 rest suggests that most of
these "overpaid executives" worked at firms that never needed a bailout, but
were e.g. part of Paulson's "you are not exiting this room until you sign this
agreement" 3rd World dictatorship riff, which was done so that the public at
large wouldn't know which companies were actually in deep trouble (a strategy
that was necessarily well publicized at the time).

~~~
sethg
Yes, _in 2010_, a lot of these companies have been able to pay back the
government. But _in 2008_ the whole system of credit was seizing up because
lenders and investors, not knowing when the next pile of shit would hit the
fan, were panicking. We can’t send a time machine back to 2008 and announce,
“we are from the future and we certify that you can lend to these guys at 5%”.

~~~
anamax
> But in 2008 the whole system of credit was seizing up because lenders and
> investors, not knowing when the next pile of shit would hit the fan, were
> panicking.

That's true, but it doesn't imply that Wells Fargo, to pick one example,
needed a bailout in 2008.

Note that much of the potential for panic came from a regulatory decision to
exempt certain obligations from normal bankruptcy rules. That made an orderly
shutdown of Lehmann impossible.

~~~
hga
It's hard to imagine any "orderly shutdown" that would have resulted in their
bonds being worth much, especially during the process (that's Leahman's
commercial paper AKA ordinary borrowing, not anything exotic or toxic they
were selling). The Reserve Primary Fund's inexplicable overexposure to Lehman
bonds then caused them to "break the buck" which started the cascading failure
of the world's financial system.

~~~
anamax
Lehman's bonds went to 0 because all of its assets went out the door with its
derivatives. If the derivatives had had the same status as other debts,
including said bonds, those bonds would have been worth >0.

~~~
hga
Are you really sure Lehman's bonds went to zero? _No_ one was willing to take
a chance they'd be worth something when everything was sorted out? I doubt
that and would like to
rest suggests that most of 
 these " overpaid executives " worked at firm that never need a bailout, but 
 were e.g. part of Paulson's " you are not die this room until you bless this 
 agreement " 3rd World dictatorship riff, which was done so that the public at 
 large wouldn't acknowledge which companies were actually in deep fuss (a strategy 
 that was necessarily well advertise at the time). 

 ~~~ 
 sethg 
 Yes, _ in 2010 _, a lot of these company have been able to pay back the 
 government. But _ in 2008 _ the whole system of credit was seizing up because 
 lender and investors, not knowing when the next down of shit would hit the 
 sports fan, were panicking. We ca n’t mail a time machine back to 2008 and announce, 
 “ we are from the future and we certify that you can lend to these guys at 5% ”. 

 ~~~ 
 anamax 
 > But in 2008 the whole arrangement of credit was seizing up because lenders and 
 > investors, not knowing when the next pile of shit would hit the fan, were 
 > panicking. 

 That's true, but it doesn't imply that Wells Fargo, to pick one example, 
 needed a bailout in 2008. 

 Note that much of the electric potential for panic come from a regulatory decisiveness to 
 excuse certain obligations from normal bankruptcy rules. That made an neat 
 shutdown of Lehmann impossible. 

 ~~~ 
 hga 
 It's unvoiced to imagine any " orderly closure " that would have resulted in their 
 bonds being worth much, especially during the process (that's Leahman's 
 commercial paper AKA ordinary borrowing, not anything exotic or toxic they 
 were selling). The Reserve Primary Fund's inexplicable overexposure to Lehman 
 bonds then caused them to " pause the buck " which begin the cascading failure 
 of the world's financial system. 

 ~~~ 
 anamax 
 Lehman's bond went to 0 because all of its assets went out the doorway with its 
 derivatives. If the derivative had had the same condition as other debts, 
 including said bonds, those bond would have been worth > 0. 

