text: "Cc: Berger Samuel R.HRC: I wasn't satisfied by my answer to your question about how to gain leverage over thePakistanis to move them to more aggressively pursue AQ. I've thought about it some more andwhile I have no silver bullet here are some further thoughts.-- My impression is that the Pakistanis have been more cooperative lately in assisting us target someAQ in Pakistan and that where they hold back it is less a function of affinity toward AQ and moreabout with whom AQ is imbedded..-- In particular they seem to be more reluctant to target AQ where it is nestled with groups they wantto cultivate in the event we ""leave"" Afghanistan and they need influence there. They have seen thatbefore and will hedge their bets.-- So the first point is that we have to address the reason why they are holding back. If we candisabuse them of the perception that we are leaving Afghanistan it will be easier to get the Pakistanisto go after AQ in sanctuaries provided by groups which would be part of a future Afghanistandominated by the Taliban.-- Second I believe that coercive measures are more likely to be effective if they are targeted againstmilitary leaders who give support to AQ and its allies. Assuming we have adequate intelligence wecan go after bank accounts travel and other reachable assets of individual Pakistani officers raisingthe stakes for those supporting the militants without creating an inordinate backlash . Bluntermeasures of coercion like conditioning our assistance are more likely to be counterproductive. Giventhe level of distrust for us among the Pakistani people they would see this as another sharp swing ofthe U.S. pendulum which would harden their attitudes and make greater cooperation very difficult forthe Pakistani people to accept.-- There may be greater leverage in giving the Pakistanis incentives to be more aggressive. Ofcourse the military's calculation is most important. I'm not sure what is on their shopping list thesedays but we would need to balance what would move the needle on AQ against undercutting oureffort to get them to shift their strategic focus away from India. . At the same time we can be asforward leaning as possible in support of their counterinsurgency capabilities (equipment trainingwhatever material intelligence and other assistance we can give them if they move into Wazeristan --including relief for displaced persons). If they finally take that step we can do all that is possible todemonstrate that our arrows are aligned with theirs..-- On the civilian side their desire for greater control over how Kerry-Lugar money can be used canbe played to our strategic advantage. If we give them a greater sense that they are directing the useof these funds -- without greatly undercutting their effectiveness -- it strengthens our position to pressthem on AQ.-- Finally there is the defining relationship with India. Are there measures that the Indians could takethat would reduce Pakistani anxieties about the Indian front and thus better enable them to focus onthreats to the East including both AQ and anti-Indian militant groups like LET? Are there confidencebuilding measures such as information sharing on troop movements that would both reduceuncertainty and support a Pakistani public narrative for a shift in emphasis from India to the militancy?To the extent India seeks to have Pakistan move more vigorously against the militants they couldsee such steps as advancing their interests. This is tricky territory but may be worth pursuing.Sandy"