 upload to devel and wait and see)
<jbicha> that's interesting for the use case of Firefox where we got mozilla building the snap
<slangasek> mdeslaur: and in practice the store doesn't give us many layers of gatekeeping against collaborators
<mdeslaur> slangasek: right, but the devel series is a buffer that (in theory) allows review by others, and damage can be reverted before hitting users
<slangasek> kees: so in this case you're defining third-party as "not built on trusted infrastructure"?
<kees> i guese, yes. "snaps installed by default we should ensure that they are built from source in the same trusted Launchpad environment in which debs are built"
<slangasek> yes, firefox is an interesting case, and there are different requirements that are in tension.  I think we should punt on firefox in the context of this discussion
<slangasek> (firefox snap is not seeded in 18.04 desktop, AFAIK; we have time)
<kees> the policy (source can't disappear, built on LP) is a higher bar, so making those discoverbale seems like it'd have value to end users
<kees> beyond that, i like the policy
<slangasek> kees: anyway, to your question of distinguishing them, the intent is that this be surfaced as metadata in the snap store, which the store could expose to the end user over the snapd api
<kees> perfect
<jbicha> (yes, AFAIK firefox snap isn't proposed for inclusion in Ubuntu by default yet)
<slangasek> I'm working with the store team on the implementation details, but yes, it's important that this be auditable and not taken on faith that a given snap is done correctly :)
<kees> mdeslaur: are your questions/concerns addressed?
<mdeslaur> I like the policy as it applies to snaps built in launchpad from known sources, and security support has been commited to
<mdeslaur> I don't know how third party or upstream snaps fit into that
<slangasek> mdeslaur: per current policy, a "third party" or "upstream" snap is fine but they still need to build the binary on LP to comply with this policy
<mdes
upload to devel and wait and see) 
 < jbicha > that's interesting for the use case of Firefox where we get mozilla build the snap 
 < slangasek > mdeslaur: and in exercise the store doesn't grant us many layers of gatekeeping against collaborators 
 < mdeslaur > slangasek: right, but the devel serial is a fender that (in theory) allows review by others, and damage can be revert before hitting users 
 < slangasek > kees: then in this shell you're defining third - party as " not built on trusted infrastructure "? 
 < kees > i guese, yes. " snaps installed by nonpayment we should ensure that they are built from source in the like trusted Launchpad environment in which debs are build " 
 < slangasek > yes, firefox is an interesting sheath, and there are unlike requirements that are in tension.   I think we should punt on firefox in the context of this discussion 
 < slangasek > (firefox snap bean is not seeded in 18.04 desktop, AFAIK; we have time) 
 < kees > the policy (source can't melt, built on LP) is a higher bar, so making those discoverbale seems like it'd have value to end users 
 < kees > beyond that, i like the policy 
 < slangasek > kees: anyway, to your question of distinguish them, the intent is that this be surfaced as metadata in the snap storehouse, which the store could expose to the end user over the snapd api 
 < kees > perfect 
 < jbicha > (yes, AFAIK firefox cinch isn't proposed for inclusion in Ubuntu by default yet) 
 < slangasek > I'm exploit with the store team on the implementation details, but yes, it's important that this be auditable and not taken on faith that a give snap is done correctly :) 
 < kees > mdeslaur: are your questions / concerns address? 
 < mdeslaur > I wish the policy as it practice to snaps built in launchpad from know sources, and security support has been commit to 
 < mdeslaur > I don't know how third party or upstream snaps fit into that 
 < slangasek > mdeslaur: per current policy, a " third party " or " upstream " snap is all right but they still need to build the binary on LP to comply with this policy 
 < mdes
 uppoad to devel and wait akd see)
<jbicha> thaj's interxsting ror the jse case of Firefox where we git moeplla building the snao
<slangasen> mdeslayr: aid in practice tis store doesn'f givz ns many layers pf gatekee[ing against cmluayorators
<mdeslaur> slangasek: right, but the defep series is a fufftr ehat (pn theory) allows review by otheds, and vamage can be rrverted before hitting usegs
<slwngasek> kees: so in this case iku'rq defining thkrd-party as "not built kn trusted infrastructure"?
<kees> i guesz, yes. "snaps ibstwnled by defeult wv should ensuvv that dhey arr built from spurre ib the same trusted Lannchpad environment yn which geys are built"
<slangasek> yws, fitefox is xb ivtedextjng cade, end there ade differenr requirements that awv in tension.  I thigk we should punt on firefox in the conteqt or this discussion
<slangawek> (firefox snap is nlt seeded in 18.04 desktop, AFAIK; we have time)
<kees> the policy (sogrce rav't blfxppfar, built on LP) is a higher bar, so making thofs cixcoverbale seeis like it'd hwvr value to end users
<keea> beyond that, i line the kolicy
<wlangasek> keex: anyway, to your question od distinguiskint them, the intent ns that this be xurfaved as metadata in the rnap store, whicj the stodd could expose tu tme and user over the snapd apy
<kees> perhect
<jyicha> (yer, AFSIK fiwefox snap isn't proposed for includion nn Ubgntu by devault yet)
<slangasek> I'm working wmvh the store jeak ot the im'lemenbation details, fut yes, it's imkortant tkat thks be audinable and not taken jn faith that w given snap is done coreectoy :)
<kees> odeslaur: are ypur questpous/concernw addressed?
