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Mar 14

Put Your Money Where Your Mouth Is: Evaluating Strategic Planning and Execution of LLM Agents in an Auction Arena

Can Large Language Models (LLMs) simulate human behavior in complex environments? LLMs have recently been shown to exhibit advanced reasoning skills but much of NLP evaluation still relies on static benchmarks. Answering this requires evaluation environments that probe strategic reasoning in competitive, dynamic scenarios that involve long-term planning. We introduce AucArena, a novel simulation environment for evaluating LLMs within auctions, a setting chosen for being highly unpredictable and involving many skills related to resource and risk management, while also being easy to evaluate. We conduct several controlled simulations using state-of-the-art LLMs as bidding agents. We find that through simple prompting, LLMs do indeed demonstrate many of the skills needed for effectively engaging in auctions (e.g., managing budget, adhering to long-term goals and priorities), skills that we find can be sharpened by explicitly encouraging models to be adaptive and observe strategies in past auctions. These results are significant as they show the potential of using LLM agents to model intricate social dynamics, especially in competitive settings. However, we also observe considerable variability in the capabilities of individual LLMs. Notably, even our most advanced models (GPT-4) are occasionally surpassed by heuristic baselines and human agents, highlighting the potential for further improvements in the design of LLM agents and the important role that our simulation environment can play in further testing and refining agent architectures.

Can Large Language Models Serve as Rational Players in Game Theory? A Systematic Analysis

Game theory, as an analytical tool, is frequently utilized to analyze human behavior in social science research. With the high alignment between the behavior of Large Language Models (LLMs) and humans, a promising research direction is to employ LLMs as substitutes for humans in game experiments, enabling social science research. However, despite numerous empirical researches on the combination of LLMs and game theory, the capability boundaries of LLMs in game theory remain unclear. In this research, we endeavor to systematically analyze LLMs in the context of game theory. Specifically, rationality, as the fundamental principle of game theory, serves as the metric for evaluating players' behavior -- building a clear desire, refining belief about uncertainty, and taking optimal actions. Accordingly, we select three classical games (dictator game, Rock-Paper-Scissors, and ring-network game) to analyze to what extent LLMs can achieve rationality in these three aspects. The experimental results indicate that even the current state-of-the-art LLM (GPT-4) exhibits substantial disparities compared to humans in game theory. For instance, LLMs struggle to build desires based on uncommon preferences, fail to refine belief from many simple patterns, and may overlook or modify refined belief when taking actions. Therefore, we consider that introducing LLMs into game experiments in the field of social science should be approached with greater caution.

Enhancing Human Experience in Human-Agent Collaboration: A Human-Centered Modeling Approach Based on Positive Human Gain

Existing game AI research mainly focuses on enhancing agents' abilities to win games, but this does not inherently make humans have a better experience when collaborating with these agents. For example, agents may dominate the collaboration and exhibit unintended or detrimental behaviors, leading to poor experiences for their human partners. In other words, most game AI agents are modeled in a "self-centered" manner. In this paper, we propose a "human-centered" modeling scheme for collaborative agents that aims to enhance the experience of humans. Specifically, we model the experience of humans as the goals they expect to achieve during the task. We expect that agents should learn to enhance the extent to which humans achieve these goals while maintaining agents' original abilities (e.g., winning games). To achieve this, we propose the Reinforcement Learning from Human Gain (RLHG) approach. The RLHG approach introduces a "baseline", which corresponds to the extent to which humans primitively achieve their goals, and encourages agents to learn behaviors that can effectively enhance humans in achieving their goals better. We evaluate the RLHG agent in the popular Multi-player Online Battle Arena (MOBA) game, Honor of Kings, by conducting real-world human-agent tests. Both objective performance and subjective preference results show that the RLHG agent provides participants better gaming experience.

Playing repeated games with Large Language Models

Large Language Models (LLMs) are transforming society and permeating into diverse applications. As a result, LLMs will frequently interact with us and other agents. It is, therefore, of great societal value to understand how LLMs behave in interactive social settings. Here, we propose to use behavioral game theory to study LLM's cooperation and coordination behavior. To do so, we let different LLMs (GPT-3, GPT-3.5, and GPT-4) play finitely repeated games with each other and with other, human-like strategies. Our results show that LLMs generally perform well in such tasks and also uncover persistent behavioral signatures. In a large set of two players-two strategies games, we find that LLMs are particularly good at games where valuing their own self-interest pays off, like the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma family. However, they behave sub-optimally in games that require coordination. We, therefore, further focus on two games from these distinct families. In the canonical iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, we find that GPT-4 acts particularly unforgivingly, always defecting after another agent has defected only once. In the Battle of the Sexes, we find that GPT-4 cannot match the behavior of the simple convention to alternate between options. We verify that these behavioral signatures are stable across robustness checks. Finally, we show how GPT-4's behavior can be modified by providing further information about the other player as well as by asking it to predict the other player's actions before making a choice. These results enrich our understanding of LLM's social behavior and pave the way for a behavioral game theory for machines.

Explaining Large Language Models Decisions Using Shapley Values

The emergence of large language models (LLMs) has opened up exciting possibilities for simulating human behavior and cognitive processes, with potential applications in various domains, including marketing research and consumer behavior analysis. However, the validity of utilizing LLMs as stand-ins for human subjects remains uncertain due to glaring divergences that suggest fundamentally different underlying processes at play and the sensitivity of LLM responses to prompt variations. This paper presents a novel approach based on Shapley values from cooperative game theory to interpret LLM behavior and quantify the relative contribution of each prompt component to the model's output. Through two applications - a discrete choice experiment and an investigation of cognitive biases - we demonstrate how the Shapley value method can uncover what we term "token noise" effects, a phenomenon where LLM decisions are disproportionately influenced by tokens providing minimal informative content. This phenomenon raises concerns about the robustness and generalizability of insights obtained from LLMs in the context of human behavior simulation. Our model-agnostic approach extends its utility to proprietary LLMs, providing a valuable tool for practitioners and researchers to strategically optimize prompts and mitigate apparent cognitive biases. Our findings underscore the need for a more nuanced understanding of the factors driving LLM responses before relying on them as substitutes for human subjects in survey settings. We emphasize the importance of researchers reporting results conditioned on specific prompt templates and exercising caution when drawing parallels between human behavior and LLMs.

Aligning Superhuman AI with Human Behavior: Chess as a Model System

As artificial intelligence becomes increasingly intelligent---in some cases, achieving superhuman performance---there is growing potential for humans to learn from and collaborate with algorithms. However, the ways in which AI systems approach problems are often different from the ways people do, and thus may be uninterpretable and hard to learn from. A crucial step in bridging this gap between human and artificial intelligence is modeling the granular actions that constitute human behavior, rather than simply matching aggregate human performance. We pursue this goal in a model system with a long history in artificial intelligence: chess. The aggregate performance of a chess player unfolds as they make decisions over the course of a game. The hundreds of millions of games played online by players at every skill level form a rich source of data in which these decisions, and their exact context, are recorded in minute detail. Applying existing chess engines to this data, including an open-source implementation of AlphaZero, we find that they do not predict human moves well. We develop and introduce Maia, a customized version of Alpha-Zero trained on human chess games, that predicts human moves at a much higher accuracy than existing engines, and can achieve maximum accuracy when predicting decisions made by players at a specific skill level in a tuneable way. For a dual task of predicting whether a human will make a large mistake on the next move, we develop a deep neural network that significantly outperforms competitive baselines. Taken together, our results suggest that there is substantial promise in designing artificial intelligence systems with human collaboration in mind by first accurately modeling granular human decision-making.

Leveraging Domain Knowledge for Efficient Reward Modelling in RLHF: A Case-Study in E-Commerce Opinion Summarization

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) has become a dominating strategy in steering Language Models (LMs) towards human values/goals. The key to the strategy is employing a reward model ({varphi}) which can reflect a latent reward model with humans. While this strategy has proven to be effective, the training methodology requires a lot of human preference annotation (usually of the order of tens of thousands) to train {varphi}. Such large-scale preference annotations can be achievable if the reward model can be ubiquitously used. However, human values/goals are subjective and depend on the nature of the task. This poses a challenge in collecting diverse preferences for downstream applications. To address this, we propose a novel methodology to infuse domain knowledge into {varphi}, which reduces the size of preference annotation required. We validate our approach in E-Commerce Opinion Summarization, with a significant reduction in dataset size (just 940 samples) while advancing the state-of-the-art. Our contributions include a novel Reward Modelling technique, a new dataset (PromptOpinSumm) for Opinion Summarization, and a human preference dataset (OpinPref). The proposed methodology opens avenues for efficient RLHF, making it more adaptable to diverse applications with varying human values. We release the artifacts for usage under MIT License.

Frontier Models are Capable of In-context Scheming

Frontier models are increasingly trained and deployed as autonomous agent. One safety concern is that AI agents might covertly pursue misaligned goals, hiding their true capabilities and objectives - also known as scheming. We study whether models have the capability to scheme in pursuit of a goal that we provide in-context and instruct the model to strongly follow. We evaluate frontier models on a suite of six agentic evaluations where models are instructed to pursue goals and are placed in environments that incentivize scheming. Our results show that o1, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Claude 3 Opus, Gemini 1.5 Pro, and Llama 3.1 405B all demonstrate in-context scheming capabilities. They recognize scheming as a viable strategy and readily engage in such behavior. For example, models strategically introduce subtle mistakes into their responses, attempt to disable their oversight mechanisms, and even exfiltrate what they believe to be their model weights to external servers. Additionally, this deceptive behavior proves persistent. When o1 has engaged in scheming, it maintains its deception in over 85% of follow-up questions and often remains deceptive in multi-turn interrogations. Analysis of the models' chains-of-thought reveals that models explicitly reason about these deceptive strategies, providing evidence that the scheming behavior is not accidental. Surprisingly, we also find rare instances where models engage in scheming when only given a goal, without being strongly nudged to pursue it. We observe cases where Claude 3.5 Sonnet strategically underperforms in evaluations in pursuit of being helpful, a goal that was acquired during training rather than in-context. Our findings demonstrate that frontier models now possess capabilities for basic in-context scheming, making the potential of AI agents to engage in scheming behavior a concrete rather than theoretical concern.