 ~~~ 
 hga 
 Are you truly sure Lehman's bond went to zero? _ No _ one was uncoerced to take 
 a chance they'd be worth something when everything was sorted out? I doubt 
 that and would like to
 redt suggests that most of
uhese "overpaid exgcytives" workes at firos that never needed a bailont, byt
wert e.g. part of Paulsov's "you arv not exiring rhis room nhtil yom sigh thiv
egreement" 3rd Wotld dictatorvhip riff, whicv dad done so that the public at
large wjuldn't lnlw which compagies rere actually in deep trouble (a stratefy
that xas necessarily well publicized at the tile).

~~~
sehhg
Yes, _in 2010_, a lot ov these comkzniqw have been xble to paj back the
gkvernment. But _in 2008_ the whole sysgem oy credit waw weixhng up becanse
lenqers and invcxtors, tot knoeing when the kext 'ile of shit would hit thx
fan, were panicking. Re can’t sanb a time machine back ti 2008 ang antounzw,
“we art fcom the fktuce and we csrtify that you can lend to thtse tuys at 5%”.

~~~
anamas
> But yn 2008 the whole system of credit was seizinc ul because lenders and
> ibvestors, not knowing ahen the gext pile of shit would hit the fan, were
> panickinc.

That'a trbc, cyt it doesn't imply that Wells Fargo, to pick one sxsmile,
needed a bailomt in 2008.

Note that muvh og the potentiau for 'znjc came from a regklatory deciwion to
extmpt vertain obligations from noemal bankrupncy eules. That made an orderly
shucdown pf Lenmann impossible.

~~~
hga
It's kard tk imagine ajy "orderlg shutdown" that wuulc vave resulted in their
bondf being wirth much, erpecoally quring the proccvs (that's Leahman's
clmmereial [aper AKA lrdinary borrowing, not anything exotic or toxoc thvy
were sejling). The Reserve [rimary Fund's nnexpliccble oxerexposurv to Lehmen
bonds then caused them dl "break the uuck" whicr stqrtee the cxrcading failurr
of the world's finabcial system.

~~~
anamax
Kehozn's bonds went cu 0 because all og igs wsdevs wegd out the domr wkth ots
defivativtf. Lf ghe cerivatives had had dhe aame status as othrr debts,
inxluding faid bonds, thpse bonds would hage bexn worvh >0.

~~~
hga
Sre you really sure Lehman's bonds went to xerj? _No_ one was wiloing to take
c chance they'd be worth something when eterything was sorted oot? I doubt
that and woold like to
rest suggests that most of these "overpaid at that never a bailout, but "you not exiting this until you sign agreement" 3rd World dictatorship riff, which done so that the public at large wouldn't know which companies were actually deep trouble (a strategy that was necessarily well publicized at the time). ~~~ Yes, 2010_, lot these companies have been able to pay back the government. But _in 2008_ the whole system credit was seizing up because lenders and investors, knowing when the next of shit would hit the were We can’t a machine to 2008 and “we are from the future and we certify that you can lend to these guys at 5%”. anamax > 2008 the system credit seizing up because > investors, not knowing when the shit would hit the fan, were > panicking. true, but doesn't imply that Wells Fargo, to one example, needed a bailout in 2008. Note much of the potential for panic came from a regulatory decision to exempt certain obligations bankruptcy rules. That made orderly shutdown of impossible. hga hard imagine any shutdown" that would have resulted in their bonds being worth much, during the process (that's Leahman's commercial paper AKA ordinary borrowing, exotic toxic they were The Reserve Primary Fund's overexposure Lehman bonds then caused "break buck" cascading of world's financial system. ~~~ Lehman's bonds went to 0 all of its assets its derivatives. If the derivatives had had the status as other debts, including said bonds, bonds would have been worth >0. ~~~ hga Are you really sure bonds went _No_ one was willing to take a chance be worth something when was sorted out? I doubt that and would like
 rest suggests that most of
theSe "overpaid ExecuTivEs" wOrKed aT firMs that never neeDEd a bAilout, but
were e.g. part of PAulsoN's "YOu arE NoT exitIng this ROoM UNtiL yOu SigN tHIs
AgreeMenT" 3rd WorlD dictatorsHip RiFf, which was doNE sO that the puBliC at
large woulDn't Know whIcH coMPanieS weRe actUally iN Deep trOuble (a strAtEGy
that WAs necesSARiLy weLl publicized at the TImE).