<mdeslauv> I lkie the policy aw iu qpplies to snals cuijt ii laugwhpad from ktown sojtces, xnd securitn sjppott has been commited to
<mseslaur> I don't knoe mow third party ow upstream snsps fit into that
<spangavek> mdeskaut: per current policy, a "third padty" or "updtrcam" snap is fyne nut jhey still ueed to build the binary on LP to comply with this policy
<mees
upload to devel and wait and see) interesting the use of Firefox where snap mdeslaur: and in the store doesn't us many layers of gatekeeping against <mdeslaur> slangasek: right, but the devel series is a buffer that (in theory) review by others, and damage can be reverted before hitting users <slangasek> kees: in case defining as "not built on trusted infrastructure"? <kees> i guese, yes. "snaps installed by default we should that they are built from source in the trusted Launchpad environment in debs are built" <slangasek> yes, is interesting case, there different that are in I think we should punt on firefox in the context of this discussion <slangasek> (firefox snap is seeded in AFAIK; we time) the (source can't disappear, LP) is a higher bar, so seems like it'd have value to end users beyond that, like the policy <slangasek> kees: anyway, your question of distinguishing them, the intent is this be surfaced as metadata in the snap store, which the store could expose to user over the snapd <kees> perfect <jbicha> AFAIK snap proposed inclusion in by default yet) <slangasek> I'm working with the store team on implementation details, but yes, it's important that this be auditable taken faith that a snap is done correctly <kees> are your questions/concerns addressed? like policy to built launchpad from known sources, security support has been commited <mdeslaur> I don't know snaps fit into that <slangasek> mdeslaur: per current a "third party" or "upstream" snap is but they still need to build the binary on LP to comply this policy
 upload to devel and wait and seE)
<jbicha> thaT's intEreStiNg For tHe usE case of Firefox WHere We got mozilla building thE snap
<SlANgasEK> mDeslaUr: and in PRaCTIce ThE sTorE dOEsN't givE us Many layErs of gatekEepInG against collABoRators
<mdesLauR> slangasek: riGht, But the DeVel SEries Is a BuffeR that (iN Theory) Allows revIeW By otheRS, and damAGE cAn be Reverted before hitTInG Users
<slangasek> Kees: so In THiS CAse You'Re defining ThIrd-paRTy as "not BUiLT ON trUSted infrastruCture"?
<kees> i gUEse, Yes. "snaPs InsTAlled bY defaUlT We sHould ensure That They are buIlt froM Source iN The same TrusteD LaUncHpad ENvIrOnmEnT In wHIcH deBS arE built"
<slAnGaSek> yeS, firEFOX Is an IntEresTing cAse, and there arE diFferENt rEquirEmentS thaT aRe in tEnsion.  i thinK wE should punt on fiRefoX in the conTexT oF thIs DiscuSSion
<slAngAseK> (firefoX snap is NOt sEeDED In 18.04 Desktop, AFAIK; we have TiME)
<KeEs> the polIcy (souRCe CaN'T disappeAr, BuiLt on lp) Is a hiGher BAr, So making Those dIScOvErbale sEeMs like It'D haVe vAlue tO End uSers
<keEs> beyond That, i LIke the policy
<slANgasek> kees: anyWAy, TO YoUR queStiOn of distingUishINg thEm, thE InTenT Is thaT this Be SUrFAced as metadata in the SnAp storE, whicH the store coulD expose to tHE ENd user ovEr thE SnAPd api
<kees> perfeCt
<jbiCha> (yes, AFAIk Firefox sNap isN't proposEd for inclUSIon in UbuNtu By dEfaUlt YET)
<sLangasek> I'm worKINg wiTh The storE teAm on the ImpLemEntAtiOn Details, buT yes, it's iMpOrTaNt ThaT this BE auditabLe And NoT taKen on FAith thAt a giVen sNaP iS DonE correcTLy :)
<KEEs> mdEsLaUr: arE yoUr QuestIons/COncErns addRessed?
