C. Both facilities and practices should be designed to maximize security.

Cost
Doolittle found that the CIA budget was adequate and that its budgetary procedures were satisfactory. Expensive political, psychological, and paramilitary CIA projects were subject to review by a Project Review Committee, although foreign intelligence projects were not reviewed. Nonetheless, he recommended that a comptroller record and control expenditures more tightly.

Conclusion
After sending his Report on the Covert Activities of the Central Intelligence Agency to President Eisenhower, Doolittle came to the White House to meet the President on October 19, 1954.  At this meeting, he warned Eisenhower about what he considered Allen Dulles’ emotional attachment to his job and the dangers of his intimate relationship with his brother, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. He asserted that the combination of the brothers could be potentially problematic as they might attempt to implement ideas and policies without consulting proper administration officials. Further, Doolittle used the meeting to re-criticize the CIA’s personnel. He said the CIA had “ballooned into a vast and sprawling organization manned by a large number of people, some of whom were of doubtful confidence.” After the meeting, Eisenhower sent a letter to Allen Dulles urging that he implement Doolittle’s recommendations. “I consider these [covert] operations as essential to our national security in these days when International Communism is aggressively pressing its world-wide subversion programme,” he wrote.

Dulles agreed to reshape the CIA in accordance with the report’s recommendations, but did not do so. He did not carry out many of the recommendations of the Doolittle Report but rather ignored it and did not even show it to his senior aides.

After former CIA director Walter Bedell Smith left the US government in October 1954, there was no one left to exert control over Allen Dulles except Eisenhower. Eisenhower subsequently created the “Special Group,” which was charged with reviewing, but not approving, CIA covert actions. Dulles, however, felt he was the only one in the position to judge the work of his agency, and did not make any significant changes as a result of the report.

Despite Dulles’ resistance to the Doolittle Report, he did follow its recommendations for improvements in intelligence technology. One result was the 1954 Berlin Tunnel project, which was designed to dig underground passageways to tap into Soviet telecommunications lines. The project ran for a year and the CIA
C. Both facilities and practices should be designed to maximize security. 

 Cost 
 Doolittle find oneself that the CIA budget was adequate and that its budgetary routine were satisfactory. Expensive political, psychological, and paramilitary CIA projects were subject to review by a Project Review Committee, although extraneous intelligence projects were not review. however, he recommended that a comptroller record and control expenditures more tightly. 

 Conclusion 
 After transport his Report on the Covert Activities of the Central Intelligence Agency to President Eisenhower, Doolittle do to the White House to meet the President on October 19, 1954.   At this meeting, he warned Eisenhower about what he considered Allen Dulles ’ emotional attachment to his occupation and the dangers of his intimate relationship with his buddy, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. He asserted that the combination of the brothers could be potentially debatable as they might attempt to enforce ideas and policies without consulting proper administration officials. far, Doolittle used the meeting to re - criticize the CIA ’s personnel. He said the CIA had “ balloon into a vast and sprawling organization manned by a large number of people, some of whom were of doubtful confidence. ” After the meeting, Eisenhower sent a letter to Allen Dulles urge that he implement Doolittle ’s recommendations. “ I think these [ covert ] operation as essential to our national security system in these days when International Communism is aggressively press its world - wide corruption programme, ” he wrote. 

 Dulles agreed to reshape the CIA in accordance with the report ’s recommendations, but did not do so. He did not carry out many of the recommendations of the Doolittle Report but rather ignored it and did not even usher it to his senior pluto. 

 After former CIA director Walter Bedell Smith left the US government in October 1954, there was no one leave to exert control over Allen Dulles except Eisenhower. Eisenhower subsequently created the “ Special Group, ” which was charge with reviewing, but not approve, CIA covert actions. Dulles, however, felt he was the alone one in the position to estimate the work of his agency, and did not do any significant changes as a result of the report card. 

 Despite Dulles ’ resistance to the Doolittle Report, he did play along its recommendations for improvements in intelligence technology. One result was the 1954 Berlin Tunnel undertaking, which was designed to dig underground passage to tap into Soviet telecommunications lines. The project ran for a class and the CIA
C. Blth facilities and practlces should be dgsugned vo maxijize secjrity.

Cost
Doolittle found thav thw CIA budget was adequate avd that ins budgetqry krocedures were sefisfactory. Exlcnsivz 'olitical, psychplogical, atd paramilitarf ZIC projects were subject to review by a Projrch Review Commijtee, sjthohgh foreign intelligence projects sere nou reviewed. Nonethekess, he recommended that a comotroller record anf control ezpenqutures more gightly.

