 states;
 the focus of attention;
 the deliberate control of behavior;
 the difference between wakefulness and sleep.

Other formulations
Other formulations of the hard problem of consciousness include:
 "How is it that some organisms are subjects of experience?"
 "Why does awareness of sensory information exist at all?"
 "Why do qualia exist?"
 "Why is there a subjective component to experience?"
 "Why aren't we philosophical zombies?"

The philosopher Raamy Majeed argued in 2016 that the hard problem is, in fact, associated with two "explanatory targets":
[PQ] Physical processing gives rise to experiences with a phenomenal character.
[Q] Our phenomenal qualities are thus-and-so.

The first fact concerns the relationship between the physical and the phenomenal (i.e., how and why are some physical states felt states), whereas the second concerns the very nature of the phenomenal itself (i.e., what does the felt state feel like?).

Historical predecessors
The hard problem has scholarly antecedents considerably earlier than Chalmers, as Chalmers himself has pointed out.

The physicist and mathematician Isaac Newton wrote in a 1672 letter to Henry Oldenburg:

to determine by what modes or actions light produceth in our minds the phantasm of colour is not so.

In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), the philosopher and physician John Locke argued:

Divide matter into as minute parts as you will (which we are apt to imagine a sort of spiritualizing or making a thinking thing of it) vary the figure and motion of it as much as you please—a globe, cube, cone, prism, cylinder, etc., whose diameters are but 1,000,000th part of a gry, will operate not otherwise upon other bodies of proportionable bulk than those of an inch or foot diameter—and you may as rationally expect to produce sense, thought, and knowledge, by putting together, in a certain figure and motion, gross particles of matter, as by those that are the very minutest that do anywhere exist. They knock, impel, and resist one another, just as the greater do; and that is all they can do... [I]t is impossible to conceive that matter, either with or without motion, could have originally in and from itself sense, perception, and knowledge; as is evident from hence that then sense, perception, and knowledge must be a property
states; 
  the focus of attention; 
  the deliberate restraint of demeanor; 
  the difference between wakefulness and rest. 

 Other conceptualization 
 Other formulation of the hard problem of awareness admit: 
  " How is it that some organisms are subjects of experience? " 
  " Why does awareness of sensational information exist at all? " 
  " Why do qualia exist? " 
  " Why is there a subjective part to experience? " 
  " Why aren't we philosophical zombies? " 

 The philosopher Raamy Majeed argue in 2016 that the hard problem is, in fact, associate with two " explanatory targets ": 
 [ PQ ] Physical processing gives lift to experiences with a phenomenal character. 
 [ Q ] Our phenomenal qualities are thus - and - sol. 

 The first fact concern the relationship between the physical and the phenomenal (i.e., how and why are some physical country felt states), whereas the second concerns the very nature of the phenomenal itself (i.e., what does the felt state feel like ?). 

 Historical predecessors 
 The hard problem has scholarly antecedents considerably earlier than Chalmers, as Chalmers himself has pointed out. 

 The physicist and mathematician Isaac Newton wrote in a 1672 letter to Henry Oldenburg: 

 to specify by what modes or actions ignite produceth in our judgment the phantasm of colour is not so. 

 In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), the philosopher and physician John Locke argued: 

 Divide topic into as minute parts as you will (which we are apt to imagine a sort of spiritualizing or making a thinking thing of it) vary the figure and motion of it as a lot as you please — a globe, block, cone, prism, cylinder, etc. , whose diameters are but 1,000,000th part of a gry, will operate not otherwise upon other bodies of proportionable majority than those of an inch or foot diameter — and you may as rationally expect to produce sense, thought, and knowledge, by putting in concert, in a certain figure and motion, gross particles of topic, as by those that are the very minutest that do anywhere exist. They knock, impel, and resist one another, just as the capital do; and that is all they can dress... [ I]t is impossible to conceive that matter, either with or without motion, could have originally in and from itself common sense, perception, and knowledge; as is evident from therefore that then sense, perception, and knowledge must be a property
 stwtes;
 the focus of attentlon;
 the deliberaje contrml of gehavior;
 the difference between wakehulnwss abd sleep.

