Daily Papers

Morphing attacks are an emerging threat to state-of-the-art Face Recognition (FR) systems, which aim to create a single image that contains the biometric information of multiple identities. Diffusion Morphs (DiM) are a recently proposed morphing attack that has achieved state-of-the-art performance for representation-based morphing attacks. However, none of the existing research on DiMs have leveraged the iterative nature of DiMs and left the DiM model as a black box, treating it no differently than one would a Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) or Varational AutoEncoder (VAE). We propose a greedy strategy on the iterative sampling process of DiM models which searches for an optimal step guided by an identity-based heuristic function. We compare our proposed algorithm against ten other state-of-the-art morphing algorithms using the open-source SYN-MAD 2022 competition dataset. We find that our proposed algorithm is unreasonably effective, fooling all of the tested FR systems with an MMPMR of 100%, outperforming all other morphing algorithms compared.

While speculative decoding has recently appeared as a promising direction for accelerating the inference of large language models (LLMs), the speedup and scalability are strongly bounded by the token acceptance rate. Prevalent methods usually organize predicted tokens as independent chains or fixed token trees, which fails to generalize to diverse query distributions. In this paper, we propose DySpec, a faster speculative decoding algorithm with a novel dynamic token tree structure. We begin by bridging the draft distribution and acceptance rate from intuitive and empirical clues, and successfully show that the two variables are strongly correlated. Based on this, we employ a greedy strategy to dynamically expand the token tree at run time. Theoretically, we show that our method can achieve optimal results under mild assumptions. Empirically, DySpec yields a higher acceptance rate and speedup than fixed trees. DySpec can drastically improve the throughput and reduce the latency of token generation across various data distribution and model sizes, which significantly outperforms strong competitors, including Specinfer and Sequoia. Under low temperature setting, DySpec can improve the throughput up to 9.1times and reduce the latency up to 9.4times on Llama2-70B. Under high temperature setting, DySpec can also improve the throughput up to 6.21times, despite the increasing difficulty of speculating more than one token per step for draft model.

This paper proposes a novel reinforcement learning (RL) framework for credit underwriting that tackles ungeneralizable contextual challenges. We adapt RL principles for credit scoring, incorporating action space renewal and multi-choice actions. Our work demonstrates that the traditional underwriting approach aligns with the RL greedy strategy. We introduce two new RL-based credit underwriting algorithms to enable more informed decision-making. Simulations show these new approaches outperform the traditional method in scenarios where the data aligns with the model. However, complex situations highlight model limitations, emphasizing the importance of powerful machine learning models for optimal performance. Future research directions include exploring more sophisticated models alongside efficient exploration mechanisms.

Mining cohesive subgraphs in attributed graphs is an essential problem in the domain of graph data analysis. The integration of fairness considerations significantly fuels interest in models and algorithms for mining fairness-aware cohesive subgraphs. Notably, the relative fair clique emerges as a robust model, ensuring not only comprehensive attribute coverage but also greater flexibility in distributing attribute vertices. Motivated by the strength of this model, we for the first time pioneer an investigation into the identification of the maximum relative fair clique in large-scale graphs. We introduce a novel concept of colorful support, which serves as the foundation for two innovative graph reduction techniques. These techniques effectively narrow the graph's size by iteratively removing edges that do not belong to relative fair cliques. Furthermore, a series of upper bounds of the maximum relative fair clique size is proposed by incorporating consideration of vertex attributes and colors. The pruning techniques derived from these upper bounds can significantly trim unnecessary search space during the branch-and-bound procedure. Adding to this, we present a heuristic algorithm with a linear time complexity, employing both a degree-based greedy strategy and a colored degree-based greedy strategy to identify a larger relative fair clique. This heuristic algorithm can serve a dual purpose by aiding in branch pruning, thereby enhancing overall search efficiency. Extensive experiments conducted on six real-life datasets demonstrate the efficiency, scalability, and effectiveness of our algorithms.

The language model (LM) approach based on acoustic and linguistic prompts, such as VALL-E, has achieved remarkable progress in the field of zero-shot audio generation. However, existing methods still have some limitations: 1) repetitions, transpositions, and omissions in the output synthesized speech due to limited alignment constraints between audio and phoneme tokens; 2) challenges of fine-grained control over the synthesized speech with autoregressive (AR) language model; 3) infinite silence generation due to the nature of AR-based decoding, especially under the greedy strategy. To alleviate these issues, we propose ELLA-V, a simple but efficient LM-based zero-shot text-to-speech (TTS) framework, which enables fine-grained control over synthesized audio at the phoneme level. The key to ELLA-V is interleaving sequences of acoustic and phoneme tokens, where phoneme tokens appear ahead of the corresponding acoustic tokens. The experimental findings reveal that our model outperforms VALL-E in terms of accuracy and delivers more stable results using both greedy and sampling-based decoding strategies. The code of ELLA-V will be open-sourced after cleanups. Audio samples are available at https://ereboas.github.io/ELLAV/.

