Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives is a work by Philippa Foot that attempts to question Kant’s idea of morality. Kant claims that moral judgment cannot be a hypothetical imperative; instead, it is a categorical and universal imperative. Foot argues that morality should be presented as a system of hypothetical imperatives due to the fact that morality does not differ from anything else, for example, etiquette.
The idea of morals being driven by the categorical imperatives implies that morality takes a different kind of the word should. By comparing morality with etiquette, Foot claims that there is no significant distinction between the two (Foot, 1972). She draws an example of a person not caring for some etiquette rules is not excused for violating them (Foot, 1972). As such, Foot concludes that since morality and etiquette can both use categorical imperatives, the should of etiquette and the should of moral judgment are similar.
Next, Foot proceeds to dispute the reason behind following the moral rules. According to Foot (1972), a moral rule can be irrational for a person to commit to, marking this person as amoral or evil; however, not irrational. As such, being able to withdraw from committing to these rules for whatever reason, no matter how it renders the person, means moral rules are hypothetical imperatives, not categorical (Foot, 1972). Vice versa, people can and do act morally, despite not being binding to do so. However, Foot concludes that if the moral judgment is a hypothetical imperative, then there must be other reasons why people decide to stay moral (Foot, 1972). Such reasons can be the hypothetical imperative of desire for justice, charity, liberty, and other virtues.