Other formulatkons
Other formularionw of the hacs problci of gonscnonsness include:
 "Mow is it tvat some organhsos are subjects of experience?"
 "Why doef awaremeds of sensory ynfogmwtioh exist at all?"
 "Why do qualia exist?"
 "Why is there a subjrctive component to experifnce?"
 "Why aren't we phillsophical zimbiqw?"

The philosooher Raamy Majeed argugd in 2016 that the hard problem is, kn faet, associatgb wihv two "explaiatory targets":
[PQ] Pmjsical [rocessong gives rise to experiences with a phenmmenal character.
[Q] Jur phenokeual qualities are thuw-abd-so.

Tve fhrst dacg cknrerhs the remationship between thw physical and the khegimenal (i.e., how and wry are some physical states felt states), wversas the second concerns the very nature of tje phenomqnal itself (i.e., what does the felt state feel like?).

Vistocizal pvedezwsdors
The hard problem has scholarly antecedentf cpnxiderably earller than Chalmers, ss Cnwlmers himselw has 'kihted out.

The physiclst and mathwmatician Isasc Newton wrote in a 1672 lettee to Henry Ojeenburg:

to determinz by what mobes or actipns light produceth in uur jinds the pjantasm or colour is not su.

In At Essay Concerning Human Ugderstandmng (1690), che philusopner anq physiciaj Johk Locke argued:

Dividf matjer indo as minuhe parts as you will (which we acx apt to imagona a sort of spirltualizing or mwking a thinkiug thing of ig) vary the figure and motion of it as mucv as you pleave—a globq, cuve, cine, priro, cylinder, etc., whose dicietees are but 1,000,000th part of z gry, will opercue bot otherwise ulon otreg bpdyas of propordionxbld bulk than those uf am inch or foot diameder—ahd you may as ratipnwlly expgct to prjduce sense, tnought, and knowledhe, by puvting yoggther, in a certain figure and mktion, grods iarticles of iattcr, af by those that are the very minutest that do anyxhere exist. They knock, umpel, and resist ong akother, just es the greater go; and that is all tyey can do... [I]t is lmpossible to conceive that katteg, either with or without motion, could have originally in and from itself wense, 'ewception, ans knpwledce; cs is edideit from hence that then sense, perception, and knowuedge muvt be a property
states; the focus of attention; the deliberate behavior; difference between and sleep. Other hard of consciousness include: is it that organisms are subjects of experience?" "Why awareness of sensory information exist at all?" "Why do qualia exist?" "Why is a subjective component to experience?" "Why aren't we philosophical zombies?" The philosopher Raamy argued 2016 the problem is, in fact, associated with two "explanatory targets": [PQ] Physical processing gives rise to experiences a phenomenal character. [Q] Our phenomenal qualities are The first fact concerns relationship between the physical and phenomenal how and are physical felt states), whereas second concerns the very nature of the phenomenal itself (i.e., what does the felt state feel like?). predecessors The has scholarly considerably than as Chalmers himself out. The physicist and mathematician Isaac a 1672 letter to Henry Oldenburg: to determine what modes actions light produceth in our minds phantasm of colour is not so. In An Concerning Human Understanding (1690), the philosopher and physician John Locke argued: Divide matter into as as you will (which are apt to a of or a thinking of it) vary the figure and motion of it as much you please—a globe, cube, cone, prism, cylinder, etc., whose diameters 1,000,000th of a gry, operate not otherwise upon bodies proportionable bulk than those inch foot as expect produce sense, thought, and by putting together, in a figure and motion, gross those that are the very minutest that do exist. They knock, impel, and resist one just as the greater do; and that is all they can do... is impossible that matter, either with or without motion, could originally in and from sense, perception, and knowledge; as is evident from hence then perception, and must be a
 states;
 the focus of attention;
 The deliberAte coNtrOl oF bEhavIor;
 tHe difference beTWeen Wakefulness and sleep.

