President Putin 's endgame in Crimea is now clear -- and the West has only a few days to act . On Thursday , the Crimean parliament voted 78-0 to hold a referendum on March 16 . The main question will ask whether voters want the region to secede from Ukraine and become part of Russia . Previously , a referendum had been scheduled for March 30 on the less politically charged question of whether Crimea should have greater autonomy within Ukraine . If , as expected , a majority endorses secession , the story will change overnight from one about Russia 's unprovoked military invasion to one about a minority 's right to self-determination . That is the Kremlin 's plan . European leaders , already having trouble agreeing on a response to naked aggression , will find it much harder to oppose the popular will of the Crimean people . At that point , risky actions to force Crimea back into Ukraine will become difficult for Western politicians to explain to their own domestic voters . The legal status of the planned referendum is more than murky . Ukrainian acting president Oleksandr Turchynov has called it a `` farce '' and a `` crime against the nation . '' But , for democratic politicians -- and the societies they represent -- going against a majority vote is never easy . If Russia can change the subject in this way , Crimean secession will become an established fact . Putin , who assured journalists on Tuesday that Russia did not mean to annex Crimea , will then be able to claim that he was `` forced to yield to the will of the people . '' With just a few days to turn the situation around , temporizing needs to stop . Allowing Russia `` more time '' at this point , as some European leaders have proposed , is exactly what the West should not do . That Russia 's Crimean clients have moved the referendum date forward suggests nervousness in Moscow -- and a recognition that time is of the essence . In the remaining time before March 16 , the West must convince both the Kremlin-connected Russian elite and the population of Crimea that the region 's secession to Russia would be a mistake . Direct threats are counterproductive , but clearly and calmly articulating the consequences of such a move can produce results . First , all the European Union states plus the United States should make absolutely clear that they will not recognize the results of a referendum held while armed bands of `` self-defense forces '' roam Crimea . Any decision to secede that results from such a referendum will be considered illegitimate . To increase Moscow 's isolation , it is worth exploring whether a large majority would support a resolution in the United Nations General Assembly -- of course , Russia would veto in the Security Council -- reasserting the inviolability of borders in this case . Second , the EU and U.S. should announce that economic relations would be frozen between the West and a Crimea in legal limbo following secession . In part , this freeze would be enforced by the markets themselves . Crimea 's tourism industry would have to forget about attracting Western visitors to the region 's beaches . International investors would demand huge risk premiums . But Western restrictions on investment and trade with Crimea could amplify the effect . The region 's agricultural produce could be banned from European and Ukrainian markets . Crimeans must be helped to understand the choice they face : between becoming another Abkhazia -- a failed statelet on intravenous drip from Moscow -- or a flourishing region within the new , broader Europe . The EU should quickly earmark some portion of the 11 billion euros already promised to Ukraine for projects to develop Crimea 's economy if it remains Ukrainian . Third , the United States should work out a set of restrictions to place on Russian banks and corporations that do business in a Crimea that has illegally seceded . As economist Anders Aslund has pointed out , existing rules against money laundering could be enforced more rigorously against various Russian entities . All of this needs to be done rapidly . While Washington has reacted quickly as the crisis unfolded , the EU has suffered from its chronic lack of central decision-making authority . The next few days constitute a test . If Brussels can not forge a strong , common position in time , then management of future crises will simply revert to the foreign ministries of Germany , France , and Britain , with the EU 's foreign policy role narrowed to coordinating long-term policies . While spelling out the costs that threaten the Crimean population and the Russian political elite , Western leaders must continue to devise `` off-ramps '' to outcomes that Putin could conceivably accept , but that , nevertheless , will not be seen as rewarding aggression . The West can call for a significant increase in Crimea 's political autonomy within Ukraine , negotiated with Kiev . U.S. and European leaders should also speak out far more audibly in favor of minority language and cultural rights . They should have responded with outrage when the Rada , Ukraine 's parliament , canceled the status of Russian as an official language and should now praise the promised veto of this law . It may still be possible to prevent the illegal annexation of Crimea . Putin is sensitive to the danger of splits within his political elite . The West must show him that he has underestimated the extent of political isolation and economic disruption that annexation would cause . It must work on winning the hearts and minds of the Crimean population . The clock is ticking .
Paul Treisman : Only a few days are left to discuss the Crimea breakaway . He says if Crimea votes to join Russia , that will greatly strengthen Putin 's position . Russia and EU need to apply economic pressure , make the case for a ` ` no '' vote , he says . Putin : Crimea must see the choice is between prosperity and stagnation .