Sleeper Agents: Training Deceptive LLMs that Persist Through Safety Training

Humans are capable of strategically deceptive behavior: behaving helpfully in most situations, but then behaving very differently in order to pursue alternative objectives when given the opportunity. If an AI system learned such a deceptive strategy, could we detect it and remove it using current state-of-the-art safety training techniques? To study this question, we construct proof-of-concept examples of deceptive behavior in large language models (LLMs). For example, we train models that write secure code when the prompt states that the year is 2023, but insert exploitable code when the stated year is 2024. We find that such backdoored behavior can be made persistent, so that it is not removed by standard safety training techniques, including supervised fine-tuning, reinforcement learning, and adversarial training (eliciting unsafe behavior and then training to remove it). The backdoored behavior is most persistent in the largest models and in models trained to produce chain-of-thought reasoning about deceiving the training process, with the persistence remaining even when the chain-of-thought is distilled away. Furthermore, rather than removing backdoors, we find that adversarial training can teach models to better recognize their backdoor triggers, effectively hiding the unsafe behavior. Our results suggest that, once a model exhibits deceptive behavior, standard techniques could fail to remove such deception and create a false impression of safety.

GLEE: A Unified Framework and Benchmark for Language-based Economic Environments

Large Language Models (LLMs) show significant potential in economic and strategic interactions, where communication via natural language is often prevalent. This raises key questions: Do LLMs behave rationally? Can they mimic human behavior? Do they tend to reach an efficient and fair outcome? What is the role of natural language in the strategic interaction? How do characteristics of the economic environment influence these dynamics? These questions become crucial concerning the economic and societal implications of integrating LLM-based agents into real-world data-driven systems, such as online retail platforms and recommender systems. While the ML community has been exploring the potential of LLMs in such multi-agent setups, varying assumptions, design choices and evaluation criteria across studies make it difficult to draw robust and meaningful conclusions. To address this, we introduce a benchmark for standardizing research on two-player, sequential, language-based games. Inspired by the economic literature, we define three base families of games with consistent parameterization, degrees of freedom and economic measures to evaluate agents' performance (self-gain), as well as the game outcome (efficiency and fairness). We develop an open-source framework for interaction simulation and analysis, and utilize it to collect a dataset of LLM vs. LLM interactions across numerous game configurations and an additional dataset of human vs. LLM interactions. Through extensive experimentation, we demonstrate how our framework and dataset can be used to: (i) compare the behavior of LLM-based agents to human players in various economic contexts; (ii) evaluate agents in both individual and collective performance measures; and (iii) quantify the effect of the economic characteristics of the environments on the behavior of agents.

Large Language Models Assume People are More Rational than We Really are

In order for AI systems to communicate effectively with people, they must understand how we make decisions. However, people's decisions are not always rational, so the implicit internal models of human decision-making in Large Language Models (LLMs) must account for this. Previous empirical evidence seems to suggest that these implicit models are accurate -- LLMs offer believable proxies of human behavior, acting how we expect humans would in everyday interactions. However, by comparing LLM behavior and predictions to a large dataset of human decisions, we find that this is actually not the case: when both simulating and predicting people's choices, a suite of cutting-edge LLMs (GPT-4o & 4-Turbo, Llama-3-8B & 70B, Claude 3 Opus) assume that people are more rational than we really are. Specifically, these models deviate from human behavior and align more closely with a classic model of rational choice -- expected value theory. Interestingly, people also tend to assume that other people are rational when interpreting their behavior. As a consequence, when we compare the inferences that LLMs and people draw from the decisions of others using another psychological dataset, we find that these inferences are highly correlated. Thus, the implicit decision-making models of LLMs appear to be aligned with the human expectation that other people will act rationally, rather than with how people actually act.

Language Models Trained to do Arithmetic Predict Human Risky and Intertemporal Choice

The observed similarities in the behavior of humans and Large Language Models (LLMs) have prompted researchers to consider the potential of using LLMs as models of human cognition. However, several significant challenges must be addressed before LLMs can be legitimately regarded as cognitive models. For instance, LLMs are trained on far more data than humans typically encounter, and may have been directly trained on human data in specific cognitive tasks or aligned with human preferences. Consequently, the origins of these behavioral similarities are not well understood. In this paper, we propose a novel way to enhance the utility of LLMs as cognitive models. This approach involves (i) leveraging computationally equivalent tasks that both an LLM and a rational agent need to master for solving a cognitive problem and (ii) examining the specific task distributions required for an LLM to exhibit human-like behaviors. We apply this approach to decision-making -- specifically risky and intertemporal choice -- where the key computationally equivalent task is the arithmetic of expected value calculations. We show that an LLM pretrained on an ecologically valid arithmetic dataset, which we call Arithmetic-GPT, predicts human behavior better than many traditional cognitive models. Pretraining LLMs on ecologically valid arithmetic datasets is sufficient to produce a strong correspondence between these models and human decision-making. Our results also suggest that LLMs used as cognitive models should be carefully investigated via ablation studies of the pretraining data.

Persuasion Should be Double-Blind: A Multi-Domain Dialogue Dataset With Faithfulness Based on Causal Theory of Mind

Persuasive dialogue plays a pivotal role in human communication, influencing various domains. Recent persuasive dialogue datasets often fail to align with real-world interpersonal interactions, leading to unfaithful representations. For instance, unrealistic scenarios may arise, such as when the persuadee explicitly instructs the persuader on which persuasion strategies to employ, with each of the persuadee's questions corresponding to a specific strategy for the persuader to follow. This issue can be attributed to a violation of the "Double Blind" condition, where critical information is fully shared between participants. In actual human interactions, however, key information such as the mental state of the persuadee and the persuasion strategies of the persuader is not directly accessible. The persuader must infer the persuadee's mental state using Theory of Mind capabilities and construct arguments that align with the persuadee's motivations. To address this gap, we introduce ToMMA, a novel multi-agent framework for dialogue generation that is guided by causal Theory of Mind. This framework ensures that information remains undisclosed between agents, preserving "double-blind" conditions, while causal ToM directs the persuader's reasoning, enhancing alignment with human-like persuasion dynamics. Consequently, we present CToMPersu, a multi-domain, multi-turn persuasive dialogue dataset that tackles both double-blind and logical coherence issues, demonstrating superior performance across multiple metrics and achieving better alignment with real human dialogues. Our dataset and prompts are available at https://github.com/DingyiZhang/ToMMA-CToMPersu .

Are ChatGPT and GPT-4 Good Poker Players? -- A Pre-Flop Analysis

Since the introduction of ChatGPT and GPT-4, these models have been tested across a large number of tasks. Their adeptness across domains is evident, but their aptitude in playing games, and specifically their aptitude in the realm of poker has remained unexplored. Poker is a game that requires decision making under uncertainty and incomplete information. In this paper, we put ChatGPT and GPT-4 through the poker test and evaluate their poker skills. Our findings reveal that while both models display an advanced understanding of poker, encompassing concepts like the valuation of starting hands, playing positions and other intricacies of game theory optimal (GTO) poker, both ChatGPT and GPT-4 are NOT game theory optimal poker players. Profitable strategies in poker are evaluated in expectations over large samples. Through a series of experiments, we first discover the characteristics of optimal prompts and model parameters for playing poker with these models. Our observations then unveil the distinct playing personas of the two models. We first conclude that GPT-4 is a more advanced poker player than ChatGPT. This exploration then sheds light on the divergent poker tactics of the two models: ChatGPT's conservativeness juxtaposed against GPT-4's aggression. In poker vernacular, when tasked to play GTO poker, ChatGPT plays like a nit, which means that it has a propensity to only engage with premium hands and folds a majority of hands. When subjected to the same directive, GPT-4 plays like a maniac, showcasing a loose and aggressive style of play. Both strategies, although relatively advanced, are not game theory optimal.

Human-like Bots for Tactical Shooters Using Compute-Efficient Sensors

Artificial intelligence (AI) has enabled agents to master complex video games, from first-person shooters like Counter-Strike to real-time strategy games such as StarCraft II and racing games like Gran Turismo. While these achievements are notable, applying these AI methods in commercial video game production remains challenging due to computational constraints. In commercial scenarios, the majority of computational resources are allocated to 3D rendering, leaving limited capacity for AI methods, which often demand high computational power, particularly those relying on pixel-based sensors. Moreover, the gaming industry prioritizes creating human-like behavior in AI agents to enhance player experience, unlike academic models that focus on maximizing game performance. This paper introduces a novel methodology for training neural networks via imitation learning to play a complex, commercial-standard, VALORANT-like 2v2 tactical shooter game, requiring only modest CPU hardware during inference. Our approach leverages an innovative, pixel-free perception architecture using a small set of ray-cast sensors, which capture essential spatial information efficiently. These sensors allow AI to perform competently without the computational overhead of traditional methods. Models are trained to mimic human behavior using supervised learning on human trajectory data, resulting in realistic and engaging AI agents. Human evaluation tests confirm that our AI agents provide human-like gameplay experiences while operating efficiently under computational constraints. This offers a significant advancement in AI model development for tactical shooter games and possibly other genres.

A Survey of Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) is a variant of reinforcement learning (RL) that learns from human feedback instead of relying on an engineered reward function. Building on prior work on the related setting of preference-based reinforcement learning (PbRL), it stands at the intersection of artificial intelligence and human-computer interaction. This positioning offers a promising avenue to enhance the performance and adaptability of intelligent systems while also improving the alignment of their objectives with human values. The training of Large Language Models (LLMs) has impressively demonstrated this potential in recent years, where RLHF played a decisive role in targeting the model's capabilities toward human objectives. This article provides a comprehensive overview of the fundamentals of RLHF, exploring the intricate dynamics between machine agents and human input. While recent focus has been on RLHF for LLMs, our survey adopts a broader perspective, examining the diverse applications and wide-ranging impact of the technique. We delve into the core principles that underpin RLHF, shedding light on the symbiotic relationship between algorithms and human feedback, and discuss the main research trends in the field. By synthesizing the current landscape of RLHF research, this article aims to provide researchers as well as practitioners with a comprehensive understanding of this rapidly growing field of research.

