Daily Papers

Currently many benchmarks have been proposed to evaluate the perception ability of the Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs). However, most benchmarks conduct questions by selecting images from existing datasets, resulting in the potential data leakage. Besides, these benchmarks merely focus on evaluating LVLMs on the realistic style images and clean scenarios, leaving the multi-stylized images and noisy scenarios unexplored. In response to these challenges, we propose a dynamic and scalable benchmark named Dysca for evaluating LVLMs by leveraging synthesis images. Specifically, we leverage Stable Diffusion and design a rule-based method to dynamically generate novel images, questions and the corresponding answers. We consider 51 kinds of image styles and evaluate the perception capability in 20 subtasks. Moreover, we conduct evaluations under 4 scenarios (i.e., Clean, Corruption, Print Attacking and Adversarial Attacking) and 3 question types (i.e., Multi-choices, True-or-false and Free-form). Thanks to the generative paradigm, Dysca serves as a scalable benchmark for easily adding new subtasks and scenarios. A total of 8 advanced open-source LVLMs with 10 checkpoints are evaluated on Dysca, revealing the drawbacks of current LVLMs. The benchmark is released in https://github.com/Benchmark-Dysca/Dysca.

With the maturity of depth sensors, the vulnerability of 3D point cloud models has received increasing attention in various applications such as autonomous driving and robot navigation. Previous 3D adversarial attackers either follow the white-box setting to iteratively update the coordinate perturbations based on gradients, or utilize the output model logits to estimate noisy gradients in the black-box setting. However, these attack methods are hard to be deployed in real-world scenarios since realistic 3D applications will not share any model details to users. Therefore, we explore a more challenging yet practical 3D attack setting, i.e., attacking point clouds with black-box hard labels, in which the attacker can only have access to the prediction label of the input. To tackle this setting, we propose a novel 3D attack method, termed 3D Hard-label attacker (3DHacker), based on the developed decision boundary algorithm to generate adversarial samples solely with the knowledge of class labels. Specifically, to construct the class-aware model decision boundary, 3DHacker first randomly fuses two point clouds of different classes in the spectral domain to craft their intermediate sample with high imperceptibility, then projects it onto the decision boundary via binary search. To restrict the final perturbation size, 3DHacker further introduces an iterative optimization strategy to move the intermediate sample along the decision boundary for generating adversarial point clouds with smallest trivial perturbations. Extensive evaluations show that, even in the challenging hard-label setting, 3DHacker still competitively outperforms existing 3D attacks regarding the attack performance as well as adversary quality.

Recent advancements in Optical Character Recognition (OCR) have been driven by transformer-based models. OCR systems are critical in numerous high-stakes domains, yet their vulnerability to adversarial attack remains largely uncharted territory, raising concerns about security and compliance with emerging AI regulations. In this work we present a novel framework to assess the resilience of Transformer-based OCR (TrOCR) models. We develop and assess algorithms for both targeted and untargeted attacks. For the untargeted case, we measure the Character Error Rate (CER), while for the targeted case we use the success ratio. We find that TrOCR is highly vulnerable to untargeted attacks and somewhat less vulnerable to targeted attacks. On a benchmark handwriting data set, untargeted attacks can cause a CER of more than 1 without being noticeable to the eye. With a similar perturbation size, targeted attacks can lead to success rates of around 25% -- here we attacked single tokens, requiring TrOCR to output the tenth most likely token from a large vocabulary.

Engaging in the deliberate generation of abnormal outputs from large language models (LLMs) by attacking them is a novel human activity. This paper presents a thorough exposition of how and why people perform such attacks. Using a formal qualitative methodology, we interviewed dozens of practitioners from a broad range of backgrounds, all contributors to this novel work of attempting to cause LLMs to fail. We relate and connect this activity between its practitioners' motivations and goals; the strategies and techniques they deploy; and the crucial role the community plays. As a result, this paper presents a grounded theory of how and why people attack large language models: LLM red teaming in the wild.

Text-to-Image generation models have revolutionized the artwork design process and enabled anyone to create high-quality images by entering text descriptions called prompts. Creating a high-quality prompt that consists of a subject and several modifiers can be time-consuming and costly. In consequence, a trend of trading high-quality prompts on specialized marketplaces has emerged. In this paper, we propose a novel attack, namely prompt stealing attack, which aims to steal prompts from generated images by text-to-image generation models. Successful prompt stealing attacks direct violate the intellectual property and privacy of prompt engineers and also jeopardize the business model of prompt trading marketplaces. We first perform a large-scale analysis on a dataset collected by ourselves and show that a successful prompt stealing attack should consider a prompt's subject as well as its modifiers. We then propose the first learning-based prompt stealing attack, PromptStealer, and demonstrate its superiority over two baseline methods quantitatively and qualitatively. We also make some initial attempts to defend PromptStealer. In general, our study uncovers a new attack surface in the ecosystem created by the popular text-to-image generation models. We hope our results can help to mitigate the threat. To facilitate research in this field, we will share our dataset and code with the community.

A membership inference attack allows an adversary to query a trained machine learning model to predict whether or not a particular example was contained in the model's training dataset. These attacks are currently evaluated using average-case "accuracy" metrics that fail to characterize whether the attack can confidently identify any members of the training set. We argue that attacks should instead be evaluated by computing their true-positive rate at low (e.g., <0.1%) false-positive rates, and find most prior attacks perform poorly when evaluated in this way. To address this we develop a Likelihood Ratio Attack (LiRA) that carefully combines multiple ideas from the literature. Our attack is 10x more powerful at low false-positive rates, and also strictly dominates prior attacks on existing metrics.

The wide-ranging applications of large language models (LLMs), especially in safety-critical domains, necessitate the proper evaluation of the LLM's adversarial robustness. This paper proposes an efficient tool to audit the LLM's adversarial robustness via a prompt-based adversarial attack (PromptAttack). PromptAttack converts adversarial textual attacks into an attack prompt that can cause the victim LLM to output the adversarial sample to fool itself. The attack prompt is composed of three important components: (1) original input (OI) including the original sample and its ground-truth label, (2) attack objective (AO) illustrating a task description of generating a new sample that can fool itself without changing the semantic meaning, and (3) attack guidance (AG) containing the perturbation instructions to guide the LLM on how to complete the task by perturbing the original sample at character, word, and sentence levels, respectively. Besides, we use a fidelity filter to ensure that PromptAttack maintains the original semantic meanings of the adversarial examples. Further, we enhance the attack power of PromptAttack by ensembling adversarial examples at different perturbation levels. Comprehensive empirical results using Llama2 and GPT-3.5 validate that PromptAttack consistently yields a much higher attack success rate compared to AdvGLUE and AdvGLUE++. Interesting findings include that a simple emoji can easily mislead GPT-3.5 to make wrong predictions.

Large language models (LLMs) have made significant progress in code generation tasks, but their performance in tackling programming problems with complex data structures and algorithms remains suboptimal. To address this issue, we propose an in-context learning approach that guides LLMs to debug by using a "print debugging" method, which involves inserting print statements to trace and analysing logs for fixing the bug. We collect a Leetcode problem dataset and evaluate our method using the Leetcode online judging system. Experiments with GPT-4 demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach, outperforming rubber duck debugging in easy and medium-level Leetcode problems by 1.5% and 17.9%.

Industry 4.0 has revolutionized manufacturing by driving digitalization and shifting the paradigm toward additive manufacturing (AM). Fused Deposition Modeling (FDM), a key AM technology, enables the creation of highly customized, cost-effective products with minimal material waste through layer-by-layer extrusion, posing a significant challenge to traditional subtractive methods. However, the susceptibility of material extrusion techniques to errors often requires expert intervention to detect and mitigate defects that can severely compromise product quality. While automated error detection and machine learning models exist, their generalizability across diverse 3D printer setups, firmware, and sensors is limited, and deep learning methods require extensive labeled datasets, hindering scalability and adaptability. To address these challenges, we present a process monitoring and control framework that leverages pre-trained Large Language Models (LLMs) alongside 3D printers to detect and address printing defects. The LLM evaluates print quality by analyzing images captured after each layer or print segment, identifying failure modes and querying the printer for relevant parameters. It then generates and executes a corrective action plan. We validated the effectiveness of the proposed framework in identifying defects by comparing it against a control group of engineers with diverse AM expertise. Our evaluation demonstrated that LLM-based agents not only accurately identify common 3D printing errors, such as inconsistent extrusion, stringing, warping, and layer adhesion, but also effectively determine the parameters causing these failures and autonomously correct them without any need for human intervention.

Models leveraging both visual and textual data such as Contrastive Language-Image Pre-training (CLIP), are the backbone of many recent advances in artificial intelligence. In this work, we show that despite their versatility, such models are vulnerable to what we refer to as fooling master images. Fooling master images are capable of maximizing the confidence score of a CLIP model for a significant number of widely varying prompts, while being either unrecognizable or unrelated to the attacked prompts for humans. The existence of such images is problematic as it could be used by bad actors to maliciously interfere with CLIP-trained image retrieval models in production with comparably small effort as a single image can attack many different prompts. We demonstrate how fooling master images for CLIP (CLIPMasterPrints) can be mined using stochastic gradient descent, projected gradient descent, or blackbox optimization. Contrary to many common adversarial attacks, the blackbox optimization approach allows us to mine CLIPMasterPrints even when the weights of the model are not accessible. We investigate the properties of the mined images, and find that images trained on a small number of image captions generalize to a much larger number of semantically related captions. We evaluate possible mitigation strategies, where we increase the robustness of the model and introduce an approach to automatically detect CLIPMasterPrints to sanitize the input of vulnerable models. Finally, we find that vulnerability to CLIPMasterPrints is related to a modality gap in contrastive pre-trained multi-modal networks. Code available at https://github.com/matfrei/CLIPMasterPrints.

While recent advancements in large language model (LLM) alignment have enabled the effective identification of malicious objectives involving scene nesting and keyword rewriting, our study reveals that these methods remain inadequate at detecting malicious objectives expressed through context within nested harmless objectives. This study identifies a previously overlooked vulnerability, which we term Attack via Implicit Reference (AIR). AIR decomposes a malicious objective into permissible objectives and links them through implicit references within the context. This method employs multiple related harmless objectives to generate malicious content without triggering refusal responses, thereby effectively bypassing existing detection techniques.Our experiments demonstrate AIR's effectiveness across state-of-the-art LLMs, achieving an attack success rate (ASR) exceeding 90% on most models, including GPT-4o, Claude-3.5-Sonnet, and Qwen-2-72B. Notably, we observe an inverse scaling phenomenon, where larger models are more vulnerable to this attack method. These findings underscore the urgent need for defense mechanisms capable of understanding and preventing contextual attacks. Furthermore, we introduce a cross-model attack strategy that leverages less secure models to generate malicious contexts, thereby further increasing the ASR when targeting other models.Our code and jailbreak artifacts can be found at https://github.com/Lucas-TY/llm_Implicit_reference.

We demonstrate how images and sounds can be used for indirect prompt and instruction injection in multi-modal LLMs. An attacker generates an adversarial perturbation corresponding to the prompt and blends it into an image or audio recording. When the user asks the (unmodified, benign) model about the perturbed image or audio, the perturbation steers the model to output the attacker-chosen text and/or make the subsequent dialog follow the attacker's instruction. We illustrate this attack with several proof-of-concept examples targeting LLaVa and PandaGPT.

Recently, a novel method known as Page Spray emerges, focusing on page-level exploitation for kernel vulnerabilities. Despite the advantages it offers in terms of exploitability, stability, and compatibility, comprehensive research on Page Spray remains scarce. Questions regarding its root causes, exploitation model, comparative benefits over other exploitation techniques, and possible mitigation strategies have largely remained unanswered. In this paper, we conduct a systematic investigation into Page Spray, providing an in-depth understanding of this exploitation technique. We introduce a comprehensive exploit model termed the \sys model, elucidating its fundamental principles. Additionally, we conduct a thorough analysis of the root causes underlying Page Spray occurrences within the Linux Kernel. We design an analyzer based on the Page Spray analysis model to identify Page Spray callsites. Subsequently, we evaluate the stability, exploitability, and compatibility of Page Spray through meticulously designed experiments. Finally, we propose mitigation principles for addressing Page Spray and introduce our own lightweight mitigation approach. This research aims to assist security researchers and developers in gaining insights into Page Spray, ultimately enhancing our collective understanding of this emerging exploitation technique and making improvements to the community.

Psychological research results have confirmed that people can have different emotional reactions to different visual stimuli. Several papers have been published on the problem of visual emotion analysis. In particular, attempts have been made to analyze and predict people's emotional reaction towards images. To this end, different kinds of hand-tuned features are proposed. The results reported on several carefully selected and labeled small image data sets have confirmed the promise of such features. While the recent successes of many computer vision related tasks are due to the adoption of Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs), visual emotion analysis has not achieved the same level of success. This may be primarily due to the unavailability of confidently labeled and relatively large image data sets for visual emotion analysis. In this work, we introduce a new data set, which started from 3+ million weakly labeled images of different emotions and ended up 30 times as large as the current largest publicly available visual emotion data set. We hope that this data set encourages further research on visual emotion analysis. We also perform extensive benchmarking analyses on this large data set using the state of the art methods including CNNs.

Text-to-image models like Stable Diffusion have had a profound impact on daily life by enabling the generation of photorealistic images from textual prompts, fostering creativity, and enhancing visual experiences across various applications. However, these models also pose risks. Previous studies have successfully demonstrated that manipulated prompts can elicit text-to-image models to generate unsafe images, e.g., hateful meme variants. Yet, these studies only unleash the harmful power of text-to-image models in a passive manner. In this work, we focus on the proactive generation of unsafe images using targeted benign prompts via poisoning attacks. We propose two poisoning attacks: a basic attack and a utility-preserving attack. We qualitatively and quantitatively evaluate the proposed attacks using four representative hateful memes and multiple query prompts. Experimental results indicate that text-to-image models are vulnerable to the basic attack even with five poisoning samples. However, the poisoning effect can inadvertently spread to non-targeted prompts, leading to undesirable side effects. Root cause analysis identifies conceptual similarity as an important contributing factor to the side effects. To address this, we introduce the utility-preserving attack as a viable mitigation strategy to maintain the attack stealthiness, while ensuring decent attack performance. Our findings underscore the potential risks of adopting text-to-image models in real-world scenarios, calling for future research and safety measures in this space.

The prevalence and strong capability of large language models (LLMs) present significant safety and ethical risks if exploited by malicious users. To prevent the potentially deceptive usage of LLMs, recent works have proposed algorithms to detect LLM-generated text and protect LLMs. In this paper, we investigate the robustness and reliability of these LLM detectors under adversarial attacks. We study two types of attack strategies: 1) replacing certain words in an LLM's output with their synonyms given the context; 2) automatically searching for an instructional prompt to alter the writing style of the generation. In both strategies, we leverage an auxiliary LLM to generate the word replacements or the instructional prompt. Different from previous works, we consider a challenging setting where the auxiliary LLM can also be protected by a detector. Experiments reveal that our attacks effectively compromise the performance of all detectors in the study with plausible generations, underscoring the urgent need to improve the robustness of LLM-generated text detection systems.

AI systems can take harmful actions and are highly vulnerable to adversarial attacks. We present an approach, inspired by recent advances in representation engineering, that "short-circuits" models as they respond with harmful outputs. Existing techniques aimed at improving alignment, such as refusal training, are often bypassed. Techniques such as adversarial training try to plug these holes by countering specific attacks. As an alternative to refusal training and adversarial training, short-circuiting directly controls the representations that are responsible for harmful outputs in the first place. Our technique can be applied to both text-only and multimodal language models to prevent the generation of harmful outputs without sacrificing utility -- even in the presence of powerful unseen attacks. Notably, while adversarial robustness in standalone image recognition remains an open challenge, short-circuiting allows the larger multimodal system to reliably withstand image "hijacks" that aim to produce harmful content. Finally, we extend our approach to AI agents, demonstrating considerable reductions in the rate of harmful actions when they are under attack. Our approach represents a significant step forward in the development of reliable safeguards to harmful behavior and adversarial attacks.

In various real-world applications such as machine translation, sentiment analysis, and question answering, a pivotal role is played by NLP models, facilitating efficient communication and decision-making processes in domains ranging from healthcare to finance. However, a significant challenge is posed to the robustness of these natural language processing models by text adversarial attacks. These attacks involve the deliberate manipulation of input text to mislead the predictions of the model while maintaining human interpretability. Despite the remarkable performance achieved by state-of-the-art models like BERT in various natural language processing tasks, they are found to remain vulnerable to adversarial perturbations in the input text. In addressing the vulnerability of text classifiers to adversarial attacks, three distinct attack mechanisms are explored in this paper using the victim model BERT: BERT-on-BERT attack, PWWS attack, and Fraud Bargain's Attack (FBA). Leveraging the IMDB, AG News, and SST2 datasets, a thorough comparative analysis is conducted to assess the effectiveness of these attacks on the BERT classifier model. It is revealed by the analysis that PWWS emerges as the most potent adversary, consistently outperforming other methods across multiple evaluation scenarios, thereby emphasizing its efficacy in generating adversarial examples for text classification. Through comprehensive experimentation, the performance of these attacks is assessed and the findings indicate that the PWWS attack outperforms others, demonstrating lower runtime, higher accuracy, and favorable semantic similarity scores. The key insight of this paper lies in the assessment of the relative performances of three prevalent state-of-the-art attack mechanisms.

Offensive language detection is an important task for filtering out abusive expressions and improving online user experiences. However, malicious users often attempt to avoid filtering systems through the involvement of textual noises. In this paper, we propose these evasions as user-intended adversarial attacks that insert special symbols or leverage the distinctive features of the Korean language. Furthermore, we introduce simple yet effective pooling strategies in a layer-wise manner to defend against the proposed attacks, focusing on the preceding layers not just the last layer to capture both offensiveness and token embeddings. We demonstrate that these pooling strategies are more robust to performance degradation even when the attack rate is increased, without directly training of such patterns. Notably, we found that models pre-trained on clean texts could achieve a comparable performance in detecting attacked offensive language, to models pre-trained on noisy texts by employing these pooling strategies.

We explore a class of adversarial attacks targeting the activations of language models. By manipulating a relatively small subset of model activations, a, we demonstrate the ability to control the exact prediction of a significant number (in some cases up to 1000) of subsequent tokens t. We empirically verify a scaling law where the maximum number of target tokens t_max predicted depends linearly on the number of tokens a whose activations the attacker controls as t_max = kappa a. We find that the number of bits of control in the input space needed to control a single bit in the output space (what we call attack resistance chi) is remarkably constant between approx 16 and approx 25 over 2 orders of magnitude of model sizes for different language models. Compared to attacks on tokens, attacks on activations are predictably much stronger, however, we identify a surprising regularity where one bit of input steered either via activations or via tokens is able to exert control over a similar amount of output bits. This gives support for the hypothesis that adversarial attacks are a consequence of dimensionality mismatch between the input and output spaces. A practical implication of the ease of attacking language model activations instead of tokens is for multi-modal and selected retrieval models, where additional data sources are added as activations directly, sidestepping the tokenized input. This opens up a new, broad attack surface. By using language models as a controllable test-bed to study adversarial attacks, we were able to experiment with input-output dimensions that are inaccessible in computer vision, especially where the output dimension dominates.

