In this essay, I will first give a brief introduction to the inductivist and Popperian accounts of science. Then I will explain how an inductivist might respond to the claim that “Knowledge comes from experimental falsification of a hypothesis rather than from experimental confirmation of one”. I will then explain my opinion of the inductivist response and consider the reasoning of the inductivist for the knowledge and rationality of science compare these ideals to those held by Popperians and discuss the overlaps and contradictions between the two.
The Inductivist account of science is one derived from observations and described as objective (SCIE1000 Notes, p. 130). The fundamental idea is that, once we have made numerous observations under various circumstances, we can generalize the behavior we have observed to state some law or theory, and thus gain scientific knowledge. This generalization is made using inductive inference, the method of using observations made in the past to predict what should happen in the future under similar circumstances (SCIE1000 Notes, p. 131). Inductivists justify the use of inductive inference for providing scientific proof and knowledge by arguing that if some phenomenon happens frequently, under various circumstances, then it cannot happen by chance (SCIE1000 Notes, p. 131).
The Popperian account of science, known as falsificationism, was thought of by Karl Popper as a replacement for inductivism, as he believed inductivism was unjustifiable (SCIE1000 Notes, p. 145). The fundamental idea behind falsificationism is that we can only rationally prove a hypothesis to be false, and hence, we can never prove it to be true (SCIE1000 Notes, p. 146). Even if in some experiment it turned out that our hypothesis was true it would not mean that our hypothesis is generally true, it only tells us about the specific circumstances. For falsificationism to work, a hypothesis cannot be necessarily true, like “It is sunny, or It is not sunny”, with no way to falsify it. By only making statements about the falseness of a hypothesis, something that we can rationally do by observing a contradiction to our hypothesis, and saying nothing of the truth we are using a deductive argument which is objectively rational, and thus Popperians believe that falsificationism is a rational account of science (SCIE1000 Notes, p. 146).
An Inductivist would disagree with the claim that knowledge comes from the experimental falsification of a hypothesis rather than from the experimental confirmation of one. This is because Inductivists believe that scientific knowledge is proven knowledge, and hence we should be able to gain scientific knowledge by proving hypotheses to be true, via the method of induction (SCIE1000 Notes, p. 135).
I disagree with the inductivist response to the claim. I do not believe that induction has no place in science, however, I do not believe it can rationally tell us the true outcomes of hypotheses, and hence, cannot give us rational scientific knowledge based on the outcomes of hypotheses. I do, however, believe it is a useful stepping stone to help us come to weak conclusions and apply our scientific knowledge.
I believe inductivism does not provide us with rationally proven knowledge because the method of proof is fundamentally flawed. The proportion of the infinitely many possible cases from which inductivists draw their conclusions is essentially zero, thus, it is reasonable to think there may be some situation that we haven’t observed that could contradict our hypothesis, and without observing it, an inductivist could easily falsely conclude that the hypothesis is true (SCIE1000 Notes, p. 139). Therefore, the reasoning of proof by induction is fundamentally flawed and it cannot provide us with rational scientific knowledge based on proof.
Inductivists, specifically Chalmers, describe scientific knowledge as being objective, without room for speculation or imagination (SCIE1000 Notes, p. 135). I believe this to be far from the truth, many of our current ideas in science such as dark matter and dark energy have no observational evidence behind them, yet we hypothesize that they may exist, and could help explain some observed phenomena (SCIE1000 Notes, p. 136).
While induction has many flaws, it does tell us something about the world from our observations. The weakened inductivist method lets us claim that some hypotheses may probably be true if our many tests always showed them to be under various circumstances (SCIE1000 Notes, p. 140). It is by no means rigorous proof; however, it can give us an idea as to what the truth may be. Inductivism also lets us apply our scientific laws and theories to real applications and expect them to work with confidence as if it has worked in the past, we can justifiably expect it to work again in the future (SCIE1000 Notes, p. 137).
Popperians, in contradiction to the inductivist view, believe that speculation and imagination a fundamental parts of science, and coming up with bold new hypotheses is the first step in discovering new knowledge and then trying to falsify them through experimentation (SCIE1000 Notes, p. 149). This provides us with certain knowledge about which hypotheses are false and why, so we can come up with new bold hypotheses that aim to solve the shortcomings discovered in the previous hypotheses (SCIE1000 Notes, p. 149). This deductive method of falsification allows us to expand our knowledge from our past errors, and to aim to correct the mistakes we have found. Unlike inductivism which builds knowledge from inductive proofs, which, as previously argued, are irrational.
I do not believe falsificationism is entirely successful in avoiding the use of inductivism. This is because when we apply some theory or law, are expecting it to work, and, hence using induction. A Popperian would argue that we use it because it is the “most correct” version of the theory or law we have tested, that is, it has passed the most tests, or it mechanistically explains the situation the best. However, this leads us to the problem of defining “most correct” and it brings out a grey area for when we should dismiss a hypothesis for being incorrect (SCIE1000 Notes, p. 152). Hence, I believe that the logic behind falsificationism is not entirely independent of inductivism.
Therefore, while I believe that the inductivist method for attaining knowledge in science is fundamentally flawed and that falsificationism does a decent job of replacing it, I do not believe that falsificationism is entirely exclusive from inductivism. I do not believe that inductivism is an entirely useless element of science, as it allows us to make assumptions and apply our science in ways otherwise deemed irrational.