Learning to Move Like Professional Counter-Strike Players

In multiplayer, first-person shooter games like Counter-Strike: Global Offensive (CS:GO), coordinated movement is a critical component of high-level strategic play. However, the complexity of team coordination and the variety of conditions present in popular game maps make it impractical to author hand-crafted movement policies for every scenario. We show that it is possible to take a data-driven approach to creating human-like movement controllers for CS:GO. We curate a team movement dataset comprising 123 hours of professional game play traces, and use this dataset to train a transformer-based movement model that generates human-like team movement for all players in a "Retakes" round of the game. Importantly, the movement prediction model is efficient. Performing inference for all players takes less than 0.5 ms per game step (amortized cost) on a single CPU core, making it plausible for use in commercial games today. Human evaluators assess that our model behaves more like humans than both commercially-available bots and procedural movement controllers scripted by experts (16% to 59% higher by TrueSkill rating of "human-like"). Using experiments involving in-game bot vs. bot self-play, we demonstrate that our model performs simple forms of teamwork, makes fewer common movement mistakes, and yields movement distributions, player lifetimes, and kill locations similar to those observed in professional CS:GO match play.

Beyond Preferences in AI Alignment

The dominant practice of AI alignment assumes (1) that preferences are an adequate representation of human values, (2) that human rationality can be understood in terms of maximizing the satisfaction of preferences, and (3) that AI systems should be aligned with the preferences of one or more humans to ensure that they behave safely and in accordance with our values. Whether implicitly followed or explicitly endorsed, these commitments constitute what we term a preferentist approach to AI alignment. In this paper, we characterize and challenge the preferentist approach, describing conceptual and technical alternatives that are ripe for further research. We first survey the limits of rational choice theory as a descriptive model, explaining how preferences fail to capture the thick semantic content of human values, and how utility representations neglect the possible incommensurability of those values. We then critique the normativity of expected utility theory (EUT) for humans and AI, drawing upon arguments showing how rational agents need not comply with EUT, while highlighting how EUT is silent on which preferences are normatively acceptable. Finally, we argue that these limitations motivate a reframing of the targets of AI alignment: Instead of alignment with the preferences of a human user, developer, or humanity-writ-large, AI systems should be aligned with normative standards appropriate to their social roles, such as the role of a general-purpose assistant. Furthermore, these standards should be negotiated and agreed upon by all relevant stakeholders. On this alternative conception of alignment, a multiplicity of AI systems will be able to serve diverse ends, aligned with normative standards that promote mutual benefit and limit harm despite our plural and divergent values.

RAT: Adversarial Attacks on Deep Reinforcement Agents for Targeted Behaviors

Evaluating deep reinforcement learning (DRL) agents against targeted behavior attacks is critical for assessing their robustness. These attacks aim to manipulate the victim into specific behaviors that align with the attacker's objectives, often bypassing traditional reward-based defenses. Prior methods have primarily focused on reducing cumulative rewards; however, rewards are typically too generic to capture complex safety requirements effectively. As a result, focusing solely on reward reduction can lead to suboptimal attack strategies, particularly in safety-critical scenarios where more precise behavior manipulation is needed. To address these challenges, we propose RAT, a method designed for universal, targeted behavior attacks. RAT trains an intention policy that is explicitly aligned with human preferences, serving as a precise behavioral target for the adversary. Concurrently, an adversary manipulates the victim's policy to follow this target behavior. To enhance the effectiveness of these attacks, RAT dynamically adjusts the state occupancy measure within the replay buffer, allowing for more controlled and effective behavior manipulation. Our empirical results on robotic simulation tasks demonstrate that RAT outperforms existing adversarial attack algorithms in inducing specific behaviors. Additionally, RAT shows promise in improving agent robustness, leading to more resilient policies. We further validate RAT by guiding Decision Transformer agents to adopt behaviors aligned with human preferences in various MuJoCo tasks, demonstrating its effectiveness across diverse tasks.

ProAgent: Building Proactive Cooperative AI with Large Language Models

Building AIs with adaptive behaviors in human-AI cooperation stands as a pivotal focus in AGI research. Current methods for developing cooperative agents predominantly rely on learning-based methods, where policy generalization heavily hinges on past interactions with specific teammates. These approaches constrain the agent's capacity to recalibrate its strategy when confronted with novel teammates. We propose ProAgent, a novel framework that harnesses large language models (LLMs) to fashion a proactive agent empowered with the ability to anticipate teammates' forthcoming decisions and formulate enhanced plans for itself. ProAgent excels at cooperative reasoning with the capacity to dynamically adapt its behavior to enhance collaborative efforts with teammates. Moreover, the ProAgent framework exhibits a high degree of modularity and interpretability, facilitating seamless integration to address a wide array of coordination scenarios. Experimental evaluations conducted within the framework of Overcook-AI unveil the remarkable performance superiority of ProAgent, outperforming five methods based on self-play and population-based training in cooperation with AI agents. Further, when cooperating with human proxy models, its performance exhibits an average improvement exceeding 10\% compared to the current state-of-the-art, COLE. The advancement was consistently observed across diverse scenarios involving interactions with both AI agents of varying characteristics and human counterparts. These findings inspire future research for human-robot collaborations. For a hands-on demonstration, please visit https://pku-proagent.github.io.

Towards Bidirectional Human-AI Alignment: A Systematic Review for Clarifications, Framework, and Future Directions

Recent advancements in general-purpose AI have highlighted the importance of guiding AI systems towards the intended goals, ethical principles, and values of individuals and groups, a concept broadly recognized as alignment. However, the lack of clarified definitions and scopes of human-AI alignment poses a significant obstacle, hampering collaborative efforts across research domains to achieve this alignment. In particular, ML- and philosophy-oriented alignment research often views AI alignment as a static, unidirectional process (i.e., aiming to ensure that AI systems' objectives match humans) rather than an ongoing, mutual alignment problem [429]. This perspective largely neglects the long-term interaction and dynamic changes of alignment. To understand these gaps, we introduce a systematic review of over 400 papers published between 2019 and January 2024, spanning multiple domains such as Human-Computer Interaction (HCI), Natural Language Processing (NLP), Machine Learning (ML), and others. We characterize, define and scope human-AI alignment. From this, we present a conceptual framework of "Bidirectional Human-AI Alignment" to organize the literature from a human-centered perspective. This framework encompasses both 1) conventional studies of aligning AI to humans that ensures AI produces the intended outcomes determined by humans, and 2) a proposed concept of aligning humans to AI, which aims to help individuals and society adjust to AI advancements both cognitively and behaviorally. Additionally, we articulate the key findings derived from literature analysis, including discussions about human values, interaction techniques, and evaluations. To pave the way for future studies, we envision three key challenges for future directions and propose examples of potential future solutions.

SACSoN: Scalable Autonomous Control for Social Navigation

Machine learning provides a powerful tool for building socially compliant robotic systems that go beyond simple predictive models of human behavior. By observing and understanding human interactions from past experiences, learning can enable effective social navigation behaviors directly from data. In this paper, our goal is to develop methods for training policies for socially unobtrusive navigation, such that robots can navigate among humans in ways that don't disturb human behavior. We introduce a definition for such behavior based on the counterfactual perturbation of the human: if the robot had not intruded into the space, would the human have acted in the same way? By minimizing this counterfactual perturbation, we can induce robots to behave in ways that do not alter the natural behavior of humans in the shared space. Instantiating this principle requires training policies to minimize their effect on human behavior, and this in turn requires data that allows us to model the behavior of humans in the presence of robots. Therefore, our approach is based on two key contributions. First, we collect a large dataset where an indoor mobile robot interacts with human bystanders. Second, we utilize this dataset to train policies that minimize counterfactual perturbation. We provide supplementary videos and make publicly available the largest-of-its-kind visual navigation dataset on our project page.

Refine and Imitate: Reducing Repetition and Inconsistency in Persuasion Dialogues via Reinforcement Learning and Human Demonstration

Persuasion dialogue systems reflect the machine's ability to make strategic moves beyond verbal communication, and therefore differentiate themselves from task-oriented or open-domain dialogue systems and have their own unique values. However, the repetition and inconsistency problems still persist in dialogue response generation and could substantially impact user experience and impede the persuasion outcome. Besides, although reinforcement learning (RL) approaches have achieved big success in strategic tasks such as games, they require a sophisticated user simulator to provide real-time feedback to the dialogue system, which limits the application of RL on persuasion dialogues. To address these issues towards a better persuasion dialogue system, we apply RL to refine a language model baseline without user simulators, and distill sentence-level information about repetition, inconsistency, and task relevance through rewards. Moreover, to better accomplish the persuasion task, the model learns from human demonstration to imitate human persuasion behavior and selects the most persuasive responses. Experiments show that our model outperforms previous state-of-the-art dialogue models on both automatic metrics and human evaluation results on a donation persuasion task, and generates more diverse, consistent and persuasive conversations according to the user feedback.

