Domestic terrorism and homegrown extremism have been rather poorly informed by our media since the 9/11 attacks against the United States. I believe that our own belief systems and apprehensions have led us and our government to really dividing our nation’s freedom and security rather then listening to reason and reality. In this research paper, I am going to list my own beliefs based on my own research to tell you why the difference between national security vs freedom has not yet been answered. I believe that there is a connection between these ideals. Starting with the United States terrorism’s own history, I will discuss three important detailed cases to observe domestic terrorism and its plan of policy. These three strategies will include racial profiling, the more severe case of cross examinations, and how gun laws have evolved and its effect on race relations in the United States. These strategies have long lasting effects on freedom and human rights and can ultimately harm our national security through its action. It has an effect on the relations between law officials and our residents, including the population of the Muslim American groups and can lead US officials away from the direct dangers against our country.
In this paper, I am going to focus on real-life examples of counter-terrorism attacks and how America can balance freedom vs national security. There have been a wide list of occasions of counter terrorism acts starting all the way from 2,000 years ago with cold-blooded Jewish rituals. People had not used the word terrorism until 1793 during the French Revolution when Maximilien Robespierre, an influential politician had used it. One of the first counts of United States terrorism that was recorded was in 1622. A tribe of Native Americans brutally attacked Jamestown and killed thirty percent of its civilians. There were also the domestic historical uprisings of terrorist attacks made by the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) in 1867. At first, it was a peaceful social gathering which was led by a Confederate general named Nathan Bedford Forrest. But before long, the clan opposed the peaceful gatherings, and turned to savagery and killing supporters of the Republican party and African American voters. It wasn’t until the 1920s to the 1960’s where domestic terrorism showed up more frequently. Historian, David Rapoport states that this period saw what was called the 'counter provincial wave' of domestic terrorism. An example of this would be the 1954 shooting of Congress which Rapoport believes to be the root of the domestic terrorist attack. During the mid 1960’s, there were many more cases of domestic terrorism which still are precedent today. In the 1990’s, terrorist assaults on US terrain were starting from white patriots and the people on the extreme Right group. One incident is the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing.
In 2007, there was an article that covered an analysis of cross examinations and the methods that the specialists used. The overall question was: Does cross examination help domestic national security? The specialists came to a conclusion of no, it did not help. Torture as a cross examination device was overall pointless. Torture was utilized if they were sure that they had all the necessary basic information to try and stop a bomb that could explode and kill innocent civilians. One example of this is included in articles by Bruce Hoffman and Alan Dershowitz noting that torture can be utilized in certain situations. First, when operators capture a terrorist at the time between an initial bombing setup and the bomb’s explosives go off. Another scenario is when law officials or agents already have the knowledge that the terrorist has most of the information that could find where the bomb is located, the timing of finding the bomb and defusing it. Many scientists and researchers have mainly focused on the ineffectiveness of torture, the mental and the physical types as a method of cross examination. Torture can make the terrorist feel more safe in certain situations or make the more nervous individual feel like they will say any information on the matter of their cross examination just to end the misery. By this time, the bomb would have been already detonated. Many specialists would not be able to receive their data on time and even if they did, the facts would still be questionable. Torture can be conceived a s counterproductive and much more deceptive. It can ultimately harm the individuals, both mentally and physically.
