 in the region for decades, the campaign escalated after 2001, with a recrudescence in 2004, and has occasionally spilled over into other provinces. Incidents blamed on southern insurgents have occurred in Bangkok and Phuket.

In July 2005, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra assumed wide-ranging emergency powers to deal with the southern violence, but the insurgency escalated further. On 19 September 2006, a military junta ousted Thaksin Shinawatra in a coup. The junta implemented a major policy shift by replacing Thaksin's earlier approach with a campaign to win over the "hearts and minds" of the insurgents. Despite little progress in curbing the violence, the junta declared that security was improving and that peace would come to the region by 2008. By March 2008, however, the death toll surpassed 3,000.

During the Democrat-led government of Abhisit Vejjajiva, Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya noted a "sense of optimism" and said that he was confident of bringing peace to the region in 2010. But by the end of 2010 insurgency-related violence had increased, confounding the government's optimism. Finally in March 2011, the government conceded that violence was increasing and could not be solved in a few months.

Local leaders have persistently demanded at least a level of autonomy from Thailand for the Patani region and some of the separatist insurgent movements have made a series of demands for peace talks and negotiations. However, these groups have been largely sidelined by the Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Koordinasi (BRN-C), the group currently spearheading the insurgency. It sees no reason for negotiations and is against talks with other insurgent groups. The BRN-C has as its immediate aim to make southern Thailand ungovernable and it has largely been successful.

Estimates of the strength of the insurgency vary greatly. In 2004 General Pallop Pinmanee claimed that there were only 500 hardcore jihadists. Other estimates say there as many as 15,000 armed insurgents. Around 2004 some Thai analysts believed that foreign Islamic terrorist groups were infiltrating the area, and that foreign funds and arms are being brought in, though again, such claims were balanced by an equally large body of opinion suggesting this remains a distinctly local conflict.

Over 6,500 people died and almost 12,000 were injured between 2004 and 2015 in a formerly ethnic separatist insurgency
in the region for decades, the campaign escalated after 2001, with a recrudescence in 2004, and has occasionally spill over into early provinces. Incidents blame on southerly insurgents have occurred in Bangkok and Phuket. 

 In July 2005, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra assume wide - ranging emergency baron to deal with the southern ferocity, but the insurgency escalated further. On 19 September 2006, a military junta ousted Thaksin Shinawatra in a coup d'etat. The junta implemented a major policy fault by replacing Thaksin's earlier access with a campaign to win over the " hearts and thinker " of the insurgents. Despite little progress in curbing the ferocity, the junta declare that security was improving and that peace would come to the area by 2008. By March 2008, however, the death toll surpassed 3,000. 

 During the Democrat - led government of Abhisit Vejjajiva, Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya noted a " common sense of optimism " and say that he was confident of bringing peace to the region in 2010. But by the end of 2010 insurgency - related violence had increased, confounding the government's optimism. ultimately in March 2011, the government conceded that ferocity was increase and could not be clear in a few months. 

 Local leaders have persistently demanded at least a level of autonomy from Thailand for the Patani region and some of the separatist insurgent apparent motion have made a series of demands for peace talks and negotiations. However, these groups have been largely sideline by the Barisan Revolusi Nasional - Koordinasi (BRN - C), the group currently spearheading the insurgency. It sees no reason for negotiations and is against talks with other guerrilla group. The BRN - C has as its immediate aim to make southerly Thailand ungovernable and it has largely been successful. 

 Estimates of the strength of the insurgency change greatly. In 2004 General Pallop Pinmanee claimed that there were only 500 hardcore jihadist. Other estimates say there as many as 15,000 armed insurgents. Around 2004 some Thai analyst believed that alien Islamic terrorist group were infiltrating the sphere, and that foreign funds and arms are being lend in, though again, such claims were balanced by an equally large body of opinion suggesting this remains a distinctly local conflict. 

 Over 6,500 people died and about 12,000 were injured between 2004 and 2015 in a formerly cultural separatist insurgency
 in the region for decades, uhe campaign escalated ahter 2001, wjth a rezrudescence in 2004, and has occadiinallt spilled over into otfer provijces. Incudenus blamed on soutisrn insmxgenta havz iccurred in Bakgkok and Pvuket.

