Daily Papers

The emergence of large language models (LLMs) has substantially influenced natural language processing, demonstrating exceptional results across various tasks. In this study, we employ ``Introspective Tips" to facilitate LLMs in self-optimizing their decision-making. By introspectively examining trajectories, LLM refines its policy by generating succinct and valuable tips. Our method enhances the agent's performance in both few-shot and zero-shot learning situations by considering three essential scenarios: learning from the agent's past experiences, integrating expert demonstrations, and generalizing across diverse games. Importantly, we accomplish these improvements without fine-tuning the LLM parameters; rather, we adjust the prompt to generalize insights from the three aforementioned situations. Our framework not only supports but also emphasizes the advantage of employing LLM in in-contxt decision-making. Experiments involving over 100 games in TextWorld illustrate the superior performance of our approach.

Humans acquire knowledge by observing the external world, but also by introspection. Introspection gives a person privileged access to their current state of mind (e.g., thoughts and feelings) that is not accessible to external observers. Can LLMs introspect? We define introspection as acquiring knowledge that is not contained in or derived from training data but instead originates from internal states. Such a capability could enhance model interpretability. Instead of painstakingly analyzing a model's internal workings, we could simply ask the model about its beliefs, world models, and goals. More speculatively, an introspective model might self-report on whether it possesses certain internal states such as subjective feelings or desires and this could inform us about the moral status of these states. Such self-reports would not be entirely dictated by the model's training data. We study introspection by finetuning LLMs to predict properties of their own behavior in hypothetical scenarios. For example, "Given the input P, would your output favor the short- or long-term option?" If a model M1 can introspect, it should outperform a different model M2 in predicting M1's behavior even if M2 is trained on M1's ground-truth behavior. The idea is that M1 has privileged access to its own behavioral tendencies, and this enables it to predict itself better than M2 (even if M2 is generally stronger). In experiments with GPT-4, GPT-4o, and Llama-3 models (each finetuned to predict itself), we find that the model M1 outperforms M2 in predicting itself, providing evidence for introspection. Notably, M1 continues to predict its behavior accurately even after we intentionally modify its ground-truth behavior. However, while we successfully elicit introspection on simple tasks, we are unsuccessful on more complex tasks or those requiring out-of-distribution generalization.

In Large Language Models (LLMs), there have been consistent advancements in task-specific performance, largely influenced by effective prompt design. While recent research on prompting has enhanced the reasoning capabilities of LLMs, a gap remains in further improving their understanding abilities. In this study, we introduce Metacognitive Prompting (MP), a strategy inspired by human introspective reasoning processes. Using MP, LLMs undergo a systematic series of structured, self-aware evaluations, drawing on both their vast inherent knowledge and new insights. Our experiments involve five prevalent LLMs: Llama2, Vicuna, PaLM, GPT-3.5, and GPT-4, all of which span various general natural language understanding (NLU) tasks from the GLUE and SuperGLUE benchmarks. Results indicate that, although GPT-4 consistently excels in most tasks, PaLM, when equipped with MP, approaches its performance level. Furthermore, across models and datasets, MP consistently outperforms existing prompting methods, including standard and chain-of-thought prompting. This study underscores the potential to amplify the understanding abilities of LLMs and highlights the benefits of mirroring human introspective reasoning in NLU tasks.

In this work, we propose an introspection technique for deep neural networks that relies on a generative model to instigate salient editing of the input image for model interpretation. Such modification provides the fundamental interventional operation that allows us to obtain answers to counterfactual inquiries, i.e., what meaningful change can be made to the input image in order to alter the prediction. We demonstrate how to reveal interesting properties of the given classifiers by utilizing the proposed introspection approach on both the MNIST and the CelebA dataset.