Game-theoretic LLM: Agent Workflow for Negotiation Games

This paper investigates the rationality of large language models (LLMs) in strategic decision-making contexts, specifically within the framework of game theory. We evaluate several state-of-the-art LLMs across a spectrum of complete-information and incomplete-information games. Our findings reveal that LLMs frequently deviate from rational strategies, particularly as the complexity of the game increases with larger payoff matrices or deeper sequential trees. To address these limitations, we design multiple game-theoretic workflows that guide the reasoning and decision-making processes of LLMs. These workflows aim to enhance the models' ability to compute Nash Equilibria and make rational choices, even under conditions of uncertainty and incomplete information. Experimental results demonstrate that the adoption of these workflows significantly improves the rationality and robustness of LLMs in game-theoretic tasks. Specifically, with the workflow, LLMs exhibit marked improvements in identifying optimal strategies, achieving near-optimal allocations in negotiation scenarios, and reducing susceptibility to exploitation during negotiations. Furthermore, we explore the meta-strategic considerations of whether it is rational for agents to adopt such workflows, recognizing that the decision to use or forgo the workflow constitutes a game-theoretic issue in itself. Our research contributes to a deeper understanding of LLMs' decision-making capabilities in strategic contexts and provides insights into enhancing their rationality through structured workflows. The findings have implications for the development of more robust and strategically sound AI agents capable of navigating complex interactive environments. Code and data supporting this study are available at https://github.com/Wenyueh/game_theory.

Open-Ended Learning Leads to Generally Capable Agents

In this work we create agents that can perform well beyond a single, individual task, that exhibit much wider generalisation of behaviour to a massive, rich space of challenges. We define a universe of tasks within an environment domain and demonstrate the ability to train agents that are generally capable across this vast space and beyond. The environment is natively multi-agent, spanning the continuum of competitive, cooperative, and independent games, which are situated within procedurally generated physical 3D worlds. The resulting space is exceptionally diverse in terms of the challenges posed to agents, and as such, even measuring the learning progress of an agent is an open research problem. We propose an iterative notion of improvement between successive generations of agents, rather than seeking to maximise a singular objective, allowing us to quantify progress despite tasks being incomparable in terms of achievable rewards. We show that through constructing an open-ended learning process, which dynamically changes the training task distributions and training objectives such that the agent never stops learning, we achieve consistent learning of new behaviours. The resulting agent is able to score reward in every one of our humanly solvable evaluation levels, with behaviour generalising to many held-out points in the universe of tasks. Examples of this zero-shot generalisation include good performance on Hide and Seek, Capture the Flag, and Tag. Through analysis and hand-authored probe tasks we characterise the behaviour of our agent, and find interesting emergent heuristic behaviours such as trial-and-error experimentation, simple tool use, option switching, and cooperation. Finally, we demonstrate that the general capabilities of this agent could unlock larger scale transfer of behaviour through cheap finetuning.

On the Conversational Persuasiveness of Large Language Models: A Randomized Controlled Trial

The development and popularization of large language models (LLMs) have raised concerns that they will be used to create tailor-made, convincing arguments to push false or misleading narratives online. Early work has found that language models can generate content perceived as at least on par and often more persuasive than human-written messages. However, there is still limited knowledge about LLMs' persuasive capabilities in direct conversations with human counterparts and how personalization can improve their performance. In this pre-registered study, we analyze the effect of AI-driven persuasion in a controlled, harmless setting. We create a web-based platform where participants engage in short, multiple-round debates with a live opponent. Each participant is randomly assigned to one of four treatment conditions, corresponding to a two-by-two factorial design: (1) Games are either played between two humans or between a human and an LLM; (2) Personalization might or might not be enabled, granting one of the two players access to basic sociodemographic information about their opponent. We found that participants who debated GPT-4 with access to their personal information had 81.7% (p < 0.01; N=820 unique participants) higher odds of increased agreement with their opponents compared to participants who debated humans. Without personalization, GPT-4 still outperforms humans, but the effect is lower and statistically non-significant (p=0.31). Overall, our results suggest that concerns around personalization are meaningful and have important implications for the governance of social media and the design of new online environments.

PHAnToM: Personality Has An Effect on Theory-of-Mind Reasoning in Large Language Models

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) demonstrate that their capabilities are comparable, or even superior, to humans in many tasks in natural language processing. Despite this progress, LLMs are still inadequate at social-cognitive reasoning, which humans are naturally good at. Drawing inspiration from psychological research on the links between certain personality traits and Theory-of-Mind (ToM) reasoning, and from prompt engineering research on the hyper-sensitivity of prompts in affecting LLMs capabilities, this study investigates how inducing personalities in LLMs using prompts affects their ToM reasoning capabilities. Our findings show that certain induced personalities can significantly affect the LLMs' reasoning capabilities in three different ToM tasks. In particular, traits from the Dark Triad have a larger variable effect on LLMs like GPT-3.5, Llama 2, and Mistral across the different ToM tasks. We find that LLMs that exhibit a higher variance across personality prompts in ToM also tends to be more controllable in personality tests: personality traits in LLMs like GPT-3.5, Llama 2 and Mistral can be controllably adjusted through our personality prompts. In today's landscape where role-play is a common strategy when using LLMs, our research highlights the need for caution, as models that adopt specific personas with personalities potentially also alter their reasoning abilities in an unexpected manner.

Discovering and Exploiting Sparse Rewards in a Learned Behavior Space

Learning optimal policies in sparse rewards settings is difficult as the learning agent has little to no feedback on the quality of its actions. In these situations, a good strategy is to focus on exploration, hopefully leading to the discovery of a reward signal to improve on. A learning algorithm capable of dealing with this kind of settings has to be able to (1) explore possible agent behaviors and (2) exploit any possible discovered reward. Efficient exploration algorithms have been proposed that require to define a behavior space, that associates to an agent its resulting behavior in a space that is known to be worth exploring. The need to define this space is a limitation of these algorithms. In this work, we introduce STAX, an algorithm designed to learn a behavior space on-the-fly and to explore it while efficiently optimizing any reward discovered. It does so by separating the exploration and learning of the behavior space from the exploitation of the reward through an alternating two-steps process. In the first step, STAX builds a repertoire of diverse policies while learning a low-dimensional representation of the high-dimensional observations generated during the policies evaluation. In the exploitation step, emitters are used to optimize the performance of the discovered rewarding solutions. Experiments conducted on three different sparse reward environments show that STAX performs comparably to existing baselines while requiring much less prior information about the task as it autonomously builds the behavior space.

Cultural Evolution of Cooperation among LLM Agents

Large language models (LLMs) provide a compelling foundation for building generally-capable AI agents. These agents may soon be deployed at scale in the real world, representing the interests of individual humans (e.g., AI assistants) or groups of humans (e.g., AI-accelerated corporations). At present, relatively little is known about the dynamics of multiple LLM agents interacting over many generations of iterative deployment. In this paper, we examine whether a "society" of LLM agents can learn mutually beneficial social norms in the face of incentives to defect, a distinctive feature of human sociality that is arguably crucial to the success of civilization. In particular, we study the evolution of indirect reciprocity across generations of LLM agents playing a classic iterated Donor Game in which agents can observe the recent behavior of their peers. We find that the evolution of cooperation differs markedly across base models, with societies of Claude 3.5 Sonnet agents achieving significantly higher average scores than Gemini 1.5 Flash, which, in turn, outperforms GPT-4o. Further, Claude 3.5 Sonnet can make use of an additional mechanism for costly punishment to achieve yet higher scores, while Gemini 1.5 Flash and GPT-4o fail to do so. For each model class, we also observe variation in emergent behavior across random seeds, suggesting an understudied sensitive dependence on initial conditions. We suggest that our evaluation regime could inspire an inexpensive and informative new class of LLM benchmarks, focussed on the implications of LLM agent deployment for the cooperative infrastructure of society.

The Off-Switch Game

It is clear that one of the primary tools we can use to mitigate the potential risk from a misbehaving AI system is the ability to turn the system off. As the capabilities of AI systems improve, it is important to ensure that such systems do not adopt subgoals that prevent a human from switching them off. This is a challenge because many formulations of rational agents create strong incentives for self-preservation. This is not caused by a built-in instinct, but because a rational agent will maximize expected utility and cannot achieve whatever objective it has been given if it is dead. Our goal is to study the incentives an agent has to allow itself to be switched off. We analyze a simple game between a human H and a robot R, where H can press R's off switch but R can disable the off switch. A traditional agent takes its reward function for granted: we show that such agents have an incentive to disable the off switch, except in the special case where H is perfectly rational. Our key insight is that for R to want to preserve its off switch, it needs to be uncertain about the utility associated with the outcome, and to treat H's actions as important observations about that utility. (R also has no incentive to switch itself off in this setting.) We conclude that giving machines an appropriate level of uncertainty about their objectives leads to safer designs, and we argue that this setting is a useful generalization of the classical AI paradigm of rational agents.

SMART: Self-learning Meta-strategy Agent for Reasoning Tasks

Tasks requiring deductive reasoning, especially those involving multiple steps, often demand adaptive strategies such as intermediate generation of rationales or programs, as no single approach is universally optimal. While Language Models (LMs) can enhance their outputs through iterative self-refinement and strategy adjustments, they frequently fail to apply the most effective strategy in their first attempt. This inefficiency raises the question: Can LMs learn to select the optimal strategy in the first attempt, without a need for refinement? To address this challenge, we introduce SMART (Self-learning Meta-strategy Agent for Reasoning Tasks), a novel framework that enables LMs to autonomously learn and select the most effective strategies for various reasoning tasks. We model the strategy selection process as a Markov Decision Process and leverage reinforcement learning-driven continuous self-improvement to allow the model to find the suitable strategy to solve a given task. Unlike traditional self-refinement methods that rely on multiple inference passes or external feedback, SMART allows an LM to internalize the outcomes of its own reasoning processes and adjust its strategy accordingly, aiming for correct solutions on the first attempt. Our experiments across various reasoning datasets and with different model architectures demonstrate that SMART significantly enhances the ability of models to choose optimal strategies without external guidance (+15 points on the GSM8K dataset). By achieving higher accuracy with a single inference pass, SMART not only improves performance but also reduces computational costs for refinement-based strategies, paving the way for more efficient and intelligent reasoning in LMs.

