712 A.2d 132 (1998) 122 Md. App. 295 John DOE v. Jane DOE. No. 1330, Sept. Term, 1997. Court of Special Appeals of Maryland. June 29, 1998. *135 M. Albert Figinski (David W. Erb and Weinberg & Green, L.L.C., on the brief), Baltimore, for appellant. Paul Mark Sandler (Stacie F. Dubnow, Freishtat & Sandler, Baltimore, Thomas C. Ries and Kaufman, Ries & Elgin, P.A., Towson, on the brief), for appellee. Argued before HARRELL, THIEME and KENNEY, JJ. *133 *134 HARRELL, Judge. On 12 July 1996, appellant, John Doe,[1] filed a Complaint for Absolute Divorce against appellee, Jane Doe, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. The ground asserted for the divorce sought by Mr. Doe was Ms. Doe's alleged commission of adultery. On 5 December 1996, Mr. Doe filed an amended complaint, adding Counts II through VIII, which are the subject of this appeal. Counts II and III alleged fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress, respectively, relating to Ms. Doe's alleged knowing, deliberate, false, and affirmative misrepresentation to Mr. Doe that he was the father of two of the parties' three children. Counts IV through VIII alleged fraud, negligent misrepresentation, promissory estoppel, breach of contract, and constructive trust, respectively, relating to allegations that Ms. Doe repeatedly dissuaded Mr. Doe from contributing to his 401(k) plan by falsely *136 and intentionally promising Mr. Doe that he could rely on Ms. Doe's stockholdings for his retirement. Compensatory and punitive damages were sought on all counts, save that for a constructive trust. On 31 January 1997, Ms. Doe filed a motion to dismiss Counts II through VII. The trial court held a hearing on the motion on 16 May 1997 and on 8 July 1997 issued an order granting Ms. Doe's motion to dismiss. On 14 July 1997, the court granted a motion for entry of final judgment as to Counts II through VIII pursuant to Rule 2-602(b)[2]. Mr. Doe presents the following questions for our review, which we have rephrased: I. Whether the trial court erred in dismissing Counts II and III on public policy grounds. II. Whether the trial court erred in finding the allegations in Counts II and III insufficient to state a cause of action. III. Whether the trial court erred in dismissing Counts IV through VIII for failure to state a cause of action. FACTS Mr. and Ms. Doe married on 2 September 1989. During the course of their marriage, three children were born: J.D. Doe, born 21 February 1992; and twins A.E. Doe and Z.S. Doe, born 10 July 1993. Mr. Doe was named as the father on the birth certificates of each of the three children, and Ms. Doe held out Mr. Doe as the biological father of each of the children. Unbeknown to Mr. Doe, Ms. Doe, an art student, began a sexual affair in 1990 with M.G., Ms. Doe's art professor. In 1991, Ms. Doe began tylerkhan@example.com.'s art gallery in Baltimore. At Ms. Doe's request, M.G. became godfather to all three children. On 2 July 1996, Mr. Doe discovered a letter written by Ms. Doe to M.G. which stated, in part: It remains my belief that at some point in the course [of] our relationship I disappointed you deeply, and that this is a[t] least partially (if not wholly) responsible for bringing about the distance which has complicated our interactions during the past few years. The commencement of this change seems to roughly correlate with the birth of our children ... I realize that my decision not to terminate these pregnancies ... If my decision to bear J.D. & A.E. & Z.S. altered the feelings you held towards me, I am sorry. Though I have occasionally wondered if I made the correct choice in this I am convinced that given my perception (or misconceptions) about the bond [between] us at that time, I could not have decided otherwise. You will always be the father of my children. i.e.have/develop your own relationship with each of them as you wish. The divulging of their identities will be at your discretion. If for some unforeseeable reason it should become necessary for me to provide information to the children regarding how they came to be Z.S., A.E., and J.D. will likely receive the [point] of view reflected in this letter, your name ... will be withheld and your privacy protected... Included please find cards from the St. Paul's parish documenting your godparentship to the children. Mr. Doe spoke with M.G. on 7 July 1996. During the course of that conversation, M.G. admitted the affair and acknowledged that he and Ms. Doe had engaged in sexual relations at the time J.D. was conceived in May 1991, and did not deny that he and Ms. Doe had engaged in sexual relations at or about the *137 time A.E. and Z.S. were conceived in November 1992. Mr. Doe confronted his wife on 11 July with the letter and M.G.'s admissions. Ms. Doe denied having sexual relations with M.G. and refused to discuss the children's paternity. The next day Mr. Doe filed for divorce. On 25 July 1996, Mr. Doe and the children submitted blood samples for DNA testing regarding Mr. Doe's paternity. The test results, provided in October 1996, confirmed that Mr. Doe was J.D.'s biological father but excluded him as the biological father of the twins. Mr. Doe alleged that throughout the parties' marriage the sexual encounters between Ms. Doe and himself were infrequent. In part because of Ms. Doe's health problems, the parties used withdrawal as their sole source of birth control. Mr. Doe recalled that in November or early December 1992, Ms. Doe uncharacteristically instigated sexual intercourse and "knowingly, deliberately and physically, prevented [Mr. Doe] from withdrawing when necessary." Mr. Doe alleges that this conduct, together with Ms. Doe's letter to M.G., allows a reasonable inference that Ms. Doe knew that M.G. had impregnated her before the rare sexual encounter with Mr. Doe, and that she seduced Mr. Doe solely to mislead him into believing that he was the biological father of the twins born thereafter. In addition to his allegations regarding Ms. Doe's concealment of the