 = data.resources;
            var filtered;
            filtered  = $filter('filter')(courseResources, {type: 'pdf'});
            filtered = $filter('filter')(filtered, {isDeleted: false});
            $scope.pdfCount = filtered.length;

            var filtered2;
            filtered2 = $filter('filter')(courseResources, {isDeleted: false}).length;
            $scope.videoCount = filtered2 - filtered.length;
            $http.get('/api/my-course/my-discussion-status').success(function (data) {
                var myDiscussionStatus  = data.myDiscussionStatus;
                var filtered;
                filtered = $filter('filter')(myDiscussionStatus, {isDeleted: false});
                $scope.myDiscussionStatus = filtered.length;
                $scope.courseActivityData = [ $scope.pdfCount, $scope.videoCount, $scope.myDiscussionStatus];
            });
        });

        
    }]);
If airline groups can be thought of as families, then profitable British Airways is the strait-laced older sister of the petulant, unreliable and loss-making Iberia. BA has learnt from its hedonistic, free-spending youth and matured into the sensible, trustworthy one. Parents are not meant to have favourites, but it is clear that IAG looks on BA with a glint in the parental eye, while Iberia is constantly being scolded. IAG refuses to buy its irresponsible Spanish child any new toys until it mends its ways, while it now trusts her British sister with shiny new 787s and A350s.
Nevertheless, BA should not allow itself to feel too smug. It remains much more dependent on a single hub (Heathrow) and on a single intercontinental market (North America), but less connected to domestic and European markets than its peers. Moreover, cost benchmarking points to the need for a reduction in CASK, which it has not managed since before the merger. As any parent knows, it is not just the children that are most visibly struggling that need attention.
In contrast to its sister carrier Iberia, British Airways has enjoyed a period of growth under IAG ownership after many years of decline. From 2001 to 2010, BA’s annual passenger numbers fell from 39 million to just short of 31 million. Numbers have risen in each of the post merger years, reaching almost 38 million in 2012, while Iberia's capacity has been cut.
Within the context of an overall capacity cut for IAG in 2013, the group plans to increase BA’s capacity, in ASK terms, by almost 3%. This would take its share of IAG’s total ASK capacity from 69% in 2010, the year before the merger, to 76% in 2013 (excluding Vueling).
Historical BA traffic figures that show passengers by region up until 2010, demonstrate that the decline in passenger numbers during the 2000s was almost entirely due to falling numbers on short/medium-haul routes, although this remains its most important region in passenger numbers. In UK/Europe, its passenger numbers fell from 27.6 million in 2001 to 18.4 million in 2010, while the Americas saw an increase from 6.8 to 7.3 million. Asia-Pacific also saw a decline, from 1.8 million to 1.4 million, while Africa and Middle East saw growth from 2.8 million to 3.5 million.
BA’s decline on short/medium-haul routes was accompanied by the disposal or closure of a number of subsidiary companies in this segment, including Deutsche BA, BA Citi Express and BA Connect. BA also ceased franchise operations with franchisees BMED and GB Airways. It seemed that low-cost competition was persuading it to abandon all but hub feeder routes and a few niche point-to-point routes between key business destinations. Its own experiment with setting up an LCC, Go, ended in a management buy out and subsequent sale to easyJet (the latter also eventually bought BA franchisee GB Airways).
In ASK terms, the Americas region (mainly North America) has remained BA’s most important region, while UK/Europe and Asia-Pacific have declined in importance. By 2007, UK/Europe had slipped to third place among BA’s regions ranked by ASKs, behind Africa and Middle East.
As a result of BA’s falling passenger numbers through the 2000s, its share of scheduled passenger numbers at UK airports fell from 21% in 2001 to 16% in 2010, before its resurgence under IAG saw its share climb to 17% in 2011 and, helped by the bmi acquisition, to 18% in 2012. BA no longer separately reports its regional traffic data, so it is not possible to determine which regions have driven this resurgence (although OAG data suggest that BA has been growing again in Europe, even before the bmi acquisition after heavy cuts in the 2009-2010 period; and that is has grown capacity on North America).
A comparison with the other two major European legacy flag carriers shows that BA has a much smaller share of the aviation market in the UK than either of Lufthansa or Air France in their home country markets. Using Innovata data for the week of 20-May-2013, BA has 20% of seats in the UK, while Lufthansa has 38% in Germany (43% with Germanwings) and Air France has 36% in France. Fellow IAG carrier Iberia has only 13% in Spain (25% with Vueling).
BA is the most international of the big flag carriers, which means its network is the least domestic-focused. For BA, the domestic market accounts for just 16% of seats, while this figure is 21% for Lufthansa and 33% for Air France. For Iberia, it is 49%, even after some years of domestic capacity cuts, underlining the threat it faces in Spain, the most competitive of markets.
BA also has the lowest proportion of its traffic on domestic/European routes among the four large flag carriers, with 64% of seats within the continent of Europe, compared with 80% for Lufthansa, 71% for Air France and 78% for Iberia. Again, this reflects the decline in BA’s short/medium-haul activities and also the strength of London Heathrow as an O&D market requiring less feed than rival hubs such as Frankfurt. Lufthansa’s seat capacity is not particularly domestic-focused, but it is very Europe-focused. This reflects the much weaker status of Frankfurt as an O&D market, with the result that Lufthansa has to gather traffic from across Europe in order to sustain its long-haul network.
Almost half of BA’s intercontinental seat capacity is to North America, making it much more exposed to a single market than either of Lufthansa or Air France. It has a lower proportion of its seats in Asia than the other two and a higher proportion in the Middle East. Perhaps these two factors, plus BA’s lower dependence on transfer traffic, help to explain why it has tended to sound more relaxed about Gulf carrier competition than Lufthansa or Air France. Air France has the most diversified intercontinental network of the three, with a similar proportion of seats on North America, Latin America, Asia and Africa.
BA’s focus on North America, together with the strong London market and capacity constraints at Heathrow, have helped to give it a profitable and defendable niche. However, this has also made it vulnerable to any weakness in the trans-Atlantic, a situation that has been helped by recent capacity constraint and the immunised alliances in this market. The merger with Iberia added strength in Latin America, but IAG still has a relatively low proportion of seats in Asia.
BA is highly dependent on its Heathrow hub, with Gatwick taking less than one sixth of the number of BA seats at the main hub. The decline in short/medium-haul traffic through the 2000s, referred to above, was accompanied by a refocusing of most of BA’s hub traffic on Heathrow and a reduction in BA’s Gatwick operations to focus on point-to-point routes.
The dependence on Heathrow is much greater than either Lufthansa or Air France have at their main hubs. While BA has six times the number of seats at Heathrow as at Gatwick, Air France has less than three times the number of seats at its CDG hub compared with Orly and, for Lufthansa, the ratio between Frankfurt and Munich is around one and a half times.
BA has steadily grown its share of slots at London Heathrow by buying slots on the market where possible. Its share moved from the high 30% region to the low 40% region through the first decade of the century and jumped to 51% in the summer 2013 schedule as a result of its acquisition of bmi. With Iberia and oneworld partner American Airlines, its share is 55%.
See related report: Heathrow Airport’s slot machine: hitting the jackpot again?
At Gatwick the trend has been the opposite. BA’s slot holding has fallen from 32% in summer 2003 to 16% in summer 2013. At the same time, easyJet's share has grown from just under 7% to 41%.
Flybe is in discussions that may lead to its selling its Gatwick slots, of which it owns 6%. Ryanair is known to have expressed interest in bidding for them and it seems reasonable to assume that easyJet will also be interested in extending its leading position