 to authorizing Douglas MacArthur to conduct operations in North Korea.  A secret "eyes only" signal from Marshall to MacArthur on September 29, 1950 declared the Truman administration's commitment: "We want you to feel unhampered strategically and tactically to proceed north of the 38th Parallel". At the same time, Marshall advised against public pronouncements which might lead to United Nations votes undermining or countermanding the initial mandate to restore the border between North and South Korea. Marshall and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were generally supportive of MacArthur because they were of the view that field commanders should be able to exercise their best judgment in accomplishing the intent of their superiors.

Following Chinese military intervention in Korea during late November, Marshall and the Joint Chiefs of Staff sought ways to aid MacArthur while avoiding all-out war with China. In the debate over what to do about China's increased involvement, Marshall opposed a cease–fire on the grounds that it would make the U.S. look weak in China's eyes, leading to demands for future concessions. In addition, Marshall argued that the U.S. had a moral obligation to honor its commitment to South Korea. When British Prime Minister Clement Attlee suggested diplomatic overtures to China, Marshall opposed, arguing that it was impossible to negotiate with the Communist government. In addition, Marshall expressed concern that concessions to China would undermine confidence in the U.S. among its Asian allies, including Japan and the Philippines.  When some in Congress favored expanding the war in Korea and confronting China, Marshall argued against a wider war in Korea, continuing instead to stress the importance of containing the Soviet Union during the Cold War battle for primacy in Europe.

Relief of General MacArthur

Increasingly concerned about public statements from MacArthur, commander of United Nations forces fighting in the Korean War, which contradicted President Truman's on prosecution of the war, on the morning of 6 April 1951, Truman held a meeting with Marshall, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Omar Bradley, Secretary of State Dean Acheson and advisor W. Averell Harriman to discuss whether MacArthur should be removed from command.

Harriman was emphatically in favor of MacArthur's relief, but Bradley opposed it. Marshall asked for more time to consider the matter. Acheson was in favor but did not disclose this, instead warning Truman that if he did it, MacArthur's relief would cause "the biggest fight of your administration." At another meeting the
to authorizing Douglas MacArthur to conduct operations in North Korea.   A secret " eye merely " signal from Marshall to MacArthur on September 29, 1950 declared the Truman administration's commitment: " We desire you to feel unhampered strategically and tactically to proceed north of the 38th analogue ". At the same time, Marshall rede against public pronouncements which might lead to United Nations vote undermining or countermanding the initial mandate to repair the edge between North and South Korea. Marshall and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were generally supportive of MacArthur because they were of the view that field commanders should be able to exercise their good judgment in accomplishing the purpose of their superiors. 

 Following taiwanese military intervention in Korea during former November, Marshall and the Joint Chiefs of Staff sought way to aid MacArthur while avoiding all - out war with China. In the argument over what to do about China's increased involvement, Marshall opposed a cease – fire on the grounds that it would make the U.S. expect faint in China's eyes, leading to demands for future concessions. In addition, Marshall argued that the U.S. receive a moral duty to honor its commitment to South Korea. When British Prime Minister Clement Attlee suggest diplomatic overture to China, Marshall opposed, arguing that it was impossible to negotiate with the Communist government. In addition, Marshall expressed concern that concession to China would undermine confidence in the U.S. among its Asian allies, including Japan and the Philippines.   When some in Congress favored expanding the war in Korea and confront China, Marshall argued against a wider war in Korea, continuing instead to try the importance of containing the Soviet Union during the Cold War conflict for primacy in Europe. 

 Relief of General MacArthur 

 Increasingly implicated about public statement from MacArthur, commander of United Nations forces fighting in the Korean War, which oppose President Truman's on prosecution of the war, on the morning of 6 April 1951, Truman held a merging with Marshall, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Omar Bradley, Secretary of State Dean Acheson and advisor W. Averell Harriman to discuss whether MacArthur should be removed from command. 

 Harriman was decidedly in favor of MacArthur's relief, but Bradley opposed it. Marshall asked for more time to see the matter. Acheson was in party favor but did not disclose this, instead warning Truman that if he did it, MacArthur's easing would cause " the biggest fight of your administration. " At another meeting the
 to authorizing Douglas MacXrthur to conduer operetions jn North Korea.  A secret "eyes only" smgnao fron Marshall to MacArthuf on Septvmber 29, 1950 dwclaced the Truman avjinistration's gommicmxnt: "We want you to feel uthampered stradeeieally and tactically to proceed nortr of thr 38hh Parallel". At the fame nine, Marshall advised against phblic pgonouncements whivh might lead to United Nahiond votes undermininh or countetjanqung the initkal mandatt co restore jhe border between North and Sough Koxea. Marshalo qnd jhe Joint Chmefs os Staff were generalny suppprtive of MacAvthur bexause they were of thx view that field coimanders vhkuld be able to ezeecise thehr bdwt gudfmxnt in acfom'lishing ths intent of their superiors.

