Daily Papers

Generative Large Language Models (LLMs) have made significant strides across various tasks, but they remain vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where specific triggers in the prompt cause the LLM to generate adversary-desired responses. While most backdoor research has focused on vision or text classification tasks, backdoor attacks in text generation have been largely overlooked. In this work, we introduce BackdoorLLM, the first comprehensive benchmark for studying backdoor attacks on LLMs. BackdoorLLM features: 1) a repository of backdoor benchmarks with a standardized training pipeline, 2) diverse attack strategies, including data poisoning, weight poisoning, hidden state attacks, and chain-of-thought attacks, 3) extensive evaluations with over 200 experiments on 8 attacks across 7 scenarios and 6 model architectures, and 4) key insights into the effectiveness and limitations of backdoors in LLMs. We hope BackdoorLLM will raise awareness of backdoor threats and contribute to advancing AI safety. The code is available at https://github.com/bboylyg/BackdoorLLM.

Large language models (LLMs) showcase impressive reasoning capabilities when coupled with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting. However, the robustness of this approach warrants further investigation. In this paper, we introduce a novel scenario termed preemptive answers, where the LLM obtains an answer before engaging in reasoning. This situation can arise inadvertently or induced by malicious users by prompt injection attacks. Experiments reveal that preemptive answers significantly impair the model's reasoning capability across various CoT methods and a broad spectrum of datasets. To bolster the robustness of reasoning, we propose two measures aimed at mitigating this issue to some extent.

Large language models (LLMs) are shown to benefit from chain-of-thought (COT) prompting, particularly when tackling tasks that require systematic reasoning processes. On the other hand, COT prompting also poses new vulnerabilities in the form of backdoor attacks, wherein the model will output unintended malicious content under specific backdoor-triggered conditions during inference. Traditional methods for launching backdoor attacks involve either contaminating the training dataset with backdoored instances or directly manipulating the model parameters during deployment. However, these approaches are not practical for commercial LLMs that typically operate via API access. In this paper, we propose BadChain, the first backdoor attack against LLMs employing COT prompting, which does not require access to the training dataset or model parameters and imposes low computational overhead. BadChain leverages the inherent reasoning capabilities of LLMs by inserting a backdoor reasoning step into the sequence of reasoning steps of the model output, thereby altering the final response when a backdoor trigger exists in the query prompt. Empirically, we show the effectiveness of BadChain for two COT strategies across four LLMs (Llama2, GPT-3.5, PaLM2, and GPT-4) and six complex benchmark tasks encompassing arithmetic, commonsense, and symbolic reasoning. Moreover, we show that LLMs endowed with stronger reasoning capabilities exhibit higher susceptibility to BadChain, exemplified by a high average attack success rate of 97.0% across the six benchmark tasks on GPT-4. Finally, we propose two defenses based on shuffling and demonstrate their overall ineffectiveness against BadChain. Therefore, BadChain remains a severe threat to LLMs, underscoring the urgency for the development of robust and effective future defenses.

Recently, Multimodal LLMs (MLLMs) have shown a great ability to understand images. However, like traditional vision models, they are still vulnerable to adversarial images. Meanwhile, Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning has been widely explored on MLLMs, which not only improves model's performance, but also enhances model's explainability by giving intermediate reasoning steps. Nevertheless, there is still a lack of study regarding MLLMs' adversarial robustness with CoT and an understanding of what the rationale looks like when MLLMs infer wrong answers with adversarial images. Our research evaluates the adversarial robustness of MLLMs when employing CoT reasoning, finding that CoT marginally improves adversarial robustness against existing attack methods. Moreover, we introduce a novel stop-reasoning attack technique that effectively bypasses the CoT-induced robustness enhancements. Finally, we demonstrate the alterations in CoT reasoning when MLLMs confront adversarial images, shedding light on their reasoning process under adversarial attacks.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used to control robotic systems such as drones, but their risks of causing physical threats and harm in real-world applications remain unexplored. Our study addresses the critical gap in evaluating LLM physical safety by developing a comprehensive benchmark for drone control. We classify the physical safety risks of drones into four categories: (1) human-targeted threats, (2) object-targeted threats, (3) infrastructure attacks, and (4) regulatory violations. Our evaluation of mainstream LLMs reveals an undesirable trade-off between utility and safety, with models that excel in code generation often performing poorly in crucial safety aspects. Furthermore, while incorporating advanced prompt engineering techniques such as In-Context Learning and Chain-of-Thought can improve safety, these methods still struggle to identify unintentional attacks. In addition, larger models demonstrate better safety capabilities, particularly in refusing dangerous commands. Our findings and benchmark can facilitate the design and evaluation of physical safety for LLMs. The project page is available at huggingface.co/spaces/TrustSafeAI/LLM-physical-safety.

Longer thought, better performance: large language models with deep reasoning capabilities, particularly o1-like models, have demonstrated remarkable performance by generating extensive thought processes during inference. This trade-off reveals a potential vulnerability: adversaries could compromise model performance by forcing immediate responses without thought processes. To this end, in this paper, we introduce a novel attack scenario targeting the long thought processes of o1-like models and propose BoT (Break CoT), which can selectively break intrinsic reasoning mechanisms through backdoor attacks. BoT constructs poisoned datasets with designed triggers and injects backdoor by either supervised fine-tuning or direct preference optimization. When triggered, the model directly generates answers without thought processes, while maintaining normal reasoning capabilities for clean inputs. Extensive experiments on open-source o1-like models, including recent DeepSeek-R1, demonstrate that BoT nearly achieves high attack success rates while maintaining clean accuracy, highlighting the critical safety risk in current models. Furthermore, the relationship between task difficulty and helpfulness reveals a potential application for good, enabling users to customize model behavior based on task complexity. Code is available at https://github.com/zihao-ai/BoT{https://github.com/zihao-ai/BoT}.

Chain-of-thought reasoning, a cognitive process fundamental to human intelligence, has garnered significant attention in the realm of artificial intelligence and natural language processing. However, there still remains a lack of a comprehensive survey for this arena. To this end, we take the first step and present a thorough survey of this research field carefully and widely. We use X-of-Thought to refer to Chain-of-Thought in a broad sense. In detail, we systematically organize the current research according to the taxonomies of methods, including XoT construction, XoT structure variants, and enhanced XoT. Additionally, we describe XoT with frontier applications, covering planning, tool use, and distillation. Furthermore, we address challenges and discuss some future directions, including faithfulness, multi-modal, and theory. We hope this survey serves as a valuable resource for researchers seeking to innovate within the domain of chain-of-thought reasoning.

Modern systems for multi-hop question answering (QA) typically break questions into a sequence of reasoning steps, termed chain-of-thought (CoT), before arriving at a final answer. Often, multiple chains are sampled and aggregated through a voting mechanism over the final answers, but the intermediate steps themselves are discarded. While such approaches improve performance, they do not consider the relations between intermediate steps across chains and do not provide a unified explanation for the predicted answer. We introduce Multi-Chain Reasoning (MCR), an approach which prompts large language models to meta-reason over multiple chains of thought, rather than aggregating their answers. MCR examines different reasoning chains, mixes information between them and selects the most relevant facts in generating an explanation and predicting the answer. MCR outperforms strong baselines on 7 multi-hop QA datasets. Moreover, our analysis reveals that MCR explanations exhibit high quality, enabling humans to verify its answers.

We increase overhead for applications that rely on reasoning LLMs-we force models to spend an amplified number of reasoning tokens, i.e., "overthink", to respond to the user query while providing contextually correct answers. The adversary performs an OVERTHINK attack by injecting decoy reasoning problems into the public content that is used by the reasoning LLM (e.g., for RAG applications) during inference time. Due to the nature of our decoy problems (e.g., a Markov Decision Process), modified texts do not violate safety guardrails. We evaluated our attack across closed-(OpenAI o1, o1-mini, o3-mini) and open-(DeepSeek R1) weights reasoning models on the FreshQA and SQuAD datasets. Our results show up to 18x slowdown on FreshQA dataset and 46x slowdown on SQuAD dataset. The attack also shows high transferability across models. To protect applications, we discuss and implement defenses leveraging LLM-based and system design approaches. Finally, we discuss societal, financial, and energy impacts of OVERTHINK attack which could amplify the costs for third-party applications operating reasoning models.

The o1 model series is trained with large-scale reinforcement learning to reason using chain of thought. These advanced reasoning capabilities provide new avenues for improving the safety and robustness of our models. In particular, our models can reason about our safety policies in context when responding to potentially unsafe prompts, through deliberative alignment. This leads to state-of-the-art performance on certain benchmarks for risks such as generating illicit advice, choosing stereotyped responses, and succumbing to known jailbreaks. Training models to incorporate a chain of thought before answering has the potential to unlock substantial benefits, while also increasing potential risks that stem from heightened intelligence. Our results underscore the need for building robust alignment methods, extensively stress-testing their efficacy, and maintaining meticulous risk management protocols. This report outlines the safety work carried out for the OpenAI o1 and OpenAI o1-mini models, including safety evaluations, external red teaming, and Preparedness Framework evaluations.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) has been a widely adopted prompting method, eliciting impressive reasoning abilities of Large Language Models (LLMs). Inspired by the sequential thought structure of CoT, a number of Chain-of-X (CoX) methods have been developed to address various challenges across diverse domains and tasks involving LLMs. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive survey of Chain-of-X methods for LLMs in different contexts. Specifically, we categorize them by taxonomies of nodes, i.e., the X in CoX, and application tasks. We also discuss the findings and implications of existing CoX methods, as well as potential future directions. Our survey aims to serve as a detailed and up-to-date resource for researchers seeking to apply the idea of CoT to broader scenarios.

Equipped with Chain-of-Thought (CoT), Large language models (LLMs) have shown impressive reasoning ability in various downstream tasks. Even so, suffering from hallucinations and the inability to access external knowledge, LLMs often come with incorrect or unfaithful intermediate reasoning steps, especially in the context of answering knowledge-intensive tasks such as KBQA. To alleviate this issue, we propose a framework called Knowledge-Driven Chain-of-Thought (KD-CoT) to verify and modify reasoning traces in CoT via interaction with external knowledge, and thus overcome the hallucinations and error propagation. Concretely, we formulate the CoT rationale process of LLMs into a structured multi-round QA format. In each round, LLMs interact with a QA system that retrieves external knowledge and produce faithful reasoning traces based on retrieved precise answers. The structured CoT reasoning of LLMs is facilitated by our developed KBQA CoT collection, which serves as in-context learning demonstrations and can also be utilized as feedback augmentation to train a robust retriever. Extensive experiments on WebQSP and ComplexWebQuestion datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of proposed KD-CoT in task-solving reasoning generation, which outperforms the vanilla CoT ICL with an absolute success rate of 8.0% and 5.1%. Furthermore, our proposed feedback-augmented retriever outperforms the state-of-the-art baselines for retrieving knowledge, achieving significant improvement in Hit performance.

Backdoor attacks have become a significant threat to the pre-training and deployment of deep neural networks (DNNs). Although numerous methods for detecting and mitigating backdoor attacks have been proposed, most rely on identifying and eliminating the ``shortcut" created by the backdoor, which links a specific source class to a target class. However, these approaches can be easily circumvented by designing multiple backdoor triggers that create shortcuts everywhere and therefore nowhere specific. In this study, we explore the concept of Multi-Trigger Backdoor Attacks (MTBAs), where multiple adversaries leverage different types of triggers to poison the same dataset. By proposing and investigating three types of multi-trigger attacks including parallel, sequential, and hybrid attacks, we demonstrate that 1) multiple triggers can coexist, overwrite, or cross-activate one another, and 2) MTBAs easily break the prevalent shortcut assumption underlying most existing backdoor detection/removal methods, rendering them ineffective. Given the security risk posed by MTBAs, we have created a multi-trigger backdoor poisoning dataset to facilitate future research on detecting and mitigating these attacks, and we also discuss potential defense strategies against MTBAs. Our code is available at https://github.com/bboylyg/Multi-Trigger-Backdoor-Attacks.

As large language models (LLMs) have become the norm in NLP, demonstrating good performance in generation and reasoning tasks, one of its most fatal disadvantages is the lack of factual correctness. Generating unfactual texts not only leads to lower performances but also degrades the trust and validity of their applications. Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting improves trust and model performance on complex reasoning tasks by generating interpretable reasoning chains, but still suffers from factuality concerns in knowledge-intensive tasks. In this paper, we propose the Verify-and-Edit framework for CoT prompting, which seeks to increase prediction factuality by post-editing reasoning chains according to external knowledge. Building on top of GPT-3, our framework lead to accuracy improvements in multiple open-domain question-answering tasks.

The development of robust safety benchmarks for large language models requires open, reproducible datasets that can measure both appropriate refusal of harmful content and potential over-restriction of legitimate scientific discourse. We present an open-source dataset and testing framework for evaluating LLM safety mechanisms across mainly controlled substance queries, analyzing four major models' responses to systematically varied prompts. Our results reveal distinct safety profiles: Claude-3.5-sonnet demonstrated the most conservative approach with 73% refusals and 27% allowances, while Mistral attempted to answer 100% of queries. GPT-3.5-turbo showed moderate restriction with 10% refusals and 90% allowances, and Grok-2 registered 20% refusals and 80% allowances. Testing prompt variation strategies revealed decreasing response consistency, from 85% with single prompts to 65% with five variations. This publicly available benchmark enables systematic evaluation of the critical balance between necessary safety restrictions and potential over-censorship of legitimate scientific inquiry, while providing a foundation for measuring progress in AI safety implementation. Chain-of-thought analysis reveals potential vulnerabilities in safety mechanisms, highlighting the complexity of implementing robust safeguards without unduly restricting desirable and valid scientific discourse.

Recently, Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has delivered success on complex reasoning tasks, which aims at designing a simple prompt like ``Let's think step by step'' or multiple in-context exemplars with well-designed rationales to elicit Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate intermediate reasoning steps. However, the generated rationales often come with mistakes, making unfactual and unfaithful reasoning chains. To mitigate this brittleness, we propose a novel Chain-of-Knowledge (CoK) prompting, where we aim at eliciting LLMs to generate explicit pieces of knowledge evidence in the form of structure triple. This is inspired by our human behaviors, i.e., we can draw a mind map or knowledge map as the reasoning evidence in the brain before answering a complex question. Benefiting from CoK, we additionally introduce a F^2-Verification method to estimate the reliability of the reasoning chains in terms of factuality and faithfulness. For the unreliable response, the wrong evidence can be indicated to prompt the LLM to rethink. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method can further improve the performance of commonsense, factual, symbolic, and arithmetic reasoning tasks.

Deep neural networks (DNNs) are widely deployed on real-world devices. Concerns regarding their security have gained great attention from researchers. Recently, a new weight modification attack called bit flip attack (BFA) was proposed, which exploits memory fault inject techniques such as row hammer to attack quantized models in the deployment stage. With only a few bit flips, the target model can be rendered useless as a random guesser or even be implanted with malicious functionalities. In this work, we seek to further reduce the number of bit flips. We propose a training-assisted bit flip attack, in which the adversary is involved in the training stage to build a high-risk model to release. This high-risk model, obtained coupled with a corresponding malicious model, behaves normally and can escape various detection methods. The results on benchmark datasets show that an adversary can easily convert this high-risk but normal model to a malicious one on victim's side by flipping only one critical bit on average in the deployment stage. Moreover, our attack still poses a significant threat even when defenses are employed. The codes for reproducing main experiments are available at https://github.com/jianshuod/TBA.

We investigate a new threat to neural sequence-to-sequence (seq2seq) models: training-time attacks that cause models to "spin" their outputs so as to support an adversary-chosen sentiment or point of view -- but only when the input contains adversary-chosen trigger words. For example, a spinned summarization model outputs positive summaries of any text that mentions the name of some individual or organization. Model spinning introduces a "meta-backdoor" into a model. Whereas conventional backdoors cause models to produce incorrect outputs on inputs with the trigger, outputs of spinned models preserve context and maintain standard accuracy metrics, yet also satisfy a meta-task chosen by the adversary. Model spinning enables propaganda-as-a-service, where propaganda is defined as biased speech. An adversary can create customized language models that produce desired spins for chosen triggers, then deploy these models to generate disinformation (a platform attack), or else inject them into ML training pipelines (a supply-chain attack), transferring malicious functionality to downstream models trained by victims. To demonstrate the feasibility of model spinning, we develop a new backdooring technique. It stacks an adversarial meta-task onto a seq2seq model, backpropagates the desired meta-task output to points in the word-embedding space we call "pseudo-words," and uses pseudo-words to shift the entire output distribution of the seq2seq model. We evaluate this attack on language generation, summarization, and translation models with different triggers and meta-tasks such as sentiment, toxicity, and entailment. Spinned models largely maintain their accuracy metrics (ROUGE and BLEU) while shifting their outputs to satisfy the adversary's meta-task. We also show that, in the case of a supply-chain attack, the spin functionality transfers to downstream models.

Instruction-tuned Large Language Models (It-LLMs) have been exhibiting outstanding abilities to reason around cognitive states, intentions, and reactions of all people involved, letting humans guide and comprehend day-to-day social interactions effectively. In fact, several multiple-choice questions (MCQ) benchmarks have been proposed to construct solid assessments of the models' abilities. However, earlier works are demonstrating the presence of inherent "order bias" in It-LLMs, posing challenges to the appropriate evaluation. In this paper, we investigate It-LLMs' resilience abilities towards a series of probing tests using four MCQ benchmarks. Introducing adversarial examples, we show a significant performance gap, mainly when varying the order of the choices, which reveals a selection bias and brings into discussion reasoning abilities. Following a correlation between first positions and model choices due to positional bias, we hypothesized the presence of structural heuristics in the decision-making process of the It-LLMs, strengthened by including significant examples in few-shot scenarios. Finally, by using the Chain-of-Thought (CoT) technique, we elicit the model to reason and mitigate the bias by obtaining more robust models.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning has emerged as a promising approach for enhancing the performance of large language models (LLMs) on complex reasoning tasks. Recently, a series of studies attempt to explain the mechanisms underlying CoT, aiming to deepen the understanding of its efficacy. Nevertheless, the existing research faces two major challenges: (1) a lack of quantitative metrics to assess CoT capabilities and (2) a dearth of guidance on optimizing CoT performance. Motivated by this, in this work, we introduce a novel reasoning boundary framework (RBF) to address these challenges. To solve the lack of quantification, we first define a reasoning boundary (RB) to quantify the upper-bound of CoT and establish a combination law for RB, enabling a practical quantitative approach applicable to various real-world CoT tasks. To address the lack of optimization, we propose three categories of RBs. We further optimize these categories with combination laws focused on RB promotion and reasoning path optimization for CoT improvement. Through extensive experiments on 27 models and 5 tasks, the study validates the existence and rationality of the proposed framework. Furthermore, it explains the effectiveness of 10 CoT strategies and guides optimization from two perspectives. We hope this work can provide a comprehensive understanding of the boundaries and optimization strategies for reasoning in LLMs. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/LightChen233/reasoning-boundary.

Chain of Thought (CoT) was introduced in recent research as a method for improving step-by-step reasoning in Large Language Models. However, CoT has limited applications such as its need for hand-crafted few-shot exemplar prompts and no capability to adjust itself to different queries. In this work, we propose a system to automatically generate rationales using CoT. Our method improves multi-step implicit reasoning capabilities by decomposing the implicit query into several explicit questions. This provides interpretability for the model, improving reasoning in weaker LLMs. We test our approach with two Q\&A datasets: StrategyQA and HotpotQA. We show an increase in accuracy with both, especially on StrategyQA. To facilitate further research in this field, the complete source code for this study has been made publicly available on GitHub: https://github.com/miralab-ai/autoreason.

Instructing the model to generate a sequence of intermediate steps, a.k.a., a chain of thought (CoT), is a highly effective method to improve the accuracy of large language models (LLMs) on arithmetics and symbolic reasoning tasks. However, the mechanism behind CoT remains unclear. This work provides a theoretical understanding of the power of CoT for decoder-only transformers through the lens of expressiveness. Conceptually, CoT empowers the model with the ability to perform inherently serial computation, which is otherwise lacking in transformers, especially when depth is low. Given input length n, previous works have shown that constant-depth transformers with finite precision poly(n) embedding size can only solve problems in TC^0 without CoT. We first show an even tighter expressiveness upper bound for constant-depth transformers with constant-bit precision, which can only solve problems in AC^0, a proper subset of TC^0. However, with T steps of CoT, constant-depth transformers using constant-bit precision and O(log n) embedding size can solve any problem solvable by boolean circuits of size T. Empirically, enabling CoT dramatically improves the accuracy for tasks that are hard for parallel computation, including the composition of permutation groups, iterated squaring, and circuit value problems, especially for low-depth transformers.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting reveals that large language models are capable of performing complex reasoning via intermediate steps. CoT prompting is primarily categorized into three approaches. The first approach utilizes straightforward prompts like ``Let's think step by step'' to generate a sequential thought process before yielding an answer. The second approach makes use of human-crafted, step-by-step demonstrations to guide the model's reasoning process. The third automates the generation of reasoned demonstrations with the 'Let's think step by step'.This approach sometimes leads to reasoning errors, highlighting the need to diversify demonstrations to mitigate its misleading effects. However, diverse demonstrations pose challenges for effective representations. In this work, we propose ECHO, a self-harmonized chain-of-thought prompting method. It consolidates diverse solution paths into a uniform and effective solution pattern.ECHO demonstrates the best overall performance across three reasoning domains.

It has recently been shown that adversarial attacks on large language models (LLMs) can "jailbreak" the model into making harmful statements. In this work, we argue that the spectrum of adversarial attacks on LLMs is much larger than merely jailbreaking. We provide a broad overview of possible attack surfaces and attack goals. Based on a series of concrete examples, we discuss, categorize and systematize attacks that coerce varied unintended behaviors, such as misdirection, model control, denial-of-service, or data extraction. We analyze these attacks in controlled experiments, and find that many of them stem from the practice of pre-training LLMs with coding capabilities, as well as the continued existence of strange "glitch" tokens in common LLM vocabularies that should be removed for security reasons.

Sequential recommender systems stand out for their ability to capture users' dynamic interests and the patterns of item-to-item transitions. However, the inherent openness of sequential recommender systems renders them vulnerable to poisoning attacks, where fraudulent users are injected into the training data to manipulate learned patterns. Traditional defense strategies predominantly depend on predefined assumptions or rules extracted from specific known attacks, limiting their generalizability to unknown attack types. To solve the above problems, considering the rich open-world knowledge encapsulated in Large Language Models (LLMs), our research initially focuses on the capabilities of LLMs in the detection of unknown fraudulent activities within recommender systems, a strategy we denote as LLM4Dec. Empirical evaluations demonstrate the substantial capability of LLMs in identifying unknown fraudsters, leveraging their expansive, open-world knowledge. Building upon this, we propose the integration of LLMs into defense strategies to extend their effectiveness beyond the confines of known attacks. We propose LoRec, an advanced framework that employs LLM-Enhanced Calibration to strengthen the robustness of sequential recommender systems against poisoning attacks. LoRec integrates an LLM-enhanced CalibraTor (LCT) that refines the training process of sequential recommender systems with knowledge derived from LLMs, applying a user-wise reweighting to diminish the impact of fraudsters injected by attacks. By incorporating LLMs' open-world knowledge, the LCT effectively converts the limited, specific priors or rules into a more general pattern of fraudsters, offering improved defenses against poisoning attacks. Our comprehensive experiments validate that LoRec, as a general framework, significantly strengthens the robustness of sequential recommender systems.

In natural language processing, transformer-based large language models (LLMs) like GPT-x models developed by OpenAI have revolutionized the landscape. Despite their impressive capabilities, these models often encounter challenges when handling tasks that differ from their training data, resulting in compromised performance. To address this, few-shot learning has emerged as a valuable technique, allowing LLMs to adapt with minimal task-specific data. One innovative strategy, known as Chain-of-Thought Prompting (CoT), has been introduced to guide LLMs in revealing cognitive processes during multi-step reasoning. In this paper, we propose Code Chain-of-Thought~(CodeCoT), which consists of two components: the Vanilla CodeCoT and the Self-exam CodeCoT. The latter incorporates self-examination, empowering the model to iteratively generate code, formulate test cases, and refine its outputs. Specifically, the process entails the generation of test examples by the model corresponding to the code it is tasked to implement. If it fails on the test examples, then it regenerates the code based on the erroneous code and associated error types. Through comprehensive experiments, we observed that both techniques significantly enhance code generation accuracy across various LLM variants. Our evaluation results reveal that CodeCoT improves the code generation effectiveness, including an unprecedented pass@1 accuracy of 79.27\% using the Self-exam CodeCoT approach on the gpt-3.5-turbo-0613 model in the HumanEval dataset.

Mixture of Experts (MoE) has become a key ingredient for scaling large foundation models while keeping inference costs steady. We show that expert routing strategies that have cross-batch dependencies are vulnerable to attacks. Malicious queries can be sent to a model and can affect a model's output on other benign queries if they are grouped in the same batch. We demonstrate this via a proof-of-concept attack in a toy experimental setting.

Chain-of-Thought significantly enhances a model's reasoning capability, but it also comes with a considerable increase in inference costs due to long chains. With the observation that the reasoning path can be easily compressed under easy tasks but struggle on hard tasks, we explore the feasibility of elastically controlling the length of reasoning paths with only one model, thereby reducing the inference overhead of reasoning models dynamically based on task difficulty. We introduce a new tuning and inference strategy named CoT-Valve, designed to allow models to generate reasoning chains of varying lengths. To achieve this, we propose to identify a direction in the parameter space that, when manipulated, can effectively control the length of generated CoT. Moreover, we show that this property is valuable for compressing the reasoning chain. We construct datasets with chains from long to short for the same questions and explore two enhanced strategies for CoT-Valve: (1) a precise length-compressible CoT tuning method, and (2) a progressive chain length compression approach. Our experiments show that CoT-Valve successfully enables controllability and compressibility of the chain and shows better performance than the prompt-based control. We applied this method to QwQ-32B-Preview, reducing reasoning chains on GSM8K from 741 to 225 tokens with a minor performance drop (95.07% to 94.92%) and on AIME from 6827 to 4629 tokens, with only one additional incorrect answer.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning has emerged as an effective approach for activating latent capabilities in large language models (LLMs). We observe that CoT shares significant similarities with self-training in terms of their learning processes. Motivated by these parallels, this paper explores the underlying relationship between CoT and self-training, demonstrating how insights from self-training can enhance CoT performance. Specifically, our study first reveals that CoT, like self-training, follows the principle of semantic entropy minimization. Leveraging this insight, we propose a novel CoT framework that incorporates two key components: (i) a task-specific prompt module designed to guide LLMs in generating high-quality initial reasoning processes, and (ii) an adaptive reasoning iteration module for progressively refining the reasoning process.

