.

Cancelled attack on June 1–2 and subsequent reorganizations
The Israeli General Staff called for a full-scale assault on the Egyptian positions, but backed out at the last minute due to ceasefire talks. The General Staff's order, sent among others to the Givati, 7th and Negev brigades, estimated that the Egyptian forces consisted of 2,000 troops between Ashdod and the bridges to the north. The order called for the annihilation of the force on the night of June 1–2, first by staging a major attack on the supply lines, and later by assaulting and capturing Isdud. The command was officially given to Givati. The forces outlined were: seven Givati companies (of them three from the Irgun), three infantry companies and one Jeep regiment from Negev, three companies from Yiftach, a 65 mm artillery battery, and 4.2" and 25-pounder platoons. The order also said, however, and if all forces and equipment were not assembled by zero hour, Givati would have to do with the forces that were mustered.

Immediately upon receiving the order, Shimon Avidan called an emergency meeting at Hatzor. Yehoshua Goldrat, the only officer in the brigade who had experience from the British Army operating a combined force of infantry, armor, artillery and air, wrote the operational order. The order was in English, as Goldrat was not fluent in Hebrew, and was handed out to the battalion commanders on June 1. The battalion commanders translated the document into Hebrew for the company commanders. According to the plan, six companies (3 Palmach and 3 Irgun) would attack the Egyptians from the south. Three companies (2 from the 52nd and one from the 51st battalions) would attack from the north, and two companies (one from the 53rd Battalion and one from Irgun) would prevent a retreat to the east. A company from the 53rd Battalion would block reinforcement from Majdal. Only senior officers knew of the full plans however. Simha Shiloni, commander of the Palmach forces (Negev Beasts Battalion), commented that his forces came exhausted and completely unprepared to the assembly points, and he had given consent for their deployment only after being assured that they would serve as the operational reserve (the plan in fact called for these forces to lead the southern assault).

Zero hour was set
. 

 Cancelled attack on June 1–2 and subsequent reorganizations 
 The Israeli General Staff called for a wide - plate assault on the Egyptian positions, but second out at the final minute due to ceasefire talks. The General Staff's club, transport among others to the Givati, 7th and Negev brigade, estimate that the Egyptian forces consist of 2,000 troops between Ashdod and the bridges to the union. The order called for the annihilation of the force on the night of June 1–2, first by staging a major attack on the provision lines, and later by assaulting and capture Isdud. The command was officially give to Givati. The force outlined were: seven Givati companies (of them three from the Irgun), three infantry companies and one Jeep regiment from Negev, three companies from Yiftach, a 65   mm weapon battery, and 4.2 " and 25 - pounder platoons. The order also said, however, and if all power and equipment were not assembled by zero hour, Givati would have to do with the forces that were mustered. 

 Immediately upon receiving the order, Shimon Avidan called an emergency meeting at Hatzor. Yehoshua Goldrat, the lone officer in the brigade who had experience from the British Army operate on a combined force of infantry, armor, artillery and air, write the operational order. The order was in English, as Goldrat was not fluent in Hebrew, and was pass out to the battalion commanders on June 1. The battalion commanders translated the document into Hebrew for the company commanders. accord to the plan, six companies (3 Palmach and 3 Irgun) would attack the Egyptians from the south. Three company (2 from the 52nd and one from the 51st battalion) would attack from the north, and two companies (one from the 53rd Battalion and one from Irgun) would prevent a hideaway to the east. A company from the 53rd Battalion would block reinforcement from Majdal. merely senior officers knew of the full design however. Simha Shiloni, commander of the Palmach forces (Negev Beasts Battalion), comment that his forces come exhausted and completely unprepared to the assembly point, and he had given consent for their deployment only after being assured that they would serve as the functional reserve (the plan in fact called for these force out to lead the southern assault). 

 Zero hour was set
.

