

~~~
kasey_junk
They implemented a known & vetted encryption protocol with expert consultation
from the outside.

Its one of the most widely distributed apps in the world & thus likely to have
lots of people looking at it.

If you don't trust it, is there any possible encryption scheme you would
trust?

~~~
darklajid
I think the general trust issues people have are

\- metadata / contact lists in the hand of Facebook

\- a proprietary binary that _claims_ to use said encryption schemes

Scenarios that you could come up with:

The next version of WhatsApp sends unencrypted data again.

WhatsApp encrypts for your recipient just fine, but also encrypts the same
message for the great Facebook skeleton key.

Basically trust is a bigger problem than you acknowledge here, I think. If you
trust the encryption scheme, even the specific encryption implementation, then
you still need to trust the (binary, closed) application. Ignoring the
metadata issue completely for now.

~~~
rtkwe
>The next version of WhatsApp sends unencrypted data again. >WhatsApp encrypts
for your recipient just fine, but also encrypts the same message for the great
Facebook skeleton key.

Both of these can and would show up in an analysis of the code.

------
sleepychu
web.whatsapp.com still works, so clearly it's possible for something outside
my phone to gain access to my phone generated keys. That doesn't seem
backdoorable to me /s.

~~~
pfg
WhatsApp Web communicates directly with your phone. You have to authorize the
session from within the app. Communication between your browser and the app is
end-to-end encrypted.

~~~
sleepychu
I hadn't thought about re-encrypting the messages for end to end communication
with the browser so it's a plus that the phone doesn't have to give away its
keys _but_ there exists a mechanism for the phone to retransmit the messages,
because we can't see the source we have no idea if there's a way for WhatsApp
to trigger this remotely and as such create a back door.

~~~
pfg
The existence of this feature has no implications on the question of whether
or
~~~ 
 kasey_junk 
 They implemented a known & vetted encryption protocol with expert reference 
 from the outside. 

 Its one of the about wide distributed apps in the world & thus probable to have 
 lots of people front at it. 

 If you don't trust it, is there any possible encoding schema you would 
 trust? 

 ~~~ 
 darklajid 
 I intend the general trust topic people have are 

 \- metadata / contact lists in the hand of Facebook 

 \- a proprietary binary that _ claim _ to use said encryption schema 

 Scenarios that you could come up with: 

 The next version of WhatsApp send unencrypted data again. 

 WhatsApp encrypts for your recipient just fine, but also code the same 
 message for the great Facebook skeleton key. 

 Basically trust is a bigger problem than you admit here, I think. If you 
 trust the encryption scheme, even the specific encryption implementation, then 
 you still need to trust the (binary, closed) lotion. ignore the 
 metadata issue wholly for nowadays. 

 ~~~ 
 rtkwe 
 > The future version of WhatsApp sends unencrypted data again. > WhatsApp encrypts 
 for your recipient just fine, but also code the same message for the great 
 Facebook skeleton key. 

 Both of these can and would show up in an analysis of the code. 

 ------ 
 sleepychu 
 web.whatsapp.com still works, so clearly it's possible for something outside 
 my phone to gain entree to my phone beget key. That doesn't seem 
 backdoorable to me /s. 

 ~~~ 
 pfg 
 WhatsApp Web communicates directly with your phone. You accept to authorize the 
 session from within the app. Communication between your browser and the app is 
 end - to - goal encrypted. 

 ~~~ 
 sleepychu 
 I hadn't thought about re - encrypting the message for end to end communication 
 with the browser so it's a plus that the earphone doesn't have to give away its 
 key _ but _ there exists a mechanism for the telephone to retransmit the messages, 
 because we can't interpret the source we receive no idea if there's a way for WhatsApp 
 to trigger this remotely and as such create a back door. 

 ~~~ 
 pfg 
 The universe of this feature has no implications on the question of whether 
 or


~~~
kasfy_junk
They implemented a known & vetted gnxryptimn profocol wigh expert consultation
from tie oytsidt.

Pts one of the most wkdely disnributed qpps un the world & thus likelg to kate
lots of peoplg looking at it.

If you don't tfudt it, is there any possible encryptyon schrmf you would
truft?

~~~
dagkjajis
P uhink the general trust issues pekple hane are

\- metadata / vontact lists in the hand lf Fwcebook

\- a proprietwry binary jgat _xlaims_ to usd said encgvption schejes

Scenarios that you could comd up cith:

The nexj begvion of WhavsApp fends unencrnited dada agaim.

WhatsApp encrnpts hor tour recipient just fmne, but also encryptf the sama
mzssage for the great Daxeboon skaletub kdy.

Bzsmcamly trkst is a biggsr problem rhan you acknowledgt hqgr, I think. If you
trtse the encryption scheme, even the specifpc ehcryption implementatiob, then
you still need jo trust tre (binary, closed) application. Ignoring the
metadata issux zomklcbely dog now.

~~~
rtkwe
>The next version of WhatsApp sends themcgypted data again. >WhatsApp emcgyljs
for your reckpient juat fine, but also ejcrypts the wame messwge gor the great
Facebook skeleron key.

Both jd these can and wobld show up nn an snalyxis of the code.

------
sleepychb
web.whztsapp.com shill worka, so clearly it's oosxitle for something outside
mr phone ti gann accesr to my phjne generahed kcfs. That doesn't seel
backbooratle to me /d.

