( CNN ) -- Headlines and pundits once again declare that we have a crisis on our hands in the wake of discovering that North Korea is building a new nuclear reactor and a uranium enrichment plant . More ominously , Tuesday brought news of direct artillery barrages between North and South Korea , heightening tensions and costing lives . But as provocative and serious as this is , neither is a crisis . Both fit a clear pattern of North Korean behavior -- a pattern that ultimately holds out the opportunity for progress . Unfortunately , so far the U.S. response also fits a pattern of rhetorical condemnation but little in the way of creative or effective engagement . Some key lessons need to be re-learned in light of these developments . First , the fundamental security situation with respect to North Korea has not changed . Pyongyang 's estimated stockpile of plutonium bombs remains the same ( four to eight bombs ' worth ) . It does not have the capability to deliver these devices by aircraft or missile and its plutonium program remains frozen or perhaps even further eroded , as described in a report by Dr. Sig Hecker , who visited the North 's nuclear facilities two weeks ago . Tuesday , in a briefing in Washington , Hecker , the former head of the Los Alamos Nuclear Laboratory , said that his report had been `` hyped '' in the media . He detailed how the new facilities , while potentially capable of producing material for bombs , are hardly the quickest route for North Korea to do so . Here 's why . Uranium weapons are bigger than plutonium weapons , thus more difficult to shrink to the size needed for a missile warhead . The facility Hecker visited could only produce one or two bombs ' worth of material a year , it is not clear when it will be fully operational and it has been built to replace the plutonium production facilities , not add to them . The new , small light-water reactor under construction is actually not very good for producing weapons-grade plutonium . If North Korea wanted to expand its nuclear arsenal , it makes much more sense for it to restart the plutonium reactor it has , not replace it with this new one . Finally , the North Koreans said they would scrap their plutonium capabilities completely in exchange for improved relations with the United States . In short , it is conceivable that the facilities are what the North claims , its attempt at home-grown nuclear energy , a goal the North has had for decades . As Hecker said , the trip raised `` as many questions as it answered . '' Second , as difficult as engagement is , it is preferable to the alternative , isolation and instability . Remember that North Korea succeeded in acquiring or building these new facilities during a time when sanctions were extreme and U.S. engagement was absent . In fact , we only know about the facilities because of an unofficial visit by Americans whom the North wanted to use to reveal them . Before that , the Bush administration 's years-long policy of complete isolation allowed North Korea to produce plutonium , fashion it into bombs and test two of them . Only in the last two years of the Bush era did a change in U.S. approach bear some fruit in freezing North Korea 's programs . `` Strategic patience '' has been the nickname for the U.S. approach to North Korea since the early weeks of the Obama administration , when Pyongyang rejected early overtures of dialogue . What the administration failed to grasp is that diplomacy with the North is pretty much the most difficult exercise one can do in international relations . But that does not mean you should n't continue to try , even when -- or maybe especially when -- the response is a poke in the eye . So where does this leave us ? What can or should the United States do to respond to these latest developments ? Here again , everything old is new again : Creative , thoughtful approaches to engaging North Korea have to be designed and tested -- persistently . Yes , U.S. overtures will annoy allies in the region , but not if done in concert with or through consultation with them . Yes , the administration will suffer reactionary criticism from the right for `` dealing with evil '' or similar screeds . But the stakes are too high to allow the long-term threats that North Korea poses to be hamstrung by near-term political scorekeeping . President Obama has to be bold . A number of ideas about how to proceed are offered in a recent piece by Lee Sigal of the Social Sciences Research Council . These suggestions , including economic incentives and diplomatic measures such as a trip by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to North Korea and the conclusion of a peace declaration involving both Koreas and China , are a good starting point . Sun-tzu , an ancient Chinese expert on the region , advised , `` Keep your friends close and your enemies closer . '' Good advice and as relevant as ever for the United States regarding North Korea . The opinions expressed in this commentary are solely those of Paul Carroll and Joe Cirincione .
North Korea 's artillery barrage was serious , but this is not a crisis , said co - authors . They say the barrage fits pattern of North Korea 's behavior and does n't preclude progress . Revelation of a uranium enrichment plant does n't signal increase in its nuclear capability , they say . U.S. needs to try economic and diplomatic measures to move ahead , they say .