128 S. Ct. 1029 (2008) Stephen DANFORTH, Petitioner, v. MINNESOTA. No. 06-8273. Supreme Court of United States. Argued October 31, 2007. Decided February 20, 2008. *1032 Benjamin J. Butler, Minneapolis, MN, for petitioner. Patrick C. Diamond, Minneapolis, MN, for respondent. Benjamin J. Butler, Counsel of Record, Assistant Minnesota State Public Defender, Roy G. Spurbeck, Assistant Minnesota State Public Defender, Office of the Minnesota State Public Defender, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for Petitioner. Lori Swanson, Minnesota Attorney General, Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Patrick C. Diamond, Counsel of Record, Deputy County Attorney, Jean Burdorf, Assistant County Attorney, Office of the Hennepin County Attorney, Minneapolis, MN, for Respondent. Justice STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. New constitutional rules announced by this Court that place certain kinds of primary individual conduct beyond the power of the States to proscribe, as well as "watershed" rules of criminal procedure, must be applied in all future trials, all cases pending on direct review, and all federal habeas corpus proceedings. All other new rules of criminal procedure must be applied in future trials and in cases pending on direct review, but may not provide the basis for a federal collateral attack on a state-court conviction. This is the substance of the "Teague rule" described by Justice O'Connor in her plurality opinion in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1989).[1]*1033 The question in this case is whether Teague constrains the authority of state courts to give broader effect to new rules of criminal procedure than is required by that opinion. We have never suggested that it does, and now hold that it does not. I In 1996 a Minnesota jury found petitioner Stephen Danforth guilty of first-degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor. See Minn.Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a) (1994). The 6-year-old victim did not testify at trial, but the jury saw and heard a videotaped interview of the child. On appeal from his conviction, Danforth argued that the tape's admission violated the Sixth Amendment's guarantee that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him." Applying the rule of admissibility set forth in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597 (1980), the Minnesota Court of Appeals concluded that the tape "was sufficiently reliable to be admitted into evidence," and affirmed the conviction. State v. Danforth, 573 N.W.2d 369, 375 (1997). The conviction became final in 1998 when the Minnesota Supreme Court denied review and petitioner's time for filing a writ of certiorari elapsed. See Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 390, 114 S. Ct. 948, 127 L. Ed. 2d 236 (1994). After petitioner's conviction had become final, we announced a "new rule" for evaluating the reliability of testimonial statements in criminal cases. In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68-69, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004), we held that where testimonial statements are at issue, "the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation." Shortly thereafter, petitioner filed a state postconviction petition, in which he argued that he was entitled to a new trial because the admission of the taped interview violated the rule announced in Crawford. Applying the standards set forth in Teague, the Minnesota trial court and the Minnesota Court of Appeals concluded that Crawford did not apply to petitioner's case. The State Supreme Court granted review to consider two arguments: (1) that the lower courts erred in holding that Crawford did not apply retroactively under Teague; and (2) that the state court was "free to apply a broader retroactivity standard than that of Teague," and should apply the Crawford rule to petitioner's case even if federal law did not require it to do so. 718 N.W.2d 451, 455 (2006). The court rejected both arguments. Ibid. With respect to the second, the Minnesota court held that our decisions in Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 93 S. Ct. 1966, 36 L. Ed. 2d 736 (1973), American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 110 S. Ct. 2323, 110 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1990), and Teague itself establish that state courts are not free to give a Supreme Court decision announcing a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure broader retroactive application than that given by this Court.[2] The Minnesota Court acknowledged *1034 that other state courts had held that Teague does not apply to state postconviction proceedings,[3] but concluded that "we are not free to fashion our own standard of retroactivity for Crawford." 718 N.W.2d, at 455-457. Our recent decision in Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 1173, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2007), makes clear that the Minnesota court correctly concluded that federal law does not require state courts to apply the holding in Crawford to cases that were final when that case was decided. Nevertheless, we granted certiorari, 550 U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 2427, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1129 (2007), to consider whether Teague or any other federal rule of law prohibits them from doing so.