 resulting in loss of service.
The application server may respond in several ways to the client's continuing use of a stale ticket. One way is to remain silent and to refrain from acknowledging the access request. This technique results in a temporary disruption of service. The client, unaware of the service key change, continuously uses the stale ticket to request access to the application server. After a number of unsuccessful attempts, the client requests a new ticket from the Kerberos KDC (key distribution center). A new ticket encrypted with a new service key is issued to the client. The client employs the new ticket to request service from the application server and service is thus continued.
Another way the application server denies service is by sending an error message to the client. The error message indicates that the service key has been compromised. The client can respond in a number of ways. First, it may ignore the message, and continue to request access to the application server. This is a typical client reaction because, in existing systems, error messages are not authenticated and may have been sent by a third party interested in disrupting service. Thus, the client continues to request access until its ticket expires.
Another way for the client to respond is to request a new ticket from the KDC. The client can use this new ticket to request application server access. A problem with a client requesting a new ticket in response to an error message is that an inauthentic error message may be received by the client from a third party interested in disrupting service. The third party could duplicate a first error message and replay to send a second error message. If the client returns to the KDC for a new ticket, receives the ticket and presents the new ticket to the application server, again, an inauthentic error message can be sent. This cycle can be continued and the KDC may be kept too busy to respond to legitimate ticket requests from other clients.
The KDC may notice the multiple requests from the same client to access the same application server before a current ticket expires. Accordingly, the KDC may deny all further ticket requests. Since this action denies further service to the affected client, a third party has disabled a client without any cryptographic key knowledge. Conventional systems determine a disc type by reading the lead-in area in the disc (or by determining if a lead-in area is present or not), to select whether a DVD+R/RW, DVD-ROM or DVD-R/RW is being read. Such a process can be slow. Such a process
resulting in loss of service. 
 The application waiter may react in several ways to the customer's continue use of a stale slate. One room is to remain mum and to refrain from acknowledging the entree request. This technique results in a temporary disruption of serve. The client, unaware of the servicing key change, endlessly uses the stale ticket to request entree to the application server. After a number of unsuccessful attempts, the customer requests a new ticket from the Kerberos KDC (key distribution center). A newfangled ticket encrypted with a new service key is issued to the client. The client employs the new ticket to request service from the application server and service is thus continued. 
 Another manner the application server deny service is by sending an error message to the client. The mistake message indicates that the service key has been compromised. The customer can respond in a number of ways. First, it may ignore the message, and continue to request entree to the application server. This is a typical client reaction because, in existing systems, mistake messages are not authenticated and may have been sent by a third party interested in disrupting overhaul. Thus, the client continues to request access until its ticket expires. 
 Another way for the client to answer is to request a new slate from the KDC. The client can use this fresh ticket to request lotion server access. A problem with a client request a new ticket in reply to an error message is that an inauthentic erroneousness message may be received by the client from a third party interested in disrupting service. The third party could duplicate a first error message and replay to send a second mistake message. If the client returns to the KDC for a modern ticket, receives the slate and presents the new ticket to the lotion server, again, an inauthentic error message can be sent. This cycle can be continued and the KDC may be kept too busy to react to legalize slate requests from other clients. 
 The KDC may notice the multiple requests from the like client to access the same application server before a current ticket expires. Accordingly, the KDC may deny all further ticket requests. Since this military action denies further service to the affected client, a third party has disabled a client without any cryptanalytic key knowledge. Conventional systems determine a disc type by reading the lead - in area in the disc (or by determining if a lead - in area is present or not), to select whether a DVD+R / RW, DVD - ROM or DVD - R / RW is being read. Such a process can be slow. Such a summons
 redulting in loss of servige.
The applicatiou servec may rsspond iv several ways to the client'd xontibuing use of a stale tkcket. One way is ro rtmain silent and vk refralu froj ackuoxledging the acgess requesd. This techniqge rzsults in a temporary disruption of fervice. Tje client, unawwre ps ths service key change, continuously hses tht stale ticket to tequest access to the appllcatlon server. After a number of ohsusxessful atteopts, the client requesjs a new ticket from the Kerberor KDC (key distrubytilt center). A iew tibket encrypted with a new setvice key is ixsuxd ti the client. The clieit employs the new tycket to sesuest service fron rhe akplicdtiov sefved end servife ms thus confinued.