Global channel pruning (GCP) aims to remove a subset of channels (filters) across different layers from a deep model without hurting the performance. Previous works focus on either single task model pruning or simply adapting it to multitask scenario, and still face the following problems when handling multitask pruning: 1) Due to the task mismatch, a well-pruned backbone for classification task focuses on preserving filters that can extract category-sensitive information, causing filters that may be useful for other tasks to be pruned during the backbone pruning stage; 2) For multitask predictions, different filters within or between layers are more closely related and interacted than that for single task prediction, making multitask pruning more difficult. Therefore, aiming at multitask model compression, we propose a Performance-Aware Global Channel Pruning (PAGCP) framework. We first theoretically present the objective for achieving superior GCP, by considering the joint saliency of filters from intra- and inter-layers. Then a sequentially greedy pruning strategy is proposed to optimize the objective, where a performance-aware oracle criterion is developed to evaluate sensitivity of filters to each task and preserve the globally most task-related filters. Experiments on several multitask datasets show that the proposed PAGCP can reduce the FLOPs and parameters by over 60% with minor performance drop, and achieves 1.2xsim3.3x acceleration on both cloud and mobile platforms.

Current approaches for training Process Reward Models (PRMs) often involve breaking down responses into multiple reasoning steps using rule-based techniques, such as using predefined placeholder tokens or setting the reasoning step's length into a fixed size. These approaches overlook the fact that specific words do not typically mark true decision points in a text. To address this, we propose AdaptiveStep, a method that divides reasoning steps based on the model's confidence in predicting the next word. This division method provides more decision-making information at each step, enhancing downstream tasks, such as reward model learning. Moreover, our method does not require manual annotation. We demonstrate its effectiveness through experiments with AdaptiveStep-trained PRMs in mathematical reasoning and code generation tasks. Experimental results indicate that the outcome PRM achieves state-of-the-art Best-of-N performance, surpassing greedy search strategy with token-level value-guided decoding, while also reducing construction costs by over 30% compared to existing open-source PRMs. In addition, we provide a thorough analysis and case study on the PRM's performance, transferability, and generalization capabilities.

Aligning large language models with human objectives is paramount, yet common approaches including RLHF suffer from unstable and resource-intensive training. In response to this challenge, we introduce ARGS, Alignment as Reward-Guided Search, a novel framework that integrates alignment into the decoding process, eliminating the need for expensive RL training. By adjusting the model's probabilistic predictions using a reward signal, ARGS generates texts with semantic diversity while being aligned with human preferences, offering a promising and flexible solution for aligning language models. Notably, ARGS demonstrates consistent enhancements in average reward compared to baselines across diverse alignment tasks and various model dimensions. For example, under the same greedy-based decoding strategy, our method improves the average reward by 19.56% relative to the baseline and secures a preference or tie score of 64.33% in GPT-4 evaluation. We believe that our framework, emphasizing decoding-time alignment, paves the way for more responsive language models in the future. Code is publicly available at: https://github.com/deeplearning-wisc/args.

Block coordinate descent (BCD) methods are widely used for large-scale numerical optimization because of their cheap iteration costs, low memory requirements, amenability to parallelization, and ability to exploit problem structure. Three main algorithmic choices influence the performance of BCD methods: the block partitioning strategy, the block selection rule, and the block update rule. In this paper we explore all three of these building blocks and propose variations for each that can significantly improve the progress made by each BCD iteration. We (i) propose new greedy block-selection strategies that guarantee more progress per iteration than the Gauss-Southwell rule; (ii) explore practical issues like how to implement the new rules when using "variable" blocks; (iii) explore the use of message-passing to compute matrix or Newton updates efficiently on huge blocks for problems with sparse dependencies between variables; and (iv) consider optimal active manifold identification, which leads to bounds on the "active-set complexity" of BCD methods and leads to superlinear convergence for certain problems with sparse solutions (and in some cases finite termination at an optimal solution). We support all of our findings with numerical results for the classic machine learning problems of least squares, logistic regression, multi-class logistic regression, label propagation, and L1-regularization.

Fine-tuned language models use greedy decoding to answer reading comprehension questions with relative success. However, this approach does not ensure that the answer is a span in the given passage, nor does it guarantee that it is the most probable one. Does greedy decoding actually perform worse than an algorithm that does adhere to these properties? To study the performance and optimality of greedy decoding, we present exact-extract, a decoding algorithm that efficiently finds the most probable answer span in the context. We compare the performance of T5 with both decoding algorithms on zero-shot and few-shot extractive question answering. When no training examples are available, exact-extract significantly outperforms greedy decoding. However, greedy decoding quickly converges towards the performance of exact-extract with the introduction of a few training examples, becoming more extractive and increasingly likelier to generate the most probable span as the training set grows. We also show that self-supervised training can bias the model towards extractive behavior, increasing performance in the zero-shot setting without resorting to annotated examples. Overall, our results suggest that pretrained language models are so good at adapting to extractive question answering, that it is often enough to fine-tune on a small training set for the greedy algorithm to emulate the optimal decoding strategy.

