to how New York's courts will resolve any of the questions that need to be decided. Compare id. 307-12, 99 S. Ct. 2313-16. Furthermore, although decisions on these state law issues might conceivably avoid some federal questions,[13] most of the difficult questions that could possibly be avoided *1113 are federal pre-emption matters rather than ordinary questions of constitutional interpretation.[14] The interests that support Pullman abstention are to some extent applicable to pre-emption decisions.[15] Normally, however, a pre-emption decision is an exercise in determining Congress' intent, and is subject to legislative review. Such decisions, therefore, often lack that dangerous combination of judicial subjectivism and jurisprudential finality associated with constitutional determinations, which makes the avoidance of constitutional issues especially important.[16] The weight of authority seems in fact strongly against treating abstention as applicable to pre-emption decisions, even though they may be based ultimately upon the Supremacy Clause.[17] Furthermore, the development of several grounds for abstention other than Pullman assures that federal courts will abstain in appropriate cases involving important state *1114 interests. No need exists to create a doctrinal basis for permitting federal courts to avoid exercising their ordinary and expected function of construing federal laws.[18] Finally, the federal constitutional questions that would be avoided by certain possible interpretations of state law are insubstantial, and seem clearly to warrant rulings upholding the validity of those parts of WCA § 8 that are in question. In such a contextwhere the constitutional decisions reached by refusing to abstain uphold the state lawthe potential for embarrassment or "needless friction with state policies," Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman, supra, 312 U.S. at 500, 61 S. Ct. at 645, is minimized, since the federal court decision on these issues does not foreclose the state court from later adopting a different, more restrictive construction of state law.[19] The costs of abstention in this case are, moreover, too substantial to justify obtaining the minimal benefits that abstaining might confer. All the partiessave the intervenor New York Stateoppose abstention, largely because of the delay it would cause. Time is particularly crucial to the Commission, since its principal aim here is to remove from union office those individuals who have been found guilty of crimes before their appeals have been exhausted. WCA § 8 loses much of its impact after appeals are final, since, at that point, federal law would usually make it unlawful for convicted officials to continue to serve the union. See 29 U.S.C. § 504. Thus, even a relatively short delay is likely to deprive the Commission of the opportunity to vindicate its reading of WCA § 8. The impact of WCA § 8 on the employers, NYSA and MMCA, as well as on the public, must also be considered. The employers are faced with serious injury if WCA § 8 is enforced against them for collecting dues; they predict a strike if they fail to abide by collective bargaining agreements permitting a dues checkoff procedure. Their claims are based on federal pre-emption and constitutional arguments that almost certainly would not be avoided by abstaining on any state law question, and which therefore should be reached now rather than after a further period of delay and uncertainty. Finally, abstention would cause considerable judicial diseconomies in this case.[20] IV. ISSUES OF STATE LAW A. Meaning of Conviction The sanctions of WCA § 8 are triggered when a union official or employee "has been convicted" of one of the enumerated crimes. Plaintiffs and defendants NYSA and MMCA argue that a "conviction" should be held to occur under WCA § 8 only after all appeals have been exhausted. They argue, in particular, that WCA § 8 should be interpreted consistently with related federal statutes, which expressly define conviction to mean the later of the date of the trial court's judgment or *1115 of "the final sustaining of such judgment on appeal . . .."[21] No New York decision has addressed the meaning of conviction as used in WCA § 8. But in a thoughtful and well-reasoned decision, the New Jersey Superior Court recently held that an individual is "convicted" under New Jersey's counterpart to WCA § 8, N.J.Stat.Ann. 32:23-80 and 32:23-80.2, at the time a guilty verdict is returned or guilty plea is entered, and not after affirmance on appeal. Local 1804, International Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, 171 N.J.Super. 508, 410 A.2d 73 (1979). In the context of bi-state legislation designed to remedy problems shared by New York and New Jersey, a New York judge would naturally turn to this decision for guidance in construing New York's almost identical provision.