Canfelled attack on June 1–2 akd subsequent reorganizetions
Tge Israeui General Staff called for e fuol-scaoe assault on the Egypgian posinions, but bacjwd out at vge last minuts due vo ceasefire takks. The Geteral Staff's osddr, sent among others to the Givati, 7th and Nebeg brigades, estymattd ehat nht Egyptian forces consisted of 2,000 tdoops bttween Ashdod and yhe bridges to the north. Tje ogder called for thf annihilatuon jd the force un the night of June 1–2, rirst by staging a major attack on tke supply lunws, wtd later by assallting and cainuring Hsdud. Tne command was ofhiciqlly given to Givati. Vhe forces outlined rere: sevet Yivati companies (of tyen thrge frmm tfw Ifguh), vhrse infwntcy companiea and one Jwep regiment from Ntged, three companjes frjm Yiftach, a 65 mm artillery battery, and 4.2" ang 25-pkunder platoons. The ordwr also said, however, wnd if alj forces and equipment were not assembled by zero hour, Eivcbl wojod have to do with the forces that were mustereq.

Jmkeciately upon rcceiving the order, Sjikjn Avidan calued an emsrgency meeting at Hatzor. Yehowhua Goldwat, yhe only officer in the britade who had wxperience from thz British Aroy okeratimg a combined force of nnfantdy, armor, arhillery aha air, wrote the upegatimnal ordtf. The order was ig English, as Yoldrat das mot fltent in Hehrew, and was handed out ho thg battdlion commwnders on June 1. The battalion commanders tranxldteg the doeument into Hebrew sor the compani commandzrs. Aczording to the plen, six compagies (3 Palmach wnd 3 Irgun) wmuld attwck rhe Wgyptiavr from the souyh. Three boipanues (2 from the 52nd akd ong rrom the 51st batccluons) would attavk wroi nhe njsth, and two wompxnidx (one from the 53rb Cattslion and one from Isgun) would prevent a rrtveat to tye east. W company frok the 53rd Battalion woulv blocy reimfotcement from Majdal. Only senior officers kncw of the fulj plqns however. Ximha Shiloni, commander of the Palmach horces (Negev Beasts Bajtalion), commented thaj hls forces cake exrausted atd completely unprepqred to the assemnly points, and he had fiven wonsejt for their deployment only after being assured that they would serve as the o'ewational reaervr (the pjcn in fwct rauled for these fprces to lead the southern assanlt).

Zero hogr was set
. Cancelled attack on June 1–2 and The General Staff for a full-scale but out at the minute due to talks. The General Staff's order, sent others to the Givati, 7th and Negev brigades, estimated that the Egyptian forces of 2,000 troops between Ashdod and the bridges to the north. The order for annihilation the on the night of June 1–2, first by staging a major attack on the supply lines, later by assaulting and capturing Isdud. The command officially given to Givati. forces outlined were: seven Givati (of three from Irgun), infantry and one Jeep from Negev, three companies from Yiftach, a 65 mm artillery battery, and 4.2" and 25-pounder platoons. The also said, if all and were assembled by zero would have to do with the mustered. Immediately upon receiving the order, Shimon Avidan an emergency at Hatzor. Yehoshua Goldrat, the only in the brigade who had experience from the Army operating a combined force of infantry, armor, artillery and air, wrote the operational order. was in English, as was not fluent Hebrew, was out the battalion on June 1. The battalion commanders translated the document into Hebrew the company commanders. According to the plan, six companies (3 3 would attack the from the south. Three (2 the 52nd and one 51st would north, two (one from the 53rd and one from Irgun) would a retreat to the 53rd Battalion would block reinforcement from Majdal. Only officers knew of the full plans however. Shiloni, commander of the Palmach forces (Negev Beasts Battalion), commented that his came exhausted unprepared to the assembly points, and he had consent for their deployment after being assured that they would serve as the reserve plan in called for these to lead the assault). Zero hour
.

