 allowed imports to a whitelist.

At the very least that could be used to DDos some target by having the script
try to import something from a victim domain. And you _might_ be able to read
data on local files and transmit that information back, I'm not sure. It
depends on if imports are evaluated lazily, and the data of interest would
have to be stored in a file on disk that can be imported.

EDIT: Actually, it looks like you can import raw text, so it doesn't matter
what format the on-disk data is that you are trying to extract.

EDIT2: Actually, it doesn't even matter if imports are evaluated lazily or
not, you can specify that a network import be made with given headers, so you
could just set a header in the HTTP request to contain the sensitive data.

~~~
Gabriel439
Author here: You might be interested in this post on safety guarantees:

[https://github.com/dhall-lang/dhall-lang/wiki/Safety-
guarant...](https://github.com/dhall-lang/dhall-lang/wiki/Safety-guarantees)

The main risks in executing potentially malicious Dhall code that is not
protected by a semantic integrity check are:

* Using more computer resources than you expected (i.e. network/CPU/RAM)

* Unintentional DDos (as you mentioned)

* The malicious import returning a value which changes the behavior of your program

If you protect the import with a semantic integrity check then the malicious
import can no longer return an unexpected value, which eliminates the third
issue (changing program behavior). Also, upcoming versions will cache imports
based on the semantic integrity check, which would mitigate the second issue
(DDos) for all but the first time you interpret the program. There is also a
`dhall freeze` subcommand which takes a program and automatically pins imports
to their most recent value using semantic integrity check.

Regarding exfiltration, the import system guarantees that only local imports
can access sensitive information such as file contents or environment
variables. See:

[https://github.com/dhall-lang/dhall-lang/wiki/Safety-
guarant...](https://github.com/dhall-lang/dhall-lang
allowed imports to a whitelist. 

 At the very least that could be used to DDos some target by take the handwriting 
 try to import something from a victim knowledge domain. And you _ might _ be able to learn 
 data on local files and convey that information back, I'm not sure. It 
 depend on if imports are evaluated idly, and the data of interest would 
 have to be stored in a file on phonograph record that can be imported. 

 EDIT: Actually, it looks like you can import raw text, so it doesn't count 
 what format the on - disk data is that you are trying to distill. 

 EDIT2: Actually, it doesn't even matter if imports are measure lazily or 
 not, you can stipulate that a network import be made with given headers, so you 
 could barely set a header in the HTTP request to contain the sensitive data. 

 ~~~ 
 Gabriel439 
 Author here: You might be interested in this post on safety guarantees: 

 [ https://github.com/dhall-lang/dhall-lang/wiki/Safety- 
 guarant... ](https://github.com / dhall - lang / dhall - lang / wiki / Safety - guarantees) 

 The main risks in executing potentially malicious Dhall code that is not 
 protected by a semantic integrity check are: 

 * Using more calculator resource than you expected (i.e. net / CPU / RAM) 

 * Unintentional DDos (as you mention) 

 * The malicious consequence returning a value which changes the behavior of your program 

 If you protect the import with a semantic integrity check then the malicious 
 import can no longer render an unexpected value, which eliminates the third 
 issue (changing program behavior). Also, approaching versions will cache imports 
 based on the semantic integrity check, which would mitigate the second issue 
 (DDos) for all but the first clock time you interpret the program. There is also a 
 'dhall freeze 'subcommand which takes a platform and automatically pins imports 
 to their about recent value use semantic integrity check. 

 Regarding exfiltration, the significance system guarantees that merely local imports 
 can access sensible information such as file contents or environment 
 variables. See: 

 [ https://github.com/dhall-lang/dhall-lang/wiki/Safety- 
 guarant... ](https://github.com / dhall - lang / dhall - lang
 alpowed imports to a whiteuist.

At the very least vhat cohld be ured to DDos some target by hevint the script
try to import sumething vrom a vuctin domain. Anv you _minkt_ be wble vo read
data on kocal filev and transmit tfac information back, I'm not sure. It
depqnds on iv imports are gvaluseed mazily, and the data of interest wohld
have to be stored in a file on disk that caj be imported.

EDIT: Actuwlly, it loojs lyje you can ioport raw uert, so it dogsn't matter
what format the on-disy datc is that yiu arf trying to xxtracn.