Anothwr way the applicatoog server deniea servycq is by sending an error message to the cljent. The error message undicates that the setvice key ras been compromised. The client can respond in a tumbec uf cqys. Fkesh, it may ignore the message, and continue to rqsutst access to the applicatiom detder. This is a typiccm dlient reaction befause, ig exiwting sysuems, rrror messages are not authwnticated anb mqy have been sent yy a third pcrty imterexted in disrupting servnce. Thhs, the cliejt continhds to request aczesx gntil its ticket expires.
Anjther way for the clkent to refpond is tl reqmast a new ticket fgom tke KDW. The cliejt can use this new ticket to rxauest applicsthon server cccess. A problem wieh a client reauestiny a ned ticket ih respoise to an erwor message iv that an inanthentic qrroe mewsage mxh be received ny the clpeut from a third party intercsted jn disrupting szxvuce. The third psrth cjupd dt[licate a fisst drrut mesrage and reilah to send a second error mesaage. If the client rcturns to the KDC for a new tivket, receives the uicket anv presrntf the new ticket to the applicztion serger, again, an inwuthcntis error mexsage can be sent. This cycle can be convinued and the KDC may ve kept too busy to vespond to lxgitimwte ticked requests from othee clients.
The KDC kay notice the multipme reqgests from the same client to access the same application server before a currwnt tirkqt expires. Zccotdingny, che KDC may veny all further nicket requests. Since this actioi denies fgrcher service to the affected vlkent, a third karty has disabled a clienf withouy any cryptographic key knowledbe. Conventional systems ceterminw a djsc tyig bb reading the lead-in area nn the disc (oe by determining kf s pead-in arfa ix 'resent or not), to select whether q DVD+R/EW, DVD-ROM or DVD-R/RX is being rcaa. Sucg a prjcess can be slos. Sudj a ptocess
resulting in loss of service. The application respond several ways the client's continuing One is to remain and to refrain acknowledging the access request. This technique in a temporary disruption of service. The client, unaware of the service key continuously uses the stale ticket to request access to the application server. After number unsuccessful the requests a new ticket from the Kerberos KDC (key distribution center). A new ticket encrypted with new service key is issued to the client. client employs the new to request service from the server service is continued. way application server denies is by sending an error message to the client. The error message indicates that the service key been compromised. can respond a of First, it may message, and continue to request access server. This is a typical client reaction because, existing systems, messages are not authenticated and may been sent by a third party interested in service. Thus, the client continues to request access until its ticket expires. Another way for to respond is to a new ticket the The can this new to request application server access. A problem with a client requesting new ticket in response to an error message is that error may be received the client from a party in disrupting service. The could a and to a second error message. the client returns to the for a new ticket, the new ticket to the application server, again, inauthentic error message can be sent. This can be continued and the KDC may be kept too busy to to legitimate from other clients. The KDC may notice the requests from the same to access the same application server before a current expires. the KDC deny all further requests. Since this denies further service affected client, third has without any cryptographic key knowledge. Conventional determine disc type by reading the area disc (or by determining if a lead-in area is present or not), to select whether DVD-ROM or DVD-R/RW is read. a process can be slow. Such a process
 resulting in loss of service.
THe applicatIon seRveR maY rEspoNd in Several ways to tHE cliEnt's continuing use of a stAle tiCkET. One WAy Is to rEmain siLEnT ANd tO rEfRaiN fROm AcknoWleDging thE access reqUesT. THis technique REsUlts in a temPorAry disruptioN of ServicE. THe cLIent, uNawAre of The serVIce key Change, conTiNUously USes the sTALe TickEt to request access TO tHE application seRver. AfTeR A nUMBer Of uNsuccessfuL aTtempTS, the cliENt REQUesTS a new ticket frOm the KerberOS KDc (key diStRibUTion ceNter). A NeW TicKet encrypteD witH a new servIce key IS issued TO the cliEnt. The CliEnt EmplOYs ThE neW tICkeT To ReqUEst Service fRoM tHe appLicaTION ServEr aNd seRvice Is thus continuEd.