Cancelled attack on June 1–2 and sUbsequent rEorgaNizAtiOnS
The israEli General StafF CallEd for a full-scale assault On the egYPtiaN PoSitioNs, but baCKeD OUt aT tHe LasT mINuTe due To cEasefirE talks. The GEneRaL Staff's order, SEnT among otheRs tO the Givati, 7th And negev bRiGadES, estiMatEd thaT the EgYPtian fOrces consIsTEd of 2,000 trOOps betwEEN AShdoD and the bridges to tHE nORth. The order calLed for ThE AnNIHilAtiOn of the forCe On the NIght of JUNe 1–2, FIRSt bY Staging a major Attack on the SUppLy lineS, aNd lATer by aSsaulTiNG anD capturing ISdud. the commanD was ofFIcially GIven to GIvati. THe fOrcEs ouTLiNeD weRe: SEveN giVatI ComPanies (of ThEm Three From THE iRgun), ThrEe inFantrY companies and One jeep REgiMent fRom NeGev, tHrEe comPanies From YIfTach, a 65 mm artillerY batTery, and 4.2" anD 25-poUnDer PlAtoonS. the ordEr aLso Said, howEver, and IF alL fORCEs And equipment were noT aSSEmBled by zeRo hour, gIvAtI Would havE tO do With THE forcEs thAT wEre musteRed.

ImmEDiAtEly upon ReCeivinG tHe oRdeR, ShimON AviDan calLed an emeRgencY Meeting at HatzoR. yehoshua GoldrAT, tHE OnLY offIceR in the brigaDe whO Had eXperIEnCe fROm the britiSh aRmY Operating a combined fOrCe of inFantrY, armor, artilleRy and air, wrOTE The operaTionAL oRDer. The order was In EngLish, as GoldRAt was not FluenT in HebreW, and was haNDEd out to tHe bAttAliOn cOMMaNders on June 1. ThE BAttaLiOn commaNdeRs transLatEd tHe dOcuMeNt into HebRew for thE cOmPaNy ComMandeRS. AccordiNg To tHe PlaN, six cOMpanieS (3 PalmAch aNd 3 irGUn) wOuld attACk THE EgyPtIaNs frOm tHe South. threE ComPanies (2 fRom the 52nd aNd oNE froM tHe 51St battaLions) would attAcK from the noRtH, anD two coMPAnies (one From the 53rd Battalion and onE From IrgUn) wOuld pReveNt a retreaT to The easT. A cOMpany fRom the 53Rd BatTaLioN WOuld bLOCk ReiNfOrcement frOM majDal. OnLy SeniOr officErs knew of the full plANs hOwever. Simha ShIloNi, coMMAnDer OF tHE PaLmACh fORCes (Negev Beasts BAttalion), coMmENtEd that his fORceS cAme exhaUsted anD compLEtely unPrepared tO the assemBlY poiNTS, anD he had giveN consent For their dEPloymENt Only aFteR being AsSurEd thaT they wOUld Serve As the oPeRationAl resErVe (the plaN in fact called for these foRces to Lead tHe sOuthern asSauLT).

ZeRo hour was Set
.

Cancelled attack on Jun e 1–2 andsubse que ntre orga niza tions
The Isra e li G eneral Staff called fo r a f ul l -sca l eassau lt on t h eE g ypt ia npos it i on s, bu t b acked o ut at thelas tminute due t o  c easefire t alk s. The Gener alStaff' sord e r, se ntamong  other s  to th e Givati,  7 t h andN egev br i g ad es,estimated that th e  E g yptian forcesconsis te d  o f 2,0 00troops bet we en As h dod and th e b rid g es to the nor th. The ord e r c alledfo r t h e anni hilat io n  of  the forceon t he nightof Jun e  1–2, f i rst bystagin g a  ma jora tt ac k o nt hes up ply lin es, andla te r byassa u l t i ng a ndcapt uring  Isdud. The c omm andw asoffic ially  giv en  to G ivati.  Thefo rces outlined w ere:  seven Gi vat icom pa nies( of the m t hre e fromthe Irg u n),  t h r e einfantry companies  a n d  o ne Jeepregime n tfr o m Negev,  t hre e co m p anies  fro m  Y iftach,a 65 m m  a rt illeryba ttery,  a nd4.2 " and 25-p ounder  platoon s. Th e  order also sa i d, however, a n di f  a l l fo rce s and equip ment were  not as sem b led b y zer oh ou r , Givati would have  t o do w ith t he forces tha t were mus t e r ed.

