This autumn sees the 25th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall . In the world of today , it can be hard to recall that the collapse of Soviet communism left U.S. prestige at a major high . So great was the shift to what was termed Washington 's `` unipolar moment '' that some , such as French foreign minister Hubert Vedrine , quickly warned of the dangers of Washington 's `` hyperpower '' . A quarter of a century on , the United States remains the most powerful country in the world -- certainly in a military sense . It can still project and deploy overwhelming force relative to any probable enemy . However , Washington is not , to use a term of art in international relations , an all-powerful hegemonic power . This core fact has been demonstrated repeatedly throughout the last two-and-a-half decades , from Somalia in 1993 , Iraq and Afghanistan since 9/11 , and also most recently to Ukraine and Syria . Since 1989 , other hopes and expectations of how the post-Cold War world might look have also been dashed . The vision of a universal order of liberal , capitalist , democratic states living in peace and contentment -- as painted by Francis Fukuyama and others -- has been replaced by a reality in which authoritarian states such as Russia and China appear to many to be in the ascendancy , so-called Islamic terrorism has become a significant international concern , and several unstable countries , including North Korea , have acquired nuclear weaponry . This complex picture is reflected in the multiple challenges confronting the US-led international order today . To take just one example , following Russia 's annexation of Crimea , Washington 's relations with Moscow are now more strained than at any time since 1989 , yet many of its allies in Europe remain dependent on Russian gas supplies as the continent heads into winter . Meanwhile , the rise of China , which is forecast to imminently surpass the United States as the world 's largest economy on purchasing parity terms , is one of the biggest game changers in global affairs since the collapse of the Soviet Union . This development has potential to be either a growing source of tension with Washington or develop into a fruitful partnership . Growing bilateral rivalry , rather than an increasingly cooperative relationship , is especially likely if Beijing 's economic and military power continues to grow rapidly , and its leadership embraces an increasingly assertive foreign policy stance towards its neighbors in Asia . Moreover , terrorism remains a threat to U.S. national interests : more than a dozen years after 9/11 , the Obama administration is still engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan to a degree that reduces the ability of the Pentagon to deal with new crises elsewhere . Meanwhile , the Israeli-Palestinian peace process has collapsed again , and Washington and Pyongyang remain locked in nuclear stand-off on the Korean peninsula . To be sure , the post-Cold War world contains multiple opportunities as well as risks for Washington , including the potential forthcoming agreement of the Trans-Pacific Partnership with around a dozen countries in the Americas and Asia-Pacific that collectively account for about 40 % of world GDP . Washington hopes that this will embed U.S. influence in Asia-Pacific and is part of the so-called U.S. pivot to the region . Meanwhile , President Barack Obama also wants to secure in coming months the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with the 28 states of the European Union . This would represent the largest regional free trade and investment agreement in history , with the U.S. and Europe accounting for more than 50 % of global GDP , and embed Washington 's role as guardian of the `` rules of the road '' for international commerce , as an administration trade official put it recently . The fall of the Wall is rightly celebrated . However , it is possible to detect these days -- and not just in Washington -- a certain nostalgia for what is sometimes seen as the greater `` strategic stability '' of the `` simpler '' bipolar era that preceded it . Indisputably , there are a range of significant , complicated challenges to the U.S.-led order today that were not fully anticipated by many , including Fukuyama , when Soviet Communism collapsed . However , rose-tinted recollections for a Cold War-era need to be put in the context of that fact that the period of U.S.-Soviet rivalry from 1947 to 1989 also had some exceptionally dangerous moments . Perhaps the best example is the Cuban Missile Crisis which was probably the time that the world came closest to nuclear annihilation . More generally , while the U.S. and the Soviets did not formally engage directly in war , there were multiple proxy battles fought across the world with destabilizing consequences -- far from their borders but deadly to those caught up in them . Taken overall , despite all the challenges that Washington faces today , the country will remain , for the foreseeable future , the primary actor in many theatres across the world . While its relative power may erode , it will seek to continue set the international agenda in the political , economic and security spheres and succeed in doing so more often than any other state . However , U.S. success in managing the complexity of global affairs will also increasingly depend upon the cooperation of others , both competitors and allies . And a key uncertainty here is the direction of the bilateral relationship in coming years , with a rising China which could be a force for greater global instability and tension , or much deeper , collaborative strategic partnership .
In wake of fall of Berlin Wall , United States ' prestige was at a major high . 25 years on , U.S. still most powerful country in the world , but status has diminished . Post-Cold War vision of liberal , capitalist , democratic states living in peace dashed .