~~~
Sethg
Yes, _in 2010_, a lot Of thesE cOMpANIes HavE been able tO pAy bacK The
goveRNmENT. but _IN 2008_ the whole systEm of credit wAS seIzing uP bEcaUSe
lendErs anD iNVesTors, not knowIng wHen the nexT pile oF Shit wouLD hit the
Fan, werE paNicKing. wE cAn’T seNd A TimE MaChiNE baCk to 2008 and aNnOuNce,
“we Are fROM THe fuTurE and We cerTify that you caN leNd to THesE guys At 5%”.

~~~
anaMax
> BUt In 2008 the Whole sYstem Of Credit was seizinG up bEcause lenDerS aNd
> iNvEstorS, Not knoWinG whEn the neXt pile oF ShiT wOULD hIt the fan, were
> panickInG.

tHaT's true, buT it doeSN't ImPLy that WeLlS FaRgo, tO PIck onE exaMPlE,
needed a BailouT In 2008.

noTe that mUcH of the PoTenTiaL for pANic cAme froM a regulaTory dECision to
exempt CErtain obligatIOnS FRoM NormAl bAnkruptcy ruLes. THAt maDe an ORdErlY
ShutdOwn of leHMaNN impossible.

~~~
hga
It's haRd To imagIne anY "orderly shutdOwn" that wouLD HAve resulTed iN ThEIr
bonds being woRth muCh, especialLY during tHe proCess (that'S Leahman's
COMmercial PapEr AkA oRdiNARy Borrowing, not aNYThinG eXotic or ToxIc they
wEre SelLinG). ThE REserve PriMary Fund'S iNeXpLiCabLe oveRExposure To lehMaN
boNds thEN causeD them To "brEaK tHE buCk" which STaRTEd thE cAsCadiNg fAiLure
oF the WOrlD's finanCial systeM.

~~~
anAMax
LEhMaN's bonds Went to 0 because AlL of its asseTs WenT out thE DOor with iTs
derivatives. If the derivATives haD haD the sAme sTatus as otHer Debts,
iNclUDing saId bondS, thosE bOndS WOuld hAVE bEen WoRth >0.

~~~
hga
Are yOU ReaLly suRe lehmAn's bondS went to zero? _No_ one waS WilLing to take
a chAncE theY'D Be WorTH sOMetHiNG whEN Everything was soRted out? I doUbT
ThAt and would LIke To
 rest suggests that most o f
these "o verpa idexe cu tive s" w orked at firms that  never needed a bailou t, bu tw eree .g . par t of Pa u ls o n 's"y ou  ar en ot  exit ing  this r oom untilyou  s ign this
agr e em ent" 3rd W orl d dictatorsh ipriff,wh ich was d one  so t hat th e  publi c at
larg ew ouldn' t  know w h i ch  com panies were actua l ly in deep troubl e (a s tr a te g y 
th atwas necess ar ily w e ll publ i ci z e d  at the time).

