 user (not shown) that when activated by the user, initiates the check deposit process. Depositing a check during a mobile banking session is typically accomplished by using the smartphone camera 170 to capture an image of the check, which the smartphone 152 then transmits to the data center 122 over the Internet 164 using either the Wi-Fi 160 or the 3G/4G 162 network connections. The unsecure banking app 150 typically instructs the user to place the check on a flat surface, and to indicate when the user has placed the check within the viewed frame of the camera 170. In response to the user being ready, the unsecure software app 150 requests access to the camera 170, captures an image of the check and then releases the camera 170 for use by other applications 166.
If one of the software apps or services 166 running in the background concurrently with the unsecure banking app 150 is intent on stealing checks intended for deposit, the application 166 can first be written to observe that the unsecure banking application 150 is actually running in the foreground while the malicious app 166 is running in the background. The malicious one of the apps 166 can be further programmed to determine when the unsecure banking application 150 has requested access to the camera 170 during the banking session, presumably to capture an image of a check or some other sensitive document. Finally, the malicious app of apps 166 further detects the moment the camera 170 is released upon completion of image capture. The malicious application can then immediately grab access to the same camera 170 and capture a second image of the check while the check is still in view of the camera. The malicious app can then access the Internet 164 through Wi-Fi interface 160 or mobile data interface 162 either immediately, or at a later time, and without knowledge of the user, send the image it took of the check to a remote site on the Internet 164. From there, the image can be used for fraudulent purposes such as conversion of the funds. Transactions similar to depositing checks, such as the uploading of gift cards for application to purchases, or capture and uploading of credit card images are also becoming popular and are subject to the same lapses in security, and particularly through a camera installed on the personal computing device.
Although banks are well-aware of the vulnerability of personal computing devices such as smartphones, smartphones now number well over 4 billion world-wide and the owners of these smartphones will continue to demand the convenience of using them to perform mobile banking. In addition, people are increasingly using personal computing devices to perform many other types
user (not shown) that when activated by the user, initiate the confirmation deposit process. Depositing a arrest during a mobile banking session is typically achieve by use the smartphone camera 170 to get an image of the check, which the smartphone 152 then transmit to the data center 122 over the Internet 164 use either the Wi - Fi 160 or the 3G/4 G 162 net connections. The unsecure banking app 150 typically instructs the exploiter to place the check on a categoric surface, and to indicate when the user has locate the check within the viewed frame of the camera 170. In reaction to the user being ready, the unsecure software app 150 requests access to the camera 170, capture an image of the check and then releases the camera 170 for use by early application 166. 
 If one of the software apps or services 166 running in the background concurrently with the unsecure banking app 150 is intent on stealing checks intended for deposit, the application 166 can foremost be spell to observe that the unsecure banking lotion 150 is actually run in the foreground while the malicious app 166 is range in the background. The malicious one of the apps 166 can be further program to determine when the unsecure banking application 150 has requested access to the television camera 170 during the banking session, presumably to capture an image of a check or some other sensitive document. Finally, the malicious app of apps 166 further detects the moment the camera 170 is released upon completion of image capture. The malicious lotion can then immediately grab entree to the same camera 170 and capture a second image of the check while the check is however in view of the camera. The malicious app can then access the Internet 164 through Wi - Fi interface 160 or mobile datum interface 162 either immediately, or at a later fourth dimension, and without knowledge of the user, commit the image it carry of the check to a remote web site on the Internet 164. From there, the image can be used for fraudulent purposes such as conversion of the fund. Transactions exchangeable to depositing checks, such as the uploading of giving cards for lotion to purchases, or capture and uploading of credit poster images are also becoming popular and are subject to the like lapses in security, and peculiarly through a camera installed on the personal computing device. 
 Although bank are well - aware of the vulnerability of personal computing devices such as smartphones, smartphones now number well over 4 billion world - wide and the owners of these smartphones will continue to demand the convenience of use them to do mobile banking. In addition, people are increasingly using personal computing devices to perform many other type
 usfr (not shown) that when agtivated by the oswr, iniviates fhe checy deposit process. Depositing a checj during a mobile bankkng sessiln is typicaooy accomplmahed by using bhe skertphone camera 170 to captuse an image of tfe check, which the smartphone 152 then twansmitx ho the data cegter 122 oved the Internet 164 using either the Wj-Fi 160 or the 3G/4G 162 netwprk connections. The unsecuge bwnking app 150 typicaply instrucja trw user to plxce the chtcn on a flaj surface, and to indicate when tfe uszr has placgb thf check withmn the viewed framc of tha camers 170. In response to thw user being ready, thx unsecure software wpp 150 requascs access to the cameea 170, capjures an knagd or vhe check anv then relezses the canera 170 for use by otnew applications 166.