[22] Several New York decisions, involving the disqualification of attorneys and public officials, support the view that a "conviction" is usually held to occur no later than the time of sentence, before an appeal has been taken or exhausted. E. g., Toro v. Malcolm, 44 N.Y.2d 146, 404 N.Y.S.2d 558, 375 N.E.2d 739, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 837, 99 S. Ct. 121, 58 L. Ed. 2d 133 (1978) (removal of city corrections officer); Mitchell v. Association of the Bar, City of N. Y., 40 N.Y.2d 153, 386 N.Y.S.2d 95, 351 N.E.2d 743 (1976) (attorney disbarment). These holdings are consistent with the prevailing construction of "conviction" adopted among the states in interpreting analogous statutory and constitutional provisions that call for the prompt removal of persons from public office or other positions of trust. See generally "OfficerConviction of Crime," Annot., 71 A.L.R. 2d 593 (1960). According to these cases, the purpose of disqualification statutes is not to punish the convicted officer or attorney but rather to protect the public; once the presumption of innocence is overcome at the trial court level, the public interest in prompt removal generally outweighs the interests of the individual officeholder. This reasoning applies equally to waterfront union officials found guilty of serious crimes. The legislative findings that led New York to adopt WCA § 8 were that corrupt union officers were exploiting their positions for illegal purposes, including the misuse of union funds. These objectives are most effectively attained by removing individuals found guilty of serious crimes immediately rather than awaiting completion of often lengthy appellate procedures. Plaintiffs' attempt to distinguish the New York cases is unpersuasive. They argue that those decisions involved statutes which, unlike WCA § 8, suggested on their face that the officer's removal should precede appellate review. In Mitchell, the statute governing disbarment expressly provided for reinstatement procedures upon reversal of an attorney's conviction. The statute at issue in Toro, N.Y.Pub.Off. § 30, declared that a public office "shall be vacant" *1116 upon the officer's conviction, language which plaintiffs contend shows the legislature intended immediate removal. The language "shall be vacant" in the statute considered in Toro, suggests no greater degree of urgency than the language "no person . . . shall serve," found in WCA § 8. Furthermore, that WCA § 8 contains no explicit restoration provision, as does the statute in Mitchell, hardly establishes that the legislature intended to delay its enforcement pending all appeals. An individual disqualified from employment by WCA § 8, whose conviction is reversed on appeal, might be eligible for reinstatement because the "conviction" no longer exists. Whether a convicted officer or employee should be re-elected or rehired after his conviction is vacated on appeal is a decision which the legislature could reasonably have left to the union leadership or membership, while still intending that the individual be removed from office in the interim.[23] In any event, the recent decision in Gunning v. Codd, 49 N.Y.2d 495, 427 N.Y.S.2d 209, 403 N.E.2d 1208 (1980) has apparently settled the question of the meaning of "conviction" in a statute like WCA § 8. In that case, the narrow issue addressed was whether "conviction" as used in N.Y.Pub. Off. § 30 occurred upon verdict or upon sentencing.[24] The New York Court of Appeals recognized that prior cases had defined "conviction" with a view toward achieving equitable consequences, and avoiding harsh results. Those decisions were rejected. According to the Court, any confusion concerning "conviction" was laid to rest in 1971 when the legislature enacted Section 1.10 of the Criminal Procedure Law, which defined a conviction to occur upon "entry of a plea of guilty . . . or a verdict of guilty . . .." "By its plain terms," the Court noted, "the provisions of the CPL apply `to all matters of criminal procedure.'" 427 N.Y.S.2d at 211, 403 kristensanchez@example.com. Indeed, the Court held that the "all-embracing" definition of conviction applied even to the civil statute in question. It follows that the same definition would apply under WCA § 8. Finally, a construction of "conviction" that enables the Commission promptly to remove convicted union employees from office, finds added support in other provisions of the Compact and supplementary legislation. N.Y.Laws, § 9921, for example, authorizes the Commission to suspend temporarily the license or registration of certain waterfront employees who have merely been indicted or charged with various crimes. The Compact itself permits revocation or suspension of a waterfront employee's license without the institution of criminal proceedings; simply engaging in certain conduct or acting in violation of the Compact may be sufficient grounds for disciplinary action. See N.Y.Laws §§ 9818, 9824(e), 9831(f) and 9844(c). In light of these authorities, plaintiffs' argument that the meaning of conviction under WCA § 8 should be determined *1117 so as to avoid inconsistency with federal labor law statutes, LMRDA § 504(c) and ERISA § 411(c)(1), must be rejected. To construe WCA § 8 consistently with federal laws, might avoid the need to decide whether WCA § 8 is invalid under the Supremacy Clause, and might also create a more easily administered, sensible and humane rule.