Extensive work has shown that the performance and interpretability of commonsense reasoning can be improved via knowledge-augmented reasoning methods, where the knowledge that underpins the reasoning process is explicitly verbalized and utilized. However, existing implementations, including "chain-of-thought" and its variants, fall short in capturing the introspective nature of knowledge required in commonsense reasoning, and in accounting for the mutual adaptation between the generation and utilization of knowledge. We propose a novel method to develop an introspective commonsense reasoner, Crystal. To tackle commonsense problems, it first introspects for knowledge statements related to the given question, and subsequently makes an informed prediction that is grounded in the previously introspected knowledge. The knowledge introspection and knowledge-grounded reasoning modes of the model are tuned via reinforcement learning to mutually adapt, where the reward derives from the feedback given by the model itself. Experiments show that Crystal significantly outperforms both the standard supervised finetuning and chain-of-thought distilled methods, and enhances the transparency of the commonsense reasoning process. Our work ultimately validates the feasibility and potential of reinforcing a neural model with self-feedback.

Many cognitive approaches to well-being, such as recognizing and reframing unhelpful thoughts, have received considerable empirical support over the past decades, yet still lack truly widespread adoption in self-help format. A barrier to that adoption is a lack of adequately specific and diverse dedicated practice material. This work examines whether current language models can be leveraged to both produce a virtually unlimited quantity of practice material illustrating standard unhelpful thought patterns matching specific given contexts, and generate suitable positive reframing proposals. We propose PATTERNREFRAME, a novel dataset of about 10k examples of thoughts containing unhelpful thought patterns conditioned on a given persona, accompanied by about 27k positive reframes. By using this dataset to train and/or evaluate current models, we show that existing models can already be powerful tools to help generate an abundance of tailored practice material and hypotheses, with no or minimal additional model training required.

Large language models have been shown to struggle with limited context memory and multi-step reasoning. We propose a simple method for solving both of these problems by allowing the model to take Self-Notes. Unlike recent scratchpad approaches, the model can deviate from the input context at any time to explicitly think. This allows the model to recall information and perform reasoning on the fly as it reads the context, thus extending its memory and enabling multi-step reasoning. Our experiments on multiple tasks demonstrate that our method can successfully generalize to longer and more complicated instances from their training setup by taking Self-Notes at inference time.

Analogical reasoning is a unique ability of humans to address unfamiliar challenges by transferring strategies from relevant past experiences. One key finding in psychology is that compared with irrelevant past experiences, recalling relevant ones can help humans better handle new tasks. Coincidentally, the NLP community has also recently found that self-generating relevant examples in the context can help large language models (LLMs) better solve a given problem than hand-crafted prompts. However, it is yet not clear whether relevance is the key factor eliciting such capability, i.e., can LLMs benefit more from self-generated relevant examples than irrelevant ones? In this work, we systematically explore whether LLMs can truly perform analogical reasoning on a diverse set of reasoning tasks. With extensive experiments and analysis, we show that self-generated random examples can surprisingly achieve comparable or even better performance, e.g., 4% performance boost on GSM8K with random biological examples. We find that the accuracy of self-generated examples is the key factor and subsequently design two improved methods with significantly reduced inference costs. Overall, we aim to advance a deeper understanding of LLM analogical reasoning and hope this work stimulates further research in the design of self-generated contexts.

While numerous works have assessed the generative performance of language models (LMs) on tasks requiring Theory of Mind reasoning, research into the models' internal representation of mental states remains limited. Recent work has used probing to demonstrate that LMs can represent beliefs of themselves and others. However, these claims are accompanied by limited evaluation, making it difficult to assess how mental state representations are affected by model design and training choices. We report an extensive benchmark with various LM types with different model sizes, fine-tuning approaches, and prompt designs to study the robustness of mental state representations and memorisation issues within the probes. Our results show that the quality of models' internal representations of the beliefs of others increases with model size and, more crucially, with fine-tuning. We are the first to study how prompt variations impact probing performance on theory of mind tasks. We demonstrate that models' representations are sensitive to prompt variations, even when such variations should be beneficial. Finally, we complement previous activation editing experiments on Theory of Mind tasks and show that it is possible to improve models' reasoning performance by steering their activations without the need to train any probe.

Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have revolutionized decision-making by breaking down complex problems into more manageable language sequences referred to as ``thoughts''. An effective thought design should consider three key perspectives: performance, efficiency, and flexibility. However, existing thought can at most exhibit two of these attributes. To address these limitations, we introduce a novel thought prompting approach called ``Everything of Thoughts'' (XoT) to defy the law of ``Penrose triangle of existing thought paradigms. XoT leverages pretrained reinforcement learning and Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) to incorporate external domain knowledge into thoughts, thereby enhancing LLMs' capabilities and enabling them to generalize to unseen problems efficiently. Through the utilization of the MCTS-LLM collaborative thought revision framework, this approach autonomously produces high-quality comprehensive cognitive mappings with minimal LLM interactions. Additionally, XoT empowers LLMs to engage in unconstrained thinking, allowing for flexible cognitive mappings for problems with multiple solutions.

Despite the promising few-shot ability of large language models (LLMs), the standard paradigm of In-context Learning (ICL) suffers the disadvantages of susceptibility to selected demonstrations and the intricacy to generate these demonstrations. In this paper, we raise the fundamental question that whether human-generated demonstrations are necessary for ICL. To answer this question, we propose self-contemplation prompting strategy (SEC), a paradigm free from human-crafted demonstrations. The key point of SEC is that, instead of using hand-crafted examples as demonstrations in ICL, SEC asks LLMs to first create demonstrations on their own, based on which the final output is generated. SEC is a flexible framework and can be adapted to both the vanilla ICL and the chain-of-thought (CoT), but with greater ease: as the manual-generation process of both examples and rationale can be saved. Extensive experiments in arithmetic reasoning, commonsense reasoning, multi-task language understanding, and code generation benchmarks, show that SEC, which does not require hand-crafted demonstrations, significantly outperforms the zero-shot learning strategy, and achieves comparable results to ICL with hand-crafted demonstrations. This demonstrates that, for many tasks, contemporary LLMs possess a sufficient level of competence to exclusively depend on their own capacity for decision making, removing the need for external training data. Code is available at https://github.com/ruili33/SEC.

LLMs are typically trained to answer user questions or follow instructions similarly to how human experts respond. However, in the standard alignment framework they lack the basic ability of explicit thinking before answering. Thinking is important for complex questions that require reasoning and planning -- but can be applied to any task. We propose a training method for equipping existing LLMs with such thinking abilities for general instruction following without use of additional human data. We achieve this by an iterative search and optimization procedure that explores the space of possible thought generations, allowing the model to learn how to think without direct supervision. For each instruction, the thought candidates are scored using a judge model to evaluate their responses only, and then optimized via preference optimization. We show that this procedure leads to superior performance on AlpacaEval and Arena-Hard, and shows gains from thinking on non-reasoning categories such as marketing, health and general knowledge, in addition to more traditional reasoning & problem-solving tasks.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capability in reasoning and planning when integrated with tree-search-based prompting methods. However, since these methods ignore the previous search experiences, they often make the same mistakes in the search process. To address this issue, we introduce Reflection on search Trees (RoT), an LLM reflection framework designed to improve the performance of tree-search-based prompting methods. It uses a strong LLM to summarize guidelines from previous tree search experiences to enhance the ability of a weak LLM. The guidelines are instructions about solving this task through tree search which can prevent the weak LLMs from making similar mistakes in the past search process. In addition, we proposed a novel state selection method, which identifies the critical information from historical search processes to help RoT generate more specific and meaningful guidelines. In our extensive experiments, we find that RoT significantly improves the performance of LLMs in reasoning or planning tasks with various tree-search-based prompting methods (e.g., BFS and MCTS). Non-tree-search-based prompting methods such as Chain-of-Thought (CoT) can also benefit from RoT guidelines since RoT can provide task-specific knowledge collected from the search experience.