twins' paternity, Mr. Doe made several allegations regarding the parties' finances. Specifically, Mr. Doe alleged that in 1990 he discussed with Ms. Doe his desire to take advantage of the opportunity to contribute to the 401(k) retirement plan established by his employer. Ms. Doe asked him instead to continue to contribute one hundred percent of his salary into the joint family bank account, and, in return, Ms. Doe promised that Mr. Doe could rely on her stockholdings for his retirement. Based on these representations, Mr. Doe continued to deposit his entire salary into the parties' joint account, which Ms. Doe managed. Throughout the marriage, Mr. Doe continued to express his desire to begin contributing to the 401(k) plan, but Ms. Doe repeatedly dissuaded him from doing so, claiming that Mr. Doe's income was needed to pay for family expenses. She allegedly continued to assure him that he would be able to rely on her stockholdings for his retirement. As of November 1996, however, Ms. Doe has taken the position that Mr. Doe will not be able to rely on her stockholdings for his retirement. DISCUSSION Maryland Rule 2-322(b)(2) allows a defendant to seek a dismissal on the ground that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A complaint fails to state a claim when, even if the allegations of the complaint are true, the plaintiff nevertheless is not entitled to relief as a matter of law. Lubore v. RPM Associates, Inc., 109 Md.App. 312, 322, 674 A.2d 547, cert. denied, 343 Md. 565, 683 A.2d 177 (1996). When considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the circuit court only examines the sufficiency of a pleading. Id. " `The grant of a motion to dismiss is proper if the complaint does not disclose, on its face, a legally sufficient cause of action.'" Id. (citing Hrehorovich v. Harbor Hosp. Ctr., 93 Md.App. 772, 784, 614 A.2d 1021 (1992)). On appeal, this Court "must assume the truth of all well-pleaded facts ... as well as inferences which may reasonably be drawn from those well-pleaded facts." Lee v. Denro, Inc., 91 Md.App. 822, 828, 605 A.2d 1017 (1992). If the complaint contains any material facts that support the plaintiff's right to recover, this Court must reverse the order of dismissal. Id. In the case sub judice the circuit court found Mr. Doe's complaint legally insufficient for two reasons: First, the court found that Mr. Doe's allegations of fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress were barred by public policy. Second, the court found that the complaint failed to include any material facts supporting Mr. Doe's right to recover not only on the fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress counts, but also on the counts relating to Ms. Doe's stockholdings and Mr. Doe's intentions regarding his employer's 401(k) plan. We will first address the trial court's finding that Mr. *138 Doe's claims are barred by public policy. Then we will turn to the specific allegations to determine if the pertinent counts of the complaint are sufficient to state a cause of action. I. The issue presented in this case is one of first impression in this State: Whether public policy precludes spouses from suing each other for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress even though the Maryland Court of Appeals has abrogated interspousal immunity. The court below believed such public policy exists. The court opined: Maryland has not yet confronted the issue of whether one spouse can sue another for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress relating to the paternity of the children born during the course of a marriage. Under the current state of the law, one spouse may sue another for certain outrageous and intentional tortious conduct. The Court of Appeals has expressly stated that interspousal tort immunity no longer exists in Maryland. Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334 [390 A.2d 77] (1978).... [In Lusby t]he Court noted that "no sound public policy in the latter half of the 20th-century ... would prevent one spouse from recovering from another for the outrageous conduct ... alleged" by the Plaintiff in that situation. Id. at 357 [390 A.2d 77]. Implicit in this statement is that public policy considerations may preclude interspousal suits for intentional torts in certain situations. The facts of the instant case present just such a situation. A.E. Doe and Z.S. Doe are almost four years old. For their entire life they have known the Plaintiff [Mr. Doe] as their father and have benefitted from his love and support. He notes in his complaint that he "has developed a close and loving relationship with each of them, cared for them, raised them and invested substantial time, effort, money and other resources... in each child's health, welfare and wellbeing." Plaintiff is seeking relief for the emotional distress of learning that he was not the biological father of the twins and also for the financial investment incurred as a result of this alleged fraud. To allow him to litigate these claims, outside the context of the domestic action, is not in the best interest of the children and provides little additional benefit to Plaintiff. In considering whether to allow these tort claims to proceed, the Court must balance the harm suffered by the Plaintiff against the potential harm to the children. The Plaintiff is not without a remedy. The conduct of the Defendant is relevant to the issue of custody and will impact on the Court's willingness to grant a monetary award. The Plaintiff can be compensated for the wrongs he has suffered without litigating these issues again in tort. Conversely, the potential harm to the children is great. Inter-familial warfare takes its toll on children, regardless of their age or awareness of the proceedings. These painful issues would be litigated twice, once in front of a judge for the divorce and again in front of a jury. Moreover, one day these children may become aware that the only father they had known sought to recover damages for his