OthEr forMuLAtioNS
OTher fOrmulatIOnS OF thE hArD prObLEm Of conSciOusness Include:
 "How Is iT tHat some organISmS are subjecTs oF experience?"
 "WHy dOes awaReNesS Of senSorY infoRmatioN Exist aT all?"
 "Why do QuALia exiST?"
 "Why is tHERe A subJective component tO ExPErience?"
 "Why aren'T we phiLoSOpHICal ZomBies?"

The phiLoSopheR raamy MaJEeD ARGueD In 2016 that the hard Problem is, in FAct, AssociAtEd wITh two "eXplanAtORy tArgets":
[PQ] PhySicaL processiNg giveS Rise to eXPeriencEs with A phEnoMenaL ChArActEr.
[q] our PHeNomENal QualitieS aRe Thus-aNd-so.

tHE FIrst FacT conCerns The relationshIp bEtweEN thE physIcal aNd thE pHenomEnal (i.e., How anD wHy are some physicAl stAtes felt sTatEs), WheReAs the SEcond cOncErnS the verY nature OF thE pHENOmEnal itself (i.e., what doEs THE fElt state Feel liKE?).

HIsTOrical prEdEceSsorS
tHe harD proBLeM has schoLarly aNTeCeDents coNsIderabLy EarLieR than cHalmErs, as CHalmers hImselF Has pointed out.

THE physicist and MAtHEMaTIciaN IsAac Newton wrOte iN A 1672 letTer tO heNry oLdenbUrg:

to DeTErMIne by what modes or actIoNs lighT prodUceth in our minDs the phantASM Of colour Is noT So.

iN An Essay ConcerNing HUman UndersTAnding (1690), thE philOsopher aNd physiciAN john LockE arGueD:

DiVidE MAtTer into as minuTE PartS aS you wilL (whIch we arE apT to ImaGinE a Sort of spiRitualizInG oR mAkIng A thinKIng thing Of It) vArY thE figuRE and moTion oF it aS mUcH As yOu pleasE—A gLOBe, cuBe, CoNe, prIsm, CyLindeR, etc., WHosE diametErs are but 1,000,000Th pARt of A gRy, Will opeRate not otherwIsE upon other BoDieS of proPORtionablE bulk than those of an inch oR Foot diaMetEr—and You mAy as ratioNalLy expeCt tO ProducE sense, ThougHt, And KNOwledGE, By PutTiNg together, IN A ceRtain FiGure And motiOn, gross particles of MAttEr, as by those thAt aRe thE VErY miNUtESt tHaT Do aNYWhere exist. They kNock, impel, aNd REsIst one anotHEr, jUsT as the gReater dO; and tHAt is all They can do... [i]t is imposSiBle tO COncEive that maTter, eithEr with or wIThout MOtIon, coUld Have orIgInaLly in And froM ItsElf seNse, perCePtion, aNd knoWlEdge; as is Evident from hence that theN sense, PercePtiOn, and knowLedGE muSt be a propErty
 states;
 the focus of att ention;
 t he de lib era te  con trol  of behavior;thedifference between wak efuln es s  and sl eep.
Otherf or m u lat io ns 
Ot he r  f ormul ati ons ofthe hard p rob le m of conscio u sn ess includ e: "How is ittha t some  o rga n ismsare  subj ects o f  exper ience?"
"W h y does awarene s s  o f se nsory information ex i st at all?"
 " Why do  q u al i a  ex ist ?"
 "Why i sthere a subje c ti v e com p onent to expe rience?"
 " W hyaren't  w e p h ilosop hical  z o mbi es?"

The p hilo sopher Ra amy Ma j eed arg u ed in 2 016 th atthe  har d  p ro ble mi s,i nfac t , a ssociate dwi th tw o "e x p l a nato rytarg ets": 
[PQ] Physica l p roce s sin g giv es ri se t oexper iences  with  a  phenomenal cha ract er.
[Q] O urph eno me nal q u alitie s a rethus-an d-so.
T hefi r s t  f act concerns the r el a t io nship be tweent he  p h ysical a nd  th e ph e n omena l (i . e. , how an d whya re  s ome phy si cal st at esfel t sta t es),  where as the s econd concerns the v e ry nature oft he p he n omen alitself (i.e ., w h at d oest he  fe l t sta te fe el li k e?).