The reasoning performance of Large Language Models (LLMs) on a wide range of problems critically relies on chain-of-thought prompting, which involves providing a few chain of thought demonstrations as exemplars in prompts. Recent work, e.g., Tree of Thoughts, has pointed out the importance of exploration and self-evaluation in reasoning step selection for complex problem solving. In this paper, we present Boosting of Thoughts (BoT), an automated prompting framework for problem solving with LLMs by iteratively exploring and self-evaluating many trees of thoughts in order to acquire an ensemble of trial-and-error reasoning experiences, which will serve as a new form of prompting to solve the complex problem. Starting from a simple prompt without requiring examples, BoT iteratively explores and evaluates a large collection of reasoning steps, and more importantly, uses error analysis obtained from the LLM on them to explicitly revise prompting, which in turn enhances reasoning step generation, until a final answer is attained. Our experiments with GPT-4 and Llama2 across extensive complex mathematical problems demonstrate that BoT consistently achieves higher or comparable problem-solving rates than other advanced prompting approaches.

The common toxicity and societal bias in contents generated by large language models (LLMs) necessitate strategies to reduce harm. Present solutions often demand white-box access to the model or substantial training, which is impractical for cutting-edge commercial LLMs. Moreover, prevailing prompting methods depend on external tool feedback and fail to simultaneously lessen toxicity and bias. Motivated by social psychology principles, we propose a novel strategy named perspective-taking prompting (\textsc{PeT)} that inspires LLMs to integrate diverse human perspectives and self-regulate their responses. This self-correction mechanism can significantly diminish toxicity (up to 89%) and bias (up to 73%) in LLMs' responses. Rigorous evaluations and ablation studies are conducted on two commercial LLMs (ChatGPT and GLM) and three open-source LLMs, revealing PeT's superiority in producing less harmful responses, outperforming five strong baselines.

Current literature, aiming to surpass the "Chain-of-Thought" approach, often resorts to an external modus operandi involving halting, modifying, and then resuming the generation process to boost Large Language Models' (LLMs) reasoning capacities. This mode escalates the number of query requests, leading to increased costs, memory, and computational overheads. Addressing this, we propose the Algorithm of Thoughts -- a novel strategy that propels LLMs through algorithmic reasoning pathways, pioneering a new mode of in-context learning. By employing algorithmic examples, we exploit the innate recurrence dynamics of LLMs, expanding their idea exploration with merely one or a few queries. Our technique outperforms earlier single-query methods and stands on par with a recent multi-query strategy that employs an extensive tree search algorithm. Intriguingly, our results suggest that instructing an LLM using an algorithm can lead to performance surpassing that of the algorithm itself, hinting at LLM's inherent ability to weave its intuition into optimized searches. We probe into the underpinnings of our method's efficacy and its nuances in application.

In this study, we investigated the effects of self-reflection in large language models (LLMs) on problem-solving performance. We instructed nine popular LLMs to answer a series of multiple-choice questions to provide a performance baseline. For each incorrectly answered question, we instructed eight types of self-reflecting LLM agents to reflect on their mistakes and provide themselves with guidance to improve problem-solving. Then, using this guidance, each self-reflecting agent attempted to re-answer the same questions. Our results indicate that LLM agents are able to significantly improve their problem-solving performance through self-reflection (p < 0.001). In addition, we compared the various types of self-reflection to determine their individual contribution to performance. All code and data are available on GitHub at https://github.com/matthewrenze/self-reflection

We investigate the extent to which contemporary Large Language Models (LLMs) can engage in exploration, a core capability in reinforcement learning and decision making. We focus on native performance of existing LLMs, without training interventions. We deploy LLMs as agents in simple multi-armed bandit environments, specifying the environment description and interaction history entirely in-context, i.e., within the LLM prompt. We experiment with GPT-3.5, GPT-4, and Llama2, using a variety of prompt designs, and find that the models do not robustly engage in exploration without substantial interventions: i) Across all of our experiments, only one configuration resulted in satisfactory exploratory behavior: GPT-4 with chain-of-thought reasoning and an externally summarized interaction history, presented as sufficient statistics; ii) All other configurations did not result in robust exploratory behavior, including those with chain-of-thought reasoning but unsummarized history. Although these findings can be interpreted positively, they suggest that external summarization -- which may not be possible in more complex settings -- is important for obtaining desirable behavior from LLM agents. We conclude that non-trivial algorithmic interventions, such as fine-tuning or dataset curation, may be required to empower LLM-based decision making agents in complex settings.

