Alan Westin identifies four primary functions of privacy: personal autonomy, emotional release, self-evaluation, and limited and protected communication. The first one refers to how privacy is central to maintaining one’s sense of individuality (Halbert & Inguilli, 2014). Emotional release means the individuals’ need to relieve themselves of the psychological stress that is inseparable from living n a society for which privacy is also indispensable (Halbert & Inguilli, 2014). Privacy is also important for self-evaluation because it is often a preliminary condition for a thorough self-reflection (Halbert & Inguilli, 2014). As for limited and protected communication, privacy is essential for allowing people to share sensitive information only with those they want instead of everyone.
The Constitution does not mention the right to privacy explicitly. The position of the Supreme Court in this regard is roughly consistent with this in the sense that it does not focus on privacy per se. For example, in City of Ontario v. Quon , the Supreme Court was only concerned with privacy insofar as it related to the permissibility of a governmental search of text messages (Halbert & Inguilli, 2014). In other words, the court did not outline a specific right to privacy but merely elaborated on the technicalities of allowing a search on a directly relevant constitutional basis. Hence, to the extent that the Supreme Court finds privacy in the Constitution, it is justified in doing so.
Westin and the Supreme Court generally coincide in their view of privacy. In Riley v. California , the court stated that searching a cell phone without a warrant is illegal and recognized the swiftly increasing value of digital devices to people’s identities (Halbert & Inguilli, 2014). The importance of being secure in one’s digital communication corresponds directly to Westin’s function of limited and protected communication. Similarly, the amount of personal information stored on an average cellphone can make it an important component of the extended self, making it valuable for both personal autonomy and self-reflation. Thus, the Supreme Court’s position on privacy implicitly recognizes the value of privacy functions as defined by Westin.