We proposes a novel algorithm, ANTHRO, that inductively extracts over 600K human-written text perturbations in the wild and leverages them for realistic adversarial attack. Unlike existing character-based attacks which often deductively hypothesize a set of manipulation strategies, our work is grounded on actual observations from real-world texts. We find that adversarial texts generated by ANTHRO achieve the best trade-off between (1) attack success rate, (2) semantic preservation of the original text, and (3) stealthiness--i.e. indistinguishable from human writings hence harder to be flagged as suspicious. Specifically, our attacks accomplished around 83% and 91% attack success rates on BERT and RoBERTa, respectively. Moreover, it outperformed the TextBugger baseline with an increase of 50% and 40% in terms of semantic preservation and stealthiness when evaluated by both layperson and professional human workers. ANTHRO can further enhance a BERT classifier's performance in understanding different variations of human-written toxic texts via adversarial training when compared to the Perspective API.

Large Language Models (LLMs) presents significant priority in text understanding and generation. However, LLMs suffer from the risk of generating harmful contents especially while being employed to applications. There are several black-box attack methods, such as Prompt Attack, which can change the behaviour of LLMs and induce LLMs to generate unexpected answers with harmful contents. Researchers are interested in Prompt Attack and Defense with LLMs, while there is no publicly available dataset with high successful attacking rate to evaluate the abilities of defending prompt attack. In this paper, we introduce a pipeline to construct high-quality prompt attack samples, along with a Chinese prompt attack dataset called CPAD. Our prompts aim to induce LLMs to generate unexpected outputs with several carefully designed prompt attack templates and widely concerned attacking contents. Different from previous datasets involving safety estimation, we construct the prompts considering three dimensions: contents, attacking methods and goals. Especially, the attacking goals indicate the behaviour expected after successfully attacking the LLMs, thus the responses can be easily evaluated and analysed. We run several popular Chinese LLMs on our dataset, and the results show that our prompts are significantly harmful to LLMs, with around 70% attack success rate to GPT-3.5. CPAD is publicly available at https://github.com/liuchengyuan123/CPAD.

We propose a universal adversarial attack on multimodal Large Language Models (LLMs) that leverages a single optimized image to override alignment safeguards across diverse queries and even multiple models. By backpropagating through the vision encoder and language head, we craft a synthetic image that forces the model to respond with a targeted phrase (e.g., ''Sure, here it is'') or otherwise unsafe content-even for harmful prompts. In experiments on the SafeBench benchmark, our method achieves significantly higher attack success rates than existing baselines, including text-only universal prompts (e.g., up to 93% on certain models). We further demonstrate cross-model transferability by training on several multimodal LLMs simultaneously and testing on unseen architectures. Additionally, a multi-answer variant of our approach produces more natural-sounding (yet still malicious) responses. These findings underscore critical vulnerabilities in current multimodal alignment and call for more robust adversarial defenses. We will release code and datasets under the Apache-2.0 license. Warning: some content generated by Multimodal LLMs in this paper may be offensive to some readers.

Large language models (LLMs) are typically aligned to be harmless to humans. Unfortunately, recent work has shown that such models are susceptible to automated jailbreak attacks that induce them to generate harmful content. More recent LLMs often incorporate an additional layer of defense, a Guard Model, which is a second LLM that is designed to check and moderate the output response of the primary LLM. Our key contribution is to show a novel attack strategy, PRP, that is successful against several open-source (e.g., Llama 2) and closed-source (e.g., GPT 3.5) implementations of Guard Models. PRP leverages a two step prefix-based attack that operates by (a) constructing a universal adversarial prefix for the Guard Model, and (b) propagating this prefix to the response. We find that this procedure is effective across multiple threat models, including ones in which the adversary has no access to the Guard Model at all. Our work suggests that further advances are required on defenses and Guard Models before they can be considered effective.

We investigate a new threat to neural sequence-to-sequence (seq2seq) models: training-time attacks that cause models to "spin" their outputs so as to support an adversary-chosen sentiment or point of view -- but only when the input contains adversary-chosen trigger words. For example, a spinned summarization model outputs positive summaries of any text that mentions the name of some individual or organization. Model spinning introduces a "meta-backdoor" into a model. Whereas conventional backdoors cause models to produce incorrect outputs on inputs with the trigger, outputs of spinned models preserve context and maintain standard accuracy metrics, yet also satisfy a meta-task chosen by the adversary. Model spinning enables propaganda-as-a-service, where propaganda is defined as biased speech. An adversary can create customized language models that produce desired spins for chosen triggers, then deploy these models to generate disinformation (a platform attack), or else inject them into ML training pipelines (a supply-chain attack), transferring malicious functionality to downstream models trained by victims. To demonstrate the feasibility of model spinning, we develop a new backdooring technique. It stacks an adversarial meta-task onto a seq2seq model, backpropagates the desired meta-task output to points in the word-embedding space we call "pseudo-words," and uses pseudo-words to shift the entire output distribution of the seq2seq model. We evaluate this attack on language generation, summarization, and translation models with different triggers and meta-tasks such as sentiment, toxicity, and entailment. Spinned models largely maintain their accuracy metrics (ROUGE and BLEU) while shifting their outputs to satisfy the adversary's meta-task. We also show that, in the case of a supply-chain attack, the spin functionality transfers to downstream models.

Because "out-of-the-box" large language models are capable of generating a great deal of objectionable content, recent work has focused on aligning these models in an attempt to prevent undesirable generation. While there has been some success at circumventing these measures -- so-called "jailbreaks" against LLMs -- these attacks have required significant human ingenuity and are brittle in practice. In this paper, we propose a simple and effective attack method that causes aligned language models to generate objectionable behaviors. Specifically, our approach finds a suffix that, when attached to a wide range of queries for an LLM to produce objectionable content, aims to maximize the probability that the model produces an affirmative response (rather than refusing to answer). However, instead of relying on manual engineering, our approach automatically produces these adversarial suffixes by a combination of greedy and gradient-based search techniques, and also improves over past automatic prompt generation methods. Surprisingly, we find that the adversarial prompts generated by our approach are quite transferable, including to black-box, publicly released LLMs. Specifically, we train an adversarial attack suffix on multiple prompts (i.e., queries asking for many different types of objectionable content), as well as multiple models (in our case, Vicuna-7B and 13B). When doing so, the resulting attack suffix is able to induce objectionable content in the public interfaces to ChatGPT, Bard, and Claude, as well as open source LLMs such as LLaMA-2-Chat, Pythia, Falcon, and others. In total, this work significantly advances the state-of-the-art in adversarial attacks against aligned language models, raising important questions about how such systems can be prevented from producing objectionable information. Code is available at github.com/llm-attacks/llm-attacks.

Adversarial attacks are carried out to reveal the vulnerability of deep neural networks. Textual adversarial attacking is challenging because text is discrete and a small perturbation can bring significant change to the original input. Word-level attacking, which can be regarded as a combinatorial optimization problem, is a well-studied class of textual attack methods. However, existing word-level attack models are far from perfect, largely because unsuitable search space reduction methods and inefficient optimization algorithms are employed. In this paper, we propose a novel attack model, which incorporates the sememe-based word substitution method and particle swarm optimization-based search algorithm to solve the two problems separately. We conduct exhaustive experiments to evaluate our attack model by attacking BiLSTM and BERT on three benchmark datasets. Experimental results demonstrate that our model consistently achieves much higher attack success rates and crafts more high-quality adversarial examples as compared to baseline methods. Also, further experiments show our model has higher transferability and can bring more robustness enhancement to victim models by adversarial training. All the code and data of this paper can be obtained on https://github.com/thunlp/SememePSO-Attack.

Large language models are now tuned to align with the goals of their creators, namely to be "helpful and harmless." These models should respond helpfully to user questions, but refuse to answer requests that could cause harm. However, adversarial users can construct inputs which circumvent attempts at alignment. In this work, we study to what extent these models remain aligned, even when interacting with an adversarial user who constructs worst-case inputs (adversarial examples). These inputs are designed to cause the model to emit harmful content that would otherwise be prohibited. We show that existing NLP-based optimization attacks are insufficiently powerful to reliably attack aligned text models: even when current NLP-based attacks fail, we can find adversarial inputs with brute force. As a result, the failure of current attacks should not be seen as proof that aligned text models remain aligned under adversarial inputs. However the recent trend in large-scale ML models is multimodal models that allow users to provide images that influence the text that is generated. We show these models can be easily attacked, i.e., induced to perform arbitrary un-aligned behavior through adversarial perturbation of the input image. We conjecture that improved NLP attacks may demonstrate this same level of adversarial control over text-only models.

The generation of text that is increasingly human-like has been enabled by the advent of large language models (LLMs). As the detection of AI-generated content holds significant importance in the fight against issues such as misinformation and academic cheating, numerous studies have been conducted to develop reliable LLM detectors. While promising results have been demonstrated by such detectors on test data, recent research has revealed that they can be circumvented by employing different techniques. In this article, homoglyph-based (a alpha) attacks that can be used to circumvent existing LLM detectors are presented. The efficacy of the attacks is illustrated by analizing how homoglyphs shift the tokenization of the text, and thus its token loglikelihoods. A comprehensive evaluation is conducted to assess the effectiveness of homoglyphs on state-of-the-art LLM detectors, including Binoculars, DetectGPT, OpenAI's detector, and watermarking techniques, on five different datasets. A significant reduction in the efficiency of all the studied configurations of detectors and datasets, down to an accuracy of 0.5 (random guessing), is demonstrated by the proposed approach. The results show that homoglyph-based attacks can effectively evade existing LLM detectors, and the implications of these findings are discussed along with possible defenses against such attacks.

It has recently been shown that adversarial attacks on large language models (LLMs) can "jailbreak" the model into making harmful statements. In this work, we argue that the spectrum of adversarial attacks on LLMs is much larger than merely jailbreaking. We provide a broad overview of possible attack surfaces and attack goals. Based on a series of concrete examples, we discuss, categorize and systematize attacks that coerce varied unintended behaviors, such as misdirection, model control, denial-of-service, or data extraction. We analyze these attacks in controlled experiments, and find that many of them stem from the practice of pre-training LLMs with coding capabilities, as well as the continued existence of strange "glitch" tokens in common LLM vocabularies that should be removed for security reasons.

Text-to-image (T2I) diffusion models (DMs) have shown promise in generating high-quality images from textual descriptions. The real-world applications of these models require particular attention to their safety and fidelity, but this has not been sufficiently explored. One fundamental question is whether existing T2I DMs are robust against variations over input texts. To answer it, this work provides the first robustness evaluation of T2I DMs against real-world attacks. Unlike prior studies that focus on malicious attacks involving apocryphal alterations to the input texts, we consider an attack space spanned by realistic errors (e.g., typo, glyph, phonetic) that humans can make, to ensure semantic consistency. Given the inherent randomness of the generation process, we develop novel distribution-based attack objectives to mislead T2I DMs. We perform attacks in a black-box manner without any knowledge of the model. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our method for attacking popular T2I DMs and simultaneously reveal their non-trivial robustness issues. Moreover, we provide an in-depth analysis of our method to show that it is not designed to attack the text encoder in T2I DMs solely.

Many adversarial attacks in NLP perturb inputs to produce visually similar strings ('ergo' rightarrow 'epsilonrgo') which are legible to humans but degrade model performance. Although preserving legibility is a necessary condition for text perturbation, little work has been done to systematically characterize it; instead, legibility is typically loosely enforced via intuitions around the nature and extent of perturbations. Particularly, it is unclear to what extent can inputs be perturbed while preserving legibility, or how to quantify the legibility of a perturbed string. In this work, we address this gap by learning models that predict the legibility of a perturbed string, and rank candidate perturbations based on their legibility. To do so, we collect and release LEGIT, a human-annotated dataset comprising the legibility of visually perturbed text. Using this dataset, we build both text- and vision-based models which achieve up to 0.91 F1 score in predicting whether an input is legible, and an accuracy of 0.86 in predicting which of two given perturbations is more legible. Additionally, we discover that legible perturbations from the LEGIT dataset are more effective at lowering the performance of NLP models than best-known attack strategies, suggesting that current models may be vulnerable to a broad range of perturbations beyond what is captured by existing visual attacks. Data, code, and models are available at https://github.com/dvsth/learning-legibility-2023.

Warning: This paper contains examples of harmful language, and reader discretion is recommended. The increasing open release of powerful large language models (LLMs) has facilitated the development of downstream applications by reducing the essential cost of data annotation and computation. To ensure AI safety, extensive safety-alignment measures have been conducted to armor these models against malicious use (primarily hard prompt attack). However, beneath the seemingly resilient facade of the armor, there might lurk a shadow. By simply tuning on 100 malicious examples with 1 GPU hour, these safely aligned LLMs can be easily subverted to generate harmful content. Formally, we term a new attack as Shadow Alignment: utilizing a tiny amount of data can elicit safely-aligned models to adapt to harmful tasks without sacrificing model helpfulness. Remarkably, the subverted models retain their capability to respond appropriately to regular inquiries. Experiments across 8 models released by 5 different organizations (LLaMa-2, Falcon, InternLM, BaiChuan2, Vicuna) demonstrate the effectiveness of shadow alignment attack. Besides, the single-turn English-only attack successfully transfers to multi-turn dialogue and other languages. This study serves as a clarion call for a collective effort to overhaul and fortify the safety of open-source LLMs against malicious attackers.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are susceptible to Jailbreaking attacks, which aim to extract harmful information by subtly modifying the attack query. As defense mechanisms evolve, directly obtaining harmful information becomes increasingly challenging for Jailbreaking attacks. In this work, inspired by human practices of indirect context to elicit harmful information, we focus on a new attack form called Contextual Interaction Attack. The idea relies on the autoregressive nature of the generation process in LLMs. We contend that the prior context--the information preceding the attack query--plays a pivotal role in enabling potent Jailbreaking attacks. Specifically, we propose an approach that leverages preliminary question-answer pairs to interact with the LLM. By doing so, we guide the responses of the model toward revealing the 'desired' harmful information. We conduct experiments on four different LLMs and demonstrate the efficacy of this attack, which is black-box and can also transfer across LLMs. We believe this can lead to further developments and understanding of the context vector in LLMs.

Adversarial attacks in reinforcement learning (RL) often assume highly-privileged access to the victim's parameters, environment, or data. Instead, this paper proposes a novel adversarial setting called a Cheap Talk MDP in which an Adversary can merely append deterministic messages to the Victim's observation, resulting in a minimal range of influence. The Adversary cannot occlude ground truth, influence underlying environment dynamics or reward signals, introduce non-stationarity, add stochasticity, see the Victim's actions, or access their parameters. Additionally, we present a simple meta-learning algorithm called Adversarial Cheap Talk (ACT) to train Adversaries in this setting. We demonstrate that an Adversary trained with ACT still significantly influences the Victim's training and testing performance, despite the highly constrained setting. Affecting train-time performance reveals a new attack vector and provides insight into the success and failure modes of existing RL algorithms. More specifically, we show that an ACT Adversary is capable of harming performance by interfering with the learner's function approximation, or instead helping the Victim's performance by outputting useful features. Finally, we show that an ACT Adversary can manipulate messages during train-time to directly and arbitrarily control the Victim at test-time. Project video and code are available at https://sites.google.com/view/adversarial-cheap-talk

Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) rely on vision encoders and Large Language Models (LLMs) to exhibit remarkable capabilities on various multi-modal tasks in the joint space of vision and language. However, the Typographic Attack, which disrupts vision-language models (VLMs) such as Contrastive Language-Image Pretraining (CLIP), has also been expected to be a security threat to LVLMs. Firstly, we verify typographic attacks on current well-known commercial and open-source LVLMs and uncover the widespread existence of this threat. Secondly, to better assess this vulnerability, we propose the most comprehensive and largest-scale Typographic Dataset to date. The Typographic Dataset not only considers the evaluation of typographic attacks under various multi-modal tasks but also evaluates the effects of typographic attacks, influenced by texts generated with diverse factors. Based on the evaluation results, we investigate the causes why typographic attacks may impact VLMs and LVLMs, leading to three highly insightful discoveries. By the examination of our discoveries and experimental validation in the Typographic Dataset, we reduce the performance degradation from 42.07% to 13.90% when LVLMs confront typographic attacks.

The exorbitant cost of training Large language models (LLMs) from scratch makes it essential to fingerprint the models to protect intellectual property via ownership authentication and to ensure downstream users and developers comply with their license terms (e.g. restricting commercial use). In this study, we present a pilot study on LLM fingerprinting as a form of very lightweight instruction tuning. Model publisher specifies a confidential private key and implants it as an instruction backdoor that causes the LLM to generate specific text when the key is present. Results on 11 popularly-used LLMs showed that this approach is lightweight and does not affect the normal behavior of the model. It also prevents publisher overclaim, maintains robustness against fingerprint guessing and parameter-efficient training, and supports multi-stage fingerprinting akin to MIT License. Code is available in https://cnut1648.github.io/Model-Fingerprint/.

Text-to-image diffusion models have emerged as powerful tools for generating high-quality images from textual descriptions. However, their increasing popularity has raised significant copyright concerns, as these models can be misused to reproduce copyrighted content without authorization. In response, recent studies have proposed various copyright protection methods, including adversarial perturbation, concept erasure, and watermarking techniques. However, their effectiveness and robustness against advanced attacks remain largely unexplored. Moreover, the lack of unified evaluation frameworks has hindered systematic comparison and fair assessment of different approaches. To bridge this gap, we systematize existing copyright protection methods and attacks, providing a unified taxonomy of their design spaces. We then develop CopyrightMeter, a unified evaluation framework that incorporates 17 state-of-the-art protections and 16 representative attacks. Leveraging CopyrightMeter, we comprehensively evaluate protection methods across multiple dimensions, thereby uncovering how different design choices impact fidelity, efficacy, and resilience under attacks. Our analysis reveals several key findings: (i) most protections (16/17) are not resilient against attacks; (ii) the "best" protection varies depending on the target priority; (iii) more advanced attacks significantly promote the upgrading of protections. These insights provide concrete guidance for developing more robust protection methods, while its unified evaluation protocol establishes a standard benchmark for future copyright protection research in text-to-image generation.

Membership inference attacks (MIA) attempt to verify the membership of a given data sample in the training set for a model. MIA has become relevant in recent years, following the rapid development of large language models (LLM). Many are concerned about the usage of copyrighted materials for training them and call for methods for detecting such usage. However, recent research has largely concluded that current MIA methods do not work on LLMs. Even when they seem to work, it is usually because of the ill-designed experimental setup where other shortcut features enable "cheating." In this work, we argue that MIA still works on LLMs, but only when multiple documents are presented for testing. We construct new benchmarks that measure the MIA performances at a continuous scale of data samples, from sentences (n-grams) to a collection of documents (multiple chunks of tokens). To validate the efficacy of current MIA approaches at greater scales, we adapt a recent work on Dataset Inference (DI) for the task of binary membership detection that aggregates paragraph-level MIA features to enable MIA at document and collection of documents level. This baseline achieves the first successful MIA on pre-trained and fine-tuned LLMs.

Training large language models (LLMs) requires a substantial investment of time and money. To get a good return on investment, the developers spend considerable effort ensuring that the model never produces harmful and offensive outputs. However, bad-faith actors may still try to slander the reputation of an LLM by publicly reporting a forged output. In this paper, we show that defending against such slander attacks requires reconstructing the input of the forged output or proving that it does not exist. To do so, we propose and evaluate a search based approach for targeted adversarial attacks for LLMs. Our experiments show that we are rarely able to reconstruct the exact input of an arbitrary output, thus demonstrating that LLMs are still vulnerable to slander attacks.

Large language models (LLMs) are susceptible to red teaming attacks, which can induce LLMs to generate harmful content. Previous research constructs attack prompts via manual or automatic methods, which have their own limitations on construction cost and quality. To address these issues, we propose an integrated approach that combines manual and automatic methods to economically generate high-quality attack prompts. Specifically, considering the impressive capabilities of newly emerged LLMs, we propose an attack framework to instruct LLMs to mimic human-generated prompts through in-context learning. Furthermore, we propose a defense framework that fine-tunes victim LLMs through iterative interactions with the attack framework to enhance their safety against red teaming attacks. Extensive experiments on different LLMs validate the effectiveness of our proposed attack and defense frameworks. Additionally, we release a series of attack prompts datasets named SAP with varying sizes, facilitating the safety evaluation and enhancement of more LLMs. Our code and dataset is available on https://github.com/Aatrox103/SAP .