ANothER waY the aPplicAtioN sErver Denies ServiCe Is by sending an erRor mEssage to tHe cLiEnt. thE erroR MessagE inDicAtes thaT the serVIce KeY HAS bEen compromised. The cLiENT cAn responD in a nuMBeR oF Ways. FirsT, iT maY ignORE the mEssaGE, aNd continUe to reQUeSt Access tO tHe applIcAtiOn sErver. tHis iS a typiCal clienT reacTIon because, in exISting systems, eRRoR MEsSAges Are Not authentiCateD And mAy haVE bEen SEnt by A thirD pARtY Interested in disruptInG serviCe. ThuS, the client conTinues to reQUESt access UntiL ItS Ticket expires.
ANotheR way for the CLient to rEsponD is to reqUest a new tICKet from tHe KdC. THe cLieNT CaN use this new tiCKEt to ReQuest apPliCation sErvEr aCceSs. A PrOblem with A client rEqUeStInG a nEw ticKEt in respOnSe tO aN erRor meSSage is That aN inaUtHeNTic Error meSSaGE May bE rEcEiveD by ThE clieNt frOM a tHird parTy interesTed IN disRuPtIng servIce. The third paRtY could duplIcAte A first ERRor messaGe and replay to send a seconD Error meSsaGe. If tHe clIent returNs tO the KDc foR A new tiCket, reCeiveS tHe tICKet anD PReSenTs The new tickET To tHe appLiCatiOn serveR, again, an inauthentiC ErrOr message can bE seNt. ThIS CyCle CAn BE coNtINueD ANd the KDC may be kePt too busy tO rESpOnd to legitIMatE tIcket reQuests fRom otHEr clienTs.
The KDC mAy notice tHe MultIPLe rEquests froM the same Client to aCCess tHE sAme apPliCation SeRveR befoRe a curREnt TickeT expirEs. accordIngly, ThE KDC may dEny all further ticket requEsts. SiNce thIs aCtion deniEs fURthEr service To thE affected cLieNt, a Third ParTY has dIsabLEd A clIEnt wiThouT Any cryptoGRaPhiC KEy Knowledge. CoNVENtiOnal sYstEMs deteRminE a disc type by readiNG the lead-in area In thE DIsc (Or bY DeteRmIning if a lead-in AreA iS PResent or NoT), to select whEther a DVd+R/rw, DVD-RoM or DVd-R/RW is Being reAD. suCH a procEss cAn bE slow. Such A prOcESs
 resulting in loss of serv ice.
The a pplic ati onse rver  may  respond in se v eral  ways to the client'sconti nu i ng u s eof astale t i ck e t . O ne  w ayis to  rema insilentand to ref rai nfrom acknowl e dg ing the ac ces s request. T his  techn iq uer esult s i n a t empora r y disr uption of  s e rvice. The cli e n t,  una ware of the servi c ek ey change, con tinuou sl y  u s e s t hestale tick et  to r e quest a c ce s s tot he applicatio n server. A f ter  a num be r o f  unsuc cessf ul att empts, theclie nt reques ts a n e w ticke t  from t he Ker ber osKDC( ke ydis tr i but i on  ce n ter ). A new  t ic ket e ncry p t e d  wit h a  new  serv ice key is is sue d to the  clie nt. T he c li ent e mploys  thene w ticket to req uest  servicefro mthe  a pplic a tion s erv erand ser vice is thu sc o n ti nued.
Another wayth e ap plicatio n serv e rde n ies serv ic e i s by s endin g an er ror mess age to th eclient.  T he err or  me ssa ge in d icat es tha t the se rvice key has been c o mpromised. Th e  c l i en t  can  re spond in anumb e r of  way s .Fir s t, it  mayig n or e  the message, and c on tinueto re quest accessto the app l i c ation se rver .  T h is is a typica l cli ent reacti o n becaus e, in  existin g systems , error me ssa ges  ar e n o t  a uthenticateda n d ma yhave be ensent by  athi rdpar ty  interest ed in di sr up ti ng  se rvice .  Thus, t he  cl ie ntconti n ues to  requ estac ce s s u ntil it s  t i c ketex pi res. 
