Hong Kong ( CNN ) -- There is only one thing that Chinese and foreign observers of China are looking for at the 18th Chinese Communist Party ( CCP ) Congress : signs of reform , especially political liberalization . The chances of meaningful political changes , or those that dovetail with global norms , however , are getting increasingly slim . The reason may be simple . Until around about the time of the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989 , to reform or not to reform belonged in the realm of ideology . Even before the birth of the People 's Republic in 1949 , factions within the party had fought over the future direction of the country . When Mao Zedong was running the show , there was the celebrated `` struggle between two lines . '' This referred to the fierce competition between the Maoists -- who claimed to uphold unadulterated Marxism -- and the `` capitalist roaders , '' led by then-president Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping . After the Cultural Revolution ( 1966-76 ) , Deng , the Great Architect of Reform , battled furiously with conservative patriarch Chen Yun , who only wanted `` [ market-oriented ] reform within a bird-cage . '' In the run-up to the June 4 , 1989 massacre , Deng , who was paranoid about China succumbing to the winds of change that were sweeping Eastern Europe , mobilized the troops to torpedo the Westernized political reforms championed by the liberal General Secretary Zhao Ziyang . Since the early 1990s , three major factions have emerged within the party : the Shanghai faction led by ex-president Jiang Zemin , the Communist Youth League ( CYL ) faction led by President Hu Jintao , and the `` Gang of Princelings '' -- a reference to the offspring of party elders -- led by president-in-waiting Xi Jinping . Despite their apparent differences , these factions have come to a solid consensus on the major goals of the country . Politically , the CCP must preserve its near-total monopoly on power . And while aspects of the economy are being integrated with the global marketplace , about 120 yangqi or centrally-held enterprises will continue to enjoy monopolies over key sectors , ranging from oil and gas to banking and telecommunications . Moreover , an unprecedented number of the spouses and children of party elders have gone into business . Some have become the yangqi 's senior managers . Even more have used their sterling political connections to start highly successful private businesses in lucrative areas such as finance and real estate . These so-called `` red capitalists '' are evenly represented by members of the party major factions . Critics of the government do not seem to be exaggerating when they say that 100 or so of the biggest clans that represent the country 's `` red aristocracy '' control the largest chunk of the economy . The official China Daily has reported that the top 1 % of Chinese families owns 41.4 % of the nation 's wealth , while a survey by the People 's Daily indicated that 91 % of respondents thought the `` nouveau riche '' in China had benefited from their political ties to the CCP leadership . Reform has become nigh impossible because any change of the political or economic status quo will threaten the vested interests -- and finances and earnings -- of these near-omnipotent CCP clans . Politburo member and Guangdong Province Party Secretary Wang Yang admitted this earlier this year . `` At the early stage of reform , the obstacles [ to liberalization ] were mainly due to ideological differences , '' he said . `` Now , the major problems faced by reform come from the configuration of interest groups [ at the top ] . '' It is most unlikely that the fifth-generation leadership under General Secretary-in-waiting Xi Jinping will change the rules of the game . While Xi , 59 , has the reputation of `` Mr. Clean , '' his siblings are multi-millionaires who have substantial investments in China and Hong Kong . Quite a few of the members of the new CCP Politburo Standing Committee ( PBSC ) -- China 's highest ruling council -- to be confirmed at the November congress are representatives of China 's big clans . They include the Vice-Premier Wang Qishan , Head of the Propaganda Department Liu Yunshan , and Vice-Premier and Chongqing Party Chief , Zhang Dejiang . Owing to the rigidity of China 's one-party authoritarian rule -- as well as the political elite 's determination to uphold the status quo -- expectations of any kind of reform and liberalization have fallen to new lows among the Chinese intelligentsia as well as ordinary folk . Even though China watchers in the West are paying close attention to who will be inducted into the Politburo and the PBSC , Beijing 's largely apathetic political pundits are seized by a feeling of plus ca change -- the more things change , the more they stay the same . The opinions expressed in this commentary are solely those of Willy Lam .
Chance of meaningful reform from China 's new leaders is slim . Different factions have reached consensus on major national goals . An unprecedented number of relatives of party elders have gone into business . Reform complicated by vested interests of these `` red capitalists ''