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Mar 14

Beyond First-Order Tweedie: Solving Inverse Problems using Latent Diffusion

Sampling from the posterior distribution poses a major computational challenge in solving inverse problems using latent diffusion models. Common methods rely on Tweedie's first-order moments, which are known to induce a quality-limiting bias. Existing second-order approximations are impractical due to prohibitive computational costs, making standard reverse diffusion processes intractable for posterior sampling. This paper introduces Second-order Tweedie sampler from Surrogate Loss (STSL), a novel sampler that offers efficiency comparable to first-order Tweedie with a tractable reverse process using second-order approximation. Our theoretical results reveal that the second-order approximation is lower bounded by our surrogate loss that only requires O(1) compute using the trace of the Hessian, and by the lower bound we derive a new drift term to make the reverse process tractable. Our method surpasses SoTA solvers PSLD and P2L, achieving 4X and 8X reduction in neural function evaluations, respectively, while notably enhancing sampling quality on FFHQ, ImageNet, and COCO benchmarks. In addition, we show STSL extends to text-guided image editing and addresses residual distortions present from corrupted images in leading text-guided image editing methods. To our best knowledge, this is the first work to offer an efficient second-order approximation in solving inverse problems using latent diffusion and editing real-world images with corruptions.

AttackGNN: Red-Teaming GNNs in Hardware Security Using Reinforcement Learning

Machine learning has shown great promise in addressing several critical hardware security problems. In particular, researchers have developed novel graph neural network (GNN)-based techniques for detecting intellectual property (IP) piracy, detecting hardware Trojans (HTs), and reverse engineering circuits, to name a few. These techniques have demonstrated outstanding accuracy and have received much attention in the community. However, since these techniques are used for security applications, it is imperative to evaluate them thoroughly and ensure they are robust and do not compromise the security of integrated circuits. In this work, we propose AttackGNN, the first red-team attack on GNN-based techniques in hardware security. To this end, we devise a novel reinforcement learning (RL) agent that generates adversarial examples, i.e., circuits, against the GNN-based techniques. We overcome three challenges related to effectiveness, scalability, and generality to devise a potent RL agent. We target five GNN-based techniques for four crucial classes of problems in hardware security: IP piracy, detecting/localizing HTs, reverse engineering, and hardware obfuscation. Through our approach, we craft circuits that fool all GNNs considered in this work. For instance, to evade IP piracy detection, we generate adversarial pirated circuits that fool the GNN-based defense into classifying our crafted circuits as not pirated. For attacking HT localization GNN, our attack generates HT-infested circuits that fool the defense on all tested circuits. We obtain a similar 100% success rate against GNNs for all classes of problems.

The Reversal Curse: LLMs trained on "A is B" fail to learn "B is A"

We expose a surprising failure of generalization in auto-regressive large language models (LLMs). If a model is trained on a sentence of the form "A is B", it will not automatically generalize to the reverse direction "B is A". This is the Reversal Curse. For instance, if a model is trained on "Olaf Scholz was the ninth Chancellor of Germany", it will not automatically be able to answer the question, "Who was the ninth Chancellor of Germany?". Moreover, the likelihood of the correct answer ("Olaf Scholz") will not be higher than for a random name. Thus, models exhibit a basic failure of logical deduction and do not generalize a prevalent pattern in their training set (i.e. if "A is B'' occurs, "B is A" is more likely to occur). We provide evidence for the Reversal Curse by finetuning GPT-3 and Llama-1 on fictitious statements such as "Uriah Hawthorne is the composer of 'Abyssal Melodies'" and showing that they fail to correctly answer "Who composed 'Abyssal Melodies?'". The Reversal Curse is robust across model sizes and model families and is not alleviated by data augmentation. We also evaluate ChatGPT (GPT-3.5 and GPT-4) on questions about real-world celebrities, such as "Who is Tom Cruise's mother? [A: Mary Lee Pfeiffer]" and the reverse "Who is Mary Lee Pfeiffer's son?". GPT-4 correctly answers questions like the former 79% of the time, compared to 33% for the latter. This shows a failure of logical deduction that we hypothesize is caused by the Reversal Curse. Code is available at https://github.com/lukasberglund/reversal_curse.