relationship with and investment in them. Allowing a non-biological parent to recover damages for developing a close relationship with a child misrepresented to be his and performing parental acts is not a damage which should be compensable under the law. The Court does not condone the alleged behavior of the Defendant, but the misrepresentations and omissions alleged are betrayals for which the law should not provide a remedy.... The Court[`]s ruling is limited to the facts of the instant case. It is not necessary to reach the broader issue of whether parties should be able to bring claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and fraud when such suits are predicated on an action for divorce. It is the Court's belief, however, that such actions should be prohibited in the interest of judicial economy and the efficient administration of justice. As every trial judge knows, if such claims are allowed there will be two suits in every divorceone at law and one in equity. Perhaps Judge Henderson in the Pickering case said it best: "where a man *139 and wife are involved in a marriage relationship, there could always exist a tort for intentional infliction of emotional distress where they had an argument. It could be over the family dog, who takes out the garbage, who forgot to pay the bills or who is spending too much money. In other words the law should not provide a basis for interfamilial warfare between husbands and wives where our courts would be flooded with litigation." [Pickering v. Pickering, 434 N.W.2d 758, 764 (S.D.1989) (Henderson, J. concurring in part, dissenting in part) ]. This is not to suggest that the allegations in the instant case equate to an argument over the family dog or taking out the trash, but the traumas spouses inflict upon each other in today's world are often heinous and all too common. It is simply not practical to allow these claims to be litigated as intentional torts when a remedy can be provided within the divorce action. We disagree with the trial court. First, given that Maryland has abrogated interspousal immunity for intentional torts, we reject the court's conclusion that public policy regarding the best interests of the children precludes this particular interspousal tort claim. Second, we do not agree that a divorce action will provide Mr. Doe a complete remedy for his claims if proven. We explain. Abrogation of Interspousal Immunity The common law doctrine of interspousal immunity was predicated on the concept of a husband and wife as one legal entity. Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 614, 31 S. Ct. 111, 54 L. Ed. 1180 (1910). Because a wife's legal identity merged with her husband's upon marriage, married women were unable to enter into contracts, own property, sue or be sued. Id. at 614-15, 31 S. Ct. 111. The legal fiction of husband and wife as one entity precluded suits between spouses. Id. at 615, 31 S. Ct. 111. As the Court of Appeals explained: The disabilities formerly existing insofar as women are concerned are difficult for those of us of the present generation to fully comprehend. It seems hard to believe that prior to the adoption of the 19th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States in 1920 women were not permitted to vote in Maryland and many other states. Prior to the enactment of Chapter 399 of the Acts of 1902 they were not permitted to practice law in Maryland. See In Re Maddox, 93 Md. 727, 50 A. 487 (1901). Deeds are to be found among the land records of some of our counties in which acknowledgments appear referring to the examination of the wife out of the presence of her husband by the person taking the acknowledgment. Judge Richard Grason in Barton v. Barton, 32 Md. 214, 224 (1870), is authority for the fact that at common law "a debt due by the husband to the wife for money lent before marriage, became extinguished by the marriage." In that case he said for the Court: "[P]ublic policy, originating in the delicate relation existing between husband and wife, forbids a wife from maintaining an action at law against her husband during the coverture, and her only remedy against him is by a proceeding in equity." Id. at 224. In David v. David, 161 Md. 532, 534, 157 A. 755, 756 (1932), Judge Offutt said for the Court, "The rule at common law is that a married woman cannot maintain an action against her husband for injuries caused by his negligent or tortious act. 30 C.J., `Husband and Wife,' secs. 317, 675." He went on to say, referring to the same citation and also to Philips v. Barnet, 1 Q.B.D. 436 (1876), that "[t]he reason usually given for that rule is the presumed legal identity of the husband and wife...." Background for this is found in 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries some 200 years ago: "By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband: under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs everything; and is therefore called in our law-french a feme-covert, foemina viro co-operta; is said to be *140 covert-baron, or under the protection and influence of her husband, her baron, or lord; and her condition during her marriage is called her coverture. Upon this principle, of a union of person in husband and wife, depend almost all the legal rights, duties, and disabilities, that either of them acquire by the marriage." Id. at * 442 (italics in original). He adds, in discussing the consequences of this union of husband and wife, "If the wife be injured in her person or her property, she can bring no action for redress without her husband's concurrence, and in his name, as well as her own: neither can she be sued without making the husband a defendant." Id. at * 443. Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 337-38, 390 A.2d 77 (1978). The passage of Married Women's Acts in the 1800s significantly weakened the legal fiction of "the union of person in husband and wife." These Acts, passed in most states, gave women a separate legal identity with the right to contract, own property, and maintain separate legal actions. See Stacey S. Kawasaki, Interspousal Torts: a Procedural Framework for Hawai'i, 19 U. Haw. L.Rev. 377, 378-79 (1997). Chapter 457 of the Acts of 1898, later codified in Article 45, § 5, and now contained in Md.Code (1984, 1991 Repl.Vol., 1997 Supp.), § 4-201 to 206 of the Family Law Article, revised Maryland's law regarding spouses' legal rights. Section 4-204 provides: § 4-204. Married woman's right to deal as if unmarried. A married woman may do any of the following, as if she were unmarried: (1) engage in business; (2) make a contract with any person, including her husband, whether or not she is engaged in business; (3) bind herself and her assigns by a covenant running with or related to real property or chattels real deeded to her on or after March 19, 1867; (4) form a partnership with any person, including her husband; (5) sue on any contract, including a contract made with her husband; (6) sue for the recovery, security, or protection of her property; (7) sue for any tort committed against her; and (8) appoint counsel to represent her in an action brought under § 4-205(b) or (c) or § 4-301(b) of this title. Section 4-205 provides, in part: § 4-205. Right to deal with married woman as if unmarried. (a) Husband's right.A husband may sue his wife on a contract made with her, as if she were unmarried. (b) Rights of a third personIn general. (1) A third person may take any of the following actions with or against a married woman, as if the married woman were unmarried: (i) make a contract; (ii) sue on the contract, whether the contract was made before or during the woman's marriage; (iii) sue for a tort, whether the woman committed the tort before or during her marriage; and (iv) execute on a judgment. (2) A third person may maintain an action at law or in equity against a married woman in her married name. Until Lusby, Maryland courts did not interpret these provisions as allowing spouses to sue one another in tort. Lusby, 283 Md. at 358, 390 A.2d 77. In Furstenburg v. Furstenburg, 152 Md. 247, 136 A. 534 (1927), Ms. Furstenburg brought an action against her husband for injuries she suffered in an automobile accident. Id. at 248, 136 A. 534. Rejecting the argument that Section 5 of Article 45 allowed an interspousal tort suit, the Furstenburg Court relied on Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 31 S. Ct. 111, 54 L. Ed. 1180 (1910), in which the Supreme Court construed a similar District of Columbia statute. Furstenburg, 152 Md. at 249, 136 A. 534. The Furstenburg Court concluded that "[t]he statute was not intended to give a right of action as against the husband, but to allow the wife, in her own name, to maintain actions of tort which, at common *141 law, must be brought in the joint names of herself and husband." Id. at 251, 136 A. 534 (quoting Thompson, 218 U.S. at 617, 31 S. Ct. 111). The Court found that [i]t appears to have been the purpose of the Act of 1898 to give the wife a remedy, by her suit alone, for actionable wrongs which could not theretofore be thus independently redressed. The intention to create, as between husband and wife, personal causes of action, which did not exist before the act, is not, in our opinion, expressed by its terms. Furstenburg, 152 Md. at 252-53, 136 A. 534 (emphasis added). Several years later, in David v. David, 161 Md. 532, 157 A. 755 (1932), the Court again concluded that the rights afforded spouses in Article 45, Section 5 did not include the ability to sue each other in tort: The rule at common law is that a married woman cannot maintain an action against her husband for injuries caused by his negligent or tortious act. The reason usually given for that rule is the presumed legal identity of the husband and wife, and some confusion has arisen from the adoption of the legislation which has had the effect of partially dissipating that fiction by permitting suits between husband and wife to enforce contractual liabilities, by according to each the same rights and privileges in respect to property they would have if unmarried, by permitting the wife to carry on a trade or business, and to receive and enjoy her earnings from any source as freely as if single, and to sue in her own name for torts against her. Coincident with the widening scope and extent of such legislation, there has been a determined effort to have it construed so as to permit actions between husband and wife for damages resulting from some wrongful or negligent act of the defendant, and in some jurisdictions it has been so construed, usually on the ground that, with the disappearance of the fiction of identity, the reason for the rule denying persons in the relation of husband and wife the right to sue each other in tort ceased. But that view has been rejected by what seems to be the weight of authority, not only upon the technical and artificial ground that the identity of husband and wife persists in its original vigor until it has been completely dissolved by express legislative mandate, in respect to all matters which the Legislature has not expressly included within the meaning of the emancipatory statutes, but upon the broader sociological and political ground that it would introduce into the home, the basic unit of organized society, discord, suspicion and distrust, and would be inconsistent with the common welfare. David, 161 Md. at 534-35, 157 A. 755 (citations omitted). In Gregg v. Gregg, 199 Md. 662, 87 A.2d 581 (1952), the Court rejected the David Court's reasoning as artificial, explaining that [i]t applies to a post-bellum situation a theory which is clearly only applicable to conditions prior to the difficulty which caused the bringing of the legal action. After discord, suspicion and distrust have entered the home, it is idle to say that one of the parties shall not be allowed to sue the other because of fear of bringing in what is already there. Id. at 667, 87 A.2d 581. The Court concluded, nevertheless, that "these ancient theories which form a part