ɔːlðˈoʊ ðə suːpɹˈiːm kˈoːɹt hæd sˈɛd ɪn kwᵻbˈɛk ɐtˈɜːni dʒˈɛnɚɹəl vˈiː. blˈeɪki nˈoʊ. tˈuː nˈaɪntiːnhˈʌndɹɪd ˈeɪɾi wˈʌn ðætðə sˈɛkʃən wˈʌnhˈʌndɹɪd θˈɜːɾi θɹˈiː ɹᵻkwˈaɪɚmənts ʌvðə kwᵻbˈɛk lˈɛdʒɪslətʃɚ duːnˌɑːt ɛkstˈɛnd tə kwᵻbˈɛk mjuːnˈɪsɪpˈælᵻɾiz, ðə nˈuː bɹˈʌnswɪk kˈoːɹt əbzˈɜːvd sˈɛkʃən wˈʌnhˈʌndɹɪd θˈɜːɾi θɹˈiː ænd ðə tʃˈɑːɹɾɚɹ ɑːɹ sˈɛpɹət lˈɔːz ɛnˈæktᵻd fɔːɹ dˈɪfɹənt pˈɜːpəsᵻz.
Although the Supreme Court had said in Quebec (Attorney General) v. Blaikie (No. 2) (1981) that the section 133 requirements of the Quebec legislature do not extend to Quebec municipalities, the New Brunswick court observed section 133 and the Charter are separate laws enacted for different purposes.