Folkorpmg Chinese mjlitarr yntervention in Korea during late Novemter, Marshall and the Joint Chiefs of Staff sougjt ways tj aid MacArthur while avoiding all-out war with Chhna. Ii ghe dcbatd oger what to do about China's increased involveisnu, Msrshall opposeb a cease–fire on tje drounds that kt would jake the U.S. look wfak in Shina'w eyes, lewdinb to demands for future conxessions. In cddution, Marshall argbed that the U.S. nad a moral obligation to houor ita commitmenh to Soutg Korea. When Britksh Psime Minister Clement Attlqe suggesved dnplomatiz ovgrtures to China, Larshall opposed, arguing that id was impodsible to negotiate with the Communist governkett. Pn additijn, Mavshall expresseq concern that concesfions to China sould uidermine considence in tha U.S. among itv Asian wlliws, ibcludine Japan and the Philippiuts.  When sime in Congress fayored sxpanding the wcx un Korea and comfruntynh Rhina, Karshall argged xgakmst a wider war ln Yores, continuing instead to atress the importamcc of contqining tre Soviet Unipn during the Cold War uattle for lriiacy in Europe.

Relief of Generam MacArthkr

Ikcreasingly cjncevned about pubkic statements from MacArthur, commander of United Nations forces fighting in uhe Korean Wac, whicr contradhcted President Trumqn's on prosecutiok of the war, on the modning mf 6 Aoril 1951, Truman held a meeting with Marshall, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Omar Bradleg, Sevretagy jy State Deai Echeson and advispr W. Averell Harriman to discusr whethes IacArthur should be removed grum command.

Hartiman was emphatically in ravor of MacArthur's relief, but Bradley ppposed it. Marshall askec for moee tije to bknrider the matter. Avheson was un favoe bub did not discuosr bhis, instewd wernnng Truman that if he did it, MacAethur's rflief would causx "the biggesb night kf yout administration." Zt ahlther meeting the
to authorizing Douglas MacArthur to conduct operations Korea. secret "eyes signal from Marshall 1950 the Truman administration's "We want you feel unhampered strategically and tactically to north of the 38th Parallel". At the same time, Marshall advised against public which might lead to United Nations votes undermining or countermanding the initial mandate restore border North South Korea. Marshall and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were generally supportive of MacArthur because they of the view that field commanders should be to exercise their best in accomplishing the intent of superiors. Chinese military in during November, Marshall and Joint Chiefs of Staff sought ways to aid MacArthur while avoiding all-out war with China. In the over what about China's involvement, opposed cease–fire on the it would make the U.S. look eyes, leading to demands for future concessions. In Marshall argued the U.S. had a moral obligation honor its commitment to South Korea. When British Minister Clement Attlee suggested diplomatic overtures to China, Marshall opposed, arguing that it was impossible with the Communist government. addition, Marshall expressed that to would confidence in U.S. among its Asian allies, including Japan and the Philippines. When in Congress favored expanding the war in Korea and confronting argued a wider war Korea, continuing instead to the of containing the Soviet the War in Relief General MacArthur Increasingly concerned public statements from MacArthur, commander United Nations forces fighting contradicted President Truman's on prosecution of the war, the morning of 6 April 1951, Truman a meeting with Marshall, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Omar Secretary of Acheson and advisor W. Averell Harriman to discuss MacArthur should be removed command. Harriman was emphatically in favor of MacArthur's relief, Bradley it. Marshall for more time consider the matter. was in favor not disclose instead Truman did it, MacArthur's relief would cause biggest of your administration." At another the
 to authorizing Douglas MacArThur to condUct opEraTioNs In NoRth KOrea.  A secret "eyeS Only" Signal from Marshall to MaCArthUr ON SepTEmBer 29, 1950 deClared tHE TRUMan AdMiNisTrATiOn's coMmiTment: "We Want you to fEel UnHampered straTEgIcally and tActIcally to procEed North oF tHe 38tH paralLel". at the Same tiME, MarshAll adviseD aGAinst pUBlic proNOUnCemeNts which might lead TO UNIted Nations votEs undeRmINiNG Or cOunTermanding ThE initIAl mandaTE tO REStoRE the border betWeen North anD souTh KoreA. MArsHAll and The JoInT chiEfs of Staff wEre gEnerally sUpportIVe of MacaRthur beCause tHey WerE of tHE vIeW thAt FIelD CoMmaNDerS should bE aBlE to exErciSE THEir bEst JudgMent iN accomplishinG thE intENt oF theiR supeRiorS.

