osevic would not enter the bargaining with the Americans. Now he is offering, in the form of the recognition of Bosnia, exactly that used story about the unification in the exchange for the lifting of sanctions. He did not succeed, but that job will be concluded, sooner or later. He only has to persuade those that don't believe anything he says that he will not deal anymore in unification and similar great endeavors and that he is slowly dismantling what he has done so far, as long as he cannot return everything into the state it was in before.
Milosevic's problem is that he cannot find a good replacement for unification. He is not even offered a role of the "Lifter" of sanctions; to become a half-pardoned criminal instead of a Unifier, doesn't look well, it seems. It could even become risky. remnants of the myth about victory and treason.
All this, after Serbs have made a common stand behind Milosevic, five-six years ago, like never before. In the manner in which people could agree only about evil: when they are getting ready to commit evil and when they are promised that it will pay off and even be sanctified. To see where that leads, continues Cerovic, they only needed to look at some old German and Italian documentaries. From greatest unity come remnants of the myth about victory and treason.
Easily planned and nicely drawn big Serbian state now comprises tree, or five, mainly temporary and provisionary parts. There is no more one leader, but everywhere two or three, which are trying to stab each other in the back. There will definitely be no unification, even Knin and Pale are barely holding and are loosing faith in the future. Serbia has still not definitely defined its western borders, and it still does not know what it will do with Kosovo, so that this formless and chaotic state is run by sheer inspiration.Even the strength of the union with Montenegro is equal to the authority of the federal president Zoran Lilic.
The current outcome is known, and the perspective could only be a little or a lot worse. All Serbian leaders, and hopefully a good part of the people, are now undoubtedly aware of that. That is why the renewed story of unification seems unreal and fake. It is, by all probability, only another desperate bluff which has to extend the life of those small, temporary statesmen of the type as Martic and Karadzic, and to create an impression that they are still in the game and that they are still making some moves, even off the board.
By the number of announcements of unification, says Cerovic, Serbs are starting to resemble Arabic countries. The manner around here have acquired much of an oriental flavour: a little bit of fighting, a little bit of brotherhood, swearing, playing hurt and unification.
This time, they say, it is serious. The parliament in Banja Luka was delighted and unanimous, which is particularly suspicious. From those acclamations, nothing came to be. And, haven't the Bosnian Serbs shown how much the Serbian unity lies on their hearts, while the Croats have conducted "peaceful re-integration" of Western Slavonia. If they were for it, they could have attempted the unification while they stood better and were on the rise, and their opponents still attempting to consolidate themselves.
But, everybody wanted his own duchy, and besides that, they depended too much on Milosevic who was putting on the brakes, since he coldly calculated out that the unification would draw him into a big war, with good chances that he would draw the big world powers on his back and loose it.
Karadzic and Martic are now speaking about unification not because of delight but out of fear. Not that the Serbs would live happily together, but that they would be able to save their skin. In a situations like these, the statesmen of their "qualities" and scruples will only look how to trick one another, at which the one that is stronger comes out as the more skilfully one.
Karadzic would definitely like to take over from Krajina the arms and the militarily able part of the population. He is not interested in the rest, the least to pick a fight with the Croats. The perspective of such a unification would amount to move of Martic and his company to the Bosnian side and a gradual delivery of Krajina to Croatia, probably under the conditions worse than they would get without the unification and in cooperation with international arbiters.
This unification, besides not being able to save or make things better, actually leads towards departure from Krajina, but also represents spitting in the face of the whole international community and all those that have spent all that money, energy, prestige and political capital in the search of a compromise plan and peaceful solution. If one talks about national treason, I don't see anybody who can outdo these unifiers. I also can't see, says Cerovic, who can Karadzic plan the unification and at the same time send a message to the world that he is ready to discuss the contact group plan.
Even though he might recognize Bosnia and Croatia, it is not certain that Milosevic has given up on the unification. He is probably hoping, or would like to promise that this will be a part of his long term strategy, but first of all he has to upgrade the relations with the world. People close to him think that in Bosnia the most important and the hardest part of the job has already been done and that the Serbs could stop shooting now.
In the future, it seems, it would be enough that they refuse any cooperation, boycott every agreement, to play stupid and impossible to handle, until everybody gets sick of them and lets them go wherever they want. Cerovic says that he does not think that this could succeed, and that he does not understand why somebody would want such unification and such a state which would owe its existence solely to its being civilisationally indigestible.
Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme", May 29, 1994.
The authors state that many think that the basic motive of this turbo unification of the Serbs on the other side of the Drina river is in the attempt to prevent Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic to recognize the international borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Actually, if the recognition is to come about, Pale would be forced, sooner or later, to accept the peace plan of the contact group and most on what Krajina could ount on is a high level of autonomy in Croatia within the Z-4 plan.
With the unification, the leaders there will attempt to prove, as Karadzic has stated at one point, "that Serbian politics is not being conducted from one center", and that, no matter what is accepted by the Serbian president, nothing will change in the field, and the escalation of the war would become completely inevitable. If they succeed in their intentions, significant reduction or lifting of the sanctions which Milosevic is attempting to forge, would become an irrelevant subject.
What is interesting also,the authors write, is the reaction from Belgrade to Karadzic's statement that he is ready "to treat the plan of the contact group as the basis for negotiations". He was brushed off, and told that there is no need for him to "treat it" in any manner, but to accept it as the official Belgrade and the international community expect of him. All this happened, as it was informally found out, after a recent meeting between Milosevic and Karadzic and Momcilo Krajisnik (president of the Bosnian Serb parliament). At that meeting, they were not asked anymore to accept the contact group maps, but, if they really wish anything good to happen to their people, to resign.
On the Knin side, many think that the initiative for the unification came from the newly appointed prime minister, and former foreign minister Milan Babic (leader of the strongest party in Krajina), because he wanted to preempt a possible military coup by president Milan Martic.
According to another interpretation, it is an attempt of Babic to secure some form or other of existence of Krajina outside of Croatia, when the Bosnian Serbs accept the contact group maps - after the unification, Karadzic can, as a condition for the mentioned acceptance, demand the remaining of Krajina in the joint state. Maybe not in its entirety, but a big part of it, which would probably dampen the dissatisfaction in the Bosnian Serb state.
According to this interpretation, Croatia would find its compensation in Eastern Slavonia, for which Knin and Pale are not interested in.
Actually, the unification of Serbs across Drina into a state which should be called "United Serb Krajina", beyond allthe bragging of the leaders over there, particularly Karadzic, show more for the final breakdown of the project called "all Serbs in one state" than its renaissance.
One of the key reasons for that is the atmosphere in Serbia, where there is no more readiness to involve itself into the war for their "brethren". This could be also sent from the fact that the oppositionary block gave the unification idea a very lukewarm support. Furthermore, the Serbs across Drina are weakening more and more militarily, while the Croatian and Bosnian army are strengthening, so they would neither be able to win the war or continue it indefinitely; from the beginning of the year, actually, they have only been going through defeats.
Along with that, the population there is exhausted by the war to continue with the blood