[4] II We begin with a comment on the source of the "new rule" announced in Crawford. For much of our Nation's history, federal constitutional rightssuch as the Sixth Amendment confrontation right at issue in Crawfordwere not binding on the States. Federal law, in fact, imposed no constraints on the procedures that state courts could or should follow in imposing criminal sanctions on their citizens. Neither the Federal Constitution as originally ratified nor any of the Amendments added by the Bill of Rights in 1791 gave this Court or any other federal-court power to review the fairness of state criminal procedures. Moreover, before 1867 the statutory authority of federal district courts to issue writs of habeas corpus did not extend to convicted criminals in state custody. See Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385. The ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment radically changed the federal courts' relationship with state courts. That Amendment, one of the post-Civil War Reconstruction Amendments ratified in 1868, is the source of this Court's power to decide whether a defendant in a state proceeding received a fair triali.e., whether his deprivation of liberty was "without due process of law." U.S. Const., Amdt. 14, § 1 ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"). In construing that Amendment, we have held that it imposes minimum standards of fairness on the States, and requires state criminal trials to provide defendants with protections "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 *1035 U.S. 319, 325, 58 S. Ct. 149, 82 L. Ed. 288 (1937). Slowly at first, and then at an accelerating pace in the 1950's and 1960's, the Court held that safeguards afforded by the Bill of Rightsincluding a defendant's Sixth Amendment right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him"are incorporated in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and are therefore binding upon the States. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963) (applying the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to the States); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403, 85 S. Ct. 1065, 13 L. Ed. 2d 923 (1965) (holding that "the Sixth Amendment's right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him is likewise a fundamental right and is made obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment"). Our interpretation of that basic Sixth Amendment right of confrontation has evolved over the years. In Crawford we accepted the petitioner's argument that the interpretation of the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation that we had previously endorsed in Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597, needed reconsideration because it "stray[ed] from the original meaning of the Confrontation Clause." 541 U.S., at 42, 124 S. Ct. 1354. We "turn[ed] to the historical background of the Clause to understand its meaning," id., at 43, 124 S. Ct. 1354, and relied primarily on legal developments that had occurred prior to the adoption of the Sixth Amendment to derive the correct interpretation. Id., at 43-50, 124 S. Ct. 1354. We held that the "Constitution prescribes a procedure for determining the reliability of testimony in criminal trials, and we, no less than the state courts, lack authority to replace it with one of our own devising." Id., at 67, 124 S. Ct. 1354. Thus, our opinion in Crawford announced a "new rule"as that term is defined in Teaguebecause the result in that case "was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final," Teague, 489 U.S., at 301, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (plurality opinion). It was not, however, a rule "of our own devising" or the product of our own views about sound policy. III Our decision today must also be understood against the backdrop of our somewhat confused and confusing "retroactivity" cases decided in the years between 1965 and 1987. Indeed, we note at the outset that the very word "retroactivity" is misleading because it speaks in temporal terms. "Retroactivity" suggests that when we declare that a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure is "nonretroactive," we are implying that the right at issue was not in existence prior to the date the "new rule" was announced. But this is incorrect. As we have already explained, the source of a "new rule" is the Constitution itself, not any judicial power to create new rules of law. Accordingly, the underlying right necessarily pre-exists our articulation of the new rule. What we are actually determining when we assess the "retroactivity" of a new rule is not the temporal scope of a newly announced right, but whether a violation of the right that occurred prior to the announcement of the new rule will entitle a criminal defendant to the relief sought.[5] *1036 Originally, criminal defendants whose convictions were final were entitled to federal habeas relief only if the court that rendered the judgment under which they were in custody lacked jurisdiction to do so. Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193, 7 L. Ed. 650 (1830); Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163, 176, 21 L. Ed. 872 (1874); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 376-377, 25 L. Ed. 717 (1880).[6] In 1915, the realm of violations for which federal habeas relief would be available to state prisoners was expanded to include state proceedings that "deprive[d] the accused of his life or liberty without due process of law." Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 335, 35 S. Ct. 582, 59 L. Ed. 969 (1915). In the early 1900's, however, such relief was only granted when the constitutional violation was so serious that it effectively rendered the conviction void for lack of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 43 S. Ct. 265, 67 L. Ed. 543 (1923) (mob domination of a trial); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 55 S. Ct. 340, 79 L. Ed. 791 (1935) (per curiam) (knowing use of perjured testimony by the prosecution); Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 62 S. Ct. 964, 86 L. Ed. 1302 (1942) (per curiam) (coerced guilty plea).[7] The serial incorporation of the Amendments in the Bill of Rights during the 1950's and 1960's imposed more constitutional obligations on the States and created more opportunity for claims that individuals were being convicted without due process and held in violation of the Constitution. Nevertheless, until 1965 the Court continued to construe every constitutional error, including newly announced ones, as entitling state prisoners to relief on federal habeas. "New" constitutional rules of criminal procedure were, without discussion or analysis, routinely applied to cases on habeas review. See, e.g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S. Ct. 1774, 12 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1964); Gideon, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799; Eskridge v. Washington Bd. of Prison Terms and Paroles, 357 U.S. 214, 78 S. Ct. 1061, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1269 (1958) (per curiam). In Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S. Ct. 1731, 14 L. Ed. 2d 601 (1965), the Court expressly considered the issue of "retroactivity" for the first time. Adopting a practical approach, we held that the retroactive effect of each new rule should be determined on a case-by-case basis by examining the purpose of the rule, the *1037 reliance of the States on the prior law, and the effect on the administration of justice of retroactive application of the rule. Id., at 629, 85 S. Ct. 1731. Applying those considerations to the exclusionary rule announced in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961), we held that the Mapp rule would not be given retroactive effect; it would not, in other words, be applied to convictions that were final before the date of the Mapp decision.