Model merging has become one of the key technologies for enhancing the capabilities and efficiency of Large Language Models (LLMs). However, our understanding of the expected performance gains and principles when merging any two models remains limited. In this work, we introduce model kinship, the degree of similarity or relatedness between LLMs, analogous to biological evolution. With comprehensive empirical analysis, we find that there is a certain relationship between model kinship and the performance gains after model merging, which can help guide our selection of candidate models. Inspired by this, we propose a new model merging strategy: Top-k Greedy Merging with Model Kinship, which can yield better performance on benchmark datasets. Specifically, we discover that using model kinship as a criterion can assist us in continuously performing model merging, alleviating the degradation (local optima) in model evolution, whereas model kinship can serve as a guide to escape these traps. Code is available at https://github.com/zjunlp/ModelKinship.

Chain-of-thought prompting combined with pre-trained large language models has achieved encouraging results on complex reasoning tasks. In this paper, we propose a new decoding strategy, self-consistency, to replace the naive greedy decoding used in chain-of-thought prompting. It first samples a diverse set of reasoning paths instead of only taking the greedy one, and then selects the most consistent answer by marginalizing out the sampled reasoning paths. Self-consistency leverages the intuition that a complex reasoning problem typically admits multiple different ways of thinking leading to its unique correct answer. Our extensive empirical evaluation shows that self-consistency boosts the performance of chain-of-thought prompting with a striking margin on a range of popular arithmetic and commonsense reasoning benchmarks, including GSM8K (+17.9%), SVAMP (+11.0%), AQuA (+12.2%), StrategyQA (+6.4%) and ARC-challenge (+3.9%).

Competitions for shareable and limited resources have long been studied with strategic agents. In reality, agents often have to learn and maximize the rewards of the resources at the same time. To design an individualized competing policy, we model the competition between agents in a novel multi-player multi-armed bandit (MPMAB) setting where players are selfish and aim to maximize their own rewards. In addition, when several players pull the same arm, we assume that these players averagely share the arms' rewards by expectation. Under this setting, we first analyze the Nash equilibrium when arms' rewards are known. Subsequently, we propose a novel SelfishMPMAB with Averaging Allocation (SMAA) approach based on the equilibrium. We theoretically demonstrate that SMAA could achieve a good regret guarantee for each player when all players follow the algorithm. Additionally, we establish that no single selfish player can significantly increase their rewards through deviation, nor can they detrimentally affect other players' rewards without incurring substantial losses for themselves. We finally validate the effectiveness of the method in extensive synthetic experiments.

In economy, markets are denoted as efficient when it is impossible to systematically generate profits which outperform the average. In the past years, the concept has been tested in other domains such as the growing sports betting market. Surprisingly, despite its large size and its level of maturity, sports betting shows traits of inefficiency. The anomalies indicate the existence of strategies which shift betting from a game of chance towards a game of skill. This article shows an example for an inefficiency detected in the German soccer betting TOTO 13er Wette, which is operated by state-run lottery agencies. Gamblers have to guess the outcome (win, draw, loss) of 13 soccer matches listed on a lottery tip. Applying stochastic methods, a recipe is presented to determine hit rates for single match outcomes. More important, the recipe provides the number of lottery tips required to achieve a specific number of strikes (number of correct match forecasts per lottery tip) for any given level of safety. An approximation is derived to cope with large numbers in hypergeometric distributions, valid under certain constraints. Overall, the strategy does lead to returns exceeding the aggregated lottery fees, resulting in moderate, but consistent profits. It is briefly discussed if lessions learned from soccer betting can be transferred back to financial markets, because gamblers and retail investors face similar challenges and opportunities.

Stochastic optimization is one of the central problems in Machine Learning and Theoretical Computer Science. In the standard model, the algorithm is given a fixed distribution known in advance. In practice though, one may acquire at a cost extra information to make better decisions. In this paper, we study how to buy information for stochastic optimization and formulate this question as an online learning problem. Assuming the learner has an oracle for the original optimization problem, we design a 2-competitive deterministic algorithm and a e/(e-1)-competitive randomized algorithm for buying information. We show that this ratio is tight as the problem is equivalent to a robust generalization of the ski-rental problem, which we call super-martingale stopping. We also consider an adaptive setting where the learner can choose to buy information after taking some actions for the underlying optimization problem. We focus on the classic optimization problem, Min-Sum Set Cover, where the goal is to quickly find an action that covers a given request drawn from a known distribution. We provide an 8-competitive algorithm running in polynomial time that chooses actions and decides when to buy information about the underlying request.