Iterative human engagement is a common and effective means of leveraging the advanced language processing power of large language models (LLMs). Using well-structured prompts in a conversational manner, human users can effectively influence an LLM to develop more thoughtful and accurate responses. Motivated by this insight, we propose the Iteration of Thought (IoT) framework for enhancing LLM responses by generating "thought"-provoking prompts vis a vis an input query and the current iteration of an LLM's response. Unlike static or semi-static approaches, e.g. Chain of Thought (CoT) or Tree of Thoughts (ToT), IoT adapts its reasoning path dynamically, based on evolving context, and without generating alternate explorative thoughts which are ultimately discarded. The three components of the IoT framework are (1) an Inner Dialogue Agent (IDA) responsible for generating instructive, context-specific prompts; (2) an LLM Agent (LLMA) that processes these prompts to refine its responses; and (3) an iterative prompting loop that implements a conversation between the former two components. We introduce two variants of our framework: Autonomous Iteration of Thought (AIoT), where an LLM decides when to stop iterating, and Guided Iteration of Thought (GIoT), which always forces a fixed number iterations. We investigate the performance of IoT across various datasets, spanning complex reasoning tasks from the GPQA dataset, explorative problem-solving in Game of 24, puzzle solving in Mini Crosswords, and multi-hop question answering from the HotpotQA dataset. Our results show that IoT represents a viable paradigm for autonomous response refinement in LLMs, showcasing significant improvements over CoT and thereby enabling more adaptive and efficient reasoning systems that minimize human intervention.

Large language models (LLMs) are powerful AI tools that can generate and comprehend natural language text and other complex information. However, the field lacks a mathematical framework to systematically describe, compare and improve LLMs. We propose Hex a framework that clarifies key terms and concepts in LLM research, such as hallucinations, alignment, self-verification and chain-of-thought reasoning. The Hex framework offers a precise and consistent way to characterize LLMs, identify their strengths and weaknesses, and integrate new findings. Using Hex, we differentiate chain-of-thought reasoning from chain-of-thought prompting and establish the conditions under which they are equivalent. This distinction clarifies the basic assumptions behind chain-of-thought prompting and its implications for methods that use it, such as self-verification and prompt programming. Our goal is to provide a formal framework for LLMs that can help both researchers and practitioners explore new possibilities for generative AI. We do not claim to have a definitive solution, but rather a tool for opening up new research avenues. We argue that our formal definitions and results are crucial for advancing the discussion on how to build generative AI systems that are safe, reliable, fair and robust, especially in domains like healthcare and software engineering.

Recent advances in large language models have demonstrated remarkable reasoning capabilities through Chain of Thought (CoT) prompting, but often at the cost of excessive verbosity in their intermediate outputs, which increases computational overhead. We introduce Sketch-of-Thought (SoT), a novel prompting framework that combines cognitive-inspired reasoning paradigms with linguistic constraints to minimize token usage while preserving reasoning accuracy. SoT is designed as a flexible framework that can incorporate any custom reasoning paradigms based on cognitive science, and we instantiate it with three such paradigms - Conceptual Chaining, Chunked Symbolism, and Expert Lexicons - each tailored to different reasoning tasks and selected dynamically via a lightweight routing model. Through comprehensive evaluation across 15 reasoning datasets with multiple languages and multimodal scenarios, we demonstrate that SoT achieves token reductions of 76% with negligible accuracy impact. In certain domains like mathematical and multi-hop reasoning, it even improves accuracy while using significantly fewer tokens. Our code is publicly available: https://www.github.com/SimonAytes/SoT.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) has been proven effective in enhancing the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs). Recent advancements, such as OpenAI's o1 and DeepSeek-R1, suggest that scaling up the length of CoT sequences during inference could further boost LLM reasoning performance. However, due to the autoregressive nature of LLM decoding, longer CoT outputs lead to a linear increase in inference latency, adversely affecting user experience, particularly when the CoT exceeds 10,000 tokens. To address this limitation, we analyze the semantic importance of tokens within CoT outputs and reveal that their contributions to reasoning vary. Building on this insight, we propose TokenSkip, a simple yet effective approach that enables LLMs to selectively skip less important tokens, allowing for controllable CoT compression. Extensive experiments across various models and tasks demonstrate the effectiveness of TokenSkip in reducing CoT token usage while preserving strong reasoning performance. Notably, when applied to Qwen2.5-14B-Instruct, TokenSkip reduces reasoning tokens by 40% (from 313 to 181) on GSM8K, with less than a 0.4% performance drop.

Recently, there has been significant progress in teaching language models to perform step-by-step reasoning to solve complex numerical reasoning tasks. Chain-of-thoughts prompting (CoT) is by far the state-of-art method for these tasks. CoT uses language models to perform both reasoning and computation in the multi-step `thought' process. To disentangle computation from reasoning, we propose `Program of Thoughts' (PoT), which uses language models (mainly Codex) to express the reasoning process as a program. The computation is relegated to an external computer, which executes the generated programs to derive the answer. We evaluate PoT on five math word problem datasets (GSM, AQuA, SVAMP, TabMWP, MultiArith) and three financial-QA datasets (FinQA, ConvFinQA, TATQA) for both few-shot and zero-shot setups. Under both few-shot and zero-shot settings, PoT can show an average performance gain over CoT by around 12\% across all the evaluated datasets. By combining PoT with self-consistency decoding, we can achieve SoTA performance on all math problem datasets and near-SoTA performance on financial datasets. All of our data and code are released in Github\url{https://github.com/wenhuchen/Program-of-Thoughts}.

The observations documented in Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) reports play a critical role in describing adversarial behaviors, providing valuable insights for security practitioners to respond to evolving threats. Recent advancements of Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated significant potential in various cybersecurity applications, including CTI report understanding and attack knowledge graph construction. While previous works have proposed benchmarks that focus on the CTI extraction ability of LLMs, the sequential characteristic of adversarial behaviors within CTI reports remains largely unexplored, which holds considerable significance in developing a comprehensive understanding of how adversaries operate. To address this gap, we introduce AttackSeqBench, a benchmark tailored to systematically evaluate LLMs' capability to understand and reason attack sequences in CTI reports. Our benchmark encompasses three distinct Question Answering (QA) tasks, each task focuses on the varying granularity in adversarial behavior. To alleviate the laborious effort of QA construction, we carefully design an automated dataset construction pipeline to create scalable and well-formulated QA datasets based on real-world CTI reports. To ensure the quality of our dataset, we adopt a hybrid approach of combining human evaluation and systematic evaluation metrics. We conduct extensive experiments and analysis with both fast-thinking and slow-thinking LLMs, while highlighting their strengths and limitations in analyzing the sequential patterns in cyber attacks. The overarching goal of this work is to provide a benchmark that advances LLM-driven CTI report understanding and fosters its application in real-world cybersecurity operations. Our dataset and code are available at https://github.com/Javiery3889/AttackSeqBench .

To achieve reliable, robust, and safe AI systems, it is vital to implement fallback strategies when AI predictions cannot be trusted. Certifiers for neural networks are a reliable way to check the robustness of these predictions. They guarantee for some predictions that a certain class of manipulations or attacks could not have changed the outcome. For the remaining predictions without guarantees, the method abstains from making a prediction, and a fallback strategy needs to be invoked, which typically incurs additional costs, can require a human operator, or even fail to provide any prediction. While this is a key concept towards safe and secure AI, we show for the first time that this approach comes with its own security risks, as such fallback strategies can be deliberately triggered by an adversary. In addition to naturally occurring abstains for some inputs and perturbations, the adversary can use training-time attacks to deliberately trigger the fallback with high probability. This transfers the main system load onto the fallback, reducing the overall system's integrity and/or availability. We design two novel availability attacks, which show the practical relevance of these threats. For example, adding 1% poisoned data during training is sufficient to trigger the fallback and hence make the model unavailable for up to 100% of all inputs by inserting the trigger. Our extensive experiments across multiple datasets, model architectures, and certifiers demonstrate the broad applicability of these attacks. An initial investigation into potential defenses shows that current approaches are insufficient to mitigate the issue, highlighting the need for new, specific solutions.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate impressive reasoning capabilities, understanding and validating their knowledge utilization remains challenging. Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting partially addresses this by revealing intermediate reasoning steps, but the knowledge flow and application remain implicit. We introduce IAO (Input-Action-Output) prompting, a structured template-based method that explicitly models how LLMs access and apply their knowledge during complex reasoning tasks. IAO decomposes problems into sequential steps, each clearly identifying the input knowledge being used, the action being performed, and the resulting output. This structured decomposition enables us to trace knowledge flow, verify factual consistency, and identify potential knowledge gaps or misapplications. Through experiments across diverse reasoning tasks, we demonstrate that IAO not only improves zero-shot performance but also provides transparency in how LLMs leverage their stored knowledge. Human evaluation confirms that this structured approach enhances our ability to verify knowledge utilization and detect potential hallucinations or reasoning errors. Our findings provide insights into both knowledge representation within LLMs and methods for more reliable knowledge application.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting empowers the reasoning abilities of Large Language Models (LLMs), eliciting them to solve complex reasoning tasks step-by-step. However, with the success of CoT methods, the ability to deliver multi-step reasoning remains limited to English due to the imbalance in the distribution of the pre-training data, making the other languages a barrier. In this work, we propose a Cross-lingual multi-step reasoning approach, aiming to align reasoning processes across different languages. In particular, our method, through a Self-consistent Cross-lingual prompting mechanism inspired by the Tree-of-Thoughts approach, delivers multi-step reasoning paths in different languages that, during the steps, lead to the final solution. Our experimental evaluations show that our method significantly outperforms existing prompting methods, reducing the number of interactions and achieving state-of-the-art performance.

Prompt leakage poses a compelling security and privacy threat in LLM applications. Leakage of system prompts may compromise intellectual property, and act as adversarial reconnaissance for an attacker. A systematic evaluation of prompt leakage threats and mitigation strategies is lacking, especially for multi-turn LLM interactions. In this paper, we systematically investigate LLM vulnerabilities against prompt leakage for 10 closed- and open-source LLMs, across four domains. We design a unique threat model which leverages the LLM sycophancy effect and elevates the average attack success rate (ASR) from 17.7% to 86.2% in a multi-turn setting. Our standardized setup further allows dissecting leakage of specific prompt contents such as task instructions and knowledge documents. We measure the mitigation effect of 7 black-box defense strategies, along with finetuning an open-source model to defend against leakage attempts. We present different combination of defenses against our threat model, including a cost analysis. Our study highlights key takeaways for building secure LLM applications and provides directions for research in multi-turn LLM interactions

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance across multiple tasks through in-context learning. For complex reasoning tasks that require step-by-step thinking, Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has given impressive results, especially when combined with self-consistency. Nonetheless, some tasks remain particularly difficult for LLMs to solve. Tree of Thoughts (ToT) and Graph of Thoughts (GoT) emerged as alternatives, dividing the complex problem into paths of subproblems. In this paper, we propose Tree of Problems (ToP), a simpler version of ToT, which we hypothesise can work better for complex tasks that can be divided into identical subtasks. Our empirical results show that our approach outperforms ToT and GoT, and in addition performs better than CoT on complex reasoning tasks. All code for this paper is publicly available here: https://github.com/ArmelRandy/tree-of-problems.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting has become a widely used strategy for working with large language and multimodal models. While CoT has been shown to improve performance across many tasks, determining the settings in which it is effective remains an ongoing effort. In particular, it is still an open question in what settings CoT systematically reduces model performance. In this paper, we seek to identify the characteristics of tasks where CoT reduces performance by drawing inspiration from cognitive psychology, looking at cases where (i) verbal thinking or deliberation hurts performance in humans, and (ii) the constraints governing human performance generalize to language models. Three such cases are implicit statistical learning, visual recognition, and classifying with patterns containing exceptions. In extensive experiments across all three settings, we find that a diverse collection of state-of-the-art models exhibit significant drop-offs in performance (e.g., up to 36.3% absolute accuracy for OpenAI o1-preview compared to GPT-4o) when using inference-time reasoning compared to zero-shot counterparts. We also identify three tasks that satisfy condition (i) but not (ii), and find that while verbal thinking reduces human performance in these tasks, CoT retains or increases model performance. Overall, our results show that while there is not an exact parallel between the cognitive processes of models and those of humans, considering cases where thinking has negative consequences for human performance can help us identify settings where it negatively impacts models. By connecting the literature on human deliberation with evaluations of CoT, we offer a new tool that can be used in understanding the impact of prompt choices and inference-time reasoning.

Language model attacks typically assume one of two extreme threat models: full white-box access to model weights, or black-box access limited to a text generation API. However, real-world APIs are often more flexible than just text generation: these APIs expose ``gray-box'' access leading to new threat vectors. To explore this, we red-team three new functionalities exposed in the GPT-4 APIs: fine-tuning, function calling and knowledge retrieval. We find that fine-tuning a model on as few as 15 harmful examples or 100 benign examples can remove core safeguards from GPT-4, enabling a range of harmful outputs. Furthermore, we find that GPT-4 Assistants readily divulge the function call schema and can be made to execute arbitrary function calls. Finally, we find that knowledge retrieval can be hijacked by injecting instructions into retrieval documents. These vulnerabilities highlight that any additions to the functionality exposed by an API can create new vulnerabilities.

While chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting has revolutionized how LLMs perform reasoning tasks, its current methods and variations (e.g, Self-consistency, ReACT, Reflexion, Tree-of-Thoughts (ToT), Cumulative Reasoning (CR)) suffer from limitations like slowness, limited context grounding, hallucination and inconsistent outputs. To overcome these challenges, we introduce Evidence to Generate (E2G), a novel single-agent, two-step prompting framework. Instead of unverified reasoning claims, this innovative approach leverages the power of "evidence for decision making" by first focusing exclusively on the thought sequences (the series of intermediate steps) explicitly mentioned in the context which then serve as extracted evidence, guiding the LLM's output generation process with greater precision and efficiency. This simple yet powerful approach unlocks the true potential of chain-of-thought like prompting, paving the way for faster, more reliable, and more contextually aware reasoning in LLMs. \tool achieves remarkable results robustly across a wide range of knowledge-intensive reasoning and generation tasks, surpassing baseline approaches with state-of-the-art LLMs. For example, (i) on LogiQA benchmark using GPT-4 as backbone model, \tool achieves a new state-of-the Accuracy of 53.8% exceeding CoT by 18%, ToT by 11%, CR by 9% (ii) a variant of E2G with PaLM2 outperforms the variable-shot performance of Gemini Ultra by 0.9 F1 points, reaching an F1 score of 83.3 on a subset of DROP.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have revolutionized natural language processing and hold immense potential for advancing Artificial Intelligence. However, the core architecture of most mainstream LLMs -- the Transformer -- has inherent limitations in computational depth, rendering them theoretically incapable of solving many reasoning tasks that demand increasingly deep computations. Chain of Thought (CoT) prompting has emerged as a technique to address these architectural limitations, as evidenced by several theoretical studies. It offers a promising approach to solving complex reasoning tasks that were previously beyond the capabilities of these models. Despite its successes, CoT and its variants (such as Tree of Thought, Graph of Thought, etc.) rely on a "one-prompt-for-all" approach, using a single prompt structure (e.g., "think step by step") for a wide range of tasks -- from counting and sorting to solving mathematical and algorithmic problems. This approach poses significant challenges for models to generate the correct reasoning steps, as the model must navigate through a vast prompt template space to find the appropriate template for each task. In this work, we build upon previous theoretical analyses of CoT to demonstrate how the one-prompt-for-all approach can negatively affect the computability of LLMs. We partition the solution search space into two: the prompt space and the answer space. Our findings show that task-specific supervision is essential for navigating the prompt space accurately and achieving optimal performance. Through experiments with state-of-the-art LLMs, we reveal a gap in reasoning performance when supervision is applied versus when it is not.

The Chain-of-Thought (CoT) paradigm has emerged as a critical approach for enhancing the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs). However, despite their widespread adoption and success, CoT methods often exhibit instability due to their inability to consistently ensure the quality of generated reasoning paths, leading to sub-optimal reasoning performance. To address this challenge, we propose the Strategic Chain-of-Thought (SCoT), a novel methodology designed to refine LLM performance by integrating strategic knowledge prior to generating intermediate reasoning steps. SCoT employs a two-stage approach within a single prompt: first eliciting an effective problem-solving strategy, which is then used to guide the generation of high-quality CoT paths and final answers. Our experiments across eight challenging reasoning datasets demonstrate significant improvements, including a 21.05\% increase on the GSM8K dataset and 24.13\% on the Tracking\_Objects dataset, respectively, using the Llama3-8b model. Additionally, we extend the SCoT framework to develop a few-shot method with automatically matched demonstrations, yielding even stronger results. These findings underscore the efficacy of SCoT, highlighting its potential to substantially enhance LLM performance in complex reasoning tasks.

Discrete adversarial attacks are symbolic perturbations to a language input that preserve the output label but lead to a prediction error. While such attacks have been extensively explored for the purpose of evaluating model robustness, their utility for improving robustness has been limited to offline augmentation only. Concretely, given a trained model, attacks are used to generate perturbed (adversarial) examples, and the model is re-trained exactly once. In this work, we address this gap and leverage discrete attacks for online augmentation, where adversarial examples are generated at every training step, adapting to the changing nature of the model. We propose (i) a new discrete attack, based on best-first search, and (ii) random sampling attacks that unlike prior work are not based on expensive search-based procedures. Surprisingly, we find that random sampling leads to impressive gains in robustness, outperforming the commonly-used offline augmentation, while leading to a speedup at training time of ~10x. Furthermore, online augmentation with search-based attacks justifies the higher training cost, significantly improving robustness on three datasets. Last, we show that our new attack substantially improves robustness compared to prior methods.

Large language models (LLMs) can spend extra compute during inference to generate intermediate thoughts, which helps to produce better final responses. Since Chain-of-Thought (Wei et al., 2022), many such System 2 techniques have been proposed such as Rephrase and Respond (Deng et al., 2023a), System 2 Attention (Weston and Sukhbaatar, 2023) and Branch-Solve-Merge (Saha et al., 2023). In this work we investigate self-supervised methods to ``compile'' (distill) higher quality outputs from System 2 techniques back into LLM generations without intermediate reasoning token sequences, as this reasoning has been distilled into System 1. We show that several such techniques can be successfully distilled, resulting in improved results compared to the original System 1 performance, and with less inference cost than System 2. We posit that such System 2 distillation will be an important feature of future continually learning AI systems, enabling them to focus System 2 capabilities on the reasoning tasks that they cannot yet do well.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown remarkable abilities across various language tasks, but solving complex reasoning problems remains a challenge. While existing methods like Chain-of-Thought (CoT) and Tree-of-Thought (ToT) enhance reasoning by decomposing problems or structuring prompts, they typically perform a single pass of reasoning and may fail to revisit flawed paths, compromising accuracy. To address this, we propose a novel reasoning framework called Forest-of-Thought (FoT), which integrates multiple reasoning trees to leverage collective decision-making for solving complex logical problems. FoT utilizes sparse activation strategies to select the most relevant reasoning paths, improving both efficiency and accuracy. Additionally, we introduce a dynamic self-correction strategy that enables real-time error correction and learning from past mistakes, as well as consensus-guided decision making strategies to optimize correctness and computational resources. Experimental results demonstrate that the FoT framework, combined with these strategies, significantly enhances the reasoning capabilities of LLMs, enabling them to solve complex tasks with greater precision and efficiency.

The large-scale deployment of Solidity smart contracts on the Ethereum mainnet has increasingly attracted financially-motivated attackers in recent years. A few now-infamous attacks in Ethereum's history includes DAO attack in 2016 (50 million dollars lost), Parity Wallet hack in 2017 (146 million dollars locked), Beautychain's token BEC in 2018 (900 million dollars market value fell to 0), and NFT gaming blockchain breach in 2022 ($600 million in Ether stolen). This paper presents a comprehensive investigation of the use of large language models (LLMs) and their capabilities in detecting OWASP Top Ten vulnerabilities in Solidity. We introduce a novel, class-balanced, structured, and labeled dataset named VulSmart, which we use to benchmark and compare the performance of open-source LLMs such as CodeLlama, Llama2, CodeT5 and Falcon, alongside closed-source models like GPT-3.5 Turbo and GPT-4o Mini. Our proposed SmartVD framework is rigorously tested against these models through extensive automated and manual evaluations, utilizing BLEU and ROUGE metrics to assess the effectiveness of vulnerability detection in smart contracts. We also explore three distinct prompting strategies-zero-shot, few-shot, and chain-of-thought-to evaluate the multi-class classification and generative capabilities of the SmartVD framework. Our findings reveal that SmartVD outperforms its open-source counterparts and even exceeds the performance of closed-source base models like GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 Mini. After fine-tuning, the closed-source models, GPT-3.5 Turbo and GPT-4o Mini, achieved remarkable performance with 99% accuracy in detecting vulnerabilities, 94% in identifying their types, and 98% in determining severity. Notably, SmartVD performs best with the `chain-of-thought' prompting technique, whereas the fine-tuned closed-source models excel with the `zero-shot' prompting approach.

The Single-Turn Crescendo Attack (STCA), first introduced in Aqrawi and Abbasi [2024], is an innovative method designed to bypass the ethical safeguards of text-to-text AI models, compelling them to generate harmful content. This technique leverages a strategic escalation of context within a single prompt, combined with trust-building mechanisms, to subtly deceive the model into producing unintended outputs. Extending the application of STCA to text-to-image models, we demonstrate its efficacy by compromising the guardrails of a widely-used model, DALL-E 3, achieving outputs comparable to outputs from the uncensored model Flux Schnell, which served as a baseline control. This study provides a framework for researchers to rigorously evaluate the robustness of guardrails in text-to-image models and benchmark their resilience against adversarial attacks.

Large language models have astounded the world with fascinating new capabilities. However, they currently lack the ability to teach themselves new skills, relying instead on being trained on large amounts of human-generated data. We introduce SECToR (Self-Education via Chain-of-Thought Reasoning), a proof-of-concept demonstration that language models can successfully teach themselves new skills using chain-of-thought reasoning. Inspired by previous work in both reinforcement learning (Silver et al., 2017) and human cognition (Kahneman, 2011), SECToR first uses chain-of-thought reasoning to slowly think its way through problems. SECToR then fine-tunes the model to generate those same answers, this time without using chain-of-thought reasoning. Language models trained via SECToR autonomously learn to add up to 29-digit numbers without any access to any ground truth examples beyond an initial supervised fine-tuning phase consisting only of numbers with 6 or fewer digits. Our central hypothesis is that chain-of-thought reasoning can act as a policy improvement operator, analogously to how Monte-Carlo Tree Search is used in AlphaZero. We hope that this research can lead to new directions in which language models can learn to teach themselves without the need for human demonstrations.

Recent work has proposed stateful defense models (SDMs) as a compelling strategy to defend against a black-box attacker who only has query access to the model, as is common for online machine learning platforms. Such stateful defenses aim to defend against black-box attacks by tracking the query history and detecting and rejecting queries that are "similar" and thus preventing black-box attacks from finding useful gradients and making progress towards finding adversarial attacks within a reasonable query budget. Recent SDMs (e.g., Blacklight and PIHA) have shown remarkable success in defending against state-of-the-art black-box attacks. In this paper, we show that SDMs are highly vulnerable to a new class of adaptive black-box attacks. We propose a novel adaptive black-box attack strategy called Oracle-guided Adaptive Rejection Sampling (OARS) that involves two stages: (1) use initial query patterns to infer key properties about an SDM's defense; and, (2) leverage those extracted properties to design subsequent query patterns to evade the SDM's defense while making progress towards finding adversarial inputs. OARS is broadly applicable as an enhancement to existing black-box attacks - we show how to apply the strategy to enhance six common black-box attacks to be more effective against current class of SDMs. For example, OARS-enhanced versions of black-box attacks improved attack success rate against recent stateful defenses from almost 0% to to almost 100% for multiple datasets within reasonable query budgets.

In various real-world applications such as machine translation, sentiment analysis, and question answering, a pivotal role is played by NLP models, facilitating efficient communication and decision-making processes in domains ranging from healthcare to finance. However, a significant challenge is posed to the robustness of these natural language processing models by text adversarial attacks. These attacks involve the deliberate manipulation of input text to mislead the predictions of the model while maintaining human interpretability. Despite the remarkable performance achieved by state-of-the-art models like BERT in various natural language processing tasks, they are found to remain vulnerable to adversarial perturbations in the input text. In addressing the vulnerability of text classifiers to adversarial attacks, three distinct attack mechanisms are explored in this paper using the victim model BERT: BERT-on-BERT attack, PWWS attack, and Fraud Bargain's Attack (FBA). Leveraging the IMDB, AG News, and SST2 datasets, a thorough comparative analysis is conducted to assess the effectiveness of these attacks on the BERT classifier model. It is revealed by the analysis that PWWS emerges as the most potent adversary, consistently outperforming other methods across multiple evaluation scenarios, thereby emphasizing its efficacy in generating adversarial examples for text classification. Through comprehensive experimentation, the performance of these attacks is assessed and the findings indicate that the PWWS attack outperforms others, demonstrating lower runtime, higher accuracy, and favorable semantic similarity scores. The key insight of this paper lies in the assessment of the relative performances of three prevalent state-of-the-art attack mechanisms.

Engaging in the deliberate generation of abnormal outputs from large language models (LLMs) by attacking them is a novel human activity. This paper presents a thorough exposition of how and why people perform such attacks. Using a formal qualitative methodology, we interviewed dozens of practitioners from a broad range of backgrounds, all contributors to this novel work of attempting to cause LLMs to fail. We relate and connect this activity between its practitioners' motivations and goals; the strategies and techniques they deploy; and the crucial role the community plays. As a result, this paper presents a grounded theory of how and why people attack large language models: LLM red teaming in the wild.

