0937e642_Game_Theory_Discussion_Group__Title_and_abstract
[Date/Time] October 26, 2004 6:00 -- 7:30 PM [Location] Wean 4623 [Speaker] Jason Hartline (Microsoft Research) [Title and abstract] 
Derandomizing Auctions I will give an exponential time construction that shows that asymmetry is almost as powerful as randomization in auction design (clearly, with computational issues aside). In particular, for the unlimited supply auction problem, this shows that for any randomized competitive auction there exists a asymmetric deterministic auction that obtains almost the same performance guarantees. This is a work in progress, we are still trying to show that there exists a polynomial time computable deterministic competitive auction. This is joint work with Gagan Aggarwal, Amos Fiat, Andrew Goldberg, Nicole Immorlica, Anna Karlin, and Madhu Sudan (who all visited MSR/SVC this summer at roughly the same time).
Game Theory Discussion Group
Title and abstract