People have a natural desire to find explanations of the world around them. In some cases this includes the adoption of conspiracy theories. However, there is still significant doubt surrounding the features of a conspiracy theory, or the personal characteristics of the individual believer that make the conspiracy theory itself more or less persuasive. The following study will seek to gain a further understanding of conspiracy theories and why people invest differently in different conspiracy theories, and why they find them persuasive overall.
The Compelling Nature of Conspiracy Theories and Why People are Persuaded to Believe Them
Conspiracy theories are a unique form of social and political response, which is used to explain a given event or set of events (Douglas et al., 2019). The word conspiracy is derived from the Latin word conspire, meaning “to breath together” and is commonly used to refer to people working together to a reach a specific goal (Byford, 2010). However, conspiracy theories, in psychology and political science refer to either evidence or speculation based conclusions that offer an alternative explanation for a set of events, based on a conspiracy or plot (Byford, 2010). For example, there is a multitude of theories regarding how John F Kennedy died, including one of America’s most popular conspiracy theories, which holds that Lee Havey Oswald did not act alone in his assassination, a conspiracy that more than half of Americans believe (Jensen, 2013). Similarly, as much has a third of Americans believe that global warming is a political hoax (Swift). The question remains, however, that it is not completely understood what social and psychological factors may give a particular conspiracy theory traction, or make them persuasive to the public.
This is, therefore, a specific element of conspiracy theories which needs further investigation, in order to determine what leads to the growing belief in or attraction to specific conspiracy theory, wheat makes people believe those theories, and if there are shared underlying factors in their persuasiveness. One possible explanation for the persuasiveness of conspiracy theories is epistemic motives (Douglas et al., 2017). People have a natural need to find a causal explanation for various events, in order to create a “stable, accurate and internally consistent” vision of the world (Douglas et al., 2017). Thus, when otherwise unexplainable events, like Lee Harvey Oswald’s seemingly unmotivated killing of President Kennedy, can be more cohesively or more completely explained by a conspiracy theory, like the theory that Oswald was working within a larger political movement, the cohesive explanation is naturally persuasive, and even preferable, to the real cause.
This is tied to the idea that many conspiracy theories are preferred, as explanatory objects, because they protect a belief that the individual is personally invested in. For example, this might include those that believe the conspiracy theory that vaccination is harmful, because they are personally invested in using it as an explanation for their child’s autism (Douglas et al., 2017). This allows them to believe what they want to believe, in spite of overwhelming negative evidence, or scientific findings, that work against the profession made by the conspiracy theory (Lewandowsky et al., 2013). This is supported by the theory that people may find a conspiracy theory persuasive, if they prefer the outcome, or the alternative explanation (Lamberty & Imhoff, 2018). The belief in a conspiracy theory can be related to fear of the consequences of some other truth. However, this also means, according to van Prooijen and Douglas (2018) that most conspiracy theories also have negative consequences for the believer.
Correspondingly, Van Prooijen and Douglas (2018) also suggest that conspiracy theories are social, and so adoption of conspiracy theory, is related to the resolution or reflection of intergroup conflict. All conspiracy theories are based on the assumption that there is a threatening group, taking subversive action. Thus, conspiracy theories assume a social aspect that there are common drives among two opposing groups. Returning to the example of vaccine conspiracy theories, the two groups, with opposing positions are the parents, who are motivated to protect their children, and big pharmaceutical companies who are motivated by profitability in spite of harm.
A second theory, as developed by van Prooijen and Douglas (2018) is that conspiracy theories are universal, or happen in all parts of the world. This fits with the idea that man is naturally inclined to seek explanations for difficult truths, and to invent explanations that align with their vision of the world (Douglas et al., 2017). Thus, people have always, and are likely to continue using conspiracy theories for that purpose (West & Sanders, 2003). However, Buss (2009) notes that while all cultures, and all times do universally refer to some conspiracy theories, certainly not all sub-groups believe in them unequally. In other words, the extent to which a culture relies on and produces conspiracy can vary significantly (Buss, 2009).
Additionally, van Prooijen and Douglas (2018) suggest that the belief in conspiracy theories is always, in one way or another, emotional in nature. They state that conspiracy theory is consistently related to a paradox, in that conspiracy theories are supported by arguments that are based in analytic thinking, and a system (van Prooijen & Douglas, 2018). For example, those that believe conspiracy theories regarding the moon landing persistently justify their belief based on the lack of wind on the moon, and the movement of the flag in the images. Thus, the conspiracy theory is based in analysis of detail, and a belief in fact, regardless of the presence of fact.
However, the paradox is that conspiracy theory cannot rely purely on analysis, rather they are associated with intuitive thinking (Swami et al.2014). People have a strong feeling in a specific belief, and apply this to their interpretation of empirical evidence. Thus, the combination is motivated by speculation, or bias, which allows the pairing of analytical and intuitive thinking to consistently draw conclusions that justify the acceptance of the conspiracy theory.
What, therefore, makes a person more likely to believe in conspiracy theories, or more susceptible to being persuaded by existent theories? Dougles et al., (2016) holds that one factor that reduces the total belief in conspiracy theories is education. The more educated an individual is the less likely they are to believe, or engage in the formation of conspiracy theories. This is because those with less education attribute agency or intentionality, without cause, while the educated are more likely to analyze the evidence and come to a more logical and less intuitive answer.
This is supported by a variety of studies that indicate the emotional nature of conspiracy theories. Grzesiak-Feldman (2013) held that a belief in conspiracy theories could be directly correlated with anxiety. That is to say a person who is naturally more prone to anxiety is also more likely to believe in conspiracy theories because they are already predisposed to believe that their society/way of life is under threat (Jolley, Douglas, & Sutton, 2018). Thus, they have an emotional response to the conspiracy theory, because it supports the fears that are within, or at the base of, their anxiety.
