 a brigade with about 500 vehicles. Estimates from the General Staff stood at 200 vehicles and 2,000–3,000 soldiers. At the time, the Israeli decision makers did not know where the Egyptians were headed. They envisioned one of three possibilities: A march on Tel Aviv, about  northwards—the view adopted by David Ben-Gurion; an attempt to connect to the Transjordanian Arab Legion in the Hebron area and capture the Negev—proposed by Nahum Sarig of the Negev Brigade; or an attempt to connect with the remaining Arab forces in Lydda and Ramla.

The IDF command did not see the forces in the western Negev as sufficient to fully stop an Egyptian invasion, wherever it was headed, and ordered an operation to stop or delay the advancing column. The command also feared that the Arab forces would try to create facts on the ground before the impending UN-imposed ceasefire. The two Arab forces that were considered a threat were the Iraqis in the Triangle (Jenin–Nablus–Tulkarm) and the Egyptians at Majdal–Isdud. Thus, Golani and Carmeli were to attack Jenin, Alexandroni was to harass Tulkarm, and Givati was to attack Isdud.

Prelude

At 11:00 on May 29, the Egyptian 2nd Battalion passed through Isdud, and at 12:00–13:00, the 9th Battalion took the village itself, their progress hampered only by occasional machine gun fire from Nitzanim. Later on the same day, the 2nd Battalion stopped at the Lakhish River, about  north of Isdud. The Egyptians began preparations to cross the river by erecting a Bailey bridge. Volunteers from Sudan and Saudi Arabia also joined the Isdud position.

Shimon Avidan, the commander of the Givati Brigade, which was responsible for the southern Shephelah area (including most southern Israeli villages at the time), asked to allocate forces to stop or hinder the Egyptian advance. A number of 65 mm Napoleonchik cannons were given to Givati, and units from the Palmach's Negev Brigade were poised to assist it, despite a severe shortage of manpower and munitions in the brigade. On May 28, Czech technicians at the Ekron Airbase finished assembling four Avia S-199 planes (a Mess
a brigade with about 500 vehicles. Estimates from the General Staff stood at 200 vehicle and 2,000–3,000 soldier. At the time, the Israeli decision makers did not sleep together where the Egyptians were headed. They envisioned one of three possibility: A marching music on Tel Aviv, about   northwards — the view adopted by David Ben - Gurion; an attack to connect to the Transjordanian Arab Legion in the Hebron area and capture the Negev — proposed by Nahum Sarig of the Negev Brigade; or an attack to connect with the remaining Arab force in Lydda and Ramla. 

 The IDF command did not see the effect in the western Negev as sufficient to fully stop an Egyptian invasion, wherever it was head, and ordered an operation to stop or delay the advance column. The command also feared that the Arab forces would try to make facts on the ground before the impending UN - imposed ceasefire. The two Arab forces that were considered a threat were the Iraqis in the Triangle (Jenin – Nablus – Tulkarm) and the Egyptians at Majdal – Isdud. Thus, Golani and Carmeli were to attack Jenin, Alexandroni was to harass Tulkarm, and Givati was to attack Isdud. 

 Prelude 

 At 11:00 on May 29, the Egyptian 2nd Battalion passed through Isdud, and at 12:00–13:00, the 9th Battalion took the village itself, their progress hampered only by episodic machine gun ardor from Nitzanim. subsequently on the like day, the 2nd Battalion stopped at the Lakhish River, about   north of Isdud. The Egyptians began preparations to cross the river by erecting a Bailey bridge. tennessean from Sudan and Saudi Arabia also joined the Isdud position. 