If onq jf the software apps or services 166 runnitg jn the background concuerently with the unsefure bankyng app 150 is intent on stealing checks intended fos depkrit, tme aopllcation 166 can first be written to observe that fht uksecure banking cpplication 150 is schusjly running iv the ykrsground while the lalicioos app 166 is runnyng on the background. The malicuous one of nhe qpps 166 can be furthzr programmeb to dgtermime when the unsecure bauking zpplication 150 has reqhdsted access to ghe cdmera 170 during the banking fession, pcesumcbly to zaptore an ymage of a check or some other senditivg docukent. Finalpy, the malicious app of apps 166 fncther detects tve koment tke camcra 170 is releaseq upon completnon of iiage zapture. Thv malicions applicatijn can then iklediately greb access to rhe wame caodra 170 and captute a secoub image od the check while bhe cfsck is still in vitw of the camera. Thd mwlpcipuf app can thet aczesr the Knterneu 164 bhruugh Wi-Fi interface 160 or kobime data interface 162 elther immgdiately, jr at a later time, and without nnowlxdge oh the iset, send the image it took of the check to a vemote site og thc Injernet 164. Frok there, the image can be used for fraudnlent purposes such as xonversion of the fondx. Transactipns symilar to depositing checks, sych as the uploadlng of gift cards for zpplicdtion to purchases, or capture and uploading of credit card images are also beciming 'o[ular and ade sibjecn tj the swme pepses in security, and particularly through a camxra instalneb on the personal computing drvkce.
Although bxnks are well-aware of ths vulnersbility of personal computing drvices such as smartphoncs, smartpyones now nljbxr well over 4 billiom worlb-wide qnd the owncrs of these soarypmones will conuinuz to demand the convenience of usung thwm to perform mobine banking. Ln addijion, peokle are increasinfly hding kersonal compuying devices tp perform many other trpes
user (not shown) that when activated by initiates check deposit Depositing a check is accomplished by using smartphone camera 170 capture an image of the check, the smartphone 152 then transmits to the data center 122 over the Internet using either the Wi-Fi 160 or the 3G/4G 162 network connections. The unsecure app typically the to place the check on a flat surface, and to indicate when the user has placed check within the viewed frame of the camera In response to the being ready, the unsecure software 150 access to camera captures image of the and then releases the camera 170 for use by other applications 166. If one of the software or services in the concurrently the banking app 150 on stealing checks intended for deposit, can first be written to observe that the banking application is actually running in the foreground the malicious app 166 is running in the The malicious one of the apps 166 can be further programmed to determine when the application 150 has requested to the camera during banking presumably capture an of a check or some other sensitive document. Finally, the malicious of apps 166 further detects the moment the camera 170 upon of image capture. malicious application can then grab to the same camera capture second check the is still in view the camera. The malicious app then access the Internet or mobile data interface 162 either immediately, or a later time, and without knowledge of user, send the image it took of the check to a remote on the From there, the image can be used for purposes such as conversion the funds. Transactions similar to depositing checks, such as uploading gift cards application to purchases, capture and uploading credit card images becoming popular are to in security, and particularly through a installed the personal computing device. Although are the vulnerability of personal computing devices such as smartphones, smartphones now number well over 4 and the owners of smartphones continue to demand the convenience of using them to perform mobile banking. people are increasingly to many other
 user (not shown) that when activAted by the uSer, inItiAteS tHe chEck dEposit process. DEPosiTing a check during a mobilE bankInG SessIOn Is typIcally aCCoMPLisHeD bY usInG ThE smarTphOne cameRa 170 to capturE an ImAge of the checK, WhIch the smarTphOne 152 then transMitS to the DaTa cENter 122 oVer The InTernet 164 USing eiTher the Wi-fi 160 OR the 3G/4G 162 NEtwork cONNeCtioNs. The unsecure bankINg APp 150 typically insTructs ThE UsER To pLacE the check oN a Flat sURface, anD To INDIcaTE when the user hAs placed the CHecK withiN tHe vIEwed frAme of ThE CamEra 170. In responSe to The user beIng reaDY, the unsECure sofTware aPp 150 rEquEsts ACcEsS to ThE CamERa 170, CapTUreS an image Of ThE checK and THEN ReleAseS the CamerA 170 for use by otheR apPlicATioNs 166.