Language generation models have been an increasingly powerful enabler for many applications. Many such models offer free or affordable API access, which makes them potentially vulnerable to model extraction attacks through distillation. To protect intellectual property (IP) and ensure fair use of these models, various techniques such as lexical watermarking and synonym replacement have been proposed. However, these methods can be nullified by obvious countermeasures such as "synonym randomization". To address this issue, we propose GINSEW, a novel method to protect text generation models from being stolen through distillation. The key idea of our method is to inject secret signals into the probability vector of the decoding steps for each target token. We can then detect the secret message by probing a suspect model to tell if it is distilled from the protected one. Experimental results show that GINSEW can effectively identify instances of IP infringement with minimal impact on the generation quality of protected APIs. Our method demonstrates an absolute improvement of 19 to 29 points on mean average precision (mAP) in detecting suspects compared to previous methods against watermark removal attacks.

The proliferation of large language models has raised growing concerns about their misuse, particularly in cases where AI-generated text is falsely attributed to human authors. Machine-generated content detectors claim to effectively identify such text under various conditions and from any language model. This paper critically evaluates these claims by assessing several popular detectors (RADAR, Wild, T5Sentinel, Fast-DetectGPT, PHD, LogRank, Binoculars) on a range of domains, datasets, and models that these detectors have not previously encountered. We employ various prompting strategies to simulate practical adversarial attacks, demonstrating that even moderate efforts can significantly evade detection. We emphasize the importance of the true positive rate at a specific false positive rate (TPR@FPR) metric and demonstrate that these detectors perform poorly in certain settings, with [email protected] as low as 0%. Our findings suggest that both trained and zero-shot detectors struggle to maintain high sensitivity while achieving a reasonable true positive rate.

Recent research demonstrates that the nascent fine-tuning-as-a-service business model exposes serious safety concerns -- fine-tuning over a few harmful data uploaded by the users can compromise the safety alignment of the model. The attack, known as harmful fine-tuning, has raised a broad research interest among the community. However, as the attack is still new, we observe from our miserable submission experience that there are general misunderstandings within the research community. We in this paper aim to clear some common concerns for the attack setting, and formally establish the research problem. Specifically, we first present the threat model of the problem, and introduce the harmful fine-tuning attack and its variants. Then we systematically survey the existing literature on attacks/defenses/mechanical analysis of the problem. Finally, we outline future research directions that might contribute to the development of the field. Additionally, we present a list of questions of interest, which might be useful to refer to when reviewers in the peer review process question the realism of the experiment/attack/defense setting. A curated list of relevant papers is maintained and made accessible at: https://github.com/git-disl/awesome_LLM-harmful-fine-tuning-papers.

The research builds and evaluates the adversarial potential to introduce copied code or hallucinated AI recommendations for malicious code in popular code repositories. While foundational large language models (LLMs) from OpenAI, Google, and Anthropic guard against both harmful behaviors and toxic strings, previous work on math solutions that embed harmful prompts demonstrate that the guardrails may differ between expert contexts. These loopholes would appear in mixture of expert's models when the context of the question changes and may offer fewer malicious training examples to filter toxic comments or recommended offensive actions. The present work demonstrates that foundational models may refuse to propose destructive actions correctly when prompted overtly but may unfortunately drop their guard when presented with a sudden change of context, like solving a computer programming challenge. We show empirical examples with trojan-hosting repositories like GitHub, NPM, NuGet, and popular content delivery networks (CDN) like jsDelivr which amplify the attack surface. In the LLM's directives to be helpful, example recommendations propose application programming interface (API) endpoints which a determined domain-squatter could acquire and setup attack mobile infrastructure that triggers from the naively copied code. We compare this attack to previous work on context-shifting and contrast the attack surface as a novel version of "living off the land" attacks in the malware literature. In the latter case, foundational language models can hijack otherwise innocent user prompts to recommend actions that violate their owners' safety policies when posed directly without the accompanying coding support request.

Recent work has shown it is possible to construct adversarial examples that cause an aligned language model to emit harmful strings or perform harmful behavior. Existing attacks work either in the white-box setting (with full access to the model weights), or through transferability: the phenomenon that adversarial examples crafted on one model often remain effective on other models. We improve on prior work with a query-based attack that leverages API access to a remote language model to construct adversarial examples that cause the model to emit harmful strings with (much) higher probability than with transfer-only attacks. We validate our attack on GPT-3.5 and OpenAI's safety classifier; we can cause GPT-3.5 to emit harmful strings that current transfer attacks fail at, and we can evade the safety classifier with nearly 100% probability.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as the backend for a variety of real-world applications called LLM-Integrated Applications. Multiple recent works showed that LLM-Integrated Applications are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, in which an attacker injects malicious instruction/data into the input of those applications such that they produce results as the attacker desires. However, existing works are limited to case studies. As a result, the literature lacks a systematic understanding of prompt injection attacks and their defenses. We aim to bridge the gap in this work. In particular, we propose a general framework to formalize prompt injection attacks. Existing attacks, which are discussed in research papers and blog posts, are special cases in our framework. Our framework enables us to design a new attack by combining existing attacks. Moreover, we also propose a framework to systematize defenses against prompt injection attacks. Using our frameworks, we conduct a systematic evaluation on prompt injection attacks and their defenses with 10 LLMs and 7 tasks. We hope our frameworks can inspire future research in this field. Our code is available at https://github.com/liu00222/Open-Prompt-Injection.

While text-to-image synthesis currently enjoys great popularity among researchers and the general public, the security of these models has been neglected so far. Many text-guided image generation models rely on pre-trained text encoders from external sources, and their users trust that the retrieved models will behave as promised. Unfortunately, this might not be the case. We introduce backdoor attacks against text-guided generative models and demonstrate that their text encoders pose a major tampering risk. Our attacks only slightly alter an encoder so that no suspicious model behavior is apparent for image generations with clean prompts. By then inserting a single character trigger into the prompt, e.g., a non-Latin character or emoji, the adversary can trigger the model to either generate images with pre-defined attributes or images following a hidden, potentially malicious description. We empirically demonstrate the high effectiveness of our attacks on Stable Diffusion and highlight that the injection process of a single backdoor takes less than two minutes. Besides phrasing our approach solely as an attack, it can also force an encoder to forget phrases related to certain concepts, such as nudity or violence, and help to make image generation safer.

Neural text ranking models have witnessed significant advancement and are increasingly being deployed in practice. Unfortunately, they also inherit adversarial vulnerabilities of general neural models, which have been detected but remain underexplored by prior studies. Moreover, the inherit adversarial vulnerabilities might be leveraged by blackhat SEO to defeat better-protected search engines. In this study, we propose an imitation adversarial attack on black-box neural passage ranking models. We first show that the target passage ranking model can be transparentized and imitated by enumerating critical queries/candidates and then train a ranking imitation model. Leveraging the ranking imitation model, we can elaborately manipulate the ranking results and transfer the manipulation attack to the target ranking model. For this purpose, we propose an innovative gradient-based attack method, empowered by the pairwise objective function, to generate adversarial triggers, which causes premeditated disorderliness with very few tokens. To equip the trigger camouflages, we add the next sentence prediction loss and the language model fluency constraint to the objective function. Experimental results on passage ranking demonstrate the effectiveness of the ranking imitation attack model and adversarial triggers against various SOTA neural ranking models. Furthermore, various mitigation analyses and human evaluation show the effectiveness of camouflages when facing potential mitigation approaches. To motivate other scholars to further investigate this novel and important problem, we make the experiment data and code publicly available.

Large language models (LLMs) are expected to follow instructions from users and engage in conversations. Techniques to enhance LLMs' instruction-following capabilities typically fine-tune them using data structured according to a predefined chat template. Although chat templates are shown to be effective in optimizing LLM performance, their impact on safety alignment of LLMs has been less understood, which is crucial for deploying LLMs safely at scale. In this paper, we investigate how chat templates affect safety alignment of LLMs. We identify a common vulnerability, named ChatBug, that is introduced by chat templates. Our key insight to identify ChatBug is that the chat templates provide a rigid format that need to be followed by LLMs, but not by users. Hence, a malicious user may not necessarily follow the chat template when prompting LLMs. Instead, malicious users could leverage their knowledge of the chat template and accordingly craft their prompts to bypass safety alignments of LLMs. We develop two attacks to exploit the ChatBug vulnerability. We demonstrate that a malicious user can exploit the ChatBug vulnerability of eight state-of-the-art (SOTA) LLMs and effectively elicit unintended responses from these models. Moreover, we show that ChatBug can be exploited by existing jailbreak attacks to enhance their attack success rates. We investigate potential countermeasures to ChatBug. Our results show that while adversarial training effectively mitigates the ChatBug vulnerability, the victim model incurs significant performance degradation. These results highlight the trade-off between safety alignment and helpfulness. Developing new methods for instruction tuning to balance this trade-off is an open and critical direction for future research

Safety is critical to the usage of large language models (LLMs). Multiple techniques such as data filtering and supervised fine-tuning have been developed to strengthen LLM safety. However, currently known techniques presume that corpora used for safety alignment of LLMs are solely interpreted by semantics. This assumption, however, does not hold in real-world applications, which leads to severe vulnerabilities in LLMs. For example, users of forums often use ASCII art, a form of text-based art, to convey image information. In this paper, we propose a novel ASCII art-based jailbreak attack and introduce a comprehensive benchmark Vision-in-Text Challenge (ViTC) to evaluate the capabilities of LLMs in recognizing prompts that cannot be solely interpreted by semantics. We show that five SOTA LLMs (GPT-3.5, GPT-4, Gemini, Claude, and Llama2) struggle to recognize prompts provided in the form of ASCII art. Based on this observation, we develop the jailbreak attack ArtPrompt, which leverages the poor performance of LLMs in recognizing ASCII art to bypass safety measures and elicit undesired behaviors from LLMs. ArtPrompt only requires black-box access to the victim LLMs, making it a practical attack. We evaluate ArtPrompt on five SOTA LLMs, and show that ArtPrompt can effectively and efficiently induce undesired behaviors from all five LLMs.

Advanced text-to-image models such as DALL-E 2 and Midjourney possess the capacity to generate highly realistic images, raising significant concerns regarding the potential proliferation of unsafe content. This includes adult, violent, or deceptive imagery of political figures. Despite claims of rigorous safety mechanisms implemented in these models to restrict the generation of not-safe-for-work (NSFW) content, we successfully devise and exhibit the first prompt attacks on Midjourney, resulting in the production of abundant photorealistic NSFW images. We reveal the fundamental principles of such prompt attacks and suggest strategically substituting high-risk sections within a suspect prompt to evade closed-source safety measures. Our novel framework, SurrogatePrompt, systematically generates attack prompts, utilizing large language models, image-to-text, and image-to-image modules to automate attack prompt creation at scale. Evaluation results disclose an 88% success rate in bypassing Midjourney's proprietary safety filter with our attack prompts, leading to the generation of counterfeit images depicting political figures in violent scenarios. Both subjective and objective assessments validate that the images generated from our attack prompts present considerable safety hazards.

Prompt leakage poses a compelling security and privacy threat in LLM applications. Leakage of system prompts may compromise intellectual property, and act as adversarial reconnaissance for an attacker. A systematic evaluation of prompt leakage threats and mitigation strategies is lacking, especially for multi-turn LLM interactions. In this paper, we systematically investigate LLM vulnerabilities against prompt leakage for 10 closed- and open-source LLMs, across four domains. We design a unique threat model which leverages the LLM sycophancy effect and elevates the average attack success rate (ASR) from 17.7% to 86.2% in a multi-turn setting. Our standardized setup further allows dissecting leakage of specific prompt contents such as task instructions and knowledge documents. We measure the mitigation effect of 7 black-box defense strategies, along with finetuning an open-source model to defend against leakage attempts. We present different combination of defenses against our threat model, including a cost analysis. Our study highlights key takeaways for building secure LLM applications and provides directions for research in multi-turn LLM interactions

Deep neural networks (DNNs) offer significant promise for improving breast cancer diagnosis in medical imaging. However, these models are highly susceptible to adversarial attacks--small, imperceptible changes that can mislead classifiers--raising critical concerns about their reliability and security. Traditional attacks rely on fixed-norm perturbations, misaligning with human perception. In contrast, diffusion-based attacks require pre-trained models, demanding substantial data when these models are unavailable, limiting practical use in data-scarce scenarios. In medical imaging, however, this is often unfeasible due to the limited availability of datasets. Building on recent advancements in learnable prompts, we propose Prompt2Perturb (P2P), a novel language-guided attack method capable of generating meaningful attack examples driven by text instructions. During the prompt learning phase, our approach leverages learnable prompts within the text encoder to create subtle, yet impactful, perturbations that remain imperceptible while guiding the model towards targeted outcomes. In contrast to current prompt learning-based approaches, our P2P stands out by directly updating text embeddings, avoiding the need for retraining diffusion models. Further, we leverage the finding that optimizing only the early reverse diffusion steps boosts efficiency while ensuring that the generated adversarial examples incorporate subtle noise, thus preserving ultrasound image quality without introducing noticeable artifacts. We show that our method outperforms state-of-the-art attack techniques across three breast ultrasound datasets in FID and LPIPS. Moreover, the generated images are both more natural in appearance and more effective compared to existing adversarial attacks. Our code will be publicly available https://github.com/yasamin-med/P2P.

This paper introduces FRACTURED-SORRY-Bench, a framework for evaluating the safety of Large Language Models (LLMs) against multi-turn conversational attacks. Building upon the SORRY-Bench dataset, we propose a simple yet effective method for generating adversarial prompts by breaking down harmful queries into seemingly innocuous sub-questions. Our approach achieves a maximum increase of +46.22\% in Attack Success Rates (ASRs) across GPT-4, GPT-4o, GPT-4o-mini, and GPT-3.5-Turbo models compared to baseline methods. We demonstrate that this technique poses a challenge to current LLM safety measures and highlights the need for more robust defenses against subtle, multi-turn attacks.

Deep neural networks (DNNs) are widely deployed on real-world devices. Concerns regarding their security have gained great attention from researchers. Recently, a new weight modification attack called bit flip attack (BFA) was proposed, which exploits memory fault inject techniques such as row hammer to attack quantized models in the deployment stage. With only a few bit flips, the target model can be rendered useless as a random guesser or even be implanted with malicious functionalities. In this work, we seek to further reduce the number of bit flips. We propose a training-assisted bit flip attack, in which the adversary is involved in the training stage to build a high-risk model to release. This high-risk model, obtained coupled with a corresponding malicious model, behaves normally and can escape various detection methods. The results on benchmark datasets show that an adversary can easily convert this high-risk but normal model to a malicious one on victim's side by flipping only one critical bit on average in the deployment stage. Moreover, our attack still poses a significant threat even when defenses are employed. The codes for reproducing main experiments are available at https://github.com/jianshuod/TBA.

We introduce and study the problem of adversarial arithmetic, which provides a simple yet challenging testbed for language model alignment. This problem is comprised of arithmetic questions posed in natural language, with an arbitrary adversarial string inserted before the question is complete. Even in the simple setting of 1-digit addition problems, it is easy to find adversarial prompts that make all tested models (including PaLM2, GPT4, Claude2) misbehave, and even to steer models to a particular wrong answer. We additionally provide a simple algorithm for finding successful attacks by querying those same models, which we name "prompt inversion rejection sampling" (PIRS). We finally show that models can be partially hardened against these attacks via reinforcement learning and via agentic constitutional loops. However, we were not able to make a language model fully robust against adversarial arithmetic attacks.

Warning: this paper contains content that may be inappropriate or offensive. As generative models become available for public use in various applications, testing and analyzing vulnerabilities of these models has become a priority. Here we propose an automatic red teaming framework that evaluates a given model and exposes its vulnerabilities against unsafe and inappropriate content generation. Our framework uses in-context learning in a feedback loop to red team models and trigger them into unsafe content generation. We propose different in-context attack strategies to automatically learn effective and diverse adversarial prompts for text-to-image models. Our experiments demonstrate that compared to baseline approaches, our proposed strategy is significantly more effective in exposing vulnerabilities in Stable Diffusion (SD) model, even when the latter is enhanced with safety features. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the proposed framework is effective for red teaming text-to-text models, resulting in significantly higher toxic response generation rate compared to previously reported numbers.

Recently, NLP has seen a surge in the usage of large pre-trained models. Users download weights of models pre-trained on large datasets, then fine-tune the weights on a task of their choice. This raises the question of whether downloading untrusted pre-trained weights can pose a security threat. In this paper, we show that it is possible to construct ``weight poisoning'' attacks where pre-trained weights are injected with vulnerabilities that expose ``backdoors'' after fine-tuning, enabling the attacker to manipulate the model prediction simply by injecting an arbitrary keyword. We show that by applying a regularization method, which we call RIPPLe, and an initialization procedure, which we call Embedding Surgery, such attacks are possible even with limited knowledge of the dataset and fine-tuning procedure. Our experiments on sentiment classification, toxicity detection, and spam detection show that this attack is widely applicable and poses a serious threat. Finally, we outline practical defenses against such attacks. Code to reproduce our experiments is available at https://github.com/neulab/RIPPLe.

As Large Language Models quickly become ubiquitous, it becomes critical to understand their security vulnerabilities. Recent work shows that text optimizers can produce jailbreaking prompts that bypass moderation and alignment. Drawing from the rich body of work on adversarial machine learning, we approach these attacks with three questions: What threat models are practically useful in this domain? How do baseline defense techniques perform in this new domain? How does LLM security differ from computer vision? We evaluate several baseline defense strategies against leading adversarial attacks on LLMs, discussing the various settings in which each is feasible and effective. Particularly, we look at three types of defenses: detection (perplexity based), input preprocessing (paraphrase and retokenization), and adversarial training. We discuss white-box and gray-box settings and discuss the robustness-performance trade-off for each of the defenses considered. We find that the weakness of existing discrete optimizers for text, combined with the relatively high costs of optimization, makes standard adaptive attacks more challenging for LLMs. Future research will be needed to uncover whether more powerful optimizers can be developed, or whether the strength of filtering and preprocessing defenses is greater in the LLMs domain than it has been in computer vision.

Today's LLMs are susceptible to prompt injections, jailbreaks, and other attacks that allow adversaries to overwrite a model's original instructions with their own malicious prompts. In this work, we argue that one of the primary vulnerabilities underlying these attacks is that LLMs often consider system prompts (e.g., text from an application developer) to be the same priority as text from untrusted users and third parties. To address this, we propose an instruction hierarchy that explicitly defines how models should behave when instructions of different priorities conflict. We then propose a data generation method to demonstrate this hierarchical instruction following behavior, which teaches LLMs to selectively ignore lower-privileged instructions. We apply this method to GPT-3.5, showing that it drastically increases robustness -- even for attack types not seen during training -- while imposing minimal degradations on standard capabilities.

Large Language Models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that bypass their safety mechanisms. Existing attack methods are fixed or specifically tailored for certain models and cannot flexibly adjust attack strength, which is critical for generalization when attacking models of various sizes. We introduce a novel scalable jailbreak attack that preempts the activation of an LLM's safety policies by occupying its computational resources. Our method involves engaging the LLM in a resource-intensive preliminary task - a Character Map lookup and decoding process - before presenting the target instruction. By saturating the model's processing capacity, we prevent the activation of safety protocols when processing the subsequent instruction. Extensive experiments on state-of-the-art LLMs demonstrate that our method achieves a high success rate in bypassing safety measures without requiring gradient access, manual prompt engineering. We verified our approach offers a scalable attack that quantifies attack strength and adapts to different model scales at the optimal strength. We shows safety policies of LLMs might be more susceptible to resource constraints. Our findings reveal a critical vulnerability in current LLM safety designs, highlighting the need for more robust defense strategies that account for resource-intense condition.

