 at the start of the Second World War and subsequently. Earlier archaeological monuments do appear to have been removed during the construction of the airfield. The Ark tea room and Rifle Volunteers pub were amongst these, together with the eponymous Bury's Bank linear earthwork and some 19th century rifle butts. Any pre-Second World War monuments and artefacts that remain are therefore vital in terms of what they can tell us about the common prior to that date and back into prehistory.
A Heritage Management Plan (HEMP) has been produced (2011) for Greenham and Crookham Commons as part of the Higher Level Stewardship agreement.
In essence the plan highlights the key historic environment features surviving on the commons, and the land use practices which created and sustained them. It provides an overall assessment of any potential conflicts in the management of the historic environment features with other interests on the commons.
This will enable us to better conserve historic features on the common and to avoid any potential damage caused by other management activities or visitor pressure. It may also provide opportunities for interpretation of some of the more notable or visible features.
Incorporate the findings and recommendations of the Historic Environment Management Plan 2011 (HEMP) into this Management Plan. The HEMP can be downloaded as a pdf file from the Appendices page.
Using the HEMP and West Berkshire Council's Historic Environment Record, follow the recommendations for management of each historic feature in order to conserve and enhance it, taking into account the nature conservation value of the site and the habitat management prescriptions for the relevant compartment.
Select those historic features or any collection of related features identified in the HEMP that would aid understanding of the historic processes at work on the common. Provide some form of interpretive information on them either within planned on-site interpretation or leaflets (see Education page) or in the form of an additional interpretive panel and/or leaflet.
Continue to promote the significance of the common in terms of its built heritage through on-site interpretation, website and events. We start by cycling in a part of Wadi Hanifa and enjoying the scenery there. After that, we will head to Munira Center and enjoy the horse show and feeding. Our journey will end with a yoga session in which we relax and restore the spiritual balance of our bodies.Readers should be made well aware that Doug Beattie is retired and has not accepted, and will not accept, any compensation for the reports he has written. Once compensation comes into the equation, it takes away some of his editorial liberty and would likely cause him to become very cautious with what he has to say.
Secondly, with respect to the zinc modules in particular, he has based his assessment on publicly available information only, hence he does not have the "inside angle" that analysts at the brokerages, traders etc. have. Since most of these modules were written over two years ago, many of the links are no longer functional.
The uranium work is largely based on recollections since he no longer keeps a library of information, apart from what is publicly available.
That these reports are often on the whimsical side and readers should bear this in mind.
That Doug has given me permission to republish.
Doug Beattie is a retired Chief Mine Engineer of Cameco, one of the largest uranium producers in the world, and is knowledgeable on uranium mines and mining. He also spent approximately eight of his 30+ years in the mining business working as an engineer at zinc mines including Noranda’s Geco copper/zinc/silver mine in northern Ontario, and Glencore’s George Fisher and McArthur River zinc/lead/silver mines in northern Australia. Doug Beattie graduated in mining engineering at Queen’s University.
After working as a mining engineer in Saskatchewan, Ontario and Australia, he joined Cameco Corporation in 1993 as Senior Mining Engineer at the McArthur River exploration project. He later became Engineering Superintendent during the construction phase, and Mine Superintendent during the ramp-up to full production. In 2002 he became the Corporate Chief Mine Engineer at Cameco’s head office where he was largely involved in uranium project assessments and studies. He then consulted on a number of projects in Canada and Europe before full retirement in 2015.
I read somewhere that between 400 and 500 uranium companies sprung up out of the woodwork during the ramp up in spot uranium prices in the mid-2000’s. The vast majority of these firms were explorers who would hope to gain from the ability to raise funds in the stock markets easily. Uranium was the flavor of the month, or in this case a couple years, similar to lithium and cobalt recently. You can see the reason why in the graph below, created by UxC.
I have all the time in the world for explorers (though I seldom buy their stock). The mining industry would be no where today without them. Many of these companies, however, had projects that were well fleshed out during previous rounds of exploration. Much of this exploration took place during the Cold War when a commercial uranium market did not exist. In this case, mines operated on more or less a cost-plus basis. In other words, the miners were guaranteed a profit. This is how a large portion of previous US uranium production operated for instance which, as a by-product, has led to a very good understanding of what remains in the ground there today. The US government in fact operated a number of uranium mills during the Cold War.
The problem many of the advanced projects had in the mid-2000’s was a lack of potential buyers for their project. Almost all of these companies had no intention of ever building and operating a uranium mine. There were very honorable exceptions including Paladin Resources and Ur-Energy to name a couple. I tip my hat to these guys. Many projects had advanced to the pre-feasibility study or feasibility study phase. But without a potential buyer (there was quite a beauty contest being run by multiple companies at that time), the owners had no way to monetize their holdings. Enter Areva and the aggregators.
The fundamental problem with the steep run-up in the spot uranium price in the mid-2000’s was that it was largely driven to those heights by hedge fund speculation, not utility supply/consumption fundamentals. Utilities appeared to have panicked in the face of this and over contracted in the term market. They brought forward demand. I imagine a hedge fund manager could pay themselves a nice annual bonus based on the increase in the book value of their uranium inventory but there comes a time where they have to monetize this uranium by selling it to a utility or other trader and this is when the rubber truly hit the road, particularly in light of the financial crisis that then occurred. Goldman Sachs for instance probably took a hit in the hundreds of millions disposing of their uranium.
It should be noted that numerous commodities were ramping up in price prior to the financial crisis. Uranium is somewhat of a special case though since its lack of liquidity was ripe for exploitation by hedge funds. I see a handful are making similar type noises today.
The frenzy in the stock market therefore was being driven in large part by hedge fund speculation in the uranium spot market. Companies such as Cameco were looked upon as a bunch of prima donna's since we had already forward sold our uranium for a fraction of the current spot price.
Analysts/journalists/investors did not, and probably still do not, understand the subtleties of the uranium markets. Utilities source most of their uranium in the term market whereas the spot market is largely the playground for the traders and opportunists. The press we received was not pretty and here is some of it….
To get an understanding of the sort of beating Cameco was taking publicly at the time, the difference between spot and long term pricing is illustrated here….
The boom in uranium stocks was aided and abetted by the likes of Energy Metals, Uranium One and Areva. The key difference between Cameco’s actions and those mentioned above was the perception of what the long-term uranium price was going forward.
For instance, it is my understanding that Areva was utilizing a long-term uranium price of $100/lb in their assessment of projects. Meanwhile, Cameco was utilizing a uranium price of roughly $50/lb.
The role Energy Metals and Uranium One played in the boom is that they acted as uranium property aggregators. I believe the term Wall Street uses is that they were “roll up companies”. They used their stock as a currency to acquire numerous properties. Energy Metals listed 33 separate uranium properties in their last quarterly report prior to being folded into Uranium One. A roll up company being rolled up themselves.
 That is how many managed to monetize their property.
And while all this is going on, the sell side analysts at the brokerages are just egging it on daily with glowing reports.
Areva’s motivation in this process appeared to me, to not get in the situation that Westinghouse found themselves in in the 1970’s. Areva was actively trying to sell nuclear reactors to various entities around the world. My understanding was that they were guaranteeing the supply of nuclear fuel to these reactors for their working life as part of the sales pitch.
The problem is, Westinghouse made the same promise in the 1970’s but did not have the uranium in the ground to mine and deliver. When the price of uranium rose to $41/lb. in the late 1970’s the 72 Mlb. of U3O8 Westinghouse had promised to deliver for $10/lb. almost led to their bankruptcy.
So, in my mind, this was why Areva went on an acquisition spree during the mid-2000’s boom