ðə kˈoːɹt ɛksplˈeɪnd ðætðə ɹˈaɪt nˌɑːt tə kəntɹˈɪbjuːt mˈʌni fɚðə səpˈoːɹt əvɚ ɹᵻlˈɪdʒəs ɪstˈæblɪʃmənt wʌz "fˌʌndəmˈɛntəli ʌnlˈaɪk" wʌtˈɛvɚ ɹˈaɪts ðə plˈeɪntɪfs mˌeɪhɐv ˌʌndɚ ðə kˈɑːmɜːs klˈɔːz, ænd ðə kəmpˈæɹɪsən ðə plˈeɪntɪfs ɐtˈɛmptᵻd wʌz "æt sˈʌtʃ ɐ hˈaɪ lˈɛvəl ʌv dʒˌɛnɚɹˈælᵻɾi ðæt ˈɔːlmoʊst ˌɛni kˌɑːnstɪtˈuːʃənəl kənstɹˈeɪnt ˌɔn ɡˈʌvɚnmənt pˈaʊɚ wʊd spəsˈɪfɪkli lˈɪmɪt ɐ stˈeɪtz tˈæksɪŋ ænd spˈɛndɪŋ pˈaʊɚ fɔːɹ flˈæst pˈɜːpəsᵻz."
The Court explained that the right not to contribute money for the support of a religious establishment was "fundamentally unlike" whatever rights the plaintiffs may have under the Commerce Clause, and the comparison the plaintiffs attempted was "at such a high level of generality that almost any constitutional constraint on government power would 'specifically limit' a State's taxing and spending power for Flast purposes."