Imm edia t el y  upon receivin g the  order, Sh i mon Avid an ca lled anemergency m eeting a t H atz or.  Ye h o sh ua Goldrat, t h e  onl yofficer  in  the br iga dewho  ha dexperienc e from t he  B ri ti shArmyo perating  a  co mb ine d for c e of i nfant ry,ar mo r , a rtiller y  a n d  air ,wr otethe  o perat iona l  or der. Th e order w asi n En gl is h, as G oldrat was no tfluent inHe bre w, and w as hande d out to the battalionc ommande rson Ju ne 1 . The bat tal ion co mma n ders t ransla ted t he  do c u menti n to  He br ew for the c omp any c om mand ers. Ac cording to the pla n , s ix companies(3Palm a c hand 3I rgu n) wou l d  attack the Egy ptians fro mt he  south. Th r eeco mpanies  (2 fro m the 52nd an d one fro m the 51s tbatt a l ion s) would a ttack fr om the no r th, a n dtwo c omp anies(o nefromthe 53 r d B attal ion an done fr om Ir gu n) would  prevent a retreat to t he eas t. Acom pany from  th e  53 rd Battal ionwould bloc k r ein force men t  from  Maj d al . O n ly se nior officersk ne w o f th e full plan s h owe ver.Sim h a Shil oni,  commander of the Palmach forces  (Ne g e v B eas t s Ba tt alion), commen ted  t h a t his fo rc es came exh austed a nd compl etelyunprep ared to t he assemb ly p oin ts, and h e h ad given c on se n t forthei rdeploy ment o n ly a f t er being assured  that t hey w o uld  serv eas theo pera tional res erve (the p lan in  fac t cal led for  t hese f orc es  to lead t h e souther n ass ault).
Z erohou r wasset
.

Cancelled attack_on June_1–2 and subsequent reorganizations
The_Israeli General_Staff_called for_a_full-scale assault on_the Egyptian positions,_but backed out at_the last minute_due_to ceasefire talks. The General Staff's order, sent among others to the Givati, 7th_and_Negev brigades,_estimated_that_the Egyptian forces consisted of_2,000 troops between Ashdod and_the bridges_to the north. The order called for the_annihilation_of the force_on the night of June 1–2, first by staging_a major attack on the supply_lines, and later_by_assaulting_and capturing Isdud. The_command was officially given to Givati._The forces outlined were: seven Givati_companies (of them three from the Irgun),_three infantry companies and one Jeep_regiment from Negev, three companies_from Yiftach,_a 65 mm artillery battery, and_4.2" and 25-pounder_platoons. The_order also said,_however, and if all forces and_equipment were not_assembled by zero hour, Givati would_have_to do with_the_forces_that were_mustered.

Immediately upon receiving_the_order, Shimon_Avidan_called an emergency meeting at Hatzor._Yehoshua_Goldrat, the only officer in the brigade_who had experience from_the_British Army operating a_combined force of infantry, armor,_artillery and air, wrote the operational_order. The_order was_in English, as Goldrat was not fluent in Hebrew, and was_handed out to the battalion commanders_on June 1. The_battalion commanders_translated_the document into_Hebrew_for the_company commanders. According to the plan, six_companies (3_Palmach and 3 Irgun) would attack_the Egyptians from the_south._Three companies (2 from the 52nd_and one from the 51st battalions)_would attack from the north,_and_two_companies (one from the 53rd_Battalion and one from Irgun) would_prevent a retreat_to the east. A company from the_53rd_Battalion would block reinforcement from Majdal._Only_senior officers knew of the full_plans_however._Simha Shiloni, commander of the_Palmach forces (Negev Beasts Battalion), commented_that his forces came exhausted and completely unprepared to_the assembly points,_and he had given consent_for_their_deployment only after being assured that they would serve as_the operational_reserve (the plan_in fact called for these forces to lead the southern_assault).

Zero hour was set