( CNN ) -- At a time when the United States is trying to figure out how to respond to threats from North Korean leaders , America and Israel are synthesizing their intelligence assessments of Iran 's nuclear capability , and Americans are marking the 10th anniversary of the Iraq war , it is useful to remind ourselves of the central role that intelligence plays in trying to understand our nation 's greatest threat , an enemy armed with weapons of mass destruction . Whether this intelligence turns out to be accurate or inaccurate , when trying to figure out the capabilities and intentions of hostile countries , our leaders turn to clandestinely collected information simply because they have no other way of knowing . But it is also worth remembering that the picture that intelligence paints is not a factual depiction . With solid sources and analysis rigorously tested for bias , it can be very good . But a lack of these can produce intelligence analysis that is far less certain and therefore open for interpretation from policymakers . The general public is not aware of the quality of our nation 's intelligence at any given moment because it is not shared with the public , and we are forced to rely on the president 's representation of the information . Not an ideal situation for a democracy -- and one that proved disastrous in the case of the Iraq War . As an intelligence analyst at the CIA , I was privy to all the intelligence analysis on Iraq in the lead-up to that war . My office covered the country analysis while other offices covered WMD and terrorism , but we read each other 's work . I remember thinking at the time how paradoxical it was that we were working so hard to be thorough in our analysis for the president , but then he gave the public only a few pieces of raw intelligence reporting from a handful of sources as well as the administration 's own judgments that did not reflect the complexity of our assessments . Thus the general public was given only the intelligence the Bush administration judged was most useful to characterize the danger of Saddam Hussein 's regime . This was done by unilaterally declassifying secret intelligence for speeches , talk show appearances and Colin Powell 's famous U.N. Security Council speech . There is a far better way to give the public a more accurate reading of threats to our national security . One need n't look any further than the Constitution . The framers created Congress to be another body , unaccountable to the executive , to be entrusted with the nation 's security and with the exclusive power to make war . But for Congress to play this role in today 's WMD reality , congressional leaders need to have access to the same intelligence the president has . This would allow Congress to challenge a president 's characterization of a threat with the public ( as well as call out a president if he is n't addressing a threat ) . This would provide the public a more accurate understanding of the real threats it faces and with that a greater certainty as to when we need to act . While some congressional members on the intelligence committees are getting more intelligence information today than they were before , the President 's Daily Brief , with information from the nation 's most sensitive sources , is still for presidential eyes only . This puts the president in the driver 's seat to define our threats , determine our enemies and tell the public what he thinks we need to do about it . In the case of the Iraq war , by the time Congress began to take a more active role and summoned the now infamous National Intelligence Estimate , they were not in a position to function as a `` balance '' to the executive branch and `` check '' that branch 's characterization of Hussein as an imminent threat . The Bush administration had already released most of the damning intelligence to the public , creating enough fear to convince many Americans that Hussein was `` very likely '' to give WMD to terrorists . It would have been far better to have trusted the public with the CIA analysts ' full assessments than for the individual , sometimes uncorroborated pieces of raw intelligence to be released to the public without any analysis or context . The public would have had to wrestle with the complexity , the uncertainties and in some cases the limited availability of sources that was the intelligence picture on Iraq in 2002-2003 . I am not advocating for this type of complete intel-sharing with the public in the future . Releasing top secret information to the public risks lives and collection methods and is clearly unwise . Congress , as the body representing the public , can and should serve this function . But unless Congress ' access to intelligence is on par with the president 's , you can forget what you read in the Constitution ; information is power and the branch with the most classified intelligence is king and alone makes war . Congress , and by default , the public , are largely irrelevant . Fear should not compel us to go to war . A decision of that consequence should only follow a rigorous debate among all of our leaders on the necessity for war based on the best information available . And while they 're at it , a debate on the quality of that information as well . The opinions expressed in this commentary are solely those of Elizabeth C. MacKenzie Biedell .
Elizabeth Biedell : In major foreign policy decisions , intelligence plays a key role . Presidents get the fullest description of what intelligence can do . Failure to share intelligence fully misled the public in advance of Iraq War , she said . Biedell : Presidents should fully inform Congress of relevant intelligence .