In the context of multi-step reasoning, language models (LMs) probabilities are often miscalibrated -- solutions with high probabilities are not always correct. Therefore, greedy decoding, which is the standard decoding method for reasoning tasks, often yields incorrect solutions. In addition, methods such as self-consistency and verifiers rely on sampling from the LM distribution and do not tackle the underlying issue. To address this, we introduce Guiding Multi-step ReAsoning with a CorrectnEss Discriminator (GRACE), a stepwise decoding approach that nudges the model towards producing correct reasoning steps. GRACE employs a discriminator model, which is trained to differentiate correct steps from invalid ones, to adjust decoding preferences based on the correctness of each reasoning step. Importantly, GRACE does not require fine-tuning or re-training the LMs. When compared with conventional decoding strategies over four popular math reasoning benchmarks, GRACE exhibits significant improvements in both final answer accuracy and step correctness, outperforming both greedy decoding and self-consistency.Our code can be found at \url{https://github.com/mukhal/grace.}

We study an online learning problem in general-sum Stackelberg games, where players act in a decentralized and strategic manner. We study two settings depending on the type of information for the follower: (1) the limited information setting where the follower only observes its own reward, and (2) the side information setting where the follower has extra side information about the leader's reward. We show that for the follower, myopically best responding to the leader's action is the best strategy for the limited information setting, but not necessarily so for the side information setting -- the follower can manipulate the leader's reward signals with strategic actions, and hence induce the leader's strategy to converge to an equilibrium that is better off for itself. Based on these insights, we study decentralized online learning for both players in the two settings. Our main contribution is to derive last-iterate convergence and sample complexity results in both settings. Notably, we design a new manipulation strategy for the follower in the latter setting, and show that it has an intrinsic advantage against the best response strategy. Our theories are also supported by empirical results.

Feature selection helps reduce data acquisition costs in ML, but the standard approach is to train models with static feature subsets. Here, we consider the dynamic feature selection (DFS) problem where a model sequentially queries features based on the presently available information. DFS is often addressed with reinforcement learning, but we explore a simpler approach of greedily selecting features based on their conditional mutual information. This method is theoretically appealing but requires oracle access to the data distribution, so we develop a learning approach based on amortized optimization. The proposed method is shown to recover the greedy policy when trained to optimality, and it outperforms numerous existing feature selection methods in our experiments, thus validating it as a simple but powerful approach for this problem.

We present a Spades bidding algorithm that is superior to recreational human players and to publicly available bots. Like in Bridge, the game of Spades is composed of two independent phases, bidding and playing. This paper focuses on the bidding algorithm, since this phase holds a precise challenge: based on the input, choose the bid that maximizes the agent's winning probability. Our Bidding-in-Spades (BIS) algorithm heuristically determines the bidding strategy by comparing the expected utility of each possible bid. A major challenge is how to estimate these expected utilities. To this end, we propose a set of domain-specific heuristics, and then correct them via machine learning using data from real-world players. The \BIS algorithm we present can be attached to any playing algorithm. It beats rule-based bidding bots when all use the same playing component. When combined with a rule-based playing algorithm, it is superior to the average recreational human.

In reinforcement learning (RL), rewards of states are typically considered additive, and following the Markov assumption, they are independent of states visited previously. In many important applications, such as coverage control, experiment design and informative path planning, rewards naturally have diminishing returns, i.e., their value decreases in light of similar states visited previously. To tackle this, we propose submodular RL (SubRL), a paradigm which seeks to optimize more general, non-additive (and history-dependent) rewards modelled via submodular set functions which capture diminishing returns. Unfortunately, in general, even in tabular settings, we show that the resulting optimization problem is hard to approximate. On the other hand, motivated by the success of greedy algorithms in classical submodular optimization, we propose SubPO, a simple policy gradient-based algorithm for SubRL that handles non-additive rewards by greedily maximizing marginal gains. Indeed, under some assumptions on the underlying Markov Decision Process (MDP), SubPO recovers optimal constant factor approximations of submodular bandits. Moreover, we derive a natural policy gradient approach for locally optimizing SubRL instances even in large state- and action- spaces. We showcase the versatility of our approach by applying SubPO to several applications, such as biodiversity monitoring, Bayesian experiment design, informative path planning, and coverage maximization. Our results demonstrate sample efficiency, as well as scalability to high-dimensional state-action spaces.

This paper investigates the problem of ensembling multiple strategies for sequential portfolios to outperform individual strategies in terms of long-term wealth. Due to the uncertainty of strategies' performances in the future market, which are often based on specific models and statistical assumptions, investors often mitigate risk and enhance robustness by combining multiple strategies, akin to common approaches in collective learning prediction. However, the absence of a distribution-free and consistent preference framework complicates decisions of combination due to the ambiguous objective. To address this gap, we introduce a novel framework for decision-making in combining strategies, irrespective of market conditions, by establishing the investor's preference between decisions and then forming a clear objective. Through this framework, we propose a combinatorial strategy construction, free from statistical assumptions, for any scale of component strategies, even infinite, such that it meets the determined criterion. Finally, we test the proposed strategy along with its accelerated variant and some other multi-strategies. The numerical experiments show results in favor of the proposed strategies, albeit with small tradeoffs in their Sharpe ratios, in which their cumulative wealths eventually exceed those of the best component strategies while the accelerated strategy significantly improves performance.