Before the attacks of 9/11, there was a national action to ban racial profiling in effect. But, after these attacks, many officials looked the other way on the whole idea. There were many reasons for racial profiling of Muslim groups and other individuals who “look Muslim”. Racial profiling supporters believe the reason for racial profiling is survival against terrorists. Despite this ideal, I argue that racial profiling is not only treating others unfairly but it brings up the United States own laws of national security. Racial profiling is the act of focusing on individuals for security custody based on their race, religion, or ethnicity because you believe that they are going to take part in an illegal manner and may harm others. I believe that racial profiling is unfair and unjust because the fact that an individual’s race or religion can make you doubt your own beliefs of safety and national security. You have no idea that the individual is exhibiting unlawful conduct. Despite this, there are very few US households that forbid this type of racial profiling. In 2003, there was research that race may be found as a factor when there is knowledge that can show illegal acts done by individuals of a specific race or ethnicity that can ultimately cause harm and if there is suspicious behavior. Racial profiling done on an individual when there is no knowledge of that person behaving in an illegal manner is to be found false. Many would argue that there are issues with these ideals of racial profiling and when it is fine to use against an individual. When it takes into analysis as an immunity under national security and does not tell us what is an “issue” of national security. Another example is it doesn’t tell us what “suspicious conduct” is. I believe that there are numerous reasons to make a restriction for racial profiling for terrorism purposes. The Muslim group of people are ethnically different. How can we decided who is Muslim and who is not? The main way that we can do this is by addressing their “religious” clothing. Not all Muslims may dress in this mannerism. An example of this would be Al-Qaeda and if they all dressed in a religious manner, they would all fit the profile and it would make them all rather too obvious and rather suspicious. In the 9/11 attacks, some of the terrorists were dressed like Americans and had shaven faces. Many officials have looked for individuals that might blend in best. Racial profiling is not ultimately efficient in the fact that terrorists may not use their own people to make the assault. Some terrorists are known to use their wives or children to make a transfer of weapons. Muslim Americans are not the only risk that challenges us Americans. Other groups such as Neo-Nazis and White Supremacists can put us in danger. By racial profiling against groups of people, such as the 5,000 number of Muslims who were put into question after the 9/11 attacks, can have an effect on our freedom and it doesn’t get rid of the terrorist organizations. It can cause individuals to become reluctant to assist law officials and become frustrated with the American culture itself. We have increasingly updated our national security because of racial profiling. The airports such as LAX themselves have become increasingly more and more loaded with security each year.
National security is a crucial factor of any nation, but I believe that freedom is just as crucial. After the 9/11 attacks, the national US security was taken to a whole other level, with increased border patrol and airport security. The government did not take proper action to enforce stricter rules in who enters the country. I believe that the government did not need to violate our American freedoms that we worked so hard for. The US Patriot Act of 2001 enforces the ability of law officials to search personal information. Some of these acts are necessary but not all of them are. Reading over the Fourth Amendment, it allows the right of the people to be secure against obstructive searches. It is unreasonable for officials to listen to private phone calls and go through private emails. U.S. law officials were made to listen in on private phone calls even when there was no threat to the nation’s security. Even when there was no danger to America, our American freedoms were torn from us to provide national security.
Some researchers may argue that, even if there are current threats on US soil, the national security must be taken seriously no matter the cost of it and its peoples. It will take priority over the peoples freedoms. I believe that taking away the liberty of the people for national security is giving the terrorists the upper hand. They want Americans and American suppression. During domestic terrorist acts, there is some need to place national security above liberty, an example being the Espionage Act of 1917 and the following years amendment, the Sedition Act during World War I. The Espionage Act of 1917 was ultimately supposed to secure the nation and provide more security in the effects of World War I. It ultimately failed and rather put a tight grip om the fear of the nations people. In America where freedom has very high value and its people are determined to go to wits end to hold on to their pride and values, it is rather impossible to place national security before liberty.
Security must be balanced against civil liberty, and any improvement in one results in a diminution of the other. This is the wrong perspective: America is not limited to a zero-sum game. There are effective ways to limit the ability of the government to intrude into Americans' lives while increasing security. America must adhere to fundamental and firm principles of limited government, and it can do so while also answering the terrorist threat.
Breaks about the National Security Agency's (NSA) local wiretapping program – otherwise called signs insight activities, or SIGINT initially showed up on December 16, 2005 in the New York Times.The article uncovered that since 2002 President Bush approved the observing of global phone calls and worldwide email messages of hundreds, maybe thousands, of individuals inside the United States without warrants. The NSA's local wiretapping exercises without legal or congressional oversight are another unmistakable case of issues with the Bush organization's counter-terrorism system, both lawfully and security-wise. A few legitimate examiners and security promotion associations fight the organization has seriously confined people's entitlement to protection by disregarding the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978 (controlling wiretapping of an outside power through an extraordinary court), Title III (overseeing residential criminal wiretapping), a progression of correspondences protection laws and conceivably the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution. News associations revealed that President Bush marked a bill immediately gone through the House and Senate, called the 2007 Protect America Act (PAA 2007), which permits warrantless residential electronic spying by the National Security Agency to occur for as long as a half year.