[25] But a federal court is not free to construe a state's laws to avoid possible conflict with federal laws where it is clear the state's courts would face the alleged conflict. B. Meaning of Moral Turpitude Plaintiffs argue that Gardner's conviction under Section 302(b)(1) of the Taft-Hartley Act ("LMRDA § 302"), 29 U.S.C. § 186(b)(1), for requesting and receiving a loan from an employer of ILA members whom he represents, does not constitute a "misdemeanor involving moral turpitude" within the meaning of WCA § 8.[26] Although the term "moral turpitude" has survived a void for vagueness challenge, Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 229-30, 71 S. Ct. 703, 95 L. Ed. 886 (1951), precise definition is elusive. The uncertainty stems in part from the varied use to which the phrase is put, ranging from the disbarment of attorneys and the disqualification of jurors under state law to the deportation of aliens under the federal immigration laws. One New York court adopted the following definition of moral turpitude in defining slander per se: Moral turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private or social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man. Mishkin v. Roreck, 202 Misc. 653, 115 N.Y. S.2d 269, 272 (Sup.Ct.Nassau Co.1952) (quoting Newell [4th Ed.] § 32). Moral turpitude has also been described as the "quality of a crime involving grave infringement of the moral sentiment of the community as distinguished from statutory mala prohibita." People v. Ferguson, 55 Misc. 2d 711, 286 N.Y.S.2d 976, 981 (Sup.Ct. Queens Co.1968) (quoting Merriam-Webster's New Int'l Dict. [2d Ed.]). Such abstract definitions provide little guidance for a court called upon to apply the term in a given case. As the New Jersey courts have noted, "the attempt to apply these definitions to specific criminal acts . . . has demonstrated only the elasticity of the phrase and its necessarily adaptive character, reflective at all times of the common moral sense prevailing throughout the community." State Board of Medical Examiners v. Weiner, 68 N.J.Super. 468, 484, 172 A.2d 661, 669 (App.Div.1961), quoted with approval in Makwinski v. State, Board of Commissioners, Consolidated Police and Firemen's Pension Fund, 76 N.J. 87, 385 A.2d 1227, 1230 (1978). Gardner's conduct in requesting and accepting a loan in violation of Section 302 appears to satisfy these traditional definitions of moral turpitude. As a union official, he not only had a legal obligation but also a moral obligation to represent the interests of ILA members zealously, and therefore to maintain at all times an arms-length relationship with management. By entering into a loan transaction with a union employer, and thereby potentially creating a conflict between his personal interests and the interests of the workers he represented, he plainly acted "contrary to the *1118 accepted and customary rule of right and duty" established in the union community.[27] Plaintiffs correctly urge a less subjective or moralistic approach in defining moral turpitude than the courts have traditionally adopted. The better and more reasoned inquiry focuses on its meaning "in light of the mischief to be corrected and the end to be attained." Warner v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155, 158, 55 S. Ct. 46, 48, 79 L. Ed. 254 (1934). Even by this more functional test, however, Gardner's conduct justifies his removal. The mischief sought to be corrected by the Compact and its supplementary provisions is corruption on the waterfront. In particular, Congress and the legislatures of New York and New Jersey seek to combat the corrupting influence of irresponsible and dishonest union officials who use their positions for personal gain. To hold that a violation of Section 302 is a misdemeanor of moral turpitude is wholly consistent with this legislative aim. Adopted during the same period as the Compact, Section 302 was designed to prohibit "all forms of extortion and bribery in labor management relations . . .." S.Rep. No. 187 on S. 1555 as reported, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., at 13 (1959), reprinted in U.S.Code Cong. & kristensanchez@example.com. "The chief, if not only, purpose of the section was to put a stop to practices that, if unchecked, might impair the impartiality of union `representatives.'" United States v. Ryan, 232 F.2d 481, 483 (2d Cir. 1956). Pervasive corruption in certain segments of organized labor apparently led Congress to adopt a bright line test, outlawing any payment, with stated exceptions, regardless of motive or intent. That the statute does not require a showing of "conscious wrongdoing," e. g., United States v. Ricciardi, 357 F.2d 91, 100 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 942, 86 S. Ct. 1464, 16 L. Ed. 2d 540 (1966), does not mean a violation of its provisions may be regarded as trivial. On the contrary, it means that Congress regarded any payment or loan between management and union members and representatives as potentially corrupting, and so utterly lacking in any legitimate justification that all such transactions should be prohibited. See United States v. Ryan, supra, 232 kristensanchez@example.com. Plaintiffs argue that Congress made Section 302 so broad and inclusive that it could conceivably cover acts which are relatively innocent and "inconsiderable and harmless in