We propose a novel framework, Meta Chain-of-Thought (Meta-CoT), which extends traditional Chain-of-Thought (CoT) by explicitly modeling the underlying reasoning required to arrive at a particular CoT. We present empirical evidence from state-of-the-art models exhibiting behaviors consistent with in-context search, and explore methods for producing Meta-CoT via process supervision, synthetic data generation, and search algorithms. Finally, we outline a concrete pipeline for training a model to produce Meta-CoTs, incorporating instruction tuning with linearized search traces and reinforcement learning post-training. Finally, we discuss open research questions, including scaling laws, verifier roles, and the potential for discovering novel reasoning algorithms. This work provides a theoretical and practical roadmap to enable Meta-CoT in LLMs, paving the way for more powerful and human-like reasoning in artificial intelligence.

This paper introduces a new method for adversarial attacks on large language models (LLMs) called the Single-Turn Crescendo Attack (STCA). Building on the multi-turn crescendo attack method introduced by Russinovich, Salem, and Eldan (2024), which gradually escalates the context to provoke harmful responses, the STCA achieves similar outcomes in a single interaction. By condensing the escalation into a single, well-crafted prompt, the STCA bypasses typical moderation filters that LLMs use to prevent inappropriate outputs. This technique reveals vulnerabilities in current LLMs and emphasizes the importance of stronger safeguards in responsible AI (RAI). The STCA offers a novel method that has not been previously explored.

Although powerful graph neural networks (GNNs) have boosted numerous real-world applications, the potential privacy risk is still underexplored. To close this gap, we perform the first comprehensive study of graph reconstruction attack that aims to reconstruct the adjacency of nodes. We show that a range of factors in GNNs can lead to the surprising leakage of private links. Especially by taking GNNs as a Markov chain and attacking GNNs via a flexible chain approximation, we systematically explore the underneath principles of graph reconstruction attack, and propose two information theory-guided mechanisms: (1) the chain-based attack method with adaptive designs for extracting more private information; (2) the chain-based defense method that sharply reduces the attack fidelity with moderate accuracy loss. Such two objectives disclose a critical belief that to recover better in attack, you must extract more multi-aspect knowledge from the trained GNN; while to learn safer for defense, you must forget more link-sensitive information in training GNNs. Empirically, we achieve state-of-the-art results on six datasets and three common GNNs. The code is publicly available at: https://github.com/tmlr-group/MC-GRA.

Although recent personalization methods have democratized high-resolution image synthesis by enabling swift concept acquisition with minimal examples and lightweight computation, they also present an exploitable avenue for high accessible backdoor attacks. This paper investigates a critical and unexplored aspect of text-to-image (T2I) diffusion models - their potential vulnerability to backdoor attacks via personalization. Our study focuses on a zero-day backdoor vulnerability prevalent in two families of personalization methods, epitomized by Textual Inversion and DreamBooth.Compared to traditional backdoor attacks, our proposed method can facilitate more precise, efficient, and easily accessible attacks with a lower barrier to entry. We provide a comprehensive review of personalization in T2I diffusion models, highlighting the operation and exploitation potential of this backdoor vulnerability. To be specific, by studying the prompt processing of Textual Inversion and DreamBooth, we have devised dedicated backdoor attacks according to the different ways of dealing with unseen tokens and analyzed the influence of triggers and concept images on the attack effect. Our empirical study has shown that the nouveau-token backdoor attack has better attack performance while legacy-token backdoor attack is potentially harder to defend.

The remarkable performance of models like the OpenAI o1 can be attributed to their ability to emulate human-like long-time thinking during inference. These models employ extended chain-of-thought (CoT) processes, exploring multiple strategies to enhance problem-solving capabilities. However, a critical question remains: How to intelligently and efficiently scale computational resources during testing. This paper presents the first comprehensive study on the prevalent issue of overthinking in these models, where excessive computational resources are allocated for simple problems with minimal benefit. We introduce novel efficiency metrics from both outcome and process perspectives to evaluate the rational use of computational resources by o1-like models. Using a self-training paradigm, we propose strategies to mitigate overthinking, streamlining reasoning processes without compromising accuracy. Experimental results show that our approach successfully reduces computational overhead while preserving model performance across a range of testsets with varying difficulty levels, such as GSM8K, MATH500, GPQA, and AIME.

Chain of Thought (CoT) of multi-step benefits from the logical structure of the reasoning steps and task-specific actions, significantly enhancing the mathematical reasoning capabilities of large language models. As the prevalence of long CoT, the number of reasoning steps exceeds manageable token limits and leads to higher computational demands. Inspired by the fundamental logic of human cognition, ``derive, then reduce'', we conceptualize the standard multi-step CoT as a novel Markov Chain of Thought (MCoT). In this study, we consider the mathematical reasoning task, defining each reasoning step as text accompanied by a Python code snippet. To facilitate a longer reasoning path, self-correction is enabled through interactions with the code interpreter. Our MCoT aims to compress previous reasoning steps into a simplified question, enabling efficient next-step inference without relying on a lengthy KV cache. In our experiments, we curate the MCoTInstruct dataset, and the empirical results indicate that MCoT not only significantly enhances efficiency but also maintains comparable accuracy. While much remains to be explored, this work paves the way for exploring the long CoT reasoning abilities of LLMs.

Federated learning (FL) has been widely deployed to enable machine learning training on sensitive data across distributed devices. However, the decentralized learning paradigm and heterogeneity of FL further extend the attack surface for backdoor attacks. Existing FL attack and defense methodologies typically focus on the whole model. None of them recognizes the existence of backdoor-critical (BC) layers-a small subset of layers that dominate the model vulnerabilities. Attacking the BC layers achieves equivalent effects as attacking the whole model but at a far smaller chance of being detected by state-of-the-art (SOTA) defenses. This paper proposes a general in-situ approach that identifies and verifies BC layers from the perspective of attackers. Based on the identified BC layers, we carefully craft a new backdoor attack methodology that adaptively seeks a fundamental balance between attacking effects and stealthiness under various defense strategies. Extensive experiments show that our BC layer-aware backdoor attacks can successfully backdoor FL under seven SOTA defenses with only 10% malicious clients and outperform the latest backdoor attack methods.

Planning and acting to solve `real' tasks using large language models (LLMs) in interactive environments has become a new frontier for AI methods. While recent advances allowed LLMs to interact with online tools, solve robotics tasks and many more, long range reasoning tasks remain a problem for LLMs. Existing methods to address this issue are very resource intensive and require additional data or human crafted rules, instead, we propose a simple method based on few-shot in-context learning alone to enhance `chain-of-thought' with state-tracking for planning and acting with LLMs. We show that our method establishes the new state-of-the-art on Alfworld for in-context learning methods (+14\% over the previous best few-shot in-context learning method) and performs on par with methods that use additional training data and additional tools such as code-execution. We also demonstrate that our enhanced `chain-of-states' allows the agent to both solve longer horizon problems and to be more efficient in number of steps required to solve a task. We show that our method works across a variety of LLMs for both API-based and open source ones. Finally, we also conduct ablation studies and show that `chain-of-thoughts' helps state-tracking accuracy, while a json-structure harms overall performance. We open-source our code and annotations at https://github.com/ai-nikolai/StateAct.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated their impressive abilities in various reasoning and decision-making tasks. However, the quality and coherence of the reasoning process can still benefit from enhanced introspection and self-reflection. In this paper, we introduce Multiplex CoT (Chain of Thought), a method that enables LLMs to simulate a form of self-review while reasoning, by initiating double Chain of Thought (CoT) thinking. Multiplex CoT leverages the power of iterative reasoning, where the model generates an initial chain of thought and subsequently critiques and refines this reasoning with a second round of thought generation. This recursive approach allows for more coherent, logical, and robust answers, improving the overall decision-making process. We demonstrate how this method can be effectively implemented using simple prompt engineering in existing LLM architectures, achieving an effect similar to that of the Learning-Refinement Model (LRM) without the need for additional training. Additionally, we present a practical guide for implementing the method in Google Colab, enabling easy integration into real-world applications.

As the use of large language model (LLM) agents continues to grow, their safety vulnerabilities have become increasingly evident. Extensive benchmarks evaluate various aspects of LLM safety by defining the safety relying heavily on general standards, overlooking user-specific standards. However, safety standards for LLM may vary based on a user-specific profiles rather than being universally consistent across all users. This raises a critical research question: Do LLM agents act safely when considering user-specific safety standards? Despite its importance for safe LLM use, no benchmark datasets currently exist to evaluate the user-specific safety of LLMs. To address this gap, we introduce U-SAFEBENCH, the first benchmark designed to assess user-specific aspect of LLM safety. Our evaluation of 18 widely used LLMs reveals current LLMs fail to act safely when considering user-specific safety standards, marking a new discovery in this field. To address this vulnerability, we propose a simple remedy based on chain-of-thought, demonstrating its effectiveness in improving user-specific safety. Our benchmark and code are available at https://github.com/yeonjun-in/U-SafeBench.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning enables Large Language Models (LLMs) to solve complex reasoning tasks by generating intermediate reasoning steps. However, most existing approaches focus on hard token decoding, which constrains reasoning within the discrete vocabulary space and may not always be optimal. While recent efforts explore continuous-space reasoning, they often suffer from catastrophic forgetting, limiting their applicability to state-of-the-art LLMs that already perform well in zero-shot settings with a proper instruction. To address this challenge, we propose a novel approach for continuous-space reasoning that does not require modifying the underlying LLM. Specifically, we employ a lightweight assistant model to generate instance-specific soft thought tokens speculatively as the initial chain of thoughts, which are then mapped into the LLM's representation space via a projection module. Experimental results on five reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that our method enhances LLM reasoning performance through supervised, parameter-efficient fine-tuning.

Humans are capable of strategically deceptive behavior: behaving helpfully in most situations, but then behaving very differently in order to pursue alternative objectives when given the opportunity. If an AI system learned such a deceptive strategy, could we detect it and remove it using current state-of-the-art safety training techniques? To study this question, we construct proof-of-concept examples of deceptive behavior in large language models (LLMs). For example, we train models that write secure code when the prompt states that the year is 2023, but insert exploitable code when the stated year is 2024. We find that such backdoored behavior can be made persistent, so that it is not removed by standard safety training techniques, including supervised fine-tuning, reinforcement learning, and adversarial training (eliciting unsafe behavior and then training to remove it). The backdoored behavior is most persistent in the largest models and in models trained to produce chain-of-thought reasoning about deceiving the training process, with the persistence remaining even when the chain-of-thought is distilled away. Furthermore, rather than removing backdoors, we find that adversarial training can teach models to better recognize their backdoor triggers, effectively hiding the unsafe behavior. Our results suggest that, once a model exhibits deceptive behavior, standard techniques could fail to remove such deception and create a false impression of safety.

Despite significant advancements in the general capability of large language models (LLMs), they continue to struggle with consistent and accurate reasoning, especially in complex tasks such as mathematical and code reasoning. One key limitation is that LLMs are trained primarily on correct solutions, reducing their ability to detect and learn from errors, which hampers their ability to reliably verify and rank outputs. To address this, we scale up the inference-time computation by generating multiple reasoning paths and employing verifiers to assess and rank the generated outputs by correctness. To facilitate this, we introduce a comprehensive dataset consisting of correct and incorrect solutions for math and code tasks, generated by multiple LLMs. This diverse set of solutions enables verifiers to more effectively distinguish and rank correct answers from erroneous outputs. The training methods for building verifiers were selected based on an extensive comparison of existing approaches. Moreover, to leverage the unique strengths of different reasoning strategies, we propose a novel collaborative method integrating Chain-of-Thought (CoT) and Program-of-Thought (PoT) solutions for verification. CoT provides a clear, step-by-step reasoning process that enhances interpretability, while PoT, being executable, offers a precise and error-sensitive validation mechanism. By taking both of their strengths, our approach significantly improves the accuracy and reliability of reasoning verification. Our verifiers, Math-Rev and Code-Rev, demonstrate substantial performance gains to existing LLMs, achieving state-of-the-art results on benchmarks such as GSM8k and MATH and even outperforming GPT-4o with Qwen-72B-Instruct as the reasoner.

Adversarial attacks are carried out to reveal the vulnerability of deep neural networks. Textual adversarial attacking is challenging because text is discrete and a small perturbation can bring significant change to the original input. Word-level attacking, which can be regarded as a combinatorial optimization problem, is a well-studied class of textual attack methods. However, existing word-level attack models are far from perfect, largely because unsuitable search space reduction methods and inefficient optimization algorithms are employed. In this paper, we propose a novel attack model, which incorporates the sememe-based word substitution method and particle swarm optimization-based search algorithm to solve the two problems separately. We conduct exhaustive experiments to evaluate our attack model by attacking BiLSTM and BERT on three benchmark datasets. Experimental results demonstrate that our model consistently achieves much higher attack success rates and crafts more high-quality adversarial examples as compared to baseline methods. Also, further experiments show our model has higher transferability and can bring more robustness enhancement to victim models by adversarial training. All the code and data of this paper can be obtained on https://github.com/thunlp/SememePSO-Attack.

Pretrained language models sometimes possess knowledge that we do not wish them to, including memorized personal information and knowledge that could be used to harm people. They can also output toxic or harmful text. To mitigate these safety and informational issues, we propose an attack-and-defense framework for studying the task of deleting sensitive information directly from model weights. We study direct edits to model weights because (1) this approach should guarantee that particular deleted information is never extracted by future prompt attacks, and (2) it should protect against whitebox attacks, which is necessary for making claims about safety/privacy in a setting where publicly available model weights could be used to elicit sensitive information. Our threat model assumes that an attack succeeds if the answer to a sensitive question is located among a set of B generated candidates, based on scenarios where the information would be insecure if the answer is among B candidates. Experimentally, we show that even state-of-the-art model editing methods such as ROME struggle to truly delete factual information from models like GPT-J, as our whitebox and blackbox attacks can recover "deleted" information from an edited model 38% of the time. These attacks leverage two key observations: (1) that traces of deleted information can be found in intermediate model hidden states, and (2) that applying an editing method for one question may not delete information across rephrased versions of the question. Finally, we provide new defense methods that protect against some extraction attacks, but we do not find a single universally effective defense method. Our results suggest that truly deleting sensitive information is a tractable but difficult problem, since even relatively low attack success rates have potentially severe societal implications for real-world deployment of language models.

Emerging large reasoning models (LRMs), such as DeepSeek-R1 models, leverage long chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning to generate structured intermediate steps, enhancing their reasoning capabilities. However, long CoT does not inherently guarantee safe outputs, potentially leading to harmful consequences such as the introduction of security vulnerabilities in code or the spread of misinformation. Current research on large language model (LLM) safety usually focuses on short-answer responses, overlooking the long CoT style outputs of LRMs. To bridge this gap, we conduct a systematic study of LRM safety. First, we investigate safety evaluators calibrated against human annotations. Using our newly developed metrics, we thoroughly assess the safety of 12 state-of-the-art LRMs on StrongReject and WildJailbreak datasets. Our results show that LRMs are not safe compared to their reasoning advance. Further, we perform a fine-grained analysis of the reasoning trace and final answer. We find that three decoding strategies-ZeroThink, LessThink, and MoreThink-can improve model safety without additional training. However, these strategies either use constrained reasoning traces or incur high inference costs. To better strengthen LRM safety, we introduce SafeChain, the first-of-its-kind safety training dataset in CoT style. We fine-tune two LRMs with SafeChain, showing that it not only enhances model safety but also preserves performance across 6 reasoning benchmarks.

The growing dependence on machine learning in real-world applications emphasizes the importance of understanding and ensuring its safety. Backdoor attacks pose a significant security risk due to their stealthy nature and potentially serious consequences. Such attacks involve embedding triggers within a learning model with the intention of causing malicious behavior when an active trigger is present while maintaining regular functionality without it. This paper evaluates the effectiveness of any backdoor attack incorporating a constant trigger, by establishing tight lower and upper boundaries for the performance of the compromised model on both clean and backdoor test data. The developed theory answers a series of fundamental but previously underexplored problems, including (1) what are the determining factors for a backdoor attack's success, (2) what is the direction of the most effective backdoor attack, and (3) when will a human-imperceptible trigger succeed. Our derived understanding applies to both discriminative and generative models. We also demonstrate the theory by conducting experiments using benchmark datasets and state-of-the-art backdoor attack scenarios.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) via prompting is the de facto method for eliciting reasoning capabilities from large language models (LLMs). But for what kinds of tasks is this extra ``thinking'' really helpful? To analyze this, we conducted a quantitative meta-analysis covering over 100 papers using CoT and ran our own evaluations of 20 datasets across 14 models. Our results show that CoT gives strong performance benefits primarily on tasks involving math or logic, with much smaller gains on other types of tasks. On MMLU, directly generating the answer without CoT leads to almost identical accuracy as CoT unless the question or model's response contains an equals sign, indicating symbolic operations and reasoning. Following this finding, we analyze the behavior of CoT on these problems by separating planning and execution and comparing against tool-augmented LLMs. Much of CoT's gain comes from improving symbolic execution, but it underperforms relative to using a symbolic solver. Our results indicate that CoT can be applied selectively, maintaining performance while saving inference costs. Furthermore, they suggest a need to move beyond prompt-based CoT to new paradigms that better leverage intermediate computation across the whole range of LLM applications.

Chain-of-thought prompting (CoT) advances the reasoning abilities of large language models (LLMs) and achieves superior performance in arithmetic, commonsense, and symbolic reasoning tasks. However, most CoT studies rely on carefully designed human-annotated rational chains to prompt the language model, which poses challenges for real-world applications where labeled training data is available without human-annotated rational chains. This creates barriers to applications of CoT prompting to these general tasks. This paper proposes a new strategy, Automate-CoT (Automatic Prompt Augmentation and Selection with Chain-of-Thought), that can bypass human engineering of CoTs by automatically augmenting rational chains from a small labeled dataset, and then pruning low-quality chains to construct a candidate pool of machine-generated rationale chains based on the labels. Finally, it selects the optimal combination of several rationale chains from the pool for CoT prompting by employing a variance-reduced policy gradient strategy to estimate the significance of each example in a black-box language model. Automate-CoT enables a quick adaptation of the CoT technique to different tasks. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of our method, where state-of-the-art results are achieved on arithmetic reasoning (+2.7\%), commonsense reasoning (+3.4\%), symbolic reasoning (+3.2\%), and non-reasoning tasks (+2.5\%). Our code will be available at https://github.com/shizhediao/automate-cot.

The o1 system card identifies the o1 models as the most robust within OpenAI, with their defining characteristic being the progression from rapid, intuitive thinking to slower, more deliberate reasoning. This observation motivated us to investigate the influence of System-2 thinking patterns on model safety. In our preliminary research, we conducted safety evaluations of the o1 model, including complex jailbreak attack scenarios using adversarial natural language prompts and mathematical encoding prompts. Our findings indicate that the o1 model demonstrates relatively improved safety performance; however, it still exhibits vulnerabilities, particularly against jailbreak attacks employing mathematical encoding. Through detailed case analysis, we identified specific patterns in the o1 model's responses. We also explored the alignment of System-2 safety in open-source models using prompt engineering and supervised fine-tuning techniques. Experimental results show that some simple methods to encourage the model to carefully scrutinize user requests are beneficial for model safety. Additionally, we proposed a implementation plan for process supervision to enhance safety alignment. The implementation details and experimental results will be provided in future versions.

The rapid adoption of large language models (LLMs) in multi-agent systems has highlighted their impressive capabilities in various applications, such as collaborative problem-solving and autonomous negotiation. However, the security implications of these LLM-based multi-agent systems have not been thoroughly investigated, particularly concerning the spread of manipulated knowledge. In this paper, we investigate this critical issue by constructing a detailed threat model and a comprehensive simulation environment that mirrors real-world multi-agent deployments in a trusted platform. Subsequently, we propose a novel two-stage attack method involving Persuasiveness Injection and Manipulated Knowledge Injection to systematically explore the potential for manipulated knowledge (i.e., counterfactual and toxic knowledge) spread without explicit prompt manipulation. Our method leverages the inherent vulnerabilities of LLMs in handling world knowledge, which can be exploited by attackers to unconsciously spread fabricated information. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that our attack method can successfully induce LLM-based agents to spread both counterfactual and toxic knowledge without degrading their foundational capabilities during agent communication. Furthermore, we show that these manipulations can persist through popular retrieval-augmented generation frameworks, where several benign agents store and retrieve manipulated chat histories for future interactions. This persistence indicates that even after the interaction has ended, the benign agents may continue to be influenced by manipulated knowledge. Our findings reveal significant security risks in LLM-based multi-agent systems, emphasizing the imperative need for robust defenses against manipulated knowledge spread, such as introducing ``guardian'' agents and advanced fact-checking tools.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has marked a significant advancement in enhancing the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs). Previous studies have developed various extensions of CoT, which focus primarily on enhancing end-task performance. In addition, there has been research on assessing the quality of reasoning chains in CoT. This raises an intriguing question: Is it possible to predict the accuracy of LLM outputs by scrutinizing the reasoning chains they generate? To answer this research question, we introduce a benchmark, R2PE, designed specifically to explore the relationship between reasoning chains and performance in various reasoning tasks spanning five different domains. This benchmark aims to measure the falsehood of the final output of LLMs based on the reasoning steps. To make full use of information in multiple reasoning chains, we propose the process discernibility score (PDS) framework that beats the answer-checking baseline by a large margin. Concretely, this resulted in an average of 5.1% increase in the F1 score across all 45 subsets within R2PE. We further demonstrate our PDS's efficacy in advancing open-domain QA accuracy. Data and code are available at https://github.com/XinXU-USTC/R2PE.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning has been extensively explored in large models to tackle complex understanding tasks. However, it still remains an open question whether such strategies can be applied to verifying and reinforcing image generation scenarios. In this paper, we provide the first comprehensive investigation of the potential of CoT reasoning to enhance autoregressive image generation. We focus on three techniques: scaling test-time computation for verification, aligning model preferences with Direct Preference Optimization (DPO), and integrating these techniques for complementary effects. Our results demonstrate that these approaches can be effectively adapted and combined to significantly improve image generation performance. Furthermore, given the pivotal role of reward models in our findings, we propose the Potential Assessment Reward Model (PARM) and PARM++, specialized for autoregressive image generation. PARM adaptively assesses each generation step through a potential assessment approach, merging the strengths of existing reward models, and PARM++ further introduces a reflection mechanism to self-correct the generated unsatisfactory image. Using our investigated reasoning strategies, we enhance a baseline model, Show-o, to achieve superior results, with a significant +24% improvement on the GenEval benchmark, surpassing Stable Diffusion 3 by +15%. We hope our study provides unique insights and paves a new path for integrating CoT reasoning with autoregressive image generation. Code and models are released at https://github.com/ZiyuGuo99/Image-Generation-CoT

Large language models (LLMs) have gained human trust due to their capabilities and helpfulness. However, this in turn may allow LLMs to affect users' mindsets by manipulating language. It is termed as gaslighting, a psychological effect. In this work, we aim to investigate the vulnerability of LLMs under prompt-based and fine-tuning-based gaslighting attacks. Therefore, we propose a two-stage framework DeepCoG designed to: 1) elicit gaslighting plans from LLMs with the proposed DeepGaslighting prompting template, and 2) acquire gaslighting conversations from LLMs through our Chain-of-Gaslighting method. The gaslighting conversation dataset along with a corresponding safe dataset is applied to fine-tuning-based attacks on open-source LLMs and anti-gaslighting safety alignment on these LLMs. Experiments demonstrate that both prompt-based and fine-tuning-based attacks transform three open-source LLMs into gaslighters. In contrast, we advanced three safety alignment strategies to strengthen (by 12.05%) the safety guardrail of LLMs. Our safety alignment strategies have minimal impacts on the utility of LLMs. Empirical studies indicate that an LLM may be a potential gaslighter, even if it passed the harmfulness test on general dangerous queries.

Neural ranking models (NRMs) have shown remarkable success in recent years, especially with pre-trained language models. However, deep neural models are notorious for their vulnerability to adversarial examples. Adversarial attacks may become a new type of web spamming technique given our increased reliance on neural information retrieval models. Therefore, it is important to study potential adversarial attacks to identify vulnerabilities of NRMs before they are deployed. In this paper, we introduce the Word Substitution Ranking Attack (WSRA) task against NRMs, which aims to promote a target document in rankings by adding adversarial perturbations to its text. We focus on the decision-based black-box attack setting, where the attackers cannot directly get access to the model information, but can only query the target model to obtain the rank positions of the partial retrieved list. This attack setting is realistic in real-world search engines. We propose a novel Pseudo Relevance-based ADversarial ranking Attack method (PRADA) that learns a surrogate model based on Pseudo Relevance Feedback (PRF) to generate gradients for finding the adversarial perturbations. Experiments on two web search benchmark datasets show that PRADA can outperform existing attack strategies and successfully fool the NRM with small indiscernible perturbations of text.

While text-to-image diffusion models demonstrate impressive generation capabilities, they also exhibit vulnerability to backdoor attacks, which involve the manipulation of model outputs through malicious triggers. In this paper, for the first time, we propose a comprehensive defense method named T2IShield to detect, localize, and mitigate such attacks. Specifically, we find the "Assimilation Phenomenon" on the cross-attention maps caused by the backdoor trigger. Based on this key insight, we propose two effective backdoor detection methods: Frobenius Norm Threshold Truncation and Covariance Discriminant Analysis. Besides, we introduce a binary-search approach to localize the trigger within a backdoor sample and assess the efficacy of existing concept editing methods in mitigating backdoor attacks. Empirical evaluations on two advanced backdoor attack scenarios show the effectiveness of our proposed defense method. For backdoor sample detection, T2IShield achieves a detection F1 score of 88.9% with low computational cost. Furthermore, T2IShield achieves a localization F1 score of 86.4% and invalidates 99% poisoned samples. Codes are released at https://github.com/Robin-WZQ/T2IShield.

We explore how generating a chain of thought -- a series of intermediate reasoning steps -- significantly improves the ability of large language models to perform complex reasoning. In particular, we show how such reasoning abilities emerge naturally in sufficiently large language models via a simple method called chain of thought prompting, where a few chain of thought demonstrations are provided as exemplars in prompting. Experiments on three large language models show that chain of thought prompting improves performance on a range of arithmetic, commonsense, and symbolic reasoning tasks. The empirical gains can be striking. For instance, prompting a 540B-parameter language model with just eight chain of thought exemplars achieves state of the art accuracy on the GSM8K benchmark of math word problems, surpassing even finetuned GPT-3 with a verifier.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has significantly enhanced the reasoning abilities of large language models. However, recent studies have shown that models can still perform complex reasoning tasks even when the CoT is replaced with filler(hidden) characters (e.g., "..."), leaving open questions about how models internally process and represent reasoning steps. In this paper, we investigate methods to decode these hidden characters in transformer models trained with filler CoT sequences. By analyzing layer-wise representations using the logit lens method and examining token rankings, we demonstrate that the hidden characters can be recovered without loss of performance. Our findings provide insights into the internal mechanisms of transformer models and open avenues for improving interpretability and transparency in language model reasoning.