[8]Linkletter, 381 U.S., at 636-640, 85 S. Ct. 1731. During the next four years, application of the Linkletter standard produced strikingly divergent results. As Justice Harlan pointed out in his classic dissent in Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 257, 89 S. Ct. 1030, 22 L. Ed. 2d 248 (1969), one new rule was applied to all cases subject to direct review, Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 86 S. Ct. 459, 15 L. Ed. 2d 453 (1966); another to all cases in which trials had not yet commenced, Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S. Ct. 1772, 16 L. Ed. 2d 882 (1966); another to all cases in which tainted evidence had not yet been introduced at trial, Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U.S. 80, 89 S. Ct. 61, 21 L. Ed. 2d 212 (1968) (per curiam); and still others only to the party involved in the case in which the new rule was announced and to all future cases in which the proscribed official conduct had not yet occurred, Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S. Ct. 1967, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1199 (1967); DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 88 S. Ct. 2093, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1308 (1968) (per curiam). He reasonably questioned whether such decisions "may properly be considered the legitimate products of a court of law, rather than the commands of a super-legislature." 394 U.S., at 259, 89 S. Ct. 1030. Justice Harlan's dissent in Desist, buttressed by his even more searching separate opinion in Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675, 91 S. Ct. 1160, 28 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1971) (opinion concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part), and scholarly criticism,[9] laid the groundwork for the eventual demise of the Linkletter standard. In Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 107 S. Ct. 708, 93 L. Ed. 2d 649 (1987), the Court rejected as "unprincipled and inequitable," the application of the Linkletter standard to cases pending on direct review. In Teague, Justice O'Connor reaffirmed Griffith's rejection of the Linkletter standard for determining the "retroactive" applicability of new rules to state convictions that were not yet final and rejected the Linkletter standard for cases pending on federal habeas review. She adopted (with a significant modification) the approach advocated by Justice Harlan for federal collateral review of final state judgments. Justice O'Connor endorsed a general rule of nonretroactivity for cases on collateral *1038 review, stating that "[u]nless they fall within an exception to the general rule, new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become final before the new rules are announced." 489 U.S., at 310, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (plurality opinion). The opinion defined two exceptions: rules that render types of primary conduct "`beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe,'" id., at 311, 109 S. Ct. 1060, and "watershed" rules that "implicate the fundamental fairness of the trial," id., at 311, 312, 313, 109 S. Ct. 1060.[10] It is clear that Linkletter and then Teague considered what constitutional violations may be remedied on federal habeas.[11] They did not define the scope of the "new" constitutional rights themselves. Nor, as we shall explain, did Linkletter or Teague (or any of the other cases relied upon by respondent and the Minnesota Supreme Court) speak to the entirely separate question whether States can provide remedies for violations of these rights in their own postconviction proceedings. IV Neither Linkletter nor Teague explicitly or implicitly constrained the authority of the States to provide remedies for a broader range of constitutional violations than are redressable on federal habeas. Linkletter spoke in broad terms about the retroactive applicability of new rules to state convictions that had become final prior to our announcement of the rules. Although Linkletter arose on federal habeas, the opinion did not rely on that procedural posture as a factor in its holding or analysis. Arguably, therefore, the approach it established might have been applied with equal force to both federal and state courts reviewing final state convictions. But we did not stateand the state courts did not concludethat Linkletter imposed such a limitation on the States.[12] A year after deciding Linkletter, we granted certiorari in Johnson to address the retroactivity of the rules announced in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S. Ct. 1758, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977 (1964), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). Applying the standard announced in Linkletter, we held that those rules should be applied only to trials that began after the respective dates of those decisions; they were given no retroactive *1039 effect beyond the parties in Miranda and Escobedo themselves.[13] Notably, the Oregon Supreme Court decided to give retroactive effect to Escobedo despite our holding in Johnson. In State v. Fair, 263 Ore. 383, 502 P.2d 1150 (1972), the Oregon court noted that it was continuing to apply Escobedo retroactively and correctly stated that "we are free to choose the degree of retroactivity or prospectivity which we believe appropriate to the particular rule under consideration, so long as we give federal constitutional rights at least as broad a scope as the United States Supreme Court requires." 