ðə səbstˈæntɪv ˈɪʃuːz ɪnðə kˈeɪs ɹᵻvˈɑːlvd ɚɹˈaʊnd ðɪ ɪntˌɜːpɹɪtˈeɪʃən ʌv pˈɑːɹt ɹˌoʊmən θɹˈiː ʌvðə sˈɪŋɡəl jˌʊɹɹəpˈiən ˈækt wˌɪtʃ kˈoʊdᵻfˌaɪd koʊˈɑːpɚɹˈeɪʃən ˌɔn fˈɔːɹən pˈɑːlɪsi mˈæɾɚz bᵻtwˌiːn ðə ɡˈʌvɚnmənts ʌvðə ðˈɛn twˈɛlv mˈɛmbɚ stˈeɪts ʌvðə jˌʊɹɹəpˈiən ˌiːkənˈɑːmɪk kəmjˈuːnᵻɾi ɹᵻfˈɜːd tʊ æz jˌʊɹɹəpˈiən pəlˈɪɾɪkəl koʊˈɑːpɚɹˈeɪʃən ˌɪntʊ ɐn ˌɪntɚnˈæʃənəl ɐɡɹˈiːmənt.
The substantive issues in the case revolved around the interpretation of Part III of the Single European Act which codified cooperation on foreign policy matters between the governments of the then twelve member states of the European Economic Community – referred to as European Political Cooperation – into an international agreement.