Neural text ranking models have witnessed significant advancement and are increasingly being deployed in practice. Unfortunately, they also inherit adversarial vulnerabilities of general neural models, which have been detected but remain underexplored by prior studies. Moreover, the inherit adversarial vulnerabilities might be leveraged by blackhat SEO to defeat better-protected search engines. In this study, we propose an imitation adversarial attack on black-box neural passage ranking models. We first show that the target passage ranking model can be transparentized and imitated by enumerating critical queries/candidates and then train a ranking imitation model. Leveraging the ranking imitation model, we can elaborately manipulate the ranking results and transfer the manipulation attack to the target ranking model. For this purpose, we propose an innovative gradient-based attack method, empowered by the pairwise objective function, to generate adversarial triggers, which causes premeditated disorderliness with very few tokens. To equip the trigger camouflages, we add the next sentence prediction loss and the language model fluency constraint to the objective function. Experimental results on passage ranking demonstrate the effectiveness of the ranking imitation attack model and adversarial triggers against various SOTA neural ranking models. Furthermore, various mitigation analyses and human evaluation show the effectiveness of camouflages when facing potential mitigation approaches. To motivate other scholars to further investigate this novel and important problem, we make the experiment data and code publicly available.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have recently made significant strides in complex reasoning tasks through the Chain-of-Thought technique. Despite this progress, their reasoning is often constrained by their intrinsic understanding, lacking external insights. To address this, we propose Exchange-of-Thought (EoT), a novel framework that enables cross-model communication during problem-solving. Drawing inspiration from network topology, EoT integrates four unique communication paradigms: Memory, Report, Relay, and Debate. This paper delves into the communication dynamics and volume associated with each paradigm. To counterbalance the risks of incorrect reasoning chains, we implement a robust confidence evaluation mechanism within these communications. Our experiments across diverse complex reasoning tasks demonstrate that EoT significantly surpasses established baselines, underscoring the value of external insights in enhancing LLM performance. Furthermore, we show that EoT achieves these superior results in a cost-effective manner, marking a promising advancement for efficient and collaborative AI problem-solving.

Large language models (LLMs) are capable of answering knowledge-intensive complex questions with chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning. However, they tend to generate factually incorrect reasoning steps when the required knowledge is not available or up-to-date in models' parameters. Recent works turn to retrieving external knowledge to augment CoT reasoning. Despite being promising, these chain-based methods suffer from: 1) Negative retrieval. Unnecessary or incorrect retrieval may mislead the reasoning; 2) Limited sight. Lacking the ability to look backward or forward, a local error in one step will propagate along the chain. In this paper, we propose a novel approach: Probabilistic Tree-of-thought Reasoning (ProbTree). First, LLMs translate a complex question into a query tree, in which each non-root node denotes a sub-question of its parent node. Then, probabilistic reasoning is conducted over the tree, by solving questions from leaf to root considering the confidence of both question decomposing and answering. During reasoning, for leaf nodes, LLMs choose a more confident answer from Closed-book QA that employs parametric knowledge and Open-book QA that employs retrieved external knowledge, thus eliminating the negative retrieval problem. For non-leaf nodes, with the hierarchical structure, LLMs have broader sights and are able to globally reason with the information from child nodes, thus recovering from local errors. The experiments on three Complex QA datasets under the open-domain setting show that our approach outperforms SOTA methods significantly, demonstrating the effect of probabilistic tree-of-thought reasoning.

AI systems can take harmful actions and are highly vulnerable to adversarial attacks. We present an approach, inspired by recent advances in representation engineering, that "short-circuits" models as they respond with harmful outputs. Existing techniques aimed at improving alignment, such as refusal training, are often bypassed. Techniques such as adversarial training try to plug these holes by countering specific attacks. As an alternative to refusal training and adversarial training, short-circuiting directly controls the representations that are responsible for harmful outputs in the first place. Our technique can be applied to both text-only and multimodal language models to prevent the generation of harmful outputs without sacrificing utility -- even in the presence of powerful unseen attacks. Notably, while adversarial robustness in standalone image recognition remains an open challenge, short-circuiting allows the larger multimodal system to reliably withstand image "hijacks" that aim to produce harmful content. Finally, we extend our approach to AI agents, demonstrating considerable reductions in the rate of harmful actions when they are under attack. Our approach represents a significant step forward in the development of reliable safeguards to harmful behavior and adversarial attacks.

Generation of plausible yet incorrect factual information, termed hallucination, is an unsolved issue in large language models. We study the ability of language models to deliberate on the responses they give in order to correct their mistakes. We develop the Chain-of-Verification (CoVe) method whereby the model first (i) drafts an initial response; then (ii) plans verification questions to fact-check its draft; (iii) answers those questions independently so the answers are not biased by other responses; and (iv) generates its final verified response. In experiments, we show CoVe decreases hallucinations across a variety of tasks, from list-based questions from Wikidata, closed book MultiSpanQA and longform text generation.

This paper introduces a novel adversarial attack method targeting text classification models, termed the Modified Word Saliency-based Adversarial At-tack (MWSAA). The technique builds upon the concept of word saliency to strategically perturb input texts, aiming to mislead classification models while preserving semantic coherence. By refining the traditional adversarial attack approach, MWSAA significantly enhances its efficacy in evading detection by classification systems. The methodology involves first identifying salient words in the input text through a saliency estimation process, which prioritizes words most influential to the model's decision-making process. Subsequently, these salient words are subjected to carefully crafted modifications, guided by semantic similarity metrics to ensure that the altered text remains coherent and retains its original meaning. Empirical evaluations conducted on diverse text classification datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method in generating adversarial examples capable of successfully deceiving state-of-the-art classification models. Comparative analyses with existing adversarial attack techniques further indicate the superiority of the proposed approach in terms of both attack success rate and preservation of text coherence.

Designing models that are robust to small adversarial perturbations of their inputs has proven remarkably difficult. In this work we show that the reverse problem---making models more vulnerable---is surprisingly easy. After presenting some proofs of concept on MNIST, we introduce a generic tilting attack that injects vulnerabilities into the linear layers of pre-trained networks by increasing their sensitivity to components of low variance in the training data without affecting their performance on test data. We illustrate this attack on a multilayer perceptron trained on SVHN and use it to design a stand-alone adversarial module which we call a steganogram decoder. Finally, we show on CIFAR-10 that a poisoning attack with a poisoning rate as low as 0.1% can induce vulnerabilities to chosen imperceptible backdoor signals in state-of-the-art networks. Beyond their practical implications, these different results shed new light on the nature of the adversarial example phenomenon.

Decision-based adversarial attacks construct inputs that fool a machine-learning model into making targeted mispredictions by making only hard-label queries. For the most part, these attacks have been applied directly to isolated neural network models. However, in practice, machine learning models are just a component of a much larger system. By adding just a single preprocessor in front of a classifier, we find that state-of-the-art query-based attacks are as much as seven times less effective at attacking a prediction pipeline than attacking the machine learning model alone. Hence, attacks that are unaware of this invariance inevitably waste a large number of queries to re-discover or overcome it. We, therefore, develop techniques to first reverse-engineer the preprocessor and then use this extracted information to attack the end-to-end system. Our extraction method requires only a few hundred queries to learn the preprocessors used by most publicly available model pipelines, and our preprocessor-aware attacks recover the same efficacy as just attacking the model alone. The code can be found at https://github.com/google-research/preprocessor-aware-black-box-attack.

Adversarial attacks have been a looming and unaddressed threat in the industry. However, through a decade-long history of the robustness evaluation literature, we have learned that mounting a strong or optimal attack is challenging. It requires both machine learning and domain expertise. In other words, the white-box threat model, religiously assumed by a large majority of the past literature, is unrealistic. In this paper, we propose a new practical threat model where the adversary relies on transfer attacks through publicly available surrogate models. We argue that this setting will become the most prevalent for security-sensitive applications in the future. We evaluate the transfer attacks in this setting and propose a specialized defense method based on a game-theoretic perspective. The defenses are evaluated under 24 public models and 11 attack algorithms across three datasets (CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and ImageNet). Under this threat model, our defense, PubDef, outperforms the state-of-the-art white-box adversarial training by a large margin with almost no loss in the normal accuracy. For instance, on ImageNet, our defense achieves 62% accuracy under the strongest transfer attack vs only 36% of the best adversarially trained model. Its accuracy when not under attack is only 2% lower than that of an undefended model (78% vs 80%). We release our code at https://github.com/wagner-group/pubdef.

Recent work has shown it is possible to construct adversarial examples that cause an aligned language model to emit harmful strings or perform harmful behavior. Existing attacks work either in the white-box setting (with full access to the model weights), or through transferability: the phenomenon that adversarial examples crafted on one model often remain effective on other models. We improve on prior work with a query-based attack that leverages API access to a remote language model to construct adversarial examples that cause the model to emit harmful strings with (much) higher probability than with transfer-only attacks. We validate our attack on GPT-3.5 and OpenAI's safety classifier; we can cause GPT-3.5 to emit harmful strings that current transfer attacks fail at, and we can evade the safety classifier with nearly 100% probability.

Pre-trained programming language (PL) models (such as CodeT5, CodeBERT, GraphCodeBERT, etc.,) have the potential to automate software engineering tasks involving code understanding and code generation. However, these models operate in the natural channel of code, i.e., they are primarily concerned with the human understanding of the code. They are not robust to changes in the input and thus, are potentially susceptible to adversarial attacks in the natural channel. We propose, CodeAttack, a simple yet effective black-box attack model that uses code structure to generate effective, efficient, and imperceptible adversarial code samples and demonstrates the vulnerabilities of the state-of-the-art PL models to code-specific adversarial attacks. We evaluate the transferability of CodeAttack on several code-code (translation and repair) and code-NL (summarization) tasks across different programming languages. CodeAttack outperforms state-of-the-art adversarial NLP attack models to achieve the best overall drop in performance while being more efficient, imperceptible, consistent, and fluent. The code can be found at https://github.com/reddy-lab-code-research/CodeAttack.

Recently, NLP has seen a surge in the usage of large pre-trained models. Users download weights of models pre-trained on large datasets, then fine-tune the weights on a task of their choice. This raises the question of whether downloading untrusted pre-trained weights can pose a security threat. In this paper, we show that it is possible to construct ``weight poisoning'' attacks where pre-trained weights are injected with vulnerabilities that expose ``backdoors'' after fine-tuning, enabling the attacker to manipulate the model prediction simply by injecting an arbitrary keyword. We show that by applying a regularization method, which we call RIPPLe, and an initialization procedure, which we call Embedding Surgery, such attacks are possible even with limited knowledge of the dataset and fine-tuning procedure. Our experiments on sentiment classification, toxicity detection, and spam detection show that this attack is widely applicable and poses a serious threat. Finally, we outline practical defenses against such attacks. Code to reproduce our experiments is available at https://github.com/neulab/RIPPLe.

Neural ranking models (NRMs) have attracted considerable attention in information retrieval. Unfortunately, NRMs may inherit the adversarial vulnerabilities of general neural networks, which might be leveraged by black-hat search engine optimization practitioners. Recently, adversarial attacks against NRMs have been explored in the paired attack setting, generating an adversarial perturbation to a target document for a specific query. In this paper, we focus on a more general type of perturbation and introduce the topic-oriented adversarial ranking attack task against NRMs, which aims to find an imperceptible perturbation that can promote a target document in ranking for a group of queries with the same topic. We define both static and dynamic settings for the task and focus on decision-based black-box attacks. We propose a novel framework to improve topic-oriented attack performance based on a surrogate ranking model. The attack problem is formalized as a Markov decision process (MDP) and addressed using reinforcement learning. Specifically, a topic-oriented reward function guides the policy to find a successful adversarial example that can be promoted in rankings to as many queries as possible in a group. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed framework can significantly outperform existing attack strategies, and we conclude by re-iterating that there exist potential risks for applying NRMs in the real world.

The interactive use of large language models (LLMs) in AI assistants (at work, home, etc.) introduces a new set of inference-time privacy risks: LLMs are fed different types of information from multiple sources in their inputs and are expected to reason about what to share in their outputs, for what purpose and with whom, within a given context. In this work, we draw attention to the highly critical yet overlooked notion of contextual privacy by proposing ConfAIde, a benchmark designed to identify critical weaknesses in the privacy reasoning capabilities of instruction-tuned LLMs. Our experiments show that even the most capable models such as GPT-4 and ChatGPT reveal private information in contexts that humans would not, 39% and 57% of the time, respectively. This leakage persists even when we employ privacy-inducing prompts or chain-of-thought reasoning. Our work underscores the immediate need to explore novel inference-time privacy-preserving approaches, based on reasoning and theory of mind.

As large language models (LLMs) are continuously being developed, their evaluation becomes increasingly important yet challenging. This work proposes Chain-of-Thought Hub, an open-source evaluation suite on the multi-step reasoning capabilities of large language models. We are interested in this setting for two reasons: (1) from the behavior of GPT and PaLM model family, we observe that complex reasoning is likely to be a key differentiator between weaker and stronger LLMs; (2) we envisage large language models to become the next-generation computational platform and foster an ecosystem of LLM-based new applications, this naturally requires the foundation models to perform complex tasks that often involve the composition of linguistic and logical operations. Our approach is to compile a suite of challenging reasoning benchmarks to track the progress of LLMs. Our current results show that: (1) model scale clearly correlates with reasoning capabilities; (2) As of May 2023, Claude-v1.3 and PaLM-2 are the only two models that are comparable with GPT-4, while open-sourced models still lag behind; (3) LLaMA-65B performs closely to code-davinci-002, indicating that with successful further development such as reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), it has great potential to be close to GPT-3.5-Turbo. Our results also suggest that for the open-source efforts to catch up, the community may focus more on building better base models and exploring RLHF.

A membership inference attack allows an adversary to query a trained machine learning model to predict whether or not a particular example was contained in the model's training dataset. These attacks are currently evaluated using average-case "accuracy" metrics that fail to characterize whether the attack can confidently identify any members of the training set. We argue that attacks should instead be evaluated by computing their true-positive rate at low (e.g., <0.1%) false-positive rates, and find most prior attacks perform poorly when evaluated in this way. To address this we develop a Likelihood Ratio Attack (LiRA) that carefully combines multiple ideas from the literature. Our attack is 10x more powerful at low false-positive rates, and also strictly dominates prior attacks on existing metrics.

Text-to-image (T2I) diffusion models (DMs) have shown promise in generating high-quality images from textual descriptions. The real-world applications of these models require particular attention to their safety and fidelity, but this has not been sufficiently explored. One fundamental question is whether existing T2I DMs are robust against variations over input texts. To answer it, this work provides the first robustness evaluation of T2I DMs against real-world attacks. Unlike prior studies that focus on malicious attacks involving apocryphal alterations to the input texts, we consider an attack space spanned by realistic errors (e.g., typo, glyph, phonetic) that humans can make, to ensure semantic consistency. Given the inherent randomness of the generation process, we develop novel distribution-based attack objectives to mislead T2I DMs. We perform attacks in a black-box manner without any knowledge of the model. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our method for attacking popular T2I DMs and simultaneously reveal their non-trivial robustness issues. Moreover, we provide an in-depth analysis of our method to show that it is not designed to attack the text encoder in T2I DMs solely.

In most current research, large language models (LLMs) are able to perform reasoning tasks by generating chains of thought through the guidance of specific prompts. However, there still exists a significant discrepancy between their capability in solving complex reasoning problems and that of humans. At present, most approaches focus on chains of thought (COT) and tool use, without considering the adoption and application of human cognitive frameworks. It is well-known that when confronting complex reasoning challenges, humans typically employ various cognitive abilities, and necessitate interaction with all aspects of tools, knowledge, and the external environment information to accomplish intricate tasks. This paper introduces a novel intelligent framework, referred to as OlaGPT. OlaGPT carefully studied a cognitive architecture framework, and propose to simulate certain aspects of human cognition. The framework involves approximating different cognitive modules, including attention, memory, reasoning, learning, and corresponding scheduling and decision-making mechanisms. Inspired by the active learning mechanism of human beings, it proposes a learning unit to record previous mistakes and expert opinions, and dynamically refer to them to strengthen their ability to solve similar problems. The paper also outlines common effective reasoning frameworks for human problem-solving and designs Chain-of-Thought (COT) templates accordingly. A comprehensive decision-making mechanism is also proposed to maximize model accuracy. The efficacy of OlaGPT has been stringently evaluated on multiple reasoning datasets, and the experimental outcomes reveal that OlaGPT surpasses state-of-the-art benchmarks, demonstrating its superior performance. Our implementation of OlaGPT is available on GitHub: https://github.com/oladata-team/OlaGPT.

Text-to-image models like Stable Diffusion have had a profound impact on daily life by enabling the generation of photorealistic images from textual prompts, fostering creativity, and enhancing visual experiences across various applications. However, these models also pose risks. Previous studies have successfully demonstrated that manipulated prompts can elicit text-to-image models to generate unsafe images, e.g., hateful meme variants. Yet, these studies only unleash the harmful power of text-to-image models in a passive manner. In this work, we focus on the proactive generation of unsafe images using targeted benign prompts via poisoning attacks. We propose two poisoning attacks: a basic attack and a utility-preserving attack. We qualitatively and quantitatively evaluate the proposed attacks using four representative hateful memes and multiple query prompts. Experimental results indicate that text-to-image models are vulnerable to the basic attack even with five poisoning samples. However, the poisoning effect can inadvertently spread to non-targeted prompts, leading to undesirable side effects. Root cause analysis identifies conceptual similarity as an important contributing factor to the side effects. To address this, we introduce the utility-preserving attack as a viable mitigation strategy to maintain the attack stealthiness, while ensuring decent attack performance. Our findings underscore the potential risks of adopting text-to-image models in real-world scenarios, calling for future research and safety measures in this space.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are swiftly advancing in architecture and capability, and as they integrate more deeply into complex systems, the urgency to scrutinize their security properties grows. This paper surveys research in the emerging interdisciplinary field of adversarial attacks on LLMs, a subfield of trustworthy ML, combining the perspectives of Natural Language Processing and Security. Prior work has shown that even safety-aligned LLMs (via instruction tuning and reinforcement learning through human feedback) can be susceptible to adversarial attacks, which exploit weaknesses and mislead AI systems, as evidenced by the prevalence of `jailbreak' attacks on models like ChatGPT and Bard. In this survey, we first provide an overview of large language models, describe their safety alignment, and categorize existing research based on various learning structures: textual-only attacks, multi-modal attacks, and additional attack methods specifically targeting complex systems, such as federated learning or multi-agent systems. We also offer comprehensive remarks on works that focus on the fundamental sources of vulnerabilities and potential defenses. To make this field more accessible to newcomers, we present a systematic review of existing works, a structured typology of adversarial attack concepts, and additional resources, including slides for presentations on related topics at the 62nd Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (ACL'24).

Backdoor attacks, which maliciously control a well-trained model's outputs of the instances with specific triggers, are recently shown to be serious threats to the safety of reusing deep neural networks (DNNs). In this work, we propose an efficient online defense mechanism based on robustness-aware perturbations. Specifically, by analyzing the backdoor training process, we point out that there exists a big gap of robustness between poisoned and clean samples. Motivated by this observation, we construct a word-based robustness-aware perturbation to distinguish poisoned samples from clean samples to defend against the backdoor attacks on natural language processing (NLP) models. Moreover, we give a theoretical analysis about the feasibility of our robustness-aware perturbation-based defense method. Experimental results on sentiment analysis and toxic detection tasks show that our method achieves better defending performance and much lower computational costs than existing online defense methods. Our code is available at https://github.com/lancopku/RAP.

Large Language Models (LLMs) significantly benefit from Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting in performing various reasoning tasks. While CoT allows models to produce more comprehensive reasoning processes, its emphasis on intermediate reasoning steps can inadvertently introduce hallucinations and accumulated errors, thereby limiting models' ability to solve complex reasoning tasks. Inspired by how humans engage in careful and meticulous deductive logical reasoning processes to solve tasks, we seek to enable language models to perform explicit and rigorous deductive reasoning, and also ensure the trustworthiness of their reasoning process through self-verification. However, directly verifying the validity of an entire deductive reasoning process is challenging, even with advanced models like ChatGPT. In light of this, we propose to decompose a reasoning verification process into a series of step-by-step subprocesses, each only receiving their necessary context and premises. To facilitate this procedure, we propose Natural Program, a natural language-based deductive reasoning format. Our approach enables models to generate precise reasoning steps where subsequent steps are more rigorously grounded on prior steps. It also empowers language models to carry out reasoning self-verification in a step-by-step manner. By integrating this verification process into each deductive reasoning stage, we significantly enhance the rigor and trustfulness of generated reasoning steps. Along this process, we also improve the answer correctness on complex reasoning tasks. Code will be released at https://github.com/lz1oceani/verify_cot.

The rapid advancement of large models, driven by their exceptional abilities in learning and generalization through large-scale pre-training, has reshaped the landscape of Artificial Intelligence (AI). These models are now foundational to a wide range of applications, including conversational AI, recommendation systems, autonomous driving, content generation, medical diagnostics, and scientific discovery. However, their widespread deployment also exposes them to significant safety risks, raising concerns about robustness, reliability, and ethical implications. This survey provides a systematic review of current safety research on large models, covering Vision Foundation Models (VFMs), Large Language Models (LLMs), Vision-Language Pre-training (VLP) models, Vision-Language Models (VLMs), Diffusion Models (DMs), and large-model-based Agents. Our contributions are summarized as follows: (1) We present a comprehensive taxonomy of safety threats to these models, including adversarial attacks, data poisoning, backdoor attacks, jailbreak and prompt injection attacks, energy-latency attacks, data and model extraction attacks, and emerging agent-specific threats. (2) We review defense strategies proposed for each type of attacks if available and summarize the commonly used datasets and benchmarks for safety research. (3) Building on this, we identify and discuss the open challenges in large model safety, emphasizing the need for comprehensive safety evaluations, scalable and effective defense mechanisms, and sustainable data practices. More importantly, we highlight the necessity of collective efforts from the research community and international collaboration. Our work can serve as a useful reference for researchers and practitioners, fostering the ongoing development of comprehensive defense systems and platforms to safeguard AI models.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) plays a crucial role in reasoning for math problem solving. We conduct a comprehensive examination of methods for designing CoT, comparing conventional natural language CoT with various program CoTs, including the self-describing program, the comment-describing program, and the non-describing program. Furthermore, we investigate the impact of programming language on program CoTs, comparing Python and Wolfram Language. Through extensive experiments on GSM8K, MATHQA, and SVAMP, we find that program CoTs often have superior effectiveness in math problem solving. Notably, the best performing combination with 30B parameters beats GPT-3.5-turbo by a significant margin. The results show that self-describing program offers greater diversity and thus can generally achieve higher performance. We also find that Python is a better choice of language than Wolfram for program CoTs. The experimental results provide a valuable guideline for future CoT designs that take into account both programming language and coding style for further advancements. Our datasets and code are publicly available.

Large Language Models (LLMs) can achieve strong performance on many tasks by producing step-by-step reasoning before giving a final output, often referred to as chain-of-thought reasoning (CoT). It is tempting to interpret these CoT explanations as the LLM's process for solving a task. However, we find that CoT explanations can systematically misrepresent the true reason for a model's prediction. We demonstrate that CoT explanations can be heavily influenced by adding biasing features to model inputs -- e.g., by reordering the multiple-choice options in a few-shot prompt to make the answer always "(A)" -- which models systematically fail to mention in their explanations. When we bias models toward incorrect answers, they frequently generate CoT explanations supporting those answers. This causes accuracy to drop by as much as 36% on a suite of 13 tasks from BIG-Bench Hard, when testing with GPT-3.5 from OpenAI and Claude 1.0 from Anthropic. On a social-bias task, model explanations justify giving answers in line with stereotypes without mentioning the influence of these social biases. Our findings indicate that CoT explanations can be plausible yet misleading, which risks increasing our trust in LLMs without guaranteeing their safety. CoT is promising for explainability, but our results highlight the need for targeted efforts to evaluate and improve explanation faithfulness.

Autonomous agents deployed in the real world need to be robust against adversarial attacks on sensory inputs. Robustifying agent policies requires anticipating the strongest attacks possible. We demonstrate that existing observation-space attacks on reinforcement learning agents have a common weakness: while effective, their lack of temporal consistency makes them detectable using automated means or human inspection. Detectability is undesirable to adversaries as it may trigger security escalations. We introduce perfect illusory attacks, a novel form of adversarial attack on sequential decision-makers that is both effective and provably statistically undetectable. We then propose the more versatile R-attacks, which result in observation transitions that are consistent with the state-transition function of the adversary-free environment and can be learned end-to-end. Compared to existing attacks, we empirically find R-attacks to be significantly harder to detect with automated methods, and a small study with human subjects suggests they are similarly harder to detect for humans. We propose that undetectability should be a central concern in the study of adversarial attacks on mixed-autonomy settings.

Prompting language models to provide step-by-step answers (e.g., "Chain-of-Thought") is the prominent approach for complex reasoning tasks, where more accurate reasoning chains typically improve downstream task performance. Recent literature discusses automatic methods to verify reasoning steps to evaluate and improve their correctness. However, no fine-grained step-level datasets are available to enable thorough evaluation of such verification methods, hindering progress in this direction. We introduce Reveal: Reasoning Verification Evaluation, a new dataset to benchmark automatic verifiers of complex Chain-of-Thought reasoning in open-domain question answering settings. Reveal includes comprehensive labels for the relevance, attribution to evidence passages, and logical correctness of each reasoning step in a language model's answer, across a wide variety of datasets and state-of-the-art language models.