There are no arrangements for assurance against outlandish physical or electronic hunt and seizures. Besides, there is no responsibility. While the facts demonstrate that calls being grabbed by the NSA should be erased, the arrangement about keeping up records of data that has remote insight esteem or wrongdoing is flexible since outside knowledge esteem is a both expansive and abstract measure. From an absolutely security stance, the NSA program allows us to dissect the viability of SIGINT and the organization itself in counter-terrorism tasks. I contend that such a meddling project isn't just unlawful and unscrupulous, yet inadequate and counterproductive to battling terrorism inside the United States.
To start with, the degree to which wiretapping SIGINT adds to these activities, might be exaggerated. As ahead of schedule as October 2002 the news offices announced that the NSA experienced difficulty entering and following Al-Qaeda cells since they figured out how to sidestep U.S. capture attempt innovation, mainly by utilizing dispensable PDAs or by keeping away from telephones through and through and substituting human delegates and up close and personal gatherings to pass on requests. As the article delineates, an overwhelming accentuation on SIGINT can be counterproductive to counter-terrorism endeavors. Al-Qaeda individuals intentionally endeavor to trigger false alarms by transparently bolstering disinformation. They would then be able to plug up any inner interchanges spills by seeing when counter-terrorism powers follow up on the bogus knowledge. Deciding the legitimacy of data from SIGINT activities has been troublesome notwithstanding for the most experienced examiners since what are gathered are obscure articulations that can be effectively confused.
Second, as per the 2006 USA Today article, NSA authorities asserted household SIGINT activities help battle fear based oppression by utilizing the information created for interpersonal organization examination. Anyway the present informal community examination strategies used to direct SIGINT tasks called snowball inspecting, are not appropriate for the sort of counter-terrorism activities generally done by FBI criminal agents. Research directed by two informal community specialists, finds that the snowball strategy is more qualified for very associated gatherings, instead of a little self-governing cell which is the possible hierarchical structure of decision for the developing wonder of homegrown terrorist agents. The NSA's snowball examining strategies accumulated a monstrous volume of pointless data that overpowers experts and drove FBI authorities no place, squandering restricted assets and time. Besides, the household SIGINT activities put a gigantic specialized strain on the NSA's assets, constraining the organization to devour ravenous measures of electricity– over managing its flow PC problems– to support its flow operational limit. This imperils American national security by risking another electrical over-burden, like the one that incapacitated the office seven years prior and left our country defenseless for about three days.
Both of these models show that the NSA, with its SIGINT center, isn't appropriate for the sort of work successfully directed FBI criminal examiners. They demonstrate that electronic trawls are insufficient, yet in addition counterproductive to battling psychological warfare. The issue with the residential SIGINT program isn't gathering data. Actually, the inverse is valid – experts are overpowered by the monstrous measure of data they need to look at, aggravated just by dreary administration rehearses that misuse the human and specialized methods for such investigation. (Botch is purportedly likewise to fault for neglecting to establish another information filtering program that could accumulate and examine data progressively productive while agreeing to protection laws, before 9/11.) Getting the correct data is vital, however breaking down it, researching it and dispersing it to the perfect individuals are additionally basic. Neglecting to do these other three stages were central point that prompted the 9/11 and 7/7 assaults.
Give us a chance to finish up this segment by looking at the more extensive ramifications of this program in the battle against psychological militant systems. Regardless of whether the NSA were to come back to working inside the FISA system, one must ask whether that is best lawful way to deal with battling psychological warfare. Expecting that organization's exceptionally faulty legitimization for bypassing the FISA warrants– purportedly excessively troublesome and moderate to be approved– is valid, one ought to think about that there are government legal locale, yet just a single FISA court. When any security office figures out how to get past the FISA procedure, it could have gotten consent for a criminal wiretap dependent on the Title III from any of the numerous other government courts. Past time and coordinations issues of FISA versus criminal courts, there is a bigger reasonable clash inside arrangement circles. It is between utilizing counter-knowledge versus law implementation ways to deal with counter-terrorism– which have gigantic implications for both the lawful and strategic bearings in the battle against terroristsystems.