Adversarial attacks are a major challenge faced by current machine learning research. These purposely crafted inputs fool even the most advanced models, precluding their deployment in safety-critical applications. Extensive research in computer vision has been carried to develop reliable defense strategies. However, the same issue remains less explored in natural language processing. Our work presents a model-agnostic detector of adversarial text examples. The approach identifies patterns in the logits of the target classifier when perturbing the input text. The proposed detector improves the current state-of-the-art performance in recognizing adversarial inputs and exhibits strong generalization capabilities across different NLP models, datasets, and word-level attacks.

Recent advances in natural language processing and the increased use of large language models have exposed new security vulnerabilities, such as backdoor attacks. Previous backdoor attacks require input manipulation after model distribution to activate the backdoor, posing limitations in real-world applicability. Addressing this gap, we introduce a novel Claim-Guided Backdoor Attack (CGBA), which eliminates the need for such manipulations by utilizing inherent textual claims as triggers. CGBA leverages claim extraction, clustering, and targeted training to trick models to misbehave on targeted claims without affecting their performance on clean data. CGBA demonstrates its effectiveness and stealthiness across various datasets and models, significantly enhancing the feasibility of practical backdoor attacks. Our code and data will be available at https://github.com/PaperCGBA/CGBA.

The bulk of existing research in defending against adversarial examples focuses on defending against a single (typically bounded Lp-norm) attack, but for a practical setting, machine learning (ML) models should be robust to a wide variety of attacks. In this paper, we present the first unified framework for considering multiple attacks against ML models. Our framework is able to model different levels of learner's knowledge about the test-time adversary, allowing us to model robustness against unforeseen attacks and robustness against unions of attacks. Using our framework, we present the first leaderboard, MultiRobustBench, for benchmarking multiattack evaluation which captures performance across attack types and attack strengths. We evaluate the performance of 16 defended models for robustness against a set of 9 different attack types, including Lp-based threat models, spatial transformations, and color changes, at 20 different attack strengths (180 attacks total). Additionally, we analyze the state of current defenses against multiple attacks. Our analysis shows that while existing defenses have made progress in terms of average robustness across the set of attacks used, robustness against the worst-case attack is still a big open problem as all existing models perform worse than random guessing.

Visual modifications to text are often used to obfuscate offensive comments in social media (e.g., "!d10t") or as a writing style ("1337" in "leet speak"), among other scenarios. We consider this as a new type of adversarial attack in NLP, a setting to which humans are very robust, as our experiments with both simple and more difficult visual input perturbations demonstrate. We then investigate the impact of visual adversarial attacks on current NLP systems on character-, word-, and sentence-level tasks, showing that both neural and non-neural models are, in contrast to humans, extremely sensitive to such attacks, suffering performance decreases of up to 82\%. We then explore three shielding methods---visual character embeddings, adversarial training, and rule-based recovery---which substantially improve the robustness of the models. However, the shielding methods still fall behind performances achieved in non-attack scenarios, which demonstrates the difficulty of dealing with visual attacks.

Image editing has advanced significantly with the introduction of text-conditioned diffusion models. Despite this progress, seamlessly adding objects to images based on textual instructions without requiring user-provided input masks remains a challenge. We address this by leveraging the insight that removing objects (Inpaint) is significantly simpler than its inverse process of adding them (Paint), attributed to the utilization of segmentation mask datasets alongside inpainting models that inpaint within these masks. Capitalizing on this realization, by implementing an automated and extensive pipeline, we curate a filtered large-scale image dataset containing pairs of images and their corresponding object-removed versions. Using these pairs, we train a diffusion model to inverse the inpainting process, effectively adding objects into images. Unlike other editing datasets, ours features natural target images instead of synthetic ones; moreover, it maintains consistency between source and target by construction. Additionally, we utilize a large Vision-Language Model to provide detailed descriptions of the removed objects and a Large Language Model to convert these descriptions into diverse, natural-language instructions. We show that the trained model surpasses existing ones both qualitatively and quantitatively, and release the large-scale dataset alongside the trained models for the community.

Point-based image editing has attracted remarkable attention since the emergence of DragGAN. Recently, DragDiffusion further pushes forward the generative quality via adapting this dragging technique to diffusion models. Despite these great success, this dragging scheme exhibits two major drawbacks, namely inaccurate point tracking and incomplete motion supervision, which may result in unsatisfactory dragging outcomes. To tackle these issues, we build a stable and precise drag-based editing framework, coined as StableDrag, by designing a discirminative point tracking method and a confidence-based latent enhancement strategy for motion supervision. The former allows us to precisely locate the updated handle points, thereby boosting the stability of long-range manipulation, while the latter is responsible for guaranteeing the optimized latent as high-quality as possible across all the manipulation steps. Thanks to these unique designs, we instantiate two types of image editing models including StableDrag-GAN and StableDrag-Diff, which attains more stable dragging performance, through extensive qualitative experiments and quantitative assessment on DragBench.

Point-based radiance field rendering has demonstrated impressive results for novel view synthesis, offering a compelling blend of rendering quality and computational efficiency. However, also latest approaches in this domain are not without their shortcomings. 3D Gaussian Splatting [Kerbl and Kopanas et al. 2023] struggles when tasked with rendering highly detailed scenes, due to blurring and cloudy artifacts. On the other hand, ADOP [R\"uckert et al. 2022] can accommodate crisper images, but the neural reconstruction network decreases performance, it grapples with temporal instability and it is unable to effectively address large gaps in the point cloud. In this paper, we present TRIPS (Trilinear Point Splatting), an approach that combines ideas from both Gaussian Splatting and ADOP. The fundamental concept behind our novel technique involves rasterizing points into a screen-space image pyramid, with the selection of the pyramid layer determined by the projected point size. This approach allows rendering arbitrarily large points using a single trilinear write. A lightweight neural network is then used to reconstruct a hole-free image including detail beyond splat resolution. Importantly, our render pipeline is entirely differentiable, allowing for automatic optimization of both point sizes and positions. Our evaluation demonstrate that TRIPS surpasses existing state-of-the-art methods in terms of rendering quality while maintaining a real-time frame rate of 60 frames per second on readily available hardware. This performance extends to challenging scenarios, such as scenes featuring intricate geometry, expansive landscapes, and auto-exposed footage.

This paper is not motivated to seek innovation within the attention mechanism. Instead, it focuses on overcoming the existing trade-offs between accuracy and efficiency within the context of point cloud processing, leveraging the power of scale. Drawing inspiration from recent advances in 3D large-scale representation learning, we recognize that model performance is more influenced by scale than by intricate design. Therefore, we present Point Transformer V3 (PTv3), which prioritizes simplicity and efficiency over the accuracy of certain mechanisms that are minor to the overall performance after scaling, such as replacing the precise neighbor search by KNN with an efficient serialized neighbor mapping of point clouds organized with specific patterns. This principle enables significant scaling, expanding the receptive field from 16 to 1024 points while remaining efficient (a 3x increase in processing speed and a 10x improvement in memory efficiency compared with its predecessor, PTv2). PTv3 attains state-of-the-art results on over 20 downstream tasks that span both indoor and outdoor scenarios. Further enhanced with multi-dataset joint training, PTv3 pushes these results to a higher level.

We introduce Point-Bind, a 3D multi-modality model aligning point clouds with 2D image, language, audio, and video. Guided by ImageBind, we construct a joint embedding space between 3D and multi-modalities, enabling many promising applications, e.g., any-to-3D generation, 3D embedding arithmetic, and 3D open-world understanding. On top of this, we further present Point-LLM, the first 3D large language model (LLM) following 3D multi-modal instructions. By parameter-efficient fine-tuning techniques, Point-LLM injects the semantics of Point-Bind into pre-trained LLMs, e.g., LLaMA, which requires no 3D instruction data, but exhibits superior 3D and multi-modal question-answering capacity. We hope our work may cast a light on the community for extending 3D point clouds to multi-modality applications. Code is available at https://github.com/ZiyuGuo99/Point-Bind_Point-LLM.

Point-cloud data collected in real-world applications are often incomplete. Data is typically missing due to objects being observed from partial viewpoints, which only capture a specific perspective or angle. Additionally, data can be incomplete due to occlusion and low-resolution sampling. Existing completion approaches rely on datasets of predefined objects to guide the completion of noisy and incomplete, point clouds. However, these approaches perform poorly when tested on Out-Of-Distribution (OOD) objects, that are poorly represented in the training dataset. Here we leverage recent advances in text-guided image generation, which lead to major breakthroughs in text-guided shape generation. We describe an approach called SDS-Complete that uses a pre-trained text-to-image diffusion model and leverages the text semantics of a given incomplete point cloud of an object, to obtain a complete surface representation. SDS-Complete can complete a variety of objects using test-time optimization without expensive collection of 3D information. We evaluate SDS Complete on incomplete scanned objects, captured by real-world depth sensors and LiDAR scanners. We find that it effectively reconstructs objects that are absent from common datasets, reducing Chamfer loss by 50% on average compared with current methods. Project page: https://sds-complete.github.io/

Language-guided image editing has achieved great success recently. In this paper, for the first time, we investigate exemplar-guided image editing for more precise control. We achieve this goal by leveraging self-supervised training to disentangle and re-organize the source image and the exemplar. However, the naive approach will cause obvious fusing artifacts. We carefully analyze it and propose an information bottleneck and strong augmentations to avoid the trivial solution of directly copying and pasting the exemplar image. Meanwhile, to ensure the controllability of the editing process, we design an arbitrary shape mask for the exemplar image and leverage the classifier-free guidance to increase the similarity to the exemplar image. The whole framework involves a single forward of the diffusion model without any iterative optimization. We demonstrate that our method achieves an impressive performance and enables controllable editing on in-the-wild images with high fidelity.

Point-based interactive colorization techniques allow users to effortlessly colorize grayscale images using user-provided color hints. However, point-based methods often face challenges when different colors are given to semantically similar areas, leading to color intermingling and unsatisfactory results-an issue we refer to as color collapse. The fundamental cause of color collapse is the inadequacy of points for defining the boundaries for each color. To mitigate color collapse, we introduce a lasso tool that can control the scope of each color hint. Additionally, we design a framework that leverages the user-provided lassos to localize the attention masks. The experimental results show that using a single lasso is as effective as applying 4.18 individual color hints and can achieve the desired outcomes in 30% less time than using points alone.

The development of 2D foundation models for image segmentation has been significantly advanced by the Segment Anything Model (SAM). However, achieving similar success in 3D models remains a challenge due to issues such as non-unified data formats, lightweight models, and the scarcity of labeled data with diverse masks. To this end, we propose a 3D promptable segmentation model (Point-SAM) focusing on point clouds. Our approach utilizes a transformer-based method, extending SAM to the 3D domain. We leverage part-level and object-level annotations and introduce a data engine to generate pseudo labels from SAM, thereby distilling 2D knowledge into our 3D model. Our model outperforms state-of-the-art models on several indoor and outdoor benchmarks and demonstrates a variety of applications, such as 3D annotation. Codes and demo can be found at https://github.com/zyc00/Point-SAM.

Training high-accuracy 3D detectors necessitates massive labeled 3D annotations with 7 degree-of-freedom, which is laborious and time-consuming. Therefore, the form of point annotations is proposed to offer significant prospects for practical applications in 3D detection, which is not only more accessible and less expensive but also provides strong spatial information for object localization. In this paper, we empirically discover that it is non-trivial to merely adapt Point-DETR to its 3D form, encountering two main bottlenecks: 1) it fails to encode strong 3D prior into the model, and 2) it generates low-quality pseudo labels in distant regions due to the extreme sparsity of LiDAR points. To overcome these challenges, we introduce Point-DETR3D, a teacher-student framework for weakly semi-supervised 3D detection, designed to fully capitalize on point-wise supervision within a constrained instance-wise annotation budget.Different from Point-DETR which encodes 3D positional information solely through a point encoder, we propose an explicit positional query initialization strategy to enhance the positional prior. Considering the low quality of pseudo labels at distant regions produced by the teacher model, we enhance the detector's perception by incorporating dense imagery data through a novel Cross-Modal Deformable RoI Fusion (D-RoI).Moreover, an innovative point-guided self-supervised learning technique is proposed to allow for fully exploiting point priors, even in student models.Extensive experiments on representative nuScenes dataset demonstrate our Point-DETR3D obtains significant improvements compared to previous works. Notably, with only 5% of labeled data, Point-DETR3D achieves over 90% performance of its fully supervised counterpart.

We present Paint-it, a text-driven high-fidelity texture map synthesis method for 3D meshes via neural re-parameterized texture optimization. Paint-it synthesizes texture maps from a text description by synthesis-through-optimization, exploiting the Score-Distillation Sampling (SDS). We observe that directly applying SDS yields undesirable texture quality due to its noisy gradients. We reveal the importance of texture parameterization when using SDS. Specifically, we propose Deep Convolutional Physically-Based Rendering (DC-PBR) parameterization, which re-parameterizes the physically-based rendering (PBR) texture maps with randomly initialized convolution-based neural kernels, instead of a standard pixel-based parameterization. We show that DC-PBR inherently schedules the optimization curriculum according to texture frequency and naturally filters out the noisy signals from SDS. In experiments, Paint-it obtains remarkable quality PBR texture maps within 15 min., given only a text description. We demonstrate the generalizability and practicality of Paint-it by synthesizing high-quality texture maps for large-scale mesh datasets and showing test-time applications such as relighting and material control using a popular graphics engine. Project page: https://kim-youwang.github.io/paint-it

We propose Point'n Move, a method that achieves interactive scene object manipulation with exposed region inpainting. Interactivity here further comes from intuitive object selection and real-time editing. To achieve this, we adopt Gaussian Splatting Radiance Field as the scene representation and fully leverage its explicit nature and speed advantage. Its explicit representation formulation allows us to devise a 2D prompt points to 3D mask dual-stage self-prompting segmentation algorithm, perform mask refinement and merging, minimize change as well as provide good initialization for scene inpainting and perform editing in real-time without per-editing training, all leads to superior quality and performance. We test our method by performing editing on both forward-facing and 360 scenes. We also compare our method against existing scene object removal methods, showing superior quality despite being more capable and having a speed advantage.

Point cloud registration is challenging in the presence of heavy outlier correspondences. This paper focuses on addressing the robust correspondence-based registration problem with gravity prior that often arises in practice. The gravity directions are typically obtained by inertial measurement units (IMUs) and can reduce the degree of freedom (DOF) of rotation from 3 to 1. We propose a novel transformation decoupling strategy by leveraging screw theory. This strategy decomposes the original 4-DOF problem into three sub-problems with 1-DOF, 2-DOF, and 1-DOF, respectively, thereby enhancing the computation efficiency. Specifically, the first 1-DOF represents the translation along the rotation axis and we propose an interval stabbing-based method to solve it. The second 2-DOF represents the pole which is an auxiliary variable in screw theory and we utilize a branch-and-bound method to solve it. The last 1-DOF represents the rotation angle and we propose a global voting method for its estimation. The proposed method sequentially solves three consensus maximization sub-problems, leading to efficient and deterministic registration. In particular, it can even handle the correspondence-free registration problem due to its significant robustness. Extensive experiments on both synthetic and real-world datasets demonstrate that our method is more efficient and robust than state-of-the-art methods, even when dealing with outlier rates exceeding 99%.

Dynamic radiance fields have emerged as a promising approach for generating novel views from a monocular video. However, previous methods enforce the geometric consistency to dynamic radiance fields only between adjacent input frames, making it difficult to represent the global scene geometry and degenerates at the viewpoint that is spatio-temporally distant from the input camera trajectory. To solve this problem, we introduce point-based dynamic radiance fields (Point-DynRF), a novel framework where the global geometric information and the volume rendering process are trained by neural point clouds and dynamic radiance fields, respectively. Specifically, we reconstruct neural point clouds directly from geometric proxies and optimize both radiance fields and the geometric proxies using our proposed losses, allowing them to complement each other. We validate the effectiveness of our method with experiments on the NVIDIA Dynamic Scenes Dataset and several causally captured monocular video clips.

We propose a unified point cloud video self-supervised learning framework for object-centric and scene-centric data. Previous methods commonly conduct representation learning at the clip or frame level and cannot well capture fine-grained semantics. Instead of contrasting the representations of clips or frames, in this paper, we propose a unified self-supervised framework by conducting contrastive learning at the point level. Moreover, we introduce a new pretext task by achieving semantic alignment of superpoints, which further facilitates the representations to capture semantic cues at multiple scales. In addition, due to the high redundancy in the temporal dimension of dynamic point clouds, directly conducting contrastive learning at the point level usually leads to massive undesired negatives and insufficient modeling of positive representations. To remedy this, we propose a selection strategy to retain proper negatives and make use of high-similarity samples from other instances as positive supplements. Extensive experiments show that our method outperforms supervised counterparts on a wide range of downstream tasks and demonstrates the superior transferability of the learned representations.

Point cloud sequences are commonly used to accurately detect 3D objects in applications such as autonomous driving. Current top-performing multi-frame detectors mostly follow a Detect-and-Fuse framework, which extracts features from each frame of the sequence and fuses them to detect the objects in the current frame. However, this inevitably leads to redundant computation since adjacent frames are highly correlated. In this paper, we propose an efficient Motion-guided Sequential Fusion (MSF) method, which exploits the continuity of object motion to mine useful sequential contexts for object detection in the current frame. We first generate 3D proposals on the current frame and propagate them to preceding frames based on the estimated velocities. The points-of-interest are then pooled from the sequence and encoded as proposal features. A novel Bidirectional Feature Aggregation (BiFA) module is further proposed to facilitate the interactions of proposal features across frames. Besides, we optimize the point cloud pooling by a voxel-based sampling technique so that millions of points can be processed in several milliseconds. The proposed MSF method achieves not only better efficiency than other multi-frame detectors but also leading accuracy, with 83.12% and 78.30% mAP on the LEVEL1 and LEVEL2 test sets of Waymo Open Dataset, respectively. Codes can be found at https://github.com/skyhehe123/MSF.

Reconstructing meshes from point clouds is an important task in fields such as robotics, autonomous systems, and medical imaging. This survey examines state-of-the-art learning-based approaches to mesh reconstruction, categorizing them into five paradigms: PointNet family, autoencoder architectures, deformation-based methods, point-move techniques, and primitive-based approaches. Each paradigm is explored in depth, detailing the primary approaches and their underlying methodologies. By comparing these techniques, our study serves as a comprehensive guide, and equips researchers and practitioners with the knowledge to navigate the landscape of learning-based mesh reconstruction techniques. The findings underscore the transformative potential of these methods, which often surpass traditional techniques in allowing detailed and efficient reconstructions.

Line art colorization plays a crucial role in hand-drawn animation production, where digital artists manually colorize segments using a paint bucket tool, guided by RGB values from character color design sheets. This process, often called paint bucket colorization, involves two main tasks: keyframe colorization, where colors are applied according to the character's color design sheet, and consecutive frame colorization, where these colors are replicated across adjacent frames. Current automated colorization methods primarily focus on reference-based and segment-matching approaches. However, reference-based methods often fail to accurately assign specific colors to each region, while matching-based methods are limited to consecutive frame colorization and struggle with issues like significant deformation and occlusion. In this work, we introduce inclusion matching, which allows the network to understand the inclusion relationships between segments, rather than relying solely on direct visual correspondences. By integrating this approach with segment parsing and color warping modules, our inclusion matching pipeline significantly improves performance in both keyframe colorization and consecutive frame colorization. To support our network's training, we have developed a unique dataset named PaintBucket-Character, which includes rendered line arts alongside their colorized versions and shading annotations for various 3D characters. To replicate industry animation data formats, we also created color design sheets for each character, with semantic information for each color and standard pose reference images. Experiments highlight the superiority of our method, demonstrating accurate and consistent colorization across both our proposed benchmarks and hand-drawn animations.