themselves," id., for example, an innocently intended holiday gift. According to plaintiff, this type of conduct cannot in itself be deemed to involve "moral turpitude." In particular, plaintiffs note that the federal courts, in enforcing Section 212(a)(9) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9), have required that moral turpitude "be inherent in, or an essential ingredient of, the crime. If a person not guilty of moral turpitude may nevertheless be convicted of the crime, the offense cannot be said to involve moral turpitude for purposes of . . . [Section 212(a)(9)]" Ablett v. Brownell, 240 F.2d 625, 627 (D.C.Cir. 1957). Accord, United States v. Uhl, 107 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1939); United States v. Neelly, 208 F.2d 337 (7th Cir. 1953). Under this standard, even assuming Gardner's individual conduct was morally base in light of his responsibilities, a conviction under Section 302 could not be deemed to involve moral turpitude under WCA § 8. But why should a New York court construe WCA § 8 to incorporate the extraordinarily restrictive definition of moral turpitude applied by federal courts in deportation proceedings?[28] In construing "moral *1119 turpitude" under INS § 212(a)(9), federal courts have been profoundly influenced by the grave consequences of deportationthe "dreadful penalty of banishment." United States v. Uhl, supra, 107 kristensanchez@example.com. Deportation is a remedy that necessarily implies a judgment that the individual involved is unfit to live in this nation. So comprehensive a condemnation calls for an extremely reliable predicate, and for a standard of review that would avoid even a slight possibility that any individual would be found deportable without ample justification. A finding of moral turpitude under WCA § 8 entails far less serious consequences than deportation; individuals convicted of misdemeanors involving moral turpitude are prohibited from working for unions on the New York-New Jersey waterfront. This less drastic sanction involves a more limited judgment of the individual's fitness than does deportation, and therefore permits a less rigorous predicate. Whatever "moral turpitude" may be held to mean under WCA § 8 in dealing with misdemeanors having little or no relationship to the responsibilities of labor officials, the phrase should be construed to include misconduct which touches upon the essence of a union official's role as a fiduciary.[29] To hold that no violation of Section 302 could ever be an act of moral turpitude because of a theoretical possibility that an innocent and trifling payment would fall within its scope would pointlessly frustrate the core purposes of WCA § 8. C. "Persons" Covered by Section 8 Several issues exist concerning the meaning of "persons" as it is used in various parts of WCA § 8. First, plaintiffs contend that "persons" who serve as officers in ILA locals in states other than New York and New Jersey cannot be prosecuted under WCA § 8, because their activities are unrelated to the New York waterfront. The NYSA also contends that WCA § 8 should not be enforced against these individuals because of unsettling consequences that might be caused if activities unrelated to the New York waterfront are prosecuted here. Had the Commission or New York State urged that WCA § 8 could be applied against ILA employees convicted, for example, in Florida, who have no connection with or authority over labor relations on the New York waterfront, then a substantial question might have been presented as to how New York's courts would construe the law. But they claim that WCA § 8 applies to a person convicted outside New York or New Jersey only if the individual involved serves the ILA in some capacity with influence over labor relations on the New York waterfront. All four of the ILA officials convicted in Florida, to whom the Commission has sent warning letters, serve in important ILA offices, having substantial power to affect labor relations on the New York waterfront.[30] The Commission has sought only to remove these individuals *1120 from those offices; no effort has been made to change their status as officers in Florida locals. The New York courts seem likely to hold that convictions in any jurisdiction are adequate predicates for enforcement of WCA § 8, to the extent the individuals involved hold positions with significant influence over the New York waterfront. A more limited construction would permit union officials who hold high positions in the ILA to engage in or facilitate corrupt activities in New York, even though they have been found guilty of such activities in other jurisdictions. Second, the full scope of "persons" to whom the dues collection prohibition aspect of WCA § 8 applies has not authoritatively been settled. No one claims, however, that the provision will not be construed to apply to employers who collect dues in a union's behalf. Similarly, that part of WCA § 8 that prohibits any "person" from knowingly allowing a disqualified person to continue in union office is likely to be construed as the Commission has treated it. The Commission in effect claims that, once it has given the union notice that one of its personnel is disqualified, the