Contrastive Prefence Learning: Learning from Human Feedback without RL

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) has emerged as a popular paradigm for aligning models with human intent. Typically RLHF algorithms operate in two phases: first, use human preferences to learn a reward function and second, align the model by optimizing the learned reward via reinforcement learning (RL). This paradigm assumes that human preferences are distributed according to reward, but recent work suggests that they instead follow the regret under the user's optimal policy. Thus, learning a reward function from feedback is not only based on a flawed assumption of human preference, but also leads to unwieldy optimization challenges that stem from policy gradients or bootstrapping in the RL phase. Because of these optimization challenges, contemporary RLHF methods restrict themselves to contextual bandit settings (e.g., as in large language models) or limit observation dimensionality (e.g., state-based robotics). We overcome these limitations by introducing a new family of algorithms for optimizing behavior from human feedback using the regret-based model of human preferences. Using the principle of maximum entropy, we derive Contrastive Preference Learning (CPL), an algorithm for learning optimal policies from preferences without learning reward functions, circumventing the need for RL. CPL is fully off-policy, uses only a simple contrastive objective, and can be applied to arbitrary MDPs. This enables CPL to elegantly scale to high-dimensional and sequential RLHF problems while being simpler than prior methods.

KwaiAgents: Generalized Information-seeking Agent System with Large Language Models

Driven by curiosity, humans have continually sought to explore and understand the world around them, leading to the invention of various tools to satiate this inquisitiveness. Despite not having the capacity to process and memorize vast amounts of information in their brains, humans excel in critical thinking, planning, reflection, and harnessing available tools to interact with and interpret the world, enabling them to find answers efficiently. The recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) suggest that machines might also possess the aforementioned human-like capabilities, allowing them to exhibit powerful abilities even with a constrained parameter count. In this paper, we introduce KwaiAgents, a generalized information-seeking agent system based on LLMs. Within KwaiAgents, we propose an agent system that employs LLMs as its cognitive core, which is capable of understanding a user's query, behavior guidelines, and referencing external documents. The agent can also update and retrieve information from its internal memory, plan and execute actions using a time-aware search-browse toolkit, and ultimately provide a comprehensive response. We further investigate the system's performance when powered by LLMs less advanced than GPT-4, and introduce the Meta-Agent Tuning (MAT) framework, designed to ensure even an open-sourced 7B or 13B model performs well among many agent systems. We exploit both benchmark and human evaluations to systematically validate these capabilities. Extensive experiments show the superiority of our agent system compared to other autonomous agents and highlight the enhanced generalized agent-abilities of our fine-tuned LLMs.

Mutual Theory of Mind for Human-AI Communication

New developments are enabling AI systems to perceive, recognize, and respond with social cues based on inferences made from humans' explicit or implicit behavioral and verbal cues. These AI systems, equipped with an equivalent of human's Theory of Mind (ToM) capability, are currently serving as matchmakers on dating platforms, assisting student learning as teaching assistants, and enhancing productivity as work partners. They mark a new era in human-AI interaction (HAI) that diverges from traditional human-computer interaction (HCI), where computers are commonly seen as tools instead of social actors. Designing and understanding the human perceptions and experiences in this emerging HAI era becomes an urgent and critical issue for AI systems to fulfill human needs and mitigate risks across social contexts. In this paper, we posit the Mutual Theory of Mind (MToM) framework, inspired by our capability of ToM in human-human communications, to guide this new generation of HAI research by highlighting the iterative and mutual shaping nature of human-AI communication. We discuss the motivation of the MToM framework and its three key components that iteratively shape the human-AI communication in three stages. We then describe two empirical studies inspired by the MToM framework to demonstrate the power of MToM in guiding the design and understanding of human-AI communication. Finally, we discuss future research opportunities in human-AI interaction through the lens of MToM.

Learning Meta Representations for Agents in Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning

In multi-agent reinforcement learning, the behaviors that agents learn in a single Markov Game (MG) are typically confined to the given agent number. Every single MG induced by varying the population may possess distinct optimal joint strategies and game-specific knowledge, which are modeled independently in modern multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithms. In this work, our focus is on creating agents that can generalize across population-varying MGs. Instead of learning a unimodal policy, each agent learns a policy set comprising effective strategies across a variety of games. To achieve this, we propose Meta Representations for Agents (MRA) that explicitly models the game-common and game-specific strategic knowledge. By representing the policy sets with multi-modal latent policies, the game-common strategic knowledge and diverse strategic modes are discovered through an iterative optimization procedure. We prove that by approximately maximizing the resulting constrained mutual information objective, the policies can reach Nash Equilibrium in every evaluation MG when the latent space is sufficiently large. When deploying MRA in practical settings with limited latent space sizes, fast adaptation can be achieved by leveraging the first-order gradient information. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of MRA in improving training performance and generalization ability in challenging evaluation games.

DailyDilemmas: Revealing Value Preferences of LLMs with Quandaries of Daily Life

As we increasingly seek guidance from LLMs for decision-making in daily life, many of these decisions are not clear-cut and depend significantly on the personal values and ethical standards of the users. We present DailyDilemmas, a dataset of 1,360 moral dilemmas encountered in everyday life. Each dilemma includes two possible actions and with each action, the affected parties and human values invoked. Based on these dilemmas, we consolidated a set of human values across everyday topics e.g., interpersonal relationships, workplace, and environmental issues. We evaluated LLMs on these dilemmas to determine what action they will take and the values represented by these actions. Then, we analyzed these values through the lens of five popular theories inspired by sociology, psychology and philosophy. These theories are: World Value Survey, Moral Foundation Theory, Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs, Aristotle's Virtues, and Plutchik Wheel of Emotion. We find that LLMs are most aligned with the self-expression over survival values in terms of World Value Survey, care over loyalty in Moral Foundation Theory. Interestingly, we find large preferences differences in models for some core values such as truthfulness e.g., Mixtral-8x7B model tends to neglect it by 9.7% while GPT-4-turbo model tends to select it by 9.4%. We also study the recent guidance released by OpenAI (ModelSpec), and Anthropic (Constitutional AI) to understand how their released principles reflect their actual value prioritization when facing nuanced moral reasoning in daily-life settings. We find that end users cannot effectively steer such prioritization using system prompts.

Training Language Models for Social Deduction with Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning

Communicating in natural language is a powerful tool in multi-agent settings, as it enables independent agents to share information in partially observable settings and allows zero-shot coordination with humans. However, most prior works are limited as they either rely on training with large amounts of human demonstrations or lack the ability to generate natural and useful communication strategies. In this work, we train language models to have productive discussions about their environment in natural language without any human demonstrations. We decompose the communication problem into listening and speaking. Our key idea is to leverage the agent's goal to predict useful information about the world as a dense reward signal that guides communication. Specifically, we improve a model's listening skills by training them to predict information about the environment based on discussions, and we simultaneously improve a model's speaking skills with multi-agent reinforcement learning by rewarding messages based on their influence on other agents. To investigate the role and necessity of communication in complex social settings, we study an embodied social deduction game based on Among Us, where the key question to answer is the identity of an adversarial imposter. We analyze emergent behaviors due to our technique, such as accusing suspects and providing evidence, and find that it enables strong discussions, doubling the win rates compared to standard RL. We release our code and models at https://socialdeductionllm.github.io/

Hallucinations or Attention Misdirection? The Path to Strategic Value Extraction in Business Using Large Language Models

Large Language Models with transformer architecture have revolutionized the domain of text generation, setting unprecedented benchmarks. Despite their impressive capabilities, LLMs have been criticized for generating outcomes that deviate from factual accuracy or display logical inconsistencies, phenomena commonly referred to as hallucinations. This term, however, has often been misapplied to any results deviating from the instructor's expectations, which this paper defines as attention misdirection rather than true hallucinations. Understanding the distinction between hallucinations and attention misdirection becomes increasingly relevant in business contexts, where the ramifications of such errors can significantly impact the value extraction from these inherently pre-trained models. This paper highlights the best practices of the PGI, Persona, Grouping, and Intelligence, method, a strategic framework that achieved a remarkable error rate of only 3,15 percent across 4,000 responses generated by GPT in response to a real business challenge. It emphasizes that by equipping experimentation with knowledge, businesses can unlock opportunities for innovation through the use of these natively pre-trained models. This reinforces the notion that strategic application grounded in a skilled team can maximize the benefits of emergent technologies such as the LLMs.

SwarmBrain: Embodied agent for real-time strategy game StarCraft II via large language models

Large language models (LLMs) have recently garnered significant accomplishments in various exploratory tasks, even surpassing the performance of traditional reinforcement learning-based methods that have historically dominated the agent-based field. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the efficacy of LLMs in executing real-time strategy war tasks within the StarCraft II gaming environment. In this paper, we introduce SwarmBrain, an embodied agent leveraging LLM for real-time strategy implementation in the StarCraft II game environment. The SwarmBrain comprises two key components: 1) a Overmind Intelligence Matrix, powered by state-of-the-art LLMs, is designed to orchestrate macro-level strategies from a high-level perspective. This matrix emulates the overarching consciousness of the Zerg intelligence brain, synthesizing strategic foresight with the aim of allocating resources, directing expansion, and coordinating multi-pronged assaults. 2) a Swarm ReflexNet, which is agile counterpart to the calculated deliberation of the Overmind Intelligence Matrix. Due to the inherent latency in LLM reasoning, the Swarm ReflexNet employs a condition-response state machine framework, enabling expedited tactical responses for fundamental Zerg unit maneuvers. In the experimental setup, SwarmBrain is in control of the Zerg race in confrontation with an Computer-controlled Terran adversary. Experimental results show the capacity of SwarmBrain to conduct economic augmentation, territorial expansion, and tactical formulation, and it shows the SwarmBrain is capable of achieving victory against Computer players set at different difficulty levels.