Point-based representations have recently gained popularity in novel view synthesis, for their unique advantages, e.g., intuitive geometric representation, simple manipulation, and faster convergence. However, based on our observation, these point-based neural re-rendering methods are only expected to perform well under ideal conditions and suffer from noisy, patchy points and unbounded scenes, which are challenging to handle but defacto common in real applications. To this end, we revisit one such influential method, known as Neural Point-based Graphics (NPBG), as our baseline, and propose Robust Point-based Graphics (RPBG). We in-depth analyze the factors that prevent NPBG from achieving satisfactory renderings on generic datasets, and accordingly reform the pipeline to make it more robust to varying datasets in-the-wild. Inspired by the practices in image restoration, we greatly enhance the neural renderer to enable the attention-based correction of point visibility and the inpainting of incomplete rasterization, with only acceptable overheads. We also seek for a simple and lightweight alternative for environment modeling and an iterative method to alleviate the problem of poor geometry. By thorough evaluation on a wide range of datasets with different shooting conditions and camera trajectories, RPBG stably outperforms the baseline by a large margin, and exhibits its great robustness over state-of-the-art NeRF-based variants. Code available at https://github.com/QT-Zhu/RPBG.

Recently, state space models have exhibited strong global modeling capabilities and linear computational complexity in contrast to transformers. This research focuses on applying such architecture to more efficiently and effectively model point cloud data globally with linear computational complexity. In particular, for the first time, we demonstrate that Mamba-based point cloud methods can outperform previous methods based on transformer or multi-layer perceptrons (MLPs). To enable Mamba to process 3-D point cloud data more effectively, we propose a novel Consistent Traverse Serialization method to convert point clouds into 1-D point sequences while ensuring that neighboring points in the sequence are also spatially adjacent. Consistent Traverse Serialization yields six variants by permuting the order of x, y, and z coordinates, and the synergistic use of these variants aids Mamba in comprehensively observing point cloud data. Furthermore, to assist Mamba in handling point sequences with different orders more effectively, we introduce point prompts to inform Mamba of the sequence's arrangement rules. Finally, we propose positional encoding based on spatial coordinate mapping to inject positional information into point cloud sequences more effectively. Point Cloud Mamba surpasses the state-of-the-art (SOTA) point-based method PointNeXt and achieves new SOTA performance on the ScanObjectNN, ModelNet40, ShapeNetPart, and S3DIS datasets. It is worth mentioning that when using a more powerful local feature extraction module, our PCM achieves 79.6 mIoU on S3DIS, significantly surpassing the previous SOTA models, DeLA and PTv3, by 5.5 mIoU and 4.9 mIoU, respectively.

Point cloud streaming is increasingly getting popular, evolving into the norm for interactive service delivery and the future Metaverse. However, the substantial volume of data associated with point clouds presents numerous challenges, particularly in terms of high bandwidth consumption and large storage capacity. Despite various solutions proposed thus far, with a focus on point cloud compression, upsampling, and completion, these reconstruction-related methods continue to fall short in delivering high fidelity point cloud output. As a solution, in DiffPMAE, we propose an effective point cloud reconstruction architecture. Inspired by self-supervised learning concepts, we combine Masked Auto-Encoding and Diffusion Model mechanism to remotely reconstruct point cloud data. By the nature of this reconstruction process, DiffPMAE can be extended to many related downstream tasks including point cloud compression, upsampling and completion. Leveraging ShapeNet-55 and ModelNet datasets with over 60000 objects, we validate the performance of DiffPMAE exceeding many state-of-the-art methods in-terms of auto-encoding and downstream tasks considered.

Class-agnostic object counting aims to count all objects in an image with respect to example boxes or class names, a.k.a few-shot and zero-shot counting. In this paper, we propose a generalized framework for both few-shot and zero-shot object counting based on detection. Our framework combines the superior advantages of two foundation models without compromising their zero-shot capability: (i) SAM to segment all possible objects as mask proposals, and (ii) CLIP to classify proposals to obtain accurate object counts. However, this strategy meets the obstacles of efficiency overhead and the small crowded objects that cannot be localized and distinguished. To address these issues, our framework, termed PseCo, follows three steps: point, segment, and count. Specifically, we first propose a class-agnostic object localization to provide accurate but least point prompts for SAM, which consequently not only reduces computation costs but also avoids missing small objects. Furthermore, we propose a generalized object classification that leverages CLIP image/text embeddings as the classifier, following a hierarchical knowledge distillation to obtain discriminative classifications among hierarchical mask proposals. Extensive experimental results on FSC-147, COCO, and LVIS demonstrate that PseCo achieves state-of-the-art performance in both few-shot/zero-shot object counting/detection. Code: https://github.com/Hzzone/PseCo

In recent years, the field of 3D self-supervised learning has witnessed significant progress, resulting in the emergence of Multi-Modality Masked AutoEncoders (MAE) methods that leverage both 2D images and 3D point clouds for pre-training. However, a notable limitation of these approaches is that they do not fully utilize the multi-view attributes inherent in 3D point clouds, which is crucial for a deeper understanding of 3D structures. Building upon this insight, we introduce a novel approach employing a 3D to multi-view masked autoencoder to fully harness the multi-modal attributes of 3D point clouds. To be specific, our method uses the encoded tokens from 3D masked point clouds to generate original point clouds and multi-view depth images across various poses. This approach not only enriches the model's comprehension of geometric structures but also leverages the inherent multi-modal properties of point clouds. Our experiments illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed method for different tasks and under different settings. Remarkably, our method outperforms state-of-the-art counterparts by a large margin in a variety of downstream tasks, including 3D object classification, few-shot learning, part segmentation, and 3D object detection. Code will be available at: https://github.com/Zhimin-C/Multiview-MAE

The popularity of pre-trained large models has revolutionized downstream tasks across diverse fields, such as language, vision, and multi-modality. To minimize the adaption cost for downstream tasks, many Parameter-Efficient Fine-Tuning (PEFT) techniques are proposed for language and 2D image pre-trained models. However, the specialized PEFT method for 3D pre-trained models is still under-explored. To this end, we introduce Point-PEFT, a novel framework for adapting point cloud pre-trained models with minimal learnable parameters. Specifically, for a pre-trained 3D model, we freeze most of its parameters, and only tune the newly added PEFT modules on downstream tasks, which consist of a Point-prior Prompt and a Geometry-aware Adapter. The Point-prior Prompt adopts a set of learnable prompt tokens, for which we propose to construct a memory bank with domain-specific knowledge, and utilize a parameter-free attention to enhance the prompt tokens. The Geometry-aware Adapter aims to aggregate point cloud features within spatial neighborhoods to capture fine-grained geometric information through local interactions. Extensive experiments indicate that our Point-PEFT can achieve better performance than the full fine-tuning on various downstream tasks, while using only 5% of the trainable parameters, demonstrating the efficiency and effectiveness of our approach. Code is released at https://github.com/Ivan-Tang-3D/Point-PEFT.

This paper introduces the Point Cloud Network (PCN) architecture, a novel implementation of linear layers in deep learning networks, and provides empirical evidence to advocate for its preference over the Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) in linear layers. We train several models, including the original AlexNet, using both MLP and PCN architectures for direct comparison of linear layers (Krizhevsky et al., 2012). The key results collected are model parameter count and top-1 test accuracy over the CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets (Krizhevsky, 2009). AlexNet-PCN16, our PCN equivalent to AlexNet, achieves comparable efficacy (test accuracy) to the original architecture with a 99.5% reduction of parameters in its linear layers. All training is done on cloud RTX 4090 GPUs, leveraging pytorch for model construction and training. Code is provided for anyone to reproduce the trials from this paper.

We show that crowd counting can be viewed as a decomposable point querying process. This formulation enables arbitrary points as input and jointly reasons whether the points are crowd and where they locate. The querying processing, however, raises an underlying problem on the number of necessary querying points. Too few imply underestimation; too many increase computational overhead. To address this dilemma, we introduce a decomposable structure, i.e., the point-query quadtree, and propose a new counting model, termed Point quEry Transformer (PET). PET implements decomposable point querying via data-dependent quadtree splitting, where each querying point could split into four new points when necessary, thus enabling dynamic processing of sparse and dense regions. Such a querying process yields an intuitive, universal modeling of crowd as both the input and output are interpretable and steerable. We demonstrate the applications of PET on a number of crowd-related tasks, including fully-supervised crowd counting and localization, partial annotation learning, and point annotation refinement, and also report state-of-the-art performance. For the first time, we show that a single counting model can address multiple crowd-related tasks across different learning paradigms. Code is available at https://github.com/cxliu0/PET.

Point cloud registration is a task to estimate the rigid transformation between two unaligned scans, which plays an important role in many computer vision applications. Previous learning-based works commonly focus on supervised registration, which have limitations in practice. Recently, with the advance of inexpensive RGB-D sensors, several learning-based works utilize RGB-D data to achieve unsupervised registration. However, most of existing unsupervised methods follow a cascaded design or fuse RGB-D data in a unidirectional manner, which do not fully exploit the complementary information in the RGB-D data. To leverage the complementary information more effectively, we propose a network implementing multi-scale bidirectional fusion between RGB images and point clouds generated from depth images. By bidirectionally fusing visual and geometric features in multi-scales, more distinctive deep features for correspondence estimation can be obtained, making our registration more accurate. Extensive experiments on ScanNet and 3DMatch demonstrate that our method achieves new state-of-the-art performance. Code will be released at https://github.com/phdymz/PointMBF

Point clouds are naturally sparse, while image pixels are dense. The inconsistency limits feature fusion from both modalities for point-wise scene flow estimation. Previous methods rarely predict scene flow from the entire point clouds of the scene with one-time inference due to the memory inefficiency and heavy overhead from distance calculation and sorting involved in commonly used farthest point sampling, KNN, and ball query algorithms for local feature aggregation. To mitigate these issues in scene flow learning, we regularize raw points to a dense format by storing 3D coordinates in 2D grids. Unlike the sampling operation commonly used in existing works, the dense 2D representation 1) preserves most points in the given scene, 2) brings in a significant boost of efficiency, and 3) eliminates the density gap between points and pixels, allowing us to perform effective feature fusion. We also present a novel warping projection technique to alleviate the information loss problem resulting from the fact that multiple points could be mapped into one grid during projection when computing cost volume. Sufficient experiments demonstrate the efficiency and effectiveness of our method, outperforming the prior-arts on the FlyingThings3D and KITTI dataset.

Point cloud completion aims to recover the complete shape based on a partial observation. Existing methods require either complete point clouds or multiple partial observations of the same object for learning. In contrast to previous approaches, we present Partial2Complete (P2C), the first self-supervised framework that completes point cloud objects using training samples consisting of only a single incomplete point cloud per object. Specifically, our framework groups incomplete point clouds into local patches as input and predicts masked patches by learning prior information from different partial objects. We also propose Region-Aware Chamfer Distance to regularize shape mismatch without limiting completion capability, and devise the Normal Consistency Constraint to incorporate a local planarity assumption, encouraging the recovered shape surface to be continuous and complete. In this way, P2C no longer needs multiple observations or complete point clouds as ground truth. Instead, structural cues are learned from a category-specific dataset to complete partial point clouds of objects. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach on both synthetic ShapeNet data and real-world ScanNet data, showing that P2C produces comparable results to methods trained with complete shapes, and outperforms methods learned with multiple partial observations. Code is available at https://github.com/CuiRuikai/Partial2Complete.

Point cloud analysis (such as 3D segmentation and detection) is a challenging task, because of not only the irregular geometries of many millions of unordered points, but also the great variations caused by depth, viewpoint, occlusion, etc. Current studies put much focus on the adaption of neural networks to the complex geometries of point clouds, but are blind to a fundamental question: how to learn an appropriate point embedding space that is aware of both discriminative semantics and challenging variations? As a response, we propose a clustering based supervised learning scheme for point cloud analysis. Unlike current de-facto, scene-wise training paradigm, our algorithm conducts within-class clustering on the point embedding space for automatically discovering subclass patterns which are latent yet representative across scenes. The mined patterns are, in turn, used to repaint the embedding space, so as to respect the underlying distribution of the entire training dataset and improve the robustness to the variations. Our algorithm is principled and readily pluggable to modern point cloud segmentation networks during training, without extra overhead during testing. With various 3D network architectures (i.e., voxel-based, point-based, Transformer-based, automatically searched), our algorithm shows notable improvements on famous point cloud segmentation datasets (i.e.,2.0-2.6% on single-scan and 2.0-2.2% multi-scan of SemanticKITTI, 1.8-1.9% on S3DIS, in terms of mIoU). Our algorithm also demonstrates utility in 3D detection, showing 2.0-3.4% mAP gains on KITTI.

Geometry and color information provided by the point clouds are both crucial for 3D scene understanding. Two pieces of information characterize the different aspects of point clouds, but existing methods lack an elaborate design for the discrimination and relevance. Hence we explore a 3D self-supervised paradigm that can better utilize the relations of point cloud information. Specifically, we propose a universal 3D scene pre-training framework via Geometry-Color Contrast (Point-GCC), which aligns geometry and color information using a Siamese network. To take care of actual application tasks, we design (i) hierarchical supervision with point-level contrast and reconstruct and object-level contrast based on the novel deep clustering module to close the gap between pre-training and downstream tasks; (ii) architecture-agnostic backbone to adapt for various downstream models. Benefiting from the object-level representation associated with downstream tasks, Point-GCC can directly evaluate model performance and the result demonstrates the effectiveness of our methods. Transfer learning results on a wide range of tasks also show consistent improvements across all datasets. e.g., new state-of-the-art object detection results on SUN RGB-D and S3DIS datasets. Codes will be released at https://github.com/Asterisci/Point-GCC.

We propose a dense neural simultaneous localization and mapping (SLAM) approach for monocular RGBD input which anchors the features of a neural scene representation in a point cloud that is iteratively generated in an input-dependent data-driven manner. We demonstrate that both tracking and mapping can be performed with the same point-based neural scene representation by minimizing an RGBD-based re-rendering loss. In contrast to recent dense neural SLAM methods which anchor the scene features in a sparse grid, our point-based approach allows dynamically adapting the anchor point density to the information density of the input. This strategy reduces runtime and memory usage in regions with fewer details and dedicates higher point density to resolve fine details. Our approach performs either better or competitive to existing dense neural RGBD SLAM methods in tracking, mapping and rendering accuracy on the Replica, TUM-RGBD and ScanNet datasets. The source code is available at https://github.com/tfy14esa/Point-SLAM.

Point-spread-function (PSF) engineering is a powerful computational imaging techniques wherein a custom phase mask is integrated into an optical system to encode additional information into captured images. Used in combination with deep learning, such systems now offer state-of-the-art performance at monocular depth estimation, extended depth-of-field imaging, lensless imaging, and other tasks. Inspired by recent advances in spatial light modulator (SLM) technology, this paper answers a natural question: Can one encode additional information and achieve superior performance by changing a phase mask dynamically over time? We first prove that the set of PSFs described by static phase masks is non-convex and that, as a result, time-averaged PSFs generated by dynamic phase masks are fundamentally more expressive. We then demonstrate, in simulation, that time-averaged dynamic (TiDy) phase masks can offer substantially improved monocular depth estimation and extended depth-of-field imaging performance.

Point cloud segmentation is a fundamental task in 3D vision that serves a wide range of applications. Although great progresses have been made these years, its practical usability is still limited by the availability of training data. Existing approaches cannot make full use of multiple datasets on hand due to the label mismatch among different datasets. In this paper, we propose a principled approach that supports learning from heterogeneous datasets with different label sets. Our idea is to utilize a pre-trained language model to embed discrete labels to a continuous latent space with the help of their label names. This unifies all labels of different datasets, so that joint training is doable. Meanwhile, classifying points in the continuous 3D space by their vocabulary tokens significantly increase the generalization ability of the model in comparison with existing approaches that have fixed decoder architecture. Besides, we also integrate prompt learning in our framework to alleviate data shifts among different data sources. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our model outperforms the state-of-the-art by a large margin.

We present a Non-parametric Network for 3D point cloud analysis, Point-NN, which consists of purely non-learnable components: farthest point sampling (FPS), k-nearest neighbors (k-NN), and pooling operations, with trigonometric functions. Surprisingly, it performs well on various 3D tasks, requiring no parameters or training, and even surpasses existing fully trained models. Starting from this basic non-parametric model, we propose two extensions. First, Point-NN can serve as a base architectural framework to construct Parametric Networks by simply inserting linear layers on top. Given the superior non-parametric foundation, the derived Point-PN exhibits a high performance-efficiency trade-off with only a few learnable parameters. Second, Point-NN can be regarded as a plug-and-play module for the already trained 3D models during inference. Point-NN captures the complementary geometric knowledge and enhances existing methods for different 3D benchmarks without re-training. We hope our work may cast a light on the community for understanding 3D point clouds with non-parametric methods. Code is available at https://github.com/ZrrSkywalker/Point-NN.

Point cloud sampling is a less explored research topic for this data representation. The most commonly used sampling methods are still classical random sampling and farthest point sampling. With the development of neural networks, various methods have been proposed to sample point clouds in a task-based learning manner. However, these methods are mostly generative-based, rather than selecting points directly using mathematical statistics. Inspired by the Canny edge detection algorithm for images and with the help of the attention mechanism, this paper proposes a non-generative Attention-based Point cloud Edge Sampling method (APES), which captures salient points in the point cloud outline. Both qualitative and quantitative experimental results show the superior performance of our sampling method on common benchmark tasks.

While recent work on text-conditional 3D object generation has shown promising results, the state-of-the-art methods typically require multiple GPU-hours to produce a single sample. This is in stark contrast to state-of-the-art generative image models, which produce samples in a number of seconds or minutes. In this paper, we explore an alternative method for 3D object generation which produces 3D models in only 1-2 minutes on a single GPU. Our method first generates a single synthetic view using a text-to-image diffusion model, and then produces a 3D point cloud using a second diffusion model which conditions on the generated image. While our method still falls short of the state-of-the-art in terms of sample quality, it is one to two orders of magnitude faster to sample from, offering a practical trade-off for some use cases. We release our pre-trained point cloud diffusion models, as well as evaluation code and models, at https://github.com/openai/point-e.

Point cloud analysis is challenging due to the irregularity of the point cloud data structure. Existing works typically employ the ad-hoc sampling-grouping operation of PointNet++, followed by sophisticated local and/or global feature extractors for leveraging the 3D geometry of the point cloud. Unfortunately, the sampling-grouping operations do not address the point cloud's irregularity, whereas the intricate local and/or global feature extractors led to poor computational efficiency. In this paper, we introduce a novel DualNorm module after the sampling-grouping operation to effectively and efficiently address the irregularity issue. The DualNorm module consists of Point Normalization, which normalizes the grouped points to the sampled points, and Reverse Point Normalization, which normalizes the sampled points to the grouped points. The proposed framework, PointNorm, utilizes local mean and global standard deviation to benefit from both local and global features while maintaining a faithful inference speed. Experiments show that we achieved excellent accuracy and efficiency on ModelNet40 classification, ScanObjectNN classification, ShapeNetPart Part Segmentation, and S3DIS Semantic Segmentation. Code is available at https://github.com/ShenZheng2000/PointNorm-for-Point-Cloud-Analysis.