263 Ore., at 387-388, 502 P.2d, at 1152. In so holding, the Oregon court cited our language in Johnson that "`States are still entirely free to effectuate under their own law stricter standards than those we have laid down and to apply those standards in a broader range of cases than is required by this decision.'" 263 Ore., at 386, 502 P.2d, at 1151 (quoting Johnson, 384 U.S., at 733, 86 S. Ct. 1772).[14] Like Linkletter, Teague arose on federal habeas. Unlike in Linkletter, however, this procedural posture was not merely a background fact in Teague. A close reading of the Teague opinion makes clear that the rule it established was tailored to the unique context of federal habeas and therefore had no bearing on whether States could provide broader relief in their own postconviction proceedings than required by that opinion. Because the case before us now does not involve either of the "Teague exceptions," it is Justice O'Connor's discussion of the general rule of nonretroactivity that merits the following three comments. First, not a word in Justice O'Connor's discussionor in either of the opinions of Justice Harlan that provided the blueprint for her entire analysisasserts or even intimates that her definition of the class eligible for relief under a new rule should inhibit the authority of any state agency or state court to extend the benefit of a new rule to a broader class than she defined. Second, Justice O'Connor's opinion clearly indicates that Teague's general rule of nonretroactivity was an exercise of this *1040 Court's power to interpret the federal habeas statute. Chapter 153 of Title 28 of the U.S.Code gives federal courts the authority to grant "writs of habeas corpus," but leaves unresolved many important questions about the scope of available relief. This Court has interpreted that congressional silencealong with the statute's command to dispose of habeas petitions "as law and justice require," 28 U.S.C. § 2243as an authorization to adjust the scope of the writ in accordance with equitable and prudential considerations. See, e.g., Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 123 L. Ed. 2d 353 (1993) (harmless-error standard); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 113 L. Ed. 2d 517 (1991) (abuse-of-the-writ bar to relief); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S. Ct. 2497, 53 L. Ed. 2d 594 (1977) (procedural default); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1067 (1976) (cognizability of Fourth Amendment claims). Teague is plainly grounded in this authority, as the opinion expressly situated the rule it announced in this line of cases adjusting the scope of federal habeas relief in accordance with equitable and prudential considerations. 489 U.S., at 308, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (plurality opinion) (citing, inter alia, Wainwright and Stone).[15] Since Teague is based on statutory authority that extends only to federal courts applying a federal statute, it cannot be read as imposing a binding obligation on state courts. Third, the text and reasoning of Justice O'Connor's opinion also illustrate that the rule was meant to apply only to federal courts considering habeas corpus petitions challenging state-court criminal convictions. Justice O'Connor made numerous references to the "Great writ" and the "writ," and expressly stated that "[t]he relevant frame of reference" for determining the appropriate retroactivity rule is defined by "the purposes for which the writ of habeas corpus is made available." 489 U.S., at 306, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (plurality opinion). Moreover, she justified the general rule of nonretroactivity in part by *1041 reference to comity and respect for the finality of state convictions. Federalism and comity considerations are unique to federal habeas review of state convictions. See, e.g., State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 475, 609 A.2d 1280, 1292 (1992) (explaining that comity and federalism concerns "simply do not apply when this Court reviews procedural rulings by our lower courts"). If anything, considerations of comity militate in favor of allowing state courts to grant habeas relief to a broader class of individuals than is required by Teague. And while finality is, of course, implicated in the context of state as well as federal habeas, finality of state convictions is a state interest, not a federal one. It is a matter that States should be free to evaluate, and weigh the importance of, when prisoners held in state custody are seeking a remedy for a violation of federal rights by their lower courts. The dissent correctly points out that Teague was also grounded in concerns over uniformity and the inequity inherent in the Linkletter approach. There is, of course, a federal interest in "reducing the inequity of haphazard retroactivity standards and disuniformity in the application of federal law." Post, at 1053. This interest in uniformity, however, does not outweigh the general principle that States are independent sovereigns with plenary authority to make and enforce their own laws as long as they do not infringe on federal constitutional guarantees. The fundamental interest in federalism that allows individual States to define crimes, punishments, rules of evidence, and rules of criminal and civil procedure in a variety of different waysso long as they do not violate the Federal Constitutionis not otherwise limited by any general, undefined federal interest in uniformity. Nonuniformity is, in fact, an unavoidable reality in a federalist system of government. Any State could surely have adopted the rule of evidence defined in Crawford under state law even if that case had never been decided. It should be equally free to give its citizens the benefit of our rule in any fashion that does not offend federal law. It is thus abundantly clear that the Teague rule of non-retroactivity was fashioned to achieve the goals of federal habeas while minimizing federal intrusion into state criminal proceedings. It was intended to limit the authority of federal courts to overturn state convictionsnot to limit a state court's authority to grant relief for violations of new rules of constitutional law when reviewing its own State's convictions.