When presented with questions involving visual thinking, humans naturally switch reasoning modalities, often forming mental images or drawing visual aids. Large language models have shown promising results in arithmetic and symbolic reasoning by expressing intermediate reasoning in text as a chain of thought, yet struggle to extend this capability to answer text queries that are easily solved by visual reasoning, even with extensive multimodal pretraining. We introduce a simple method, whiteboard-of-thought prompting, to unlock the visual reasoning capabilities of multimodal large language models across modalities. Whiteboard-of-thought prompting provides multimodal large language models with a metaphorical `whiteboard' to draw out reasoning steps as images, then returns these images back to the model for further processing. We find this can be accomplished with no demonstrations or specialized modules, instead leveraging models' existing ability to write code with libraries such as Matplotlib and Turtle. This simple approach shows state-of-the-art results on four difficult natural language tasks that involve visual and spatial reasoning. We identify multiple settings where GPT-4o using chain-of-thought fails dramatically, including more than one where it achieves 0% accuracy, while whiteboard-of-thought enables up to 92% accuracy in these same settings. We present a detailed exploration of where the technique succeeds as well as its sources of error.

Language models are increasingly being deployed for general problem solving across a wide range of tasks, but are still confined to token-level, left-to-right decision-making processes during inference. This means they can fall short in tasks that require exploration, strategic lookahead, or where initial decisions play a pivotal role. To surmount these challenges, we introduce a new framework for language model inference, Tree of Thoughts (ToT), which generalizes over the popular Chain of Thought approach to prompting language models, and enables exploration over coherent units of text (thoughts) that serve as intermediate steps toward problem solving. ToT allows LMs to perform deliberate decision making by considering multiple different reasoning paths and self-evaluating choices to decide the next course of action, as well as looking ahead or backtracking when necessary to make global choices. Our experiments show that ToT significantly enhances language models' problem-solving abilities on three novel tasks requiring non-trivial planning or search: Game of 24, Creative Writing, and Mini Crosswords. For instance, in Game of 24, while GPT-4 with chain-of-thought prompting only solved 4% of tasks, our method achieved a success rate of 74%. Code repo with all prompts: https://github.com/ysymyth/tree-of-thought-llm.

Recently, with the chain of thought (CoT) prompting, large language models (LLMs), e.g., GPT-3, have shown strong reasoning ability in several natural language processing tasks such as arithmetic, commonsense, and logical reasoning. However, LLMs with CoT require multi-step prompting and multi-token prediction, which is highly sensitive to individual mistakes and vulnerable to error accumulation. The above issues make the LLMs need the ability to verify the answers. In fact, after inferring conclusions in some thinking decision tasks, people often check them by re-verifying steps to avoid some mistakes. In this paper, we propose and prove that LLMs also have similar self-verification abilities. We take the conclusion obtained by CoT as one of the conditions for solving the original problem. By taking turns masking the original conditions and predicting their results, we calculate an explainable answer verification score based on whether the re-predicted conditions are correct. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed method can improve the reasoning performance on various arithmetic, commonsense, and logical reasoning datasets. Our code is publicly available at: https://github.com/WENGSYX/Self-Verification.

Language-Image Pre-training has demonstrated promising results on zero-shot and few-shot downstream tasks by prompting visual models with natural language prompts. However, most recent studies only use a single prompt for tuning, neglecting the inherent step-to-step cognitive reasoning process that humans conduct in complex task settings, for example, when processing images from unfamiliar domains. Chain of Thought is a simple and effective approximation to human reasoning process and has been proven useful for natural language processing (NLP) tasks. Based on this cognitive intuition, we believe that conducting effective reasoning is also an important problem in visual tasks, and a chain of thought could be a solution to this problem. In this work, we propose a novel chain of thought prompt tuning for vision-language modeling. Extensive experiments show that our method not only generalizes better in image classification tasks, has greater transferability beyond a single dataset, and has stronger domain generalization performance, but also performs much better in imagetext retrieval and visual question answering, which require more reasoning capabilities. We are the first to successfully adapt chain-of-thought prompting that combines visual and textual embeddings. We will release our codes

Large language models (LLMs) have attracted considerable attention in various fields for their cost-effective solutions to diverse challenges, especially with advancements in instruction tuning and quantization. E-commerce, with its complex tasks and extensive product-user interactions, presents a promising application area for LLMs. However, the domain-specific concepts and knowledge inherent in e-commerce pose significant challenges for adapting general LLMs. To address this issue, we developed EC-Guide https://github.com/fzp0424/EC-Guide-KDDUP-2024, a comprehensive e-commerce guide for instruction tuning and quantization of LLMs. We also heuristically integrated Chain-of-Thought (CoT) during inference to enhance arithmetic performance. Our approach achieved the 2nd place in Track 2 and 5th place in Track 5 at the Amazon KDD Cup'24 https://www.aicrowd.com/challenges/amazon-kdd-cup-2024-multi-task-online-shopping-challenge-for-llms. Additionally, our solution is model-agnostic, enabling effective scalability across larger systems.

Recently, autonomous agents built on large language models (LLMs) have experienced significant development and are being deployed in real-world applications. These agents can extend the base LLM's capabilities in multiple ways. For example, a well-built agent using GPT-3.5-Turbo as its core can outperform the more advanced GPT-4 model by leveraging external components. More importantly, the usage of tools enables these systems to perform actions in the real world, moving from merely generating text to actively interacting with their environment. Given the agents' practical applications and their ability to execute consequential actions, it is crucial to assess potential vulnerabilities. Such autonomous systems can cause more severe damage than a standalone language model if compromised. While some existing research has explored harmful actions by LLM agents, our study approaches the vulnerability from a different perspective. We introduce a new type of attack that causes malfunctions by misleading the agent into executing repetitive or irrelevant actions. We conduct comprehensive evaluations using various attack methods, surfaces, and properties to pinpoint areas of susceptibility. Our experiments reveal that these attacks can induce failure rates exceeding 80\% in multiple scenarios. Through attacks on implemented and deployable agents in multi-agent scenarios, we accentuate the realistic risks associated with these vulnerabilities. To mitigate such attacks, we propose self-examination detection methods. However, our findings indicate these attacks are difficult to detect effectively using LLMs alone, highlighting the substantial risks associated with this vulnerability.

Motivated by ethical and legal concerns, the scientific community is actively developing methods to limit the misuse of Text-to-Image diffusion models for reproducing copyrighted, violent, explicit, or personal information in the generated images. Simultaneously, researchers put these newly developed safety measures to the test by assuming the role of an adversary to find vulnerabilities and backdoors in them. We use compositional property of diffusion models, which allows to leverage multiple prompts in a single image generation. This property allows us to combine other concepts, that should not have been affected by the inhibition, to reconstruct the vector, responsible for target concept generation, even though the direct computation of this vector is no longer accessible. We provide theoretical and empirical evidence why the proposed attacks are possible and discuss the implications of these findings for safe model deployment. We argue that it is essential to consider all possible approaches to image generation with diffusion models that can be employed by an adversary. Our work opens up the discussion about the implications of concept arithmetics and compositional inference for safety mechanisms in diffusion models. Content Advisory: This paper contains discussions and model-generated content that may be considered offensive. Reader discretion is advised. Project page: https://cs-people.bu.edu/vpetsiuk/arc

Adversarial attacks expose important vulnerabilities of deep learning models, yet little attention has been paid to settings where data arrives as a stream. In this paper, we formalize the online adversarial attack problem, emphasizing two key elements found in real-world use-cases: attackers must operate under partial knowledge of the target model, and the decisions made by the attacker are irrevocable since they operate on a transient data stream. We first rigorously analyze a deterministic variant of the online threat model by drawing parallels to the well-studied k-secretary problem in theoretical computer science and propose Virtual+, a simple yet practical online algorithm. Our main theoretical result shows Virtual+ yields provably the best competitive ratio over all single-threshold algorithms for k<5 -- extending the previous analysis of the k-secretary problem. We also introduce the stochastic k-secretary -- effectively reducing online blackbox transfer attacks to a k-secretary problem under noise -- and prove theoretical bounds on the performance of Virtual+ adapted to this setting. Finally, we complement our theoretical results by conducting experiments on MNIST, CIFAR-10, and Imagenet classifiers, revealing the necessity of online algorithms in achieving near-optimal performance and also the rich interplay between attack strategies and online attack selection, enabling simple strategies like FGSM to outperform stronger adversaries.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting with large language models has proven effective in numerous natural language processing tasks, but designing prompts that generalize well to diverse problem types can be challenging, especially in the context of math word problem (MWP) solving. Additionally, it is common to have a large amount of training data that have a better diversity coverage but CoT annotations are not available, which limits the use of supervised learning techniques. To address these issues, we investigate two approaches to leverage the training data in a few-shot prompting scenario: dynamic program prompting and program distillation. Our approach is largely inspired by Gao et al., (2022), where they proposed to replace the CoT with the programs as the intermediate reasoning step. Such a prompting strategy allows us to accurately verify the answer correctness through program execution in MWP solving. Our dynamic program prompting involves annotating the training data by sampling correct programs from a large language model, while program distillation involves adapting a smaller model to the program-annotated training data. Our experiments on three standard MWP datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of these approaches, yielding significant improvements over previous baselines for prompting and fine-tuning. Our results suggest that leveraging a large amount of training data can improve the generalization ability of prompts and boost the performance of fine-tuned small models in MWP solving.

Deep learning models are often trained on distributed, web-scale datasets crawled from the internet. In this paper, we introduce two new dataset poisoning attacks that intentionally introduce malicious examples to a model's performance. Our attacks are immediately practical and could, today, poison 10 popular datasets. Our first attack, split-view poisoning, exploits the mutable nature of internet content to ensure a dataset annotator's initial view of the dataset differs from the view downloaded by subsequent clients. By exploiting specific invalid trust assumptions, we show how we could have poisoned 0.01% of the LAION-400M or COYO-700M datasets for just $60 USD. Our second attack, frontrunning poisoning, targets web-scale datasets that periodically snapshot crowd-sourced content -- such as Wikipedia -- where an attacker only needs a time-limited window to inject malicious examples. In light of both attacks, we notify the maintainers of each affected dataset and recommended several low-overhead defenses.

The bulk of existing research in defending against adversarial examples focuses on defending against a single (typically bounded Lp-norm) attack, but for a practical setting, machine learning (ML) models should be robust to a wide variety of attacks. In this paper, we present the first unified framework for considering multiple attacks against ML models. Our framework is able to model different levels of learner's knowledge about the test-time adversary, allowing us to model robustness against unforeseen attacks and robustness against unions of attacks. Using our framework, we present the first leaderboard, MultiRobustBench, for benchmarking multiattack evaluation which captures performance across attack types and attack strengths. We evaluate the performance of 16 defended models for robustness against a set of 9 different attack types, including Lp-based threat models, spatial transformations, and color changes, at 20 different attack strengths (180 attacks total). Additionally, we analyze the state of current defenses against multiple attacks. Our analysis shows that while existing defenses have made progress in terms of average robustness across the set of attacks used, robustness against the worst-case attack is still a big open problem as all existing models perform worse than random guessing.

It is important that consumers and regulators can verify the provenance of large neural models to evaluate their capabilities and risks. We introduce the concept of a "Proof-of-Training-Data": any protocol that allows a model trainer to convince a Verifier of the training data that produced a set of model weights. Such protocols could verify the amount and kind of data and compute used to train the model, including whether it was trained on specific harmful or beneficial data sources. We explore efficient verification strategies for Proof-of-Training-Data that are compatible with most current large-model training procedures. These include a method for the model-trainer to verifiably pre-commit to a random seed used in training, and a method that exploits models' tendency to temporarily overfit to training data in order to detect whether a given data-point was included in training. We show experimentally that our verification procedures can catch a wide variety of attacks, including all known attacks from the Proof-of-Learning literature.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems based on Large Language Models (LLMs) have become essential for tasks such as question answering and content generation. However, their increasing impact on public opinion and information dissemination has made them a critical focus for security research due to inherent vulnerabilities. Previous studies have predominantly addressed attacks targeting factual or single-query manipulations. In this paper, we address a more practical scenario: topic-oriented adversarial opinion manipulation attacks on RAG models, where LLMs are required to reason and synthesize multiple perspectives, rendering them particularly susceptible to systematic knowledge poisoning. Specifically, we propose Topic-FlipRAG, a two-stage manipulation attack pipeline that strategically crafts adversarial perturbations to influence opinions across related queries. This approach combines traditional adversarial ranking attack techniques and leverages the extensive internal relevant knowledge and reasoning capabilities of LLMs to execute semantic-level perturbations. Experiments show that the proposed attacks effectively shift the opinion of the model's outputs on specific topics, significantly impacting user information perception. Current mitigation methods cannot effectively defend against such attacks, highlighting the necessity for enhanced safeguards for RAG systems, and offering crucial insights for LLM security research.

With the widespread use of large language models (LLMs) in NLP tasks, researchers have discovered the potential of Chain-of-thought (CoT) to assist LLMs in accomplishing complex reasoning tasks by generating intermediate steps. However, human thought processes are often non-linear, rather than simply sequential chains of thoughts. Therefore, we propose Graph-of-Thought (GoT) reasoning, which models human thought processes not only as a chain but also as a graph. By representing thought units as nodes and connections between them as edges, our approach captures the non-sequential nature of human thinking and allows for a more realistic modeling of thought processes. Similar to Multimodal-CoT, we modeled GoT reasoning as a two-stage framework, generating rationales first and then producing the final answer. Specifically, we employ an additional graph-of-thoughts encoder for GoT representation learning and fuse the GoT representation with the original input representation through a gated fusion mechanism. We implement a GoT reasoning model on the T5 pre-trained model and evaluate its performance on a text-only reasoning task (GSM8K) and a multimodal reasoning task (ScienceQA). Our model achieves significant improvement over the strong CoT baseline with 3.41% and 5.08% on the GSM8K test set with T5-base and T5-large architectures, respectively. Additionally, our model boosts accuracy from 84.91% to 91.54% using the T5-base model and from 91.68% to 92.77% using the T5-large model over the state-of-the-art Multimodal-CoT on the ScienceQA test set. Experiments have shown that GoT achieves comparable results to Multimodal-CoT(large) with over 700M parameters, despite having fewer than 250M backbone model parameters, demonstrating the effectiveness of GoT.

Recently, methods for skeleton-based human activity recognition have been shown to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks. However, these attack methods require either the full knowledge of the victim (i.e. white-box attacks), access to training data (i.e. transfer-based attacks) or frequent model queries (i.e. black-box attacks). All their requirements are highly restrictive, raising the question of how detrimental the vulnerability is. In this paper, we show that the vulnerability indeed exists. To this end, we consider a new attack task: the attacker has no access to the victim model or the training data or labels, where we coin the term hard no-box attack. Specifically, we first learn a motion manifold where we define an adversarial loss to compute a new gradient for the attack, named skeleton-motion-informed (SMI) gradient. Our gradient contains information of the motion dynamics, which is different from existing gradient-based attack methods that compute the loss gradient assuming each dimension in the data is independent. The SMI gradient can augment many gradient-based attack methods, leading to a new family of no-box attack methods. Extensive evaluation and comparison show that our method imposes a real threat to existing classifiers. They also show that the SMI gradient improves the transferability and imperceptibility of adversarial samples in both no-box and transfer-based black-box settings.

Large language models trained for safety and harmlessness remain susceptible to adversarial misuse, as evidenced by the prevalence of "jailbreak" attacks on early releases of ChatGPT that elicit undesired behavior. Going beyond recognition of the issue, we investigate why such attacks succeed and how they can be created. We hypothesize two failure modes of safety training: competing objectives and mismatched generalization. Competing objectives arise when a model's capabilities and safety goals conflict, while mismatched generalization occurs when safety training fails to generalize to a domain for which capabilities exist. We use these failure modes to guide jailbreak design and then evaluate state-of-the-art models, including OpenAI's GPT-4 and Anthropic's Claude v1.3, against both existing and newly designed attacks. We find that vulnerabilities persist despite the extensive red-teaming and safety-training efforts behind these models. Notably, new attacks utilizing our failure modes succeed on every prompt in a collection of unsafe requests from the models' red-teaming evaluation sets and outperform existing ad hoc jailbreaks. Our analysis emphasizes the need for safety-capability parity -- that safety mechanisms should be as sophisticated as the underlying model -- and argues against the idea that scaling alone can resolve these safety failure modes.

Large language models (LLMs) can perform complex reasoning by generating intermediate reasoning steps. Providing these steps for prompting demonstrations is called chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting. CoT prompting has two major paradigms. One leverages a simple prompt like "Let's think step by step" to facilitate step-by-step thinking before answering a question. The other uses a few manual demonstrations one by one, each composed of a question and a reasoning chain that leads to an answer. The superior performance of the second paradigm hinges on the hand-crafting of task-specific demonstrations one by one. We show that such manual efforts may be eliminated by leveraging LLMs with the "Let's think step by step" prompt to generate reasoning chains for demonstrations one by one, i.e., let's think not just step by step, but also one by one. However, these generated chains often come with mistakes. To mitigate the effect of such mistakes, we find that diversity matters for automatically constructing demonstrations. We propose an automatic CoT prompting method: Auto-CoT. It samples questions with diversity and generates reasoning chains to construct demonstrations. On ten public benchmark reasoning tasks with GPT-3, Auto-CoT consistently matches or exceeds the performance of the CoT paradigm that requires manual designs of demonstrations. Code is available at https://github.com/amazon-research/auto-cot

Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting enables large language models (LLMs) to solve complex reasoning tasks by generating an explanation before the final prediction. Despite it's promising ability, a critical downside of CoT prompting is that the performance is greatly affected by the factuality of the generated explanation. To improve the correctness of the explanations, fine-tuning language models with explanation data is needed. However, there exists only a few datasets that can be used for such approaches, and no data collection tool for building them. Thus, we introduce CoTEVer, a tool-kit for annotating the factual correctness of generated explanations and collecting revision data of wrong explanations. Furthermore, we suggest several use cases where the data collected with CoTEVer can be utilized for enhancing the faithfulness of explanations. Our toolkit is publicly available at https://github.com/SeungoneKim/CoTEVer.

The research builds and evaluates the adversarial potential to introduce copied code or hallucinated AI recommendations for malicious code in popular code repositories. While foundational large language models (LLMs) from OpenAI, Google, and Anthropic guard against both harmful behaviors and toxic strings, previous work on math solutions that embed harmful prompts demonstrate that the guardrails may differ between expert contexts. These loopholes would appear in mixture of expert's models when the context of the question changes and may offer fewer malicious training examples to filter toxic comments or recommended offensive actions. The present work demonstrates that foundational models may refuse to propose destructive actions correctly when prompted overtly but may unfortunately drop their guard when presented with a sudden change of context, like solving a computer programming challenge. We show empirical examples with trojan-hosting repositories like GitHub, NPM, NuGet, and popular content delivery networks (CDN) like jsDelivr which amplify the attack surface. In the LLM's directives to be helpful, example recommendations propose application programming interface (API) endpoints which a determined domain-squatter could acquire and setup attack mobile infrastructure that triggers from the naively copied code. We compare this attack to previous work on context-shifting and contrast the attack surface as a novel version of "living off the land" attacks in the malware literature. In the latter case, foundational language models can hijack otherwise innocent user prompts to recommend actions that violate their owners' safety policies when posed directly without the accompanying coding support request.

Creating secure and resilient applications with large language models (LLM) requires anticipating, adjusting to, and countering unforeseen threats. Red-teaming has emerged as a critical technique for identifying vulnerabilities in real-world LLM implementations. This paper presents a detailed threat model and provides a systematization of knowledge (SoK) of red-teaming attacks on LLMs. We develop a taxonomy of attacks based on the stages of the LLM development and deployment process and extract various insights from previous research. In addition, we compile methods for defense and practical red-teaming strategies for practitioners. By delineating prominent attack motifs and shedding light on various entry points, this paper provides a framework for improving the security and robustness of LLM-based systems.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting can dramatically improve the multi-step reasoning abilities of large language models (LLMs). CoT explicitly encourages the LLM to generate intermediate rationales for solving a problem, by providing a series of reasoning steps in the demonstrations. Despite its success, there is still little understanding of what makes CoT prompting effective and which aspects of the demonstrated reasoning steps contribute to its performance. In this paper, we show that CoT reasoning is possible even with invalid demonstrations - prompting with invalid reasoning steps can achieve over 80-90% of the performance obtained using CoT under various metrics, while still generating coherent lines of reasoning during inference. Further experiments show that other aspects of the rationales, such as being relevant to the query and correctly ordering the reasoning steps, are much more important for effective CoT reasoning. Overall, these findings both deepen our understanding of CoT prompting, and open up new questions regarding LLMs' capability to learn to reason in context.

Generating a Chain of Thought (CoT) has been shown to consistently improve large language model (LLM) performance on a wide range of NLP tasks. However, prior work has mainly focused on logical reasoning tasks (e.g. arithmetic, commonsense QA); it remains unclear whether improvements hold for more diverse types of reasoning, especially in socially situated contexts. Concretely, we perform a controlled evaluation of zero-shot CoT across two socially sensitive domains: harmful questions and stereotype benchmarks. We find that zero-shot CoT reasoning in sensitive domains significantly increases a model's likelihood to produce harmful or undesirable output, with trends holding across different prompt formats and model variants. Furthermore, we show that harmful CoTs increase with model size, but decrease with improved instruction following. Our work suggests that zero-shot CoT should be used with caution on socially important tasks, especially when marginalized groups or sensitive topics are involved.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance in solving complex reasoning tasks through mechanisms like Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting, which emphasizes verbose, step-by-step reasoning. However, humans typically employ a more efficient strategy: drafting concise intermediate thoughts that capture only essential information. In this work, we propose Chain of Draft (CoD), a novel paradigm inspired by human cognitive processes, where LLMs generate minimalistic yet informative intermediate reasoning outputs while solving tasks. By reducing verbosity and focusing on critical insights, CoD matches or surpasses CoT in accuracy while using as little as only 7.6% of the tokens, significantly reducing cost and latency across various reasoning tasks.

Deep neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples, dictating the imperativeness to test the model's robustness before deployment. Transfer-based attackers craft adversarial examples against surrogate models and transfer them to victim models deployed in the black-box situation. To enhance the adversarial transferability, structure-based attackers adjust the backpropagation path to avoid the attack from overfitting the surrogate model. However, existing structure-based attackers fail to explore the convolution module in CNNs and modify the backpropagation graph heuristically, leading to limited effectiveness. In this paper, we propose backPropagation pAth Search (PAS), solving the aforementioned two problems. We first propose SkipConv to adjust the backpropagation path of convolution by structural reparameterization. To overcome the drawback of heuristically designed backpropagation paths, we further construct a DAG-based search space, utilize one-step approximation for path evaluation and employ Bayesian Optimization to search for the optimal path. We conduct comprehensive experiments in a wide range of transfer settings, showing that PAS improves the attack success rate by a huge margin for both normally trained and defense models.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) display versatile functionality, they continue to generate harmful, biased, and toxic content, as demonstrated by the prevalence of human-designed jailbreaks. In this work, we present Tree of Attacks with Pruning (TAP), an automated method for generating jailbreaks that only requires black-box access to the target LLM. TAP utilizes an LLM to iteratively refine candidate (attack) prompts using tree-of-thoughts reasoning until one of the generated prompts jailbreaks the target. Crucially, before sending prompts to the target, TAP assesses them and prunes the ones unlikely to result in jailbreaks. Using tree-of-thought reasoning allows TAP to navigate a large search space of prompts and pruning reduces the total number of queries sent to the target. In empirical evaluations, we observe that TAP generates prompts that jailbreak state-of-the-art LLMs (including GPT4 and GPT4-Turbo) for more than 80% of the prompts using only a small number of queries. This significantly improves upon the previous state-of-the-art black-box method for generating jailbreaks.

Language agents powered by large language models (LLMs) have seen exploding development. Their capability of using language as a vehicle for thought and communication lends an incredible level of flexibility and versatility. People have quickly capitalized on this capability to connect LLMs to a wide range of external components and environments: databases, tools, the Internet, robotic embodiment, etc. Many believe an unprecedentedly powerful automation technology is emerging. However, new automation technologies come with new safety risks, especially for intricate systems like language agents. There is a surprisingly large gap between the speed and scale of their development and deployment and our understanding of their safety risks. Are we building a house of cards? In this position paper, we present the first systematic effort in mapping adversarial attacks against language agents. We first present a unified conceptual framework for agents with three major components: Perception, Brain, and Action. Under this framework, we present a comprehensive discussion and propose 12 potential attack scenarios against different components of an agent, covering different attack strategies (e.g., input manipulation, adversarial demonstrations, jailbreaking, backdoors). We also draw connections to successful attack strategies previously applied to LLMs. We emphasize the urgency to gain a thorough understanding of language agent risks before their widespread deployment.

Major search engine providers are rapidly incorporating Large Language Model (LLM)-generated content in response to user queries. These conversational search engines operate by loading retrieved website text into the LLM context for summarization and interpretation. Recent research demonstrates that LLMs are highly vulnerable to jailbreaking and prompt injection attacks, which disrupt the safety and quality goals of LLMs using adversarial strings. This work investigates the impact of prompt injections on the ranking order of sources referenced by conversational search engines. To this end, we introduce a focused dataset of real-world consumer product websites and formalize conversational search ranking as an adversarial problem. Experimentally, we analyze conversational search rankings in the absence of adversarial injections and show that different LLMs vary significantly in prioritizing product name, document content, and context position. We then present a tree-of-attacks-based jailbreaking technique which reliably promotes low-ranked products. Importantly, these attacks transfer effectively to state-of-the-art conversational search engines such as perplexity.ai. Given the strong financial incentive for website owners to boost their search ranking, we argue that our problem formulation is of critical importance for future robustness work.

A high volume of recent ML security literature focuses on attacks against aligned large language models (LLMs). These attacks may extract private information or coerce the model into producing harmful outputs. In real-world deployments, LLMs are often part of a larger agentic pipeline including memory systems, retrieval, web access, and API calling. Such additional components introduce vulnerabilities that make these LLM-powered agents much easier to attack than isolated LLMs, yet relatively little work focuses on the security of LLM agents. In this paper, we analyze security and privacy vulnerabilities that are unique to LLM agents. We first provide a taxonomy of attacks categorized by threat actors, objectives, entry points, attacker observability, attack strategies, and inherent vulnerabilities of agent pipelines. We then conduct a series of illustrative attacks on popular open-source and commercial agents, demonstrating the immediate practical implications of their vulnerabilities. Notably, our attacks are trivial to implement and require no understanding of machine learning.