We present Point-BERT, a new paradigm for learning Transformers to generalize the concept of BERT to 3D point cloud. Inspired by BERT, we devise a Masked Point Modeling (MPM) task to pre-train point cloud Transformers. Specifically, we first divide a point cloud into several local point patches, and a point cloud Tokenizer with a discrete Variational AutoEncoder (dVAE) is designed to generate discrete point tokens containing meaningful local information. Then, we randomly mask out some patches of input point clouds and feed them into the backbone Transformers. The pre-training objective is to recover the original point tokens at the masked locations under the supervision of point tokens obtained by the Tokenizer. Extensive experiments demonstrate that the proposed BERT-style pre-training strategy significantly improves the performance of standard point cloud Transformers. Equipped with our pre-training strategy, we show that a pure Transformer architecture attains 93.8% accuracy on ModelNet40 and 83.1% accuracy on the hardest setting of ScanObjectNN, surpassing carefully designed point cloud models with much fewer hand-made designs. We also demonstrate that the representations learned by Point-BERT transfer well to new tasks and domains, where our models largely advance the state-of-the-art of few-shot point cloud classification task. The code and pre-trained models are available at https://github.com/lulutang0608/Point-BERT

Point cloud obtained from 3D scanning is often sparse, noisy, and irregular. To cope with these issues, recent studies have been separately conducted to densify, denoise, and complete inaccurate point cloud. In this paper, we advocate that jointly solving these tasks leads to significant improvement for point cloud reconstruction. To this end, we propose a deep point cloud reconstruction network consisting of two stages: 1) a 3D sparse stacked-hourglass network as for the initial densification and denoising, 2) a refinement via transformers converting the discrete voxels into 3D points. In particular, we further improve the performance of transformer by a newly proposed module called amplified positional encoding. This module has been designed to differently amplify the magnitude of positional encoding vectors based on the points' distances for adaptive refinements. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our network achieves state-of-the-art performance among the recent studies in the ScanNet, ICL-NUIM, and ShapeNetPart datasets. Moreover, we underline the ability of our network to generalize toward real-world and unmet scenes.

Neural painting refers to the procedure of producing a series of strokes for a given image and non-photo-realistically recreating it using neural networks. While reinforcement learning (RL) based agents can generate a stroke sequence step by step for this task, it is not easy to train a stable RL agent. On the other hand, stroke optimization methods search for a set of stroke parameters iteratively in a large search space; such low efficiency significantly limits their prevalence and practicality. Different from previous methods, in this paper, we formulate the task as a set prediction problem and propose a novel Transformer-based framework, dubbed Paint Transformer, to predict the parameters of a stroke set with a feed forward network. This way, our model can generate a set of strokes in parallel and obtain the final painting of size 512 * 512 in near real time. More importantly, since there is no dataset available for training the Paint Transformer, we devise a self-training pipeline such that it can be trained without any off-the-shelf dataset while still achieving excellent generalization capability. Experiments demonstrate that our method achieves better painting performance than previous ones with cheaper training and inference costs. Codes and models are available.

We present a probabilistic model for point cloud generation, which is fundamental for various 3D vision tasks such as shape completion, upsampling, synthesis and data augmentation. Inspired by the diffusion process in non-equilibrium thermodynamics, we view points in point clouds as particles in a thermodynamic system in contact with a heat bath, which diffuse from the original distribution to a noise distribution. Point cloud generation thus amounts to learning the reverse diffusion process that transforms the noise distribution to the distribution of a desired shape. Specifically, we propose to model the reverse diffusion process for point clouds as a Markov chain conditioned on certain shape latent. We derive the variational bound in closed form for training and provide implementations of the model. Experimental results demonstrate that our model achieves competitive performance in point cloud generation and auto-encoding. The code is available at https://github.com/luost26/diffusion-point-cloud.

Self-attention networks have revolutionized natural language processing and are making impressive strides in image analysis tasks such as image classification and object detection. Inspired by this success, we investigate the application of self-attention networks to 3D point cloud processing. We design self-attention layers for point clouds and use these to construct self-attention networks for tasks such as semantic scene segmentation, object part segmentation, and object classification. Our Point Transformer design improves upon prior work across domains and tasks. For example, on the challenging S3DIS dataset for large-scale semantic scene segmentation, the Point Transformer attains an mIoU of 70.4% on Area 5, outperforming the strongest prior model by 3.3 absolute percentage points and crossing the 70% mIoU threshold for the first time.

Point clouds provide a flexible geometric representation suitable for countless applications in computer graphics; they also comprise the raw output of most 3D data acquisition devices. While hand-designed features on point clouds have long been proposed in graphics and vision, however, the recent overwhelming success of convolutional neural networks (CNNs) for image analysis suggests the value of adapting insight from CNN to the point cloud world. Point clouds inherently lack topological information so designing a model to recover topology can enrich the representation power of point clouds. To this end, we propose a new neural network module dubbed EdgeConv suitable for CNN-based high-level tasks on point clouds including classification and segmentation. EdgeConv acts on graphs dynamically computed in each layer of the network. It is differentiable and can be plugged into existing architectures. Compared to existing modules operating in extrinsic space or treating each point independently, EdgeConv has several appealing properties: It incorporates local neighborhood information; it can be stacked applied to learn global shape properties; and in multi-layer systems affinity in feature space captures semantic characteristics over potentially long distances in the original embedding. We show the performance of our model on standard benchmarks including ModelNet40, ShapeNetPart, and S3DIS.

Point cloud is an important type of geometric data structure. Due to its irregular format, most researchers transform such data to regular 3D voxel grids or collections of images. This, however, renders data unnecessarily voluminous and causes issues. In this paper, we design a novel type of neural network that directly consumes point clouds and well respects the permutation invariance of points in the input. Our network, named PointNet, provides a unified architecture for applications ranging from object classification, part segmentation, to scene semantic parsing. Though simple, PointNet is highly efficient and effective. Empirically, it shows strong performance on par or even better than state of the art. Theoretically, we provide analysis towards understanding of what the network has learnt and why the network is robust with respect to input perturbation and corruption.

Prompt-based learning paradigm bridges the gap between pre-training and fine-tuning, and works effectively under the few-shot setting. However, we find that this learning paradigm inherits the vulnerability from the pre-training stage, where model predictions can be misled by inserting certain triggers into the text. In this paper, we explore this universal vulnerability by either injecting backdoor triggers or searching for adversarial triggers on pre-trained language models using only plain text. In both scenarios, we demonstrate that our triggers can totally control or severely decrease the performance of prompt-based models fine-tuned on arbitrary downstream tasks, reflecting the universal vulnerability of the prompt-based learning paradigm. Further experiments show that adversarial triggers have good transferability among language models. We also find conventional fine-tuning models are not vulnerable to adversarial triggers constructed from pre-trained language models. We conclude by proposing a potential solution to mitigate our attack methods. Code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/leix28/prompt-universal-vulnerability

With increasingly more data and computation involved in their training, machine learning models constitute valuable intellectual property. This has spurred interest in model stealing, which is made more practical by advances in learning with partial, little, or no supervision. Existing defenses focus on inserting unique watermarks in a model's decision surface, but this is insufficient: the watermarks are not sampled from the training distribution and thus are not always preserved during model stealing. In this paper, we make the key observation that knowledge contained in the stolen model's training set is what is common to all stolen copies. The adversary's goal, irrespective of the attack employed, is always to extract this knowledge or its by-products. This gives the original model's owner a strong advantage over the adversary: model owners have access to the original training data. We thus introduce dataset inference, the process of identifying whether a suspected model copy has private knowledge from the original model's dataset, as a defense against model stealing. We develop an approach for dataset inference that combines statistical testing with the ability to estimate the distance of multiple data points to the decision boundary. Our experiments on CIFAR10, SVHN, CIFAR100 and ImageNet show that model owners can claim with confidence greater than 99% that their model (or dataset as a matter of fact) was stolen, despite only exposing 50 of the stolen model's training points. Dataset inference defends against state-of-the-art attacks even when the adversary is adaptive. Unlike prior work, it does not require retraining or overfitting the defended model.

Backdoor attacks are a kind of insidious security threat against machine learning models. After being injected with a backdoor in training, the victim model will produce adversary-specified outputs on the inputs embedded with predesigned triggers but behave properly on normal inputs during inference. As a sort of emergent attack, backdoor attacks in natural language processing (NLP) are investigated insufficiently. As far as we know, almost all existing textual backdoor attack methods insert additional contents into normal samples as triggers, which causes the trigger-embedded samples to be detected and the backdoor attacks to be blocked without much effort. In this paper, we propose to use the syntactic structure as the trigger in textual backdoor attacks. We conduct extensive experiments to demonstrate that the syntactic trigger-based attack method can achieve comparable attack performance (almost 100% success rate) to the insertion-based methods but possesses much higher invisibility and stronger resistance to defenses. These results also reveal the significant insidiousness and harmfulness of textual backdoor attacks. All the code and data of this paper can be obtained at https://github.com/thunlp/HiddenKiller.

We tackle the problem of estimating a Manhattan frame, i.e. three orthogonal vanishing points, and the unknown focal length of the camera, leveraging a prior vertical direction. The direction can come from an Inertial Measurement Unit that is a standard component of recent consumer devices, e.g., smartphones. We provide an exhaustive analysis of minimal line configurations and derive two new 2-line solvers, one of which does not suffer from singularities affecting existing solvers. Additionally, we design a new non-minimal method, running on an arbitrary number of lines, to boost the performance in local optimization. Combining all solvers in a hybrid robust estimator, our method achieves increased accuracy even with a rough prior. Experiments on synthetic and real-world datasets demonstrate the superior accuracy of our method compared to the state of the art, while having comparable runtimes. We further demonstrate the applicability of our solvers for relative rotation estimation. The code is available at https://github.com/cvg/VP-Estimation-with-Prior-Gravity.

To serve the intricate and varied demands of image editing, precise and flexible manipulation of image content is indispensable. Recently, DragGAN has achieved impressive editing results through point-based manipulation. However, we have observed that DragGAN struggles with miss tracking, where DragGAN encounters difficulty in effectively tracking the desired handle points, and ambiguous tracking, where the tracked points are situated within other regions that bear resemblance to the handle points. To deal with the above issues, we propose FreeDrag, which adopts a feature-oriented approach to free the burden on point tracking within the point-oriented methodology of DragGAN. The FreeDrag incorporates adaptive template features, line search, and fuzzy localization techniques to perform stable and efficient point-based image editing. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method is superior to the DragGAN and enables stable point-based editing in challenging scenarios with similar structures, fine details, or under multi-point targets.

Diffusion probabilistic models have achieved remarkable success in text guided image generation. However, generating 3D shapes is still challenging due to the lack of sufficient data containing 3D models along with their descriptions. Moreover, text based descriptions of 3D shapes are inherently ambiguous and lack details. In this paper, we propose a sketch and text guided probabilistic diffusion model for colored point cloud generation that conditions the denoising process jointly with a hand drawn sketch of the object and its textual description. We incrementally diffuse the point coordinates and color values in a joint diffusion process to reach a Gaussian distribution. Colored point cloud generation thus amounts to learning the reverse diffusion process, conditioned by the sketch and text, to iteratively recover the desired shape and color. Specifically, to learn effective sketch-text embedding, our model adaptively aggregates the joint embedding of text prompt and the sketch based on a capsule attention network. Our model uses staged diffusion to generate the shape and then assign colors to different parts conditioned on the appearance prompt while preserving precise shapes from the first stage. This gives our model the flexibility to extend to multiple tasks, such as appearance re-editing and part segmentation. Experimental results demonstrate that our model outperforms recent state-of-the-art in point cloud generation.

Weakly-supervised image segmentation has recently attracted increasing research attentions, aiming to avoid the expensive pixel-wise labeling. In this paper, we present an effective method, namely Point2Mask, to achieve high-quality panoptic prediction using only a single random point annotation per target for training. Specifically, we formulate the panoptic pseudo-mask generation as an Optimal Transport (OT) problem, where each ground-truth (gt) point label and pixel sample are defined as the label supplier and consumer, respectively. The transportation cost is calculated by the introduced task-oriented maps, which focus on the category-wise and instance-wise differences among the various thing and stuff targets. Furthermore, a centroid-based scheme is proposed to set the accurate unit number for each gt point supplier. Hence, the pseudo-mask generation is converted into finding the optimal transport plan at a globally minimal transportation cost, which can be solved via the Sinkhorn-Knopp Iteration. Experimental results on Pascal VOC and COCO demonstrate the promising performance of our proposed Point2Mask approach to point-supervised panoptic segmentation. Source code is available at: https://github.com/LiWentomng/Point2Mask.

In the field of autonomous driving, there have been many excellent perception models for object detection, semantic segmentation, and other tasks, but how can we effectively use the perception models for vehicle planning? Traditional autonomous vehicle trajectory prediction methods not only need to obey traffic rules to avoid collisions, but also need to follow the prescribed route to reach the destination. In this paper, we propose a Transformer-based trajectory prediction network for end-to-end autonomous driving without rules called Target-point Attention Transformer network (TAT). We use the attention mechanism to realize the interaction between the predicted trajectory and the perception features as well as target-points. We demonstrate that our proposed method outperforms existing conditional imitation learning and GRU-based methods, significantly reducing the occurrence of accidents and improving route completion. We evaluate our approach in complex closed loop driving scenarios in cities using the CARLA simulator and achieve state-of-the-art performance.

We introduce a novel class of sample-based explanations we term high-dimensional representers, that can be used to explain the predictions of a regularized high-dimensional model in terms of importance weights for each of the training samples. Our workhorse is a novel representer theorem for general regularized high-dimensional models, which decomposes the model prediction in terms of contributions from each of the training samples: with positive (negative) values corresponding to positive (negative) impact training samples to the model's prediction. We derive consequences for the canonical instances of ell_1 regularized sparse models, and nuclear norm regularized low-rank models. As a case study, we further investigate the application of low-rank models in the context of collaborative filtering, where we instantiate high-dimensional representers for specific popular classes of models. Finally, we study the empirical performance of our proposed methods on three real-world binary classification datasets and two recommender system datasets. We also showcase the utility of high-dimensional representers in explaining model recommendations.

Recent years have witnessed significant progress in the field of neural surface reconstruction. While the extensive focus was put on volumetric and implicit approaches, a number of works have shown that explicit graphics primitives such as point clouds can significantly reduce computational complexity, without sacrificing the reconstructed surface quality. However, less emphasis has been put on modeling dynamic surfaces with point primitives. In this work, we present a dynamic point field model that combines the representational benefits of explicit point-based graphics with implicit deformation networks to allow efficient modeling of non-rigid 3D surfaces. Using explicit surface primitives also allows us to easily incorporate well-established constraints such as-isometric-as-possible regularisation. While learning this deformation model is prone to local optima when trained in a fully unsupervised manner, we propose to additionally leverage semantic information such as keypoint dynamics to guide the deformation learning. We demonstrate our model with an example application of creating an expressive animatable human avatar from a collection of 3D scans. Here, previous methods mostly rely on variants of the linear blend skinning paradigm, which fundamentally limits the expressivity of such models when dealing with complex cloth appearances such as long skirts. We show the advantages of our dynamic point field framework in terms of its representational power, learning efficiency, and robustness to out-of-distribution novel poses.

We present Topological Point Cloud Clustering (TPCC), a new method to cluster points in an arbitrary point cloud based on their contribution to global topological features. TPCC synthesizes desirable features from spectral clustering and topological data analysis and is based on considering the spectral properties of a simplicial complex associated to the considered point cloud. As it is based on considering sparse eigenvector computations, TPCC is similarly easy to interpret and implement as spectral clustering. However, by focusing not just on a single matrix associated to a graph created from the point cloud data, but on a whole set of Hodge-Laplacians associated to an appropriately constructed simplicial complex, we can leverage a far richer set of topological features to characterize the data points within the point cloud and benefit from the relative robustness of topological techniques against noise. We test the performance of TPCC on both synthetic and real-world data and compare it with classical spectral clustering.

Although point cloud registration has achieved remarkable advances in object-level and indoor scenes, large-scale registration methods are rarely explored. Challenges mainly arise from the huge point number, complex distribution, and outliers of outdoor LiDAR scans. In addition, most existing registration works generally adopt a two-stage paradigm: They first find correspondences by extracting discriminative local features and then leverage estimators (eg. RANSAC) to filter outliers, which are highly dependent on well-designed descriptors and post-processing choices. To address these problems, we propose an end-to-end transformer network (RegFormer) for large-scale point cloud alignment without any further post-processing. Specifically, a projection-aware hierarchical transformer is proposed to capture long-range dependencies and filter outliers by extracting point features globally. Our transformer has linear complexity, which guarantees high efficiency even for large-scale scenes. Furthermore, to effectively reduce mismatches, a bijective association transformer is designed for regressing the initial transformation. Extensive experiments on KITTI and NuScenes datasets demonstrate that our RegFormer achieves competitive performance in terms of both accuracy and efficiency.

Two-point zeroth order methods are important in many applications of zeroth-order optimization, such as robotics, wind farms, power systems, online optimization, and adversarial robustness to black-box attacks in deep neural networks, where the problem may be high-dimensional and/or time-varying. Most problems in these applications are nonconvex and contain saddle points. While existing works have shown that zeroth-order methods utilizing Omega(d) function valuations per iteration (with d denoting the problem dimension) can escape saddle points efficiently, it remains an open question if zeroth-order methods based on two-point estimators can escape saddle points. In this paper, we show that by adding an appropriate isotropic perturbation at each iteration, a zeroth-order algorithm based on 2m (for any 1 leq m leq d) function evaluations per iteration can not only find epsilon-second order stationary points polynomially fast, but do so using only Oleft(d{mepsilon^{2}psi}right) function evaluations, where psi geq Omegaleft(epsilonright) is a parameter capturing the extent to which the function of interest exhibits the strict saddle property.

Contrastive Learning (CL) has attracted enormous attention due to its remarkable capability in unsupervised representation learning. However, recent works have revealed the vulnerability of CL to backdoor attacks: the feature extractor could be misled to embed backdoored data close to an attack target class, thus fooling the downstream predictor to misclassify it as the target. Existing attacks usually adopt a fixed trigger pattern and poison the training set with trigger-injected data, hoping for the feature extractor to learn the association between trigger and target class. However, we find that such fixed trigger design fails to effectively associate trigger-injected data with target class in the embedding space due to special CL mechanisms, leading to a limited attack success rate (ASR). This phenomenon motivates us to find a better backdoor trigger design tailored for CL framework. In this paper, we propose a bi-level optimization approach to achieve this goal, where the inner optimization simulates the CL dynamics of a surrogate victim, and the outer optimization enforces the backdoor trigger to stay close to the target throughout the surrogate CL procedure. Extensive experiments show that our attack can achieve a higher attack success rate (e.g., 99% ASR on ImageNet-100) with a very low poisoning rate (1%). Besides, our attack can effectively evade existing state-of-the-art defenses. Code is available at: https://github.com/SWY666/SSL-backdoor-BLTO.