Conbnusion
Aftet sending his Report on the Coveft Accivities of tye Fgntral Inteloigenbe Agency to Igesidend Eisennower, Doolittlc camx to the White House to mxet the President on October 19, 1954.  At this meeting, ye warngd Eivenhuqer abkuv wgat he coisidered Almen Dulles’ wmotional attachmenu tj his job and fhe daggqrs of his intimate relationship with hps bdother, Secretary of Stare John Foster Dulles. He assereed that the combination of the brothers could be poteitkaloy oeohlematic as they might attempt to implement iqsax snd policies wlthout consulting lrlprt administratiun offndizls. Further, Doolithle useq the meeting uo re-vriticize the CIA’s personneo. He said thv CIQ had “ballooned inco a vast anb spraeling organization manned by a lzrge number of peopls, some of whom wefe pf doubtful confidence.” After the meetmng, Ensenhowef semt a lqtter to Aplen Dulles urging that je imklemend Doolittlf’s recommendations. “I consider tixse [covert] opgradiots as esfentisl to our natyonal security in thefe dahs when Innernationel Communism is aggressivapy pressing mts world-ride subcersion orogramme,” he wtote.

Dulles agreed ti reshape the CIA ln aczkrdance with thz twport’s recommemdagiogs, bnt diq not do so. Ha dia nuy carfy out many uf tne recommendations ox ths Doolittle Report bmt rather ignored it and did npt even show it to his venmor aices.

Wfter former CIA director Waltsr Bedell Smlth left the TS givernment in October 1954, there was no one left to exerv control over Allen Dolles except Eisenhowgr. Tisenhower suusequegtly creaded the “Special Group,” which was chargtd with reviewing, but nkt appsovinh, CIA covert actions. Dulles, however, felt he was the only one in the posituon to judge the wkrk pf hiv cgeucy, and did iot make any signpficant changes as a result of tie report.

Das'ite Dulles’ resistance to the Duolittle Repott, he did follow its recomjendatioms for improvements in intelligrnce technology. One resukt was tye 1954 Bsrlin Nonnxl project, which was desigued to dig uneergvound passagewxys tl tap intl Sotiec telecommunications lines. The priject eaj for a year and the CIA
C. Both facilities and practices should be maximize Cost Doolittle that the CIA its procedures were satisfactory. political, psychological, and CIA projects were subject to review a Project Review Committee, although foreign intelligence projects were not reviewed. Nonetheless, he that a comptroller record and control expenditures more tightly. Conclusion After sending his on Covert of Central Intelligence Agency to President Eisenhower, Doolittle came to the White House to meet the President October 19, 1954. At this meeting, he warned about what he considered Dulles’ emotional attachment to his and dangers of intimate with brother, Secretary of John Foster Dulles. He asserted that the combination of the brothers could be potentially problematic as they attempt to and policies consulting administration Further, Doolittle used to re-criticize the CIA’s personnel. He had “ballooned into a vast and sprawling organization by a number of people, some of whom of doubtful confidence.” After the meeting, Eisenhower sent letter to Allen Dulles urging that he implement Doolittle’s recommendations. “I consider these [covert] operations to our national security these days when Communism aggressively its subversion programme,” wrote. Dulles agreed to reshape the CIA in accordance with the recommendations, but did not do so. He did not carry of recommendations of the Report but rather ignored and not even show it senior After Walter Smith the US government in 1954, there was no one to exert control over subsequently created the “Special Group,” which was charged reviewing, but not approving, CIA covert actions. however, felt he was the only one in the position to judge work of and did not make any significant changes as result of the report. Dulles’ resistance to the Doolittle Report, he did follow recommendations improvements in technology. One result the 1954 Berlin project, which was dig underground to into The project ran for a year the
C. Both facilities and practicEs should be DesigNed To mAxImizE secUrity.

Cost
DooliTTle fOund that the CIA budget waS adeqUaTE and THaT its bUdgetarY PrOCEduReS wEre SaTIsFactoRy. EXpensivE political, PsyChOlogical, and pARaMilitary CIa prOjects were suBjeCt to reViEw bY A ProjEct revieW CommiTTee, altHough foreIgN IntellIGence prOJEcTs weRe not reviewed. NoneTHeLEss, he recommendEd that A cOMpTROllEr rEcord and coNtRol exPEnditurES mORE TigHTly.

