When the case was happening, it was not much of a dilemma rather personal responsibility. However, conventionally the ethical dilemma surrounds the judgment of consensus of the parents, doctors, and lawyers (Darr, 2011). The baby’s parents did not exercise independence on their willingness to raise or not to raise a child with a disability. The ethical dilemma was in the determination of parents raising a child with some mental disorder.
In a utilitarian perspective, the baby was too young to exercise his will and also was not able to satisfy the utilitarian principle satisfying most people by doing the right thing. The issue of doing good is quite a mystery. In this case, the child does not know what is good or not, but the parents who have the knowhow may make the wrong decision by leaving the child to die (Darr, 2011). From the deontology perspective humans are not things and therefore should be treated not as means but as an end.
For an action to be ethical, the person doing it must have the good will and also have categorical imperatives which can be universalized reasonably. There are faults within the imperatives. However, it would be very unreasonable to place Golden role under a duty-based system. Some people may think that in Baby Doe shoes they may not wish to live, but this is living in their current and physical health and intellectual now. Categorical imperative may imply to let the mentally retarded person die as they cannot live normal lives (Naess, 2008). However, this is not ethical because no one knows after-life, and the choice to live is driven by pain and fear.
Natural law principle sees humans as rational beings, and therefore, we ought to pursue good acts. It argues that we should treat other people well as they are just like we (Taylor, 2011). The big question, in this case, would be what is it that makes us human, and if it is reason, then baby Doe lacked the most inmate feature that most humans are born with. Therefore baby doe would not be let to live as he lacked human reason.
Regarding casuistry case, normative judgments based on inductive reasoning have no ethical standpoint for the valuation. If at all life is the basic concern of life, then considering all ethical venues is very important. Therefore, in baby Doe’s case if his medical condition were manageable, then offering treatment and medication would not only be ethical but also necessary to his life. If the baby’s condition would not change, who would take care of him when he becomes an adult. At that point, as an adult, the decision would be upon him and therefore intervention all life is not guaranteed. Non-maleficence does not mean that the person is unethical; it is just a negotiation.
The doctors may not have done all within their capacity in the situation. Assumingly that the child was taken for the surgery and happened to live and consequently adopted, this would not have reduced the child’s sufferings. On the other hand, if the parents had the right to take life, the permissible condition of death would still be unethical (Naess, 2008). Under the subjectivity and relativistic perspective, the limitations of ethics are evident. Being good at one moment and no-maleficence in another moment does not make for an ethical disposition. If in justifying health, we consider social responsibility then life should be conserved at all circumstances.
In my opinion, life should be conserved at all costs and in all situations. There is life beyond its very functions. All stakeholders, mainly parents, and doctors, should do all that is within their powers to conserve life; it doesn’t matter whether the person will ultimately die or not. Factually, we are all exposed at risks that would cause death, but we keep being hopeful to live.
References
Darr, K. (2011). Ethics in Health Services Management (5th ed). Health Professions Press.
Naess, A. (2008). In ecology of Wisdom. Berkeley: Counterpoint Press
Taylor, P. W. (2011). The Biocentric Outlook on Nature. In Respect for Nature: A theory of environmental ethics (25th Anniversary edition) (pp. 99-168) Princeton: Princeton University Press.