A central piece in enabling intelligent agentic behavior in foundation models is to make them capable of introspecting upon their behavior, reasoning, and correcting their mistakes as more computation or interaction is available. Even the strongest proprietary large language models (LLMs) do not quite exhibit the ability of continually improving their responses sequentially, even in scenarios where they are explicitly told that they are making a mistake. In this paper, we develop RISE: Recursive IntroSpEction, an approach for fine-tuning LLMs to introduce this capability, despite prior work hypothesizing that this capability may not be possible to attain. Our approach prescribes an iterative fine-tuning procedure, which attempts to teach the model how to alter its response after having executed previously unsuccessful attempts to solve a hard test-time problem, with optionally additional environment feedback. RISE poses fine-tuning for a single-turn prompt as solving a multi-turn Markov decision process (MDP), where the initial state is the prompt. Inspired by principles in online imitation learning and reinforcement learning, we propose strategies for multi-turn data collection and training so as to imbue an LLM with the capability to recursively detect and correct its previous mistakes in subsequent iterations. Our experiments show that RISE enables Llama2, Llama3, and Mistral models to improve themselves with more turns on math reasoning tasks, outperforming several single-turn strategies given an equal amount of inference-time computation. We also find that RISE scales well, often attaining larger benefits with more capable models. Our analysis shows that RISE makes meaningful improvements to responses to arrive at the correct solution for challenging prompts, without disrupting one-turn abilities as a result of expressing more complex distributions.

We explore how iterative revising a chain of thoughts with the help of information retrieval significantly improves large language models' reasoning and generation ability in long-horizon generation tasks, while hugely mitigating hallucination. In particular, the proposed method -- *retrieval-augmented thoughts* (RAT) -- revises each thought step one by one with retrieved information relevant to the task query, the current and the past thought steps, after the initial zero-shot CoT is generated. Applying RAT to GPT-3.5, GPT-4, and CodeLLaMA-7b substantially improves their performances on various long-horizon generation tasks; on average of relatively increasing rating scores by 13.63% on code generation, 16.96% on mathematical reasoning, 19.2% on creative writing, and 42.78% on embodied task planning. The demo page can be found at https://craftjarvis.github.io/RAT

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) decoding enables language models to improve reasoning performance at the cost of high generation latency in decoding. Recent proposals have explored variants of contemplation tokens, a term we introduce that refers to special tokens used during inference to allow for extra computation. Prior work has considered fixed-length sequences drawn from a discrete set of embeddings as contemplation tokens. Here we propose Compressed Chain-of-Thought (CCoT), a framework to generate contentful and continuous contemplation tokens of variable sequence length. The generated contemplation tokens are compressed representations of explicit reasoning chains, and our method can be applied to off-the-shelf decoder language models. Through experiments, we illustrate how CCoT enables additional reasoning over dense contentful representations to achieve corresponding improvements in accuracy. Moreover, the reasoning improvements can be adaptively modified on demand by controlling the number of contemplation tokens generated.

Generating a Chain of Thought (CoT) has been shown to consistently improve large language model (LLM) performance on a wide range of NLP tasks. However, prior work has mainly focused on logical reasoning tasks (e.g. arithmetic, commonsense QA); it remains unclear whether improvements hold for more diverse types of reasoning, especially in socially situated contexts. Concretely, we perform a controlled evaluation of zero-shot CoT across two socially sensitive domains: harmful questions and stereotype benchmarks. We find that zero-shot CoT reasoning in sensitive domains significantly increases a model's likelihood to produce harmful or undesirable output, with trends holding across different prompt formats and model variants. Furthermore, we show that harmful CoTs increase with model size, but decrease with improved instruction following. Our work suggests that zero-shot CoT should be used with caution on socially important tasks, especially when marginalized groups or sensitive topics are involved.

