As the Ancient Greeks would say, ‘’Desperate times call for desperate measures’’. It all started in Japan in 1939, as newly appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, and his predecessor or antecedent Zengo Yoshida, discuss the United States of America’s embargo, restriction, and impediment that deprives Japan of raw materials they can barely attain in the first place seeing that Japan is an island with scarcely any raw materials to be as independent and prosperous as any other imperial nation such as European imperial nations who can otherwise self-suffice for the most part, (Shinsato and Urabe, 2011). Both the newly appointed Commander-in-Chief and his predecessor agreed upon the idea that starting a war with the United States would be a mess, screw-up, and error, although, Japan did not stop there. It began to come forth and form alliances with Germany and Italy in the early 1940s and begin plotting for a big war against the United States, (Shinsato and Urabe, 2011). With the U.S. Pacific armada at Pearl Harbor, Yamamoto arranges the preparation of a preventive strike, accepting Japan's just expectation to demolish the American Pacific armada at the beginning of threats, (Shinsato and Urabe, 2011).
For a plan or mission to succeed, it must be planned carefully and precisely, and that’s what Japan did. The main element of the attack on Pearl Harbor was surprise and shock, as the United States did not expect what was coming. The central issue between the two countries, the United States of America and Japan, is Japan’s aggression towards China. The aggression not only threatened China's integrity and pride but also threatened US commercial interests, even though it was not part of its great national security, for the benefit of, the United States continued to commit to China's supreme power and authority, (Stille M., Brown T., Laurier J., 2011). When the Japanese aggressed and invaded deep into China, starting a war with them with increasingly shockingly bad and cruel acts, Americans began translating Japan's dependence on resources from the United States under economic pressure. In 1940, the United States increased economic pressure on Japan to achieve this, the US wanted to suppress the Japanese’s ambitions with other ticktacks other than war, (Stille M., Brown T., Laurier J., 2011). In July 1941, the United States freezes to prevent Japan's advance in French Indochina. The United States and all Japanese assets in Japan have completely hit the ban, including oil. It was a declaration of a complete economic war, up to 80% of the oil imported when the United States was Japan at the age of 75 (and Japan imported 90% of the total oil consumed), Japan went into a mode of panic as the oil ban would seriously have a damaging outcome to Japan’s economy and power-hold, (Stille M., Brown T., Laurier J., 2011). The difficult line pursued through America demanded a Japanese response. Not doing anything wasn't a choice considering that in one to two years Japan’s oil portrays supplies would be severely exhausted, which could lessen its impotence, (Stille M., Brown T., Laurier J., 2011). Japan ought to publish to the United States or catch the action and use pressure to prize itself from this issue and problem and the rate for submission set through the Americans became too immoderate to ponder through Japan’s army autocrats and war machinery, these needs protected, Japan needed to abandon its income in Indochina, China, and, it became certainly stressed, in Manchuria, (Stille M., Brown T., Laurier J., 2011). This was not solvable from the viewpoint of the pride of the public, this would put Japan in a spot of critical planning vulnerability to the USA, (Stille M., Brown T., Laurier J., 2011).
There used to be little debate within the Japanese leadership that the only alternative used to be to fight. This direction of motion offered a way out of the American financial stranglehold considering that the seizure of the lightly defended oil resources in the Dutch East Indies, collectively with the sources of the British possessions in Asia, ought to negate the effects of the American embargo, (Stille M., Brown T., Laurier J., 2011). The price of this answer was once battle with Great Britain and the Netherlands, and, much greater importantly, likely with the United States as well. In the minds of the Japanese leadership, all three Western powers were linked strategically. Since the Netherlands was already occupied by the Germans, and Great Britain used to be hostilities for its very survival, only the United States possessed the military means to threaten Japan’s potential march south, (Stille M., Brown T., Laurier J., 2011). With this strategic setting, the Japanese began to appear at the high-quality strategy for enticing in combat with the strongest kingdom and the largest empire on the planet whilst nevertheless combat a struggle in China that defied military or political solution, (Stille M., Brown T., Laurier J., 2011). On the pinnacle of this, Japan still harbored designs of putting the Soviet Union in the Far East. The key for Japan’s strategic planners was to obtain the six months required to effectively triumph over the aid areas in the south to provide it the financial base to prosecute fighting in opposition to all its present-day and potential enemies, (Stille M., Brown T., Laurier J., 2011). Imperial Navy approach started out to alternate when Japan’s Commander-in-chief, Yamamoto, took command of the Combined Fleet in August 1939, (Stille M., Brown T., Laurier J., 2011). He became long-standing Japanese naval dogma on his head and later became the originator and chief recommended for the Pearl Harbor operation. He was a complicated figure but used to be no longer the advocate for peace portrayed by many historians. Yamamoto was ardent and nationalistic and he was raised in the samurai tradition, he acquired pride in it. He supported the thought that the Japanese establish hegemony over Asia, and as fighting loomed in 1941 he also supported the idea that Japan would have to go to war to rescue and save its empire and its very existence, (Stille M., Brown T., Laurier J., 2011). Thus, he supported the proposed attack to capture the southern aid areas. Yamamoto’s quandary and dilemma were that he, like most strategists from Japan, believed that initiating and starting a struggle with Great Britain and the Netherlands to catch their far Eastern possessions would inevitably lead to a war with the U.S. as well. This potentially deadly assumption, probably incorrect, led Yamamoto to hire his instincts for boldness and danger to find a way to deal with the US at the beginning of the conflict, (Stille M., Brown T., Laurier J., 2011). The idea of starting a sudden war with no actual war declaration is not new to Japan.
The primary Japanese bomb (bomb-diver) was respected on top of Pearl Harbor at around eight in the morning on the seventh day of December 1941, (Britannica, 2022). Over the following thirty minutes, the Harbor’s landing strips and docked ships have been subjected to an unfeeling attack with bombs, weapons, and torpedoes. A 2nd wave struck at 8:50 AM, and the Japanese pulled back quickly after 9:00 AM. In essentially over an hour, the Japanese crushed an additional 180 airships and devastated or broke additional than a dozen ships. More than 2,400 U.S. military supporters and civilians have been murdered, (Britannica, 2022). Japan’s negligence of not attacking repair spots was a serious mistake, damaged U.S. equipment got fixed locally and in a very short period, (Britannica, 2022). Strike two, was less successful, although, it was successful enough as it caused severe damage to U.S. machinery. Japan had achieved great success. As they destroyed most of the ships in the harbor. The Arizona and Oklahoma were demolished, although, other battleships had a chance to be repaired.
To conclude, the attack cirriped the United States of America's naval strength and air strength. Roosevelt brought together the public and the nation felt a sense of unity. On the eighth day of December, the U.S. declared war on Japan with only a single disagreeing vote.