of the common law have to be followed by us unless they have been changed by legislative action, and the clear import of the decision in the David case is that the emancipatory statutes must be strictly construed." Id. The following year the Court reiterated that "[i]t is clear that Maryland will not entertain a suit by one spouse against the other for his or her tort, committed during the marital status." Tobin v. Hoffman, 202 Md. 382, 391, 96 A.2d 597 (1953). In Lusby, however, the Court changed the rule. See Lusby, 283 Md. at 358, 390 A.2d 77. In Lusby, Ms. Lusby's husband carjacked her at gunpoint, assaulted and raped her, then helped two of his friends try to rape her. Id. at 336, 390 A.2d 77. Ms. Lusby then sued her husband in tort. The trial court dismissed the action on the basis of interspousal immunity. Id. In reversing the trial court, the Court of Appeals looked to other states for guidance regarding the *142 abrogation of interspousal immunity for tort actions. The Court quoted Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass. 619, 351 N.E.2d 526 (1976), in which the Massachusetts Supreme Court stated: "We conclude therefore that it is open to this court to reconsider the common law rule of interspousal immunity and, having done so, we are of opinion that it should no longer bar an action by one spouse against another in a case such as the present one. We believe this result is consistent with the general principle that if there is tortious injury there should be recovery, and only strong arguments of public policy should justify a judicially created immunity for tortfeasors and bar to recovery for injured victims." Lusby, 283 Md. at 347, 390 A.2d 77 (quoting Lewis, 351 N.E.2d at 532). The Lusby Court further noted: Although the courts have been divided on this issue, the commentators have been nearly unanimous in their criticism of the common law rule of immunity. See, e.g., W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, § 122 (4th ed. 1971) (At 864 Prosser states, "The devastating attack on the old rule found in a number of recent decisions seems to leave no possible justification for it except that of historical survival."); 1 F. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts § 8.10 (1956) (At 645 the authors state, "The rule denying recovery has been applied literally and blindly in many cases where the reason for the rule could not possibly apply inasmuch as there was no home to disrupt and no domestic harmony to disturb." At 646 they state, "The metaphysical and practical reasons which prevented such actions at common law are no longer applicable."); and McCurdy, Personal Injury Torts Between Spouses, 4 Vill. L.Rev. 303 (1959). In the latter article Professor McCurdy states: "There is no reason to think that in the case of intentional, wilful, and wanton injury an action would disrupt domestic harmony, since the conduct leading to the action has already caused the disruptions; and indeed there is every reason to think that denial of an action might be more disruptive in that it might lead to resort to other admittedly available redress such as to be found in the criminal and divorce law. Besides, a substantial number of states have for years allowed such interspousal tort actions either by decision or by express statute and it would be impossible to demonstrate that more domestic disharmony exists because of it." Lusby, 283 Md. at 350-51, 390 A.2d 77 (footnote omitted). The Lusby Court observed: "[I]n none of the prior Maryland cases has there been an allegation of an intentional tort, much less the outrageous conduct here set forth. Moreover, at no time since Furstenburg has the Court examined the foundation upon which our holdings rest." Id. at 352, 390 A.2d 77 (citation omitted). The Court then recalled the U.S. Supreme Court's 1910 decision in Thompson, and concluded that Justice Harlan's dissent, in which Justices Holmes and Hughes joined, was more persuasive than the majority opinion. Id. The Lusby Court quoted Justice Harlan: "In my opinion these statutory provisions, properly construed, embrace such a case as the present one.... The statute enables the married woman to take, as her own, property of any kind, no matter how acquired by her, as well as the avails of her skill, labor or personal exertions, `as absolutely as if she were unmarried. It then confers upon married women the power to engage in any business, no matter what, and to enter into contracts, whether engaged in business or not, and to sue separately upon those contracts. If the statute stopped here, there would be ground for holding that it did not authorize this suit. But the statute goes much farther. It proceeds to authorize married women `also' to sue separately for the recovery, security or protection of their property; still more, they may sue, separately, `for torts committed against Them, as fully and freely as if they were unmarried.' No discrimination is made, in either case, between the persons charged with committing the tort. No exception is made in reference to the husband, if he happens to be the party charged with transgressing the rights conferred upon the wife by the statute. In *143 other words, Congress, by these statutory provisions, destroys the unity of the marriage association as it had previously existed. It makes a radical change in the relations of man and wife as those relations were at common law in this District. In respect of business and property the married woman is given absolute control; in respect of the recovery, security and protection of her property, she may sue, separately, in tort, as if she was unmarried; and in respect of herself, that is, of her person, she may sue, separately, as fully and freely, as if she were unmarried, `for torts committed against her.' So the statute expressly reads. But my brethren think that notwithstanding the destruction by the statute of the unity of the married relation, it could not have been intended to open the doors of the courts to accusations