[16] Our subsequent cases, which characterize the Teague rule as a standard limiting only the scope of federal habeas relief, confirm that Teague speaks only to the context of federal habeas. See, e.g., Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 412, 124 S. Ct. 2504, 159 L. Ed. 2d 494 (2004) ("Teague's nonretroactivity principle acts as a limitation on the power of federal courts to grant habeas corpus relief to state prisoners" (internal quotation marks, ellipsis, and brackets omitted)); Caspari, 510 U.S., at 389, 114 S. Ct. 948 ("The [Teague] nonretroactivity principle prevents a federal court from granting habeas corpus relief to a state *1042 prisoner based on a rule announced after his conviction and sentence became final"). It is also noteworthy that for many years following Teague, state courts almost universally understood the Teague rule as binding only federal habeas courts, not state courts. See, e.g., Cowell v. Leapley, 458 N.W.2d 514 (S.D.1990); Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 609 A.2d 1280; State ex rel. Schmelzer v. Murphy, 201 Wis. 2d 246, 256-257, 548 N.W.2d 45, 49 (1996) (choosing of its own volition to adopt the Teague rule); but see State v. Egelhoff, 272 Mont. 114, 900 P.2d 260 (1995).[17] Commentators were similarly confident that Teague's "restrictions appl[ied] only to federal habeas cases," leaving States free to "determine whether to follow the federal courts' rulings on retroactivity or to fashion rules which respond to the unique concerns of that state." Hutton, Retroactivity in the States: The Impact of Teague v. Lane on State Postconviction Remedies, 44 Ala. L.Rev. 421, 423-424, 422-423 (1993). In sum, the Teague decision limits the kinds of constitutional violations that will entitle an individual to relief on federal habeas, but does not in any way limit the authority of a state court, when reviewing its own state criminal convictions, to provide a remedy for a violation that is deemed "nonretroactive" under Teague. V The State contends that two of our prior decisionsMichigan v. Payne and American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smithcast doubt on state courts' authority to provide broader remedies for federal constitutional violations than mandated by Teague. We disagree. A In Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 93 S. Ct. 1966, 36 L. Ed. 2d 736, we considered the retroactivity of the rule prohibiting "vindictive" resentencing that had been announced in our opinion in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723-726, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1969).[18] Relying on the approach set forth in Linkletter and Stovall, we held that the Pearce rule did not apply because Payne's resentencing had occurred prior to Pearce's date of decision.[19] We therefore reversed the judgment of the Michigan Supreme Court, which had applied Pearce retroactively, and remanded for further proceedings. At first blush the fact that we reversed the judgment of the Michigan court appears to lend support to the view that state courts may not give greater retroactive effect to new rules announced by this *1043 Court than we expressly authorize. But, as our opinion in Payne noted, the Michigan Supreme Court had applied the Pearce rule retroactively "`pending clarification'" by this Court. 412 U.S., at 49, 93 S. Ct. 1966. As the Michigan Court explained, it had applied the new rule in the case before it in order to give guidance to Michigan trial courts concerning what it regarded as an ambiguity in Pearce's new rule.[20] The Michigan Court did not purport to make a definitive ruling on the retroactivity of Pearce; nor did it purport to apply a broader state rule of retroactivity than required by federal law. Our opinion in Payne did not require the Michigan Supreme Court to modify its disposition of the case; it simply remanded for further proceedings after providing the clarification that the Michigan Court sought. Most significantly, other than the fact that the case was remanded for further proceedings, not a word in our Payne opinion suggests that the Court intended to prohibit state courts from applying new constitutional standards in a broader range of cases than we require.[21] Notably, at least some state courts continued, after Payne, to adopt and apply broader standards of retroactivity than required by our decisions. In Pennsylvania v. McCormick, 359 Pa.Super. 461, 470, 519 A.2d 442, 447 (1986), for example, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania chose not to follow this Court's nonretroactivity holding in Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 106 S. Ct. 2878, 92 L. Ed. 2d 199 (1986) (per curiam). The Pennsylvania court correctly explained that our decision was "not binding authority [in part] because neither the federal nor the state constitution dictate which decisions must be given retroactive effect." 359 Pa.Super., at 470, 519 A.2d, at 447. B In American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 110 S. Ct. 2323, 110 L. Ed. 2d 148, petitioners challenged the constitutionality of an Arkansas statute enacted in 1983 that imposed a discriminatory burden on interstate truckers. While their suit was pending, this Court declared a virtually identical Pennsylvania tax unconstitutional. See American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 107 S. Ct. 2829, 97 L. Ed. 2d 226 (1987). Shortly *1044 thereafter, the Arkansas Supreme Court struck down the Arkansas michelleriddle@example.net. The primary issue in Smith was whether petitioners were entitled to a refund of taxes that were assessed before the date of our decision in Scheiner. The Arkansas Court held that petitioners were not entitled to a refund because our decision in Scheiner did not apply retroactively. Four Members of this Court agreed. The plurality opinion concluded that federal law did not provide petitioners with a right to a refund of pre-Scheiner tax payments because Scheiner did not apply retroactively to invalidate the Arkansas tax prior to its date of decision. Four Members of this Court dissented. The dissenting opinion argued that the case actually raised both the substantive question whether the tax violated the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution and the remedial question whether, if so, the petitioners were entitled to a refund. The dissent concluded as a matter of federal law that the tax was invalid during the years before Scheiner, and that petitioners were entitled to a decision to that effect. Whether petitioners