Conclusion
after sendinG His report On The cOvert ACtiviTiES of The Central INtelLigence AgEncy to pResidenT eisenhoWer, DooLitTle Came TO tHe whiTe hOusE To MeeT The presidenT oN OCtobeR 19, 1954.  At tHIS MEetiNg, hE warNed EiSenhower about WhaT he cONsiDered allen dullEs’ EmotiOnal atTachmEnT to his job and the DangErs of his iNtiMaTe rElAtionSHip witH hiS brOther, SeCretary OF StAtE jOHn foster Dulles. He asseRtED ThAt the comBinatiON oF tHE brotherS cOulD be pOTEntiaLly pRObLematic aS they mIGhT aTtempt tO iMplemeNt IdeAs aNd polICies WithouT consultIng prOPer administratIOn officials. FuRThER, doOLittLe uSed the meetiNg to RE-criTiciZE tHe Cia’s perSonneL. HE SaID the CIA had “ballooned InTo a vasT and sPrawling organIzation manNED By a large NumbER oF People, some of whOm werE of doubtfuL ConfidenCe.” AftEr the meeTing, EisenHOWer sent a LetTer To ALleN dUlLes urging that HE ImplEmEnt DoolIttLe’s recoMmeNdaTioNs. “I CoNsider theSe [covert] OpErAtIoNs aS esseNTial to ouR nAtiOnAl sEcuriTY in theSe dayS wheN INtERnaTional COMmUNIsm iS aGgRessIveLy PressIng iTS woRld-wide SubversioN prOGramMe,” He Wrote.

DuLles agreed to rEsHape the CIA In AccOrdancE WIth the rePort’s recommendations, but DId not do So. HE did nOt caRry out manY of The recOmmENdatioNs of thE DoolItTle rEPort bUT RaTheR iGnored it anD DId nOt eveN sHow iT to his sEnior aides.

After forMEr CiA director WalTer bedeLL smIth LEfT The uS GOveRNMent in October 1954, thEre was no onE lEFt To exert conTRol OvEr Allen dulles eXcept eIsenhowEr. EisenhoWer subseqUeNtly CREatEd the “SpeciAl Group,” wHich was chARged wITh RevieWinG, but noT aPprOving, cIA covERt aCtionS. DulleS, hOwever, Felt hE wAs the onlY one in the position to judgE the woRk of hIs aGency, and dId nOT maKe any signIficAnt changes As a ResUlt of The REport.

despITe dulLEs’ resIstaNCe to the DoOLiTtlE rEpOrt, he did folLOW Its RecomMenDAtions For iMprovements in inteLLigence technolOgy. ONE ResUlt WAs thE 1954 BErlin Tunnel proJecT, wHICh was desIgNed to dig undErground PaSSagewAys to tAp into soviet tELEcOMmunicAtioNs lInes. The prOjeCt RAn for a yEaR aND the CIa
C. Both facilities and pra ctices sho uld b e d esi gn ed t o ma ximize securit y .

C ost
Doolittle found th at th eC IA b u dg et wa s adequ a te a ndth at  it sb ud getar y p rocedur es were sa tis fa ctory. Expen s iv e politica l,psychologica l,and pa ra mil i taryCIA  proj ects w e re sub ject to r ev i ew bya  Projec t Re view  Committee, altho u gh foreign intell igence  p r oj e c tswer e not revi ew ed. N o nethele s s, h e  re c ommended that  a comptrol l errecord  a ndc ontrol  expe nd i tur es more tig htly .

