Assisted suicide, unlike euthanasia, consists of actively assisting someone who wishes to terminate his or her own life, and is unable to do so themselves (Sartori, 2018). At present, assisted suicide, in some form, is legal in four European countries, Canada, and some states of America and Australia. However, assisting suicide is prohibited by the 1961 Suicide Act. This essay will consider legal obligations to protect the right to life of vulnerable people but also the need to safeguard against unnecessary harm and discrimination. I will explore how the criminalization of assisted suicide interferes with the human rights of the disabled, using examples of cases that campaigned for the legalization of assisted suicide. Further to this, I will outline reasonable conditions that must be met in order to avoid unnecessary harm if assisted suicide were legalized. Ultimately,
I will conclude that assisted suicide should be legal because the criminalization of the act infringes on the rights of disabled people, however, sufficient conditions must be met to ensure that vulnerable people are protected.
The Suicide Act of 1961 formally decriminalized suicide. However, section 2 (1) of the act prohibits any third party to assist or encourage another in committing suicide. Whilst I agree that encouraging another to commit suicide is impermissible, it is harmful that those who are physically unable to commit suicide have to needlessly suffer when they wish to end their own lives. In addition to this, it is discriminatory that only able-bodied suicidal people can fulfill their desire to end their own lives without risking the prosecution of their loved ones. In recent years, there has been a shift in public opinion regarding the legality of assisted suicide, with several attempts to liberalize the law via Private Members' Bills, but these have been wholly rejected. The key concern of legalizing assisted suicide is that an initial legal change, however tightly drafted, could be a 'slippery slope' whereby legalizing assisted suicide for the terminally ill and profoundly disabled could lead to further liberalization of the legislation, extending to those who without any such illness (UK Parliament, 2015). Moreover, those who may meet the criteria for permissible assisted suicide but do not wish to die could feel pressured to end their own lives. Whilst, both are valid concerns, bills that legalize assisted suicide can safeguard against this by enforcing conditions protecting vulnerable people. Lord Falconer's Assisted Dying Bill, for example, would require any requests for assisted suicide to be subject to oversight by both medical professionals and the Family Division of the High Court, as well as constant third-party monitoring of the case (Assisted Dying Bill, 2015, pp. 3- 11). Additionally, the answer to the threat of a slippery slope can be resolved by a 'willingness of the courts to hear virtually every disputed case' (Bottum, 1997, pp. 28). This would sufficiently safeguard against any trivialization of assisted suicide and ensure no necessary harm occurs, thus assisted suicide should be legal.
The landmark Pretty vs case first questioned the legality of assisted suicide. Diane Pretty suffered from a degenerative disease and wanted to be able to end her life before suffering a painful and undignified death. As Pretty was paralyzed, she was unable to commit the act herself but wished for her husband to assist her. The Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) refused to protect her husband from prosecution should he assist her and Pretty alleged that this violated her human rights. The first violation Pretty argued was Article 2 of the Human Rights Act- the right to life- which is an instrument for the protection of individual human life and generally prohibits the deprivation of human life (Human Rights Act 1998, 2017). The conflict is whether the right to life encompasses its corollary, the right to die (Millns, 2002, pp. 2). The Court found that no right to die, whether at the hands of a third person or with the assistance of a public authority, can be derived from Article 2 of the Act (Pretty v., 2002, pp. 40). I disagree with this ruling, whilst the right to life establishes the State's duty to protect its people's right to life, it does not protect life itself. If Article 2 infers that the state has an active obligation to protect individual life, then the act of suicide itself should be criminalized too. The state only has to protect the right to life, for those who wish their right to be protected. I believe that assisted suicide should be legalized because the state has no legal right to intervene in the lives of those who do not wish for their right to life to be protected. At the same time, I understand that is important to ensure that the right to life has been respected. Thus, conditions should be met to ensure the request for assisted suicide is free from coercion or pressure. I believe that the conditions outlined in the pending Assisted Dying Bill are sufficient, an informed and educated decision, and a healthy psychological state (Gorgy, 2012). This meets the state's obligation to safeguard life but respects an individual's right to die and if one cannot end her life by themselves, the right to be given assistance by another to end it.