of all sorts by husband and wife against each other; and, therefore, they are moved to add, by construction, to the provision that married women may `sue separately... for torts committed against them as fully and freely as if they were unmarried' these words: `Provided, however, that the wife shall not be entitled, in any case, to sue her husband separately for a tort committed against her person.'" Lusby, 283 Md. at 354-55, 390 A.2d 77 (emphasis in original) (quoting Thompson, 218 U.S. at 621-23, 31 S. Ct. 111). The Lusby Court then concluded: Much of what Mr. Justice Harlan said in his dissent in Thompson could be said by way of analysis of the Maryland act, as Judge Hammond implied for the Court in Fernandez, 214 Md. at 524, 135 A.2d 886, when he indicated that the literal language of Art. 45, § 5 would authorize the type of suit we here have before us. Thompson was decided nine years before the adoption of the 19th Amendment and Furstenburg, eight years after its adoption. One senses in Thompson a reluctance to permit change. Certainly Justices Harlan, Holmes, and Hughes, the dissenters in Thompson, constituted three of the great minds of the Supreme Court of the United States in 1910. We can conceive of no sound public policy in the latter half of the 20th-century which would prevent one spouse from recovering from another for the outrageous conduct here alleged. There certainly can be no domestic tranquility to be preserved in the face of allegations such as we have before us. It will be recalled that in Gregg, 199 Md. at 667, 87 A.2d 581, Chief Judge Marbury said for the Court, "After discord, suspicion and distrust have entered the home, it is idle to say that one of the parties shall not be allowed to sue the other because of fear of bringing in what is already there." It will further be recalled that he labeled as "artificial" the theory that "the identity of husband and wife persists in its original vigor until it has been completely dissolved by express legislative mandate...." The General Assembly has not heeded the suggestions by this Court that a new statute be enacted. Insofar as the interpretation to be given to the present statute is concerned, we have said many times that the cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and carry out the real legislative intent, and in ascertaining that intent the court considers the language of an enactment in its natural and ordinary signification. See, e.g., Howell v. State, 278 Md. 389, 392, 364 A.2d 797 (1976), and the cases there cited. For purposes of our decision here today, however, we need not be involved with statutory construction nor need we be involved with our prior cases other than for dicta appearing in them to the effect that one spouse may not sue another for tort. None of our prior cases has involved an intentional tort. We find nothing in our prior cases or elsewhere to indicate that under the common law of Maryland a wife was not permitted to recover from her husband in tort when she alleged and proved the type of outrageous, intentional conduct here alleged. Note that under the common law in England as reflected in Blackstone it was under "the old common law" that a husband "might give his wife moderate correction." (Emphasis added.) The type of action in the case at bar not being forbidden by the common law of this State or any statute of *144 this State, it follows that the trial court erred. Lusby, 283 Md. at 357-58, 390 A.2d 77 (footnote omitted). In the next case to address interspousal immunity, Linton v. Linton, 46 Md.App. 660, 420 A.2d 1249 (1980), this Court observed that "Maryland has steadfastly adhered to the common law doctrine of interspousal immunity in tort cases." Id. at 664, 420 A.2d 1249. The Court nevertheless acknowledged that "in Lusby v. Lusby, [the Court of Appeals] recognized an exception to the doctrine whenever the tort committed against the spousal victim is not only intentional, as in assault and battery, but "outrageous," as where the errant spouse's conduct transcends common decency and accepted practices." Linton, 46 Md.App. at 664, 420 A.2d 1249 (citation omitted). The Court pointed out that the holding in Lusby, which was limited to what it characterized as "outrageous, intentional torts," represented merely a "small gap" in the rule of interspousal immunity. Id. A few years later, however, the Court of Appeals created a chasm out of the small gap when it expanded the abrogation of interspousal immunity to negligence cases. Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 275, 462 A.2d 506 (1983). The Court reviewed decisions in the few states retaining the interspousal immunity doctrine and reviewed decisions from the states that had abrogated the doctrine fully and partially.[3]Id. at 253-75, 462 A.2d 506. The Court quoted the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which approved abrogation of the doctrine: "Section 895F. Husband and Wife (1) A husband and wife is not immune from tort liability to the other solely by reason of that relationship. * * * * Comment: * * * * f. Abrogation. The last two decades have witnessed the definite rejection and abolition of the immunity between husband and wife in its entirety in a substantial number of jurisdictions. Numerous courts have followed a dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan in Thompson v. Thompson, (1910) 218 U.S. 611 [31 S. Ct. 111, 54 L. Ed. 1180], and have held that the Married Women's Acts and the position of equality in which they were intended to place the spouses have removed all reason and justification for the immunity, and that one spouse is subject to liability to the other for any tort whether it is to property or to the person. The number of these decisions has been on the increase in recent years and has been encouraged by the spread and general use of liability insurance, particularly in automobile cases. The indications are clear that this is the future state of the law in all states...." Id. at 271-72, 462 A.2d 506 