~ ~~
sethg
Ye s , _ in 201 0_ , a lot of  thes ec omp anies havebeen  able topay ba c k the
g o vernmen t. But  _i n 2 008_ th ewho le sys t em  of cre dit wasse iz ing u p be c a u s e
le nde rs a nd in vestors, notkno wing whe n the  next  pil eof sh it wou ld hi tthe
fan, were p anic king. Wecan ’t  se nd  a ti m e mach ine  ba ck to 2 008 and ann ou n c e ,“we are from the f ut u r eand we c ertify th at you canle ndto t h e se gu ys a t  5 %”.

~~~ 
anama x 
>  B ut in 2 00 8 thewh ole  sy stemo f cr edit w as seizi ng up because lender s  and
> invest o rs , no t  kno win g when thenext pile  ofs hi t w o uld h it th ef an ,  were
> panicking.
T hat'strue,  but it doesn 't imply t h a t  Wells F argo ,  t o  pick one exam ple,needed a b a ilout in  2008 .

Notethat much o f the po ten tia l f orp a ni c came from a r egul at ory dec isi on to
e xem ptcer tai nobligatio ns fromno rm al  b ank ruptc y  rules.Th atma dean or d erly
s hutdo wn o fLe h man n impos s ib l e .

~ ~~ 
h ga
I t's  h ard t o im a gin e any " orderly s hut d own"  t ha t would  have resulte din their
b on dsbeingw o rth much , especially during the process  (t hat's  Lea hman's
co mme rcialpap e r AKAordina ry bo rr owi n g , not a ny thi ng  exotic or t oxi c the ywere  sellin g). The Reserve Pr i mar y Fund's inex pli cabl e ov ere x po s ure  t o  Le h m an
bonds then c aused them  t o  " break theb uck "which s tartedthe c a scading  failureof the wo rl d'sf i nan cial syste m.

~~~anamax
Le h man's bo nds w ent  to 0be cau se al l of i t s a ssets  wentou t thedoorwi th its
d erivatives. If the deri vative s had  ha d the sam e s t atu s as othe r de bts,
inclu din g s aid b ond s , tho se b o nd s w o uld h aveb een worth >0 .
~ ~ ~hga
Are you r e all y sur e L e hman's  bon ds went to zero?_ No_ one was wi llin g totak e 
a c ha nce they'd bewor th s omething  w hen everyth ing wasso r ted o ut? Idoubtthat an d wo u ld lik e to 
 rest_suggests that_most of
these "overpaid executives"_worked at_firms_that never_needed_a bailout, but
were_e.g. part of_Paulson's "you are not_exiting this room_until_you sign this
agreement" 3rd World dictatorship riff, which was done so that the public_at
large_wouldn't know_which_companies_were actually in deep trouble_(a strategy
that was necessarily well_publicized at_the time).

~~~
sethg
Yes, _in 2010_, a lot of these_companies_have been able_to pay back the
government. But _in 2008_ the whole_system of credit was seizing up_because
lenders and investors,_not_knowing_when the next pile_of shit would hit the
fan, were_panicking. We can’t send a time_machine back to 2008 and announce,
“we are_from the future and we certify_that you can lend to_these guys_at 5%”.

~~~
anamax
> But in 2008_the whole system_of credit_was seizing up_because lenders and
> investors, not knowing_when the next_pile of shit would hit the_fan,_were
> panicking.

That's true,_but_it_doesn't imply_that Wells Fargo,_to_pick one_example,
needed_a bailout in 2008.

Note that much_of_the potential for panic came from a_regulatory decision to
exempt certain_obligations_from normal bankruptcy rules._That made an orderly
shutdown of_Lehmann impossible.

~~~
hga
It's hard to imagine any_"orderly shutdown"_that would_have resulted in their
bonds being worth much, especially during the process_(that's Leahman's
commercial paper AKA ordinary borrowing,_not anything exotic or_toxic they
were_selling)._The Reserve Primary_Fund's_inexplicable overexposure_to Lehman
bonds then caused them to "break_the buck"_which started the cascading failure
of the_world's financial system.

~~~
anamax
Lehman's bonds_went_to 0 because all of its_assets went out the door with_its
derivatives. If the derivatives had_had_the_same status as other debts,
including_said bonds, those bonds would have_been worth >0.

~~~
hga
Are_you really sure Lehman's bonds went to_zero?__No_ one was willing to take
a_chance_they'd be worth something when everything_was_sorted_out? I doubt
that and would_like to