Another reason assisted suicide should be legalized is incompatible with Article 8 of the Human Rights Act, which is the right to respect their private life. Pretty included this in her court proceedings, but more recently Tony Nicklinson fought the High Court for the right to end his life before his death in 2012. Nicklinson argued the 'continuation of his unbearable suffering was contrary to his common law rights of self-determination and dignity and his article 8 rights to personal autonomy' (Nicklinson v. Ministry of Justice, 2012). The nature of this right is extremely personal, and I agree that the right to self-determination encompasses the right to make decisions about one's body, including the right to choose when and how to die so that suffering and indignity could be avoided (Millns, 2002, pp. 3). Whilst the court accepted that the rights of Nicklinson, were engaged in this debate, the state did have the legal right to intervene, as section 2 (1) of Article 8 permits public authority interference in accordance with the law (Human Rights Act 1998, 2017), and thus must be 'considered against the background of the law of murder as it applies to assisted suicide' (Nicklinson v. Ministry of Justice, 2012, pp. 14). So, whilst the judges accepted the terrible predicament of people who are unable to end their own lives as they wish, they are unable to rule against the law and the legalization of assisted suicide is a matter for parliament, rather than the courts on a case-by-case basis. Regardless, Nicklinson died shortly after the ruling, having contracted pneumonia, and then refusing food and water. Evidently, the court had failed to actually protect Nicklinson from harm and as a result, Nicklinson suffered a far more painful and undignified death. It is obvious that the law on assisted suicide should be changed to allow those who meet sufficient requirements to end their life (Gorgy, 2012). This would then mean Article 8(2) could not be used to justify interference within the private sphere and the autonomy of disabled people will be protected.
Further to this, the criminalization of suicide for those who need assistance but decriminalization of suicide for the able-bodied violates Article 14 of the human rights act. This 'enshrines the protection against discrimination in the enjoyment of the rights set forth in the Act' (Human Rights Act 1998, 2017). The conflict is that disabled people are discriminated against because they cannot employ the same legal right to suicide as their able-bodied peers. In Pretty's case, the court held that there was 'objective and reasonable justification for not distinguishing in law between those who were and those who were not physically capable of committing suicide' (Pretty v., 2002 pp. 17). This is 'in order to avoid the risk of abuse to vulnerable persons who might otherwise be coerced into requesting an early termination of their life' (Millns, 2002, pp 5). Whilst the court acknowledged that there is a difference in treatment, it is justified in order to protect the greater good. I disagree with this ruling as it is overly paternalistic; a seriously disabled patient has the same rights as a fit person to respect for personal autonomy (Ms. B v. An NHS Hospital Trust, supra n. 32, para. 94)). Where 'individual liberty has been granted and where we are allowed to do things ourselves, respect for autonomy implies that we should not be hindered by others to pursue our aims' (Schramme, 2013, pp 484). In order for assisted suicide to be legitimately illegal, the law has one of two options: 'to criminalize suicide again, or to permit euthanasia and assisted suicide in situations where the right to life has been respected' (Gorgy, 2020). In either of these circumstances, Article 14 of the Act is not violated. However, the recriminalization of suicide is an unlikely option- the law previously held suicide to be an immoral, criminal offense against God- this is primitive (Canick, 1997). Therefore, the appropriate ruling would be to legalize assisted suicide, providing the right to life has been respected.
This essay has explored some of the conflicts between human rights legislation and the criminalization of assisted suicide as well as some of the court proceedings that questioned the legality of assisted suicide. Overall, it is clear that the current criminalization of assisted suicide is extremely harmful, discriminatory and infringes upon the human rights of the disabled. I have argued in favor of legal assisted suicide, as long as there are measures in place to ensure that the gravity and seriousness of the act are not underestimated. Whilst the criminalization of assisted suicide does infringe upon the rights of the disabled in most cases, in some instances (like Article 8) the offense is compatible with human rights legislation. This does not mean that assisted suicide is legitimately illegal, instead Parliament should reform the Suicide Act or introduce an Assisted Dying Bill that protects and enhances the autonomy of the disabled. Clearly, the laws should be amended, and assisted suicide should be legalized.