WASHINGTON ( CNN ) -- The U.S. Marine Corps knew of the threat posed by roadside bombs before the start of the Iraq war , yet did nothing to buy protective vehicles for troops , according to a report to be released by the Pentagon . Marines ' armored Humvees are parked at a miltary camp in Fallujah , Iraq , in May 2007 . Additionally , Marine leaders in 2005 decided to buy up-armored , or reinforced , Humvees instead of Mine Resistant Ambush-Protected vehicles to shield troops in Iraq from mines and other explosives -- a decision that could have cost lives , according to the report obtained Tuesday by CNN . The report by the Department of Defense inspector general was requested by the Marine Corps in early 2008 after a civilian employee with the service complained that bureaucratic delays undermined the program to develop the armored vehicles . Inspectors found that the decision not to buy MRAP vehicles in 2005 stopped the Marine Corps Combat Development Command , the agency in charge of finding the best protective vehicle from troops in Iraq , from `` developing a course of action ... to attempt to obtain funding for [ MRAPs ] , '' according to the report . The report found that the Department of Defense knew before the war started in 2003 of the threats of mines and roadside bombs in Iraq but did nothing to acquire `` MRAP-type '' vehicles ahead of the invasion . `` As a result , the department entered into operations in Iraq without having taken available steps to acquire technology to mitigate the known mine and IED risk to soldiers and Marines , '' the report said . In response to the report , Marine Corps spokesman Maj. David Nevers pointed out the inspector general found no `` evidence of criminal negligence '' in the Corps ' actions . The decision to buy the up-armored Humvee model , he said , was made `` consciously by the Marine Corps leadership because of its proven capability to protect and its tactical utility ; the survivability and mobility demanded by the Marines in theater ; and its availability , based on an active , responsive production line . '' `` The Marine Corps fully cooperated with [ inspector general ] during this audit , '' Nevers said . `` We are reviewing the report to ensure that our processes best support the war fighter in theater . '' A civilian whistle-blower working with the Marine Corps on the MRAP program wrote a scathing report about delays in the procurement process in early 2008 . `` If the mass procurement and fielding of MRAPs had begun in 2005 in response to the known and acknowledged threats at that time , as the USMC is doing today , hundreds of deaths and injuries could have been prevented , '' Franz Gayl wrote in his January report . He said bureaucratic delays plagued the program at the height of the insurgency , when U.S. troops were regularly being attacked and killed by roadside bombs . Gayl 's report prompted the Marine Corps to request the inspector general 's audit in 2008 . The Gayl report drew attention just months after MRAPs had been pushed into Iraq by Defense Secretary Robert Gates in an effort to protect troops from roadside bombs -- the leading killer of troops at the time .
Report : Buying reinforced Humvees , not MRAPs , possibly cost lives . Defense Department knew of roadside bomb risk ahead of Iraq war , report says . Comment: Department did n't immediately take available steps to get MRAPs . MRAPs are designed to shield troops from mines and other explosives .