The Brusilov Offensive, which lasted from June to September 1916, was the straw that broke the camel's back for Russia. The war was lost when Russia signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk following the 1917 revolutions. This essay will argue that the 'June Advance' was not necessarily a military failure since it inflicted enormous losses on the Central Powers; however, when the Russian Imperial army also suffered heavy casualties, the campaign became a disastrous moral failure. Nevertheless, this was only one of the many factors that caused the downfall of the Tsarist regime. Extreme food shortages coupled with devastating economic problems made most Russians very miserable and very hungry. In this situation, one would usually look to the top for aid and inspiration, but all the Russian people could look up to was an incompetent Tsar accompanied by equally inept associates. Hence, the population began to oppose the war, and when the Bolsheviks promised to end the conflict, the people were all too happy to support them and overthrow the Imperial government. This essay will find that the Brusilov Offensive, although significant, was not the main reason Russia lost the war: its failure, however, was a severe blow to an already drained and unhappy population.
Firstly, the Brusilov Offensive of 1916 was one of the bloodiest conflicts in the First World War due to the sheer number of casualties. Brusilov, along with Evert, was responsible for executing the offensive; however, while the former adapted to modern warfare by attacking in smaller, better-trained units, the latter still fought in the conventional form, with human wave attacks: this was futile and caused considerable casualties. Hence, many believe that the Brusilov Offensive was a disaster for Russia.
In terms of leadership, Russia lost the war because the Tsar and his close associates were very inefficient: Nicholas II had removed the capable Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaevich and made himself the supreme commander of all Russian forces. The Tsar, who had no experience in war, only acted as a figurehead for the army: thus, he assumed that his presence would boost morale on the battlefield. On the contrary, Nicholas II was blamed for every military defeat since his self-elevation, shattering the divine infallibility many thought he had.
Due to his new post, Nicholas also abandoned the home front, and his wife, Tsarina Alexandra, took over the domestic government. One modern source explains that 'the Tsar had taken over at this point [on September 15, 1915,] ignoring warnings that he could not be both soldier and statesman'. The Tsarina, who, as historian Jonathan Bromley put it, was an ‘awkward figure', and was not popular with the people: Alexandra's German origin did not gain many citizens' trust (she was often known as 'nemka', meaning 'German woman'). Furthermore, chaos ensued in the Russian government because Alexandra gave people positions based on their loyalty to the regime rather than their competence, so the administration effectively ground to a halt. The Tsarina employed four different Prime Ministers and three different Ministers of War in 16 months which caused inadequate responses to problems such as shortages of material. Hence, many believed that the Tsarina was trying to damage the war effort, and the people began to grow suspicious of Alexandra and the Russian regime more generally.
Therefore, the Tsar's failures caused the people to be discontent with the government and contributed to Russia's loss in the East. Support for the Petrograd Soviets skyrocketed since the majority of people wanted stronger leadership. Ultimately, this caused the revolutions of 1917 and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Although the army's defeat in the Brusilov Offensive made the Tsar even more unpopular, the campaign did not affect how the Russian imperial regime acted.
Economic problems such as food shortages also contributed to Russia's downfall: a war economy made fewer consumer goods available because most resources went to the war effort. Since most commodities were in short supply, peasants in the countryside hoarded their food: after all, money was practically worthless, so exchanging grain for cash was nonsensical.
Recruitment also affected food supplies as the army had conscripted many peasant farmers, who accounted for 82% of the population. The shortage of workers on the farms caused consumable commodities to be harder to obtain, especially in towns and cities.
Poor infrastructure contributed further to the problem since Russia's underdeveloped rail system had to transport troops to the front lines and simultaneously keep the cities supplied. The inadequate railways could not keep up with the demand, and there were severe food shortages in many shops.
Therefore, food was difficult to obtain in the cities as less grain was available: Moscow required 120 freight cars of grain a day to sustain itself, but at the start of 1917, the city received just one-sixth of this amount. Food rationing due to the shortages led to protests which sparked the Revolutions of 1917.
The Brusilov Offensive played no part in this as the lack of grain originated from infrastructural and administrative issues rather than from one particular event.
Another economic problem that weakened Russia's ability to fight in the war was inflation. Initially, the government started to print more money since it lacked funds: this worked out in the short term but was disastrous in the long. The price of goods increased dramatically, whilst wages stayed the roughly same. By late 1916, inflation was up by almost 400 percent, and the rouble was worth a quarter of its pre-war buying power. Life became very challenging for ordinary citizens. The economic problems fuelled discontentment, which helped spark the 1917 revolutions. Alexander Kerensky, the Minister of War, wrote that ‘the Russian people [were] suffering from economic fatigue’, and consequently, ‘the Russian Revolution [was] just beginning’.
Additionally, shortages of equipment were a pressing problem. Russia had begun the war ill-prepared for modern conflict since the country had not yet fully industrialized: at the onset of the war, the artillery was using 45,000 shells a day, but the factories produced only 1,300 in the same period. Although the situation started to improve in 1916, the military still lacked airplanes and heavy guns. Colonel Knox wrote that ‘without airplanes and far more heavy guns and shells and some knowledge of their use, it is butchery, and useless butchery to drive Russian infantry against German lines’. Without good supplies and equipment, Russia could not overcome its enemies.
The Russian population was on the verge of revolt due to inflation: this problem made the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk almost inexorable. The underequipped military could not defeat the Central Powers because of the glaring supply issues: the Imperial Army would find itself on the brink of collapse, creating a military catastrophe for Russia. The Brusilov Offensive was not significant here as the campaign neither changed the Russian economic situation nor affected the equipment shortages.
Russia also capitulated to Germany because of the lack of morale in the army and among the people.
The high casualties from the Brusilov Offensive sparked waves of demoralization: according to General Dukhonin, the commander-in-chief, the campaign caused one million losses. Desertion and dissent became endemic; this led to the collapse of the shrinking Imperial Army in 1917. Without an army, Russia could not fight a war.
The high number of total fatalities, aggravated by the Brusilov Offensive, hit the people hard too: most Russians were appalled at the loss of men and were horrified by the army's failure: dissent and discontent spread amongst the population. A 21st-century account explains that ‘success on the battlefield would quell dissent at home’. However, the continuous losses and the failure of the Brusilov Offensive made the people desperate for change.
The high death toll, which provoked desertion in the army and dissidence amongst the people, contributed to the 1917 Revolution and obliterated Russia's shrinking army. The Brusilov Offensive played a substantial part in this, and the campaign exacerbated existing problems with morale.
Ultimately, Russia lost the First World War because the people were incandescent: food shortages, economic problems, and the Tsar's incompetence made the people despise the imperial regime. The Bolsheviks' popularity soared, and the slogan 'peace, land, bread' effectively guaranteed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The Brusilov Offensive caused high casualties and demoralized both the troops and the people, but the campaign's failure, although significant, was not the main reason Russia surrendered to Germany. The principal causes of the defeat were the 1917 revolutions and the disintegration of the Imperial Army. The Brusilov Offensive shook a population on the brink of revolt, and the campaign's failure was nothing less than the straw that broke the camel's back.