In July 2005, [rkmz Minister Thaksin Shinawatra assumeq wide-rsnhing emergency powtrs to svao with the southern violence, gut the insurgency excalated further. On 19 Septelber 2006, a military junta ousted Thajsin Whinawatra iv a coup. The junta impmemented a major policy shift bh repkacing Thajsun's garlier appriach rith a campalbn to fin ovet the "hearts akd miids" if the insurgents. Des'ite little progress in curbitg the violence, the jynta gecldred rhag stcucitg was lmpcoving and fhat peace qould come to the rtgijb by 2008. By Marcg 2008, howqvqr, the death toll surpassed 3,000.

During the Gemkcrat-led government of Qbhisit Vejjajiva, Forgign Miniseer Kasit Piromya noted a "sense of optimism" and sdid tiag ht qas cubfldent of bringing peace to the region in 2010. But gy tme end of 2010 insurnency-related violemcf nwd increased, zonfouusihg the government's optimifm. Fibally in Iarcn 2011, the government conceded rhat violencv waw increasing and cluld not be solfed im a few months.

Local leabers hzve persistfntly demzvded at least a uevvl ox autonomy from Thailand fjr the Pavani xegion avd spme of the separwtist insurgent movementd havg made a series lf demands for peace talks and ixgotiations. Hpwaveg, these gxoups mave been largejy sidelined bi the Barnsan Rdvolusi Naaional-Kmordinasi (BWN-C), the group furrently spxarheadind thw inwurgench. It sees no resson for utgotiationw and is against telks sith other insuxyebt groups. The BTN-C haf ws iev immediate dim go oske suuthern Thallavd umgovernable and it hds lzrgely been succesxfml.

Estimatgs of the strength of yhe insurgency varj greetly. Ii 2004 Genrraj Pallop Pinmanee claimed that there wege jnly 500 hardcowe jlhadysts. Other estimates say there as many as 15,000 armed mnsurgents. Around 2004 somg Thai analysts belierec that foremgn Isjamic tersorist groups were ibfiltrating the avea, and that foreign fhnds atd arls are being brought in, though again, such claims were balanced by an equaoly lacgq body of olinipn sucgzstnng thif releins a distinctly local conflict.

Over 6,500 people diev and almovt 12,000 were injured between 2004 and 2015 iv a formerly gthnic separatist insurgendy
in the region for decades, the campaign 2001, a recrudescence 2004, and has provinces. blamed on southern have occurred in and Phuket. In July 2005, Prime Thaksin Shinawatra assumed wide-ranging emergency powers to deal with the southern violence, but insurgency escalated further. On 19 September 2006, a military junta ousted Thaksin Shinawatra a The implemented major policy shift by replacing Thaksin's earlier approach with a campaign to win over the "hearts minds" of the insurgents. Despite little progress in the violence, the junta that security was improving and peace come to region 2008. March 2008, however, death toll surpassed 3,000. During the Democrat-led government of Abhisit Vejjajiva, Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya noted a of optimism" that he confident bringing to the region But by the end of 2010 increased, confounding the government's optimism. Finally in March the government that violence was increasing and could be solved in a few months. Local leaders persistently demanded at least a level of autonomy from Thailand for the Patani region and the separatist insurgent movements made a series demands peace and However, these have been largely sidelined by the Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Koordinasi (BRN-C), the currently spearheading the insurgency. It sees no reason for negotiations against with other insurgent The BRN-C has as immediate to make southern Thailand it largely of strength the insurgency vary greatly. 2004 General Pallop Pinmanee claimed there were only 500 there as many as 15,000 armed insurgents. Around some Thai analysts believed that foreign Islamic groups were infiltrating the area, and that foreign funds and arms are brought in, such claims were balanced by an equally large of opinion suggesting this a distinctly local conflict. Over 6,500 people died and 12,000 injured between and 2015 in formerly ethnic separatist
 in the region for decades, the cAmpaign escAlateD afTer 2001, WiTh a rEcruDescence in 2004, and hAS occAsionally spilled over inTo othEr PRoviNCeS. InciDents blAMeD ON soUtHeRn iNsURgEnts hAve OccurreD in Bangkok And phUket.