Previous 16-year FBI veteran Michael German finds that rather than the present counter-knowledge approach that drives counter-fear based oppression strategy, the FBI and more extensive US government ought to take a more law-authorization based methodology. The ongoing theme issue of a counter-insight approach is its solid requirement for mystery. Strategically, on the ground, mystery obstructs the essential knowledge sharing to battle psychological oppressors out of a need to ensure sources and strategies, and keeps the introduction of good and terrible works on, evacuating impetus for organizations to audit and change themselves when botches are made. Mystery additionally permits more space for injurious practices that undermine America's human rights and common freedoms establishments and redirecting restricted data gathering assets from different zones, subsequently squandering constrained assets and diverting specialists and experts from genuine dangers.
Watching contemporary situation in the country, we can make reference to that U.S. authorities are stressed over the creating number of locals and unchanging inhabitants of the U.S. who are locked in with terrorism based oppressor practices against the country. Regardless of the way that the American home-created psychological oppressors are suffering one destruction after another, U.S. experts are sure in their virtuoso and alert the inhabitants that neighborhood mental persecution is a certifiable hazard for the country. According to Whittaker (2003), private psychological militants are particularly hazardous because they can hit any flank and with essentially zero forewarning. Whittaker (2003) forewarned that they appreciate American culture, they understand all of the systems to ensure the security of the country's vulnerabilities. Likewise, they use the Internet, relational connection and publicizing aptitudes in order to affect the adherents. Thusly, the need to focus on the essential issues of the chronicled background of family unit mental fighting has a strong establishment.
To begin, we need to make reference to that the issue of local terrorism has significant roots, and this thought takes its beginnings various decades earlier. For instance, let us recall the way that Leon Czolgosz, rebel who killed President McKinley in 1901, was a neighborhood of the United States and acted without outside help. As shown by Schmid (1983), the most perilous exhibition of local fear based oppression in U.S. history was the impact in Oklahoma, which was made by a veteran of the Gulf War, whose name was Timothy McVeigh, and who was considered in New York. Clearly, the amount of local terrorism strikes has staggeringly decreased conversely with 1970, when Weather Underground, The Jewish Defense League, a social event of Cuban outsiders who confined Castro and Puerto Rican loyalists set off bombs on the space of the U.S., yet the issue has not evaporated yet. Viewing U.S. history of nearby dread based abuse, we need to express that Al Qaeda is a strong mental aggressor affiliation nowadays. Likewise, according to Schmid (1983), it has an indisputable spot in the chronicled background of household terrorism in the United States. Regardless, clearly, the manner in which that Al Qaeda has a couple of inconveniences in its fuse into the ordinary American life can be illuminated by three rule reasons. The principle reason is concealed in the conviction arrangement of Al Qaeda since its representatives execute various people, including Muslims, while this reality guarantees its offensiveness in a huge piece of the world. Schmid (1983) showed that their conviction framework is particularly malevolent for the people who live in the intentional liberal social requests, for instance, the United States. The second reason can be seen in trouble of Americans to be truly dedicated to this relationship by the spot of first experience with the world. It is a reality that the Americans, who are destroyed in to Al Qaeda, prone somewhat focused and vexed, yet they are not improved with properties that various affiliations regard most in their enrolled individuals. Furthermore, the third reason can be elucidated by the activity of American government to control the component of residential terrorism for the motivation to smash it. Into the certification of this reality, we can say that U.S. pioneers search for the assortments to fortify existing measures against neighborhood mental activists.