union's failure to remove that individual makes it subject to prosecution. Here, again, no party suggests another construction. V. FEDERAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES Plaintiffs raise numerous federal and constitutional issues with respect to the enforcement of WCA § 8. The Commission and the State of New York urge that most, if not all, these claims have been settled by De Veau v. Braisted, supra. A review of the factual and procedural history of De Veau, however, as well as of its reasoning, demonstrates it is not controlling on several substantial issues relating to pre-emption and freedom of association. De Veau was an action by George De Veau in 1956 for a judgment declaring WCA § 8 invalid and enjoining its enforcement. At the time, WCA § 8 contained only the first of its three present prohibitions, the part that makes it illegal for any "person" to collect dues for a waterfront union employing someone convicted of certain crimes.[31] The ILA had discharged De Veau as Secretary-Treasurer of its Local 1346 when the Commission threatened to enforce the statute against anyone collecting dues while De Veau remained an ILA employee. Enforcement would necessarily have focussed entirely on De Veau's removal from office, since the statute contained no criminal or other penalty. De Veau sought reinstatement, and was joined by two union members claiming that De Veau's removal deprived them of their right to be represented by individuals of their choice. Thus, the central issues in De Veau were plaintiff's right to union employment, and the right of union members to employ him. After losing in the state courts,[32] De Veau appealed to the Supreme Court, where he presented several substantive issues, all of which related to his exclusion from waterfront employment. He claimed that New York could not lawfully enforce WCA § 8, even directly against convicted persons such as himself, for holding waterfront *1121 union office. The legality of enforcing the dues-collection enforcement mechanism against others was not presented. The Court held that WCA § 8 had in principle been approved by Congress; that it was not pre-empted by Section 504(a) of the LMRDA; and that its application to De Veau was not a violation of his right to work, of due process, or of the ex-post-facto and bill-of-attainder clauses of the Constitution. Significantly, the Court expressed no view on several of the pre-emption issues raised by plaintiffs in this case, including the legality of the Commission's construction of when a "conviction" occurs, or of its determination that a violation of LMRDA § 302 is a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude. Nor did the Court discuss whether WCA § 8, as then written, violated or could be applied so as to violate union members' freedom of association. Finally, although the Court in De Veau upheld WCA § 8 at a time when it contained only the dues-collection prohibition, the Court did not determine whether WCA § 8 was pre-empted insofar as it was intended to be applied against the union or employers; the Court dealt only with whether WCA § 8's disqualification of certain convicted persons violated their rights or the rights of other union members. A. Pre-emption of WCA § 8's Provisions A fair analysis of the Supreme Court's opinion in De Veau requires that the lower federal courts accept as valid WCA § 8's basic objective of preventing "convicted" persons from serving in waterfront union positions. Nevertheless, whether the preemption claims not specifically addressed in De Veau are valid remains a difficult inquiry, depending on a balancing of state and federal interests. As Justice Frankfurter noted in De Veau, "[t]he doctrine of pre-emption does not present a problem in physics but one of adjustment because of the interdependence of federal and state interests and of the interaction of federal and state powers." 363 U.S. at 152, 80 S.Ct. at 1151. The decisions concerning federal labor law pre-emption offer few, if any, hard-and-fast rules for effecting that adjustment. In San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245, 79 S. Ct. 773, 779, 3 L. Ed. 2d 775 (1959), the Supreme Court attempted to set forth a workable rule whereby state regulation of any activity that is "arguably protected" or "arguably prohibited" by the NLRA would be pre-empted. Almost from the outset that rule has been qualified and modified. Perhaps recognizing that the exceptions had become too prevalent to ignore, the Court recently rejected a "literal, mechanical" application of the Garmon rule, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 188-89, 98 S. Ct. 1745, 1752-53, 56 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1978), opting for "a balanced inquiry into such factors as the nature of the federal and state interests in regulation and the potential for interference with federal regulation." Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290, 300, 97 S. Ct. 1056, 1063, 51 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1976). See Benke, The Apparent Reformulation of Garmon: Its Effect on the Federal Preemption of Concerted Trespassory Union Activity, 9 U.Toledo L.Rev. 793, 801-07 (1978). See generally Case Note,