FOllowIng ChiNese mIlItary interventiOn in korea duriNg lAtE NoVeMber, MARshall And The joint ChIefs of STAff SoUGHT wAys to aid MacArthur wHiLE AvOiding alL-out waR WiTh cHina. In thE dEbaTe ovER What tO do aBOuT China's iNcreasED iNvOlvemenT, MArshalL oPpoSed A ceasE–Fire On the gRounds thAt it wOUld make the U.S. loOK weak in China's EYeS, LEaDIng tO deMands for futUre cONcesSionS. in AddITion, MArshaLl ARgUEd that the U.S. had a moraL oBligatIon to Honor its commiTment to SouTH kOrea. When britISh pRime Minister ClEment attlee suggESted diplOmatiC overturEs to China, mARshall opPosEd, aRguIng THAt It was impossibLE To neGoTiate wiTh tHe CommuNisT goVerNmeNt. in additioN, MarshalL eXpReSsEd cOncerN That concEsSioNs To CHina wOUld undErminE conFiDeNCe iN the U.S. aMOnG ITs AsIaN aLlieS, inClUding japaN And The PhilIppines.  WhEn sOMe in coNgRess favOred expanding ThE war in KoreA aNd cOnfronTINg China, MArshall argued against a wiDEr war in korEa, conTinuIng insteaD to Stress The IMportaNce of cOntaiNiNg tHE sovieT uNiOn dUrIng the Cold wAR baTtle fOr PrimAcy in EuRope.

Relief of GeneraL macarthur

IncreasIngLy coNCErNed ABoUT puBlIC stATEments from MacArThur, commanDeR Of united NatiONs fOrCes fighTing in tHe KorEAn War, whIch contraDicted PreSiDent tRUmaN's on prosecUtion of tHe war, on thE MorniNG oF 6 ApriL 1951, TrUman heLd A meEting With MaRShaLl, ChaIrman oF tHe JoinT ChieFs Of Staff OMar Bradley, Secretary of StAte DeaN AcheSon And advisoR W. AVEreLl HarrimaN to dIscuss whetHer macarthuR shOUld be RemoVEd FroM CommaNd.

HaRRiman was eMPhAtiCALlY in favor of MACaRthUr's reLieF, But BraDley Opposed it. Marshall ASked for more timE to cONSidEr tHE matTeR. Acheson was in fAvoR bUT Did not diScLose this, insTead warnInG trumaN that iF he did It, MacArTHUr'S Relief WoulD caUse "the bigGesT fIGht of yoUr AdMInistrAtioN." AT anothEr meetINg thE
 to authorizing Douglas Ma cArthur to  cond uct  op er atio ns i n North Korea.  A s ecret "eyes only" sign al fr om Mars h al l toMacArth u ro n  Se pt em ber  2 9 ,1950dec lared t he Trumanadm in istration'sc om mitment: " Wewant you tofee l unha mp ere d  stra teg icall y andt actica lly to pr oc e ed nor t h of th e 38 th P arallel". At thes am e  time, Marshal l advi se d  a g a ins t p ublic pron ou nceme n ts whic h  m i g h t l e ad to UnitedNations vot e s u ndermi ni ngo r coun terma nd i ngthe initial  man date to r estore the bor d er betw een No rth  an d So u th  K ore a. Mar s ha lla ndthe Join tCh iefsof S t a f f  wer e g ener allysupportive of  Ma cArt h urbecau se th ey w er e ofthe vi ew th at  field commande rs s hould beabl etoex ercis e  their  be stjudgmen t in ac c omp li s h i ng  the intent of the ir s up eriors.
Follo w in gC hinese m il ita ry i n t erven tion in  Korea d uringl at eNovembe r,  Marsh al l a ndthe J o intChiefs  of Staf f sou g ht ways to aid MacArthur whi l ea v oi d ingall -out war wi th C h ina.  Int he  de b ate o ver w ha t  t o  do about China's i nc reased  invo lvement, Mars hall oppos e d a cease– fire on the grounds th at it  would mak e  the U.S . loo k weak i n China's e yes, lea din g t o d ema n d sfor future co n c essi on s. In a ddi tion, M ars hal l a rgu ed  that the  U.S. ha damo ra l o bliga t ion to h on orit s c ommit m ent to  Sout h Ko re a. Whe n Briti s hP r imeMi ni ster  Cl em ent A ttle e  su ggested  diplomat ico vert ur es  to Chi na, Marshallop posed, arg ui ngthat i t was impo ssible to negotiate wit h  the Co mmu nistgove rnment. I n a dditio n,M arshal l expr essed  c onc e r n tha t co nce ss ions to Ch i n a w ouldun derm ine con fidence in the U.S .  am ong its Asian  al lies , in clu d in g  Ja pa n  an d the Philippines .  When so me in  Congressf avo re d expan ding th e war in Kore a and con frontingCh ina, M ars hall argue d agains t a wider war i n  K orea,  co ntinui ng  in stead  to st r ess  theimport an ce ofconta in ing theSoviet Union during the  ColdWar b att le for pr ima c y i n Europe. 