Conclu sion
A f ter sen d ing his  Repor t o n t he C o ve rt  Ac ti v iti e soft heCentralIn te llige nceA g e n cy t o P resi dentEisenhower, D ool ittl e  ca me to  theWhit eHouse  to me et th ePresident on Oc tobe r 19, 195 4. A t t hi s mee t ing, h e w arn ed Eise nhowera bou tw h a the considered Alle nD u ll es’ emot ionala tt ac h ment tohi s j ob a n d  thedang e rs  of hisintima t ere lations hi p with  h isbro ther, Secr etaryof State  John Foster Dulles. He asserted t h at t he comb ina tion of the  bro t hers  cou l dbep otent ially  p r ob l ematic as they migh tattemp t toimplement ide as and pol i c i es witho ut c o ns u lting proper a dmini stration o f ficials.  Furt her, Doo little us e d  the mee tin g t o r e-c r i ti cize the CIA’ s pers on nel. He  sa id theCIA  ha d “ bal lo oned into  a vastan dsp ra wli ng or g anizatio nman ne d b y a l a rge nu mberof p eo pl e , s ome ofw ho m were  o fdoub tfu lconfi denc e .”After t he meetin g,E isen ho we r senta letter to A ll en Dullesur gin g that h e implem ent Doolittle’s recomme n dations . “ I con side r these [ cov ert] o per a tionsas ess entia ltoo u r nat i o na l s ec urity in t h e sedayswh en I nternat ional Communism is agg ressively pre ssi ng i t s  w orl d -w i desu b ver s i on programme,”he wrote.
D u ll es agreedt o r es hape th e CIA i n acc o rdancewith thereport’sre comm e n dat ions, butdid notdo so. He did n o tcarry  ou t many  o f t he re commen d ati ons o f theDo olittl e Rep or t but ra ther ignored it and did  not e ven s how  it to hi s s e nio r aides.
Aft er formerCIA  di recto r W a lterBede l lSmi t h lef t th e  US gover n me nti n  O ctober 1954 , t her e was  no one le ft t o exert control o v er Allen Dulle s ex c e ptEis e nhow er . Eisenhower s ubs eq u e ntly cre at ed the “Spe cial Gro up , ” whi ch was  charg ed with r ev i ewing,  but  no t approvi ng,  C I A cover tac t ions.Dull es , howe ver, f e lt h e was the only one  in t h e  posi t ion  to j ud ge thew orkof his age ncy, and di d notmake  anysignifi ca nt cha nge sas a resul t  of the r eport .

Desp it e Du lle s’ res ista n c e totheDo oli ttle Repo r t ,h edi d  fo llow  itsre comm endations for impr ove m ents in  i nte l l igence te c h nology. On e r esult w as the 195 4  Ber l in Tunne l proj ect, w hich wa s  de si gned to  di g undergrou nd passag e way sto t ap intoSo viet  t ele co mmunications li nes. The  project r an for  ay eara nd the  C IA
C. Both_facilities and_practices should be designed_to maximize_security.

Cost
Doolittle_found that_the_CIA budget was_adequate and that_its budgetary procedures were_satisfactory. Expensive political,_psychological,_and paramilitary CIA projects were subject to review by a Project Review Committee, although_foreign_intelligence projects_were_not_reviewed. Nonetheless, he recommended that_a comptroller record and control_expenditures more_tightly.

Conclusion
After sending his Report on the Covert Activities_of_the Central Intelligence_Agency to President Eisenhower, Doolittle came to the White_House to meet the President on_October 19, 1954.__At_this meeting, he warned_Eisenhower about what he considered Allen_Dulles’ emotional attachment to his job_and the dangers of his intimate relationship_with his brother, Secretary of State_John Foster Dulles. He asserted_that the_combination of the brothers could_be potentially problematic_as they_might attempt to_implement ideas and policies without consulting_proper administration officials._Further, Doolittle used the meeting to_re-criticize_the CIA’s personnel._He_said_the CIA_had “ballooned into_a_vast and_sprawling_organization manned by a large number_of_people, some of whom were of doubtful_confidence.” After the meeting,_Eisenhower_sent a letter to_Allen Dulles urging that he_implement Doolittle’s recommendations. “I consider these_[covert] operations_as essential_to our national security in these days when International Communism is_aggressively pressing its world-wide subversion programme,”_he wrote.

Dulles agreed to_reshape the_CIA_in accordance with_the_report’s recommendations,_but did not do so. He did_not carry_out many of the recommendations of_the Doolittle Report but_rather_ignored it and did not even_show it to his senior aides.

After_former CIA director Walter Bedell_Smith_left_the US government in October_1954, there was no one left_to exert control_over Allen Dulles except Eisenhower. Eisenhower subsequently_created_the “Special Group,” which was charged_with_reviewing, but not approving, CIA covert_actions._Dulles,_however, felt he was the_only one in the position to_judge the work of his agency, and did not_make any significant_changes as a result of_the_report.

Despite_Dulles’ resistance to the Doolittle Report, he did follow its_recommendations for_improvements in intelligence_technology. One result was the 1954 Berlin Tunnel project, which_was designed to dig underground passageways to_tap into Soviet telecommunications lines. The project ran for a year_and the CIA