 Shimon Avidan, the commander of the Givati Brigade, which was responsible for the southern Shephelah sphere (including most southern Israeli villages at the time), asked to allocate forces to stop or impede the Egyptian advance. A number of 65   mm Napoleonchik cannons were given to Givati, and unit from the Palmach's Negev Brigade were poised to assist it, despite a severe shortage of manpower and munitions in the brigade. On May 28, Czech technicians at the Ekron Airbase finished meet four Avia S-199 planes (a Mess
 a hrigade with about 500 vehigles. Estimates fton the Jeneral Staff sgood at 200 vehicles and 2,000–3,000 soldixrs. Qt tht time, the Israeli aecision lakers dud nir know whecs the Envptiahd wexe headed. They ekvisioned ote of three povskbnlities: A march on Tel Aviv, about  njrthwarcs—hhe view adoptgd by Qavis Ben-Gurion; an attempt to connect fo the Uransjordanian Aran Legion in the Hebron arew anf capture the Negeg—proposed bi Narym Sarig of ghe Negev Brigade; or ah attempt to connect with the rdmainnng Arab fotews lt Lydda and Ramlw.

The IDF command did not ser the forces ik the wewtern Negev as sufficment to fully stop ag Egyptiat nnvasion, wherever it qaw heaged, dnd uedefed ai oleratiln vo stop or selay the aevancing column. The cjnmand also fezred trae the Arab forces would try to create fdcta on the ground before rhe impending UN-imposgd ceasefiwe. The two Arab forces that were considered a thraat wxrd tkc Keaeis in the Triangle (Jenin–Nablus–Tulkarm) and thq Ebyitians at Majdal–Ifdud. Thus, Gplwno and Carmeli dere to aftack Jenin, Alexanfroni wws to harass Ttlkatm, and Givati was to attack Isdud.

Preludv

At 11:00 on May 29, the Egyptnan 2nd Battauion passrd through Isdud, and at 12:00–13:00, ths 9th Battallon took ffe village itselw, tmeis progress hampered only br occasioial mcchine gjn fore frjm Nitzanil. Latcs on the same day, hhe 2nb Batdalion stooped at the Lakhish River, about  north of Isdod. Dhe Egyptiaus begsn preparatiogs to cross thg river bv erecging a Baimey brivge. Volunteews from Sudan wnd Saudi Arebia also joibed rhe Isdja position.

Shimpn Avidan, the commabder of the Givati Brkfade, which was xtspinsible for the sojthqrj Xhq[helah area (hncljdivb mosg southtxn Lsrxeli villages at the tima), asied to allocate fotccs to stok or hindqr the Egyptisn advance. A numbeg of 65 km Iapolepncrik cannons were given to Givafi, and unlts from the Pajmacm's Nggev Brigadz were poised to assist it, despite a sevxre shortage of manpowgr and munitions in tke brigade. On May 28, Czech tewhnicians at the Ekrin Airbase finishtd assembling four Avia S-199 plates (a Mess
a brigade with about 500 vehicles. Estimates General stood at vehicles and 2,000–3,000 Israeli makers did not where the Egyptians headed. They envisioned one of three A march on Tel Aviv, about northwards—the view adopted by David Ben-Gurion; an to connect to the Transjordanian Arab Legion in the Hebron area and capture Negev—proposed Nahum of Negev Brigade; or an attempt to connect with the remaining Arab forces in Lydda and Ramla. IDF command did not see the forces in western Negev as sufficient fully stop an Egyptian invasion, it headed, and an to or delay the column. The command also feared that the Arab forces would try to create facts on the ground the impending The two forces were a threat were in the Triangle (Jenin–Nablus–Tulkarm) and the Thus, Golani and Carmeli were to attack Jenin, was to Tulkarm, and Givati was to attack Prelude At 11:00 on May 29, the Egyptian Battalion passed through Isdud, and at 12:00–13:00, the 9th Battalion took the village itself, their only by occasional machine fire from Nitzanim. on same the Battalion stopped the Lakhish River, about north of Isdud. The Egyptians began preparations cross the river by erecting a Bailey bridge. Volunteers from Saudi also joined the position. Shimon Avidan, the of Givati Brigade, which was the Shephelah southern villages the time), asked to forces to stop or hinder Egyptian advance. A number were given to Givati, and units from the Negev Brigade were poised to assist it, a severe shortage of manpower and munitions in the brigade. On May Czech technicians Ekron Airbase finished assembling four Avia S-199 planes Mess
 a brigade with about 500 vehicles. estimates fRom thE GeNerAl stafF stoOd at 200 vehicles anD 2,000–3,000 SoldIers. At the time, the IsraelI deciSiON makERs Did noT know whERe THE EgYpTiAns WeRE hEaded. theY envisiOned one of tHreE pOssibilities: a MaRch on Tel AvIv, aBout  northwarDs—tHe view AdOptED by DaVid ben-GuRion; an ATtempt To connect To THe TranSJordaniAN arAb LeGion in the Hebron arEA aND capture the NegEv—propOsED bY nAhuM SaRig of the NeGeV BrigADe; or an aTTeMPT To cONnect with the rEmaining AraB ForCes in LYdDa aND Ramla.

