ðə kˈoːɹt ɹᵻdʒˈɛktᵻd ðɪ ˈɑːɹɡjuːmənt ðæt ɐn ɛksˈɛpʃən fɔːɹ kˈɑːmɜːs klˈɔːz tʃˈælɪndʒᵻz tə stˈeɪt tˈæks ɔːɹ spˈɛndɪŋ dᵻsˈɪʒənz ʃˌʊd ɛɡzˈɪst, æz ɐn ɐnˈælədʒi tə ðɪ ɪstˈæblɪʃmənt klˈɔːz tæksˈeɪʃən tʃˈælɪndʒ ðə kˈoːɹt hæd pɚmˈɪɾᵻd ɪn flˈæst vˈiː. kˈoʊən, θɹˈiːhˈʌndɹɪd nˈaɪnti tˈuː jˈuː.ˈɛs. ˈeɪɾi θɹˈiː nˈaɪntiːnhˈʌndɹɪd sˈɪksti ˈeɪt, bɪkˈʌz bˈoʊθ kˌɑːnstɪtˈuːʃənəl klˈɔːzᵻz ˈɑːpɚɹˌeɪt æz ɐ spəsˈɪfɪk lˈɪmɪt ɔnðə tˈæksɪŋ ænd spˈɛndɪŋ klˈɔːz.
The Court rejected the argument that an exception for Commerce Clause challenges to state tax or spending decisions should exist, as an analogy to the Establishment Clause taxation challenge the Court had permitted in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), because both constitutional clauses operate as a specific limit on the Taxing and Spending Clause.