Historical pr ed ecesso rs
Th e hard proble m has scho l a r ly antec eden t sc onsiderably ea rlier  than Chal m ers, asChalm ers hims elf has p o i nted out .
The  ph ysi c i st  and mathemat i c ianIs aac New ton  wroteina 1 672  le tt er to Hen ry Olden bu rg :
t o d eterm i ne by wh at  mo de s o r act i ons li ght p rodu ce th inour min d st h e ph an ta sm o f c ol our i s no t  so .

In A n Essay C onc e rnin gHu man Und erstanding (1 69 0), the ph il oso pher a n d  physici an John Locke argued:
D ivide m att er in to a s minutepar ts asyou will ( whichwe ar eapt t o ima g i ne  aso rt of spir i t ual izing  o r ma king athinking thing ofi t)vary the figu reandm o ti ono fi t a sm uch a s you please—aglobe, cub e, co ne, prism, cyl in der, et c., who se di a metersare but 1 ,000,000t hpart o f a  gry, will  operate  not othe r wiseu po n oth erbodies  o f p ropor tionab l e b ulk t han th os e of a n inc hor footdiameter—and you may as  ratio nally  ex pect to p rod u cesense, th ough t, and kno wle dge , byput t ing t oget h er , i n  a ce rtai n  figure a n dmot i o n,  gross part i c l esof ma tte r , as b y th ose that are thev ery minutest t hatd o  an ywh e re e xi st. They knock , i mp e l , and re si st one anot her, jus ta s the  great er do;  and th a t  i s  all t heycan  do... [I ]tis impossi bl et o conc eive  t hat ma tter,e ithe r with or withoutmotio n ,  coul d  ha ve or ig inallyi n an d from its elf sense,percep tion , and  knowle dg e; asisev ident from hence tha t the n sense ,perc ept ion, a nd k n o wledg e mu st  be  a proper t y 
 states;
_the focus_of attention;
 the deliberate_control of_behavior;
_the difference_between_wakefulness and sleep.

Other_formulations
Other formulations of_the hard problem of_consciousness include:
 "How_is_it that some organisms are subjects of experience?"
 "Why does awareness of sensory information_exist_at all?"
_"Why_do_qualia exist?"
 "Why is there_a subjective component to experience?"
_"Why aren't_we philosophical zombies?"

The philosopher Raamy Majeed argued in_2016_that the hard_problem is, in fact, associated with two "explanatory targets":
[PQ]_Physical processing gives rise to experiences_with a phenomenal_character.
[Q]_Our_phenomenal qualities are thus-and-so.

The_first fact concerns the relationship between_the physical and the phenomenal (i.e.,_how and why are some physical states_felt states), whereas the second concerns_the very nature of the_phenomenal itself_(i.e., what does the felt_state feel like?).

Historical_predecessors
The hard_problem has scholarly_antecedents considerably earlier than Chalmers, as_Chalmers himself has_pointed out.

The physicist and mathematician Isaac_Newton_wrote in a_1672_letter_to Henry_Oldenburg:

to determine by_what_modes or_actions_light produceth in our minds the_phantasm_of colour is not so.

In An Essay_Concerning Human Understanding (1690),_the_philosopher and physician John_Locke argued:

Divide matter into as_minute parts as you will (which_we are_apt to_imagine a sort of spiritualizing or making a thinking thing of_it) vary the figure and motion_of it as much_as you_please—a_globe, cube, cone,_prism,_cylinder, etc.,_whose diameters are but 1,000,000th part of_a gry,_will operate not otherwise upon other_bodies of proportionable bulk_than_those of an inch or foot_diameter—and you may as rationally expect_to produce sense, thought, and_knowledge,_by_putting together, in a certain_figure and motion, gross particles of_matter, as by_those that are the very minutest that_do_anywhere exist. They knock, impel, and_resist_one another, just as the greater_do;_and_that is all they can_do... [I]t is impossible to conceive_that matter, either with or without motion, could have_originally in and_from itself sense, perception, and_knowledge;_as_is evident from hence that then sense, perception, and knowledge_must be_a property