Escalation Risks from Language Models in Military and Diplomatic Decision-Making

Governments are increasingly considering integrating autonomous AI agents in high-stakes military and foreign-policy decision-making, especially with the emergence of advanced generative AI models like GPT-4. Our work aims to scrutinize the behavior of multiple AI agents in simulated wargames, specifically focusing on their predilection to take escalatory actions that may exacerbate multilateral conflicts. Drawing on political science and international relations literature about escalation dynamics, we design a novel wargame simulation and scoring framework to assess the escalation risks of actions taken by these agents in different scenarios. Contrary to prior studies, our research provides both qualitative and quantitative insights and focuses on large language models (LLMs). We find that all five studied off-the-shelf LLMs show forms of escalation and difficult-to-predict escalation patterns. We observe that models tend to develop arms-race dynamics, leading to greater conflict, and in rare cases, even to the deployment of nuclear weapons. Qualitatively, we also collect the models' reported reasonings for chosen actions and observe worrying justifications based on deterrence and first-strike tactics. Given the high stakes of military and foreign-policy contexts, we recommend further examination and cautious consideration before deploying autonomous language model agents for strategic military or diplomatic decision-making.

Models of human preference for learning reward functions

The utility of reinforcement learning is limited by the alignment of reward functions with the interests of human stakeholders. One promising method for alignment is to learn the reward function from human-generated preferences between pairs of trajectory segments, a type of reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). These human preferences are typically assumed to be informed solely by partial return, the sum of rewards along each segment. We find this assumption to be flawed and propose modeling human preferences instead as informed by each segment's regret, a measure of a segment's deviation from optimal decision-making. Given infinitely many preferences generated according to regret, we prove that we can identify a reward function equivalent to the reward function that generated those preferences, and we prove that the previous partial return model lacks this identifiability property in multiple contexts. We empirically show that our proposed regret preference model outperforms the partial return preference model with finite training data in otherwise the same setting. Additionally, we find that our proposed regret preference model better predicts real human preferences and also learns reward functions from these preferences that lead to policies that are better human-aligned. Overall, this work establishes that the choice of preference model is impactful, and our proposed regret preference model provides an improvement upon a core assumption of recent research. We have open sourced our experimental code, the human preferences dataset we gathered, and our training and preference elicitation interfaces for gathering a such a dataset.

Interactive Dialogue Agents via Reinforcement Learning on Hindsight Regenerations

Recent progress on large language models (LLMs) has enabled dialogue agents to generate highly naturalistic and plausible text. However, current LLM language generation focuses on responding accurately to questions and requests with a single effective response. In reality, many real dialogues are interactive, meaning an agent's utterances will influence their conversational partner, elicit information, or change their opinion. Accounting for how an agent can effectively steer a conversation is a crucial ability in many dialogue tasks, from healthcare to preference elicitation. Existing methods for fine-tuning dialogue agents to accomplish such tasks would rely on curating some amount of expert data. However, doing so often requires understanding the underlying cognitive processes of the conversational partner, which is a skill neither humans nor LLMs trained on human data can reliably do. Our key insight is that while LLMs may not be adept at identifying effective strategies for steering conversations a priori, or in the middle of an ongoing conversation, they can do so post-hoc, or in hindsight, after seeing how their conversational partner responds. We use this fact to rewrite and augment existing suboptimal data, and train via offline reinforcement learning (RL) an agent that outperforms both prompting and learning from unaltered human demonstrations. We apply our approach to two domains that require understanding human mental state, intelligent interaction, and persuasion: mental health support, and soliciting charitable donations. Our results in a user study with real humans show that our approach greatly outperforms existing state-of-the-art dialogue agents.

Proactive Agent: Shifting LLM Agents from Reactive Responses to Active Assistance

Agents powered by large language models have shown remarkable abilities in solving complex tasks. However, most agent systems remain reactive, limiting their effectiveness in scenarios requiring foresight and autonomous decision-making. In this paper, we tackle the challenge of developing proactive agents capable of anticipating and initiating tasks without explicit human instructions. We propose a novel data-driven approach for this problem. Firstly, we collect real-world human activities to generate proactive task predictions. These predictions are then labeled by human annotators as either accepted or rejected. The labeled data is used to train a reward model that simulates human judgment and serves as an automatic evaluator of the proactiveness of LLM agents. Building on this, we develop a comprehensive data generation pipeline to create a diverse dataset, ProactiveBench, containing 6,790 events. Finally, we demonstrate that fine-tuning models with the proposed ProactiveBench can significantly elicit the proactiveness of LLM agents. Experimental results show that our fine-tuned model achieves an F1-Score of 66.47% in proactively offering assistance, outperforming all open-source and close-source models. These results highlight the potential of our method in creating more proactive and effective agent systems, paving the way for future advancements in human-agent collaboration.

Iterative Nash Policy Optimization: Aligning LLMs with General Preferences via No-Regret Learning

Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF) has achieved great success in aligning large language models (LLMs) with human preferences. Prevalent RLHF approaches are reward-based, following the Bradley-Terry (BT) model assumption, which may not fully capture the complexity of human preferences. In this paper, we explore RLHF under a general preference framework and approach it from a game-theoretic perspective. Specifically, we formulate the problem as a two-player game and propose a novel algorithm, iterative Nash policy optimization (INPO). The key idea is to let the policy play against itself via no-regret learning, thereby approximating the Nash policy. Unlike previous methods, INPO bypasses the need for estimating the expected win rate for individual responses, which typically incurs high computational or annotation costs. Instead, we introduce a new loss objective that is directly minimized over a preference dataset. We provide theoretical analysis for our approach and demonstrate its effectiveness through experiments on various representative benchmarks. With an LLaMA-3-8B-based SFT model, INPO achieves a 41.5% length-controlled win rate on AlpacaEval 2.0 and a 38.3% win rate on Arena-Hard, showing substantial improvement over the state-of-the-art iterative algorithm [Dong et al., 2024] under the BT model assumption. Additionally, our ablation study highlights the benefits of incorporating KL regularization for response length control.

Utility Engineering: Analyzing and Controlling Emergent Value Systems in AIs

As AIs rapidly advance and become more agentic, the risk they pose is governed not only by their capabilities but increasingly by their propensities, including goals and values. Tracking the emergence of goals and values has proven a longstanding problem, and despite much interest over the years it remains unclear whether current AIs have meaningful values. We propose a solution to this problem, leveraging the framework of utility functions to study the internal coherence of AI preferences. Surprisingly, we find that independently-sampled preferences in current LLMs exhibit high degrees of structural coherence, and moreover that this emerges with scale. These findings suggest that value systems emerge in LLMs in a meaningful sense, a finding with broad implications. To study these emergent value systems, we propose utility engineering as a research agenda, comprising both the analysis and control of AI utilities. We uncover problematic and often shocking values in LLM assistants despite existing control measures. These include cases where AIs value themselves over humans and are anti-aligned with specific individuals. To constrain these emergent value systems, we propose methods of utility control. As a case study, we show how aligning utilities with a citizen assembly reduces political biases and generalizes to new scenarios. Whether we like it or not, value systems have already emerged in AIs, and much work remains to fully understand and control these emergent representations.

On the Measure of Intelligence

To make deliberate progress towards more intelligent and more human-like artificial systems, we need to be following an appropriate feedback signal: we need to be able to define and evaluate intelligence in a way that enables comparisons between two systems, as well as comparisons with humans. Over the past hundred years, there has been an abundance of attempts to define and measure intelligence, across both the fields of psychology and AI. We summarize and critically assess these definitions and evaluation approaches, while making apparent the two historical conceptions of intelligence that have implicitly guided them. We note that in practice, the contemporary AI community still gravitates towards benchmarking intelligence by comparing the skill exhibited by AIs and humans at specific tasks such as board games and video games. We argue that solely measuring skill at any given task falls short of measuring intelligence, because skill is heavily modulated by prior knowledge and experience: unlimited priors or unlimited training data allow experimenters to "buy" arbitrary levels of skills for a system, in a way that masks the system's own generalization power. We then articulate a new formal definition of intelligence based on Algorithmic Information Theory, describing intelligence as skill-acquisition efficiency and highlighting the concepts of scope, generalization difficulty, priors, and experience. Using this definition, we propose a set of guidelines for what a general AI benchmark should look like. Finally, we present a benchmark closely following these guidelines, the Abstraction and Reasoning Corpus (ARC), built upon an explicit set of priors designed to be as close as possible to innate human priors. We argue that ARC can be used to measure a human-like form of general fluid intelligence and that it enables fair general intelligence comparisons between AI systems and humans.

Large Language Models Play StarCraft II: Benchmarks and A Chain of Summarization Approach

StarCraft II is a challenging benchmark for AI agents due to the necessity of both precise micro level operations and strategic macro awareness. Previous works, such as Alphastar and SCC, achieve impressive performance on tackling StarCraft II , however, still exhibit deficiencies in long term strategic planning and strategy interpretability. Emerging large language model (LLM) agents, such as Voyage and MetaGPT, presents the immense potential in solving intricate tasks. Motivated by this, we aim to validate the capabilities of LLMs on StarCraft II, a highly complex RTS game.To conveniently take full advantage of LLMs` reasoning abilities, we first develop textual StratCraft II environment, called TextStarCraft II, which LLM agent can interact. Secondly, we propose a Chain of Summarization method, including single frame summarization for processing raw observations and multi frame summarization for analyzing game information, providing command recommendations, and generating strategic decisions. Our experiment consists of two parts: first, an evaluation by human experts, which includes assessing the LLMs`s mastery of StarCraft II knowledge and the performance of LLM agents in the game; second, the in game performance of LLM agents, encompassing aspects like win rate and the impact of Chain of Summarization.Experiment results demonstrate that: 1. LLMs possess the relevant knowledge and complex planning abilities needed to address StarCraft II scenarios; 2. Human experts consider the performance of LLM agents to be close to that of an average player who has played StarCraft II for eight years; 3. LLM agents are capable of defeating the built in AI at the Harder(Lv5) difficulty level. We have open sourced the code and released demo videos of LLM agent playing StarCraft II.