An ot her w ay f o r t he clie nt to res pon d  isto  r equesta new ticketfr om the KDC .The  clien t can usethis new ticket to requ e st appl ica tionserv er access . A  probl emw ith aclient  requ es tin g a new t ic ket  i n response t o a n err or  mes sage is  that an inauthent i c e rror messagemay  ber e ce ive d  b y  th ec lie n t  from a third p arty inter es t ed  in disrup t ing  s ervice.  The th ird p a rty cou ld duplic ate a fir st  err o r  me ssage andreplay t o send as econd er ror m ess age. I fthe  clie nt ret u rns  to t he KDC  f or a n ew ti ck et, rece ives the ticket and pre sentsthe n ewticket to  th e  ap plication  ser ver, again , a n i nauth ent i c err or m e ss age can b e se n t. This c y cl e c a n  b e continued a n d t he KD C m a y be k epttoo busy to respo n d to legitimat e ti c k etreq u ests  f rom other clie nts .T h e KDC ma ynotice themultiple  r e quest s from  the s ame cli e n tt o acce ss t hesame appl ica ti o n serve rbe f ore acurr en t tick et exp i res. A ccordingly, theKDC m a y  deny all  furt he r ticke t  req uests. Sin ce this act ion de nies  furt her ser vi ce tothe  a ffected cl i ent, a th ird p arty ha sdisa ble d a cl ient w ithou t an ycry ptographi c ke y  k no w led ge.Conve nt iona l systems determin e a disc ty pe  by r eading th e lead-in ar eain th e disc (or b y  det e rm i ningif a l ead-in  area i s  pr es ent ornot ) ,  to selec t whether a D VD +R/R W, DVD-R OM  orDV D-R /R W is being read . Such a  process c an beslo w . Su c h a pr oc ess
 resulting_in loss_of service.
The application server_may respond_in_several ways_to_the client's continuing_use of a_stale ticket. One way_is to remain_silent_and to refrain from acknowledging the access request. This technique results in a temporary_disruption_of service._The_client,_unaware of the service key_change, continuously uses the stale_ticket to_request access to the application server. After a_number_of unsuccessful attempts,_the client requests a new ticket from the Kerberos_KDC (key distribution center). A new_ticket encrypted with_a_new_service key is issued_to the client. The client employs_the new ticket to request service_from the application server and service is_thus continued.
Another way the application server_denies service is by sending_an error_message to the client. The_error message indicates_that the_service key has_been compromised. The client can respond_in a number_of ways. First, it may ignore_the_message, and continue_to_request_access to_the application server._This_is a_typical_client reaction because, in existing systems,_error_messages are not authenticated and may have_been sent by a_third_party interested in disrupting_service. Thus, the client continues_to request access until its ticket_expires.
Another way_for the_client to respond is to request a new ticket from the_KDC. The client can use this_new ticket to request_application server_access._A problem with_a_client requesting_a new ticket in response to an_error message_is that an inauthentic error message_may be received by_the_client from a third party interested_in disrupting service. The third party_could duplicate a first error_message_and_replay to send a second_error message. If the client returns_to the KDC_for a new ticket, receives the ticket_and_presents the new ticket to the_application_server, again, an inauthentic error message_can_be_sent. This cycle can be_continued and the KDC may be_kept too busy to respond to legitimate ticket requests_from other clients.
The_KDC may notice the multiple_requests_from_the same client to access the same application server before_a current_ticket expires. Accordingly,_the KDC may deny all further ticket requests. Since this_action denies further service to the affected_client, a third party has disabled a client without any cryptographic_key knowledge. Conventional systems determine a disc type_by reading the lead-in area in the_disc (or by determining_if_a lead-in area is present or not),_to_select_whether_a DVD+R/RW, DVD-ROM_or DVD-R/RW is_being read. Such_a process_can be slow._Such a_process