We study the problem of designing mechanisms for information acquisition scenarios. This setting models strategic interactions between an uniformed receiver and a set of informed senders. In our model the senders receive information about the underlying state of nature and communicate their observation (either truthfully or not) to the receiver, which, based on this information, selects an action. Our goal is to design mechanisms maximizing the receiver's utility while incentivizing the senders to report truthfully their information. First, we provide an algorithm that efficiently computes an optimal incentive compatible (IC) mechanism. Then, we focus on the online problem in which the receiver sequentially interacts in an unknown game, with the objective of minimizing the cumulative regret w.r.t. the optimal IC mechanism, and the cumulative violation of the incentive compatibility constraints. We investigate two different online scenarios, i.e., the full and bandit feedback settings. For the full feedback problem, we propose an algorithm that guarantees mathcal O(sqrt T) regret and violation, while for the bandit feedback setting we present an algorithm that attains mathcal O(T^{alpha}) regret and mathcal O(T^{1-alpha/2}) violation for any alphain[1/2, 1]. Finally, we complement our results providing a tight lower bound.

We study a strategic variant of the multi-armed bandit problem, which we coin the strategic click-bandit. This model is motivated by applications in online recommendation where the choice of recommended items depends on both the click-through rates and the post-click rewards. Like in classical bandits, rewards follow a fixed unknown distribution. However, we assume that the click-rate of each arm is chosen strategically by the arm (e.g., a host on Airbnb) in order to maximize the number of times it gets clicked. The algorithm designer does not know the post-click rewards nor the arms' actions (i.e., strategically chosen click-rates) in advance, and must learn both values over time. To solve this problem, we design an incentive-aware learning algorithm, UCB-S, which achieves two goals simultaneously: (a) incentivizing desirable arm behavior under uncertainty; (b) minimizing regret by learning unknown parameters. We characterize all approximate Nash equilibria among arms under UCB-S and show a mathcal{O} (KT) regret bound uniformly in every equilibrium. We also show that incentive-unaware algorithms generally fail to achieve low regret in the strategic click-bandit. Finally, we support our theoretical results by simulations of strategic arm behavior which confirm the effectiveness and robustness of our proposed incentive design.

We study the incentivized information acquisition problem, where a principal hires an agent to gather information on her behalf. Such a problem is modeled as a Stackelberg game between the principal and the agent, where the principal announces a scoring rule that specifies the payment, and then the agent then chooses an effort level that maximizes her own profit and reports the information. We study the online setting of such a problem from the principal's perspective, i.e., designing the optimal scoring rule by repeatedly interacting with the strategic agent. We design a provably sample efficient algorithm that tailors the UCB algorithm (Auer et al., 2002) to our model, which achieves a sublinear T^{2/3}-regret after T iterations. Our algorithm features a delicate estimation procedure for the optimal profit of the principal, and a conservative correction scheme that ensures the desired agent's actions are incentivized. Furthermore, a key feature of our regret bound is that it is independent of the number of states of the environment.

We study offline multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) in Markov games, where the goal is to learn an approximate equilibrium -- such as Nash equilibrium and (Coarse) Correlated Equilibrium -- from an offline dataset pre-collected from the game. Existing works consider relatively restricted tabular or linear models and handle each equilibria separately. In this work, we provide the first framework for sample-efficient offline learning in Markov games under general function approximation, handling all 3 equilibria in a unified manner. By using Bellman-consistent pessimism, we obtain interval estimation for policies' returns, and use both the upper and the lower bounds to obtain a relaxation on the gap of a candidate policy, which becomes our optimization objective. Our results generalize prior works and provide several additional insights. Importantly, we require a data coverage condition that improves over the recently proposed "unilateral concentrability". Our condition allows selective coverage of deviation policies that optimally trade-off between their greediness (as approximate best responses) and coverage, and we show scenarios where this leads to significantly better guarantees. As a new connection, we also show how our algorithmic framework can subsume seemingly different solution concepts designed for the special case of two-player zero-sum games.

Learning optimal policies in sparse rewards settings is difficult as the learning agent has little to no feedback on the quality of its actions. In these situations, a good strategy is to focus on exploration, hopefully leading to the discovery of a reward signal to improve on. A learning algorithm capable of dealing with this kind of settings has to be able to (1) explore possible agent behaviors and (2) exploit any possible discovered reward. Efficient exploration algorithms have been proposed that require to define a behavior space, that associates to an agent its resulting behavior in a space that is known to be worth exploring. The need to define this space is a limitation of these algorithms. In this work, we introduce STAX, an algorithm designed to learn a behavior space on-the-fly and to explore it while efficiently optimizing any reward discovered. It does so by separating the exploration and learning of the behavior space from the exploitation of the reward through an alternating two-steps process. In the first step, STAX builds a repertoire of diverse policies while learning a low-dimensional representation of the high-dimensional observations generated during the policies evaluation. In the exploitation step, emitters are used to optimize the performance of the discovered rewarding solutions. Experiments conducted on three different sparse reward environments show that STAX performs comparably to existing baselines while requiring much less prior information about the task as it autonomously builds the behavior space.