the IDf cOMmaNd did not see The fOrces in thE westeRN Negev aS SufficiEnt to fUllY stOp an eGyPtIan InVAsiON, wHerEVer It was heaDeD, aNd ordEred AN OPEratIon To stOp or dElay the advancIng ColuMN. ThE commAnd alSo feArEd thaT the ArAb forCeS would try to creaTe faCts on the gRouNd BefOrE the iMPendinG UN-ImpOsed ceaSefire. THE twO ARAB FoRces that were considErED A tHreat werE the IrAQiS iN The TrianGlE (JeNin–NABLus–TuLkarM) AnD the EgypTians aT maJdAl–Isdud. thUs, GolaNi And carMeli wERe to Attack jenin, AleXandrONi was to harass TULkarm, and GivatI WaS TO aTTack isdUd.

Prelude

At 11:00 On MaY 29, The EGyptIAn 2Nd BATtaliOn pasSeD ThROugh Isdud, and at 12:00–13:00, the 9th baTtalioN took The village itsElf, their prOGREss hampeRed oNLy BY occasional macHine gUn fire from nItzanim. LAter oN the same Day, the 2nd BATTalion stOppEd aT thE LaKHIsH River, about  noRTH of ISdUd. The EgYptIans begAn pRepAraTioNs To cross thE river by ErEcTiNg A BaIley bRIdge. VoluNtEerS fRom sudan ANd SaudI ArabIa alSo JoINed The IsduD PoSITion.

shImOn AvIdaN, tHe comMandER of The GivaTi Brigade, WhiCH was ReSpOnsible For the southerN SHephelah arEa (IncLuding MOSt southeRn Israeli villages at the tIMe), asked To aLlocaTe foRces to stoP or Hinder The eGyptiaN advanCe. A nuMbEr oF 65 MM NapoLEOnChiK cAnnons were GIVen To GivAtI, and Units frOm the Palmach's Negev bRigAde were poised To aSsisT IT, dEspITe A SevErE ShoRTAge of manpower anD munitions In THe Brigade. On MAY 28, CzEcH techniCians at The EkROn AirbaSe finisheD assembliNg Four aVIa S-199 Planes (a MesS
 a brigade with about 500vehicles.Estim ate s f ro m th e Ge neral Staff st o od a t 200 vehicles and 2,0 00–3, 00 0  sol d ie rs. A t the t i me , the  I sr ael id ec ision  ma kers di d not know  wh er e the Egypti a ns  were head ed.  They envisi one d oneof  th r ee po ssi bilit ies: A marchon Tel Av iv ,  about  northw a r ds —the  view adopted byD av i d Ben-Gurion;an att em p tt o  co nne ct to theTr ansjo r danianA ra b L egi o n in the Hebr on area and cap ture t he  Ne g ev—pro posed  b y  Na hum Sarig o f th e Negev B rigade ;  or ana ttemptto con nec t w itht he  r ema in i ngA ra b f o rce s in Lyd da  a nd Ra mla. T h e ID F c omma nd di d not see the  fo rces inthe w ester n Ne ge v assuffic ientto  fully stop anEgyp tian inva sio n,  wh er everi t washea ded , and o rdereda n o pe r a t io n to stop or delay  t h e  a dvancing  colum n .Th e  command  a lso  fea r e d tha t th e  A rab forc es wou l dtr y to cr ea te fac ts  on  th e gro u nd b eforethe impe nding UN-imposed cea s efire. The tw o  A r a bf orce s t hat were co nsid e reda th r ea t w e re th e Ira qi s  i n  the Triangle (Jeni n– Nablus –Tulk arm) and theEgyptiansa t Majdal–I sdud .  T h us, Golani and  Carm eli were t o  attackJenin , Alexan droni was t o harass  Tu lka rm,  an d Gi vati was to a t t ackIs dud.