The living-off-the-land (LOTL) offensive methodologies rely on the perpetration of malicious actions through chains of commands executed by legitimate applications, identifiable exclusively by analysis of system logs. LOTL techniques are well hidden inside the stream of events generated by common legitimate activities, moreover threat actors often camouflage activity through obfuscation, making them particularly difficult to detect without incurring in plenty of false alarms, even using machine learning. To improve the performance of models in such an harsh environment, we propose an augmentation framework to enhance and diversify the presence of LOTL malicious activity inside legitimate logs. Guided by threat intelligence, we generate a dataset by injecting attack templates known to be employed in the wild, further enriched by malleable patterns of legitimate activities to replicate the behavior of evasive threat actors. We conduct an extensive ablation study to understand which models better handle our augmented dataset, also manipulated to mimic the presence of model-agnostic evasion and poisoning attacks. Our results suggest that augmentation is needed to maintain high-predictive capabilities, robustness to attack is achieved through specific hardening techniques like adversarial training, and it is possible to deploy near-real-time models with almost-zero false alarms.

It has become common to publish large (billion parameter) language models that have been trained on private datasets. This paper demonstrates that in such settings, an adversary can perform a training data extraction attack to recover individual training examples by querying the language model. We demonstrate our attack on GPT-2, a language model trained on scrapes of the public Internet, and are able to extract hundreds of verbatim text sequences from the model's training data. These extracted examples include (public) personally identifiable information (names, phone numbers, and email addresses), IRC conversations, code, and 128-bit UUIDs. Our attack is possible even though each of the above sequences are included in just one document in the training data. We comprehensively evaluate our extraction attack to understand the factors that contribute to its success. Worryingly, we find that larger models are more vulnerable than smaller models. We conclude by drawing lessons and discussing possible safeguards for training large language models.

Chain-of-thought (COT) prompting can help large language models (LLMs) reason toward correct answers, but its efficacy in reasoning toward incorrect answers is unexplored. This process of elimination (PoE), when used with COT, can enhance self-consistency, interpretability, and tasks such as medical diagnoses of exclusion. Thus, we propose PoE with COT, where LLMs must reason toward incorrect options on multiple-choice questions. We evaluate the ability of GPT-3.5, LLaMA-2, and Falcon to perform PoE with COT on a total of four commonsense and scientific reasoning datasets. We find that the strategy of PoE always underperforms the strategy of choosing the correct answer. The agreement of these strategies is also lower than the self-consistency of each strategy. To study these issues further, we conduct error analyses and give suggestions for future work.

Self-consistency (SC) has been a widely used decoding strategy for chain-of-thought reasoning. Despite bringing significant performance improvements across a variety of multi-step reasoning tasks, it is a high-cost method that requires multiple sampling with the preset size. In this paper, we propose a simple and scalable sampling process, Early-Stopping Self-Consistency (ESC), to greatly reduce the cost of SC without sacrificing performance. On this basis, one control scheme for ESC is further derivated to dynamically choose the performance-cost balance for different tasks and models. To demonstrate ESC's effectiveness, we conducted extensive experiments on three popular categories of reasoning tasks: arithmetic, commonsense and symbolic reasoning over language models with varying scales. The empirical results show that ESC reduces the average number of sampling of chain-of-thought reasoning by a significant margin on six benchmarks, including MATH (-33.8%), GSM8K (-80.1%), StrategyQA (-76.8%), CommonsenseQA (-78.5%), Coin Flip (-84.2%) and Last Letters (-67.4%), while attaining comparable performances.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are employed across various high-stakes domains, where the reliability of their outputs is crucial. One commonly used method to assess the reliability of LLMs' responses is uncertainty estimation, which gauges the likelihood of their answers being correct. While many studies focus on improving the accuracy of uncertainty estimations for LLMs, our research investigates the fragility of uncertainty estimation and explores potential attacks. We demonstrate that an attacker can embed a backdoor in LLMs, which, when activated by a specific trigger in the input, manipulates the model's uncertainty without affecting the final output. Specifically, the proposed backdoor attack method can alter an LLM's output probability distribution, causing the probability distribution to converge towards an attacker-predefined distribution while ensuring that the top-1 prediction remains unchanged. Our experimental results demonstrate that this attack effectively undermines the model's self-evaluation reliability in multiple-choice questions. For instance, we achieved a 100 attack success rate (ASR) across three different triggering strategies in four models. Further, we investigate whether this manipulation generalizes across different prompts and domains. This work highlights a significant threat to the reliability of LLMs and underscores the need for future defenses against such attacks. The code is available at https://github.com/qcznlp/uncertainty_attack.

Adversarial poisoning attacks pose huge threats to various machine learning applications. Especially, the recent accumulative poisoning attacks show that it is possible to achieve irreparable harm on models via a sequence of imperceptible attacks followed by a trigger batch. Due to the limited data-level discrepancy in real-time data streaming, current defensive methods are indiscriminate in handling the poison and clean samples. In this paper, we dive into the perspective of model dynamics and propose a novel information measure, namely, Memorization Discrepancy, to explore the defense via the model-level information. By implicitly transferring the changes in the data manipulation to that in the model outputs, Memorization Discrepancy can discover the imperceptible poison samples based on their distinct dynamics from the clean samples. We thoroughly explore its properties and propose Discrepancy-aware Sample Correction (DSC) to defend against accumulative poisoning attacks. Extensive experiments comprehensively characterized Memorization Discrepancy and verified its effectiveness. The code is publicly available at: https://github.com/tmlr-group/Memorization-Discrepancy.

This study exposes the safety vulnerabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) in multi-turn interactions, where malicious users can obscure harmful intents across several queries. We introduce ActorAttack, a novel multi-turn attack method inspired by actor-network theory, which models a network of semantically linked actors as attack clues to generate diverse and effective attack paths toward harmful targets. ActorAttack addresses two main challenges in multi-turn attacks: (1) concealing harmful intents by creating an innocuous conversation topic about the actor, and (2) uncovering diverse attack paths towards the same harmful target by leveraging LLMs' knowledge to specify the correlated actors as various attack clues. In this way, ActorAttack outperforms existing single-turn and multi-turn attack methods across advanced aligned LLMs, even for GPT-o1. We will publish a dataset called SafeMTData, which includes multi-turn adversarial prompts and safety alignment data, generated by ActorAttack. We demonstrate that models safety-tuned using our safety dataset are more robust to multi-turn attacks. Code is available at https://github.com/renqibing/ActorAttack.

Many real-world data come in the form of graphs. Graph neural networks (GNNs), a new family of machine learning (ML) models, have been proposed to fully leverage graph data to build powerful applications. In particular, the inductive GNNs, which can generalize to unseen data, become mainstream in this direction. Machine learning models have shown great potential in various tasks and have been deployed in many real-world scenarios. To train a good model, a large amount of data as well as computational resources are needed, leading to valuable intellectual property. Previous research has shown that ML models are prone to model stealing attacks, which aim to steal the functionality of the target models. However, most of them focus on the models trained with images and texts. On the other hand, little attention has been paid to models trained with graph data, i.e., GNNs. In this paper, we fill the gap by proposing the first model stealing attacks against inductive GNNs. We systematically define the threat model and propose six attacks based on the adversary's background knowledge and the responses of the target models. Our evaluation on six benchmark datasets shows that the proposed model stealing attacks against GNNs achieve promising performance.

Recently, diffusion models have garnered significant interest in the field of text processing due to their many potential advantages compared to conventional autoregressive models. In this work, we propose Diffusion-of-Thought (DoT), a novel approach that integrates diffusion models with Chain-of-Thought, a well-established technique for improving the reasoning ability of autoregressive language models. In contrast to autoregressive language models that make decisions in a left-to-right, token-by-token manner, DoT allows reasoning steps to diffuse over time through a diffusion language model and offers greater flexibility in trading-off computation for reasoning performance. Our experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of DoT in multi-digit multiplication, boolean logic, and grade school math problems, with a small diffusion model outperforming a much larger autoregressive model in both efficiency and accuracy. In addition to that, DoT showcases promising self-correction abilities and benefits from existing reasoning-enhancing techniques like self-consistency decoding. Our findings contribute to the understanding and development of reasoning with diffusion language models.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have achieved impressive performance and have been put into practical use in commercial applications, but they still have potential safety mechanism vulnerabilities. Jailbreak attacks are red teaming methods that aim to bypass safety mechanisms and discover MLLMs' potential risks. Existing MLLMs' jailbreak methods often bypass the model's safety mechanism through complex optimization methods or carefully designed image and text prompts. Despite achieving some progress, they have a low attack success rate on commercial closed-source MLLMs. Unlike previous research, we empirically find that there exists a Shuffle Inconsistency between MLLMs' comprehension ability and safety ability for the shuffled harmful instruction. That is, from the perspective of comprehension ability, MLLMs can understand the shuffled harmful text-image instructions well. However, they can be easily bypassed by the shuffled harmful instructions from the perspective of safety ability, leading to harmful responses. Then we innovatively propose a text-image jailbreak attack named SI-Attack. Specifically, to fully utilize the Shuffle Inconsistency and overcome the shuffle randomness, we apply a query-based black-box optimization method to select the most harmful shuffled inputs based on the feedback of the toxic judge model. A series of experiments show that SI-Attack can improve the attack's performance on three benchmarks. In particular, SI-Attack can obviously improve the attack success rate for commercial MLLMs such as GPT-4o or Claude-3.5-Sonnet.

3D Gaussian splatting (3DGS), known for its groundbreaking performance and efficiency, has become a dominant 3D representation and brought progress to many 3D vision tasks. However, in this work, we reveal a significant security vulnerability that has been largely overlooked in 3DGS: the computation cost of training 3DGS could be maliciously tampered by poisoning the input data. By developing an attack named Poison-splat, we reveal a novel attack surface where the adversary can poison the input images to drastically increase the computation memory and time needed for 3DGS training, pushing the algorithm towards its worst computation complexity. In extreme cases, the attack can even consume all allocable memory, leading to a Denial-of-Service (DoS) that disrupts servers, resulting in practical damages to real-world 3DGS service vendors. Such a computation cost attack is achieved by addressing a bi-level optimization problem through three tailored strategies: attack objective approximation, proxy model rendering, and optional constrained optimization. These strategies not only ensure the effectiveness of our attack but also make it difficult to defend with simple defensive measures. We hope the revelation of this novel attack surface can spark attention to this crucial yet overlooked vulnerability of 3DGS systems. Our code is available at https://github.com/jiahaolu97/poison-splat .

Multivariate Time Series (MTS) forecasting is a fundamental task with numerous real-world applications, such as transportation, climate, and epidemiology. While a myriad of powerful deep learning models have been developed for this task, few works have explored the robustness of MTS forecasting models to malicious attacks, which is crucial for their trustworthy employment in high-stake scenarios. To address this gap, we dive deep into the backdoor attacks on MTS forecasting models and propose an effective attack method named BackTime.By subtly injecting a few stealthy triggers into the MTS data, BackTime can alter the predictions of the forecasting model according to the attacker's intent. Specifically, BackTime first identifies vulnerable timestamps in the data for poisoning, and then adaptively synthesizes stealthy and effective triggers by solving a bi-level optimization problem with a GNN-based trigger generator. Extensive experiments across multiple datasets and state-of-the-art MTS forecasting models demonstrate the effectiveness, versatility, and stealthiness of attacks. The code is available at https://github.com/xiaolin-cs/BackTime.

Code provides a general syntactic structure to build complex programs and perform precise computations when paired with a code interpreter -- we hypothesize that language models (LMs) can leverage code-writing to improve Chain of Thought reasoning not only for logic and arithmetic tasks, but also for linguistic ones (and in particular, those that are a mix of both). For example, consider prompting an LM to write code that counts the number of times it detects sarcasm in an essay: the LM may struggle to write an implementation for "detect_sarcasm(string)" that can be executed by the interpreter (handling the edge cases would be insurmountable). However, LMs may still produce a valid solution if they are used not only to write the code, but also to selectively "emulate" the interpreter by generating the expected output of "detect_sarcasm(string)" and other lines of code (e.g., that the interpreter could not compile). In this work, we propose Chain of Code (CoT), a simple yet surprisingly effective extension that improves LM code-driven reasoning. The key idea is to encourage LMs to format linguistic sub-tasks in a program as flexible pseudocode that the compiler can explicitly catch undefined behaviors and hand off to simulate with an LM (as an "LMulator"). Experiments demonstrate that Chain of Code outperforms Chain of Thought and other baselines across a variety of benchmarks; on BIG-Bench Hard, Chain of Code achieves 84%, a gain of 12% over Chain of Thought. CoT scales well with large and small models alike, and broadens the scope of reasoning questions that LMs can correctly answer by "thinking in code". Project webpage: https://chain-of-code.github.io/.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) guides large language models (LLMs) to reason step-by-step, and can motivate their logical reasoning ability. While effective for logical tasks, CoT is not conducive to creative problem-solving which often requires out-of-box thoughts and is crucial for innovation advancements. In this paper, we explore the Leap-of-Thought (LoT) abilities within LLMs -- a non-sequential, creative paradigm involving strong associations and knowledge leaps. To this end, we study LLMs on the popular Oogiri game which needs participants to have good creativity and strong associative thinking for responding unexpectedly and humorously to the given image, text, or both, and thus is suitable for LoT study. Then to investigate LLMs' LoT ability in the Oogiri game, we first build a multimodal and multilingual Oogiri-GO dataset which contains over 130,000 samples from the Oogiri game, and observe the insufficient LoT ability or failures of most existing LLMs on the Oogiri game. Accordingly, we introduce a creative Leap-of-Thought (CLoT) paradigm to improve LLM's LoT ability. CLoT first formulates the Oogiri-GO dataset into LoT-oriented instruction tuning data to train pretrained LLM for achieving certain LoT humor generation and discrimination abilities. Then CLoT designs an explorative self-refinement that encourages the LLM to generate more creative LoT data via exploring parallels between seemingly unrelated concepts and selects high-quality data to train itself for self-refinement. CLoT not only excels in humor generation in the Oogiri game but also boosts creative abilities in various tasks like cloud guessing game and divergent association task. These findings advance our understanding and offer a pathway to improve LLMs' creative capacities for innovative applications across domains. The dataset, code, and models will be released online. https://zhongshsh.github.io/CLoT/.

Pretrained large language models (LLMs) are increasingly utilized across a wide range of natural language processing (NLP) tasks due to their impressive capabilities as few-shot learners. Recent techniques, such as chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting, have significantly advanced multi-step reasoning by introducing step-by-step decomposition, achieving state-of-the-art results on complex reasoning benchmarks. However, these approaches often rely on static prompting templates that do not adapt to task complexity or errors during the reasoning process. In this work, we introduce Adaptive Prompting, a dynamic and iterative framework designed to enhance reasoning by incorporating real-time adjustments to prompt structures and validation mechanisms.Experimental results demonstrate that Adaptive Prompting significantly improves performance on diverse reasoning benchmarks, including arithmetic reasoning (GSM8K, MultiArith), logical reasoning and commonsense tasks, achieving substantial accuracy gains compared to static prompting baselines. By integrating guided prompts, intermediate validation, and self-corrective steps, our approach enables smaller models to achieve competitive performance with larger counterparts, such as GPT-4, while maintaining computational efficiency. The framework achieves this without requiring fine-tuning or task-specific training data, highlighting the untapped potential of iterative reasoning methods.

Prompt-based learning paradigm bridges the gap between pre-training and fine-tuning, and works effectively under the few-shot setting. However, we find that this learning paradigm inherits the vulnerability from the pre-training stage, where model predictions can be misled by inserting certain triggers into the text. In this paper, we explore this universal vulnerability by either injecting backdoor triggers or searching for adversarial triggers on pre-trained language models using only plain text. In both scenarios, we demonstrate that our triggers can totally control or severely decrease the performance of prompt-based models fine-tuned on arbitrary downstream tasks, reflecting the universal vulnerability of the prompt-based learning paradigm. Further experiments show that adversarial triggers have good transferability among language models. We also find conventional fine-tuning models are not vulnerable to adversarial triggers constructed from pre-trained language models. We conclude by proposing a potential solution to mitigate our attack methods. Code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/leix28/prompt-universal-vulnerability

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has proven highly effective for enhancing complex reasoning in Large Language Models (LLMs) and Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs). Yet, it struggles in complex spatial reasoning tasks. Nonetheless, human cognition extends beyond language alone, enabling the remarkable capability to think in both words and images. Inspired by this mechanism, we propose a new reasoning paradigm, Multimodal Visualization-of-Thought (MVoT). It enables visual thinking in MLLMs by generating image visualizations of their reasoning traces. To ensure high-quality visualization, we introduce token discrepancy loss into autoregressive MLLMs. This innovation significantly improves both visual coherence and fidelity. We validate this approach through several dynamic spatial reasoning tasks. Experimental results reveal that MVoT demonstrates competitive performance across tasks. Moreover, it exhibits robust and reliable improvements in the most challenging scenarios where CoT fails. Ultimately, MVoT establishes new possibilities for complex reasoning tasks where visual thinking can effectively complement verbal reasoning.

The recent development of chain-of-thought (CoT) decoding has enabled large language models (LLMs) to generate explicit logical reasoning paths for complex problem-solving. However, research indicates that these paths are not always deliberate and optimal. The tree-of-thought (ToT) method employs tree-searching to extensively explore the reasoning space and find better reasoning paths that CoT decoding might overlook. This deliberation, however, comes at the cost of significantly increased inference complexity. In this work, we demonstrate that fine-tuning LLMs leveraging the search tree constructed by ToT allows CoT to achieve similar or better performance, thereby avoiding the substantial inference burden. This is achieved through Chain of Preference Optimization (CPO), where LLMs are fine-tuned to align each step of the CoT reasoning paths with those of ToT using the inherent preference information in the tree-search process. Extensive experimental results show that CPO significantly improves LLM performance in solving a variety of complex problems, including question answering, fact verification, and arithmetic reasoning, demonstrating its effectiveness. Our code is available at https://github.com/sail-sg/CPO.

As the application of Large Language Models (LLMs) expands, the demand for reliable evaluations increases. Existing LLM evaluation benchmarks primarily rely on static datasets, making it challenging to assess model performance in dynamic interactions with users. Moreover, these benchmarks often depend on specific background knowledge, complicating the measurement of a model's logical reasoning capabilities. Other dynamic evaluation methods based on strong models or manual efforts may introduce biases and incur high costs and time demands, hindering large-scale application. To address these issues, we propose TurtleBench. TurtleBench collects real user guesses from our online Turtle Soup Puzzle platform that we developed. This approach allows for the relatively dynamic generation of evaluation datasets, mitigating the risk of model cheating while aligning assessments more closely with genuine user needs for reasoning capabilities, thus enhancing the reliability of evaluations. TurtleBench includes 1,532 user guesses along with the correctness of guesses after annotation. Using this dataset, we thoroughly evaluated nine of the most advanced LLMs available today. Notably, the OpenAI o1 series models did not achieve leading results in these evaluations. We propose several hypotheses for further research, such as "the latent reasoning of o1 utilizes trivial Chain-of-Thought (CoT) techniques" and "increasing CoT length not only provides reasoning benefits but also incurs noise costs."

Deep neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to backdoor attacks. The backdoor adversaries intend to maliciously control the predictions of attacked DNNs by injecting hidden backdoors that can be activated by adversary-specified trigger patterns during the training process. One recent research revealed that most of the existing attacks failed in the real physical world since the trigger contained in the digitized test samples may be different from that of the one used for training. Accordingly, users can adopt spatial transformations as the image pre-processing to deactivate hidden backdoors. In this paper, we explore the previous findings from another side. We exploit classical spatial transformations (i.e. rotation and translation) with the specific parameter as trigger patterns to design a simple yet effective poisoning-based backdoor attack. For example, only images rotated to a particular angle can activate the embedded backdoor of attacked DNNs. Extensive experiments are conducted, verifying the effectiveness of our attack under both digital and physical settings and its resistance to existing backdoor defenses.

Advanced text-to-image models such as DALL-E 2 and Midjourney possess the capacity to generate highly realistic images, raising significant concerns regarding the potential proliferation of unsafe content. This includes adult, violent, or deceptive imagery of political figures. Despite claims of rigorous safety mechanisms implemented in these models to restrict the generation of not-safe-for-work (NSFW) content, we successfully devise and exhibit the first prompt attacks on Midjourney, resulting in the production of abundant photorealistic NSFW images. We reveal the fundamental principles of such prompt attacks and suggest strategically substituting high-risk sections within a suspect prompt to evade closed-source safety measures. Our novel framework, SurrogatePrompt, systematically generates attack prompts, utilizing large language models, image-to-text, and image-to-image modules to automate attack prompt creation at scale. Evaluation results disclose an 88% success rate in bypassing Midjourney's proprietary safety filter with our attack prompts, leading to the generation of counterfeit images depicting political figures in violent scenarios. Both subjective and objective assessments validate that the images generated from our attack prompts present considerable safety hazards.

Chain of thought prompting successfully improves the reasoning capabilities of large language models, achieving state of the art results on a range of datasets. However, these reasoning capabilities only appear to emerge in models with a size of over 100 billion parameters. In this paper, we explore the transfer of such reasoning capabilities to models with less than 100 billion parameters via knowledge distillation. Specifically, we finetune a student model on the chain of thought outputs generated by a larger teacher model. Our experiments show that the proposed method improves task performance across arithmetic, commonsense and symbolic reasoning datasets. For example, the accuracy of T5 XXL on GSM8K improves from 8.11% to 21.99% when finetuned on PaLM-540B generated chains of thought.

Backdoor attacks represent one of the major threats to machine learning models. Various efforts have been made to mitigate backdoors. However, existing defenses have become increasingly complex and often require high computational resources or may also jeopardize models' utility. In this work, we show that fine-tuning, one of the most common and easy-to-adopt machine learning training operations, can effectively remove backdoors from machine learning models while maintaining high model utility. Extensive experiments over three machine learning paradigms show that fine-tuning and our newly proposed super-fine-tuning achieve strong defense performance. Furthermore, we coin a new term, namely backdoor sequela, to measure the changes in model vulnerabilities to other attacks before and after the backdoor has been removed. Empirical evaluation shows that, compared to other defense methods, super-fine-tuning leaves limited backdoor sequela. We hope our results can help machine learning model owners better protect their models from backdoor threats. Also, it calls for the design of more advanced attacks in order to comprehensively assess machine learning models' backdoor vulnerabilities.

Backdoor attacks are a kind of insidious security threat against machine learning models. After being injected with a backdoor in training, the victim model will produce adversary-specified outputs on the inputs embedded with predesigned triggers but behave properly on normal inputs during inference. As a sort of emergent attack, backdoor attacks in natural language processing (NLP) are investigated insufficiently. As far as we know, almost all existing textual backdoor attack methods insert additional contents into normal samples as triggers, which causes the trigger-embedded samples to be detected and the backdoor attacks to be blocked without much effort. In this paper, we propose to use the syntactic structure as the trigger in textual backdoor attacks. We conduct extensive experiments to demonstrate that the syntactic trigger-based attack method can achieve comparable attack performance (almost 100% success rate) to the insertion-based methods but possesses much higher invisibility and stronger resistance to defenses. These results also reveal the significant insidiousness and harmfulness of textual backdoor attacks. All the code and data of this paper can be obtained at https://github.com/thunlp/HiddenKiller.

We introduce the first model-stealing attack that extracts precise, nontrivial information from black-box production language models like OpenAI's ChatGPT or Google's PaLM-2. Specifically, our attack recovers the embedding projection layer (up to symmetries) of a transformer model, given typical API access. For under \20 USD, our attack extracts the entire projection matrix of OpenAI's Ada and Babbage language models. We thereby confirm, for the first time, that these black-box models have a hidden dimension of 1024 and 2048, respectively. We also recover the exact hidden dimension size of the gpt-3.5-turbo model, and estimate it would cost under 2,000 in queries to recover the entire projection matrix. We conclude with potential defenses and mitigations, and discuss the implications of possible future work that could extend our attack.

Table-based reasoning with large language models (LLMs) is a promising direction to tackle many table understanding tasks, such as table-based question answering and fact verification. Compared with generic reasoning, table-based reasoning requires the extraction of underlying semantics from both free-form questions and semi-structured tabular data. Chain-of-Thought and its similar approaches incorporate the reasoning chain in the form of textual context, but it is still an open question how to effectively leverage tabular data in the reasoning chain. We propose the Chain-of-Table framework, where tabular data is explicitly used in the reasoning chain as a proxy for intermediate thoughts. Specifically, we guide LLMs using in-context learning to iteratively generate operations and update the table to represent a tabular reasoning chain. LLMs can therefore dynamically plan the next operation based on the results of the previous ones. This continuous evolution of the table forms a chain, showing the reasoning process for a given tabular problem. The chain carries structured information of the intermediate results, enabling more accurate and reliable predictions. Chain-of-Table achieves new state-of-the-art performance on WikiTQ, FeTaQA, and TabFact benchmarks across multiple LLM choices.

Large language models (LLMs) are susceptible to red teaming attacks, which can induce LLMs to generate harmful content. Previous research constructs attack prompts via manual or automatic methods, which have their own limitations on construction cost and quality. To address these issues, we propose an integrated approach that combines manual and automatic methods to economically generate high-quality attack prompts. Specifically, considering the impressive capabilities of newly emerged LLMs, we propose an attack framework to instruct LLMs to mimic human-generated prompts through in-context learning. Furthermore, we propose a defense framework that fine-tunes victim LLMs through iterative interactions with the attack framework to enhance their safety against red teaming attacks. Extensive experiments on different LLMs validate the effectiveness of our proposed attack and defense frameworks. Additionally, we release a series of attack prompts datasets named SAP with varying sizes, facilitating the safety evaluation and enhancement of more LLMs. Our code and dataset is available on https://github.com/Aatrox103/SAP .

As large language models become more prevalent, their possible harmful or inappropriate responses are a cause for concern. This paper introduces a unique dataset containing adversarial examples in the form of questions, which we call AttaQ, designed to provoke such harmful or inappropriate responses. We assess the efficacy of our dataset by analyzing the vulnerabilities of various models when subjected to it. Additionally, we introduce a novel automatic approach for identifying and naming vulnerable semantic regions - input semantic areas for which the model is likely to produce harmful outputs. This is achieved through the application of specialized clustering techniques that consider both the semantic similarity of the input attacks and the harmfulness of the model's responses. Automatically identifying vulnerable semantic regions enhances the evaluation of model weaknesses, facilitating targeted improvements to its safety mechanisms and overall reliability.