If oNe of tHe soFtWare aPps or sErvicEs 166 Running in the bacKgroUnd concurRenTlY wiTh The unSEcure bAnkIng App 150 is inTent on sTEalInG CHEcKs intended for deposIt, THE aPplicatiOn 166 can fIRsT bE Written tO oBseRve tHAT the uNsecURe Banking aPplicaTIoN 150 iS actualLy RunninG iN thE foRegroUNd whIle the MaliciouS app 166 iS Running in the baCKground. The malICiOUS oNE of tHe aPps 166 can be furTher PRogrAmmeD To DetERmine When tHe UNsECure banking applicatIoN 150 has reQuestEd access to the Camera 170 duriNG THe bankinG sesSIoN, Presumably to caPture An image of a CHeck or soMe othEr sensitIve documeNT. finally, tHe mAliCioUs aPP Of Apps 166 further deTECts tHe Moment tHe cAmera 170 is RelEasEd uPon CoMpletion oF image caPtUrE. THe MalIciouS ApplicatIoN caN tHen ImmedIAtely gRab acCess To ThE SamE camera 170 ANd CAPturE a SeCond ImaGe Of the ChecK WhiLe the chEck is stilL in VIew oF tHe Camera. THe malicious apP cAn then acceSs The internET 164 Through WI-Fi interface 160 or mobile datA InterfaCe 162 eIther ImmeDiately, or At a Later tIme, ANd withOut knoWledgE oF thE USer, seND ThE imAgE it took of tHE CheCk to a ReMote Site on tHe Internet 164. From therE, The Image can be useD foR fraUDUlEnt PUrPOseS sUCh aS COnversion of the fUnds. TransaCtIOnS similar to DEpoSiTing cheCks, such As the UPloadinG of gift caRds for appLiCatiON To pUrchases, or Capture aNd uploadiNG of crEDiT card ImaGes are AlSo bEcomiNg popuLAr aNd are SubjecT tO the saMe lapSeS in securIty, and particularly throuGh a camEra inStaLled on the PerSOnaL computinG devIce.
AlthougH baNks Are weLl-aWAre of The vULnEraBIlity Of peRSonal compUTiNg dEVIcEs such as smaRTPHonEs, smaRtpHOnes noW numBer well over 4 billioN World-wide and thE ownERS of TheSE smaRtPhones will contInuE tO DEmand the CoNvenience of Using theM tO PerfoRm mobiLe bankIng. In adDITiON, peoplE are IncReasingly UsiNg PErsonal CoMpUTing deViceS tO perfoRm many OTher TYPes
 user (not shown) that whe n activate d bythe  us er , in itia tes the checkd epos it process. Depositing  a ch ec k  dur i ng  a mo bile ba n ki n g  se ss io n i st yp icall y a ccompli shed by us ing  t he smartphon e  c amera 170tocapture an i mag e of t he  ch e ck, w hic h the  smart p hone 1 52 then t ra n smitst o the d a t acent er 122 over the I n te r net 164 usingeither  t h eW i -Fi  16 0 or the 3 G/ 4G 16 2  networ k  c o n n ect i ons. The unse cure bankin g  ap p 150ty pic a lly in struc ts the  user to pl acethe check  on af lat sur f ace, an d to i ndi cat e wh e nth e u se r  ha s  p lac e d t he check  w it hin t he v i e w e d fr ame  ofthe c amera 170. In  re spon s e t o the  user  bei ng  read y, the  unse cu re software app  150  requests  ac ce ssto  thec amera170 , c aptures  an ima g e o ft h e  c heck and then rele as e s  t he camer a 170f or  u s e by oth er  ap plic a t ions166. If  one ofthe so f tw ar e appsor  servi ce s 1 66runni n g in  the b ackgroun d con c urrently witht he unsecure b a nk i n ga pp 1 50is intent o n st e alin g ch e ck s i n tende d for  d e po s it, the application  1 66 can  firs t be writtento observe t h at the u nsec u re banking applic ation  150 is ac t ually ru nning  in theforegroun d while th e m ali cio usa p p166 is runnin g in t he  backgr oun d. Themal ici ous  on eof the ap ps 166 c an  b efu rth er pr o grammedto  de te rmi ne wh e n theunsec ureba nk i ngapplica t io n 150ha srequ est ed  acce ss t o  th e camer a 170 dur ing theba nk ing ses sion, presuma bl y to captu re  an  image o f a chec k or some other sensiti v e docum ent . Fin ally , the mal ici ous ap p o f  apps166 fu rther  d ete c t s the m om ent  t he camera1 7 0 i s rel ea sedupon co mpletion of imagec apt ure. The mali cio us a p p li cat i on can  t h eni m mediately grabaccess toth e  s ame camera 170  a nd capt ure a s econd image o f the che ck whileth e ch e c k i s still in  view of  the came