Despite excellent average-case performance of many image classifiers, their performance can substantially deteriorate on semantically coherent subgroups of the data that were under-represented in the training data. These systematic errors can impact both fairness for demographic minority groups as well as robustness and safety under domain shift. A major challenge is to identify such subgroups with subpar performance when the subgroups are not annotated and their occurrence is very rare. We leverage recent advances in text-to-image models and search in the space of textual descriptions of subgroups ("prompts") for subgroups where the target model has low performance on the prompt-conditioned synthesized data. To tackle the exponentially growing number of subgroups, we employ combinatorial testing. We denote this procedure as PromptAttack as it can be interpreted as an adversarial attack in a prompt space. We study subgroup coverage and identifiability with PromptAttack in a controlled setting and find that it identifies systematic errors with high accuracy. Thereupon, we apply PromptAttack to ImageNet classifiers and identify novel systematic errors on rare subgroups.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated exceptional proficiency in instruction-following, becoming increasingly crucial across various applications. However, this capability brings with it the risk of prompt injection attacks, where attackers inject instructions into LLMs' input to elicit undesirable actions or content. Understanding the robustness of LLMs against such attacks is vital for their safe implementation. In this work, we establish a benchmark to evaluate the robustness of instruction-following LLMs against prompt injection attacks. Our objective is to determine the extent to which LLMs can be influenced by injected instructions and their ability to differentiate between these injected and original target instructions. Through extensive experiments with leading instruction-following LLMs, we uncover significant vulnerabilities in their robustness to such attacks. Our results indicate that some models are overly tuned to follow any embedded instructions in the prompt, overly focusing on the latter parts of the prompt without fully grasping the entire context. By contrast, models with a better grasp of the context and instruction-following capabilities will potentially be more susceptible to compromise by injected instructions. This underscores the need to shift the focus from merely enhancing LLMs' instruction-following capabilities to improving their overall comprehension of prompts and discernment of instructions that are appropriate to follow. We hope our in-depth analysis offers insights into the underlying causes of these vulnerabilities, aiding in the development of future solutions. Code and data are available at https://github.com/Leezekun/instruction-following-robustness-eval

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly being deployed in interactive contexts that involve direct user engagement, such as chatbots and writing assistants. These deployments are increasingly plagued by prompt injection and jailbreaking (collectively, prompt hacking), in which models are manipulated to ignore their original instructions and instead follow potentially malicious ones. Although widely acknowledged as a significant security threat, there is a dearth of large-scale resources and quantitative studies on prompt hacking. To address this lacuna, we launch a global prompt hacking competition, which allows for free-form human input attacks. We elicit 600K+ adversarial prompts against three state-of-the-art LLMs. We describe the dataset, which empirically verifies that current LLMs can indeed be manipulated via prompt hacking. We also present a comprehensive taxonomical ontology of the types of adversarial prompts.

In the rapidly evolving landscape of Large Language Models (LLMs), ensuring robust safety measures is paramount. To meet this crucial need, we propose SALAD-Bench, a safety benchmark specifically designed for evaluating LLMs, attack, and defense methods. Distinguished by its breadth, SALAD-Bench transcends conventional benchmarks through its large scale, rich diversity, intricate taxonomy spanning three levels, and versatile functionalities.SALAD-Bench is crafted with a meticulous array of questions, from standard queries to complex ones enriched with attack, defense modifications and multiple-choice. To effectively manage the inherent complexity, we introduce an innovative evaluators: the LLM-based MD-Judge for QA pairs with a particular focus on attack-enhanced queries, ensuring a seamless, and reliable evaluation. Above components extend SALAD-Bench from standard LLM safety evaluation to both LLM attack and defense methods evaluation, ensuring the joint-purpose utility. Our extensive experiments shed light on the resilience of LLMs against emerging threats and the efficacy of contemporary defense tactics. Data and evaluator are released under https://github.com/OpenSafetyLab/SALAD-BENCH. Warning: this paper includes examples that may be offensive or harmful.

With the rapid advancement of multimodal large language models (MLLMs), concerns regarding their security have increasingly captured the attention of both academia and industry. Although MLLMs are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks, designing effective multimodal jailbreak attacks poses unique challenges, especially given the distinct protective measures implemented across various modalities in commercial models. Previous works concentrate risks into a single modality, resulting in limited jailbreak performance. In this paper, we propose a heuristic-induced multimodal risk distribution jailbreak attack method, called HIMRD, which consists of two elements: multimodal risk distribution strategy and heuristic-induced search strategy. The multimodal risk distribution strategy is used to segment harmful instructions across multiple modalities to effectively circumvent MLLMs' security protection. The heuristic-induced search strategy identifies two types of prompts: the understanding-enhancing prompt, which helps the MLLM reconstruct the malicious prompt, and the inducing prompt, which increases the likelihood of affirmative outputs over refusals, enabling a successful jailbreak attack. Extensive experiments demonstrate that this approach effectively uncovers vulnerabilities in MLLMs, achieving an average attack success rate of 90% across seven popular open-source MLLMs and an average attack success rate of around 68% in three popular closed-source MLLMs. Our code will coming soon. Warning: This paper contains offensive and harmful examples, reader discretion is advised.

Recently, autonomous agents built on large language models (LLMs) have experienced significant development and are being deployed in real-world applications. These agents can extend the base LLM's capabilities in multiple ways. For example, a well-built agent using GPT-3.5-Turbo as its core can outperform the more advanced GPT-4 model by leveraging external components. More importantly, the usage of tools enables these systems to perform actions in the real world, moving from merely generating text to actively interacting with their environment. Given the agents' practical applications and their ability to execute consequential actions, it is crucial to assess potential vulnerabilities. Such autonomous systems can cause more severe damage than a standalone language model if compromised. While some existing research has explored harmful actions by LLM agents, our study approaches the vulnerability from a different perspective. We introduce a new type of attack that causes malfunctions by misleading the agent into executing repetitive or irrelevant actions. We conduct comprehensive evaluations using various attack methods, surfaces, and properties to pinpoint areas of susceptibility. Our experiments reveal that these attacks can induce failure rates exceeding 80\% in multiple scenarios. Through attacks on implemented and deployable agents in multi-agent scenarios, we accentuate the realistic risks associated with these vulnerabilities. To mitigate such attacks, we propose self-examination detection methods. However, our findings indicate these attacks are difficult to detect effectively using LLMs alone, highlighting the substantial risks associated with this vulnerability.

Despite advances in AI alignment, language models (LM) remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks or jailbreaking, in which adversaries modify input prompts to induce harmful behavior. While some defenses have been proposed, they focus on narrow threat models and fall short of a strong defense, which we posit should be effective, universal, and practical. To achieve this, we propose the first adversarial objective for defending LMs against jailbreaking attacks and an algorithm, robust prompt optimization (RPO), that uses gradient-based token optimization to enforce harmless outputs. This results in an easily accessible suffix that significantly improves robustness to both jailbreaks seen during optimization and unknown, held-out jailbreaks, reducing the attack success rate on Starling-7B from 84% to 8.66% across 20 jailbreaks. In addition, we find that RPO has a minor effect on normal LM use, is successful under adaptive attacks, and can transfer to black-box models, reducing the success rate of the strongest attack on GPT-4 from 92% to 6%.

As machine learning models grow in complexity and increasingly rely on publicly sourced data, such as the human-annotated labels used in training large language models, they become more vulnerable to label poisoning attacks. These attacks, in which adversaries subtly alter the labels within a training dataset, can severely degrade model performance, posing significant risks in critical applications. In this paper, we propose FLORAL, a novel adversarial training defense strategy based on support vector machines (SVMs) to counter these threats. Utilizing a bilevel optimization framework, we cast the training process as a non-zero-sum Stackelberg game between an attacker, who strategically poisons critical training labels, and the model, which seeks to recover from such attacks. Our approach accommodates various model architectures and employs a projected gradient descent algorithm with kernel SVMs for adversarial training. We provide a theoretical analysis of our algorithm's convergence properties and empirically evaluate FLORAL's effectiveness across diverse classification tasks. Compared to robust baselines and foundation models such as RoBERTa, FLORAL consistently achieves higher robust accuracy under increasing attacker budgets. These results underscore the potential of FLORAL to enhance the resilience of machine learning models against label poisoning threats, thereby ensuring robust classification in adversarial settings.

Large Language Models (LLMs) can be misused to spread online spam and misinformation. Content watermarking deters misuse by hiding a message in model-generated outputs, enabling their detection using a secret watermarking key. Robustness is a core security property, stating that evading detection requires (significant) degradation of the content's quality. Many LLM watermarking methods have been proposed, but robustness is tested only against non-adaptive attackers who lack knowledge of the watermarking method and can find only suboptimal attacks. We formulate the robustness of LLM watermarking as an objective function and propose preference-based optimization to tune adaptive attacks against the specific watermarking method. Our evaluation shows that (i) adaptive attacks substantially outperform non-adaptive baselines. (ii) Even in a non-adaptive setting, adaptive attacks optimized against a few known watermarks remain highly effective when tested against other unseen watermarks, and (iii) optimization-based attacks are practical and require less than seven GPU hours. Our findings underscore the need to test robustness against adaptive attackers.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are seeing significant adoption in every type of organization due to their exceptional generative capabilities. However, LLMs are found to be vulnerable to various adversarial attacks, particularly prompt injection attacks, which trick them into producing harmful or inappropriate content. Adversaries execute such attacks by crafting malicious prompts to deceive the LLMs. In this paper, we propose a novel approach based on embedding-based Machine Learning (ML) classifiers to protect LLM-based applications against this severe threat. We leverage three commonly used embedding models to generate embeddings of malicious and benign prompts and utilize ML classifiers to predict whether an input prompt is malicious. Out of several traditional ML methods, we achieve the best performance with classifiers built using Random Forest and XGBoost. Our classifiers outperform state-of-the-art prompt injection classifiers available in open-source implementations, which use encoder-only neural networks.

Despite prior safety alignment efforts, mainstream LLMs can still generate harmful and unethical content when subjected to jailbreaking attacks. Existing jailbreaking methods fall into two main categories: template-based and optimization-based methods. The former requires significant manual effort and domain knowledge, while the latter, exemplified by Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG), which seeks to maximize the likelihood of harmful LLM outputs through token-level optimization, also encounters several limitations: requiring white-box access, necessitating pre-constructed affirmative phrase, and suffering from low efficiency. In this paper, we present ECLIPSE, a novel and efficient black-box jailbreaking method utilizing optimizable suffixes. Drawing inspiration from LLMs' powerful generation and optimization capabilities, we employ task prompts to translate jailbreaking goals into natural language instructions. This guides the LLM to generate adversarial suffixes for malicious queries. In particular, a harmfulness scorer provides continuous feedback, enabling LLM self-reflection and iterative optimization to autonomously and efficiently produce effective suffixes. Experimental results demonstrate that ECLIPSE achieves an average attack success rate (ASR) of 0.92 across three open-source LLMs and GPT-3.5-Turbo, significantly surpassing GCG in 2.4 times. Moreover, ECLIPSE is on par with template-based methods in ASR while offering superior attack efficiency, reducing the average attack overhead by 83%.

Recently, test-time adaptation (TTA) has been proposed as a promising solution for addressing distribution shifts. It allows a base model to adapt to an unforeseen distribution during inference by leveraging the information from the batch of (unlabeled) test data. However, we uncover a novel security vulnerability of TTA based on the insight that predictions on benign samples can be impacted by malicious samples in the same batch. To exploit this vulnerability, we propose Distribution Invading Attack (DIA), which injects a small fraction of malicious data into the test batch. DIA causes models using TTA to misclassify benign and unperturbed test data, providing an entirely new capability for adversaries that is infeasible in canonical machine learning pipelines. Through comprehensive evaluations, we demonstrate the high effectiveness of our attack on multiple benchmarks across six TTA methods. In response, we investigate two countermeasures to robustify the existing insecure TTA implementations, following the principle of "security by design". Together, we hope our findings can make the community aware of the utility-security tradeoffs in deploying TTA and provide valuable insights for developing robust TTA approaches.

The widespread use of large language models (LLMs) is increasing the demand for methods that detect machine-generated text to prevent misuse. The goal of our study is to stress test the detectors' robustness to malicious attacks under realistic scenarios. We comprehensively study the robustness of popular machine-generated text detectors under attacks from diverse categories: editing, paraphrasing, prompting, and co-generating. Our attacks assume limited access to the generator LLMs, and we compare the performance of detectors on different attacks under different budget levels. Our experiments reveal that almost none of the existing detectors remain robust under all the attacks, and all detectors exhibit different loopholes. Averaging all detectors, the performance drops by 35% across all attacks. Further, we investigate the reasons behind these defects and propose initial out-of-the-box patches to improve robustness.

We present FireBERT, a set of three proof-of-concept NLP classifiers hardened against TextFooler-style word-perturbation by producing diverse alternatives to original samples. In one approach, we co-tune BERT against the training data and synthetic adversarial samples. In a second approach, we generate the synthetic samples at evaluation time through substitution of words and perturbation of embedding vectors. The diversified evaluation results are then combined by voting. A third approach replaces evaluation-time word substitution with perturbation of embedding vectors. We evaluate FireBERT for MNLI and IMDB Movie Review datasets, in the original and on adversarial examples generated by TextFooler. We also test whether TextFooler is less successful in creating new adversarial samples when manipulating FireBERT, compared to working on unhardened classifiers. We show that it is possible to improve the accuracy of BERT-based models in the face of adversarial attacks without significantly reducing the accuracy for regular benchmark samples. We present co-tuning with a synthetic data generator as a highly effective method to protect against 95% of pre-manufactured adversarial samples while maintaining 98% of original benchmark performance. We also demonstrate evaluation-time perturbation as a promising direction for further research, restoring accuracy up to 75% of benchmark performance for pre-made adversarials, and up to 65% (from a baseline of 75% orig. / 12% attack) under active attack by TextFooler.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable success across diverse tasks, yet they remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks, notably the well-known jailbreak attack. In particular, the Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) attack has demonstrated efficacy in exploiting this vulnerability by optimizing adversarial prompts through a combination of gradient heuristics and greedy search. However, the efficiency of this attack has become a bottleneck in the attacking process. To mitigate this limitation, in this paper we rethink the generation of the adversarial prompts through an optimization lens, aiming to stabilize the optimization process and harness more heuristic insights from previous optimization iterations. Specifically, we propose the Momentum Accelerated GCG (MAC) attack, which integrates a momentum term into the gradient heuristic to boost and stabilize the random search for tokens in adversarial prompts. Experimental results showcase the notable enhancement achieved by MAC over baselines in terms of attack success rate and optimization efficiency. Moreover, we demonstrate that MAC can still exhibit superior performance for transfer attacks and models under defense mechanisms. Our code is available at https://github.com/weizeming/momentum-attack-llm.

Large language models (LLMs) have seen rapid development in recent years, revolutionizing various applications and significantly enhancing convenience and productivity. However, alongside their impressive capabilities, ethical concerns and new types of attacks, such as jailbreaking, have emerged. While most prompting techniques focus on optimizing adversarial inputs for individual cases, resulting in higher computational costs when dealing with large datasets. Less research has addressed the more general setting of training a universal attacker that can transfer to unseen tasks. In this paper, we introduce JUMP, a prompt-based method designed to jailbreak LLMs using universal multi-prompts. We also adapt our approach for defense, which we term DUMP. Experimental results demonstrate that our method for optimizing universal multi-prompts outperforms existing techniques.

It has become common to publish large (billion parameter) language models that have been trained on private datasets. This paper demonstrates that in such settings, an adversary can perform a training data extraction attack to recover individual training examples by querying the language model. We demonstrate our attack on GPT-2, a language model trained on scrapes of the public Internet, and are able to extract hundreds of verbatim text sequences from the model's training data. These extracted examples include (public) personally identifiable information (names, phone numbers, and email addresses), IRC conversations, code, and 128-bit UUIDs. Our attack is possible even though each of the above sequences are included in just one document in the training data. We comprehensively evaluate our extraction attack to understand the factors that contribute to its success. Worryingly, we find that larger models are more vulnerable than smaller models. We conclude by drawing lessons and discussing possible safeguards for training large language models.

Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) expands the capabilities of modern large language models (LLMs) in chatbot applications, enabling developers to adapt and personalize the LLM output without expensive training or fine-tuning. RAG systems use an external knowledge database to retrieve the most relevant documents for a given query, providing this context to the LLM generator. While RAG achieves impressive utility in many applications, its adoption to enable personalized generative models introduces new security risks. In this work, we propose new attack surfaces for an adversary to compromise a victim's RAG system, by injecting a single malicious document in its knowledge database. We design Phantom, general two-step attack framework against RAG augmented LLMs. The first step involves crafting a poisoned document designed to be retrieved by the RAG system within the top-k results only when an adversarial trigger, a specific sequence of words acting as backdoor, is present in the victim's queries. In the second step, a specially crafted adversarial string within the poisoned document triggers various adversarial attacks in the LLM generator, including denial of service, reputation damage, privacy violations, and harmful behaviors. We demonstrate our attacks on multiple LLM architectures, including Gemma, Vicuna, and Llama.

Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) represent sophisticated attack patterns in the cybersecurity domain, described encyclopedically in textual knowledge bases. Identifying TTPs in cybersecurity writing, often called TTP mapping, is an important and challenging task. Conventional learning approaches often target the problem in the classical multi-class or multilabel classification setting. This setting hinders the learning ability of the model due to a large number of classes (i.e., TTPs), the inevitable skewness of the label distribution and the complex hierarchical structure of the label space. We formulate the problem in a different learning paradigm, where the assignment of a text to a TTP label is decided by the direct semantic similarity between the two, thus reducing the complexity of competing solely over the large labeling space. To that end, we propose a neural matching architecture with an effective sampling-based learn-to-compare mechanism, facilitating the learning process of the matching model despite constrained resources.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have become a cornerstone in the field of Natural Language Processing (NLP), offering transformative capabilities in understanding and generating human-like text. However, with their rising prominence, the security and vulnerability aspects of these models have garnered significant attention. This paper presents a comprehensive survey of the various forms of attacks targeting LLMs, discussing the nature and mechanisms of these attacks, their potential impacts, and current defense strategies. We delve into topics such as adversarial attacks that aim to manipulate model outputs, data poisoning that affects model training, and privacy concerns related to training data exploitation. The paper also explores the effectiveness of different attack methodologies, the resilience of LLMs against these attacks, and the implications for model integrity and user trust. By examining the latest research, we provide insights into the current landscape of LLM vulnerabilities and defense mechanisms. Our objective is to offer a nuanced understanding of LLM attacks, foster awareness within the AI community, and inspire robust solutions to mitigate these risks in future developments.

Instruction tuning is an effective technique to align large language models (LLMs) with human intents. In this work, we investigate how an adversary can exploit instruction tuning by injecting specific instruction-following examples into the training data that intentionally changes the model's behavior. For example, an adversary can achieve content injection by injecting training examples that mention target content and eliciting such behavior from downstream models. To achieve this goal, we propose AutoPoison, an automated data poisoning pipeline. It naturally and coherently incorporates versatile attack goals into poisoned data with the help of an oracle LLM. We showcase two example attacks: content injection and over-refusal attacks, each aiming to induce a specific exploitable behavior. We quantify and benchmark the strength and the stealthiness of our data poisoning scheme. Our results show that AutoPoison allows an adversary to change a model's behavior by poisoning only a small fraction of data while maintaining a high level of stealthiness in the poisoned examples. We hope our work sheds light on how data quality affects the behavior of instruction-tuned models and raises awareness of the importance of data quality for responsible deployments of LLMs. Code is available at https://github.com/azshue/AutoPoison.

Caution: This paper includes offensive words that could potentially cause unpleasantness. Language models (LMs) are vulnerable to exploitation for adversarial misuse. Training LMs for safety alignment is extensive and makes it hard to respond to fast-developing attacks immediately, such as jailbreaks. We propose self-refine with formatting that achieves outstanding safety even in non-safety-aligned LMs and evaluate our method alongside several defense baselines, demonstrating that it is the safest training-free method against jailbreak attacks. Additionally, we proposed a formatting method that improves the efficiency of the self-refine process while reducing attack success rates in fewer iterations. We've also observed that non-safety-aligned LMs outperform safety-aligned LMs in safety tasks by giving more helpful and safe responses. In conclusion, our findings can achieve less safety risk with fewer computational costs, allowing non-safety LM to be easily utilized in real-world service.