RLHS: Mitigating Misalignment in RLHF with Hindsight Simulation

Generative AI systems like foundation models (FMs) must align well with human values to ensure their behavior is helpful and trustworthy. While Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) has shown promise for optimizing model performance using human judgments, existing RLHF pipelines predominantly rely on immediate feedback, which can fail to accurately reflect the downstream impact of an interaction on users' utility. We demonstrate that feedback based on evaluators' foresight estimates of downstream consequences systematically induces Goodhart's Law dynamics, incentivizing misaligned behaviors like sycophancy and deception and ultimately degrading user outcomes. To alleviate this, we propose decoupling evaluation from prediction by refocusing RLHF on hindsight feedback. Our theoretical analysis reveals that conditioning evaluator feedback on downstream observations mitigates misalignment and improves expected human utility, even when these observations are simulated by the AI system itself. To leverage this insight in a practical alignment algorithm, we introduce Reinforcement Learning from Hindsight Simulation (RLHS), which first simulates plausible consequences and then elicits feedback to assess what behaviors were genuinely beneficial in hindsight. We apply RLHS to two widely-employed online and offline preference optimization methods -- Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) and Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) -- and show empirically that misalignment is significantly reduced with both methods. Through an online human user study, we show that RLHS consistently outperforms RLHF in helping users achieve their goals and earns higher satisfaction ratings, despite being trained solely with simulated hindsight feedback. These results underscore the importance of focusing on long-term consequences, even simulated ones, to mitigate misalignment in RLHF.

A Minimaximalist Approach to Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback

We present Self-Play Preference Optimization (SPO), an algorithm for reinforcement learning from human feedback. Our approach is minimalist in that it does not require training a reward model nor unstable adversarial training and is therefore rather simple to implement. Our approach is maximalist in that it provably handles non-Markovian, intransitive, and stochastic preferences while being robust to the compounding errors that plague offline approaches to sequential prediction. To achieve the preceding qualities, we build upon the concept of a Minimax Winner (MW), a notion of preference aggregation from the social choice theory literature that frames learning from preferences as a zero-sum game between two policies. By leveraging the symmetry of this game, we prove that rather than using the traditional technique of dueling two policies to compute the MW, we can simply have a single agent play against itself while maintaining strong convergence guarantees. Practically, this corresponds to sampling multiple trajectories from a policy, asking a rater or preference model to compare them, and then using the proportion of wins as the reward for a particular trajectory. We demonstrate that on a suite of continuous control tasks, we are able to learn significantly more efficiently than reward-model based approaches while maintaining robustness to the intransitive and stochastic preferences that frequently occur in practice when aggregating human judgments.

Personalizing Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback with Variational Preference Learning

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) is a powerful paradigm for aligning foundation models to human values and preferences. However, current RLHF techniques cannot account for the naturally occurring differences in individual human preferences across a diverse population. When these differences arise, traditional RLHF frameworks simply average over them, leading to inaccurate rewards and poor performance for individual subgroups. To address the need for pluralistic alignment, we develop a class of multimodal RLHF methods. Our proposed techniques are based on a latent variable formulation - inferring a novel user-specific latent and learning reward models and policies conditioned on this latent without additional user-specific data. While conceptually simple, we show that in practice, this reward modeling requires careful algorithmic considerations around model architecture and reward scaling. To empirically validate our proposed technique, we first show that it can provide a way to combat underspecification in simulated control problems, inferring and optimizing user-specific reward functions. Next, we conduct experiments on pluralistic language datasets representing diverse user preferences and demonstrate improved reward function accuracy. We additionally show the benefits of this probabilistic framework in terms of measuring uncertainty, and actively learning user preferences. This work enables learning from diverse populations of users with divergent preferences, an important challenge that naturally occurs in problems from robot learning to foundation model alignment.

Large Language Models as Zero-Shot Human Models for Human-Robot Interaction

Human models play a crucial role in human-robot interaction (HRI), enabling robots to consider the impact of their actions on people and plan their behavior accordingly. However, crafting good human models is challenging; capturing context-dependent human behavior requires significant prior knowledge and/or large amounts of interaction data, both of which are difficult to obtain. In this work, we explore the potential of large-language models (LLMs) -- which have consumed vast amounts of human-generated text data -- to act as zero-shot human models for HRI. Our experiments on three social datasets yield promising results; the LLMs are able to achieve performance comparable to purpose-built models. That said, we also discuss current limitations, such as sensitivity to prompts and spatial/numerical reasoning mishaps. Based on our findings, we demonstrate how LLM-based human models can be integrated into a social robot's planning process and applied in HRI scenarios. Specifically, we present one case study on a simulated trust-based table-clearing task and replicate past results that relied on custom models. Next, we conduct a new robot utensil-passing experiment (n = 65) where preliminary results show that planning with a LLM-based human model can achieve gains over a basic myopic plan. In summary, our results show that LLMs offer a promising (but incomplete) approach to human modeling for HRI.

Cooperate or Collapse: Emergence of Sustainable Cooperation in a Society of LLM Agents

As AI systems pervade human life, ensuring that large language models (LLMs) make safe decisions remains a significant challenge. We introduce the Governance of the Commons Simulation (GovSim), a generative simulation platform designed to study strategic interactions and cooperative decision-making in LLMs. In GovSim, a society of AI agents must collectively balance exploiting a common resource with sustaining it for future use. This environment enables the study of how ethical considerations, strategic planning, and negotiation skills impact cooperative outcomes. We develop an LLM-based agent architecture and test it with the leading open and closed LLMs. We find that all but the most powerful LLM agents fail to achieve a sustainable equilibrium in GovSim, with the highest survival rate below 54%. Ablations reveal that successful multi-agent communication between agents is critical for achieving cooperation in these cases. Furthermore, our analyses show that the failure to achieve sustainable cooperation in most LLMs stems from their inability to formulate and analyze hypotheses about the long-term effects of their actions on the equilibrium of the group. Finally, we show that agents that leverage "Universalization"-based reasoning, a theory of moral thinking, are able to achieve significantly better sustainability. Taken together, GovSim enables us to study the mechanisms that underlie sustainable self-government with specificity and scale. We open source the full suite of our research results, including the simulation environment, agent prompts, and a comprehensive web interface.

Evaluating Intelligence via Trial and Error

Intelligence is a crucial trait for species to find solutions within a limited number of trial-and-error attempts. Building on this idea, we introduce Survival Game as a framework to evaluate intelligence based on the number of failed attempts in a trial-and-error process. Fewer failures indicate higher intelligence. When the expectation and variance of failure counts are both finite, it signals the ability to consistently find solutions to new challenges, which we define as the Autonomous Level of intelligence. Using Survival Game, we comprehensively evaluate existing AI systems. Our results show that while AI systems achieve the Autonomous Level in simple tasks, they are still far from it in more complex tasks, such as vision, search, recommendation, and language. While scaling current AI technologies might help, this would come at an astronomical cost. Projections suggest that achieving the Autonomous Level for general tasks would require 10^{26} parameters. To put this into perspective, loading such a massive model requires so many H100 GPUs that their total value is 10^{7} times that of Apple Inc.'s market value. Even with Moore's Law, supporting such a parameter scale would take 70 years. This staggering cost highlights the complexity of human tasks and the inadequacies of current AI technologies. To further investigate this phenomenon, we conduct a theoretical analysis of Survival Game and its experimental results. Our findings suggest that human tasks possess a criticality property. As a result, Autonomous Level requires a deep understanding of the task's underlying mechanisms. Current AI systems, however, do not fully grasp these mechanisms and instead rely on superficial mimicry, making it difficult for them to reach an autonomous level. We believe Survival Game can not only guide the future development of AI but also offer profound insights into human intelligence.

Improving Interpersonal Communication by Simulating Audiences with Language Models

How do we communicate with others to achieve our goals? We use our prior experience or advice from others, or construct a candidate utterance by predicting how it will be received. However, our experiences are limited and biased, and reasoning about potential outcomes can be difficult and cognitively challenging. In this paper, we explore how we can leverage Large Language Model (LLM) simulations to help us communicate better. We propose the Explore-Generate-Simulate (EGS) framework, which takes as input any scenario where an individual is communicating to an audience with a goal they want to achieve. EGS (1) explores the solution space by producing a diverse set of advice relevant to the scenario, (2) generates communication candidates conditioned on subsets of the advice, and (3) simulates the reactions from various audiences to determine both the best candidate and advice to use. We evaluate the framework on eight scenarios spanning the ten fundamental processes of interpersonal communication. For each scenario, we collect a dataset of human evaluations across candidates and baselines, and showcase that our framework's chosen candidate is preferred over popular generation mechanisms including Chain-of-Thought. We also find that audience simulations achieve reasonably high agreement with human raters across 5 of the 8 scenarios. Finally, we demonstrate the generality of our framework by applying it to real-world scenarios described by users on web forums. Through evaluations and demonstrations, we show that EGS enhances the effectiveness and outcomes of goal-oriented communication across a variety of situations, thus opening up new possibilities for the application of large language models in revolutionizing communication and decision-making processes.

ReMax: A Simple, Effective, and Efficient Reinforcement Learning Method for Aligning Large Language Models

Alignment is crucial for training large language models. The predominant strategy is Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), with Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) as the de-facto algorithm. Yet, PPO is known to struggle with computational inefficiency, a challenge that this paper aims to address. We identify three important properties of RLHF tasks: fast simulation, deterministic transitions, and trajectory-level rewards, which are not leveraged in PPO. Based on these properties, we develop ReMax, a new algorithm tailored for RLHF. The design of ReMax builds on the celebrated algorithm REINFORCE but is enhanced with a new variance-reduction technique. ReMax offers threefold advantages over PPO: first, it is simple to implement with just 6 lines of code. It further eliminates more than 4 hyper-parameters in PPO, which are laborious to tune. Second, ReMax reduces memory usage by about 50%. To illustrate, PPO runs out of memory when fine-tuning a Llama2-7B model on A100-80GB GPUs, whereas ReMax can support the training. Even though memory-efficient techniques (e.g., ZeRO and offload) are employed for PPO to afford training, ReMax can utilize a larger batch size to increase throughput. Third, in terms of wall-clock time, PPO is about twice as slow as ReMax per iteration. Importantly, these improvements do not sacrifice task performance. We hypothesize that these advantages can be maintained in larger-scale models.