should get a refund, however, the dissent deemed a mixed question of state and federal law that should be decided by the state court in the first instance. Justice SCALIA concurred with the plurality's judgment because he disagreed with the substantive rule announced in Scheiner, but he did not agree with the plurality's reasoning. After stating that his views on retroactivity diverged from the plurality's "in a fundamental way," Justice SCALIA explained: "I share [the dissent's] perception that prospective decisionmaking is incompatible with the judicial role, which is to say what the law is, not to prescribe what [the law] shall be. The very framing of the issue that we purport to decide to-day whether our decision in Scheiner shall `apply' retroactivelypresupposes a view of our decisions as creating the law, as opposed to declaring what the law already is. Such a view is contrary to that understanding of `the judicial Power,' U.S. Const., Art. III, § 1, which is not only the common and traditional one, but which is the only one that can justify courts in denying force and effect to the unconstitutional enactments of duly elected legislatures, see Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137[, 2 L. Ed. 60] (1803)the very exercise of judicial power asserted in Scheiner. To hold a governmental Act to be unconstitutional is not to announce that we forbid it, but that the Constitution forbids it; and when, as in this case, the constitutionality of a state statute is placed in issue, the question is not whether some decision of ours `applies' in the way that a law applies; the question is whether the Constitution, as interpreted in that decision, invalidates the statute. Since the Constitution does not change from year to year; since it does not conform to our decisions, but our decisions are supposed to conform to it; the notion that our interpretation of the Constitution in a particular decision could take prospective form does not make sense. Either enforcement of the statute at issue in Scheiner (which occurred before our decision there) was unconstitutional, or it was not; if it was, then so is enforcement of all identical statutes in other States, whether occurring before or after our decision; and if it was not, then Scheiner was wrong, and the issue of whether to `apply' that decision needs no further attention." American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S., at 201, 110 S. Ct. 2323. Because Justice SCALIA's vote rested on his disagreement with the substantive rule announced in Scheinerrather than with *1045 the retroactivity analysis in the dissenting opinionthere were actually five votes supporting the dissent's views on the retroactivity issue. Accordingly, it is the dissent rather than the plurality that should inform our analysis of the issue before us today.[22] Moreover, several years later, a majority of this Court explicitly adopted the Smith dissent's reasoning in Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 113 S. Ct. 2510, 125 L. Ed. 2d 74 (1993). Harper, like Smith, involved a request for a refund of taxes paid before we declared a similar Michigan tax unconstitutional. We held that the Virginia tax at issue in Harper was in fact invalideven before we declared the similar tax unconstitutional but that this did not necessarily entitle the petitioners to a full refund. We explained that the Constitution required Virginia to "`provide relief consistent with federal due process principles,'" 509 U.S., at 100, 113 S. Ct. 2510 (citing American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S., at 181, 110 S. Ct. 2323), but that "`a State found to have imposed an impermissibly discriminatory tax retains flexibility in responding to this determination'" under the due process clause, 509 U.S., at 100, 113 S. Ct. 2510 (citing McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, Fla. Dept. of Business Regulation, 496 U.S. 18, 39-40, 110 S. Ct. 2238, 110 L. Ed. 2d 17 (1990)). We left to the "Virginia courts this question of state law and the performance of other tasks pertaining to the crafting of any appropriate remedy." 509 U.S., at 102, 113 S. Ct. 2510. And we specifically noted that Virginia "`is free to choose which form of relief it will provide, so long as that relief satisfies the minimum federal requirements we have outlined.'" Ibid. (citing McKesson, 496 U.S., at 51-52, 110 S. Ct. 2238); see also 509 U.S., at 102, 113 S. Ct. 2510 ("State law may provide relief beyond the demands of federal due process, but under no circumstances may it confine petitioners to a lesser remedy" citations omitted). Thus, to the extent that these civil retroactivity decisions are relevant to the issue before us today,[23] they support our conclusion that the remedy a state court chooses to provide its citizens for violations of the Federal Constitution is primarily a question of state law. Federal law simply "sets certain minimum requirements that States must meet but may exceed in providing appropriate relief." American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S., at 178-179, 110 S. Ct. 2323 (plurality opinion). They provide no support for the proposition that *1046 federal law places a limit on state authority to provide remedies for federal constitutional violations. VI Finally, while the State acknowledges that it may grant its citizens broader protection than the Federal Constitution requires by enacting appropriate legislation or by judicial interpretation of its own Constitution, it argues that it may not do so by judicial misconstruction of federal law. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 95 S. Ct. 1215, 43 L. Ed. 2d 570 (1975)like our early decisions in Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506, 16 L. Ed. 169 (1859), and Tarble's Case, 13 Wall. 397, 20 L. Ed. 597 (1872)provides solid support for that proposition. But the States that give broader retroactive effect to this Court's new rules of criminal procedure do not do so by misconstruing the federal Teague standard. Rather, they have developed state law to govern retroactivity in state postconviction proceedings. See, e.g., State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253, 268 (Mo.2003) ("[A]s a matter of state law, this Court chooses not to adopt the Teague analysis ..."). The issue in this case is whether there is a federal rule, either implicitly announced in Teague, or in some other source of federal law, that prohibits them from doing so. The absence of any precedent for the claim that Teague limits state collateral review courts' authority to provide remedies for federal constitutional violations is a sufficient reason for concluding that there is no such rule of federal law. That conclusion is confirmed by several additional considerations. First, if there is such a federal rule of law, presumably the Supremacy Clause in Article V of the Federal Constitution would require all state entitiesnot just state judgesto comply with it. We have held that States can waive a Teague defense, during the course of litigation, by expressly choosing not to rely on it, see Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41, 110 S. Ct. 2715, 111 L. Ed. 2d 30 (1990), or by failing to raise it in a timely manner, see Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 228-229, 114 S. Ct. 783, 127 L. Ed. 2d 47 (1994). It would indeed be anomalous to hold that state legislatures and executives are not bound by Teague, but that state courts are. Second, the State has not identified, and we cannot discern, the source of our authority to promulgate such a novel rule of federal law. While we have ample authority to control the administration of justice in the federal courtsparticularly in their enforcement of federal legislationwe have no comparable supervisory authority over the work of state judges. Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 117 S. Ct. 1800, 138 L. Ed. 2d 108 (1997). And while there are federal interests that occasionally justify this Court's development of common-law rules of federal law,[24] our normal role is to interpret law created by others and "not to prescribe what it shall be." American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S., at 201, 110 S. Ct. 2323 (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment). Just as constitutional doubt may tip the scales in favor of one construction of a statute rather than another, so does uncertainty about *1047 the source of authority to impose a federal limit on the power of state judges to remedy wrongful state convictions outweigh any possible policy arguments favoring the rule that respondent espouses. Finally, the dissent contends that the "end result [of this opinion] is startling" because "two criminal defendants, each of whom committed the same crime, at the same time, whose convictions became final on the same day, and each of whom raised an identical claim at the same time under the Federal Constitution" could obtain different results. Post, at 1047. This assertion ignores the fact that the two hypothetical criminal defendants did not actually commit the "same crime." They violated different state laws, were tried in and by different state sovereigns, and mayfor many reasonsbe subject to different penalties. As previously noted, such nonuniformity is a necessary consequence of a federalist system of government. VII It is important to keep in mind that our jurisprudence concerning the "retroactivity" of "new rules" of constitutional law is primarily concerned, not with the question whether a constitutional violation occurred, but with the availability or nonavailability of remedies. The former is a "pure question of federal law, our resolution of which should be applied uniformly throughout the Nation, while the latter is a mixed question of state and federal law." American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S., at 205, 110 S. Ct. 2323 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). A decision by this Court that a new rule does not apply retroactively under Teague does not imply that there was no right and thus no violation of that right at the time of trialonly that no remedy will be provided in federal habeas courts. It is fully consistent with a government of laws to recognize that the finality of a judgment may bar relief. It would be quite wrong to assume, however, that the question whether constitutional violations occurred in trials conducted before a certain date depends on how much time was required to complete the appellate process. Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Minnesota is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. As was true in Michigan v. Payne, the Minnesota Court is free to reinstate its judgment disposing of the petition for state postconviction relief. It is so ordered. Chief Justice ROBERTS, with whom Justice KENNEDY joins, dissenting. Some of our new rulings on the meaning of the United States Constitution apply retroactivelyto cases already concludedand some do not. This Court has held that the question whether a particular ruling is retroactive is itself a question of federal law. It is basic that when it comes to any such question of federal law, it is "the province and duty" of this Court "to say what the law is." Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803). State courts are the final arbiters of their own state law; this Court is the final arbiter of federal law. State courts are therefore bound by our rulings on whether our cases construing federal law are retroactive. The majority contravenes these bedrock propositions. The end result is startling: Of two criminal defendants, each of whom committed the same crime, at the same time, whose convictions became final on the same day, and each of whom raised an identical claim at the same time under the Federal Constitution, one may be executed while the other is set freethe first despite *1048 being correct on his claim, and the second because of it. That result is contrary to the Supremacy Clause and the Framers' decision to vest in "one supreme Court" the responsibility and authority to ensure the uniformity of federal law. Because the Constitution requires us to be more jealous of that responsibility and authority, I respectfully dissent. I One year after Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1989)our leading modern precedent on retroactivityTeague's author explained: "The determination whether a constitutional decision of this Court is retroactive... is a matter of federal law. When questions of state law are at issue, state courts generally have the authority to determine the retroactivity of their own decisions. The retroactive applicability of a constitutional decision of this Court, however, `is every bit as much of a federal question as what particular federal constitutional provisions themselves mean, what they guarantee, and whether they have been denied.'" American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 177-178, 110 S. Ct. 2323, 110 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1990) (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967); citation omitted). For that reason, "we have consistently required that state courts adhere to our retroactivity decisions." 