P rel ude

At  11 :00  on  Ma y29, the E gyptian2n dBa tt ali on pa s sed thro ug h I sd ud,  anda t 12:0 0–13: 00,th e9 thBattali o nt o ok t he  v illa geit self,  the i r p rogress  hampered  on l y by  o cc asional  machine gunfi re from Ni tz ani m. Lat e r  on thesame day, the 2nd Batta l ion sto ppe d attheLakhish R ive r, abo utnorthof Isd ud. T he  Eg y p tians b eg anpr eparations t o c rossth e ri ver byerecting a Baileyb rid ge. Volunteer s f romS u da n a n dS aud iA rab i a  also joined th e Isdud po si t io n.

Shimon Avi da n, thecommand er of the Giv ati Briga de, which  w as r e s pon sible forthe sout hern Shep h elaha re a (in clu ding m os t s outhe rn Isr a eli  vill ages a tthe ti me),as ked to a llocate forces to stopor hin der t heEgyptianadv a nce . A numbe r of  65 mm Nap ole onc hik c ann o ns we re g i ve n t o  Giva ti,a nd unitsf ro m t h e  P almach's Ne g e v  Br igade  we r e pois ed t o assist it, desp i te a severe sh orta g e  of  ma n powe rand munitionsinth e brigade.  O n May 28, C zech tec hn i cians  at th e Ekro n Airba s e  f i nished  ass emb ling four  Av ia S-199 p la ne s  (a Me ss
 a_brigade with_about 500 vehicles. Estimates_from the_General_Staff stood_at_200 vehicles and_2,000–3,000 soldiers. At_the time, the Israeli_decision makers did_not_know where the Egyptians were headed. They envisioned one of three possibilities: A march_on_Tel Aviv,_about__northwards—the view adopted by David_Ben-Gurion; an attempt to connect_to the_Transjordanian Arab Legion in the Hebron area and_capture_the Negev—proposed by_Nahum Sarig of the Negev Brigade; or an attempt_to connect with the remaining Arab_forces in Lydda_and_Ramla.

The_IDF command did not_see the forces in the western_Negev as sufficient to fully stop_an Egyptian invasion, wherever it was headed,_and ordered an operation to stop_or delay the advancing column._The command_also feared that the Arab_forces would try_to create_facts on the_ground before the impending UN-imposed ceasefire._The two Arab_forces that were considered a threat_were_the Iraqis in_the_Triangle_(Jenin–Nablus–Tulkarm) and_the Egyptians at_Majdal–Isdud._Thus, Golani_and_Carmeli were to attack Jenin, Alexandroni_was_to harass Tulkarm, and Givati was to_attack Isdud.

Prelude

At 11:00 on_May_29, the Egyptian 2nd_Battalion passed through Isdud, and_at 12:00–13:00, the 9th Battalion took_the village_itself, their_progress hampered only by occasional machine gun fire from Nitzanim. Later_on the same day, the 2nd_Battalion stopped at the_Lakhish River,_about_ north of_Isdud._The Egyptians_began preparations to cross the river by_erecting a_Bailey bridge. Volunteers from Sudan and_Saudi Arabia also joined_the_Isdud position.

Shimon Avidan, the commander of_the Givati Brigade, which was responsible_for the southern Shephelah area_(including_most_southern Israeli villages at the_time), asked to allocate forces to_stop or hinder_the Egyptian advance. A number of 65 mm_Napoleonchik_cannons were given to Givati, and_units_from the Palmach's Negev Brigade were_poised_to_assist it, despite a severe_shortage of manpower and munitions in_the brigade. On May 28, Czech technicians at the_Ekron Airbase finished_assembling four Avia S-199 planes_(a_Mess