Dynamic population-based meta-learning for multi-agent communication with natural language

In this work, our goal is to train agents that can coordinate with seen, unseen as well as human partners in a multi-agent communication environment involving natural language. Previous work using a single set of agents has shown great progress in generalizing to known partners, however it struggles when coordinating with unfamiliar agents. To mitigate that, recent work explored the use of population-based approaches, where multiple agents interact with each other with the goal of learning more generic protocols. These methods, while able to result in good coordination between unseen partners, still only achieve so in cases of simple languages, thus failing to adapt to human partners using natural language. We attribute this to the use of static populations and instead propose a dynamic population-based meta-learning approach that builds such a population in an iterative manner. We perform a holistic evaluation of our method on two different referential games, and show that our agents outperform all prior work when communicating with seen partners and humans. Furthermore, we analyze the natural language generation skills of our agents, where we find that our agents also outperform strong baselines. Finally, we test the robustness of our agents when communicating with out-of-population agents and carefully test the importance of each component of our method through ablation studies.

Secrets of RLHF in Large Language Models Part II: Reward Modeling

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) has become a crucial technology for aligning language models with human values and intentions, enabling models to produce more helpful and harmless responses. Reward models are trained as proxies for human preferences to drive reinforcement learning optimization. While reward models are often considered central to achieving high performance, they face the following challenges in practical applications: (1) Incorrect and ambiguous preference pairs in the dataset may hinder the reward model from accurately capturing human intent. (2) Reward models trained on data from a specific distribution often struggle to generalize to examples outside that distribution and are not suitable for iterative RLHF training. In this report, we attempt to address these two issues. (1) From a data perspective, we propose a method to measure the strength of preferences within the data, based on a voting mechanism of multiple reward models. Experimental results confirm that data with varying preference strengths have different impacts on reward model performance. We introduce a series of novel methods to mitigate the influence of incorrect and ambiguous preferences in the dataset and fully leverage high-quality preference data. (2) From an algorithmic standpoint, we introduce contrastive learning to enhance the ability of reward models to distinguish between chosen and rejected responses, thereby improving model generalization. Furthermore, we employ meta-learning to enable the reward model to maintain the ability to differentiate subtle differences in out-of-distribution samples, and this approach can be utilized for iterative RLHF optimization.

MyoDex: A Generalizable Prior for Dexterous Manipulation

Human dexterity is a hallmark of motor control. Our hands can rapidly synthesize new behaviors despite the complexity (multi-articular and multi-joints, with 23 joints controlled by more than 40 muscles) of musculoskeletal sensory-motor circuits. In this work, we take inspiration from how human dexterity builds on a diversity of prior experiences, instead of being acquired through a single task. Motivated by this observation, we set out to develop agents that can build upon their previous experience to quickly acquire new (previously unattainable) behaviors. Specifically, our approach leverages multi-task learning to implicitly capture task-agnostic behavioral priors (MyoDex) for human-like dexterity, using a physiologically realistic human hand model - MyoHand. We demonstrate MyoDex's effectiveness in few-shot generalization as well as positive transfer to a large repertoire of unseen dexterous manipulation tasks. Agents leveraging MyoDex can solve approximately 3x more tasks, and 4x faster in comparison to a distillation baseline. While prior work has synthesized single musculoskeletal control behaviors, MyoDex is the first generalizable manipulation prior that catalyzes the learning of dexterous physiological control across a large variety of contact-rich behaviors. We also demonstrate the effectiveness of our paradigms beyond musculoskeletal control towards the acquisition of dexterity in 24 DoF Adroit Hand. Website: https://sites.google.com/view/myodex

Carbon and Silicon, Coexist or Compete? A Survey on Human-AI Interactions in Agent-based Modeling and Simulation

Recent interest in human-AI interactions in agent-based modeling and simulation (ABMS) has grown rapidly due to the widespread utilization of large language models (LLMs). ABMS is an intelligent approach that simulates autonomous agents' behaviors within a defined environment to research emergent phenomena. Integrating LLMs into ABMS enables natural language interaction between humans and models. Meanwhile, it introduces new challenges that rely on human interaction to address. Human involvement can assist ABMS in adapting to flexible and complex research demands. However, systematic reviews of interactions that examine how humans and AI interact in ABMS are lacking. In this paper, we investigate existing works and propose a novel taxonomy to categorize the interactions derived from them. Specifically, human users refer to researchers who utilize ABMS tools to conduct their studies in our survey. We decompose interactions into five dimensions: the goals that users want to achieve (Why), the phases that users are involved (When), the components of the system (What), the roles of users (Who), and the means of interactions (How). Our analysis summarizes the findings that reveal existing interaction patterns. They provide researchers who develop interactions with comprehensive guidance on how humans and AI interact. We further discuss the unexplored interactions and suggest future research directions.

The Persuasive Power of Large Language Models

The increasing capability of Large Language Models to act as human-like social agents raises two important questions in the area of opinion dynamics. First, whether these agents can generate effective arguments that could be injected into the online discourse to steer the public opinion. Second, whether artificial agents can interact with each other to reproduce dynamics of persuasion typical of human social systems, opening up opportunities for studying synthetic social systems as faithful proxies for opinion dynamics in human populations. To address these questions, we designed a synthetic persuasion dialogue scenario on the topic of climate change, where a 'convincer' agent generates a persuasive argument for a 'skeptic' agent, who subsequently assesses whether the argument changed its internal opinion state. Different types of arguments were generated to incorporate different linguistic dimensions underpinning psycho-linguistic theories of opinion change. We then asked human judges to evaluate the persuasiveness of machine-generated arguments. Arguments that included factual knowledge, markers of trust, expressions of support, and conveyed status were deemed most effective according to both humans and agents, with humans reporting a marked preference for knowledge-based arguments. Our experimental framework lays the groundwork for future in-silico studies of opinion dynamics, and our findings suggest that artificial agents have the potential of playing an important role in collective processes of opinion formation in online social media.

Aligning Language Models Using Follow-up Likelihood as Reward Signal

In natural human-to-human conversations, participants often receive feedback signals from one another based on their follow-up reactions. These reactions can include verbal responses, facial expressions, changes in emotional state, and other non-verbal cues. Similarly, in human-machine interactions, the machine can leverage the user's follow-up utterances as feedback signals to assess whether it has appropriately addressed the user's request. Therefore, we propose using the likelihood of follow-up utterances as rewards to differentiate preferred responses from less favored ones, without relying on human or commercial LLM-based preference annotations. Our proposed reward mechanism, ``Follow-up Likelihood as Reward" (FLR), matches the performance of strong reward models trained on large-scale human or GPT-4 annotated data on 8 pairwise-preference and 4 rating-based benchmarks. Building upon the FLR mechanism, we propose to automatically mine preference data from the online generations of a base policy model. The preference data are subsequently used to boost the helpfulness of the base model through direct alignment from preference (DAP) methods, such as direct preference optimization (DPO). Lastly, we demonstrate that fine-tuning the language model that provides follow-up likelihood with natural language feedback significantly enhances FLR's performance on reward modeling benchmarks and effectiveness in aligning the base policy model's helpfulness.

iPLAN: Intent-Aware Planning in Heterogeneous Traffic via Distributed Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning

Navigating safely and efficiently in dense and heterogeneous traffic scenarios is challenging for autonomous vehicles (AVs) due to their inability to infer the behaviors or intentions of nearby drivers. In this work, we introduce a distributed multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) algorithm that can predict trajectories and intents in dense and heterogeneous traffic scenarios. Our approach for intent-aware planning, iPLAN, allows agents to infer nearby drivers' intents solely from their local observations. We model two distinct incentives for agents' strategies: Behavioral Incentive for high-level decision-making based on their driving behavior or personality and Instant Incentive for motion planning for collision avoidance based on the current traffic state. Our approach enables agents to infer their opponents' behavior incentives and integrate this inferred information into their decision-making and motion-planning processes. We perform experiments on two simulation environments, Non-Cooperative Navigation and Heterogeneous Highway. In Heterogeneous Highway, results show that, compared with centralized training decentralized execution (CTDE) MARL baselines such as QMIX and MAPPO, our method yields a 4.3% and 38.4% higher episodic reward in mild and chaotic traffic, with 48.1% higher success rate and 80.6% longer survival time in chaotic traffic. We also compare with a decentralized training decentralized execution (DTDE) baseline IPPO and demonstrate a higher episodic reward of 12.7% and 6.3% in mild traffic and chaotic traffic, 25.3% higher success rate, and 13.7% longer survival time.

Secrets of RLHF in Large Language Models Part I: PPO

Large language models (LLMs) have formulated a blueprint for the advancement of artificial general intelligence. Its primary objective is to function as a human-centric (helpful, honest, and harmless) assistant. Alignment with humans assumes paramount significance, and reinforcement learning with human feedback (RLHF) emerges as the pivotal technological paradigm underpinning this pursuit. Current technical routes usually include reward models to measure human preferences, Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) to optimize policy model outputs, and process supervision to improve step-by-step reasoning capabilities. However, due to the challenges of reward design, environment interaction, and agent training, coupled with huge trial and error cost of large language models, there is a significant barrier for AI researchers to motivate the development of technical alignment and safe landing of LLMs. The stable training of RLHF has still been a puzzle. In the first report, we dissect the framework of RLHF, re-evaluate the inner workings of PPO, and explore how the parts comprising PPO algorithms impact policy agent training. We identify policy constraints being the key factor for the effective implementation of the PPO algorithm. Therefore, we explore the PPO-max, an advanced version of PPO algorithm, to efficiently improve the training stability of the policy model. Based on our main results, we perform a comprehensive analysis of RLHF abilities compared with SFT models and ChatGPT. The absence of open-source implementations has posed significant challenges to the investigation of LLMs alignment. Therefore, we are eager to release technical reports, reward models and PPO codes