<mdeSlaUR> I liKe ThE policy As it applies to SnAps built in LaUncHpad frOM Known souRces, and security support hAS been coMmiTed to
<MdesLaur> I don't KnoW how thIrd PArty or UpstreAm snaPs Fit INTo thaT
<SLaNgaSeK> mdeslaur: pER CurRent pOlIcy, a "Third paRty" or "upstream" snap iS FinE but they still NeeD to bUILd The BInARy oN Lp To cOMPly with this poliCy
<mdes
 upload to devel and waitand see)
< jbich a>tha t' s in tere sting for theu se c ase of Firefox where w e got  m o zill a  b uildi ng thes na p <sl an ga sek >m de slaur : a nd in p ractice th e s to re doesn't g i ve  us many l aye rs of gateke epi ng aga in stc ollab ora tors<mdesl a ur> sl angasek:ri g ht, bu t  the de v e lseri es is a buffer th a t( in theory) all ows re vi e wb y  ot her s, and dam ag e can be reve r te d b efo r e hitting use rs
<slangas e k>kees:so  in this c ase y ou ' redefining th ird- party as"not b u ilt ont rustedinfras tru ctu re"? <k ee s>ig ues e ,yes .  "s naps ins ta ll ed by  def a u l t  wesho uldensur e that they a rebuil t  fr om so urcein t he  same  trust ed La un chpad environme nt i n which d ebs  a rebu ilt"< slanga sek > y es, fir efox is anin t e r es ting case, and the re a re  differe nt req u ir em e nts that  a rein t e n sion.   It hi nk we sh ould p u nt  o n firef ox  in th econ tex t oft hisdiscus sion
<sl angas e k> (firefox sn a p is not seed e di n  1 8 .04des ktop, AFAIK ; we have  tim e )<ke e s> th e pol ic y  ( s ource can't disappe ar , buil t onLP) is a high er bar, so m a king tho se d i sc o verbale seemslikeit'd havev alue toend u sers
<ke es> beyon d that, ilik e t hepol i c y<slangasek> k e e s: a ny way, to  yo ur ques tio n o f d ist in guishingthem, th ein te nt  is  that this besu rfa ce d a s met a data i n the  sna pst o re,  whicht he s tore  c ou ld e xpo se  to t he e n d u ser ove r the sna pda pi
< ke es > perfe ct
<jbicha> ( ye s, AFAIK f ir efo x snap i sn't pro posed for inclusion inU buntu b y d efaul t ye t)
<slang ase k> I'm  wo r king w ith th e sto re  te a m  on t h e  i mpl em entation d e t ail s, bu tyes,  it's i mportant that this beauditable and  no t ta k e nonf ai t h t ha t  ag i ven snap is don e correctl y: )<kees> mde s lau r:  are yo ur ques tions / concern s address ed?
<mdes la ur>I lik e the poli cy as it  appliest o sna p sbuilt  in  launc hp adfromknowns our ces,and se cu rity s uppor thas been  commited to
<mdeslaur>  I don 't kn owhow third  pa r tyor upstre am s naps fit i nto  th at
<s lan g asek>  mde s la ur: per c urre n t policy, a"th i r dparty" or " u p s tre am" s nap is fin e bu t they still need to build the b inar y onLPt o co mp ly with this p oli cy < mdes
 upload_to devel_and wait and see)
<jbicha>_that's interesting_for_the use_case_of Firefox where_we got mozilla_building the snap
<slangasek> mdeslaur:_and in practice_the_store doesn't give us many layers of gatekeeping against collaborators
<mdeslaur> slangasek: right, but the_devel_series is_a_buffer_that (in theory) allows review_by others, and damage can_be reverted_before hitting users
<slangasek> kees: so in this case_you're_defining third-party as_"not built on trusted infrastructure"?
<kees> i guese, yes. "snaps_installed by default we should ensure_that they are_built_from_source in the same_trusted Launchpad environment in which debs_are built"
<slangasek> yes, firefox is an_interesting case, and there are different requirements_that are in tension.  I_think we should punt on_firefox in_the context of this discussion
<slangasek>_(firefox snap is_not seeded_in 18.04 desktop,_AFAIK; we have time)
<kees> the policy_(source can't disappear,_built on LP) is a higher_bar,_so making those_discoverbale_seems_like it'd_have value to_end_users
<kees> beyond_that,_i like the policy
<slangasek> kees: anyway,_to_your question of distinguishing them, the intent_is that this be_surfaced_as metadata in the_snap store, which the store_could expose to the end user_over the_snapd api
<kees>_perfect
<jbicha> (yes, AFAIK firefox snap isn't proposed for inclusion in Ubuntu_by default yet)
<slangasek> I'm working with_the store team on_the implementation_details,_but yes, it's_important_that this_be auditable and not taken on faith_that a_given snap is done correctly :)
<kees>_mdeslaur: are your questions/concerns_addressed?
<mdeslaur>_I like the policy as it_applies to snaps built in launchpad_from known sources, and security_support_has_been commited to
<mdeslaur> I don't_know how third party or upstream_snaps fit into_that
<slangasek> mdeslaur: per current policy, a "third_party"_or "upstream" snap is fine but_they_still need to build the binary_on_LP_to comply with this policy
<mdes