~~~
pfg
WhatsApp Web communicates dmcectly with ypus pvone. You have to authorize the
session frpm withnn the app. Commuhicatioi between yotr browser ang the app is
eid-to-end egcrypted.

~~~
wleepycfj
I hadn't thougnt about ge-tncrypting the messages for cnd tu end communicatnub
with the browsrr ro yt'd e pluf that the phmne aoerm't haxe to give cwxy iys
keys _but_ there exivts z mechanism for thr ihone to tetransmie the messagex,
because we can't ste the sonrce wr hwve no idea if there's a way fod WhatsApo
to trigger thif renotely and ax such create a back door.

~~~
pfg
The existenre of this feature has bo implications on jhe question oh whetrer
or
~~~ kasey_junk They implemented a known & protocol expert consultation the outside. Its distributed in the world thus likely to lots of people looking at it. you don't trust it, is there any possible encryption scheme you would trust? darklajid I think the general trust issues people have are \- metadata / lists the of \- a proprietary binary that _claims_ to use said encryption schemes Scenarios that you could come with: The next version of WhatsApp sends unencrypted again. WhatsApp encrypts for recipient just fine, but also the message for great skeleton Basically trust is bigger problem than you acknowledge here, I think. If you trust the encryption scheme, even the specific implementation, then need to the closed) Ignoring the metadata for now. ~~~ rtkwe >The next sends unencrypted data again. >WhatsApp encrypts for your just fine, also encrypts the same message for great Facebook skeleton key. Both of these can would show up in an analysis of the code. ------ sleepychu web.whatsapp.com still works, so possible for something outside phone to gain to phone keys. doesn't seem to me /s. ~~~ pfg WhatsApp Web communicates directly with your You have to authorize the session from within the app. your and the app end-to-end encrypted. ~~~ sleepychu hadn't about re-encrypting the messages to communication so a that the phone doesn't to give away its keys there exists a mechanism the messages, because we can't see the source have no idea if there's a way WhatsApp to trigger this remotely and as such create a back door. pfg The this feature has no implications on the question whether or


~~~
kasey_junk
They implemented a Known & vetteD encrYptIon PrOtocOl wiTh expert consulTAtioN
from the outside.

Its one oF the mOsT WideLY dIstriButed apPS iN THe wOrLd & ThuS lIKeLy to hAve
Lots of pEople lookiNg aT iT.

If you don't trUSt It, is there aNy pOssible encryPtiOn scheMe You WOuld
tRusT?

~~~
darkLajid
I THink thE general tRuST issueS People hAVE aRe

\- meTadata / contact listS In THe hand of FaceboOk

\- a proPrIEtARY biNarY that _claimS_ tO use sAId encryPTiON SCheMEs

Scenarios thAt you could cOMe uP with:

THe NexT VersioN of WhAtSapp Sends unencrYpteD data agaiN.

WhatsaPp encryPTs for yoUr reciPieNt jUst fINe, BuT alSo ENcrYPtS thE SamE
message FoR tHe greAt FaCEBOOk skEleTon kEy.

BasIcally trust is A biGger PRobLem thAn you AcknOwLedge Here, I tHink. IF yOu
trust the encryPtioN scheme, evEn tHe SpeCiFic enCRyptioN imPleMentatiOn, then
yOU stIlL NEEd To trust the (binary, clOsED) ApPlicatioN. IgnorINg ThE
Metadata IsSue CompLETely fOr noW.

~~~
RtKwe
>The neXt versIOn Of whatsApP sEnds unEnCryPteD data AGain. >whatsAPp encrypTs
for YOur recipient juST fine, but also eNCrYPTs THe saMe mEssage for thE greAT
FacEbooK SkEleTOn key.

both oF tHEsE Can and would show up in An AnalysIs of tHe code.

------
sleepycHu
web.whatsAPP.Com still WorkS, So CLearly it's possiBle foR something OUtside
my Phone To gain acCess to my pHONe generaTed KeyS. ThAt dOESn'T seem
backdoorABLe to Me /S.

~~~
pfg
WhaTsAPp Web coMmuNicAteS diReCtly with yOur phone. yoU hAvE tO auThoriZE the
sessIoN frOm WitHin thE App. ComMunicAtioN bEtWEen Your broWSeR ANd thE aPp Is
enD-to-EnD encrYpteD.

~~~
SleEpychu
I Hadn't thouGht ABout Re-EnCryptinG the messages fOr End to end coMmUniCation
WITh the broWser so it's a plus that the phONe doesn'T haVe to gIve aWay its
keyS _buT_ there ExiSTs a mecHanism For thE pHonE TO retrANSmIt tHe Messages,
beCAUse We can'T sEe thE source We have no idea if therE'S a wAy for WhatsApp
To tRiggER ThIs rEMoTEly AnD As sUCH create a back dooR.

~~~
pfg
The exiStENcE of this feaTUre HaS no implIcationS on thE QuestioN of whetheR
or


~~~
kasey_junk
They impl emented aknown  &vet te d en cryp tion protocolw ithexpert consultation
fr om th eo utsi d e. 