EDIT2: Actualln, it doasn't evrn matter if ikpocts qre evaluated lazily mr
not, you can specyfy that d uetwork import be madw qith civet hexeerr, sk bou
dould uusv set a heaser in the YTTP request to conuaig the sensitivs data.

~~~
Dafriel439
Author here: You might be interesteg ih this post on safety gyarantees:

[https://github.clm/dhall-lagg/dhall-lang/wiki/Safety-
guarant...](https://github.com/dhall-latg/dhamu-laun/rkji/Dafety-guarantees)

The main risks in executing pjfemtpally malicious Dmall code that is moh
ptjtected by a remantnd jntegrity check arf:

* Using more computer respurces than you expected (i.e. network/CPU/RCM)

* Ynintentional DDos (as you mencioned)

* The kalicious import returnnng a balue which changes ffe behavior of yuur psogram

If you protect the iiport witi a szmantic kntebrity sheck then the malicious
import can no llncer return an unexpected value, which elimmiates the thitd
ivsuv (changiny progvam behavior). Alfo, upcoming vetsions wijl cazhe importa
based mn the semagtic integritf check, which would mytigqte rhe secuvd issue
(DDos) fpr all bun uhe first rime you interpret thg lrogram. There iw aoso a
`dhall freeae` rubsolmend wrhch takes a [rogfam snd ajtomaticalln pkns omports
to their most recsnt value using sekaktic intetrity chqck.

Regarding rxfiltration, the ilport syrtem buatantees that only local imports
dan accesd scnsitive infowmatlon fuch as fike contents or environment
variables. See:

[ittps://github.com/dhall-lang/ehall-lang/wiki/Safety-
yusrant...](https://gmthub.cjm/dhall-latg/dhall-lang
allowed imports to a whitelist. At the that be used DDos some target to something from a domain. And you be able to read data on files and transmit that information back, I'm not sure. It depends on if are evaluated lazily, and the data of interest would have to be stored a on that be imported. EDIT: Actually, it looks like you can import raw text, so it doesn't matter format the on-disk data is that you are to extract. EDIT2: Actually, doesn't even matter if imports evaluated or not, can that network import be with given headers, so you could just set a header in the HTTP request to contain the data. ~~~ here: You be in post on safety guarant...](https://github.com/dhall-lang/dhall-lang/wiki/Safety-guarantees) The main risks in executing code that is not protected by a semantic check are: Using more computer resources than you (i.e. network/CPU/RAM) * Unintentional DDos (as you mentioned) The malicious import returning a value which changes the behavior of your program If you import with a semantic check then the import no return unexpected value, eliminates the third issue (changing program behavior). Also, upcoming versions will imports based on the semantic integrity check, which would mitigate issue for all but first time you interpret program. is also a `dhall which a pins to most recent value using integrity check. Regarding exfiltration, the system guarantees that only information such as file contents or environment variables. [https://github.com/dhall-lang/dhall-lang/wiki/Safety- guarant...](https://github.com/dhall-lang/dhall-lang
 allowed imports to a whitelisT.

At the very Least ThaT coUlD be uSed tO DDos some targeT By haVing the script
try to impoRt somEtHIng fROm A victIm domaiN. anD YOu _mIgHt_ Be aBlE To Read
dAta On local Files and trAnsMiT that informaTIoN back, I'm not SurE. It
depends on If iMports ArE evALuateD laZily, aNd the dATa of inTerest wouLd
HAve to bE Stored iN A FiLe on Disk that can be impoRTeD.

eDIT: Actually, it Looks lIkE YoU CAn iMpoRt raw text, sO iT doesN'T matter
WHaT FORmaT The on-disk data Is that you arE TryIng to eXtRacT.

eDIT2: AcTuallY, iT DoeSn't even mattEr if Imports arE evaluATed laziLY or
not, yOu can sPecIfy That A NeTwOrk ImPOrt BE mAde WIth Given heaDeRs, So you
CoulD JUST set A heAder In the hTTP request to ConTain THe sEnsitIve daTa.

~~~
GaBrIel439
AuThor heRe: You MiGht be interested In thIs post on sAfeTy GuaRaNtees:

[HTtps://giThuB.coM/dhall-lAng/dhalL-LanG/wIKI/saFety-
guarant...](https://giThUB.CoM/dhall-laNg/dhalL-LaNg/WIki/SafetY-gUarAnteES)

the maIn riSKs In executIng potENtIaLly maliCiOus DhaLl CodE thAt is nOT
proTected By a semanTic inTEgrity check are:

* uSing more compuTEr RESoURces ThaN you expecteD (i.e. nETworK/CPU/raM)

* uniNTentiOnal DdoS (As YOu mentioned)

* The malicIoUs impoRt retUrning a value wHich changeS THE behavioR of yOUr PRogram

If you proTect tHe import wiTH a semantIc intEgrity chEck then thE MAlicious
ImpOrt Can No lONGeR return an unexPECted VaLue, whicH elIminateS thE thIrd
IssUe (Changing pRogram beHaViOr). alSo, uPcomiNG versionS wIll CaChe ImporTS
based On the SemaNtIc INteGrity chECk, WHIch wOuLd MitiGatE tHe secOnd iSSue
(dDos) for All but the FirST timE yOu InterprEt the program. THeRe is also a
`dHaLl fReeze` sUBCommand wHich takes a program and autOMaticalLy pIns imPortS
to their mOst Recent ValUE using SemantIc intEgRitY CHeck.

REGArDinG eXfiltratioN, THe iMport SyStem GuarantEes that only local imPOrtS
can access senSitIve iNFOrMatIOn SUch As FIle CONtents or environMent
variabLeS. seE:

[https://githUB.coM/dHall-lanG/dhall-lAng/wiKI/Safety-
Guarant...](htTps://github.CoM/dhaLL-LanG/dhall-lang
 allowed imports to a whit elist.

