Historian Allan Nevins argued that the newly inaugurated Lincoln made three miscalculations: underestimating the gravity of the crisis, exaggerating the strength of Unionist sentiment in the South, and overlooking Southern Unionist opposition to an invasion.
hɪstˈoːɹiən ˈælən nˈɛvɪnz ˈɑːɹɡjuːd ðætðə nˈuːli ɪnˈɔːɡjʊɹˌeɪɾᵻd lˈɪŋkən mˌeɪd θɹˈiː mɪskˌælkjʊlˈeɪʃənz: ˌʌndɚɹˈɛstᵻmˌeɪɾɪŋ ðə ɡɹˈævᵻɾi ʌvðə kɹˈaɪsɪs, ɛɡzˈædʒɚɹˌeɪɾɪŋ ðə stɹˈɛŋθ ʌv jˈuːniənˌɪst sˈɛntɪmənt ɪnðə sˈaʊθ, ænd ˌoʊvɚlˈʊkɪŋ sˈʌðɚn jˈuːniənˌɪst ˌɑːpəzˈɪʃən tʊ ɐn ɪnvˈeɪʒən.