mˈoːɹ bɹˈɔːdli, ˈɜːlɪɚ dʒˈɜːnəl ˈɑːɹɾɪkəlz ɪŋklˈuːdᵻd wˈɜːk ɔnðə dɪzˈaɪn ʌv ˈɑːptɪməl nˌɑːnlˈɪnɪɹ tæksˈeɪʃən ɪn ɐ wˈɜːld ɪnwˌɪtʃ pˈiːpəl kˈɛɹ ɐbˌaʊt ðɛɹ ɹˈɛlətˌɪv ˈɪŋkʌm ɪnðə nˈaɪntiːnhˈʌndɹɪd ˈeɪɾi θɹˈiː dʒˈɜːnəl ʌv pˈʌblɪk ˌiːkənˈɑːmɪks ænd ˌɔn wˌaɪ hjˈuːmənz ˈɪmᵻtˌeɪt ˈiːtʃ ˈʌðɚ ɪnðə nˈaɪntiːnhˈʌndɹɪd nˈaɪnti ˈeɪt dʒˈɜːnəl ʌv pˈʌblɪk ˌiːkənˈɑːmɪks.
More broadly, earlier journal articles included work on the design of optimal nonlinear taxation in a world in which people care about their relative income (in the 1983 Journal of Public Economics) and on why humans imitate each other (in the 1998 Journal of Public Economics).