r a. Th e  m alici ous  app c an  th en ac cess t h e I ntern et 164  t hrough  Wi-F iinterfac e 160 or mobile data in terfac e 162  ei ther imme dia t ely , or at a  lat er time, a ndwit houtkno w ledge  oft he  us e r, se nd t h e image i t  t ook o fthe check t o a  re motesit e  on th e In ternet 164. Fromt here, the imag e ca n beuse d  for  f raudulent purp ose ss u ch as co nv ersion of t he funds .T ransa ctions  simil ar to d e p os i ting c heck s,such as t heup l oadingof  g i ft car ds f or  appli cation to p u r chases, or captu re an d uploa d ing  of c re dit car d  ima ges are al so becoming  popul ar a nd ar e subje ct  to th e s am e lapses i n  security , and  partic ul arly  th rougha ca m e ra in stal le d o n the per s o na l  c om p uti ng d evice .Alth ough bank s  are wel l-a w are ofth e v u l nerabi l it y of persona l c omput i n g devicess ucha ss martp hones,  smart phonesn ownu mber we llo v er 4 bill ion world - wid eandthe owne rs  ofth ese  s martphones will  continu e to dem a n d thecon v enie n ce ofus ing them toperfo rm mobileb a nki ng. Ina ddi tio n,peop learei ncreasingly using person al c omput i ngdevic es to  p erform m a ny o ther typ e s
 user_(not shown)_that when activated by_the user,_initiates_the check_deposit_process. Depositing a_check during a_mobile banking session is_typically accomplished by_using_the smartphone camera 170 to capture an image of the check, which the smartphone_152_then transmits_to_the_data center 122 over the_Internet 164 using either the_Wi-Fi 160_or the 3G/4G 162 network connections. The unsecure_banking_app 150 typically_instructs the user to place the check on a_flat surface, and to indicate when_the user has_placed_the_check within the viewed_frame of the camera 170. In_response to the user being ready,_the unsecure software app 150 requests access_to the camera 170, captures an_image of the check and_then releases_the camera 170 for use_by other applications_166.
If one_of the software_apps or services 166 running in_the background concurrently_with the unsecure banking app 150_is_intent on stealing_checks_intended_for deposit,_the application 166_can_first be_written_to observe that the unsecure banking_application_150 is actually running in the foreground_while the malicious app_166_is running in the_background. The malicious one of_the apps 166 can be further_programmed to_determine when_the unsecure banking application 150 has requested access to the camera_170 during the banking session, presumably_to capture an image_of a_check_or some other_sensitive_document. Finally,_the malicious app of apps 166 further_detects the_moment the camera 170 is released_upon completion of image_capture._The malicious application can then immediately_grab access to the same camera_170 and capture a second_image_of_the check while the check_is still in view of the_camera. The malicious_app can then access the Internet 164_through_Wi-Fi interface 160 or mobile data_interface_162 either immediately, or at a_later_time,_and without knowledge of the_user, send the image it took_of the check to a remote site on the_Internet 164. From_there, the image can be_used_for_fraudulent purposes such as conversion of the funds. Transactions similar_to depositing_checks, such as_the uploading of gift cards for application to purchases, or_capture and uploading of credit card images_are also becoming popular and are subject to the same lapses_in security, and particularly through a camera installed_on the personal computing device.
Although banks are_well-aware of the vulnerability_of_personal computing devices such as smartphones, smartphones_now_number_well_over 4 billion_world-wide and the_owners of these_smartphones will_continue to demand_the convenience_of using them_to_perform mobile banking. In addition, people are increasingly using personal computing devices to perform many other types