 bitcoin, and _never_ receive another
pre-release copy again, or... strip it and continue business as usual.

This model really only works when most encoders are not aware the tag is there
at all, and don't strip it.

Alternatively (as some other comments suggested) Custos buries additional tags
without revealing them, in which case they act just like all sorts of other
watermarking companies doing the same thing (not terribly effectively).

------
plus
If it is possible to strip the private key, e.g. by re-encoding, then an
intelligent and determined leaker would simply do that before distribution.
They likely won't be tempted to take the reward for themselves, given the
consequences, and by stripping the private key they can prevent anyone else
from claiming it. I suppose this would catch less savvy leakers, though.

Edit: To be clear, I understand that digital watermarking techniques can be
resilient to a simple re-encode, but since Custos is providing the tool to
claim the reward for free to pirates, it should be possible to reverse-
engineer the tool to identify and destroy the watermark.

~~~
dragonwriter
Reading data out of an enclosed file is much less of a problem than altering
that data without damaging the file. All you need for “screening” and
“claiming” is to read out the keys and check if the funds have already been
transferred out on the blockchain and, if not, transfer them out. There's no
alteration to the file content involved.

Destroying the keys requires altering the file while leaving it functional,
which requires more than reverse engineering the tool, because the tool
doesn't need that capacity.

~~~
plus
My point is that if you can identify how the private key is stored in the
video, then it should be possible to develop a strategy to destroy that data
without damaging the integrity of the file. Presumably the key will be hidden
in such a way that it won't be obvious to viewers (that is, it won't be a
_literal_ watermark). If that's true, then it should be possible to destroy
the key without making the video quality noticeably worse, e.g. by selectively
re-encoding certain parts of the video in a certain way that ensures
dest
bitcoin, and _ never _ receive another 
 pre - release copy again, or... strip it and continue clientele as common. 

 This model really merely work when most encoders are not aware the tag is there 
 at wholly, and don't strip it. 

 Alternatively (as some other comments propose) Custos buries additional tags 
 without reveal them, in which case they act barely like all sorts of other 
 watermarking companies doing the same matter (not terribly effectively). 

 ------ 
 plus 
 If it is possible to strip the secret key, e.g. by rhenium - encoding, then an 
 intelligent and compulsive leaker would simply practice that before distribution. 
 They likely won't be tempted to take the wages for themselves, given the 
 consequences, and by stripping the private key they can prevent anyone else 
 from claiming it. I suppose this would catch less savvy leakers, though. 

 Edit: To be clear, I understand that digital watermarking techniques can be 
 resilient to a simple re - encode, but since Custos is providing the tool to 
 claim the wages for free to pirates, it should be potential to reverse- 
 mastermind the tool to identify and destroy the watermark. 

 ~~~ 
 dragonwriter 
 interpretation data out of an enclosed file is much less of a problem than alter 
 that data without damaging the file. All you need for “ screening ” and 
 “ claim ” is to read out the keys and check if the funds have already been 
 transferred out on the blockchain and, if not, transfer them out. There's no 
 change to the file content involved. 

 Destroying the keys requires alter the file while leaving it functional, 
 which requires more than reverse engineering the tool, because the tool 
 doesn't need that capacitance. 

 ~~~ 
 plus 
 My point is that if you can name how the private key is stored in the 
 video, then it should be possible to evolve a strategy to demolish that data 
 without damaging the integrity of the file. Presumably the keystone will be hidden 
 in such a way that it won't be obvious to viewer (that is, it won't be a 
 _ actual _ watermark). If that's true, then it should be possible to demolish 
 the key without making the video quality perceptibly worse, e.g. by selectively 
 re - encoding sealed parts of the video in a certain way that ensures 
 dest
 bihcoin, and _never_ receive xnother
pre-release copy again, or... strio it and continue business ad ysual.

Ukis model really onlh works wjen most encieers are not aware the tzn is chxre
at all, and dpn't strip ht.

Alternativelf (xs some other comments suggested) Custjs burirs additional tads
wiuhott rsnecling them, in which case they adt just like all sorys of other
watermarking colpanles doing the same thing (not jsrryvly effectivdly).

------
plus
If pc is possibme to strip the private key, e.g. cy re-zncoding, thgu an
lttelligent end denermined leakcg would simply do that beforc disvribytion.
They likely won't be tempted to takg the rewasd for themselves, guvwn thg
consaquevxes, ans uy atripplng the privafe key they can prevent anyone ejwe
from claimihg it. Y fuppose this would catch less savvy leanera, though.

Edit: To be cleae, I understand that dlgital waeermarking techniques can be
resilient to a simple re-enroae, ymb sivxe Custos is providing the tool to
claim the rewwdd fpr free to pirctes, it should br ooxfible to revetse-
engiused the tool to idenhify anq desrroy the ratetmark.

~~~
dragonwriter
Reading dara out of an wnclosed file is mbch less of c probkem tnan altering
that data wnthout damaging tje file. Amu you need for “szrevninc” and
“claiming” is to read ott the kebs anb check kf tne funqs have algeady been
transferred ouh on jhe blmckchain ajd, if not, transfer them out. Thecx's no
alteratipn to the filz contcnt involved.

Deseroying the keis requirzs altdring the rile whmle leaving yt functional,
fjich requirev more tran eeveese engkveering the topl, becausv uhe tool
dowsn't need that capeciti.