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895F). The Court then discussed Lusby and concluded: In capsulation, the opinion in Lusby, supra, pointed out (1) the current invalidity of the disabilities imposed upon women by the original rule of law; (2) that the great minds of Supreme Court Justices Harlan, Holmes and Hughes had dissented from the narrow interpretation of the District of Columbia Married Womens [sic] Act in Thompson v. Thompson, supra; (3) that Chief Judge Marbury [in Gregg ]was rightly critical of the reasons for decision in the early cases; (4) that Judge Hammond's observation [in Fernandez ] that the literal language of Article 45, Section 5 would authorize tort actions was quite correct and in accord with the view of the dissenters in Thompson, supra; and (5) that since the decision in Stokes [v. Taxi Operators Ass'n, 248 Md. 690, 237 A.2d 762] in 1968 there has been a parade of cases in *145 which courts have altered the previous common law rule. Boblitz, 296 Md. at 272-73, 462 A.2d 506 (footnotes omitted). Noting that the Lusby Court found it unnecessary to rule upon the question of the continuing viability of the interspousal immunity rule in general negligence cases, the Court stated: In the subject case the issue whether the rule [of interspousal immunity] continues to be viable is clearly before us. We share the view now held by the vast majority of American States that the interspousal immunity rule is unsound in the circumstances of modern life in such cases as the subject. It is a vestige of the past. We are persuaded that the reasons asserted for its retention do not survive careful scrutiny. They furnish no reasonable basis for denial of recovery for tortious personal injury. We find no subsisting public policy that justifies retention of a judicially created immunity that would bar recovery for injured victims in such cases as the present. Id. at 273, 462 A.2d 506. Although "mindful of the value of the doctrine of stare decisis and aware that for reasons of certainty and stability, changes in decisional doctrine ordinarily should be left to the Legislature," id. at 273, 462 A.2d 506, the Court pointed out that "[t]he doctrine of stare decisis, important as it is, is not to be construed as preventing us from changing a rule of law if we are convinced that the rule has become unsound in the circumstances of modern life." Id. at 274, 462 A.2d 506 (quoting White v. King, 244 Md. 348, 354, 223 A.2d 763 (1966)). The Court concluded: In cases such as the present we have no legislative barrier to abrogation of this outmoded rule of law. Indeed, after legislative passage and approval by the people of Article 46 of the Declaration of Rights any ancient deprivation of rights based upon sex would contravene the basic law of this State. By the same token, we recognize that "conduct, tortious between two strangers, may not be tortious between spouses because of the mutual concessions implied in the marital relationship." Decision in such cases necessarily will be determined on a case to case basis. Id. at 274-75, 462 A.2d 506 (citation omitted). This Court further defined the limits of the interspousal immunity doctrine in Bender v. Bender, 57 Md.App. 593, 471 A.2d 335 (1984), explaining that "[a]lthough Lusby does not explicitly define the extent of the change it directs in the law of interspousal immunity, preferring a case by case approach, it clearly paves the way for such actions involving intentional infliction of personal injury." Id. at 600-01, 471 A.2d 335. Implicitly rejecting the analysis in Linton, the Bender Court declared that Judge Smith's use of the word "outrageous" aptly describes the nature of the offense in Lusby. The use of a descriptive adjective, however, does not require that the same word be grafted upon each succeeding tortious act in order to establish a cause of action. We believe the Court's primary focus in Lusby was its recognition that henceforth in Maryland intentional torts would form a basis for interspousal tylerkhan@example.com.... The use of the word "outrageous," in our view, appropriately characterized the offense, but the Court was sanctioning claims for intentional torts and not claims limited to outrageous torts.... The severity [of the tort] is a matter of damages, not of liability. Id. at 601-02, 471 A.2d 335. The Court then affirmed the trial court's "finding that an intentional tort was committed under circumstances which render legally inappropriate the interposition of interspousal immunity." Id. at 602, 471 A.2d 335. A review of Lusby, Boblitz, and Bender leads us to the conclusion that interspousal tort suits are now permitted in Maryland in both negligence and intentional tort cases. Neither Lusby nor Bender indicates which cases, under the suggested "case-bycase" approach, would be precluded, or on what basis. Nothing in the previous decisions indicates that the particular claim at issue in this case, intentional infliction of emotional distress, would be precluded. As one commentator suggested, "[t]herefore, in *146 most states it may now be argued that it `logically' follows from the end of [interspousal] immunity that, because section 46 torts [intentional infliction of emotional distress] are generally recognized, they should be available to spouses as well, or at least that the burden of persuasion lies with those who reject this position." Ira Mark Ellman and Stephen D. Sugarman, Spousal Emotional Abuse as a Tort, 22 Md. L.Rev. 1268, 1283 (1996). In this case, as with most other domestic tort cases, discord, suspicion, and distrust have already entered the Doe home. The historic public policy rationale precluding interspousal suits seems inane when there is no home to disrupt and no domestic tranquility left to preserve. Interspousal immunity is as much a vestige of the past in this instance as in the circumstances considered in Lusby and Boblitz. The Court of Appeals has not carved out an exception to the abrogation of interspousal immunity for intentional