496 U.S., at 178, 110 S. Ct. 2323 (citing Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 93 S. Ct. 1966, 36 L. Ed. 2d 736 (1973), and Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5, 89 S. Ct. 35, 21 L. Ed. 2d 5 (1968) (per curiam)). Even more recently, we held that the "Supremacy Clause does not allow federal retroactivity doctrine to be supplanted by the invocation of a contrary approach to retroactivity under state law." Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 100, 113 S. Ct. 2510, 125 L. Ed. 2d 74 (1993) (citation omitted). Indeed, about the only point on which our retroactivity jurisprudence has been consistent is that the retroactivity of new federal rules is a question of federal law binding on States. The Court's contrary holding is based on a misreading of our precedent and a misunderstanding of the nature of retroactivity generally. A As the Court correctly points out, before 1965 we took for granted the proposition that all federal constitutional rights, including rights that represented a break from earlier precedent, would be given full retroactive effect on both direct and collateral review. That all changed with Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S. Ct. 1731, 14 L. Ed. 2d 601 (1965). In that case, a Louisiana prisoner brought a federal habeas petition arguing that illegally seized evidence was introduced against him at trial in violation of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961). Mapp, however, had been decided after his conviction became final. We granted certiorari to decide whether the Mapp rule "operates retrospectively upon cases finally decided in the period prior to Mapp." 381 U.S., at 619-620, 85 S. Ct. 1731. In answering this question, we broke from our past practice of assuming full retroactivity, holding that "we are neither required to apply, nor prohibited from applying, a decision retrospectively." Id., at 629, 85 S. Ct. 1731. Our analysis turned entirely on the nature and scope of the particular constitutional right at issue: "[W]e must ... weigh the merits and demerits [of retroactive application] in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, *1049 and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation." Ibid. Under this framework, we held that Mapp would apply only prospectively. 381 U.S., at 639-640, 85 S. Ct. 1731. The next year, we decided Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S. Ct. 1772, 16 L. Ed. 2d 882 (1966). Johnson was a direct appeal from the New Jersey Supreme Court's denial of state collateral relief. The precise question in Johnson was whether the rules announced in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S. Ct. 1758, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977 (1964), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), would apply to state prisoners whose convictions had become final before those cases were decided. In holding that Escobedo and Miranda should apply only prospectively, 384 U.S., at 732, 86 S. Ct. 1772, we imported Linkletter's mode of retroactivity analysis into review of state postconviction proceedings, 384 U.S., at 726-727, 86 S. Ct. 1772. Finally, in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S. Ct. 1967, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1199 (1967), we announced that, for purposes of retroactivity analysis, "no distinction is justified between convictions now final, as in the instant case, and convictions at various stages of trial and direct review." Id., at 300, 87 S. Ct. 1967. Thus, by 1967, the Linkletter analysis was applied in review of criminal convictions, whether final or not. No matter at what stage of proceedings this Court considered a retroactivity question, the issue was decided with reference to the purposes and practical impact of the precise federal right in question: "Each constitutional rule of criminal procedure has its own distinct functions, its own background of precedent, and its own impact on the administration of justice, and the way in which these factors combine [to decide the retroactivity issue] must inevitably vary with the [constitutional] dictate involved." Johnson, supra, at 728, 86 S. Ct. 1772. Because the question of retroactivity was so tied up with the nature and purpose of the underlying federal constitutional right, it would have been surprising if any of our cases had suggested that States were free to apply new rules of federal constitutional law retroactively even when we would not. As one of the more thoughtful legal scholars put it in discussing the effect of the Linkletter analysis on state collateral review, "[i]f a state gave relief in such a case on the exclusive authority of Mapp, under the rationale of the Linkletter opinion it would presumably have been reversed." Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, The Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 Harv. L.Rev. 56, 91, n. 132 (1965). Our precedents made clear that States could give greater substantive protection under their own laws than was available under federal law, and could give whatever retroactive effect to those laws they wished. As the Court explained in Johnson, "[o]f course, States are still entirely free to effectuate under their own law stricter standards than those we have laid down and to apply those standards in a broader range of cases than is required by this decision." 384 U.S., at 733, 86 S. Ct. 1772. The clear implication of this statement was that States could apply their own retroactivity rules only to new substantive rights "under their own law," not to new federal rules announced by this Court. Thus, contrary to the Court's view, our early retroactivity cases nowhere suggested that the retroactivity of new federal constitutional rules