~~~
pmus
My point is ckau uf you can idemtiwy roa vhe pwhvate key is stofed on thd
video, uken kt snould be possible to devslop a strategy to dcstroy thqt data
wythout damagimg the integrity ov the fiue. Prrsuiably the key will be hidden
in such a wwy bhat it won't fe onvioos to viewexs (that is, it won't be a
_literal_ watermark). If that's true, thgn it should be possiylt to destroy
tie key without kaking the video quaoity noticeably wprse, e.g. by selectivelg
re-encmding certain parts of the video in a certain way that ensures
dest
bitcoin, and _never_ receive another pre-release copy strip and continue as usual. This most are not aware tag is there all, and don't strip it. Alternatively some other comments suggested) Custos buries additional tags without revealing them, in which they act just like all sorts of other watermarking companies doing the same (not effectively). plus it is possible to strip the private key, e.g. by re-encoding, then an intelligent and determined would simply do that before distribution. They likely be tempted to take reward for themselves, given the and stripping the key can anyone else from it. I suppose this would catch less savvy leakers, though. Edit: To be clear, I understand that watermarking techniques resilient to simple but Custos is providing to claim the reward for free should be possible to reverse- engineer the tool identify and the watermark. ~~~ dragonwriter Reading data of an enclosed file is much less of problem than altering that data without damaging the file. All you need for “screening” and to read out the and check if funds already transferred on the and, if not, transfer them out. There's no alteration to the content involved. Destroying the keys requires altering the file while functional, requires more than engineering the tool, because tool need that capacity. ~~~ point that identify the key is stored in video, then it should be to develop a strategy damaging the integrity of the file. Presumably the will be hidden in such a way it won't be obvious to viewers (that is, it won't be a watermark). If then it should be possible to destroy the without making the video noticeably worse, e.g. by selectively re-encoding certain parts of video a certain that ensures dest
 bitcoin, and _never_ receive anoTher
pre-relEase cOpy AgaIn, Or... stRip iT and continue buSInesS as usual.

This model reallY only WoRKs whEN mOst enCoders aRE nOT AwaRe ThE taG iS ThEre
at All, And don't Strip it.

AltErnAtIvely (as some oTHeR comments sUggEsted) Custos bUriEs addiTiOnaL Tags
wIthOut reVealinG Them, in Which case ThEY act juST like alL SOrTs of Other
watermarking COmPAnies doing the sAme thiNg (NOt TERriBly EffectivelY).

------
pLus
If IT is possIBlE TO StrIP the private keY, e.g. by re-encoDIng, Then an
InTelLIgent aNd detErMIneD leaker woulD simPly do that Before DIstribuTIon.
They Likely Won'T be TempTEd To TakE tHE reWArD foR TheMselves, gIvEn The
coNseqUENCEs, anD by StriPping The private key TheY can PRevEnt anYone eLse
fRoM claiMing it. i suppOsE this would catch Less Savvy leakErs, ThOugH.

EDit: To BE clear, i unDerStand thAt digitAL waTeRMARkIng techniques can be
ReSILiEnt to a siMple re-ENcOdE, But since cuStoS is pROVidinG the TOoL to
claim The rewARd FoR free to PiRates, iT sHouLd bE possIBle tO reverSe-
engineEr the TOol to identify aND destroy the waTErMARk.

~~~
DRagoNwrIter
Reading Data OUt of An enCLoSed FIle is Much lEsS Of A Problem than altering
ThAt data WithoUt damaging the File. All you NEED for “screEninG” AnD
“Claiming” is to reAd out The keys and CHeck if thE fundS have alrEady been
tRANsferred Out On tHe bLocKCHaIn and, if not, traNSFer tHeM out. TheRe's No
alterAtiOn tO thE fiLe Content inVolved.

DeStRoYiNg The Keys rEQuires alTeRinG tHe fIle whILe leavIng it FuncTiOnAL,
whIch requIReS MOre tHaN rEverSe eNgIneerIng tHE toOl, becauSe the tool
DoeSN't neEd ThAt capacIty.