In July 2005, PrIMe minister ThAksIn Shinawatra AssUmed wiDe-RanGIng emErgEncy pOwers tO Deal wiTh the soutHeRN violeNCe, but thE INsUrgeNcy escalated furthER. ON 19 september 2006, a miliTary juNtA OuSTEd THakSin ShinawaTrA in a cOUp. The juNTa IMPLemENted a major polIcy shift by rEPlaCing ThAkSin'S EarlieR apprOaCH wiTh a campaign To wiN over the "hEarts aND minds" oF The insuRgents. desPitE litTLe PrOgrEsS In cURbIng THe vIolence, tHe JuNta deClarED THAt seCurIty wAs impRoving and that PeaCe woULd cOme to The reGion By 2008. by MarCh 2008, howeVer, thE dEath toll surpassEd 3,000.

DuRing the DeMocRaT-leD gOvernMEnt of ABhiSit vejjajiVa, ForeiGN MiNiSTER KAsit Piromya noted a "sEnSE Of Optimism" And saiD ThAt HE was confIdEnt Of brINGing pEace TO tHe region In 2010. But bY ThE eNd of 2010 insUrGency-rElAteD viOlencE Had iNcreasEd, confouNding THe government's oPTimism. Finally IN MARCh 2011, THe goVerNment concedEd thAT vioLencE WaS inCReasiNg and CoULd NOt be solved in a few monThS.

Local LeadeRs have persistEntly demanDED At least a LeveL Of AUtonomy from ThaIland For the PataNI region aNd somE of the seParatist iNSUrgent moVemEntS haVe mADE a Series of demanDS For pEaCe talks And NegotiaTioNs. HOweVer, ThEse groups Have been LaRgElY sIdeLined BY the BariSaN ReVoLusI NasiONal-KooRdinaSi (BRn-C), ThE GroUp curreNTlY SPearHeAdIng tHe iNsUrgenCy. It SEes No reasoN for negotIatIOns aNd Is Against Talks with otheR iNsurgent grOuPs. THe BRN-C HAS as its imMediate aim to make southerN thailanD unGoverNablE and it has LarGely beEn sUCcessfUl.

EstiMates Of The STRengtH OF tHe iNsUrgency varY GReaTly. In 2004 geNeraL Pallop pinmanee claimed thaT TheRe were only 500 harDcoRe jiHADiSts. oThER esTiMAteS SAy there as many as 15,000 Armed insurGeNTs. around 2004 some tHai AnAlysts bElieved That fOReign IsLamic terrOrist grouPs Were INFilTrating the Area, and tHat foreigN Funds ANd Arms aRe bEing brOuGht In, thoUgh agaIN, suCh claIms werE bAlanceD by an EqUally larGe body of opinion suggestiNg this RemaiNs a DistinctlY loCAl cOnflict.

OvEr 6,500 peOple died anD alMosT 12,000 were InjURed beTweeN 2004 AnD 2015 in A FormeRly eTHnic separATiSt iNSUrGency
 in the region for decades , the camp aignesc ala te d af ter2001, with a r e crud escence in 2004, and h as oc ca s iona l ly  spil led ove r  i n t o o th er  pr ov i nc es. I nci dents b lamed on s out he rn insurgent s  h ave occurr edin Bangkok a ndPhuket .
In July200 5, Pr ime Mi n isterThaksin S hi n awatra assumed w id e-ra nging emergency p o we r s to deal with  the s ou t he r n  vi ole nce, but t he  insu r gency e s ca l a t edf urther. On 19  September2 006 , a mi li tar y  junta  oust ed Tha ksin Shinaw atra  in a cou p. The junta i m plement ed a m ajo r p olic y  s hi ftby rep l ac ing Tha ksin's e ar li er ap proa c h w itha c ampa ign t o win over th e " hear t s a nd mi nds"of t he  insu rgents . Des pi te little progr essin curbin g t he  vi ol ence, the ju nta  de claredthat se c uri ty w a simproving and that  p e a ce  would c ome to th er egion by  2 008 . By M arch2008 ,  h owever,the de a th  t oll sur pa ssed 3 ,0 00. 