This paper investigates a novel lossy compression framework operating under logarithmic loss, designed to handle situations where the reconstruction distribution diverges from the source distribution. This framework is especially relevant for applications that require joint compression and retrieval, and in scenarios involving distributional shifts due to processing. We show that the proposed formulation extends the classical minimum entropy coupling framework by integrating a bottleneck, allowing for a controlled degree of stochasticity in the coupling. We explore the decomposition of the Minimum Entropy Coupling with Bottleneck (MEC-B) into two distinct optimization problems: Entropy-Bounded Information Maximization (EBIM) for the encoder, and Minimum Entropy Coupling (MEC) for the decoder. Through extensive analysis, we provide a greedy algorithm for EBIM with guaranteed performance, and characterize the optimal solution near functional mappings, yielding significant theoretical insights into the structural complexity of this problem. Furthermore, we illustrate the practical application of MEC-B through experiments in Markov Coding Games (MCGs) under rate limits. These games simulate a communication scenario within a Markov Decision Process, where an agent must transmit a compressed message from a sender to a receiver through its actions. Our experiments highlight the trade-offs between MDP rewards and receiver accuracy across various compression rates, showcasing the efficacy of our method compared to conventional compression baseline.

We consider the problem of fairly allocating a sequence of indivisible items that arrive online in an arbitrary order to a group of n agents with additive normalized valuation functions. We consider both the allocation of goods and chores and propose algorithms for approximating maximin share (MMS) allocations. When agents have identical valuation functions the problem coincides with the semi-online machine covering problem (when items are goods) and load balancing problem (when items are chores), for both of which optimal competitive ratios have been achieved. In this paper, we consider the case when agents have general additive valuation functions. For the allocation of goods, we show that no competitive algorithm exists even when there are only three agents and propose an optimal 0.5-competitive algorithm for the case of two agents. For the allocation of chores, we propose a (2-1/n)-competitive algorithm for n>=3 agents and a square root of 2 (approximately 1.414)-competitive algorithm for two agents. Additionally, we show that no algorithm can do better than 15/11 (approximately 1.364)-competitive for two agents.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

Recent research suggests that tree search algorithms (e.g. Monte Carlo Tree Search) can dramatically boost LLM performance on complex mathematical reasoning tasks. However, they often require more than 10 times the computational resources of greedy decoding due to wasteful search strategies, making them difficult to be deployed in practical applications. This study introduces a novel guided tree search algorithm with dynamic node selection and node-level exploration budget (maximum number of children) calculation to tackle this issue. By considering the search progress towards the final answer (history) and the guidance from a value network (future) trained without any step-wise annotations, our algorithm iteratively selects the most promising tree node before expanding it within the boundaries of the allocated computational budget. Experiments conducted on the GSM8K and TabMWP datasets demonstrate that our approach not only offers competitive performance but also enjoys significantly lower computational costs compared to baseline methods.

There is a strong link between the general concept of intelligence and the ability to collect and use information. The theory of Bayes-adaptive exploration offers an attractive optimality framework for training machines to perform complex information gathering tasks. However, the computational complexity of the resulting optimal control problem has limited the diffusion of the theory to mainstream deep AI research. In this paper we exploit the inherent mathematical structure of Bayes-adaptive problems in order to dramatically simplify the problem by making the reward structure denser while simultaneously decoupling the learning of exploitation and exploration policies. The key to this simplification comes from the novel concept of cross-value (i.e. the value of being in an environment while acting optimally according to another), which we use to quantify the value of currently available information. This results in a new denser reward structure that "cashes in" all future rewards that can be predicted from the current information state. In a set of experiments we show that the approach makes it possible to learn challenging information gathering tasks without the use of shaping and heuristic bonuses in situations where the standard RL algorithms fail.

In collaborative learning with streaming data, nodes (e.g., organizations) jointly and continuously learn a machine learning (ML) model by sharing the latest model updates computed from their latest streaming data. For the more resourceful nodes to be willing to share their model updates, they need to be fairly incentivized. This paper explores an incentive design that guarantees fairness so that nodes receive rewards commensurate to their contributions. Our approach leverages an explore-then-exploit formulation to estimate the nodes' contributions (i.e., exploration) for realizing our theoretically guaranteed fair incentives (i.e., exploitation). However, we observe a "rich get richer" phenomenon arising from the existing approaches to guarantee fairness and it discourages the participation of the less resourceful nodes. To remedy this, we additionally preserve asymptotic equality, i.e., less resourceful nodes achieve equal performance eventually to the more resourceful/"rich" nodes. We empirically demonstrate in two settings with real-world streaming data: federated online incremental learning and federated reinforcement learning, that our proposed approach outperforms existing baselines in fairness and learning performance while remaining competitive in preserving equality.