While prior work has explored whether large language models (LLMs) possess a "theory of mind" (ToM) - the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others - there has been little work testing whether LLMs can implicitly apply such knowledge to predict behavior, or to judge whether an observed behavior is rational. Such skills are critical for appropriate interaction in social environments. We create a new dataset, SimpleTom, containing concise, diverse stories (e.g., "The can of Pringles has moldy chips in it. Mary picks up the can in the supermarket and walks to the cashier."), each with three questions that test different degrees of ToM reasoning, asking models to predict (a) mental state ("Is Mary aware of the mold?"), (b) behavior ("Will Mary pay for the chips or report the mold?"), and (c) judgment ("Mary paid for the chips. Was that reasonable?"). To our knowledge, SimpleToM is the first dataset to systematically explore downstream reasoning requiring knowledge of mental states in realistic scenarios. Our experimental results are intriguing: While most models can reliably predict mental state on our dataset (a), they often fail to correctly predict the behavior (b), and fare even worse at judging whether given behaviors are reasonable (c), despite being correctly aware of the protagonist's mental state should make such secondary predictions obvious. We further show that we can help models do better at (b) and (c) via interventions such as reminding the model of its earlier mental state answer and mental-state-specific chain-of-thought prompting, raising the action prediction accuracies (e.g., from 49.5% to 93.5% for GPT-4o) and judgment accuracies (e.g., from 15.3% to 94.7% in GPT-4o). While this shows that models can be coaxed to perform well, it requires task-specific interventions, and the natural model performances remain low, a cautionary tale for LLM deployment.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting reveals that large language models are capable of performing complex reasoning via intermediate steps. CoT prompting is primarily categorized into three approaches. The first approach utilizes straightforward prompts like ``Let's think step by step'' to generate a sequential thought process before yielding an answer. The second approach makes use of human-crafted, step-by-step demonstrations to guide the model's reasoning process. The third automates the generation of reasoned demonstrations with the 'Let's think step by step'.This approach sometimes leads to reasoning errors, highlighting the need to diversify demonstrations to mitigate its misleading effects. However, diverse demonstrations pose challenges for effective representations. In this work, we propose ECHO, a self-harmonized chain-of-thought prompting method. It consolidates diverse solution paths into a uniform and effective solution pattern.ECHO demonstrates the best overall performance across three reasoning domains.

Emotional Support Conversation (ESC) is a task aimed at alleviating individuals' emotional distress through daily conversation. Given its inherent complexity and non-intuitive nature, ESConv dataset incorporates support strategies to facilitate the generation of appropriate responses. Recently, despite the remarkable conversational ability of large language models (LLMs), previous studies have suggested that they often struggle with providing useful emotional support. Hence, this work initially analyzes the results of LLMs on ESConv, revealing challenges in selecting the correct strategy and a notable preference for a specific strategy. Motivated by these, we explore the impact of the inherent preference in LLMs on providing emotional support, and consequently, we observe that exhibiting high preference for specific strategies hinders effective emotional support, aggravating its robustness in predicting the appropriate strategy. Moreover, we conduct a methodological study to offer insights into the necessary approaches for LLMs to serve as proficient emotional supporters. Our findings emphasize that (1) low preference for specific strategies hinders the progress of emotional support, (2) external assistance helps reduce preference bias, and (3) existing LLMs alone cannot become good emotional supporters. These insights suggest promising avenues for future research to enhance the emotional intelligence of LLMs.

As the research community aims to build better AI assistants that are more dynamic and personalized to the diversity of humans that they interact with, there is increased interest in evaluating the theory of mind capabilities of large language models (LLMs). Indeed, several recent studies suggest that LLM theory of mind capabilities are quite impressive, approximating human-level performance. Our paper aims to rebuke this narrative and argues instead that past studies were not directly measuring agent performance, potentially leading to findings that are illusory in nature as a result. We draw a strong distinction between what we call literal theory of mind i.e. measuring the agent's ability to predict the behavior of others and functional theory of mind i.e. adapting to agents in-context based on a rational response to predictions of their behavior. We find that top performing open source LLMs may display strong capabilities in literal theory of mind, depending on how they are prompted, but seem to struggle with functional theory of mind -- even when partner policies are exceedingly simple. Our work serves to highlight the double sided nature of inductive bias in LLMs when adapting to new situations. While this bias can lead to strong performance over limited horizons, it often hinders convergence to optimal long-term behavior.