( CNN ) -- Amos Yadlin , formerly chief of Defense Intelligence for the Israel Defense Forces ( IDF ) , observed this week that the Israeli public typically goes through wartime `` cycles '' : first showing sweeping support and then , as civilian and military deaths begin , growing impatient and putting pressure on politicians to end hostilities . Therefore , as Yadlin put it , `` the ability of the Israeli home front to withstand a campaign that lasts for more than a week is a key factor in the outcome . '' In recent years , though , Israel 's missile defense system , Iron Dome , has had a significant impact on that home front 's resilience -- and therefore on the calculus of Israel 's leaders . Of course , Israel 's overwhelming military superiority over Gaza-based militants ensures that Israeli deaths in Gaza wars have always been relatively low . Nine Israelis were killed in the two-week ground offensive in 2009 , Operation Cast Lead , compared to well over a thousand Palestinians . The November 2012 airstrikes , Operation Pillar of Defense , resulted in six Israeli deaths compared to 167 Palestinians . But the political impact of rocket attacks is greater than these numbers suggest , particularly when usually safe areas come under fire . In 2012 , Hamas ' longer-range rockets targeted both Tel Aviv , causing air raid sirens to sound there for the first time since Saddam Hussein fired Scud missiles towards the city during the first Gulf War two decades previously , and Jerusalem , which had not been struck since 1970 . Although no casualties were inflicted , Hamas demonstrated its ability to threaten Israel 's two largest and most important cities . It has done so again in the past week , and additionally promised to target Ben-Gurion International Airport . Although Hamas faces difficulties in importing its most sophisticated rockets , owing to the new Egyptian government 's demolition of key tunnels connecting Gaza with the Sinai Peninsula , Israel 's head of Military Intelligence Analysis estimates that the group has still managed to double its stockpile since the 2012 war , to approximately 10,000 rockets , suggesting that it could sustain attacks for months . The Israeli leadership therefore faces twin pressures . On the one hand , as Yadlin suggests , an open-ended campaign of airstrikes that fails to suppress rocket attacks or demonstrate other strategic achievements could meet with increasing public opposition . On the other hand , a successful rocket attack that inflicts deaths -- particularly in a symbolic area , like Tel Aviv or Jerusalem -- could put sudden pressure on Israeli leaders to escalate , and send ground troops into Gaza . Any such invasion , involving urban combat in a densely populated urban environment that Hamas knows well , would result in higher IDF casualties , extremely high Palestinian casualties , enormous damage to civilian infrastructure , and the prospect of Israeli troops being taken hostage . This is why , despite getting his Cabinet to authorize the enlistment of 40,000 reservists last week , Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has refrained from launching a ground assault . Israel 's Iron Dome missile defense system , which came to prominence in the 2012 conflict , affects this dynamic in important ways . Although there is intense debate over its effectiveness -- critics argue that the system is knocking rockets to the ground without detonating them , and that it destroys fewer than half -- Israel says that it has successfully intercepted 90 % of those rockets that it engaged in this campaign . Even if this is exaggerated , Iron Dome 's ability to shield population centers and key infrastructure has two important effects . First , it buys time for Israel to continue airstrikes without facing popular impatience . Second , it lessens the prospect that a rocket will inflict deaths in a way that forces the government to launch a costly ground invasion it does n't truly want . Taken together , this suggests that Iron Dome gives the IDF more time to strike Gaza from the air , and therefore to weaken Hamas , with less pressure to put boots on the ground . It is important to note that even if Iron Dome is highly effective , there are still other sources of pressure on the Israeli government . Calling up tens of thousands of reservists in a country of just 8 million people places strain on the domestic economy , and pressure quickly mounts to demobilize those forces . Moreover , international pressure also grows over time . For instance , Egyptian President Abdul Fattah el-Sisi is hostile to Hamas and has refrained from commenting , but a mounting Palestinian death toll would draw him further into the conflict , possibly persuading him to open land borders with Gaza . Finally , the longer the conflict drags on , the greater the likelihood that Iron Dome 's imperfections will be revealed , and that a rocket will get through . These factors mean that the clock is still ticking for Netanyahu -- though perhaps at a slower pace than it used to . How Iron Dome blocks rockets from Gaza , protects Israelis . Rocket fired into northern Israel from Lebanon as Gaza conflict continues . Striking Gaza could buy Israel peace for a year , maybe more , analysts say .
Israeli deaths in Gaza wars have always been relatively low , writes Shashank Joshi . Score: 6 Political impact of rocket attacks is greater than these numbers suggest though . Israeli invasion of Gaza would carry big military and political risks , he says . Missile defense means Israel need not resort to ground troops , Joshi argues .