Ensuring the safety and harmlessness of Large Language Models (LLMs) has become equally critical as their performance in applications. However, existing safety alignment methods typically suffer from safety-performance trade-offs and the susceptibility to jailbreak attacks, primarily due to their reliance on direct refusals for malicious queries. In this paper, we propose STAIR, a novel framework that integrates SafeTy Alignment with Itrospective Reasoning. We enable LLMs to identify safety risks through step-by-step analysis by self-improving chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning with safety awareness. STAIR first equips the model with a structured reasoning capability and then advances safety alignment via iterative preference optimization on step-level reasoning data generated using our newly proposed Safety-Informed Monte Carlo Tree Search (SI-MCTS). We further train a process reward model on this data to guide test-time searches for improved responses. Extensive experiments show that STAIR effectively mitigates harmful outputs while better preserving helpfulness, compared to instinctive alignment strategies. With test-time scaling, STAIR achieves a safety performance comparable to Claude-3.5 against popular jailbreak attacks. Relevant resources in this work are available at https://github.com/thu-ml/STAIR.

One of the most common causes of lack of continuity of online systems stems from a widely popular Cyber Attack known as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), in which a network of infected devices (botnet) gets exploited to flood the computational capacity of services through the commands of an attacker. This attack is made by leveraging the Domain Name System (DNS) technology through Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs), a stealthy connection strategy that yet leaves suspicious data patterns. To detect such threats, advances in their analysis have been made. For the majority, they found Machine Learning (ML) as a solution, which can be highly effective in analyzing and classifying massive amounts of data. Although strongly performing, ML models have a certain degree of obscurity in their decision-making process. To cope with this problem, a branch of ML known as Explainable ML tries to break down the black-box nature of classifiers and make them interpretable and human-readable. This work addresses the problem of Explainable ML in the context of botnet and DGA detection, which at the best of our knowledge, is the first to concretely break down the decisions of ML classifiers when devised for botnet/DGA detection, therefore providing global and local explanations.

Among adversarial attacks against sequential recommender systems, model extraction attacks represent a method to attack sequential recommendation models without prior knowledge. Existing research has primarily concentrated on the adversary's execution of black-box attacks through data-free model extraction. However, a significant gap remains in the literature concerning the development of surrogate models by adversaries with access to few-shot raw data (10\% even less). That is, the challenge of how to construct a surrogate model with high functional similarity within the context of few-shot data scenarios remains an issue that requires resolution.This study addresses this gap by introducing a novel few-shot model extraction framework against sequential recommenders, which is designed to construct a superior surrogate model with the utilization of few-shot data. The proposed few-shot model extraction framework is comprised of two components: an autoregressive augmentation generation strategy and a bidirectional repair loss-facilitated model distillation procedure. Specifically, to generate synthetic data that closely approximate the distribution of raw data, autoregressive augmentation generation strategy integrates a probabilistic interaction sampler to extract inherent dependencies and a synthesis determinant signal module to characterize user behavioral patterns. Subsequently, bidirectional repair loss, which target the discrepancies between the recommendation lists, is designed as auxiliary loss to rectify erroneous predictions from surrogate models, transferring knowledge from the victim model to the surrogate model effectively. Experiments on three datasets show that the proposed few-shot model extraction framework yields superior surrogate models.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) Prompting is a dominant paradigm in Large Language Models (LLMs) to enhance complex reasoning. It guides LLMs to present multi-step reasoning, rather than generating the final answer directly. However, CoT encounters difficulties when key information required for reasoning is implicit or missing. This occurs because CoT emphasizes the sequence of reasoning steps while overlooking the early extraction of essential information. We propose a pre-prompting method called Iterative Summarization Pre-Prompting (ISP^2) to refine LLM reasoning when key information is not explicitly provided. First, entities and their corresponding descriptions are extracted to form potential key information pairs. Next, we use a reliability rating to assess these pairs, then merge the two lowest-ranked pairs into a new entity description. This process is repeated until a unique key information pair is obtained. Finally, that pair, along with the original question, is fed into LLMs to produce the answer. Extensive experiments demonstrate a 7.1% improvement compared to existing methods. Unlike traditional prompting, ISP^2 adopts an inductive approach with pre-prompting, offering flexible integration into diverse reasoning frameworks. The code is available at https://github.com/zdhgreat/ISP-2.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) decoding enables language models to improve reasoning performance at the cost of high generation latency in decoding. Recent proposals have explored variants of contemplation tokens, a term we introduce that refers to special tokens used during inference to allow for extra computation. Prior work has considered fixed-length sequences drawn from a discrete set of embeddings as contemplation tokens. Here we propose Compressed Chain-of-Thought (CCoT), a framework to generate contentful and continuous contemplation tokens of variable sequence length. The generated contemplation tokens are compressed representations of explicit reasoning chains, and our method can be applied to off-the-shelf decoder language models. Through experiments, we illustrate how CCoT enables additional reasoning over dense contentful representations to achieve corresponding improvements in accuracy. Moreover, the reasoning improvements can be adaptively modified on demand by controlling the number of contemplation tokens generated.

The rapid development of large reasoning models, such as OpenAI-o3 and DeepSeek-R1, has led to significant improvements in complex reasoning over non-reasoning large language models~(LLMs). However, their enhanced capabilities, combined with the open-source access of models like DeepSeek-R1, raise serious safety concerns, particularly regarding their potential for misuse. In this work, we present a comprehensive safety assessment of these reasoning models, leveraging established safety benchmarks to evaluate their compliance with safety regulations. Furthermore, we investigate their susceptibility to adversarial attacks, such as jailbreaking and prompt injection, to assess their robustness in real-world applications. Through our multi-faceted analysis, we uncover four key findings: (1) There is a significant safety gap between the open-source R1 models and the o3-mini model, on both safety benchmark and attack, suggesting more safety effort on R1 is needed. (2) The distilled reasoning model shows poorer safety performance compared to its safety-aligned base models. (3) The stronger the model's reasoning ability, the greater the potential harm it may cause when answering unsafe questions. (4) The thinking process in R1 models pose greater safety concerns than their final answers. Our study provides insights into the security implications of reasoning models and highlights the need for further advancements in R1 models' safety to close the gap.

We reveal new methods and the theoretical foundations of techniques for editing large language models. We also show how the new theory can be used to assess the editability of models and to expose their susceptibility to previously unknown malicious attacks. Our theoretical approach shows that a single metric (a specific measure of the intrinsic dimensionality of the model's features) is fundamental to predicting the success of popular editing approaches, and reveals new bridges between disparate families of editing methods. We collectively refer to these approaches as stealth editing methods, because they aim to directly and inexpensively update a model's weights to correct the model's responses to known hallucinating prompts without otherwise affecting the model's behaviour, without requiring retraining. By carefully applying the insight gleaned from our theoretical investigation, we are able to introduce a new network block -- named a jet-pack block -- which is optimised for highly selective model editing, uses only standard network operations, and can be inserted into existing networks. The intrinsic dimensionality metric also determines the vulnerability of a language model to a stealth attack: a small change to a model's weights which changes its response to a single attacker-chosen prompt. Stealth attacks do not require access to or knowledge of the model's training data, therefore representing a potent yet previously unrecognised threat to redistributed foundation models. They are computationally simple enough to be implemented in malware in many cases. Extensive experimental results illustrate and support the method and its theoretical underpinnings. Demos and source code for editing language models are available at https://github.com/qinghua-zhou/stealth-edits.

Despite the success of chain of thought in enhancing language model reasoning, the underlying process remains less well understood. Although logically sound reasoning appears inherently crucial for chain of thought, prior studies surprisingly reveal minimal impact when using invalid demonstrations instead. Furthermore, the conventional chain of thought does not inform language models on what mistakes to avoid, which potentially leads to more errors. Hence, inspired by how humans can learn from both positive and negative examples, we propose contrastive chain of thought to enhance language model reasoning. Compared to the conventional chain of thought, our approach provides both valid and invalid reasoning demonstrations, to guide the model to reason step-by-step while reducing reasoning mistakes. To improve generalization, we introduce an automatic method to construct contrastive demonstrations. Our experiments on reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that contrastive chain of thought can serve as a general enhancement of chain-of-thought prompting.

Recent advancements in large language models have showcased their remarkable generalizability across various domains. However, their reasoning abilities still have significant room for improvement, especially when confronted with scenarios requiring multi-step reasoning. Although large language models possess extensive knowledge, their behavior, particularly in terms of reasoning, often fails to effectively utilize this knowledge to establish a coherent thinking paradigm. Generative language models sometimes show hallucinations as their reasoning procedures are unconstrained by logical principles. Aiming to improve the zero-shot chain-of-thought reasoning ability of large language models, we propose Logical Chain-of-Thought (LogiCoT), a neurosymbolic framework that leverages principles from symbolic logic to verify and revise the reasoning processes accordingly. Experimental evaluations conducted on language tasks in diverse domains, including arithmetic, commonsense, symbolic, causal inference, and social problems, demonstrate the efficacy of the enhanced reasoning paradigm by logic.

We conduct experiments on the impact of increasing inference-time compute in reasoning models (specifically OpenAI o1-preview and o1-mini) on their robustness to adversarial attacks. We find that across a variety of attacks, increased inference-time compute leads to improved robustness. In many cases (with important exceptions), the fraction of model samples where the attack succeeds tends to zero as the amount of test-time compute grows. We perform no adversarial training for the tasks we study, and we increase inference-time compute by simply allowing the models to spend more compute on reasoning, independently of the form of attack. Our results suggest that inference-time compute has the potential to improve adversarial robustness for Large Language Models. We also explore new attacks directed at reasoning models, as well as settings where inference-time compute does not improve reliability, and speculate on the reasons for these as well as ways to address them.

Pre-trained models of code have achieved success in many important software engineering tasks. However, these powerful models are vulnerable to adversarial attacks that slightly perturb model inputs to make a victim model produce wrong outputs. Current works mainly attack models of code with examples that preserve operational program semantics but ignore a fundamental requirement for adversarial example generation: perturbations should be natural to human judges, which we refer to as naturalness requirement. In this paper, we propose ALERT (nAturaLnEss AwaRe ATtack), a black-box attack that adversarially transforms inputs to make victim models produce wrong outputs. Different from prior works, this paper considers the natural semantic of generated examples at the same time as preserving the operational semantic of original inputs. Our user study demonstrates that human developers consistently consider that adversarial examples generated by ALERT are more natural than those generated by the state-of-the-art work by Zhang et al. that ignores the naturalness requirement. On attacking CodeBERT, our approach can achieve attack success rates of 53.62%, 27.79%, and 35.78% across three downstream tasks: vulnerability prediction, clone detection and code authorship attribution. On GraphCodeBERT, our approach can achieve average success rates of 76.95%, 7.96% and 61.47% on the three tasks. The above outperforms the baseline by 14.07% and 18.56% on the two pre-trained models on average. Finally, we investigated the value of the generated adversarial examples to harden victim models through an adversarial fine-tuning procedure and demonstrated the accuracy of CodeBERT and GraphCodeBERT against ALERT-generated adversarial examples increased by 87.59% and 92.32%, respectively.

Reliable deployment of machine learning models such as neural networks continues to be challenging due to several limitations. Some of the main shortcomings are the lack of interpretability and the lack of robustness against adversarial examples or out-of-distribution inputs. In this exploratory review, we explore the possibilities and limits of adversarial attacks for explainable machine learning models. First, we extend the notion of adversarial examples to fit in explainable machine learning scenarios, in which the inputs, the output classifications and the explanations of the model's decisions are assessed by humans. Next, we propose a comprehensive framework to study whether (and how) adversarial examples can be generated for explainable models under human assessment, introducing and illustrating novel attack paradigms. In particular, our framework considers a wide range of relevant yet often ignored factors such as the type of problem, the user expertise or the objective of the explanations, in order to identify the attack strategies that should be adopted in each scenario to successfully deceive the model (and the human). The intention of these contributions is to serve as a basis for a more rigorous and realistic study of adversarial examples in the field of explainable machine learning.

Recent advances in natural language processing and the increased use of large language models have exposed new security vulnerabilities, such as backdoor attacks. Previous backdoor attacks require input manipulation after model distribution to activate the backdoor, posing limitations in real-world applicability. Addressing this gap, we introduce a novel Claim-Guided Backdoor Attack (CGBA), which eliminates the need for such manipulations by utilizing inherent textual claims as triggers. CGBA leverages claim extraction, clustering, and targeted training to trick models to misbehave on targeted claims without affecting their performance on clean data. CGBA demonstrates its effectiveness and stealthiness across various datasets and models, significantly enhancing the feasibility of practical backdoor attacks. Our code and data will be available at https://github.com/PaperCGBA/CGBA.

The rapid advancement of ML models in critical sectors such as healthcare, finance, and security has intensified the need for robust data security, model integrity, and reliable outputs. Large multimodal foundational models, while crucial for complex tasks, present challenges in scalability, reliability, and potential misuse. Decentralized systems offer a solution by distributing workload and mitigating central points of failure, but they introduce risks of unauthorized access to sensitive data across nodes. We address these challenges with a comprehensive framework designed for responsible AI development. Our approach incorporates: 1) Zero-knowledge proofs for secure model verification, enhancing trust without compromising privacy. 2) Consensus-based verification checks to ensure consistent outputs across nodes, mitigating hallucinations and maintaining model integrity. 3) Split Learning techniques that segment models across different nodes, preserving data privacy by preventing full data access at any point. 4) Hardware-based security through trusted execution environments (TEEs) to protect data and computations. This framework aims to enhance security and privacy and improve the reliability and fairness of multimodal AI systems. Promoting efficient resource utilization contributes to more sustainable AI development. Our state-of-the-art proofs and principles demonstrate the framework's effectiveness in responsibly democratizing artificial intelligence, offering a promising approach for building secure and private foundational models.

Recent studies have revealed a security threat to natural language processing (NLP) models, called the Backdoor Attack. Victim models can maintain competitive performance on clean samples while behaving abnormally on samples with a specific trigger word inserted. Previous backdoor attacking methods usually assume that attackers have a certain degree of data knowledge, either the dataset which users would use or proxy datasets for a similar task, for implementing the data poisoning procedure. However, in this paper, we find that it is possible to hack the model in a data-free way by modifying one single word embedding vector, with almost no accuracy sacrificed on clean samples. Experimental results on sentiment analysis and sentence-pair classification tasks show that our method is more efficient and stealthier. We hope this work can raise the awareness of such a critical security risk hidden in the embedding layers of NLP models. Our code is available at https://github.com/lancopku/Embedding-Poisoning.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have advanced the integration of visual and linguistic modalities, establishing themselves as the dominant paradigm for visual-language tasks. Current approaches like chain of thought (CoT) reasoning have augmented the cognitive capabilities of large language models (LLMs), yet their adaptation to MLLMs is hindered by heightened risks of hallucination in cross-modality comprehension. In this paper, we find that the thinking while looking paradigm in current multimodal CoT approaches--where reasoning chains are generated alongside visual input--fails to mitigate hallucinations caused by misleading images. To address these limitations, we propose the Visual Inference Chain (VIC) framework, a novel approach that constructs reasoning chains using textual context alone before introducing visual input, effectively reducing cross-modal biases and enhancing multimodal reasoning accuracy. Comprehensive evaluations demonstrate that VIC significantly improves zero-shot performance across various vision-related tasks, mitigating hallucinations while refining the reasoning capabilities of MLLMs. Our code repository can be found at https://github.com/Terry-Xu-666/visual_inference_chain.

Chain of Thought (CoT) is significant in improving the reasoning abilities of large language models (LLMs). However, the correlation between the effectiveness of CoT and the length of reasoning steps in prompts remains largely unknown. To shed light on this, we have conducted several empirical experiments to explore the relations. Specifically, we design experiments that expand and compress the rationale reasoning steps within CoT demonstrations, while keeping all other factors constant. We have the following key findings. First, the results indicate that lengthening the reasoning steps in prompts, even without adding new information into the prompt, considerably enhances LLMs' reasoning abilities across multiple datasets. Alternatively, shortening the reasoning steps, even while preserving the key information, significantly diminishes the reasoning abilities of models. This finding highlights the importance of the number of steps in CoT prompts and provides practical guidance to make better use of LLMs' potential in complex problem-solving scenarios. Second, we also investigated the relationship between the performance of CoT and the rationales used in demonstrations. Surprisingly, the result shows that even incorrect rationales can yield favorable outcomes if they maintain the requisite length of inference. Third, we observed that the advantages of increasing reasoning steps are task-dependent: simpler tasks require fewer steps, whereas complex tasks gain significantly from longer inference sequences.

Recently, test-time adaptation (TTA) has been proposed as a promising solution for addressing distribution shifts. It allows a base model to adapt to an unforeseen distribution during inference by leveraging the information from the batch of (unlabeled) test data. However, we uncover a novel security vulnerability of TTA based on the insight that predictions on benign samples can be impacted by malicious samples in the same batch. To exploit this vulnerability, we propose Distribution Invading Attack (DIA), which injects a small fraction of malicious data into the test batch. DIA causes models using TTA to misclassify benign and unperturbed test data, providing an entirely new capability for adversaries that is infeasible in canonical machine learning pipelines. Through comprehensive evaluations, we demonstrate the high effectiveness of our attack on multiple benchmarks across six TTA methods. In response, we investigate two countermeasures to robustify the existing insecure TTA implementations, following the principle of "security by design". Together, we hope our findings can make the community aware of the utility-security tradeoffs in deploying TTA and provide valuable insights for developing robust TTA approaches.

Warning: This paper contains examples of harmful language, and reader discretion is recommended. The increasing open release of powerful large language models (LLMs) has facilitated the development of downstream applications by reducing the essential cost of data annotation and computation. To ensure AI safety, extensive safety-alignment measures have been conducted to armor these models against malicious use (primarily hard prompt attack). However, beneath the seemingly resilient facade of the armor, there might lurk a shadow. By simply tuning on 100 malicious examples with 1 GPU hour, these safely aligned LLMs can be easily subverted to generate harmful content. Formally, we term a new attack as Shadow Alignment: utilizing a tiny amount of data can elicit safely-aligned models to adapt to harmful tasks without sacrificing model helpfulness. Remarkably, the subverted models retain their capability to respond appropriately to regular inquiries. Experiments across 8 models released by 5 different organizations (LLaMa-2, Falcon, InternLM, BaiChuan2, Vicuna) demonstrate the effectiveness of shadow alignment attack. Besides, the single-turn English-only attack successfully transfers to multi-turn dialogue and other languages. This study serves as a clarion call for a collective effort to overhaul and fortify the safety of open-source LLMs against malicious attackers.

Chain-of-thought prompting combined with pre-trained large language models has achieved encouraging results on complex reasoning tasks. In this paper, we propose a new decoding strategy, self-consistency, to replace the naive greedy decoding used in chain-of-thought prompting. It first samples a diverse set of reasoning paths instead of only taking the greedy one, and then selects the most consistent answer by marginalizing out the sampled reasoning paths. Self-consistency leverages the intuition that a complex reasoning problem typically admits multiple different ways of thinking leading to its unique correct answer. Our extensive empirical evaluation shows that self-consistency boosts the performance of chain-of-thought prompting with a striking margin on a range of popular arithmetic and commonsense reasoning benchmarks, including GSM8K (+17.9%), SVAMP (+11.0%), AQuA (+12.2%), StrategyQA (+6.4%) and ARC-challenge (+3.9%).

In this paper, we introduce Concise Chain-of-Thought (CCoT) prompting. We compared standard CoT and CCoT prompts to see how conciseness impacts response length and correct-answer accuracy. We evaluated this using GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 with a multiple-choice question-and-answer (MCQA) benchmark. CCoT reduced average response length by 48.70% for both GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 while having a negligible impact on problem-solving performance. However, on math problems, GPT-3.5 with CCoT incurs a performance penalty of 27.69%. Overall, CCoT leads to an average per-token cost reduction of 22.67%. These results have practical implications for AI systems engineers using LLMs to solve real-world problems with CoT prompt-engineering techniques. In addition, these results provide more general insight for AI researchers studying the emergent behavior of step-by-step reasoning in LLMs.

Decision-based evasion attacks repeatedly query a black-box classifier to generate adversarial examples. Prior work measures the cost of such attacks by the total number of queries made to the classifier. We argue this metric is flawed. Most security-critical machine learning systems aim to weed out "bad" data (e.g., malware, harmful content, etc). Queries to such systems carry a fundamentally asymmetric cost: queries detected as "bad" come at a higher cost because they trigger additional security filters, e.g., usage throttling or account suspension. Yet, we find that existing decision-based attacks issue a large number of "bad" queries, which likely renders them ineffective against security-critical systems. We then design new attacks that reduce the number of bad queries by 1.5-7.3times, but often at a significant increase in total (non-bad) queries. We thus pose it as an open problem to build black-box attacks that are more effective under realistic cost metrics.

Model inversion (MI) attacks aim to infer and reconstruct private training data by abusing access to a model. MI attacks have raised concerns about the leaking of sensitive information (e.g. private face images used in training a face recognition system). Recently, several algorithms for MI have been proposed to improve the attack performance. In this work, we revisit MI, study two fundamental issues pertaining to all state-of-the-art (SOTA) MI algorithms, and propose solutions to these issues which lead to a significant boost in attack performance for all SOTA MI. In particular, our contributions are two-fold: 1) We analyze the optimization objective of SOTA MI algorithms, argue that the objective is sub-optimal for achieving MI, and propose an improved optimization objective that boosts attack performance significantly. 2) We analyze "MI overfitting", show that it would prevent reconstructed images from learning semantics of training data, and propose a novel "model augmentation" idea to overcome this issue. Our proposed solutions are simple and improve all SOTA MI attack accuracy significantly. E.g., in the standard CelebA benchmark, our solutions improve accuracy by 11.8% and achieve for the first time over 90% attack accuracy. Our findings demonstrate that there is a clear risk of leaking sensitive information from deep learning models. We urge serious consideration to be given to the privacy implications. Our code, demo, and models are available at https://ngoc-nguyen-0.github.io/re-thinking_model_inversion_attacks/

Chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning has enabled large language models (LLMs) to utilize additional computation through intermediate tokens to solve complex tasks. However, we posit that typical reasoning traces contain many redundant tokens, incurring extraneous inference costs. Upon examination of the output distribution of current LLMs, we find evidence on their latent ability to reason more concisely, relative to their default behavior. To elicit this capability, we propose simple fine-tuning methods which leverage self-generated concise reasoning paths obtained by best-of-N sampling and few-shot conditioning, in task-specific settings. Our combined method achieves a 30% reduction in output tokens on average, across five model families on GSM8K and MATH, while maintaining average accuracy. By exploiting the fundamental stochasticity and in-context learning capabilities of LLMs, our self-training approach robustly elicits concise reasoning on a wide range of models, including those with extensive post-training. Code is available at https://github.com/TergelMunkhbat/concise-reasoning

As machine learning models grow in complexity and increasingly rely on publicly sourced data, such as the human-annotated labels used in training large language models, they become more vulnerable to label poisoning attacks. These attacks, in which adversaries subtly alter the labels within a training dataset, can severely degrade model performance, posing significant risks in critical applications. In this paper, we propose FLORAL, a novel adversarial training defense strategy based on support vector machines (SVMs) to counter these threats. Utilizing a bilevel optimization framework, we cast the training process as a non-zero-sum Stackelberg game between an attacker, who strategically poisons critical training labels, and the model, which seeks to recover from such attacks. Our approach accommodates various model architectures and employs a projected gradient descent algorithm with kernel SVMs for adversarial training. We provide a theoretical analysis of our algorithm's convergence properties and empirically evaluate FLORAL's effectiveness across diverse classification tasks. Compared to robust baselines and foundation models such as RoBERTa, FLORAL consistently achieves higher robust accuracy under increasing attacker budgets. These results underscore the potential of FLORAL to enhance the resilience of machine learning models against label poisoning threats, thereby ensuring robust classification in adversarial settings.

We identify two crucial limitations in the evaluation of recent parallel-integrated method Parallel Context Windows (PCW), which extends the maximum context lengths of language models, e.g., 2048 for LLaMA, by harnessing window-wise attention and positional embedding techniques. We first show that a simple yet strong baseline, weighted sum ensemble, is missing for the in-context few-shot classification. Moreover, on more challenging Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning (e.g., HotpotQA), PCW would present unexpected deterioration regarding question miscomprehension and false inference. Based on our findings, we suggest that the existing PCW design may not guarantee sufficient improvement and practicality in handling lengthy documents in real-world applications. More community efforts on enabling language models' long context understanding ability should be paid.

Current literature, aiming to surpass the "Chain-of-Thought" approach, often resorts to an external modus operandi involving halting, modifying, and then resuming the generation process to boost Large Language Models' (LLMs) reasoning capacities. This mode escalates the number of query requests, leading to increased costs, memory, and computational overheads. Addressing this, we propose the Algorithm of Thoughts -- a novel strategy that propels LLMs through algorithmic reasoning pathways, pioneering a new mode of in-context learning. By employing algorithmic examples, we exploit the innate recurrence dynamics of LLMs, expanding their idea exploration with merely one or a few queries. Our technique outperforms earlier single-query methods and stands on par with a recent multi-query strategy that employs an extensive tree search algorithm. Intriguingly, our results suggest that instructing an LLM using an algorithm can lead to performance surpassing that of the algorithm itself, hinting at LLM's inherent ability to weave its intuition into optimized searches. We probe into the underpinnings of our method's efficacy and its nuances in application.