Multitask Reinforcement Learning (MTRL) approaches have gained increasing attention for its wide applications in many important Reinforcement Learning (RL) tasks. However, while recent advancements in MTRL theory have focused on the improved statistical efficiency by assuming a shared structure across tasks, exploration--a crucial aspect of RL--has been largely overlooked. This paper addresses this gap by showing that when an agent is trained on a sufficiently diverse set of tasks, a generic policy-sharing algorithm with myopic exploration design like epsilon-greedy that are inefficient in general can be sample-efficient for MTRL. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first theoretical demonstration of the "exploration benefits" of MTRL. It may also shed light on the enigmatic success of the wide applications of myopic exploration in practice. To validate the role of diversity, we conduct experiments on synthetic robotic control environments, where the diverse task set aligns with the task selection by automatic curriculum learning, which is empirically shown to improve sample-efficiency.

Because it is difficult to precisely specify complex objectives, reinforcement learning policies are often optimized using proxy reward functions that only approximate the true goal. However, optimizing proxy rewards frequently leads to reward hacking: the optimized reward function ceases to be a good proxy and the resulting policy performs poorly with respect to the unspecified true reward. Principled solutions to reward hacking have been impeded by the lack of a good definition for the problem. To address this gap, we introduce a definition of reward hacking based on the correlation between proxy and true rewards for states and actions seen by a "base policy" that breaks down under optimization. We show that this definition captures reward hacking behavior across several realistic settings, including in reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). Using our formulation, we show theoretically that regularization to the base policy can effectively prevent reward hacking. While the current practice in RLHF applies a KL penalty between action distributions for this purpose, our theory suggests regularizing the chi^2 divergence between the policies' occupancy measures can be more effective. We intuitively show the benefits of this type of regularization and demonstrate that it better mitigates reward hacking in practice across four realistic settings, including RLHF. Our code is available at https://github.com/cassidylaidlaw/orpo.

We consider negotiation settings in which two agents use natural language to bargain on goods. Agents need to decide on both high-level strategy (e.g., proposing \50) and the execution of that strategy (e.g., generating "The bike is brand new. Selling for just 50."). Recent work on negotiation trains neural models, but their end-to-end nature makes it hard to control their strategy, and reinforcement learning tends to lead to degenerate solutions. In this paper, we propose a modular approach based on coarse di- alogue acts (e.g., propose(price=50)) that decouples strategy and generation. We show that we can flexibly set the strategy using supervised learning, reinforcement learning, or domain-specific knowledge without degeneracy, while our retrieval-based generation can maintain context-awareness and produce diverse utterances. We test our approach on the recently proposed DEALORNODEAL game, and we also collect a richer dataset based on real items on Craigslist. Human evaluation shows that our systems achieve higher task success rate and more human-like negotiation behavior than previous approaches.

In Reinforcement Learning (RL), an agent acts in an unknown environment to maximize the expected cumulative discounted sum of an external reward signal, i.e., the expected return. In practice, in many tasks of interest, such as policy optimization, the agent usually spends its interaction budget by collecting episodes of fixed length within a simulator (i.e., Monte Carlo simulation). However, given the discounted nature of the RL objective, this data collection strategy might not be the best option. Indeed, the rewards taken in early simulation steps weigh exponentially more than future rewards. Taking a cue from this intuition, in this paper, we design an a-priori budget allocation strategy that leads to the collection of trajectories of different lengths, i.e., truncated. The proposed approach provably minimizes the width of the confidence intervals around the empirical estimates of the expected return of a policy. After discussing the theoretical properties of our method, we make use of our trajectory truncation mechanism to extend Policy Optimization via Importance Sampling (POIS, Metelli et al., 2018) algorithm. Finally, we conduct a numerical comparison between our algorithm and POIS: the results are consistent with our theory and show that an appropriate truncation of the trajectories can succeed in improving performance.

This paper introduces Alympics (Olympics for Agents), a systematic simulation framework utilizing Large Language Model (LLM) agents for game theory research. Alympics creates a versatile platform for studying complex game theory problems, bridging the gap between theoretical game theory and empirical investigations by providing a controlled environment for simulating human-like strategic interactions with LLM agents. In our pilot case study, the "Water Allocation Challenge," we explore Alympics through a challenging strategic game focused on the multi-round auction on scarce survival resources. This study demonstrates the framework's ability to qualitatively and quantitatively analyze game determinants, strategies, and outcomes. Additionally, we conduct a comprehensive human assessment and an in-depth evaluation of LLM agents in strategic decision-making scenarios. Our findings not only expand the understanding of LLM agents' proficiency in emulating human strategic behavior but also highlight their potential in advancing game theory knowledge, thereby enriching our understanding of both game theory and empowering further research into strategic decision-making domains with LLM agents. Codes, prompts, and all related resources are available at https://github.com/microsoft/Alympics.