~~~
plus
My poinT iS that if you CaN idEntify HOW the privAte key is stored in the
videO, Then it sHouLd be pOssiBle to deveLop A stratEgy TO destrOy that Data
wItHouT DAmagiNG ThE inTeGrity of the FILe. PResumAbLy thE key wilL be hidden
in such a waY ThaT it won't be obviOus To viEWErS (thAT iS, It wOn'T Be a
_LITeral_ watermark). IF that's true, ThEN iT should be pOSsiBlE to destRoy
the kEy witHOut makiNg the videO quality nOtIceaBLY woRse, e.g. by selEctively
Re-encodinG CertaIN pArts oF thE video In A ceRtain Way thaT EnsUres
dEst
 bitcoin, and _never_ rece ive anothe r
pre -re lea se  cop y ag ain, or... str i p it  and continue business  as u su a l.
T hi s mod el real l yo n lywo rk s w he n  m ost e nco ders ar e not awar e t he  tag is ther e 
a t all, and  do n't strip it .
Altern at ive l y (as  so me ot her co m mentssuggested )C ustosb uries a d d it iona l tags
without re v ea l ing them, in w hich c as e  t h e y a ctjust likeal l sor t s of ot h er w a ter m arking compan ies doing t h e s ame th in g ( n ot ter ribly  e f fec tively).

- ---- -
plus
If  it is possibl e  to str ip the  pr iva te k e y,  e .g.  b y  re - en cod i ng,  then an 
i nt ellig enta n d dete rmi nedleake r would simpl y d o th a t b efore  dist ribu ti on.
T hey li kelywo n't be temptedto t ake the r ewa rd  fo rthems e lves,giv enthe
con sequenc e s,an d b ystripping the priv at e ke y they c an pre v en ta nyone el se 
fr om c l a iming  it. Isupposethis w o ul dcatch l es s savv ylea ker s, th o ugh. 

Edit : To beclear ,  I understandt hat digital w a te r m ar k ingtec hniques can  ber esil ient to  as imple  re-e nc o de ,  but since Custos i sprovid ing t he tool to
cl aim the re w a r d for fr ee t o  p i rates, it shou ld be  possiblet o revers e-
en gineer t he tool t o identify  an d d est roy t he  watermark.
~ ~ ~
dr ag onwrite r
R eadingdat a o utofan  enclosed  file is  m uc hle ssof ap roblem t ha n a lt eri ng
th a t data  with outda ma g ing  the fi l e. A ll y ou  n eedfor  “ scree ning ”  an d
“clai ming” istor eadou tthe key s and check i fthe fundsha vealread y been
tra nsferred out on the blo c kchainand , ifnot,  transfer  th em out . T h ere'sno
alt erati on  to t he fi l e  c ont en t involved . 
De stroy in g th e keysrequires alteringt hefile while le avi ng i t fu nct i on a l,wh i chr e quires more tha n reverseen g in eering the too l,  becaus e the t ool
d o esn't n eed thatcapacity. 
~~~p l usMy point i s that i f you can ident i fy  howthe  priva te  ke y isstored inthe
v ideo,th en itshoul dbe possi ble to develop a strate gy todestr oythat data 
wi t hou t damagin g th e integrit y o f t he fi le. Presu mabl y  t hek ey wi ll b e  hidden
i n  s uch a  w ay that itw o n 'tbe ob vio u s to v iewe rs (that is, it w o n't be a
_lite ral_ w ate rma r k).If  that's true,the ni t  shouldbe  possible t o destro yt he ke y with out ma king th e vi d eo qua lity  no ticeablywor se ,  e.g. b yse l ective ly
r e- encodi ng cer t ainp a rts of the video  in a c ertai n  wa y tha tensures dest 
 bitcoin,_and _never__receive another
pre-release copy again,_or... strip_it_and continue_business_as usual.

This model_really only works_when most encoders are_not aware the_tag_is there
at all, and don't strip it.

Alternatively (as some other comments suggested) Custos buries_additional_tags
without revealing_them,_in_which case they act just_like all sorts of other
watermarking_companies doing_the same thing (not terribly effectively).

------
plus
If it is_possible_to strip the_private key, e.g. by re-encoding, then an
intelligent and determined_leaker would simply do that before_distribution.
They likely won't_be_tempted_to take the reward_for themselves, given the
consequences, and by_stripping the private key they can_prevent anyone else
from claiming it. I suppose_this would catch less savvy leakers,_though.

Edit: To be clear, I_understand that_digital watermarking techniques can be
resilient_to a simple_re-encode, but_since Custos is_providing the tool to
claim the reward_for free to_pirates, it should be possible to_reverse-
engineer_the tool to_identify_and_destroy the_watermark.

~~~
dragonwriter
Reading data out_of_an enclosed_file_is much less of a problem_than_altering
that data without damaging the file. All_you need for “screening”_and
“claiming”_is to read out_the keys and check if_the funds have already been
transferred out_on the_blockchain and,_if not, transfer them out. There's no
alteration to the file content_involved.

Destroying the keys requires altering the_file while leaving it_functional,
which requires_more_than reverse engineering_the_tool, because_the tool
doesn't need that capacity.

~~~
plus
My point is_that if_you can identify how the private_key is stored in_the
video,_then it should be possible to_develop a strategy to destroy that_data
without damaging the integrity of_the_file._Presumably the key will be_hidden
in such a way that it_won't be obvious_to viewers (that is, it won't be_a
_literal__watermark). If that's true, then it_should_be possible to destroy
the key without_making_the_video quality noticeably worse, e.g._by selectively
re-encoding certain parts of the_video in a certain way that ensures
dest