ðə kwˈɛstʃən ʌv wˈɛðɚ mˈɑːdɚn dʒˌæpənˈiːz stˈɪl fˈiːl ɐ ɡɹˈeɪɾɚ sˈɛns ʌv dʒˈiəɹi ðɐn ðɛɹ wˈɛstɚn kˈaʊntɚpˌɑːɹts, ænd ðˈʌs ɹᵻmˈeɪn ɪn sˌʌm ɪnˈɛfəbəl wˈeɪ saɪkəlˈɑːdʒɪkli klˈoʊsɚ tə ðɪs sˈɔːɹt ʌv dʒˈiəɹi nˈɪndʒoʊ kˈɑːnflɪkt ɪz pɹɪsˈaɪsli wˌɛɹ nˈɪhəndʒˌɪnɹən dᵻvˈaɪdz ˌɪntʊ ðə dʒəpˈænsˈɛntɹɪk ænd dʒəpˈænskˈɛptɪk kˈæmps.
The question of whether modern Japanese still feel a greater sense of giri than their Western counterparts, and thus remain in some ineffable way psychologically closer to this sort of giri–ninjo conflict is precisely where nihonjinron divides into the Japan-centric and Japan-skeptic camps.