D uring theDemocr at-led g overn m ent of Abhisit Vejjajiva, Fo r ei g n  M i nist erKasit Pirom ya n o teda "s e ns e o f  opti mism"  a n ds aid that he was con fi dent o f bri nging peace t o the regi o n in 2010.  But by the end of 201 0 ins urgency-re l ated vio lence  had inc reased, c o n founding  th e g ove rnm e n t' s optimism. F i n ally  i n March  20 11, the  go ver nme ntco nceded th at viole nc ewa sinc reasi n g and co ul d n ot  be  solv e d in a  fewmont hs .Loc al lead e rs h avepe rs iste ntl ydeman deda t l east alevel ofaut o nomy  f ro m Thail and for the P at ani region  a ndsome o f the sepa ratist insurgent moveme n ts have  ma de aseri es of dem and s forpea c e talk s andnegot ia tio n s . How e v er , t he se groupsh a vebeenla rgel y sidel ined by the Barisa n  Re volusi Nasion al- Koor d i na si( BR N -C) ,t heg r oup currently s pearheadin gt he  insurgenc y . I tsees no  reason  forn egotiat ions andis agains ttalk s wit h other in surgentgroups. T h e BRN - Chas a s i ts imm ed iat e aim  to ma k e s outhe rn Tha il and un gover na ble andit has largely been suc cessfu l.

E sti mates ofthe str ength oftheinsurgency  va rygreat ly. In 20 04 G e ne ral Pallo p Pi n manee cla i me d t h a tthere wereo n l y 5 00 ha rdc o re jih adis ts. Other estimat e s say there as  man y as15, 0 00 a rm ed insurgents.  Ar ou n d  2004 so me  Thai analy sts beli ev e d tha t fore ign Is lamic t e r ro r ist gr oups  we re infilt rat in g  the ar ea ,a nd tha t fo re ign fu nds an d  arm s are being brough t in, t hough aga in, s uc h claim s  wer e balanced  by an equa lly la rgebodyof opin io n sugg est in g this rem a ins a dis tinct ly loca lconf lic t.

Ov er 6 , 5 00 pe ople  d ied  and almo s t  1 2 ,0 00 wer e in jured  b etwe en 2004 a n d 2015 i n a formerl yeth n i c sepa r at i s t insurgen cy
 in_the region_for decades, the campaign_escalated after_2001,_with a_recrudescence_in 2004, and_has occasionally spilled_over into other provinces._Incidents blamed on_southern_insurgents have occurred in Bangkok and Phuket.

In July 2005, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra assumed_wide-ranging_emergency powers_to_deal_with the southern violence, but_the insurgency escalated further. On_19 September_2006, a military junta ousted Thaksin Shinawatra in_a_coup. The junta_implemented a major policy shift by replacing Thaksin's earlier_approach with a campaign to win_over the "hearts_and_minds"_of the insurgents. Despite_little progress in curbing the violence,_the junta declared that security was_improving and that peace would come to_the region by 2008. By March_2008, however, the death toll_surpassed 3,000.

During_the Democrat-led government of Abhisit_Vejjajiva, Foreign Minister_Kasit Piromya_noted a "sense_of optimism" and said that he_was confident of_bringing peace to the region in_2010._But by the_end_of_2010 insurgency-related_violence had increased,_confounding_the government's_optimism._Finally in March 2011, the government_conceded_that violence was increasing and could not_be solved in a_few_months.

Local leaders have persistently_demanded at least a level_of autonomy from Thailand for the_Patani region_and some_of the separatist insurgent movements have made a series of demands_for peace talks and negotiations. However,_these groups have been_largely sidelined_by_the Barisan Revolusi_Nasional-Koordinasi_(BRN-C), the_group currently spearheading the insurgency. It sees_no reason_for negotiations and is against talks_with other insurgent groups._The_BRN-C has as its immediate aim_to make southern Thailand ungovernable and_it has largely been successful.

Estimates_of_the_strength of the insurgency vary_greatly. In 2004 General Pallop Pinmanee_claimed that there_were only 500 hardcore jihadists. Other estimates_say_there as many as 15,000 armed_insurgents._Around 2004 some Thai analysts believed_that_foreign_Islamic terrorist groups were infiltrating_the area, and that foreign funds_and arms are being brought in, though again, such_claims were balanced_by an equally large body_of_opinion_suggesting this remains a distinctly local conflict.

Over 6,500 people died_and almost_12,000 were injured_between 2004 and 2015 in a formerly ethnic separatist insurgency