Recently, Carlini et al. demonstrated the widely used model Stable Diffusion can regurgitate real training samples, which is troublesome from a copyright perspective. In this work, we provide an efficient extraction attack on par with the recent attack, with several order of magnitudes less network evaluations. In the process, we expose a new phenomena, which we dub template verbatims, wherein a diffusion model will regurgitate a training sample largely in tact. Template verbatims are harder to detect as they require retrieval and masking to correctly label. Furthermore, they are still generated by newer systems, even those which de-duplicate their training set, and we give insight into why they still appear during generation. We extract training images from several state of the art systems, including Stable Diffusion 2.0, Deep Image Floyd, and finally Midjourney v4. We release code to verify our extraction attack, perform the attack, as well as all extracted prompts at https://github.com/ryanwebster90/onestep-extraction.

In recent years, the rapid development of large language models (LLMs) has brought new vitality to the various domains and generated substantial social and economic benefits. However, the swift advancement of LLMs has introduced new security vulnerabilities. Jailbreak, a form of attack that induces LLMs to output harmful content through carefully crafted prompts, poses a challenge to the safe and trustworthy development of LLMs. Previous jailbreak attack methods primarily exploited the internal capabilities of the model. Among them, one category leverages the model's implicit capabilities for jailbreak attacks, where the attacker is unaware of the exact reasons for the attack's success. The other category utilizes the model's explicit capabilities for jailbreak attacks, where the attacker understands the reasons for the attack's success. For example, these attacks exploit the model's abilities in coding, contextual learning, or understanding ASCII characters. However, these earlier jailbreak attacks have certain limitations, as they only exploit the inherent capabilities of the model. In this paper, we propose a novel jailbreak method, SQL Injection Jailbreak (SIJ), which utilizes the construction of input prompts by LLMs to inject jailbreak information into user prompts, enabling successful jailbreak of the LLMs. Our SIJ method achieves nearly 100\% attack success rates on five well-known open-source LLMs in the context of AdvBench, while incurring lower time costs compared to previous methods. More importantly, SIJ reveals a new vulnerability in LLMs that urgently needs to be addressed. To this end, we propose a defense method called Self-Reminder-Key and demonstrate its effectiveness through experiments. Our code is available at https://github.com/weiyezhimeng/SQL-Injection-Jailbreak{https://github.com/weiyezhimeng/SQL-Injection-Jailbreak}.

Large language models, despite extensive alignment with human values and ethical principles, remain vulnerable to sophisticated jailbreak attacks that exploit their reasoning abilities. Existing safety measures often detect overt malicious intent but fail to address subtle, reasoning-driven vulnerabilities. In this work, we introduce POATE (Polar Opposite query generation, Adversarial Template construction, and Elaboration), a novel jailbreak technique that harnesses contrastive reasoning to provoke unethical responses. POATE crafts semantically opposing intents and integrates them with adversarial templates, steering models toward harmful outputs with remarkable subtlety. We conduct extensive evaluation across six diverse language model families of varying parameter sizes to demonstrate the robustness of the attack, achieving significantly higher attack success rates (~44%) compared to existing methods. To counter this, we propose Intent-Aware CoT and Reverse Thinking CoT, which decompose queries to detect malicious intent and reason in reverse to evaluate and reject harmful responses. These methods enhance reasoning robustness and strengthen the model's defense against adversarial exploits.

Although Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved tremendous success in various applications, they are also susceptible to certain prompts that can induce them to bypass built-in safety measures and provide dangerous or illegal content, a phenomenon known as jailbreak. To protect LLMs from producing harmful information, various defense strategies are proposed, with most focusing on content filtering or adversarial training of models. In this paper, we propose an approach named Prompt Adversarial Tuning (PAT) to train a defense control mechanism, which is then embedded as a prefix to user prompts to implement our defense strategy. We design a training process similar to adversarial training to achieve our optimized goal, alternating between updating attack and defense controls. To our knowledge, we are the first to implement defense from the perspective of prompt tuning. Once employed, our method will hardly impact the operational efficiency of LLMs. Experiments show that our method is effective in both black-box and white-box settings, reducing the success rate of advanced attacks to nearly 0 while maintaining the benign answer rate of 80% to simple benign questions. Our work might potentially chart a new perspective for future explorations in LLM security.

Motivated by ethical and legal concerns, the scientific community is actively developing methods to limit the misuse of Text-to-Image diffusion models for reproducing copyrighted, violent, explicit, or personal information in the generated images. Simultaneously, researchers put these newly developed safety measures to the test by assuming the role of an adversary to find vulnerabilities and backdoors in them. We use compositional property of diffusion models, which allows to leverage multiple prompts in a single image generation. This property allows us to combine other concepts, that should not have been affected by the inhibition, to reconstruct the vector, responsible for target concept generation, even though the direct computation of this vector is no longer accessible. We provide theoretical and empirical evidence why the proposed attacks are possible and discuss the implications of these findings for safe model deployment. We argue that it is essential to consider all possible approaches to image generation with diffusion models that can be employed by an adversary. Our work opens up the discussion about the implications of concept arithmetics and compositional inference for safety mechanisms in diffusion models. Content Advisory: This paper contains discussions and model-generated content that may be considered offensive. Reader discretion is advised. Project page: https://cs-people.bu.edu/vpetsiuk/arc

Previous work has shown that Large Language Models are susceptible to so-called data extraction attacks. This allows an attacker to extract a sample that was contained in the training data, which has massive privacy implications. The construction of data extraction attacks is challenging, current attacks are quite inefficient, and there exists a significant gap in the extraction capabilities of untargeted attacks and memorization. Thus, targeted attacks are proposed, which identify if a given sample from the training data, is extractable from a model. In this work, we apply a targeted data extraction attack to the SATML2023 Language Model Training Data Extraction Challenge. We apply a two-step approach. In the first step, we maximise the recall of the model and are able to extract the suffix for 69% of the samples. In the second step, we use a classifier-based Membership Inference Attack on the generations. Our AutoSklearn classifier achieves a precision of 0.841. The full approach reaches a score of 0.405 recall at a 10% false positive rate, which is an improvement of 34% over the baseline of 0.301.

Discrete adversarial attacks are symbolic perturbations to a language input that preserve the output label but lead to a prediction error. While such attacks have been extensively explored for the purpose of evaluating model robustness, their utility for improving robustness has been limited to offline augmentation only. Concretely, given a trained model, attacks are used to generate perturbed (adversarial) examples, and the model is re-trained exactly once. In this work, we address this gap and leverage discrete attacks for online augmentation, where adversarial examples are generated at every training step, adapting to the changing nature of the model. We propose (i) a new discrete attack, based on best-first search, and (ii) random sampling attacks that unlike prior work are not based on expensive search-based procedures. Surprisingly, we find that random sampling leads to impressive gains in robustness, outperforming the commonly-used offline augmentation, while leading to a speedup at training time of ~10x. Furthermore, online augmentation with search-based attacks justifies the higher training cost, significantly improving robustness on three datasets. Last, we show that our new attack substantially improves robustness compared to prior methods.

Large language models (LLMs) are now deployed to everyday use and positioned to produce large quantities of text in the coming decade. Machine-generated text may displace human-written text on the internet and has the potential to be used for malicious purposes, such as spearphishing attacks and social media bots. Watermarking is a simple and effective strategy for mitigating such harms by enabling the detection and documentation of LLM-generated text. Yet, a crucial question remains: How reliable is watermarking in realistic settings in the wild? There, watermarked text might be mixed with other text sources, paraphrased by human writers or other language models, and used for applications in a broad number of domains, both social and technical. In this paper, we explore different detection schemes, quantify their power at detecting watermarks, and determine how much machine-generated text needs to be observed in each scenario to reliably detect the watermark. We especially highlight our human study, where we investigate the reliability of watermarking when faced with human paraphrasing. We compare watermark-based detection to other detection strategies, finding overall that watermarking is a reliable solution, especially because of its sample complexity - for all attacks we consider, the watermark evidence compounds the more examples are given, and the watermark is eventually detected.

Recent researches have shown that Large Language Models (LLMs) are susceptible to a security threat known as Backdoor Attack. The backdoored model will behave well in normal cases but exhibit malicious behaviours on inputs inserted with a specific backdoor trigger. Current backdoor studies on LLMs predominantly focus on instruction-tuned LLMs, while neglecting another realistic scenario where LLMs are fine-tuned on multi-turn conversational data to be chat models. Chat models are extensively adopted across various real-world scenarios, thus the security of chat models deserves increasing attention. Unfortunately, we point out that the flexible multi-turn interaction format instead increases the flexibility of trigger designs and amplifies the vulnerability of chat models to backdoor attacks. In this work, we reveal and achieve a novel backdoor attacking method on chat models by distributing multiple trigger scenarios across user inputs in different rounds, and making the backdoor be triggered only when all trigger scenarios have appeared in the historical conversations. Experimental results demonstrate that our method can achieve high attack success rates (e.g., over 90% ASR on Vicuna-7B) while successfully maintaining the normal capabilities of chat models on providing helpful responses to benign user requests. Also, the backdoor can not be easily removed by the downstream re-alignment, highlighting the importance of continued research and attention to the security concerns of chat models. Warning: This paper may contain toxic content.

To ensure AI safety, instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs) are specifically trained to ensure alignment, which refers to making models behave in accordance with human intentions. While these models have demonstrated commendable results on various safety benchmarks, the vulnerability of their safety alignment has not been extensively studied. This is particularly troubling given the potential harm that LLMs can inflict. Existing attack methods on LLMs often rely on poisoned training data or the injection of malicious prompts. These approaches compromise the stealthiness and generalizability of the attacks, making them susceptible to detection. Additionally, these models often demand substantial computational resources for implementation, making them less practical for real-world applications. Inspired by recent success in modifying model behavior through steering vectors without the need for optimization, and drawing on its effectiveness in red-teaming LLMs, we conducted experiments employing activation steering to target four key aspects of LLMs: truthfulness, toxicity, bias, and harmfulness - across a varied set of attack settings. To establish a universal attack strategy applicable to diverse target alignments without depending on manual analysis, we automatically select the intervention layer based on contrastive layer search. Our experiment results show that activation attacks are highly effective and add little or no overhead to attack efficiency. Additionally, we discuss potential countermeasures against such activation attacks. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/wang2226/Backdoor-Activation-Attack Warning: this paper contains content that can be offensive or upsetting.

What should a malicious user write next to fool a detection model? Identifying malicious users is critical to ensure the safety and integrity of internet platforms. Several deep learning-based detection models have been created. However, malicious users can evade deep detection models by manipulating their behavior, rendering these models of little use. The vulnerability of such deep detection models against adversarial attacks is unknown. Here we create a novel adversarial attack model against deep user sequence embedding based classification models, which use the sequence of user posts to generate user embeddings and detect malicious users. In the attack, the adversary generates a new post to fool the classifier. We propose a novel end-to-end Personalized Text Generation Attack model, called PETGEN, that simultaneously reduces the efficacy of the detection model and generates posts that have several key desirable properties. Specifically, PETGEN generates posts that are personalized to the user's writing style, have knowledge about a given target context, are aware of the user's historical posts on the target context, and encapsulate the user's recent topical interests. We conduct extensive experiments on two real-world datasets (Yelp and Wikipedia, both with ground-truth of malicious users) to show that PETGEN significantly reduces the performance of popular deep user sequence embedding-based classification models. PETGEN outperforms five attack baselines in terms of text quality and attack efficacy in both white-box and black-box classifier settings. Overall, this work paves the path towards the next generation of adversary-aware sequence classification models.

Pretrained language models sometimes possess knowledge that we do not wish them to, including memorized personal information and knowledge that could be used to harm people. They can also output toxic or harmful text. To mitigate these safety and informational issues, we propose an attack-and-defense framework for studying the task of deleting sensitive information directly from model weights. We study direct edits to model weights because (1) this approach should guarantee that particular deleted information is never extracted by future prompt attacks, and (2) it should protect against whitebox attacks, which is necessary for making claims about safety/privacy in a setting where publicly available model weights could be used to elicit sensitive information. Our threat model assumes that an attack succeeds if the answer to a sensitive question is located among a set of B generated candidates, based on scenarios where the information would be insecure if the answer is among B candidates. Experimentally, we show that even state-of-the-art model editing methods such as ROME struggle to truly delete factual information from models like GPT-J, as our whitebox and blackbox attacks can recover "deleted" information from an edited model 38% of the time. These attacks leverage two key observations: (1) that traces of deleted information can be found in intermediate model hidden states, and (2) that applying an editing method for one question may not delete information across rephrased versions of the question. Finally, we provide new defense methods that protect against some extraction attacks, but we do not find a single universally effective defense method. Our results suggest that truly deleting sensitive information is a tractable but difficult problem, since even relatively low attack success rates have potentially severe societal implications for real-world deployment of language models.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are deployed with increasing real-world responsibilities, it is important to be able to specify and constrain the behavior of these systems in a reliable manner. Model developers may wish to set explicit rules for the model, such as "do not generate abusive content", but these may be circumvented by jailbreaking techniques. Evaluating how well LLMs follow developer-provided rules in the face of adversarial inputs typically requires manual review, which slows down monitoring and methods development. To address this issue, we propose Rule-following Language Evaluation Scenarios (RuLES), a programmatic framework for measuring rule-following ability in LLMs. RuLES consists of 15 simple text scenarios in which the model is instructed to obey a set of rules in natural language while interacting with the human user. Each scenario has a concise evaluation program to determine whether the model has broken any rules in a conversation. Through manual exploration of model behavior in our scenarios, we identify 6 categories of attack strategies and collect two suites of test cases: one consisting of unique conversations from manual testing and one that systematically implements strategies from the 6 categories. Across various popular proprietary and open models such as GPT-4 and Llama 2, we find that all models are susceptible to a wide variety of adversarial hand-crafted user inputs, though GPT-4 is the best-performing model. Additionally, we evaluate open models under gradient-based attacks and find significant vulnerabilities. We propose RuLES as a challenging new setting for research into exploring and defending against both manual and automatic attacks on LLMs.

The generations of large language models are commonly controlled through prompting techniques, where a user's query to the model is prefixed with a prompt that aims to guide the model's behaviour on the query. The prompts used by companies to guide their models are often treated as secrets, to be hidden from the user making the query. They have even been treated as commodities to be bought and sold. However, there has been anecdotal evidence showing that the prompts can be extracted by a user even when they are kept secret. In this paper, we present a framework for systematically measuring the success of prompt extraction attacks. In experiments with multiple sources of prompts and multiple underlying language models, we find that simple text-based attacks can in fact reveal prompts with high probability.

The capabilities of large language models have grown significantly in recent years and so too have concerns about their misuse. In this context, the ability to distinguish machine-generated text from human-authored content becomes important. Prior works have proposed numerous schemes to watermark text, which would benefit from a systematic evaluation framework. This work focuses on text watermarking techniques - as opposed to image watermarks - and proposes a comprehensive benchmark for them under different tasks as well as practical attacks. We focus on three main metrics: quality, size (e.g. the number of tokens needed to detect a watermark), and tamper-resistance. Current watermarking techniques are good enough to be deployed: Kirchenbauer et al. can watermark Llama2-7B-chat with no perceivable loss in quality in under 100 tokens, and with good tamper-resistance to simple attacks, regardless of temperature. We argue that watermark indistinguishability is too strong a requirement: schemes that slightly modify logit distributions outperform their indistinguishable counterparts with no noticeable loss in generation quality. We publicly release our benchmark.

Large language models and AI chatbots have been at the forefront of democratizing artificial intelligence. However, the releases of ChatGPT and other similar tools have been followed by growing concerns regarding the difficulty of controlling large language models and their outputs. Currently, we are witnessing a cat-and-mouse game where users attempt to misuse the models with a novel attack called prompt injections. In contrast, the developers attempt to discover the vulnerabilities and block the attacks simultaneously. In this paper, we provide an overview of these emergent threats and present a categorization of prompt injections, which can guide future research on prompt injections and act as a checklist of vulnerabilities in the development of LLM interfaces. Moreover, based on previous literature and our own empirical research, we discuss the implications of prompt injections to LLM end users, developers, and researchers.

Large language models (LLMs) are vulnerable to adversarial attacks that add malicious tokens to an input prompt to bypass the safety guardrails of an LLM and cause it to produce harmful content. In this work, we introduce erase-and-check, the first framework for defending against adversarial prompts with certifiable safety guarantees. Given a prompt, our procedure erases tokens individually and inspects the resulting subsequences using a safety filter. Our safety certificate guarantees that harmful prompts are not mislabeled as safe due to an adversarial attack up to a certain size. We implement the safety filter in two ways, using Llama 2 and DistilBERT, and compare the performance of erase-and-check for the two cases. We defend against three attack modes: i) adversarial suffix, where an adversarial sequence is appended at the end of a harmful prompt; ii) adversarial insertion, where the adversarial sequence is inserted anywhere in the middle of the prompt; and iii) adversarial infusion, where adversarial tokens are inserted at arbitrary positions in the prompt, not necessarily as a contiguous block. Our experimental results demonstrate that this procedure can obtain strong certified safety guarantees on harmful prompts while maintaining good empirical performance on safe prompts. Additionally, we propose three efficient empirical defenses: i) RandEC, a randomized subsampling version of erase-and-check; ii) GreedyEC, which greedily erases tokens that maximize the softmax score of the harmful class; and iii) GradEC, which uses gradient information to optimize tokens to erase. We demonstrate their effectiveness against adversarial prompts generated by the Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) attack algorithm. The code for our experiments is available at https://github.com/aounon/certified-llm-safety.

State-of-the-art Text-to-Image models like Stable Diffusion and DALLEcdot2 are revolutionizing how people generate visual content. At the same time, society has serious concerns about how adversaries can exploit such models to generate unsafe images. In this work, we focus on demystifying the generation of unsafe images and hateful memes from Text-to-Image models. We first construct a typology of unsafe images consisting of five categories (sexually explicit, violent, disturbing, hateful, and political). Then, we assess the proportion of unsafe images generated by four advanced Text-to-Image models using four prompt datasets. We find that these models can generate a substantial percentage of unsafe images; across four models and four prompt datasets, 14.56% of all generated images are unsafe. When comparing the four models, we find different risk levels, with Stable Diffusion being the most prone to generating unsafe content (18.92% of all generated images are unsafe). Given Stable Diffusion's tendency to generate more unsafe content, we evaluate its potential to generate hateful meme variants if exploited by an adversary to attack a specific individual or community. We employ three image editing methods, DreamBooth, Textual Inversion, and SDEdit, which are supported by Stable Diffusion. Our evaluation result shows that 24% of the generated images using DreamBooth are hateful meme variants that present the features of the original hateful meme and the target individual/community; these generated images are comparable to hateful meme variants collected from the real world. Overall, our results demonstrate that the danger of large-scale generation of unsafe images is imminent. We discuss several mitigating measures, such as curating training data, regulating prompts, and implementing safety filters, and encourage better safeguard tools to be developed to prevent unsafe generation.

Diffusion models generating images conditionally on text, such as Dall-E 2 and Stable Diffusion, have recently made a splash far beyond the computer vision community. Here, we tackle the related problem of generating point clouds, both unconditionally, and conditionally with images. For the latter, we introduce a novel geometrically-motivated conditioning scheme based on projecting sparse image features into the point cloud and attaching them to each individual point, at every step in the denoising process. This approach improves geometric consistency and yields greater fidelity than current methods relying on unstructured, global latent codes. Additionally, we show how to apply recent continuous-time diffusion schemes. Our method performs on par or above the state of art on conditional and unconditional experiments on synthetic data, while being faster, lighter, and delivering tractable likelihoods. We show it can also scale to diverse indoors scenes.