infliction of emotional distress or fraud, and neither shall we. The Best Interests of the Children The trial court in the case sub judice followed a different path of logic than we follow. The trial court read into Lusby`s pronouncement that "no sound public policy in the latter half of the 20th-century ... would prevent one spouse from recovering from another for the ... conduct ... alleged" an implicit statement that as yet unidentified and sound public policy considerations may preclude interspousal suits for intentional torts in cases such as this one. The trial court stretched the scope of this interspousal suit to envelop the entire family unit, and concluded that regardless of the abrogation of interspousal immunity, public policy regarding the children mandated a dismissal of this action. We find unpersuasive the circuit court's reliance on "the best interests of the children" as a public policy basis to preclude this interspousal suit for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress. In barring Mr. Doe's suit as a matter of public policy, the circuit court relied primarily on Pickering v. Pickering, 434 N.W.2d 758 (S.D.1989). In Pickering, Ms. Pickering had an affair with a co-worker and became pregnant. Id. at 760. She then seduced her husband so that he would believe he was the father of the child. Id. The truth came out when the child was four months old, whereupon Mr. Pickering filed for divorce and commenced a tort action against Ms. Pickering and her paramour. Id. In his tort action Mr. Pickering alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud and deceit, negligent misrepresentation, tortious interference with a marital contract, and alienation of affections. Id. Regarding the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the Pickering court baldly asserted, "[w]e believe the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress should be unavailable as a matter of public policy when it is predicated on conduct which leads to the dissolution of a marriage." Id. at 761. In Maryland, however, the Court of Appeals has not limited interspousal tort suits in such a way as to exclude those suits in which the defendant's conduct leads to the dissolution of a marriage. See Lusby, 283 Md. at 357, 390 A.2d 77. In Lusby, for example, where the husband forced his wife's car off the road, hit her, forcibly raped her, and helped two of his friends try to rape her, the Court of Appeals did not appear concerned that the suit arose from conduct that could end the parties' marriage, acknowledging that "[t]here certainly can be no domestic tranquility to be preserved in the face of allegations such as we have before us." Id. We find the Pickering court's rationale unpersuasive. The Pickering court denied relief to the husband for another reason as well: In South Dakota, an action for alienation of affections provides a remedy for intentional infliction of emotional distress, thus a separate action is not necessary. Id. In Maryland, however, the cause of action for alienation of affections has been abolished. Miller v. Ratner, 114 Md.App. 18, 35, 688 A.2d 976, cert. denied, 345 Md. 458, 693 A.2d 355 (1997). As to Mr. Pickering's claim of fraud and deceit, the court also concluded that the claim should be barred as a matter of public *147 policy. Pickering, 434 tylerkhan@example.com. The Pickering court relied on Richard P. v. Superior Court, 202 Cal. App. 3d 1089, 249 Cal. Rptr. 246 (1988), in which the California court, after considering a similar action, concluded that any wrong which has occurred as a result of [the defendant's] actions is not one that can be redressed in a tort action. We do not doubt that this lawsuit emanated from an unhappy situation in which the real parties in interest suffered grief. We feel, however, that the innocent children here may suffer significant harm from having their family involved in litigation such as this and that this is exactly the type of lawsuit which, if allowed to proceed, might result in more social damage than will occur if the courts decline to intervene. "We do not believe that the law should provide a basis for such interfamilial warfare." Pickering, 434 N.W.2d at 761-62 (citing Richard P., 202 Cal.App. 3d at 1094, 249 Cal. Rptr. 246). The Pickering court worried that allowing Mr. Pickering to maintain his suit could cause the child "to suffer significant harm" and concluded that "[t]his innocent party, who is now three years old, should not be subjected to this type of `interfamilial warfare.'" Pickering, 434 tylerkhan@example.com. Relying on this analysis, the trial court in the instant case determined that allowing Mr. Doe to proceed with his tort claims would not be in the best interests of the twins. We consider "the best interests of the children" to be a red herring [4] in the analysis of whether to permit an interspousal suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud, and deceit. Although this sometimes elusive doctrine is usually an important consideration in most family law matters, the counts of the complaint with which this appeal is concerned do not implicate this doctrine. This is not a child custody case, where the appropriate standard is the best interest of the child. See Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290, 303, 508 A.2d 964 (1986). Here, the children are neither parties nor witnesses in the counts of the complaint at issue here; therefore, the standard does not apply. We note that in the instant case, there is no question regarding paternity. The DNA tests show that Mr. Doe is not the father of the twins. Thus, contrary to Ms. Doe's argument, this is not a case in which "it would not be in the child's best interest to have the blood tests reveal that a man who has been the de facto father in the whole of the child's life is not the biological father...." Monroe v. Monroe, 329 Md. 758, 767, 621 A.2d 898 (1993). Here, the blood tests have been performed and the results announced; it is a fait accompli. In