tʃˈɜːtʃlənd bᵻlˈiːvz ðæt bᵻlˈiːfs ɑːɹ nˌɑːt ˌɑːntəlˈɑːdʒɪkli ɹˈiːəl; ðæt ˈɪz, ðˌæɾə fjˈuːtʃɚ, fˈʊli mətʃˈʊɹd nˈʊɹɹəsˌaɪəns ɪz lˈaɪkli tə hæv nˈoʊ nˈiːd fɔːɹ "bᵻlˈiːfs" sˈiː pɹˌɑːpəzˈɪʃənəl ˈæɾɪtˌuːdz, ɪnðə sˈeɪm mˈænɚ ðæt mˈɑːdɚn sˈaɪəns dɪskˈɑːɹdᵻd sˈʌtʃ nˈoʊʃənz æz lˈɛdʒəndz ɔːɹ wˈɪtʃkɹæft.
Churchland believes that beliefs are not ontologically real; that is, that a future, fully matured neuroscience is likely to have no need for "beliefs" (see propositional attitudes), in the same manner that modern science discarded such notions as legends or witchcraft.