After September 11, 2001, the FBI got a great deal of additional financing for counter-terrorism and hurled a little furnished power of experts driving the fight against bad behavior to the fight against household terrorism. Numerous authorities were fused into the new joint forces to fight local terrorism. Also, determined specialists dynamically attempted to bring charges against the fear mongers, and it in like manner reduced the element of household mental fighting in the United States. To incorporate, Schmid (1983) saw that various states have set up excellent concentrations to total up all of the data about local terrorism ambushes, where the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) began to give current information about the hazard. Being continuously unequivocal, we need to express that household terrorism fuses acts that bargain human life and are an encroachment of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State; the exhibitions which look as a development that has a straightly planned character; the showings that are gone for threatening, or impulse of customary individuals; the shows used to affect the course of action of a lawmaking body by threatening or weight, or to affect the movement of an organization by mass destruction, demise, or capturing of a statesman, and happens fundamentally inside the provincial domain of the United States.
Watching weak sides of family unit dread based abuse for the motivation to understand the adversary better, Zetter (2005) communicated that local mental activist affiliations have issues in their affiliation. The mass violence has genuinely been an aftereffect of bureaucratic and different leveled affiliations having a spot with or like them rebel improvements. Regardless, what is important is concealed in the manner in which that bureaucratic affiliations have the strategies imperative in order to prepare and induce various people to do unlawful exercises by the solicitation of fear monger pioneers, and as history shows up, it was the base of the viciousness with the use of little arms. What's more, simply bureaucratic affiliations have physical security, data, capacities and capital expected to make weapons, for example, enormous firearms, ambush flying machine and nuclear weapons (fit for killing various people) as masters of the state or diverse affiliations which can store violence.
Since these affiliations are normally underground, terrorists as a rule don't have such properties. They feel that its difficult to acquire and transmit data bearing end, assemble wealth, fabricate plants for the making of complex weapons or give enough individuals to coordinate attacks against the people. These inadequacies are particularly clear in Al Qaeda, which has constantly been even more around bound social event of radicals, rather than the affiliation which prepared to regulate its gathering and supporters. In such a way, sketching out the as of late communicated facts, we can express that the miracle of dread based abuse in the bleeding edge society is very incredible and it produces social and political entropy, primary effects of which are not enlisted. Zetter (2005) referenced that household terrorism movement normally gains a phenomenal, or an indicated 'generative' character through the gem of present day media. In an overall population which has an important crisis potential constantly exists a sufficient number of express affiliations, groups, criminal systems that reject common models of moral nature of people, and social occasions with tremendous enthusiastic prosperity issues who are anxious to do a terrorist act or to take an interest in residential psychological warfare works out. To incorporate, residential terrorism by its political and social mental reasons is energized not by religious characteristics and musings, yet by unequivocal settings for dealing with political issues. Thusly, a commitment with respect to mental activist activities must be finished by express individuals, social events, affiliations, which may cover the real reasons of residential terrorist ambushes behind religious, national or distinctive goals to achieve their destinations, similarly as the forces that are behind the psychological militants.
After analyzing these analyses of domestic terrorism methods like cross examination, gun laws, and racial profiling, I think that there is a fine line between freedom and human rights and warfare strategies. The connection between maintaining some freedom through our laws against terrorism is reliable. Researching the history of domestic terrorism in the United States has given me more thought to the possibility of terrorist attacks on our nation and how us as individuals mentally fight these acts here in America.
References
Albert J. Jongman and Alex P. Schmid, Political Terrorism. (New Brunswick, NJ: SWIDOC, Amsterdam and Transactions Publishers, 1983). P. 5. Cited in Boaz Ganor, The Counterterrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision Makers. (New Brunswick, NJ: Transactions Publishers, 2005.) P. 16.
Robin Wright, “Iranian Unit to Be Labeled ‘Terrorist.’” Washington Post, (August 15, The Terrorism Reader. Ed. David J. Whittaker. 2nd edition. (New York, NY: Routledge, 2003). P. 4-13.
Jonathan M. Bryant, “Ku Klux Klan in the Reconstruction Era.” The New Georgia Encyclopedia, (October 3, 2002), .
“Weather Underground Organization (WUO) / Weatherman.” MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, (July 1, 2007), .
Kim Zetter, “Why Racial Profiling Doesn’t Work.” Salon.com, (August 22, 2005),