Since the introduction of ChatGPT and GPT-4, these models have been tested across a large number of tasks. Their adeptness across domains is evident, but their aptitude in playing games, and specifically their aptitude in the realm of poker has remained unexplored. Poker is a game that requires decision making under uncertainty and incomplete information. In this paper, we put ChatGPT and GPT-4 through the poker test and evaluate their poker skills. Our findings reveal that while both models display an advanced understanding of poker, encompassing concepts like the valuation of starting hands, playing positions and other intricacies of game theory optimal (GTO) poker, both ChatGPT and GPT-4 are NOT game theory optimal poker players. Profitable strategies in poker are evaluated in expectations over large samples. Through a series of experiments, we first discover the characteristics of optimal prompts and model parameters for playing poker with these models. Our observations then unveil the distinct playing personas of the two models. We first conclude that GPT-4 is a more advanced poker player than ChatGPT. This exploration then sheds light on the divergent poker tactics of the two models: ChatGPT's conservativeness juxtaposed against GPT-4's aggression. In poker vernacular, when tasked to play GTO poker, ChatGPT plays like a nit, which means that it has a propensity to only engage with premium hands and folds a majority of hands. When subjected to the same directive, GPT-4 plays like a maniac, showcasing a loose and aggressive style of play. Both strategies, although relatively advanced, are not game theory optimal.

The bandits with knapsack (BwK) framework models online decision-making problems in which an agent makes a sequence of decisions subject to resource consumption constraints. The traditional model assumes that each action consumes a non-negative amount of resources and the process ends when the initial budgets are fully depleted. We study a natural generalization of the BwK framework which allows non-monotonic resource utilization, i.e., resources can be replenished by a positive amount. We propose a best-of-both-worlds primal-dual template that can handle any online learning problem with replenishment for which a suitable primal regret minimizer exists. In particular, we provide the first positive results for the case of adversarial inputs by showing that our framework guarantees a constant competitive ratio alpha when B=Omega(T) or when the possible per-round replenishment is a positive constant. Moreover, under a stochastic input model, our algorithm yields an instance-independent O(T^{1/2}) regret bound which complements existing instance-dependent bounds for the same setting. Finally, we provide applications of our framework to some economic problems of practical relevance.

The online knapsack problem is a classic problem in the field of online algorithms. Its canonical version asks how to pack items of different values and weights arriving online into a capacity-limited knapsack so as to maximize the total value of the admitted items. Although optimal competitive algorithms are known for this problem, they may be fundamentally unfair, i.e., individual items may be treated inequitably in different ways. Inspired by recent attention to fairness in online settings, we develop a natural and practically-relevant notion of time fairness for the online knapsack problem, and show that the existing optimal algorithms perform poorly under this metric. We propose a parameterized deterministic algorithm where the parameter precisely captures the Pareto-optimal trade-off between fairness and competitiveness. We show that randomization is theoretically powerful enough to be simultaneously competitive and fair; however, it does not work well in practice, using trace-driven experiments. To further improve the trade-off between fairness and competitiveness, we develop a fair, robust (competitive), and consistent learning-augmented algorithm with substantial performance improvement in trace-driven experiments.

Budget management strategies in repeated auctions have received growing attention in online advertising markets. However, previous work on budget management in online bidding mainly focused on second-price auctions. The rapid shift from second-price auctions to first-price auctions for online ads in recent years has motivated the challenging question of how to bid in repeated first-price auctions while controlling budgets. In this work, we study the problem of learning in repeated first-price auctions with budgets. We design a dual-based algorithm that can achieve a near-optimal O(T) regret with full information feedback where the maximum competing bid is always revealed after each auction. We further consider the setting with one-sided information feedback where only the winning bid is revealed after each auction. We show that our modified algorithm can still achieve an O(T) regret with mild assumptions on the bidder's value distribution. Finally, we complement the theoretical results with numerical experiments to confirm the effectiveness of our budget management policy.

Pruning is a standard technique for reducing the computational cost of deep networks. Many advances in pruning leverage concepts from the Lottery Ticket Hypothesis (LTH). LTH reveals that inside a trained dense network exists sparse subnetworks (tickets) able to achieve similar accuracy (i.e., win the lottery - winning tickets). Pruning at initialization focuses on finding winning tickets without training a dense network. Studies on these concepts share the trend that subnetworks come from weight or filter pruning. In this work, we investigate LTH and pruning at initialization from the lens of layer pruning. First, we confirm the existence of winning tickets when the pruning process removes layers. Leveraged by this observation, we propose to discover these winning tickets at initialization, eliminating the requirement of heavy computational resources for training the initial (over-parameterized) dense network. Extensive experiments show that our winning tickets notably speed up the training phase and reduce up to 51% of carbon emission, an important step towards democratization and green Artificial Intelligence. Beyond computational benefits, our winning tickets exhibit robustness against adversarial and out-of-distribution examples. Finally, we show that our subnetworks easily win the lottery at initialization while tickets from filter removal (the standard structured LTH) hardly become winning tickets.