What is Pragmatism? ‘pragmatism’, as applied to shifts in India’s post-Cold War foreign policy, has generally been interpreted substantively: that is, to denote a foreign policy that has expunged one form of ‘content’ (earlier ideational frameworks) and adopted a new ‘content’, namely a set of realist assumptions that frame the national interest in terms of material power.
The age of taking moral stands – peace over war – on terror with loose, ineffective statements that lack credibility because of subsequent inaction, such as “we condemn” or “we warn”, are behind India. Modi has been hailed to bypass the long-held idealistic notions of Nehruvianism; he will also set aside cultural and religious ideologies or entrenched principles, specifically, if and when required his own party’s Hindutva or Hindu nationalist ideology such as Mr. Modi declared that India would contribute to the conservation of the Maldives’ oldest mosque, an ornate, 17th-century building made of coral.
Perhaps the States do not suddenly adopt realist assumptions; rather, those assumptions are simply and universally part of their nature and/or the structure of the international system. As Reus-Smit observes, the assumptions of neo-realism render ‘actors’ interests ... exogenous to social interaction’.
But apparently, Mr. Modi brings a rare pragmatism in dealing with the many differences with the US on trade, climate change, and civil nuclear liability. Modi’s eager pursuit of American investment in India is matched by his recognition of the unprecedented possibilities for geopolitical cooperation with the US. ‘The nuclear deal between Iran and the US is a vindication of Delhi’s diplomatic pragmatism that [has] unfolded since India conducted nuclear tests in May 1998.’
Procedural pragmatism, which Modi brings with himself is a process of ideational innovation in foreign policy, rather than the content-rich blueprint for change—namely, to a foreign policy built on realist assumptions—that foreign policy revisionists envisage. As a process, pragmatism means working creatively with ideas and ideologies, but it does not prescribe which ideas and ideologies are relevant, since these are defined by the given political and historical context. At the same time, he will be willing to abandon ideological and institutionalized ideational stances of all kinds, where necessary (‘Modi will be more interested in development than pushing the Hindutva agenda’).
However, Mr. Modi can be more openly pro-Israel than any Congress prime minister, not having to contend with a large Muslim membership with strong anti-Zionist feelings. Behind the scenes, though, Israel’s weapons exports to India have risen consistently as has trade and technology transfer between the two nations.
Just like Mr. Modi’s choice of foreign minister, seems to suggest new pragmatism in pursuit of India’s goals. These are grand and overarching, a re-imagining of India’s place regionally and in the wider world, in order to move from a nation that follows global rules to a force that helps to establish them.
Focus on building Materially can be seen from S. Jaishankar's current Foreign Minister’s statement which exclaims that ‘ It’s all about positioning today’s India on the world stage, he said, which means “cultivating America, steadying Russia, managing China, enthusing Japan and attending to Europe”. In the same breath, he adds that “prioritization of the neighborhood is also important”.
After making several efforts in the earlier phase of his Diplomacy which went on the extent of a surprise landing at Islamabad on Nawaz Sharif’s birthday to Isolating Pakistan is part of the reason for the change in Mr. Modi’s guest list in his two inaugurations. The shift from SAARC to BIMSTEC was about more than acronyms. BIMSTEC comprises India, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. So, it is SAARC minus Pakistan and Afghanistan, plus Thailand and Myanmar. BIMSTEC’s new prominence is significant, 22 years after it came into being as a means of integrating the littoral economies of the Bay of Bengal. Mr. Modi’s India is signaling a quite different aspiration to those of years past. Instead of engaging Pakistan, it seeks to marginalize it all together and build new bridges to east and south-east Asia.
The words used this time are more aggressive: “they [Pakistan] have made a big mistake”, “will have to pay a heavy price”, and above all “Freehand has been given to security forces to act.” The part on “free hand” has created a new meaning for itself that implies the forces are free to act what they deem best, there will be no political barriers placed in their way and they will not be held back, as they were during the Kargil War in 1999.
Criticism
Ignorance or flawed:
The prime minister of Nepal, the current chair of SAARC, has urged its 'revival', a point of view seconded by the Sri Lankan president, who insists that 'both BIMSTEC and SAARC are significant organizations”. His first big mistake was demanding changes to Nepal’s newly approved constitution and imposing an unofficial blockade of that land-locked nation in 2015. Nepalis naturally interpreted this stance as that of a regional hegemon seeking to impose its will on a democratic government. Nepal reacted by building closer ties with China as a bulwark against India’s domination.
To the south of India, China’s acquisition of the Hambantota port in Sri Lanka in an equity-for-debt swap has underlined the massively increased clout of India’s largest neighbor. Security experts speak of China’s “string of pearls” strategy, and view Hambantota as an addition to that string, alongside the Gwadar port in Pakistan and the country’s first overseas military base in Djibouti.
Maldives former President Abdulla Yameen signed a free trade agreement with China last year, enthusiastically backed Xi Jinping’s signature Belt and Road Initiative, and leased an island to China for military use, leading some commentators to question whether he was handing the rudder of the nation to the Chinese.
Modi was playing the same game of smoke and mirrors in this area as he had in domestic policy. A further two years down the line, relations with many of our neighbors have deteriorated, and his image as a leader who can get things done needs questioning also we have experienced nothing like the whiplash shift marking the entry of Donald Trump into the White House.
In opposition to popular belief Modi’s policies are indeed constrained by both ideology and institutionalized ideas, and, as a result, like most other leaders, his pragmatism entails Bricolage that is, improvising with influential and institutionalized ideas rather than without them. In the Indian context, this finding is significant since it suggests that Modi cannot always set aside the personal and domestic beliefs of Hindutva that are so closely aligned with his leadership, and, equally, that he is not entirely free to move away from India’s entrenched foreign policy positions of the past. It falsely signals to outside observers that India’s foreign policy is driven entirely by considerations of power and interest whereas in actuality it continues to draw on domestic sets of ideas.
Girish Sahane says ‘Modi is like a stylish batsman of whom much is expected but who consistently fails to deliver big scores. Four years on, he’s put far too few runs on the board while Xi’s been on a century spree. It might be time to accept the man’s technique is fatally flawed, and drop him from the national team.’ frequently confused and pursued an ad hoc, personality-driven style that has contributed to a worsening of relations with most of our neighbors.
https://qz.com/india/1262687/indian-foreign-policy-is-blighted-by-modis-incompetence/
https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/5-ways-indias-foreign-policy-has-changed-post-balakot/?amp
https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/a-new-era-of-pragmatic-foreign-policy-appears-to-be-emerging-in-modi-s-india-2-0-1.873121
https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/ia/pragmatism-indian-foreign-policy-how-ideas-constrain-modi