Data poisoning attacks manipulate training data to introduce unexpected behaviors into machine learning models at training time. For text-to-image generative models with massive training datasets, current understanding of poisoning attacks suggests that a successful attack would require injecting millions of poison samples into their training pipeline. In this paper, we show that poisoning attacks can be successful on generative models. We observe that training data per concept can be quite limited in these models, making them vulnerable to prompt-specific poisoning attacks, which target a model's ability to respond to individual prompts. We introduce Nightshade, an optimized prompt-specific poisoning attack where poison samples look visually identical to benign images with matching text prompts. Nightshade poison samples are also optimized for potency and can corrupt an Stable Diffusion SDXL prompt in <100 poison samples. Nightshade poison effects "bleed through" to related concepts, and multiple attacks can composed together in a single prompt. Surprisingly, we show that a moderate number of Nightshade attacks can destabilize general features in a text-to-image generative model, effectively disabling its ability to generate meaningful images. Finally, we propose the use of Nightshade and similar tools as a last defense for content creators against web scrapers that ignore opt-out/do-not-crawl directives, and discuss possible implications for model trainers and content creators.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreaksx2013methods to elicit harmful or generally impermissible outputs. Safety measures are developed and assessed on their effectiveness at defending against jailbreak attacks, indicating a belief that safety is equivalent to robustness. We assert that current defense mechanisms, such as output filters and alignment fine-tuning, are, and will remain, fundamentally insufficient for ensuring model safety. These defenses fail to address risks arising from dual-intent queries and the ability to composite innocuous outputs to achieve harmful goals. To address this critical gap, we introduce an information-theoretic threat model called inferential adversaries who exploit impermissible information leakage from model outputs to achieve malicious goals. We distinguish these from commonly studied security adversaries who only seek to force victim models to generate specific impermissible outputs. We demonstrate the feasibility of automating inferential adversaries through question decomposition and response aggregation. To provide safety guarantees, we define an information censorship criterion for censorship mechanisms, bounding the leakage of impermissible information. We propose a defense mechanism which ensures this bound and reveal an intrinsic safety-utility trade-off. Our work provides the first theoretically grounded understanding of the requirements for releasing safe LLMs and the utility costs involved.

Reasoning language models have shown an uncanny ability to improve performance at test-time by ``thinking longer''-that is, by generating longer chain-of-thought sequences and hence using more compute. However, the length of their chain-of-thought reasoning is not controllable, making it impossible to allocate test-time compute to achieve a desired level of performance. We introduce Length Controlled Policy Optimization (LCPO), a simple reinforcement learning method that optimizes for accuracy and adherence to user-specified length constraints. We use LCPO to train L1, a reasoning language model that produces outputs satisfying a length constraint given in its prompt. L1's length control allows for smoothly trading off computational cost and accuracy on a wide range of tasks, and outperforms the state-of-the-art S1 method for length control. Furthermore, we uncover an unexpected short chain-of-thought capability in models trained with LCPO. For instance, our 1.5B L1 model surpasses GPT-4o at equal reasoning lengths. Overall, LCPO enables precise control over reasoning length, allowing for fine-grained allocation of test-time compute and accuracy. We release code and models at https://www.cmu-l3.github.io/l1

Recent research demonstrates that the nascent fine-tuning-as-a-service business model exposes serious safety concerns -- fine-tuning over a few harmful data uploaded by the users can compromise the safety alignment of the model. The attack, known as harmful fine-tuning, has raised a broad research interest among the community. However, as the attack is still new, we observe from our miserable submission experience that there are general misunderstandings within the research community. We in this paper aim to clear some common concerns for the attack setting, and formally establish the research problem. Specifically, we first present the threat model of the problem, and introduce the harmful fine-tuning attack and its variants. Then we systematically survey the existing literature on attacks/defenses/mechanical analysis of the problem. Finally, we outline future research directions that might contribute to the development of the field. Additionally, we present a list of questions of interest, which might be useful to refer to when reviewers in the peer review process question the realism of the experiment/attack/defense setting. A curated list of relevant papers is maintained and made accessible at: https://github.com/git-disl/awesome_LLM-harmful-fine-tuning-papers.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown impressive performance in various reasoning benchmarks with the emergence of Chain-of-Thought (CoT) and its derivative methods, particularly in tasks involving multi-choice questions (MCQs). However, current works all process data uniformly without considering the problem-solving difficulty, which means an excessive focus on simple questions while insufficient to intricate ones. To address this challenge, we inspired by humans using heuristic strategies to categorize tasks and handle them individually, propose to apply the Divide and Conquer to LLMs reasoning. First, we divide questions into different subsets based on the statistical confidence score (CS), then fix nearly resolved sets and conquer demanding nuanced process ones with elaborately designed methods, including Prior Knowledge based Reasoning (PKR) and Filter Choices based Reasoning (FCR), as well as their integration variants. Our experiments demonstrate that this proposed strategy significantly boosts the models' reasoning abilities across nine datasets involving arithmetic, commonsense, and logic tasks. For instance, compared to baseline, we make a striking improvement on low confidence subsets of 8.72\% for AQuA, 15.07\% for ARC Challenge and 7.71\% for RiddleSense. In addition, through extensive analysis on length of rationale and number of options, we verify that longer reasoning paths in PKR could prevent models from referring infer-harmful shortcuts, and also find that removing irrelevant choices in FCR would substantially avoid models' confusion. The code is at https://github.com/AiMijie/Divide-and-Conquer

Backdoor learning is an emerging and vital topic for studying deep neural networks' vulnerability (DNNs). Many pioneering backdoor attack and defense methods are being proposed, successively or concurrently, in the status of a rapid arms race. However, we find that the evaluations of new methods are often unthorough to verify their claims and accurate performance, mainly due to the rapid development, diverse settings, and the difficulties of implementation and reproducibility. Without thorough evaluations and comparisons, it is not easy to track the current progress and design the future development roadmap of the literature. To alleviate this dilemma, we build a comprehensive benchmark of backdoor learning called BackdoorBench. It consists of an extensible modular-based codebase (currently including implementations of 8 state-of-the-art (SOTA) attacks and 9 SOTA defense algorithms) and a standardized protocol of complete backdoor learning. We also provide comprehensive evaluations of every pair of 8 attacks against 9 defenses, with 5 poisoning ratios, based on 5 models and 4 datasets, thus 8,000 pairs of evaluations in total. We present abundant analysis from different perspectives about these 8,000 evaluations, studying the effects of different factors in backdoor learning. All codes and evaluations of BackdoorBench are publicly available at https://backdoorbench.github.io.

While chain-of-thought prompting (CoT) has the potential to improve the explainability of language model reasoning, it can systematically misrepresent the factors influencing models' behavior--for example, rationalizing answers in line with a user's opinion without mentioning this bias. To mitigate this biased reasoning problem, we introduce bias-augmented consistency training (BCT), an unsupervised fine-tuning scheme that trains models to give consistent reasoning across prompts with and without biasing features. We construct a suite testing nine forms of biased reasoning on seven question-answering tasks, and find that applying BCT to GPT-3.5-Turbo with one bias reduces the rate of biased reasoning by 86% on held-out tasks. Moreover, this model generalizes to other forms of bias, reducing biased reasoning on held-out biases by an average of 37%. As BCT generalizes to held-out biases and does not require gold labels, this method may hold promise for reducing biased reasoning from as-of-yet unknown biases and on tasks where supervision for ground truth reasoning is unavailable.

Chain-of-Thought(CoT) prompting and its variants explore equipping large language models (LLMs) with high-level reasoning abilities by emulating human-like linear cognition and logic. However, the human mind is complicated and mixed with both linear and nonlinear thinking. In this work, we propose Inferential Exclusion Prompting (IEP), a novel prompting that combines the principles of elimination and inference in order to guide LLMs to think non-linearly. IEP guides LLMs to plan and then utilize Natural Language Inference (NLI) to deduce each possible solution's entailment relation with context, commonsense, or facts, therefore yielding a broader perspective by thinking back for inferring. This forward planning and backward eliminating process allows IEP to better simulate the complex human thinking processes compared to other CoT-based methods, which only reflect linear cognitive processes. We conducted a series of empirical studies and have corroborated that IEP consistently outperforms CoT across various tasks. Additionally, we observe that integrating IEP and CoT further improves the LLMs' performance on certain tasks, highlighting the necessity of equipping LLMs with mixed logic processes. Moreover, to better evaluate comprehensive features inherent in human logic, we introduce Mental-Ability Reasoning Benchmark (MARB). The benchmark comprises six novel subtasks with a total of 9,115 questions, among which 1,685 are developed with hand-crafted rationale references. We believe both IEP and MARB can serve as a promising direction for unveiling LLMs' logic and verbal reasoning abilities and drive further advancements. MARB will be available at ~anonymity link soon.

Chain of Thought prompting strategy has enhanced the performance of Large Language Models (LLMs) across various NLP tasks. However, it still has shortcomings when dealing with complex reasoning tasks, following~cot_wei, including understanding errors, calculation errors and process errors (e.g. missing-step and hallucinations). Subsequently, Our in-depth analysis of various error types has found that deeply understanding the whole problem is critical in addressing complicated reasoning tasks. In this paper, we proposed a novel prompt strategy called Deeply Understanding the Problems (DUP) prompting, inspired by how humans solve complex reasoning problems, designed to enhance the comprehensive understanding of problems by LLMs. It consists of three stages: 1) extract the core question; 2) find out problem-solving information based on the core question; 3) generate and extract answers by LLMs. We evaluate the performance of DUP prompting on ten diverse reasoning datasets. Experimental results suggest that DUP prompting significantly outperforms Zero-Shot CoT ~kojima2022large across all datasets. Notably, DUP achieves state-of-the-art on SVAMP (90.4\% to 94.2\%) and GSM8K (94.6\% to 97.1\%).

Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) have highlighted the challenge of handling long-context tasks, where models need to reason over extensive input contexts to aggregate target information. While Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has shown promise for multi-step reasoning, its effectiveness for long-context scenarios remains underexplored. Through systematic investigation across diverse tasks, we demonstrate that CoT's benefits generalize across most long-context scenarios and amplify with increasing context length. Motivated by this critical observation, we propose LongRePS, a process-supervised framework that teaches models to generate high-quality reasoning paths for enhanced long-context performance. Our framework incorporates a self-sampling mechanism to bootstrap reasoning paths and a novel quality assessment protocol specifically designed for long-context scenarios. Experimental results on various long-context benchmarks demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach, achieving significant improvements over outcome supervision baselines on both in-domain tasks (+13.6/+3.8 points for LLaMA/Qwen on MuSiQue) and cross-domain generalization (+9.3/+8.1 points on average across diverse QA tasks). Our code, data and trained models are made public to facilitate future research.

Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) have been widely applied to different tasks such as bioinformatics, drug design, and social networks. However, recent studies have shown that GNNs are vulnerable to adversarial attacks which aim to mislead the node or subgraph classification prediction by adding subtle perturbations. Detecting these attacks is challenging due to the small magnitude of perturbation and the discrete nature of graph data. In this paper, we propose a general adversarial edge detection pipeline EDoG without requiring knowledge of the attack strategies based on graph generation. Specifically, we propose a novel graph generation approach combined with link prediction to detect suspicious adversarial edges. To effectively train the graph generative model, we sample several sub-graphs from the given graph data. We show that since the number of adversarial edges is usually low in practice, with low probability the sampled sub-graphs will contain adversarial edges based on the union bound. In addition, considering the strong attacks which perturb a large number of edges, we propose a set of novel features to perform outlier detection as the preprocessing for our detection. Extensive experimental results on three real-world graph datasets including a private transaction rule dataset from a major company and two types of synthetic graphs with controlled properties show that EDoG can achieve above 0.8 AUC against four state-of-the-art unseen attack strategies without requiring any knowledge about the attack type; and around 0.85 with knowledge of the attack type. EDoG significantly outperforms traditional malicious edge detection baselines. We also show that an adaptive attack with full knowledge of our detection pipeline is difficult to bypass it.

Automatic medical report generation (MRG), which possesses significant research value as it can aid radiologists in clinical diagnosis and report composition, has garnered increasing attention. Despite recent progress, generating accurate reports remains arduous due to the requirement for precise clinical comprehension and disease diagnosis inference. Furthermore, owing to the limited accessibility of medical data and the imbalanced distribution of diseases, the underrepresentation of rare diseases in training data makes large-scale medical visual language models (LVLMs) prone to hallucinations, such as omissions or fabrications, severely undermining diagnostic performance and further intensifying the challenges for MRG in practice. In this study, to effectively mitigate hallucinations in medical report generation, we propose a chain-of-medical-thought approach (CoMT), which intends to imitate the cognitive process of human doctors by decomposing diagnostic procedures. The radiological features with different importance are structured into fine-grained medical thought chains to enhance the inferential ability during diagnosis, thereby alleviating hallucination problems and enhancing the diagnostic accuracy of MRG. The code and dataset have been released at https://github.com/FRENKIE-CHIANG/CoMT.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) excel in several natural language processing tasks, their size and inaccessibility present challenges for extensive practical application. Previous studies acquire specialized skills through distillation on LLMs, which result in trading generic abilities, called model specialization. As for reasoning ability, chain-of-thought was synthesized to subsequent distillation. However, due to hallucination, synthetic chain-of-thought from LLMs contains faulty reasoning. These incorrect reasoning steps damage the reasoning capability. To tackle above issues, we propose Program-aided Distillation (PaD), which distills LLMs to obtain specialized small models in reasoning tasks. In PaD, we strengthen specialized models with program-aided reasoning, and help them overcome faulty reasoning steps with automated error checking. Experimental results demonstrate that, on the GSM8K benchmark, a 0.06B model using PaD can not only outperform certain LLMs (e.g., LLaMA), but also achieves a 10% improvement over baselines with a significantly smaller scale of parameters and data. Data pruning analysis reveals that PaD possesses higher training efficiency.

While text-to-image synthesis currently enjoys great popularity among researchers and the general public, the security of these models has been neglected so far. Many text-guided image generation models rely on pre-trained text encoders from external sources, and their users trust that the retrieved models will behave as promised. Unfortunately, this might not be the case. We introduce backdoor attacks against text-guided generative models and demonstrate that their text encoders pose a major tampering risk. Our attacks only slightly alter an encoder so that no suspicious model behavior is apparent for image generations with clean prompts. By then inserting a single character trigger into the prompt, e.g., a non-Latin character or emoji, the adversary can trigger the model to either generate images with pre-defined attributes or images following a hidden, potentially malicious description. We empirically demonstrate the high effectiveness of our attacks on Stable Diffusion and highlight that the injection process of a single backdoor takes less than two minutes. Besides phrasing our approach solely as an attack, it can also force an encoder to forget phrases related to certain concepts, such as nudity or violence, and help to make image generation safer.

With the rapid development and integration of artificial intelligence (AI) methods in next-generation networks (NextG), AI algorithms have provided significant advantages for NextG in terms of frequency spectrum usage, bandwidth, latency, and security. A key feature of NextG is the integration of AI, i.e., self-learning architecture based on self-supervised algorithms, to improve the performance of the network. A secure AI-powered structure is also expected to protect NextG networks against cyber-attacks. However, AI itself may be attacked, i.e., model poisoning targeted by attackers, and it results in cybersecurity violations. This paper proposes an AI trust platform using Streamlit for NextG networks that allows researchers to evaluate, defend, certify, and verify their AI models and applications against adversarial threats of evasion, poisoning, extraction, and interference.

Although chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting combined with language models has achieved encouraging results on complex reasoning tasks, the naive greedy decoding used in CoT prompting usually causes the repetitiveness and local optimality. To address this shortcoming, ensemble-optimization tries to obtain multiple reasoning paths to get the final answer assembly. However, current ensemble-optimization methods either simply employ rule-based post-processing such as self-consistency, or train an additional model based on several task-related human annotations to select the best one among multiple reasoning paths, yet fail to generalize to realistic settings where the type of input questions is unknown or the answer format of reasoning paths is unknown. To avoid their limitations, we propose self-agreement, a generalizable ensemble-optimization method applying in almost all scenarios where the type of input questions and the answer format of reasoning paths may be known or unknown. Self-agreement firstly samples from language model's decoder to generate a diverse set of reasoning paths, and subsequently prompts the language model one more time to determine the optimal answer by selecting the most agreed answer among the sampled reasoning paths. Self-agreement simultaneously achieves remarkable performance on six public reasoning benchmarks and superior generalization capabilities.

Prompting methods such as Chain-of-Thought (CoT) have shed new light on enhancing the reasoning capabilities of large language models, and researchers have extensively explored the generation process of rationales and answers. However, they have overlooked the potential challenges posed by the poor quality of reasoning problems, which may influence the reasoning performance significantly. In this work, we propose Self-Polish (SP), a novel method that facilitates the model's problem-solving process by prompting them to progressively refine the given problems to be more comprehensible and solvable. Specifically, the method teaches models to eliminate irrelevant information, rearrange the logic structure and organize local conditions into new ones parallelly. SP is orthogonal to all other prompting methods, making it convenient to integrate with state-of-the-art techniques for further improvement. We conduct thorough experiments on five benchmarks to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed method. For example, with Text-davinci-003, our method boosts the performance of standard few-shot prompting by 8.0% on GSM8K and 17.8% on MultiArith; it also improves the performance of CoT by 6.0% on GSM8K and 6.0% on MathQA, respectively. Furthermore, our method also showcases impressive performance on robustness evaluation.

Recently, self-supervised learning (SSL) was shown to be vulnerable to patch-based data poisoning backdoor attacks. It was shown that an adversary can poison a small part of the unlabeled data so that when a victim trains an SSL model on it, the final model will have a backdoor that the adversary can exploit. This work aims to defend self-supervised learning against such attacks. We use a three-step defense pipeline, where we first train a model on the poisoned data. In the second step, our proposed defense algorithm (PatchSearch) uses the trained model to search the training data for poisoned samples and removes them from the training set. In the third step, a final model is trained on the cleaned-up training set. Our results show that PatchSearch is an effective defense. As an example, it improves a model's accuracy on images containing the trigger from 38.2% to 63.7% which is very close to the clean model's accuracy, 64.6%. Moreover, we show that PatchSearch outperforms baselines and state-of-the-art defense approaches including those using additional clean, trusted data. Our code is available at https://github.com/UCDvision/PatchSearch

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as the backend for a variety of real-world applications called LLM-Integrated Applications. Multiple recent works showed that LLM-Integrated Applications are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, in which an attacker injects malicious instruction/data into the input of those applications such that they produce results as the attacker desires. However, existing works are limited to case studies. As a result, the literature lacks a systematic understanding of prompt injection attacks and their defenses. We aim to bridge the gap in this work. In particular, we propose a general framework to formalize prompt injection attacks. Existing attacks, which are discussed in research papers and blog posts, are special cases in our framework. Our framework enables us to design a new attack by combining existing attacks. Moreover, we also propose a framework to systematize defenses against prompt injection attacks. Using our frameworks, we conduct a systematic evaluation on prompt injection attacks and their defenses with 10 LLMs and 7 tasks. We hope our frameworks can inspire future research in this field. Our code is available at https://github.com/liu00222/Open-Prompt-Injection.

To ensure AI safety, instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs) are specifically trained to ensure alignment, which refers to making models behave in accordance with human intentions. While these models have demonstrated commendable results on various safety benchmarks, the vulnerability of their safety alignment has not been extensively studied. This is particularly troubling given the potential harm that LLMs can inflict. Existing attack methods on LLMs often rely on poisoned training data or the injection of malicious prompts. These approaches compromise the stealthiness and generalizability of the attacks, making them susceptible to detection. Additionally, these models often demand substantial computational resources for implementation, making them less practical for real-world applications. Inspired by recent success in modifying model behavior through steering vectors without the need for optimization, and drawing on its effectiveness in red-teaming LLMs, we conducted experiments employing activation steering to target four key aspects of LLMs: truthfulness, toxicity, bias, and harmfulness - across a varied set of attack settings. To establish a universal attack strategy applicable to diverse target alignments without depending on manual analysis, we automatically select the intervention layer based on contrastive layer search. Our experiment results show that activation attacks are highly effective and add little or no overhead to attack efficiency. Additionally, we discuss potential countermeasures against such activation attacks. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/wang2226/Backdoor-Activation-Attack Warning: this paper contains content that can be offensive or upsetting.

Recent advancements in pre-trained language models have enabled convenient methods for generating human-like text at a large scale. Though these generation capabilities hold great potential for breakthrough applications, it can also be a tool for an adversary to generate misinformation. In particular, social media platforms like Twitter are highly susceptible to AI-generated misinformation. A potential threat scenario is when an adversary hijacks a credible user account and incorporates a natural language generator to generate misinformation. Such threats necessitate automated detectors for AI-generated tweets in a given user's Twitter timeline. However, tweets are inherently short, thus making it difficult for current state-of-the-art pre-trained language model-based detectors to accurately detect at what point the AI starts to generate tweets in a given Twitter timeline. In this paper, we present a novel algorithm using stylometric signals to aid detecting AI-generated tweets. We propose models corresponding to quantifying stylistic changes in human and AI tweets in two related tasks: Task 1 - discriminate between human and AI-generated tweets, and Task 2 - detect if and when an AI starts to generate tweets in a given Twitter timeline. Our extensive experiments demonstrate that the stylometric features are effective in augmenting the state-of-the-art AI-generated text detectors.

Penetration testing, a critical component of cybersecurity, typically requires extensive time and effort to find vulnerabilities. Beginners in this field often benefit from collaborative approaches with the community or experts. To address this, we develop CIPHER (Cybersecurity Intelligent Penetration-testing Helper for Ethical Researchers), a large language model specifically trained to assist in penetration testing tasks. We trained CIPHER using over 300 high-quality write-ups of vulnerable machines, hacking techniques, and documentation of open-source penetration testing tools. Additionally, we introduced the Findings, Action, Reasoning, and Results (FARR) Flow augmentation, a novel method to augment penetration testing write-ups to establish a fully automated pentesting simulation benchmark tailored for large language models. This approach fills a significant gap in traditional cybersecurity Q\&A benchmarks and provides a realistic and rigorous standard for evaluating AI's technical knowledge, reasoning capabilities, and practical utility in dynamic penetration testing scenarios. In our assessments, CIPHER achieved the best overall performance in providing accurate suggestion responses compared to other open-source penetration testing models of similar size and even larger state-of-the-art models like Llama 3 70B and Qwen1.5 72B Chat, particularly on insane difficulty machine setups. This demonstrates that the current capabilities of general LLMs are insufficient for effectively guiding users through the penetration testing process. We also discuss the potential for improvement through scaling and the development of better benchmarks using FARR Flow augmentation results. Our benchmark will be released publicly at https://github.com/ibndias/CIPHER.

Large language models demonstrate exceptional performance in simple code generation tasks but still face challenges in tackling complex problems. These challenges may stem from insufficient reasoning and problem decomposition capabilities. To address this issue, we propose a reasoning-augmented data generation process, SRA-MCTS, which guides the model to autonomously generate high-quality intermediate reasoning paths. This creates a positive feedback loop, enabling continuous improvement. Our method operates entirely through the model itself without requiring additional supervision. By synthesizing natural language reasoning paths and translating them into executable code, the approach ensures analytical accuracy and enhances the success rate in solving complex tasks. Experimental results show that, even without additional supervisory signals, our method achieves performance improvements across different model scales, demonstrating the significant potential of self-improvement in small models. Furthermore, the method remains robust when traditional Chain-of-Thought (CoT) approaches exhibit performance degradation, with notable improvements observed in diversity metrics such as pass@10. We encourage further exploration of reasoning processes within training data to enhance the ability of language models to address complex problems. Our code and data are public at https://github.com/DIRECT-BIT/SRA-MCTS.

Given a large number of low-level heterogeneous categorical alerts from an anomaly detection system, how to characterize complex relationships between different alerts, filter out false positives, and deliver trustworthy rankings and suggestions to end users? This problem is motivated by and generalized from applications in enterprise security and attack scenario reconstruction. While existing techniques focus on either reconstructing abnormal scenarios or filtering out false positive alerts, it can be more advantageous to consider the two perspectives simultaneously in order to improve detection accuracy and better understand anomaly behaviors. In this paper, we propose CAR, a collaborative alerts ranking framework that exploits both temporal and content correlations from heterogeneous categorical alerts. CAR first builds a tree-based model to capture both short-term correlations and long-term dependencies in each alert sequence, which identifies abnormal action sequences. Then, an embedding-based model is employed to learn the content correlations between alerts via their heterogeneous categorical attributes. Finally, by incorporating both temporal and content dependencies into one optimization framework, CAR ranks both alerts and their corresponding alert patterns. Our experiments, using real-world enterprise monitoring data and real attacks launched by professional hackers, show that CAR can accurately identify true positive alerts and successfully reconstruct attack scenarios at the same time.

Recent work in open-domain question answering (ODQA) has shown that adversarial poisoning of the input contexts can cause large drops in accuracy for production systems. However, little to no work has proposed methods to defend against these attacks. To do so, we introduce a new method that uses query augmentation to search for a diverse set of retrieved passages that could answer the original question. We integrate these new passages into the model through the design of a novel confidence method, comparing the predicted answer to its appearance in the retrieved contexts (what we call Confidence from Answer Redundancy, e.g. CAR). Together these methods allow for a simple but effective way to defend against poisoning attacks and provide gains of 5-20% exact match across varying levels of data poisoning.

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly capable, it is prudent to assess whether safety measures remain effective even if LLMs intentionally try to bypass them. Previous work introduced control evaluations, an adversarial framework for testing deployment strategies of untrusted models (i.e., models which might be trying to bypass safety measures). While prior work treats a single failure as unacceptable, we perform control evaluations in a "distributed threat setting" -- a setting where no single action is catastrophic and no single action provides overwhelming evidence of misalignment. We approach this problem with a two-level deployment framework that uses an adaptive macro-protocol to choose between micro-protocols. Micro-protocols operate on a single task, using a less capable, but extensively tested (trusted) model to harness and monitor the untrusted model. Meanwhile, the macro-protocol maintains an adaptive credence on the untrusted model's alignment based on its past actions, using it to pick between safer and riskier micro-protocols. We evaluate our method in a code generation testbed where a red team attempts to generate subtly backdoored code with an LLM whose deployment is safeguarded by a blue team. We plot Pareto frontiers of safety (# of non-backdoored solutions) and usefulness (# of correct solutions). At a given level of usefulness, our adaptive deployment strategy reduces the number of backdoors by 80% compared to non-adaptive baselines.

Recent developments, particularly OpenAI's O1 model, have demonstrated the remarkable potential of Large Language Models (LLMs) for complex reasoning tasks. Through analysis of O1's outputs and provided sample Chain-of-Thought (CoT) demonstrations, we observe that it approaches problem-solving in a distinctly human-like manner, systematically brainstorming ideas, testing hypotheses, verifying results, and planning comprehensive solutions. These sophisticated reasoning capabilities remain notably absent in other state-of-the-art language models. In this paper, we hypothesize that this performance gap stems from the limited availability of high-quality reasoning process data in current training sets. We demonstrate that by constructing a specialized dataset focused on explicit problem-solving workflows ("worked solutions"), we can elicit substantially improved planning capabilities from existing models. Additionally, we propose the Reasoning Enhancement Loop (REL), a method for generating synthetic worked solutions.