Re lief of Ge ner alMacAr thu r 

Inc reas i ng lyc oncer neda bout publ i csta t e me nts from Ma c A r thu r, co mma n der of  Uni ted Nations force s  fighting in t he K o r ean  Wa r , wh ic h contradicted  Pr es i d ent Trum an 's on prose cution o ft he wa r, onthe mo rning o f 6A pril 1 951,  Tr uman held  ame e ting wi th  M a rshall , Ch ai rman o f theJ oint C hiefs of Staff O mar B r a dley, Sec retar yof Stat e  Dea n Achesonand advisor  W. Av erel l Har riman t odiscus s w he ther MacAr t hur shoul d beremoved  f romcom mand.
Har r i man w as e mp hat ically in f av o rof Mac Arth ur'sre lief , but Bra d ley oppo sed it. Mar sh all a sked f o rm o re time to  co nside r the matter .  Ach e so n  wasin fav or but  did no t  di sc lose th is, i nstead wa rning Tru m anth at i f he did  i t, M ac Art hu r's relief woul d cause"the big g e st fig hto f yo u r admi ni stration." A t ano th e r meeti n g  th e
 to_authorizing Douglas_MacArthur to conduct operations_in North_Korea._ A_secret_"eyes only" signal_from Marshall to_MacArthur on September 29,_1950 declared the_Truman_administration's commitment: "We want you to feel unhampered strategically and tactically to proceed north_of_the 38th_Parallel"._At_the same time, Marshall advised_against public pronouncements which might_lead to_United Nations votes undermining or countermanding the initial_mandate_to restore the_border between North and South Korea. Marshall and the_Joint Chiefs of Staff were generally_supportive of MacArthur_because_they_were of the view_that field commanders should be able_to exercise their best judgment in_accomplishing the intent of their superiors.

Following Chinese_military intervention in Korea during late_November, Marshall and the Joint_Chiefs of_Staff sought ways to aid_MacArthur while avoiding_all-out war_with China. In_the debate over what to do_about China's increased_involvement, Marshall opposed a cease–fire on_the_grounds that it_would_make_the U.S._look weak in_China's_eyes, leading_to_demands for future concessions. In addition,_Marshall_argued that the U.S. had a moral_obligation to honor its_commitment_to South Korea. When_British Prime Minister Clement Attlee_suggested diplomatic overtures to China, Marshall_opposed, arguing_that it_was impossible to negotiate with the Communist government. In addition, Marshall_expressed concern that concessions to China_would undermine confidence in_the U.S._among_its Asian allies,_including_Japan and_the Philippines.  When some in Congress_favored expanding_the war in Korea and confronting_China, Marshall argued against_a_wider war in Korea, continuing instead_to stress the importance of containing_the Soviet Union during the_Cold_War_battle for primacy in Europe.

Relief_of General MacArthur

Increasingly concerned about public_statements from MacArthur,_commander of United Nations forces fighting in_the_Korean War, which contradicted President Truman's_on_prosecution of the war, on the_morning_of_6 April 1951, Truman held_a meeting with Marshall, Chairman of_the Joint Chiefs of Staff Omar Bradley, Secretary of_State Dean Acheson_and advisor W. Averell Harriman_to_discuss_whether MacArthur should be removed from command.

Harriman was emphatically in_favor of_MacArthur's relief, but_Bradley opposed it. Marshall asked for more time to consider_the matter. Acheson was in favor but_did not disclose this, instead warning Truman that if he did_it, MacArthur's relief would cause "the biggest fight_of your administration." At another meeting the