People are also more likely to believe conspiracy theories when they face a situation that they have no control over, especially as it relates to the interworking of various organizations (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008), or political parties (Van Prooijen & Acker, 2015). This may be because introduction of a lack of control causes individuals to seek a measure of control, which they gain through the investment in and adoption of conspiracy theories. This correlates to, or aligns with the previous theory, which stated that people invest in conspiracy theories because of their desire to find explanations that provide a consistent or stable experience of life (Douglas et al., 2017).
This also fits with the findings that most conspiracy theories are mutually confirming, or support one another (Douglas et al., 2019). In other words, from a psychological perspective, an individual that believes in one conspiracy theory is more likely to believe in another. The more individual conspiracy theories that the person adopts, the more their network may expand, and the more that they may invest in (Goertzel, 1994). This is in part because of personal factors, like anxiety, which may make them more likely to be persuaded by conspiracy theories, but also because those that turn to a conspiracy theory to support one pet theory, are likely to adopt others, to support other theories and to amass support for their various positions and beliefs, with or without empirical evidence to support those beliefs (Boudry and Braeckman, 2011). This also ties directly to the belief that individuals can have a predisposition to accepting “epistemologically unwarranted beliefs” (Douglas et al., 2019), including those who are religious, have a lower level of intelligence, or who are given to delusions.
Finally, there is a connection to politics, as it relates to conspiracy theories, that cannot be ignored. Often, those that believe in conspiracy theories are those that are disenfranchised, or alienated by the government (Douglas et al., 2019). These people feel that there is a personal level of unrest between the people and the government, which lends itself to a lack of understanding of the social world (Douglas et al., 2019). In these cases, adoption of conspiracy theory aligns with their social view of the political world.
Considering this review of the existing literature, there is a need to study the political, social, and personal psychological relationship of the individual to conspiracy theories, and what causes individuals to be persuaded to believe conspiracy theories, or what specific characteristics a conspiracy theory must have to be most believable by those most and least likely to invest in conspiracy theories. In other words, there is an interest in what makes a conspiracy more or less persuasive, leading to the the difference in social investment between conspiracies like those surrounding Lee Harvey Oswald, which persuades more than half the population of the United States, versus anti-vax conspiracies that are adhered to by a much smaller percentage of the population.
Method
The study will use a mixed method approach, collecting a combination of qualitative and quantitative data during pre-and post-testing, and exposure to two different sets of stimulus to determine if there are certain characteristics of either the viewer, or the theory itself that makes a conspiracy theory more persuasive.
Participants
The Participants will include 140 (70 male and 70 female) students current pursuing a degree at the UNIVERSITY, who have signed up to participate via the university’s online research participation system (SONA) in exchange for credit in one of their courses. All participants, in order to meet the exclusion criteria, had to confirm that they are registered voters, and that they agree to participate voluntarily.
Apparatus
Participants will be assigned to one of 14 rooms which are equipped with a pencil, a TV, and a copy of the survey or answer form. They will then be asked to watch video clips which present 5 conspiracy theories and their basis, and the individual’s response to the theory. These will include both open ended questions, and Likert based questions to judge their response and the degree to which they were persuaded, and why.
Task One:
The first task is a Likert scale survey, which will be given pre-exposure to the conspiracy theories, which will ask questions related to the individual’s general propensity to believe in conspiracy theory. This will contain questions regarding whether or not they think the government is honest, whether or not they believe that facts are hidden for the good of the country, whether or not they believe there are interlopers interfering with the government, their view of the media’s honesty, and other similar topics. This will be designed to take about 10 minutes.
Task Two:
The second task will include dividing the participants of task one into two groups. The first group, or the control group, will watch standard media reporting videos, and the second group, or the experimental group, will watch videos of conspiracy theory presentations. Both groups will then respond to a series of open-ended questions regarding their response to the video, and whether or not they think they provided a truth.
Task Three:
The final task will involve responding to the pre-test, as a post-test, in order to determine if the group’s views of conspiracy theories, or on the honesty of the government, have changed as a result of viewing the videos. They will also be asked to answer an open ended series of question regarding how they felt persuaded by the videos they watched.
Procedure
To account for individual differences in predisposition, personality, and social and political factors, all participants will be divided into two groups, by random selection, which will attempt to individually distribute these differences (Tice et al., 2007). Each of the two groups will go through all three phases of the experiment/ control. The first phase will take about 15 minutes, the second phase will take about an hour, and the third phase will take about 15 minutes.
Anticipated Results
It is anticipated that between-group factorial analysis of variance (ANOVA) can be used in any case where there are two or more individual variables (Hills, 2010), this can be used to determine if the experiment or control groups had similar responses to the videos, or different views of conspiracy theory as a result of exposure to the videos.
Nvivo, or a similar qualitative data software, will be used to determine common themes in responses to the open-ended questions, to determine what is common in the responses or feelings regarding the theories and their persuasiveness.
Discussion
The projected outcome suggests that the hypotheses will be supportable, and that the research will provide evidence that those who demonstrated the features of both the individual and the conspiracy theory which increase belief in the conspiracy, and suggest overall persuasiveness. This will include factors like religiousness, alienation from the government, and lack of education, among others indicated in the literature review (Douglas et al., 2019). However, it will also include some features of the conspiracy itself, like the ability to offer an acceptable or more rational explanation of difficult events, as can be seen in the theories surrounding the death of Kennedy.
Despite the gain that is expected, in terms of understanding, from this study, the limitations should be noted. The weakness is that there is not a way to divide how different racial groups, genders, or other sub-groups may react differently to conspiracy theories, and how that may ultimately influence these results.
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