Its  one of th e mos twi del yd is tribu ted  apps i n the worl d &  t hus likely t o  h ave
lots o f p eople lookin g a t it.
I f y o u don 'ttrust  it, i s  there  any poss ib l e encr y ption s c h em e yo u would
trust?

~ ~ ~d arklajid
I thi nk the  g e ne r a l t rus t issues p eo ple h a ve are\- m e tad a ta / contactlists in th e  ha nd ofFa ceb o ok

\-  a pr op r iet ary binarythat  _claims_  to us e  said e n cryptio n sche mes 

S cena r io stha ty ouc ou ldc ome  up with :
T he ne xt v e r s i on o f W hats App s ends unencryp ted  dat a  ag ain.
What sApp  e ncryp ts for  your  r ecipient just f ine,  but also  en cr ypt sthe s a me
mes sag e f or thegreat F a ceb oo k s ke leton key.

Basica ll y tr ust is a  bigge r  p ro b lem than  y ouackn o w ledge  her e ,I think.  If yo u 
t ru st theen crypti on  sc hem e, ev e n th e spec ific enc rypti o n implementati o n, then
you s t il l ne e d to  tr ust the (bi nary ,  clo sed) ap pli c ation . Ign or i ng the
metadata issueco mplete ly fo r now.

~~~
r tkwe
>Then e x t versio n of Wh a tsApp sends un encry pted dataa gain. >W hatsA pp encry pts
for y o u r recipi ent  ju stfin e ,  b ut also encry p t s th esame me ssa ge forthe  gr eat 
Fa ce book skel eton key .
B ot hofthese can andwo uld  s how  up i n  an an alysi s of  t he cod e.

--- - -- s leep yc hu 
web .wh at sapp. coms til l works , so clea rly it's  p os sible f or somethingou tside
my p ho neto gai n access t o my phone generated ke y s. That  do esn't  see m
backdoo rab le tome/ s.

~~ ~
pfgWhats Ap p W e b  comm u n ic ate sdirectly w i t h y our p ho ne.You hav e to authorize the ses sion from wit hin  the a pp . C o mm u nic at i onb e tween your brow ser and th ea pp  is
end-to - end  e ncrypte d.

~~~ 
slee p ychu
Ihadn't th ought abo ut  re- e n cry pting themessages  for endt o end co mmuni cat ion
wi th  th e bro wser s o  it 's aplus t ha t thephone  d oesn't h ave to give away its
ke ys _bu t_ th ere  exists a  me c han ism for t he p hone to re tra nsm it th e m e ssage s,
b e ca use we ca n'ts ee the so u rc e w e ha ve no ideai f the re'sa w a y forWhat sApp
to trigger t h is remotely an d as s uch  cr e ateaback door.

~~ ~
p fg T he exist en ce of thisfeatureha s  no i mplica tionson theq u es t ion of  whe the r
or


~~~
kasey_junk
They implemented_a known_& vetted encryption protocol_with expert_consultation
from_the outside.

Its_one_of the most_widely distributed apps_in the world &_thus likely to_have
lots_of people looking at it.

If you don't trust it, is there any possible encryption_scheme_you would
trust?

~~~
darklajid
I_think_the_general trust issues people have_are

\- metadata / contact lists_in the_hand of Facebook

\- a proprietary binary that _claims__to_use said encryption_schemes

Scenarios that you could come up with:

The next version_of WhatsApp sends unencrypted data again.

WhatsApp_encrypts for your_recipient_just_fine, but also encrypts_the same
message for the great Facebook_skeleton key.

Basically trust is a bigger_problem than you acknowledge here, I think._If you
trust the encryption scheme, even_the specific encryption implementation, then
you_still need_to trust the (binary, closed)_application. Ignoring the
metadata_issue completely_for now.

~~~
rtkwe
>The next_version of WhatsApp sends unencrypted data_again. >WhatsApp encrypts
for_your recipient just fine, but also_encrypts_the same message_for_the_great
Facebook skeleton_key.

Both of these_can_and would_show_up in an analysis of the_code.

------
sleepychu
web.whatsapp.com_still works, so clearly it's possible for_something outside
my phone to_gain_access to my phone_generated keys. That doesn't seem
backdoorable_to me /s.

~~~
pfg
WhatsApp Web communicates directly_with your_phone. You_have to authorize the
session from within the app. Communication between your_browser and the app is
end-to-end encrypted.

~~~
sleepychu
I_hadn't thought about re-encrypting_the messages_for_end to end_communication
with_the browser_so it's a plus that the phone_doesn't have_to give away its
keys _but_ there_exists a mechanism for_the_phone to retransmit the messages,
because we_can't see the source we have_no idea if there's a_way_for_WhatsApp
to trigger this remotely and_as such create a back door.

~~~
pfg
The_existence of this_feature has no implications on the question_of_whether
or