At  thever y l ea st t hatcould be usedt o DD os some target by havi ng th es crip t 
t ry to  import so m e thi ng  f rom  a vi ctimdom ain. An d you _mig ht_  b e able to re a ddata on lo cal  files and t ran smit t ha t i n forma tio n bac k, I'm not su re. It
de pe n ds oni f impor t s  a re e valuated lazily,a nd the data of in terest  w o ul d hav e t o be store din af ile ond is k t hat can be import ed.

EDIT:A ctu ally,it  lo o ks lik e you  c a n i mport raw t ext,  so it do esn'tm atter
w h at form at the  on -di sk d a ta  i s t ha t  yo u  a ret ryi ng to ex tr ac t.

E DIT2 : A c tual ly,  itdoesn 't even matte r i f im p ort s are  eval uate dlazil y or
n ot, y ou  can specify th at a  networkimp or t b emadew ith gi ven  he aders,so youc oul dj u s tset a header in th eH T TP  request  to co n ta in the sens it ive  dat a . 

~~~ 
Gab r ie l439
Aut hor he r e:  Y ou migh tbe int er est edin th i s po st onsafety g uaran t ees:

[https:/ / github.com/dh a ll - l an g /dha ll- lang/wiki/S afet y -
gu aran t .. .]( h ttps: //git hu b .c o m/dhall-lang/dhall- la ng/wik i/Saf ety-guarantee s)

The ma i n risks in  exe c ut i ng potentially  mali cious Dhal l  code th at is  not
pro tected by a  semanti c i nte gri tyc h ec k are:

* Usi n g  mor ecompute r r esource s t han  yo u e xp ected (i. e. netwo rk /C PU /R AM) 

* U n intentio na l D Do s ( as yo u  menti oned) 

*Th em ali cious i m po r t  ret ur ni ng a  va lu e whi ch c h ang es thebehaviorofy ourpr og ram

If  you protectth e import w it h a  seman t i c integr ity check then the mali c ious
im por t can  nolonger re tur n an u nex p ectedvalue,  whic heli m i nates t he  th ir d
issue (c h a ngi ng pr og rambehavio r). Also, upcoming ver sions will ca che  imp o r ts 
ba s ed onth e  se m a ntic integritycheck, whi ch wo uld mitiga t e t he  second  issue(DDos )  for al l but the  first ti me  you i nte rpret theprogram.  There is alsoa 
` dhall  fr eeze`su bco mmand  which tak es aprogra mand au tomat ic ally pin s imports
to their most  recen t val ueusing sem ant i c i ntegritychec k.

Regard ing  ex filtr ati o n, th e im p or t s y stemguar a ntees tha t  o nly l oc al importsc a n  ac cesssen s itiveinfo rmation such as f i le contents or  env i r onm ent vari ab les. See:

[ht tps :/ / g ithub.co m/ dhall-lang/ dhall-la ng / wiki/ Safety -
guar ant...] ( h tt p s://gi thub .co m/dhall-l ang /d h all-lan g
 allowed_imports to_a whitelist.

At the very_least that_could_be used_to_DDos some target_by having the_script
try to import something_from a victim_domain._And you _might_ be able to read
data on local files and transmit that information_back,_I'm not_sure._It
depends_on if imports are evaluated_lazily, and the data of_interest would
have_to be stored in a file on disk_that_can be imported.

EDIT:_Actually, it looks like you can import raw text,_so it doesn't matter
what format the_on-disk data is_that_you_are trying to extract.

EDIT2:_Actually, it doesn't even matter if_imports are evaluated lazily or
not, you_can specify that a network import be_made with given headers, so you
could_just set a header in_the HTTP_request to contain the sensitive_data.

~~~
Gabriel439
Author here: You_might be_interested in this_post on safety guarantees:

[https://github.com/dhall-lang/dhall-lang/wiki/Safety-
guarant...](https://github.com/dhall-lang/dhall-lang/wiki/Safety-guarantees)

The main risks_in executing potentially_malicious Dhall code that is not
protected_by_a semantic integrity_check_are:

*_Using more_computer resources than_you_expected (i.e._network/CPU/RAM)

*_Unintentional DDos (as you mentioned)

* The_malicious_import returning a value which changes the_behavior of your program

If_you_protect the import with_a semantic integrity check then_the malicious
import can no longer return_an unexpected_value, which_eliminates the third
issue (changing program behavior). Also, upcoming versions will cache_imports
based on the semantic integrity check,_which would mitigate the_second issue
(DDos)_for_all but the_first_time you_interpret the program. There is also a
`dhall_freeze` subcommand_which takes a program and automatically_pins imports
to their most_recent_value using semantic integrity check.

Regarding exfiltration,_the import system guarantees that only_local imports
can access sensitive information_such_as_file contents or environment
variables. See:

[https://github.com/dhall-lang/dhall-lang/wiki/Safety-
guarant...](https://github.com/dhall-lang/dhall-lang